"Pathological Narcissus" as a Socially Mandatory Form of Subjectivity1 Slavoj ZiZekOn the surface, the basic thesis of Christopher Lasch's The Culture of Narcissism does not seem in the least bit "scandalous" and, if read from a certain point of view, may even appear to be another example of neo-conservative criticism of contemporary authoritarian consumer society. Lasch attempts to lean on the classical analysis contained in works by David Riesman (The Lonely Crowd) and William Whyte (The Organization Man) and show how, in late capitalism, what in Marxist terminology is called "socially mandatory character" has received a new form. That is to say, after the "autonomous" individual of Protestant ethics and the "heteronomous" (Other-oriented) individual of bureaucratic capitalism, a new narcissistic type of individual is being formed, corresponding to the transition to a "post-industrial" society. Given Lasch's evidently critical attitude towards "Narcissus", his work could easily be categorised as a neo-conservative rejection of contemporary hedonism and the disintegration of authoritarian values. But the "Lasch scandal" is connected with something else; he defined his project as leftist and radically democratic; he proposed that the contemporary left had surrendered defence of the family and patriarchal authority to (neo-)conservatism too soon. According to Lasch, today's conformist type is in fact the "anti-authoritarian" Narcissus, who mocks the family and rejects patriarchal authority. For this reason, if the left wants to establish an active alternative to the existing situation, it must begin to deal with all these ideas. This entirely changes the view which laid the foundations for the New Left in the west and whose purest expression is without doubt Marcuse's Eros and Civilization. According to this view, revolution is expressed in the surpassing of the family as a mediator of patriarchal authority and in the re-affirmation of Narcissus, blended with the world. It is easy to imagine what polemical reactions were triggered by this thesis; it is rejected by both the majority of feminists, who Žižek, S. "Pathological Narcissus‖ as a Socially Mandatory Form of Subjectivity." First published in the Croatian edition of The Culture of Narcissism by Christopher Lasch (Narcisistička kultura, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1986) Translation on: http://www.manifesta. org/manifesta3/catalogue5.htm (1986). 1 understand it as a concealed re-affirmation of patriarchy, and by a broad range of the liberal New Left. Participants in the cultural debates triggered by The Culture of Narcissism were quick to forget the fact that the notion of narcissism is not merely an abstract moral idea but an accurate notion with a precisely defined role in the theory of psychoanalysis. Lasch takes from Otto Kernberg's standard work Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism in particular. For this reason, we must start with a summary of Kernberg's basic theses and place the discussion of pathological narcissism (PN) and borderline states into an appropriate historical context. What historical experience resulted in the theory of the borderline as a special clinical entity? Back in the 1940s and particularly in the 1950s, American psychoanalysts encountered a growing number of cases which eluded any classification based on the distinction between neurosis and psychosis. On the one hand, it was evident that these were not cases of psychosis (the individuals in question could still participate in society, sometimes very successfully, and "functioned" very well in general) and obviously could not be associated with the "loss of a sense of reality" or "madness" (in the ordinary sense). On the other hand, they were not cases of neurosis (hysteria and obsession) either, at least not in the usual sense, for the patients displayed a whole range of psychotic symptoms: paranoid ideas, neurotic repression substituted with more "primitive" defence mechanisms (split, denial of certain aspects of reality, etc.) and, particularly, pathologically accentuated narcissism (since even Freud described neurosis as a narcissistic disorder, his case of "President Schreber" can in fact be interpreted as a narcissistic defence against homosexuality; because homosexuality is completely unacceptable for his narcissistic self-image, Schreber can come to terms with it only if he assumes the role of a passive sexual partner of God Himself, who selected him to conceive a new mankind). This was the basic rift, the fundamental "impossible encounter", at the very outset of borderline theory: the well-established classification or axis was shattered and violated, the axis whose one end is the "over-adjusted" hysteric that exaggeratedly identifies himself with social order, which causes his suppressed instinctive substance to strike back in the form of symptoms, while the other is deviations from the rule. we are faced with the unbelievable phantom of a psychotic who "functions" perfectly. the impression of randomly accumulated symptoms which are not derived from any unified subjective existential position and which seem to be only partly connected – this lack of any system is not due to our incomplete approach but is characteristic of the disjointed or "dispersed" borderline subject whose individual symptomatic complexes are "held together" only by (a Hegelian) abstract negativity of undefined unattached anxiety. "classical" symptoms of obsession. The unsystematic features of polysymptomatic neurosis. "Free" unattached anxiety. fear of an emotionally over-strenuous commitment that would "curtail" one's freedom). "Polymorphically perverse" sexual tendencies (promiscuity. is defined by the following features: 1. All of a sudden. pathological hypochondria. or a range of symptoms incompatible in "classical" neurosis (hysterical conversions. the anxious "feeling of emptiness" signifies that the subject has failed to unify or "totalise" himself into a homogenous existential being. 3. impulsive neurosis. The fact that the borderline is connected with the un-unified. this anxiety renders only unconnectedness positive. they were far from exceptional in everyday practice. along with its correlate "pathological narcissism". polyphobia. unlike traditional cases of neurosis and psychosis. Unlike positive connection. at the diagnostic level. exceptional borderline phenomena were given an independent theoretical consistency which. The third characteristic of borderline. these cases were at first excluded as exceptions. "dissociation reactions". "polymorphically perverse" sexuality. 2. exposes the effects of the "dispersed" totalised subjective structure in sexuality.the "maladjusted" psychotic who wilfully excludes himself from (social symbolic) reality. experimenting with "new forms". Polysymptomatic neurosis. "unformed" Ego is . Naturally. paranoid ideas). but it soon transpired that these borderline exceptions between neurosis and psychosis were the rule and that. A new clinical definition of borderline disorder was gradually formed. 2.confirmed by structural analysis. 3. although he is completely aware that a person close to him is not an enemy and holds nothing against him. and a message which is unsuitable for this unified framework is suppressed or pushed from one's awareness). Here. there is more to it. projection. their behaviour and emotions follow two completely different sets of logic. the subject tells jokes that fail to amuse and hears sarcastic remarks about his or her person) can cause extreme anxiety and depression. Kernberg defines four basic features of the borderline subject: 1. Regression to primary mental forms: the subject's mentality is dominated by associations and superficial details which are beyond "rational" thinking. for example. he gives the impression that his only motivation is social success and that. he "does not care about it at all"…). based on a paranoid interpretation of a casual smile or similarity to another (hostile) individual."Regression" to primary defence mechanisms: the main defence mechanism in a "normal". denial of reality. these "regressive" defence mechanisms prevent both the . by employing some kind of paranoid construct. succumbs to his impulses). convinces the subject that this person is the worst of his enemies (this regression is best carried out by means of projective tests). which is. insufficient control over one's own instinctive reactions (the subject "cannot control himself". in reality. while in a borderline subject. the subject is no stranger to "important" achievements. the subject can boast merit and considerable knowledge – nevertheless. Different signs of the weakness of the Ego (the difference between the "strong" and "weak" Ego is naturally characteristic of American psychoanalysis): a low anxiety "tolerance threshold" (in comparison with a "normal" individual). "mature" person is suppression (the fully-developed Ego integrates and unifies one's mental life. less significant problems (social failure. some "primitive" conclusion. inability to sublimate (which in fact is only another aspect of the above). For example. On the surface. which are merely a means to satisfy a "lower" aim (in high social circles. But again. special attention must be paid to how. nevertheless. the Ego is not strong enough to perform this integrational role and is replaced by primitive defence mechanisms which destroy the integrity of the Ego: split. borderline subjects are completely capable of rational thinking. this contradiction gives depth to the other. 4. The only thing still left is genealogical analysis. and vice versa. The last feature. that everything is like a piece of puppet theatre. that he is incapable of a proper inter-subjective relationship. Intersubjectivity implies accurate knowledge and acceptance of the other as a contradictory unity of different opinions. at another point. the object is "good". a detailed analysis reveals that in his libidinal economy his seemingly genital sexual activity is dominated and defined by pre-genital. the subject respects all the rules of the inter-subjective game. The "little man" does not attempt to integrate these two beliefs. after which the subject goes to the other extreme and the object becomes "bad". In a borderline subject. he solves this dichotomy with a simple time split: for a while. we are dealing with the als-obpersonality: on the surface. in relation to which I wish to limit myself to a single comment regarding sexuality. is a pathological relationship towards the object. which is already contained in the previous one. a borderline subject considers somebody both "good" and "bad".) A "normal" subject would suppress or eject one of the contrary beliefs from his awareness: if according to my integrated normative system I hate somebody. Although the borderline subject is capable of "normal" genital sexuality. a sphere of corruption and intrigue. which is in fact an inability to integrate different beliefs (the "good" and the "bad") into a single image of the object. (The best known example of such a tendency is the attitude of the "little man" towards politics. When. oral and anal logic. in terms of rapidly changing contradictory libidinal opinions: at one point. that he treats us "superficially". for example. he nevertheless gives the impression that he is not a "living personality".unity of the Ego and psychological unity. The very sexual act is mostly . which plays an important role in the experience of the "personality". it is a "whore". it is possible to describe the basic characteristic of the borderline subject: he always gives the impression that he experiences the other as a "puppet". In this respect. he can carry several contradictory libidinal beliefs which are expressed one after another. which does not result in any sense of contradiction. because the subject's Ego is not sufficiently integrated. everything seems to be "normal". I must suppress the love I feel for this person. awakening patriotic feelings. a feeling of boundlessness. "politics" is a "big thing". understood as an act of violence and display of aggression. if the woman dominates. who "thinks that he is recognised for the master since he already is a master as it is". he subordinates everything to his public "appearance". to be more precise. in place of the "normal" Ego. "Pathological narcissism". he "functions" well and sometimes even "distinguishes" himself. PN appears more adjusted to the environment than the borderline subject. displays the "pathological". PN is the paradox of a reflected master who knows that his position is secured only by the recognition of other people. The slightest sign that the slave has seen through him. Unlike the traditional master. performs the function of integration. the woman feels humiliated and exploited while. at the same time. and exists only because of the reputation which he enjoys among his fellow human beings. Nevertheless. there is a weak Ego regressing to the primary forms of thinking and primary defence mechanisms and establishing a pathological relationship towards objects. cynical. seeing in them nothing more than a tool for his own affirmation. but all these weaknesses are "compensated" for with the "big Ego". a phenomenological description of "pathological Narcissus": – Upon first contact. as a correlate of the borderline in addition to all borderline symptoms. Therefore. a pathological construct which. efficient and witty individual without superfluous illusions. or dominates his surroundings. Let us begin with a diagnosis or. The Hegelian dialectic of recognition is here brought to its opposite: the "master" is a slave to the recognition of his slave and constantly anxiously observes the effect his complacency has on the slave. playing the role of a powerful. we soon come across a contradiction: PN despises and exploits people. This basic contradiction is the source of other PN features: . At the same time. the slightest derision or some other social "failure" drives him to a state of traumatic depression. For this reason. He distinguishes himself socially. "big" Ego. the man feels endangered and fears that the woman will "devour" him and that he will lose his identity and autonomy. that he is secretly laughing at him. he is completely dependent on their acknowledgement and admiration. can bring him down. and of depending on him or her in terms of commitment. Narcissus attempts to charm and seduce us. obligation. (2) "enemies" or "conspirators" who represent a threat to his narcissistic affirmation. gain as much narcissistic profit from him or her. engagement. Narcissus wants to take advantage of the other. the "crowd". his incredible charm immediately turns into complete indifference. but once "we are no longer of any interest" to him. All people in his surroundings fall into one of the following three categories: (1) The ideal other. hidden behind a mask of brilliance. "puppets". in PN's subjective economy. influential and famous individuals). Relationships are easily broken and established anew. PN takes the availability of other people for granted and finds it completely natural that people should be treated ruthlessly and used for his own narcissistic pleasure. (3) the rest. PN is a slave to his "success" in the eyes of other people. As long as he expects narcissistic gain from us. enthusiasm and sexiness. "feel" with him. PN often gives the impression of profound indifference. the relationship is not particularly deep and can easily be broken or demoted to the level of the "crowd" (if the ideal other experiences failure) or the "enemy" (if the ideal other humiliates PN's narcissism or ignores him). he does that . Nevertheless. He depends on their recognition. he is full of enthusiasm. behind it all. function as an extension of his own "big Ego" (as a rule. these are powerful. but this kind of dependence cannot be mistaken for trust in and dedication to the other. For this reason. he astonishes with eloquence. coldness and selfishness. trust and dedication. the ideal other today is the "enemy" tomorrow because Narcissus cannot establish a relationship with the other at the subjective level. and even when he greatly admires the other. experience him in terms of "personality depth" or subjectivity abyss. a cruel and selfish mind can be sensed. Even when PN develops an attachment to the ideal other. – It is evident from the above that PN is incapable of forming a sincere attachment to another person. Evidently.– A complete inability to empathise: PN can never really "enter the other". those from whom he expects narcissistic recognition and who. suckers who exist only to be used and abandoned. PN is even convinced that everybody else does the same: life in society is a game. he always preserves a fundamental mistrust in people. he is pathologically afraid of being excessively dependent on them. he respects the "rules of the game". one must know how to lie low and adjust. he is a conformist. old age and illness. because pleasure is completely alien to him and exteriorised in the other. For this reason. everybody wears a mask. such as loneliness. which brings us back to the initial paradox. tries to stay "forever young" and remain the centre of attention. – PN is incapable of true sadness. He is incapable of "containing" this wild rage and turning it into quiet mourning. The loss is simply unacceptable and unbearable to him. One must be smart. he "does not take the game seriously". it is an assault on his narcissism. When faced with the loss of a loved one. in reality. PN simply cannot enjoy himself.exclusively for narcissistic reasons. of opening up "too much" and becoming too attached to them. Externally. he breaks into a helpless rage. – PN pathologically fears even the smallest failure. For this reason. This subjective economy results in a curious "short circuit": the final aim of being successful is not what can be gained by it but the success itself as social fact. for . while in reality he does not care because the only thing that matters to him is the recognition he gains from other people with his exploits – he enjoys himself as much as he thinks others enjoy themselves). he "plays it" only to escape punishment and become successful in society. he prefers short-term "cold" relationships which do not represent an excessive "emotional burden" and which "allow him to breathe". He finds pleasure when other people acknowledge his pleasure (a typical example would be a "heart-breaker" who boasts about his conquests. everybody is a criminal hiding behind a conformist appearance and thinking only about how to exploit and trick other people. which manifests itself. – Every Narcissus is intrinsically convinced that he is an exception. in sexuality. because he believes that there are only two kinds of people in the world: those who have made it and the remaining "crowd". an "outcast". He is prepared to do everything "not to get lost in the grey crowd of the average". PN is never "with himself" but is always "exteriorised". – Finally the last feature. He takes care of his body (jogging being narcissistic exercise par excellence!). Therefore. the real Ego is directly blended with the ideal Ego. This observation in no way diminishes the value of Kernberg's analysis. Consequently. is a result of the fusion or merging of three elements: (1) the real Ego (the subject recognising himself as a special. which drives him into even more frenetic activity. while the idealised Other loses all negative characteristics and appears as an omnipotent "good other". Therefore. in a pure and distilled form. which in a "normal" subject is a motivating force for constant improvement and approximation to the ideal. Therefore. however. This merging diminishes the critical distance between the real Ego. It is not difficult to recognise in PN an "average American". With this we have touched upon the crucial dimension concealed behind PN: in reality. another observation derived from the phenomenological description of PN must be mentioned. Sometimes we even get the impression that Kernberg is not describing a type generated by means of generalised clinical experiences but a caricatured model found in films or literature. presuming that in "real life" individuals do not imitate models which are. as an "evil fate" embodied in the "enemy" into whom the subject projects his own aggression. Before we begin with structural analysis. because it is based on a naďve distinction between "real life" and ideological "clichés". blind. The critical component of PN takes a "degenerate" form of the horrifying. paranoid and threatening force of the Superego. as the central integrational aspect of PN. terrified subject. real being). "pathological Narcissus" is a helpless. (3) the ideal object (the ideal other. as the subject's secret guardian who takes care of his wellbeing and provides narcissistic satisfaction. (2) the ideal Ego (an idealised self-image nourished by the subject).example. with his paradoxical "conformist individualism" (individualism as a social conformist perception") and cult of social "success" at any cost. offered by popular art. cruel. structural analysis shows that the pathological "big Ego". the ideological construct of the "big Ego" is in no way merely a "reflection" of real processes but is actively formed and structured by the very "real" subjective constitution of an individual. in PN. a dear person. experienced by PN as an extension or part of his own "big Ego"). a victim of a cruel and uncontrollable Superego who is completely lost and faced with . etc. as an "inner sense of emptiness" and "loss of identity". the ideal Ego and the object. motherly guardian. with the name of the father and the paternal ideal of the Ego. the law loses . in Hegelian terminology.impossible demands on the part of his environment and his own aggression. in fact. dominated by an omnipotent. "anal" and sadistic Superego into the pacifying "inner law" of the ideal Ego. the Aufhebung or abolition/surpassing – of the cruel. the "big Ego". protective and caring mother and the "evil" mother imposing "impossible" demands on the child and threatening to "devour" him. protective and caring mother in the form of the "ideal object" on the one hand and the aggressive uncontrollable environment on the other. which is blended with the omnipotent. The only way for the subject to endure this situation is to build an "imaginary supplement". both initial aspects are "synthesised": the subject symbolically identifies himself with the name of the father. This is. The narcissistic "big Ego" is in fact a reactive formation – a reaction to an unresolved and unsymbolised conflict situation. and of dialectically "surpassing" it with an inner law. but the weak Ego – the fact that the patient's self has not developed to the level where it could perform its integrational function…" The answer to this observation would be that the Oedipus complex is still very topical because the unsolved issue of Oedipus as such underlines the borderline and PN problem. having been transformed. the child is incapable of doing away with or resolving the contradiction between the protective and threatening other. Now we can reply to a previous remark according to which the borderline phenomenon proves the outdatedness of the Oedipus complex and of classical psychoanalytical methods as such: "… the problem of borderline is not the exaggerated repression of instinctive forces. which would cause neurotic reactions in the form of the symptomatic 'resurfacing of what has been suppressed'. which is the only path to transformation – or. Kernberg himself points out that the borderline disorder in PN can be found almost exclusively in families where the "father has been absent" (not meaning "empirical absence" but the fact that the father did not perform his paternal "role" and did not function as an embodiment of law). the subject has failed to "internalise" paternal law. a pre-Oedipal situation. Because of the "father's absence". in which. idealised. because of which the child's life was controlled by the mother in a double phantasmic image of the "good". Despite all the revisionist claims that classical psychoanalysis is outdated. and resulted in the transformation of American psychoanalysis into a conformist ego-psychology. Equally. which in turn corresponds with the notion of narcissism.its terrifying Superego alienation and. the aim of psychoanalysis is the . According to the analysis. the Superego is not some bright force of moral law constraining barbaric instincts and managing them with difficulty. written in the second decade of the 20th century. This reading prevailed in the 1940s. there is the fear of establishing contact with and the inability to surrender to the object: the "big Ego" is. the "critical" dimension is preserved and can act as a "punishing" element (the inner "voice of conscience"). in fact. and the immense anxiety felt towards the object. the Other Subject).e. the narcissistic "self-love" and the libidinal investment in the Ego conceals rather than replaces the subject's incredible hostility towards himself and his uncontrolled aggression. We must not forget that borderline and PN theory was developed by the "traditional" and not "revisionist" neo-analytical trend of American psychoanalysis. the Ego is no longer only a rational element representing reality and conscious control. Borderline and PN theory is undoubtedly based on Freud's second topic (ego-superego-id). it is a very likely "pathology" of the Ego itself. a mask for its opposite. Behind indifference towards and contempt for the object (i. the main contribution of this topic. over the obscure subconscious instincts. Freud's second topic also allows a different "conformist" reading which emphasises the Ego as a synthesising element which "rationally" harmonises the demands of reality and the Id. is evident in the context of Freud's texts on narcissism. but is usually connected with the Id and can be as cruel and "irrational" as the barbaric law which embodies the destructive "deadly instinct". the subject invests libidinal energy in the self because he is incredibly afraid of the object and is incapable of establishing a normal relationship with it. at the same time. Accordingly. etc. Accordingly. a description which far supersedes the ideological phrases (of the neo-romantics) relating to the "consumer society individual". which replaced the consciousness/the pre-conscious/the unconscious topic. the Ego is subject to unconscious libidinal investments. this "traditional" trend still offers the most insightful description of the mental constitution of an individual living in late capitalist society. Nevertheless. Naturally. the distinction between "normal" and "pathological" narcissism is indelibly marked by the tradition of ego-psychology. Kernberg lists the following four functions of the "mature" Ego: – to distinguish the Ego and its subjectively experienced content from objective reality. transforming it into the ideal Ego. For this reason. The borderline personality remains halfway between psychosis and the normal Ego: its attitude towards objects is pathological. anal. A person with a "mature Ego" possesses a normal sense of reality and a realistic understanding of objects when he replaces the archaic. and when he successfully renders primitive instincts sublime. dependence on the other. This would be a case of "normal narcissism" – a justified investment of libidinal energy in the Ego and a narcissistic contentment with one's own personality. instincts are not sublimate. – to interiorise and de-personalise the punishing Superego element. ability to mourn. and the Ego is not integrated enough to perform the integrational role. This difference between normal and "pathological" narcissism is undoubtedly real. sadistic and personalised Superego with a de-personalised moral ideal Ego and inner law.strengthening of the patient's Ego to enable him to adjust to (social) reality without irrational constraints. because the features which distinguish "normal" from "pathological" narcissism (ability to form relationships. But the problem is that its theoretical implications lack a notion of the symbolic and of the need for symbolic order. – to integrate ("good" and "bad") characteristics into a united image of the object. because the notion of "normal narcissism" is based on the "strong" Ego capable of performing its integrational role. – to sublimate instincts. Briefly. for it is confirmed by medical cases. the Superego remains at the primitive sadomasochistic level. In reaction to this weakness. the pathological integrational "big Ego" is formed. which is not "pathological". integration of "good" and "bad" characteristics into an integral image of the object) point to the importance . the difference between "normal" and "pathological" narcissism cannot be theoretically explained without referring to the symbolic. This dependence or commitment is what Lacan calls "symbolic connection".of the symbolic. sincerity. The performative aspect is not the same as the pragmatic "effect" of a statement. Let us take an extremely basic example: if I say to somebody in trouble "I promise I will help you". This also explains the well-known pressing feeling of "inner emptiness" and "loss of one's own identity". He regards promises. we must take account of the key differences (interpreted completely wrongly by Marcuse in his criticism of Austin's supposed "behaviourism") between the performative (illocutive) and pragmatic (perlocutive) aspects of the speech act. the whole point of his speaking being to assert his brilliance and to enchant or seduce the person spoken to. because PN strives for "effect" rather than for the "content" of what is said. pact or engagement – "giving one's word" to someone. due to which the formation of the "normal" Ego is a secondary result of the "interiorisation" of symbolic law. which I thereby perform. This statement may at first seem paradoxical. there is a new symbolic relationship between us and I am obliged to help regardless of whether I will indeed help him. this is the performative aspect. His problem lies in the fact that a promise does not commit him internally. I gave my word to somebody. he does not know an intrinsically valid law. PN "feels free". Let us turn to PN's inability to depend on the other and to nourish feelings of commitment to and trust in the other. empathy and compassion – PN has plenty of these. he will feel gratitude and respect towards me. This does not involve emotions or feelings. he recognises only the external "rules of the game". The fate of the subject's Ego and its "normality" or "pathology" is not decided by the Ego itself but by the subject's attitude towards the symbolic. In this respect. does not place an obligation on him. bonds and pacts as "rules of the game" which must be observed on the outside but which do not represent an existential commitment. In fact. or the very act of promise. The pragmatic aspect of this example would encompass the "actual" effects of the promised act: the other will undoubtedly behave differently if he believes my promise. In other words (if the "metaphorical " description is replaced with more expert terminology): pathological Narcissus simply lacks the performative dimension of speaking. what he lacks are not images that would give him an imaginary identity but a "bond" that would place him in the inter-subjective symbolic network. And this is PN's problem: he is a . and so on. particularly those which meet his narcissistic needs. he sees the other reduced to a set of descriptive characteristics. PN could be described as a subject behaving in accordance with the theory of description. Naming and Necessity. The other side of this reduction to a set of descriptive virtues is that as soon as the subject loses one of these virtues. In other words. The moment she loses this virtue. his rejection of the possibility of replacing a name with a description of a set of characteristics (see Saul Kripke. etc. she has a great sense of humour and is interested in the same films as he is). she also loses her libidinal status and becomes dull. he knows how to use speech as a tool for the manipulation. What precisely do we mean when we say that PN is not capable of establishing a relationship with the other (i. to be more precise. that is. at the same time. which include the fact that "she is never late for a date". subject) as such – that he is not capable of real inter-subjectivity? This issue can be approached by means of description theory or. by means of Kripke's criticism of this theory and his rejection of the possibility of reducing a name to a set of positive characteristics that an object must feature in order to be denotative of the name in question – in other words. It is immediately evident that an answer to the question "Why do you love me?". By it. she also loses her status and is no longer a fiancée. because of your wit. is a rude and scornful insult and a direct negation of love. 1979). the moment she is late.master of the pragmatic power of speech. he does not keep his word and keeps his distance from it. the other is "objectivised" and denied existence as a subject. PN is therefore the person who answers the woman's eternally excruciating question: "Why do you love me?" with a detailed description of reasons: because of your beautiful eyes. he sees the object in terms of the gain he can receive from him or her: he loves a woman because… (she has beautiful hair and legs. It is not necessary to point out how far this kind of attitude is from a real attitude towards the other as such. The logic of "pathological Narcissus" is clearly reflected in the often-heard remark: "My fiancée is never late for a date. The only true answer to the .e. which consists of a well-defined list. otherwise she would no longer be my fiancée!" The fiancée is reduced to a set of positive features. as if it were the tool of manipulation itself. seduction and enchantment of others. 1981. This means that even if she is late. which represent a symbolic definition (Lacan's S1 mathem) superseding and totalising a chain of positive virtues (S2). a symbolic engagement. bond and obligation – you are the one who must follow me (even if in reality you do not). p. however. all of his or her "positive" characteristics are trans-substantiated. If in the third person. The definition of the subordinate clause radically changes its status depending on whether the verb in the subordinate sentence is in the second or third person. With this. Here we can return to the statement about the fiancée: the mandate and commitment of the "fiancée" naturally implies a whole set of positive characteristics. a "mandate" defining your inter-subjective status. The fact that you did not follow me does not change this status but means that you simply did not keep your promise and commitment. the sentence is no longer merely about a description but a performative "appointment of a mandate". a description of (one's) characteristics. you will remain that who will follow me.question would be: "I do not know why. including the fact that the person who is granted this mandate will not be late for a date (leaving aside to what extent certain cultural environments regard being late for a date as proof of "female charm" and part of the game). some x. who should have followed me. the sentence is about a simple statement. Paris. they glow in some impalpable void and are in fact a "positivisation" of the void itself – of that x ("object small a" in Lacan's terminology). XXII). If the verb is in the second person. In the other case ("tu es celui qui me suivras"). Proper "love" entails a feeling that one would still love a person if he or she lost all his or her positive features. we have reached the realistically known possibilities for the integration of "good" and . The same theory could be approached from the point of Lacan's distinction between the logic of the sentences: "tu es celui qui me suivra" and "tu es celui qui me suivras" (see Lacan. because the fact that "you will follow me" remains a symbolic bond. she will remain my fiancée because we are bonded with a symbolic pact that is beyond petty narcissistic disappointments. something that gives a miraculous lustre to all your virtues…". Le Séminaire III. In the first case ("tu es celui qui me suivra") one simply made a mistake – one associated the other with an erroneous characteristic and it turns out that the other is not the one who will follow. the beloved is "set in an abyss". In other words. there is something in you. mourning implies a calming down. one notices that the object is not really lost and that the "body is still alive". But in order not to get lost in the re-listing of characteristics. For this reason. PN's other characteristics can be explained. thereby investing his libidinal energy in a new object. this is more probable if founded on a symbolic integrating characteristic or a symbolic "beyond good and evil" definition – in other words. a symbolic designation of a performative nature which cannot be justified by means of the object's positive characteristics."bad" characteristics into an integrated image of the object. "anal". Lasch was the first to draw attention to the fact that the making-up for the ideal of the Ego with the "anal" Superego was the basic characteristic of late capitalistic "bureaucratic" society. The united or integrated image of a "fiancée" does not lie in the simple "picturing of the same object with both good and bad characteristics". behind the superficial "breakdown of (paternal) authority" . Although in a typically American "naďve" theoretical form. It is more probable that he will forget about the lost object or discover that he did not really care for it at all. pacification. The integration of the image of the object as a collection of his or her "imaginary" characteristics implies some unimaginable aspect. "maternal" Superego. and the impotent rage triggered by the loss is transformed into a respectful admiration of the lost object (proof of this is the confusion or comic effect when. the making-up for the paternal ideal with the pre-Oedipal "sadomasochistic". in the middle of the mourning ritual. PN is incapable of transforming loss-induced rage into mourning. such as his inability to mourn. the coincidental symbolical identification with the ideal of the Ego (as a result of a "normal" resolution of the Oedipus complex). A unifying symbol is called for. On this basis. let us return to the decisive feature which is the source of the rest: of fundamental importance for PN is the coincidental integration of symbolic law which represents the name of the father or the paternal ideal of the Ego. which preserves its value even if she disappointed us regarding the positive features implied by the mandate or definition. Mourning is a symbolic act par excellence by which the lost object is interiorised (aufgehoben) in a symbolic ritual. coming to terms with the loss. as in the case of the funeral mass for Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn). beyond the imaginary opposition of "good" and "bad" characteristics. a symbolic definition which defines the person of the "fiancée" beyond her (imaginary) characteristics. the example cannot be connected with imaginary narcissism. we have fulfilled a difficult task. non-internalised. all of which are beyond the narcissistic interest of the Ego because they are part of the symbolic order in which we are integrated. ungraspable and threatening order. the ideal of the ego (Ich-Ideal) and the ideal Ego (Idealich). from which the subject sees himself in a form worthy of love. for sacrificing our narcissistic interest. symbolic and imaginary – or. ideals and the law which we abide by. proved our loyalty on some higher level – in this case we feel some inner contentment that we have risen to the "level of our mission". because "we like ourselves". kept separate. a trinity which corresponds with Real-Symbolic-Imaginary. with the predominator in the other. Based on this. For this reason. The characteristic that distinguishes the ideal of the Ego from the ideal Ego is undoubtedly identification. As far as the difference between the ideal of the ego and the ideal Ego is concerned. as represented by the subject. Narcissism contained within this "inner contentment" is of secondary significance and is mediated by the symbolic. to Lacan's mathems: I(A) and i(a) identification with the S1 "unary feature". there is the rise of a much more "irrational" and "cruel" pre-Oedipal "archaic" Superego. from which he is seen as worthy of the other's love. according to J. and the Superego. For example. traumatic. an over-hasty invocation of the "archaic Superego" leaves the door open to Jungian obscurity.–A. In . and identification with the mirror image. examples of higher theoretical consistency in Kernberg's distinction between "normal" and "pathological" narcissism can be drawn. and therefore something real in the sense of the impossibly unsymbolised. according. because it contains an element of symbolic identification with objects.and "permissiveness" significant of the psychological constitution of Narcissus. Although this undoubtedly implies an instance of narcissistic pleasure. and is an irreducibly alien. The ideal of the Ego and the ideal Ego are two modes of identification. sacrificed our own direct interests and fulfilled our duty. it suffices to remember Lacan's definition of the ideal of the self as a point of symbolic identification from Le Séminaire XI. it is a point in the other. a purely conceptual level must be maintained. Miller the Superego excludes any kind of identification. Nevertheless. In contrast. The "feeling of contentment" is our "reward" for subordinating ourselves to a higher cause. On the surface. such as symbolic identification with the name of the father – the paternal ideal of the Ego is the one that makes up and regulates imaginary narcissistic satisfaction. And this is what must be focused on in the "big Ego" characteristic of PN. crazy. Its other side is the emergence of a much more "irrational" and "cruel" law. Lasch connects this process with certain fundamental changes in late capitalist social relations – in other words. as the "man of the apparatus". the maternal Superego. Lasch's contribution lies in the fact . this thesis may seem paradoxical: "bureaucratic man" is usually envisaged as the exact opposite of Narcissus. domination over other people and their exploitation with the aim of confirming one's own narcissism) and which punishes "failure" much more severely than the "voice of conscience" of the ideal of the ego."normal" narcissism. who does not take the social "rules of the game" seriously and who is an unrelenting outcast interested only in manipulating other people to attain narcissistic satisfaction. without finding support in I(A). is in fact "pathological Narcissus". The solution to this paradox lies in the fact that there exist three rather than two stages in the development of what can be called the "libidinal constitution of the subject in bourgeois society": the individual of Protestant ethics. which has been confirmed by the clinical analysis of the constitution of "pathological Narcissus". an anonymous individual dedicated to the organisation and reduced to the status of a cog in the bureaucratic machine. the psychological type. the celebrated "breakdown of paternal authority" or the paternal ideal of the Ego is only one side of the process. But according to Lasch. and "pathological Narcissus". the heteronomous "man of organisation". What we are dealing with in "pathological Narcissus" is i(a) directly based on the cruel. the symbolic identification i(a). According to Lasch's basic thesis. instead of i(a) "mediated" by I(A). with the onset of "bureaucratic society". the narcissistic imaginary identification i(a) is "mediated" by symbolic identification I(A). or a libidinal economy which corresponds to contemporary bureaucratic society. "Pathological" Narcissus lacks the ideal of the ego element. "irrational" and "anal" Superego. and the image of the Ego as such. which does not prohibit but orders. with unbearable anxiety and extreme masochistic self-humiliation that can even lead to the loss of one's own identity. demands pleasure (by means of a constant grasping for "social success". performs the "integrational" role. Riesman introduces a fundamental notional contradiction of the "autonomous" (selfdirected) and "heteronomous" (Other-directed) individual. the inner satisfaction of having done one's duty is more important than the reputation and success enjoyed with other people. one has remained faithful to oneself and fulfilled one's duty. In the conflict between the individual and the institution. With the onset of bureaucratic corporate capitalism. The ideal of the ego radically changes its content and. the society of the "struggle against everything" – this society is guided by the "invisible hand" of the market. consisting of the expectations of one's group and surroundings. the "nonconformity" of Protestant ethics has been replaced by an individual striving to attain recognition from the social group to which he belongs. The "self-directed" individual is the basic type of the 19th and early 20th centuries. There is still talk of a phenomenon called the downfall or breakdown of Protestant ethics. Two classical descriptions of this process are The Organization Man by William Whyte and The Lonely Crowd by David Riesman. the internalised paternal ideal of the Ego. the "voice of conscience" or. On the contrary. the individual must let go. He is the individual of "Protestant ethics". For this reason. this individual autonomy was lost and the heteronomous principle prevailed. Naturally. he sees himself the way he should be in order to be worthy of the group's affection. despite pressures from the environment. The source of moral satisfaction is no longer a sense that. this implies an ideology that fits in with liberal capitalism. everyone should follow their own interests and thus contribute to the welfare of the whole of society as much as possible. in a way. becomes "exteriorised".that he was the first to clearly describe the transition from the second to the third stage. the latter is guided by an inner law. in other words. it is the sense that one has given priority to being loyal to one's group. whose basic principles are individual responsibility and individual initiative ("Help thyself and God will help thee!"). the fundamental characteristic of Protestant ethics is the difference between legality and morality: the former consists of social rules and external laws. Each individual answers before God and must not follow the blind crowd. renounce his worthless independence and find his place in the social organism to which he belongs and which gives . the individual observes himself with the eyes of the people around him. From the point of view of the ideal of the Ego. They succeed in doing this with the help of their lawyer. on shore. in reality. The institution does not want to harm him. individualism has been replaced by conformity but that the ability to adjust to the demands of the environment and respond quickly to the ever new and changing demands of the environment is a value as such. The extreme example quoted by Whyte is The Caine Mutiny (based on H. he is ashamed of himself because they were in fact guilty. The individual's resistance to the institution is a result of his narrow narcissistic delusion rather than anything else. "heteronomous ethics" was promoted by a series of Hollywood films. In the 1940s and 50s. One of the reasons why the captain became paranoid was that the subordinate officers derided him instead of putting up with his whims and striving to help him as considerately as possible. the mutinous officers must justify their actions in court and prove that the captain was indeed insane and incompetent. in the case of the heteronomous individual. or even a supreme value. Later. from his individual. (The gallant paradox of the lawyer character lies in the fact that it is his duty to defend the officers. the officers bear the blame for the entire incident because they displayed cynical mistrust instead of dedication to the common cause. Wouk's novel of the same title). "inner" ethical stand he is on the side of "heteronomous" exteriorised ethics. the story is about a warship called Caine. the lawyer tells them that he defended them out of duty whereas. He is replaced by a group of officers who take over the command and save the ship. "Socially mandatory . In brief.meaning to his life – the greatest value is the sense of belonging. This does not only change the "content" of the ideal but also its status: it is not that. but at a reception where the mutinous crew members celebrate their victory. In short. which is in danger of sinking because its crazy paranoid captain is incapable of issuing the right commands. What we have here is a perversion of an ordinary character who "externally" fakes his loyalty to the institution while "internally" striving to preserve his autonomous ethical stand.) There is one constant in this process of the transformation of Protestant ethics into the "heteronomous" ethics of "organisation man". The "invisible hand" of the market has been replaced by the "invisible hand" of the institution. which corresponds to individualist ethics. which gives priority to one's dedication to the institution. it is just that the deluded individual is not always aware of that. The role of the strict judge is taken over by social care: the offender must be cured and not punished. The most distinct sign of this transformation is the substitution of the right to punishment (and sentencing) with therapeutic law: the subject is no longer guilty because he is not responsible for his actions. not in terms of the ideal Ego but in terms of the "anal". the social "big Other". The third stage described by Lasch breaks through this framework: the form of the ideal of the Ego is replaced by the narcissistic "big Ego". which increasingly appears as the Other-outside-law and could therefore be termed "benevolent despotism". and suitable social and psychological circumstances must be created that will not drive him to crime… An analogous trend can be found in education: the aim of . of an integrated and "interiorised" symbolic code. in which the satisfaction of needs depends on the "whims of the Other".) under the protective care of the motherly "big Other" as an extension of the narcissistic "big Ego". but of a "Narcissus" who "does not experience the game with sincerity" and who takes the rules of the environment as the external "rules of the game". "sadomasochistic" Superego. The basic feature of this third stage is that in the subjective economy. functions more like a "mother-on-whom-the-satisfaction-ofone's-needs-depends". He experiences "social pressure" completely differently. The demand of the Other assumes the form of a command of the Superego to find pleasure (in the form of "social success". which are a result of a plethora of psychological and social circumstances. the loyal servant of the institution. And this is the key moment: today's society is no less "repressive" than it was at the time of "organisation man". repeats itself in the subject's relationship towards the socio-symbolic Other. The state of dependence characteristic of the pre-Oedipal constellation. the difference is that social demands no longer take the form of the ideal of the ego.character" (if we may make use of Marx' syntagm) is formed on the basis of symbolic identification or an interiorised ideal of the Ego. which is a network of socio-symbolic relations faced by and capturing the subject. representing Lacan's first image of the big Other. it is no longer the case of an individual forced to integrate the demands of the environment constituted in the symbolic element of the ideal of the Ego. On the contrary. but remain at the level of the pre-Oedipal command of the Superego. etc. in reality. this cult of the free development of the "big Ego". Lasch shows that this cult of "authenticity". from work to hobbies. it implies a much greater dependence than that of "organisation man".–A. alien aspect of the symbolic law external to the Ego. we must agree with J. Now we can finally return to the key issue of the relationship between "pathological narcissism" and borderline disorders. this turning point is not difficult to determine: it is the transformation of the bureaucratic capitalist society of the 1940s and 50s into a society described as "permissive". Miller. in accordance with social needs. Lasch's weak point lies in the fact that he does not supply a sufficient theoretical definition of that turning point in the socio-economic reality of late capitalism which corresponds to the transition of "organisation man" to "pathological Narcissus". If "pathological Narcissus" . who says that borderline is literally a "contemporary form of hysteria". from sports to religion. in order to turn it into a sphere for the expression and affirmation of one's "authentic" personality and for the development of one's creative potentials. it should create a space for the free expression of his personality. At the level of discourse. at this level.the educational system is no longer the imparting of certain knowledge or a certain system of rules of social behaviour to students. "alienated social roles" and "repressive rules" and open the door to one's "true self" in every sphere of creativity. which sets borderline closer to psychosis than neurosis (which is due to an obsession with the "strong Ego" as a sign of "normality". free of "masks" and "repressive" rules. This kind of school is nowadays considered an "alienated" and "repressive" institution which takes no account of the student's individual needs. while the absence of this Ego immediately points to psychosis). is nothing less than a form of its own opposite. direct and develop his creative potential. from politics to sexuality. has been described in terms of the "Third Wave" theory of writers such as Toffler. and that the only path leading to the mastering of this dependence is identification with a certain decentralised. the school should enable the student to recognise and. we find the cult of "authenticity": one should cast away "masks". of preOedipal dependence. On the contrary. The late bourgeois individualism of the narcissistic "big Ego" merely seems to be a return to the early bourgeois individualism of "Protestant ethics" while. Unlike American medical practice. It entails a "post-industrial" process which. In addition to the inherent incompleteness of his analytical conceptual apparatus. At all levels of society. borderline marks the point of its hysterisation.' . This blending of Lebenswelt with science radically undermines the very notion of Lebenswelt as a field of everyday pre-scientific self-understanding and pre-theoretical life practice. which is increasingly becoming an inherent constituent of the everyday Lebenswelt. ranging from experts whose advice and instructions guide our entire life. Recently. in the strict hermeneutic sense of the word.represents the prevalent libidinal constitution of late bourgeois "permissive" society. including its most intimate aspects. it is impossible to say that science replaces the original ground of life practice with another (its own) signifying horizon or a hermeneutic question. a hermeneutic question to which science replies with its activity only through references to the pre-scientific Lebenswelt. a person from Silicon Valley gave a befitting description of the turning point which in culture is generally experienced as discomfort: 'Home computer is a solution without a problem. from which science derives its meaning. the whole loses its meaning and we find ourselves in a void. to micro-electronic gadgets offered en masse by industry. An exemplary case would be Husserl's late attempt to expose the rootedness of the scientific way of thinking in the pre-scientific world of life practice – exemplary because it is no longer possible today. Husserl is entirely right when he claims that it is possible to define science's signifying horizon – in other words. is unsignifying and as soon as it inherently begins to encroach on the Lebenswelt. since Lebenswelt has "lost its innocence" and become inherently defined by science. In this sense. In other words. we must also understand Miller's claim that there exist today numerous proofs of the presence of science in the everyday Lebenswelt. Miller connects the transformation of hysteria into borderline disorder with scientific changes in contemporary ideological everyday life – science in different forms. the point at which the subject is faced with the already-described basic paradox or contradiction of his PN. which in its basic dimension appears to be an answer without a question: "The history of our time adjusts to the predominant form of knowledge: to science – which is evident in the constant invasion of gadgets that represent numerous answers without questions. Reference to the pre-scientific Lebenswelt would today correspond with reference to the pristine and unspoiled domestic environment of Blut and Boden ideology. Science as such. a feeling of complete helplessness and an inability to find a way out of this dead end – or in the words of Moličre. up to now. in order to conceal the basic . 29. But we are ignoring the opposite dimension. how to cast his mask and reveal his "real Ego". Miller.Based on this. This aspect of the "question-less answer" can be clearly presented with three partial characteristics of the contemporary age: the role of experts in everyday life. before these manuals offer their poetry to us. with an "ethical" obsession. and how to turn to intuitive spontaneity and genuineness. he invents for each object functions and needs to be met by it. The basic paradox of the contemporary "cult of authenticity" is that its inner constitution and driving force are a bunch of manuals which. micro-electronic gadgets. 4) Given the fact that an "answer without a question" is actually the most condensed definition of the real as the unsymbolised (the real as a condition that "does not answer any question" and which lacks a signifying horizon). a hysteric turns his essence into a question. we have been talking in prose. we usually speak of a void. Ornicar?. 1984. Paris. the lack of creativity of our work. In connection with these phenomena. and of the loneliness. alienation and artificiality of "contemporary man" in terms of a real need which the scores of manuals attempt to satisfy in an individually psychological way by means of a mystification of the actual social foundations. "Liminaire". at the same time. The difference between PN and borderline can be defined in terms of this very dialectic of the question and answer: "pathological" Narcissus plunges "without questions" into the current of ever-new answers and for each answer. which is in fact even more important: the primary effect of these manuals is not a prescription of how to satisfy these needs but the creation of these "needs" and the provocation of the unbearable sense of "void" in our everyday life. and advertising. give the subject prescriptions on how to attain his authenticity.–A. the insufficiency of our sexuality. the artificiality of our relations with other people and. it becomes clear in what sense science represents the basic reality of the contemporary world. by appearing scientifically legitimate. they haughtily instruct us that." (J. how to liberate the "creative potentials of his Ego". But here we are interested in something other than the fact that even the most intimate spheres of life are presented as attainable by means of (pseudo or real – it does not matter which) scientifically legitimate procedures. p. which in turn creates a possibility for a whole range of "not wanting anything" stands. from whom he expects a different answer. demanding to tell us what we want and what our desire is. this explanation is misleading. while beyond this demand there lurks the abyss of unarticulated and merely-evoked desire. But as soon as we enter the sphere of the symbolic. to desire the Other himself.paradox of the "answer without a question" as soon as possible. In contrast. Nevertheless. the subject in reality and irreducibly "does not know what he wants". The "hysterical question" is the question to the big Other. the position of the hysteric is nothing other than the position of a subject who "does not know what he wants". Naturally. to desire what the Other desires. such as of wanting only "nothing" – that missing part which fuels the desire. because it presumes the existence of "real needs". always "mediated" by the desire of the Other. That need is subordinated to desire is made evident by the banal fact that for desire (=law). From a traditional point of view. a question to the Other. the subject is prepared to sacrifice any "basic" need. borderline defines a point where this current stops. The basic paradox or fundamental fact of psychoanalysis is that no matter how integrated he is into the network of speech. Here we must take into account the key fact that desire is always intersubjective – the subject's desire is. every individual has a few "basic" needs which must be met in order to survive. Strictly speaking. in different forms. He asks a wellknown hysterical question. an answer to what these answers without questions mean. the problem of the "permissive" "consumer" society does not lie in the fact that it . where the subject is faced with the lack of meaning of the answer as such and where he no longer accepts ever-new "answers without questions" "without asking questions". the object of his desire eludes him. such as going on hunger strike or living in complete celibacy. the whole matter is reversed and the symbolic articulation of a need changes it into a demand of the Other. who does not know to what extent he is caught up in the network of predominators. this answer would be quickly rejected on the premise that it represents "fake needs" serving the interest of capital accumulation. The desire. and every articulation of desire in the form of a symbolic demand is accompanied by a shift until the ultimate point of the desire turns into the experience of "this is not it". to desire to become the object of the Other's desire… Therefore. which results in the fact that. convincing himself that. In simple terms. and creates a saturated field where the "impossible" desire can no longer be articulated. which supposedly maintained the appearance of unity. he in fact "does not know what he wants". the problem is that with the constant flood of new consumer items and the provocation of demands. that he simply cannot experience the paradox of the desire. characteristic of the "als-ob-personality" (as-if-personality) – a condition in which. a point at which the subject loses all distance and gets caught up in the paradox of desire or the symbolic. For this reason. it narrows the space of desire. according to which borderline would be closer to the pathological disintegration of the personality while PN would represent a step closer to normalisation. and that what is hiding behind it is something completely different and dialectically not mediated by the mask. despite all the answers. On the contrary. that the mask really is just a mask. masks the "empty place" from which desire emerges. The paradox of the relationship between PN and borderline is that the actual situation contradicts what is visible. "pathological narcissism" is clinically a "pre-psychotic condition" at least. it is the first step towards the "normalisation" of pathological Narcissus."pathological Narcissus" gives the unsettling impression that "there is nothing behind the mask". finally opening up to the desire. or to an attempt at some kind of unification of the Ego which is supposed to synthesise the disintegrated elements. On the contrary. the subject is "fully functional". Borderline is not a transition from a pre-psychotic condition to psychosis or the breakdown of the mask of the "pathological" Ego. despite the object of desire. "pathological Narcissus" is so saturated with "answers without questions". a point in its hysterisation. it quickly pronounces . on the surface. An opposing view would be that if it is not a psychosis. On this point. and is shown in so many ways "what he really wants". although he does not inherently abide by social law. American psychoanalysis suffers retaliation from its own conformist obsession with the problems of the Ego as the agent of social adjustment: since the borderline type lacks a "strong Ego". the cleft between desire and wanting. "we do not know what we want".forces us to adopt "fake needs" instead of "real ones". that we are speaking to a puppet. Borderline marks the very point where this crazy curve breaks and the subject becomes hysterical. "nothing is right" and we get this persistent feeling that it is all a terrible travesty. Here we could quote the well-known joke from Freud's Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious. we must also understand Lacan's statement that the present-day "normal" individual is psychotic. which corresponds with its own deficiency. According to a vulgar psychoanalytical "interpretation". while desublimation must be understood in the strictest sense of Lacan's writings. It is not difficult to conclude that this kind of understanding again presupposes some kind of "basic". "more cultural" form of fulfilment. Its idea of psychosis is defined in terms of a subject who has lost "control of himself". which says that Shakespeare's works were not written by Shakespeare but by his contemporary of the same name. The paradox of "pathological Narcissus" lies in the fact that he is a psychotic normal person: although PN behaves "normally" in a "socially adjusted way" according to all "positive" and empirically visible characteristics. or in terms of his symbolic identity or identification. Lacan starts from an empty place or nothing around which a desire is articulated and from which the object or the reason for a desire is an impossible and unsymbolised object. be psychotic. This is an example of PN's psychotic dimension: "pathological Narcissus" is literally "somebody else" in relation to himself. one criticises other people. that the person in question is merely "acting real". which satisfies instinctive needs.him psychotic and cannot understand that somebody who is socially fully "adjusted" and fully "functional" can. and for a critic an attack represents a sublime form of aggression. to a "higher". behaves in a "socially maladjusted way". which is almost the opposite of the ordinary. for this kind of artist contact with the audience is a sublime form of sexual intercourse. who "cannot control his instinctive forces" – who. in short. "unsublime" form of gratification which is sublimated. In this context. one seduces the audience with poetry. and instead of getting into fights. This considerably narrows down the term "repressive desublimation" as employed by "critical theory" to determine the libidinal economy of late bourgeois society: "repression" is understood as the opposite of symbolic law or the pressure or command coming from the Superego. in fact. or a threatening deluding thing (das Ding) that is in itself "nothing". instead of seducing a woman. Sublimation is usually identified with desexualisation or a shift of the object as such. Sublimation is nothing but the fact that some "empirical" positive . speak of "desublimation": not because he is not able to "redirect his libidinal energy towards higher goals" but because the libidinal object is reduced to mere "positivity" due to the fact that Narcissus wants to get to the "bottom" of everything. Although borderline is a contemporary form of hysteria. it represents a threatening "thing".object is "elevated to the dignity of things". In Fellini's Roma. to bring it to light. Desperate onlookers can only observe how the object which they approached too closely is slipping away from them. as soon as we get too close to it. to come to terms with it. it turns into an ordinary "positive" object and we are faced with the banal reality. exactly because of this. The sublime object is therefore the paradox of an object which can "live" only in "semi-shadow" or can only be evoked: as soon as we attempt to render it "explicit". as soon as they come into contact with the air. it is lost or melts away. For this reason. In the case of "pathological Narcissus". because of which they are doomed. This is the sublime object: as long as it exists in "midspace". with all justification. they start to fade away. in its subjective libidinal economy. who with justification are portrayed by Fellini as hypocritical and obscene – this is also the gist of Fellini's Satyricon). who break through the wall sealing the cave. we can. Suddenly. or the impossible thing and reasonobject of desire. melancholic figures (their sadness is caused by their awareness that they are heathens. it functions as the embodiment or positivisation of "nothing". But the frescos are too fragile to stand the light and. it does not imply a simple . he misses that "nothing" evoked by the object if it remains in "mid-space". During the construction of tunnels for Rome's underground railway. we find an exceptional example of the fragility of the sublime object. that they were born too early for the Christian truth. these figures are closer to truth than "real" Christians. or the point of the hysterisation of "pathological Narcissus" as the prevalent libidinal constitution of late bourgeois society. sublimation evidently has nothing to do with "desexualisation": the object of "physical" erotic passion (if indeed it is passion) is always sublime. however. in an obscure shadowy world. however. Nevertheless. workers find an unexplored underground opening and immediately call archaeologists. Therefore. they gaze upon the splendour of an ancient Roman hall whose walls are covered with frescos featuring sad. that it experiences its own transsubstantiation and that. Lacan can repeat Rilke's thought that beauty is the last mask shielding the horrible – beauty is a way of evoking the horror of things in the world of the gaze. It is possible to say that only with borderline does the constitution of hysteria enter its "distilled" or purified form as a question presented to another subject who "does not know what he wants". whereas an approach which preserves a feeling for the real subversive core of Freud's discovery points to the fact that the paradoxical essence of the hysterical condition is only now becoming evident. With the emergence of the "permissive" society. pushing them to the unconscious. In the case of "traditional" hysteria. rather defining borderline disorders as related to psychosis. The vulgar understanding of psychoanalysis has proclaimed it "outdated".transformation of a former "traditional" form of hysteria. "Traditional" hysteria can still be interpreted in terms of a naďve and unproblematic opposition between "internalised" suppression and suppressed instincts: the subject suppresses instincts or forms of instinct gratification which are not acceptable to the internalised value system. . is a result of its blindness to the aforementioned subversive core of psychoanalysis and of the fact that it literally does not hear the hysterical question. this naďve stand has lost its significance. while the suppressed then resurfaces in the form of hysterical symptoms. this basic constellation is veiled with "sexual repression". The fact that analytical psychoanalysis does not recognise borderline to be a contemporary form of hysteria.
Report "Zizek - 1986 - Pathological Narcissus as a Socially Mandatory Form of Subjectivity"