Zimmermann - Criteria of Identity

DEAN W.ZIMMERMAN CRITERIA OF IDENTITY AND THE ‘IDENTITY MYSTICS’∗ 1. INTRODUCTION The centerpiece of this paper is the construction of a framework in which to state theses of mereological supervenience – assertions about the dependence of wholes upon their parts. The project is given its point by the light it sheds upon two controversies over criteria of synchronic and diachronic unity. Some philosophers (the ‘Identity Mystics’, as I shall call them) claim that, at least in the case of human beings, there is no reason to look for informative criteria of identity over time. I shall argue that, given certain highly plausible theses of mereological supervenience, if human beings are wholly material – if, that is, they have no immaterial soul – then this view is untenable. In the final section, I consider a problem that arises for those who suppose that criteria of synchronic and diachronic unity are, in a certain sense, intrinsic. 2. THE ROLE OF CRITERIA OF IDENTITY I begin, however, with a brief description of the philosophical disputes that have given rise to the technical terminology of criteria of synchronic and diachronic unity or identity. It is relatively easy to say what a principle of synchronic unity is supposed to do: it tells us under what conditions a group of things go together to compose a whole – in the case of spatially located objects, under what conditions a group of smaller things go to make up a spatially larger whole. Such principles will look something like this: a set of things S constitutes a whole of kind K if and only if . . . , where the ellipsis is to be filled in by some condition on the members of S. Principles of diachronic unity tell us under what conditions a succession of things existing at different moments go together to compose a temporally extended whole. But this way of putting things may already seem to presuppose what it should not: the doctrine of temporal parts, which Erkenntnis 48: 281–301, 1998. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 282 DEAN W. ZIMMERMAN Figure 1. The ship of Theseus. says that just as spatially extended objects have different parts at different places, temporally extended objects have different parts at different times. Philosophers friendly to this doctrine will no doubt regard principles of diachronic and synchronic unity as precisely parallel in form; the rest of us will disagree. But are there any ‘successions of things existing at different moments’ that can be accepted by both the friends and enemies of temporal parts, and so used to state criteria of diachronic unity that are neutral with respect to the doctrine of temporal parts? After a thorough survey of alternative frameworks for giving criteria of diachronic identity, Harold Noonan concludes that such criteria are best taken as stating conditions necessary and sufficient for a series of events to constitute the history of a persisting thing. His idea can be applied to the Ship of Theseus, a ship kept continuously functioning over many years by gradual replacement of all the original boards. In situation (1) (see Figure 1), the discarded boards become flotsam, never recovered; in situation (2), they are saved by an antiquarian and then finally reassembled to form the ship occupying the spatiotemporal path c; in (3), the boards are never replaced, so that Theseus’ ship becomes gradually unseaworthy, ceasing to be a ship long before the antiquarian puts his boards together. Noonan shows that the position of ‘best candidate’ or ‘closest continuer’ theorists comes to something like this: Consider all the events that occur within the boundaries of some ship or other in situation (3) – including those rather uneventful occurrences Cardinal Mercier dubbed ‘unchanges’, such as a certain board’s retaining its location relative to the contours of the ship. If we think of events as exemplifications of properties or as property instances, then an event happening within some ship’s boundaries can be construed as the exemplification of an intrinsic property (of which more later) by any aggregate of boards, and the holding of a relation of distance between any parts. All the events (that are instances of these event-types) going on within the boundaries of Theseus’ ship in situation (3) also occur the one constitutes the history of a single ship only if the other does. The best candidate theorist can interpret the names in the diagram as referring to series of events of this sort. On the assumption that no event could have had a different substrate than it actually had. The fissioning simple. so controversies over event identity across possible worlds can be avoided altogether simply by stating criteria of unity in terms of the properties exemplified by objects at different times. they do not.CRITERIA OF IDENTITY AND THE ‘IDENTITY MYSTICS’ 283 Figure 2. in the latter. where the histories in question consist of collections of parts and potential parts taken at different times and paired with the properties and relations they exemplify or might have exemplified at those times. they constitute the history of a single ship. in situation (5). The best candidate theorist would likely judge that c and c are distinct though qualitatively identical. in situation (3) they go together with the events a to constitute the history of a single ship. The ‘substrate’ of the c events is identical with the substrate of the a events. If fixing the intrinsic properties of . but the substrate of the c events is not identical with the substrate of the a events.2 I assume that every event is the exemplification of a property. in situation (2).1 the c and c events cannot be the same. As Noonan realizes. Her thesis can then be put in this way: c and c are the same events. controversies will sometimes arise over whether one has the same or different events in counterfactual situations. Competing criteria of diachronic unity can then be given in terms of potential histories of objects. In the former. a process goes on that is intrinsically just like a + c in (4). The opponent of best candidate theories of identity holds that. but constitute instead the history of a ship that came into being for the first time when the antiquarian put his collection of planks together. in situation (2) they do not. Consider the two circumstances depicted in Figure 2: situation (4) involves the fissioning of a simple particle. given the precise similarity of the series of events a + c and a + c . introduces the notions of ‘loneliness’ and ‘accompaniment’ – where an item is lonely just in case nothing exists beside itself and any proper parts it might have. It is this approach to criteria that will fall out of the theory of mereological supervenience developed in the next section.3 Elsewhere. or spatial or temporal loneliness. and something is accompanied if and only if not lonely. principles of diachronic unity state that a persisting whole of a certain sort supervenes upon a series of collections of parts arranged in certain ways.5 I suggest that criteria of synchronic and diachronic unity are themselves supervenience theses. otherwise. in which mereological dependence and its implications with respect to criteria of synchronic and diachronic unity will become clear. Jaegwon Kim has suggested that mereological dependence – the dependence of wholes on their parts – is a species of supervenience: supervenience with ‘multiple domains’. their intrinsic properties remain the same. But what exactly are intrinsic properties? Intrinsic properties are those that do not differ between qualitative duplicates. Principles of synchronic unity state that wholes of a certain sort supervene upon parts arranged in a certain way. it may be hoped. do better. then the criteria of diachronic unity are intrinsic. I turn then to the notion of mereological supervenience – the thesis that wholes are dependent upon their parts. Lewis. I set up a schematic framework for multiple domain supervenience. and say that a property is ‘completely intrinsic’ if and only if every part that is also a property is intrinsic by the provisional criterion. in discussions of the intrinsic and extrinsic. not. One can. Intrinsic properties are those necessarily equivalent to completely intrinsic properties. this is a pretty tight definitional circle. 3. ZIMMERMAN and spatial relations among the parts in these collections is all it takes to settle whether such a series constitutes the history of a single persisting thing. define provisionally spatially and temporally intrinsic properties as those that do not imply either spatial or temporal accompaniment. and what such things are supposed to do. For I think it is the conviction that mereological supervenience must be true that fuels the search for criteria of identity. no matter how different the environments of qualitative duplicates. I have proposed this account of the intrinsic:4 First. MEREOLOGICAL SUPERVENIENCE AND CRITERIA OF UNITY It should now be more or less clear what criteria of synchronic and diachronic unity look like. Then introduce a notion of parthood for properties.284 DEAN W. As David Lewis points out. . whether new ones appear. Generally. often enough. The B-properties and relations or ‘subvenient’ properties and relations constitute the supervenience base. then fixing how things are at a time on the level of the parts will determine how things are at that time on the level of wholes. If. being two feet from. like being an organism or being a cat. and so on. there is a generalized spatial relation I have. both active and passive) and the spatial relations holding among them. Each little picture is. generalized spatial and spatiotemporal relations. The parts are the dots. which holds between me and one of my bookshelves). Furthermore. The arrangement of dots on a given page determines what object or group of objects is depicted on that page. In order for there to be principles of synchronic and diachronic unity. the same objects must appear doing the same things. Given the same arrangements of dots appearing in the same order. then the supervenience base (the B-properties) need only include the intrinsic properties of parts (including their causal dispositions. which is really the property of standing in that relation to something or other .CRITERIA OF IDENTITY AND THE ‘IDENTITY MYSTICS’ 285 Before diving into the details. (D1) and (D2) will be disjoint. The A-properties should include all properties of wholes which are thought to be determined by the properties and arrangement of their parts. on the other hand.6 If principles of synchronic and diachronic unity are intrinsic. fixing how things are over time on the level of parts determines how things are during that time on the level of persisting wholes. And let (D2) be the domain of wholes that can be made out of the members of (D1). more will be needed in the supervenience base: what Kim has called ‘generalized relations’ will have to be added – in particular. For every spatial relation that holds between myself and something else of a certain kind (for instance. The thesis of mereological supervenience I shall articulate affirms that something analogous is true of wholes and their parts. The analogy comes from ‘flip books’: books with pictures in the lower or upper right-hand corner of each page. I’ll introduce a simple analogy to motivate the theory on offer. made out of a bunch of dots. The analogy with flip books will prove helpful both where it holds and where it fails. which produce a moving image when one riffles through the pages from front to back. such principles are not intrinsic. these will have to include ‘sortal properties’. if a class of wholes are made entirely of a given sort of part. the series of all the arrangements of dots that appear on the pages determines what the object or objects depicted do over time – whether one disappears or disintegrates. Let (D1) be the ‘subvenient’ domain – the collection of parts and potential parts in terms of which principles of synchronic and diachronic unity will be stated. the things that will have the subvenient properties upon which wholes will supervene. The pursuit of principles of synchronic unity for complex objects is justified by the conviction that wholes are dependent upon their parts: Fix how things are at the level of parts. then there is an object constituted by S in w1 that is indiscernible with respect to A-properties from one constituted by S ∗ in w2. The extrinsic determiners of identity that I shall consider countenancing are generalized spatial relations to things having intrinsic properties appropriate to items in the domain of parts. x has P iff f x has P . z} is in the extension of R. and you’ve fixed how things are on the level of wholes. (D1) F is a synchronic complete specification with respect to B =df F is a property of sets which is such that. and if either constitutes an object. with respect to subvenient properties and relations. which vary only in color and location on the page. z} in S. First. and all worlds w1 and w2. So if the intrinsic property having positive charge is in the supervenience base. and any B-property P and Brelation R. a set exemplifies the one if and only if it exemplifies the other. and {y. necessarily. z} is in the extension of R iff f {y. then the generalized relation being two feet from something having positive charge would also be in the supervenience base. necessarily. if S in w1 and S ∗ in w2 exemplify structure-specific indiscernible synchronic complete specifications. Synchronic complete specifications F and F ∗ are ‘structurespecific indiscernible’ just in case. I define a notion meant to capture something like the complete state of a collection of objects at a time – complete. that is. for any x and {y. In a domain of flip-book dots. S and S ∗ both have F iff there is a one-one function f from S (and its subsets) to S ∗ (and its subsets) such that. Any two groups of dots with the same synchronic complete specification will include dots of the same colors arranged in the same way. We’ll call this way of enriching the supervenience base.286 DEAN W. or to events involving the exemplification of such properties. for any sets S and S ∗ . the notion of a synchronic complete specification for dots comes to this: a property of a set of dots on a single page that fixes their spatial relations and colors. ‘admitting extrinsic determiners’. This conviction can be turned into a more precise principle of synchronic supervenience: (SS) For every set S and S ∗ of members of (D1). ZIMMERMAN of that kind (in this case.7 . being two feet from a bookshelf). then S constitutes an object in w1 if and only if S ∗ does in w2. Even if it should prove too hard for us to formulate precise necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of a whole out of parts. To deny that principles of synchronic unity exist for some domain of complex things is. Then the difference between the external situations of the two sets of cells will make a difference in the generalized spatial relations exemplified by the cells. although the complex things are made entirely out of things of some other kind.CRITERIA OF IDENTITY AND THE ‘IDENTITY MYSTICS’ 287 There are two ways of reading (SS): the B-properties that go into the complete specifications of the sets of parts may be restricted to intrinsic determiners. there are groups that would constitute a picture of a cat without a tail. But that doesn’t prove that there is no hope of our seeing what the members of G have in common. or expanded to include extrinsic ones as well. the difference between those types of arrangements which yield wholes and those that don’t may be quite simple. nearly incoherent. Granted. this set G will consist of infinitely many different complete specifications of arrangements of parts.8 Couldn’t there be sets of cells constituting just a part of a cat that are intrinsically just like the set of cells now constituting all of Tibbles? If so. In any case. it even takes . it implies that there are principles of synchronic unity. To deny such supervenience is to say that. who has just lost her tail in a very sudden accident. and to see that some others are necessary. nonetheless everything could have been the same at the level of these parts and yet some of the complex things have failed to exist. making a complex thing out of parts takes more than just putting the parts together in the right way. Similarly. Someone who accepts this reasoning must throw extrinsic determiners into the supervenience base as well. One might have doubts about the truth of (SS) on the intrinsic reading: In the domain of dots. there will be a set G of synchronic complete specifications such that a set S from (D1) constitutes a whole of kind K if and only if it exemplifies one of the members of G. On this view. at least in the case of complex objects made of more than just a few parts that can be arranged in more than just a few ways. but for the presence of nearby dots that make them just part of a picture of a cat with a tail. cells arranged just like Tibbles’s could have failed to constitute a cat. we should still hope to be able to find some sufficient conditions. if synchronic supervenience is true with respect to some domains of parts and wholes. But whether (SS) be construed weakly (by including extrinsic determiners in the supervenience base) or strongly (by excluding them). then there are necessary connections between what goes on at the level of parts and what goes on at the level of wholes. by my lights. like poor Tibbles the cat.9 For any particular kind K of object made of the parts in (D1). suppose the subvenient domain consists of living cells and the supervenient domain of mammals. If the difference between the numbers in two members of a micro-history is three.10 Principles of diachronic unity follow from the supervenience of persisting wholes upon the histories of the parts that make them up at different times. (D2) T is a B-micro-history =df T is an ordered series of ordered pairs B. with a page number attached to each arrangement. if the micro-history were exemplified. Now in the case of dots. Diachronic supervenience is a matter of the exemplification of indiscernible micro-histories having the same macro-results. in minutes. In the general case. while an evil demon simultaneously . this is a question that does matter. and (2) S’s exemplification of the first member of f S occurs n minutes earlier than S ∗ ’s if and only if the second member of f S subtracted from the second member of f S ∗ = n. and (3) one member of T is earlier than another iff its second member is lower than that of the other. (2) t is a real number. there’s no need to ask questions about whether the dot on page three that is part of the cat’s tail is the same as some dot on page four. Formulating a thesis of diachronic supervenience requires the notions of a “B-micro-history”. S exemplifies the first member of f S. ZIMMERMAN more (assuming the supervenience base to include extrinsic determiners) than making sure the parts are in the right sort of environment.288 DEAN W. a micro-history is a series of possible ways for dots to be arranged on a page. then the one with the lower number would occur three minutes before the one with the higher number – where (D3). In the realm of flip-book pictures. gives the relevant meaning of exemplification. below. this signifies that. and the pages on which they appear come in the order specified. the temporal distances between the parts of the micro-history. What more could be asked for is beyond me. and of the B-micro-history exemplified by a particular object. But in the case of real wholes made out of real parts. The numerical member of these pairs will be used to measure. If God were to annihilate all the atoms in my body at noon. exemplification of a micro-history comes to this: (D3) A series U of sets of members of (D1) exemplifies B-microhistory T =df . There is a one-one function f from U onto T such that: (1) for every pair S and S ∗ of members U . Each dot is confined to its own page. A series of sets of actual dots exemplifies such a micro-history only if each group of dots in the series exemplifies one of the arrangements. and S ∗ exemplifies the first member of f S ∗ . t such that: (1) B is a synchronic complete specification. flipping one of the resulting books will reveal a cat chasing a mouse if and only if flipping the other book would do the same. then there must be an individual t. separated by the same temporal distances. Now it is obvious that when two series of dots are arranged in the same ways on pages that are bound together in the same order. Clause (2b) insures that these exemplifications of synchronic complete specifications come in the same temporal order. Something analogous is true for any domain of wholes made out of parts.CRITERIA OF IDENTITY AND THE ‘IDENTITY MYSTICS’ 289 replaced them with duplicates arranged exactly as mine would have been. (D4) U ’s exemplification of B-micro-history T is structure-specific indiscernible from U ∗ ’s exemplification of B-micro-history T ∗ =df (1) U exemplifies T and U ∗ exemplifies T ∗ . When there are indiscernible . I shall say that exemplifications of micro-histories are structure-specific indiscernible only if parts that play a certain role in one exemplification of a micro-history have counterparts playing the same role in the other exemplification of the micro-history. for every pair of members S 1 and S 2 of U . S 1 and S 2 exemplify synchronic complete specifications P 1 and P 2 in T if and only if: (a) f S 1 and f S 2 exemplify a Q1 and Q2 in T ∗ that are structure-specific indiscernible from P 1 and P 2 . and t 1 − t 2 = t 3 − t 4 . and (c) if an individual x or pair y and z in S 1 and S 2 exemplify properties or relations in the supervenience base when S 1 exemplifies P 1 and when S 2 exemplifies P 2 . Clause (2c) insures that parts in the subvenient domain that persist from one part of the micro-history to another are paired with corresponding persisting parts in the other microhistory. in both f S 1 and f S 2 exemplifying the same properties or relations when Q1 and Q2 are exemplified. We want to be able to recognize the difference between the exemplification of my micro-history in this way (with the instantaneous replacement of all the cells by new ones at some point) and an exemplification of the same micro-history in which the annihilation and creation doesn’t occur. then t 1 > t 2 if and only if t 3 > t 4 . Clause (2a) insures that each exemplification of a synchronic complete specification by a member of U gets matched up with a corresponding exemplification of an indiscernible synchronic complete specification by a member of U ∗ . many would be inclined to say that I failed to survive the mishap. or pair u and v. (b) if t 1 and t 2 are the numbers paired with P 1 and P 2 in T . and t 3 and t 4 are the numbers paired with Q1 and Q2 in T ∗ . and (2) there is a one-one function f from members of U onto members of U ∗ which is such that. ZIMMERMAN exemplifications of micro-histories. then. for all times t during U ’s exemplification of T . I shall argue. In what sense. (D6) The diachronic supervenience of wholes on parts can now be stated: (DS) For all series U and U ∗ consisting of sets of the members of (D1). the one can be the history of a single supervening object if and only if the other is. and (2) if either exemplification constitutes the history of a single object. if U ’s exemplification of Bmicro-history T is structure-specific indiscernible from U ∗ ’s exemplification of B-micro-history T ∗ . x and y have the same A-history during t and t ∗ =df there is a series of A-properties S such that: (a) x exemplifies every member of S during t. The relevant pairing relation and notion of indiscernibility of A-histories are these: (D5) U ’s exemplification of B-micro-history T constitutes the history of a single object x =df U exemplifies T . x exists at t iff x is constituted at t by some member of U which then exemplifies some element of T . none of these could have been exemplified without being the history of a K.11 x has the same A-history during the time of this exemplification as some object y constituted by U ∗ ’s exemplification of T ∗ during the time of the latter exemplification. and y exemplifies every member of S during t ∗ . This. The existence of diachronic criteria of unity follows from (DS). (3) for every pair P and Q in S. So it is a necessary and sufficient condition for a given B-micro-history to be the history of a K that it belong to the set L.290 DEAN W. By (DS). and under what conditions will the set L of microhistories serve as an informative criterion of diachronic unity for Ks? For . and all worlds w1 and w2. constitutes an informative criterion of diachronic unity for Ks. for every object x constituted by U ’s exemplification of T . and the supervening objects must be indiscernible with respect to kind and other A-properties. For any kind of supervenient whole K that can be made out of the parts in the subvenient domain. there is a set L of B-micro-histories which includes all and only the B-micro-histories that are the histories of a K. then (1) U ’s exemplification of T un w1 constitutes the history of a single object iff U ∗ ’s exemplification of T ∗ does in w2. x exemplifies P n minutes before Q during t iff y exemplifies P n minutes before Q during t ∗ . (2) a property is in S if it is an A-property exemplified by x during t or by y during t ∗ . and. So some micro-histories will be paired with supervening objects. a kind of mereological essentialism would probably be true of this stuff: a more-than-one-kilogram mass of it cannot survive the gain or loss of any smaller-than-one-kilogram parts. For instance. every chunk composed of smaller bits of the same stuff. with associated persistence conditions different from those of the supervening wholes. importantly informative criteria of diachronic unity. More is learned if the subvenient kind is very different from the supervenient kind. naturally occurring kind. then there will be. Here is the most serious objection to the whole enterprise of deriving criteria of diachronic unity from mereological supervenience: What has been proven to follow from (DS) is just the existence of a set of microhistories that coincides with all the possible careers of supervening objects. Now I suppose there will be something informative about the criterion implied by the version of (DS) resulting in this case. But even in some cases where there are no Ks in the realm of parts. criteria for organisms in terms of the histories of cells. there should be no danger of uninformativeness resulting from the impurity of the ‘ideology’ employed in the statement of mereological supervenience. If ‘properties’ like being a part of this ship and relations like being part of the same persisting ship as were allowed into the supervenience base of a thesis of mereological supervenience for ships. Suppose.CRITERIA OF IDENTITY AND THE ‘IDENTITY MYSTICS’ 291 one thing. criteria for cells in terms of the histories of organic molecules. for any even mildly complex domain of wholes. If criteria for ships can be given in terms of the histories of planks. there should be no Ks in the subvenient domain. it seems to me. the more informative the criteria that follow from the thesis of mereological supervenience. and as long as you have all the same smaller-than-one-kilogram parts. The condition. you have the same larger-than-one-kilogram whole. for instance. the more dissimilar the subvenient and supervenient domains. that the information gleaned from the criterion does not seem worth much. there would be no assurance whatsoever that informative criteria of diachronic unity would follow. the resulting criterion may be less informative than one would like. But. and so on. And suppose the domain of supervening wholes contains all and only the hunks of this stuff that weigh more than one kilogram. for all we know. But since the supervenience base is restricted to just intrinsic properties of parts and their relations to other such parts. But the supervenient and subvenient domains in this case are such obviously trivial restrictions on a single broader. ‘having a micro-history that is a member of L’ might be. In general. and the subvenient domain all and only the hunks that weigh one kilogram or less. there will be infinitely many such micro-histories. impossibly complicated . that there were infinitely divisible Aristotelian matter. And just try imagining what would be involved in the failure of cat-persistence to supervene upon micro-histories of feline flesh. our sensitivity to the observations that justify belief in cat persistence is not a wholly ‘subrational’ process – we don’t have bare intuitions about cat identities that bypass the evidence of our senses. ZIMMERMAN for human beings to grasp in its details. These similarities and differences are not only completely determined by the microhistories of feline flesh and hair. What if these histories had too little in common for us to make useful generalizations about them? Then wouldn’t they also have too little in common for us to be able to have reasonable convictions concerning when we have or do not have the same cat? I take it that our evidence for sameness of cat comes from observing cats – observing how cat-hair changes color only gradually. cat-flesh. for example. I maintain that. Tibbles survives the routine loss of a single hair. and cat-bone. size. Furthermore. how changes in look or behavior tend to be retained. none the worse . For one thing. perhaps in the form of a brute but non-necessary law of nature. So we have no assurance that a criterion that follows from mereological supervenience could in any sense inform us of anything. what this would mean in the case of the supervenience of cats upon the histories of smallish bits of cat-hair. blood. so there couldn’t be indiscernible micro-histories the one of which provided more evidence for the persistence of a cat than the other. in our world. Consider. Could there be a merely contingent connection. knowing about them is simply a matter of knowing about the micro-history. knowing that there are bits of cat flesh and hair arranged thus and so. say. The micro-histories determine all the observable facts. at least in the case of the sorts of familiar. complex material objects that most interest us. there would be no way to tell the difference between a world in which the law holds and one in which it does not. and bone. The contention here is that the members of L might be such a heterogeneous bunch. and that these bits at one time are suitably related to similar collections of bits at later times. with so little in common.292 DEAN W. shape. that there is nothing more we can say about them than that they happen to be just the set of micro-histories upon which the wholes in question supervene. so no observable differences between such worlds could appear. behavior. etc. connecting micro-histories of cat parts with facts about persisting cats? I doubt it. how cats grow only gradually. that are not grounded in the awareness of similarities and differences with respect to hair-coloring. And indiscernible histories of feline flesh and hair will be indiscernible with respect to the observations of these sorts that they make possible. and arrangements of feline bodily parts. a defeatist attitude towards our ability to grasp what these histories have in common is highly suspect. There’s a familiar objection to views according to which one material object can constitute a distinct one: Since each is just like the other with respect to locally manifest properties. And this requires criteria of unity that can be given in terms of those parts. But it isn’t. for instance – that lack informative criteria of identity? Their answer: No reason at all. Lowe. do not accept this reasoning. But then lifting both should be like lifting 300 pounds.13 reason as follows: there are no informative criteria of identity for persons. say. there would be if persons were large material objects the size of living human bodies. But. digesting the same mouse that Tibbles ate moments before. each is 150 pounds if either is. including Trenton Merricks and E.12 One wonders how they would respond to all this. a cat (a different one) wanders on. she wanders on. in that I have material properties like being six feet tall and weighing 150 pounds. nothing else happens differently. is just a whole made out of suitably arranged cells. when you lift it. The ‘old guard’ objectors to criteria. Of course. 150 pound objects. Unless removal of the hair had resulted in something substantially different in the nonactual world – such as the loss of something like a kitty-soul – this is too wild to countenance as a possibility. Lowe might respond by simply denying that persons need supervene on.15 This objection is not as devastating as I once thought. in some other world – a world in which there are no changes in the laws governing the behavior of feline cells. or any other thing. molecules or cells. OBJECTIONS FROM THE “ IDENTITY MYSTICS ” There are important new voices being raised against criteria of diachronic unity for human beings. etc. therefore a person is not a living human body. But I am unlike the human organism here. J. and the mass of stuff that makes it up. then the micro-histories of these cells determine the histories of wholes with a force stronger than mere nomic necessity. A person like myself is a material object. she’s gone. They ask: Why could there not be large-scale physical objects – six-foot-tall. for we’ve included causal powers of parts in the supervenience base. How might Lowe and Merricks try to resist my argument? I say complex objects made out of parts supervene upon them. and grows a new one. since – on his view14 – persons have neither molecules nor cells nor anything else as parts. – she loses the hair. Take anything with parts that add up to 150 pounds. and poof. growing its new hair. you lift something that weighs 150 pounds (the object itself) and . But the new opponents of criteria for persons. 4. such as Chisholm and Swinburne. are dependent upon them. in that I have no parts. If a cat.CRITERIA OF IDENTITY AND THE ‘IDENTITY MYSTICS’ 293 for wear.16 Here’s the problem with it. Since every part of the clay is a part of the statue (or at least is constituted entirely of parts of the statue). It follows from Lowe’s view. And suppose you insist that it is a proper part of the organism. they had better have some physical parts. Could the simple person be a part (proper or improper) of the organism? Not an improper part. the person. the organism then consists of all the cells. Or. If. Ignore that extra part for a moment. a 150-pound hunk of clay and the 150-pound statue made from it – following such principles gives the right results. by the transitivity of ‘part’. of atomic parts. Notice. There are a number of principles that will insure this doesn’t happen. nonetheless there are no informative criteria of . plus this ‘extra’ part. But the organism is not simple. that there really are two wholly distinct objects here. and so on. should still weigh 300 pounds. you shouldn’t add the weight of any hunk of clay to the reading of 150 pounds that results from weighing the statue ‘alone’. Well. plus the person (which has no part in common with it). Now. The fact that both can be lifted so easily constitutes an empirical refutation of his theory. a fortiori it has no part (proper or improper) of the coincident hunk of matter or human organism as a proper part. a person and a living human organism. so this seems ruled out. one must never add the weight of one to the weight of another if the one is part of the other. persons are to be material objects coincident with these gross physical bodies. say: ‘Weigh only the biggest member’. Since the 150-pound person doesn’t have any proper parts. however. then. Applying the ‘don’t count common parts’ principle for figuring weights doesn’t help. and what’s left of the organism still weighs 150 pounds. Could it have the organism as a whole as an improper part? Then the organism would be its sole part. So the remainder reached by subtracting the person from the whole (a remainder which sure looks like a living human organism – so far as I can see. in the normal case of coincident objects – say. there is no independent motivation for saying that the organism has a simple person as a part). ZIMMERMAN something that weighs 100 pounds (its bottom two-thirds) and something that weighs 50 pounds (its top one-third). then. if all the parts in a set are constituted.294 DEAN W. one can simply say: ‘Add the weights of all the smallest parts of anything in the set’. And this takes us to Trenton Merricks’s view: although human persons are wholes made entirely of living cells. so why doesn’t that take 300pounds’-worth of effort? Answer: because the ‘extra’ things lifted were just parts of the whole. for the reasons just mentioned. if there’s one member that has every other member as a part. molecules. each weighing 150 pounds but sharing no parts in common. So in figuring how much work it will take to lift a given collection of objects. ultimately. what happens when we accuse Lowe of countenancing distinct objects with weights that don’t add up. For instance. one of which is the history of a single human being. It amounts to the claim that everything could have been the same with respect to all the histories of human cells everywhere (recall that there is now no limit to the range of spatial relations to other cells that can be generalized and included in the supervenience base). can pass from one set of parts to another like shadows. we should allow generalized spatial relations in the supervenience base. but also partly the history of a proper part of a cat (all of Tibbles but her tail). the other of which is not a history of a whole cat at all – rather. it is partly the history of a whole cat. But once extrinsic determiners are let in. the other not. above. then worlds that are ‘globally indiscernible’ with respect to what goes on at the level of these parts had better be ‘globally indiscernible’ with respect to what goes on at the level of wholes. How could human beings be made completely out of cells. and yet there be some persons missing from the world.CRITERIA OF IDENTITY AND THE ‘IDENTITY MYSTICS’ 295 diachronic unity for persons. Now if extrinsic determiners were excluded from the supervenience base. 5. the one of which is the history of a cat that loses her tail. one could imagine cases that might fit this bill. To claim that it’s possible for there to have been differences in when and where persons are constituted by cells even if everything had been the same at the level of cells is to promulgate a kind of ‘identity mysticism’. denying diachronic supervenience of persons on their cells becomes truly heroic. leads one very naturally to conclude that no interesting kind of whole supervenes synchronically upon just the intrinsic properties of and spatial relations among objects in the domain of parts. human beings do not supervene mereologically upon their cells. This implies that (DS) is false for the domains of persons and living cells – that is. But recall what this would mean: there are indiscernible micro-histories telling precisely the same stories about cells. but they can come loose from their parts. Supposing we buy this possibility. Persons are material objects. INTRINSIC CRITERIA OF UNITY ? Accepting the moral drawn from the case of Tibbles. Sortal properties for complex objects appear to be extrinsically sensitive in the following sense: . Remember Tibbles and her tail: there might be indiscernible micro-histories involving feline cells. yet float free in this way from their parts? If certain kinds of wholes are made entirely out of certain kinds of parts. or some extra ones appearing. or that some parts of the tail cells are coincident with some parts of some members of S. and then come to constitute x itself at t ∗ . we must admit that being a cat does not supervene upon intrinsic determiners alone – the criterion of synchronic unity for cats must include extrinsic determiners as well. and (2) has a proper part y that is not a C but is constituted by some set S of members of (D1) that is possibly such that: (a) it will constitute x. during which the particles in the tail-cells could be gone but before which their absence would not be registered by any intrinsic changes in S. it would seem that there must be a time-lag. for the moment. and S be the set of all Tibbles’s cells except for those in her tail. and a set could constitute a part of some x that is a C at t. But aren’t all of the particles that make up the tail-cells at some distance from the particles that make up the cells in S? If so. but without a tail (or at least a part of a tail) attached. Let x be Tibbles with a tail. then. then any criterion of synchronic unity that appeals in an essential way to causal relations is in danger of being extrinsically sensitive. however.296 (D7) DEAN W. intrinsically just as it is? If so. leaving S. Are there ways in which this conclusion could be avoided? One could insist that the instant the cells in question cease to be parts of the cat. this is possible – as two homes may share a common wall. something changes somewhere in the cells that remain. and be intrinsically just the same at t and t ∗ . This will require either instantaneous causation at a distance. (b) x will be a C. A natural response to this argument is to balk at the alleged possibility described: it is impossible for there to be a set of cells intrinsically just like S is now. and (c) S will exemplify a set-theoretic complete specification (extrinsic determiners excluded) that is indiscernible from the one it exemplifies while constituting the proper part y. be chosen in such a way that none shares parts with . unless we want to say that S constitutes a cat even now (with the tail still attached). however small. The members of the supervenience base can. ZIMMERMAN Being a C is extrinsically sensitive =df being a C is possibly such that there is an object x which: (1) is a C. I take it that the latter is preferable. Given that causal influence takes a finite time to be felt. couldn’t the cells in the tail have been annihilated or have jumped away by some freak of quantum mechanics. If causation does not propagate instantaneously. An extrinsically sensitive C is one that a thing can lack just in virtue of being a proper part of a C. Consider the synchronic complete specification S exemplifies now (absent extrinsic determiners). But can there really be parts of one cell coincident with parts of another? If they share some parts in common. ‘Do the members of S compose a whole?’. What’s more. of different kinds but otherwise exactly alike. masses of matter aren’t like cats and ships. But that’s impossible. So whether or not the members of S compose something does not depend on relations to things outside the group. By my lights. or even could be there. in the same place at the same time. they don’t cease to be when scattered. This mass of matter is itself physical. Now if the members of S compose a whole distinct from the mass of matter. In other words.17 But here’s the bare bones of my reasoning: . they’re not sensitive to extrinsic factors. then any set of parts of x that either does constitute or could constitute a C must be such that the C they do or would constitute would be distinct from x. naturally. Collections of objects only compose masses of matter. for every collection of objects. is just the mass of matter. in fact.CRITERIA OF IDENTITY AND THE ‘IDENTITY MYSTICS’ 297 any other. This may require arbitrary stipulation about where one cell ends and another begins. something very much like mereological essentialism must be true for things of kind C. so. or when other things are attached to them or detached from them. I have defended this thesis at great length elsewhere. I am inclined to accept all this. So the only object that’s really there. There are at least two spots where this train slows down enough for almost everyone but me to jump off. there is also a question concerning whether a certain mass of matter composes a whole – the mass of matter composed of all the bits of stuff that constitute the members of the collection. since I think there are independent reasons to be a mereological essentialist. all principles of synchronic unity are intrinsic. Let me briefly recount them: Whenever there is a question concerning whether a certain collection of objects composes a whole. the answer is always ‘Yes’ – because there’s bound to be a mass of matter that is identical with the sum of the members of S. whenever one asks. and (according to me) itself a whole – not a collection or plurality. and with such relentlessness of detail as to put off almost everyone who has tried to work out my argument (always a good defensive strategy). The first is at the point where I say that. This does not bother me. but that shouldn’t effect the truth of the supervenience thesis. it doesn’t even depend upon relations (other than mere coexistence) to things inside the group. but to insist that criteria of synchronic unity are intrinsic nonetheless. So if x is a C. there is a mass of matter that is the sum of those objects. then there would be two physical objects. then. no C can contain smaller parts that could come to constitute it without changing intrinsically. But then what sorts of complex wholes could there be – what kinds of complex things are not extrinsically sensitive? In order that a kind C not be extrinsically sensitive. ’ A leading feature of masses is their mereological rigidity: we are unwilling to allow that I still have precisely the same water he gave me if I’ve spilled even a few drops. only contingently false. but are instead of the same kind through and through. although I may still have most of the water he gave me. if not precisely for us (perhaps we are necessarily constituted by electrons and quarks. what Aristotle called ‘homeomerous substances’ – homogeneous stuffs that don’t break down into simple atoms. both a human being that can gain or lose parts and a mass of matter that cannot. in the same place at the same time. Solving metaphysical problems of constitution requires that one take into account the possibility of Aristotelian stuff-kinds. to do duty for the mass of K. there could have been. and so can be treated as sets of atoms. it turns out that any portion of K you pick is in fact a whole that cannot gain or lose parts. cannot survive the gain or loss of any parts. The friends of temporal parts say both can be there because. these ersatz-atoms. there’s just one thing filling that place – a single temporal part shared between four-dimensional objects that diverge before and after the time in question. But.298 DEAN W. Couldn’t things have turned out differently for us? Or. ‘He gave me some water. if false. The second point at which many philosophers would jump off is at the rejection of coincident entities. ZIMMERMAN A mass of matter is simply the kind of thing that we refer to by mass terms preceded by ‘the’ or an unstressed ‘some’ – as in. since the grid used to select the ersatz-atoms was chosen arbitrarily. at least for beings just like us in every way that matters? And so I plump for a theory of masses that treats all the most fundamental material stuff-kinds as physical wholes. but I say this couldn’t be so. It would be absurdly parochial to rest content with the reflection that the heaps of matter of which we are constituted do not appear to be homeomerous. when we talk in this way of some water or the copper in the statue. Now some philosophers want to say we’re picking out pluralities. there can be two physical wholes here with differing persistence conditions. Others who. Nor would it be safe to pick a set of parts of some arbitrary size and use those as ‘ersatz-atoms’. Here’s why: Aristotelian theories of matter are. I say there can’t be. not wholes. not collections of atoms. but weighing the same . which I mixed with the water from Heraclitus’ tub. at least not in general. reject temporal parts are nonetheless friends of coincident objects. themselves necessarily indivisible). like intersecting roads with a single square of pavement in common. After all. like me. perhaps even are. An artifact or organism made out of some such stuff-kind K would be constituted by a mass of matter that could not be identified with a plurality of smallest K-parts. really. The human being and the stuff she is now made of overlap for a tiny stretch of space-time. then the object constituted by S in w1 is indiscernible with respect to A-properties from the one constituted by S ∗ in w2”. This sort of brute difference between intrinsically indiscernible physical things is. 5 Cf. there would seem to be no way to exclude them from criteria of diachronic unity. since I do not want to alienate the friends of coincident objects – at least not at this point. or processes passing through various parcels of stuff – in something like the way a hurricane is a process that passes through many different tracts of air and water. there must be some persistence-condition-determining sortal property that such a creature would share with ordinary cats. 2 Compare Noonan (1989. and thus no principled way to resist ‘best candidate’ theories of identity. Kim (1993b).18 What motivates their commitment? One factor is probably this: Once extrinsic determiners are allowed to play a role in criteria of synchronic unity. But it could mate with ordinary cats. 3 Lewis (1983). and produce cat-like offspring. 7 I do not say “if either constitutes an object. at some level. . even if it were not generated from ordinary cat DNA? Some say “no” – it’s not a cat unless it’s a descendent of ordinary earthly cats. and also from very detailed comments on an early draft from Trenton Merricks and Loretta Torrago. 161–162). Garden variety objects that ostensibly gain and lose parts over time must be logical constructions out of masses. There are many who would reject this argument for mereological essentialism but insist that criteria of synchronic unity are intrinsic. The scheme developed in this section is foreshadowed in Zimmerman (1997a). NOTES ∗ I have benefited from the criticisms and questions of my commentator and members of the audience in Innsbruck. So I see no choice but to stay on the train until the last stop: The only true principles of synchronic unity are ones that yield masses of matter. beyond my comprehension. A similar complication appears in (DS). Surely the animal would have the same persistence conditions as ordinary cats. The paper was also read at Purdue University. I would argue. 6 Would any animal physically indiscernible from an ordinary cat still be a cat.CRITERIA OF IDENTITY AND THE ‘IDENTITY MYSTICS’ 299 amount and sharing. I fear. 4 See Appendix 1 of Zimmerman (1997a) and Langton et al. 1 I defend this assumption in Zimmerman (1997b). So. (1997). But I do not pretend to have shown this here. all the same parts. I suspect that anyone who rejects both the doctrine of temporal parts and ‘best candidate’ theories of identity will be forced inexorably towards mereological essentialism. and others provided some very helpful criticisms and suggestions. Martin Curd. I am indebted to Franklin Mason for pointing out that earlier versions of (SS) and (DS) presupposed that there are no coincident objects differing in sortal and other properties. where Franklin Mason. : 1983. at this point. E. Basil Blackwell. R. 12–13). 333–45. Kim.: 1996. 2). Zimmerman (1995a). Mavrodes. couldn’t there be a block of marble just like the David. University of Minnesota Press.: 1989. then. Kim. 25–41 and 119–28. J. REFERENCES Chisholm. J. in the case of single-domain supervenience. Kim. 121–137). e. 27–39. ‘The Life Everlasting and the Bodily Criterion of Identity’. For an account of the incident. 10 Artifacts might be thought to represent a counterexample to this claim.: 1998. How could such a ‘change’ really represent a difference in the number of objects there are? And aren’t all artworks and artifacts on a continuum with such frivolous cases of ‘creation’? 11 I leave open the possibility that more than one object be constituted by U ’s exemplification of T . Kinds of Being.g. and Lewis.. E. 18 Compare. Lowe (1989. Philosophy 58. J. Cambridge. See Swinburne (1997) and Chisholm (1989). 14 See Lowe (1996. to presuppose the falsity of a metaphysics of coincident objects. ch. J. 53–78. Lowe (1996. Consider the ease with which a piece of driftwood or a urinal may be ‘turned into’ a piece of art. while Chisholm. van Inwagen (1990. On Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press. logical constructions out of objects and times.: 1989. 109– 30. reprinted in Kim (1993a). and Mackenzie (1983) 161–174). 17 Cf. 161–74. . wants to leave open the more bizarre possibility that persons are tiny physical particles. Minneapolis. 106–24. Peter Geach was chief investigator. related in the same ways to other bits of marble as the David. T. 2). Cambridge University Press. but not a statue? I take this failure of supervenience as just another reason to think that artifacts and artworks are fictions. reprinted in Kim (1993a). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58. 12 Cf. Lowe. pp. Wiggins (1968).: 1993b. 9 My strategy here should be compared with Kim’s (1993c) for proving. ZIMMERMAN 8 Poor Tibbles wandered into a philosophical laboratory by accident back in the sixties. ‘Supervenience for Multiple Domains’. ch. 85–93) and (1995b).300 DEAN W. is that persons are (or at least have) an immaterial part. ‘Defining “Intrinsic” ’. cf. 13 Swinburne concludes that the only live possibility. in some moods at least. Merricks (1998). Cambridge. Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Langton. pp. Noûs 32. ‘Concepts of Supervenience’. Zimmerman (1995a. Noûs 11. pp. Oderberg (1993).: 1998. D. 16 Thanks to Peter van Inwagen and Peter Simons for making me see this. M.: 1993c.: 1993a. there is no need.: 1977. Subjects of Experience. There is considerable skepticism about the availability of informative criteria of identity in Mavrodes (1977) and Quinn (1978). ‘Personal Identity and the Imagination’. R. that supervening properties are equivalent to disjunctions of “maximal B-properties” (the strongest consistent properties constructible from properties in the supervenience base). J. Mackenzie. I. T. ‘There are no Criteria of Identity Over Time’. P. Lowe. Merricks. G. 15 Cf. Oxford. La Salle. A. D.4@nd. Philosophical Review 77.) Metaphysik – Neue Zugänge zu alten Fragen. D. Zimmerman. Simons (eds. revised ed. Bodily Continuity and Resurrection’. in L. ‘Immanent Causation’. pp. Zimmerman. R.CRITERIA OF IDENTITY AND THE ‘IDENTITY MYSTICS’ 301 Noonan.: 1997.: 1990. Material Beings. Personal Identity. The Philosophical Review 104. 433–71. Oxford. H. D. Martin’s Press. D. London. 90–5. pp. in J. ‘Theories of Masses and Problems of Constitution’. Zimmerman. Cornell University Press. The Philosophy of Roderick M. E. Augustin. Routledge. ‘Ist ein Körper-Austausch möglich? Kommentar zu Peter van Inwagen’. Ithaca. Quinn. ‘Personal Identity. D. 53–110.).: 1978.Zimmerman. D. Van Inwagen. L. The Evolution of the Soul. Zimmerman. Brandl. S.W. The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time. W. New York. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9.: 1968. ‘Chisholm and the Essences of Events’. Hieke. IN 46556 USA E-mail: Dean.. pp. Open Court. Causation. Department of Philosophy University of Notre Dame Notre Dame. W.edu . and P. St. and World). Illinois. Oderberg. pp.: 1997a. Noûs supplementary volume (Philosophical Perspectives.: 1993. Wiggins. Swinburne. P. 11: Mind. New York. Hahn (ed. 265–68. Vol. W. 145–60. ‘On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time’. Academia Verlag. St. Clarendon Press. 73–100.: 1995a. Chisholm. 101–13. W.: 1997b.: 1989. P.: 1995b. 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