Zhukov, Manstein, and their Masterful Battles of the Eastern Frontby Cheezy the Wiz Wars are started by politicians, fought by men, and dictated by generals. To understand the course of a war, it is important to understand its generals. On the Eastern Front of the European Theater of World War II, two generals came to the fore as being the most capable, the most influential, and most studied of the conflict: Marshals Erich von Manstein of Germany, and Georgy Zhukov of the Soviet Union. Through these men, their political masters’ ambitions on the battlefield were sought. Three specific battles in particular are worthy of examination in any prudent comparative study of these two men: for Marshal von Manstein, the Third Battle of Kharkov, in February and March 1943, stands above the rest as his greatest field maneuver; for Marshal Zhukov, his defense of the Russian capital of Moscow during the fall of 1941 and winter of 1942. However, these men also had the fortune of directly opposing one another on the field of battle in July and August 1943, at the climactic battle of Kursk, in the heartland of the Soviet Union. By examining these three battles and the genius behind them, we hope to gain a better understanding of these two pivotal figures in military, and world, history. The military history of Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov begins in the First World War. Zhukov fought as a non-commissioned officer in a cavalry unit: the Novgorod Dragoons. During his service he was awarded two Orders of St. George, the highest Czarist military decoration. When civil war broke out in 1918, Zhukov joined the Red Army, and fought at Tsaritsyn in 1919. It was here that he first met two men who would become pivotal in his life: Josef Stalin and Semyon Timoshenko, who would be his senior officer both during the civil war, and in 1941 at the outset of the German invasion. During the civil war, Zhukov rose to the position of squadron commander. After the war, in 1928, he entered into the Frunze Military Academy, the Soviet General Staff School. While there, he studied under the German general Hans von Seeckt. During the 1930s, he was sent to Spain to observe German, Italian, and Russian armored tactics in combat; he also was part of a delegation sent to China to study Japanese military techniques. These two experiences, in addition to his staff schooling, would greatly aid Zhukov in expanding his understanding of battlefield tactics and strategy, but would also expose him to the battlefield habits of other nations he would one day face on the field. In July 1938, Marshal Zhukov took command of the Soviet 1st Army Group in KhalkhinGol, on the Mongolian frontier with Japan. There he commanded the Soviet forces in an undeclared war with the Japanese for several weeks. It was here that he was able to develop and refine his strategic style. The definitive “Zhukov style” is a time consuming, yet effective method, if certain circumstances are provided. While maintaining a defensive posture, Zhukov stockpiled vast reserves of men and materiel until he obtained a definitive superiority of fire and manpower. When this buildup was complete, he threw his enormous numerical superiority into the fray, quickly smashing the enemy and scattering them. It is this pattern that Zhukov would use again and again throughout his military career. At Khalkhin-Gol, Zhukov demonstrated another of his defining traits: a willingness to take human losses. “If we come to a minefield,” he said, “our infantry attack exactly as if it were not there…the losses we get from personnel mines we consider only equal to those we would have gotten from machine guns and artillery if the Germans had chosen to defend the area with strong bodies of troops instead of minefields.” Historian John Erickson described the Khalkhin-Gol operation as “brilliant but costly.” Unfortunately for his men, this was another of Zhukov’s battlefield patterns. When the Winter War with Finland broke out, Zhukov was sent to be Marshal Zhukov’s forces constituted six full armies. and began to rise through the ranks. and Zhukov received Timoshenko’s position in Kiev. After the invasion of Poland. The function of this force was to act a breakwater to enemy penetrations of the main front and. in Stalin’s famous way of doing things. if there were no penetrations. having been commissioned and promoted to lieutenant in that time period. to deliver a counterthrust. he must relieve Paulus’ 6th Army trapped inside Stalingrad. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was destined to be a general before he was born. The young Manstein entered the corps of cadets at Plön in 1900. It was here that that Zhukov met Nikita Khrushchev. He was also closely related to Paul von Hindenburg. 1941. as he was then sent south to command the newly organized Army Group Don. The strategy their work produced came to be called the “Manstein Plan.” Because of its enormous success. the Prussian Generalfieldmarschall and second President of the Weimar Republic. penetrating deep into Russian-occupied Poland. In January 1941. and bringing the Germans juggernaut to a halt. Hitler had him promoted to General. one month after the German invasion began. the “gateway to Moscow. and may have kept Germany in the war. who was at the time merely in charge of the Party branch in the Ukrainian capital. and the War Academy in 1913. 1941. immediately depriving Meretskov of this position. Manstein’s corps enjoyed considerable success. Here he was charged with two orders of duty: first. he then cooperated with von Rundstedt and Guderian in forming and reforming the plans for Operation Fall Gelb. In the towns surrounding Moscow in the fall of 1941. second. where he remained for the duration of the war.” fall. On . Marshal Kiril Meretskov botched a report to Stalin on a previous war games session and so. and sent to produce similar results in the siege of Leningrad. centered on the town of Rzhev. In 1938. and placed him in command of the 56th Panzer Corps. imbedded deep in the Caucasus range but quickly making for the Don River. he received a promotion to Generalfieldmarschall. preventing an even greater tragedy than that which had befallen the Stalingrad front. but his grandfather had commanded an army corps during the Franco-Prussian War. when Operation Barbarossa began. Such a creation is a common Russian military practice. Zhukov prevented catastrophe by saving the Russian capital. In 1939. It was this position which Zhukov occupied on June 22. His work with Army Group Don was widely acclaimed. While he was unable to reach Paulus in time to prevent capitulation. Through this restructuring. Timoshenko became Defense Commissar. After his completion of this task in July 1942. however. When Operation Barbarossa began on 22 June. and saved the Soviet Union from collapse during the first winter of the Great Patriotic War. Marshal Zhukov’s entry into this theater began on July 30. His stay in the north would not last long. and charged with the task of taking the Crimean Peninsula and the impregnable fortress-city of Sevastopol. but their sacrifice bought the Russian valuable time. Not only were his father and uncle generals. he prevented the capture of Rostov until most of Hoth’s forces were evacuated. many office positions were shuffled around as the Soviet military leadership realized its outdated system of warfare. In September. he was severely wounded and returned to service in 1915 as a staff officer. many miles behind the active front. Zhukov was placed in command of the Reserve Front. 1941. These forces were to halt a German advance toward Moscow should the city of Smolensk. he was given command of the 11th Army. he attained the rank of brigadier general. he served as Chief of Staff to Karl Rudolph Gerd von Rundstedt during Operation Fall Weiβ. The costs in manpower and machines were astounding. he helped in the formation of the Reichswehr. While serving on the Western Front. he must aid in the salvation of Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army. the invasion of France. After the war was over. the future Premier of the Soviet Union.Timoshenko’s Chief of Staff. After that short but disastrous war was over. he appointed Zhukov as the Chief in Staff of the High Command. 000 were trained to fight.700 tanks and self-propelled guns. miles of barbed wire. and on the outskirts. saved Moscow more than anything. by the time contact was reestablished. four new armies had been raised. on the southern approaches to Moscow.” Through the end of October and beginning of November. and 19. and . The Russian forces assigned to halt this offensive numbered twelve armies. the Germans had wedged between the 43rd and 24th Armies.000 artillery pieces. These new forces were concentrated around the flat westerly approaches to Moscow. was renewed on September 30. though. however. and for the fortifications around Moscow to be completed. The total Russian forces in the region constituted a force of 800. An additional 100. We have suffered a serious defeat. and the muds freeze in early November. the Bryansk Front collapsed when Heinz Guderian took the undefended city of Orel. or the troops from the Far East arrived.August 9. Fedor von Bock’s Army Group Center was clearly superior. complimented by the Second Air Fleet under Kesselring. he ordered his forces to establish defensive positions. The eastern end of Army Group Center advanced to the city of Tula. Zhukov began the construction of massive fortifications on the approaches to Moscow. rapidly falling temperatures yield snowfall. The Russians obtained valuable time for reorganization during the muddy season at the end of October. this function was put to the test. At this time. however. this was fortunate. This would have to do. 16 tank brigades. Fiery and stubborn defense prevented German occupation of the city and tied down their right flank. and 9150 guns. in the city itself. creating an additional 90. 1. All the sacrifices and efforts of our brilliant troops have failed. This incredibly massive concentration of forces constituted 40% of all Russian troops at the time. In anticipation of this massive assault. By mid-October. These stubborn units tied up vast numbers of German forces that could have otherwise been used to hasten the drive against Moscow. The German advance inexorably continued. Zhukov argued. and 40 artillery regiments. totaling more than one million men. holding on for dear life. These defense lines included 1928 artillery emplacements. held a much more defensible position than before. The German offensive on the Bryansk Front. a double-echeloned ring of defenses surrounded Moscow. Zhukov was able to organize another 5 divisions purely from the Muscovite populace. writing that “The offensive on Moscow has ended. and Moscow’s title of “Hero City” is just as much deserved by Tula. spreading chaos through the Russian lines. especially tanks and trucks. when several tank units arrived from the Leningrad front. including remnants of the surrounded armies to the west. When Guderian failed to take the city in December. however short-lived. By mid-November. to the south of Rzhev. for they first encountered German forces on the 16th of November. They bought Zhukov valuable time to organize a real defense of the city.000 men. The night of October 4-5 Zhukov described as being “the most alarming of the war” This was because the Russian High Command had no contact with the front lines at all. This mud. Zhukov’s front successfully stemmed the German advance. and bogged down Army Group Center just west of Rzhev. and 35% of all tanks and planes. however. was responsible for the loss of huge numbers of mechanical equipment. but not organized into units. and a 15-mile long armored column was moving east unmolested towards Moscow. so reserve units were quickly brought up to defend the most essential roads to the city. However. The time to raise these units had been bought by the extended resistance of the surrounded field armies on the Bryansk and Western fronts. On October 3. Stalin and Zhukov realized something must quickly be done. 770 tanks. a decidedly inadequate force for proper defense.000 men for defense. there were no Russian units between them and Moscow. The resistance of Tula. and the troops occupying them. these units only totaled 14 infantry divisions. until more reserves could be raised. 500 gun. however. decisive. driving west from the Mius River area. Heavy snows further inhibited movements. He believed human life to be the necessary price to win a war. though inferior in numbers to that enemy. these two have more in common with their nemesis in Berlin than with their comrades on the ground. their forces were still drastically overextended. and the city of Kharkov. a final push for Rzhev failed. and 15. Zhukov employed many of his characteristic tactics in this battle. especially to go on the offensive immediately upon halting the German advance. As soon as they were stopped. It was around this hard point. forcing forward without regard for losses sustained. though it is not his most widely known in the West. While that is true. and forced back to positions around Kharkov. they succeeded in holding the line against the Nazis. The German thrust for Moscow from the northwest was finally halted on 4 December. the fourth largest city in Russia. in the central Ukraine. His operations during March 1943 are characteristic of classic Manstein tactics: swift.anti-tank ditches and obstacles. These forces driving southwest from Belgorod were outflanked. This is again fortunate. hereafter referred to simply as The Battle of Kharkov. 2. as his reserves were depleted. they possessed no significant reserves to back up their line. Having once again stopped the Germans. which Stalin delivered to him by the end of November. Stalin ordered a counterstroke. Of the forthcoming weak offensives. after taking heavy losses from artillery and minefields on the very outskirts of the city. though. It is true that Zhukov’s actions saved the capital. . While Zhukov protested this insistence. Through the cold January on 1942. by Manstein’s Army Group Don. containing the 3rd Russian Tank Army. it appears to be due to strategic realities. however. When German forces finally met these works in midNovember. German losses sustained in the campaign were staggering: 500. knowing the Germans were illequipped to deal with the harsh Russian winter. the only one which achieved any success is on the Northwest Front. began with the Soviet “Operation STAR. and assigned to areas much too large for them to properly defend. delivering a deadly blow to the enemy’s most vulnerable point. and the troops that were available were stretched very thinly. and exact. The ultimate goal of this was to reach the Black Sea and outflank most of Army Group B. for the final German assault began on 1 December. and that they had sustained enormous losses. In March and April. It is also true. fueled by new levies and reserves from the East. bringing the Russian advance to a halt. Kalinin. and arguably the Soviet Union. that Zhukov received an extraordinary amount of pressure from Stalin during the operations around Moscow. The Third Battle of Kharkov is often cited as being Marshal von Manstein’s crowning strategic achievement. albeit for both sides. He requested 2 more armies and 200 tanks. Over the course of the winter. Zhukov slowly pushed the Germans back a distance of 65 miles. The most apparent of these is the pressing advance. The Third Battle of Kharkov. 1300 tanks.000 trucks. Stalin asked Zhukov to go on the offensive. and there only due to the lack of a contiguous German defense line. in this light. but to argue that the ends justify the means is to disregard the value of the individual. the Western. beyond the city of Ostrashkov. Even though the Russians had been forced back into their salient. Zhukov insisted on more men. who was deeply dug in on the Mius River.” a drive south from Voronezh aimed at establishing bridgeheads across the Dnepr River near Denepropetrovsk and Zaprozhye. and Istra fronts slowly advanced west towards Rzhev. The only remaining Russian hard point lay in a small salient immediately south of Kharkov.000 men. that Manstein would construct victory. rather than humanitarian sympathy for his men. it is possible that Zhukov’s understanding of this maxim was too literal. before the German drive for Stalingrad began. Further. With Manstein’s quick penetration north. Manstein’s victory at Kharkov was also very much of his own design. As the 38th and 40th Armies rejoined their comrades in the Kursk salient.Manstein’s plan first involved amassing forces in a manner similar to Zhukov’s at Khalkhin-Gol. is why Manstein stands head and shoulders above the vast majority of men who have ever commanded a fighting force. The ability to recognize the vulnerability of the enemy in conjunction with the presented opportunity such as that found in the Kharkov salient. penetrating blow often separated into several prongs. Normally. but instead. “…with the exception of Stalingrad. however. Manstein’s outstretched left arm. under-equipped.” The Soviets invited disaster by being too ambitious in their advance west. The German units were well-rested. being unable to coordinate a strike with the 3rd Tank Army against Manstein’s left arm. because of the location of his strike. Meanwhile. It also isolated the Kursk salient. Manstein’s riposte delivered a sobering blow to the Soviet command. was . and forced them to re-evaluate their goals for the upcoming year. their ranks also included Waffen-SS divisions. by this time both sides had sustained considerable losses. many of which were beyond his control. having been moved southeast in preparation for an offensive of its own. The new units he received were not only fresh and well-rested units. and one east. the morale of the German troops was much higher than their Russian counterparts. though with considerably more urgency time-wise. and thus a valuable prize for Manstein and the Germany Army. the 3rd Tank Army was outflanked. a number of variables allowed the front to stabilize just north of Belgorod. “the Soviet command never managed to coordinate strength and speed when hitting a decisive spot. the Leibstandarte SS Adolph Hitler. aiming for the city of Belgorod. This northwesterly stroke also served to cut both 3rd Tank Army and Kharkov off from the 38th and 40th Armies deeper in the salient to the west. and along the North Donets River. at the base of the Kharkov salient. while the Russian units had been on the front line since the breakout around Voronezh. The Spring thaw was beginning. Within days. isolating one unit from another and disrupting their ability to effectively counterattack. this was only exacerbated by his deep penetration movements. this westerly maneuver would have been precisely where 3rd Soviet Tank Army was. including Hitler’s personal bodyguard. months before. Manstein was successful at Kharkov for a number of reasons. designated “Operation Citadel” by the German High Command. several of the German units were elite units. The Germans were also forced to consolidate their forces after the costly occupation of Kharkov. continued to march north. his drive consisted of two main thrusts: one to drive north and west of Kharkov. In his memoirs.” he states. In addition. the left thrust made easy headway north. These prongs created mini-salients and allowed the creation of multiple pockets of resistance. and was thus flanked on both sides and pummeled into oblivion. and set the stage for the climactic battle there in July and August 1943. Manstein commanded in a manner similar to that of other German generals: a swift. The front thus stabilized ironically at roughly the same position it was in the winter of 1941-42. and liquidated. these two armies were faced with the possibility of being completely isolated and encircled. 1943. In addition. decisive. surrounded. When Manstein began his counteroffensive on 16 February. he was able to place large numbers of Soviet troops in immediate danger. First. an excellently defendable position if being attacked from the east. and momentarily retired to lick their wounds. and to then deliver the decisive blow needed to counteract the enemy’s advance and disrupt his forward momentum. and far from their supply depots. Manstein traced his victory at Kharkov to the failure of Operation STAR. towards Kursk. and the roads become very muddy and inhibit all forms of travel. The Kursk offensive. it found the 3rd Tank Army trapped inside a salient. like a fork stabbing into the enemy’s lines. flanking Kharkov as the Leibstandarte entered the city to subjugate it. including the Leibstandarte and Das Reich panzer grenadiers. and. were forced to hastily withdraw north and east. These units were tired. Regardless. they estimated that the Russians would put considerable energy into fortifying the area. and take the initiative in the fight. First. By doing this. 2009 09:31 PM Interestingly. and a new offensive operation in the east was demanded if they were to regain their lost prestige. and because the Soviets knew the precise locations of German attack. If the Russians took too long to attack. The German plan was a simple one: by attacking from the north and south with two pincers. and the threat of an Allied landing in the West appeared more real than ever before. Hitler was less than fond of giving up land. and it remained their most likely avenue of attack. The Russians had tried before to outflank the Mius River line and take the industrial heartland of the Donets-Dnepr basin. This required letting the Soviets strike first. and so favors a different plan. much had happened since the German victory in March 1943. what Manstein referred to as “the backhand blow. Estimates given in March estimated the time for Citadel to come in mid-late May. Since the Kursk salient was such an obvious point for a military operation. Hitler’s plan was the other possibility: to go on the offensive. . and both Hitler and the OKH were desperate to improve their position as best they could during the upcoming summer offensive season. eliminate any chance of a large Soviet offensive in the summer of 1943. and would hold a large force in reserve with which to counterattack. waiting allowed the Russians time to consolidate their forces. Rumania. There were two possibilities of action for the German Army in the summer of 1943. this was the course of action that much of the high command favored. they would destroy huge numbers of men and equipment. or to hold the line as a secondary defense. Cheezy the Wiz Feb 26. and to switch out beaten units for fresh reserves. and centered in the industrial town of Kursk. The first was what is termed a defensive-offensive action. This also gave them time to collect more of the new Panther and Tiger tanks. and was in danger of soon seeking to quit the war. One of Germany’s chief allies. the Germans ran the risk of an allied landing in the west drawing valuable troops away from the front. if done so in a timely manner. force considerable redistribution of Russian forces to compensate for the deficit. replenish and re-arm. and prevent an offensive by them.the follow-up operation to Manstein’s fantastic riposte at Kharkov-Belgorod. when this happened. The best location of this attack was determined to be the Kursk salient. and then counterattack in turn. However. the Kharkov operation and cold winter months having taken their toll. This served to throw the Russians off-balance. Tunisia had been lost. However. The most likely place for this to occur was in the area of Army Group South. the German OKH correctly guessed the Soviet strategy. a large bulge in the Russian lines produced by the Kharkov operation. and perhaps force the Russians into accepting a stalemate. they aimed to isolate the forces in the Kursk bulge and liquidate them. Hitler decided to take the latter course of action. Germany and the Axis were in desperate need of a morale boost. should the Germans punch through and drive for Voronezh. and into entering peace negotiations. the Germans should conduct an elastic defense and give ground to the Russians. had suffered the horrific loss of two field armies. There were two major disadvantages of this plan.” and beat them in open combat. however. thanks to extensive intelligence. In addition. the Germans had first to reequip their tired and depleted units. the only armor capable of toeing up to the Russian T-34s. fearing it could turn into a rout. it was entirely dependent on the Russians to act first. This was the last year the Germans could hope to operate freely in Russia without being harassed by a large-scale mainland assault by the Allies in the West. probably with many layers of defenses. where Manstein was in command. However. hoping to let them overextend. though slowed by Zhukov’s defenses. During this time. and barbed wire. perhaps even more so than the trademark German blitzkrieg. anti-tank and ant-personnel obstacles. the Orel bulge. The offensive began as planned on 5 July. With victory in their grasp. which contained five corps. 1943. Zhukov elected to follow the same rule he did at Moscow and Stalingrad: let the enemy attack first. When the German forces were finally amassed. and . a gaping hole 35 miles wide opened up in Manstein’s lines. which ran six ranks and 60 kilometers deep. and then strike with stockpiled reserves in the rear. but to stop it outright. and could not be concentrated on the Kursk salient. and though it is slow and. by the end of August to stave off total disaster in the South.When May came. the attack begins. it is nonetheless an effective strategy. and the wiring of all bridges in the area for demolition. however. the sizable forces massing near the two areas of intended penetration readily alerted the Russians to German intentions. as noted above. tank traps.800 tanks. other realities had also doomed the operation: in addition to Kluge making no headway in his pincer. the Germans were not ready as anticipated. and were designed not to bring pause to the German attack. including Panzer Vs and VIs. containing two corps and driving south from the Orel bulge. down to the smallest of details. Continued pressure during August forced further holes. falling upon a severely beaten enemy. his armored forces were bled dry. Being fully aware of the German plans for attack. and a withdrawal of both Manstein’s and Kluge’s forces from the salient to more defensible positions. most of which were Panzers. should push come to shove. bog them down in considerable defensive works. Manstein’s group driving north from Belgorod. Not only did he plan out the defenses. artillery positions. The Soviet story of Kursk begins after the resolution of the 3rd Battle of Kharkov. 267 field pieces. his base of operations. by 8 August. they numbered 59 divisions. and only penetrated nine miles before becoming bogged down in one of the Soviet defensive rings. This time delay allowed them considerably more time to construct their massive defensive works that would ultimately prove to be the doom of the operation. and Manstein was forced to abandon all the gains of the Kharkov operation. including taking 24. and all units knew not only where they were advancing from. to. minefields. Zhukov correctly predicted the location and method of German assault. ran concentrically around the central city of Kursk. However. By this time. all of Kluge’s energy was diverted to staving off disaster at Orel. On 3 August. Included in these concentric fortifications were machine-gun positions which provided overlapping fields of fire. Hitler was forced to call off the operation. Zhukov was able to plan the whole operation from the start. and 1. predictable because the OKH was able to predict his precise plan.000 men as prisoners and destroying 1. Operation Husky had begun: the Allied invasion of Sicily. Hans von Kluge’s force. Helmut Von Moltke the Elder observed that “no battle plan survives contact with the enemy” and his maxim rings true at Kursk. pre-sighted artillery and mortar positions. faced tremendous pressure from a Soviet counterattack. Manstein had inflicted considerable losses on the enemy. As noted earlier. just what the OKH had feared would doom their operation. made considerable headway and. The Soviet counterattack followed thereafter. These fortifications. Hitler orders the immediate end to Operation Citadel. for reasons to be explained later. Zhukov’s plan was to turn the salient into a massive fortress of trenches. It is Zhukov’s distinct style. encountered stiff resistance. A new date was set: 5 July. including the city itself. he also pre-planned all axes of advance. succeeded in breaking through the last defensive ring on 11 July. pillboxes. and to keep them bogged down while reserve units struck at the enemy’s exposed flanks.080 anti-tank guns. and systematically eliminate them. but were provided with up-to-date maps of the location of minefields. and threatening the German salient in a manner similar to that which the Germans had hoped to achieve in Kursk. In the south. If they stood up to tanks. When the Germans finally began to withdraw on 15 July. part of Kluge’s pincers’ failure was attributed to the massive flanking maneuver on his rear. the pre-Kursk line was restored near Belgorod by 23 July. when in fact Manstein possessed the tools to continue his penetration and perhaps link up with Kluge. could also serve as a secondary line of defense to stem the tide of German advance. As noted above. always the master of a fighting withdrawal. and the myriad fortifications addressed above. should some miracle occur in the salient and the Germans bust through. simply as a result of confused orders and planning.” Manstein’s penetration was nonetheless impressive. possessing a ratio of “41 guns and 4 tanks per mile instead of 57 guns and 11 tanks. isolate them from the tanks. re-equipped and re-armed. This reserve force constituted seven full armies. Zhukov also saw to it that all civilians were removed from the area. Zhukov applied a lesson quickly learned from the Kharkov operation: ordering all the units in the Voronezh front (the name for the troops in the Kursk salient) brought to full-strength. Manstein. Zhukov’s counterstroke had begun. but would also give the Russian units closer to the salient room to maneuver. He placed these units deep behind their lines. In addition to preparing the land for the upcoming assault. Anti-tank strong points were focused on the areas deemed most likely avenues of armored advance. Though the operation was indeed a failure for the Germans. anti-tank rifles. along the Don River and in front of Voronezh. This defensive line. called the Reserve Front. Even before the German advance was halted. and provided with considerable numbers of anti-tank weaponry. As noted above. Zhukov misinterpreted the withdrawal as the culmination of failure of Citadel. these two factors combined to create an eight-day delay in the Russian answer to Citadel in the south. Infantry were taught how to use Molotov cocktails more effectively. enormous gains . the Reserve Front armies took longer than expected to reach the Voronezh front. artillery. Zhukov’s plans worked perfectly. The Germans sustained huge losses. When the attack finally came on 5 July. Artillery gunners were bestowed with knowledge of a Tiger tank’s weak spots. In addition to collecting his reserve armies. These areas were reinforced with extra tanks. However. blockaded roads. which must be taken into account. their withdrawal was not entirely due to Russian resistance. inflicted considerably more damage on his Russian pursuers than was expected. as Zhukov implied. with the exception of von Manstein’s momentary penetration in the south.how to get there. as well as the engineering materials they required constructing their fortifications. pressing hard on his lines. In addition. should they need to. All soldiers in the area were provided additional protection by gas mask and chemical ponchos. part of Zhukov’s plan involved a considerable buildup of reserves. the Russians were right on their heels. Zhukov also had his men trained in the art of defensive combat procedure. should the enemy resort to more morally questionable military tactics. and machine gun nests. although he enjoyed a numerical superiority to Kluge’s force. When the offensive finally began on 3 August. six corps. Here they would be safe from German reconnaissance. but rather to the manpower demands placed upon the Germans by the Allied invasion of Sicily. they could engage the infantry that advanced behind them. and an air army. rather than withdrawing. Zhukov also noted that the front where Manstein’s penetration was made was more lightly defended than the rest of the Voronezh front. to stand up to tanks. and more importantly. as well as effective ways of engaging the German heavy tanks. though inflicting many themselves. even though the Germans correctly guessed the presence of Zhukov’s extensive reserves. Works Cited Busse. and apply them in modern or future theaters. but also because the construction of his fortifications did not begin in earnest until May 1943. as at Kharkov. his plan was nonetheless just as effective as if the Germans never knew of it at all.000 field pieces.” so can students of war learn the lessons of war as experienced by the great captains of history. His trademark strategy of maintaining the defensive while organizing a massive buildup of forces to deliver the finishing blow is reminiscent not only to Montgomery’s strategy at El Alamein in October-November 1942. but not much different from Zhukov’s strategy at Kursk. or even defensive ones. 2. Manstein. While it is true that Zhukov emerged victorious in this epic clash of fates. Moltke’s maxim held true. although the Germans were able to inflict massive casualties on the Voronezh front. favored a more careful and calculated style of warfare. Zhukov. when these elements are ensured. edited by . and 3. so was victory.000 tanks and self-propelled guns. while this had the wonderful benefit of keeping the enemy on his toes. though Petain teamed his with an elastic defense similar to Manstein’s favored method. their strategy relied on the elements of surprise and secrecy. and a massive flanking maneuver requiring the evacuation of the long-held Mius River line. It is well worth noting that. “Operation Citadel Overview”. and by the end of August. In Kursk. While not as strictly linear as Montgomery or Eisenhower. favored making swift. but also Petain’s during the Second Battle of the Marne in July-August 1918. so were the Russians in return. to compare and contrast two men who epitomize these schools of thought. and precise. By the end of the operation. the German View. and so his risks seem justified. when pitted against one another on the field of battle. which of these strategies is better is a matter left to personal preference. This stands in stark contrast to Manstein’s style. Zhukov still operated in an older frame of mind.were made. Manstein was successful many times. it is well worth noting that his success was largely due to the fact that he was not only able to correctly guess the axes of German advance. Zhukov and Manstein came from two very different schools of military thought. Each of these strategies was effective within its own ideal environment. and in the north Bryansk and Orel were liberated. when deprived of these elements. and to examine and evaluate how they compare in their ideal environments. I prefer to profit by others’ experience. greater risk often entails greater benefit if you are successful. Though he took many risks. as at Kursk. on the other hand. Belgorod and Kharkov in the south were taken. the Germans were not. and thus the liberation of occupied Ukraine. While the Russians were able to replenish their losses. in the Old Prussian tradition. German losses included 500. becomes significantly strained. That decision can perhaps be made through this method of study. calculating. given Manstein’s depth of penetration even after the defensive echelons had been completed. and so this strategic victory becomes even greater for the Russians. as the German capacity to conduct offensive operations. Manstein preferred to think and act quickly and independently. It seemed to violate von Moltke’s maxim that “No battle plan survives contact with the enemy” in that. There was a distinct advantage to Zhukov’s style of war. The result of this massive counterstroke was the end of German hopes for a victory in the East. he was fortunate that such a development never came to fruition. they might well have broken through and isolated the salient. bold moves at the enemy’s weak points. and that of most German generals of the war. and finally. It was cold. Theodore.000 men. had the Germans been ready as they expected to be at that time. This can be considered quite likely. it in many ways inhibited the ability to cooperate in large groups of like-minded commanders. To quote Otto von Bismarck’s aphorism: “Fools say they learn by experience. Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles. MA. Bernard and Graefe Verlang. The Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study. 1999 Liddell Hart B. Cambridge. Glantz. Harper and Row Publishers. Portland. and Harold S. Lost Victories.. trans. . David M. The Classic Book on Military Strategy. OR. From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations. First Meridian Printing. December 1942-August 1943. 1991. Erich von. Frank Cass Publishers. 2002. Da Capo Press. Munich. and ed. Frank Cass Publishers. Glantz. Manstein. Newton. David M.H. 1969. Zhukov Georgy. 1982. New York. Orenstein. OR.Steven H. 1991. New York. Portland.