Trustees of Princeton UniversityInternational Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation Author(s): Oran R. Young Source: World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Apr., 1980), pp. 331-356 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010108 . Accessed: 04/08/2011 17:20 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected]. Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to World Politics. http://www.jstor.org INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: Problemsof Concept Formation By ORAN R. YOUNG* E live in a worldof international regimes.Some of themdeal with monetaryissues (for example,the BrettonWoods systradein commodities(forexample, tem); othersgoverninternational thecoffeeagreement).Some regimesserveto managethe use of naturalresourcesat theinternational level (forexample,theinternational forwhaling)or to advancethecauseofconservation arrangements (for example,the agreementon polar bears). Still otherregimesaddress problemspertainingto the controlof armamentsat the international level (forexample,thepartialtest-bansystem)or to themanagement of powerwithinthe international community(for example,the neutralizationagreementforSwitzerland).And thereare some internationalregimesthatencompassseveralissueswithinwell-defined geographicalareas (for example,the Spitzbergenagreementand the forAntarctica). arrangement International regimesvarygreatlyin termsof functional scope,areal from the narrow domain,and membership. Functionally, theyrange purviewof the polar bear agreementto the broad concernsof the treatieson Antarcticaand outerspace. The area coveredmay be as domainof theregimeforfursealsin the smallas thehighlyrestricted as thatof the global regimesforinterNorthPacificor as far-flung nationalair transport (the ICAO/IATA system)or forthecontrolof occurswithrespectto membership: nucleartesting.A similardiversity therangerunsfromtwoor threemembers(as in theregimeforhighseasfishingestablished undertheInternational NorthPacificFisheries Convention)to well overa hundredmembers(as in thepartialnuclear test-bansystem).What is moststriking, however,is the sheernumber of international regimes.Far frombeing unusual,theyare common theinternational throughout system. thatscholarshave not focusedmoreintenIt is therefore surprising sivelyon international regimes,and thatmuchof theexistingliterature in analyticterms.During the last on the subjectis weak,particularly severalyears,therehas been a noticeableupsurgeof interestin the * This paperwas preparedfortheannualmeetingof theInternational StudiesAsso- MarchI979. ciation, Toronto, ? i980 ofPrinceton byTheTrustees University WorldPolitics0043-887I/8o/03033I-26$oI.30/I seecontributor Forcopying information, page. theyarerecognized patterns ofpractice aroundwhichexpectations conIt is important aresocialstructures. Russell. xxix. 4 See Young. I (I975). Haas. xxix. No..RichardN. amongothers. Nye.I972)."Prolegomenato the Choice of an InternationalMonetarySystem.Council on ForeignRelations. eds. JohnGerardRuggieand ErnstB. Cooper. In thisessay..i978).Brown. Keohaneand JosephS.xxvii (January ErnstB. KennethDam. see WilliamM.' We nowhavefairly descriptiveaccountsof somespecific regimes2 and somespeculative ideas aboutphenomena suchas regimechange. 63-97. see L. Collective Decision Making: ApplicationsfromPublic Choice Theory (Baltimore: The JohnsHop- kinsUniversity Press.Considering the pervasiveness and importance of regimesat theinternational level. No. As such. to mistake thoughtheoperation contributes to thefulfillment of certain Like other quently functions.ed.i976)."The Management in CyrilE. I55-247.332 WORLD POLITICS extensive studyofinternational regimes.Keohaneand Nye (fn.I977). and Young. InternationalResponses to Robert0. 3 For example."in Clifford S. I977). I47-74. eds. Part II.and making useofsomeformulations I am currently developing at greater length elsewhere. and Weather (Washington: The Brookings Commonsin Institution."in progress. Blackand RichardA.. 24I-82. Ross.E. IV: The Structure of the InternationalEnvironment (Princeton: Princeton University Press. In addition..3 Butthefundamental characterof international regimesremainselusive.It followsthatregimes not of regimesfrethemforfunctions. Outer Space."International Organization.I977). 1 See.the a stateof theexisting literature on themconstitutes underdeveloped seriousdeficiency. "On Systems and International I975). or less be more and they structures.To illustrate. regimes may formally articulated. Young."WorldPolitics. Oil Pollution as an International Problem: A Study of Puget Sound and the Strait of Georgia (Seattle: Universityof ed. Falk.I979). . M.Regimes for the Ocean. Oran R. 2 For a rangeof examples.I975)."Globaland OtherInternational the i980S" (mimeo. i).4 THE CORE CONCEPT theactionsof thoseinterRegimesaresocialinstitutions governing estedin specifiable activities (ormeaningful setsofactivities)." tional Legal Order. of tunity(London: Europa.international regimesforsome time. The North Sea: Challenge and OpporWashington Press. and Arild Underdal. 3 (1975).I976). Sibthorp."International ResourceRegimes."The Politicsof International Management:The Case of the NortheastAtlantic"(unpub. M.then. lawyershave talkedaboutinternational the Maritime of Ocean Resources:RegimesforStructuring Goldie.Power and Interdependence(Boston:Little.I proposeto takesomepreliminarystepstowardfilling thisgapbydrawing on thestudies ofresource I havebeenconducting regimes overa numberofyears.specialissueof InternationalOrganization. Oil Resources(Chicago: University Fisheries Chicago Press.The Futureof theInternaEnvironment. Morse. Technology.F.. and EdwardL. verge. Haas. SeyomBrownand others.I973)."ResourceRegimes:NaturalResources and Institutional Design. Regimes. Resource Management at the International Level: The Case of the NorthPacific(London and New York: Pinterand Nichols.. system 5Among otherthings. components regime The coreof everyinternational i. In formal themembers terms. thoughthepartiescarrying outtheactionsgoverned by international regimesare oftenprivateentities (forexample.INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 333 mayor maynotbe accompanied by explicitorganizational arrangements. Press.forexample.The roleofhuman entitled byvirtueofoccupying is oftensaidto carrywithit a righttolife. theseactors. a feature that is notcharacteristic ofregimes at thedomestic level.In the being. The substantive recomponent. deepseabedmining).i964).A Theory of Justice(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity worldsituations. Press. chap. arrangetheopportunities oftheactors willstructure ina given ments interested willbe a matter andtheirexactcontent ofintense interest to activity. majoradjustments in exchange rates).See RichardA.economic sustained efficiency.III. possibleto enumerate several thatevery international willpossess.it will oftenprovenecessaryto relyon domesticcourtsto regimes. .Y.5 The mereexistence ofa regimewilllendan element oforderliness totheactivity itgoverns. Butthereis no reasontoassumethatregimes willguidehumanactionstowardwell-defined substantive goalssuch as enduring or maximum peace. theseactivities takeplaceentirely outsidethejurisdictional boundaries of sovereign states(forexample. theterms Implementing ofintera two-step national regimes therefore involves procedure.6It is.however.fishing companies. University 6 Actorswill virtually neveroperatebehinda Rawlsian"veil of ignorance"in realSee JohnRawls. thoughactorsinvolved ofanygivenregimewilloftenattempt to shapeits creation orreform withclearcut contents goalsin mind. or involveactionshavinga directimpacton theinterests oftwoor moremembers oftheinternationalcommunity (forexample.orprivate airlines).or cutacrossinternational jurisdictional boundaries (forexample. to whichan actor(individual or otherwise) is A rightis anything a recognized role. Falk. in international enforcetherightsand rulesincorporated N. no intrinsic contains in the or teleological metaphysical orientation. banks.high-seas fishing). theroleofcitizencarries withit theright oftheUnitedStates.Theymaybe moreor less gimeis a collection extensive or formally butsomesuchinstitutional articulated. ofinternational regimes arealwayssovereignstates. yields The concept"regime" fromrenewable resources.: Syracuse The Role of Domestic Courtsin the InternationalLegal Order (Syracuse.I971). International regimes pertain to activities of interest to members of theinternational system. of rightsand rules. Typically. inmatesin prisons. contributions CompareH. includingtherightto protection transacsion. The Conceptof Law (Oxford: .the rightto tradeon favorableterms and therightto withothermembersof theinternational community. Pollution. participatein makingcollectivedecisionsunderthe termsof a given regime.to redefinetherightsof women. 10My use of the concept"rules" differssomewhatfromthat prevalentin recent to jurisprudence.Many rolescarrywiththem bundlesofrightsthatmaybe moreor less extensiveand whoseprecise contentis subjectto changeovertime. 6i-65.and animals. 733-87. 8 Consult. considerable in real-world frequency Severaldifferentiable categoriesof rightsare prominentin internarightsmaytake the formof privateproperty tionalregimes.8Because of the prevalenceof common propertyarrangementsat theinternational regimesoftenemphasize level.the rightto use certaininternational suchrightsare designedto ensurethe availabilityof key resourcesto actorsunderconditionsin whichprivateownershipis infeasible.9But all (for example.the possessionof a rightin no way guaranteesthat an actorwill actuallyreceivethose thingsto whichhe is entitledunderthe termsof the right.see CharlesA. 73 (April i964). of TorontoPress. Hart. x.334 WORLD POLITICS to votein elections. Dales.in somecases.These maybe exclusive thedevelopment of use-and-enjoyment in nature(forexample.A.rightsto commoditiestradedinternationally) to or high-seas rights airspace rights(for example.7Of course. 4 (1972). socialcontexts. We are now witnessingvigorouscampaignsto clarify and.Property.therightto exploita giventracton the deep in non-exclusive terms seabed).children."Property amongothers.Although evenacknowledgedrightsare violatedwith rightsare oftenrespected.Vol. I137-62.Interof othertypesof nationalregimesmay also encompassan assortment againstcertainformsof aggresrights.the rightto speak freely.L.therightto receivespecifiedbenefitsfrominternational tionsor productiveoperations. 9 The resultmightbe describedas a systemof "restricted" commonproperty:see and Prices (Toronto: University J. Reich."The New Property." journal of EconomicLiterature.Property or rights(for example. H. rulesare well-defined guidesto actionor standards settingforthactions that membersof some specifiedsubject under groupare expectedto perform(or to refrainfromperforming) circumstances. or theymay be explicitlyformulated straits). commonproperty fisheries).'0 Any givenrulewill exhibitthefollowing appropriate 7On the notionof bundlesof rights. No.hospital patients. In contrast to rights. EirikFurubotnand SvetozarPejovich.international rights. I968). Rightsand EconomicTheory:A Surveyof RecentLiterature.and the rightto move about at will." Yale Law Journal. Oxford UniversityPress. and (c) a specification ofthecircumstances underwhichtheruleis operative.They rangefromrulesconcerning compensation forexpropriation offoreign investments undervariouscircumstances to rulespertaining to responin the wake of accisibilityforcleaningup maritimeenvironments dents. 85 (April I972). H.LiabilityRules. and Ronald Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously (Cam- bridge:HarvardUniversity Press.membersof the ICAO/IATA systemare required to followcertainsafetyrules in using international airspace. Among the numerousrules associatedwith international regimes." HarvardLaw Review. I-44. chaps. H.Vol. and Guido Calabresiand A. 1 See G. 12 On liability rulesand theirsignificance.INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 335 features: (a) an indication of therelevant subjectgroup. At the domesticlevel. "The Problemof Social Cost.thereare use rules.Or a rule may focuson some specificactivity. In somesocieties. there arenear-universal rulesenjoining individuals to tellthetruthand to in theirdealingswithothermembers keeppromises of the society.Of course. forinstance. Douglas Melamed.First.non-compliance withrulesis a commonoccurrence. iii (October i960). thoseengagedin high seas fishingshouldabide by rulespertaining to theconservation of fishstocks. compareR.Justas rightscommonlysafeguardthe freedomof actorsto behavein certainways.Norm and Actions(New York: HumanitiesPress. i96i).and thoseusinginternational sea lanes are subjectto rules designedto maximize safetyand to minimize marinepollution. as in the case of prescriptions pertainingto civil aviationor maritime commerce.international regimesoftenspecifya varietyof proceduralrules. Even in well-ordered societies.the existenceof an acknowledgedrule does not guaranteethatthe membersof the subjectgroupwill alwayscomply withits requirements.and Inalienability:One View of theCathedral.rulesoftenspell out restrictions on thefreedomof actorsto do as theywish. I089-II28.Frequently.They spell out the locus and extentof liabilityin casesof (usuallyunintended)injuryto othersarisingfrom the actionsof individualpartiesunderthe termsof a regime.i963). von Wright.2 and 3.as in the case of ethicalprescriptions relatingto the behaviorof teachers.(b) a behavioralprescription.12 Finally. esp.1"Liabilityrules constitute a secondcategory.I977).such use rulestake the formof limitationson the exerciseof rights.or lawyers.collectionsof rightsand rulesare commonly supplemented by extensivesetsof regulationsand incentivesystems."Property Rules.whichdeal withthehandlingof disputesor theoperation of explicitorganizationsassociatedwith the regimes. doctors. threegeneralcategoriesare particularly prominent." Journal of Law and Economics.For example. . Coase. A rule may be directedtowardsome clearlydesignatedgroup. I976).see GeorgeStigler.Theyare widelyused to translate rightsand rulesformulated in generaltermsintoworking managerial arrangementsapplicableto real-world situations.the International Fund has promulgated extensive to Monetary regulations pertaining thedrawing rights ofindividual members.are penaltiesand rewardsemployed by publicagencies forthepurpose ofaltering thebehavior ofidentifiable actorsin desired directions.I975). Althoughcollections of rightsand rulesformthesubstantive coreof international regimes. forexample.The Citizenand theState:Essayson Regulation (Chicago:University ofChicagoPress. Aliber. however.Theyrequiretheexistenceof somepublicagencypossessing a measureof authority and power. theyarenot theonlycomponents ofsuchregimes.ig7o). nationalregimesaccompaniedby explicitorganizations can and sometimes do employthesedevices.suchagencies arefarlesscharacteristic ofhighlydecentralized socialsystems liketheinternational thanof themorecentralsystem izedsystems interthatarecommon atthenational level. 16 For a generalanalysis of socialchoice.14 Perhapstheclassiccasesofincentive aretaxesand systems subsidies.RobertZ.The International MoneyGame (New York: BasicBooks. The procedural component. Obviously.Situations ofthistypearisewhenever it is necesto aggregate the (non-identical) saryor desirable preferences of two more or individual actorsintoa groupchoice. A procedural component encompassesrecognized arrangements forresolving situations requiring social or collective choices.13 Incentive on the systems. otherhand. 15 See. theyrangefromtheselection ofindividuals to 13 J use the concept"regulation" in a somewhatdifferent sense than it is used in discussions concerning publicregulationof privateindustries. 14Incentivesystems can also be used to raiseor disburserevenue.For example. K. . and theproposed InternationalSeabedAuthority ofmanwouldbe abletoregulate production ganesenodulesto implement such moregeneralrulesconcerning matters as the impactof deep seabedminingon the worldnickel market. CollectiveChoiceand Social Welfare(San Francisco:Freeman.Nevertheless. For a clear exampleof thisalternative usage."5 2.'6 Suchproblems occur in mostsocialsystems. Sen.Ordinarily.336 WORLD POLITICS areadministrative Regulations directives frompublicagenemanating ciesandspecifying conditions underwhichcertain actorsaretooperate on a day-to-day basis.see A. regulations andincentive systems willbe usedlessextensivelyin conjunction withinternational regimesthanwithregimes at thenationalor subnational operating level.theirprimary purposeis to structure thebehaviorof certaingroupsof actors. 17 Some of thesewill involvethe allocationof factorsof production(for example.Thus. teristicof systemsof thistypeare the "law of capture.and organized violence. The moststrikingfeaturesof theinternational systemin this connectionare its relativelysmall numberof formal membersand its high level of decentralization with respectto the Social choicemechanismscharacdistribution of powerand authority. therewill be cases in whichgroupdecithesortsofresearchactivities sionsarenecessary to determine to permit in an area like Antarctica.Social Choice and IndividualValues(2d ed. .18 Certainconditionsare requiredforthe effective operation of each of these mechanisms. and to organizecollectivesanctionsaimedat obtaining compliancewith the rightsand rulesof an international regime. encompassingsuch devicesas the "law of capture.decisionsrelatingto adjustments ties in connectionwith deep seabed mining).and segmentsof theglobal radiospectrum).administrative decision making.Like othercomponentsof regimes. 17 Problems of social choicepertainingto the selectionand reformof international regimesperse are discussedin a latersectionof thisessay. Nor does thisexhausttherangeof problemsof social choicethatcan be expectedto emergecontinuallyunderthe termsof international regimes.totalallowablecatchesin thefisheries.Other social choice problemswill relateto issueswithexplicitdistributive implications(for in exchangeratesor royalexample. Social choicemechanismsare institutional arrangements specialized to theresolution of problemsof socialchoicearisingwithintheframework of particularregimes.adjudication. 18 The classicstudy(focusingon votingsystems) is KennethArrow.deep seabedminingtracts.and it is typicalfor a regimeto make use of severalat the same time. tionshipsand decidingon thedistribution Severaltypesof problemsrequiringsocialchoicescan be expectedto arise withinthe frameworkof an operativeinternationalregime.The range of these mechanismsis wide.we may thereforeassume that individualmechanismswill be associatedprimarilywith particular typesof socialsystems.unilateralactionbackedby coercion.I963).bargaining."markets.Such problemswill leveldue to theprevato solveat theinternational be especiallydifficult lence of commonratherthan privateproperty.thesewill arisefrom efforts to apply generalrightsand rules to the complexitiesof realworldsituations.."bargaining. Collectivechoiceswill also be requiredin settlingdisputes.INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 337 the termsof tradeforexchangerelafilltop positionsto establishing ofvaluedgoodsand services.voting systems. New York: Wiley.Typically.these mechanismsmay be more or less formalized. to resolveconflicts betweendifferent usesof thesameresource. Accordingly. January I977. Anydiscussionof compliancemustdeal withtheissueof incentives. and land use. "Anarchyand Social Choice: Reflections on the International Polity.forexample. acknowledgedrulesare violatedwithsomefrequency.Such situationsare commonin cases where adjudicationor votingis employedin reachingcollectivechoices. Resources for the Future.20 and evenwidely Rightsare not alwaysrespected. They may relyupon the institutional arrangementsof largersocial structures in dealing with problemsof socialchoice.bargaining. 35L. Nor is it reasonable to assumethattherelevantactorswill simplyaccepttheoutcomes generatedby social choicemechanismsas authoritative. . 24I-63.business Courtof Justice activities." World Politics.In practice. realityseldom approximates the conditionof "perfectcompliance"discussedin Rawls (fn.19 Still. In principle.21 and thissuggestsan examination mechanisms as a thirdmajorcomponentof theseregimes. 3.Voting. Implementation.For example.however."Environmental Managementas a Regulatory Process. xxx (January I978).or theymaysharemechanismswithotherregimes.338 WORLD POLITICS variousformsof coercion.in What are thebenefits contrastto violatingthem?How do individualactorsdecide whether to complywith the substantive provisionsof international regimes? There is a tendencyto assumethatthe typicalactorwill violatesuch 19Young. and abide by them.markets.and coercionare centralto the processesof reaching socialchoiceswithinmostinternational regimes.We should therefore expectimportantproblemsof social choice arisingin internationalregimesto be handledthroughtheseprocedures. 6).variouscombinationsof bargainingand coerciongearedto theproblemsof specificregimesconstitutethenormat theinternational level.the same courts may resolveconflicts of interestpertainingto civil liberties."DiscussionPaper D-4. and costsof complyingwithrightsand rules. 20 That is.and. it is importantto thinkabout the effectiveness of international ofcompliance regimes. 21 aboutdomesticproblems.is of some significance in cases like the InternationalMonetaryFund and theICAO/IATA system. MyrickFreeman. It is also worthnotingthatsomeregimesdo notpossesssocialchoice mechanismsof theirown. to a lesserdegree.proceduresinvolvingvotingand administrative decisionmakingwill not be altogetherabsentin international regimes.theInternational or the GeneralAssemblyof the United Nations could be employed to deal withmanysocialchoiceproblemsarisingunderspecificinternationalregimes.But therecan be no doubtthatunilateral claims. For a similarobservation see A. Smoothlyfunctioning international regimesare difficult to achieve. see AbramChayes.Primitive examples. 85. I-33. 905-69.I977). "The Enforcement tionalLaw journal.Anyexpendiofcompliancemechanisms posesan investment costs.25 theICAO/IATA systemand manyof theregionalfisheries Fromthepointofviewofthemembersofa regime.Actorswill compliancewith the provisionsof international in or this and it seemsrearealm.: Government (Bloomington.or withtheoutcomesgeneratedby itssocialchoicemechanisms. Press. IndianaUniversity Harvard Internaof IATA Agreements."An Enquiryinto the Harvard LIw Review.I979). of self-interest stancesin whichconsiderations on iterativebeespeciallyin conjunctionwith long-runperspectives havior. Tauber.thereis no reasonto assume that individualactors calculationsrelatingto make large numbersof discretebenefit/cost regimes. tureof resourceson suchmechanismswill generateopportunity will virtually and decliningmarginalreturnsfromsuch investments alwaysbecomepronouncedbeforeperfectcomplianceis reached.thedevelopment problem.4 and 5. 23 . No.Ac22 For an intriguing empiricalexample.INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 339 of being caughtin specificinprovisionsso long as the probability stancesis low-a line of reasoningwhichimpliesthatthe availability of enforcement proceduresis essentialto the achievement of effective mark of the wide be quite appears to compliance. Vol. I (i969).It is not difficult will lead to compliance. 24 For empirical see LucyMair. chaps.typicallyrely upon them. esp. i. in whichexplicitagenciesareemployedto gatherinformarangements tion and to inspectthe actionsof individualactors. chap. regimes)." (975). ApplicaA TheorywithInternational Young. rules policies oftendevelopgeneral sonable to expectthat long-termsocializationas well as feelingsof obligationwill play an importantrole in the articulationof these rules. Press.and highlydecentralizedsocial syssystem.Further. 5 Workingsof Arms ControlAgreements.But thisargument to identifycircumin many real-worldsituations.The image thatcomesto mind hereis one of formalgovernmentalagencies.23 tems. No.24 Alternatively.x.but decentralized proceduresare retainedforthe applicationof sanctions(for example.and suchagenciesare no doubttheclassicinstitutions specializingin the achievementof compliance." 25 Ronald S. Complianceand Public Authority. esp. tions(Baltimore:The JohnsHopkinsUniversity Ind.22 pubor setof institutions A compliancemechanismis anyinstitution provisions liclyauthorizedto pursuecompliancewiththe substantive of a regime.But less formalcompliancemechanismsare common.such as the international calculations The resultis apt to be a heavyemphasison self-interest forself-help in theredress coupledwithpubliclyrecognizedprocedures the outcomemay involverelianceon arof wrongs. Exactly theseinvestment decisions madeaboutthe dependson theassumptions members of international In viewof thedecentralization regimes. It is possibleto arguethatsomeregimemustalwaysbe present with respect to anygivenactivity: regimes in extent. Sometimes de novoin theabsenceofpriorexpeactivities areinitiated rience(forexample. Burke.thearrangementforhigh-seas fishing priorto WorldWar II mightbe described as a regime basedon unrestricted common andtheprocedure property knownas the"law ofcapture. i965). however.like othersocial institutions.RichardLegatski.26 Still. I -23I. consultPhilipC. can varygreatly and extreme casescansimply be treated as nullregimes. 27 For a variety of examples.I975)."The UnitedNationsConference on the Law of the Sea. 29 For the background of earlierefforts to reach agreementon a regimefor the territorial sea. Further. Thus. todevelopcompliance mechanisms attempt viocapableofeliminating whereequilibrium willoccurwithrespect to lationsaltogether. Christyand AnthonyScott.varioustypesofcompliance mechanisms do occurat theinternational level.we wouldhaveto developsomefictions about latentor tacitregimes to avoidtheconclusion thattherearesituations in whichno regimeis present.The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press.National and International Law Enforcementin the Ocean (Seattle: University of WashingtonPress. it seemssafetoconcludethat underinvestment in compliance mechanisms of will be characteristic international regimes.29Heretoo. of thatgoeswiththedecentralization ofpowerandauthorresponsibility ityin theinternational system. 28Francis T.The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries (Baltimore:The JohnsHopkinsUniversity Press.see MancurOlson." rather thanas a situation lackingany Butthislineofreasoning leadstoserious operative regime. situation regarding theterritorialsea).340 WORLD POLITICS itis safetoassumethatthemembers ofa regimewillrarely cordingly. Additionally.27 and suchmechanisms mustbe accepted as a thirdmajorcomponent ofinternational regimes.i965).In suchcases. ordeepseabed international satellite broadcasting mining). Woodhead." in Essays on InternationalLaw from the Columbia Law Review (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press. 26 International regimes.see WilliamT. will ordinarilyexhibitthe attributes of collectivegoods (that is. .theconceptwouldhaveto be stretched excesthecontinued sively toassert existence ofa regime.and William W.28 problems. Severalclarifying observations are in orderin closingthissection.i965).leavinga confused andinchoate situation withrespect to someactivity thecurrent (forexample. Jessup.. non-excludability and jointnessof supply) to a highdegree. existing regimessometimes breakdown. avoidtoassumethepresence ingthetemptation ofsomeregimein conjunctionwithevery specifiable activity willfacilitate laterdiscussions ofthe ofregimes origins andofregimetransformation.For further discussionof theproblemsof supplyingcollectivegoods.Jr. This is trueevenofregimes initially formulated in comprehensively somesort of "constitutional" contract.i966).see AnatolRapoport.Two-Person Game Theory (Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress.i976). The development of an international regimeusuallyinvolvesintensebargaining and the outof criticalcompromises hammering amongtheinterested actors. But a failureto bearin mindthedistinction between idealtypesand reality is bound to leadtoconfusion. incorporating elementsderivedfromseveralanalyticconstructs.real-world regimes aretypically unsystematic and ambiguous. forthe required of an international effective operation regimeand the consequences fromitsoperation. This divergence betweentheidealtypesarticulated bystudents ofregimes andthemore inchoate inoperation in real-world regimes situations is partly attributabletomisunderstandings bythosewhomakedecisions aboutregimes. entiate between clearly them. andan absenceofnaturalmonopolies.The Economics of the Public Sector (New York: Wiley. to ensureeffective necessary of sucha regimeincludethe availability operation of information aboutpotential a willingness to acceptthetermsof tradedictrades.by contrast. international regimes evolveand changeover generally timein response to variouseconomicand politicalpressures. Muchofit.and so forth. Furthermore. arisesfromtwootherfactors. man. 31 For a succinct see RobertHaveand clearlywrittendiscussionof such conditions. resulting To illustrate.as wellas tobearinmindthatboththese to the 300n the relationship betweenideal typesand reality. a regimegoverning consider international tradeinsomecommodity basedonprivate property rights anda competitive The conditions market. A dramatic current illustration of thisphenomenon is theongoing bargaining relatingto theproposedInternational SeabedAuthority. Yet. 22-27.30 thereis a difference between theconditions Finally. tatedbythemarket.however. thereis a tendency to focuson highlycoherent and internally consistent constructs. The pointoftheseremarks is neither to criticize nor existing regimes toarguethattheexamination ofidealtypesis unimportant in conjunctionwiththedevelopment of international regimes. sequencesof theoperation relateto the extent towhichityieldseconomically efficient thedegreeto outcomes. .withspecialreference theoryof games. in distributive nessoftheresults Boththeconditerms.regimesgenerallyacquireadditional features andbecomelessconsistent internally. social or whichit produces costs neighborhood theattractiveeffects. tionsforoperation andtheconsequences ofoperation arecentral issues in theanalysis of international Butit is important to differregimes. i86-2I4. Withthepassageof time.31 The conof theregime.INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 341 In analyzing international regimes. in theextentto whichtheyare International regimes varygreatly laid out in formalagreements. .In othercases. or treaties. mayserveeither oftheformal ofambiguous pretations aspects arrangements (forexam32 A regimeforsome naturalresourcewith no privateproperty rights. direction. moreover.and allocationbased on the principleknown as the "law of capture"might approximate thisextremecase. patterns of institutional evolution overtime. conventions. The extent ofa regimeis a matter ofthenumber andrestrictiveness ofitsrights is thecaseofunlimited laissezandrules.International tendto be lessrestrictive tonomy regimes thandomestic theextreme ones.in whichtheactors arecompletely freetodo as theypleasewithAt the outeventheconstraints ofproperty or userights. For example. I." specialreference totheinternational system.Variety withrespect to extent. understandings ofan interwithintheframework established bytheformalstructure interSuchunderstandings toprovide national regime. Forexample.32 ofa system otherextreme arearrangements central anddeemphasizing planning tailedrulesgoverning the actionsof individualmembers.At oneextreme faire. formality. REGIMES IN OPERATION theanalytic with Havingexamined content oftheconcept "regime.buttheydo notgenerally approximate ofunlimitedlaissez-faire. Sometimes thesedifferences areattributable to underlying philosophicalorientations.variations arisefromthe character of specific of settingup bargainsstruckin the processes or fromthe particular regimes. thecurrent to a greaterdegree is formalized regimeforAntarctica thantheneutralization forSwitzerland. Between in terms theseextremes lie variousmixedcasesthataredifferentiable towhichtheyincluderights theauoftheextent andrulesrestricting oftheactors. As in domestic arrangements to arise it is commonforinformal settings.no liability rules. Varietiesof regimes. regimes resting on socialist premises will encompass moreextensive collections ofrulesas wellas moreexplicit efforts todirect behavior towardtheachievement ofgoalsthanlaissezfaireregimesthatemphasizedecentralized decisionmakingand autonomy forindividual actors. letmeturntosomeofthe majorfeatures ofregimes as theyoccurin real-world situations.342 WORLD POLITICS fromefforts issuesareseparable tocharacterize theinstitutional content ofan international regime. andcoherence is a prominent feature ofinternational regimes. 27-101. it mayprovedifficult tomeetunderreal-world conditions. ofincoherence in terms ofthecompromises to achieveinitial necessary of a regime.Thoughitmaybe helpful.Vol. thetreatment of nuclear technology underthe termsof the partialnucleartest-ban regime). commonly of indivisible statesovereignty and theobligations imposedby therules of international It is nothardto accountfortheseelements regimes. Thereare informal regimesthathavebeengenerally and successful. beenarticulated in moreor lessexplicit "constitutional" contracts. and socialforces. Butthewidespread occurrence ofincoherence meansthat 33United Nations. anyapparent directedness ofa regime twoormore encompassing distinct goalswillbe an illusion.. see RichardZeckhauserand Elmer Shaefer. is directed towardtheachievement ofseveral goalsat once.i968).34 whena regime Additionally." Regimesaredirected to theextentthattheyexertpressure on their members to actin conformity withsomeclear-cut socialgoal."An EpitaphfortheConceptof MaximumSustainedYield. thegoal of "optimum" yieldwithrespectto themarinefisheries is notoriously difficult tofulfill in reality.INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 343 ple.35 In theabsenceofsystematic efforts to construct trade-off functions. formalization is clearly nota necessarycondition fortheeffective operation of international regimes. A.Gergen. Bauer and KennethJ. contradictions between userights formarine resources andrights vestedin adjacentcoastalstatestoexcludeoutsiders. io6 (January 1977).however.The StudyofPolicyFormation(New York: Free Press. Severeinternalcontradictionsarecommoninreal-world evenin caseswheretheyhave regimes. 34 P.or in termsof the piecemealevolutionof acceptance regimesovertimein responseto changingpolitical. economic. Larkin.eds. or to supplement formalarrangements by dealing withissuesthattheyfailto cover(forexample. . I-II. Evenwherethereis agreementin principle aboutthepursuitof somesocialgoal. For there areoften example." Transactions of the American Fisheries Society. 35 On the economicapproachto such trade-offs. andso forth."PublicPolicyand NormativeEconomicTheory.Various goalsare feasible-including economicefficiency.closeattentionmustbe paid to the determination of trade-offs amongthese goals."in RaymondA. InternationalCompensation for Fluctuations in Commodity Trade (New York: UnitedNations. conflicts arisebetween theallegedrequirements Similarly.i96i). Coherence refers to thedegreeto whichtheelements of an internationalregimeare internally consistent.thenotionof maximum sustained withthe yieldin conjunction marinefisheries). severalofthecommodity agreements). thereareformal thathaveproduced arrangements results unimpressive (forexample. For example. distributive justice. thepreservation of ecosystems. 344 WORLD POLITICS in constructs tooheavilyon neatanalytic we mustbewareof relying andthatwe mustlearntocopewith situations. oftheirown. structures maymakeuseoforganizational in preferwitha morecomprehensive publicauthority. or associated of theirown. vate-enterprise withtheir arrangements by explicitorganizational be accompanied and so forth. ton:Princeton 36 37 . 2..Situainternational level.38 toenforce couldrelyon somelargerauthority IATA system are eitherlackingor capabilities But comprehensive organizational Thus. in the international underdeveloped severely carriedout activities UnitedNationsis hardlycapableof inspecting Mair (fn. gathering. as thosegoverning othersocialinstitutions-such with effectively behavior tostructure relations-serve intergenerational true Althoughit is undoubtedly littleneedforexplicitorganization.3" "primitive" makinguse of comsystems free-enterprise ofthistype. 21. Falk and RichardBarnet. of marketsin preciselytheseterms. vital performing areclassiccasesofsocialinstitutions markets petitive Many organization. involvefewerexplicitorcharacteristically regimes thatinternational not it is important regimes. regimes Evenwherea needforexplicitorganization createdforotherpurposes.eds. theexistence prievenhighlydecentralized All regimes. SeabedAuthority withtheproposed International is apparent. specializing andenforcement toagencies ment. organization. Explicit buttheyneednot aresocialinstitutions.The explicitorganizations to carrythisgeneralization nottrivial. 31).arms-control mentsoccurfrequently and the ICAO/ procedures.and manners.Security in Disarmament (PrinceUniversity Press. fora description 38 See RichardA. tasksthatinvolveinformation so that in thesematters. couldmakeuseofmoregeneralinspection itsrules. 24). are commonto arrangements organizational lackingexplicit regimes to societies confined no means are by butthey societies.Suchsitarrangements autonomous enceto establishing turnover regularly level:regimes uationsarecommonat thedomestic disputesettleinspection. own personnel. PartI. arrangements. See Haveman (fn.For example. thandomestic arrangements ganizational assotoo far. 25).I965). regimearecertainly monetary ciatedwiththeinternational in conjunction contemplated arrangements and the organizational arequitecomplex.At the orpoliceforces courtsystems theywillnotrequire appearsto be farlesscommon. as well as Tauber (fn." explicit of the absence in in society functions dress.physicalfacilities. real-world interpreting ofcontradictions.thispractice fromsucharrangetionsin whichsubstantive regimescouldbenefit regimes enough.the community.Effective budgets.For example. Suchproblems withrespect thestabilization ofcomto themanagement of fisheries. forexample. schemes vests. .How muchautonomy.andthehandling ofoil spills.the classicargumentdevelopedby Locke and similarcontractarians concerning theoriginsof government. to handletheresultant in dealoftenbecomeimportant explicit organizational arrangements thatareoutsidethe ofsocialchoiceandcompliance ingwithproblems realmofdisputesettlement.The Second Treatise of Government.and how shouldtheyberaised?How shouldtheorganizations be staffed? What 39This is. For example. in orderto determine whether activities rightsand rulesneedto be arecommon adjusted todealwithchanging conditions. arenottightly regimes linked.39 For inthatare difficult to accomplish withoutsuchorganizations. various and to monitor it maybe desirable to conduct research stance. shouldtheorganizations authority possess?What ofdecision sorts rulesandprocedures shouldbe adoptedin conjunction withtheseorganizations? How muchdiscretion shouldtheorganizationshaveto makechangesthataffect thesubstantive content or the character of theregimeitself?How shouldtheorganizaprocedural tionsbe financed: whereshouldtheirrevenues comefrom. theestablishment of explicitorganizations a necessity. See JohnLocke. of fishstockspurelyon The exploitation no explicit but thebasisofthe"lawofcapture" requires organization.or entry Someregimes(forexample.In theinternational system.INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 345 or resolving to undertheregimeforAntarctica disputespertaining individual deepseabedmining. quotas. therefore. othercenters of vis-a-vis in thesocialsystem. modity trade. a regimefordeepseabedminingthatrequires leaseholders can hardlyfunction to makeregularroyalty payments withoutsomeorganization funds. regime) without areabletoresolve theirbasicproblems ofcompliance creating Butwiththeintroduction ofsystematic surveilexplicit organizations. lanceor formalsanctions. theneedfororganization hararisesas soonas regulations limiting The sameholdstrueof areintroduced.eventhoughtheyoftenlackextensive in theirownright. organizational arrangements reasonto endowregimes Perhapsthemostobviousand compelling ofinis toresolve withexplicit organizational arrangements problems Butthereareseveralothertasks terpretation anddisputesettlement.Moreover.someorganizational arrangements required.paragraphs123-131. thepartialtest-ban compliance. becomes The emergence of explicitorganizational arrangements raisesa thatarejustas pressing rangeofclassicquestions attheinternational as at thedomestic level.Whenever revenues must be collected anddisposed willbe of. and where shouldthesefacilities be located?The answersto all thesequestions can affect theimpactthatanygivenregimehason itsmembers.are standardissuesinvolving policyinstrumentsin fisheries of exchangeratesor theisregimes.346 WORLD POLITICS sortsof physicalfacilities shouldtheorganizations have. i). It is therefore tobe expected thattheseissueswillbe fought overvigorously -not onlyat theoutset."International Organization. concerning ual applications forloansor mininglicensesmay all be treatedas matters theuse of policyinstruments.it mayevenbe possibleto do so bymeansof unilateral actions onthepartofsomemembers subseofa regime towhichothers quently conform ona de factobasis. 40See.Policyinstruments ofthissortwill havean obviousappealin highlydecentralized This socialsystems.the determination allowablecatches.4" At theinternational theextentto level. of contents rightsand rulesat occasionalassemblies of themembers of a regime. butalsoduringthewholeperiodoverwhich theregimeis effective. and MichaelHardy. Thus."Choice among PolicyInstrumentsforPollutionControl. Policyinstruments are elements of regimes thataresubjectto deliberate or plannedmanipulation in theinterests ofachieving socialgoals. see GiandomenicoMajone. Policyinstruments. 2 (I977). deep seabedmining. itis possible toredefine arrangements. troduction ofrestrictive anddecisions individregulations.Brown(fn.Suchinstruments atdifferent canoperate levelsofgenerality. 41For further discussion."The Implications of AlternativeSolutionsfor Regulatingthe Exploitationof Seabed Minerals.thissortof contention will be lesspervasive at theinternationallevel. 3I3-42. To theextentthatexplicitorganizational arrangements arelessimportant in international regimes thanin domesticones.ii (Fall i976)."PolicyAnalysis. but theyobviously involving addressproblems at different levelsofgenerality." 3. theinThus. No. it is impossible to makesenseoutofrecent negotiations relatingto international monetary arrangements. occurring Policyinstruments are also apt to be articulated in termsthatare specific to individual of regimesor typesof regimes. 589-6I3. . xxxi.Nevertheless.as well as decisionsconcerning the openingand of harvest closing areas. Adjustments suanceofbroadcast in other licensesarecommonpolicyinstruments regimes. or theallocation of thebroadcast frequency spectrum without payingcarefulattention to thesequestions of organizational design. forexample.a keydistinction concerns whichtheuse ofpolicyinstruments theexistence of explicit requires the organizational Forexample.changesin bundlesof property rights. 43 suitableforuse by explicitorganiNonetheless.thisis thecentralinsight subjectto regulation of the"capture"theoryof regulation. thoughtheuseof theseinstruments regimes. theinternational level. 42 arisingfromunilateralextensions Recentchangesin regimesformarinefisheries thisprospect. 45 It is notnecessary to Marxianpreceptsto realizethatdomesticas well to subscribe by actorswho are.45 associated with thecharacteristic of explicit organizations weaknesses at irrelevant are by no means international theinstruments regimes. and Management Conservation 43For a case in point. adjustannualharvest in conditions The International Monetary Fundcanlaydownspecific currency problems." ExportQuota Commodity 4Bart S. requirements fornewinternational theydo notgenerate ofuserulesforcommonproperty resources.In the case of the on the partof coastalstatesexemplify of jurisdiction was accomplishedthroughthe passage of the Fishery United States. in Young. The creation is apttorequirethedevelopment thoughthe organizations. 3 (1971)."Enforcing nationalLaw journal.the transition Act of 1976 (PL 94-265).exportquotasforcoffee). ofexplicit results maybe moreequitablethanthosearisingfromshifts produced injurisdictional boundaries. The Interexperiencing granting loanstocountries allowsfortheallocation of exportshares nationalCoffeeAgreement SeabedAuthority International Andtheproposed amongitsmembers. compliance Moreover. 401-35.4).INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 347 tendency to respondto problems appealmayaccountforthecurrent byredrawing jurisdictional maritime regimes relating to international common fromthedomainofinternational boundaries (thatis.xii. HarvardInterAgreements. of suchinstruments (forexample."International Authority.consultthe analysisof the proposedInternational Seabed ResourceRegimes"(fn. of permits wouldbe ableto makeuseof a relatively complexsystem of manganese nodulesfrom and licensesto regulatetheproduction to reachautonothedeepseabed. bycontrast.42 organizations. Fisher. No. . quotasforindividualspeciesof greatwhales.The abilityof theseorganizations mousdecisionsaboutthe use of suchinstruments maybe severely in theuse canbecomea majorproblem limited. in principle.4"But between theuse of distinction a qualitative thesefactsdo notsuggest and theiruse in domestic in international regimes policyinstruments is limitedby In short. policyinstruments withinternational zationsare not altogether lackingin connection hastheauthority to The International WhalingCommission regimes. nationallevel.In fact. regimesmay be heavilyinfluenced as international underthetermsof theseregimes.shifting rather thanbyagreeing property to thedomainofnationalproperty) resources at theintertospecific rulesfortheuseofcommonproperty Jurisdictional changescan be pursuedunilaterally. 18-25.evenwhentheygenerate outcomes quently proveresistant as undesirable.i969).In viewoftheprevalence ofconflicts ofinterest regarding itis fairto assumethata conproblems ofinternational coordination. are highlyspecializedevenin the realmof producesuchoutcomes In the international arena. 48Thomas C. Convention:A Philosophical Study(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press.Socialinstitutions to change. the actionsof individualactorsfreconsciousefforts to coordinate runafoulofsevereconflicts ofinterest.47 self-interest leadstooutcomes that thepursuit ofindividual commonly the sense even are sociallyundesirable (in of beingPareto-inferior). Schelling.socialinstitutions whichtypically a numberof informal as well as entities. are some Nor theylike rights." The Public Interest.and Utopia(New York: BasicBooks. Whatis more. straightforward economictransactions.Butinvisible-hand The conditions on toyieldeffective international to necessary regimes. thatgroupsof individuals-each in whichit is suggested ofmarkets. guidedchangerequiresnotonlythedestruction aroundsomenew butalsothecoordination ofexpectations institutions.Theyare notautonomous forinstitutional togovern discovered arrangements byactorssearching natural theiractivities. mechanisms be counted cannotgenerally ciency). No.1974). 47 For a moreoptimistic of invisible-hand assessment mechanisms see RobertNozick. encompass 46 Comparethisview withthe analysisof conventions in David K. in sucha way hisownself-interest-will interact vigorously pursuing effias to producesocially desirable outcomes economic (forexample.48 quently therewillbe no physical Sinceregimes arehumanartifacts. ativestatusindependent oftheevaluations oftheaffected thatregimesarisefromthe actionsof groupsof It is significant Sometimes actors. focalpoint. 25 (Fall i'7i ). Lewis.46 socialinstitutions ofthistypeemergeandfunction effort on thepartof individual pareffectively without anydeliberate the"invisible Thatis theideaunderlying hand"conception ticipants. possessing normactors."On the Ecology of Micromotives. procedures of existing Further. requireactorsto learn unfamiliar and to accept(initially)unknownoutcomes. barriers andreform. regimes andtheconvergence amonggroups humaninteractions ofexpectations entities waitingto be of interested actors. are fathatare widelyregarded Existinginstitutions whilenew arrangements miliarconstructs. . Anarchy. Butchange-especially guidedchangeto theircreation is notnecessarily freeasyto achievein thisrealm.348 WORLD POLITICS REGIME DYNAMICS areproducts international of Like othersocialinstitutions. State. 6i-98. aroundnew institutional of expectations will arrangements vergence arecomplex oftenbe slowin coming. 49This pointof viewmayseemconservative (in the Burkeansense). 2 (1977).naive hopes concerningthe efficacy of in thisrealmaboundamongpolicymakersand stusocialengineering dentsof international relationsalike.The Limits of Liberty (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress. . There are similarthemesin many of the anarchistcriticismsof Marxianor authoritarian socialism.More specifically.There is. see JamesM.Consequently. xxxi. 51Howard Taubenfeld. Skepticismabout the efficacy of social engineering."A Treatyfor Antarctica.The actorsinterested with. Shelf.the currenteffort to work out a upon in i959 exemplifies a far comprehensive international regimefor the oceans constitutes on a conmore ambitiousattemptto engage in regimeconstruction tractarian basis.but surelyit is more than that.52 shelvesexemplifies whichmightbe In an intermediate processof regimeconstruction." International Conciliation." InternationalOrganization.A commonjustification forthisapproachrestson the (dubious) argumentthatthe ofone or severalregimecomponents will initiatea process introduction of taskexpansionor "spillover"thatwill lead overtimeto the emeri. 29).1975).as well as in many contemporary expressions of libertarianism. No.49 threechannelsor Originsof regimes. is not a good indicatorof ideologicalorientation. theymayproducedisruptive consequencesthat were neitherforeseennor intendedby those advocatingthespecificchanges. labeledthepiecemealtrack.50 The regimeforAntarcticathatwas agreed thistrack. No. chap.thecontractarian theirauthorizedrepresentatives) maymeetforthe explicitpurposeof negotiating a "constitutional" contractlayingout a regimeto govern the activityin question.deliberateefforts runtheriskof doingmoreharmthangood.regimesgoverningtheuse of marineresourceshavetraditionally originatedin this the post-I945regimefor the continental fashion.INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 349 to adjust a regime formalelements.It is helpfulto differentiate tracksin the emergenceof international regimes. to begin in someactivity(or track. Buchanan. 52 Note thatit was formalized or codifiedin the 1958 Geneva Conventionon the OuterContinental see Jessup(fn.Althoughnotall initiatives alongthese lines are doomed to failure. and EdwardMiles. esp. 159-234. thispattern.actorssometimesreachagreementon one or morecomponentsof a regimewithoutenteringinto a comprehensivesocialcontractregardingthe activity in question. therefore.In general. 531 (i96i). 50On theconceptof a "constitutional" contract."The Structure and Effectsof the DecisionProcessin the Seabed Committeeand the Third UnitedNationsConference on the Law of the Sea.51 An alternative track: approachcan be describedas the evolutionary ariseeitherfromwidespreadpracticeover sometimes socialinstitutions timeor as a consequenceof dramaticunilateralactionsthatare subsequentlyacceptedbyotherson a de factobasis.4.For relevantbackground. 350 WORLD POLITICS genceof a morecomprehensive and coherentregime.evenwhen it is politically feasibleto persuadetheactorsto acceptit.ICNAF or INPFC).Despite theirobviousinitialdraw53 Leon Lindbergand StuartScheingold.The Interpretation of Agree- ments and World Order (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress. but in the UnitedNationsConferenceon the Law of the and large numSea (UNCLOS) the combinationof decentralization in workingout a meaningful bershas led to fundamentaldifficulties ''constitutional" contractcoveringtheoceans. as well as the institutional arrangements relatingto marinepollution.Harold D. 54 On the resulting problemsof treatyinterpretation in international law. i967).actorsfrequentlyindicatesuperficialacquiescencein arto whichtheydo not intendto abide in practice.At the same time.eds. There can be no doubtthatthe evolutionary trackwill be followed moreoftenthanthecontractarian trackin highlydecentralizedsocial systems like theinternational system.the I2 originalsignatories to the AntarcticaTreatyof I959 were able to reach agreementon a relativelycomprehensive regimefor Antarctica. Regional Integration:Theoryand Practice (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press.I971). but such difficult to reachin systems thatare bothhighly bargainsareextremely and largewithrespectto numberof members. see Myres S.it is oftendifficult evento determine the pertinentset of actorsto deal with the developmentof a regime..Agreements ofthistypemay be explicit. But the articulationon a "constitutional" contractis not alwaysan unmixedblessing. McDougal. Lasswell. whetherthe institutional Does it make a difference arrangements governinga given activityemerge along one or anotherof these tracks?Contractarian processesofferthedistinctadvantageof producthatare incorporated into documents(such ing explicitarrangements as treatiesor conventions)which become part of the public record availablefor consultation.groupsize undoubtedly makesa difference It is possibleto idenwithintheclassof highlydecentralized systems.54 Moreover.In such rangements contractpurportingto cases. .These systems lack authoritative procedures fordealingwithregimes. it is also apt to breeddisillusionment and cynicismamong the membersof the relevantsocial system. tifycases in which small groupsof actorshave been able to reach contractarian bargainseven in highlydecentralizedsystems.53 Prominentexamplesof thispiecemealtrackat the international level includemany of the regionalfisheries regimes(for example. Miller.the promulgationof a "constitutional" spellout a regimeforsome activity will not onlygenerateconfusion.To illusdecentralized trate.and JamesC.buttheyarefrequently couchedin ambiguouslanguagedeof interest signedto obscureirreconcilable conflicts amongtheactors. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 351 processes fromevolutionary regimesemerging backs.:Prentice-Hall.Europe's Would-BePolity (Englewood Cliffs.55 arepolitically wherethenotion andpolitical integration.56 Whatis more.thecharacter rights ofa regime's respect tothecontent mechanisms.N. ing Peace System(London: RoyalInstitute of International Affairs." tuallygeneratesubstantial or planned fordeliberate theapproachseemsto offeropportunities wherecontractarian ofinternational procedures regimes development is notreassuring. 56 Leon Lindbergand StuartScheingold. 57 See Brown(fn.57 regime of someactoror classof actors changearisefromthedissatisfaction 2. specttoregionaleconomic theavailableevidenceoffers mostthoroughly. International regimesdo not become Regimetransformation. at somecriticalpointof transition to identify It wouldbe arbitrary changein thesenseof one whichsuchalterations yielda qualitative myobonetakingitsplace. in thenatureoftherelevant changes fortraditional majorproblems lightto heavyusagehavegenerated and the adventof communications regimesin themarinefisheries. in response to shifts transformation continuous mayoccurwith alterations Significant nomic. orthenatureofitscompliance socialchoicemechanisms. In thepiecemeal will acof one or severalregimecomponents thattheintroduction Although taskexpansionor "spillover.thepiecemealtrackmaylead to significant whenlittlespillover occurs:it may of incoherence severeproblems withlittleif anything to recomleavea trailof half-formed regimes mendthem. Theyundergo evenaftertheyare fullydeveloped.and to comment regimes duresforhandling thesechanges.In somecases. I943). Withreactualexperience infeasible.J. the pre-existing problemsaffecting has raisedsignificant satellites for In other cases.thereare fundamental tionin international shifts from Forexample. fortransformaseveral typesofpressure It is possible todifferentiate regimes.Rather. ofits andrules. and another regimedisappearing which theprocesses through is to identify jectivein thisdiscussion on institutional proceinternational change.andsocialenvironments. pressures for international broadcasting. activity. thecritical issueconcerns thelikelihood approach. staticconstructs ecoin theirpolitical. 55The classicearlyexpression A Workof thisreasoningappearsin David Mitrany. I970). i).international to thosearisingfroma contracthatarepreferable mayyieldresults tarianapproach gonesour. . has beeninvestigated on toyield canbe counted thatthelogicoffunctionalism no assurance results. 59 coalitionbuilding. rules-evenif theyare notalwaysfollowedin practice-islikelyto of of theprecisecontent efforts Regardless to alterregimes.Numerousillustrationsof this phenomenoncan be found in the debatesover the AmericanFishery Conservation and ManagementAct of I976. severein systems socialchanges.352 WORLD POLITICS The unilatof a prevailing withthedistributive regime. systems. legislative in efforts to altera givenregime. especially that.and thatmembers overtime. tionof authority procedures lackroutinized and power. economic.A thirdtypeofpressure orcoherent a systematic regimetoreplace tionsis a desiretointroduce or regime. contract thearforchangethrough anticipate pressures Regimesfrequently arrangements rules.The basicidea hereis to streamline a chaoticor inchoate in the orcontradictory rationalize a regimethathasgrownambiguous oneofthemotivatThisobjective is undoubtedly courseofevolution. consequences on the jurisdictions in recentyearsof200-milefishery eralimposition of a dramatic illustration coastalstatesconstitutes partof numerous formajoralterathistypeofregimechange. 260-62.or easeof actorswillneverbe equalin thepossession of transformation accessto them. andwhatdecision rule be takentobringaboutalterations when proposed is to be employedas a standardfor determining rulesmayvarygreatly changesare to be accepted. 58 59 See Young (fn.and reasoning)will be essential of theseskills.Suchsystems The distinction betweenthistypeof pressureand redistributive pressurefrequently becomesblurredin practicebecauseit is politically moreacceptableto cloak redistributivedesiresin the guiseof promoting good management practices. structure ofthe intheirimpacton theinterests therules. rulestheyexpecttofavortheirowninterests in all social Guidedreform ofsocialinstitutions is a difficult process and in thepresenceof rapidpolitical.It followsthatthe promulgation matas an important regimewillbe treated rulesforan international of of theregimewill promote theacceptance ter.legal whatskills(such as bargaining. specifying in a regime. .Theseareinstitutional oftransformation ticulation whatstepsmust howpressures forchangearetobe treated. i9). Butthedifficulties areunusually liketheinternational arehighly decentralized in theirdistribusystem.Transformation towhichtheymakeiteasy withrespect totheirstringency (theextent andthereis noreasontoassume accepted).theywillnotbe neutral ruleswill determine actorsaffected Transformation by a regime. ordifficult togetalterations thatthosewishingto changea regimewillalwaysabidebytheterms theexistence of a setof transformation of suchrules.58 new efforts to work out a "constitutional" current forces behind ing fortheoceans.Nevertheless. the transaction ternationalregimeswill be substantial. costsassociatedwithefforts to transform inhowever. Moreover. Under the circumstances.Where the numberof actorsis large and theirinterestsare heterogeneous. 4).Currentefforts to hammer out a new international regimefortheoceansoffera clearillustration of theseproblemsof achievingguided institutional change in large.and so forth."Exploitation toryMechanisms and UnitedStatesPolicy.it may prove impossibleto to highlycoercivepracarriveat clearcutoutcomeswithoutresorting tices-eitherin theformof unilateralactionstakenin disregardof the to imposechangeson others ofothers."International ResourceRegimes"(fn. I43-77. 61 Comparetheviewsexpressed in Young.it is safe to assumethatinterested parties with respectto both the initial will expressnon-identical preferences developmentand the subsequentreformof these social institutions.it maybe possibleto solvesuchproblemsthroughregularizedbargainingprocesses. 3. 26).6" regimesexhibitthe attributes Therefore. of Deep Ocean Minerals:Regulawiththoseadvancedin RossD. international of interestamong major However.Like all socialinstitutions.INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 353 (forexample."journalofLaw and Economics. thoughtheremay be marketsin entrypermitsfor fishing.Again.conflicts 60 This argument is set forthclearlyin Olson (fn. regimedynamicstypicallyrevolvearound processesof socialchoiceor procedures throughwhichconflicting preferencesconcerninginstitutional can be aggregatedinto arrangements collectivedecisions.licensesfor deep seabed mining. the prescribed procedureforresolvingsuch problemsof social choice is to resortto multilateralbargainingwithinthe frameworkof an conference.Since regimes neveryieldneutralresults.pollution rights.the expectedimpactof international regimesis generally great enough to deterthe affectedactorsfrom consigningmatters relatingto theirdevelopmentand alterationto administrative experts. international of collectivegoods to a high degree.xviI (April I974).no marketswill arise in internationalregimesper se. Changeand socialchoice.legislativemechanisms)capableof accommodating pressuresforinstitutional change. .a particularly clearillustration of thisphenomenoncan be seen in the currentcomplexnegotiations concerning the institutional featuresof the proposedInternationalSeabed Authority.or in theformofefforts interests in the absenceof theirvoluntaryconsent. forthe generalcase of social institutions.Wherethenumberof membersis small and thesystemhas beenin operationa long time. Eckert."6 environment In thehighlydecentralized of theinternational system. decentralized systems. Buchananand Gordon Tullock.R.62 Since actorscommonlymistrustthe performance of institutional arrangeto resolveall potentialissuesduring ments(to thepointof attempting the phase of regimeformation)."Yale Law Journal. . 64 See. The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor:University of MichiganPress. 493) has been introducedin the 96th Congress.Under suitableconditions. 63 "Thaw in International Law? Rightsin Antarcticaunder the Law of Common Spaces.65 Any givencase of regimedevelopmentor alterationat the international level will undoubtedlybe governedby the configuration of 62 Some analysts favorunanimity as a decisionrule. 398-4I9. continentalshelvesand the emergingregimeforthe marinefisheries have arisenlargelyin thisfashion. whaling.Vol.thisprocess will lead to de factoconformity on the part of othersin the same way thatpriceleadershipoperatesto producecoordinatedbehaviorin Both the existingregimeforthe outer certainoligopolisticindustries."InternationalOrganization. 87 (March I978).narrowly failedto pass in the 95thCongress. Rawls (fn. Two alternative methodsexistfordealingwiththedevelopment and alteration of international regimes.In somesituations.The existingregimesfor Antarctica. for example. smallgroupsof actorspossessingstrongand generallycompatibleinterests in a particular activityband togetherto work out an acceptableset of arrangementsto governthat activity. 3350)."The Politicsof Transnational EconomicRelations. 804-59. No. Similarlegislation(S.There is no effective traditionthatputspressureon interested partieswho findthemselves to the of in theminority accept preferences majoritycoalitions.I962). There are also indicationsthatseveralimportantactorsare preparingto followthe same route in developinga regimefor the marine fisheriesof the or SouthernOcean area.354 WORLD POLITICS actorsor groupsof actorsare typicallysevere.and thepostwarinternational monetaryregimemaybe considereda productof Americandominancein the aftermath of the war.multilateralbargainingis oftena costlymethodof resolvingproblemsof social choicerelatingto internationalregimes.63 Antarctic The othermethodinvolvesdramaticunilateralactionon thepartof one or a few powerfulactors.sometimesit fails to yield any clearcutoutcomes altogether.and standsa relatively good chanceof passing.developmentofa regimefordeep seabedminingmayfollowa similarcourse. 6) suggeststhat individualscontemplating principlesof justicein the "originalposition"would reach unanimousagreement.especiallyat thelevelof "constitutional"contracts:see JamesM.and fishingin the northeastern Atlanticare all productsof this methodof handlingproblemsof social choice. settingfortha unilaterally imposedregimefordeep seabedmining. 3 (i97i). 65 A Deep Seabed Hard MineralsAct (H. xxv.RobertGilpin.64If the UnitedStatesgetsits way. Consequences ofoperation. Ullman." Theory and Practice in InternationalRelations (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress.67 CONCLUSION Although thereis greatvariation amonginternational regimes.eds. 67 For a moreextensive development of the analogybetweenoligopolistic industries and international relations. Institutional character. Baldwin. Whereone actoris like thoseoccurring unilateral actionsare likelyto loom largein the clearlydominant. they are all social institutions.andmembership? To whatextentis thiscoverageoptimalunderthe prevailing conditions ? 3.this suggeststhat aredependent regimes of convergent uponthemaintenance expectationsamongactors.formalization is nota necessary condition forthe of regimes. Whatarethecentral rights. sharepoweras well as a stronginterest by contrast. I90-95- . I972). fortheachievement of anyanalyticsuccessin this is a prerequisite realm.. What is the coverageof the regime withrespect tofunctional scope.INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 355 The resultant aremuch actors. Whatconditions are necessary forthe regimetoworkat all? Underwhatconditions willtheoperation of theregimeyieldparticularly desirableresults(forexample. rules. Whereseveralactors in the activity. I wouldliketolayoutan agendaofquestions In closing. theseattributes accountfor certain Undoubtedly. xxxi (JanuaryI979). Amongotherthings.and so- oftheregime?How do theyinteract cialchoiceprocedures with thebehavior ofindividual actors toproducea stream ofoutcomes? 2. Relations. Jurisdictional boundaries. "The Perils of Odysseus:On Constructing Theoriesof International in RaymondTanterand RichardH. regimesare likelyto emergefrombargainsstruckamongsmall groupsofkeyplayers.arealdomain.66 poweramongtheinterested dynamics in oligopolistic industries. Conditions foroperation. (eitherindi66 For a reviewof recentthinking aboutpowerin international see David relations." World Politics. i6I-94. are alwayscreatedrather effective and regimes operation than discovered. A. thatshould in theanalysis ofanyinternational be considered regime: I. of regimeconstruction processes and reform.see Young. economic orequity)? efficiency Whatsortsofoutcomes 4. thatariseregularly in efforts to studyintermethodological problems national regimes Buttherecognition oftheseattributes systematically."PowerAnalysisand WorldPolitics:New TrendsversusOld Tendencies. and whatis thelikelihood ofitsexperiencing majoralterations in the foreseeable future? Does theregimeincludetransformation rules andaretheylikelyto be effective? This agendais intended to stimulate thedevelopment of a growing substantive materialon international bodyof comparable regimes. yetpoorlyunderstood. .356 WORLD POLITICS vidualor collective)can the regimebe expectedto produce? Whatareappropriate ? criteria in thiscontext ofevaluation 5.thismaterial canbe expected to improve ourability to arrive at generalconclusions aboutthisfundamental. In time. How did theregimecomeintoexistence. Regimedynamics. international phenomenon.