yom kippur

CHAPTER I : PRINCIPLES OF WAR1. Mil thinkers have studied various campaigns and have attempted to draw imp lessons from their study, so that future campaigns might be conducted favourably. Various lessons drawn from all these campaigns have been condensed into a No of basic principles, called the principles of war. 2. The principles of war may be defined as gen laws or rules adopted or professed as a guide for action. The principles of war are not rigid dogmas like scientific laws and mathematical formulae but only rules for guidance. The principles of war, therefore, have been handed down not for blind adherence but rather to serve as a warning that in disregarding any one of them we accept risk and confer an advantage on the en. The ten principles of war which have been universally accepted are as under:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (j) (k) The selection and maint of Aim. Conc. Economy of Effort. Offensive action. Surprise. Co-op. Security. Flexibility. Maint of Morale. Adm. 3. The aim of this chap is to put across to the offrs the principles of war in brief, before they start the detailed study of the mil campaign of Yom Kippur. There is a reqmt of continuously referring to these principles during their study to comprehend the adherence or neglect of these cardinal rules and how it affected the outcome of war. They should also ex their minds towards assessing the relevance of these principles in the conditions and op sits as obtaining in our context today. 4. Selection and Maint of Aim. Ultimate the political aim of any nation at war is to impose it¶s will upon the en. All other objs such as to annihilate the forces, capture their centres or destroy their industrial bases/instlns are subdy. Every op should have a bearing upon the same aim. Fulfillment of the aim should be the tgt of cdrs at all level. Selection of the aim would depend on political , mil and economic considerations. Neutr of the main force of the en will of course be the main intention. The mil obj has to be in consonance with the national obj. 5. Conc. According to some there is only one principle of war and that is the Principle of Conc of Force. This is merely to say that to achieve good conc of forces one must emp most of the other principles of war. This principle is therefore one of the maj principles of war if not the most imp. Conc is the method or means by which a cdr achieves superiority at the pt of decision. The attacker can always conceal his area of main effort and by secretly massing forces against the selected objs, he can achieve local superiority. The defending side suffers the disadvantage of having to be strong everywhere. Thus, it is linked with offensive spirit. History is replete with examples of small armies defeating large ones through perfect and well timed conc of forces. 6. Economy of Effort. This principle is really the complement if not the foundation of conc of force. It means the judicial emp of fighting str or the comb potential. It means the meshing of a cdr¶s resources & the aim and maint of a fighting res. 7. Offensive Action. Def action can avert disaster or defeat but it cannot achieve victory. The principle of offensive action does not, however, mean that a cdr must be on the offensive all the time. It simply means that in order to achieve the Aim, plg must provide for a ph of offensive action. It wrests the initiative, raises morale and it is only by offensive action that a cdr can hope to surprise his en. Offensive action has certain incidental advantages. 8. Surprise. Surprise has the most powerful and eff influence in war. As applied to war, it means the process of taking the en at a disadvantage by sudden or unexpected action. It can be further sub divided into three types:(a) Strat Surprise. Strat surprise is achieved before the battle starts by resorting to certain mvres ,long marches negotiating seemingly impassable regions or by hitting the en w/o declaring the actual start of hostilities. (b) Tech Surprise. Tech surprise is surprise which is attained by the emp of new wpns against which the en has no answer. It can be by discoveries, inventions or innovations. (c) Tac Surprise. Tac surprise is surprise achieved on the actual battle-fd by employing various methods like adoption of new tac doctrines such as the Blitizkreg by the Germans in World War II. Employing stratagems , feints and mvres which aim at inducing or forcing an en into an unfavourable posn are also methods of achieving surprise. 9. Coop. It means eff coop of all comps of the nation to give the best results at the right hr. It implies:(a) (b) (c) Unity of comd at the highest level. Coord of political and mil auth. Coop between the armed forces and the civ population. (d) Coop between the three services (i.e. navy, AF, Army) and their comp arms/services (i.e. Army, Inf & Arty). (e) Coop at the strat, op and lac Levels. 10. Security. Security implies security of men, mtrl, resources and plans. The cdr must be cautious in the plg stg but bold in implementing the plan. It is wrong to associate security with timidity. Security implies making provisions against any mov of the en which may prejudice the attainment of the Aim. The principle of security does not prevent a cdr from taking risks in battle. 11. Flexibility. Literally, Flexibility implies the ability to bend under stress w/o breaking. The emphasis is, therefore, laid on elimination of rigidity in all spheres viz, plans, org, trg and exec. The ability of cdr to make quick tac decisions under fluid battle conditions involving mod of existing plans to achieve the aim, is flexibility. 12. Maint of Morale. Success in war depends more upon morale than on physical qualities. Sophisticated wpns and unlimited resources cannot compensate for lack of courage, determination, boldness, confidence and offensive spirit. Morale is non-tangible. It is a state of mind or spirit of refusal to surrender and admit defeat. High morale depends on various factors, some of them are given below:(a) (b) (c) (d) Success in battle. Trg and discp. Faith in the Cause of War, its cdrs, wpn and eqpt. Std of med care and gen welfare of troops. 13. Adm. Adm is a comd function. This for obvious reasons, is a separate and full time resp, the principal aim of which is to give the op tps complete liberty of action and to supply them with all their reqmts for the purpose of war or a particular op. And as success in ops is as much dependant on the fighting abilities and trg of troops as on their supplies or eqpt, adm has been made a principle of war and good adm is now indispensable to success. CHAPTER 2 : TOPO AND TRN SECTION 1 : ISRAEL 1. Israel is loc on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. Israel is bounded on the north by Lebanon, on the northeast by Syria, on the east by Jordan, and on the southwest by Egypt. Its southernmost tip extends to the Gulf of Aqaba, an arm of the Red Sea. 2. The total area of Israel, based on the frontiers est at the end of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949, is about 20,700 sq km . Areas occupied by Israel as a result of the Six-Day War included the West Bank (5,860 sq km), the Gaza Strip (378 sq km), the Golan Heights (1,250 sq km), and East Jerusalem (70 sq km). Because Israel annexed the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem in 1981, the country officially includes them in total area and population figs. However Israel stretches north to south to a max length of 420 km , from east to west it varies from 16 to 115 km. 3. There are five maj geographical regions of Israel. The mtnous Galilee region dominates the northern sec of Israel, extending east 40 km from a narrow coastal plain across to the Sea of Galilee (also called Lake Tiberias). Mount Meron (1,208 m) in central Galilee is the highest pt in Israel. South of Galilee lies the Plain of Esdraelon. The plain runs across Israel from the vicinity of Haifa on the Mediterranean coast to the Jordan River, which forms Israel¶s eastern border. a central plateau. 7. Jordan. Negev desert region. Other principal rivers are the Yarqon. The average annual rainfall is less than 254 mm and although the soil in the north is fertile. some as high as 10. Geographically the triangle-shaped Negev is divided into four regions: a coastal plain in the northwest. industry. 5. . extend 195 km along the Mediterranean Ras En Naqura on the Lebanese Israel border to Gaza. The unnavigable Jordan River forms the northern portion of the borders between Israel and Jordan and between the West Bank and Jordan. making it extremely imp to the country¶s shipping interests. a conduit extending from the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) began pumping water into the northwestern region of the Negev. Sinai. 6.000 ft. Negev desert region. 9. The port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba provides Israel¶s only access to the Red Sea. which reaches the Mediterranean Sea near Haifa. (c) Southern Region. Area roughly from Kantara to Port Said is a salty marsh. and a valley in the east.4. In the North is a sandy coastal Mediterranean plateau with its low hills and deep not always passable sand dunes (75-100 ft high) dotted here and there with brackish wells and oasis. containing most of Israel¶s large cities. the highest mtn on the Sinai Peninsula. Parts of the Dead Sea lie in Israel. The Judean and Samarian hills run north and south throughout most of Israel. between the Gulf of Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba. Haifa. which runs through Tel Aviv-Yafo. Adjacent to Mount Sinai is Mount Catherine (Jabal Katrnah). (b) Central Region. It is divided into three distinct regions :(a) Northern Region. and Ashdod. Southern Sinai consists of deep wadis (valliys) and high pinnacles.800 sq km . Mount Sinai. a mtnous area in the south central portion. and the West Bank. In 1964. E-Tih desert is a gaunt and formidable. crisscrossed by a No of routes which were constr by Israeli army . comprises an area of approx 12. or Jabal Mosá (Arabic for ³Mtn of Moses´) in theological tradition is part of a rocky mass that almost fills the Sinai Peninsula of northeastern Egypt. passing to the north of the city of Beersheba. Mount Sinai. a natural harbour in the northern part of the country. This region rgs in width from less than 1 km to 30 km . br the continents of Africa and Asia on the one hand and Mediterranean and Red Sea on the other. and the Qishon River. irrigation is necessary for agriculture. The Negev is a triangular desert region in southern Israel extending north from the Gulf of Aqaba to a line connecting the southern end of the Dead Sea and the Mediterranean. and commerce. an artificial deepwater port to the south. largely limestone escarpment. The coastal plains. SECTION 2 : SINAI PENINSULA 8. serve as the main seaports on the Mediterranean. Sinai peninsula extends 240 by 120 miles is a large inverted triangular wedge of sandy mtns between the Gulf of Aqaba in the East and Gulf of Suez in the West. past Romani and along the coast towards El Arish. five miles East of it. The suez cnl which is 180 to 240 yds wide and 50 to 60 ft deep was described by Gen Dayan as one of the best A tk ditches available. South of Bitter Lakes. The East Bank is windy while the West Bank. It is in this area that Israelis had deployed bulk of their forces and constr the following rds :(i) (ii) Lexicon. (iv) Pilgrims Way. Ancient route followed by Egyptian pilgrims voyaging to Mecca. Israel shares an open border with Egypt and it¶s shipping lane of Gulf of Aqaba is dominated by this peninsula. (a) The Suez Cnl is approx 163 km long. From Kantara East. Other main factors are :(a) (b) (c) It provides strat depth to Israel from West/SW. (a) Along The Bar Lev Line. Ran parallel to Suez Cnl along its length. along which the sweet water cnl runs. It permits direct passage from Europe and the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean instead of the long voyage around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. has cultivated belt running parallel to it. Suez Cnl. Lake Timsah. (iii) Southern Route. each channeled either by the line of passes or by rockey out crops and sand seas (Stretches of loose sand across which tks can¶t pass) :(i) Northern Route. starting at Ras al Sudr in the South and gradually veers off NE wards to E1 Arish. Further to the East running from Baluza to Tasa. The dredged earth soil was conc along the East Bank in the from of dykes some 18 to 30 ft high.Gulf of Suez and Gulf of Aqaba. over Giddi Pass. (ii) Central Route. ran from Port Twefiq over Mitla Pass and Nakhel on to Ras Al Nagev near the Israeli port of Eilat. (iii) Lateral Rd. Comn. however. the desert rises in an undulating manner. Took off at Suez Cnl bank opposite Ismalia. From the Suez cnl. Ran parallel to Lexicon. The cnl links the Mediterranean Sea at Port Said to the Red Sea at Suez by connecting a series of lakes ie Lake Manzilah. skirting marshes. 11. (b) Suez Cnl borders NW side of Sinai for a distance of 110 miles. Four maj rds led back from Bar Lev Line across the Northern Sinai towards Israeli border. The tidal eff changes the water level ht from one to six ft a fact of great imp in carrying out xg ops. and the Bitter Lakes. towards Israeli border East of Kusseima. over the Khatima Pass and on to Abu Ageila and Israeli border South of Rafah. Acts as a trip wire against any mov in western front. 12. just West of the passes. Domination of Suez cnl .10. Arty Rd. . (b) East of the Bar Lev Line. passing lanes exist at several points. Strat Imp of Sinai Peninsula. passed through Tasa. In most places the cnl has only one shipping lane. Most of the country lies in Africa. Tiran.SECTION 3 : GULF OF AQABA 13. is usually considered part of Asia.105 km and a max width. occupying a portion of the great geological fault known as the Great Rift Valley. it forms the only land br between the two continents. the Gulf of Suez is connected to the Mediterranean Sea by the Suez Cnl. northeastern Egypt. divided into two unequal parts by the Nile River. Gulf of Aqaba.129 km . The country has a max length from north to south of 1. incl the Libyan Desert (also known as the Western Desert) in the west. near the southern border.739 sq km . and on the west by Libya. The valley and delta of the Nile are the main centers of habitation. Gulf of Suez is arm of the Red Sea. and links the Gulf of Aqaba to the Red Sea. and the Red Sea. narrow channel in southwestern Asia. The Isthmus of Suez. on the south by Sudan. is northeastern arm of the Red Sea which separates the Sinai and Arabian peninsulas. Israel. At its northern end. SECTION 5 : STRAIT OF TIRAN 15. a country in northeastern Africa and southwestern Asia. It has a total area of 997. but the easternmost portion of Egypt. The Strait of Tiran provides the only access to the Israeli port of Elat at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. Strait of. The gulf is linked to the Red Sea on the south by the Strait of Tiran.450 km of coastline. is traversed from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Suez by the Suez Cnl. in the east. Egypt is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea. Most of Egypt¶s trn is desert. and the Arabian Desert (also called the Eastern Desert). Israel. the Sinai Peninsula. . between the Sinai Peninsula and the Egyptian Desert. The passage is bordered on the west by the Sinai Peninsula and on the east by the Saudi Arabian mainland. of 1. which is the extreme northern end of the Red Sea. indentations suitable as harbours are confined to the delta. SECTION 4 : GULF OF SUEZ 14. which connects the Sinai Peninsula with the African mainland. 18. Although Egypt has 2. 19. up to 24 km wide and 160 km long. It is a narrow body of water. Jordan. two-thirds of which are on the Red Sea. 17. which borders the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez. More than 90 percent of the country consists of desert areas. It has a length of 290 km with a width of 25 to 55 km . at its head in the north are the port of Al µAqabah. Egypt. on the east by the Gaza Strip. The capital and largest city is Cairo. a part of the Sahara. surrounding Tiran Island (Saudi Arabia). and the port of Eilat. SECTION 6 : EGYPT 16. and on the north and east by Israel. along the border of Syria and Lebanon." is actually composed of two geologically distinct areas: the Golan Heights proper (approx. region in southwestern Asia is bordered on the south by Sinai (Egypt). with dunes stretching inland from the coast. the Orontes. a narrow rg of mtns and hills. The plateau is crossed by a No of seasonal streams. Syria has an area of 185. 1. which is 193 km long. bounded on the north by Turkey. The Euphrates. There are a No of sandy beaches and fishing vills along the region's coastline. Syria is loc in southwestern Asia. 24. the Golan Heights proper is mostly basalt and other types of volcanic rock. on the east by Iraq.) and the slopes of the Mt. are the Anti-Lebanon Mtns. km. the site of Mount Hermon. The Gaza Strip is a narrow territory extending from the northern Sinai Peninsula into Israel's Mediterranean coastal plain. forming a plateau that drops off to the west. 100 sq. Along the Mediterranean coast. particularly in the south. SECTION 8 : SYRIA 22. the longest river in Syria. lies a narrow plain extending inland as far as 32 km. 25.by Israel and Egypt after the first Arab-Israeli War (1948-1949). The region is largely flat and sandy. with an average annual accumulation of about 150 to 400 mm . While the Mt. flows diagonally across the country from Turkey in the north to Iraq on the east. Golan Hts. 27. Hermon rg (approx.070 sq. Parallel to this plain is the Jabal an Nuayryah. which run through valleys. 26. sometimes very deep. originates in the Lebanese portion of the Anti-Lebanon Mtns and flows north through western Syria to Turkey. and flow west into the Jordan or the Lake . and on the west by Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea. The semicircular plateau area in the southeastern is in the Syrian Desert.814 m. to the Jordan River and Lake Kinneret. Gaza Strip. The sec longest river. south of which. Syria has an extreme east-to-west distance of about 830 km and an extreme northto-south distance of about 740 km. The area in the north which came under Israeli control as a result of the 1967 Six Day War and is popularly ref to as the "Golan Heights. which is bisected in the northeast by the valley of the Euphrates River. 21. on the south by Jordan and Israel. 23. its shape and size were determined by the armistice agreement sd/. on the west by the Mediterranean Sea.180 sq km. to the Yarmuk River. Much of the rest of the country consists of a plateau.SECTION 7 : GAZA STRIP 20. The Anti-Lebanon rg tapers off into a hilly region called the Golan Heights (captured by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War) in the southwestern corner of Syria. km. The capital and largest city is Damascus. the highest pt in the country at 2. Rainfall diminishes from north to south. The area of the Gaza Strip is 378 sq km . Hermon rg is mostly limestone. and to the south. The plateau area north of the Euphrates is called the plain of Al Jazrah.). The Yom Kippur War also referred to as Ramadan War or the Oct War. neither side met these conditions. Acts as an impregnable line of def against the Israelis. brought about no significant changes to territorial boundaries. CHAPTER 3 : OVERVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN Appendix: A . The only rd that links Northern Israel to the Golan hts is over the Benat Yakov br on to Kuientra and Damascus. 29. 5. and the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 4. after 1964. formerly belonging to Syria. but underestimated Sadat¶s commitment to use a mil option against Israel. SECTION 10 : CAUSES OF WAR 2. 1956. Israel gained control of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. However. the Golan Heights. The long-standing conflict between Jews and Arabs over control of historic Palestine had resulted in wars in 1948. Later that yr. The Arab opposition to the Jewish state of Israel incl neighboring Arab statess and. 3. knew that Egypt was preparing for war. Nevertheless. the war and its aftermath had far-rg effects on the participant nations and their relations with world superpowers. formerly administered by Jordan.28. Strat Imp of Golan Hts.Chronology of Events SECTION 9 : INTRO 1. (a) (b) Dominates the adjoining Israeli territory. Neither the US nor Israel believed that Arab forces could challenge Israel¶s proven mil power. (c) Arty Locs /OPs in the Golan hts could bring down hy and accurate fire in the surrounding plains. In 1969 Egyptian president Nasser launched the War of Attrition. neither Washington nor Moscow were fully aware of the profound differences in policy between the Egyptian and Syrian ldrs. and cross-border attacks and reprisals continued. . the United Nations (UN) adopted a resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from these areas in exch for Arab recog of Israel¶s indep and security.-brokered cease-fire in 1970. In the Six-Day War of 1967. The conflict ended with a U. The USSR. and 1967. the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Furthermore. Comn. previously controlled by Egypt.S. and surrounding Egypt¶s Third Army. Egypt est strongholds to def its posn. adv into Egypt. By mid-Oct. a counteroffensive against Egypt. 9. Egypt and Syria launched their attack against Israel on 06 Oct 73. The precarious state in which the Arab armies found themselves hastened the war¶s conclusion. Israel and Egypt both broke the terms of the cease-fire. . 8. 12. president Richard Nixon that Israel¶s failure to halt mil actions would prompt a Soviet response. rather than on other Arab-Israeli issues such as the future of the West Bank and Jerusalem and the issue of Palestinian statehood. implied in comns with U. Both the Soviets and the Americans almost imdt stepped back from a confrontation. Israeli forces retook the land that Syria had captured and pushed past the Syrian border. SECTION 12 : CEASE-FIRE AND DISENGAGEMENT 11. Despite severe initial casualties. A final cease-fire took effect on Oct 25. It also prompted imdt intervention by the US and the Soviet Union. On 22 Oct the UN passed the resolution. In response. Secy of State Henry Kissinger to visit Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire resolution with Soviet ldr Leonid Brezhnev. soon making their way within arty rg of Damascus. Meanwhile. By the end of the war. and Israel¶s mil was not fully prep for war. Instead. However. crossing the Suez Cnl. Israeli forces had adv to within 100 km of Cairo and 40 km of Damascus. both armies failed to take advantage of their early gains. which also called for direct negotiations between the Israelis and Arabs. Israel¶s lack of preparedness. his armies took a small slice of land along the entire length of the cnl¶s east bank. they omitted Jordan and the PLO from the plg of the war. Lack of coord between Cairo and Damascus. Israel¶s threat to eradicate the Egyptian Third Army prompted U. Brezhnev. 10. Israel launched Op Gazelle. Israeli int sources had discounted the probability of an Arab aslt. Egypt overcame the Israeli string of fortfns along the cnl¶s east bank known as the Bar-Lev line. viewing an Egyptian defeat as potentially destabilizing to Sadat¶s govt. Meanwhile. Aware of his army¶s ltd firepower.6. In doing so. inhibited addl Arab mil successes.S. mut frustration and impatience with the diplomatic status quo led Sadat and Assad to plan an attack in collusion. SECTION 11 : COURSE OF THE WAR 7.S. incl intervention to preserve the Third Army. Despite these differences. Syrian forces adv into the Golan Heights. Kissinger asked for and recd Nixon¶s permission to put American troops on a nuc alert. 13. Sadat did not order an adv across all of the Israeli-held Sinai. Because the two Arab ldrs were focused more on their own particular national interests. and initial Israeli losses. and Israel continued its adv. Sadat¶s armies quickly crossed the Suez Cnl. Israel had mobilized its troops and launched a series of CAs on both fronts. -brokered Camp David Accords in 1978. From Oct 1973 to Nov 1974. 20. 16. 18. with Kissinger¶s help. hastened mil talks between Israel and Egypt. The Israeli mil¶s lack of readiness called into question the capabilities of the country¶s ldrs. SECTION 13 : CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR 17. combined with the precarious existence of the Egyptian Third Army. desiring greater American participation. arng a Middle East peace conf with the US and the Soviet Union as co chairs. Syria declined to attend. Egypt¶s improved relations with the US and Israel also led to its separation and isolation from inter-Arab affairs in the 1980s. Syria and Israel. which led to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979. Finally. However. The conf convened in Geneva. . Moshe Dayan.S.14. along with the town of Al Qunayirah in the Golan region. While the war did not affect Syria¶s close alignment with the Soviet Union and strong opposition to the US and Israel. A sec Egyptian-Israeli agreement was concluded in Sep 1975. Although Jordan participated. pushing the Arab forces back beyond the 1967 borders. Switzerland. During the next two years. 15. concluded a disengagement agreement by which Israel returned Syrian territory captured in the 1973 war. the conf was suspended and failed to reconvene. It also est a UN buffer Z between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan. The 1973 war also marked the first successful use of oil as a political wpn in the ArabIsraeli conflict. Kissinger¶s newly developing relationship with Sadat reduced Soviet influence over Egypt and brought the country closer to the US. on Dec 21. and the PLO was not invited. calling for Israel¶s withdrawal back across the Suez Cnl and the restoration in Jan 1974 of a UN peacekeeping force in the Cnl Z. it initiated drastic changes in Egypt¶s foreign relations. Both of these devps est the foundation for the U. to continue the negotiations. Israel¶s desire to have its PW returned. The war had many far-reaching effects on the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. After two days of public posturing.´ flying back and forth between the Arab capitals and Israel and actg as a mediator. 19. 21. In May 1974. Kissinger used a negotiating technique called ³shuttle diplomacy. Each successful agreement also generated trust between Israel and Egypt. Meanwhile. Kissinger. prompting the resignations of Israeli PM Golda Meir and COS. the war caused internal problems in Israel. Israel had successfully regrouped in a matter of days. despite significant early losses. the oil-producing Arab countries maint an embargo on oil exports to Western nations friendly to Israel. The results of an ensuing investigation were highly critical of the mil. The Arab forces shattered the myth of Israel¶s invincibility that had persisted since the 1967 war. Both sides claimed victory. This technique yielded the first Egyptian-Israeli mil disengagement agreement. 4. on behalf of British Govt. which the Balfour Declaration suggested. 6. According to a tradition. THE ARAB ATTITUDE 5. science and med. However. the first Zionist conf was held in 1897 and defined as its obj µthe securing for Jewish people a home in Palestine guided by the public law¶. Anti-Jewish riots erupted annually from 1921 onwards. 2. Eminent Jews were respected and honoured by non-Jewish communities. THE ZIONIST MOV 3. Jewish immigration and purchase of land by them was strongly protested against by the Palestinians. Theodor Herzl wrote the book µDar Judenstadt¶ which inspired the Zionist Mov. victimised and persecuted. made a declaration in Nov 1917 stating ³His Majesty¶s Govt views with favour. However. The Jews were driven out of Palestine with the emergence of Christianity and remained scattered since then. in the early 1870s¶ the spirit of medieval intolerance returned specially in Germany and Russia. Under Herzl. accepted both by Arabs and Jews. They were isolated in separate communities often despised. The source of eternal strife between the Arabs and the Jews is over the possession of Palestine as both claim it as their home. literature. At the San Remo conf in Apr 1920 the Palestine Mandate was awarded to the British Govt. In 1881 a Jewish physician from Odesaa published a brochure asserting that the only way the Jews could restore their dignity was to recreate the Palestine national home. Indeed the early nineteenth century seemed to find Jews emancipated all over Europe except Russia.CHAPTER ± 4 : GENESIS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SECTION 14 : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND GEN 1. The revival of persecution towards the end of the nineteenth century led to a new devp in the Jewish thought. marked the beginning of an anti-Jewish attitude. the Jews would over-take them numerically in near future. In 1986. all over the world. Only the possibility of being deprived of their land and country. There existed considerable deg of similarity in customs and attitudes of Muslim Arabs and small Jewish community in Palestine. . In recog for the contribution of Jews in World War 1. The Arabs realised that if the rate of immigration contd. The µBalfour Declaration¶ came to the Arabs as a rude shock. the est in Palestine of a µNational Home¶ for the Jewish People´. Jews played an imp role in many countries in the fd of art. PM Lord Balfour. The rivalry of Arabs and Jews is that of brothers as both belong to the Semitic race and their languages echo each other. have sprung from a common heritage. After four weeks of critical fighting. A small Iraqi contingent mov into North Palestine. a Jewish State and a spl international regime for Jerusalem. The creation of the state of Israel was followed imdt by a gen Arab attack and the conflict ensued. the British quit Palestine and returned their Mandate to the United Nations.FMN OF STATE OF ISRAEL 7. Ben Gurion proclaimed the est of Jewish state. 8. United Nations partition plan was offered and adopted with a majority vote.000 Jews (incl women) under Lt Col Dayan against 35. Egyptians made a thrust along the Gaza Strip. The United Nations Spl Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) set up on 15 May 1947. recommended the termination of British Mandate. The bal of forces is thought to have been some 20. 9. achieving the following: (a) Successfully broke the siege of Jerusalem on 11 Jun and prevented Arab Legion from driving wedge from the region of Tulkram to the sea. while advising the partition of Palestine into a Arab State. Captured approx 3000 sq mils of territory. SECTION 15 : THE EARLIER WARS THE 1948 WAR The Arab Attack 11. (b) (c) (d) (e) Drove the Egyptians back into Nagev Desert. At the end of Sec World War µThe Jewish Agency¶ asked for the fmn of a Jewish State. On 29 May 1947. Cleared Galilee of guers. On the same day in front of 36 pol reps. the Israelis launched what is known as µTen Days Offensive´. the British Govt announced its decision to submit the Palestine problem to UN. Captured the Port of Eliat at the head of Gulf of Aqaba. 10. The Nazi atrocities in Germany and in rest of Europe resulted in a mass scale exodus of Jews to Palestine. On 25 Feb 1947. . Ten Days Offensive By Israel 13. On 15 May 1948. The first rd of fighting began with the creation of Israel and the state began its fight for survival. 12.000 comb and irregular tps belonging to seven Arab states. The Arabs Launched a three-pronged attack on Israel as under :(a) (b) (c) The Arab Legion besieged Jerusalem on 18 May. The Jews accepted the plan but Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states turned it down. (b) End Fedayeen terrorism from the Gaza strip. Israel had clear-cut war aims and prosecuted the war strictly in conformity with them. Steady incr in scope and intensity of these raids coupled with Israeli reprisal raids. 16. In Jul 1956. (d) Gain cont of Sharm El Sheikh near the Southern tip of Sinai peninsula with a view to break the Egyptian blockade of Gulf of Aqaba (the primary aim). Suez Crisis. Both sides got engaged in a arms race with Egypt procuring arms from USSR and Israel from France. Israel in conjunction with Britain and France. mtd the tension gradually in the area. (c) Capture max territory in the Sinai Peninsula and use it for political bargaining with Egypt. Egypt also blocked the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. As a result of Arab-Israeli war. Syria and Jordan and other neighboring states. Conduct of Ops 19. Israel refused to take these refugees back. rejected this and were determined to eliminate Israel from Arab scene and resettle the Palestinian refugees there. Egypt devp Fedayeen bases in the Gaza strip for launching raids into Israel. The ptrs were used in conjunc with the adv colns based on armr and mot inf to capture key cens in depth. On 29 Oct 1956. with est of Arab Govt. who had been rendered homeless and lived in Gaza. Arabs. the Jews defeated the Arab attempt to drive them out of Palestine. Anglo-French AF attacked Egyptian tgts and by 02 Nov the Egyptian AF ceased to exist. Israel launched a four ph op using three axes of adv. president Nasser nationalised the Suez Cnl and took over its cont. THE 1956 WAR Background 15.000.Armistice 14. They were: (a) Destr of max possible Egyptian forces to neutr the armed Egyptian threat from south. however. 17. who were determined to wrest the cont of cnl took its chance and initiated secret mob on 25 Oct 56. however willing to pay compensation for their settlement in Arab countries. Israeli War Aims 18. The worst Legacy of 1948-49 war was the problem of Palestinian Arab refugees numbering approx 900. It was not until 28 Nov 1948 that Israel accepted the United Nations armistice resolution though there was a further ten days fighting in the Negev Desert against Egypt in Feb 1949. . From mil pt of view. British occupied Port Said. Britain and France. was re-opened in Mar 1957. the Israeli COS himself led decisive attacks. President Nasser¶s order for pull out of UN observers. the campaign was over with Israelis achiving a convincing victory. Devps Leading to The Six Day War 24. Prolonged political tension contd to build up between Arabs and Jews as posns adopted by both sides on the settlement of Palestinian refugees seemed as they were in early fifties. . Gaza strip was captured. in less then nine days. The offensive went through like a blitzkrieg. Under strong UN pressure. Maj Gen Moshe Dayan. the imp devps which went on to trigger the 1967 war were :(a) Egyptian tp concs in Sinai as a counter measure to the Israeli threat of invasion of Syria. The Suez Cnl. One third of the Egyptian Army was destroyed. the withdrawal of AngloFrench and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory was effected in Mar 1957. Following was the outcome:(a) (b) (c) (d) Aftermath 22. World opinion strongly criticised the action of Israel. (c) (d) Blockade of Gulf of Aqaba by Egypt to Israeli shipping. (b) Def pact between Egypt. Ceasefire was brought about on 06 Nov 56. which was blocked during the war with sunken ships. which was termed as µDeath Kiss¶ by Israelis. THE 1967 WAR Background 23. Jordan and Iraq. Outcome 21. Israeli forces gained cont over Sinai Desert and captured Sharm EI Sheikh.20. The Israeli strat for the war was based on the following: (a) (b) Pre-emptive Strike Attainment of total Air superiority. By 5 Nov. Israeli Strat 25. The Syrian Golan Hts on the North dominated greater part of Israeli Northern plain. There was no strat depth and no place for a sec line of def. (c) Further South. (b) In the center. CHAPTER-5 : SIX YEARS AFTER THE SIX DAY WAR SECTION 16 : GEN 1. The grnd ops proceeded speedily.(c) (d) Surprise. after an initial strong resistance from the Jordanian Army. The Gaza strip held by the Egyptians since 1948 and the Jordanian forces loc in Kalkiliya and the hills around looked upon Tel Aviv and its satl cities accommodating 40 percent of Israeli population. the Mitla pass was captured and the entire Egyptian forces still op to its North were trapped. The defacto 1949 borders placed Israel in a very precarious mil sit. Israel found herself with her territories multiplied giving her a strat depth. 27.Israeli war of 1967 completely changed the strat sit between the Arabs and Israel. She had captured the Golan Heights. At 0700h on 05 Jun 67. extended her borders to the East upto Jordan R and had secured the entire Sinai Desert. 2. At the end of the six-day war. Fighting on only one front at a time. Adv was undertaken along three axes:(a) A fast mov along the coastal rd captured the Gaza Strip. Sharm El Sheikh was also captured. Israel managed to capture Jerusalem and the entire West Bank of Jordan R. On the Jordanian Front. Syrian Front. The Arab. 28. Jordanian Front. The Arabs were taken completely by surprise. They couldn¶t afford to allow the Arabs to strike the first blow. Conduct of ops 26. the Israelis launched a carefully planned attack to capture Golan Heights. . Sinai Front. The very nature of Israel¶s borders meant danger. Ten Egyptian airfds were hit simultaneously and after a quick turn rd another six airfds were hit and destroyed. Israel launched a massive pre-emptive air strike over all Arab air fds. After completing the ops elsewhere. Out Come 30. The well-fortified and strengthened Syrian grns could not hold on against the attack and Golan Heights fell to Israel. 29. Bar Lev Line Def. maj cities of their adversaries were now threatened and within easy reach Israel. conc and launch CA. The Israelis thought that all these factors will weigh very heavily against renewal of hostilities by the Arabs. The Suez Cnl on the Egyptian front now provided addl assurance.3. Hence in Nov 68 they decided to create a def sys in Sinai to overcome the problems of Def of that sect. During the 68 clashes. For the first time their own population centres were far removed from the dangers. But the war of 67 for the first time freed Israel from this worry and provided them with depth. Effect on Egyptians and Arabs . An inter service team under Maj Gen Avraham (Bren) Adan was given this task. The details of Bar Lev Line defs will be discussed in subsequent chapters. for No of reasons other than the extent of Arab defeat. (b) Favourable sit now existed along Jordanian front with holy city of Jerusalem united and far removed from Jordanian arty. Effect on Israelis 5. On the other hand. The depth afforded by the territories taken by Israelis gave the country for the first time in the history a strat option with following advantages: (a) Sinai Peninsula offered a desert barrier of some 150 miles depth. It was now to be the Egyptian citizens who could be affected by the war and not Israelis. Electronic warning time available to Israel against en air attacks had now incr to sixteen mins instead of four previously. Jordan could not mount a maj attack on Israel without carrying out opposed river xg and then fighting across easily defensible 40 miles stretch of Judean Desert. Strat Advantage. 6. 7. which finished on 15 Mar 69. It acted as a catalyst in the Arab World and gave rise to the complete eval of the mil postures. The Israeli GS could now ex an option by launching a pre-emptive attack if the war seemed imminent or allow en the first strike and thereby utilizing the depth provided by Sinai desert to mvre. The fortfns were only one element-in what was later known as Bar Lev line. Possession of Golan Hts. West Bank and Sinai infused new confidence and changed the thinking of Israeli mil and Political ldrs. Israel discovered that the Egyptians could across Suez Cnl at any place all along its length. (c) Even on the Syrian front the Israeli forces had a ltd deg of depth. The Israeli victory of 1967 was a marked turning pt in Arab ± Israeli affairs as it changed the sit in West Asia significantly. SECTION 17 : EFFECT OF THE SIX DAY WAR Gen 4. The pattern contd during Mar-Apr. . Even though Arabs were defeated badly in 67 war. and postponed the ops to Mar 1969 Reorg Steps by Nasser 10.8. The Egyptians appre that Israelis economy and manpower sit was not capable of sustaining a war of long duration. (c) Constr of Bar Lev Line. 13. but much thought was also given to the quality of manpower and motivation of tps. As the Arabs morale sank to new depths after the 1967 defeat. and from 19 Apr. (b) Active deterrence (war of attrition) to incl destruction of Bar Lev line. 11. extensive ops in depth followed by full-scale ops for securing East Bank. (c) Coord all out offensive on both Northern and Southern front of Israel SECTION 18 : WAR OF ATTRITION BY EGYPTIANS 12. President Nasser took a No of steps to reorg the Egyptian armed forces. (b) Start of Attrition Favoured Arabs. The Egyptians drew lessons from every defeat and began to reconstruct their forces with Soviet sp and financed by oil rich Arab countries. the USSR equipped the Egyptian army to be able to face the Israelis. 9. The reorg was not ltd to eqpt alone. Reasons For The µWar of Attrition¶. In Nov 68. Cdo raids were also launched across the cnl. their plans for continuing confrontation never ceased. Defeat lowered the morale of Egyptians to new depths. President Nasser planned a three phased pgme :(a) Build up of def services and generate unity amongst the Arabs. The Israeli reaction by cdo ops convinced Nasser that Egypt yet was unprepared. Large Nos were sent on courses and offrs in mid thirties were promoted to the rk of Lt col. which would only perpetuate status quo and limit drastically the prospect of changing the sit along the cnl. These were as follows:(a) Resolve to Continue War Against Israel. Egyptians launched a maj War of Attrition with hy arty attacks. Seq of Events. It was a maj consideration for the Egyptians to commence the war Egyptians saw in its constr the creation of a permt. On 08 Mar 69 the Egyptians began a violent arty bombardment of Israeli posns on the Bar Lev Line which contd till 09 Mar. During the same period. catching Israeli forces unprepared and comparatively unprotected. impregnable Israeli presence. Offrs were encouraged to study Hebrew and learn about their adversary. (a) Egyptian Action. (i) Problem of SAMs. Lessons brought home by both sides were :(a) Egyptians. 14. Roger¶s plan was floated and President Nasser announced his acceptance in Jul and Israeli govt a month later. From the time President Sadat took office after Nasser¶s death on 28 sep 70 he knew that he would have to fight one day. followed this. For Israelis the war ended with many question marks about the SAM deterrence. Israelis let loose their day bombardment of Port Said flying 400 sorties in a day and effectively isolating it. Sadat Decides on War 16. (b) Israelis. 15. With the Egyptian air space protected. ceasfire came into effect and continued to be obs (though not w/o infringement) until the outbreak of hostilities in Oct 73. Devps following War of Attrition. (ii) Hy Cas. it had been a war of nerves in terms of cas and affecting the morale. (iii) Need for Activating Eastern Front. Nasser demanded and obtained a No of SAM-3 Byts with Russian pers to man them. The initiative passed to Israelis and the µWar of Attrition¶ became the war of counter attrition. Israelis launched massive air raids. By Jul. Following the war of Attrition. Inevitability of War. the fighting took a new ferocious turn. arty bombardment of industrial and civ tgts across the cnl and along the Gulf of Suez. Sadat Decides To Go Alone. reducing the Egyptian AD capability to near zero. to give depth to the first line of defs a sec line was constr eight to twelve kms to the rear to give overhead protection to the tks. ie. Being a long war. (iii) Str of the Bar Lev Line.(b) Israeli Reaction. It became clear that there was a urgent reqmt for re-dply of their SAM sys. In early Jun. (ii) Strat Advantage Gained. arty. Necessity for coord of both Eastern and Western fronts was felt. (c) Nasser¶s Secret Visit to Moscow. Deep penetration raids by IAF and Cdo activities contd till the end of Apr 70. Israelis decided to commit Air Power. as it was his inheritance from Nasser. Knowing that Egyptians would never fight. In reprisal action to Egyptian stepped-up raids. The Israeli raids on Egyptian SAM-2 sites. War of Attrition ended with strat advantage for Egyptians. incl 80 Soviet acs with pilots and four MG 25 acs . The Israeli response was prompt and characteristic. Lessons Learnt. climaxing in Oct 69. because of the build up of SAM sites and grnd forces in the cnl Z. On 07 Aug 70. the Israelis believed that they could never be surprised. 17. The reasons which prompted Sadat to make a decision in favour of war were :- . During 1970. HQ and some key instls. (i) Vulnerability to Israeli AF. 18. the new def minister. It was clear that stalemate (no peace no war) suited the super powers. Realising that the super powers will use every effort to restrain him. he decided to have a go at it alone. Beginning of Flow of Soviet Mil Aid. (b) Internal Pressures and Discontentment.. (d) Activation of International Community. all the diplomatic initiatives taken by USA and UN failed. to Moscow. Sadat well under. President Sadat decided in favour of offensive action to activate international community particularly the super powers. 3. This in turn led to the expulsion of Soviet advisors in Jul 72 as their presence did not allow Mr Sadat a free mvre and caused resentment in Egyptian army due to their rough and arrogant behaviour. (c) Stalemate in the Peace Negotiations. hence they agreed to sup the much needed arms to Egypt after a visit by Gen Ahmed Ismail. The Arabs came to the conclusion that there was no other alt to the Jewish-Arab problems.(a) Soviet Restraint to Sup Wpns to Egypt.stood that after six yrs of last defeat Egyptian soldiers on Suez cnl and students wanted action and ideas of war began to crystallize in Sadat¶s mind in early 72. Mr Brezhnev decision of avoiding super power confrontation did not encourage him. . hence reqmt of some mil action to re-activate CFL was called for. President Sadat had declared 1971 as the yr of decision and again he declared the same in 1972. SECTION 20 : CAUSES 2. but the Arabs were not sure of their str till the beginning of 1973 and were hesitant to start a full scale war. Russians were due to renew an agreement with Egypt in Mar 73 for the continuance of enjoying certain facilities for their fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. followed by inaction were eroding president Sadat¶s credibility and increasing his domestic problems. Freezing of Cease-fire. Credibility of President Sadat. Between 1967 and 73. CHAPTER 6 : CAUSES OF YOM KIPPUR WAR SECTION 19 : GEN 1. These rptd declarations. He made his decision of a ltd war in case of failure of diplomacy. as the plans for peace hinged on to the concessions by Israel and there was no indications of any spirit of accn by Israeli govt. It was difficult to believe that negotiations will lead to any peaceful settlement. Sometime in summer 72. The rptd extn of cease fire of Jul 70 after the war of Attrition was creating a fear in the Egyptian¶s mind that the cease fire may freeze into defacto borders. President Sadat¶s Dismissal of Soviet Advisors. Failure of Roger¶s Plan and Dr Jarring¶s Msn. He further said ³ if we don¶t take over the case in our own hands. the Arabs were totally incapable of waging a war with Israel. the msn was wound up in 71. Till Jan 73 USSR refused to provide MiG-23 ac and grnd msls. they had to withdraw a considerable portion of their political Int agents from Syria and Egypt. 5. The Russians were virtually in control of seven airfds. This strengthened his posn remarkably well at home and with the Army. Why Israel Failed to Guess ? 8. Provision of Msls and Ac by USSR. This was a turning pt in the rd to war. 6. They surmised. Availability of scud msls with a rg of 180 miles. The Israelis thought that their vigorous actions against terrorists have stamped out the border raids. had been conc on hitting the Palestinian guer. . This was a blow to any hope the Egyptians still had in peaceful soln. President Sadat thereafter ordered all Russian advisors to go back on 17 Jul. The main reasons for the failure of Israeli int services to forecast the Oct war were : - (a) Shifting of Int forces. Since last four yrs Israeli Int services. MiG-23 ac and SAM msls fulfilled the last reqmt of Egyptians ie it provided them with an umbrella against Israeli AF and a threat wpn against Israeli cities in case they bomb the population centers in Egypt. After rptd attempts by Dr Jarring. In Mar 73. which had its effect on flow of info. President Sadat Decides 7. The presence of Russian advisors was proving a hindrance and feelings against the Russians were running high in Egyptian Army . To keep tr of the guerrillas. which could reach Israeli cities from Cnl Z. Towards the end of Mar 73 . Every door I have opened has been slammed in my face´. The Israeli int agencies and the mil machine thought that after their defeat in 67. And finally in 1972. (b) Total Underestimation of Arab Capacity. (c) Total lack of Activity From Beginning of 73. Egyptian Def Min and Cdr in Chief Gen Ismail met President Nixon on after his visit to Moscow but from the talks it appeared that USA had no desire to pressurise Israel. For the first time Sadat was openly prophesising war in earnest but nobody believed him. Total lack of activity along Suez and Golan hts from late 72 onwards was interpreted by Israel as ssa further sign of Arab weakness. UN Secy Gen Kurt Waldheim declared that it was not possible to reactivate the Dr Jarring¶s msn. USA announced that 48 more phantom jet ac would be supplied to Israel. Sadat¶s PM Dr Aziz Sidqi went to Moscow to resolve the issue but he come back cutting short his visit on 15 Jul 72 w/o any agreement. there will be no mov. President Sadat gave an interview to Newsweek in which he rptd that negotiations have finally failed and that the war was necessary. that the Arabs could only wage terrorism. In this concluding remarks he said ³everything in this country is now being mob in earnest for resumption of the battle which is now inevitable´. This deal came off after Gen Ismail¶s Moscow visit and visit of high level USSR mil delegation to Cairo in Jan 73.4. (f) Israeli Gen Staff had forecasted a war in May 73 and int agencies did not think it was a possibility and it came to be true. 10. Israeli mob in May 73 had cost the nation $ 11million. They thought they will not have a credible AD before 1975 and in the absence of AD. (b) He continued the process of acquiring more mil hardware from Soviet Union. that Egyptians could be ready for war earliest by 1975 and NB. The provision of scud msls. made Egyptians to reject Soviet attitude and commence prep for the War from 14 Nov 72 onwards. On 28 Sep 1970. SECTION 21 : CONCLUSION 9. The facts were there in plenty but their interpretation was faulty. (c) Initiate a peaceful path to persuade Israel to partial withdrawal wherein the Egyptians would clear and reopen the Suez cnl. Failure of Israeli int to forecast the war was mainly the failure to guess the intentions of the Arabs. . Even the American int agencies like CIA were deceived about the intentions of Arabs. which specified Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in return of Arab assurance of a lasting peace. because of preconceived ideas about Arab capabilities. When the Egyptian mob again took place in Sep. Delay would have been fatal to Arab cause. President Naseer died and Anwar Sadat became the new Egyptian Ldr.(d) Rptd mob and demos by Egyptians conditioned the Israelis to Egyptian mobs as routine. the Israeli mil again wanted to mob. Sadat¶s Intial Apch. (a) He tried to pursue the Roger¶s peace plan of Dec 69. they knew. Mig-23 ac and sufficient no of SAM and A tk msls from Jan 73 onwards fulfilled the necessary conditions for war. The last mob was also thought of as a routine. CHAPTER 7 : PREP FOR WAR Gen 1. (e) Israeli int had earlier predicted. The CFL was freezing into a defacto bdy and the Arabs couldn¶t afford such a sit. (g) The eyeball-to-eyeball dply of Egyptians didn¶t give clear indications of preps for attack. but the int agencies again differed and the COS couldn¶t risk another mob under such a sit arose. but it failed. the Arabs could not start a war. It was seen that during 73 the Egyptians reached a diplomatic dead end and they said there was no alt to war and thus break the deadlock. 2. During this period the Russian caution and inclination to keep détente. The Egyptians were thus able to conc their attacking forces behind the already dply forces. (g) Apply political pressure on Israel to agree to concessions acceptable to Arab countries to incl evac from occupied territories. 5. Plan For Ops 6. (e) There was to be a complete coord between Egypt. . The whole invading force was to conduct ops on some 150 km front w/o armr until brs were built for armr to cross. Sadat gave instrs that mil reforms and reorg are reqd but things could crystallize only by Feb 1972. (b) Egypt. Mil. therefore. to be a massive one and launched along its entire length. The attack across Suez was. The mil obj of Arabs was to recapture parts of Syria and Egypt occupied by Israel. The plan of ops decided for the Arab forces was as follows :- (a) Attack across a wide frontage across the Suez Cnl.3. While simultaneously launching attack on Golan hts from Syria to regain whole of Golan Plateau incl the western escarpments and gain a foothold on the west bank of the upper Jordan R. None of the initiatives succeeded. Hussein¶s task was to pose merely the threat of third front and protect Southern flk of Syria. the war was to be aimed for a final solution to the confrontation with Israel by sparking a crisis into which the superpowers would inevitably be involved and attempt to seek a solution. To make good its ltd losses on Golan Heights. (f) The attack was planned for either in the month of May or during later half of Sep/Oct. (c) Jordan. Syria and Jordan. Throughout 1971. In other words ³undertake a ltd offensive to est a br H cross the cnl´. this was to be achieved in ph. Aims of The War 4. (d) Great thought was given to the depth of br H leaving the option of expl upto the passes or limiting it to 15-20 km. with a massive attack both in scope and intensity. Speady breaching op a sand escarpment on Eastbank and launching of brs. No loop holes were left for the characteristic threat from Israeli armr. Jordan was to pose fmns along the Israel-Jordan Border to tie down Israeli forces and also secure Syrian southern bdy. As decided at Cairo summit on 10 Sep 73. Political. However. (c) Est of five div size br Hs expanding to upto 8-10 miles. Recapture a slice of Sinai along the East Bank of Suez Cnl. in str. Adv to the three passes that were upto 35 miles fom the cnl based on prog of ops. So the imdt mil objs were as follows :(a) Syria. (the extent of SAM cover). with other Arab nations being treated as res. Discontent in Egypt grew. Dply of THTs ahead of br H to thwart Israeli CA. Egyptians were to attempt a combination of opposed cnl xg on a wide front. the µYr of Decision¶. (b) It was decided that Egypt must strike first. The reqmt of oil for the war was discussed with other Arab countries.(h) Incase superpowers failed to intervene then. to spark off an international crisis in which the super powers will join to reach a decision. However. 12. Sadat expelled the Soviet pers manning AD wpns and other soviet eqpt. 13. Some 40. Offrs Mgt. 10. many soldiers who had done well in action were also promoted from rks. the eqpt was def in nature and qty was inadequate for war. vehs and eqpt. until they were exhausted and agreed to Arab conditions. However. Sadat continuously persuaded the Soviet Union for addl armt. Political action undertaken to force Israel to accept concessions acceptable to Arabs. thus. Mil op to seek ltd gains. Selection was from the educated urban population. Saudi Arabia. (c) Leadership. Soviet union was the main provider of mil eqpt. Algeria provided unspecified qty of oil reqd for the campaign. In Jul 72. Rectg. Political influence was totally nullified by elimination of politically minded offrs. From Jan 71. Offrs were encouraged to study the Israelis. The initial plan formulated was that the op will be undertaken by Egypt alone and comprise of two parts :(a) Part 1. incompetent offfrs with young. Mod of Mil Eqpt. Libya provided oil only when war broke out and only for the duration of the war. Acqn of Mil Hardware. (b) Motivation. However.000 people left Egypt. lazy. . subsequently the plan got mod and other Arab allies joined in and finally the whole op was codenamed Op badr which was launched on 06 Oct 73. Prep Specific to the Offensive. to learn all about them and even to spk Hebrew. Prep by Egypt 9. (a) Sup of Oil. Selection of only the best and fittest was ensured. 8. Efforts were made to replace the old. after that the Egyptian carried out mod of tks and other eqpt to enhance their rg and effectiveness. energetic and hardworking offrs. This they called the ³Meat Grinder Tac´. SECTION 22 : EGYPT Op Spark 7. (b) Part 2. 11. continue to fight spread-out Israeli forces for weeks. Prep got underway to change the psy of the soldiers and offrs from µTrench Fever¶ or def mentality to the offensive spirit. Many Sr and incompetent offrs were removed. facilitating trg in modern wpns. (f) Focussed Trg. ferries and xg expedients. to encourage them to undertake msns with ³calculated risks´. (ii) All these wpns were neutralized during ni 05/06 Oct by Egyptian Rangers and Frogmen. eqpt. remaining two remained under cover near the waterway. rather than they being jack of many trades. ration. A detailed study was carried out from Cnl Auth records regarding tidal behaviour. However. (e) Standardization of Eqpt and Amn. bde sized forces mov toward cnl but only one bn returned westwards by evening. Gen Shazli issued µDirective No 41¶. rigorous trg was carried out to train everyone on one particular task in battle. It laid down the exact task of every soldier and laid down precise scale of wpn. Egyptian Mob and Conc 14. (i) Constr of large sand banks on west bank to achieve some cover from 60 ft high watch tower of Bar Lev Line def. This quality gen gets curbed in armies traditionally brought up on caution and def. It had a tr along the length of the horse shoe near the rim for tks to take posn and the sides sloping to grnd at the rear end to enable tks to reach the tr. (h) Selection of Trg Area. scheduled between 01 to 07 Oct were carried out. This was essential to determine the precise day and time of xg. It had similar water currents and speed to that of Suez cnl. Trg was also carried out on similar models. The annual mvres known as ³Tahir 23´. Based on the Directive issued. Drive was undertaken to infuse offensive spirit in the men. (g) Study of the Suez Cnl. µWater pumps¶ were tried and 348 experiments were carried out to ensure that a gap could be water blasted in the sand rainpart within four to five hr. nature of brs.(d) Offensive Spirit. The armed forces were placed in a µState of Alert¶. Improvisation was made to overcome the time reqmt of 12 hr for breaching the sand bank with conventional means. current speed and seasonal hydrographical disturbances. water and other items to be carried by each indl. Here men practiced vigorously in aslt boats the ops of xg the cnl and br tasks. (j) Breaching the Sand Bank on East Bank. On 21 Mar 1973. (iii) Constr of huge horseshoe shaped sand banks at intended xg pts higher than and overlooking Israeli sand rampart. (l) Neutr of ³Secret Wpn´ of Isreal. (i) Secret wpn consisted of 39 large tks along the length of the cnl containing 200 gallons of oil and a pipe descending to the water to carry the oil. (ii) Constr of concrete slipways to enable vehs to enter the water at 50 yards interval. . amn. (k) Prep of West bank. The oil would be released in water and set afire to incinerate the attackers. µEl Ballah Loop¶ was selected as the trg area where both banks were in Egyptian possession. 16. (b) Def Posture. laying of mines. during which the tide in Suez Cnl was most suitable for ops and it was the day of Yom Kippur for Israelis and Tenth day of Ramadan for the Arabs (the day of fasting). repeatedly highlighting the issue of 1971 being the µ Yr of Decision ¶ when virtually no decision was taken. President Sadat and Gen Ismail deliberately acted in a manner that would go on to encourage this sense of false security. 18. Raising of ramparts on the Egyptian side of Suez Cnl. 22. (e) Selection of 06 Oct as the µY¶ day because it was a moon±lit ni. Egyptian carried out 22 mob scheme in 1973. . In Sep 73. seeking a list of offrs and men who wished to perform Haj pilgrimage to Mecca . (c) Expulsion of Soviet advisors by the Egyptians made Israelis believe that Arabs had no intention of imdt offensive. In the evening of 05 Oct . (d) Haj Pilgrimage. (b) Schonau Incident. Syrians dply was also made to appear def orientated. Israelis assumed that Arabs will not engage in mil ops on this day and Arabs expected Israeli alertness at its lowest levels due to Yom Kippur. Surprise and Deception 20. Guns. and all prep of Egypt thereafter was viewed as def prep by them to counter Isreaeli attack. 19. Strat. 21. Twenty third mob scheme carried out for actual war was ignored by Israelis as a routine affair. This angered Israel. mov and dply were being carried out under the cover plan of a maj ex. Water level in Sweet water Cnl was lowered to prevent flooding in case of Israeli Bombardment hitting any bank. Various deception measures were under taken. Spl clo were issued to tps. hy eqpt and amn was mov at ni and hidden by day. (a) All activities pertaining to prep. SAMs were brought fwd within 4 miles of it. (a) After 1972. (f) Repetitive Mob Schemes. Two gunmen from Syrian terrorist gp ¶Saiqa¶ held up some hostages and demanded closure of the Jewish refugee route through Schonau Castle. The various actions by the Arabs towards achieving surprise and deception are listed out in the subsequent paras. just a month before the planned offensive there was an announcement for the army.15. and improvement of def posns were all depicted as if the Egyptians were improving their def posture. trucks and trlrs carrying br eqpt mov fwd to the cnl. Political. FROG tac msls were placed in their pads. 17. like. The bde cdrs knew it only by 0800 hr on 06 Oct whereas the coys learnt about the attack only at 1230 hr. SECTION 23 : SYRIA 25. (c) Progressive Dply. Role Of Syria . 5 X Inf divs. 16 X Arty bdes. Mov fwd of cnl xg eqpt was delayed as much as possible. Deep pits were dug in to hide the eqpt when it arr in the vicinity of cnl by ni. Syria and Jordan. Egyptian Orbat 24. It was org as under :(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 3 X Armd divs with 250 tks each.000. 3 X Mech divs. The civ air and sea tfc was stopped only at 1340 hr . Assad was elected President of Syria on 12 Mar 1971. 06 Oct. Very high std of security was maint at all levels. under the garb of an ex. APCs (approx 1200) and 150 X SP guns. 50 X SAM-3 Lr sites. Spl crates were made for some of the br eqpt so that no one could detect that the huge trucks carrying them belonged to the Corps of Engrs.(g) Security. (f) Tks approx 1700 (mostly T-54 / T-55 incl 100 X T-62 and 75 X PT-76). def ministers of Egypt. (b) Mov of Br Eqpt. Gen Ismail sent a bde in the morning to the waterfront and brought back only a bn at ni making the ex appear more conclusive. The str of the army was estimated to be about 2. He went through domestic political turmoil and conflicts with Israel. The COS was Lt Gen Saad el Shazli. 2 X Para bdes and 20 X Ranger units. The usual war like posturing and cycles of autumn mvres were conducted. (h) No of SAMS. In the north. Tac. barely half dozen people knew the date of µY¶ Day. RPG-7. (g) 4500 X Guns of all types. There were about 70 X SAM-2. (Each div had three integral tk bns and integral sp and lgs units). FROG Msls. (a) All Activities Made to Appear Routine. Only in Jan 73. 23. All activities undertaken by the Arabs were made to appear as routine repetitions. Initially Syria did not show any inclination to join in the Egypt Offensive. Egyptian soldiers were seen swimming in Suez Cnl and mov about w/o helmets even on the morning of µY¶ Day.60. Str of the Army. Apart from the plg staff. did President Assad express a definite interest in Op Spark and it¶s scope was widened to incl Syria. All three Mech divs began to conc near the CFL in a µDef Posture¶. Prep by Syria 27. The country continued to battle against the IS problems as well as the menace of the Palestinian Fedayeens. During ni 04/05 Oct. It was also troubled by Palestinian Fedayeens. Maj Gen Bahieddin Mohd Nofal. Jordan remained diplomatically isolated from some Arab countries because of attitude of King Hussein towards Palestinian Fedayeens.26. 32. both Sadat and Assad. They started to make political mvres to convince King Hussein. The Syrian Army comprised of the following :(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 2 X Armd divs.60 X Btys of SAMs. Both Armd divs mov fwd to Katna and Kiswe. It was agreed that Jordan will coop and mob tps toward Jordan R to alarm Israelis and force them to commit some of their fmns. 3 X Mech divs . 7 X Arty Regts. During the course of their plg. In Jun. 29. Jordan had lost heavily. Maj Wpn and Eqpt. Reservists were recalled on 02 Oct. From 24 to 30 Sep. Gen Ismail issued Federated Gen Directive to both Egyptian and Syrian Armed Forces for the strat offensive. On 22 May 1973. During the 1967 war. 28. SECTION 24 : JORDAN 31. The sec line of def was apparently unoccupied in view of the offensive dply. . Till early 1973. (i) (ii) (iii) 800 X tks. further directives were issued dealing with res on each front and with mob plans . Syrian tps began a slow build up against Golan front by withdrawing from Jordanian borders. to apply pressure against Israel from a third front. the three Mech divs near the CFL changed to offensive posture. 1 X Spl Forces Bde. Syrian ORBAT 30. realized the advantages of involving Jordan in Op badr. Entire SAM Sys was manned. 500 other A vehs. 1 X Para Bde. To launch offensive into Israel to rec the territories lost in 1967. 33. an Egyptian offr was appt as LO to ensure smooth co-op between the two plg gps. 50 . King Hussein visited Cairo on 10 Sep 73 to attend Arab Summit mtg and there he was told of the broad outline of Op Spark and Op badr. 800 Guns all types. and SP Guns. Israeli Understanding of Arabs 37. the IDF adopted offensive strat based on initiative. Unorthodox tacs and ingenuity of mil leadership at all levels. 550 X Lt Armd Vehs. M 60 tks. 36. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 140 X British Centurion tks. after 1967 war there was reluctance to have inf integral to armd fmn as gen feeling began to prevail that inf hindered and slowed down the ops of armd fmn basically due to slower pace of APCs.Tk Coop. Deep thrusts entailing conc emp of armr to hit depth objs w/o securing flks or axes. thus interpreted all Arab mov as prep for def battle. M 48s. (a) Initiative and Offensive Spirit.Jordanian ORBAT 34. However. 3 X Arty regts. Hy reliance was placed on close air sp. 1 X Mech div and 1 X Inf div. Armr and Inf as a prac were gp together down to sub unit level to derive max comb power. The Jordanian Army Comprised of :(a) (b) (c) 1 X Armd div. The following assumptions of Israelis about Arab capabilities played a significant role in the war :(a) They conveniently assumed that Arabs did not have the capability to strike. (d) Leadership. Israeli higher comd was fully confident of getting at least 72 hr EW of impending Egyptian attack. w/o due regard to the constantly thickening AD cover of the Egyptians. Concepts. (c) Close Air Sp. 200 X M42 SP AA guns. Maj Wpns and Eqpt. mob fire power and absolute confidence coupled with sense of superiority almost amounting to arrogance. Armr was the predominant arm with hy reliance on AF to sp the land battles. and would carryout complete mob to effectively deal with the threat. 190 X American M 47s. an indep inf bde and Royal Guards Armd Unit. even to the extent of compensating for arty fire sp. SECTION 25 : ISRAEL Gen 35. From the past Israeli experience against Arabs. 200 X Guns (all types). (b) Inf . . The Israeli appre that the Egyptian engrs will require 24h to build brs and their hy eqpt and armr would not be able to cross the cnl before 18hr enabling complete mob in 48h to 72h. Thus. This slope was mined and booby trapped. in 8 to12 hr time. they based their plans on a war of about one week. (c) On ejection of Russian and Czech advisors and techs by Egypt.29 Sep. along the whole length of cnl. A three storied structure. designed to hold upto approx 15 to 20 pers (though some up to even 80-120). (h) They presumed that Arabs will not launch attack in the month of Ramadan which was from 26 Sep to 26 Oct. (i) The Cnl def consisted of about 26 µForts¶. (ii) There was a 60 ft high sand bank on the eastern bank with its fwd slope on the cnl. (a) The Israelis had planned to fight a def battle based on Bar Lev Line defs. having 6-8 tk bays and even gun pits in some. The concept of fighting envisaged rft of the µBar Lev Line¶ and a sharp reaction by armr held in depth areas. (c) Layout of µFort¶. (iii) The outer fence was covered by A pers mines and wire entaglement. The gradient was 45 degs. they assumed Arabs could not handle sophisticated eqpt. so that they would hold advantageous posn at the time of cease fire. (f) They did not believe that friendship between Syria and Egypt would last.(b) They appre that GW and terrorism were real dangers rather than Arab conventional attack. not negotiable be amph vehs. in Jul 72. (e) They underestimated the Arabs in the level of edn of tps. even though large gaps existed. all underground. 28 . Overhead protection of steel beams. the middle contained amn and sups and the bottom had living qtrs (electrified and air conditioned). Bar Lev Line Def. (g) They assumed that they will always have the initiative. Their strat was to rapidly thrust as far fwd as possible into Arab territory. Each µFort¶ was self contained post. (j) Even when late indicators indicated the impending war. (d) They were over confident of their own capabilities and American sp.e. The top storey was the op floor containing A tk wpns and MMGs. thus accordingly deployed their int resources. unity among the Arabs and the sprit of nationalism amonst them. Isreali Def in Sinai 38. while the main defs were loc in the High Grnd area. . formed the strong pt. before UN/ superpower intervention would take place. stone and concrete. capable of withstanding the heaviest arty and ariel bombardment was provided. technology and integrity. they argued that the Arab attack should have been launched during Jewish New Yr holiday µRosh Hashanah¶ i. some 50 Km in depth (b) The Bar Lev Line defs were considered invincible. On 15 Jul. The main Comd HQ was at Bir Gifgafa. Local armr res were loc at suitable interval. These were loc on the High Grnd. while Maj Gen Avraham Mandler was cdr of the armd forces in the Sinai. It had 240 µPads¶ of concrete for SP guns/tks. these could get in action in eight hr. Three addl bdes were made available as rft. Rds. there were 8000 tps. One bde was in close sp of the Bar Lev Def. The role of arty was to break up any inf xg of the cnl. covering the four routes. the line was held by only 436 men with 3 tks on the water front and 7 x arty btys in the line. A black top rd ran parallel to the cnl behind the strong pts for the whole length of the Bar Lev Line. arty. on another sand rampart. The Comd had eight bdes deployed South of the border in Sinai. The sec line of strong pts was similarly constr as the fwd line. GOC Southern Comd controlled ops in Sinai from his peace time HQ in Beersheba. The entry to a strong pt was only from the existed from the fwd strong pts to those in the sec line. Some distance behind the sec line def another North-South rd had been specially constr for the mov of hy arty places. One bde was dply along Sup rd to launch CA at selected places. One bde. rfts and HQs. along this rd. was held back 8-10 Km behind the cnl line. Six CPs were sited ahead of Khatmia ridge. Sp Arms and CPs. Maj Gen Shmuel Gonen took over the Southern Comd replacing Maj Gen Ariel Sharon. with ppl for oil in the cnl. This oil was to be ignited at a moment¶s notice by on electrical mechanicm. (In actual fact when the war broke out on 6 Oct at 1400hr. Change of Comd in Southern Sect 44. while tks were to take c/o those who succeeded in xg the cnl. The Sec Line Def. 70 guns followed later. More than 20 bdes were expected to be available on mob in the Sinai. It held armr. On 06 Oct. 42. some 50 Km in depth. sp by one armd bde along 170 Km frontage. Dply of Forces in Sinai 43. 39. Israeli Reaction to Warnings . 40. though some tks were loc in the strong pts themselves. leading East wards and were based on the line Mitla Pass-Giddi Pass-Bir Gifgafa-Bir Salmana (half way between Port Said & El Arish). it was also called µSup Rd¶ or the µLateral Rd¶. One bde was dply further in depth to be eff in 2 hr time at the selected place. One bde was covering the three passes.(iv) Oil releasing switching rear. however. 41. Bulk of the armr. There were three addl bde in depth beyond Khatmia ridge. 300 tks and 70 SP guns in the Sinai. (b) Armr. The dply of forces was as under :(a) Bar Lev Line. Trs storage tks had been constr under most of the strong pts. Gonen was the overall cdr of the theatre. approx 300 to 500 m away. Main Defs. Of these 30 were always occupied. The arty rd ran parallel about 6-8 km behind the cnl. First Wave. 250 up gunned Centurions. Leading tps were to cross the stretch of water. A tk wpns incl LAW. Full mob was reluctantly not ordered till late in the AN.45. Egyptians chose to cross first wave of inf under cover of smk.000 regs and 85.SS11 and 3. Warning was recd at 0400hr. (a) Israeli Army. but H hr was assumed to be 1800h. 48. en bank of which was heavily fortified. it mentioned indications of attack late in the AN. 100 up gunned T 54/55.000 conscripts. Israeli Orbat 50. therefore the govt was hesitant to issue orders unless it was very sure of the Egyptian attack. scramble up the loose sandy surface and make for . (b) Approx 1700 tks (400 Pattons. The Egyptian offensive op to est Br Hs across the Suez Cnl was code named µOp badr¶. Ae recce of Syrian front confirmed offensive posturing of the three divs.00. CHAPTER ± 8 : OP BADR Intro 1. because there had been three mob since 1967 war which had proved costly and disruptive to Israel economy. The deception measure in r/o Schonau Castle led Israel to believe that all actions being taken by Egypt were def actions against impending Israeli attack on Arabs. Warning did not percolate down to jr ldrs till mins before launching of attack. It comprised of armr. M-3). 150 American M60 and 60 vintage Centurions and Shermans) and 300 other AFVS. inf. At 1000h. 49. Gen Plan 2. 06 Oct from Abba Eban who was in New York.000 in 72h. These were comb teams org as per tasks. US ambassador warned Israel against premptive air strike on Arabs. 46. It was a difficult and a complicated op as it entailed an attack across a formidable water obst. 200 up gunned Shermans. IDF in 1973 was estimated to have 30.5 in RL. There were also other faulty presumptions about Arabs as discussed earlier which played a role in decision making at the higher level. and arty comps. Israeli army was divided into Northern. After mob the IDF str could rise to 3. 47. It was org into 37 bdes on full mob. (c) (d) 1000 x Half trs ( M-2. Central and Southern comds resp for Syria-Lebanon. Jordan and Egyptian fronts respectively. It was not just a normal opposed water obst xg op but a multipronged offensive involving xg at a No of pts over 100 km frontage. SS10. To counter superiority of the IAF. 7. To achieve complete air def of the area. Fire plan envisaged the following :Well sited Schilkas and AA Guns boosted SAM def. Infilt upto the passes and also tgt Bir Gifgafa. AD was based on the following layout :(a) Static SAM 2 and SAM 3 were deployed on the west Bank to provide high and med cover.when it was to be enlarged to 16 Km by 8 Km. Its AOR was from Great Bitter Lake to Post Suez and task was to est two br Hs. It had 18 Inf Div . (To achieve this. It was GHQ res. 6. (c) (d) Fire sp 11. the entire AD sys was centralized under Cdr AD Comd. It was commanded by Maj Gen Mohd Saad el-Din Maamun and had five divs. (b) Mob SAM 6 and ptbl SAM 7 were provided for protection against low level attacks. Third Army.the sec line of Bar Lev defs. 3. 4. Five div size br Hs were planned. It had 3 Mech Div and 6 Mech Div. Some MIG sqns were also earmarked for air def of depth areas. Sec Army. Sec Wave. oil wells. These tps organized THTs to counter Israeli armr threat till induction of their own armr in the br H. Each br Hs was to be 8 km by 5 km till arr of armr and arty . They were emp to delay and destroy Israeli Tks . 8. AD. Egyptian Forces 5. with its base on the CnL and apex at Cairo. over a territorial cone. It contained engrs with pumps to water blast gaps in the sand rampart. 4 Armd Div was in res and meant for break out ops. 9. All pls op beyond 20 km were under direct comd of the GHQ. First Army. w/o bothering for strong pts. The inter fmn bdy between the two armies ran through Great Bitter Lake but was not clearly defined. The were to penetrate upto seven miles. 21 Armd Div & 23 Mech Div were in res & meant for breakout ops. Sec and Third Egyptian Armies were earmarked for the offensive across the Suez Cnl with First Egyptian Army in res. It was commanded by Maj Gen Abdel Moneim Mwassil and had three divs. (20 km deep) in the area of resp. Each pl was sp by its own sp sec of 10-12 men carrying RPG 7 and ATGMs). Sec wave after xg over the cnl was to fan out right and left towards the Israeli strong pts and contain them. Rangers. It had 7 Inf Div and 19 Inf Div whose task were to est a Div size Br H each. Its AOR was from Port Said to the Great Bitter Lake. no air corridors were left except for the first strike. 10. . 2 Inf Div and 16 Inf Div whose task were to est a Div size Br H each (20 Km deep). comn centers . leading inf waves were divided into self contained teams. No of Br Hs. AD btys. Xg of THTs. Adequate qty of British Bailley type br. 13. Snapper and RPG-7 and crossed over in inflatable boats. Normal method of explosive and dozers would have taken too long (12-18 h). (b) Arty. 11. two per assaulting div were planned.SAT. Rafts were to be crossed under arty and smk cover and firmly anchored on the far bank to provide stable op platforms. . launching and repair/replacement. arty opened up along the entire front. Melting of sand walls by water jets and powerful hoses was planned.(a) Air. 2000 arty pieces gp into 135 arty bns were to be emp to sp the attack along the entire front. (b) Br. Rafts. They were across and on the sec rampart in 30 mins just before the Israeli CA forces. In addn approx 1900 pieces of direct firing wpns were to neutralize the strong pts. At the same time Rangers and inf tk hunting teams (THTs) crossed the Suez Cnl. Engr Sp Plan 12. Besides constr of ten brs. Russian PMP brs and latest TPP brs of Soviet origin were reported to have been made available for constr of ten brs. The tks mov to the prep ramps and fired pt blank at Israeli strong pts. A bde of FROG SSM launched its wpns. Over 3000 tons of destruction mtrl was launched against handful of fortfns in a barrage of 53 mins. mined the apchs to the ramps. 240 Egyptian planes crossed the cnl. rdrs. Average width of reinforced sand banks was 7m and ht 18m. These were to ease build up and avoid congestion. Br the cnl. Ten brs. A new method was evolved. These were mod to be compatible with each other. Fire Aslt. adm centers and the strong pt of Budapest. hit SAM btys. Their msn to strike three airfds in Sinai. med arty posns. breaching the high sand banks and br of the water gaps. The tgts were Comd and Cont centers. SECTION 26 : DAY ONE .000 shells were to be fired in the first min alone. prep A tk obst and lay in wait for the adv of Israeli res armr. 06 OCT 1973 Egyptian Offensive 14. Israeli CPs. 15. (b) Simultaneously. One of the massive arty covering fire was planned by way of 53 mins of continuous arty barrage in which 3000 tons of war H were to be del. Weeks of prac had shown that the gaps could be created in 3 to 5h.airfds. thus facilitating easy ferrying. Hosing ops were to start as the first wave got across. 50 rafts were planned to be op imdt after the xg of initial wave. Two confronting problems were. They carried Sagger. 200 acs were to be emp to bomb tgts East of Suez Cnl upto the Line of High Grnd at H Hr. These were planned to be overcome as follows :(a) Breaching of Sand banks. It was a greater problem than br of the water obst. Ten Dummy brs were also planned to absorb the Israeli air attack. rdr stns. (a) At 1400 Hr on 06 Oct. The rds were jammed due to unregulated tfc in both directions. unopposed xg one bn mov to Mitla Pass and another bn mov to Giddi Pass. Ph I of xg was completed between 06 oct and 09 Oct.SUN. CA were launched in reckless manner w/o tac. Comd & Cont of SF. Spl ops. 17. Simultaneously. During ni 06/07 Oct. Xg of Inf and Engr. which had landed at Sudar. inf units trained to capture strong pts went in to action alongwith 60 engr teams with their water pumps. the first wave of 8000 aslt inf in 1000 inflatable boats crossed the Suez Cnl. In all there were 12 waves. 06 Oct. the Rangers were launched in depth. 07 OCT 1973 Egyptians 22. Total 14 coy sized CA were launched. Amnon in Centre and Dan in the South. ldg at an average interval of 15 mins. they expanded to the depth of about seven miles and at places overlooked the Arty rd. All forces East of this line and beyond 20 km from the cnl incl cdo forces. 18. There was paucity of tk tptrs. by last lt. incorrect fixing of map coordinates. 20. were easy prey to the waiting Rangers. fire sp and w/o inf comp. On successful. Confusion Prevails. Thus. Following this. Subsequently. . All forces West of the line Ras Sudar. all were beaten back with hy cas. Israeli Def Battle 19. Mitla and Giddi. There was lack of coord in fire sp. First wave of attacking inf incl the beach party and were tasked to est a toehold on the east bank as also to cont the mov of boats. Further adv and expansion of br Hs was undertaken. By 07 Oct last lt . They est themselves 2-3 Km in depth. A Mech Bde undertook xg of Great Bitter Lake in amph vehs. CA. The three br H in the North were merged into two and the two br H in the South were merged into one. There was confusing and inaccurate reporting.16. when the planes had just returned. When the battle was joined there was a great confusion in the Israeli camp due to the incorrect use of codewords. The evac of cas to Bir Gifgafa also added to confusion due to rumours and stories of Egyptian aslt as del by these casualties. were under comd GHQ. behind the en lines for harassment ops with the aim to secure the passes. SECTION 27 : DAY TWO . Eqpt was still moth-balled. Egyptians worked on 10 brs. At 1420 hr . the three bdes were equally divided with Gaby in North. Egyptians were well org to face CA as all inf divs and integral armr had crossed over. 21. The Israelis launched their CA within 30 mins but were reckless and relied only on speed with total disregard to minor tac and fire sp. Tasa-Baluza were under comd Sec and Third Egyptian Armies. By 1930 hr maj portion of the divs was across. Moshe Dayan and Gen Elazar visited the battle field. Due to the intensity of battle the comd and cont structure was mod as under :(a) Northern Sect. at Subha Hill. At 1350 hr. Rft. Dan¶s Bde was placed under comd Maj Gen Mandler . By 08 Oct evening. through the areas of El Shatt in the South and Ismailia respectively. 28. forces contacted Mitla pass and after a brief fighting fell back to the br H sites. (b) Central Sect. who was till then overall cdr of all armd forces in the sect. Rangers were involved in fighting at Baluza. There was discussion on withdrawing to the line of passes. rft started to arr in the sect.MON. suffering hy losses. CA. SECTION 28 : DAY THREE . Amnon¶s Bde contd fighting at Firdan. all inf divs with addl tk bdes had firmly est on the Eastern Bank. near Kantara. Bn sized CA were launched at Kantara and in area Lake Timsah. Sharon will mov south through the Third Army¶s brH. . Mandler¶s bdes were to launch sp and diversionary attacks. It was placed under Maj Gen Ariel Sharon at 1300 hr on 07 Oct. The forces of 25 Indep Armd Bde and 2 Indep Armd Bde crossed over during the ni 06/07 Oct. Maj Gen Avraham (Bren) Aden assumed comd at 0800 hr on 07 Oct. Efforts to widen the br H contd. (b) (c) If Adan was successful. Albert¶s bde lost two third of its tks. 24. 6 Mech Div of GHQ res was ready for launch. After 1200 hr. Adan had two armd bdes. Gaby¶s Bde was placed under comd Maj Gen Adan. (c) Southern Sect. It was placed under comd Maj Gen Albert Mandler. Sharon had three armd bdes . cross-rds and Chinese Farm. Offensive Plan.23. Desperate requests were made for air sp. Sharon¶s bdes were res. but Elazar insisted on holding on and launching CAs. 26. Mandler had two armd bdes and Gonen retained one para bde mtd on half trs as res. 08 OCT 1973 Egyptians 29. Both failed and Israelis suffered hy losses. Israelis 25. 27. Visits. it was placed under comd Maj Gen Sharon. Elazar visited Khaseiba and a plan was evolved to defeat the Egyptians as under :(a) Adan¶s bdes to cut through from North through the Second Army¶s br Hs. opposite Ismailia and opposite Deversoir. Successful initial xg was accomplished at the cost of a few hundred cas. instead of rolling down from the Northern flk. 37. This bn erroneously judged the fwd line of Egyptian 2 Inf Div and charged eastwards into El Farden def . Decisive blow was to be planned for. It was a disaster and more than 50 tks were lost. In the last three days of war. attacks launched by Mandler¶s bdes also failed. Adan¶s bde suffered yet another defeat near Great Bitter Lake (For Matzmed) and lost about 20 tks. Israelis 31. 36. the attack developed frontally from East to West. at 1100 hr . Tks lost were about 20. Concepts of armd attacks w/o close inf and arty sp. . they also lacked better msls eg TOW. Adan¶s bdes spread out between Tasa and Baluza along the Sup rd. more than 400 tks were lost by Israel. primarily due to the lack of far sighted plg. Piecemeal Attacks. there would have been reasonable chance of Israelis succeeding in rolling up the Egyptian br Hs. El Farden and Kantara. as his comd could not afford another day of similar fighting. Israelis commenced their attack in the morning at 0800 hr.30. hold the en and build up addl str. Sharon had been ordered to mov South as per plan. Sharon was asked to mov back to help Adan at Ismailia and El Farden. away from bulk of en forces. In the south. led to the attack being frontal. Egyptians gained the initial advantage by virtue of having achieved complete surprise. Therefore. 33. Frontal Attacks. 32. on arr of the res. They captured two more forts in the areas of Kantara and El Farden. Adan was ordered to capture three brs near El Ballah. only when full str of the force had been reconstituted. By then. 34. In the evening. was left behind at Kantara and the rest of the bdes mov towards El Farden. The bdes mov too far to the East. One bn of the Northern bde identified as 190B Bn commanded by Lt Col Asaf Yagouri. at the Southern Comd HQ Gen Gonen proposed the policy to conserve forces. At 1000 Hr. he refused. Principle of conc of force was sacrificed and instead the CA force was launched piecemeal. 38. Reasons for Hy Losses of Israelis 35. Initial error made by Gen Adan¶s bde cdrs by not rolling up the Egyptian br H from North to South but from East to West. At 1400 hr. which had entered Israeli thinking during the 1967 war proved dangerous and expensive. Had two Israeli divs attacked with necessary fire sp from the flks. Egyptians were to lose the advantage gradually due to their failure to expl it. Armd Forces Op W/O Arty and Inf Sp. These head on attacks proved too costly. Adan¶s northern bde ran into ambush near Kantara and the central bde ran into trouble near El Ferdan. The tks did not have HE amn to engage the THTs. The pattern can be summarized as under :(a) Egyptian inf crawled at ni. Change of Comd in Sinai.TUE. In the overall scenario. Gen Chaim Bar Lev was ordered to take over the comd of Sinai sect. 44. 43. soon it was understood by the Israelis and countered. Gen Shazli again proposed unsuccessfully to mov . and then leapfrog fwd. A dismal atmosphere was created by the relationship between Gen Gonen and Gen Sharon. Sharon¶s Div CA with two bdes. concluding with five mins of rapid conc of phosphorescent amn. the Israelis shifted their priority to the Northern front in their bid to throw out the Syrians from the Golan Heights. which was prejudicial to the efficient conduct of campaign. They also conducted a press tour to the fwd areas along the cnl. Israelis 42.SECTION 29 : DAY FOUR . Therefore. (c) This was followed by the adv of tks with inf interspersed. Egyptians contd to pour massive res of armr and hy eqpt on the Eastern Bank. However. while Gonen remained nominally as GOC. the Southern comd contd to fight a containing battle. The next ph which started on 09 Oct was devoted entirely to waging def war and causing max possible damage to the en. with the prog of attack. from one line to another. The dug in inf which had crawled the ni previous. to within 2 Km of Israeli units. 41. would then join the attacking force as it reached their line. SECTION 30 : DAY FIVE . Egyptians captured three more forts in the Area of Ismailia. Egyptian attack on Gaby¶s Bde was repulsed with the help of Gen Bren¶s Div. Probe by Amnon¶s Bde and div recce elements along the Great Bitter Lake and Chinese Farm revealed the bdy between Egyptian sec and Third Army.WED. Egyptian devp a pattern in their attacks which was appre even by the Israelis for their courage and bravado. However. Egyptian forces adv to the mouth of Mitla Pass to occupy the southernmost Israeli Comd Post. 40. (b) Attacks would invariably be preceeded with conc of arty barrage lasting half an hr. which was confirmed to be the soft under belly of the Egyptian offensive. in order to recapture Machsir and Televizia against Gen Gonen¶s order and suffered hy tk losses. He was sent to the front as µrep of the GS¶ thus he became the de facto cdr. Simultaneously the Israeli army in Sinai was reinforced with the aim of launching deliberate CA to throw back the Egyptians. 09 OCT 1973 Egyptians 39. 10 OCT 1973 Egyptians 45. Israelis 49. with five armd bdes. SECTION 31 : DAY SIX . with four armd bdes. A CA across the cnl had always been a cardinal element in the Israeli mil doctrine. Bar lev accepted the plan of 2 divs attack. . Gen Bar Lev Takes Over.THU. A fourth armd div was formed and placed under direct comd of Gen Gonen. with four armd bdes. It was universally felt in the Israeli higher circles that the only way out to unbalance Egyptian was to cross the Suez Cnl and devp a war of mvre. Mandler¶s Div. Egyptians now planned to launch a maj attack on Israelis and simultaneously push down towards Ras Sudar and Sharam el Sheikh. the ph of waging def war and inflicting max possible losses on the en was over. However the matter was shelved due to political reasons. they were reconstituted as Op Gps as under :(a) (b) (c) Adan¶s Div. It was designated as 45 Op Gp. another was formed and placed under comd of Maj Gen Israel Tal. On the ni 9/10 Oct pre constr br was mov down from Tasa to Yukon (West of Deversoir) for the final assy. Plg for Offensive Commences. It was designated as 131 Op Gp. Gen Bar Lev too had problems with Gen Sharon and even proposed his removal to Moshe Dayan. By 11 Oct. Pre-fabricated hy br eqpt was mov into Sinai and spl straight rds had been constr for towing these brs. in pushing back the Egyptians. 47. (b) Necessary Constr for Xg. (c) Plg for Xg Begins. Sharon¶s Div. (a) Preferred Option. Gen Bar Lev on his visit to the div sects found the Egyptians were pressing all along the line to take cont of the Arty Rd and Israeli armr was causing havoc in return. Necessary constr and prep were made in the area of Kantara and Deversoir. As Israeli str specially in tps incr. 11 OCT 1973 Egyptians 48. Southern comd began to plan for attack across the Suez Cnl in the area of Deversoir as it had been identified as bdy between sec and third army and was thinly held. Plg commenced of Egyptian attack for the capture of Bir Gifgafa. Israelis 46. Indirect apch was preferred to a direct one.to the passes as five of the six CPs were captured and it was the right time before the en could consolidate. Over the yrs eqpt was prep and placed along various pts astride the cnl which were org as prospective xg sites. Due to hy cas in the three existing divs. Gen Bar Lev took over the Southern Comd on 10 Oct. µYard¶ an area of 150 m by 700 m with high sand walls had been constr for launching cnl xg ops in Deversoir area. It was designated as 252 Op Gp. 55. As Bar Lev was presenting his plans for the Suez xg. The proposed xg was postponed by the COS until the maj tk battle had been fought. at Kantara tk clashes took place with hy damages to Israel. (b) West Bank Area opposte this pt of xg was far more conducive to the battle of mvre than the area opposite Kantara. Thus. Both Moshe Dayan and Elazar tried to put the onus of decision making on the other. 53. (b) Undertake cnl xg ops imdt.SAT . the matter was ref to the premier and the war cabinet. 4 Armd Div and 21 armd Div commenced the xg of Suez Cnl on 12 Oct. SECTION 32 : DAY SEVEN . Area of Deversoir was selected as a xg place for the following reasons :(a) One flk of the xg force was protected by Great Bitter Lake. Attack was repulsed and hy cas incurred by the Israelis. Egyptian higher comd decided to cross its armr on to the East Bank with the aim of launching a maj offensive to widen the br H. At 1000 hr.FRI . Gen Bar Lev presented his plans of proposed xg at the GHQ.50. Problem arose regarding decision making in r/o the offensive. Israelis 52. Alts available to Israelis were :(a) Launch a maj attack against Egyptian br H with a view to push them back across the cnl. 56. Sharon again attempts a CA with coy of tks and APCs on Katib el-Kheil. 54. Israelis now planned to draw out max armr from the West Bank into the br H and ensure its annihilation. SECTION 33 : DAY EIGHT . Plg of Op Gazelle Continues. However. (c) This area constituted inter fmn bdy between sec and third Egyptian Army and lighter opposition has been identified by the recce units on 09 Oct. 12 OCT 1973 Egyptians 51. (c) Await the anticipated Egyptian attack. Also. (The Egyptian attack was anticipated on 11/12 Oct as according to the Soviet mil doctrine breakout ops should be undertaken six to seven days after the est of initial br H). 13 OCT 1973 . orders for prep of the offensive was given and Adan¶s div was earmarked for the xg. intrep was recd indicating xg of Egyptian armr on to Eastern Bank into their br H. Four Armd bdes broke out of the Br H along the central route leading from Ismailia towards Khatmia Pass for Bir Gifgafa. Facing them was Sharon¶sDiv. Gen Bren¶s Div was to attack from the flk. However. Prep for Op Gazelle continued. To counter the likely Egyptian attack. (d) Subdy Thrusts. on his way to attend the plg conf brought down his heptr in full view of the Egyptians. one of the bde of Bren¶s Div was earmarked for mov down to Western entrance to Khatmia Pass. At 0600 hr. the air attack commenced. . These were as under :(a) Northern Sect. At 0615 hr. At 0730 hr. with aim of capturing the comn center of Refidim (Bir Gifgafa).SUN. 14 OCT 1973 Egyptian Attack 61. GOC sec Army died of heart attack. Gen Albert Mandler. Only Fort Tewfik held out . Egyptians began their probing attacks all along the line of br H. if the thrust contd to devp towards Refidim. towards Mitla Pass. By then maj setback had already been suffered by them. Gen Saad. The new incumbent took ch only on the 15 Oct. behind a hy arty barrage. Israelis 59. Cdos were heliported in marshland area to cover the flk. (c) Southern Sect. was captured. known as Matzmed to the Israelis. One mech bde mov towards the Giddi Pass and three bdes mov towards Ras Sudar Valley along the coast of Gulf of Suez.Egyptians 57. at a line of screens 5000 yds away the Egyptian forces were launched on three main thrusts and No of subdy thrusts. 60. At 0630 hr . The IAF was to take on the Egyptian armd fmns once they were out of their SAM cover. He also passed his loc on radio in the open. (b) If the Egyptians launched frontal attack along the central and Southern sects it was to be held by Gen Albert¶s and Gen Sharon¶s Divs. Facing them was Magen¶s Div. Thus. (b) Central Sect. 58. He was killed in the next 30 sec. Brig Kalman Megan took over the Div Cdr. SECTION 34 : DAY NINE . but it also surrendered by 1230 hr. the Israeli plan was as under :(a) Egyptian attack along the Mediterranean coast and Gulf of Suez was to be held by armd fmns. Two armd bdes adv from area of Kantara with the obj of reaching Rumani. Tej Salam Fort at the North end of Great Bitter Lake. Two tk bdes attempted to breakout eastwards. Egyptians forces lacked imagination. The forces adv towards Giddi Pass were halted half way near Jebel Shaifa . the Egyptian aim was ltd to the est a ltd br Hs across the Suez Cnl and not to capture Sinai. Israelis faced the attack as under :(a) Northern Sect. However. Gen Ismail orderd his forces to fall back to the Br Hs.62. The day was undoubtedly a turning pt for the Israelis. In the sec. Egyptians suffered very hy cas from air. (b) Central Sect. They were now prep for their offensive across the cnl. Israelis. Egyptian main thrust was aimed towards EL Tasa and Bir Gifgafa. after they had successfully thrown back the Syrians from the Golan Heights. (d) Subdy Thrusts. The Egyptians were surprised by the Israeli tks and ATGMs on all axes. Gen Ismail def himself by giving following reasons :(a) From the dply of forces. Bren¶s force succeeded in checking the attack by 1000 hr. Result of this maj battle raised Israeli morale. ATGMS and Israeli armr. Their losses were only 60 tks against 250 suffered by the Egyptians. Thus began one of the largest tk battles in the history with 2000 tks locked up in battle along entire front. Their attacks failed. Not a single adv regd success. The forces maint contact with the Egyptians . Israeli AF entered the battle and with in 2 h some 60 tks and large no of APCs were destroyed. It was caught on a flk by the Israelis and were annihilated. Egyptian effort of deep Southerly flanking mov to reach Mitla pass from South came up against Israeli forces and was halted. 65. mov fwd their guns and carried out hy bombardment of cnl line def and AD guns on the west bank. Israelis had carefully prep for the battle. (c) Southern Sect. first near the Chinese Farms in which Egyptian tk bde had been destroyed suffering 93 tk losses against 3 of Israelis. Israelis tfr three mech and one armd bde on the ni 14/15 Oct from Golan front to Sinai. Gen Ismail was hesitant of facing Israeli armr w/o SAM cover. In the battle it was twelve Egyptian Armd bdes against four armd divs ofIsrael. Gen Ismail¶s cautiousness during the first week of war came under great criticism and cost Arabs their likely victory. Assessment 64. Israelis 63. Their attack could not cross the Sup Rd which was their inter obj. 67. Egyptian Armd Div ranged against Sharon¶s forces and by the end of day¶s battle incurred a total loss of 110 tks. Egyptians. Israelis CA and re-est contact with strong pt at Budapest. The other mov towards Ras Sudar Valley turned North and tried to mov through Moses Springs to Giddi Pass. By evening. . 200 Egyptian tks were lost in fighting and another 50 during withdrawl. There were two main tk clashes. Justification for Delay in Egyptian Attack 66. the tks also had HE amn which effectively broke the inf fmns. SECTION 35 : TOWARDS THE END . a spectacular Egyptian initial success was now losing the momentum of attack and the Israeli mood was upswing ready to take battle into the Egyptian territory. HE and HEAT amn in addn to AP shell. Op badr. It was hoped that international intervention would take place within a week. (c) A deliberate pause had been planned after the est of initial br H to study the Israeli reaction and re-eval of the sit. As per anticipation of Gen Ismail. (a) The Egyptian T-54 and T-55 tks could dip their guns only 4 deg below the horizontal line and hence had to expose their under belly by coming up the sand dunes to engage the tgts. CHAPTER ± 9 : BATTLE ON SYRIAN FRONT Historical Perspective 1. All these attacks were repulsed between 15 to 17 Oct. the Isaelis attacked the br H with nine bdes. The Israelis completely abandoned their Gung Ho tac and switched to conventional ones. They allowed the Egyptians to mov out of their AD cover and then µKilled¶ them by emp of their air power. Their tks adopted shoot and scoot tac to the max benefit. The Israeli tks fought as coys now. enjoying the advantage of shooting from behind the sand dunes and thus presenting small silhouettes. These series of attacks were all along the front and the Great Bitter Lake. mors and atk wpns with the ldg tks.000 sq miles. 69.(b) Safety and protection of Egyptian tps was a paramount factor in the plg of ops. 70. It shares its borders with Lebanon and Israel in the west and Jordan in the South. Syria has an area of about 72. . 73. 2. (b) Egyptian tks could only fire AP shells where as Israeli tks could fire APDS. It had a history of political turmoil after its independence. 71. The Israelis made liberal use of atk msls incl TOW . The Feb 1966 coup brought the Army to power under President Hafez Al Assad. The Golan hts area on the Syrian Israeli border had been captured and occupied by the Israelis during the ³Six day war´ in Jun 67. Now. they ex strict fire cont and picked up their tgts accurately. issued the day prior. Causes for Hy Egyptian Casualties 68. On 14 Oct.15-17 OCT 1973 72. Hence the adv of forces was restd to the limits of SAM cover. the Israelis had their mechinf. Israeli Pattons could dip their guns 10 deg below the horizontal. Disadvantages of Egyptian Tks. (c) Arty locs/OPs is the Golan hts could bring down hy and accurate fire is the surrounding plains. Acts as an impregnable line of def against the Israelis. . then in a gen southerly dirn to West of Boutemiye and onwards to the Yarmuk river.eastwards to a few Km east of Kuneitra. (a) It extends from the lower slopes of Mt Hermon in the north to the northern bank of Yarmuk river near the Jordanian border. for a pre-emptive offensive aimed at encircling Damascus from the south and east. (b) (c) From north to south the dist across the plateau is about 55 km (at Kuneitra). A no man¶s land varying half to one mile in width existed between Syria and Israel. The CFL also called the ³Purple Line´ was manned by the UN observers. SECTION 37 : CFL ±1967 5. on to Kuneitra and Damascus. Overall plan was based on the following assumptions: (a) (b) (c) Ability to gain adv warning of impending Syrian offensive. Capability to face Syrian attack inspite of adverse one is to three numerical ratio. From the pt of view of Israelis offensive def strat also. Strat Imp of Golan Hts. It ran from a pt on the Syrian Lebanon border north of Baniyas (on the slopes of Mt Hermon) south . 4. Massive close air sp was to be emp to hold Syrian offensive in a bid to gain time for mob of res. (d) Comn. The central sector was the most strongly held. The greatest threat from Syrians lay along the axis Ahmediya-Khushniye because an en attack aimed at Kuneitra and then astride the rd to the Yakov br presented. (a) (b) Dominates the adjoining Israeli territories by obsn. Slopes on the eastern side are gentler. Israeli Concept of Def 8. 7. Topo In Brief. this sector was the most obvious spring bd. The only rd that links northern Israel to the Golan hts is over the Benat Yakov br. the shortest apch to northern Israel. Threat Perception to Israel 6.SECTION 36 : GOLAN HEIGHTS 3. Capability to mob res in time. The Israeli concept on the def of Golan hts was to hold the defs initially with a small force. tks with inf. the main attack was likely to devp along Kuneitra-Banot Yakov br axis as it would open Syrian axis of maint for their further ops into Israel. These were : (a) First Line of Def. was considered as secy apch by Gen Hofi. amn and eqpt. Israeli views were strengthened by the fact that most of the Syrian hy arty was dply along this axis. however. These were :(a) First Line of Def. Mount Hermon was converted into a strong fortress. It had well prep def based on features with natural def potential. The Barak Bde was a highly competent fmn and fully familiarized with the trn. forming third line of defs. 11. prior to the commencement of hostilities. Israelis had three lines of defs in the Golan heights Sect. Syrians had also org their defs based on three parallel def lines. (b) Sec Line of Def. Israelis had the capability of fielding approx 12 bdes for the ops on the Syrian Front. It provided series of screens or adv posns to the main defs in the depth. Israelis had appre that in case of Syrian offensive. Lebanon and Israel. In the normal `no war ± no peace¶ posture the Israelis had dply Barak Bde (a reg armd bde) to man the def of the Syrian Front. passing through Sassa down to Lasim. Followed the alignment from north of Kuneitra to west of Rafid. Fire bays were built on top. Behind the sec line of def. 10. The Rafid axis. (a) The Israeli Northern Comd was resp for the Syrian Front. It ran 10-15 km East of the µSec Line of Def ¶ starting from NW of Damascus running SE towards Mesmiye. Maj Gen Isaac Hofi was the Cdr of Northern Sect with his HQ at Nafekh. (b) In all. Israeli Comd Set Up. Gen Hofi had under him Maj Gen Dan Lanner and Maj Gen Raphul Eytan. The sec line of def ran approx 15 km East of the First line starting from Mount Hermon. the GOC Northern Sect. This was 3-5 km in depth of the first. SECTION 38 : SYRIAN DEF LINES 12. were to prove him right.9. Israeli Def Lines. (b) Sec Line of Defs. Israeli Appre. However Maj Gen Raful Etyan differed in his views and expected Syrian offensive along Rafid opening. (c) Third Line of Def. (c) Third Line of Def. along the `Purple Line¶. which were flushed with the grnd. following the aligment of hts East of Jordan R and passing through Nafekh and Khusniye. A tk guns and ATGMs were gp into def locs along the Jordan R. Subsequent events. It ran parallel to the `Purple Line¶ at a distance varying from three to five km. A rdr stn was housed in it and it was def by a coy of spl forces. both as cdrs designate of ugdhas (ugdah is a div size TF ) which could be formed on mob. It provided good obsn both inside Syria. A strong pt housed a two storey underground structure for men living and storage for ration. SECTION 39 : FORCE LEVEL . (iii) (iv) Five indep inf bdes (incl two cdo bdes). morale and offr ldrship. (v) Twelve btys of SAM 2 and SAM 3. (ii) Three inf divs (Each inf div had two inf bdes. Syrian Armed Forces. President Assad in two years prior to the 73 war did a great deal to improve the quality of armed forces. (a) Army. 14. (c) Spl emphasis was laid on trg pertaining to br. one tk bde and one mech bde). obst breaching and break out ops. A great deal of attn was paid to the trg.80 SU 7 . (b) AF. Two of the inf divs were converted to mech divs by Sep 73. SECTION 40 : SYRIAN OFFENSIVE Gen 15. President Assad stressed on improving the quality of his armed forces during the previous two yrs. based on ATGMs. Thanks to his efforts a high tech std had been achieved and ldrship improved considerably. Syrian army was primarily equipped by the Russians and comprised of :(i) Two armd divs (An armd div had approx 250 tks). Syrian drew apt lessons from their defeat in 67 war and applied them in following aspects :(a) Devp highly conc A tk def sys from CFL (Purple Line) to Damascus. tks and RCL guns.13. Consisted of the following acs: (i) (ii) (iii) MIG 17 . Aim . SAM 6 and SAM 7 replaced SAM 2 and SAM 3 by Sep 73. (b) Carried out large scale offensive ex which were in fact dress rehearsals for the 1973 offensive.200 (c) The above force level does not incl reorg and new raisings. constr of A tk ditches. Seven Arty bdes. rather than professional reputation. following the receipt of large qty of sophisticated arms and eqpt from Russia.30 MIG 21 . Ever since its failure against Israelis during 67 war. The AF also acquired an extra sqn of SU 7s and a sqn of the variable wg Sukhoi by Sep73. It was considered to be a political army with mediocre professional skills. After their convincing victory over Syria in 1967 the Israelis held the Syrian armed forces in low esteem. However. the Syrian Army commanded little respect and had a political. Str of The Syrian Armed Forces. overrun Kafr Noffakh and make for the Benat Yakov br. reinforced by a bde of armr. SECTION 41 : DPLY OF FORCES 18. This Div was to op on the main rd and south of it. SECURITY AND DECEPTION . each gp accompanied by 2-3 APCs carrying inf. Southern Sector. 20. Syrian Tac 23. Task. Northern Sector. The Offensive Plans 17. 22. 7 (Mech) Inf Div (Brig Abrash). 5 (Mech) Inf Div (Brig Mustafa Sharba). (b) Task. Salient aspects of Syrian tac are as enumerated below: (a) Offensive spear headed by mech div. SECTION 42 : SURPRISE. Force. A spl cdo TF. After considering a number of options and weighing the pros and cons. (a) Force. (b) Task. (a) (b) 21. Capture of Mount Hermon. the Syrian high comd decided on a frontal aslt across the Golan Plateau. 3 Armd Div and 1 Armd Div were held in res to sp Northern and Southern thrusts respectively. To attack from area west of Tel EI Harrar. (b) Armr allotted to mech div to enable aslt being lead by tks with inf in APC following close behind. To recapture the Golan hts. The right flk of 7 Div was to be protected by an indep bde mov parallel to it along Mt Hermon¶s lower slopes. To attack from the area of Rafid south-westwards towards Lake Tiberias. To attack west and south-west from the area of Ahmediye and aim to make for the lip of the Golan plateau. keeping north of the main rd. each axis deploying a mech inf div. (d) Covering fire was provided by an arty barrage. 19. The attack was to be launched from three sectors. (c) Syrian armr was org in gps of 7-10 tks. Central Sector (a) Force.16. Res. 9 (Mech) Inf Div (Col Hassan Turkmani). Measures taken to deceive the Israelis were: (i) Syrians Propagated that the reasons for the emergency dply of forces were in anticipation to the expected Israeli attack. Indications of Impending Offensive. The only readjustment of forces was the mov of 7 Armd Bde to reinforce Northern Comd. Similar cover story was painted for the `Moroccan Expeditionary Forces¶. All OOs were written in hand. Measures taken to achieve surprise and ensure tight security were as under :(a) Surprise. Steps taken were: (i) Hr. (ii) (c) Routine activity contd on the front line. in the front line. noise of mov of tks and APC from assy A to short of the CFL could be heard by Israeli sentries on the Golan slopes. Syrians openly declared that should the Israely attack materialize. Higher cdrs and offrs mov w/o badges of rk. Athough the Israelis did get a lot of hints of the impending offensive. Complete secrecy was maint. The Barak Bde was holding the entire Israeli def line with both its bns dply.24. their traditional tinge of contempt for the Syrian force prevented them from taking alarm at these devps.CAPTURE OF MOUNT HERMON . 27. Security. (v) All movs were carried out during the H of darkness. Normal activity contd during the daytime. North of the main rd. To ensure high std of security. SECTION 43 : ISRAELI PREP FOR BATTLE 25. Syrians undertook the following:(i) (ii) (iii) Sealed the area of ops to unauth pers. till the last moment about the timings of H (ii) Sub unit cdrs were info about the timing of H hr an hour before the commencement of the offensive. Achieving surprise was an imp factor in the Syrian Plg for offensive. (b) Before dawn on 06 Oct 73. Cam and Concealment was of a high std. SECTION 44 : PRELIM OPS . 26. Some obvious indicators of the build up were :(a) Israeli tps in Northern sector could see lines of tks formed up in area of Ahmediye. (iv) Recce of the en disposns was very carefully planned. (b) Deception. the Syrian forces would CA. (iii) Level of secrecy can be estimated from the fact that Syrian strat partner Iraq also came to know about the offensive through a radio broadcast. Redply of Israelis Forces. This was a Cdo action carried out in the following manner. Strat Imp of Mount Hermon. 30. 29. However they suffered hy cas and withdrew at 0300h 07 Oct. They lost approx 80 tk. 9 Div. Syrians attacked in waves in an effort to get past the anti tk ditch of Israeli defs. Mech and inf bdes were to secure the initial ft hold on the First Israeli Line of Def to enable the armd bdes of mech inf divs to pass through. incl int pers to man rdr eqpt and service pers for its maint were stationed there. One heptr was a cas. With a ht of approx 6600 ft it had the following obvious advantages. SECTION 45 : MAIN SYRIAN OFFENSIVE : 06 OCT 73 31. Force Level. (a) (b) Provided a bird¶s eye view of the adjacent territories of Syria and Lebanon. Syrians followed the Soviet doctrine of leading the attack with colns of tks in massed fmns. On the ³Yom Kippur Day´ a total of 55 pers. After a hand-to-hand fight the fortress was captured in less than half an hr. Ideal site for rdr stn and housing sensitive electronic eqpt. It was pitted against Barak Bde but was numerically ten times that of Israeli force level. Doctrine. At 1345h. Initial Success By Syrian Forces 33. 3 Armd Div alongwith 1 Armd Div were pushed through the opening between Tel Kudre and Refid to expl the Syrian break through. (b) (c) They circled wide to the North apch main fortress from behind to gain surprise. Since the Syrians succeeded in making a dent in the central sector they sidestepped 3 Armd Div from Katana to reinforce success. 7 Div. The H hr was 1500h (1400h Israeli std Time) on 06 Oct 73 the Syrian armr attacked behind a hy curtain of arty fire that lasted 90 min. . Exec of Ops. the Syrian arty started shelling the Israeli posn at Mt Hermon. (a) About 1100hr on 06 Oct 73 four MI 8 heptrs took off from an air fd at Damascus carrying crack cdos. (e) (f) Personnal manning post were caught in their slippers playing. (g) Subsequently a Moroccan contingent was pushed up to secure the lower slope of the apch to Mount Hermon. Gen a sec str comprising of one offr and thirteen ORs def the fortress.28. 32. (d) At 1445h three out of the four MI 8 arr at Mount Hermon and discharged their tps. 34. Syrian 7 Div forming the Northern arm was pitched against Israeli 7 Armd Bde under Col Avigdor. (a) Syrian 7 Inf Div and 3 Armd Div launched two attacks against the 7 Armd Bde. Aided with ATGMs. 1 Syrian Div reached within five miles of the Yakov br. By first lt 07 Oct 73 the elements of 5 Div were near Ramet Megshimim and El Al. the Israelis were left with the only option to stand and fight where they were till reservers could be built up to launch a CA. it succeeded in halting the adv of the Syrian 78 Tk Bde North of Natokh Sassa rd. (g) 5 Syrian Div reached a km short of EL Al with one Bde about six km short of Arik Br. 38. Cdr Brig Eytan. (k) Israeli AF successfully bombed Jordan valley and Golan ridges but in the process suffered hy cas i. By a rough estimates it was reduced to just about 15 tks by the ni of 06 Oct 73. Prog of Ops 39. It was resp for def of entire Northern sect of Golan heights. However finally the Syrians withdrew leaving 130 tks in the valley of Tears (area between Hermonit and Tel EI Booster) (d) (e) (f) 1 Syrian Armd Div reached Tel Abu Nazir. 7 Armd Bde.35. It was beaten back and by 1300h Syrians withdrew.e 30 sky hawks and 10 Phantoms to the SAM 6 msls. Cdr Barak Bde killed while withdrawing to Nafekh. It bore the brunt of the 9 Syrian Div and suffered hy losses. Cleared area around Nefekh by ni 0700h. They did not mov further due to following reason :(i) No opposition on such a vital axis was interpreted as a trap set up by the en. over looking the sea of Galilee. (j) Israeli res 17 Bde and 19 Bde effectively checked Syrian adv towards Jorden R and El Al respectively. . (h) At 2200 h Israeli 79 Armd Bde under Col Ori are the first rft to arrive. (c) Sec attack was launched at 2200h sp by hy arty shelling. Barak Bde. 5 Div. The Israeli 7 armd bde dply at Red Ridge fired at the Syrian tks. (ii) Stuck to copy book style battle and did not strive to expl success. It attacked from south of Refid in SW dirn towards El Al. SECTION 46 : HOLDING ACTION BY ISRAELIS 36. Since the Golan plateau extends only approx 18 miles from East to West and the reservists had not yet arr at the units. Col Ben Shaom. (b) First attack was launched at 0800 h between Booster and Hermonit with the aim to breakout towards Wasset. The sheer ferocity of the Syrian attack eventually rolled the Israelis back on all three sectors with maj gains in the Central sector. 07 Oct 73. 37. (a) The Israelis held an almost continuous line east of the CFL in the Central sector. just ten mins drive from Jordan R. However. (g) Peled¶s Div was pressed into action in the Southern sect and commenced its CAs against the Syrian 5 Div. the orders for a maj Israeli counter offensive had been issued. Prog of Ops 43. However the attack was beaten back by the Israeli 7 Armd Bde. Laner¶s Div had succeeded in checking the Syrian adv in the central sect and inflicted hy damage on Syrian armr. Barely 48 h after the commencement of Syrian offensive. met the challenge. Ingenuity of Israeli GS. entailing considerable disruption in the mob plan. Thrown entirely on the def. (b) Syria launched a massive attack on ni 08 Oct. SECTION 47 : ISRAELI COUNTER OFFENSIVE Gen 41. (a) The res began to arr in the central sector. (f) Laner¶s Div waged a bitter battle against the Syrian forces in Nafekh and Yehudia areas. however. which lasted for three hr. To throw the Syrians back on the µPurple Line¶. 08 Oct 73. (b) The Israeli mil rabbinate accorded permission to the armed forces to continue fighting. The Israelis offensive def strat always allotted first priority to the Egyptian front. the premise of this Israeli strat was the initiative with Israelis from the start. 11 Oct. (e) Gen Raful Eytun had been made the cdr of all Israeli forces North of YakovKuneitra rd. (c) Israeli navy struck a No of tgts on the Syrian coast between Latakia and Tartus. (c) Leading Bde of Syrian 1 Armd Div managed to get past Laner¶s forces and reached Snobar. It fought brilliantly and succeeded in halting the onslaugh of a force ten times it size. . running roughly north and south of Ahmediye.40. Aim 42. 79 Bde managed to check the Syrian deepest penetration in Snobar area where the Syrians had almost got to the Yakov Br. 7 Armd Bde contd to face the Syrian on-slaught and was left with just 40 tks. Israeli High Comd had to make a decision to switch strat priority from the Southern to Northern front. (d) Syrian 5 Div fought the whole day against a part of Peled¶s Div and suffered heavily. One para bde. 44. (a) (b) Armd div equipped with Russian T-54 & T-55 tks. likely to get T-62s. Four inf divs. Eqpt Profile. Syria pockets of resistance kept harassing Israeli colns. The total force level of Iraqi army was :(a) (b) (c) (d) 47. (a) The Israelis had brought up two armd Ugdahs and an inf bde for the proposed storming of the Syrian def line. (c) Syrians withdrew systematically to their sec line of def just east of Sassa about 40 Km from Damascus. Two mtn divs.(d) (e) Israeli AF strafed Syrian cites and the Golan heights. SECTION 48 : IRAQ AND JORDAN JOIN THE WAR Iraqi Force Level 46. (a) (b) Israeli adv towards Damascus continued on a narrow front astride the rd. Due to its dispute with Iran and the Kurdish tribes the following force level was dply at the northern border:- . (b) However this plan was dropped for the following reasons :(i) Adv on a narrow front towards Damascus would creat a dangerous salient at Sassa. 45. (ii) A more promising alt in the form of a gap between the 7 Div astride the main rd and the 5 Div in the south. 48. Two Armd divs (plus a third under raising). 87 ac (as claimed by Syria). Third Armd div under raising. 12 Oct 73. Force dply on borders. 13 Oct 73. (aa) (ab) 8 Ptl boats. Israeli. (aa) (ab) (ii) 8 Patrot boats. 11 acs. Estimated Cas. (i) Syrian. Shortage of Tk tptr. the 6 Armd (j) On 19 Oct 73 a third Iraqi tk bde (of 6 Armd Div ) arr along with Div. One Inf div. . (e) Iraqi wh left to face the threat and a furious tk battle followed but Iraqis lost out due to following reasons: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Tired after unprecedented mov over 1000 Km in two days. 49. Outside the SAM AD cover of Syria. AF ± 26 Sukhois and 14 MIG 21s.(a) (b) (c) Two mtn bdes. Force level Sent to Syria. forming a comp bde. SS-11 and TOW msl outranged the Iraqi Cobra anti tk msl. consisting of about 100-120 tks. (f) Leading elements of 6 Armd Bde arr on ni 11/12 Oct to rescue the 12 Armd Bde. (a) Two armd divs with approx 300 tks. (d) 12 Armd Bde was attacked on its vulnerable left flk by Israeli armd coln. reorg and repair of eqpt. plus APC of mech inf reqd to be tptd across 1000 Km. Ops By Iraqi Forces 50. (b) It was mov from Sanamein to the first def line to plug the gap between the 7 Div and 5 Div. After diplomatic moves to secure the safety of its borders the force level sent to Syria is as enumerated below : (a) (b) Two Armd Divs. One armd div. (b) Total availability of three tk tptr coys totalling about 270 veh incl certain unroadworthy. Russian tks out gunned by Israeli tks. The ops were conducted as follows (a) (Ref Appx C):- On 11 Oct 73. Problems Faced By Iraqi Forces 51. No time for rest. 12 Armd Bde conc at Sanamein. (c) Israelis desp strong mob coln towards Harrar and Sanamein. (g) This comp bde was tasked to hold a sector north of Tel al Harrar to south of Sassa. (h) On 17 Oct 73 a Iraqi Mtn bde reached the battle front. (a) Iraqi army lacked sr offrs mainly because of insecurity of tenure in the higher rks. The most they could be expected to do. Org of Jt Arab Comd reqd all Arab forces sp Egypt and Syria to op under the comd of the Egyptian and Syrian GHQ. (b) In depth was the 3 Armd Div around Mafraq. The overall force level available was :(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Two inf divs. was to tie down Israeli forces along the Jordan river and to act as a deterrent to a possible Israeli strike at Syria. 56. (g) AF . just north of Amman.Two sqns of Hunters and two of F-104 Star fighter. (b) Due to lack of experienced sr cdrs it is reported that the divs earmarked to mov first into battle were commanded by Brigs. Lt Cols and even Majs. Lack of Sr Offrs. 1 Div in the area of Irbid and Ajlun and 2 Div in the area across the main Jerusalem-Amman rd. Comd and Cont. The Problem was resolved as follows: (i) (ii) (iii) Certain Tk Tpts loaned by Jordan. Some tks started mov on trs (to be ferried later en route). 53.(c) (d) Jordan refused to permit use of the route through Jordan from Rutbah. due to prevalent political conditions. One indep inf bde. For a contingent as large as that of Iraq such an arng caused resentment. 5 Armd Div was being raised at Zarqa. 52. SECTION 49 : FORCE LEVEL OF JORDANIAN ARMY 54. (f) Rft from Saudi Arabia could amount to another inf bde and two armd regts loc at Tebuk. Both were still in ³skeleton´ stg amounting to not much more then a bde each. One Saudi Arabian bde. . One Armd div and a mech div under raising. The disposn of these forces was as follows : (a) 1st and 2nd Inf div occupied deliberate def posns covering the apchs from Israel to Jordan across the river Jordan. One armd div. as far as the overall Arab plan was concerned. APC tptd by civ hy load carriers. 4 Mech Div was being raised in Amman. south of lake Tiberias through Jordanian territory. 55. forces placed on alert. Combined Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian Offensive 59. The Jordanians held their positions and the def line was maint. aimed at cutting the Israeli L of C west of Kuneitra. Israelis began to tfr forces towards the Sinai area. (e) Susequently Jordan sent in 92 Armd Bde and finally the rest of 3 Armd div. (d) On 13 Oct 73. 40 Armd Bde of 3 Armd div (Two tk bns) ordered to mov to the Syrian front. lead to a flt of Syrian MIGs strafing the Jordanians by mistake. Both Syria and Iraq refused to ack the cease fire and resolved to continue the war against Israel although w/o any substantial gains. (c) During ni 11/12 Oct 73. which loc itself at Sheikh Meskine. Although details of ops during this period have not yet been revealed it is learnt that on 16 Oct a Div Sized Force (DSF) offensive was mtd by a combined Syrian ±Iraqi-Jordanian force from the area of Tel el Harrar. Rfts from Saudi Arabia and Moroccans kept pouring in. (b) Lack of IFF. (f) (g) (h) 58. fmn arr at Shaikh Meskine just in time to plug the gap between the Iraqis at the Sanamein sector and the Boutimiya axis. was covered by the 11 Saudi Inf Bde strung out from Kerak to Maan and the 4 Jordanian Indep Inf Bde between Maan and Aqaba. (Ref Appx C) (a) (b) On 06 Oct 73. On 07 Oct 73.(c) The southern sector. The plan was for the Jordanian bde to spearhead the aslt and breakthrough on a narrow front. total mob ordered. Problem Faced. Problems in Jt ops conducted by the Arab forces were :(a) Lack of coord of fire plan resulting in Jordanian forces running into an Iraqi arty barrage. (a) A mut agreed upon call sign for the armd fmn wireless net had not been alloted. stretching from south of the Dead Sea to the port of Aqaba. Capture of Mount Hermon : 21-22 Oct 73 . Problems Confronted in Jt Ops 60. The First Cease Fire : 22 Oct 73 61. 57. (b) Since the Iraqis were not info about the Jordanian tks (Centurians which were also possessed by the Israelis but not by the Iraqi-Syrian forces) they shot up five Jordanian tks by mistake. Ops by the Jordanian Forces. (i) Syrian 5 Div fritted away its str by mov South and not conc towards main axis. a para force was heli lifted for the capture of Syrian Hermon. which forced Egyptians to abandon this site in favour of another site. Surprise was only to the extent that the Israeli res were not fully mob as per mob schemes. As GOC Southern Comd . Golani bde captured Israeli Hermon by 1000h. . on 21 Oct. 2. (b) Conc of Force. 63. At 1400h. (ii) The massed use of mech forces helped flood the Israeli forces and it was pure qty which overwhelmed the Israeli forces in the initial period of the battle. Syrian Hermon was in the hands of Israelis. Inspite of suffering serious losses the Syrian¶s continued to adv. By an extraordinary coincidence. where Bar Lev defs were most difficult to cross. on 22 Oct. (e) Offensive Action. on 22 Oct against very hy odds. The principles of war that were applied or ignored during this offensive on the Syrian front are : (a) Surprise. Fortunately for the Israelis. during the ni and day. CHAPTER 10 : OP GAZELLE SECTION 50 : GEN 1. (i) It was not a complete surprise because Israel had put her forces on alert partially. A plan for xg the Suez cnl existed with Israelis for a long time. (d) Flexibility. op and tac levels. They had mob the 7th Tks Bde to battle loc.62. it was situated in one of the areas. (c) Maint of Momentum. This was due to their firm determination to achieve their obj. Israelis showed tremendous offensive def to beat back the Syrian attack at strat. Israelis adopted tacs of offensive def to beat back the Syrian attack at Strat. Res forces were kept suitably placed to expl success.Gen Sharon had ample opportunity of plg and preparing for this task . (ii) The selection of ³Yom Kippur Day´ was also very scientific and helped in achieving partial success. suffering approx 51 dead and 100 wounded. this site Lay within the ³gap´ in Egypt¶s West bank defs. He had even pre selected the site for the xg. Application of Principles of War. Results of 14 Oct gave Gen Bar Lev assurance against two maj worries:(a) Vulnerability of xg ops to sec Egyptian Army CAs . By 0330h. Op and tac lerds. Home Bank of the Lakes was def by well trained Kuwaiti Bde and Palestine National Gd (Not well equipped). A 25 Km gap which existed between the two armies was patrolled by armd colns. . Mil. Reaction of Egyptian GHQ res during consolidation stg of br H ops. (b) Assurance by USA for mil mtrl as well as sharing of info regarding thinly held gap on both sides of cnl. SECTION 51 : ISRAELI PLAN 8. (d) Realizing that cease fire was in offing the Israeli high comd was not keen to loose time . (a) East Bank. (b) A TF of over div str incl ptrs under Maj Gen Bren was earmarked for effecting the xg and est br H on the West Bank. Israeli counter-offensive force for the cnl xg and est of br H comprised of approx three divs. Aim 4. Securing a corridor on the Eastern Bank through the Egyptian br H to incl Chinese Farm area and Missouri strong pt. Force Level 6. Israeli. (c) 3 Armd bdes and an arty bde under Maj Gen Magen were to undertake consolidation and enlargement of by H. Israelis planned to carry out the op in two parts :(a) Part I. (c) Existence of well rehearsed plan for such an op. Political.(b) 3. Egypt. Egyptian Third Army¶s left flk extended upto Northern shore of Great Bitter Lake and was held by 7 Div. Adequate armr res were NA as the res armd div had crossed over to the East Bank on 14 Oct for the offensive. A No of factors led to the Israeli decision to cross the suez cnl. Egyptian Sec Army¶s flk. These were:(a) Success in gigantic Armr battle on 14 Oct. (b) West Bank. To Acquire part of Egyptians territory on the west bank so as to use it as leverage in the political bargaining after declaration of ceasefire. was manned by a bde ex 16 Div. To est br H on the West Bank and cont territory upto the cnl rd with a view to contain or even cut off Egyptian Third Army. which extended between Lake Timash and Great Bitter Lake. 5. with tasks as under :(a) Maj Gen Sharon¶s Div to secure a corridor on the Eastern Bank and est initial fthold on the West Bank. 7. . Another armd bde gp under Amnon was to make a wide Southernly sweep swinging West through the gap in the Egyptian defs and hit the Cnl rd. Tuvia¶s Bde attacked Televizia and Hamutal. Bde was successful in drawing out Egyptian 16 Inf Div and 21 Armd Div in the direction of Tasa-Ismalia rd and diverting the Egyptian attn to the Northern sect. Gen Sharon. however were :(a) The plan was anchored on one basic assumption that aslt br across the Suez Cnl would be ready by first lt. Push Northwards to contain the corridor in the direction of Chinese Farm. 16 Oct. Ph I. Comments on the Israeli Plan 11. SECTION 52 : CONDUCT 15 OCT 73 Part 1 12. who was given the task of securing a corridor across the Egyptian br H in the area of Deversoir and secure initial ft hold on the West Bank.(b) Part II. 15 Oct. (c) Timings were very optimistic as xg of the Suez Cnl at 2300 h by the ptrs meant that Amnon¶s Armd Bde just had 5h to accomplish the following :(i) Cover dunes. Armed Bde under Tuvia was to launch a feint attack from North of El Tasa towards Sec Egyptian Army defs on 15 Oct at 1700h. Part II. Ph II was to commence at 1800h. 9. (ii) (iii) an apch route of approx 30 Km through the sand Fight a ni battle to secure a corridor to the xg site. Gp µB¶. (b) Part I of the plan had to be exec entirely in the h of darkness. in a bid to divert and pin down Egyptian forces at Televizia and Hamtul. Xg of cnl and est of initial br H by Para Bde (under comd Gen Sharon) and Gen Aden¶s Div at 2300h on 16 Oct. Mov NE and clear Akavish rd to enable mov fwd of xg force. Link up with engr TF and then guide xg force to the xg site. Part I. (c) Ph III. Effect xg across the Suez Cnl and est of br H. Capture Israeli fortfn at Matzmed and secure the xg site. Ph I was launched at 1700h on 15 Oct as planned. The whole plan was rather bold and complicated. Gen Magen¶s Div was earmarked to consolidate and enlarge the br H. (iii) Gp µC¶. 10. was to be ph 4 of the ops. planned to carryout the task in three ph :(a) Ph I. Salient aspects. After hitting the cnl rd South of the xg site Amnon¶s Bde was to divide itself into three gps and undertake the following :(i) (ii) Gp µA¶. (b) Ph II. Expl by Gen Sharon. the Egyptian thrust from North of Chinese Farm area forced Amnon to withdraw to the Lakekan strong pt. (b) B and C Gps mov NE and North confronting stiff opposition and suffering very hy losses. Amnon¶s Bde failed to open Tirtur rd. 16 OCT 73 Sharon¶s Div 16. The bde after covering a distance of 30 Km reached the Cnl rd at µY¶ junc and split into three gps as planned. In spite of grand confusion. on nearing Akavish ± Tirtur rd. 15. At 2100h the boats were given to the bde. B Gp successfuly opened Akavish El Tasa rd but the xg force found it blocked again and had to fight its way out to the Chinese Farm (c) At 2315h. . first wave crossed the cnl. The Bde came under hy fire. Prefabricated aslt br had been damaged in the process of being towed to the br site. instead of resorting to traditional Israeli storming technique. C Gp withdrew under hy pressure. as planned. Matt¶s force was holding a br H extending three miles northwards from Great Bitter Lake. Subsequent events were. 30 tks and 2000 men incl Gen Sharon¶s Tac HQ were across the cnl on the West Bank by 0930 h. as under :(a) Matzmed strong pt was captured as planned. At 0135h. Area between the cnl and Missouri strong pt was a scene of hy tk destruction. At 0030h on 16 Oct. Matt¶s Para Bde. However. Amnon¶s Bde succeeded in capturing the cross rd area. thus creating a gap in the AD cover over the area. By dawn 16 Oct. The Bde under Col Matt commenced adv at 1630h w/o boats and reached El Tasa at 1900h. Gen Sharon. By mid-ni the Bde was near the br marshalling yd. under the deception cover. a force of 20 tks and 7 APCs under Col Haim crossed over to the West Bank by mid ni. Ph II. br H had not been est and even the Tirtur and Lexicon rds leading to the br site had not been cleared. 17. Gen Sharon decided to expl success irrespective of the aslt br being launched. Amnon¶s Armd Bde Gp was launched at 1800h. where its tk coy was wiped out. Part 2 14.13. though behind schedule. 19. 18. the Bde aslt gp reached pre-selected xg site. This gap was later used by the Israeli acs to sp the br H battles effectively. Amnon¶s Bde. realized that his small force had very ltd def potential against Egyptian CA: therefore planned to use it in offensive fashion by splitting it into small gps and sending them out on raids. Para Bde Gp. though suffering hy cas by using attrition and nibbling tacs. These small raiding parties claimed to have destroyed six SAM sites. By 0800h. The Israeli xg was first reported on 16 Oct and was estimated by the Egyptian High Comd to be not more than a recce unit comprising of a few amph vehs. Gen Bren¶s and Gen Magen¶s Divs to push South-wards .Bren¶s Div 20. Israelis who had initially planned only a southernly sweep on the West Bk. 17 OCT 73 Egyptian Counter Measures 22. Bren¶s Div 24. primarily because of the confused reporting by their int agencies. On 17 Oct the Egyptians commenced hy shelling on Israeli br H. 23. Egyptians did not react to Israeli xg till 16 Oct. The rds to the xg site were opened by 0200h and aslt br was ready at 1600h 17 Oct. No action was taken against the br H for nearly 18 hrs. The Div commenced xg at 2100h. the battle was over with Egyptian losing 86 tks against the loss of 4 tks by Israelis. Egyptian Reaction 21. 25 Armd bde ex 3 Egyptian Army comprising of 90 tks. Egyptian CA Against Israeli Corridor. A two pronged attack from North and South was launched by Egyptian Sec and Third Armies. was launched from South in conjunction with ops of Egyptian Sec Army. Bren¶s Div successfully ambushed 25 Armd bde in the area of Great Bitter Lake. over the Great Bitter Lake. from North of Bitter lake was uncoordinated and piecemeal. One of the bn of the Div was emp in the area of Chinese Farm to relieve pressure on Amnon¶s Bde. (a) Northern Prong.Suprisingly. the Div was engaged in clearing the Akavish and Tirtur rds to relieve pressure on the ptrs who were holding the narrow corridor leading to Israeli br H. Egyptian reaction to the Israeli corridor. 18 OCT 73 Mod of Plans by Israelis 25. Bren¶s Div had been conc in Tasa ready to expl success of the cnl xg op. On ni 16/17 Oct. Gen Bren¶s Div was ordered to prep for the xg on the ni of 17 Oct. (b) Southern Prong. on the West Bank. Egyptian Reaction to Israeli Xg. By 1730h. Both attacks were beaten back successfully by Israeli forces with 14 Egyptian Armd Bde suffering hy losses. 16 Inf Div and 21 Armd Div of 2 Egyptian Army launched two maj attacks against Bren¶s force in the area of Tirtur-Akavish. mod their plans as under :(a) (b) Sharon¶s Div to push northwards towards Ismailia. presumed to have crossed. Egyptian forces launched attack from North as well as from the South to cut off the corridor . The Div had invested Genefia Hills and fighting contd for its capture. On 19 Oct the Div mov through Bren¶s Div and headed West towards Maktsera.and cut off Egyptian Third Army. The Div contacted the formidable Egyptian Posn at Geneifa by the last lt. Sharon¶s Div 26. Egyptian CA 28. 20-21 OCT 73 Bren¶s Div . Egyptian posn at Orcha was captured rendering the en defs in the area untenable. 18 Oct. Bren¶s Div 30. mov West of Bren¶s Div but almost parallel to it. agreed to do so keeping in view the gravity of the developing sit 19OCT 73 Magen¶s Div 29. The Div was divided into three colns of bde each based on armr and ptrs and given the task to sweep southwards along the Great Bitter Lake. The pre-constr br was ferried fwd by the engrs and was op on the ni 18/19 Oct. The Div completed the cnl xg op by 18 Oct morning. Egyptians withdrew 22 Tk Bde ex 6 Mech Div to reinforce the West Bank. The Div further adv towards Cairo-Suez rd. President Sadat who was initially reluctant to pull back armr from the Eastern Bank. The div was ordered to adv Northwards. The Div cleared Chinese Farm area on 18 Oct. Sharon¶s Div began to cross over to the West Bank on 19 Oct. Fayid air fd was captured by Bren¶s Div Strengthening the Israeli br H. Bren¶s Div 27. 4 Armd Div was engaged in checking the Southward Israeli adv. Egyptians began launching coord CAs against the Israeli forces on the west Bank. Sharon¶s Div 31. Egyptian Reaction 32. The Div overcame Egyptian strong posn at Mitznefet on 20 Oct and leaned on to Asor rd by 21 Oct. Gen Bren launched his div in a pincer mov with the aim of clearing the shores of Little Bitter Lake and capturing Lituf. Egyptian Third Army Cut Off 40. 22 OCT 73 Sharon¶s Div 37. However . By the evening one of his bde had contacted Lituf. by making wide flanking hooks than to tfr forces on the Eastern Bank to sp attacks on Egyptian strong pts at Missouri. Bren¶s Div 38. Magen¶s Div 34. First cease fire came into effect at 1852h on 22 Oct. Sharon¶s Div 35. before the Arabs suffered a total collapse. fighting broke out on the front of Egyptian Third Army as the trapped Egyptians tried to break out of the cordon. 23 OCT 73 . The Div¶s leading bde under Tuvia was on the out skirts of Ismailia by 21 Oct. Egyptian Third Army fighting desperately along Asor and Sarag rds found itself cut off when first cease fire came into effect. Seeing the Egyptian reverses and tightening noose around Egyptian Third Army. Bren¶s Div had cut off the Cairo-Suez rd at Mile 109. Soviet Advise for Cease Fire 36. though his Div¶s adv was being strongly resisted by the Egyptian Cdos. First Cease Fire 39.33. Gen Sharon had difference of opinion with the higher HQ as he was more keen to cut off 2 Egyptian Army. The Div was fighting hard against desperate Egyptian 4 Armd Div. On 21 Oct the leading bde under Natke was just one mile North of Sarag (Main Suez-Cairo rd) and cont it by fire. Sharon¶s Div adv along the sweet water cnl towards Ismailia with a sense of urgency in view of the likely cease-fire. USSR advised the Egyptians to bid for imdt cease fire. Gen Sharon was all set to capture Ismailia. Thus from mid day 21 oct the Egyptian Third Army was virtually cut off from its rear HQ and main sup base. which was fully exploited by Israelis. The Div commenced adv on a seven mile frontage with two bdes up. Hazy inter fmn bdy between Egyptian Sec and third Armies proved to be a soft spot. Faulty passage of info and confused reporting by Egyptians resulted in inaccurate eval and slow reaction. Sec Cease Fire 44.Bren¶s Div 41. which dominated Adabiah. with Bren¶s force storming southwards and cutting off Suez completely from Egyptian Third Army. The factors which assisted Israelis in achieving success and contributed to Egyptian disaster are as under:(a) Offensive Action. (c) Israeli forces were in occupation of 1600 sq Km area on the West Bank. threatening to cut off Ismailia-Cairo rd. 24 OCT 73 Bren¶s div 43. SECTION 53 : COMMENTS 45. As the fighting broke out with the violation of cease fire. their intention and str of xg force. (c) Ill Defined Inter Fmn Bdy. Bren¶s Div was asked to tighten the noose by encircling Port Suez. Momentum of Israeli armr shook up the Egyptian defs. The Div occupied the oil refinery at Suez. Magen¶s Div was ordered to adv along the rt flk of Bren¶s Div and head for port Adabiah. outer defs of Suez were attacked. The success of µOp GAZELLE¶ put Israelis in a very strong bargaining posn as they successfully cut off Egyptian Third Army and occupied 1600 sq miles of Egyptian territory. When the sec cease fire came into effect on 24 Oct. . 46. The op was a classic example of offensive action. (d) Faulty Passage of Info. (b) Bren¶s Div had cut off Suez and Magen¶s Div had occupied Adabiah thus completely sealing off the Egyptian Third Army. Israelis managed to completely surprise the Egyptians regarding (b) Surprise. The plg and conduct was a tac genius. Magen¶s Army 42. By evening the Div contacted the slopes of Mt Ataka. At 1500h. the sit on the West Bank was as under :(a) Sharon¶s Div was on the out skirts of Isamailia. Its plg was bold and exec ruthless. Port Suez was fully encircled. Around mid ni the main defs of Adabiah were contacted by the leading bde. Syrian pilots after having exhausted their amn flew their ac KamiKazi fashion into Israeli fighter which although foolhardy proved to be an eff tac under such circumstances. conventional guns. (b) Israeli fighter fmns carried only one ECM eqpt (providing cover to the other ac) thus Egyptian pilots were trained to fly into Israeli attacking fmns from below to split them and deprive at least one half of this cover. .CHAPTER ± 11 : AIR AND NAVAL OPS SECTION 54 : AIR OPS Gen 1. (c) Arabs recognising the superiority of the Israeli eqpt imposed restrictive measures on air ops against Israelis. Egyptian Concept of Ops 2. (b) (c) (d) Israeli AF denied opportunity of launching a pre-emptive strike. Some of the tac adopted by the Arab forces on grnd to tilt the bal in their favour are as described below :(a) Since the Israeli pilots were capable of flying very low to avoid detection by rdr and msl screens. The Egyptian AF was kept well dispersed on airfds in the Nile Delta and Aswan. as against initial belief that it was imperative to have the capacity to strike at Israeli bases in depth. The 1973 war differed from the previous wars in a No of ways which are as enumerated below :(a) Israelis were not able to fight the land battle under conditions of absolute air supremacy. (d) There were reports. Israelis could not achieve overall superiority. Egyptians were convinced by the Russian philosophy of bldg a good AD cover in the form of SAM msl systems. that in some air engagements. (e) Lack of capacity to provide conditions for deep and spectacular armoured sweep. the Egyptians went in for ZU-23 multi barreled AD. Tac Adopted by Arab Forces 3. so that SAM msls could engage them piece-meal. The Arab nations had a better msl cover in the form of SAMs. they adopted a tac of flying a fmn pattern of two MIG 21s trailed by two MIG 17s in loose ech starboard fmn when attempting interception ops. (e) Since Syrians had less MIG 21s and more qty of MIG 17s. 000m. The Egyptian AF and the AD Service were indep services but subordinated to and controlled by a Mil Comd Centre under the COS. Rg 22. Before the commencement of 1973 war. Comparatively static. of which 50 btys were dply along the Suez Cnl. Israeli AD Sys was based on :(i) (ii) HAWK msls. in sp of the main land offensive. the Syrian AD sys was controlled by the AF. (ad) (ii) SAM 7. 5. (b) Israeli. Prelim Ops and Softening of Tgts . 30mm and 40 mm). in combination with SAM sites and grnd anti-ac fire. (iii) Dply. Egyptian Comd Structure.000 m. which was of Russian origin. (iv) To sp grnd ops. This perhaps resulted in a closer though less sophisticated coord of msl def and fighter ac. very eff against low flg acs. keeping within own msl cover except in emergency sit.000m. (iii) To deny the Israeli AF tactical air superiority. Arab µAD System¶ consisted of :(i) SAMs. Comparatively mob. (a) Egyptian. 3 and 6 were dply. in order to reduce their capacity to inflict damage. A highly mob msl which was mtd on a tk chassis. Schilka 23/4 was the main AA gun. Unlike in the Egyptian armed forces. Rg 30. AA Guns (20mm. A total of 150 btys of SAM 2. (ac) SAM 6. to ensure better coord. SAM 3. concept of AD comd was introduced. (aa) (ab) SAM 2..(f) Op instr for their AF were drawn on the following lines :(i) To launch a surprise offensive against Israeli fwd positions.the risk of SAMs shooting down their own ac could not completely be eliminated. Israelis were over confident because of their concept of pre-emptive strike. ECM had not been worked out to a deg which could effectively counter Egyptian anti ac msls. AD Sys. Syrian AD Comd Str. Even with this high level coord between AD and AF. Main reliance was on air power. It was a ptble msl. AF and AD were placed under the µMil Comd¶ to function directly under the COAS. Eqpt Profile And Comd Str of Arab & Israeli AD Sys 4. Rg 50. rdr and comn installations. 6. as best form of def. (ii) To compel the Israelis to spread their air effort over two fronts. AA Guns. and on as broad a front as possible in each sector. 7. The pre H hr offensive strike against Israeli positions in Sinai was carried out by SU-7s and mod MIG-21 (J)s and is believed to have been very eff 8. Prog of Air Ops. (a) Egyptian fighters attacked tgts such as fwd comd positions, rdr and comn centres, grnd-to-air Hawk msl bases and other vital installations up to 60 km in depth. (b) The AF provided sp for naval and cdo ops off the Sinai coast and the Gulf of Suez. (c) After the Cnl crossing offensive had been launched, the Egyptian AF was used sparingly. (d) No serious attempt was made to launch intercept on msns against Israeli ac that tried to attack the brHs and brs. (e) AD cover against these sorties was provided almost entirely by SAMs. (f) Large Nos of ac, which kept low to avoid being hit by the SAM-2s and SAM-3s, were shot down by SAM 6s, SAM 7s and anti-ac btys. (g) Since the Egyptian brH did not extend beyond the rg of the SAM-2 and SAM-3 cover, the AF was not greatly used in the sp role during the first week of the war. (h) On 14 Oct, when the Egyptian army mov out into an offensive beyond the SAM cover, the AF did mount ops in sp but lost several ac to Israeli air action. (j) Two Iraqi TU-16s are reported to have attempted to break through the Israeli AD cover to attack Tel Aviv though w/o much success. (k) Arab heptrs was used both for lifting cdos into the Sinai desert and for the Deversoir battle.There were very hy losses in the cdo ops,mainly because of lack of adequate fighter cover. (l) On the northern front, the Syrian AF, though also used almost entirely in the def role, displayed a much greater commitment to battle from the start. (m) It is believed that for a short period the Israeli AF, in order to conserve its high performance ac, switched to slower types such as super Mysteres, Vautours and Ouragons, particulary when sp their own tps after the Israeli counter-offensive was launched. (n) The Israeli AF later resorted to saturation bombing, at times attacking msl sites with fmns of two or three sqns at one time. However even this method was not always commensurately successful because of the dovetailing of SAM 6s among the SAM 2s and 3s. (o) On the Northern Nile Delta sector, Israeli ac succeeded in forcing a corridor through the Egyptian AD cover between Port Said and Damietta, from the northern Mediterranean coast. Lessons Learnt 9. The superior AF of Israelis was neutr by an integrated and extensive AD sys of Arabs, based on SAMs. Air warfare became a highly complicated affair, yet IAF maint superiority, proving that msls had not rendered an ac obsolete. Following conclusions could be drawn :(a) Imp of Arty. The Israeli belief that lack of arty could be compensated by superior air power proved to be costly, especially with the effective SAM AD cover est by the Arab countries. (b) Mob Msl Platform. SAMs should be based increasingly, on highly mob platform, such as SAM 6. (c) Anti Msl Wpns. Addl impetus to the devp of anti msl wpns, new stand off wpns and in turn devp of def sys for them, is envisaged. (d) New Concepts on Ac in War. Role of ac in war and new strat on its emp would have to be evolved. Air powers will not be as influential as they had been, and will influence the battle fd to a lesser deg. (e) Future Role of AF. Proliferation of it and ptbl msl lrs in the front line would mean that close sp will be an exception to the rule in future, with AF being obliged to conc on isolating the battle fd and maint supremacy in the air by destroying forces in the vicinty of the battle fd. (f) Counter ECMs. With sophisticated counter ECMs, AD can be neutr and therefore air power will continue to retain an upper hand. (g) Improvement in Comd Sys. Definite necessity of improved sys of comd, to coord the effort of air power and AD sys felt to reduce cas from own msls, the Grey area being IFF. SECTION 55 : THE WAR AT SEA Gen 10. When the war broke out, Egypt possessed the largest and most bal navy in the region comprising of submarines, frigates, destroyers and msl boats. The Syrians had primarily msl boats as their naval compliment. The Israeli Navy relied mainly on msl boats with Gabriel msl mtd on them. The war saw almost continuous naval ops by both sides,though it was mainly the smaller vessels such as msl and ptl boats which saw most of the action. The Egyptian navy was the first to strike. Egyptian Offensive 11. Some of the imp events which took place on the sea front were : (a) Egyptian coastal btys loc at Port Said and Port Suez gave sp fire to the crossing tps while msl boats struck at Romani to silence the Israeli hy arty loc there. (b) The strong pt at Ras Barun, further north, which contained a powerful rdr stn to tr shipping mov at the entrance to the Suez Cnl at Port Said, was also attacked by msl boats and the rdr reportedly destroyed. (c) Gulf of Suez based msl boats, sp cdo ops against Ras al Sudar and Ras Abu Ruidies. At Baleim, the frogmen were used to destroy oil refinery eqpt. (d) On 8 Oct, the Egyptian Navy fought a spirited action against Israelis and shelled subsequently Sharam Al Sheikh and posts on the Gulf of Suez. (e) Maj success was achieved during sec raid at the oil instlns at Baleim. Mines were laid here for the first time. (f) Mediterranean fleet was given the offensive tasks at Alexandaria to keep the harb and apchs to it open. Submarines there claimed to have sunk two merchant navy ships. (g) A maj op undertaken by the Red Sea fleet was the blockade (contraband control) est in the Bab al Mandab Strait at the entrance to the Red Sea. Two destroyers were stationed off Aden and two submarines op in the area north of the Strait. The normal Israeli tfc through the Strait was about 18 ships monthly. No vessel was allowed to pass through till the blockade was lifted in Nov. Israeli Offensive 12. The Israeli navy was also active throughout the war, mostly in the Mediterranean, off the Syrian coast. It scored a maj success on 11 Oct when the navy sp by the AF succesfully attacked the Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus and shelled oil storage tks at Banias, which were left blazing. In these ops, heptrs carrying msls were reported to have been used. 13. Lessons Learnt. These small scale naval engagements, brought home some pertinent lessons :(a) Small ships equipped with sophisticated instrument and msl are essential for coasted def. (b) More conc on quality rather than qty of wpns sys is expected in future. Msl power is more imp than tonnage and also works out cheaper. (c) Conventional navies are likely to be confined to super powers, whose navies have to op in the open seas. CHAPTER ± 13 : LESSONS LEARNT Gen 1. This war was unique in many aspects, such as No of tks used in such confined places, variety of wpns used and also the eqpt attrition rate. This war was the most imp conventional war fought since World War II in terms of forces, wpns & eqpt used. Hence it is very important that we draw useful lessons from it. SECTION 56 : STRAT LESSONS 2. Maint of Aim. Aim must be formulated before the war and should be maint till the end. The Egyptians had very clear mil aim in the ph 1 of their battle, however, subsequently after 14 Oct they went beyond their aim w/o adequate prep and suffered hy cas of men and mtrl. Emp of Air. Such teams should be used more freely than ac for destr in rear areas in dense AD environment. AF and tk forces of Israel. This aspect of the problem must be studied & measures devised to prevent loss of own ac due to friendly fire. Israel thought that they can achieve every thing by BAS & neglected to devp their arty. Air was not used to its full potential by both sides ie. The Israelis never believed that the Arabs could attack. In spite of clear indications of Arab build up. whereas Egyptians failed during Op GAZELLE. 7. (d) Disruption of Rear Areas. for battle fd air interdiction or for shaping the battle fd. Twenty third mob scheme carried out for actual war was ignored by Israelis as a routine affair. These wpns acted as FM and helped the Arabs to effectively neutralize. Op Preparedness. A detailed SWOT analysis of the en should be carried out before induction of any new wpn sys. the Israelis disregarded all facts because of prejudice and were surprised. (c) AD Control Measures. Surprise and Deception. The Israeli attitude towards Arabs was one of contempt. Assessment of En Capability. This war conclusively proves that one should never underrate the en. (b) Air for BAS. the results were not satisfactory. Hence the lesson is not to use air as a substitute for arty fire sp. Egyptian carried out 22 mob scheme in 1973. 6. When the war started. (b) Manning of Defs. These are :(a) There was a reqmt of a svl sys to verify the info collected by various int agencies. Israelis flawed in this aspect during Op BADR. In spite of paying hy price. The war has few lessons for the int community also. 5. Both Israelis and Egyptians employed inf/Cdo teams equipped with ptbl lt A tk msls to cause large scale confusion & destr in en rear areas. Also. (b) Eval and interpretation of available int about en¶s intentions is more imp than mere collection of facts. they learnt how costly it is to use air power as arty. Sufficient str must be available to ward off surprise attacks before the res available are committed. Selection of SAM & A tk msls by Egyptians is a good eg. (a) Under Utilisation. But they failed to evolve suitable control measures to prevent fratricide. The Arabs achieved a viable air def against the Israeli AF by integrating SAM of different types and AD guns (ZSU-23). These rptd mob by Egyptians played very important part in masking the Arab intentions. Int Mgmt. (a) Equipping the Forces. BAS in a highly devp AD environment were proved to be very costly. The wpn sys should be capable of neutralising en¶s str and capable of exploiting his weaknesses. . 4. Well executed deception plan is essential for achieving surprise.3. SECTION 57 : OP LESSONS 10. This was fully expl by Egyptians who immobilized both Israeli acs and tks in the initial stgs of the battle. resulted in delayed reponse by them . Timely Flow of Info. The Egyptian arty played a great role incl battle fd ill. But the Egyptian ops proved that most formidable obsts can be overcome and very easy solutions can be evolved. as composite teams of inf.8. Capture of Mount Hermon by Syrians and later by Israeli paratroopers proved that these forces are FMs and have a wide canvas for emp. Lack of clarity can cause loss of a battle as was shown in Israeli xg of cnl in Deversoir Area. It is essential that AOR should be clearly assigned between neighboring fmns. armr continues to enjoy a definite edge in tankable country. like Egyptian¶s use of high-powered water pumps for demolishing sand ramparts. detailed contingency plans should be worked out and rehearsals should be carried out to validate them. dominance of tks is not easily challenged by ATGMs. armr and arty. it is safe to assert. Nobody believed that the Egyptians were capable of xg the cnl in the face of Bar-Lev line with high sand ramparts. barely half dozen people knew the date of µY¶ Day. tk is still a dominant factor. Apart from the plg staff. 12. Armr : The Cutting Edge. 15. Hence. Israelis became overconfident and dependent on AF and armr. Suez cnl was supposed to be an impassable obst. Thus. Security of Plans. arty and inf sp and room for mvre. 14. Significance of Arty. The Israeli armr received very weak arty sp. Mech warfare is based on the concept of mvre to achieve conc of force at the pt of decision. The bde cdrs knew it only by 0800 hr on 06 Oct whereas the coys learnt about the attack only at 1230 hr. Syria and Jordan. Very high std of security was maint at all levels by the Arabs. Contingency Plg. 11. Demarcation of AOR. Head on clashes between the tks are not the raison d¶etre of armd fmn battles. that classic role of armr is still applicable. they neglected arty and inf. which was the bdy between the Second and Third Egyptian Armies. . Slackness or negligence by Egyptian units/fmns in passing the info of Israeli cnl xg ops to higher HQ and the long chain of comd. thus facilitating success of the Israelis. It has been proved beyond doubt that when correctly emp. def ministers of Egypt. Based on success in the previous wars. In conformation to essential characteristic of mob in executing deep sweeps to turn flks. Use of HB Forces. Role of Armr. Overrating of Obst Potential. 9. in the initial stg of the war. Op GAZELLE. even if the armr tacs have to be altered. It can be best emp. 13. Inadequate contingency plans catering for Arab offensive in Sinai and in the North created confusion at all levels in the Israeli hierarchy. 16. has amply proved that given air. Main lesson learnt by both. Inf . 21. SECTION 59 : MISC LESSONS Man Mgmt and Motivation 22. their is a reqmt to avoid predictability in conduct of ops. Arabs fully expl all the modern technological advancement to achieve eff ni fighting capability. 20. soon it became predictable and the Israelis countered it. Balanced Task Force. Follow-on Sp Ops. Armr and inf should op as composite teams which could be armr/inf predominant. The lesson is that the strong pts once by passed in the initial ph of the battle must be reduced quickly or else they will become blistering wounds. They lacked inf component.the Israelis and the Egyptians was that . 23. War taught the incisive lesson that grnd forces should be self reliant and have adequate integral fire sp in terms of arty and A tk wpns. depending upon the trn. Without this sp the punch of the armr thrust was blunted by air . there was an inescapable reqmt of AD(SP). opposn and A tk threat. After 13 Oct. AF should be left to maint air superiority and armr be let free to deal with en armr. Initially. 20. In Egypt. Egyptian devp a pattern in their attacks which was appre even by the Israelis for their courage and bravado. 18. Reqmt of AD(SP). This had a great influence in devp confidence in the men and raising the morale of the army. they suffered hy cas at the hands of THTs. Egyptian Attack Pattern. SECTION 58 : TAC LESSONS 19. Therefore.Tk Coop. 21. Hence. These fortfns played imp part and kept on passing info about the en movs and also acted as FACs. Ni-Fighting Capability. Inf has to be integrated and given matching mob and A tk wpns. they improved upon these aspects. The Syrians gen bypassed the Israeli fortfn and did not attempt to capture them even on the sec & third day of the battle. Offrs Mgmt. However. CA should be carefully planned and coord to ensure success. Motivation. . Inf tk coop was evident in the armr battles and spec when they were pitched against ATGMs and prepared defs. drive was undertaken to infuse offensive spirit in the men. Egyptians pruned their offrs cadre by removing many incompetent and politically minded offrs. to learn all about them and even to spk Hebrew. Prep got underway to change the psy of the soldiers and offrs from µTrench Fever¶ or def mentality to the offensive spirit. to encourage them to undertake msns with ³calculated risks´. Israel greatly suffered due to their over reliance on tks and acs. the Israelis followed the Gung Ho Tac and relied heavily on speed. Offrs were encouraged to study the Israelis.17. This made a marked difference in the conduct of ops by them. Thus. close arty fire sp and air sp. Israeli CA. which were not suitably equipped for fighting at ni. Whereas. This shows lack of foresight in plg. Eqpt Wastage Rate. The expdr of amn was inordinately high and rate of loss of acs and tks was alarming. Rethinking on lgs arngs to supply the forces deployed in fd. 28.000 tons from the US between 14 Oct and 14 Nov 73.Trg 24. (c) Main sup routes were crowded. This provisioning changed the course of the battle. Foresight. . (d) Depending on civ tpt proved dangerous and half their amn was stranded between depots and firing lines. SECTION 60 : OP LGS 26. Tn and Comn Netwk. Imdtly after the war people thought that the advent of msls has sounded the death bell for both ac and armr. 25. SECTION 61 : CONCLUSION 30. Trg was also carried out on models similar to actual obst. rigorous trg in the µEl Ballah Loop¶ where men practiced cnl xg in aslt boats and br tasks. This war witnessed unprecedented wastage of eqpt. any nation going to war must be adequately stocked for the duration of ops. Their armr had to mov on trs due to lack of tk tptrs. which led to incredible success in battle. Rail route. 27. The Yom Kippur war has lessons for all the three services. The Egyptians laid spl emphasis on trg during their prep for war . This reiterates the significance of op oriented trg in near real conditions. Replenishment. The Arabs had a uninterrupted sup from the Soviet Union throughout the ops. 29. where as Israel recd their sup of 20. (a) (b) Israeli faced problem of tpt and rd space to mov to the Golan and Sinai Fronts. such high intensity of war calls for reappraisal on No of fronts as follows :(a) (b) (c) Revision of war wastage rates. was not devp and its rails instead were utilised for def constr wk. Israeli staff tables of amn and eqpt needed drastic revision. but a close scrutiny of the facts does not sp this theory. but certainly. which lead to Sinai. (e) There is an inescapable requirement to have well developed rd and railway network and a well oiled Op lgs plan. the msls will have profound affect on their emp. The highlight being focused trg based on the directive issued. Intensity of war took Israeli lgs staff by surprise. Loc of deps and repair units to cater for above sit/contingency. Therefore. the Soviet prime minister Kosygin visited Egypt. Dr Kissinger left for Moscow for talks. The superpowers never wanted a war in the middle east. (b) USSR. Sharon had achieved considerable success in his offensive. He tried to convince the President of the gravity of the sit . Israel decided to go ahead with Op Gazelle. They discussed the pros and cons of the Israeli offensive. UN Resolution 338 of 22 Oct 1973. On 16 Oct. Both US and the Soviet Union had different views towards the end of the conflict. It called for an end to hostilities followed by imdt peace negotiations on the basis of Resolution 242 of 1967. 2. However. 6. 8. A proposal that seemed preposterous to the Arabs. 4. but the answer still remained no. The Intervention 3. On 12 Oct. They asked the British ambassador in Cairo to apch President Sadat for the cease fire . By 16 Oct. Their pt of view was as given below :(a) US. They wanted the cease fire on the basis of return to the 1967 line. On 13 Oct. Based on the intrep that the Soviet airborne forces were on standby for intervention incase Cairo was threatened. Both Egypt and Israel . the Israeli premier adopted a harder line regarding the cease-fire negotiations and were back to their pre-war demands and also involved the question of Israeli prisoners. when the war commenced both USA and the USSR provided all the sp to Israel and Egypt. but.CHAPTER 12 : CEASE FIRE AND DISENGAGEMENT Gen 1. the battle had it¶s toll on the Israeli lgs backup and had broken the backbone of Israeli economy. to agree to a phased withdrawl of Israel from Sinai. There it was decided that US and USSR would submit a joint resolution for cease-fire. but in vain. Kissinger persuaded the israeli foreign minister Abba Eban. that the cease fire should be based on the total withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories ie. 7. they took time in resolving the differences. By 14 Oct. They supported the Egyptian demand. 5. But. Egypt refused the proposal in disregard of Soviet advise. Both the superpowers wanted an early end to the conflict. This forced Israel to agree for discussion with Egypt on cease fire. Kissinger suggested that Britain should present the UNSC with a proposal that both US and The Soviet Union would sp. 9. The Americans and Russians also had a discussion on policing the de-militarized zone and opening of the Suez cnl with international aid. In order to bring Egypt to the discussion table. Now. UN Resolution 242. The Israeli forces were approx 100 km from Cairo and had three Egyptian airfields under cont. with total disregard to the UN Resolution Israeli forces continued their adv towards Suez town. 12. however.accepted it. on 27 Oct both fronts were reported quiet. they called the USA and the USSR to send tps to police the cease-fire line. On 23 Oct. (b) Requests the Gen Secy to take measures for imdt desp of UN observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and Egypt. Libya and PLO did not. Thus. 11. UNSC passed another resolution referring to the previous one of 22 Oct. which was repulsed. using for this purpose the pers of the UN. sporadic confrontations continued. On 24 Oct. On the same day. The resolution was to come into effect from 0652 hr on 22 Oct. It was agreed that mil reps of both the countries would meet the next day to discuss implementation of the cease-fire. It stated the following:(a) Confirms it¶s decision on the imdt cessation of all kinds of firing and all mil action and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the posns they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective. however. Iraq. 10. fighting continued. On 25 and 26 Oct. The Egyptians alleged that the Isaeli forces prevented UN observers from reaching their locs. Syria. This nearly precipitated into a maj confrontation between the superpowers. It was agreed that an Egypt-Israeli cease-fire would be mutually operative even if others did not accept it. . Egyptian and Syrian Def delegations meet at Alexandria to discuss the invasion plan.CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DATE 21 Nov 1917 29 Nov 1947 15 May 1948 GEN The Balfour declaration. Cease fire. Moshe inspects tps on Heights. Dayan Golan 22/23 Aug 1973 26 Sep 1973 DATE GEN EGYPT SYRIA ISRAEL . War of Attrition. Third Arab-Israel War. Gen Ismail made Cin-C of the armies of ³Federation of Arab Republics´. UN passes resolution on partition of palestine. Britain and France join Israel against Egypt. EGYPT SYRIA ISRAEL 15 May 1948 . (a) Britain quits palestine (b) Ben Gurion proclaims est of Jewish State.Mar 1949 29 Oct ± 06 Nov 1956 05±10Jun 1967 Mar 1969Aug 1970 07 Aug 1970 28 Sep 1970 21 Jan 1973 Sec Arab-Israel War. First Arab-Israel (Six day war) War. Nasser¶s death and Sadat¶s succession. Israeli army put on full alert. 02 Oct 1973 03 Oct 1973 04 Oct 1973 04/05 Oct 1973 05/06 Oct 1973 06 OCT 1973 : 1100 h 1400h 1405h (H Hr) DATE 1420h GEN § First wave cross the cnl. SAMs. § Egypt and Syria attack Israel. Israel convinced war imminent but unaware of D Day and H Hr. OP BADR COMMENCES 4 MI 8 heptrs with Cdos launched for attack on Mt Hermon. § Approx 200 acs strike Israel. § Air strike commenced.28 Sep 1973 µSchonau Castle¶ Incident in Austria by Syrian terrorist gp µSaiqa¶. § Guns. Syrians told of D day and H Hr. EGYPT SYRIA ISRAEL .Tks mov along the Waterfront on ni 05/06 Oct. § 8000 tps in 1000 aslt boats cross Suez. President Sadat declares to the War council that count down on Arab invasion had begun. § Hy tk cas. § All CAs fail. ISRAEL § 0800hr. § Rangers mov towards passes Oct § First fmn of the Egyptian armies est on the Eastern Bank. CA launched. § 10 brs and 50 ferries est. § Approx 80 breaches on Eastern Bank made by water jets. suffered by all three divs. § Maj Portion of the Egyptian divs was across the cnl. § Mt captured Syrians Hermon by 1830h 1930h Ni 06/07 1973 § Launched 14 coy sized CAs. § Hy loss at ambush Near El Farden.1500h § First fortress of Bar Lev Line captured. § Kantara captured by Egyptians. . § Syrian tks continue adv Towards Rafid. El Al. Kuneitra and Majdal Shams. 07 OCT 1973 ONWARDS 7/8 Oct 1973 § Egyptian halt their adv and consolidate. DATE 8/9 Oct 1973 GEN EGYPT Two more captured forts SYRIA Sit in Golan Heights stabilized and Syrian adv halted. § Israel orders withdra wal of all tps manning the Bar Lev Line fortfns. all failed. ISRAEL § Israeli CAs launched Against Egyptian br Hs. § Egyptians start probing attacks all along the br H. DATE 12/13 Oct 1973 Gen EGYPT § 4 Armd Div and 21 Armd Div start xg the cnl. § Prep for Op 9/10 Oct 1973 § Three more forts captured near Ismailia. § Gen Bar Lev takes Over as rep of the GS. 11 Oct 1973 § Plg commences for capture of Bir Gifgafa. Syrians pushed back to East of 1967 CFL. § 12 Armd Bde of Iraq conc at Sanamein. . § CA at Katib elKheil. § Israeli hold a continuous line east of CFL in Golan Front. SYRIA Syrians withdrew systematically to sec line of def. § Gap in Egyptian Forces iden in Area Deversoir. § One Iraqi inf and one armd bde committed on the Syrian front. § Gen Bar Lev presents plans for proposed offensive. failed. § Forces adv towards Mitla pass. § Plg for Offensive Across the cnl commences. § Gen Mandler dies.9 Oct 1973 § Two armies of Egypt fully est East of Suez 10-12 km in depth. § Jordanian forces join in. § The three divs in Sinai reconstituted as op Gps with addl armd bde. § Gen Saad dies. § CA launched at Machsiv and Televizia both failed. § Gen Bar Lev Earmarked For Sinai Sect. § Israeli Navy stuck No of tgts on Syrian Coast. for capture of Bir Gifgafa through the passes. § Nine bde sized CAs Launched over next three days. § Attacks launched in all three sects. 14/15 Oct 1973 § Egyptian affort to break-out beaten back. § First Israeli force on west of cnl. § Hy cas suffered. . DATE 17 Oct 1973 Gen A Iraqi Mtn Bde reached the battle front. § Attacks halted by Israelis. § CAs repulsed. 15/16 Oct 1973 § Israel launches counter-offensive in the Deversoir area between the Egyptian Sec and Third Armies (Op GAZELLE). § Battle for corridor to cnl continues. EGYPT SYRIA ISRAEL § Israelis reinforce their tps on the western bank of Suez and manage to est br H.GAZELLE continues. 18/21 Oct 1973 Sadat agrees cease fire. Gen Bren and Gen Magen adv South towards port of Suez and cutting of supply routes of Egyptian Third Army. Sinai agreement sd/-. Kissinger Israel. USSR threatens unilateral action. Israelis recapture Mount Hermon on ni 21/22 Oct. . It called for cease fire. visits 24 Oct 1973 Sep 1974 Israel accepts cease fire. 20 Oct 1973 21 Oct 1973 Kissingar USSR reaches 22 Oct 1973 UN Resolution 338 passed. § Gen Sharon adv towards the city of Ismailia. operative from 0652 h but Israel and Syria refuse to accept and contd fighting. to § Br over cnl secure. Egypt accepts cease fire but not w/o infringements.