Matthis Rouch, SOAS ID:120580 Course: Chinese Politics of the 20th Century08/11/2004 Lecturer: Dr Julia Srauss Essay question: Why did the Republic of China collapse into political disintegration and warlordism after the 1911 Revolution? As China becomes a republic after the 1911 revolution and the abdication of the last Qing emperor, she gradually moves towards a period of political disintegration featuring military supremacy: the period of warlordism. As Mary Rankin puts it, the coming of warlordism is not the result of a single factor such as increased militarization, as the latter could also have been the basis of a strong state, and is therefore a process which asks for an explanation examining the interaction of various factors. This essay will try to show that politicization of the military before the 1911 revolution did not lead to warlordism after the revolution, and that there was in a first stage strong civilian politics, but that this situation gradually changed. Indeed, warlordism is rather the product of the disintegration of state politics due to president Yuan Shikai’s policies and late Qing factional legacies, combined with the militarization of politics and politicization of the military accompanying the Yuan’s repressive policies and the Anti-Monarchical War. It is in this complex process, analyzed as the reversal of military-elite power relations, and as a dialectic of political and military fragmentation1, that this essay finds the causes of warlordism. It is firstly important to examine the consequences and level of the politicization of the army after the 1911 revolution in order to assess the importance of this process vis-à-vis the development of warlordism. By the end of the 1911 revolution, Chinese military had clearly undergone some transformations, which can be traced back to the events relative to the Taiping rebellion of 1850- 1 See McCord, The Power of the Gun, chapter 7. 5 Mary Rankin. These were the conditions which lead to the possibility of the politicization of the army. as shown by the activity and supremacy of civilian government and politics.4 In spite of this process. 2 Another important factor is the social transformation of the military in the latter half of the 19 th century. This activity was one of the consequences of the so-called failure of the revolution to unify the state. who’s membership was mainly military such as the Hubei Military Alliance 3. and then of course in the involvement of the New Armies in the 1911 revolution. as could be observed in the Hunan and Hubei New Armies. as it had allowed for the successful removal of the Qing dynasty. and although they were not 2 3 Hsi-Sheng Ch’I. P12. which had until then always be seen as inferior to civilian officials. the new Republic inherited a politicized army. The Power of the Gun. 5 Private civic organizations run by local gentry for political expression also existed. as well as the revolutionary “study societies”. which in fact resulted in the diversification of societal actors involved in politics. McCord. as well as a notion that the use of force for the resolution of political crises was valid. leading to a more literate army. The Power of the Gun. State and Society in Early Republican Politics 1912-1918. Such activity after the revolution could be observed primarily in the provinces’ assemblies set up by the late Qing reforms. as well as to a more prestigious status of the army. The rebellion indeed altered the distribution of military power due to the appearance of provincial armies to fight rebels. composed of officers from gentry background.1864. Warlord Politics in China 1916-1928. the two first years of the Republic can hardly fall under the category of warlordism. As a result of these processes started in the mid-nineteenth century. as well as the provincial civil governments set up after the revolution. chapter two P61 4 McCord. chapter two P68. which can be observed first with the failed uprising in 1900 lead by Tang Caichang. and is thus sometimes seen as the first step towards militarism. P7 . In this perspective. this essay will now turn to the causes of the reversal of these relations after 1912: on one side the disintegration of civilian politics. Although it might be argued that the military was playing a strong role in the selection of provincial officials. China was indeed losing territories. and the other related to Yuan Shikai’s politicies during the early republic. such as 6 7 McCord. The previous conclusion reveals the importance of military-elite power relations in relationship to warlordism.6 What all these factors point to is the fact that in spite of the politicization of the army. In other words. one of them related to imperialist pressures on China. as it had when participating in the removal of Jiao Dafeng. Two major elements can be said to be responsible for the decline and loss of authority of civilian government. at this stage many civil political institutions and organizations. it must be noted that this was the result of reformist elite pressure. warlordism did not yet take place. through the creation of a civil governor. Another factor showing the dominance of civil government over military elements is the division of military and civil affairs in the provincial governments. not causing national disintegration. and that the new military governor placed by this process was Tan Yankai. were. as in Hunan and Hubei. and on the other the militarization of politics connected to the 1913 revolution and the Anti-Monarchical War. and that the process of military politicization in not by itself a sufficient cause to explain warlordism. who’s civilian inclination is affirmed by McCord when he refers to Tan as Hunan’s “Civilian Military Governor”. . See Ibid.particularly pro-state they however developed structures and societal forces which could have been used to strengthen the state. chapter four P94. there was a strong cooperation of elite and armed forces in which the civil elements played the leading role7. in spite of their provincial or local nature. The Power of the Gun. chapter two. We can thus affirm that during a short period after the 1911 revolution. and then destroy. which had until then allowed for political expression from the provincial to the national level. This can firstly be seen in his use of “citizen corps” to intimidate and manipulate the national assembly9. namely Yuan Shikai’s move into repression policies. as Yuan started to implement his plan to centralize politics and administration. discrediting the power of the state 8. Yuan’s loans from Japan made him appear as a traitor to the nation. thus undermining all support to the central government 11. 11 McCord. which gave the hardest blow to civilian politics.Mongolia and Tibet. P194. The Power of the Gun. P16. The Hung-hsien emperor as a Modernizing Conservative. State and Society in Early Republican China.10 The result of both elements of Yuan’s policies were civilian political disintegration in the provinces. 12 Ibid. Together with this disintegration of civilian politics occurred a thorough militarization of politics. From 1913. P174 10 Mary Rankin. the bypass or destruction of all 8 9 Ernest Young. But it is the second element. P173 McCord. On the one hand. political authority and coercion under the dictatorship.”12 This militarization of politics was a direct consequence of Yuan’s repressive policies. but also at a national level due to the resentment to his centralizing policies: he had indeed replaced authority through consensus by authority through coercion. and the attempted monarchy only aggravated the situation. P195 . Yuan went on to disband the provincial assemblies. At the same time. all the institutions which he thought represented a threat to central power. but also in his ban of the Nationalist Party of the latter assembly and the assassination of Song Jiaoren. the party leader. he indeed proceeded to first bypass. together with all kinds of participatory or representative organizations. as it not only damaged central government politics but also destroyed civilian political activity in the provinces. The Power of the Gun. such as the province councils. After drafting the 1914 constitution securing more power to himself. to the extent that “martial law became a normal state. the 1913-1916 period. The Power of the Gun.13 The Second Revolution of 1913 was the expression of the lack of means other than military to resist Yuan Shikai. as illustrated by the example of Wang Zhanyuan setting himself as the military governor of Hubei. due to the disintegration of civilian government and the enhancement of military leaders’ power. . military commanders were in a position to obtain total command of formerly national armies. This can be applied to military commanders on the anti-monarchical side too: their support was indispensable for victory against Yuan Shikai’s forces. and that in this perspective foreign influence thus becomes one of the factors leading to warlordism. Finally. This can be proven by the example of Sun Yatsen’s dilemma over the necessity of the use of force to remove Yuan: although he was not inclined to use force at first.institutionalized means of negotiation left opponents of the central government with no other means of opposition than military conflict. lead to a reversal of the post-1911 revolution military-elite power relations. McCord. As a result. and thus placing 13 14 Gray. It is interesting to note that this militarization of the provinces would probably not have been possible with the financial support provided by the Japanese loans. which completed the reversal of military-elite power relations: military commanders of the Beiyang army were indeed in a very strong bargaining position vis-à-vis Yuan Shikai who desperately needed their support. Rebellions and Revolutions. On the other hand Yuan Shikai had directly influenced the relative position of military and civilian power in the provinces through the destruction of the provincial regimes. chapter seven P147. chapter six PP208-213. this time placing the military element in a dominating position. which resulted in civilian governments being replaced by military forces. as well as to access to key political positions.14 In short. the assassination of Song Jiaoren as well as the ban of the Nationalist Party left him no other alternative. to this strong militarization of politics was added a second stage of politicization of the military during the Anti-Monarchical War. China under the control of warlords. but that this would not be possible for a long time since both fragmentations re- 15 Idea developed in McCord. or divisions over the strategy to use to unify China. leading to the formation of the Anhui and the Zhili clique. chapter seven and Conclusion. The Power of the Gun. it is necessary to explain why a dominating military did not simply lead to a strong and unified military Chinese state. (and this was present in the south too as Sun Yatsen favored a soviet-style central state. fragmentation had remained as Yuan had never been able to completely centralize armed forces. This is accounted for by the strong factionalization of politics and fragmentation of the army15 existing after Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916. national forces under direct warlord control. smaller units within provinces. . and thus after his death. The consequence of these political and military fragmentations was not only that no one warlord could set up a strong unified state. inversely to other southern military leaders). while more immediate divisions included the conflict between Li Yuanhong and Duan Qirui. Old divisions include divisions over the central state or federalism dilemma. characteristic of warlordism. show very well that the military had come to a dominating position vis-à-vis the provincial government and gentry. against Duan’s and the central government orders reveal the warlords’ autonomy vis-à-vis the national government. These reversed military-elite power relations can easily be observed during warlordism: the warlord control of the civil provincial governor as his “civil administrator” as well as his monopoly of provincial revenue for military purposes. Similarly. as well as “independent” provincial forces were to be found. On the military side. Factionalization of politics was the result of both on old divisions as well as more immediate causes. In short. historical events such as the cease-fire with Hunan proposed by Wu Peifu. the reversal of civil-military power relations granted warlord autonomy. Before concluding. causing the resentment of gentry who now lacked budget for reforms. caused the chaotic relations characterizing warlordism. the combined effect of political and military fragmentation as been identified as the element which prevented the formation of a united military state and maintained the fragmentation characteristic of the warlord period. Indeed. It has first been emphasized that the result of the politicization of the military after the 1911. placing responsibility on both sides for warlordism. This essay as shown that the origins of warlordism are complex and can be found at different stages of Chinese history. going from the mid-19th century to the late 1910s. the absence of clearly identifiable political authority created room for military autonomy and action. Finally.”16 It is this dialectic of political and military fragmentation. in a dominating position. while the fragmentation of military forces meant that any political faction could find a military actor to support it. 16 Ibid. placing the military. was not a sufficient cause of it. and on the other hands to militarization of politics and further politicization of the military resulting from Yuan’s repressive policies and the Anti-Monarchical War. and sustain this fragmentation: “the pull of different political forces on individual commanders favored continued military fragmentation.enforced each other. resulting in more fragmentation of politics. as well as gentry-military cooperation under gentry lead. It has however been demonstrated that these military-gentry relations were then reversed. chapter seven P246 . or more specifically warlords. due on the one hand to the decline and disintegration of civilian politics on both the national and provincial levels. although a necessary condition to further developments towards warlordism. as shown by civil government activity in the provinces. which together with the dominating position of warlords over the gentry. The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism . University of California press. Edited by J. New York. in Reappraising Republican China. in The limits of change. California. Warlord Politics in China 1916-1928. Wakeman and Edmonds. University of California Press. Stanford University Press. Reform and Revolution in China. Edward MacCord. 1976 Joseph W. London 1976 . Mary Rankin. in History Today. “China’s first local election”. Stanford. Jack Gray. Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to 2000 . Young. Oxford University Press. 1976 London. edited by Charlotte Furth.Bibliography: Hsi-Sheng Ch’i. Oxford University Press. July 1997. Esherick. Ernest P. Berkeley 1993. Oxford 2000 Roger Thompson. 1912-1918. Essays on Conservative Aliternatives in Republican China. State and Society in Early Republican Politics. Harvard University Press. Second edition 2002. The Hung-hsien emperor as a Modernizing Conservative.
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