W HATIS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 1 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA What is Porphyry’s Isagoge ?* 1. B ARNES ’ I SAGOGE The way Jonathan Barnes (henceforth B.) suggests to read Porphyry’s Isagoge rests upon two main assumptions. The first assumption is that the Isagoge was never designed as an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories 1 : « Porphyry himself indicates for what study the Introduction provides preparatory material : not for a study of the Categories, but for a study of the theory of predication, and the construction of definitions, and, in general, matters connected with division and with proof (1.3-6). That is to say, Porphyry presents his essay as a preparation for the study of logic » 2 . B.’s second assumption is that the Isagoge — apart from a few isolated exceptions — conveys no specifically Peripatetic (or Platonic, or Stoic) philosophical ideas : « … if the work is Peripatetic, it is so only in the blandest of manners. There is little in it that a Stoic could not accept — and nothing that a Platonist should not accept. It is written in the philosophical lingua franca of the period » 3 . According to B., therefore, Porphyry’s short treatise is an elementary, philosophically neutral introduction to the study of logic ; as such, the work should not be seen as reflective of Porphyry’s distinctive philosophical views : « Porphyry’s philosophical notions need not be rehearsed here. Fortunately * The present article is a review of J. B ARNES , Porphyry. Introduction, Translation with an Introduction and Commentary, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003. The volume contains an introduction, translation and detailed commentary, as well as 15 additional notes, a series of textual notes and a complete bibliography. — A first draft of this paper was presented at a seminar held at Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa. I would like to thank Francesco Del Punta, Gabriele Galluzzo and the other participants of the seminar for their valuable suggestions. I am also grateful to Sergio Knipe and Ada Bronowski, for their careful linguistic revision. 1 The view according to which Porphyry’s elementary treatise is an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories represents, in B.’s words, « the traditional interpretation » of the Isagoge (B., p. XV). The traditional interpretation was favoured by ancient commentators (cf. A MM ., in Isag., 20, 1521 ; 22, 23-24 ; 24, 16-17 ; B OETH ., In Isag.1, 146, 26-147, 3, etc.), as well as by most modern scholars (cf. A. DE L IBERA , Porphyre. Isagoge, Texte grec et latin, traduction par A. de Libera et A.-P. Segonds, Introduction et notes par A. de Libera, Vrin, Paris 1998, pp. XII-XXVII). 2 B., p. XV. 3 B., p. XIX. 2 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA so ; for, despite his vast learning and his unusual critical acuity, Porphyry had a weakness for fudge » 4 . Did Porphyry truly regard elementary logic as an autonomous and neutral subject that could (and should) be dealt with regardless of what one’s ‘deeper’ philosophical views might be ? The plausibility of B.’s overall interpretation largely depends on the answer to such a question. The answer I wish here to provide is a negative one, for Porphyry, I believe, does not conceive of elementary logic as an autonomous and ontologically ‘empty’ discipline. To my mind, B.’s influential reading of Porphyry’s Isagoge — its admirable scholarship and philosophical acumen notwithstanding — remains unconvincing. At the very beginning of his treatise, Porphyry presents his celebrated methodological caveat : Porphyry suggests that his exposition will be a brief and introductory one, « avoiding deeper enquiries and aiming suitably at the more simple » (tw' n me; n baqutev r wn aj p ecov m eno~ zhthmav t wn, tw' n d’ aJ p loustev r wn summev t rw~ stocazov m eno~, Isag., 1, 8-9) : « For example, about genera and species — whether they subsist, whether they actually depend on bare thoughts alone, whether if they actually subsist they are bodies or incorporeal and whether they are separable or are in perceptible items and subsist about them — these matters I shall decline to discuss, such a subject being very deep and demanding another and a larger investigation. Here I shall attempt to show you how the old masters — and especially the Peripatetics among them — treated, from a logical point of view (logikwv t eron), genera and species and the items before us » 5 . Two chief problems may be singled out here : (a) what is the meaning of Porphyry’s set of questions on genera and species ? (b) What is the meaning of Porphyry’s claim that he will not explore such deep matters, but confine himself to a presentation of the theories of the old masters « from a logical point of view » ? 2. « F ROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW » Let us begin from (b). The general consensus is that Porphyry’s logikwv t eron means ‘in a logical way, from a logical point of view’. Such a reading can 4 B., p. XII. P ORPH ., Isag., 1, 9-16 : auj t iv k a peri; tw' n genw' n te kai; eij d w' n to; me; n ei[ t e uJ f ev s thken ei[ t e kai; ej n mov n ai~ yilai' ~ ej p inoiv a i~ kei' t ai ei[ t e kai; uJ f esthkov t a swv m atav ej s tin h] aj s wv m ata kai; pov t eron cwrista; h] ej n toi' ~ aij s qhtoi' ~ kai; peri; tau' t a uJ f estw' t a, paraithv s omai lev g ein baqutav t h~ ou[ s h~ th' ~ toiauv t h~ pragmateiv a ~ kai; a[ l lh~ meiv z ono~ deomev n h~ ej x etav s ew~ : to ; d’ o{ p w~ peri; auj t w' n kai; tw' n prokeimev n wn logikwv t eron oiJ palaioi; diev l abon kai; touv t wn mav l ista oiJ ej k tou' peripav t ou, nu' n soi peirav s omai deiknuv n ai. The English translation of passages from Porphyry’s Isagoge is that of B. 5 W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 3 actually be traced back to the ancient Neoplatonic commentators on the Isagoge (cf. Ammonius’ distinction between three methods of inquiry : the ‘logical’, the ‘physical’ and the ‘theological’) 6 ; it was also favoured by the two most recent translators of Porphyry’s treatise (de Libera, « d’une manière plus logique » ; B., « from a logical point of view ») 7 . Boethius rendering of logikwv t eron as probabiliter (indicating a dialectical, as opposed to scientific, inquiry) has usually been rejected by modern scholars (with the exception of Steven K. Strange) 8 . If logikwv t eron, however, really means ‘in a logical way’ vel similia, a further question arises as to the meaning of the word ‘logical’. According to B, the term ‘logical’ refers to « how we talk and think about genera etc. » : « you discuss something logically or logikw' ~ insofar as you discuss how it is spoken about or lev g etai » 9 . Such a reading bears important consequences : for theories about genera and species in the Isagoge do not refer to ‘how things are’ and should not be interpreted on the basis of Porphyry’s ontology. B. consistently minimizes the philosophical import of Porphyry’s assertions : these, he argues, reflect ‘familiar doctrines’ and do not refer to specific philosophical tenets and arguments 10 . According to B., most of Porphyry’s arguments in the Isagoge are actually mere commonplace, expressed in the current philosophical parlance of the time. Porphyry’s theories in the Isagoge, therefore, are unrelated to his distinctive philosophical allegiance : « Porphyry was a Platonist. The Introduction is compatible with Platonism. But the Introduction is not, and was designed not to be, a Platonist document » 11 . B. refers to Simplicius’ use of logikwv t eron at In Cat. 104, 10-14 (ad A RIST ., Cat. 5, 3 b 10) 12 : Aristotle, according to Simplicius, discusses matters logikwv t eron inasmuch as he discusses how they lev g etai : « Now, of what is said concerning substance ‘not being in a subject’ is taken from its relation to the things that are in a subject, and ‘to signify a thissomething’ from the practice of predication (aj p o; th' ~ tou' kathgorei' s qai sunhqeiv a ~). What the substance receiving such relations is itself, is not stated 6 Cf. A MM ., In Isag., 45, 1 ff. Of the two, B.’s rendering is the better : as is often the case, the Greek comparative adverb is here used in a positive sense (cf. B., p. 35). 8 Cf. B OETH ., In Isag.2, 168, 9-169, 5 ; S. K. S TRANGE , Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the ‘Categories’, ANRW II 36.2, de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1987, pp. 954-974, p. 961. 9 B., p. 36. 10 Cf. B., pp. 119, 275 etc. 11 B., p. 141. 12 B., p. 36 n. 59. 7 The former field simply bears no relation to the latter : Porphyry the logician (= Porphyry L) focuses on « things as spoken about ». and because he is hunting for the peculiar characteristics of the categories from a logical point of view (logikwv t eron). though mostly implicit. In his extant short commentary on Categories. P ORPH . i. because the issue at hand is to divide how each thing is predicated and in how many ways. 3. 58. 141-171. a method which avoids profound arguments and aims « suitably at the more simple ». 36-75. it may also contribute to explain Porphyry’s method of enquiry in the Isagoge. C. On Aristotle Categories 5-6. p. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence. Aristotle Transformed. 25-27. The Anatomy of Neoplatonism. Accordingly.’s interpretation : Porphyry’s introductory investigation on « things insofar as they are spoken about » and the more profound investigation on « things as they are » represent two radically different and mutually independent fields of enquiry. 12 . In Cat. 16 S. : while according to Ebbesen Porphyry’s logic is Peripatetic. There is a further crucial. 13 Cf. Oxford 1990. Porphyry’s Legacy to Logic : A Reconstruction. S IMPL . DE H AAS. SORABJI ed. de Haas and B. J. for this reason <Aristotle> provides their peculiar characteristics (ij d iwv m ata) as the predication occurs (kaqov s on hJ kathgoriv a giv n etai).4 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA at all 13 . After all. Fleet. pp. Clarendon Press.. 11-12 . Translated by F. De Haas renders logikwv t eron as « in a more dialectical way ».e. 34-57. London 1990. 19-23. 56. Plotinus’ polemical remarks on this at VI 1 [42]. 91. London 2001. Sten Ebbesen. Porphyry’s line of reasoning agrees with Simplicius’ use of logikwv t eron in the passage quoted above . 15-20 . trans. tou' lev g esqai). In Cat. J. pp. assumption behind B. one should not look for deep metaphysical theories in Categories. 91. while Porphyry the Platonic philosopher (= Porphyry P) focuses on « things as they are ». Porphyry points out that Aristotle’s enquiry in that treatise does not focus on things as such. 144. pp. Duckworth. had already followed a similar line of reasoning : « Porphyry assigned the little corner of the universe that interests most men as a sphere of operation for Aristotelian logic on the condition that it must not extend its field of operation to ontology proper which can be investigated only in Platonic terms » 16 .. 47-48 (translation quoted here with slight alterations). EBBESEN.. Only one (important) difference exists between Ebbesen’s interpretation and that of B. F. L LOYD . one can (and should) forget about Porphyry P. the study of signifying words cannot be otherwise than insofar as they are spoken (h] kaqov s on lev g ontai) » 14 . However. When dealing with Porphyry L. A. 104. A. but rather on words that ‘signify’ things 15 . 6-18 . in R. in his seminal works on Porphyry’s logic. Duckworth. from speech (oi| o n aj p o. A. Simplicius. On Porphyry’s semantics cf.. 15 Cf.. 14 . 2) 18 .. 17 I do not wish to discuss A. Burnyeat convincingly argues that the third meaning actually fits many of the examples of the use of the term ‘logical’ in Bonitz’s Index Aristotelicus . 1080a10 and Eth. M.. L LOYD . in talking of a ‘logical’ puzzle at Phys. 1029b13). In my view. 23 Simplicius’ (and Alexander’s) contrast between ‘logical’ (understood in the third sense of the term) and ‘nonlogical’ is unrelated to the contrast between linguistic and non-linguistic considerations. BURNYEAT. 440. Burnyeat also singles out another meaning for ‘logical’ : the meaning favoured by Andronicus (since Andronicus had recommended logic as initial training for students of Aristotle’s philosophy). diatribh' ~ ) at Metaph. Lloyd’s complex interpretation of Porphyry’s ‘logic’ in any detail here (see esp. A Map of ‘Metaphysics’ Zeta. 2) that its persuasiveness is a matter of argument alone. According to B URNYEAT .. might mean any of the following : 1) that the puzzle is based on reputable premises (ej x ej n dov x wn proi> o u' s an) . lov g wn) and logikwtev r a~ (scil. Lloyd detects the presence of two programmes in Porphyry’s work : the first a conventional programme (explicating predicates by reference to psychological. I do not wish to dwell here on Burnyeat’s description of Aristotle’s use of logikw' ~ (Burnyeat rejects Ross’s interpretation of logikw' ~ at Metaph. 4. Mathesis Publications. 25. The method of enquiry Porphyry adopts in his elementary writings indeed avoids posing profound metaphysical questions. 5. C. it is philosophically neutral and compatible with different (and even alternative) philosophical assumptions 17 . pp. without support of empirical fact . The study of ‘logical’ works such as Categories and An.e. with .W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 5 according to B. metaphysical or at any rate extra-logical elements) . Simplicius then cites Alexander’s commentary in order to illustrate the contrast described in 3). « prepare and equip the reader to embark upon the sciences […] in the following works » 19 . 3) that it proceeds from generalities rather than from principles peculiar and appropriate to the subject.. Pittsbugh 2001. 8. logical discussion is abstract. Lloyd’s conclusion is incorrect : for only one ‘programme’ (i. physics. but I do wish to suggest that. 3. Map cit. first philosophy). questions pertaining to beings and their causes. In Phys. 1217b17. G. and does not make use of principles appropriate to the subject-matter (e. According to Lloyd. Simplicius suggests that Aristotle. Porphyry’s Isagoge follows the second programme. this fact does not necessarily imply that Porphyry’s investigation on « things as they are spoken about » and his investigation on « things as they are » are two separate and mutually independent subjects. general. Anatomy cit. p.. 19-441. pp. 202a21-22.. Eud. however.. p. the second a pure logician’s programme. Z. 19 B URNYEAT .g. A. 18 Cf. Map cit. Post. The use of the expression ‘logical’ among ancient commentators on Aristotle has recently been the focus of scholarly interest.. the conventional programme) is followed by Prophyry — and the Isagoge provides its most elementary version. which does not include extra-logical elements. 19-21. M. As I aim to show.. ethics. among these. 53-56). According to this meaning. Myles Burnyeat has drawn attention to Simplicius’ distinction of three meanings for logikw' ~ (S IMPL . the comparative forms logikwtev r wn (scil. So our inquiry is incidentally concerned with the generic differentiae of beings. Translated by S.. Porphyry clearly argues in favour of the opposite conclusion : « Q : But if the treatise is about significant expression. gev n o~ diaforw' n zhv t hsi~ tw' n o[ n twn. respect to the commentators. While one may well infer that such enquiry pertains to elementary ‘logic’. 58. 440. ta. that of ‘dialectical’ — and this would also speak in favour of Boethius’ rendering of logikwv t eron at Isag. Porphyry’s line of thought. Simplicius. S TRANGE . as I said » 20 . while primarily it is about significant expressions. Porphyry. prohgoumev n h dev ej s tin hJ peri. 20 P ORPH . 104. do not point to any distinction between a ‘linguistic’ and a ‘non linguistic’ sense of logikwv t eron . but only to the preparatory character of ‘logical’ inquiries. ~ diafora. 19 ff. ”Oti aiJ fwnai. 29) . rather. for instance (In Cat.. In Cat. 104 expresses the first of the three meanings of the term at In Phys. K. 5) is not suitable for beginners : from a pedagogical point of view. fwnw' n shmantikw' n ej s tin hJ pragmateiv a . ~ lambav n ousin: aj f ’ w| n toiv n un to. Duckworth.e. ej n toi' ~ eJ x h' peri. deserves further scrutiny. 6 ff. i{ n a kata. 1. 7-9 . pragmav t wn h/ | prav g mata : P ORPH . to. ta. quoted above) shows that logikwv t eron was connected to lev g esqai.. ’Alla. Because words are like messengers that report to us about things. ~ w| n aj g gev l lousi kai. 1. 15). auj t ai. (2) that such a distinction does not point to any ‘neutrality’ of logic.. The adverb logikwv t eron at S IMPL . Trans... Porphyry argues that his research is of an introductory and preliminary nature (cf. 12 denotes this mode of research. de. Simplicius’ remarks at In Cat. Both in the Isagoge and in In Cat. th' ~ creiv a ~ aj n agkai' o n e[ c ousin. K. logikwv t eron is in itself connected with the idea of ‘being spoken’ (aj p o. 57.6 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA Burnyeat’s remarks are useful to understand Porphyry’s ‘logical’ method. aj p o.. tw' n pragmav t wn oJ pa' ~ auj t w' / gegev n htai lov g o~… ’A. aj g gev l w/ ej o ikui' a i ta. gev n o~. this must be preceded by a different introductory enquiry. tw' n fwnw' n tw' n shmantikw' n . ~ diafora. wJ ~ ei[ r htai. 6 ff. pw' ~ .. On Aristotle Categories. 104. which does not focus on the principles appropriate to things . nevertheless. tou' lev g esqai). diav f oron lav b wsi to. how is it that the whole of his subsequent discussion was about things ? A. An inquiry on « things qua things » (peri.. eij peri. w| n aj g gev l lousi. Burneyat’s conclusion is perhaps too peremptory. and they get their generic differentiae from the things about which they report. appears to be as follows. rather. The issue. he is not focussing on « things as such » but on « words which signify things ». this certainly does not entail that « words signifying things » and « things as such » are two independent areas (the former pertaining to ‘logic’. ... prav g mata aj g gev l lousin. It may well be argued that logikwv t eron at In Cat. In Cat.. tau' t a aj n agkai' o n qewrei' t ai. 21-29 : ’E... I only wish to point out here (1) that the opposition between a ‘logical’ and a ‘scientific’ inquiry was current among the ancient Aristotelian commentators . In Cat. Hence it is necessary to begin the consideration of them from what makes their use necessary. ~ genika. (i. tw' n kata. 104. the latter to ‘ontology’). so that they may receive their difference in genus from the generic differentiae of the things about which they report. London 1992. 75. Strange. Isag. ej m piv p tousa toiv n un gev g onen hJ peri. kata. as Porphyry remarks in In Cat. then. tw' n pragmav t wn. it starts from a semantic analysis of language and focuses on « words signifying things ». S. In Cat. 58. ontology (as I will argue) is not absent. 1. 12-14 : eij ~ dev k a toiv n un genika. Trans. however. but rather latent in Poprhyry’s Isagoge and In Cat. derivatively. Clarendon Press. animals »). auj t ai. I disagree with this approach (and with the presentation of Porphyry’s semantics in ibid. I believe. rather. then. he points out that his logical discussions are partial and preliminary : Porphyry never suggests that we should isolate such introductions from what comes later in the order of learning. a preliminary discussion should leave aside fully developed theories about beings and their principles : this. Evidently. gev n h kai. pp. While the act of dealing with words that signify things comes first pedagogically. and although these ideas — whether or not they are Aristotelian — are indeed laughably inept. 7 ff. Truth [completa]. words (both individual and general terms) stand for (‘signify’) things . And so the word ‘animal’ signifies. In Cat. does not entail that Porphyry’s logical discussions are philosophically neutral : what comes first in the order of learning is not ‘neutral’. Porphyry. one should look elsewhere : 21 P ORPH . aiJ dhlou' s ai tau' t a fwnai. If we consider such preliminary discussions in isolation. of animal) fortunately resembles animals or an animal. Porphyry’s semantic theory. certainly does not encourage us to do so . Oxford 2007. but merely more elementary .. : « The thought or concept (scil. : both works provide an introductory. however. perilhfqei' s ai.W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 7 According to Porphyry. aims to distinguish Porphyry’s account of predication from his semantics : « … although the Porphyrean account of predication was conceived and presented in terms of a certain set of semantic ideas. 116-117).. it is by no means removed from that of dealing with the things signified. the words that indicate them have also come to be ten in genus. the account amounts […] to no more than this : predicates are a sort of significant expression. ~ perilhfqev n twn tw' n o[ n twn dev k a kai. After all. is the sense of Porphyry’s caveat at Isag. There is simply no reason to draw an opposition between « things as conceptualised and expressed in language » and « things as such » 22 . . the significance of which can fully be appreciated in a wider context involving ontological and psychological doctrines. This. and regard them as neutral and complete in themselves. To that you may attach whatever theory of signification pleases you — or no theory at all » (B ARNES . any discussion on how we speak about things is by no means separate and independent from a discussion on how things are : « Since beings are comprehended by ten generic differentiae. Porphyry rather suggests the opposite : that in order to gain a comprehensive picture of what he is focusing on in the ‘logical’ writings. and are themselves also so classified » 21 . we may well gain the impression that logic and ontology are two mutually independent disciplines. is based on a rigorous isomorphism between language and reality (more on this later). general and simplified treatment of questions. 22 B. nonetheless the account of predication is in fact independent of the ideas. gegov n asi kata. ~ diafora. Strange. Porphyry’s great commentary on the Categories did not eschew the ‘profound’ ontological questions that Porphyry chose to avoid in his elementary works. 75. 5 . are. as such. like substances. Porphyry provides a simplified and general treatment of questions which he only fully addresses elsewhere. but while the Isagoge is an elementary work. Nevertheless. 58 . ouj k e[ s ti th' ~ tw' n eij s agomev n wn e{ x ew~ gnw' n ai.. de.. in a subject) ? The matter is deep and too large for your capacities .’s assessment. n ou\ n pareiv s qw. 27-33 = Frr. tau' t a me. there is no trace of (ii) as a characterisation of the status of logic : there is simply no hint in these works that elementary logic might be philosophically neutral. It’s rather different. p. can be gained from the extant fragments. In Cat. r ta. . sumbebhkov t a ei\ n ai… baqu. In Cat. 48.. 11-33 . in B. A couple of examples should suffice to make this point clearer. 20-79.. are compatible with a philosophically neutral reading . It is extremely important to grasp the difference between (i) « leaving something aside » (temporarily and for pedagogical reasons) and (ii) « being neutral with respect to a thing ». 23 P ORPH . whereas universals are not in existence but are merely said and are in thought. for someone with the capacities of a beginner cannot know that accidents. then. de. meiv z wn th' ~ sh' ~ e{ x ew~: o{ t i ga. me. 67 Smith. In other words. ta. rather. Suppose that Porphyry really did conceive of logic as a philosophically and metaphysically neutral discipline : the difference between an elementary and a complex logical work. insofar as such matters are too difficult for beginners. apud S IMPL . ~ oJ lov g o~ kai. preserved in Simplicius. So let these things be left aside » 23 . aj l la. 78. should be reversed : the Isagoge and In Cat. Any opposition between Porphyry L and Porphyry P. however : for the surviving fragments of Porphyry’s commentary include detailed discussions on physical beings and their principles 24 . kaqov l ou ti lev g esqai ouj k e[ s tin ej n uJ p av r xei. in this respect. 37. n w{ s per kai. Trans. are elementary works. 24 Cf. n lev g esqai fav n ai se. this is for merely pedagogical reasons which have nothing to do with the ‘ontological neutrality of logic’. r bouv l etai to. is indeed a simplified discussion : Porphyry avoids engaging with more profound questions concerning the ontological status of general concepts. n sumbebhkov t a ej s ti. it is not — and never was designed to be — a philosophically neutral treatise.. of a subject) and accidents are (scil. Accordingly. aiJ ouj s iv a i. 55 . therefore. Porphyry’s enquiry here is by no means neutral with respect to his fully developed theories on universals and abstractions . Further evidence. me. 25-29 : tiv ga. is unfounded. in his elementary writings. would simply lie in their degree of logical complexity. In Porphyry’s Isagoge and In Cat.8 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA « What does it mean when you say that universals are said (scil. B. if such detailed discussions do not feature in the Isagoge and in the short In Cat. of Porphyry’s long commentary on Categories Ad Gedalium. P ORPH . Porphyry’s logical discussion of universals in the Isagoge and in the short In Cat. 158.. ta. ta. and. mev c ri ej p inoiv a ~ lev g etai. therefore. pav q h oi| o n qermov n . which was determined in accordance with quality of such-andsuch a kind. uJ g rov n . Strange. 22. Simplicius’ In Cat. 9 :8 and other such rations which are observed in the case of the quantities and in accordance with the relative » 26 . In Cat. F LEET . Simplicius. there arise the affections. De Gruyter. which belongs to the relatives. Cf. 67 Smith. Trans. ‘Logical’ as it may be. which are qualifications » 25 . both of the body and of the soul by means of the rations 3 :2. W IESNER ed. published by Sten Ebbesen in 1987 27 . The second reason briefly (and somewhat cryptically) has to do with physical concepts : « And indeed. 26 S IMPL . which is a quantity. 4 :3. He says that Quality has its origin in a combination of Quantity and the Relative — just as others thought. provides further details on Porphyry’s treatment of this matter in the lost commentary Ad Gedalium : « But Porphyry wants to defend Aristotle’s order. 8) in the Categories. o{ ej s ti posov n . which describes Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and Porphyry’s treatment of the relation between quantity. and after the greater. an allusion to Empedocles was already present in Alexander’s exegesis. and it looks very much as if Simplicius and the scholiast are actually reporting each one part of a passage from Ad Gedalium in which Porphyry related and discusses Alexander’s use of Empedocles to support Aristotle’s order of treating the categories ». 27-33 = P ORPH . 2 :1. 310 : « The most likely origin of the scholium is a commentary on the Categories. Laurentianus Plut. Fr. to.. kai. such as hot. The scholium also presents 25 P ORPH . 6). who showed that qualities originate from the harmonious mixture of the elements. London 2002. relatives and quantity. E BBESEN . mei' z on. ej k fuv e tai ta. vol. in J. 7) and quality (ch. relatives (ch. 72. Duckworth. 158. On Aristotle Categories 7-8. f. yucrov n . ga.. In Cat. p. pp. dry. cold. 286-311. after magnitude.W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 9 At the beginning of the chapter on quality. B. Berlin-New York 1987. S. o{ ej s ti tw' n prov ~ ti. As the scholium reveals. Simplicius’ words here should be read alongside those of an important scholium. mev g eqo~. Boethius as an Aristotelian Scholar. trans.. Aristoteles — Werk und Wirkung. 7-9 : kai. 27 Ms. Plato too constituted form of such-andsuch a kind. meta. xhrov n . Porphyry provides two reasons for the order chosen by Aristotle in his progressive discussion of quantity (ch. . The first reason is pedagogical : Aristotle’s treatment of quality follows that of relatives because many questions concerning relatives had previously emerged in his discussion on quantity. especially Empedocles. 2. meta.. 15 (13th century). and wet. 127. Porphyry’s discussion in his short commentary on the Categories includes a fleeting reference to ontological notions. a{ ej s ti poiav .. to. Interestingly. r dh. 8-10 : kai. For substance. L UNA . tw' n topikw' n : fuv s ew~ ga. then. (according to Porphyry. and so forth are the product of nature » 29 . mav l ista pro. Strange. me. 56. qualification. the greater and the lesser (which belong to relatives) and qualities. The short In Cat. pp. body without quality. Paris 2001. 193-198. further problems arise. therefore. gev n h kai. R. to a philosophically neutral reading.. whereas genera and species are prior by nature to individual substances » 30 . is a more elementary work than the short In Cat. 2003.. 24. The Isagoge. ta. however. but on words signifying things. 29 P ORPH . is more open than the short In Cat. ta. 8-10 : « Accidents subsist principally on individuals. Three readings of this passage are possible : 1) Porphyry being a Platonist. tou' fusikou' a] n ei[ h mev r ou~ th' ~ filosofiv a ~ h] pro. de.. It might be instructive to focus on Porphyry’s allusion to the priority of species at Isag. poio. tw' n aj t ov m wn prohgoumev n w~ uJ f iv s tatai. « Elenchos ». In Cat. Porphyry employs Alexander’s exegesis in his lost commentary Ad Gedalium. ei[ d h fuv s ei prov t era tw' n aj t ov m wn ouj s iw' n . o{ m oia. Chapitres 2-4. The whole picture plainly contradicts the view according to which Porphyry’s short commentary on Aristotle’s Categories is a work of elementary logic with no ontological import. The short In Cat. r e[ r gon ouj s iv a .. contains an abridged version of Porphyry’s argument 28 . Commentaire sur les ‘Catégories’ d’Aristote. C HIARADONNA . is the following picture : Alexander’s lost commentary In Cat. Rather. Porphyry’s Isagoge. n sumbebhkov t a ej p i. What emerges. division and proof). Trans. Isag. views which appear to constitute an expanded version of what is found in the short In Cat. develops the relation between categories and physics in a general and introductory way. ta. included a physical excursus on quantity. which discusses physical notions such as ‘prime matter’ and ‘body without qualities’. However. three dimensionality (which belongs to quantity). 29-31 : kai. 17. ta. n kai. cf. relative and quality in which Empedocles’ cosmology was invoked in defence of Aristotle’s order of categories. he is here 28 On the relation between the two commentaries. which leaves out any allusion to Empedocles and simplifies the treatment of physics (without suppressing it). Yet the commentary shows no trace of ‘logic’ (as radically opposed to ontology) : as I shall come to discuss.10 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA Porphyry’s views on the matter. Porphyry’s statement that Aristotle’s Categories does not focus on beings as such. Simplicius. 17. Review of C. : Porphyry here examines the distinctions that exist between prime matter without form. . the study of the ‘five items’ actually serves as an introduction to the study of categories — as well as of definitions. 30 P ORPH . Les Belles Lettres. is perfectly compatible with his emphasis on the import of the treatise from the point of view of physics.. one should give full weight to Porphyry’s assertion that Categories represents « an introduction to the physical part of philosophy […]. astrazioni e forme in Porfirio.e. Concetti generali. Rusconi. among others. Institute of Classical Studies. . pp. E RISMANN éd. A. 19-20. 3) the doctrine that genera and species are prior to individuals neither refers to the ontological priority of intelligible Forms. as stated in the Isagoge) . genera and species are prior to individuals. but Socrates does not exist when man does not » 34 (i. Versione latina di Boezio.. S HEPPARD eds. 2) as the doctrine of priority of genera and species vs individuals is not exclusively Platonic (it was also embraced. R. Études sur la philosophie de Porphyre et son influence durant l’Antiquité tardive et le haut Moyen Âge. G IRGENTI . 35-49. in C. by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Paris.. Porphyry’s statement in the Isagoge should be read alongside what he says regarding the priority of genera and species vs individuals in the short In Cat. R. Testo greco a fronte.’ reading of the passage runs along these lines) 32 . B. Isagoge. self subsistent entities ontologically prior to sensible particulars (this is Giuseppe Girgenti’s view) 31 . Strange.. Porphyry’s Views on the Immanent Incorporeals. Socrates is co-removed. C HIARADONNA . Porphyry’s statement alludes (in the general fashion to be expected in an elementary work) to a distinctive ontological doctrine on the status of sensible entities and in re universals. but rather all of the particular men.. nor to a commonplace truth : rather. 90. trans. since the primacy of individuals resides in them collectively rather than individually (the species man would not exist if there were no individual man to instantiate it) . BICS Suppl. In Cat. who takes it to be uncontroversial. K ARAMANOLIS . p. Porphyry is here espousing a « commonplace truth » (B. from whom we conceive the man that is predicated in common. whereas individuals do not co-remove their species : « For man exists when Socrates does not. Studies on Porphyry. Here Porphyry maintains that (i) if man is removed. forthcoming . This is an originally Peripatetic doctrine that Porphyry adapted to his own Platonic framework. 33 Cf. Milano 1995. p. C HIARADONNA. 28. 273. through which we think the animal that is predicated in common. (ii) Aristotle is right in maintaining that individuals are prime substances prior to genera and species. (iii) individuals are somehow causally responsible for the formation of the universal concepts which are predicated of them : « You ought not to speak about a single man : you must recognise that individual substance does not mean just one of the particulars. Vrin. London 2007..W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 11 alluding to the distinctively Platonic metaphysical doctrine according to which universal genera and species are intelligible. in G. Elsewhere I have argued in favour of this third view 33 : I will here limit myself to a few points. De la logique à l’ontologie. 34 P ORPH . and Aristotelian). 32 Cf. and all the particular animals. These are the cause of the being of the common 31 G. Porfirio. 98. kai. kai. For it is not possible to think of ox or man or horse or animal in general apart from the particulars. In Cat. ~ poiei' s qai to.. universals merely are ‘in thought’. ej x w| n kai. 75. Strange.. r ta. which we no longer think as a ‘this’. 2631 Porphyry points out that he will not dwell on the ‘profound’ thesis according to which. according to which universal genera and species have a ‘notional’ status (mev c ri ej p inoiv a ~ lev g etai. ej p enohv q h.12 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA predicates. di’ a} to. kaq∆ e{ k aston aj n aireqh' / zw' / a .. eij ta. o{ p er ouj k ev t i tov d e ti noou' m en aj l la. the reason for this must be sought in what Porphyry asserts elsewhere (i. th' ~ tw' n kaq’ e{ k aston aij s qhv s ew~ ej p i. All this is extremely significant : for at In Cat. This difficult passage has been the focus of much scholarly interest. eij de. than if the particular animals are eliminated.’s reading of this passage is based on the « familiar story » according to which it is by perceiving individual cats that we come to form the concept of a cat : « Porphyry suggests that it is these individual cats who are prior to the species : primacy lies not with Cornelius. In Cat.. Rather.. 37 B. ga. mev r o~ aj l l’ oiJ kaq’ e{ k aston a[ n qrwpoi pav n te~. E BBESEN . 90. Porphyry argues that a complete treatment of post rem ‘conceptual’ universals exceeds the boundaries of any introductory and ‘logical’ discussion on ‘words signifying things’. n lov g on. 30-91. 20-91. kaq∆e{ k aston zw' / a . 3).. to. According to Sten Ebbesen. tou' ei\ n ai: para. As I have argued elsewhere. in 35 P ORPH . aj p o. to. 75. while accidents exist in the same way as substances. Trans. 26-31 coincides with the doctrine expounded in more detail at In Cat. ta. I will leave Porphyry’s statement about accidents aside for the moment. p. it represents an un-Platonic. B. 90.. ouj k ej f ’ eJ n o. o{ t i ouj k e[ s tin a[ t omo~ ouj s iv a oJ ei| ~ tw' n kata. In Cat. toiov n de. dianoiv a / .. ej n ohv s amen. ai[ t ia toi' ~ koinh' / kathgoroumev n oi~ ej s ti. 36 Cf..) nor a logical theory opposed to metaphysical speculations about separate forms (pace Ebbesen). koinh' / th' / dianoiv a / aj f iknouv m eqa. But it is from the perception of particulars that we come to conceive of the common predicate. 34 . but with a privileged litter — the litter responsible for the formation of the concept of cat in general » 37 . In Cat. 75. 91. p. kaq’ e{ k aston ou[ t e bou' n ou[ t e a[ n qrwpon ou[ t e i{ p pon ou[ t e o{ l w~ e[ s ti noh' s ai zw' / o n. As I see it. 146. 28 . 90. koinh' / kathgorouv m enon kat’ auj t w' n e[ s tai. In Cat. At In Cat. .. 90. what is predicate in common of them will no longer exist either » 35 . koinh' / kathgorouv m enon ej n ohv s amen zw' / o n. a} dh. oJ koinh' / kathgorouv m eno~ a[ n qrwpo~ ej p enohv q h. 5 : dei' de. It is plainly evident that the profound thesis about universals hinted to at In Cat. 33 . neither interpretation is truly persuasive.e. aj l l’ eu\ eij d ev n ai. 75 Porphyry presents his thesis on the conceptual genesis of universal concepts as neither a « familiar story » (pace B. ouj k ev t i ouj d e.. conceptualist and ‘logical’ account of the genesis of general concepts (« there cannot be a clash between Aristotelian logic and Platonic metaphysics as long as the logician works within the confines of his art ») 36 . Porphyry’s Legacy cit. 275. not yet with the set of all cats. but as a ‘such’. Oxford 2006. I 3.. In Ptol. pp. 24. 12-22. Duckworth. 120-131. 53. Sharples. ei\ d o~. in Porphyry’s non-introductory writings). This is neither a commonplace truth nor a theory bereft 38 P ORPH . and of general concepts on the other (In Cat. G. runs along the lines of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ theory of abstractable forms 39 . Alexander’s much debated Quaest. M.. I. Sent. etc.. 28 . H ELMIG eds. cf. Cornell University Press. Quaestiones 1. T ARRANT . pp.15. Plato and Aristotle in Agreement ? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry. H. T WEEDALE. Translated by R. rather. might be viewed as partial. (among several contributions) M. Porphyry’s assertions regarding the status of genera and species in the Isagoge and in In Cat. 21. p.. R. 479 . .W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 13 non-introductory works such as the Sentences and the Commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics) concerning immanent incorporeal entities and their abstractions.e. This is the concept » 38 . « Phronesis ». Harm. Aristotle’s doctrine of abstraction in the Commentators. therefore. p. The universal man as such does not exist in the world . 42. ‘concepts’ are abstractions of immanent incorporeal forms ‘torn off’ from matter and stored in the soul : « then it (scil. 21-24. W. that exists in particulars. 26-31). K ARAMANOLIS . Platonic Stoicism / Stoic Platonism. Tarrant). 75. Clarendon Press. 39 See esp. I D .. I 11 b. in S ORABJI . Such incorporeal immanent entities do not exist independently from their sensible instantiations : according to Porphyry. Platonismo e teoria della conoscenza stoica tra II e III secolo d. pp. whereas generalities are not the objects of any direct acquaintance.. p. . On Alexander’s views on essences and universals. M UELLER . 22 Bruns. Aristotle Transformed cit. pp. R ASHED . 316-317. Ithaca (NY) 1993. 20 . with their qualities. etc. cf. Priorité de l’ei\ d o~ ou du gev n o~ entre . I D . W. separate and incorporeal substances such as the soul and transcendent Forms. in so far as this form is separated from matter by the soul.. 279-303 . Porphyry’s doctrine of immanent abstractable natures. Alexander of Aphrodisias. they are sharply distinguished from the status of ‘Platonic’. 14. According to Porphyry.. 1984. p. 22. pp.). Porphyry’s views cit. tou' t o h\ n hJ e[ n noia (trans. Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Views on Universals. they are only incorporeal insofar as they are notionally separated from bodies (cf.C. Furthermore. The ‘conception’ resulting from this process of abstraction is the form. Leuven 2007. then. in M. S HARPLES . becomes clear : accidents. B ONAZZI . Peeters. 7. I 11a.1-2. Porphyry’s statement. 6-9 Lamberz). Accordingly.. 463-480. the complete significance of which emerges elsewhere (i. as can be traced in his extant writings. exist in the world and are perceived as such (we are directly acquainted with individual substances. Concetti generali cit. elementary and simplified versions of this doctrine. kai. 2-3 Düring : tov t e aj p ev q eto ej n th' / yuch' / to. On Porphyry’s theory of knowledge in In Ptol. 209-242 (excursus Porfirio e il criterio). regarding the different ontological status of accidents and individual substances on the one hand. 20-8. as well as individual substances. Further details in CHIARADONNA .. Thrasyllan Platonism. the immanent nature man is always instantiated by the individual men by means of which it is perceived : the (universal) essence as such is only grasped via the process of abstraction. imagination) stores the form in the soul. London 1992 . Harm. C. p. Plotinus. p. 7. pp. but by Porphyry’s day such immigrants had been thoroughly integrated. Porphyre. pp. rather. Isagoge cit. XXVII-XXX. and there is no cause to suppose that his theory Andronicos et Alexandre. p. The inference is always invalid. a Stoic term and inferred a Stoic influence. At Isag. 6 characterises the Isagoge as « un extraordinaire mélange de notions platoniciennes. Two Problematic Texts.. their immanent principles and their abstractions. 130 and 157. are not always convincing. 28 . however. pp. « Arabic Sciences and Philosophy ». Sophroniscus’ son is approaching : Porphyry. R. 962 n. 2004. 43-55. Isagoge 7. see also D E L IBERA . 2005.. 14. Cornell University Press. In his elementary writings. and the detective work usually amateur : some of the words which Porphyry uses had perhaps been introduced into the philosophical domain by Stoic thinkers for Stoic ends .20-1. H ADOT . 41 B. « The Classical Quarterly ». Aristotle and other Platonists. p. and it concerns not individual predicates but proper names. Concetti generali cit. III. highly simplified version of the doctrine . say. 9-63 . Porphyry cit. 1. . Porphyry is not simply reporting the Stoic theory . Logic and Metaphysics. Vestiges arabes et grecs inédits. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Universals. B. A Sourcebook. 40 P. does not deny that Porphyry may have adopted various Stoic notions and doctrines. vol. A DEMOLLO . 200600 AD. While B. 322-325. Cornell University Press. it is a theory which regards the status of physical entities. however. Ithaca (NY) 2005. 2004. R.. Further details in C HIARADONNA. S HARPLES . I am inclined to believe that Porphyry derived such a doctrine from the Peripatetic tradition and fitted it to his Platonic framework. aristotéliciennes et stoïciennes » . Specialists have sometimes detected the presence of distinctively Stoic theories in the Isagoge 40 . pp. often proves successful in his attempt to reject specific claims of Stoic influence in Porphyry’s Isagoge . p. A further example pertains to the vexata quaestio of Porphyry’s Stoicism in the Isagoge. XIX. Études Augustiniennes. 19-24 Porphyry presents his famous theory of individual predicates. p.14 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA of ontological significance . cf. The Philosophy of the Commentators. B. Paris 1968. Ithaca (NY) 2005. his arguments. There appears to be an overlap between Porphyry’s theory and the Stoic ij d iv w ~ poiov n . he also explicitly points out that more remains to be said on the matter. The passage is a difficult and controversial one 42 . cf. pp. 85 . Porphyry provides a partial. L. But the Stoic theory makes no mention of sets of proper features. S TRANGE . 232 n. Porphyre et Victorinus. he strongly opposes any suggestion that there might be traces of Stoicism in Porphyry’s most elementary treatise : « Here and there scholars have detected. yet it may safely be inferred that Porphyry conceives of each individual as being composed of a unique assemblage of proper features (a[ q roisma ij d iothv t wn). 150 and F. 54. their remote origin forgotten » 41 . rejects such conclusion : « The two theories have their similarities. For the parallel between Alexander and Porphyry.. 50. S ORABJI .. « Phronesis ». P. 42 On the Greek text. G ERSON . B. however. While I fully agree with B. 316. I will further attempt to elucidate this point by following a line of reasoning similar to the one I previously adopted. La teoria dell’individuo in Porfirio e l’ij d iv w ~ poiov n stoico.W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 15 was elaborated on the basis of the Stoic theory » 43 . “Subject is twofold. Porphyry’s doctrine significantly differs from Stoic ij d iv w ~ poiov n . de Haas. which Aristotle called body in potentiality. C HIARADONNA . fitted Aristotelian and Stoic notions about matter. n h] ij d iv w ~ uJ f iv s tatai)” » 44 . he also consciously made use of Stoic theories in his exegesis of Aristotle’s Categories (cf. by F. and secondly. A. certainly took account of the Stoic notion of quality in his lost commentary on Aristotle’s Categories : Simplicius records Porphyry’s response to an aporia put forward by Lucius : « In response to this problem Porphyry said. Isag. besides.. In Cat. then..e. 2. in S ORABJI . For the qualityless matter. 45 Cf. S IMPL .. I believe that there are very good reasons to suppose that Porphyry did take into account the Stoic theory of individuals. is the first meaning of subject. 22 . pp. but also according to the earlier philosophers.. in his non-introductory works) in detail.. Both in the Isagoge and in the short In Cat. p. 200-600 AD. it may safely be inferred that Porphyry’s theory of individuals as combinations of properties originated in this doctrinal context 45 . 21. a more complete version of the theory was probably contained in the lost commentary Ad Gedalium. In Cat. 8). as « what subsists […] peculiarly qualified ». S IMPL . « Elenchos ». 2000. In neither instance does Porphyry ever mention the Stoics . however. 10) of proper features or qualities. A Sourcebook. The Philosophy of the Commentators. sundromhv . 11-15 = Fr. at least in some cases. terms that by Porphyry’s day were bereft of distinctive philosophical connotations . J. then. what subsists commonly or peculiarly qualified (o} koinw' ~ poio. The passage quoted above suggests that Porphyry integrated Aristotle’s theory of substance and the Stoic theory of matter and quality — the individual substance of Aristotle’s Categories being conceived. which clarified Porphyry’s allusion to Stoicism. Trans.. correctly notes. 48. not only according to the Stoics. R. provide an elementary version of Porphyry’s theory of individually qualified substance . Porphyry regards individuals as combinations (a[ q roisma. In Cat.. 115. 303-331. qualities and ‘subjects’ within a single doctrinal framework. Again. Porphyry’s elementary writings provide a partial and simplified version of theories which Porphyry expounds elsewhere (i.’s first assertion — that Porphyry is not simply quoting a Stoic doctrine —. Not only did he adopt current terms of Stoic origin. 55 Smith. 44 . as B. the Isagoge and the short In Cat. 7. p. 43 B. III cit. While this passage does not focus on individual predicates. Porphyry. but.. Porphyry. 129. Alexander and Grammatical texts does not in itself prove that was not employed by Porphyry in a distinctive philosophical manner. A L ONG eds. A. employed by 46 Cf. At Isag. 176-207. posits a radical alternative : either (i) Porphyry is quoting a Stoic theory without any alterations. 48 Cf. or whether they depend on thought alone (ei[ t e uJ f ev s thken ei[ t e kai. one should seek to detect if (and where) current terms and arguments are used in a philosophically distinctive way (and ascertain just what that way might be). pp. 40-41. While B.. B. A. Rather. 10-11 for example. is correct in rejecting a similar approach. B. The Question of “Eclecticism”. pp. LONG . Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1988. infers (ii). Platonismo e teoria della conoscenza stoica cit. or (ii) he is simply ignoring Stoicism. Long’s remarks on the philosophical lingua franca of Imperial philosophy are more nuanced. 47 . that the same term or argument occurs in Porphyry and in Galen. Some interpreters have sought to infer philosophical influences from terminology.. B. but also a non sequitur : what we know about the reception of Stoic theories among imperial and late antique authors often contradicts the positing of any such radical alternative 46 . A. Porphyry raises the question of whether genera and species subsist. M. cf. A. An Epistemology for the Practising Scientist. By ruling out (i). B. Ptolemy ‘On the Criterion’. University of California Press. Stoic thought alters those doctrines by which it is assimilated.’s scheme fails to grasp the subtleties of such a complex process of interaction. B. 1. 182-183. points out that ej p iv n oia is a quotidian term : the addition of ‘bare’ and ‘alone’ is merely pleonastic and does not create a technical formula 48 . Studies in Later Greek Philosophy. B. The fact.16 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA Porphyry adapts (and thereby modifies) a Stoic doctrine to fit a different (and in our eyes largely incompatible) philosophical framework (a basically Peripatetic analysis of sensible substances). Rather.. The very notion of a « philosophical lingua franca » is highly controversial. C HIARADONNA . A. pp. D ILLON . for instance. ej n mov n ai~ yilai' ~ ej p inoiv a i~ kei' t ai). Yet the situation may vary : the mere fact that a commonly shared philosophical terminology existed does not imply that different authors (or the same author in different contexts) always made a use of a neutral lingua franca 47 . Sextus. esp.’s is certainly an elegant procedure. It is certainly wrong to posit Stoic influences on the mere basis of terms like uJ p ov s tasi~. countless instances are known in which Stoic terms are adopted without any trace of their original philosophical meaning . such doctrines are integrated in a different philosophical framework : they are adapted and ‘misunderstood’ . ej p iv n oia is a familiar term. in turn. but in many cases Stoic theories are neither faithfully reported nor ignored. in J. Indeed. his alternative hypothesis (that Porphyry adopted a neutral lingua franca in which terms and arguments — whatever their origin may have been — had lost their distinctive philosophical connotation) is equally unconvincing. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Cambridge 1987. Porphyry is here seeking to provide an elementary account of a philosophically distinctive argument : that universal genera and species are immanent natures ‘thought of’ as universal when the soul extracts them from matter. ej p iv n oia acquire a technical meaning in the passage in question 51 .g. 136. the chimera. I would like to address a further crucial problem : B. pp. as such. commonplace. S TOB . « Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques ». the addition of mov n ai~ and yilai' ~ serves to distinguish what depends on thought alone (e. where it designates the first principle.. then. The Stoic View on Universlas. 26-31 and 90. ej p iv n oia vel similia might possess a ‘non quotidian’ meaning of this kind in philosophically similar contexts. Harm. pp. Rather. 71-87. N. A.W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 17 authors of all kinds. « Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale ». 1. However. A. 53. pp.’s criticism of my old (and now outdated) article Essence et prédication chez Porphyre et Plotin. 18. 40 n. 10-11 Porphyry. 82. D. 1998. he might be expected to identify 49 To take an extreme example : ‘one’ is a quotidian term. 577-606 : cf. Evidently. it does not rule out that ej p iv n oia and cognate (quotidian) expressions may be used by Porphyry in a distinctive philosophical sense. 42. yet — the elementary and simplified character of Porphyry’s allusion notwithstanding — I would definitely resist the conclusion that their use is necessarily neutral. B RONOWSKI .. the expression « bare thoughts alone » at Isag. 2007. Instead of piling up example on example. this does not entail that Plotinus exclusively employs the term ‘one’ in the above sense. 14. See A. At Isag. While this is undoubtedly true.. Indeed. (like Ebbesen before him) accords a paramount importance to the absence of any explicit allusion to ‘Platonic’ ante rem forms in the Isagoge. this does not imply that Porphyry always bestows the two terms with this specific philosophical meaning 49 . 50 Cf. such as the e[ n noia of in Ptol Harm. 51 Accordingly. L AËRT . 53. 179-183 (= L. 75. but this does not prevent it from acquiring a distinctive philosophical meaning in Plotinus’ Enneads. 3 Düring . or Stoic universals) from mental concepts with an objective correlatum. In Cat. Porphyry employs ej p inoei' n and e[ n noia in order to designate the mental abstraction of an immanent incorporeal entity (In Ptol.. Obviously. D IOG . Sent. such as P ORPH . 1. . Accordingly.-S. S EDLEY .. 5. p. 30 A-I). I do not venture to say that ej p iv n oia and yilh. University Press. 2-3 Lamberz). 30-91. 74. B. is here raising the question of whether genera and species subsist (whatever the form of their subsistence may be) or are mere mental fictions (like Stoic universals) 50 . p. 10-11 is not a mere pleonasm : as I see it. 21-137. 3 Düring or the result of the act of ej p inoei' n at Sent. familiar and quotidian. 6 (SVF I 65) . Porphyry was a Platonist . I. 14.. Cf. VII 60-61. I agree with B.. 2-3 Lamberz. L ONG . p.. 42. I believe that this is the case : for in the above passages Porphyry is not alluding to quotidian or commonplace ideas. 120-131 . 13-23 may provide a hint of Porphyry’s treatment of division in his lost commentary on Plato’s Sophist : cf. suggests that despite the explicit mention of Plato at Isag. M ANSFELD . No clear allusion to the intelligible metaphysical status of the ‘common man’ is here to be found . This apparently leads to conclude that Porphyry’s elementary logical works are metaphysically neutral : that they belong to Porphyry L and have no connection with Porphyry P. Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii ‘De divisione liber’. P ORPH . Leiden 1998. In Cat. R. See the overview in J.. M ORAUX . 23-6. As I argued elsewhere. 78-109. Critical Edition. 19-27... 17. 000-000. v. fr. and the term metousiva at Isag. just before these lines (Isag. Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias. What I suggest is that Porphyry’s remarks on genealogical genera and 52 Cf. the same holds true for the passage on the priority of genera and species vs individuals at Isag. Biblipolis. Berlin-New York 1973. 8-10. Plotino critico di Aristotele. 227-271. 5. Jh. De Div. they play a crucial role in Middle and Neo-Platonic accounts of the hierarchy of beings 54 . 137-138. VI 1 [42].. Enn. 54 For a particularly close reference. pp. Prolegomena. 21 does not in itself convey the Platonic notion of participation between different degrees of reality 53 . forcefully (and in my view successfully) argues against reading ante rem forms into some passages from the Isagoge. expressly states that intelligible substances fall outside the scope of inquiry of Categories (which focuses on words signifying things and not on things as such) 52 . the ‘common man’ alluded to at Isag. The least one can say. This does not imply that one should detect a direct allusion to the Platonic scala entis in the above mentioned lines from the Isagoge : for Porphyry never mentions ideas in this passage. Hyppolitus’ ‘Elenchos’ as a Source for Greek Philosophy. I. As noted above. such theories are not philosophically neutral : rather. and Porphyry’s short In Cat. however. 6. pp. Chr. 6. 876D = P ORPH . Sostanza movimento analogia.. pp. 6.18 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA genera and species with transcendent ideas. B OETH . 3. pp. Cf. At Isag.. Brill. 3-5 : cf. and nothing suggests that the ‘common man’ here is identical to the transcendent idea of man (on the contrary. Brill.. 6.. Leiden 1992. B. 53 . much evidence would lead to the opposite conclusion).. Does this mean that the Isagoge is a neutral. cf. Heresiography in Context. B. 6.. C HIARADONNA . 5) he explains that each single genus mirrors the structure of a genealogy in which the summum genus plays the role of origin (ab uno relation). 169 Smith. Isag.. is that Platonism cannot easily be suppressed from a Porphyrian passage that explicitly mentions Plato. B. and Commentary.. Napoli 2002.. 21-22 is not directly to be identified with the transcendent idea of man.. 91. P. Cf. pp. J. 13-23 Porphyry presents a synthetic sketch of Plato’s division . ontologically empty treatise bereft of any connection with Porphyry’s Platonism ? In my view. 14. Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im I. De Gruyter. M AGEE . Translation. the answer to the question is definitely ‘no’. Yet the Isagoge does not mention ideas. So for instance. however. Concepts And Qualities : New Essays on the Meaning of Predicates. Porphyry discusses the nature of this relation (i. but an elementary treatise on notions that are useful for the study of division (among other things). this does not entail that common items are philosophically and ontologically neutral . yet this does not imply that such notions are philosophically neutral and ontologically empty. 18. 123-140. This. 139. There is more to Neoplatonic ontology (ontologies would be more correct) than what modern critics would usually admit. To sum up : it is certainly true (as B. at the same time he implies that the absence of any direct connection between common items and transcendent Forms in the Isagoge is revealing of the ontological neutrality of the work. general terms stand for general concepts that depend on sensible objects. Besides. While. Universals. F. cf. acknowledges this fact 57 . for Neoplatonic ontology extends down to the physical world — one should recall that Porphyry’s Platonic metaphysics include both transcendent and immanent (or ‘physical’) incorporeal entities. 56 On the distinction between intelligible Forms and universals in Neoplatonism. Ashgate. S ORABJI . pp. Evidently enough. A. the analysis of which is one of the aims of Porphyry’s Platonic philosophy (although a different aim from the study of transcendent entities). « Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale ». R. 105-125. common items have a different ontological status. rather.. has brilliantly proven) that the common items which Porphyry mentions in the Isagoge are not Platonic forms . according to (Neo)Platonic ontology.e. Universals Transformed : The First Thousand Years After Plato. Porphyry disregards the ontological framework behind such theories. According to Porphyry. for the sake of simplicity. C HAKRABARTI eds.W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 19 division at Isag. p.. 6 represent a partial and introductory account of doctrines which can only fully be appreciated in the wider framework of the Platonic hierarchy of beings 55 .. the ontological basis of his semantics) : our 55 Cf. . this has nothing to do with the supposed philosophical neutrality of such theories with respect to Platonism. pp. R. does not imply the absence of an underlying metaphysical background : nothing suggests that Porphyry is aiming to strip the theories he is examining in these lines of the Isagoge of all ontological significance. C HIARADONNA . I disagree with B. Aldeshot 2006. 57 Cf. Porphyry does not render the metaphysical background of his short account explicit : for the Isagoge is not a treatise on division. S TRAWSON . in P. In his non-elementary works. 2007. Forms are neither universal nor ‘common’ 56 (at least not primarily) : while B. Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals and Synonymous Predication.’s conclusion : I believe that while it is true that common items are not identical with ante rem forms. B. words stand for (‘signify’) sensible objects . p. Instead of addressing such issues. . As B. However rough it may be. 1. Porphyry’s map is neither random nor devoid of any connection (pace B. 91.. Yet Porphyry’s physical ontology is part of his Platonism : accordingly. are they bodies or incorporeal ? If they are 58 59 B. Rather. 38. is perfectly Neoplatonic : there is nothing ‘un-Platonic’ or ‘aPlatonic’ in Porphyry’s reasoning here. Porphyry L is by no means separate from Porphyry P.’s pars destruens is compelling. 39. As noted above. are post rem abstractions of immanent forms. 49 : « some may wonder if Porphyry raised a problem or rather a dust »).. as well as with other issues discussed in the treatise. internal connections can be traced in Porphyry’s catalogue of questions. While B. p. B. Porphyry does not render all connections between his three sets of questions pedantically explicit. In the Isagoge one finds no interrogation of the kind : ‘Do genera and species subsist or depend on things ? If they subsist. « He mentions one of the banished problems » 58 . Porphyry aims to show how the old masters (and the Peripatetics in particular) engaged with genera and species ‘logically’.. Specialists have at times made too much of Porphyry’s list in the attempt to detect various technicalities in his set of questions. p..’s doubts. Despite B. B. his pars construens proves unpersuasive. 19-27) and discursive reasoning. Porphyry argues. coincides not with the Porphyrian metaphysics of transcendent forms. puts it. B. The ontology behind universal genera and species in Porphyry L. Porphyry regards the Categories as a text specifically aimed at preparing for the physical part of philosophy . P ORPHYRY ’ S SET OF QUESTIONS : WHAT DOES P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE PREPARE FOR ? The problem (a) raised above can now be addressed : what is the sense of Porphyry’s set of questions at Isag. Certainly. what we know of Porphyry’s lost longer commentary Ad Gedalium confirms the impression that Porphyry made much use of physical doctrines in his interpretation of the Categories. furthermore. then. Porphyry’s claim that intelligible substances lie outside the scope of language (as stated at In Cat. 9-12 ? Porphyry puts forward his list in order to make clear what kind of questions he is not going to answer. suggests that Porphyry’s list « is a rough map of an area which Porphyry will not explore » 59 . Again. 2. and convincingly refutes the idea that Porphyry’s list represents a series of answers to a specific question (the ‘problem of universals’)..20 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA (discursive) general concepts. forcefully rejects such conclusions. but with the Porphyrian (physical) ontology of immanent forms. What is the overall purpose of Porphyry’s list of questions ? The answer to this problem. Porphyry avoids discussing which of these four modes of being reflects the status of genera and species. therefore. cf.. in particular. uJ f ev s thken. which includes transcendent incorporeals. Porphyre. B. 504 (ad Sent. . 1. (II) the second pair is subordinate to. is signalled by uJ f esthkov t a at Isag. Goulet in L. pace B. is straightforward : the list provides a preliminary (but by no means obscure or allusive) map of Porphyry’s ontology. tau' t a at Isag. Sentences cit.e. M. B. 19.. the Stoics conceived of qualities as bodies. p. 62 R. it is clear that this must be the connection between Porphyry’s set of questions : the link between the first and second set. p. what best describes their status in Porphyry’s list of questions is the formula « bare thoughts alone » at Isag. The syntactical structure of this passage is as follows : (I) the first pair of questions draws an opposition between subsisting items and bare thoughts alone .. p. 31-138. peri. Moreover. remarks that some ancient authors regarded features and qualities as bodies 61 . 12 are « two expressions for the same thing ».-O. Sent. i. but with genera and species.. 45. 44 correctly remarks that the two clauses ej n toi' ~ aij s qhtoi' ~ kai. p. 6 Lamberz) notes the connection between Porphyry’s set of questions at Isag. 10. 60 B. B RISSON ET ALII éd. but this has little to do with Porphyry’s quest . 10-11. commentaire. the fact that Porphyry might here be alluding to incorporeal entities. Porphyry’s list of questions can be seen to provide a catalogue of 4 modes of being : bare thoughts alone. 1. e[ n noiai or ej p iv n oiai). immanent incorporeals (along with their abstractions. 1 and the classification of incorporeal entities at Sent. 19. By contrast. 3. 11 . it seems highly implausible for Porphyry’s catalogue to include some kind of enigmatic ‘bodily genera and species’ which should either be separable or exist « in perceptible items and around them ». are they separable or found in perceptible items ?’ 60 . Études d’introduction. G OULET -C AZÉ . Porphyry. I.W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 21 incorporeal. Porphyry had no need to render it explicit as in the case of the second pair.. The syntax of these lines further suggests that Porphyry’s third pair of questions is subordinate to aj s wv m ata in the second pair. Le système philosophique de Porphyre dans les ‘Sentences’. are unwarranted. as for the third pair. L. in B RISSON . had Porphyry not added uJ f esthkov t a at 1. i.’s doubts. to the second and closer item of the second pair : as this subordination plainly emerges from the context itself. For the sake of simplicity. Yet. Vrin. II. 1. clearly emerges from the context. while never expressly stated. texte grec et traduction française. however. For an overall account of Porphyry’s ontology and metaphysics. 19 and 42) 62 . Paris 2005. B. Indeed. the first and more remote item of the first pair : this would not be clear. bodies. 1. (III) the third pair is subordinate to aj s wv m ata.. pp. and bodies (cf. as for Stoic universals. in my view. 61 Cf. separable incorporeals and immanent incorporeals. 11 . Sentences. 2.e. is not dealing with qualities. Porphyre. B RISSON ... — I shall attempt.. Chrisaorius. Porphyry explains. tiv sumbebhkov ~ . diairev s ew~ kai. what the older masters say… » 65 . are added to this catalogue for the sake of completeness (before asking what kind of subsisting items genera and species might be. ti i[ d ion kai. peri. 63 Cf. DE L IBERA . 64 . toi' ~ presbutev r oi~ ej p elqei' n . tw' n me. Isagoge cit. and generally for matters concerning division and proof. ei[ ~ te th. 14 . XII n.. to rehearse. the study of which is useful. cf. in making you a concise introduction. ’Aristotev l ei kathgoriw' n didaskaliv a n tou' gnw' n ai tiv gev n o~ kai. pp.. LXII-LXXV. even for a schooling in Aristotle’s predications. fictional thoughts also feature in the list because a renowned philosophical school (that of the Stoics) maintained that (universal) genera and species were mere mental creations. difference. p. eij ~ th. it is necessary to envisage the possibility that they might not exist at all). n tw' n oJ r ismw' n aj p ov d osin kai. 1. property. Porphyry is here beginning an elementary treatise on a well-defined set of notions (genus. pp. Porphyry also provides a list of possible solutions to the question of what genera and species might be . n tw' n para. n baqutev r wn aj p ecov m eno~ zhthmav t wn. kai.. o{ l w~ eij ~ ta. certainly possesses a distinctive philosophical meaning and is not ‘mere dust’. suv n tomov n soi parav d osin poiouv m eno~ peirav s omai dia.22 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA Fictional thoughts (yilai. Porphyre. Perhaps. Isag. Assuredly.. If my interpretation proves correct. his list. In order to make it clear that his discussion will be of an elementary and introductory sort. tiv te ei\ d o~ kai. but by no means philosophically neutral way) Porphyry’s ‘map of reality’ 64 . however. DE L IBERA . tw' n d’ aJ p loustev r wn summev t rw~ stocazov m eno~. is not a random one : it rather constitutes a short catalogue of modes of being which includes (in a preliminary and simplified. accident). B. species. therefore. Porphyry’s list. bracev w n w{ s per ej n eij s agwgh' ~ trov p w/ ta. no ‘problem of universals’ lies at the basis of Porphyry’s catalogue (although the later tradition read Porphyry’s list as a set of answers to such a problem) 63 . Porphyre. Isagoge cit. 65 P ORPH . that in naming genera and species his treatise will refrain from elucidating the nature of such objects. by way of example. to know what is a genus and what a difference and what a species and what a property and what an accident — and also for the presentation of definitions. briefly and in the manner of an introduction. para. I believe. ej p iv n oiai). aj p odeiv x ew~ crhsiv m h~ ou[ s h~ th' ~ touv t wn qewriv a ~. tiv diafora. But why should Porphyry choose to focus on these five items ? This question leads to the title of the present paper : what is Porphyry’s Isagoge ? Why did Porphyry write this short treatise ? And just what does the Isagoge prepare for ? It is worth quoting the opening lines of Porphyry’s treatise : « It being necessary. Crusaov r ie. 1-8 : “Onto~ aj n agkaiv o u. the traditional reading of Porphyry’s five items as « quinque voces » (for the history of which. XLII-XLIII) is misleading. is here presenting a set of topics for the study of which his investigation on species. In quoting the text. and students of Platonic philosophy started with Aristotelian logic — and so with Aristotle’s Organon. are irrelevant for the purposes of the present discussion. Porphyry. […] Porphyry’s essay. 68 Despite B. Among mondern scholars. I chose to follow B. 1. URL = <http ://plato. While no degree of certainty is possible in this regard.. p. B OBZIEN .. 70 On the Isagoge as an elementary introduction to logic (and. the issue of whether Porphyry is here alluding to Aristotle’s treatise or not is significant : were Porphyry alluding to Aristotle’s Categories at the very beginning of the Isagoge. Aristotle’s Doctrine of Predicables and Porphyry’s ‘Isagoge’. C. is listed as the first item of a set which also includes (the doctrines of) definition. 1-3 . after all. The syntactical problems of these lines.’s authoritative refutation. N. this would lend support to the hypothesis that Porphyry’s treatise is an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories. to Aristotle’s Categories).. 25. ’Aristotevlei kathgoriw'n didaskalivan at Isag. 15-34. XXVI. however. however.e. cf. difference. 12 Westerink (cf. B. But it is not an Introduction the the Categories » 69 .W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 23 The text is not entirely clear : its syntax leaves some room for ambiguity. « Journal of the History of Philosophy ». genera.. was thereby and introduction to philosophy — and hence thereby an introduction to the Categories.’s translation66 . Summer 2007 Edition. property and accident as basic notions one needs to know to understand the Categories ». commentators have regarded the Isagoge as an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories.’s reading proves generally correct 70 . p. 69 B. correctly argues against such an interpretation 68 on the grounds that Porphyry portrays his own work as being propaedeutic to the study of logic : « Students of philosophy in late antiquity generally started with logic . pp. property and accident represents a necessary (or necessary and useful) background : Aristotle’s doctrine of categories. 1-2 may either refer to Aristotle’s treatise Categories or to Aristotle’s theory of categories. E.edu/archives/sum2007/ entries/logic-ancient/> : « Two of the commentators deserve special mention in their own right : Porphyry. As noted above. 23. . indirectly. In Isag. [E LIAS ]. XVI). the excellent discussion at B. it seems to me that B. B. in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. While B. E VANGELIOU . to the whole of philosophy). 1985. Th.. species. differentia. p. in which he discusses the five notions of genus. From a different point of view. for writing the Isagoge or Introduction (i. however.. the traditional interpretation of the Isagoge still finds its champions : cf. written as an introduction to the study of logic. Z ALTA ed. Ancient Logic. is right in suppressing the capital letter. From a certain point of view. 26. XXXVII. division and proof.’s claim that « students of Platonic philosophy 66 Cf. therefore. it remains unconvincing in certain (significant) respects. cf.n tw'n para.stanford. this makes little difference : for « a schooling in Aristotle’s predications would no doubt take the form of a reading of Aristotle’s Predications »67 . B. 67 B. Since Antiquity.. XV. S. p. division. I. B ALTUSSEN . H ADOT . D’A NCONA . I. While later Neoplatonic schools adopted a well-codified school curriculum which included Aristotle’s treatises 71 . The Didaskalikos rather attributes the discovery of logical methods 71 Cf. H OFFMANN . 1. Alcinous’ treatment of logic is elementary and probably based on handbooks . 21-47. but only of Platonist students after Porphyry.. 74 Further parallels in J. 36. Brill 1990.. Whittaker. 2005.1. 63-93 and. and so with Aristotle’s Organon » might be true. The Handbook of Platonism. Philosophy. H ADOT . 30-32) . Science and Exegesis in Greek. 80 n. p. Aristotle’s Doctrine of Predicables and Porphyry’s ‘Isagoge’ cit. Porphyry appears to be the first Platonic commentator on Aristotle’s logical treatises (and on Aristotle’s treatises tout court) 73 . vol. Alcinous. Commentaire sur les Catégories. Translated with an Introduction and Commentary. . In one passage. (b) dialectical methods. Alcinous’ lists are similar to Porphyry’s list in the Isagoge. 23 : « Sia la presenza di Aristotele nel curriculum tardo-neoplatonico […] sia la crescente elaborazione dei modi di accesso ai testi filosofici e scientifici autorevoli […] appaiono allo storico come caratteri distintivi del pensiero post-plotiniano ». The work contains an important section on ‘dialectic’ and its various parts . For the ongoing debate cf. 32-34. students of Peripatetic philosophy generally started with Aristotle’s Organon . K ARAMANOLIS . more recently. pp. D’A NCONA ed. L UNA . Enseignement des doctrines de Platon. this was neither a neutral nor a generally accepted practice before Porphyry’s time. In Isag.. S TONE eds. Porphyry : The First Platonist Commentator on Aristotle. 31-33) 74 . Leiden.. but again. Arabic and Latin Commentaries. Alcinoos. P. W. Oxford 1993. 153. does not regard Aristotle’s Organon as a guide for the study of logic. induction and syllogism (Did. The Libraries of the Neoplatonists. 5. F. Il neoplatonismo alessandrino : alcune linee della ricerca contemporanea. 58-59 . induction and syllogism (Did. pp. What we know of the Middle-Platonic reception of Aristotle in no way suggests that students of Platonic schools started with Aristotle’s Organon. Leiden 2007. C. Alcinous does not mention Aristotle. the study of Aristotle’s Organon was definitely not part of a standard Platonic curriculum before the time of Porphyry 72 . Little is known about the study of logic in Middle Platonism . p. some evidence can be found in Alcinous’ Didaskalikos. fasc. Paris 1990. M. par I. 3. H. Les Belles Lettres. 31 . Indeed. Clarendon Press. significantly. pp. 156.. P. 72-73. 73 Cf. Concerning this passage see E VANGELIOU . analysis. According to E LIAS . Alcinous mentions division. J. in another. 11. however. A DAMSON . traduit par P. Simplicius. H ADOT . 97-120. Louis. the Isagoge is useful for introducing student to (a) every branch of philosophy. London 2004. definition.. Alcinous. D ILLON . Neoplatonismo alessandrino cit. most significantly. C. 29. Brill. Significantly..24 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA started with Aristotle’s logic. in P. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 83. definition. the papers collected in C. Introduction. G. and (c) the theories on categories developed by Aristotle and other philosophers.. p. 72 Cf. D’A NCONA . pp. W HITTAKER . 9-38. « Adamantius ». texte établi et commenté par J. a Platonist) 75 . Galen’s Method of Healing. R. 78 Cf. Knowledge of Aristotle’s treatises appears to have been limited 77 . therefore. Plotinus’ attitude. in M. and 18. pp. 50-102. knows about the doctrine of categories. it may be inferred. B ONAZZI . rather. he was laying the foundations of what became a Platonic school practice after him.9 = V. 159. 15. Porphyry — pace Barnes — was not following a standard practice of the Platonic school . PHP.. Plotinus has a solid knowledge of Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition : in his treatises. and in this manner they [scil.. but does not attribute it to Aristotle. D URLING eds. Bibliopolis.W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 25 to Plato : an apparently widespread belief that was also shared by Galen (who was not. V. at any rate stricto sensu. 77 Here I disagree with K ARAMANOLIS . Significantly. For an overview of Galen’s contributions to logic. B ARNES . Porphyry. Galen’s attitude. Accordingly. pp. cf. 43. in F. he constantly alludes to Peripatetic doctrines and makes an extensive use of Aristotle’s works. 1 ff. Plotinus aimed to prove that Aristotle’s theories are wrought with problems and inner contradictions which can only be solved via the adoption of ‘Platonic’ philosophical tenets (i. however. Alcinous claims that Plato has outlined the ten categories in the Parmenides and elsewhere (Did. The reception of Aristotle in imperial Platonism before Porphyry is a complex matter 76 . it might be argued that Aristotelian or Peripatetic doctrines were either (mostly tacitly) incorporated in Platonism or vehemently rejected. Galen on Logic and Therapy. Leiden 1991. 235-274.. 43). K ARAMANOLIS . Oxford 2006.. is far more complex (Galen also composed extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works). one of the most important targets of Plotinus’ polemics is the theory of categories (Enn. J. the Middle-Platonist authors. . was also tacitly reacting against his master’s anti-Aristotelian polemics. K UDLIEN . Brill. L’eredità platonica : Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo. 6. C HIARADONNA. 6. VI 1-3 [42-44]). 17-18 and 39-40. The situation radically changed with Plotinus and Porphyry.. 2 = 45. Inst. 9. .. 158. C ELLUPRICA eds. Alcinous. It is worth quoting Praechter’s words : « From the fact that Plato on occasion made use of this or that form of argument. 159. such 75 Cf. On the whole. Plotino e la corrente antiaristotelica del platonismo imperiale : analogie e differenze. The difference between Porphyry’s attitude towards Aristotle and that of the previous Platonic tradition was already outlined by Karl Praechter in his magisterial review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. by turning to intelligible forms and their distinctive causality) 78 . 14ff. Plato and Aristotle in Agreement ? cit. it was taken as proof that he had also established this form theoretically . 76 See G. Plato and Aristotle in Agreement ? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry. 10 = 38. At the opening of the Isagoge. was critical : as I argued elsewhere. J.. Clarendon Presso. therefore. Sostanza movimento analogia cit.Log. Did. A LC . Kalbfleisch. I D . . G ALEN .e. . Napoli 2005.796-7 K. etc. however. pp. pp. apud S IMPL . etc. 120 Smith. 80 Cf..26 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA as the author of the Didaskalikos] succeeded. Plato and Aristotle in Agreement ? cit. II.. Oxford 1989. reprinted in H. and thus the exegesis of Aristotle also came to hold an extremely important place in the Platonic school. Physics. and this suffices radically to distinguish his work on Aristotle from that of previous Platonists. O’MEARA . pp.. the complete list of Porphyry’s exegetical works on Aristotle’s philosophy in K ARAMANOLIS. Aristotle Transformed cit. Vrin. 82 On Porphyry’s ‘universalising’ Platonism. La Vie de Plotin. P RAECHTER . 10. 27. accordingly. in order to shed light on the first lines of the Isagoge. It can safely be inferred that Porphyry aimed to integrate such treatises and their doctrines into his ‘universalizing’ Platonism 82 . beginning with these few points. 245 ff. esp. D.. aptly illustrates his attitude : Porphyry here points out that Aristotle had only considered the immanent form. Plato. H. « Byzantinische Zeitschrift ». Paris 1992. Plato and Aristotle in Agreement ? cit. Review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. I do not wish to discuss the motivations (to my mind both philosophical and ideological) behind Porphyry’s attitude towards Aristotle 80 . the . appears to have been sober in his exegetical attempts. Vrin. formed the basis for the study of philosophy in the schools of the Neoplatonists as well. Le néoplatonisme après Plotin. 31-54. and not covered in Platonic colours. Plato and Aristotle in Agreement ? cit. which it never lost » 79 . B RISSON ET ALII . Parallels in J. D. 32-11. 338-339. pp. Pythagoras Revived. S AFFREY . 2 Diels = fr. English translation in S ORABJI . 1909. while Plato had also postulated the separate form. simplification. Porphyry. Porphyry is a commentator of Aristotle’s treatises. S AFFREY . cf. etc. 83 More details in K ARAMANOLIS . Paris 2000. in claiming essentially all of Aristotle’s logic as Plato’s. 516-538. p. pp. A fragment on principles surviving from Porphyry’s lost In Phys. 35. Porphyry composed extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories. Clarendon Press. p. 272-273. In Phys. Mathematics and Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Porphyry instead aimed to show that Platonism could ‘naturally’ integrate Aristotle’s doctrines. 31-57. pp. Aristotle. thus establishing the ‘paradigmatic’ principle 84 . Pythagoras. although Porphyry never suggested that Plato and Aristotle held the same views 83 . The most interesting example of 79 K. 81 . All this obviously implies a process of modification. M ANSFELD . Now Aristotelian logic as such. It is with this that Porphyry broke. Cf. 84 P ORPH . J. K ARAMANOLIS . and never to have attempted to read ‘Platonic’ or ‘Pythagorean’ theories into those of Aristotle. Pourquoi Porphyre a-t-il édité Plotin ? Réponse provisoire. 18. nevertheless. pp.. 81 Cf. Rather. D. in L. 3-26 . I only wish to single out some of the notable features of Porphyry’s Aristotelianism. De interpretatione. Aristotle’s ontology was part of Porphyry’s inclusive Platonism. it would be wrong to suggest that Porphyry’s integration of Aristotle into Platonism was limited to logic and that it entailed an ontological neutralisation of Aristotelian doctrine. genera and species. Heresiography in Context cit. Discussion and further references in C HIARADONNA . An endeavour of this kind was new in the Platonic tradition. does not simply quote a school theory. Bibliopolis. physical entities are here portrayed as the real correlatum of logical and epistemological notions. 88 Cf. 39. but to universal concepts (C LEM . and Thales and his Followers “On Causes” (Ps. 17-68. 14. for instance. B RANCACCI ed. Platonismo e teoria della conoscenza stoica cit. yet Porphyry developed and refined previous exegetical tendencies : his harmonisation of Aristotle with Plato is based on a detailed acquaintance with both Aristotle’s treatises and the Aristotelian commentary tradition..-Plutarchus ‘Placita’ I 11 and Stobaeus ‘Anthologium’ I 13). Further details in the studies mentioned above. pp. 85 Cf. VIII. Peripatetic and Platonist theories) is probably his epistemological excursus in the Commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics : here an Aristotelising abstractionist theory of knowledge and science is described as being propaedeutic to the intellectual knowledge of true beings (which Porphyry describes by paraphrasing Plato’s Seventh Letter) . had conceived of ‘induction’ (ej p agwghv ) as a means to awaken the inborn memory of transcendent ideas 86 . 87 Cf.. prePlotinian method of blending Peripatetic tenets into Platonism . Such a view appears strikingly similar to the Porphyrian doctrine according to which universal genera and species are post rem abstractions of immanent incorporeal natures. but engages in a detailed exegesis of Aristotle’s Categories and Physics. This is by no means a commonplace or neutral view . 19. what is more. and the Aristotelising Peripatetics.W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 27 Porphyry’s attempt to integrate Aristotle and Plato (or. furthermore. and presents in re forms as the primary objects of the oJ r ismov ~ . Heresiography in Context cit. and includes an interesting allusion to the status of objects of definition : definitions are here said to pertain not to sensible things or ideas. Porphyry was indeed relying on a previous. A LEX . M ANSFELD . the Stoics... Porphyry develops an elaborated account of definitions. p. In his In Ptol. however. 15. A LCIN . esp. 158.. C LEM . rather. Antichi e moderni nella filosofia di età imperiale.. Harm. 2) which (as suggested by Jaap Mansfeld) apparently derive from immanent forms 88 . VIII records (Middle-)Platonic school doctrines 87 . M ANSFELD . Strom... 4-6 and 15. Napoli 2001. Porphyry.. ». Nothing of this was completely new : already Alcinous. Harm. In Ptol. 62-63 : « The source our sources used by Clement belong with the Middle Platonist scholastic literature . 86 Cf. n.. 1-4. pp. .. Porphyry’s account presents abstraction as the first step in the (‘Platonic’) process of recollection 85 . A LEX . his account has preserved details deriving from the learned discussions of the first century BCE and the first two centuries CE some of which can only be paralleled in Simplicius’ much later In Cat. The same holds true for Porphyry’s views on definitions. 63 n. P ORPH . in A. 1-6 Düring. Did. 21-26 Düring. in V. M. University Press. pp. T. T RABATTONI eds. cannot be understood outside the Platonist metaphysical framework of his work. Galen : Problems and Prospects. Harm. I.. 20. Florence 1996. VON M ÜLLER . On Galen’s Epistemology. and the ability to define things. Über Galens Werk vom Wissenschaftlichen Beweis. P ORPH . 65-86. not just names. R. Essays in Ancient Philosophy. 403-478 . N UTTON ed. notions. among other things. pp. cf. In their view. 278-298. Oxford 1987. pp. T IELEMAN . F REDE . in M. More details in C HIARADONNA . for instance. Ak. Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism. La Nuova Italia.. biology. Galen’s discussion of logical methods is directly related to his views on (medical) 89 Cf. S.28 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA character of Porphyry’s treatment is revealed. logic entailed more than this. the ability to recognize similarities between things in a methodical way which will allow one to determine the genera of things and the most general truths about the various kinds of things. It is by no means surprising. Platonismo e teoria della conoscenza stoica cit. In Ptol. CHIARADONNA . F. 1897. Metaph. Cambridge 1981. Porphyry presents his work as an elementary treatise on notions pertaining to the study of logic and its various branches. Studi di storia della medicina antica e medievale in memoria di Paola Manuli. . but also include large sections on epistemology. It is crucial to note here that as far as imperial and late-antique authors were concerned. H. p. the philosophical study of ‘reasoning’ was not confined to the ability to produce logically correct deductive inferences. repr.. C HIARADONNA . G ASTALDI eds. Alcinous’ logical and epistemological sections. 2. Let us now return to the opening lines of the Isagoge. pp.. physics. 90 Cf. 49-65.. 292. The assertion that Porphyry’s Isagoge represents an introduction to the study of ‘logic’ is perfectly true when properly understood. Bayer.. but things as they essentially are in the nature of things » 90 . « Abh. F REDE . Wiss. Galen’s Concept of Dialectic and the Middle Platonist Background : The Argument of PHP Book II’. forthcoming. 11. by an allusion to A RISTOT . . but the way in which different authors made use of it entailed well-defined philosophical views on the nature of knowledge and reality. that the surviving fragments of Galen’s lost treatise On demonstration not only focus on syllogisms and definitions. 1043a14-22 89 . theories and arguments certainly existed. therefore. in R. has aptly observed of the internal complexity of Galen’s concept of ‘rational method(s)’ that : « It involves the supposed ability of reason to determine the kinds of things there are in the nature of things and their distinguishing marks by the method of division.. 91 Logical methods were by no means neutral : a commonly shared set of terms. V EGETTI . elementary as they may be. Michael Frede. Likewise. Clarendon Press. Le traité de Galien ‘Sur la démonstration’ et sa postérité tardo-antique. etc. in M. On the similarities between Galen’s conception logic and the Middle Platonic tradition. München ». d. 91 Cf. ibid. M. the adverb logikwv t eron is likely 92 Cf.. are useful for science (or theoretical philosophy). as I have argued. 13-23 clearly shows. therefore. logic should only be studied insofar as it is useful to construct proofs which. . C ONCLUSION : P ORPHYRY ’ S LOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LOGIC Porphyry’s Isagoge can be seen to serve as a preparation for the study of logic or logical methods. Berlin-New York 2007. ‘Logic’. in J.W HAT IS P ORPHYRY ’ S I SAGOGE ? 29 knowledge and nature . The Isagoge might therefore be described as a ‘logical’ introduction to the study of logic. Evidently. This. Galen and the Utility of Logic. following the footsteps of ‘the old masters’ (the Peripatetics in particular). is not presented by these authors as an autonomous branch of human thought. Galen und das hellenistische Erbe.. Porphyry’s discussion here is indeed of an elementary. as Isag. the same also holds true. In accordance with this utilitarian view. in turn. it possess a ‘logical’ character. physical or ontological background of any logical method of enquiry is not always accorded the same prominence. which is part of his overall essentialist account of reality92 . they argue. 94 Concerning Stoic influences. De Gruyter. 6. Alexandre d’Aphrodise entre logique. which mostly (though not exclusively) 94 pertains to Porphyry’s Aristotelising analysis of the physical world and of its immanent incorporeal principles. in this respect. the epistemological. Complex works such as Galen’s lost treatise On demonstration or Porphyry’s lost Ad Gedalium certainly included large (and in our view ‘extra-logical’) sections on physics and epistemology. however. Both claim that the study of logic is not to be pursued as such : rather. For all of their differences. for Alexander of Aphrodisias’ ‘logic’. may also entail something less than the study of valid argument forms. Steiner. above. 33-51. Logical methods. 3. cf. physique et cosmologie. Porphyry’s Isagoge is designed to provide a more elementary treatment of notions propaedeutic to the study of logic. Stuttgart 1993. Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias share the view that logic is ‘useful’. As I argued. Plato’s division was also part of the ontological background of Porphyry’s logic. perfectly valid arguments might be said to exist. pp. B ARNES. N ICKEL eds. the study of which is not part of logic because they are not useful for knowledge 93 . Essentialisme. R ASHED . Porphyry’s non-elementary works show that his ‘logical’ theories rest on a well-defined ontological foundation. D. 93 I wish to refer here to the excellent discussion in J. by no means implies that a similar background is missing : Porphyry is rather leaving it aside for the sake of simplicity. K OLLESCH. however. introductory and general sort . It is then by no means surprising that Porphyry does not engage in any in-depth discussion on the ontological background of such notions. among other. . B.’s claim that « … if the work is Peripatetic. It is particularly difficult to accept B. a few lines below. p. but avoided it in his most elementary treatise. but also the same philosopher. in this sense. non ‘logical’) treatment of the subject matter would require a detailed discussion of the ontological and epistemological background of ‘logic’.30 RICCARDO CHIARADONNA to allude to the introductory logical character of Porphyry’s treatise : ‘logic’ is not explicitly mentioned as subject matter. A non-introductory (and. The opening lines of Porphyry’s most elementary work can thus be seen to allude to the chief and most distinctive aspect of Porphyry’s philosophical project . this was by no means a self-evident and commonplace choice for a Platonist of his time : Porphyry’s insistence on the Peripatetic character of his work should be read in the wider context of his (philosophical and ideological) views on the harmonising of Plato and Aristotle. The name of Aristotle appears in the first line of the Isagoge . Porphyry L and Porphyry P are not only the same person. As noted above. but is implied in the list of topics to which the Isagoge is propaedeutic. Porphyry provided a similar discussion in works such as the lost Ad Gedalium. Porphyry alludes to Peripatetics. Yet this does not imply that Porphyry’s Isagoge was regarded by its author as being philosophically neutral. . it is so only in the blandest of manners » 95 . 95 B. XIX. and whatever the value of this project may be.’s suggestion that « Porphyry’s philosophical notions need not be rehearsed here » appears unconvincing.