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N.VIJAY JAGANNATHAN AHMED SHAWKY MOHAMED ALEXANDER KREMER Editors MI DDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRI CA REGI ON THE WORLD BANK THE WORLD BANK Middle East and North Africa Region (MNA) 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433 W a t e r i n t h e A r a b W o r l d : M a n a g e m e n t P e r s p e c t i v e s a n d I n n o v a t i o n s Water in the Arab World Management Perspectives and Innovations Water in the Arab World: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS N. Vijay Jagannathan Ahmed Shawky Mohamed Alexander Kremer Editors MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION THE WORLD BANK ©2009 The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank Middle East and North Africa (MNA) Region 1818 H St., NW Washington, DC 20433 All rights reserved. This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De- velopment/The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be a violation of applicable law. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Office of the Vice President, Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA. Cover photographs: World Bank MNSSD staff, clients, and consultants. Book design and typesetting: The Word Express. iii Contents Preface xv Acknowledgments xvii Acronyms and Abbreviations 1. Introduction: Beyond WRM— Unbundling Water Management in MNA Countries N. Vijay Jagannathan, Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, and Christopher J. Perry 1 SECTION 1. ASSESSMENT 17 2. Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management: Lessons from the “MNA Development Report on Water” N. Vijay Jagannathan 19 3. Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review Ahmed Shawky Mohamed and N. Vijay Jagannathan 37 4. Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: Spending Less for Better Services Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Alexander Kremer, and Manish Kumar 59 5. Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models in Water Resources Management and Planning in MNA Region Bekele Debele Negewo, Julia Bucknall, and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed 79 iv N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 6. Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World: New Analytical Tools for New Challenges Christopher J. Perry and Julia Bucknall 97 7. Egypt Case Study: Energy Efficiency CDM Program: Irrigation and Drainage Pumping Sector Abdulhamid Azad 119 8. Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience Satoru Ueda and Mohammed Benouahi 131 9. Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management Mohamed El Hedi Louati and Julia Bucknall 157 10. Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War Iraq Sana Agha Al Nimer 181 11. Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector: Lessons from the Design of an Anticorruption Action Plan Maher Abu-Taleb and Richard Calkins 191 SECTION 2. BARGAINING 211 12. Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco Rachid Abdellaoui 213 13. How Did a Small, Poor, and Remote Rural Village in Djibouti Recently Become a Government Priority to Receive Water Supply and Sanitation? Sarah Houssein, in collaboration with Julia Bucknall and Nathalie Abu-Ata 229 14. Water Conflict in Yemen: The Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms Christopher Ward 233 Contents N v 15. Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century N. Vijay Jagannathan 269 SECTION 3. CODIFICATION 283 16. Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries Jackson Morill and Jose Simas 285 17. Subsidies for the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach Providing Basic Services to Poor Periurban Neighborhoods in Morocco Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani 335 18. Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani 345 19. New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in Irrigation: Lessons from Egypt’s West Delta Project Aldo Baietti and Safwat Abdel-Dayem 355 SECTION 4. DELEGATION 365 20. Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen Naji Abu Hatim and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed 367 21. Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen Susmita Dasgupta, Craig Meisner, Andrew Makokha, and Richard Pollard 383 22. Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework: Case Study of Application in the Delta Region, Egypt Ayat Soliman, Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Maged Hamed, Wendy Wakeman, and Mohammed Mehany 401 23. Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Abdulhamid Azad, and Alexander Bakalian 421 vi N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS SECTION 5. ENGINEERING 431 24. Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta Jose Simas, Juan Morelli, and Hani El Sadani 433 25. Water Reuse in the MNA Region: Constraints, Experiences, and Policy Recommendations Claire Kfouri, Pier Mantovani, and Marc Jeuland 447 26. Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region Khairy Al-Jamal and Manuel Schiffler 479 27. Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Coastal Areas in Yemen: Case Study of Wadi Ahwar Arjen de Vries and Tarun Ghawana. Supervised by Ahmed Shawky Mohamed 497 Appendix A1. List of Authors 523 Boxes 1.1 What a Water Steward Should Monitor 6 2.1 Water Is Everybody’s Business: Morocco 20 3.1 Water Management in the Philippines 53 7.1 Need for a New Approach to Emission Reductions 120 11.1 Three Key Principles of Good Governance 194 11.2 Overview of Anticorruption Action Plan 201 14.1 Scarcity, Conflict, and Adaptation in the Sa’ada Basin 235 14.2 For Centuries, Strict Rules Have Governed Water Management in Yemen’s Wadi Dahr 238 14.3 Wadi Zabid Downstream Farmers Conflict with Upstreamers 241 14.4 Bloody Conflict between Traditional Wadi Al Jawf Spate Rules and Modernization 242 14.5 Sheikhs Adjudicate a Water Dispute in Wadi Dahr 243 14.6 Growing Water Sales around Ta’iz Raise Equity Questions 244 Contents N vii 14.7 Upstream Prospers but Downstream Area Desolate in Wadi Bani Khawlan 245 14.8 Urban Water Tactics Dry up and Pauperize Al Haima 246 14.9 Water and Land Disputes Leave Many Dead 248 14.10 Conflicts over Dam Construction in Hobah and Shahik End in Waste and Death 250 14.11 Wadi Habir Resists Surrenders Its Water to Urban Use but Is Defeated through Violence 251 14.12 Irrigation Council Water Allocation Rules 256 14.13 Sa’ada: Successful Community Initiatives 259 16.1 Brazilian Water Law 9.433, 1997 290 17.1 Output-Based Aid: Core Concepts 336 20.1 Yemen Community Water Management Project 379 22.1 Untreated Sewage Results in National Economic Loss 403 22.2 Local Context 404 22.3 Egypt’s Rural Villages 405 22.4 ISSIP Intervention Categories 411 22.5 Water Quality Index M&E Application 415 27.1. Kitui Sand Dams, Kenya 510 Figures 1.1 Large-Scale Relative Changes in Annual Runoff for 2090–99, Relative to 1980–99 2 1.2 Conceptual Framework to Explain Ideal IWRM Outcomes 5 1.3 Water Consumptive Uses and Losses 7 2.1 Projected Decreases in Rainfall, 2000–70 21 2.2 North Africa Estimates of Change in Runoffs 22 2.3 Projected Changes in Flow of the River Indus, 2005–15 22 2.4 Role of Renewable, Nonrenewable, and Virtual Water in MNA Countries, 2005 23 2.5 Estimates of Environmental Degradation Costs, 2005 27 2.6 Cost of Over-extraction of Aquifers, 2006 27 2.7 Changing Nature of Accountability 33 3.1 Irrigation and WSS Expenditures 42 3.2a Trend of Irrigation Public Authorities’ Expenditures to Total Expenditures 43 viii N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 3.2b Trend of Ratio of Expenditure of Irrigation Economic Authorities to Expenditures of all Economic Authorities 43 3.3a Trend of WSS Public Authorities’ Expenditures to Total Expenditures 44 3.3b Trend of Ratio of Expenditures of WSS Economic Authorities to Expenditures of all Economic Authorities 44 3.4 Irrigation O&M Cost Recovery Ratio 45 3.5 Financial Resources of Irrigation Sector, 2001–05 45 3.6 Financial Resources of the WSS Subsector: Cairo 46 3.7 Water Supply and Sanitation: Cost Recovery 46 3.8 Poverty and Access to Water and Wastewater 47 3.9 Cumulative Debts of WSS and Irrigation Subsectors 49 3.10 Actual Expenditures vs. Needs 55 4.1 Breakdown of Capital Spending between Public and Private Goods 60 4.2 Breakdown of GOE Recurrent Spending on Public and Private Goods 60 4.3 Seasonal Irrigation Water Supply per Unit Agricultural Area 61 4.4 On-Farm Water Demand/Supply Ratio 61 4.5 Canal-System Efficiency of Water Delivery 62 4.6 Annual Irrigation Supply per Unit Irrigated Area 62 4.7 Cost-Recovery Ratio 63 4.8 Average Depth to Shallow Water 63 4.9 Average Production Value per Unit of Irrigation Supply 63 4.10 Production Value per Unit Irrigation Supply 64 4.11 Production Value per Unit Irrigated Area, Including Multiple Cropping 64 4.12 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Improving Wastewater Disposal 67 4.13 Farmer Land and Income Distribution 68 4.14 Irrigation Subsidy as Share of Income 69 4.15 Mean Water Use by Crop Income Quintile 70 4.16 Use of Water-Saving Systems by Crop Income Quintile 70 4.17 Water Use per Cropped Area by Crop Income Quintile 70 Contents N ix 5.1 Latest Technologies in Water Resources Data Collection, Assimilation, and Modeling to Improve Decisionmaking 80 5.2 Sample Applications of GIS (ArcVIEW) in SWAT Model Use 81 5.3 Availability of Remote Sensing Data at Various Spatial and Temporal Coverage 84 5.4 Where Is Water Not Used Productively? Data from Sacramento, CA 84 5.5 Water Productivity in Sacramento, CA: Liters of Water Needed to Produce 1 Liter of Wine 85 5.6 Agricultural Lands Served by “Mazzak” Canal in Wasit Governorate before and after Project Implementation 85 5.7 Major Components of the Hydrological Balance 88 5.8 Most Commonly Used Hydrological Models and Their Suitability in Both Physical and Spatial Scale 89 6.1 Cross-Section of a Qanat 99 6.2 Spate System in Yemen 101 6.3 Water-Dividing Structure in a Foggara, Algeria 102 7.1 GHG Projections for All Sectors, 1990–2017 122 7.2 AM0020, 2005 125 8.1 Historical Changes of Water Sources: Increasing Dam Storage Water 131 8.2 Urban Water Supply Progress and Benefits, 1875–1995 136 8.3 High Industrial Water Recycle Rate: Significantly Reduced Water Demands and Pollution Loads, 1960–2000 152 9.1 Cooling Tower Bringing Geothermal Water from the Sahara Down to a Temperature Usable in Irrigation 159 9.2 Growth in Treated Wastewater Used in Agriculture, Tunisia, 1990–2001 167 9.3 Growth in Volumes and Schemes for Artificial Aquifer Recharge in Tunisia 168 9.4 Tunisia Irrigated Area Equipped with Efficient On-Farm Irrigation Systems, 1995–2008 170 9.5 Evolution of Mean Water Allocations per Irrigated Hectare, 1990–2030 170 10.1 Map of Iraq 183 10.2 Drainage Problems in Sadr City 186 10.3 Badawa: A Polluted Urban Environment 186 10.4 Badawa after Completion of Rehabilitation Works 187 x N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 11.1 Comparison with Regional Average (Middle East and North Africa) 195 12.1 Bitit Irrigation Network with Seguia Names 217 15.1 Secular Rainfall Trends in Morocco’s Major River Basins, 2030–80 274 15.2 Climate Change Impacts in North Africa: Range of Change in Runoff 277 17.1 Input-Based Approach vs. Output-Based Approach 336 17.2 Connections Realized in the First Two Years of Implementation 343 19.1 Aerial View of West Delta of Nile River 256 19.2 Supply Cost Curve to Develop West Delta Project 361 20.1 Subsectoral Five-Year Investment Plans 369 20.2 Projected Sources of Capital Expenditures for Water Sector, 2005–09 369 21.1 Rural Population Lacking Access to Public/Private/ Cooperative Water Supply Networks in Yemen 383 21.2 Various Uses of RWSSP and Other Subprojects Water in Yemen, 2007–08 391 21.3a&b Satisfaction with Water Services before and after RWSSP and Other Projects 395 21.4a&b Consumers’ Perceptions of Direction of Change in Water System Maintenance after Completion of RWSSP and Other Projects 396 22.1a&b Poverty-Sanitation Link 402 22.2 Consequence at National Level: Escalating Public Debt 402 22.3 Mahmoudia Canal Command Area Sub-Basins 406 22.4 Applying Two Scenarios for Varying Cluster Sizes: Mit Yazid Command Area 407 22.5 Priority Ranking within the Mit Yazid Command Area 408 22.6 Example of Nishil Drain 409 22.7 Simulation Results for Self-Purification of BOD along Nishil Drain, before and after Decentralized Treatment 410 22.8 Within Cluster Optimization 411 24.1 Layout Map for Northern Part of Mit-Yazid Canal Showing W-10 Subproject Area 436 24.2 Breakdown of W-10 Investment 439 Contents N xi 25.1 Recommended Steps in Wastewater Infrastructure Development 463 26.1 MNA Region Rural and Urban Population Trends, 1950–2030 480 26.2 Actual Renewable Water Resources per Capita, by Region 481 26.3 Total Renewable Water Resources per Capita, by Country 481 26.4 Cumulative Global Capacity of Contracted and Operated Desalination Plants, 1901–2000 484 26.5 Potential Operational Desalination Capacity in MNA Countries, 2006 485 26.6 Ranges of Applicability for Desalination Processes 486 26.7 Schematic Diagram of Single-Pass RO Desalination Plant 488 26.8 Interest Rate Sensitivity Analysis of Water Production Cost for SWRO Desalination Plant in Gaza Strip 493 26.9 Energy Cost Sensitivity Analysis of Water Production Cost for SWRO Desalination Plant in Gaza Strip 493 27.1 MAR Classification: Overview of MAR Techniques and Subtechniques 499 27.2 Process of Saltwater Intrusion 511 27.3 Use of 2 Abstraction Wells at 1 Location to Counteract Salinization 511 27.4 Integrated Groundwater Management Plan 513 A27.1 Location of Wadi Ahwar, Yemen 515 A27.2 Interpreted Landcover of Wadi Ahwar Region, Yemen 516 A27.3 Well Inventory and Extrapolated Groundwater Levels, Wadi Ahwar, Yemen 518 A27.4 Average Well Depth, Wadi Ahwar, Yemen 519 A27.5 Average Electrical Conductivity Levels, Wadi Ahwar, Yemen 520 Tables 3.1 Recurrent Unit Costs and Associated Subsidies in WSS 47 4.1 Benchmarking Water and Sanitation Subsector 65 5.1 Summary of Spatial Data Availability from Remote Sensing 83 6.1 Ranges of Human Domestic Water Needs 98 xii N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 6.2 Spate Irrigation in Arab Countries, 1989–1995 99 6.3 Tabulation of Land Use Classes and Water Balances at Basin Scale 111 7.1 Irrigation and Drainage Service Quality Indicators 120 7.2 GHG Emissions as Reported to UNFCCC, 1990 122 7.3 Change in Energy Use 123 7.4 Yearly Emission Reduction Resulting from Energy Savings, 2010–18 127 8.1 Main Features of Visited Water Utilities and Japan, Average Year 136 8.2 Main Features of Visited Sewerage Utilities and Japan Average 137 8.3 Japan’s and International Water and Sewerage Utilities Working Ratios 139 8.4 Average User Tariff 139 8.5 Unaccounted-for Water 140 8.6 Income Statement of Water Supply Utilities, March 31, 2006 142 8.7 Water Cost Recovery: Unit Production Cost and Tariff, March 31, 2007 142 8.8 Income Statement of Sewerage Utilities, March 31, 2006 143 8.9 Construction and Improvement Budget Sources of Sewerage Works, March 31, 2006 144 8.10 Wastewater Cost Recover: Unit Operation Cost and Tariff 144 8.11 Number of Employees per 1,000 Connections 149 8.12 Outsource Ratio of Operational Expenditures 149 9.1 Spatial Distribution of Water Resources in Tunisia 158 9.2 Tunisia: Estimates of Potential Water Supplies, 1968–2007 160 9.3 Tunisia: Change in Estimated Per Capita Long-Term Water Availability, 1995–2005 160 9.4 Breakdown of Salinity of Water Resources 161 9.5 Breakdown of Water Resources Regarding Salinity in Relation to Total Potential Resources 161 9.6 Tunisia’s Reservoirs and Number of Areas Served 165 9.7 Tunisia’s Reservoirs That Serve Multiple Uses 166 9.8 Tunisia’s Main Water Transfer Systems and Their Characteristics 166 Contents N xiii 9.9 Desalination Capacity in Tunisia, 1983–2000 167 9.10 Tunisia’s Evolution of Water Consumption, 1997–2005 169 9.11 Trends in Production and Consumption of Drinking Water, 1996–2007 171 9.12 Number of Water Supply Meters Replaced or Improved, 2004–2007 173 9.13 Evolution of Effectiveness of Dams at Regulating Irregular Flows, 1997–2006 175 9.14 Evolution of Rate of Exploitation of Water Resources in Tunisia, 1997–2004 175 9.15 Evolution of Average Yields for Drinking Water Systems in Tunisia, 1997–2007 176 11.1 Key GAC Issues and Mitigation Measures 198 12.1 Three Perennial Springs That Feed Bitit 214 12.2 Evolution of Water Allocations in Morocco, 1920s–2005 216 12.3 Water Shareholder Groups and Shares of Ait Ouallal by Main Seguia 218 12.4 Evolution of Irrigation Turn Duration over Time (Ait Moussa Hammi and Ait Hakka), 1940s–1990s 218 12.5 Price of Water, 1987 and 2005 223 12.6 Comparison of Water Tariff in Tadla Irrigation System, 1969–2004 224 12.7 Onion Price, 2000–05 225 15.1 Disputes and Agreements in Mashreq Countries, 2008 271 15.2 UN Watercourses Convention Timeline, 1970–1997 272 15.3 Typology of Interdependence 276 15.4 Simulations for Rio Bravo Basin, Mexico 278 18.1 Performance Targets and Outputs Required to Receive ONEP OBA Subsidy 349 19.1 Comparison of Characteristics of Piped and Open Channel Irrigation 359 20.1 Yield and Farm Revenue Increases Due to Improved Farming Practices: Planned Project Estimates vs. Actual Measurements 373 21.1 Number of Rural Water Schemes, June 2007 386 21.2 Sample Composition 386 21.3 Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Coverage in the Six Governorates of Yemen Included in RWSSP 387 xiv N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 21.4 Coverage of RWSSP, June 2007 388 21.5 Surveyed Households with Connection to Piped Water Network 391 21.6 HH Reporting That “Project Water” Was Not Meeting Their Entire Household Needs 392 21.7 Top 7 Reasons Why “Project Water” Is Not Sufficient to Meet Entire Household Needs 392 21.8a Actual vs. Scheduled Water Supply in Dry Season 393 21.8b Actual vs. Scheduled Water Supply in Wet Season 393 21.9 Record of Service Failure on Scheduled Days in Past Year 394 21.10a RWSSP and Other Projects: Users’ Perceptions Regarding Their WUAs 394 21.10b RWSSP and Other Projects: Average Time for WUA to Fix a Problem 395 21.11 Differences between RWSSP and Other Projects in Service Satisfaction 396 21.12 User Preferences for Management of Water Schemes 397 21.13 Cost of Water Bill per Month in Unmetered and Metered HH, 2007–08 398 24.1 Average Incremental Yields and Incomes by Crop 441 24.2 Farm Models: Estimated Income Increases 442 A1.1 Monitoring and Evaluation Framework: Integrated Improvements Components and Expected Impacts 445 25.1 Economic Impacts of Wastewater Reuse: Examples of Costs and Benefits 450 25.2 Cost of Wastewater Collection, Treatment, and Reuse 451 25.3 Prices for Irrigation Water in Select MNA Countries 453 26.1 Expected Savings in Water Supply due to Application of Demand and Supply Management Techniques in MNA Region by 2025 484 26.2 Desalination Capacity in MNA 485 26.3 Estimated Energy Consumption for Desalination Processes 487 26.4 Qualitative Overview of Environmental Impacts of Three Desalination Technologies 490 26.5 Typical Cost Breakdown for RO Desalination Plant 492 27.1 Characteristics of Groundwater Storage, Small Dam Storage, and Large Dam Reservoirs 498 A27.1 Groundwater Balance, Wadi Ahwar, Yemen 519 xv Preface This volume is intended to serve as a water handbook. It represents the collective knowledge about water resources management acquired over recent years, both within the World Bank water team and with counterparts working in the Arab countries of North Africa and the Middle East (MNA). The chapters offer a cornucopia of ideas and themes. Some chap- ters are based on background papers prepared for the 2007 “MNA Development Report on Water.” Others draw on sector work prepared at the request of client countries. Yet others summarize observations based on study tours or other learning events sponsored by the World Bank. Upon reviewing this lodestone of embedded knowledge, we real- ized that bringing together our observations and analyses could serve a useful purpose for public officials, other practitioners, academics, and students who are interested in learning more about the complexities of managing water resources management in one of the driest parts of the world. N. Vijay Jagannathan Ahmed Shawky Mohamed Alexander Kremer xvii Acknowledgments This book is the collective effort of the water team of the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) Region of the World Bank, which consists of staff members and consultants working on water issues in most countries of the Arab world and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The core team consisted of the three editors, N. Vijay Jagannathan (Sector Manager, Water), Ahmed Shawky Mohamed (Senior Water Resources Specialist), and Alexander Kremer (Senior Sector Economist), as well as Alicia Hetzner (Language Editor), and Georgine Seydi (Program Assistant). Our debt of gratitude extends to a long list of colleagues in the MNA water team who have contributed chapters, often toiling long beyond their working hours and facing impossible deadlines imposed by the substance editors. Among the several consultants who have contributed, Chris Perry—who came up with the ABCDE approach, the organizing framework for the book’s chapters—is gratefully acknowledged. The team would like to express appreciation for the guidance and support received from three colleagues in the World Bank: Nadereh Chamlou and Omer Karasapan, who gave us helpful advice; and Juan Diego Rodriguez, whose support made the production of this book possible. In addition, the two peer reviewers, Shawki Barghouti (Di- rector General of the International Center for Biosaline Agriculture, Dubai) and Rory O’Sullivan (Consultant to the Bank’s working group on Embedded Knowledge), spent hours plowing through hundreds of pages of the various papers and giving very insightful comments and guidance to the team. xviii N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Finally, the team would like to thank Laszlo Lovei, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Sustainable Development Department, for his unwavering support and confidence, without which this enterprise could never have been completed in the timeframe required; and Nadir Mohammed, Operations Director of the MNA Region, for his encouragement to include this volume as a contribution to the region’s Arab World Initiative. The MNA Region gratefully acknowledges the generous cofinancing of this work by the Dutch government via the Bank-Netherlands Water Partnership Program (BNWPP). xix Acronyms and Abbreviations AA Administrative Agencies ABCDE Assessment, Bargaining, Codification, Delegation, and Engineering ABR Anaerobic baffled reactors ACAP Anti-Corruption Action Plan AFD Agence Française de Développement AGOSD Alexandria General Organization for Sanitary Drainage AM0020 Approved Monitoring Methodology, “Monitoring Methodology for Water Pumping Efficiency Improvements” APFAMGS Andhra Pradesh Farmer-Managed Groundwater Systems Project (FAO-India) APWELL Andhra Pradesh Ground Water Irrigation Schemes (FAO-India) ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers AUEA Associations des Usagers des Eaux Agricoles (WUA) AWC Arab Water Council AWGA Alexandria Water General Authority AWI Arab World Initiative BAU Business as usual BC Branch canal BCM Billion cubic meters BCWUA Branch canal water user association BIA Benefit Incidence Assessment BOD Biological oxygen demand BOO Build-Operate-Own xx N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS BOT Build-Operate-Transfer C/D Codification and delegation CAP Compliance Action Plan CAS Country assistance strategy CBA Cost-benefit analysis CBA Catch Basin Authority (Morocco); cost-benefit analysis CBO Community-based organization CDA Community development association CER Certified Emissions Reduction (CDM) CF Conversion factor CLEQM Central Laboratory for Environment Quality Monitoring (Egypt) CMD Clean development mechanism COCA Central Organization for Control and Auditing CPA CDM Program Activity Design Document CPA Coalition Provisional Authority CRDA Regional Center for Agriculture Development (Tunisia) CSO Civil society organization CWMP Community Water Management Project (Yemen) DBL Design-Build-Lease DBO Design-Build-Operate DEM Digital elevation maps DEP Department of Environmental Protection (New York City) DG GREE General Department of Agricultural Engineering and Water/Direction Générale du Génie Rural et de l’Exploitation des Eaux DGRE Director General of Water Resources (Tunisia) DH Dirham DIR Detailed Implementation Review (WB INT) DNA Designated Operational Entity DO Dissolved oxygen DWB District Water Board EC Electrical conductivity ED Electrodialysis EEAA Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency EMWIS Euro-Mediterranean Information System on Know- How in the Water Sector (EU) EPA US Environmental Protection Agency Acronyms and Abbreviations N xxi EPADP Egyptian Public Authority for Drainage Projects EQO Environmental Quality Objective ER Emissions reduction ERR Economic rate of return ESRI Environmental Services Research Institute ET Evapotranspiration FARMOD Software developed by FAO and WB to evaluate agricultural projects FAS Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA) FDC Farmer Design Committee FO Farmer Organization G.E.O.R.E. Optimal Water Resource Management Project (Tunisia) GAC Governance and corruption GAFRD General Authority of Fish Resources Development (Egypt) GAP Good Agricultural Practices (certificate) GAPWSD General Authority for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (Egypt) GARPAD General Authority for Rehabilitation Projects and Agricultural Development (Egypt) GARWSP General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (Yemen) GDA Agricultural development group GFI Government financial institution GHG Greenhouse gas GIC Communal interest groups (Tunisia) GIS Geographic information system GLDAS Global Land Data Assimilation System GOE Government of Egypt GOFI General Organization for Industrialization (Egypt) GOGCWS General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply GOI Government of Indonesia GOSDC General Organization for Sanitary Drainage in Cairo GOY Government of Yemen GPOBA Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid GSCP Groundwater and Soil Conservation Project (Yemen) GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GWh Gigawatt hour xxii N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS GW-MATE Groundwater Management Advisory Team ha Hectare(s) HMSO Her Majesty’s Stationery Office HRU Hydrologic response unit IC Irrigation Council ICID International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage ID Irrigation Department (Egypt) IDRA Institute for Development Research and Alternatives IFI International financial institution IIIMP Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project IIP Irrigation Improvement Project IIS Irrigation Improvement Sector IMT Irrigation Management Transfer (Egypt) INDH National Initiative for Human Development/Initiative Nationale de Développement Humain INS National Statistical Institute/Institut National de la Statistique (Tunisia) INT Department of Institutional Integrity (WB) IPCC International Panel on Climate Change IPTRID International Programme for Technology and Research in Irrigation and Drainage IRR Internal rate of return IWMD Integrated Water Resources Management District IWMI International Water Management Institute IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Entwicklungsbank (German development bank) KRG Ministry of Municipalities of the Kurdistan Regional Government KWH or Kw/h Kilowatt hour l/s Liter/second LE Egyptian pound/livre égyptienne LGU Local Government Unit LLL Laser land-leveling LWCP Land and Water Conservation Project (Yemen) LWUA Local Water Utilities Administration M&E Monitoring and evaluation m 3 Cubic meter Acronyms and Abbreviations N xxiii m 3 /s Cubic meters per second MAD Moroccan currency MAI Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (Yemen) MALR Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (Egypt) MAR Managed Aquifer Recharge MARH Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources/Ministère de l’Agriculture et des Ressources Hydrauliques (Tunisia) MDG Millennium Development Goal MEB Multi-effect boiling MED Multi-effect distillation; Mechanical and Electrical Department (Egypt) METRIC Mapping Evapo-Transpiration with High Resolution and Internalized Calibration MEW Ministry of Electricity and Water (Yemen) MHUNC Ministry of Housing, Utilities and New Communities (Egypt) MIAC Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication MIS Management Information System Mm 3 Million cubic meters MMPW Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (Iraq) MNA Middle East and North Africa Region MNSRE Middle East and North Africa Rural Development, Water and Environment MOB Mayoralty of Baghdad MoEE Ministry of Electricity and Energy (Egypt) MoHP Ministry of Health and Population (Egypt) MoI Ministry of Industry (Egypt) MoLD Ministry of Local Development (Egypt) MoSEA Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (Egypt) MoT Ministry of Transport (Egypt) MPN Most probable number MSF Multi-Stage Flash MTEF Medium-term expenditure framework Mw Megawatt MWE Ministry of Water and Environment (Yemen) MWRI Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (Egypt) NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration (US) NDS National Development Strategy NIA National Irrigation Administration (Egypt) NIB National Investment Bank xxiv N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS NOPWASD National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (Egypt) NRW Nonrevenue water NWRA National Water Resources Authority (Yemen) NWRC National Water Research Center (Egypt) NWSSIP National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (Yemen) O&M Operation and maintenance OBA Output-based aid ONAS National Sanitation Agency ONEP National Water Supply Company/Office National de l’Eau Potable (Morocco) ORMVA Regional irrigation and agricultural development agencies/Offices régionaux de mise en valeur agricole (du Maroc) PAD Project appraisal document PAGER National Program for Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (Morocco) PDO Project development objective PER Public expenditure review PERSIANN Precipitation Estimation for Remotely Sensed Information Using Artificial Neural Networks PES Payment for environmental services PIM Participatory Irrigation Management PISEAU Water Investment Program (Tunisia) PIU Project implementation unit PMU Project management unit PNEEI National Program of Irrigation Water Conservation PoA DD Program of Activities Design Document (CDM) PPE Participation au Premier Etablissement PPI Public irrigation scheme PPIAF Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility PPIIGB [public land irrigated by large dams] (Tunisia) Ppm Parts per million PPP Public-private partnership PSIA Poverty and Social Impact Assessment PVC Polyvinyl chloride PWP Public Works Project (Yemen) RES Renewable energy source Rg Overall network yield Acronyms and Abbreviations N xxv RO Reverse osmosis; Regulatory Office (West Delta Project, Egypt) RS Remote sensing RSU Rural Sanitation Unit RTA River Transport Authority (Egypt) RWS Rural water supply SA Services Agencies SAD Decision support system (Spain) SAIH Sistema Automatico de Informacion Hidrologica SBWMP Sana’a Basin Water Management Project SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (Spain) SCRB Separable Costs Remaining Benefits SEBAL Surface Energy Balance Algorithm of Land SEI Stockholm Environment Institute SEMIDE See EMWIS SFD Social Fund for Development (Yemen) SINEAU Système d’Information National des Ressources en Eau (Tunisia) SME Small and medium enterprise SNACC Supreme National Agency for the Control of Corruption SOAS School of Oriental and African Studies SONODE National Authority for Water Exploitation and Distribution SRU Strategic Research Unit (Egypt) SS Suspended solid SWAT Soil and Water Assessment Tool SWCC Saline Water Conversion Corporation (Saudi Arabia) SWERI Soils, Water and Environment Research Institute (MALR, Egypt) TA Technical assistance TAP Transparency, Accountability, and Participation Framework TDS Total dissolved solids TTL Task team leader UFW Unaccounted-for-water UNEP United Nations Environment Programme USDA US Department of Agriculture VC Vapor compression VES Plant entry volume xxvi N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS VSA Conveyance plant volume VSB Cities Without Slums/Ville Sans Bidonville VSM Volume of briny water VSS Service plant volume w.r.t. With respect to WAJ Water Authority of Jordan WASAMED Water Saving in Mediterranean Agriculture WB World Bank WBI World Bank Institute WEAP Water Evaluation and Planning System WES Water and Environmental Sanitation Program (UNICEF) WQM Water quality management WRM Water resource management WSS Water supply and sanitation WSSP Water Sector Support Programme (Yemen) WTP Willingness to pay WUA Water user association WUG Water user group 1 1 Introduction: Beyond WRM— Unbundling Water Management in MNA Countries N. Vijay Jagannathan, Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, and Christopher J. Perry O ver the past two decades, water management in the MNA countries has been strongly influenced by the idea of inte- grated water resource management (IWRM). This process advocated new approaches for the assessment, management, and development of freshwater resources. IWRM processes attempt to provide holistic solutions to water issues. They depend on the commitment of governments and com- munities to adopt new approaches and back them by “substantial and immediate investments, public awareness campaigns, technology de- velopment, capacity building programs, and legislative and institutional changes” (Salman 2006). In the MNA context, IWRM is particularly vital because hydraulic infrastructure plays such a critical economic role. These countries are in either the arid or hyper-arid zone, depend on seasonal rainfall, have very few rivers—some of which carry runoff from other countries—and often rely on fragile (and sometimes nonrenewable) aquifers. Consequently, their economies are much more sensitive to the way that water is extracted, conveyed, and consumed than are the economies of other regions. Frederiksen (2005) distinguishes between resource stewardship (which is always a function of government, exercised on behalf of the nation) and service provision (which may be public, private, or coopera- tive). Once water resources are scarce and the possibility arises that one use affects another, the stewardship function must set some of the boundaries for service provision to protect the interests of all users. 1 If 1 The same point, although described for just the water supply and sanitation sec- tor, is made by World Bank 2004. 2 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS these institutional processes are inadequate or arbitrary, the outcome will not be optimal; but rather, one of wasted public finances, conflicts, and unproductive water use. New Concern: Climate Change Looking ahead, climate change poses additional challenges for IWRM: “Water managers have long dealt with changing demands for water resources. To date, water managers have typically assumed that the natural resource base is reasonably constant over the medium term and, therefore, that past hydrological experience provides a good guide to future conditions. Climate change challenges these conventional assumptions and may alter the reliability of water management systems.” —Bates and others, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008, 48 This stark statement applies nowhere more forcefully than in the MNA countries. While average rainfall worldwide is anticipated to in- crease marginally, for the MNA region, the picture is quite different. For North Africa and the Middle East region over the next century, the 2008 IPCC report anticipates declining rainfall (–10 percent to –25 percent); declining soils moisture (–5 percent to –10 percent), declining runoff (–10 percent to –40 percent), and increasing evaporation (+5 percent to +20 percent) (IPCC, figure 2.8; ranges are indicative, interpreted from figures in text). Figure 1.1 reproduces figure 2.10 of the IPCC report, showing the details for runoff. The key IPCC messages for MNA are the high incidence of reduced flows; severity of the projected declines in rainfall; higher temperatures; and agree- ment (indicated by hatching in figure 1.1) of the vast majority of models on the negative direc- tion of change. These changes ||eare 1.1 |aree-!ca|e ke|at|ºe Chaaees |a kaaaa| kaae0 fer 1ê9ê-99, ke|at|ºe te 19êê-99 Sources: Milly and others 2005; IPCC 2008. Notes: White areas: Less than 66% of the ensemble of 12 models agree on the sign of change. Hatched areas: More than 90% of models agree on the sign of change . I ntroduction N 3 will create a new and more difficult context for water management. They further elevate the significance of the stewardship function of current generations of water managers for the future generations of water users for two reasons: The future is likely to experience more competition and conflict 1. among countries, sectors, communities, and individuals over water. The farmer lobby likely will demand more water, arguing that crop needs increase with temperature and rainfall variability. Urban water utilities will demand more water to meet the needs of growing, more prosperous populations. Finally, increased environmental flows will continue to be necessary for rivers and streams to maintain and regenerate themselves. At either the subregional or regional level, finding solutions to move water from one location to another (as from sparsely populated irrigated areas to growing cities, or from a municipal treatment plant to a water-stressed agricultural region for reuse) will meet stiff political and social resistance. 2 At the macro and international levels, crafting politically acceptable policies that set in motion the required adjustments among all the affected stakehold- ers will require institutional mechanisms that mitigate conflicts and enhance a culture of benefit-sharing. 3 Under these circumstances, policymakers are faced with the challenge to craft policy instruments that balance sustainable water management against the various political and social conflicts, while learning what is working and what is not working in existing programs and policies. Agriculture (which utilizes 80 percent–90 percent of water in most 2. MNA countries) 4 will not enjoy guaranteed water supply at past historical quantities. If there is increased variability in rainfall (as has been experienced in southeast Australia in the Murray-Darling Basin), increased requirements for municipal and industrial use will cut into agriculture’s water share. 5 Farmers perforce will have to change water usage patterns at a time when plant water requirements 2 “Subregional level” refers to aquifers and river basins within a country. “Regional level” refers to watercourses that are shared between two or more countries. 3 See Sadoff and others (2008) for a description of how benefit-sharing concepts have led to greater cooperation among Nile riparian countries. 4 Share of different subsectors’ water consumption in the MNA countries is avail- able in the “MNA Development Report on Water” (World Bank 2007). 5 Personal communication from Professor Michael Young, who has been advising the water regulators of the Murray Darling Basin on how to regulate and manage these difficult trade-offs. 4 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS are increasing. For areas that already are operating with far less water than is required, changing water use patterns will make management more difficult. For areas whose supplies currently are adequate (most of Egypt, for example), the entirely new challenge of managing alternating abundance and scarcity will arise. 6 Country- or region- specific strategies for agricultural water management will need to be developed that focus on agricultural income productivity per unit of water, rather than per unit of land. 7 In brief, IWRM approaches so far have advocated a holistic “think integrated,” but “act disintegrated” approach to water management. In contrast, the forthcoming challenge—due to climate change—will be to also manage the social, political, and institutional processes of balancing the water use interests of present generations vs. future generations. 8 What do these trends imply for IWRM programs in MNA countries? This volume argues that one needs to look beyond IWRM processes to learn more about the key actions that need to be taken on the in- stitutional, economic, and technological fronts. Are the Arab Countries Well-Positioned to Face These New Challenges? Most countries in the MNA region face challenges on both fronts, with regard to both managing water resources in a sustainable manner and ensuring affordable and reliable water service delivery to farmers, households, and industries. In the case of water resource management, mechanisms for allo- N cating water among countries and among sectors within countries need to focus on generating sustainable outcomes. The outcomes 6 IPCC estimates suggest that, with higher rainfall in the catchment areas of the Nile River, the inflows into Lake Nasser-Nubia are likely to increase, leading to larger spillovers into the Toshka depression because of capacity constraints in this massive reservoir. Meanwhile, downstream in lower Egypt, municipal and industrial uses will continue to cut into the agricultural water share. The abundance of water is in an area of hyperaridity and very low population density (Toshka), whereas the scarcity of water is in the area of very high population density (Nile Delta). 7 The good news is that recent developments in technology have the potential to enable this shift in measurement. See chapters by Bekele and others and Perry and Bucknall. 8 See Briscoe and Malik 2007. I ntroduction N 5 must be sustainable in both their social/political aspects (that is, minimizing prolonged conflicts among competing users), and the environmental aspect (that is, soundly managing aquifers to avoid groundwater depletion, and maintaining instream water quality in rivers and lakes). Regarding water service delivery, responding to user demand is a N continuous challenge that will be exacerbated by climate change. In addition, several countries in the region have a vicious circle of poor service delivery exacerbated by high operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, low end-user tariffs, the resultant tendency to “back- load” or defer maintenance, and, consequently, poor services. In summary, water management in general has suffered from poor accountability (both external to service users and internal within resource management and service delivery organizations). More and more investments are being required to remedy the deferred mainte- nance of already installed hydraulic infrastructure in the region (World Bank 2007). Figure 1.2 represents four possible outcomes. The vertical axis classifies two situations: (1) one in which the financial sustainability of irrigation and water supply services has been achieved by recover- ing O&M costs from service users, and (2) the other in which there is inadequate cost recovery. The horizontal axis classifies countries in two categories: according to whether they have or have not been able to sustainably manage the water resource base. It describes their success in achieving the stewardship function. Predictably, countries with sources of renewable sur- face water (such as large rivers) do relatively better in water re- source management compared to countries that depend wholly on groundwater, which is easier to over-exploit, and more dif- ficult to control. Of the four possible out- comes, conceptually only one (the upper right box) will lead to sustainable outcomes, or the IWRM ideals. In the other three boxes, failures in policy, or in the Figure 1.2 Conceptual Framework to Explain Ideal IWRM Outcomes Sustainable use of the WR base Morocco YES YES NO NO ? Yemen, WB&G Iraq and Iran Egypt Syria F i n a n c i a l l y s u s t a i n a b l e s e r v i c e s Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, some GCC 6 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS implementation of policy, result in countries falling short of the IWRM ideals. The two axes of this diagram (finance, and water) present the two key facets of IWRM. The vertical axis describes to what degree a country is managing its water in a financially sustainable manner. The rules for financial accounting are known and proven—there is no debate about what constitutes a payment, a receipt, a stock, and a flow. There is an economic and political trade-off between spending $1 toward construction of an urban water supply system vs. spending $1 on an irrigation system. Once the system is constructed, unless costs of investments, operations, and maintenance can be recovered from the users, the contingent liability in the Ministry of Finance will increase rapidly. 9 Box 1.1 What a Water Steward Should Monitor To avoid the obvious confusion that arises when improved efficiency in one sector increases the water available for other uses, while improved efficiency in another sector decreases the availability for other uses, the following terminology was recently adopted by the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (Perry 2007): Consumed fraction (evaporation and transpiration) comprising Beneficial consumption, consisting of water evaporated or transpired for the intended N purpose—for example, evaporation from a cooling tower, transpiration from an ir- rigated crop. Nonbeneficial consumption, consisting of water evaporated or transpired for purposes N other than the intended use—for example, evaporation from water surfaces, weeds, moist or waterlogged land. Nonconsumed fraction, comprising Recoverable fraction, consisting of water that can be captured and reused—for N example, flows to drains that return to the river system and percolation from irrigated fields to aquifers; return flows from sewage systems. Nonrecoverable fraction, consisting of water that is lost to further use—for example, N flows of brine from a desalination plant. 9 Countries have major variations in cost recovery policies, with consequences for benefit incidence. See Shawky chapter on “Benefit Incidence Analysis in Egypt’s Water Resources and Irrigation Sector.” I ntroduction N 7 The horizontal axis describes how far a country is managing its water in an environmentally sustainable manner. This aspect is more complex in terms of monitoring and building up remedial actions. For example, when a cubic meter of water allocated to an urban water supply system goes to a household, most of this water is released back to the water system as wastewater. If the latter is collected and treated (requiring capital-intensive investments, of course), the receiving water body is able to regenerate itself in both quantity and quality. In contrast, a cubic meter of water delivered to an irrigation project will largely be consumed— through transpiration by crops and evapora- tion. The remaining part of the original diverted water is returned to the hydrological system. Urban water supply systems serve primarily nonconsumptive users, while the whole purpose of an irrigation system is to increase crop water consumption. “Using” water is thus not as unambiguous as “spending” money, because agriculture has both consump- tive and nonconsumptive uses of water. The proportions of the two categories vary from region to region. Depending on agro- climatic conditions, the sustain- ability of the water resource base could be severely jeopardized by unproductive consumption by agriculture and by inadequate policy attention being paid to managing the recoverable, nonconsumed frac- tion. 10 Figure 1.3 shows these distinctions with illustrative data. In a dry region such as MNA, minimizing nonbeneficial consumption (such as evaporation from reservoirs, open canals) and optimizing the extraction 10 Definitions: (a) Water use is water made available deliberately by rainfall or other natural means for an identified activity. The term does not distinguish between uses that remove water from further use (evaporation from wet soil or wetlands; tran- spiration from irrigated crops, forests) and uses that have little quantitative impact on water availability (navigation, hydropower, most domestic uses). (b) Withdrawal is water abstracted from streams, groundwater, or storage for any use, comprising (1) groundwater sinks, deep aquifers that are not economically ex- ploitable, or (2) flows to the sea. Consumed fraction Nonconsumed recoverable Total Consumed, non- benefcial Nonconsumed nonrecoverable Figure 1.3 Water Consumptive Uses and Losses 8 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS of recoverable fractions (such as sewage flows and farm runoffs) clearly become key policy priorities of future stewardship. Organizational Framework for the Contributions to This Volume The volume is organized around the observation by Perry (2003, 2008, and forthcoming) that water management at a time of societal competi- tion for the resource could be viewed in terms of five elements: 11 That the water supply is known and accessible to the user 1. groups —not necessarily precisely, but at least based on experience. Over time, and with experience, the users are able to ASSESS the availability of water and what institutional measures it would take to keep this availability in future years. The users at each level have agreed on the principles for sharing 2. water (for example, prioritized by use or shared in accordance with land-holding or contribution to the original development). This is a BARGAINING process. The agreed principles for sharing are translated into operational 3. rules that govern day-to-day distribution of water. This is a process of CODIFICATION. Where necessary—particularly for larger schemes in which a number 4. of farmer groups exist—intermediate responsibilities and arrange- ments for implementation are defined. This is DELEGATION. Finally, delivering the service requires infrastructure— 5. ENGINEERING. Taking a historical example, the Egyptian irrigation system evolved over several millennia as riverine communities learned how to harness the annual floods to develop irrigated agriculture in an arid climate. Through collective action that involved defining individual and group roles and responsibilities, these communities constructed inundation canals, and later devised the sakia, or Persian wheel, to lift water to their fields. Similarly, in the coastal areas of Yemen, communities harnessed flash floods or spate flows from the highlands through an elaborate system of earthen dikes and irrigation structures to grow food and cash crops. Developing complex institutional rules that created 11 The framework was adopted during a meeting in Abu Dhabi in July 2008 to consider the proposed Arab Water Academy as a hub for organizing research and training. I ntroduction N 9 incentives to collaborate and constructing physical structures that provided irrigation water to groups and to farmers within groups were the two key features of Yemen’s process. Obviously, another key ele- ment was the learning and feedback loop, through which institutions evolve and more hydraulic infrastructure gets augmented. Where there was more than one level of management (as in Egypt’s inundation systems, or among the spate structures of Yemen), the framework can be applied at both levels—first allocating the main supply among user-groups, then allocating the group supply among individuals. Organizing this book around the ABCDE framework enables the reader to appreciate the multifaceted nature of water management. In other words, public, private, and individual actors all contribute to successful water resource management; a variety of technologies are useful; both written laws and customary practice are effective; and facilities may be collectively owned, or constructed and operated by government. Successful water resource management requires that all the ABCDE elements are in place and are mutually compatible. The key is not particular patterns of ownership, types of water rights, or irrigation technology, but rather that each component is compatible with the other parts. Because they are integrated, when any of these components is changed, there will be significant implications for other components. Compatibility among the ABCDE components is a feature of tradi- tional water management systems that are based on limited information but extensive experience, simple technologies, and predictability of natural events (floods, droughts, seasonal rainfalls). For example, the organization of spate irrigation in Yemen, aflaj in Oman, qanat in Iran, and mesqas in the Nile delta was based on the knowledge passed down from one generation to another of water stocks, flows, and seasonal variability. Bargaining within groups led to the internalization and in- stitutionalization of behaviors within and among groups. Codification took place either informally through norms and conventions, or formally through Islamic jurisprudence. Certain rights and responsibilities were delegated among farmers, while others devolved to village leaders and sheikhs. Decisions on when and what to construct were based on a long process of community engagement that was fairly well grounded in terms of (1) awareness of water availability and constraints, (2) institutional rules that were accepted by community members, and (3) construction technologies familiar to communities. 10 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Much of traditional water management has changed in the past 50 years. New technologies arrived that short-circuited traditional pro- cedures for accessing and utilizing water. Financing options for lumpy investments changed relationships within communities and, more im- portantly, between communities and the state. In the latter situation, state agencies assumed the full responsibility for the assessment phase, as well as for codifying rules to access investment finances. In practical terms, the state appropriated the right to decide where and when to invest in hydraulic infrastructure and to whom to provide the resultant water services. Under these circumstances, bargaining processes that had centered on local, well-understood norms and conventions were supplanted by communities “receiving” irrigation and water supply services from large government-sponsored programs. The decline of informal norms and conventions led to examples of water capture by elites, particularly when energy subsidies gave wealthy landowners privileged access to powerful pumpsets. Overall, these capital-intensive investments substantially impacted delicate water balances, altered the flow of rivers, increased the pace of groundwater extraction, and aggravated competition among water users. Observed Variants of the ABCDE Model In this section, some observed “unbundled” practices are described in terms of the ABCDE framework. Moving Straight from A to C In this variant, assessment of water availability is based on historical data and onsite technical investigations by a state agency. Little atten- tion is paid to water accounting (box 1.1). The state agencies usually assume that, because water is available at the proposed investment location, the water “surplus” can be used either without detriment, or with suitable compensation, to existing users. The state agency also makes no attempt to define a formal specification of a water entitlement. Under these circumstances, not enough attention gets paid to assessing what worked and what did not work in existing informal institutional arrangements. Codification is focused around financing rules, because the state typically finances the capital investments. However, it im- poses weak conditionalities for cost recovery from users. Once funds are made available, engineering solutions are implemented. I ntroduction N 11 Moving Straight from A to C and Then to D In response to the weaknesses of the earlier approach, the codification process recognizes the need to delegate responsibilities with a modified set of rules that separates the public and private good aspects. The for- mer are paid by the state; the latter are paid by water users who benefit from using the service. Concerning water resources, in the absence of a basin- (or aquifer-) level accounting framework, there is no certainty that water entitlements are consistent with overall availability. Introducing B in the Process Given today’s climate change concerns, assessments of water availability based on past data are no longer reliable. For example, in Morocco’s river basins, recent precipitation has been 30 percent–40 percent lower than the historical trends (although 2009 rainfall has been adequate). Irrigation infrastructure in the large-scale irrigation perimeters (ORM- VAs, or regional irrigation and agricultural development agencies) was designed based on rainfall data of past decades. Thus, this infrastruc- ture over-designed water conveyance networks and under-served the beneficiary farmers. Farmers respond to the lack of reliable surface water by investing in pumping groundwater, often in excess of safe yields. Under these uncertainties, A and B become immediate priori- ties. Assessments and feedback of the risks to water resources from accelerating climate change, financing constraints, and population shifts to cities require information and knowledge-sharing among all water stakeholders in the country. Different forms of bargaining and institutional arrangements ranging from informal contracts to tradable water rights become relevant policy options that need to be debated. Organization of Chapters The chapters of this book are organized to present MNA staff obser- vations and analyses of various aspects of IWRM through 3 types of activities commissioned over the past 3 years: First and most significant, the MNA Sustainable Development 1. Department’s economic and sector work (ESW) in Arab countries. This work was summarized in the 2007 “MNA Development Report on Water” and in other initiatives of individual team members. 12 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Insights and analyses by the MNA water unit staff on specific country- 2. oriented topics that could be of general interest in Arab countries. Observations from study tours and project-level engagements by 3. MNSSD staff. The organizing principle for these chapters has been the ABCDE. Predictably, the assessment section has the largest and most diverse selection of chapters. They range from general themes such as gov- ernance and climate change to specific assessments of topics that of- fer useful learning and knowledge-sharing to the reader. The second (B) section illustrates the importance of bargaining among water stake- holders to reach sustainable solutions. The third section reviews the various “rules of the game”—both formal codification experiences in the region vis-à-vis water laws and specific financing rules that alter incentives for water service delivery. The fourth (D) section reports on specific country-level initiatives that have delegated water service responsibilities to the lowest appropriate level. The final section evalu- ates the emerging opportunities offered by innovative technologies that could be harnessed to meet the emerging water challenges. Assessments of Water Availability and Water Management A1. Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management: Lessons from the “MNA Development Report on Water” N. Vijay Jagannathan A2. Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review Ahmed Shawky Mohamed and N. Vijay Jagannathan A3. Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: Spending Less for Better Services Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Alexander Kremer, and Manish Kumar A4. Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models in Water Resource Management and Planning in MNA Region Bekele Debele Negewo, Julia Bucknall, and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed A5. Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World: New Analytical Tools for New Challenges Christopher J. Perry and Julia Bucknall A6. Egypt Case Study: Energy Efficiency CDM Program: Irrigation and Drainage Pumping Sector Abdulhamid Azad A7. Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience Satoru Ueda and Mohammed Benouahi A8. Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management Mohamed El Hedi Louati and Julia Bucknall A9. Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War Iraq Sana Agha Al Nimer A10. Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector: Lessons from the Design of an Anticorruption Action Plan Maher Abu-Taleb and Richard Calkins I ntroduction N 13 The first 10 chapters summarize the World Bank Middle East and North Africa Region (MNA) findings from assessments of key policy issues relating to water management in terms of the resource itself (both in terms of quantity and quality), financing, and implications for global public goods. The first chapter summarizes the lessons from the 2007 “MNA N Development Report on Water.” The second and third chapters describe the findings of a Public N Expenditure Review (PER) on water in Egypt, and analyze who among the various stakeholders have benefitted from existing public expenditures on water. The fourth chapter describes how remote-sensing (RS) data and N modeling techniques provide new tools for water planners and project managers. The fifth chapter looks at how irrigation management practices need N to be changed to effectively respond to climate change predictions. The sixth chapter describes the new financing mechanisms made N available to the irrigation sector in reaction to rising global concerns about climate. The seventh chapter presents the Japanese experience in bench- N marking the performance of the water and sanitation service providers. The eighth chapter presents the case of inter-basin water transfers N in Tunisia. The ninth chapter describes the lessons learned in Iraq toward N reforming the water supply and sanitation sector after the war. The last chapter discusses new institutional arrangements in Yemen N aimed at governance and anticorruption reforms. Bargaining among Water Stakeholders B1. Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco Rachid Abdellaoui B2. How Did a Small, Poor, and Remote Rural Village in Djibouti Recently Become a Government Priority to Receive Water Supply and Sanitation? Sarah Houssein, with Julia Bucknall and Nathalie Abu-Ata B3. Water Conflict in Yemen: The Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms Christopher Ward B4. Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century N. Vijay Jagannathan 14 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The second group of chapters is devoted to bargaining, by which affected stakeholders are able to exercise voice and choice in decisions that relate to their water resources and water services. The first chapter discusses how bargaining and consequent trading N of informal water rights have taken place in a Moroccan village. The second chapter describes how a poor community in Djibouti N was able to exercise its voice with the government. The third chapter describes the role of tribal and local traditions N in resolving conflicts over water in Yemen. The last chapter describes the emerging lessons for water diplomacy N or bargaining among countries sharing watercourses. Codification Experiences in MNA C1. Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries Jackson Morill and Jose Simas C2. Subsidies for the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach Providing Basic Services to Poor Periurban Neighborhoods in Morocco Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani C3. Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani C4. New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in Irrigation: Lessons from Egypt’s West Delta Project Aldo Baietti and Safwat Abdel-Dayem The third group of chapters is elucidates codification in the water sector. The first chapter describes the region’s experience with formal N codification through water laws and regulations. The next two chapters summarize an experience of targeting N subsidies to poor households so that they are able to access safe drinking water with house connections in urban and rural areas in Morocco. The forth chapter describes a new set of project rules aimed at gen- N erating public-private partnerships in Egypt’s irrigation sector. Delegation to the Lowest Appropriate Level D1. Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen Naji Abu Hatim and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed D 2. Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen Susmita Dasgupta, Craig Meisner, Andrew Makokha, and Richard Pollard I ntroduction N 15 D3. Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework: Case Study of Application in the Delta Region, Egypt Ayat Soliman, Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Maged Hamed, Wendy Wakeman, and Mohammed Mehany D4. Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Abdulhamid Azad, and Alexander Bakalian The fourth group of chapters describes MNA staff experiences with delegation of services to the lowest appropriate level. The first chapter analyzes an interesting experience in participatory N irrigation management and cost-sharing in Yemen. The second chapter evaluates user satisfaction with community- N managed RWSS services in Yemeni villages. The third chapter discusses new planning approaches to rural sani- N tation in Egypt, incorporating both extending sanitation services and improving water quality in receiving bodies. The last chapter is a report based on a joint study tour to Spain by N MNA water staff and counterparts. During this trip, they learned how that country implemented delegation to the lowest appropri- ate level in both aspects of water management: the resource itself and water supply, sanitation and irrigation services. Engineering New Approaches E1. Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta Jose Simas, Juan Morelli, and Hani El Sadani E2. Water Reuse in the MNA Region: Constraints, Experiences, and Policy Recommendations Claire Kfouri, Pier Mantovani, and Marc Jeuland E3. Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region Khairy Al-Jamal and Manuel Schiffler E4. Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Coastal Areas in Yemen: Case Study of Wadi Ahwar Arjen de Vries and Tarun Ghawana. Supervised by Ahmed Shawky Mohamed The fifth group discusses engineering aspects and comprises forward-looking studies of new water investment approaches. The first chapter presents a very interesting experience in Egypt, N whereby engineers “right-sized” design standards with community participation. 16 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The next two chapters summarize the findings of World Bank MNA N staff studies that evaluate the potentials of wastewater reuse and de- salination, which, given climate change, are two important areas. The last chapter looks at the findings of a study on conjunc- N tive use of spate irrigation and groundwater in the coastal areas of Yemen. References Bates, B., Z. Kundzewicz, S. Wu, and J. Palutikof. 2008. Climate Change and Water. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Briscoe, J., and R.P.S. Malik. 2007. A Handbook for Water Resource Management in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Delft Hydraulics. 1994. “A Framework for Water Resources Planning.” Research report. University of Delft. April. Frederiksen, H.D.. 2005. “Addressing Water Crisis in Developing Countries.” Journal of Environmental Engineering (May): 667–75. American Society of Civil Engineers. Milly, X, and others. 2005. Perry, C.J. 2003. "Non-state Actors and Water Resources Develop- ment: An Economic Perspective." Non-State Actors and Inter- national Law 3: 103. ____. 2007. ?Efficient Irrigation; Inefficient Communication; Flawed Recommendations.? Irrigation and Drainage 56: 367?78. Wiley Interscience. ____. 2008. ?The ABCDE of Water Management.? Draft guidance note contribution to the draft paper for the Arab Water Academy courses. ____. Forthcoming. "River Basin Agreements as Facilitators of Devel- opment." In Water Issues in Southeast Asia: Present Trends and Future Directions, ed. L.P. Onn. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Sadoff, C., T. Greiber, M. Smith, and G. Bergkamp. 2008. Share Man- aged Waters across Boundaries. Geneva: IUCN Water and Nature Initiative. Salman M.A. 2006. “Regulatory Frameworks for Water Resource Management.” World Bank. World Bank. 2004. “Public and Private Sector Roles in Water Supply and Sanitation Services.” April. ____. 2007. “MNA Development Report on Water.” # Assessment 19 Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management: Lessons from the “MNA Development Report on Water” N. Vijay Jagannathan I n March 2007, the Middle East and North Africa Region (MNA) of the World Bank launched the “MNA Development Report on Water.” 1 It was the culmination of two years of consultations, stud- ies, and analyses of water issues in the region. 2 The report had three main conclusions: Water is scarce and has competing uses. 1. Thus, it needs a manage- ment strategy that goes beyond merely finding engineering solutions to include revisiting the rights regime, regulatory framework, and public-private partnerships. To improve water management, 2. accountability—whether external to users of water, or internal to sector financiers and policymakers—needs to be deliberately promoted. To this end, information about water—on both public expenditures and environmental impacts of existing pat- terns of use—should be fully shared among all stakeholders. To improve water management, policies outside the water sector often are 3. as important as those within the sector. This conclusion applies to mac- roeconomic, trade liberalization, agricultural, and urban policies. The overall point of the report is that although the principles of water policies are quite well understood, public policy choices get circum- scribed by political, legal, or social considerations. For example, reforms introducing sensible pricing and tradable water rights are constrained by political and social resistance. Fiscal prudence is inhibited by inadequate 1 World Bank 2007. 2 This chapter is a modified version of an essay in honor of Dr. V.S.Vyas (IDS 2009). 2 20 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS monitoring of wasteful public expenditures in hydraulic infrastructure. Irrigation subsidies encourage crops that yield low “crop per drop.” The Challenge The challenge confronting water policy lies in bridging the “practice” gap between choices that would lead to sustainable outcomes and the perceived feasible set. This practice gap could be construed as the chasm between the universally recognized principles (as confirmed in major sectoral events such as Dublin, Rio, Kyoto, and Mexico City) and observed expediency in decisionmaking. For example, the importance of sound water management for sustainable economic development, universal public reverence for clean water, and the potential of lever- aging expanding knowledge of the surface and subsurface water cycle all are accepted by stakeholders. However, in the “pragmatic” dimen- sion, decisionmaking is severely constrained by political considerations. Water governance is the business of all levels of the government and is very sensitive to prevailing norms and conventions. In countries of the Middle East, for example, many leaders are reluctant to charge for water services because they fear creating political opposition that could exploit a widely held belief that Islamic traditions require water to be a free commodity. Box 2.1 Water Is Everybody’s Business: Morocco This photograph of a river basin in Morocco illustrates the reason that stakeholders outside the sector are so important for water reforms. The winding river services the farms and a growing urban and regional economy. Improved agricultural practices have been fuelled by excellent road connec- tions to the export market for fruits and vegetables. Large urban centers have become magnets for migrants from rural areas, attracted by off-farm jobs. How- ever, these centers’ untreated wastes pollute the river downstream. Water is everybody’s business, and its manage- ment is influenced by policy within and outside the water subsectors. Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management N 21 If pragmatism requires focusing on the feasible set of policies, the basic question is: Where does this leave policymakers in an environment in which politics triumphs over principles but in which every succeeding generation faces the cascading of the harmful consequences of past water policy missteps? The thesis of this chapter is that outside drivers often are critical factors in bringing about principled pragmatism. “Outside” Drivers That Bridge the Practice Gap in MNA Countries The most important driver from “outside” the water sector in MNA countries is the increasing political recognition of the irreversible adverse consequences of global warming. “Outside Driver” 1: Climate Change The recent International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) findings confirm trends observed over past decades in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia: that historic data on rainfall patterns no longer provide accu- rate projections for future precipitation. 3 For example, over the last three decades, dams constructed in Algeria and Morocco have been able to store, on average, only approximately half their design capacity because of inadequate annual precipitation. As a consequence, farmers have become acutely aware of the uncertainty of their water rights, and irrigation agencies in the command areas struggle with rationing uncertain water supply to the politically important farmer constituency. The IPCC report confirms these trends, and what earlier was seen as a prolonged drought is now being interpreted as a secular decline in precipita- tion caused by global climate change (figures 2.1 and 2.2). The probl ems of gl obal warming will affect other re- gions as well. For example, water resources in Bangladesh, Bhu- Figure 2.1 Projected Decreases in Rainfall, 2000–70 Source: Background paper, Stern Report. 3 Bates and others 2008. 22 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS tan, China, India, Nepal, and Pakistan are likely to face rapid shrinking because of reductions in water stored in the Himalayan glaciers as a result of changes in the duration and intensity of rainfall. The effects in the Western Himalayas are likely to be particularly dramatic—with increased flows over the next 4 or 5 decades, followed by dramatic reductions—of 40 percent–60 percent of flow—over the subsequent century. Since the rivers flowing from this massif support the “breadbaskets” of South Asian countries, the impacts will affect agriculture and urban water use (figure 2.3 shows predicted declines in Indus River flows in Pakistan). The secular decline and increased variability in rainfall will radically affect the flows and seasonality of major rivers in the subcontinent, and seriously put in doubt past assumptions on how to design hydraulic infrastructure. The solution is to develop a package of reforms that tackle both the demand (incentives to shift to crops with high water productivity) and supply (water conservation through modernized irrigation and better tracking of the water/evapotranspiration cycle) sides. “Outside Driver 2”: High-Value Farming Changes the Politics of Irrigation A second set of factors outside the water sector that is helping to narrow the practice gap is the pressure from farmers benefiting from the recent growth of high- value agriculture. These farmers have secured significant gains in income by adopting agricultural and irrigation practices that have enabled them to join the supply chain to get high-value consumer North Africa ´., / ¬ ., / ' –80 –70 –60 –50 –40 –30 –20 –10 0 0–1 1–2 2–3 3–4 4–5 Temperature increase ´, ´··' Figure 2.2 North Africa Estimates of Change in Runoffs –100 100 80 60 40 20 0 –20 –60 –40 –80 0 2 4 6 8 10 Source: Rees 2005. Indus at Bisham Cila P e r c e n t c h a n g e Figure 2.3 Projected Changes in Flow of the River Indus, 2005–15 (%) Decade in the future +0.03 degC/yr +0.05 degC/yr +0.10 degC/yr +0.15 degC/yr Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management N 23 markets in Europe and North America. Their prosperity is reflected in a change in water consumption usage. They earn significantly higher incomes per drop of water than conventional irrigators are able to earn. The hope is that such leading-edge farmers will support demand- management measures. The key policy question here is how to allocate water efficiently between its two different forms, namely, high-security water, which is needed by those making major investments in annual crops and in industry; and low security water, which farmers use for annual crops when it is available. Managing water as different products is performed well by water markets in Australia, Chile, Mexico, and the western US. In these countries, users of low-security water sell their water to users of high-security water in times of scarcity, making both parties—by definition, since the transfer is voluntary—better off. Figure 2.4 illustrates the trends of water use in MNA countries. Green represents renewable sources (from both surface and ground- water), and includes desalinated water, an important source of re- newable water in the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. The pink shaded area represents the proportion of water extracted from nonrenewable sources, and the brown represents the water “virtually” available as the water used to grow agricultural commodities that are imported through trade. For example, increased rice, wheat, dairy, and beef imports result in much more virtual water being available to local consumers, whereas exports of citrus, olives, and vegetables generate equivalent or higher value exports with relatively low water use. The preconditions for high-value farm exports were the physical access and information access necessary for supply chain management, that is, roads, high-speed internet, and container terminals. Each of these facilitated the growth of two-way trade, principally with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. A similar pattern has oc- curred in all of these growth centers: 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% A l g e r i a B a h r a i n D j i b o u t i E g y p t I r a n , I s l a m i c R e p o f I r a q I s r a e l J o r d a n K u w a i t L e b a n o n L i b y a n A r a b J a m a h i r i y a M o r o c c o O m a n Q a t a r S a u d i A r a b ia S y r i a n A r a b R e p u b l i c T u n i s i a U n i t e d A r a b E m i r a t e s W e s t B a n k & G a z a Y e m e n Internal renewable water resources External renewable water resources Non-renewable ground water Virtual Water Figure 2.4 Role of Renewable, Nonrenewable, and Virtual Water in MNA Countries, 2005 (%) Source: World Bank 2007. 24 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Investors and farmers were able to respond to the growing demand 1. for high-value farm products. Farm products in which the Region has comparative advantage— 2. olives, citrus, herbs, and other fruits and vegetables—constituted the bulk of exports. These products generated more value per drop. 3. 4 State-of-the-art technology is used to sort, pack, and store; and to enable conveyance technologies to bring fresh farm products to the supermarkets within the contracted period (a few hours to Europe and a week to Canada and the US). Agricultural practices have begun approximating the norms of efficient business enterprises. However, regarding labor productivity, more jobs are generated in the logistics and supply chain aspects than in conventional employment of farm labor. The new paradigm suits the expectations of a changing labor force; rural youth desire a higher quality of life than the drudgery of traditional farming can provide. Two key actions outside the water sector unleashed the potential of high-value agriculture: On the demand side, changing demand patterns in the EU encour- 4. aged large supermarket chains to search for reliable suppliers of cheaper, high-quality fruits and vegetables. On the supply side, the farmer’s ability to manage supply chain 5. risks hinged on reliable, good quality, irrigable water. Typically, a farm entrepreneur begins—with no support from the surface irrigation bureaucracy—by investing his or her private funds in water-conserving irrigation infrastructure (usually drip or sprinkler), and by carefully monitoring his water quality. S/he then invites the supermarket chain to inspect the facilities to ensure that the fruits and vegetables are produced using acceptable technologies. These include being irrigated by water that is free of contaminants, both chemical and biological. Thereafter, the farm secures a Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) certificate from an independent European certification agency. This seal of good housekeeping facilitates contracting with the very quality-conscious European supermarkets. Passing the GAP criteria, 4 These crops generate more value per unit of evapotranspiration (ET) (see chapter by Perry and Bucknall for a discussion on the significance of ET). Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management N 25 rather than the much laxer national regulatory laws, ensures respect for international water quality standards. The key point is that these entrepreneurial farms have invested in groundwater-based irrigation to informally create water rights for themselves. Furthermore, these farmers expect little, if any, support from the substantial surface water irrigation infrastructure. They are aware that these public sector organizations have neither the institu- tional capability nor accountability mechanisms to serve the specific quality and timing requirements of the export-oriented farms. In the few cases in which these farmers use surface irrigation, they privately finance investments to mitigate water supply risks by (a) excavating a part of the farmland as a storage reservoir, then (b) developing a pres- surized, piped drip, sprinkler, or pivot irrigation distribution system. However, these individual, private solutions are socially costly because productive farmlands are being lost to water storage. They also are inequitable because small farmers who lack financial resources and knowledge of supply chain management are de facto excluded. Even when a farmer has been able to mitigate supply risks from surface water irrigation, a major remaining risk is the farm’s ability to maintain water quality norms required by the importing country’s en- vironmental regulations. Nowhere is this challenge more visible than in Egypt. Farms on the desert and scrubland in the periphery of the Nile delta have been able to participate in the export market though ground- water-based irrigation systems. However, hundreds of thousands of farmers in the delta a few miles east and north are unable to do so. The surface water that they receive through Nile surface irrigation system is highly polluted, and therefore not capable of meeting the demanding EU water quality standards for all edible export crops. Pressure from the high-value farm lobby is helping to narrow the practice gap in water management. For example, in the West Delta area of Egypt and in Guerdaine, Morocco, investors financed high- value agriculture in desert lands that have access to groundwater. Utilizing their knowledge and connections to obtain credit, technical knowhow, and access to European markets, these groups have created large export-oriented markets for grapes, citrus, and other fruits and vegetables. While their entrepreneurship is laudable, the income and employment generated in the regional economies also enabled them to successfully lobby governments for supplemental surface water irriga- tion once groundwater started getting depleted. On the positive side, one could argue that these groups have influenced political leaders and 26 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS water policymakers to appreciate the benefits of transferable water rights, irrigation modernization, and water conservation. 5 Moreover, high-value farm exports generate better jobs with bet- ter pay in the services sector. Thus, they help reduce the exodus of the rural population to urban centers and Europe in search of better livelihoods. With a large and increasingly affluent urban middle class in MNA, the demand for high-value crops is growing. To meet this demand, countries have begun investing in large-scale investments in irrigation modernization. The preconditions for such investments are an adequate road infrastructure to ship the produce in a timely manner to markets and ports, stabilizing rural electricity services, and speeding up border procedures. These broad and deep changes must be made for demand for water-conserving irrigation technologies to become strong enough to increase pressure on policymakers for reform. “Outside Driver 3”: The Call for Clean Water A third set of factors outside the sector that is narrowing the practice gap has been political pressure on decisionmakers to focus more on water quality. Obviously, the exporters of high-value farm products have been one of the influential lobby groups creating this pressure. However, there have been other contributors. Many countries are benefiting from a tourism boom, as “package tours” from Europe and the Gulf countries to the historic and seaside resorts of several MNA countries have grown enormously. Along the Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts alone, many resorts have been developed in the past two decades to take advantage of this boom. By contrast, some other high potential areas, such as the coastline of the Nile delta, have not been able to take advantage of these opportunities because of beach contami- nation by polluted Nile waters. Tour operators and resort owners are 5 For example, in both Guerdaine and West Delta, financing has been obtained from the World Bank Group for surface irrigation infrastructure via public-private partnerships (PPPs). For the former, half of the investment costs was financed by a capital subsidy from the government. For the latter, the investment costs were financed by an IBRD loan but were recovered from the water users. Both projects have enabled the governments to test new models of service provisioning (see Baietti chapter). For the West Delta project, most of the transferred water will originate upstream of the delta barrages, that is, before it gets polluted by the agricultural or sewage return waters. The concentration of the water pollutants in the Rosetta branch culminates only in the downstream. Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management N 27 powerful interest groups who have joined environmentalists and farm exporters to lobby for better water quality manage- ment (WQM). Analytical work also has helped build the case for this coalition of interests to demand better WQM. For example, the World Bank initiated a series of studies estimating the oppor- tunity costs of environmental degradation in major MNA countries, including both water pollution and groundwater degradation (figure 2.5). These estimates, shown as a percentage of forgone GDP, were disseminated to a wide range of stakeholders through workshops, media events, and publications. The study findings coincided, particularly in Egypt, with growing public dissatisfaction with water quality in irrigation canals, so were picked up by the media. The studies’ conclusion that poor water management harmed the economy by slicing off percentage points of GDP resonated with decisionmakers in economic ministries and pushed governments to pledge significant increases in public fund- ing for remedial actions. 6 Figure 2.6 estimates the opportunity costs to GDP due to savings losses. Emerging Lessons from MNA for Bridging the Practice Gap The analysis suggests that countries in the region have taken steps to narrow the ”practice” gap in response to powerful po- litical drivers outside the wa- ter sector. Inf luential groups have highlighted the need for water reforms, although usu- ally only for their own narrow reasons. Leveraging these oppor- tunities to promote broad-based reforms is the next big challenge to reduce the “practice” gap. For Cost of Environmental Degradation of Water 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Algeria Egypt Iran Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria Tunisia S h a r e o f G D P Figure 2.5 Estimates of Environmental Degradation Costs, 2005 (%) From Gross Savings to Adjusted Net Savings 0 5 10 15 20 25 Gross Nat. Savings Net Nat. Savings Net Nat. Savings + EE Adjusted Net Savings ANS - Water depletion % o f G N I Consumption of fxed capital Energy and mineral depletion Pollution Water resources depletion Education expenditure Figure 2.6 Cost of Over-extraction of Aquifers, 2006 (%) 6 Estimates include opportunity costs of air pollution. 28 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS this, policymakers need to regularly evaluate and feed back the lessons to the sectoral decisionmaking process. Based on past assessments, the “MNA Development Report” suggests three insights in this regard: Reforms are inherently a political process and one in which the 1. technical and political dynamics are difficult to separate. Politically, an initial driver of change (such as farmers’ demand for better water quality) could be leveraged if there were a preexisting broader coali- tion of stakeholders willing to support more broad-based reforms than the farming lobby wants to promote. Non-water policies are critically central to water policy reforms 2. because the coalition becomes energized when colleagues outside the water sector (agriculture, energy, environment, trade, transport, and banking, to name a few) already are engaging, or are willing to engage, in complementary actions. Improved accountability of government organizations to users of 3. water services is a third essential leg for reducing the gap. Mecha- nisms for public accountability form the bridge between users of water and their governments by channeling relevant information and voice and ensuring fairness in resolving conflicts that may arise. How to Bridge the Practice Gap in Developing Countries Coordination and Strategic Monitoring of Water Policy Actions The problem of coordination is accentuated by divided responsibilities for water management among various levels of governance, typically, the center, governorates, and citizens. This institutional confusion is compounded by a tendency of rules and norms that focus more on the planning and resource allocation phase than on the actual implementa- tion phase and on thoroughly evaluating outcomes. For example, in large river basins such as the Nile Delta, pollution from human settlements affects water quality downstream, which in turn reduces the crop choices of farmers. For example, a farmer in the Nile Delta cannot think of growing high-value, export-oriented crops because the water quality does not meet the minimum EU Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) irrigated water standards. The Ministries of Water Resources and Irrigation, Housing, Agriculture, Local Government, Health, and Environment must devise coordinated Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management N 29 responses to this challenge. Within the Water Resources and Irrigation Ministry itself, multiple sectors (mechanical and electrical engineering, drainage, irrigation improvement, and planning) need to work together seamlessly to make the irrigation service meet the farmers’ needs for high-value agriculture. On the sanitation side, the practice gap does not get bridged because tackling pollution requires staff from various agencies to work outside their silos, think laterally, and, most importantly, engage stakeholders who are outside their internal organizational structures. Common observations on factors that contributed to this practice gap are: Key stakeholder groups were disinterested N . Pollution abatement had downstream benefits, so was not politically attractive to political leaders and even the local public. Operations and maintenance (O&M) burdens were heavy N . Moreover, in a context in which tariffs are substantially below operating costs and environmental regulations rarely enforced, sewage treatment plants get shut off. The untreated effluents are bypassed to down- stream water bodies. Raw sewage can be used for free N for high-value fruits and vegetables by surrounding farmers because environmental regulations are neither enforced nor internalized by communities. The practice gap can be bridged by coordination and strategic management with stakeholders who have an interest in achieving planned outcomes. Active engagement and dialogue are required among sewerage engineers with urban planners, agriculture and en- vironment ministry staff, and program beneficiaries in both planning and implementation. Establish Water Executive Management Programs The solution is to radically redefine the learning and capacity build- ing program for water management. Water executive education programs need to be developed to inspire and train water man- agers to see beyond their narrow specializations. The inspiration comes from successes in the field of business management through executive management programs that promoted “lateral” thinking by visionaries such as Alfred Sloan and Peter Drucker. 7 Through 30 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS these programs, business management became a more systematic process of directing and motivating people and entities to accomplish an enterprise’s goals. Water management is as multidisciplinary as running a modern business enterprise. The former requires the integration of the dif- ferent ways of thinking of a diverse range of stakeholders from farm- ers, slum dwellers, other civil society, media, and political leaders to civil servants, planners, economists, and engineers. Key stakeholders need to debate and discuss the practice gap, and reach a common appreciation of what is required for long-term sustainability in water outcomes. This consensus requires appreciating the human, finan- cial, environmental, and technological aspects of water management through the systematic engagement of stakeholders in learning about water management. The MNA countries have recognized this challenge. Through the leadership of the Arab Water Council (AWC), they have established an Arab Water Academy so that such learning events are organized and a new genre of “water managers” and water stewards are created from different disciplines and represent all sections of society. Inclusion of Stakeholders in Water Dialogues Water is both a finite resource and subject to intense competing de- mands. Political realities in all developing countries hinder, or prevent, water policymakers from using normal economic policy instruments, such as water pricing and transferable water rights, as mechanisms for resource allocation. In their absence, informal arrangements dominate the institutional environment (Shah 2007). The most noticeable evi- dence of these are the explosive growth of tubewells, fuelled in most countries by subsidized energy; inadequate water resource regulations; and self-provisioning by urban households (HH) for water supply and sanitation facilities. Over time, the adverse environmental consequences have become unavoidable, notably in the form of continuous groundwater draw-downs. These sources provide the mainstay for farm production in several regions of the world, despite the knowledge that the long-term consequences will be disastrous to these very same farming communities. Equally 7 McDonald and others 2003; Business Week 2005. Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management N 31 visible is the unequal access to this water by the poor in both rural and urban areas. Several MNA countries are facing the devastating consequences of similar trends because their groundwater resources, having a very low renewal rate, are already running out. In some of the most affected countries, such as Yemen, entire farm communities have had to leave their villages because the groundwater extraction rates greatly exceeded the replenishment rate, fuelled in particular by cheap subsidized electricity. MNA has other variants of this type of “tragedy of the commons,” especially those resulting from unchecked pollution of water bodies from urban, industrial, and agricultural runoffs. The way out is to communicate with and engage the affected stakeholders in finding solutions. No amount of executive training and management will work unless there is an educated and informed group of water users who are aware of the consequences of today’s actions on tomorrow. In other words, water management requires all individuals to understand that that they are a part of the problem as well as the possible solution. Managing the Equity Dimension of Water An equally important policy instrument is the use of redesigned subsidies to put in place incentives for public finance to target the poor and the environment. Some MNA countries now recognize using output-based subsidies as an effective tool. 8 These subsidies work in: Urban areas—by targeting low-income households with free piped N water supply connections (thereafter, these households must pay tariffs for operating costs) Rural areas—rewarding water conservation in surface irrigation N areas by subsidizing part of investment costs of low-income farmers who switch from open channels to drip, sprinkler, or other more modern irrigation technologies River basins and sub-basins—by reimbursing utilities/operators for N every unit of treated effluent that meets national standards. 8 See chapters 17 and 18 by Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani. 32 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Focus on External and Internal Accountability The practice gap can be narrowed by developing a culture of lateral thinking in water management similar to modern business management practices. Participation of all stakeholders and use of targeted subsidies are suggested as the first and second legs of this model. The third leg is putting in place mechanisms to enhance accountability. Account- ability has two dimensions: (1) an “internal” aspect in which water organizations are accountable to their financiers and management structures, and (2) an “external” aspect in which they should respond to water user preferences and willingness to pay. The practice gap has arisen because, for both aspects, MNA countries have experienced institutional design failures. The internal failure is accentuated by government pledges of general subsidies for the water sector, with no follow-up to track outcomes of programs (as illustrated by GAP 1). In the urban areas, cross-subsidies for urban water supply reduce the incentives of utilities to manage services based on commercial principles, while the benefits end up being appropriated by the middle class urban consumers. Fur- thermore, while this group benefits from the higher tariffs charged to industrial and service water users, the poor pay more while buying poor-quality water from vendors. In the irrigation sector, farmers do not have clear, predictable water rights on the basis of which they can plan their planting decisions. Instead, officials of the various state irrigation bureaucracies have the discretion to assign irrigation turns to the water user associations (WUAs) and farmers. This power gets often misused through graft and corruption (Wade 1985; Jagannathan 1987). In both situations, water service organizations have been unable to set in place governance mechanisms that ensure internal account- ability of staff to the organizational goals and external accountability to the water users. 9 Figure 2.7 illustrates how accountability gets diluted by three levels of scarcity observable in the region (World Bank 2007): Scarcity of the water resource. 1. In conditions of water scarcity the response has been to build “solutions” through dams, canals, and distribution systems. These solutions required large outlays of 9 For discussion on MNA initiatives to improve accountability, see chapter 11 by M. Abu-Taleb and R. Calkins, and chapter 24 by J. Simas, J. Morelli, and H. El Sadani. Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management N 33 public funds. With expe- rience, the IWRM pro- cesses recognized that public investments do not necessarily lead to de- sired outcomes because organizational incentives may be misaligned. 10 Scarcity of organizational 2. capacity to actually man- age the demands of vari- ous water users, and meet the growing needs of the economy. Scarcity of accountability 3. to achieve sustainable outcomes In the past decade, with climate change concerns raising serious concerns about sharply declining water availability in the MNA region, this third level has assumed prominence. 11 The thesis of the “MNA Development Report” is that, with the growing scarcity of water, policy focus needs to shift to allocative efficiency among competing water uses. For irrigation, which uses 80 percent–90 percent of all water, redesigning incentives that direct farmers toward maximizing income per drop is one obvious focus. On the urban side, the focus needs to be on rationalizing water and sanitation subsidies. As mentioned earlier, general subsidies in MNA have tended to benefit the well-to-do (water), or no one (sewerage investments). Establishing clear rules for subsidies that are based on measurable outcomes is one obvious solution. Tracking the effective- ness of public expenditures through regular public expenditure reviews is another obviously useful instrument. External accountability is generated when lobby groups outside the water sector (NGOs, high-value farmers, tour operators, resort owners, media) pressure political leaders for efficient and high quality water services. As the MNA illustrations indicated, these fairly narrow drivers could be leveraged for broad-based reforms when the debate is opened up to the other suggestions in this chapter (targeted subsidies, user participation, and effective use of public funds that foster internal and external accountability. Engineering Water services End-use efciency Allocative efciency More water More use per drop More value per drop Supply management Services Overall demand management Figure 2.7 Changing Nature of Accountability Source: World Bank 2007. 10 See chapter 4 by Shawky Mohamed and others in this volume. 11 See chapter 1, figure 1.1, and subsequent discussion on this topic. 34 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS However, there is a need to set up appropriate organizational structures to govern water management. The experience of the MNA Region suggests that empowering river basin organizations, branch canal users, or aquifer-based user associations is necessary to create awareness of water management issues. These are relatively new or- ganizations and have difficulty in acquiring legitimacy when faced with conflicts with established national or local political or administrative groupings, such as governorates, provinces, and districts. Obviously, there are no general solutions. Each country must work out solutions that fit its own context. Concluding Remarks Bridging the practice gap requires a fundamental rethinking of the way that water is managed and that stakeholders learn about sustainable management of water resources and water services. Over the last three decades, the dramatic shift from surface to groundwater in many parts of the world—by agriculture, municipal users, and industry—has been essentially a water privatization process, with no rules of the game. What is needed now are to (1) acknowledge de facto rights and (2) make a major effort to educate and inform on the need for “rights, but with rules.” The experience suggests that water managers must recognize and manage the several external drivers of water use. Policies outside the water sector often cause unintentional harm to it. Water manage- ment, therefore, requires active engagement, discussion, and debate among all parts of society before the practice gap between principles and pragmatic solutions can be bridged. References Bates, B., Z. Kundzewicz, S. Wu, and J. Palutikof. 2008. Climate Change and Water. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Briscoe, J., and R.P.S. Malik. 2007. “India’s Water Economy: An Overview.” In Briscoe and Malik, Handbook of Water Resources in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Business Week. 2005. “The Man Who Invented Management: Why Peter Drucker’s Ideas Still Matter.” November 28. Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management N 35 Jagannathan, N.V. 2009. “Bridging the Practice in Water Man- agement: An Appreciation of V.S.Vyas.” Jaipur: Institute for Development Studies. ____. 1987. Informal Markets in Developing Countries. New York: Ox- ford University Press. McDonald, J., and A.D. Chandler. 2003. A Ghost’s Memoir: The Mak- ing of Alfred P. Sloan’s “My Years with General Motors. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Press. Mohanty, N. 2007. “Scaling up Water Investments.” In J. Briscoe and R.P.S.Malik, Handbook of Water Resources in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Saleth, R.M. 2007. “Water Rights and Entitlements.” In J. Briscoe and R.P.S.Malik, Handbook of Water Resources in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Shah, T. 2007. “Institutional and Policy Reforms.” In J. Briscoe and R.P.S. Malik, Handbook of Water Resources in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Vyas, V.S. 2007. “Economic Reforms through Principled Pragmatism.” In J. Briscoe and R.P.S.Malik, Handbook of Water Resources in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Wade, R. 1985. “The Market for Public Offices: Why the Indian State Is Not Better at Development.” World Development 13 (4). World Bank. 2007. Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Bet- ter Water Management in the Middle East and North Africa. MNA Development Report on Water. 37 3 Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review Ahmed Shawky Mohamed and N. Vijay Jagannathan Key Findings In 2003–04, the Government of Egypt (GOE) budget spent 4.087 billion LE on water infrastructure in the irrigation and agriculture subsectors, and 6.697 billion LE in the WSS subsector. † Of this, approximately 79 percent and 61 percent, respectively, were allocated for new investments; the balance was allocated for recurrent costs. The outcomes of such significant public outlays have been mixed. On the positive side, there have been impressive gains in agricultural productivity due to water invest- ment and in water supply and sanitation coverage. On the negative side, fiscal dependence on the government remains, and a new concern that requires significant public finance needs immediate policy attention. The latter has arisen because of pollution externalities in the lower Nile Delta, which are exacting a heavy toll on public health and the environment. A 2002 World Bank study on the costs of environmental degradation estimates the damage costs at 1.6 percent–3.2 percent of GDP. This chapter assesses the recent trends of public expenditures of the water sector. It focuses particularly on the irrigation and water supply and sanitation (WSS) subsectors, the two major recipients of public financing in the water sector. It also investigates different sources of fiscal stress and sources of finance, and explores the efficiency and equity implications of the current arrangements. 1 † This chapter updates World Bank Water Policy Note 2 (2005), written as part of the analytical work supporting the 2005 Public Expenditure Review (PER) in Egypt, a Government of Egypt-World Bank collaboration. See chapter 4, “Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: Spending 1 Less for Better Services” by Shawky Mohamed and others in this volume. 38 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The following is a summary of the key findings: Finding 1: Most investment as well as operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of water services in Egypt are funded from the national budget. 2 Cost-recovery levels still are below international comparators. As a consequence, the sector is heavily indebted. Finding 2: Over the last two decades, the composition of water-related public expenditures has changed. A higher proportion is being allocated to new investments—at the expense of recurrent expenditures and debt repayments, thereby increasing the sector’s long-term liabilities. Finding 3: Water service coverage (in relation to both drinking water and irrigation) is adequate in the Nile Delta area. However, it is gen- erally lacking in the rural/southern areas, in which water services are particularly inequitable for low-income communities. Finding 4: Reallocating budget appropriations among different budget chapters of water agencies, among departments within agencies, and among water user groups (WUGs) requires a fundamental rearrange- ment of current budget planning and management. Finding 5: The irrigation and water supply and sanitation (WSS) subsectors have three options available to finance future O&M and investment costs. These are identified in the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) Action Plan: Increase contributions from users, requiring changes in legislation. a. Decrease transaction costs and overhead expenditures through b. decentralization and improved efficiency in service delivery. The main sources of “avoidable” transaction costs are overstaffing, duplication of responsibilities, oversized designs, suboptimal tech- nology, and procurement inefficiency. O&M costs pertain to the following items in the budget chapters of the water- 2 related ministries: a. Partly chapter 1: Wages that relate to O&M, as opposed to planning and other central administrative functions. b. Chapter 2: Goods and services for O&M. c. Partly chapter 3: Only regular/preventive rehabilitation (as opposed to occa- sional/major rehabilitation). Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review N 39 Facilitate private sector participation in financing, developing, and c. operating the irrigation systems in line with user preferences and willingness to pay. Finding 6: The WSS subsector is moving toward corporatization. It urgently needs to address the debt overhang caused by the past policy of service expansion without cost recovery. Under the present circumstances: For the holding company to fulfill its mandate of reforming the sec- a. tor, restructuring and/or writing off existing debt is inevitable. Any debt write-off needs to be contingent on achieving monitor- b. able financial and operational performance outcomes. Future donor financing could be structured around assisting the hold- c. ing company to achieve the above outcomes in the medium term, perhaps through a sector-wide approach (SWAp) operation. Sector Background Egypt is an arid country with very limited rainfall. The Nile-Lake- Nasser system is one of the largest hydraulic infrastructure complexes in the world. It consists of a series of large barrages, canals, pumping stations, water and sewage treatment plants, and water supply and sewerage networks. Importance of Water Resource Management for the Egyptian Economy The Nile-Lake-Nasser system is Egypt’s only renewable supply source for surface water, and constitutes 95 percent of the country’s total water resources. The rest of Egypt’s water resources is mainly fossil (nonrenewable) groundwater found in the coastal zones, deserts, and Sinai; and estimated at 3–4 BCM/yr. Egypt’s water requirements are increasing as a result of growing population, rising living standards, and the needs of industries and ag- riculture (particularly in the reclaimed new lands). Of the subsectoral shares, agriculture (including fisheries) is the major user; it consumes approximately 70 percent of water. Municipal/potable and industrial subsectors consume only 3.5 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. The balance, estimated at roughly one-quarter of the overall water 40 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS stock, is lost through evaporation (5 percent), and, more significantly, as drainage water (20 percent) discharged into the Mediterranean Sea and the desert fringes of the Nile system. Sectoral Challenges A major challenge facing Egypt is to close the gap between the limited water resources available and the escalating demand for water from competing users. Available water per capita per annum amounts to some 900m³, which is already below the “water poverty” index of 1000 m³/capita/annum. This figure is expected to fall to 670m³ by 2017, unless policies are implemented to sustainably manage growing demand. Managing sustainably requires developing appropriate pricing and financing rules along with an institutional framework that encour- ages sustainable use. Until the early 1990s, GOE’s attention was focused on “balancing” water supply and demand through supply augmentation. The result was significant investments in water supply, drainage, and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure, from both the national budget and donors. Nonetheless, by the mid-/late 1990s, the need for a more integrated approach became apparent due to: Continued deterioration of water quality N Growing demand-supply gap N Intensification of inter-sectoral and inter-regional water allocation N problems Inadequacy of government funds to sustain new investments and N O&M at current levels Poor operational performance of water agencies. N Since then, the government policy has shifted to integrated water quality and quantity management. The integrated water resources management (IWRM) approach seeks to address sectoral concerns through a mix of institutional reforms, changes in incentive structures, and technical innovations. “Public-Good” Perspective to Water Services Water resource management (WRM) is seen as a cornerstone of national security. Consequently, a significant part of the hydraulic Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review N 41 infrastructure is regarded as a public good and receives financing from the national budget. This infrastructure includes not only the “trunk” system, comprising the production, treatment, and distribution of water to various users/subsectors from a system of dams, barrages, and main canals; but also the recipient or “feeder” subsectors, which include irrigation, municipal, industrial, navigation, and hydropower users. For the latter system, there is both a public and a private good dimension because these users obtain privately appropriable benefits either by consumption or by using water as an input in production. Past policies have not rigorously distinguished these two aspects. For example: An Egyptian farmer in the Nile Delta pays the incremental cost N of water delivery at the farm level but not the conveyance (and lifting costs) from the river system. A water supply consumer pays a tariff of approximately only 20 N percent of the treatment and delivery costs. The rest of the “feeder” costs gets picked up in the public goods account. One could argue that apportioning the public and private costs in this very large, integrated hydraulic system is complex. Nevertheless, there clearly is significant potential to increase user contributions for water usage that yields private benefits. However, greater user financing of water services requires a fundamen- tal reorganization of Egyptian water delivery systems—from sectors and departments that rely on budgetary subventions to service-oriented utilities that respond to user preferences and willingness to pay. For example, in Egypt’s WSS subsector, users receive subsidized but poor quality services from utilities. These consumers are unwilling to pay higher tariffs because their expectations of service improvements from these providers are low. However, unless higher tariffs are paid, the utility will never be in a position to reduce its dependence on the national budget. While public money is financing private services, a genuine public service is in desperate need of public funding: infrastructure to improve water quality. Concerns with water quality distress urban and rural users of water in the Nile Delta area. The areas of concern require actions on several fronts: from technological innovations with greater user feedback and participation to improved coordination among water agencies. 42 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS This vicious cycle of poor performance, debt overhang, and private sector lack of interest must be broken. The current attention on public expenditures provides one such opportunity. Consequent Institutional Challenges Centralized but fragmented management and inadequate mechanisms for ensuring accountability to service users affect sectoral financial and operational performance. For example, responsibilities—planning, de- sign, construction, operation, research, monitoring, and regulation—are carried out through multiple agencies and departments within these agencies, and each is funded through a parallel budget line. These agencies are in the nature of “budget-maximizing” bureaucracies and have very little incentive to be accountable to the service users. In recent years, GOE began moving toward addressing these concerns. On the institutional side, “holding companies” have been established for both irrigation services in the “new lands” outside the Nile Delta and for WSS services. The explicit objective is to reduce the recurrent fiscal burden of the government, while improving the ef- ficiency and sustainability of O&M services. The eventual objective is to convert these holding companies to off-budget entities that attract private sector participation. In the irrigation subsector, two holding companies have been established: one for the South Valley/West Delta and one for Northern Sinai. For the WSS subsector, a holding com- pany subsuming 14 subsidiary companies nationwide has been established. However, before they can be effective, these hold- ing companies face two major challenges: There is still no suitable regulatory framework that enables tariff- 1. setting to respond to user demand. There is no strategy on how to write off/restructure the overhang- 2. ing debt and create organizational structures that can respond to user demand/attract private sector participation. 0 1 2 3 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 S h a r e o f G D P ( % ) Source: MOF annual data on expenditures of the two subsectors. Total irrigation expenditures Total WSS expenditures Figure 3.1 Irrigation and WSS Expenditures Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review N 43 In the Nile Delta area, the IWRM action plan already has instituted measures that enhance user voice in the O&M of services. MWRI successfully delegated O&M responsibilities to water user associations (WUAs) at the tertiary-canal (mesqa) level. MWRI also is embarking on an action plan to empower Water Boards to manage irrigation and drainage O&M at the secondary or branch-canal level. The key measure required is an amendment to Law 12/1984 (to empower WUAs), which is expected to be enacted by the end of 2009. Assessment of Expenditure Trends Trends in Water Expenditures Total water expenditures, thus including investment and recurrent invest- ments, implemented between 1981 and 2000 reached LE 23 billion. The notable trend was variability in WSS project investments over 2001–05, marking the end of an expansion phase that began 2 decades back. It generated an increase from 5.8 million m 3 / day in 1982 to 18.2 million m 3 / day in 2000. Coverage figures achieved during this period were quite impressive vis-à-vis MDGs: potable water supply coverage was almost 100 percent and 95 percent for the urban and rural populations, respectively. Per capita potable water use increased from 130 liters/day in 1981 to 275 liters/day in 2000. Sewerage and sanitation cover- age also increased substantially: from 1982–2000, wastewater collection increased eight-fold. On the MWRI side, the trend line was steadier, perhaps reflecting its consistent appropriations to maintain the “trunk” hydraulic infrastructure. 0 1 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 2 4 3 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 % irrigation to total public investments % irrigation to total debt repayments % irrigation to total recurrent expenditures Figure 3.2a Trend of Irrigation Public Authorities’ Expenditures to Total Expenditures (%) FY02 FY03 FY04 % of irrigation to total investments % of irrigation to total recurrent expenditures 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.25 0.15 0.05 0.2 Figure 3.2b Trend of Ratio of Expenditure of Irrigation Economic Authorities to Expenditures of all Economic Authorities (%) 44 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS New Investments vs. Maintenance Unlike other sectors of the econ- omy, investment spending by wa- ter utilities was a relatively high proportion of total expenditures (figures 3.2a, 3.2b, 3.3a, and 3.3b), because of the significant increase in water supply expan- sion investments. For the overall water sector, the ratio of invest- ment-to-recurrent spending has ranged from 200 percent–300 percent since FY01, while invest- ment spending has averaged only 20 percent of recurrent expen- ditures in other sectors. Within the water subsectors, there is a declining trend in recurrent ex- penditures and debt repayments, while investment expenditures have remained relatively steady. This divergence suggests that new investments may be getting higher priority than the opera- tion and maintenance of existing assets. These practices could lead to significant costs in the future in deferred maintenance and should be investigated. Water Resources and Irrigation Subsector Among MWRI departments, which are responsible for these activi- ties, Sovereign Services Aid and Domestic Loans annually comprise on average approximately 75 percent of financing. However, domestic loans are actually long-term subsidies. The reasons are that they are either (a) not repaid (for example, National Water Resources Center), or (b) only partly repaid (for example, Egyptian Public Authorities for Drainage Projects, or EPADP, which repays approximately 28 percent), or (c) expected to be repaid by holding companies that do not have the requisite cash flow from revenues. In general, user/service fees repre- sent only a few percentage points for most departments (figures 3.4 0 1 2 7 6 5 4 3 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 % WSS to total public investments % WSS to total debt repayments % WSS to total recurrent expenditures Figure 3.3a Trend of WSS Public Authorities’ Expenditures to Total Expenditures (%) 0 5 30 25 20 15 10 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 % WSS investments to total investments % WSS recurrent to total recurrent expenditures Figure 3.3b Trend of Ratio of Expenditures of WSS Economic Authorities to Expenditures of all Economic Authorities (%) Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review N 45 and 3.5). The same issue applies to the WSS subsector: Figures 3.6 and 3.7. In aggregate terms, from 2000 to 2005 approximately 12 billion LE has been spent on national ir- rigation infrastructure and water- resources related programs. This level of spending translates to an average annual rate of 15 percent of total Egyptian public invest- ments since 2000. User contributions: Costs of publicly financed investments in subsurface drainage are fully recovered from farmers, while investments in tertiary-canal (or mesqa) improvements are partially recovered through the land tax. Overall, farmers incur approxi- mately 43 percent of the tertiary- canal improvement costs. In some cases (such as the World-Bank-supported Irrigation Improvement Project), farmers are fully responsible for O&M of the improvements provided by MWRI at the tertiary-canal (or mesqa) level. Collections are made through land taxes, levied at 30 LE/feddan/year on average, which accrue to local governments at a collection effi- ciency of 60 percent–75 percent. The collected taxes amount to only 20 percent and 6 percent of the recurrent and total bud- get appropriations, respectively, channeled by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to MWRI. 0.0 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 Egypt Morocco India Phillippines Mexico Australia Source: World BanK 2003. Note: Ratios greater than 1 indicate user repayment not only for 0&M but also for Capital-replacement costs. Figure 3.4 Irrigation O&M Cost Recovery Ratio (%) Change in credits 3% Services fees 4% Foreign loans 16% Grants 7% Sovereign services aid 31% Other sources 1% Domestic loans 38% Source: MWRI data. Sources of Financing MWRI – Irrigation Department Budget Figure 3.5 Financial Resources of Irrigation Subsector, 2001–05 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 Sovereign service 315,547 297,609 307,801 356,629 401,912 Domestic loans 206,220 390,101 437,008 486,770 544,700 Foreign loans 58,232 177,392 175,069 219,988 205,587 Grants 67,241 91,443 93,274 93,150 30,720 Internal finance 10,102 4,587 530 800 701 Services fees 40,243 38,644 36,730 40,799 35,325 Change in credit 71,813 45,252 25,514 0 0 Other sources 45,231 13,300 11,946 0 0 Total 814,629 1,058,328 1,087,872 1,198,336 1,218,945 46 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS For the future, there are two means of financing the ris- ing O&M and investment costs: (1) increase contributions from users through reforms of the pricing system or (2) reduce costs by improving efficiency of service delivery. Through the Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Man- agement Project (IIIMP), MWRI has been testing new options to enhance cost recovery from water users in the Nile Delta. In addition, the proposed (World Bank-supported) West Delta irri- gation project would test full cost recovery from farmers producing high-value agricultural products in the new lands reclaimed from the desert. WSS Subsector The WSS utilities are responsi- ble for the management of water supply and sewerage networks serving domestic, institutional, and industrial water users. Nor- mally, these networks should be expected to recover at least all of the O&M costs. The PER data indicated a continued reliance on the public budget, perhaps because these utilities had been caught in a vicious circle of low tariffs, poor services, and low consumer expectations of ser- vice improvements, which in- creased consumer resistance to price increases. There is a wide Change in credits 11% Services fees 25% Internal fnance 17% Sovereign services aid 29% Other sources 10% Domestic loans 8% Source: MWRI data. Sources of Financing Cairo Potable Water Authority Budget Figure 3.6 Financial Resources of the WSS Subsector: Cairo 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 Sovereign service 553,932 527,485 623,159 493,234 468,500 Domestic loans 104,925 114,599 74,962 174,000 229,000 Foreign loans 3,189 796 1,164 4,000 4,000 Grants 2,662 210 42 0 0 Internal finance 130,693 167,402 153,183 559,818 494,068 Services fees 347,544 387,433 411,030 515,500 576,645 Change in credit 285,848 125,089 0 285,847 285,847 Other sources 201,720 220,242 458,536 0 0 Total 1,630,513 1,543,256 1,722,076 2,032,399 2,058,060 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 E g y p t A l g e r i a ( W & S ) M o r o c c o F e s ( W a t e r ) R a m a l l a h ( W a t e r ) J o r d a n ( W & S ) T u n l s l a ( W a t e r ) T u n l s l a ( S a n i t a t i o n ) E n g l a n d ( W & S ) M o r o c c o ( O N E P ) Source: World Bank Cross-country data (2003–2004). Note: Ratio > 1 indicates user repayment not only for recurrent costs, but also for capital costs. Figure 3.7 Water Supply and Sanitation: Cost Recovery (%) Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review N 47 gap between the actual costs of water supply (0.8–1.00 LE/m 3 ) that they incur and the user-tariffs (average 0.15 LE/m 3 ) that accrue to them. For example, Cairo water tariffs are among the lowest among developing country megacities and pay for only 25 percent and 10 percent of the actual costs of water supply and sanitation, respec- tively. Cost recovery in secondary cities/towns is better for water supply (Alexandria’s is as high as 50 percent), although equally low (10 percent) for sanitation. Consequently, since establishing NOPWASD (1981) and the economic authorities (1995), these entities regularly have been bailed out through sovereign aid and domestic loans that are never repaid. Recent attempts to increase Cairo’s tariffs are awaiting concur- rence from the local councils and the national Parliament. Low tariffs not only impose a heavy recurrent fiscal burden on the national budget but also generate disincentives for operational efficiency and respon- siveness to consumers. Prior to establishing the WSS holding company, governors had the authority to set water prices to a ceiling of LE 0.23 /m 3 . Although this ceiling was below actual production costs by a factor of 3–4, not many governors utilized even this authorization. The final outcome was that domestic loans and sovereign ser- vices aid (figure 3.6) became the sources of finances for even routine O&M. The O&M subsidies to the subsector were estimated at 3–4 billion LE/annum, or 2.0 percent–2.5 percent of total public re- current expenditures. Thus, the debt overhang of the WSS subsector reached 14 billion LE. Table 3.1 Recurrent Unit Costs and Associated Subsidies in WSS System NOPWASD (Municipalities) GOGCWS (Cairo) AWGA (Alexandria) LE per m³ Estimated capital, O&M costs 1.0 a 1.1 b NA c Subsidy 0.8 0.9 NA Average user fee e 0.2 0.2 0.3 Rate: Piaster /m 3 d,e 15–25 15–25 25–35 Notes: National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage. a. General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply. b. Alexandria Water General Authority. c. Wastewater tariff is 20% of water tariff for Cairo and 35% for Alexandria. d. These are applicable to the residential units, which have water meters. Those who do not have meters or whose meters are not working pay a e. fixed monthly charge for water consumption (LE 5–20 monthly/unit). The charge changes with house area. 48 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Sources of Debt In Egypt the WSS debt overhang has escalated (figure 3.9) for two reasons: First, WSS economic authorities (overseen by governorates) are a. expected to pay for their O&M costs through user fees. How- ever, there is a wide gap between the actual cost of water supply (0.8–1.00 LE/m 3 ) that the authorities incur, and the user-tariffs (0.15 LE/m 3 on average) that accrue to them. The consequence is that since the National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (NOPWASD) was established in 1981, and the economic authorities in 1995, these entities have been bailed out regularly by sovereign aid and domestic loans that rarely get repaid. Second, in the absence of adequate cash flow from service users, b. these agencies are fully dependent on O&M government budget transfers. As these transfers often are based on historical prec- edents, they often become biased toward paying wages rather than toward creating an effective O&M; or they become biased toward existing assets (such as water/wastewater plants and distribution networks) rather than new ones. The consequence is “deferred maintenance,” a situation that leads to unnecessary deterioration of assets and (eventually) costly rehabilitation that could have been avoided by less costly routine/preventive maintenance. The rehabilitation of WSS infrastructure triggers cycles of debt be- cause the utilities/NOPWASD are forced to borrow from the National Investment Bank (NIB) or seek (often off-budget) subventions to meet their pressing rehabili- tation needs. Under these circumstances, passing on the debt to the newly created holding company does not resolve the prob- lem. It simply passes on the problem to a new organization that lacks the capacity to manage the problem. 0 30 60 90 Urban Lower Egypt Upper Egypt Frontiers S h a r e o f P o p u l a t i o n ( % ) Source: World Bank 2005. Drinking Water Wastewater Poverty Figure 3.8 Poverty and Access to Water and Wastewater (% of population) Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review N 49 A similar analogy can be applied to MWRI’s holding com- panies for new lands. However, GoE has not been as apprehen- sive about the debt of the irriga- tion subsector as it has about that of WSS. The reasons are two. First, irrigation debt has not reached such an unwieldy level as has WSS (figure 3.9). Second, much of the irrigation debt has been used to finance trunk-infrastructure investments of the “public good” type, which can be deemed sunk costs. Inequitable Outcomes The equity impacts of the existing sectoral arrangements can be summed up in four points: Customers in secondary cities and rural areas incur higher WSS 1. service prices than in major cities. In many rural/periurban areas, water vendors supply potable water to households that have stand- pipes, charging more than 10 times the actual cost for piped-water prices. Moreover, poor farmers already pay as much as 10 percent of their incomes for wastewater removal from cesspools, which fact suggests their willingness to pay for a better service-provision option. WSS tariffs are heavily subsidized. Hence, increasing block tariff 2. structures may end up targeting cross-subsidies on the nonpoor (for example, because the nonpoor may have smaller families or may be able afford to use water-saving appliances, compared to the poor), not penalizing the wasteful users. Poorer areas have the worst WSS services (figure 3.8). 3. A fee of 70 LE–100 LE per feddan/year is estimated to be adequate 4. to meet the full O&M costs for irrigation services. This amount would be an average reduction in farm incomes of 5 percent, a percentage likely to be affordable to big and medium holders. In the absence of targeting, subsidies are benefiting the richer farm- ers, who use the most water. 0 10 20 15 5 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2004–05 2003–04 L E b i l l i o n s Source: MOF annual data on the debt repayment by, versus loans to, the irrigation and WSS subsectors (reference year is 2000). WSS cumulative debt Irrigation cumulative debt Figure 3.9 Cumulative Debts of WSS and Irrigation Subsectors 50 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Responding to Challenges: GOE Policy Actions Taken The government’s vision for sustainable financing for the water sector is to (a) explore alternative cost-sharing arrangements with decentral- ized service delivery institutions, (b) progressively turn over financial responsibility for O&M to water utilities or water user organizations, and (c) establish full cost-recovery arrangements between the govern- ment and farmers/investors in the new lands. GOE proposes to encourage public-private partnerships (PPP) in the financing, operation, and management of irrigation and water sup- ply infrastructure. Recently established holding companies are being encouraged to seek out private partners who can share capital and O&M costs for both the expanded irrigation network in Toshka and El-Salam canal, and for the WSS subsectors. Irrigation The Water Boards Project is testing ways to transfer water management responsibilities at the secondary level of the irrigation system from MWRI to user organizations. This transfer would reduce the government’s con- tribution to O&M costs by approximately 50 percent. The extra burden on farmers is expected to be partially compensated by exempting them from paying land taxes to local governments. The IIIMP will be testing new organizational arrangements that link the MWRI’s investment and operational functions to user organizations’ responsibility for operating and maintaining the irrigation network below the branch canal level. Water Supply While GOE’s efforts at WSS decentralization have focused on changing the institutional arrangements, the latter have not as yet adequately addressed service efficiency concerns: Increased WSS tariff collection responsibilities at the governorate N level very well could end up simply topping-up employee wages, unless the latter are made contingent on either increased labor productivity or improved O&M services. There are as yet no policies for penalizing nonpaying customers. N Government and public sector institutions often are exempted from paying water bills. Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review N 51 The cost of water treatment and distribution has not been fully N borne by industrial users because government subsidies support- ing O&M costs benefit all users (for both water and wastewater treatment). On average, for example, industries are billed 1 LE /m 3 for water, which is often substantially below the costs of delivering the service. There also is a pronounced regional bias in WSS services that N favors major cities in the Nile Delta and along the Suez Canal. Even though rural population densities are high in the delta, there is almost no sewerage in Upper Egypt or generally in rural areas. Sanitation has been defined as an urban public service, and no institution/agency has adopted providing sanitation to the rural areas (figure 3.8). Recommended Policy Orientations Increase Recovery of Recurrent Costs Egypt’s hydraulic infrastructure has been constructed over several millennia and is dependent on a storage, distribution, and collection system around a single river. The public-good aspect of a significant part of MWRI expenditures (headworks and main canal systems) always will remain. However, significant budgetary savings could be accomplished by devolving irrigation and WSS service functions to locally accountable institutions. To this end, holding companies should be vested with wider authorities to raise tariffs and recruit employees. These companies also should be entrusted with more proactive roles beyond O&M and undertake new investments. Concerning WSS services, the medium-term policy should focus on recovering O&M and amortization costs from the users. Increased private sector inter- est will take place only when there is clear evidence of reliable cash flow from users. Over recent decades, public finance of irrigation expansion in the “new lands” has taken place over vast expanses of the desert around the Nile River system. Mega projects such as Toshka in southwest Egypt, and El-Salam Canal east of the Nile Delta and Sinai have been implemented. These decisions have been based on economic, social, and political considerations that include developing agroindustrial communities and investment zones outside the Nile Valley to decongest the valley system. However, there are significant 52 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS opportunity costs of these investments, which have absorbed bil- lions of dollars of scarce public resources. Future investments could follow two criteria: Maximize “crop value per drop,” meaning that the revenues gen- 1. erated from irrigated agriculture should focus on high-value crops that generate income and employment opportunities. 3 Cost-recovery through volumetric pricing of water services. 2. Use a Part of Recurrent Cost Savings to Leverage Investments That Focus on Low-Income Communities and Urgent Environmental Expenditures The recurrent cost savings could be used to leverage donor financing to support a nationwide targeted program aimed at improving water and sanitation services in low-income communities. For water supply, the focus could be on the low-income communities of Upper Egypt through national budgetary finance. Concerning water quality, one subregion’s untreated wastewater becomes the downstream com- munity’s pollution problem. Moreover, the financing requirements to tackle the costs of environmental degradation are enormous and require significant long-term donor concessional commitments. 4 Establish Criteria to Ensure That New Public Investments Do Not Substitute for the Maintenance of Existing Hydraulic Infrastructure Assets Until the above reforms are instituted, public expenditures will continue to be the main sources of maintaining existing assets. In this case, developing new assets financed through public appropriations 5 should not substitute for public appropriations to maintain existing assets. 6 The “old lands” in the Nile Valley are restricted by heavy soils, very small ten- 3 ures, and traditional farming systems dating back thousands of years. Each of these restrictions impedes fostering a cropping pattern that maximizes net exports. See Shawky and others, ““Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: 4 Spending Less for Better Services” in this volume. Chapters 3 and 4 of the budget (according to the budget structure of the Ministry 5 of Finance in 2005). Chapter 2 of the budget for regular/preventive maintenance and chapter 3 for 6 occasional/major rehabilitation. Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review N 53 Decentralize Decentralization of governmental responsibilities and community participation in service planning and delivery must be deepened. It requires the participation of water user groups in the planning, design, implementation, and O&M of water works; in setting and adminis- tering tariffs; and in supervision and quality control. Decentralization also intends to eliminate government involvement in routine O&M/ rehabilitation of irrigation systems. In the WSS sector, utilities need to be accountable to local users and elected bodies, such as municipal councils. Meaningful participation cannot be achieved unless there is greater transfer of responsibility, authority, and resources to grassroots user groups. Deal with Debt Most of the water sector’s domestic debts have short maturity and therefore are not appropriate instruments to finance this type of long- term investment. Furthermore, as the domestic debt is not actually repaid through revenues from water tariffs, its write-off by the gov- ernment becomes inevitable. As in the Philippines (box 3.1), the long-run success of decentral- ization requires the resolution of the debt overhang. A possible solution is to link debt relief with the accomplishment of the key institutional reform milestones: improving financial and op- erational efficiency. For example, the WSS holding company’s debts could be written off after the accomplishment of milestones linked to Box 3.1 Water Management in the Philippines In the Philippines, after the law devolved O&M responsibilities from the National Irriga- tion Administration (NIA) to the local governments/communities, local governments/ communities have been reluctant to take over the O&M of communal irrigation systems. In addition to the lack of capacity at the local level, reluctance was due to the debt overhang that also was to be passed from NIA to the local governments/communities. Eventu- ally, national legislation was necessary to write off most of the debt. NIA also offered a pilot program in which a considerable part of the debt is waived if local governments/ communities contribute immediate equity through fostering local private investment in irrigation and raising user fees. 54 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS financial and operational efficiency. Performance could be monitored through five key indicators, such as debt service ratio, unaccounted- for-water (UFW) percent, 7 number of staff per 1,000 connections, total number of connections, and 100 percent metering of all water connections/subscriptions. 8 External support through a sector-wide approach (SWAp) operation or debt restructuring could improve ser- vice performance. Address Procurement Inefficiencies One glaring example of procurement inefficiencies is the lack of trans- parency. Inappropriate procurement practices can be controlled if oversight of the tendering process explicitly involves the participation of beneficiary communities. Current procurement practices are designed to safeguard the integrity of public spending but often end up creat- ing the opposite effect. Delays in awarding contracts and in honoring government payment commitments to contractors result in the lack of interest among highly competent Egyptian companies in bidding for government contracts. Overstaffing in departments has resulted in unnecessary procedures and paperwork, often as “make-work” assignments for government staff. Furthermore, the practice of retain- ing retirees as senior management advisors/consultants demotivates middle-level staff. Ensure Appropriate Design of Water Facilities and Choice of Technologies The technologies selected in providing water services often are oversized and not cost-effective, and increase O&M costs to users. An example from the irrigation subsector at the tertiary-canal level is pumping facilities (pump set and pump house) and pipelines that have been oversized to “guarantee” reliable irrigation deliveries. A cost-effective alternative would be to involve the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) in improving extension services and MWRI in improving the abil- ity of a farmer to receive water on demand, that is, through continuous Unaccounted-for-water (UFW) includes leaks and water supplied to illegal 7 connections. See example on Egypt’s WSS benchmarking indicators in chapter 4 by Shawky 8 and others. Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review N 55 flow. These concepts are being tested in the IIIMP. 9 Rather than being unilaterally imposed by one agency solely to meet engineering/technical crite- ria, technology choice should be based on comprehensive (multi- agency) and cost-effective plans. These comprehensive plans should be coordinated jointly by MoF, Ministry of Planning, NOPWASD, Egyptian Environ- mental Affairs Agency (EEAA), MWRI, Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP), and Ministry of Local Development (MoLD). Therefore, sequential and prioritized spatial coverage of services and adoption of low-cost technologies should be sought. In figure 3.10, actual public expenditure 10 (light blue) vs. needs (orange plus blue) show that savings from expenditure rationalization can be reallocated to meet the unfunded needs. Savings from the public expenditure can largely be achieved through: The aforementioned policy orientations 1 and 2: financing recurrent N expenditure through targeted end-user fees will free some public funds that then can be spent on public-like needs, such as water quality. This is an example of an “allocative” efficiency. The aforementioned policy orientations 6 on procurement efficiency N and 7 on “right-sizing” the works. These are technical efficiencies Rationalize the Institutional Architecture There is room for cost-saving toward through reducing overhead costs. The WSS subsector has begun to reduce overheads through establishing 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 Additional expenditures NEEDED for the irrigation subsector to improve water quality and public health Additional expenditures NEEDED for the WSS subsector to improve water quality and public health Total ACTUAL expenditures of the water sector in 2004 M i l l i o n L . E . / a n n u m Source: MOF (2004) data and World Bank (2005). Figure 3.10 Actual Expenditures vs. Needs (M LE/yr) See in this volume the chapter entitled “Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile 9 Delta” by Jose Simas and others, in which the W-10 pilot has tackled this oversizing issue (albeit on a demonstration scale). Summation of the long-term capital investments “annualized” for 2004, plus 10 recurrent expenditure actually spent in 2004. 56 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS the holding company described above. In the irrigation subsector, MWRI is piloting programs to reduce overheads within the governorate level, namely, at the water directorates and water districts levels. Supported by a USAID project and IIIMP, MWRI is piloting Integrated Water Manage- ment Districts (IWMDs), which assume the O&M roles. The IWMDs are entities integrated at the district level based on hydrological rather than administrative boundaries. To remedy the current fragmented structure, in the IWMDs, all MWRI departments are represented in one organization. This structure is expected to reduce O&M transac- tion costs as well as to improve O&M at the district level. The next step is to pilot Integrated Water Management Directorates, which assume design and construction roles. The lessons from these pilots will be used to scale up the concept throughout Egypt. It is advisable to change the accounting practices by posting all water-related costs under one account within the general state budget. This change could unify the present fragmentation among different institutions. Form Partnerships with the Private Sector Beyond the adoption of holding companies, more advanced PPP mod- els in irrigation and WSS need to be piloted. The depth and mode of private participation will depend critically upon measures taken to improve cost-recovery. Recommended Immediate Actions The short-term policy recommendations drawn from this PER analysis are: a. 1. Amend Law 12/1984. Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) to water user associations/groups is envisaged to reduce the fis- cal burden on the government, while improving local irrigation services. These groups need the authority to collect, retain, and administer user fees. There is an enforceable legal basis for WUAs to raise (land) taxes to recover O&M costs of the tertiary canals, because these canals are privately owned by farmers. However, Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review N 57 branch canals are public assets, and there is no legal basis for WUAs and Water Boards to recover O&M costs. Unless Law 12/1984 is amended, the suggested reforms cannot be effected. b. 2. Put in place a subsectoral investment and restructuring program in WSS. By virtue of two presidential decrees, 11 a legal basis has been initiated for the WSS holding company and its affiliated com- panies to raise tariffs and achieve financial autonomy. However, these utilities face a difficult organizational challenge. The basic infrastructure, such as universal metering, is not in place; users are skeptical of their capacity to improve services; the debt overhang restricts the flexibility of financial management; and the organiza- tions are heavily overstaffed. What is required is a wide-ranging investment and restructuring program to simultaneously improve service quality and the financial autonomy of WSS companies. References World Bank. 2002. “Cost Assessment of Environmental Degradation.” A Sector Note. Middle East and North Africa Region. Report #25175. June. In 2004, two Presidential Decrees were issued that regulated the WSS subsector 11 under the responsibility of the MHUNC. The first decree, 135 for 2004, is concerned with the creation of a Holding Company for Drinking Water and Sanitation and its affiliated companies that include the General Economic Authorities for Drinking Water and Sanitation operating in the governorates. The second Presidential Decree, 136 for 2004, covers the creation of the Central Authority for the Drinking Water and Sanitation Sector, and Protection of the Consumer. This decree aims at regulating and monitoring for quality control and consumer-price control. 59 4 Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: Spending Less for Better Services Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Alexander Kremer, and Manish Kumar Background and Objective This chapter is a sequel to chapter 3 on water sector issues and expen- diture patterns in Egypt. 1 This chapter identifies how public expenditure could be reallocated to improve equity and productivity. Water Has Public and Private Features A public good is “nonexcludable” because it is costly or unrealistic to link end-user charges to usage. A public good is also “nonsubtractable”: one person’s use of the infrastructure or the service does not detract from another person’s use. Trunk water infrastructure 2 —multipurpose dams/barrages, multipurpose conveyance canals, flood control infra- structures, and major water/wastewater treatment plants—are public goods. They may be efficiently funded by flat charges or general/ sovereign revenues, and there is no reason to link end-user payments to their usage. However, when water reaches the end-user, it becomes a pri- vate good. A private good is subtractable, meaning that one person’s use subtracts from another’s; and excludable, meaning that one can 1 This chapter originated as Water Policy Note 2 (World Bank 2005b), the sec- ond on Egypt’s water sector, as part of the analytical work supporting the Public Expenditure Review (PER) in Egypt, a collaboration between the Government of Egypt and the World Bank. The aim was to inform government decisionmaking on increasing the value added from water and curbing the socioeconomic costs of water pollution, while reducing the burden on the government budget. 2 This is true for the infrastructure although not, of course, for the water resource base. 60 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Figure 4.1 Breakdown of Capital Spending between Public and Private Goods 1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 0 Private good Public good ( 1 0 0 0 L E ) Capital expenditures Mixed good Figure 4.2 Breakdown of GOE Recurrent Spending on Public and Private Goods 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0 Private activity Public activity ( 1 0 0 0 L E ) Recurrent expenditures Mixed activity stop nonpayers from using it. In other words, it is efficient to charge the user and earmark user charges to cover the costs of the service. Charging can help to ensure that the good is not over-consumed. One example of a private good is “on-farm” water, the water flowing into tertiary/quaternary canals of the irrigation network. Another example is household water supply and sanitation connections. Government Spends on Private Goods Egypt’s capital spending on irriga- tion is primarily for public goods, but the Egyptian government also makes a major allocation to private goods (figure 4.1). The message in figure 4.2 is more dramatic: public recurrent expen- diture has been almost entirely on private-good aspects of water delivery. This observation can be cou- pled with the observations of chapter 3 (first published as World Bank 2005a). Egypt’s water infra- structure is suffering from inad- equate maintenance. Increased user charges for downstream operations and maintenance (O&M) could release public re- sources for priority maintenance of deteriorating upstream infra- structure. These resources, in turn, would reduce the need for public funding of infrastructure rehabilitation. They also would release public resources for under-funded public priorities such as wastewater collec- tion and treatment. Potential Efficiency Gains One can measure the potential for improved efficiency by benchmark- ing institutions’ performance. Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies N 61 Figure 4.3 Seasonal Irrigation Water Supply per Unit Agricultural Area 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 Besentway Zaweit Naim El Beida Daqalt Sanhour El- Kadima Neshil El- Kadima Name of branch canal C u b i c M e t e r s p e r h e c t a r e Source: Agriculture and Rural Development Department (ARD), World Bank, communicated by Safwat Abdel Dayem, former World Bank Drainage Advisor. Figure 4.4 On-Farm Water Demand/Supply Ratio (Ratios Exceeding 1 Indicate Shortage; Less than 1, Excess) Source: Agriculture and Rural Development Department (ARD), World Bank, communicated by Safwat Abdel Dayem, former World Bank Drainage Advisor. 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 Besentway Zaweit Naim Daqalt Sanhour El-Kadima Name of branch canal O n - f a r m w a t e r d e m a n d - t o - s u p p l y r a t i o Water for Irrigation Performance benchmarking in irrigation and agricultural drainage The three common types of irrigation benchmarking indica- tors are 3 : a. Service reliability indicators. These indicators may include (1) the intra-farm uniformity of water application, mea- sured at the root zone and (2) the adequacy and reliability of irriga- tion delivery, assessed against engineering/technical benchmarks. b. Internal indicators. These compare system outputs with inputs. The indicators may include (1) assessing the ratio of the water usage to the water actually delivered at various levels of the system and (2) economic efficiency (cost-benefit ratio). c. Comparative indicators. These indicators assess impacts of irrigated agriculture across compa- rable irrigation systems and/ or through time. An example would be to assess productiv- ity as the actual production per unit of water divided by the norm. The performance bench- marking undertaken below for the irrigation subsector tends toward the internal and com- parative types. Better use of water and efficient irrigation practices The analysis supported by figures 4.3–4.11 draws from a 2002–03 dataset, which may not be representative of the current nationwide 3 See International Programme for Technology and Research in Irrigation and Drainage, www.fao.org/iptrid/ 62 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Figure 4.5 Canal-System Efficiency of Water Delivery (Water Supply at Canal Level vs. Farm Level) (%) Source: Agriculture and Rural Development Department (ARD), World Bank, communicated by Safwat Abdel Dayem, former World Bank Drainage Advisor. –200.0 –150.0 –100.0 –50.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 Besentway Zaweit Naim Daqalt Sanhour El-Kadima Name of branch canal Figure 4.6 Annual Irrigation Supply per Unit Irrigated Area (m 3 /ha) 20,000.00 18,000.00 16,000.00 14,000.00 12,000.00 10,000.00 8,000.00 6,000.00 4,000.00 2,000.00 0.00 R i o Y a q u i 0 0 S r i r a m s a g a r 0 0 M a l i n d i9 8 M a l i n d i9 7 M a l i n d i0 0 M a l i n d i9 9 B a l a q t a r 0 0 context. Therefore, the results and the argumentation drawn may not apply to all irrigation schemes in Egypt. The inten- tion was more to make a case for scaling up the benchmarking exercise (when more ample data sets are available), as part of the IWRM ASSESSMENT exercise advocated in this volume. Figures 4.3–4.5 compare the irrigation technical efficiency of 6 branch-canal command areas in Egypt. They show that some regions use water much more productively than others. Figure 4.3 compares seasonal water supply per hectare; figure 4.4 compares the on-farm water supply-demand ratios; and figure 4.5 compares the canal-system efficiency of water delivery. The branch canal level is the secondary level in the Egyptian irriga- tion delivery system, below the trunk/main canal level. Being under public ownership, the branch canal level is managed and financed by the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI). However, the MWRI piloted various programs to hand over its management to Water Boards (World Bank 2005). The rationale was that the canal-drainage system is a private good from the branch-canal level downward. The data in figures 4.3–4.5 4 depict a significant disparity in performance among the 6 com- mand areas. MWRI distributes water among command areas in proportion to crop water re- quirements, adjusted for cropping area. Therefore, any variation in water availability per unit area at 4 Figures 4.4 and 4.5 lack 2 of the 6 observations of figure 4.3 due to lack of data. Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies N 63 Figure 4.7 Cost-Recovery Ratio 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 B a l a q t a r 0 0 M a l i n d i 9 8 M a l i n d i 9 7 M a l i n d i 9 9 S r i r a m s a g a r 0 0 M a l i n d i 0 0 R i o Y a q u i 0 0 Figure 4.8 Average Depth to Shallow Water (m) 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 14.00 16.00 B a l a q t a r 0 0 R i o Y a q u i 0 0 S r i r a m s a g a r 0 0 M a l i n d i 0 0 M a l i n d i 9 9 M a l i n d i 9 8 M a l i n d i 9 7 Figure 4.9 Average Production Value per Unit of Irrigation Supply (US$/m 3 /annum) 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 Yemen Iran Egypt Mexico Chile Costa Rica Turkey Brazil Lebanon n o m i n a l U S $ p e r m 3 / y e a r o f w a t e r the field level can be attributed only to water management in- efficiencies downstream of the allocation point, namely, at the secondary level and below. Figures 4.6–4.8 compare the technical and operation- al performance of Balaqtar, a representative canal in Egypt, with comparable canals in In- dia (Sriramsagar), Mexico (Rio Yaqui), and Kenya (Malindi) (World Bank 2003). The compar- ison reveals a significant potential for improving the operational and managerial performance of the feeder level of Balaqtar. The data in figures 4.3–4.8 support the argument for trans- ferring the management and f inance of the nonheadwork canal systems to water user organizations (with temporary technical backstopping from MWRI). This would not only reduce public spending but also ensure more efficient irrigation practices (World Bank 2005). Economic efficiency of irrigation Figure 4.9 compares the eco- nomic efficiency of irrigation in Egypt and other countries. The monetary value of agricultural production per unit of water is used as an indicator of economic efficiency. Although the crop- yield-per-unit-area in Egypt is quite high (particularly with rice), figure 4.9 clearly suggests that 64 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Figure 4.10 Production Value per Unit Irrigation Supply (US$/m 3 /season) 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 S r i r a m s a g a r 0 0 B a la q t a r 0 0 R i o Y a q u i 0 0 M a l i n d i9 7 M a l i n d i0 0 M a l i n d i9 9 M a l i n d i9 8 the economic returns to irrigation water in Egypt are lower than international norms. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 (World Bank 2003) support this argument by comparing the performance of Balaqtar Canal with com- parable canals in India, Kenya, and Mexico. The causes of the low socio- economic returns to irrigation water are twofold: Inefficiency in agricultural production and supply chains. Even a. though this is outside the water sector, it reduces the return on irrigation sector investment. Low technical efficiency at the canal/farm level. b. Potable Water and Sanitation Robust indicators for the WSS subsector have been established and used world-wide. Cost- recovery in Egypt is very low (table 4.1). Unaccounted-for Water (UFW) Is High Unaccounted-for water (UFW) is one of the most important indica- tors of efficiency in the WSS sub- sector. UFW is defined as water that is not metered or billed to customers. It is calculated by subtracting the metered consumption from the total amount of water supplied to the water system. UFW comprises: Apparent water loss arising from meter inaccuracies and improper 1. accounting of water used in filling new mains, connections, and service reservoirs, and for flushing the water distribution system during maintenance. Figure 4.11 Production Value per Unit Irrigated Area, Including Multiple Cropping (US$/ha) 7,000.00 6,000.00 5,000.00 4,000.00 3,000.00 2,000.00 1,000.00 0.00 S r i r a m s a g a r 0 0 R i o Y a q u i 0 0 B a l a q t a r 0 0 M a l i n d i 9 7 M a l i n d i 0 0 M a l i n d i 9 9 M a l i n d i 9 8 Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies N 65 Actual water loss due to leaks and theft. 2. In Egypt, quality UFW data is scarce. Studies on specific areas show UFW values from 50 percent–67 percent. This percentage is usually higher for smaller municipalities. A data set for 15 governorates shows a UFW range among governorates of 15 (Cairo) to 56 percent (Fayoum), with a weighted average for the 15 governorates of 30 percent. In developed countries, UFW usually ranges from less than 10 percent for new systems to 25 percent for older systems. However, some Eastern European and African countries regularly reach 40 to 50 percent, or even 60 percent. Comparing the indicators for Egypt with those observed from the comparable international norms, one can conclude: A number of staff per 1,000 population served well above 5, indi- N cating heavy overstaffing Table 4.1 Benchmarking Water and Sanitation Subsector Governorate/ indicator Capital cost- recovery ratio (%) Consumption (liter/capita/day) Debt service ratio (%) No. staff/1000 connection Benchmark (norm) 50 80 rural/150 urban 1 to 3 Water Wastewater Aswan 3 108 –383 NA 10 Alexandria Water 4 351 –16 14 DNA Alexandria Wastewater 32 NA 41 4 NA Beheira 14 85 111 8 NA Beni Suef 6 52 –8 7 20 Cairo Water 3 252 –192 NA 14 Cairo Wastewater 9 NA –450 14 NA Dakahlia 6 DNA –4 6 6 Damietta 14 DNA 0 7 DNA Fayoum 8 102 –15 4 DNA Gharbia 5 81 –3 7 17 Kafr El Sheikh 12 124 0 7 15 Minia 6 DNA 0 9 DNA Sharqeya 7 100 –4 6 10 Source: Personal communication with USAID. Notes: NA = Not applicable; DNA = Data not available. 1. Capital cost-recovery ratio = Revenues/total net fixed assets. 2. Debt service ratio = Debt service/operating profit (loss) before depreciation. 66 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Very low cost-recovery ratios and debt service ratios N Accurate UFW percentages not known, but probably at typical N developing-country levels (30 percent–50 percent) Large disparities in liter/capita/day usage rates across country. N Government policy is that water utilities should be financially au- tonomous. However, because of low end-user tariffs, the government inevitably bails out loss-making utilities with grants from the Ministry of Finance and loans from the National Investment Bank (NIB). Higher rates would help GOE to achieve its goal of financial autonomy for water utilities. Rate increases also would enable and encourage the utilities to improve technical efficiency (unit service per unit expenditure). In conclusion, Egypt’s water and sanitation services are less finan- cially sustainable than the developing-country norm. Regarding water management efficiency, the country’s services are possibly on a par with utilities in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. Improved Wastewater Disposal Will Benefit the Entire Nation We have shown above that a disproportionate volume of public spending is allocated to private goods. At the same time, there are great unre- alized opportunities for public spending on public goods. Wastewater disposal is a case in point. As part of the Country Environmental Analysis of Egypt (World Bank 2005), a study was undertaken to estimate the socioeconomic cost of the disposal of maltreated or untreated wastewater. Three policy options were compared: Business as Usual (BAU), the status quo 1. Government-led centralized actions including those executed 2. in urban and suburban areas, as proposed by the National Plan for the Protection of the Water Resources of Egypt (2003) Option b plus community-based and hygiene measures to control 3. the unsafe disposal of rural sewage. The study has estimated that the socioeconomic cost of maltreated/ untreated wastewater is higher than LE 9 billion, or 2 percent of GDP (figure 4.12). These costs represent the harm caused to human health, agriculture, and fisheries. Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies N 67 Figure 4.12 Cost-Beneft Analysis of Improving Wastewater Disposal 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 BAU Central measures Central + community & hygiene measures T o t a l c o s t s L E b i l l i o n / y e a r Forgone benefts (damage costs) Cost of added treatment/control Better wastewater disposal is a classic case of a public good because it would benef it the entire nation, particularly those downstream who cannot easily protect themselves. By imple- menting the measures cited in the 2003 National Plan for the Protection of Water Resources, Egypt could achieve a net benefit of LE 2 billion. The addition of community-based and self-fi- nanced sanitation programs could produce an extra net benefit of LE 1 billion. See details in appendix 2 and in chapter 3 (World Bank Policy Note 2005). Do Water Subsidies Support Incomes of Poorer Households? As argued above, downstream O&M expenditures provide private goods and should be covered by user charges. Switching to user charges would release public expenditures for priority public needs, such as wastewater treatment. However, one possible justification for public subsidies to downstream O&M is that it is an efficient way to support the incomes of poorer households. According to this argument, water subsidies would play the role of a social welfare transfer from the taxpayer to the poor. The methodology of Benefit Incidence Assessment (BIA) can test whether water subsidies are an effective social welfare transfer. BIA studies the distributional impact of public expenditures and whether it is pro-poor. A subsidy is defined as progressive if the absolute value of the benefit is greater for a poor household than for a rich one. The information acquired can be a useful input for policymakers concerned with the improved targeting of programs and subsidies. This BIA analyzes whether the current irrigation subsidy is progres- sive (appendix A4.1). The analysis is run for two samples of agricultural households from the western areas of the Delta region 68 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Figure 4.13 Farmer Land and Income Distribution Land and income distribution 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Decile a c r e s / h o u s e h o l d 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 L E / h o u s e h o l d / y e a r Mean acres/hh Mean income/hh There are inherent difficulties with BIA of the irrigation sector. BIAs for education or health services utilize the difference in participation by the poor vis-a-vis the rich. However, this methodology is inadequate for irrigation because households use irrigation to different degrees. Therefore, the study attempts to differentiate the level of participation among households. Ideally, this differentiation would be achieved by measuring water utilized on each household’s farm, but it is difficult to measure water utilized on a farm. In fact, in Egypt, irrigation water is not metered at canal-to-farm turnouts. Irrigation water utilization is a function of area cultivated, crop type, soil type, climate, and on-farm irrigation technology. Two samples were taken at different times and in zones with different socioeconomic characteristics. Sample A was taken from districts in three governorates and used landholding as a proxy for water use. Sample B was drawn from 7 villages in 1 governorate and included water-use data collected by interviewing a random sample of rural householders. Findings Sample A Figure 4.13 shows the relationship between households’ landholdings and incomes. Households in the richest income decile own on av- erage 10.8 acres, compared with 1.4 acres in the poorest decile. On the assumption that wa- ter use and subsidies are pro- portional to landholdings, there is a strong correlation between a household’s income and its benefit from water subsidies. The richer households benefit most. According to the data in this sample, exactly 75 percent of the water subsidy benefits the richest 50 percent of households, whereas only 25 percent benefits the poorest 50 percent. Only 9.7 percent of the total public subsidy is received by the poorest 25 percent of households. These findings indicate that irrigation subsidies are not justified as a policy instrument for the redistribution of income. The main benefi- ciaries of subsidies are the rich, not the poor. Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies N 69 Figure 4.14 Irrigation Subsidy as Share of Income 0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Decile Subsidy/income Subsidy/crop income The average value of the irrigation subsidy is LE 137/acre. Using this figure, it is possible to (1) calculate the importance of the irriga- tion subsidy as a percentage of total household income for richer and poorer households and (2) see whether removing the subsidy would have a disproportionately severe impact on the livelihoods of poor households. The irrigation subsidy is worth 2.5 percent–4 percent of the income of rural households of all income classes (figure 4.14). There is no clear correlation between household income and the importance of the irrigation subsidy as a share of income. The irrigation subsidy is therefore not a major contributor to household income for the poor. The delegation of the man- agement and financing of down- stream irrigation systems to water user associations (WUAs) would involve an increase in water charges to farmers. Delegation also would help farmers improve their crop yields through better water manage- ment. Therefore, it is useful to calculate the irrigation subsidy as a per- centage share of farmers’ crop income. This method would show the increase of crop income needed (as a result of better water management) to compensate farmers when the irrigation subsidy is withdrawn. The required increase in crop income to compensate farmers for losing the irrigation subsidy would range from 6 percent–11 percent. The required increase in crop production is higher for poorer farm- ers than for richer farmers. The reason is that richer farmers achieve higher levels of crop income per acre, so the subsidy is lower as a share of their crop incomes. However, even for poorer farmers, the yield increases required are well within the range that is expected to result from improved water management. Sample B Sample B represents 60 farms (not households) in the Western Delta area. This zone of newly developed land is characterized by larger, more commercial operations specializing in high-value cropping. Thus, it is not representative of Egyptian farming as a whole. For Sample B, farm 70 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Figure 4.15 Mean Water Use by Crop Income Quintile 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 1 2 3 4 5 Mean water use m3/year/farm Figure 4.16 Use of Water-Saving Systems by Crop Income Quintile 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 1 2 3 4 5 % of farms with drip/sprinkler Figure 4.17 Water Use per Cropped Area by Crop Income Quintile 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1 2 3 4 5 Mean water use m3/feddan crop area crop income—not household income—has been the measure according to which the income quintiles are established. As noted above, the dataset for Sample B includes estimates of water use in irrigation by farm. Thus, it is possible to do without the assumption that water use is proportional to landholding. Indeed, water use per unit area is significantly different among farmers of different income groups. Figure 4.15 plots the benefit incidence by income quintiles. Again, the allocation of the subsidy is regressive, meaning that most of it is captured by high-income farms. In this case, the 50 percent of farms with the lowest incomes receive only 36 percent of the subsidy, and the 25 percent of farms with the lowest incomes receive only 13 percent of the subsidy. The reason that the subsidy distribution in Sample B is less regressive than that in Sample A is that the larger farms in Sample B are more likely to use water-saving irrigation equip- ment (drip and/or sprinkler), instead of furrow irrigation. For this reason, even though the land area is significantly larger, the volume of water used per farm is slightly lower in the fourth and fifth income quintiles than in the third. Rates of usage of water-saving equipment are illustrated in figure 4.16. Investment in such systems is Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies N 71 a characteristic of the high-value commercial farming practiced in the Western Delta region, from which Sample B is drawn. However, it is likely that the analysis above understates the regres- sivity of the water subsidy. According to the data from Sample B, the volume of water used per cropped feddan in the fifth quintile is ap- proximately a one-tenth of that in the other 4 (lower-income) quintiles (figure 4.17). While part of this difference may be attributable to the use of water-saving systems, the differential is too great to be cred- ible. It is possible that the larger farmer operations have understated their levels of water consumption, leading to an underestimation of the regressivity of the water subsidy. Conclusions from the Benefit Incidence Assessment Water use by the poorest 25 percent in Sample A was 9.7 percent of the total, implying that 90 percent of the irrigation subsidy is being cap- tured by the non-poor. The annual subsidy in the irrigation subsector (recurrent plus amortized capital expenditures spent on quasiprivate goods/services) is approximately LE 1.8 billion. Thus, approximately LE 1.6 billion annually, or approximately 0.3 percent of Egypt’s GDP, could be being spent on irrigation subsidies for the non-poor. Targeting this money at the poorest would significantly reduce poverty rates. If the irrigation subsidy received by the richest 75 percent in Sample A instead were allocated to the poorest 25 percent, it would raise their total household incomes by as much as 30 percent. Conclusions The findings of this analysis are: There is a pressing need for additional state expenditure on waste- N water collection and treatment, a public good that could add at least 1 percent to GDP. A disproportionate volume of public expenditure on water is on “pri- N vate” (nonheadwork/trunk) water infrastructure and services. When benchmarked against established performance norms, this N expenditure is inefficient. There is no equity justification for public irrigation spending on N private water benefits because most of these benefits are captured by the better-off farmers. 72 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS These findings provide a quantitative foundation for the recom- mendations proposed in chapter 3 in this volume, namely, the gradual transfer of the finance and management of downstream infrastructure and services from public agencies to WUAs and autonomous utilities. Responsibilities to be delegated to water user organizations would in- clude water allocations and the assessment and collection of charges. Such reforms would release funding for priority expenditures on public goods such as upstream maintenance and wastewater management. These reforms also would improve the equity of water-financing by ensuring that farmers’ contributions are more proportionate to their benefits. Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies N 73 Appendix A4.1 Data Used in the Benefit Incidence Assessment The B/A analysis is based on two separate surveys, Sample A and Sample, B. They were conducted by local consultants over different periods and followed different methodologies. Besides other variables, the first survey has data on area used for cultivation; the second includes actual irrigation water used. Finally, the sample sizes were different; and the survey data represent 2 distinct rural compositions. Sample A was drawn from a random sampling survey conducted over 8 counties in 3 governorates of Egypt’s West Delta region. These governorates and the counties are listed below, with the number of samples from each region in parentheses: Beheira Governorate: Zarcoon (45), Depono (65), Barseeq (40) 1. Alexandria Governorate: Mohagrein (20), Abu-Sombel (27), 2. El-Basrah (27) Matrouh Governorate: El Ola (30), El-Tanmiah (30). 3. The Sample A survey collected data at the household level for 2003–04 on the following: Land owned by the household (net area cultivated) 1. Gross income from the farm 2. O&M cost for water management on the farm 3. Net income from livestock 4. Net income from off-farm activities 5. Total net income (net farm, net livestock, and net off-farm income) 6. Number of family members. 7. The per-unit irrigation subsidy was computed using the expen- diture of MWRI for the corresponding year. The figures were taken from Egypt Public Expenditure Review, May 2005, table 1 (World Bank 2005). The review note states that in 2003–04 approximately LE 4.09 billion was spent on water infrastructure by the irrigation and agriculture subsector, of which nearly 79 percent was spent on new investments. Table 1 of the review also gives MWRI expenditure as LE 1.2 billion, which includes 0.04 billion collected as user fees. The total irrigated land in Egypt is 8.45 million acres. The per-unit irrigation subsidy therefore is computed as follows: 74 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Unit subsidy = (1.2–0.04)/0.00845 = LE 137 per acre (approx.). Sample B collected data from the following villages in the Western Delta area: El Hussain 1. Bostan 2. Nobaria 3. Bangar Souker/Banger Elsokar 4. Rowaisat 5. El Fekra Station 6. El Omayed. 7. Sample B was undertaken over a short period and is representative of the rural area constituted by the villages above. Consequently, the result of this analysis is not generalized for the country. However, the survey provides insight into the differential subsidy allocation within the sample range. Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies N 75 Appendix A4.2 Assessing the Social Benefits of Sanitation As part of the Country Environmental Analysis of Egypt (World Bank 2005), one study evaluated the full social and economic costs and ben- efits of the country’s water use and disposal. The study put particular emphasis on rural water and sanitation. Three policy options were analyzed: (1) Business as usual (BAU); (2) centrally planned actions, as of the National Plan for the Protection of the Water Resources of Egypt; and (3) the latter plus controlling rural water pollution (assuming both partial and full coverage). The study factored in: Three key at-recipient N parameters: Fecal coliforms (combined with “exposure-risk” parameters) 5 to infer health benefits, dissolved oxygen (DO) for fishery production benefits, and total dissolved solids (TDS) for crop production benefits. Corresponding “dose-response” for estimating the fishery/crop losses, N and corresponding “exposure-risk” for estimating the disease inci- dences; translation of the forgone benefits into monetary values. Weighing the discounted forgone benefits against the discounted N expenses regarding each of the three inaction/action options. For the BAU option, the damage cost assessment undertaken for water pollution included two types of forgone benefits: 5 Agricultural damages were estimated at the “Consumer and Producer Surplus,” forgone as a result of the high TDS concentration (using FAO yield-to-salinity pro- duction functions). Health damages were based on relating the diarrhea incidence rates to the risk factors associated with the level of “water, sanitation and hygiene,” as these factors are determined by the following transmission pathways: a. Transmission through ingestion of water b. Transmission caused by lack of water linked to inadequate personal hygiene c. Transmission caused by poor personal, domestic, or agricultural hygiene d. Transmission through contact (through bathing or wading) in water containing organisms such as Schistosoma e. To a certain extent, transmission through vectors proliferating in water reservoirs or other stagnant water or certain agricultural practices f. Transmission through contaminated aerosols from poorly managed water sys- tems. Thereof, six exposure scenarios were considered. Each is associated with a combina- tion of different levels of water supply, sanitation, and hygiene. Thus, each scenario reflects a different fecal-oral pathogen exposure. Populations were grouped according to their level of water and sanitation access, and each group was attributed a differ- ent relative risk (obtained from the literature) of contacting the disease. Hence, the total respective incidence rates of diarrhea were estimated. 76 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Income losses from the use of polluted water N (for example, crop/ fishery/livestock production losses due to salinity and toxicity), as well as well-being losses, for example, from water-related diseases, food chain contamination, and occupational health impacts. Cost of avoiding the use of polluted water N such as (1) added cost of pumping groundwater when surface drainage water was too polluted to be reused and (2) forgone benefits when (a) farmers unofficially reused highly saline water from secondary drains, and (b) official reuse from main drains was halted because of pollution by untreated sewage. The study included the additional costs of the erected hydraulic, mechanical, and electrical facilities that became idle due to the halting of a number of drainage reuse schemes. Results of the Study The study estimated the total cost of forgone benefits as approximately LE 5.35 billion in 2003, or 1.8 percent of GDP (World Bank 2005, figure 7). In 2014, factoring in population growth and if no additional ac- tions are taken, the forgone benefits will reach as high as LE 9.5 billion/yr or 3.2 percent of national GDP. On average, from 2003–14, the costs of inaction would average 7.4 billion LE/year (undiscounted). On the other hand, if taken, the intervention corresponding to the National Plan for the Protection of the Water Resources of Egypt (Central Action) would cost approximately 1 billion LE/year. However, in 2014 the plan would reduce the damages to only 6.7 billion LE/yr, or a decrease of 30 percent. An alternative intervention corresponding to the national plan but adapted to include community-driven-and-financed, low-cost/ unconventional remedies for rural areas (central plus decentralized actions, including improved hygiene) could be carried out for a total cost of 2.0–2.5 billion LE/yr. Using this option, in 2014 the value of the damages avoided would be reduced by an additional LE 2.5 billion/yr, or by a total of LE 5.3 billion/year (9.5-6.7+2.5) billion. The above results suggest that the best option is the latter. It would comprise government central/sectoral plans for the urban/district areas augmented by community-driven-and-financed unconventional plans for controlling rural water pollution. Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies N 77 References Ajwad, M.I., and Q. Wodon. 2001. “Marginal Benefit Incidence Analysis Using a Single Cross-Section of Data.” World Bank. Van de Walle, D. 1997. ”The Incidence of Public Social Expenditures in Zimbabwe.” World Bank. El-Saharty, S., G. Richardson, and S. Chase. 2003. “Egypt and the Millennium Development Goals: Challenges and Opportunities.” World Bank. December. Government of Egypt. 2003. “National Plan for the Protection of the Water Resources of Egypt.” Draft Policy Paper. Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, Cairo. Lanjouw, P., and M. Ravallion. 1998. “Benefit Incidence and the Timing of Program Capture.” World Bank. July. Shawky, A. 2001. “Water Demand Management: Approach, Experi- ence and Application to Egypt.” Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands. June. World Bank. 2003. “Holistic Benchmarking in the Irrigation and Drainage Sector.” Washington, DC Workshop Proceedings. March 6–7. ____. 2004. “Cost Assessment of Environmental Degradation in Egypt.” IBRD Report 25175. ____. 2005a. “Cost Effectiveness and Equity in Egypt’s Water Sector.” Egypt Public Expenditure Review. Water Policy Note 1. May. ____. 2005b. “Egypt Country Environmental Analysis.” 79 Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models in Water Resource Management and Planning in MNA Region Bekele Debele Negewo, Julia Bucknall, and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed Water Resource Management (WRM): A New Approach for Monitoring Water Use The Introduction to this volume suggests that the management of water resources in the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) region is likely to become far more challenging in the rest of this century because of increased variability in rainfall and increased demands on the resource from rapidly growing populations. These new challenges require investing much greater effort in monitoring the use of water by various sectors of the economy than in the past—particularly on whether this resource is being put to its most beneficial use. For ex- ample, consumptive use through irrigation could have a sizeable non- beneficial component if either water from open canals and reservoirs is lost through evaporation, or profitable plants (such as bananas) use up considerably more water through transpiration than other less water-intensive plants. Under these circumstances, evapotranspiration (ET) rates become a key benchmark of efficient water use. Similarly, concerning nonconsumptive water use, despite increased urbanization, with the appropriate investments in treatment, a growing proportion of wastewater is recoverable for beneficial use. This chapter suggests the need to develop new approaches that comprehensively monitor the water balance as a means of managing variations in water supply as well as demand. Such an approach basically improves understanding of the sources and sinks of water by collecting better quality datasets and by employing state-of-the art models to advise water regulators, policymakers, and communities on the state of a country’s water resources at a given point in time. 5 80 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Applications of New Technologies to Collect and Process Water-Related Data An understanding of the availability and quality of water resources as well as current and future uses of these resources is necessary for sound water decisionmaking. Furthermore, clear, undisputed informa- tion on water availability and consumption is a critical component of improving governance and accountability in the sector. Nevertheless, developing and disseminating good information on water remains a challenge in MNA for a number of reasons. First, data collection and analysis are costly. Second, countries lack data management systems. Third, neither definitions nor data management is standard across countries. Fourth, communities and policymakers (outside the narrow group of WRM specialists) are still not fully aware of the benefits of investing in reliable data on water usage. On the supply side, technological developments are beginning to enable scientists to combine traditional water data systems with models and remote sensing (RS) information in ways that greatly reduce the cost of collecting data and increase its accuracy. These advances include a combination of the use of geographic information systems (GIS), RS, data assimilation, and modeling techniques. Figure 5.1 provides a detailed illustration of (1) how the latest technologies help collate both dynamic and static characteristics of the land, vegetation, and climate; and (2) how to combine these datasets with the latest hydrological modeling capabilities to produce outputs that facilitate making critical water resources decisions in wa- ter supply and sanitation (WSS) and irrigation. Use of Geographic Information System (GIS) Advances in GIS technology have revolutionized the way that spa- tially distributed water resources data are managed (ESRI 2008). GIS captures, visualizes, and correlates spatial data. Not too long ago, it was practically un- thinkable to spatially represent all Data assimilation modules (EnKF, EKF) Physical space analysis system (PSAS) 3-D VAR Rule-based Water supply & demand Agriculture, hydro- electric power, endangered species, water quality Improved short-term & long-term predictions Land cover, leaf area index (MODIS), AMSR, TRMM, SRTM) Meteorology modeled (NOAA-NASA) Observed (TRMM, GOES, station) Observed states (MODIS snow, Landsat ET, AMSR-E Soil moisture) Evapo- transpiration, soil moisture Land surface models (LSM) Physical process models Noah, CLM, VIC, SiB2, Catchment Surface water fluxes (e.g., runoff) Surface states: snowpack LAI Topography Soils (static) Surface energy fluxes (Qh, Qle) Inputs Physics Outputs Applications Figure 5.1 Latest Technologies in Water Resources Data Collection, Assimilation, and Modeling to Improve Decisionmaking Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models N 81 variables that directly or indirectly dictate the movement and availability of water resources in a basin to the extent that can be done today. This array of variables includes topography and land use/land cover at as low as 30m resolution; and soils, soil moisture content, and climate data at sub-km resolution. Thanks to advances in computer capacity and GIS technology, resource managers can better mimic the reality on the ground. Today, if one has the primary data and model structure at any spatial scale, computer capacity and GIS technology support the analyses to provide water resource managers and decisionmakers with the decision tools needed at the scale of interest. Advances in GIS technology become especially important when dealing with complex river basins whose climate, soils, and land use/ land cover distributions vary significantly with space. GIS technology is equally important in addressing a basin being used and managed by multiple actors. In this case, to facilitate optimal joint resources man- agement and development decisions, one needs to spatially identify the sources and sinks of water and associated pollutants. GIS tools will help identify hotspots within a given basin whose WRM needs to be the focus, and for which the maximum dividend is expected from implementation of some best management practices. Figure 5.2 depicts a sample ap- plication of GIS in organizing and assimilating physiographic data (topography, land use/land cover, soils) and climate data (precipita- tion, temperature, wind) for use in one of the complex hydro- logical models (Soil and Water Assessment Tool, or SWAT) in WRM. Applications of GIS technol- ogy are extremely diverse: from epidemiology (monitoring disease outbreaks) to analyzing the vulnerability of water resources to point or nonpoint source pollution. In water resource management, GIS facilitates the manipulation of spatial data that otherwise are difficult (if not impossible) to handle. The manipulation includes storing, que- rying, displaying, integrating, and analyzing spatial water-related data Figure 5.2 Sample Applications of GIS (ArcVIEW) in SWAT Model Use Source: DiLuzio and others 2002. Note: SWAT is a complex hydrological model designed to assess the impacts of land management on water resources. 82 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS in a complex basin. For example, using GIS, one can overlay the map of land use/land cover with a soils map to generate a unique map of hydrologic response unit (HRU), the smallest unit of water balance computation in some hydrological models (figure 5.2). Similarly, GIS is used to generate hydrographic maps from topographic maps (digital elevation maps, or DEM) (figure 5.2). Such hydrographic maps docu- ment stream networks in a given basin that drain water from one end of a basin to the basin outlet. The same GIS can help to determine stream orders, lengths, and slopes—all of which are critical factors in the computation of hydrological variables such as runoff and soil ero- sion. Finally, given its rich selection of colors and ability to designate each item with a different color, GIS is an extremely helpful tool in creating pleasing and easily accessible figures and tables. Applications of Remote Sensing Technologies in WRM Advances in RS technology in recent years have given water resource managers and decisionmakers the ability to capture—from a distance— the detailed characteristics of physiographic and natural resources (surface and groundwater, vegetation, soils, topography) and climate variables (temperature, precipitation, solar radiation). For example, the technology of remote sensing is such that one can now measure the amount of precipitable moisture in the atmosphere, air temperature, evaporation and transpiration (ET), soil, moisture content, and aqui- fer storage of the soil, without putting a sensor close to the objects of measurement. Table 5.1 depicts a partial list of variables that can be measured/estimated by remote sensing. In WRM, given the need to capture the variability of resources distribution across space and time, RS technology also should offer such capability. Whereas some state variables can be assumed to be stable over a certain period (topography, geology, soil texture), others change very frequently (weather conditions, vegetation growth, soil moisture) By the same token, some variables can be assumed to be stable over a given swath of area (air temperature 1 ) whereas others are not (soil properties, elevation, precipitation). 1 Air temperature can be assumed stable over a good-sized field unless the field has a sharp rise in elevation over a short distance, in which case the elevation lapse rate comes into play. Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models N 83 In general, however, most state variables in water resources vary both spatially and temporally. Therefore, it is imperative to select the most appropriate remote sensing technique (and data) to address a given water resource issue. For example, a satellite that provides observations every week may not be appropriate to study water resources issues on a daily basis. Similarly, a RS technique that provides observations at 100-km pixel would not be appropriate to analyze the water resources issue at plot-scale level, that is, a 10-km by 10-km area. Table 5.1 also provides the spatial scope of a suite of satellite (mission names) in measuring/estimating water-related variables. Common links to water-resource-related datasets also are provided in appendix A5.1. Table 5.1 Summary of Spatial Data Availability from Remote Sensing No. Data type Spatial scale Satellite name/mission name 1 Rainfall 3 to 25 km TRMM (25km); GOES; NEXRAD; METEOSAT; IRS; ESA 2 Skin soil moisture 25 km AMSR-E 3 Root zone soil moisture 30 m to 1 km Nimbus SSM/I (25km); 4 Air temperature 1 km AVHRR 5 Solar radiation 1 km AVHRR 6 Leaf Area Index 30 m to 1 km MODIS; LANDSAT 7 Biomass production 30 m to 1 km LANDSAT; MODIS 8 Snow cover and snow accumulation 30 m to 1 km GOES 9 Land use/land cover 30 m to 1 km MODIS; LANDSAT 10 Crop types, surface albedo, vegetation fraction 30 m MODIS; SPOT-4 11 Crop yield 30 m MODIS; LANDSAT Secondary spatial data 12 Air humidity 1 km NASA’s UARS 13 Wind speed and direction 1 km LIDAR 14 Water depletion by land cover 1 km MODIS 15 Water productivity 30 m MODIS 16 Stream flow and water quality 1 km LANDSAT; MODIS 17 Groundwater recharge/abstraction; terrestrial water storage 30 m to 1 km GRACE 18 Irrigation water demand, irrigation intensity, and irrigation efficiency 30 m to 1 km MODIS; LANDSAT 19 Carbon sequestration 30 m to 1 km MODIS 20 Topography, geology 30 m to 250 km ASTER; RADARSAT 21 ET (based on, e.g., SEBAL and METRIC approaches) 30 m to 1 km MODIS (30 m to 1 km); LANDSAT 84 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Figure 5.3 depicts the availability of various RS data sources at dif- ferent spatial resolutions and sea- sonal coverage (percent). Figure 5.3 provides a menu of options for water-related data sources to be used under a range of data needs (small plot scale, river basin scale, national scale). Sample applications of RS Remote sensing has been utilized for different purposes, from monitoring deforestation and predicting the effects of climate change on glaciers in the Arctic and Antarctic to estimating the amount of water in the clouds. Some use RS to capture distributions of climate variables such as thunder storms, hurricanes, and floods in real time. Others use RS for early warning—including for flood and drought. Still others also use RS to monitor changes in land use/land cover and soil moisture content. Some also use RS to estimate the amount of water lost to ET. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 depict sample applications of RS technology in WRM. In both figures, RS is used to gather relevant data to estimate water productivity in irrigated agriculture to guide WRM deci- sions. In figure 5.4, RS was used to analyze the productivity of water to spatially evaluate where water was being productively used. Such information can be used to make decisions to real- locate water among different users, leading to improved total water productivity. In contrast, in figure 5.5, RS was used to estimate the amount (liters) of water used to produce a liter of wine. As can be seen from both figures, water productivity Figure 5.3 Availability of Remote Sensing Data at Various Spatial and Temporal Coverage Source: Droogers 2006. Figure 5.4 Where Is Water Not Used Productively? Data from Sacramento, CA Source: Bastiaanssen 2007. Note: Legend depicts a water productivity range of 50%–175% of the average water productivity in the Sacramento Valley, implying a wider range of water productivity. Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models N 85 is not uniform across the Sacra- mento Valley. Figure 5.5 clearly shows that farmers in the north- ern parts of the valley use more water to produce the same amount of wine than do their southern counterparts. Such data are very important for WRM, particularly in making decisions on water allocation and pricing. RS also can be used to aug- ment available data and to fill data gaps, including in areas in which collecting data through traditional means is constrained. For example, since 2003, the World Bank has been using RS techniques to supervise the im- plementation of Bank-supported irrigation projects in Iraq, in which ground accessibility has been limited for security reasons (figure 5.6). As can be seen from figure 5.6, differences between areas served by the Wazzak Ca- nal before and after the canal rehabilitation are notable. In contrast, incremental productivity (project outcomes) has been validated through low-resolution satellite images. The impact evaluation for the incremen- tal outcomes can be performed through either of two approaches: Comparing the before-project and the after-project cases (thus 1. comparing over time, which was the approach followed in Iraq (figure 5.6) Comparing the without-project and the with-project cases (thus 2. comparing in space, that is, comparing with an adjacent command area outside the project’s command borders). The Bank is assisting several MNA governments to obtain more accurate and up-to-date water-related RS data in the water-stressed Figure 5.5 Water Productivity in Sacramento, CA: Liters of Water Needed to Produce 1 Liter of Wine Source: Bastiaanssen 2007. Note: Legend depicts the amount (liters) of water needed to produce one liter of wine across the Sacramento Valley. Before rehab (FY06) After rehab (FY07) Figure 5.6 Agricultural Lands Served by “Mazzak” Canal in Wasit Governorate before and after Project Implementation Source: World Bank 2006. Note: The red rectangles on the “After”map show areas that were put under cultivation after rehabilitation of the canal systems. 86 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS areas (Egypt, Gaza, Morocco, West Bank, and Yemen). As a result of coordination among the Arab Water Council, NASA, USAID, and the World Bank, a new regional initiative is being launched to help MNA make better WRM decisions and share comparable data across member countries. Such coordination envisages developing a set of tools that, taking advantage of the latest technologies, will provide regular, accurate, and standardized information on the availability and consumption of water resources in the Arab world. Cautionary note: The latest RS technologies have enabled water resources decisionmakers to use easily accessible information to make better decisions. Nonetheless, to ensure a reality check, it is very important to calibrate the data collected through RS techniques against those collected on the ground. RS technology changes rapidly. To keep up with such rapid advances, one needs to continually compare the quality of data derived from each generation of techniques with those obtained on the ground. Moreover, satellites lack the ability to take measurements over small footprints (smaller spatial resolution). Similarly, satellites cur- rently are unable to have “active” systems that can penetrate the soil below a certain depth. For now, the final word is that, in the foresee- able future, RS will not replace ground measurements. However, RS measurements can provide important augmentations to other data to improve the quality and spatial coverage of existing data. Data-sharing also is cost-sharing and obtaining better data. In many MNA countries, multiple agencies collect similar data, often not knowing that the other agencies are collecting the same data. Moreover, when one agency/country wants to do an assessment, it often starts from the beginning without first talking to the other agencies/countries to find out what data they already have. The amount of wasted resources expended in this way cannot be underestimated. Agencies should instead first identify what already has been done, then document and improve upon the data already present. To this end, data-sharing among agen- cies and/or countries is a prerequisite. Applications of Hydrological Models in WRM Need for Hydrology For any realistic implementation of WRM at a basin scale, a better and fuller understanding of the hydrology of the basin is crucial. For Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models N 87 example, the quantity and quality of runoff measured at a basin/sub- basin outlet are a collective signal of the characteristics of the whole basin/sub-basin, in the same way that pathological tests can tell much about the well-being of a person. Therefore, WRM requires a good hydrology dataset to provide an accurate basis for water accounting. Hydrological Models In parallel with the advances in GIS and RS, there have been many improvements in the understanding of the physical processes and interrelationships between climate-soils and ecosystem response. A large number of mathematical equations have been developed to mimic the understanding of these interrelationships—from simple black-box empirical models to more sophisticated, physically based and distributed parameter models. As a result, the number of hydro- logical models today is so large that many users spend a great deal of time selecting the most appropriate model for the problem(s) at hand. The fundamental principle of any hydrological model emanates from closing the mass, energy, and momentum balances. All hydrologi- cal models should respect at least one fundamental principle: a mass balance signifying continuity. Equation 1 (Eq. 1) provides the general continuity equation of hy- drological balance, which dictates that the summation of all inflows Inflow i i n = • 1 minus the summation of all outflows Outflow i i n = • 1 over a period of time (t) should equal the change in storage (Δ Storage) over the same period of time (t). Inflow Outflow Storage i i n j j m t = = • • − = ( 1 1 )) t (Eq. 1) where m and n are the different categories of outputs (extracts) from the system and inputs (additions) to the system, respectively. For most common hydrological models, Eq. 1 is rewritten by expanding the water balance components (figure 5.7) as in Eq. 2 below. 88 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS PCP ET Runoff R S deep − + + ( ) = (Eq. 2) where PCP = total precipitation (snowfall + rainfall); ET = amount of water lost to evapotranspiration; Runoff = total net water amount that leaves the system as surface and subsurface runoff (this is a net figure after subtracting inflow to the system from adjacent basins—runon, return flows, and inter-basin transfer); R deep = is the net water amount lost to deep aquifer (this is a net figure after subtracting extractions from deep aquifer); and ΔS is the change in water storage of the system over a given period of time—the same period over which total inflow and outflow are computed. Equation 2 above could equally be subdivided into water consump- tive uses and losses as described in the Introduction (figure 1.1). For example, the ET in Eq. (2) could be subdivided into beneficial and nonbeneficial ET based on where in the basin the water is lost to ET. Runoff from the system could be subdivided into recoverable fraction and nonrecoverable fraction based on where the water that is lost to runoff is destined. In a similar way, the amount of water that is per- colating to deep aquifer and stored in the upper soil horizon could be subdivided into recoverable and nonrecoverable components based on their accessibility for further use. In this case, whereas it is feasible to further divide the water balance components into consumable/nonconsumable and recoverable/nonrecoverable for water accounting purposes, keeping Eq. (2) above intact is still very important, especially for hydrological analysis in the upland watershed. Similarly, for the energy balance, the summation of all incoming energies E inco gi i r min = • 1 minus the summation of all outgoing energies Figure 5.7 Major Components of the Hydrological Balance Source: Toll 2008. Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models N 89 E inco gi i r min = • 1 must equal the change in the amount of energy stored E Stored ( ) within the system (Eq. 3). E E E inco gi i r Outgoing j j s t St min = = • • − = 1 1 oored t ( ) (Eq. 3) where r and s are the different incoming and outgoing energy categories, respectively. More complex and physically based models account for more than one physical principle (for instance, mass and momentum, mass and energy, or a combination of all balances). Another very important issue to consider when dealing with hydro- logical models is the spatial scale to be incorporated in the model and how much physical detail should be included. Figure 5.8 illustrates the negative correlation between the physical detail of the model applied and the spatial scale of application. Figure 5.8 also depicts the position of some commonly used hydrological models in this continuum. Application of Hydrological Modeling and Its Classification Hydrological models commonly are categorized based on their physical detail (physically based models, empirical models), spa- tial coverage (spatially distrib- uted models, lumped parameter models), and temporal coverage (event-based models, continuous time models). Hydrological mod- els also can be grouped based on their uses, such as for water quantity and/or quality assessment, water allocation among different users (riparian countries, sectors), evaluation of policy impacts on water resources, or payment for environmental services or assessment of climate change impacts. Whereas some models are multipurpose in their applications, others are developed Continent High Low SLURP/DHS VM/DL BRM SWAT/HSPF MIKE SHE WEAP IQQM SWAP WaterMod Basin System Field S p a t i a l s c a l e Physical detail Figure 5.8 Most Commonly Used Hydrological Models and Their Suitability in Both Physical and Spatial Scale Source: Debele 2008 modifed from Droogers 2006. 90 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS to tackle specific water-related problems. The following are the main reasons that most people use hydrological models. Models are economically more feasible than monitoring (M&E). Once a model is calibrated against available data and the state of the system as a whole, and the causal relationship is established, the model can be used as a tool to monitor the implications of changes in inputs or outputs, instead of collecting primary input and output data at every time interval. These models provide additional benefits, such as running scenario analyses to guide decisionmaking in WRM. Scenario analysis could be done without having access to observed input data. This is a very powerful advantage of models: they help not only to monitor but also to guide any future decisions. With the help of the latest technologies in RS and GIS to collect and process/assimilate data, models also could be used for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of water projects. As indicated in the previous section, the Bank’s use of RS data to (1) monitor project implementa- tion progress in Iraq and (2) estimate water productivity using a com- bination of hydrological model and RS tools are good examples of how models can be used as an M&E tool. For example, in the case of water productivity monitoring in the Sacramento Valley, a hydrological model (in combination with SEBAL 2 ) was used to determine crop water con- sumption. Alternatively, a METRIC 3 approach could equally be used to determine the amount of water consumed by crops. Hydrological models have also been successfully used to monitor and evaluate the impacts of best management practices on in-situ soil and water conservation, and management of groundwater recharge and diffuse pollution. Models advance scientific understanding in water resources and help identify knowledge gaps. Some models also are tools to further understand the linkages among different variables and how each factor dictates overall water movement in and above the soil surface. Models that come under this category include the physically based and spatially distributed models that simu- late the interrelationships among soils, climate, and vegetation response in the ecosystem. Models under this category usually are developed 2 SEBAL stands for Surface Energy Balance Algorithm of Land. 3 METRIC stands for Mapping Evapo-Transpiration with High Resolution and Internalized Calibration. Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models N 91 from mathematical equations that fulfill the continuity, momentum, and energy balances in all relevant dimensions. Such models are used primarily to deepen one’s understanding of the processes involved in water resources movement and storage. All other models are derived from models under this category by simplifying one or another param- eter, or combining a few parameters. Models enable good decisionmaking and guide policy options. Models are tools best suited for guiding decisionmaking at various levels. This function ranges from identifying what datasets to collect for what sets of decisions to make to achieve certain goals in an inte- grated water resource management (IWRM) setup. Similarly, models are used to guide the selection of policy choices in the water sector. For example, one can employ a combined hydrological and economic model to assess the implications of various water allocation measures/ policies on different sectors that are competing for shares of the same water. In a similar fashion, one can use hydrological models (especially those that are physically based and spatially distributed) to assess the implications of different best management practices on improving in- situ soil moisture and groundwater recharge, and reducing nonpoint source pollution. Such an exercise can be done either before project implementation to see the implications of various “IF” scenarios, or after project implementation to monitor and evaluate the impacts of such interventions on the end results. In an IWRM setting, models are useful to identify the optimum ob- jectives that take into account the social, economic, and environmental issues in a given basin, including interests of its upstream and down- stream riparian users. For example, many models have been developed to identify the optimum number and locations of water projects and compensation mechanisms (payment for environmental services, or PES). One very good (win/win) example of models’ applications in PES is the New York City (NYC) water supply. The NYC Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) uses hydrological models to identify areas that are hotspots in the watershed to bargain (to support onsite land management and/or provide cash for easements) with farmers who own the lands to implement best management practices that will reduce diffuse pollution. In this way, the city benefits by preserving the pristine water quality of NYC (instead of spending billions of dol- lars to treat its water supply to the EPA standards, as required by the US government). The farmers also benefit by obtaining funds (PES) 92 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS from NYC to protect their lands, and hence protect the NYC water supply watersheds. Another equally important but less known application of such models is in the implementation of the PES initiative in Costa Rica. The purpose is to reduce deforestation to (a) sequester carbon dioxide and (b) improve the water quality of groundwater for mineral water pro- duction industries. The authorities used hydrological models to identify areas in the watersheds in which groundwater recharge is significant and pay farmers accordingly for the environmental services that their lands provide. This initiative is very successful in reducing the rate of both deforestation and groundwater contamination. As indicated earlier, the latest advances in GIS and RS technolo- gies have improved the application of hydrological models to assess the implications of different water projects on overall water resources avail- ability. For example, the World Bank has supported the government of Tunisia in its assessment of the implications of water-saving investments in Tunisian agriculture (World Bank 2008). Over the last decade, the Tunisian government has been implementing modern irrigation schemes, including sprinkler and drip irrigation, to better manage its agricultural water resources. The study used remotely sensed data to determine the water balance in its irrigated areas. It disaggregated the water bal- ance into its components (precipitation, ET, soil storage, and runoff) and was able to evaluate the impacts of water-saving investments on the country’s overall water resources availability. The study concluded that although implementation of water- saving investments is very important, equally essential is the need to properly manage the saved water. For example, investing in modern irrigation schemes may reduce the amount of water that is applied to a given farm land. However, if one decides to use the saved water to increase irrigation intensity and/or horizontally expand the area of irrigated land, in the end, the amount of water saved at a basin scale might be none or even become negative (more water withdrawn than previously under traditional irrigation schemes). Therefore, one needs to approach water resource management from a comprehensive water balance perspective and at a basin scale. To date, in the Arab region, regional integration and inter-regional collaboration on development and management of shared resources have been weak. For this reason, a combination of objective water- related data and decision-aiding hydrological models would be very useful in the use and management of their shared water resources. Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models N 93 Moreover, even at a country/basin level, optimal allocation of limited water among various competing needs/sectors can be addressed using a combination of hydrological and economic/social models. Conclusions This chapter discusses the use of the latest technologies, such as GIS, RS, and hydrological models, in the WRM of the MNA Region. It highlights the applications of such technologies to capture, store, and process most datasets needed for making water resources decisions. The chapter also explores the many types of hydrological models available and their very useful and flexible applications to guide decisionmaking and balance the demands of different uses. References Aliewi, A.S., R. Mackay, A. Jayyou, K. Nasereddin, A. Mushtaha, and A. Yaqubi. 2001. “Numerical Simulation of the Movement of Saltwater under Skimming and Scavenger Pumping in the Pleis- tocene Aquifer of Gaza and Jericho Areas, Palestine.” Journal of Transport in Porous Media (43) 195–12. Almasri M.N., and S.M.S. Ghabayen. 2008. “Analysis of Nitrate Contamination of Gaza Coastal Aquifer, Palestine.” Journal of Hydrologic Engineering. 13 (2): 132–40. Bastiaanssen, W. 2007. “Adaptation to Climate Change: New Tech- nologies for Water Management and Impact Assessment.” Lecture at the World Bank. Debele, B. 2008. “Applications of Watershed Management Tools for Bank Operations: Pushing the Frontiers of River Basin IWRM.” Training at World Bank Water Week 2008, Washington, DC. Droogers, P. 2006. “Applications of Hydrological Models in Water- shed Management.” Lecture at World Bank Water Week 2006, Washington, DC. DiLuzio, M., R. Srinivasan, J.G. Arnold, and S.L. Neitsch. 2002. “ArcVIEW Interface for SWAT 2000. User’s Manual.” Grassland, Soil and Water Research Laboratory, USDA Agricultural Research Service, Temple, TX. Elewa H.H., and A.H. El Nahry. 2008. “Hydro-Environmental Status and Soil Management of the River Nile Delta, Egypt.” Journal of Environmental Geology, DOI: 10.1007/s00254-008-1354-5. 94 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS ESRI (Environmental Services Research Institute). 2008. ArcGIS 9.3 Desktop extensions @ http://support.esri.com/index.cfm?fa= knowledgebase.documentation.viewDoc&PID=83&MetaID= 1404 Goossens R., B.M. De Vlegher, and M. De Dapper. 1998. “Water Log- ging and Soil-Salinity Modeling Using Remote Sensing and GIS: A Case Study for a Sebkha Area South of Ismailia (Egypt).” Journal of Natuur-en Geneeskundige Vennootschap 78 (1–4): 137–48. IPCC (International Panel on Climate Change). 2007. Regional Cli- mate Projections. Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Ed. S. Solomon, D. Quin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor, and H.L. Miller. Cambridge University Press. Salman, M. 2004. “The Euphrates and the Tigris: The South Bound- ary Utilization and Views.” IPTRID, AGL, FAO, Rome. Smedema, L.K. 2005. “Irrigation Performance and Waterlogging and Salinity.” Journal of Irrigation and Drainage Systems, (4):367–74, DOI: 10.1007/BF01103714. Toll, D. 2008. “Applications of NASA’s Modeling and Satellite Products in Water Resource Management.” NASA presentation made at World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. 2006. “Supervision of Project Implementation Progress Using Remote Sensing Techniques: Iraq Emergency Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project.” Presentation of Mission Report, Washington, DC. ____. 2007. “Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water Management Results in the Middle East and North Africa. MNA Development Report on Water.” ____. 2008. “Water Balance and Evaluation of Water-Saving Invest- ments in Tunisian Agriculture.” Unpublished report. Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models N 95 Appendix A5.1 URLs for Water-Resources-Related Datasets Real-time Heavy Rain Maps (updated every 3 hours) N http://trmm.gsfc.nasa.gov Hydrology for the Environment, Life and Policy N http://www.unesco.org/water/ihp/help Regional Visualization and Monitoring System (“SERVIR”) N http://servir.msfc.nasa.gov/ Global Hazard System (Floods) Quasi-global Runoff Model N Running in Real-Time http://trmm.gsfc.nasa.gov/publications_dir/potential_flood_ hydro.html Stream flow Monitoring and the Dartmouth Flood Observatory N http://www.dartmouth.edu/~floods/ Remote Sensing Application In Irrigation N http://www.sage.wisc.edu ET Estimation N http://www.kimberly.uidaho.edu/ref-et/ http://www.cimis.water.ca.gov http://www.sebal.nl/ Real-time Precipitation Forecast and Other Remote Sensing N Products http://chrs.web.uci.edu/ 97 6 Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World: New Analytical Tools for New Challenges Christopher J. Perry and Julia Bucknall T his chapter examines how, over millennia, societies in Arab countries developed arrangements for water management that reflected the region’s conditions of extreme water scarcity. It notes that these traditional arrangements have been undermined by growing imbalances between demand and supply, exacerbated by new technologies that disturb stable traditional systems. The first step toward putting replacement arrangements in place, especially as climate change exacerbates the imbalances, is to build a shared understanding of the hydrology of the system in which one is working. 1 This chapter shows the role of hydrological information as a basic element of establishing sustainable water management. The chapter concludes by showing how remote sensing (RS) applications can contribute to knowledge of the status and trends in hydrological data. With very limited exceptions, the Arab countries are water short, and supplies are highly variable from year to year. 2 Definitions of water availability are not always consistent, which can lead to confusion when different source materials are quoted. However, UNESCO (2002) used the FAO-AQUASTAT database and FAOSTAT population data to rank 180 countries on the basis of water availability. Of the Arab countries, only Sudan ranked above the bottom quartile. The majority of Arab countries—including Bahrain, Gaza, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen—were in the bottom 10 percent. Even within this select group of water-short countries, the disparities in endowment were enormous. The most water plentiful of this group, 1 Throughout this chapter, “hydrology” is used to include both surface and ground- water. 2 Based on a background paper prepared by the authors for the Arab Water Council for the Fifth World Water Forum, Istanbul, 2009. 98 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Tunisia, has less than 25 percent of the availability of Sudan. The least plentiful, Kuwait, has less than 0.5 percent of the availability of Sudan. The basic human needs for drinking and sanitation are rather small. Gleick (1996) researched actual water use in various scenarios and climates and estimated the following ranges of water needs (in liters per capita per day): Table 6.1 Ranges of Human Domestic Water Needs (1/cap/day) Drinking water 2–5 Sanitation 0–75 Bathing 5–70 Cooking/kitchen 10–50 Average total 50 (= 18 m 3 /year) Thus, 1 m 3 of water supplies the various needs of 1 individual for 20 days, or the absolutely fundamental need for drinking water for as much as 1 year. According to these data, only Kuwait (10 m 3 /cap/year) has less than the total human requirement. In striking contrast, Yemen—widely identified as one of the most seriously water-short countries in the world—is endowed with more than 200 m 3 /cap/year. (Of course, the timing and location of supply may be quite different from the timing and location of demand.) The problem, the competition, and the scarcity arise when irrigated agriculture is significant: the same 1 m 3 of water that provides drinking water for 1 person for 1 year produces only 1 kg of food grain when used for irrigation in a dry climate. Thus, Singapore, with less water per capita than Yemen, is not considered water scarce because the water is used almost exclusively for residential and industrial needs. In contrast, the demand for water for irrigated agriculture in Yemen creates a situation of extreme scarcity. In the Arab world, irrigated agriculture is the dominant user of water and is thus the primary topic of this chapter. Scarcity of water in the Arab countries is not a new phenomenon—although population growth and economic development exacerbate the scarcity. Therefore, it is useful to examine how the problem has been dealt with during millennia of experience in the Arab world. Historically, countries (at the national, local and individual levels) have developed indigenous approaches to cope with water scarcity. Four examples with several millennia of experience are: Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World N 99 1. Inundation canals in Egypt diverted the Nile’s annual floods onto farmers’ lands via below-grade channels, from which the farmers, usually operating in groups, would pump water by animal-powered sakias. 3 2. Spate irrigation systems have been significant in a number of Arab countries since the early 1990s (table 6.2). They account for ap- proximately 20 percent of the irrigated area in Algeria and Yemen. These systems consist of dams—often temporary—that divert water from fast-flowing ephemeral streams onto farmers’ fields after heavy rain. Table 6.2 Spate Irrigation in Arab Countries, 1989–1995 Country Data (yr) Spate irrigation (ha) Total irrigation (ha) Spate (%) Algeria 1992 110,000 555,500 19.8 Morocco 1989 165,000 1,258,200 13.1 Sudan 1995 46,200 1,946,200 2.4 Tunisia 1991 30,000 385,000 7.8 Yemen Rep. 1994 98,320 481,520 20.4 3. Qanats (also variously known as kareez, foggara, aflaj) are found in many Arab countries, probably after originating in Iran. Certainly, in the early part of the last millennium, the Moors took the tech- nology to Spain (where some are still functioning). The Spanish, in turn, took the technology to Mexico, and qanats are now found in Peru and Chile as well. A qanat consists of a tunnel that starts at ground level in foothills and is cut into the hill, sloping upward at a lesser angle than the ground so that the tunnel becomes progres- sively deeper, eventually intersecting the water table in the hillside (figure 6.1). Qanats are essentially man- made springs that provide a route for infiltration from higher areas to flow out at a single point. The vertical shafts allow access during bedrock farm Figure 6.1 Cross-Section of a Qanat Source: Livius.Org, with permission 3 Sakia is also known as the “Persian wheel.” It is an effective technology for lifting water from canals with animal or mechanical power to irrigate farmlands. 100 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS construction. Some qanats are kilometers long. One example in Jordan exceeds 90km. 4. Shallow wells are found everywhere that the groundwater table is relatively near the surface. Historically, wells had to be shallow due to the limits of suction lift pumps (approximately 10 meters). These are four quite different technical approaches to enhance local water availability: exploitation by inundation of the regular heavy Nile River floods; diversion of irregular flash-foods in wadis; exploitation of infiltration into hillsides; and exploitation of shallow water tables. Nevertheless, they have a number of important similarities that offer important insights into how scarce water has been managed success- fully, productively, and sustainably by irrigators in the Arab world. Each approach exploits natural flows. Each approach, therefore, is limited by actual rainfall and the resulting runoff. These restrictions, in turn, mean that over-exploitation is not possible (unless shallow wells are over 10 meters in depth). Experience over the years has given water users a clear idea of how much water to expect—on average—in a wet year and in a dry year. This knowledge has provided the basis for them to decide how the water should be allocated. Where farmers had collectively built the infrastructure (as in the case of qanats and spate systems, and sometimes in the case of wells), the beneficiary group was already clear. However, contributions might not have been equal. Differences in cropping patterns might require nonuniform allocation of water, or priority to domestic or livestock use. In Egypt, for example, by the time that flood irrigation had evolved millennia ago, the scale of the system was already such that there were at least two levels of management: one for the major diversion structures and one for the local distribution of water among users at the sakia. For qanats, Mehraby (undated) describes the distribution process as follows: “Since ancient times, there have been laws as to how to distribute water fairly among various small and large villages on the kariz routes to prevent any disagreements resulting in consequent disorder, clashes or disturbance. “The distribution of the water of a kariz route is based on time as determined by the users through their representatives. If the flow of Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World N 101 a kariz is considerably high and the users of the water are numerous, the distribution of the water has to be under a trustworthy official known as mirab who is chosen by the joint users or the government and is paid a certain salary.” Mehraby’s brief summary delineates three elements: The principles for allocation of the water among users have been 1. agreed. There are rules implementing the allocation (“based on time”). 2. A management structure to oversee the operation may be 3. necessary. The nature of the rules and how they are implemented will vary among these different tech- nologies. In Yemeni spate sys- tems, for example, it is reported that the farmer is entitled to take water until the depth reaches his knee. The signal that the next irrigator should divert the water to his field is for the first farmer to fire a gun into the air. 4 While this may seem crude, it ideally suits the need in a spate system to share a very uncertain quan- tity on the basis of simple rules and quick communication. The outcome is an apparently rather uniform distribution of water among users in a wadi (figure 6.2). The infrastructure of all of these systems provides the capacity to deliver the service that the other elements—how much water is available, priorities for sharing, rules, and management arrangements— combine to define. In addition to the channel or diversion structures that deliver the water, the infrastructure also may comprise facilities Figure 6.2 Spate System in Yemen Photo: Gerhardt Lichtenthaeler. 4 Charles Abernethy, personal communication. 102 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS to assist in allocation. Figure 6.3 shows a water-dividing structure in a foggara in Algeria. Abdullah Al-Ghafri and oth- ers (undated) describe various timing devices, ranging from pots with holes in the bottom that provide a measure of time while slowly sinking, to complex, seasonally adjusted sundials. These techniques are de- signed to enable water shares, first divided among user groups by structures such as shown in figure 6.3, and then subdivided by time among individual farmers. This brief review of the successful and sustainable local approaches that have developed in the Middle East to deal with water scarcity sup- ports some significant, generalizable conclusions. These are described in the Introduction to this volume as the ABCDE approach. 5 Current Challenges Thus, we know the ingredients of sustainable and productive water resource management. Moreover, the Arab countries have developed successful approaches that have been exported to, and implemented in, Europe and South America. We can assume that farmers receiving scarce but well-defined water supplies will use these as productively as circumstances such as market opportunities and input availability permit. Overall production may be lower because water availability will be lower, but the expertise exists in the region to make the best of whatever is available. So what is the problem? The central problem is that variations in availability have surpassed the “typical” range to which “traditional” operations were adapted. Water management systems are now out of tune with water availability pat- terns, requiring changes in the associated processes to determine which 5 A = Assessment, B = Bargaining, C = Codification, D = Delegation, and E = Engineering. Such features are identifiable worldwide in successful systems. For example, see Trawick (2003) for a sociologist’s perspective, derived largely from experience in the Andes, which reached similar—certainly compatible—conclusions; and Frederiksen and Vissia (1998) for an engineering viewpoint. Figure 6.3 Water-Dividing Structure in a Foggara, Algeria Photo: Gerhardt Lichtenthaeler. Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World N 103 sectors or users will suffer and by how much. These changes require the political bargaining process to be reopened, may change the rules of operation, and require new or revised institutional responsibilities. Infrastructure also may require modification. Four important challenges to “traditional” water management systems can be identified: 1. Unsustainable, “Individualized” Withdrawals Over recent decades, for many countries, the most important develop- ment has been the break of the “natural” link between the renewable supply and the level of use. In the past, as noted, rainfall generated runoff and infiltration supplied the traditional water systems. If rainfall was low, availability was low, and utilization was low. Then, in the 1970s, cheap pumps and tubewell technology arrived. They enabled farmers to withdraw water from any source at much higher rates than with animal power and to tap deep aquifers by us- ing submersible pumps. Their advent has had three profound negative consequences: Specifically in the case of groundwater, a. users can and now do “mine” aquifers. The logic of the “tragedy of the commons” provides an incentive for the individual to derive benefits as extensively and quickly as possible. Aquifers are complex and difficult to observe—especially deep aquifers. Recharge may be vertical from rainfall; or lateral, as rainfall on surrounding hills moves down to the valleys and plains. Geological structures can constrain or redirect recharge. Thus, understanding how much water is actually available in total or on a renewable basis is extremely difficult. In many areas, the assess- ment of availability is partial and unreliable. As water sources have become individually owned and operated, b. the amount of water actually being abstracted has become difficult to measure. Controlling such use is even more difficult. The indi- vidual farmer who has invested in the pump or well feels entitled to exploit it. Setting the rules (codification) and enforcing them (delegation) is extremely difficult. 6 6 Indeed, to the authors’ knowledge, there are few if any examples of successful control of dispersed groundwater exploitation anywhere in the world. There are, 104 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The effects of over-exploitation go beyond the direct users. Falling c. water tables reduce flows to qanats. Excessive pumping from one reach of a river or canal affects all other users. For example, it is reported that the qanats serving palmeries around Marrakech dried up in the 1970s so wells are now the main source of water. 2. Increased Variability and Reduction in Rainfall Adding to this problem of unsustainable water use, IPCC projections imply increased variability and reduced river flows in areas that rely on surface storage in reservoirs. This situation already is a reality in parts of the Arab region. For example, in Morocco, due to reduced annual precipitation, dams constructed over the last three decades have been able to store, on average, only approximately half of their design capacity. As a consequence, farmers have become acutely aware of the uncertain nature of their access to water. Irrigation agencies in the command areas struggle to ration uncertain water supplies to the politically important farmer constituency. Variability has local and regional implications. For the individual farmer, investing in the inputs for high-value crops is less attractive if there is a possibility of water shortage affecting yields. At the regional level, the relationship between rainfall and runoff is not linear. Runoff typically declines much more sharply than precipitation. Thus, variability is concentrated in the downstream areas. Therefore, the foundation for current allocation priorities, rules, institutional arrangements, and infrastructure is in doubt. 3. Political Uncertainty of Cooperation with Upstream Riparians The Arab countries are dependent for some two-thirds of their water supplies on transboundary water. Egypt is the most extreme case, with some 95 percent of its water coming from the Nile. Apart from natural variability, investments in hydraulic infrastructure by upstream riparians change water availability to downstream users. For example, the Greater Anatolia Project affects water availability in Syria and Iraq. The Israeli water utility affects the availability of water in Palestine and however, many examples of uncontrolled depletion: much of India, Mexico, Paki- stan, US, and Yemen. An ongoing collective effort in Andhra Pradesh, India shows considerable early promise. Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World N 105 Jordan. Dams constructed in Ethiopia and Sudan affect the calculus of Egyptian water planners. 4. Deteriorating Water Quality A fourth factor has been the political and economic pressure on decisionmakers to focus more on water quality. An IWMI survey of government irrigation officials in Egypt in 1995 produced the surpris- ing result that many ranked pollution as the most important problem facing the sector. For example, in the congested rural settlements along the Nile River Delta, residents and farmers have become an important lobby- ing group. They have been demanding that municipal and agricultural pollution be cleaned out of their canals and rivers. Among farmers, exporters of high-value farm products have been concerned that the marketability of their products is affected by water pollution. Similarly, along the Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts, many countries are benefiting from tourism to historic and seaside resorts. However, development of other high potential areas—such as the coastline of the Nile Delta—is constrained by beach contamination from polluted Nile waters. Tour operators and resort owners are pow- erful interest groups who have thus joined environmentalists and farm exporters to lobby for enhanced water quality management. A problem facing many countries in which groundwater is overused is the deterioration in quality that occurs as water tables fall. Deterio- ration is caused either from saline water that flows laterally into the depleted zone (especially near coasts); or from the deeper layers of water, which are more saline. Understanding the Present: Traditional and New Data Sources To recapitulate, climate change is likely to increase the imbalance be- tween supply and demand for water in the Arab countries. However, there is ample evidence that scarcity has been successfully managed in the Arab world for centuries. The components required to manage scarcity are information on resource availability; a bargaining process among the users to determine how water should be allocated, resulting in rules and responsibilities; and infrastructure to deliver the service. Although their details vary, similar patterns have been common across many MNA countries for centuries. However, traditional processes increasingly are 106 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS under threat from ever-growing demand and new technologies that upset the “traditional” balance between availability and utilization. Climate change is adding to the strain. The process that will be induced by declining availability, more un- certainty and variability, and declining quality will be multidisciplinary. It will draw in hydrologists, engineers, economists, agriculturalists, law- yers, and institutional specialists—just as the ABCDE process does. Success will depend, among many factors, on (1) the ability of the participants in the process to communicate as effectively and unambiguously as possible across disciplines—that is, it will depend on developing a common terminology—and (2) placing the analysis of options in a basin context. Terminology for Water Accounting Before discussing how water management can adjust to reflect the new context of declining availability and increased demand, we need to clarify our terminology. Without agreement over the definitions of concepts such as “efficiency” and “consumption,” it is not possible to have a consistent view of what constitutes a successful water man- agement policy. Consider, for example, how a different viewpoint on the water resource gives a different understanding of efficiency in water man- agement: For a water supply and sanitation engineer, one design objective often is to recover, treat, and return to the hydrological system in good condition as much as possible (perhaps 95 percent) of the water withdrawn. A poorly functioning system would return a much smaller percentage and with a heavy pollution load. In contrast, for an irrigation engineer, the design objective is to return as little as possible (perhaps 10 percent) of withdrawals to the system, preferably including all of the salts that were in the original abstraction. Individual cases will vary, but a downstream environmental “wa- ter user” might be puzzled to find that, when urban water efficiency improves, s/he gets more and cleaner water. The same downstream user would find that improvements in irrigation efficiency reduce water availability and perhaps increase the salt load. The source of this paradox is simple. Irrigation engineers have, quite rationally, designed irrigation systems to maximize the amount Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World N 107 of water that reaches the crop, and is then consumed in transpiration. This is the purpose of an irrigation system, and understanding how much water arrives at its destination is central to operational planning and designing cropping patterns. For irrigation, water allocations usually are defined in terms of right to withdraw water (either as a volume per season; or a rate of withdrawal, or an irrigation “turn”). A common irrigation performance indicator is “how much area did we irrigate per unit of water with- drawn.” Improving on this indicator (by lining canals, or using modern irrigation technology) is a valid objective at the project level, or for the individual irrigator with a well. Improvements often will lead to substantial increases in the area irrigated (and hence consumption of water by crops) for the same quantity withdrawn. However, this “local” perspective is unhelpful, even misleading, when water is scarce at the wider basin or aquifer scale. From this perspective, the question of where the “losses” actually were going is critical. Certainly, if the irrigated area is increased, transpiration is greater and, to that extent, return flows will be reduced. Return flows to rivers may contribute to downstream human, agricultural, or natu- ral demands. Infiltration to aquifers from leaking canals or excessive irrigation applications contributes to groundwater recharge. Thus, an improvement as observed at one location may have a negative impact elsewhere. In response to this problem, the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID) recently published a review of the lit- erature on irrigation efficiency (Perry 2007) and recommended terms that were suitable for application in all water sectors. The draft was for reviewed by all of ICID’s relevant national committees and work- ing groups, and thereby represents a wide consensus. Other writers and organizations have similar views. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) is debating a change in terminology. The California Department of Water Resources makes no mention of efficiency in its regular accounts of water allocation and use in the state. Recent research publications take the same view (Ward and Pulido-Vasquez 2008). The recommendations have been summarized in terms of water consumed by users (irrigation, water supply, and industries) and nonconsumed water (usually in the form of environmental flows or as groundwater stock). This approach to water sector terminology has a number of im- portant features: 108 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS It closely follows hydrological concepts (conservation of mass. The 1. fractions add up to unity at any given level of aggregation). It differentiates between consumptive and nonconsumptive uses 2. (so that the water supply and sanitation sector is characterized quite differently from irrigation). Consumption we 3. want (transpiration by irrigated crops) is dis- tinguished from unwanted consumption (such as transpiration by weeds and evaporation from wet soil). Outflows that are recoverable are distinguished from those that 4. are not. In water-short environments, these terms enable sectoral spe- 5. cialists to communicate unambiguously to point directly to the priorities that will deliver more benefits from the same—or less—water: Reducing nonbeneficial consumption a. Minimizing nonrecoverable flows b. Recovering as much as possible of the recoverable flows. c. The use of these terms greatly clarifies the discussion of interventions. When these terms are not used carefully, the ambiguity can generate misconceptions. For example, respected authorities can quote data suggesting that production can be substantially increased while water use is cut by 50 percent–75 percent (Brown 2008). This wording could indicate this outcome without clarifying that the “saving” is in water applied, not water consumed, and that crop water transpiration is linearly related to crop production—so that, in reality, beneficial water consumption will increase with crop production. One conventional response to scarcity is to introduce “water- saving” technologies. Most MNA countries are pursuing such inter- ventions (either government sponsored or farmer initiated). Typically, the expectation is that crop production will be increased, and water will be saved. However, normally, the water-saving indicator does not signify water consumed in the irrigation process but, rather, water applied to the process. In the framework proposed by ICID, such interventions must be very carefully evaluated: To the extent that transpiration is increased, the consumptive use N of water is proportionately increased. The source of water for that increase then must be traced. Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World N 109 If the impact is to shift nonbeneficial evaporation into beneficial N transpiration, then production is increased at no incremental water cost. However, the literature suggests that, once irrigation practices are reasonable, the proportion of applied water going to evaporation is rather small. However, if the impact of the intervention is to reduce runoff or N infiltration, the ultimate destination of that excess must be identi- fied. If the water is fully or partially recovered, the actual saving is proportionately reduced. The impact of improved irrigation “efficiency” and irrigation management always will be somewhere between two extremes on a spectrum of possible impacts: At one extreme, water that otherwise would have been un- 1. productive makes a full contribution to crop transpiration and hence production. The resource cost is zero; the outcome fully positive. At the opposite end of the spectrum, incremental water consump- 2. tion as a result of improved irrigation technology in one location takes water away from a more productive alternative use in an- other location—future domestic consumption, for example—so the impact is strongly negative. River Basin Context For each part of a river basin, a water balance can be constructed comprising precipitation and surface inflows as sources; and evapo- ration, transpiration, runoff, and changes to storage as end uses (or destinations). The uses can further be classified into the ICID benefi- cial/nonbeneficial, recoverable/nonrecoverable flow categories. Some areas are “sources” of water, that is, precipitation exceeds local use and the excess goes to runoff or groundwater recharge. Other areas —including wetlands, irrigated areas, and saline sinks—are “sinks”in which consumption exceeds precipitation. The balance is met by natural inflows, managed diversions, or pumping. Table 6.3 provides a schematic, with completely notional data, of how basin accounts can be represented in accordance with this ap- proach. As is discussed later, models are available that enable various data types to be integrated into this format. 110 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The first row of table 6.3 defines the major categories of land and water use. Some are essentially natural and “unmanaged.” Others consist of managed land use. The third is managed water use. In the next row, typical classes within these categories and the percentage of the area under each class are specified. Sources of water consist of rainfall and any committed inflows (in this case, restricted to the requirement for irrigation). The rainfall is distributed across land classes—here, for simplicity, in proportion to area. The remaining lines correspond to the ICID classification of uses. The data in each column—which correspond to a water balance for that use class—then can be estimated, calculated, or modeled for each cell (elaborated below). What is deemed “nonbeneficial” is, in large measure, a political decision. Clearly, water that is consumed by weeds among irrigated crops is nonbeneficial, as is water that evaporates from bare soil (after rainfall or during poorly managed irrigation). However, water evapo- rated and transpired from wetlands, riparian vegetation, and natural forests often may be considered as environmentally useful, hence a beneficial use. This basin-scale overview would be complemented by more de- tailed analyses of specific areas of interest. For example, the estimated overall net groundwater recharge of 45 units (recoverable recharge = 145 units, transfers to irrigation = 100 units) may well disguise areas in which recharge is substantially positive or negative. As mentioned, the data in the table are invented, but the advan- tages for a country of creating such a data set are considerable. The set clarifies the most significant water sources and uses: Natural forest is the most significant source of stream flow, so N changes in this land use class should be monitored carefully. Nonbeneficial use in irrigated areas is significant. Thus, better N management or technologies offer scope for significant increases in beneficial use, hence crop production, without negative impacts on downstream areas. Recoverable river flows (209 units) are entirely utilized. Additional N use of surface water would require either transfers from one sec- tor to another, or construction of facilities to capture more of the currently nonrecoverable flows. Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World N 111 T a b l e 6 . 3 T a b u l a t i o n o f L a n d U s e C l a s s e s a n d W a t e r B a l a n c e s a t B a s i n S c a l e B a s i n N a t u r a l l a n d c o v e r ( w a t e r a n d l a n d n o t m a n a g e d ) M a n a g e d l a n d u s e M a n a g e d w a t e r u s e M m 3 R o c k s ( % ) G l a c i e r ( % ) D e s e r t ( % ) N a t u r a l f o r e s t ( % ) S a l i n e s i n k ( % ) G r a z i n g l a n d ( % ) N a t u r a l w e t l a n d ( % ) L a k e s ( % ) F o r e s t p l a n t a t i o n ( % ) R a i n f e d a g ( % ) C i t i e s ( % ) M a n a g e d w e t l a n d s ( % ) I r r i g a t e d a g ( % ) T r a n s f e r s 5 1 5 4 0 1 2 0 2 4 3 1 0 3 1 5 S o u r c e s R a i n f a l l 2 , 5 0 0 1 2 5 2 5 1 2 5 1 , 0 0 0 2 5 5 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 7 5 2 5 0 7 5 2 5 1 2 5 S u r f a c e w a t e r t r a n s f e r 2 0 9 2 0 9 G r o u n d w a t e r t r a n s f e r 1 0 0 1 0 0 U s e s E v a p o t r a n s p i r a t i o n 2 , 1 9 1 5 1 8 0 8 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 8 0 8 0 4 5 2 0 0 1 0 5 0 4 0 0 B e n e fi c i a l 1 , 5 3 5 7 0 0 3 0 0 8 0 3 0 1 2 0 5 5 0 2 5 0 N o n b e n e fi c i a l 6 5 6 5 1 8 0 1 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 8 0 1 5 8 0 5 0 1 5 0 S u r p l u s / d e fi c i t 6 1 8 1 2 0 2 4 4 5 2 0 0 – 1 5 1 0 0 – 3 0 2 0 3 0 5 0 6 5 – 2 5 3 4 R u n o ff 3 5 9 9 5 2 4 1 5 1 4 0 – 1 5 3 0 – 3 0 2 0 1 0 3 0 4 0 – 3 0 3 0 ( R e c ) 2 0 9 8 0 2 4 1 5 6 0 – 1 5 2 0 0 2 0 5 2 0 1 0 – 3 0 – 2 0 9 ( N o n - r e c ) 1 5 0 1 5 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 – 3 0 0 5 1 0 3 0 0 3 0 R e c h a r g e 2 5 9 2 5 0 3 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 5 5 4 ( R e c ) 1 4 5 2 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 5 – 1 0 0 ( N o n - r e c ) 1 1 4 2 5 0 1 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 5 5 – 2 1 112 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Rainfed agricultural areas contribute substantial recharge, so in N these areas there could be scope to develop groundwater and thus increase agricultural production. This framework forces recognition of the linkages among the components of a basin, which is an essential basis for understanding and analysis. The output from models is, at best, only as good as the data we put in to them. Remote sensing (RS) now offers important additional sources of information, from rainfall through evapotranspiration (ET) (with the potential to distinguish between the beneficial and nonben- eficial components), to stream flow, lake levels, and groundwater storage. Each of these data types—especially when combined with ground-truthed observations—now can be estimated at various scales through RS technologies. Information from Remote Sensing This section summarizes the potential contribution of RS information to the various information needs identified in table 6.3. Land-Use Classes One of the earliest uses of RS data was to classify land use. Initially, classification was little more than visual identification. However, in the past decade or so, more and more characteristics have become observable with different sensors and the data can be processed in computers. Thus, it has become possible to identify more classes with greater precision and at higher resolution. Rainfall The Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission, launched in 1997, provides real-time estimates of rainfall derived from microwave data at 1 degree resolution. More recently, data from this and other sources have been integrated through the PERSIANN (Precipitation Estimation from Remotely Sensed Information Using Artificial Neural Networks) algo- rithm to generate rainfall data at a resolution of 0.25 degrees (25km) at the equator, at 3-hour intervals. Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World N 113 Evaporation and Transpiration One of the most active areas of research in the interpretation of RS data in the last decade has been evapotranspiration (ET). The Surface Energy Balance for Land (SEBAL) (Bastiaanssen and others 1998) has been applied successfully in a large number of countries. It provides spatial estimates of ET at resolutions from a few meters to several kilometers, depending on the source data. The METRIC algorithm (Allen and others 2007) is computationally similar to SEBAL. Anderson and others (1997) use an approach that does not rely on ground-based information. It generates frequent estimates of ET at a resolution of 5km–10km. Integration of these data with finer resolution sources enables downscaling the ET estimates. Table 6.3 disaggregates ET into beneficial and nonbeneficial com- ponents. This separation is important, but not easy to make. Some nonbeneficial ET is evaporation from wet soil and can be identified because it occurs in the absence of vegetation. Similarly, ET occurs from nonbeneficial vegetation. Whether a given vegetation type is con- sidered beneficial or not is essentially a political decision. Perhaps most importantly for irrigation managers, there is nonbeneficial evaporation when irrigation deliveries are excessive or poorly managed at the farm level. Estimates of the distribution of ET between E and T also can be made based on known crop characteristics. The potential T is known, so if ET exceeds this figure, the excess must be evaporation. Runoff and Recharge Once precipitation and evapotranspiration are mapped, the total runoff and recharge for a given area can be estimated as the differ- ence between these two. Partitioning further between runoff and recharge generally requires ground data, and/or further modeling. RS data also is beginning to make a contribution in this area. The GRACE project, sponsored by NASA, measures variations in the water stored in the soil and underlying aquifers. To date, the resolution of these data is coarse (approximately 100km), making it hard to interpret lo- cal changes. However, already such information provides a degree of independent confirmation of other observations or modeling results. Thus, it can be anticipated that, in future, estimates at finer resolution will be possible. 114 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Information from Conventional Measurements The information sources outlined above provide important clues to how a basin is operating. Additional, more traditional sources of informa- tion are essential to complement and confirm such data. They include streamflows, releases from reservoirs, water table information, cropping patterns and planting dates, land cover, and meteorological data. Integrating Information and Scenario Analysis: Hydrological and WEAP Models An appropriate model can greatly facilitate the process of organizing the analysis, linking components of the system, and, especially, exploring the impact of future scenarios. The main challenge is not to try to build in all the processes that we can model, but to identify the most relevant processes. Models can address either very narrow issues in great detail— for example, how stomata react to salt—or much broader issues at a lower level of detail. For the type of analysis relevant to the issues of concern here, hydrological models are most relevant. Table 6.3 makes clear that RS data can contribute extensively to identify the main “sources and uses” (rainfall and ET) components as well as to understand recharge. These data sets are basic to the for- mulation of a hydrological model. This model then adds the capacity to define the interactions between storing and diverting runoff, and pumping groundwater. These interactions are susceptible to managed interventions. A gargantuan number of hydrological models exist, and applications are growing rapidly. The number of online pages that include the words, “hydrological model.” is over 1.2 million (Google January 2007). Using the same search engine to find “water resources model” came up with 86 million pages. Therefore, a critical question for hydrological model studies relates to the selection of the most appropriate model. One of the most important issues to consider is the spatial scale to be incorporated in the study and how much physical detail is to be included. WEAP (Water Evaluation and Planning System) is well suited to integrate the types of data described above to produce a practi- cal “accounting framework” for planners and decisionmakers. It was created in 1988 to be a flexible, integrated, and transparent planning tool to evaluate the sustainability of current water demand and supply patterns and to explore alternative long-range scenarios (SEI 1997). Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World N 115 WEAP is freely available to academic, governmental, and nonprofit organizations in developing countries. WEAP follows an integrated approach to water development that places water projects in the context of multisectoral, prioritized demands; water quality; and ecosystem preservation and protection. WEAP also is distinguished by its integrated approach to simulating both the natural (rainfall, evapotranspirative demands, runoff, base- flow) and engineered components (reservoirs, diversions, groundwater pumping) of water systems. This holistic approach gives the planner access to a comprehensive view of the broad range of factors that must be considered in managing water resources. WEAP, thus, is an effective tool for examining alternative water development and management options. WEAP operates on the basic principles of a water balance. Using this tool, the analyst can represent all of the system’s complexities: supply sources (rainfall, rivers, creeks, groundwater, and reservoirs), withdrawal, transmission and wastewater treatment facilities, eco- system requirements, water demands, and pollution generation. The data structure and level of detail easily can be customized to meet the requirements of a particular analysis and to reflect the limits imposed by available data. Operating on these basic principles, WEAP is applicable to many scales; municipal and agricultural systems, single catchments, or complex transboundary river systems. WEAP incorporates not only water al- location but also, if required, water quality and ecosystem preservation modules, making this model suitable for simulating many of the fresh- water problems that exist in the world. SEI 2005 and Droogers 2008 explain more about the WEAP model and present an example—loosely based on a known basin—with guidance for operating and modifying the model to explore future scenarios. However, the most important aspect of choosing a model is its capacity to explore different scenarios. Scenarios may be driven either by exogenous factors such as population growth and climate change (Droogers and Aerts 2005) or by management decisions (res- ervoir operation rules, water allocation among sectors, investment in infras-tructure such as water treatment or desalinization plants, and agricultural irrigation practices). Understanding how changes in one part of the basin are likely to impact on other areas and, indeed, which linkages are the most important are very powerful features of an ap- propriate modeling system. 116 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Conclusions and Recommendations The water situation facing most Arab countries is difficult: water sup- plies are scarce, and the demand for water is high. These conditions have existed for millennia so a variety of ap- proaches evolved to ensure that whatever water is available is produc- tively and sustainably used. Water management arrangements vary in scale, complexity, technology, and purpose. However, they also have important common features: the group sharing the water had a clearly defined water source; agreed priorities for allocating the water formed the basis of formal or informal rules; responsibilities for administering the rules were assigned; and the appropriate infrastructure to deliver the service is implied by this entire process. In fact, the elements that provide for stability are clearly identifiable across a wide range of countries and techniques. They comprise an understanding of availability (assessment); a political bargaining process to establish priorities for allocation; codification of the results of this process into laws and rules; delegation of powers to institutions and governmental and nongovernment agencies: and engineering works suitable to deliver the water to the users (ABCDE). However, in many countries, the precarious balance that developed over centuries to manage naturally available water supplies has been disturbed in many countries by the pressures of economic development and demographics as well as the introduction of new technologies that made over-exploitation for irrigation purposes easier to practice and harder to control. The outcome is often chaotic competition, inequi- table distribution, and over-exploitation. Climate change is an additional destabilizing factor. Sharp declines in water availability are projected over the coming century. Increasing temperature and aridity will increase crop-water demand, thus ac- centuating the deficit between supply and demand. Addressing these issues must be a multidisciplinary effort. Con- sequently, communication among the participants in unambiguous terminology about the nature of water use will be essential—to dis- tinguish between consumptive and nonconsumptive uses of water; as well as to carefully identify which return flows are already exploited elsewhere and which are genuine losses to the system. Hydrology pro- vides the scientific framework within which solutions must be found. Presenting hydrological information to policymakers and planners is not always easy. However, the combination of modern analytical tools, Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World N 117 new sources of spatial data, and diligent measurements of key “ground” data provide a proven base. Integrating these data sources will enable sectors, regions, and countries to better understand how these data interrelate and will enable the inevitable disputes about allocation to be based, as far as possible, on facts rather than assertions. Furthermore, well-formulated models enable exploration of possible scenarios that can reflect management options, technical options, and investment options in the context of projected climate scenarios. The potential contribution of new RS techniques to these efforts is substantial. Through different types of satellites and analysis, RS can provide historical time series as well as near-real-time data about the major components of the hydrological cycle: rainfall, land use, irrigated areas, ET, and changes in groundwater. Restoring hydrological equilibrium in the Arab world is critical for sustainability, productivity, and equity between generations. However, carrying it out will be difficult. It will require restoration of the historic linkages among assessment of availability, bargaining, codification, delegation, and engineering (ABCDE). Information about availability is the foundation for this structure, and new technologies, especially RS techniques, offer powerful ways to improve knowledge for all concerned. References Al-Ghafri, A., T. Inoue, and T. Nagasawa. 2007. “Irrigation Scheduling of Aflaj of Oman.” University of Hokkaido. www.inweh.unu.edu/ inweh/drylands/Publications/AlGhafri.pdf Allen R.G., M. Tasumi, and R. Trezza. 2007. “Satellite-Based Energy Balance for Mapping Evapotranspiration with Internalized Calibra- tion (METRIC) Model.” www.drought.gov/imageserver/NIDIS/ workshops/remotesensing/abstracts/graeme_aggett.pdf Anderson, M.C., J.M. Norman, G.R. Diak, W.P. Kustas, and J.R. Mecikalski. 1997. “A Two-Source Time-Integrated Model for Estimating Surface Fluxes Using Thermal Infrared Remote Sens- ing.” Remote Sensing of Environment 60: 195–216. Bastiaanssen, W.G. M., M. Menenti, R.A. Feddes, and A.A.M. Holt- slag. 1998. “A Remote Sensing Surface Energy Balance Algorithm for Land (SEBAL). Part 1: Formulation.” Journal of Hydrology: 212–13, 198–212. 118 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Bates, B.C., Z.W. Kundzewicz, S. Wu, and J.P. Palutikof, eds. 2008. “Climate Change and Water.” Technical Paper of the Intergovern- mental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Secretariat, Geneva. Battisti, D.S., and R.L. Naylor. 2009. “Historical Warnings of Future Food Insecurity with Unprecedented Seasonal Heat.” Science 323 (240). Frederiksen, H.D., and R.J. Vissia. 1998. “Considerations in Formu- lating the Transfer of Services in the Water Sector.” International Water Management Institute, Colombo. Gleick, P.H. 1996. “Basic Water Requirements for Human Activities: Meeting Basic Needs.” Water International 21: 83–92. Perry, C.J. 2007. “Efficient Irrigation, Inefficient Communication, Flawed Recommendations.” Irrigation and Drainage. July. Mehraby, R. www.destinationiran.com/Kariz_(Qanat).htm) Steduto, P., T.C. Hsiao, and E. Fereres. 2007. “On the Conservative Behaviour of Biomass Water Productivity.” Irrigation Science. DOI 10.1007/s00271-007-0064-1. SEI (Stockholm Environmental Institute): Stockholm 1998, 2005. Water Evaluation and Planning System. www.seib.org/weap Trawick, P.B. 2003. The Struggle for Water in Peru: Comedy and Tragedy in the Andean Commons. Stanford University Press. UNESCO. 2009. “Water Availability per Person per Year.” www.unesco. org/bpi/wwdr/WWDR_chart1_eng.pdf Ward, F.A., and M. Pulido-Velasquez. 2008. “Water Conservation in Irrigation Can Increase Water Use.” “Proceedings of the National Academy of Science.” Free online through the PNAS open access option. www.pnas.orgcgidoi10.1073pnas.0805554105 119 7 Egypt Case Study Energy Efficiency CDM Program: Irrigation and Drainage Pumping Sector Abdulhamid Azad I n 1992 over 180 countries adopted the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a framework convention aimed at stabilizing climate-altering greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. † The Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted under the UNFCCC and entered into force on February 2005, commits industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by an average of 5.2 percent below their 1990 levels by 2012. To meet these commitments in the most cost-effective manner, the Protocol contains provisions al- lowing industrialized countries some flexibility to meet their obligations through projects generating emission reductions (ERs) elsewhere. The most important instrument permitting industrialized countries to finance emissions-avoiding projects in developing countries and receive credit for doing so is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) proposed under article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. The main purpose of this mechanism is to assist host countries with sustainable development through the transfer of cleaner technology and financial resources for specific projects, while contributing to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the rapid growth of global carbon finance transactions, en- ergy efficiency improvements of irrigation and drainage pumping stations are still being bypassed due to lack of operational policy frameworks and pilot projects. Moreover, most of the pumping stations also are suffering from an overall lack of investments in the energy efficiency improvements. The result is that even the potentially most attractive, † This chapter was prepared on the basis of project documents in the recently com- pleted World-Bank-financed Egypt Pumps III Project and the preparatory work for a proposed operation with Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) engagement. 120 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS low-cost carbon mitigation proj- ects encounter significant dif- ficulties obtaining funding (box 7.1). This case study presents analytical issues related to CDM projects for the irrigation and drainage sector such as base- line def initions, project idea note preparation, which CDM methodology is to be used for the pumping sector, benefits, and yearly emission reductions resulting from energy savings. Irrigation and Drainage Sector Egypt has no significant rainfall and is dependent on its 55.5 billion cubic meters (m 3 ) per annum share of Nile water. The country therefore must improve returns from its available water resources in an environmentally sound and sustainable manner, which includes adopting energy-efficient technologies. The energy-intensive Egyp- tian irrigation and drainage sector plays a vital part in food produc- tion and in maintaining the rural economy. Agriculture accounts for 20 percent of GDP and 35 percent of the labor force. The success of irrigated agriculture depends to a large extent on the effective operation and maintenance (O&M) of the irrigation and drainage system to maintain the quality of the level of irrigation and drainage services (table 7.1). Box 7.1 Need for a New Approach to Emission Reductions Energy efficiency potentially could account for N more than half of energy-related greenhouse gas reductions achievable over the next 20–40 years. Energy-efficient projects account for less than N 10 percent of the current market. Table 7.1 Irrigation and Drainage Service Quality Indicators Service quality Irrigation Drainage Adequacy Ability to meet water demand for optimal plant growth Ability to dispose excess water in minimal time to prevent damage Reliability Confidence in supply of water Confidence in ability to dispose excess water Equity Fair distribution of share of water shortage risks and minimize the head and tail equities (poverty aspect) Fair distribution of risks Flexibility Ability to choose the frequency, rate, and duration of supply Ability to choose the time, rate, and duration of drainage water disposal Egypt Case Study Energy Efficiency CDM Program N 121 Given the very flat topography in most parts of the country, water in open conveyance channels needs to be lifted at certain critical points to provide irrigation, while drainage water needs to be pumped out. As a con- sequence, there are over 743 pumping stations that are of vital importance for Egypt’s agriculture in the Nile Valley and Delta. By world standards, most of these pumping stations are large, with pumping capacities ranging from 2 m 3 /s to 75 m 3 /s. They command large irrigated and drainage areas with a high cropping intensity ranging from 180 percent–200 percent. Pumping heights range from 5 meters–50 meters. Pumping drainage water also is needed to control groundwater levels and salinity to preserve crop yields. Approximately half of these stations have very old pumping units operating inefficiently and incurring high energy costs (70 percent of total operating costs). The allocation of funds to maintenance activities is small, and the pumping stations are subject to contingency repairs. Given this system’s strategic importance to the country, financing is made available from the government’s budget. However, there is generally no serious questioning of either the economics or the technological choices made, such as energy efficiency aspects. In water-scarce regions such as in Egypt, declines in reliable water supplies for irrigation will dampen the increase in cereals yield that poli- cymakers expect as a result of improving irrigation infrastructure and techniques. By 2025, reduced reliability is expected to reduce yields in the Nile River basins by 11 percent. There is evidence that temperatures already have increased in the last two decades, and that drought epi- sodes have intensified. International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) climate models predict additional increases in temperature. Climate models also predict an increase in amplitude and frequency of extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, and storms. The expected rise in temperature will increase evaporation, while a rise in the seawater level will cause salt-water intrusion in coastal groundwater reservoirs. Given such scenarios in the face of growing demand, overall water availability for irrigation and other uses will decrease. At the same time, water availability will become more erratic and thus harder to manage. In the Nile Delta, drainage pumping stations will need to be redesigned to “climate-proof ” the investment so that they can help to counter the effect of the expected seawater intrusion. Redesign also would enable the continuation of rice cultivation in the Nile Delta, which would help combat seawater intrusion. In a context of increasing water scarcity, climate change will exac- erbate the current supply-demand imbalance. Major investments will 122 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS be needed to (a) modernize irrigation and drainage pumping stations and (b) improve on-farm irrigation efficiency. Adaptation may require switches in cropping patterns to new crops or varieties more tolerant of water scarcity. To avoid the harmful effects on crops of irrigation and drainage pump failures and reduce the O&M cost of the pumping stations, the government has set up a long-term program to rehabili- tate the irrigation and drainage pumping network of the Nile Water Resource Management System. GHG Emissions Characteristics The aggregate national GHG emissions without the impacts of land-use changes were estimated at over 116 million tons of CO 2 equivalent in the baseline year 1990–91. The relative contributions of greenhouse gases in 1990–91 to the total emissions, by sector, are presented in table 7.2. The agriculture sector was the second largest GHG source, mainly from enteric fermentation and rice cultivation, followed by the non- combustion-related industrial emissions of CO 2 , mainly from the steel and cement industries (EEAA 1999). Selling Emission Reductions under the Kyoto Protocol to Support Program Implementation To register a CDM program such as this with the CDM Executive Board, an approved methodology Table 7.2 GHG Emissions as Reported to UNFCCC, 1990 (million t CO 2 ) Sector CO2 emissions (mil, t) Total emissions (%) All energy 82.72 71 Industry (other than energy) 10.27 9 Agriculture 17.93 15 Wastes 5.69 5 Total 116.60 100 Source: Egypt National Greenhouse Gases Inventory 1990–91. www.eeaa.gov.eg 0 250 400 350 300 200 150 100 20 Million tons of CO 2 1990–1991 1996–1997 2001–2002 2006–2007 2011–2012 2016–2017 Enery Waste Total Industrial processes Agriculture Figure 7.1 GHG Projections for All Sectors, 1990–2017 Egypt Case Study Energy Efficiency CDM Program N 123 must exist. In this case, an approved methodology exists, namely, AM0020, “Monitoring Methodology for Water Pumping Efficiency Improvements.” In brief, how does the CDM work in the case of this project? En- ergy savings resulting from energy efficiency improvements reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To meet their agreed emission reductions targets, OECD countries that have agreed to reduce their emissions of GHG then can purchase these emission reductions from such projects located in developing countries, which are not obliged to reduce their GHG emissions. Pumping stations that, in principle, are eligible to participate in this CDM program will need to meet the following criteria: Age of the equipment exceeds 20 years. N Average operating hours per unit exceed 100,000. N Capacity is inadequate, or there is no stand-by unit. N Drainage and static head requirements have changed. N Building is in very poor condition, including major structural defi- N ciencies. There are problems with switch gear, gear boxes, and corrosion. N New pumps will be installed if the cost of rehabilitation exceeds N 70 percent of the cost of new pumps. Most of the project investments will relate to electromechanical equipment for the pumping stations. Efforts will be directed toward establishing better linkages among the Irrigation Department, Drain- age Authority, and the Ministry of Electricity and Energy. The last is implementing Energy Efficiency Programs including auditing energy consumption. These programs have had some success with domestic water supply and wastewater treatment pumping stations. Table 7.3 Change in Energy Use Type of intervention Pumping station Annual energy savings (US$) Irrigation (%) Drainage (%) Complete rehabilitation –22 –10 624,637 Partial replacement –13 –5 1,376,690 Provision of spare parts –9 –7 1,054,593 Total 3,055,920 124 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The recent pumping station rehabilitation project analyzed the overall impact on energy use by rehabilitation alone (table 7.3). Rehabilitation increased the operational efficiency of motors and pumps and reduced the amount of maintenance required, resulting in immediate cost sav- ings. Annual savings in maintenance costs were estimated at 5 percent of the capital costs of rehabilitation and 1 percent of spare parts. CDM Program of Activities Design Document A CDM program will be implemented through what is termed a Pro- gram of Activities, for which a Program of Activities Design Document (PoA DD) will need to be prepared and registered with the CDM Executive Board. The PoA DD will describe the overall program. The proposed CDM Program Activity Design Document (CPA) will describe all the energy efficiency measures to be implemented in a specific pumping station(s). The energy efficiency measures will be based on energy audits of the pumping stations and will include: Electricity demand-side management N Power subscription adjustment N Power factor improvement N Changing mismatched pumps N Impellers adjustments N High-efficiency motors N Preventive pump maintenance N Energy efficiency monitoring and evaluation. N In the absence of the program activity, the pumping stations will continue to be operated at the same energy performance level or worse. The electricity consumption of the pumping stations will stay at the current order of 1,500 GWh/year or will increase. The program activity will improve the energy performance of the pumping stations and will save electricity, reducing GHG emissions. The program’s emis- sion reductions correspond to GHG emissions that would have been produced in the absence of the program activities. The current operational conditions and performance of the pump- ing stations will be documented and organized in a database that will be used as a reference for the future emissions reductions evaluation. A comprehensive Management Information System (MIS) has been developed for this database. Egypt Case Study Energy Efficiency CDM Program N 125 Additionality The program’s additionality can be justified by the following barrier arguments: There is no regulation or incentive scheme in place covering the a. program’s activities. The program faces significant financial barriers and possibly will b. have to be supported by a World Bank loan. Electricity tariffs are low in Egypt so the energy bill savings are not c. sufficiently motivating for program implementation. CDM Methodology to Be Used The AM0020 methodology is applicable to project activities that: Seek to reduce GHG emissions by explicitly reducing the amount N of energy required to deliver a unit of water to end-users in mu- nicipal water utilities. Improve energy efficiency in overall water pumping, including re- N ducing technical losses and leaks, as well as the energy efficiency of the pumping scheme that consumes electricity from the electricity grid, in which The existing efficiency (of water and energy) L is being improved, or A new scheme is being developed to replace completely the L old scheme. This methodology will apply to the new scheme only up to the measured delivery capacity (annual amount of delivered water) of the old scheme. The AM0020 methodology is not applicable to cases in which the project activities consist of building entirely new schemes to augment existing capacity. This requirement will ensure that only emissions re- ductions up to the existing capacity of the system will be considered. The CDM monitoring re- quirements are defined in the Ap- proved Monitoring Methodology AM0020, “Monitoring Methodol- ogy for Water Pumping Efficiency Improvements” (figure 7.2). Figure 7.2 AM0020, 2005 126 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS This methodology requires the following monitoring arrangements: Water from the entire scheme entering in the water system post- N project must be metered and the total numbers adjusted to make sure that increases in water supply from the new scheme are not counted. Energy consumption in the form of kWh required to move the N water within the boundaries of the system must be calculated. The carbon content of the electricity employed by the water system N must be calculated using the combined margin approach outlined in the “Tool to Calculate the Emission Factor for an Electricity System.” 1 In other words, if the water pumps are linked to the na- tional energy grid, the CO 2 output per Mw or kW/h of electricity will need to be calculated and monitored. This information generally is made available by the authorities each year. An amendment to the methodology will be required to accommodate off-grid pumps. If the water pumps operate from off-grid sources such as diesel generators, the annual consumption of related diesel fuel will need to be calculated. Default values for the carbon content of the diesel will be used for this calculation. The program also supports and maintains the improvement of energy efficiency of the pumping stations through energy audits, en- ergy management programs, efficiency measurement and control, and preventive pumps maintenance. The technology employed is widely used and commercially available. Most of the program activities concern water demand management and best practices for energy efficiency improvement and pumping stations and canals maintenance. However, these activities are not widely practiced in Egypt. GHG Emissions Reductions Electricity savings resulting from energy efficiency improvement will re- duce the emissions of GHG associated with power generation in Egypt. The main GHG targeted is CO 2 . The expected emissions reductions associated with the CDM program activities are evaluated in table 7.4. 1 http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/Tools/EB35_repan12_Tool_grid_emission. pdf Egypt Case Study Energy Efficiency CDM Program N 127 Table 7.4 Yearly Emission Reduction Resulting from Energy Savings, 2010–18 (%) Activity start date 2010 EE program implementation period 2010–18 (%) 2010 6.25 2011 6.25 2012 12.5 2013 12.5 2014 12.5 2015 12.5 2016 12.5 2017 12.5 2018 12.5 Year of start of crediting period 2012 Emission reductions t CO 2 Year 1 2012 29,070.6 Year 2 2013 58,141.3 Year 3 2014 87,211.9 Year 4 2015 116,282.5 Year 5 2016 145,353.1 Year 6 2017 174,423.8 Year 7 2018 203,494.4 Year 8 2019 232,565.0 Year 9 2020 232,565.0 Year 10 2021 232,565.0 Year 11 2022 232,565.0 Year 12 2023 232,565.0 Year 13 2024 232,565.0 Year 14 2025 232,565.0 Year 15 2026 232,565.0 Year 16 2027 232,565.0 Year 17 2028 232,565.0 Year 18 2029 232,565.0 Year 19 2030 232,565.0 Year 20 2031 232,565.0 Year 21 2032 232,565.0 Year 22 2033 203,494.4 Year 23 2034 174,423.8 Year 24 2035 145,353.1 Year 25 2036 116,282.5 Year 26 2037 87,211.9 Year 27 2038 58,141.3 Year 28 2039 29,070.6 Total t CO 2 4,883,865.4 Average t CO 2 /year 174,423.8 128 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS They are derived from the total annual electricity bill of the pumping sta- tions and the assumed current and target pumping station efficiencies. CDM Implementation Cost The estimated cost of the irrigation and drainage pumping stations modernization program will be detailed in the project concept design document. The additional CDM pre-operational development costs (feasibility assessment, project design document, registration, validation) are estimated at US$150,000, excluding the Designated Operational Entity (DNA fee). In Egypt, this fee is fixed at 3 percent of the Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) for energy efficiency projects. The required CDM monitoring plan will be integrated in the moni- toring and reporting procedures of the pump modernization program so the additional costs for CDM monitoring will be minimal. However, an additional budget for the CDM project operational phase should be foreseen for CER verification and issuance. 2 Benefits of the CDM Program Besides the expected additional revenues that the CDM can gener- ate, the implementation of a CDM program for the pumping stations modernization project offers multiple advantages: GOE will need to provide fewer irrigation subsidies and energy sub- N sidies and can reallocate the reduced expenditures elsewhere. The program contributes to CDM development in Egypt and helps N ensure the sustainable development of the country. It reinforces the CDM capacity of the concerned stakeholders. N It demonstrates Egypt’s efforts to reduce GHG emissions and to N reinforce its sustainable development strategy. It helps to build a viable PPP scheme and thereby facilitates the trans- N fer of the O&M of the pumping stations to the private sector. It reduces electricity consumption and helps preserve the country’s N fossil fuel resources. Training and education of pumping stations operators will create N awareness of the efficient use of electricity and proper energy management’s positive effect on the environment. 3 Estimated at US$30,000/year. Egypt Case Study Energy Efficiency CDM Program N 129 The project will encourage a greater investment and will provide N more resources to reduce water losses through fixing leaks and faulty pumps. The project supports the overall financial performance by reducing N the unit cost of supplying water. It provides employment during the implementation and monitoring N phases of the project activity. The expected revenues from the CDM program depend greatly on the commercial carbon credits selling terms and the risk-taking of transaction costs and ERs certification. The carbon price can vary from US$8–16 per ton eq. CO 2 . Accordingly, the CDM program could generate US$40–100 million during its 28-year lifespan. 4 Program Risks As part of the pumping station modernization project, the CDM pro- gram will share in the risks of project implementation. However, besides the intrinsic project risks, the specific CDM risks can be summarized as: Regi strati on ri sks associ ated with the CDM program’s N additionality 5 Uncertainty of the future of CDM beyond 2012 N Higher transaction costs N Relevant stakeholders’ insufficient motivation and awareness N of CDM benefits. On the positive side, the program provides opportunities for policy- makers to introduce, through energy efficiency measures, modernized management of this important sector. 4 This is a rough estimate of the CDM potential revenues. In fact, their amount will depend on the project implementation and the energy performance reached and, predominantly, on the post-2012 CDM status and future market. 5 Egypt’s low electricity prices facilitate the justification of the CDM additionality of energy efficiency projects. 131 8 Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience Satoru Ueda and Mohammed Benouahi E xternal accountability is considered a key foundation for well- functioning water and sanitation utilities. Japan has succeeded in achieving the highest standards of service through a combination of sound institutional regulations, a strong work ethic, and the use of technology. Although Japan’s social and economic contexts are very different from MNA’s, many aspects of Japanese water and sanitation governance would interest MNA policymakers. Japan has adequate rainfall (1600 millimeters (mm)/year). At the opposite extreme of countries that are battling desertification, Japan is vulnerable to too much water, notably destructive typhoons and floods. As the country’s rivers are short and fast flowing, a large network of reservoir storage and well-managed regulation of flows has ensured reliable water services (figure 8.1). Also, due to very high concentra- tion of population in some major metropolitan areas, such as To- kyo, and high seasonal variation in rainfall, water resources had to be developed rapidly in the 1960s–1980s. Particularly in To- kyo in the 1960s, when economic development was booming along with the hosting of the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964, Tokyo was called “Tokyo Desert” due to intensive and repeated water cutoff in rotation lasting for sev- eral months. 0.0 12.0 18.0 16.0 14.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 Year 1975 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 National water intake volume changes Dam Wells Others Surface water Sub-surface water W a t e r i n t a k e v o l u m e ( B C M ) Figure 8.1 Historical Changes of Water Sources: Increasing Dam Storage Water, 1970–2005 132 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS This chapter briefly describes the institutional set-up in Japan, reviews the performance of its water and sewerage utilities, and draws some lessons for the Middle East and North Africa region. The findings are based on an August 2007 2-week study tour by the authors. Legislative and Institutional Framework The Japanese government operates at three levels: (1) the national government, which comprises the prime minister’s office and 11 min- istries; (2) 47 prefectural governments; and (3) municipalities (cities, towns, and villages). As part of the governmental system reform, the number of municipalities has been greatly decreasing, from 3,232 in March 1999 to 1,804 in September 2007. Japan has a comprehensive system of water laws and regulations. The main water-related legislation includes: Public utility management: Local Public Enterprise Law (1952) and N Local Government Autonomy Law Water resources development and management: River Law, Water N Resources Development Promotion Law, specified multipurpose dam law Drinking water supply: Waterworks Law (1957) N Industrial water supply: Industrial Water Supply Law N Irrigation water: Land Improvement Law N Sewage management: Sewerage Law (1958), City Planning Law N Water quality and environment: Fundamental Environment Law N and Water Pollution Control Law. Water supply and sanitation (WSS) services are delegated by law to the lowest appropriate level. Thus, WSS services are princi- pally the responsibility of local governments, such as prefectures and municipalities. Local governments can organize and delegate their functions to autonomous semigovernmental enterprises. These utility entities carry out local governmental mandates and management of daily operations, and report to mayors and/or municipal councils. In principle, all recurrent expenses of utility services are required to be fully covered by tariffs. At the national level, multiple entities are responsible for the water supply: the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare; the Health Bu- reau; the Water Supply Division; the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience N 133 Communication (MIAC); and Local Public Financial Bureaus. For sewerage services, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Trans- portation, the City and Regional Development Bureau, the Sewerage Department, and MIAC are in charge. National ministries establish the regulations and guidelines for technical and service standards. They also review and approve utilities’ business plans regarding their basic scope, design, and investment schedule. Finally, under the terms of the Waterworks Law and the Sewerage Law, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transporta- tion subsidize prioritized infrastructure construction. These ministries are not involved in operational aspects of water supply and sewerage utilities. They do not approve, but are merely informed of, changes in tariff levels. Regulations for Providing Water Supply Services From the institutional perspective, the Local Public Enterprise Law (1952) is the most important. 1 This legislation requires water utilities to supply water to improve public welfare, while operating economi- cally as independent and autonomous business entities/public enter- prises. The utilities are to collect revenues from customers to cover recurrent costs. This arrangement has required the development of a well-developed accounting system so that water supply assets can be separated from other municipal accounts and charged specifically to the water supply operation. Most water utilities are established to serve the population/area within a single municipality, and their main offices are housed in the municipality’s office buildings. An independent commissioner is ap- pointed, usually by the mayor, as the head of the utility and approved by the municipal council. The commissioner reports to the owners/ regulators, namely, municipal councils, on key business decisions, such as annual investment/operation plans, tariff increases, and auditing. Water utilities also are required to follow the technical, operational, and service standards stipulated in the 1957 Waterworks Law, which is administered by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. The 1 The standard translation of the Japanese law uses “Enterprise” instead of “Cor- poration.” Therefore, when referring to water and sewerage utilities, this chapter uses “enterprise” instead of “corporation” for those that adopt corporate financing procedures according to the Local Public Enterprise Law’s financial clauses. 134 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Waterworks Law stipulates the basic management of waterworks, such as licensing for drinking-water-supply utilities establishment and operations; drinking-water quality standards; construction and admin- istration of water supply systems; subsidies for investment schemes for planned improvement of facilities, such as major treatment plants and pipelines construction; and the responsibilities of utilities commis- sioners and personnel. In 2006, 2,334 water supply utilities existed, of which 1,469 were established as statutory entities under the Local Public Enterprise Law. The remaining 885 small-scale utilities were not subject to this law. However, all of these utilities are subject to the Waterworks Law, which does not distinguish between urban and rural water. 2 Regulations for wastewater service management In general, sewerage management is handled separately from water supply. Some exceptions exist, such as Kyoto City. As opposed to water supply utilities, most sewerage utility offices are established as internal departments or divisions within local governments (prefectures or municipalities). Thus, almost all sewerage utility offices are accom- modated within local governments’ office buildings, and the heads of sewerage departments/divisions are civil servants. The user-pays principle is also applied to wastewater collection and treatment. Thus, in principle, recurrent expenses are fully covered by user charges. The sewage tariff is billed and collected together with the water tariff by water supply utilities and transferred to the sewerage department based on prior agreement. Regarding stormwater discharge, given its public-good nature, all construction and operating and maintenance (O&M) costs are covered by municipal general revenue. Stormwater discharge operations are clearly separated from sewage collection and treatment operations. For combined sewerage systems, local governments have established standard formulas to apportion costs, including staff costs, between sewage and stormwater operations. Costs are divided between sewage treatment and urban drainage. The former is considered a private good and is recovered through user fees, whereas the latter is considered a public good and therefore charged to general tax revenues. 2 As in other parts of the world, utilities in small towns and villages are better man- aged by local communities. Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience N 135 Sewerage utilities are required to meet the technical, operational, and service standards stipulated in the Sewerage Law (1958), which is governed by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transporta- tion. The Sewerage Law stipulates the planning, design, and opera- tional aspects of sewerage systems (including networks and treatment plants), licensing for construction and operational plans, subsidies for investment schemes, water quality standards for outflows from treat- ment plants, the maximum pollution level of discharges from factories/ plants, regulatory/monitoring/sanction measures, and the responsibili- ties of sewerage utilities’ managers and staff. According to the clauses of the Fundamental Environment Law and Water Pollution Control Law, sewerage utilities/departments also are required to coordinate with the environment departments of prefectures and municipalities regarding the quality and quantity of effluent discharges into rivers and lake basins. In 2005 the number of sewerage utilities was 3,699. Of these, 213 sewerage utilities apply the corporate accounting system under the Local Public Enterprise Law, while 3,486 utilities apply the general government accounting system. The number of the sewerage utilities under this law is still small but is increasing for large cities. Among sewerage offices visited by the authors, Tokyo, Kyoto, Fukuoka, and Sapporo adopt independent corporate accounting systems under the Local Public Enterprise Law, whereas Shiga prefecture employs a general governmental accounting system as a part of the prefectural government mandates. Performance Assessment Water Supply In 2005 water supply utilities served 97.1 percent of Japan’s 129 million population, 3 up from 26 percent in 1946. Water supply coverage in- creased significantly after the passage of the Waterworks Law in 1957. As water supply coverage expanded, waterborne diseases and infant mortality have dropped dramatically to almost nil (figure 8.2). Table 8.1 shows the main features of some major water supply utilities as well as the average data for all of Japan. 3 Table 8.1 indicates 96.1% for water utilities, excluding small-scale utilities. 136 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Average daily water consumption per capita is approximately 314 liters. It increased from 169 liters in 1965 to 322 liters in 1995. However, thereafter, thanks to improved water-saving equipment and public information campaigns, consumption has been decreasing slightly to approximately 314 liters. If heavy water users such as hotels and public baths are excluded, the average per capita daily water consumption rate of households in Tokyo is estimated at 244 liters. Wastewater Services In 1958 expansion of coverage was accelerated by the passage of the Sewerage Law. In 1961 wastewater services coverage was only 6 percent. By 2006 coverage reached 82.4 percent of the population. 4 Table 8.2 presents the main features of the sewerage utilities studied by the authors, as well as the average of all utilities in Japan. 0 30 60 100 90 80 70 50 40 20 10 0 6 12 20 18 16 14 10 8 4 2 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 Cholera patients (10,000 persons) Water supply coverage (%) Infant mortality rate (10,000 persons/million) Water-borne diseases patients (10,000 persons) ||eare ê.1 0r|aa Water !aee|¡ |reeress aa6 8eae0ts, 1êIî-199î N o . o f p a t i e n t s & i n f a n t m o r t a l i t y ( 1 0 , 0 0 0 p e r s o n s ) Tokyo water started chlorination in 1921 Planned water supply coverage (%) W a t e r s u p p l y c o v e r a g e ( % ) 4 The 82.4% represents the population coverage by the national-government- authorized schemes, of which 73.3% is covered by sewerage collection and treatment systems under the Sewerage Law. The remaining 9.1% is covered by community/ individual household septic systems approved and subsidized by the Ministry of Environment. However, most of the remaining areas also are covered by individual onsite sanitation facilities, and the households are equipped with flush toilets. Table 8.1 Main Features of Visited Water Utilities and Japan, Average Year Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka Japan average Population served 12,246,087 1,873,794 1,420,707 1,354,215 124,085,625 a Service coverage (%) 100.0 99.8 99.0 99.0 96.1 Average daily water supply (m 3 /day) 4,427,100 546,925 590,151 406,393 57,644 Unaccounted for water (%) 5.8 9.1 13.9 5.1 8.5 No. of employees 4,563 713 909 403 58,733 a No. of employees per 1000 connections 0.87 0.89 1.50 0.64 1.19 Water tariff (USD/m 3 ) 1.74 1.90 1.37 2.01 1.33 Working ratio (%) 63 57 54 46 49 Note: a The numbers of populations and employees are not the average of water utilities, but total in Japan. Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience N 137 Table 8.2 Main Features of Visited Sewerage Utilities and Japan Average Enterprise Nonenterprise Tokyo 23 national national wards Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka Shiga average average Population served 8,566,594 a 1,858,081 1,419,262 1,359,091 1,900,358 b 46,336,506 c 86,726,940 d Population coverage (%) 99.9 99.5 99.3 99.4 94.9 96.6 87.4 Sewerage treatment capacity 6,244,000 1,173,800 1,384,000 671,050 747,260 28,879,213 31,037,290 (m 3 /day) Unaccounted for sewage (%) 9 30 27 20 6 18 12 Sewage tariff ($/m 3 ) 1.20 0.84 1.14 1.58 1.92 1.17 1.13 Working ratio (Maint. costs/ 41 52 35 38 62 42 67 tariff) (%) No. of employees 3,238 582 637 304 285 16,102 21,516 No. of employees 0.88 0.74 1.05 0.48 0.38 0.87 0.62 per 1,000 connections Notes: a The column indicated the information only for 23 wards of Tokyo excluding Tama Wester Municipalities. b The data of Shiga Prefecture is the average of Shiga Prefacture Government (regional integrated sewerage system) and 19 municipalities (regular sewerage) within the area of Shiga Prefecture. c The average of sanitation utilities employing corporate accounting under the Local Public Enterprise Law. d Represents the sanitation utilities employing general governmental accounting. All wastewater collected by public sewers is treated at secondary- level treatment plants. Approximately 15 percent—all effluents dis- charged into closed water bodies, such as Biwa Lake, Tokyo Bay and Osaka Bay—are further treated to the tertiary level. Japan’s discharged effluent quality, even from secondary-level treatment, is remarkably good. In general, the measured effluents’ biological oxygen demand (BOD) is 3 mg/l–10 mg/l, which is well below the national effluent standard of 20 mg/l. Lessons for MNA Water Utilities The Japanese model is highly relevant to MNA countries. Its key fea- tures of interest for MNA are the semipublic corporate institutional framework under the Local Public Enterprise Law on the one hand, and the central regulation of operational and technical standards by the Waterworks Law and the Sewerage Law on the other. The legal framework balances the strong public ownership and oversight functions with the private sector’s financial autonomy and operational economic efficiency. Thanks to their semiprivate status and obligation to recover costs, the utilities enjoy considerable autonomy for their daily opera- tions and are relatively insulated from political issues. Building the trust 138 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS and confidence between the utilities and service users has been one of the bedrock principles of Japan’s utility management. The Japanese model is thereby able to deliver : Enhanced public welfare though a stable water supply and sanita- a. tion service Financial autonomy achieved through tariffs and a sound manage- b. ment system Large-scale investment in infrastructure development according c. to a long-term plan Excellent goodwill among water customers d. Municipality-based utilities tailored to unique local settings. e. In the following sections, this chapter details key strategies and achieve- ments of the Japanese water and sanitation system (WSS). They are: Legislating and regulating for cost recovery a. Keeping unaccounted-for water (UFW) very low in both water b. and sewerage utilities Maintaining clarity in accounting between recurrent and capital c. costs Making available several investment-financing options for water d. and sewerage utilities Legislating/regulating effective governance and accountability e. mechanisms Effectively managing human resources f. Outsourcing wherever possible g. Focusing on total water quality management h. Managing river water rights and discharge permits. i. Legislating and Regulating for Cost Recovery Under the Local Public Enterprise Law, water utilities are required to make annual financial statements by processing separately (1) an income statement in the current year, (2) a balance sheet, and (3) documenta- tion of the source and application of funds. 5 5 Some of Japan’s larger urban wastewater utilities adopt the corporate financing system under the Public Enterprise Law; others adopt the governmental financial system. Except for a few (1% of total) very small ones, water utilities employ the corporate financing system. Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience N 139 The WSS utilities generate healthy operating surpluses. The working ratio is the relationship of operating expenses to operating revenues. Japan’s national average working ratio of water and sewerage utilities ranges between 0.4 and 0.6. The higher the ratio, the less contribution margin is available to cover nonoperating costs, such as depreciation and financial charges. The working ratio is one of the important indica- tors of operational efficiency and the profitability of utilities. Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Average User Tariff (US$/m 3 ) Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka Japan average Damascus Jedda Tunisia Egypt 2.9 2.7 2.5 3.6 2.5 0.08 0.01 0.7 0.9 Campinas Guanajuato London Brussels Istanbul Johannesburg Singapore Philadelphia Brazil Mexico 3.2 2.8 1.8 0.7 1.3 1.9 0.3 0.4 Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan); Tunisia, London, Berlin, Brussels, Damascus, and Jedda (counry reports); Singapore (estimate by the PUB website tariff table); Other Countries (Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes No. 9, May 2006). Notes: The average tariff of Singapore is estimated on the tariff structure on the PUB website. The tariffs of Japanese water and wastewater are combined for international comparison with some assumptions. Table 8.3 Japan’s and International Water and Sewerage Utilities Working Ratios Japan Campinas Guanajuato Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka average Singapore Philadelphia Tunisia Johannesburg Brazil Mexico 0.54 0.56 0.46 0.43 0.51 0.58 0.67 0.98 0.53 (water) 0.79 0.77 1.5 (sewage) Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan), UK data on OFWAT annual report (2005), Tunisia (Country Report), Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes No. 9, May 2006. Note: The working ratio of the Japanese water and wastewater utilties are combined for international comparison with some assumptions. compares the combined working ratio of water and sewerage utilities of Japanese and international cases. Even though they cover operating and nonoperating costs, tariffs are affordable to households and compare well with those of other high-income countries. When measured against one HH’s total ex- penditures, the combined water and sewage tariffs of US$2.50 per cubic meter (m 3 ) account for approximately 1 percent of the average HH income. This figure compares with approximately 3 percent and 2 percent for electricity and gas bills, respectively. Table 8.4 compares the combined water and sewage tariff between the Japanese and international cases. 140 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Utilities do not have the authority to raise tariffs without approval from municipal councils. However, they can put forward proposals for tariff increases based on their overall revenue requirements. As in other countries, the decision to raise tariffs sometimes gets delayed or even reversed due to political considerations. Nevertheless, most utilities have been able to achieve financial balance through periodic tariff increases (every 3–4 years). Furthermore, Japan’s negative infla- tion rate—which changed from –0.9 percent in 2003 to –0.3 percent in 2006—also meant that, even in situations in which tariffs did not increase, the overall financial performance of water and sewerage utilities did not significantly deteriorate. Keeping Unaccounted-for Water Very Low in Both Water and Sewerage Utilities Water utilities and unaccounted-for water Al most al l water suppl y uti l i ti es have achi eved very l ow unaccounted-for water (UFW). The national UFW average is 8.5 percent. The most competent utilities, such as Tokyo and Fukuoka, have attained approximately 5 percent. This low percentage of UFW is highly significant compared to losses in the range of 15 percent–40 percent for water utilities in many countries globally, including devel- oped countries. Table 8.5 compares water utilities’ UFW in Japan and other countries. Table 8.5 Unaccounted-for Water (%) Japan Shiraz Campinas Guanajuato Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka average Singapore UK Philadelphia Tunisia Iran Johannesburg Brazil Mexico 5.8 9.1 13.9 5.1 8.5 4.8 15.0 32.0 20.2 35.0 35.0 26.0 37.0 Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan); UK data from OFWAT Annual Report (2005); Iran (county report); Other Countries (Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes No. 9, May 2006). Procedures are in place to minimize physical losses. Water utilities generally repair surface leakage on the same day that a problem is de- tected on a 24-hour operational basis. They regularly detect potential underground leakage by electronic and correlation-type detectors. They also have been upgrading distribution pipes from cast iron to ductile iron, and service pipes from lead to stainless steel. Thanks to Japan’s high operational standards and customer service, most water utilities maintain their administrative UFW at almost nil. In Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience N 141 2006 the nationwide average was 1.5 percent. If required, the utilities easily can exert their authority to cut off water supply to defaulters. However, disconnection is very rarely required, because customers pay their bills. Defaulting customers are automatically disconnected. The Tokyo Metropolitan Water Bureau is perhaps one of the best-run utilities in the world. UFW stands at approximately 5.8 percent with 100 percent coverage of a population of approximately 12 million. The average daily water supply volume is approximately 4.4 million m 3 , and the total length of distribution pipes is 24,782 kilometers (km). Sewerage utilities and unaccounted-for water All sewerage utilities/departments measure the amount of treated wastewater and compare it to the amount of sewerage for which treatment fees are collected. They calculate the UFW using a con- cept similar to that used for water supply. No collected wastewater is discharged without treatment. The national average UFW is 17 percent and 12 percent, respectively, for enterprise utilities and nonenterprise utilities. Tokyo’s UFW is approximately 9 percent, whereas Sapporo’s is close to 30 percent. The higher UFW of the latter may be attributed to underground water leakage into sewer networks or erroneous con- nection of rain sewers to sewage sewers. Very few other countries conduct this level of UFW measurement in sewerage systems. Clarity in Accounting for Recurrent and Capital Costs Water supply services Water supply utilities’ accounting systems are a powerful management tool. Table 8.6 breaks down the O&M costs of several water supply utilities and the national total. The costs are clearly distinguished be- tween (1) operational costs and (2) capital costs, including depreciation costs and bond interest costs. The relationship between costs and revenues is immediately ap- parent. While Tokyo’s water tariff (approximately US$2.6 billion) fully covers operational costs, the tariff of the 3 other visited cities and the national average do not fully cover capital costs (see Cost Recovery section below). The balance of approximately 5 percent is covered by the investments and subsidies from the municipalities’ general accounts. Table 8.7 shows the 2006 unit operational and capital costs of water production in comparison with the water tariff. The national average tariff 142 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS was US$1.33/m 3 , while the average production cost was US$1.37/m 3 . These figures show that the cost recovery ratio (including capital por- tion) was approximately 97 percent. Sewerage services As for water supply, sewerage utilities’ accounting systems provide a powerful management tool, enabling the comparison of costs and rev- enues. Table 8.8 breaks down O&M costs of several water sewerage Table 8.6 Income Statement of Water Supply Utilities, March 31, 2006 (US$ mil.) Cities Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka National total Personnel expenses 385 66 76 29 4,158 Energy expenses 77 3 6 4 871 Repair expenses 510 43 19 17 1,686 Chemicals/materials 66 14 10 3 519 Outsource fee 238 40 9 40 1,735 Bulk water purchase 0 0 0 19 1,415 Others 377 31 17 19 2,060 Operation costs 1,655 199 139 131 12,444 Bond 195 67 52 47 3,759 Depreciation costs 609 97 81 73 7,261 Capital costs for bulk water 0 0 0 42 2,440 Capital costs 804 164 133 163 13,460 Total 2,458 363 272 294 25,904 Water tariff 2,641 346 254 283 24,987 General & other accounts 213 28 19 6 1,357 Miscellaneous 93 5 1 20 1,347 Total 2,947 378 275 310 27,691 Surplus/deficit 489 16 3 15 1,788 Note: The exchange rate was US$ = JPY115 during the August 2007 mission. Table 8.7 Water Cost Recovery: Unit Production Cost and Tariff, March 31, 2007 (US$ per m 3 ) Cities Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka Japan Average Unit production costs 1.62 2.00 1.47 2.09 1.37 Unit operation costs 1.09 1.09 0.75 0.93 0.65 Unit capital costs 0.53 0.90 0.72 1.16 0.72 Unit average tariff 1.74 1.90 1.37 2.01 1.33 Notes: US$ = JPY 115 in August 2007. Unit production costs = Unit operation costs + unit capital costs (depreciation and bond interests). Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience N 143 utilities. For sewerage utilities that adopted the corporate financing system under the Local Public Enterprise Law, costs are clearly dis- tinguished between (1) running costs and (2) capital costs, including depreciation costs and bond interest costs. The management accounting framework makes it possible for cost- sharing schemes to be established for wastewater-and-stormwater- combined operations. While the wastewater collection and treatment portion is fully covered by the sewage tariff, the stormwater portion is covered by the municipal general budget. The sewage tariff covers on average 53 percent of sewerage running and capital costs at the national level. An additional 35 percent of the budget is supplemented by the local government general accounts. Table 8.9 breaks down sources of investment funds for four major utilities and the national total in Japan’s FY05 budget. The national average bond share was 48 percent, which was higher than that for water supply. The national average subsidy share was 38 percent for Table 8.8 Income Statement of Sewerage Utilities, March 31, 2006 (US$ mil.) Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka National enterprise total Personnel expenses 248 a 41 50 13 1,058 Energy expenses 90 13 11 9 348 Repair expenses 211 14 6 9 481 Chemicals/materials 13 7 4 4 120 Outsource fee 238 56 36 65 1,058 Others 116 9 22 32 755 Total operation costs 915 140 129 131 3,821 Bond interests 700 104 158 150 3,697 Depreciation costs 989 137 163 140 4,250 Total capital costs 1,690 241 320 290 7,947 Grant total costs 2,604 381 450 420 11,768 Sewerage service tariff 1,487 176 230 233 6,280 Rain storm discharge fee b 1,215 187 177 148 4,073 Other operation revenue 57 2 7 6 209 General accounts subsidy 59 12 41 31 1,504 Miscellaneous 20 1 1 2 119 Total revenue 2,837 378 456 420 12,185 Surplus/deficit 233 –3 6 0 417 Notes: US$ = JPY115 in August 2006. a Tokyo figures refer to 23 wards only. b Rain storm discharge fee is paid by cities’ general accounts. 144 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS sewerage—also much higher than that for water supply. The balance was covered by the municipal general account. The reliance on bonds and subsidies was a result of the delayed development of the sewerage systems. Table 8.10 shows unit sewerage running costs and capital costs, as compared with the sewage tariff. Table 8.10 deals only with wastewater collection and treatment costs, since stormwater discharge costs are fully covered by the municipal general account. Table 8.9 Construction and Improvement Budget Sources of Sewerage Works, March 31, 2006 (US$ mil.) National Enterprise Nonenterprise Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka total national total national total Enterprise bonds 478 a 106 106 139 9,950 b 3,000 6,950 National subsidies 314 62 63 79 7,944 1,992 5,953 Other works/beneficiaries share 68 11 5 4 1,344 266 1,078 General accounts support and other revenue 317 6 11 21 2,205 894 1,310 Total investment budget 1,177 185 185 243 21,443 6,152 15,291 Notes: US$ = JPY115 in August 2007. a Tokyo figures refer to 23 wards only. b National total is the sum of (a) enterprise national total and (b) nonenterprise national total. Table 8.10 Wastewater Cost Recover: Unit Operation Cost and Tariff (US$/m 3 ) Tokyo Enterprise Nonenterprise Unit costs 23 wards Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka Shiga national average national average Unit production costs 1.02 0.81 1.00 1.76 3.33 1.29 2.42 Unit operation costs 0.49 0.44 0.40 0.60 1.19 0.49 0.76 Unit capital costs 0.54 0.37 0.61 1.15 2.14 0.80 1.66 Unit average tariff 1.20 0.84 1.14 1.58 1.92 1.17 1.13 Notes: US$ = JPY 115 in August 2007. Unit production costs = Unit operation costs + unit capital costs (depreciation costs and bond interests). The sewage tariff ranges between US$0.8/m 3 –1.9/m 3 . The national average total cost is approximately US$1.3/m 3 for enterprise utilities and US$2.4/m 3 for nonenterprise utilities. Based on these, the national aver- age cost recovery rate (including capital costs) is 91 percent for enterprise utilities and 47 percent for nonenterprise utilities. Recurrent costs are fully covered by all utilities. The working ratios are 0.42 and 0.67, respectively, for enterprise and nonenterprise utilities. In general, large cities, such as Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience N 145 Tokyo, can recover all costs, including the capital portion, through the sewage tariff. In contrast, in rural areas, such as Shiga, and many other nonenterprise areas, it is not easy to collect an adequate level of sewage tariff to fully meet costs. Their unit costs, particularly capital costs, are much higher than those of urban areas. The difference reflects the fact that these rural utilities developed their systems in much more scattered areas with smaller economies of scale and, in recent years, without a historically developed infrastructure stock. The sewage tariff is generally set lower than the water tariff, despite the fact that sewerage system development costs are higher than those of water supply systems. This differential reflects the pub- lic’s willingness to pay. People are more willing to pay a higher tariff for drinking water than for wastewater. In these circumstances, some rural sewerage utilities become very dependent on funds from the municipal general account. This dependency is negatively affecting municipalities’ financial status and their ability to provide other public services. Making Available Several Investment-Financing Options for Water and Sewerage Utilities Most water supply and sewerage utilities mobilize external funds in addition to internal funds. Three major external financing sources are available. Bonds Utilities issue bonds with the authorization of and backed by municipal governments. Some wealthy municipalities’ financial standing is very good. The Tokyo Metropolitan Office’s credit rating is AAA. Although utilities do not issue bonds on their own credentials, some strong utili- ties would be able to secure funds on their own financial credentials if allowed to do so. National subsidy The national ministries subsidize investment for large-scale infrastruc- ture. For waterworks, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare subsidizes up to one-third of investment costs for large-scale systems development and renovation as well as to introduce advanced treat- ment systems. For sewerage works, the Ministry of Land, Infrastruc- ture and Transportation subsidizes 55 percent of the construction of treatment plants and 50 percent of pipe-networks development. For 146 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS integrated basin-level sewerage systems, which collect sewage from more than 2 municipalities, the subsidy rate increases to 60 percent of the construction of treatment plants. As noted earlier, the total allocated amount of national subsidies is much higher for sewerage systems than for water supply systems. National tax allocation to local governments The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication allocates block grants from national taxes to local governments. This national tax allocation to local governments is designed to ensure the national minimum standards of public services, particularly for smaller rural municipalities that have few other sources of revenue. Among the many parameters of the allocation criteria, the value of municipality bonds issued for infrastructure development, including water and wastewater systems, is taken into account. The grant is not allocated directly to water and sewerage utilities’ accounts but to the general accounts of local governments. Nonetheless, the grant works as an incentive for local governments to issue bonds for infrastructure development. Good Sector Governance and Accountability Mechanisms Japanese water utilities have established accountability mechanisms that combine the merits of both private and public entities: (1) the high economic efficiency and financial autonomy of the private sec- tor and (2) the oversight functions of the public sector. Most utilities in Japan set well-defined targets for key performance indicators. For water utilities, they typically include total revenue, water production, drinking-water quality, customer service, financial performance, water consumption, and new connections. Water supply utility commission- ers are accountable to the municipal councils for achieving the targets. The directors general of sewerage utilities/departments report to the heads of municipalities, such as mayors. Japan has a strong tradition of utilities being accountable to local elected officials and of transparent information-sharing. The munici- pal councils or mayors are kept informed of the utility’s operations by the commissioner or director general and review its annual/quarterly operational reports. However, they do not interfere in the daily opera- tions. Most municipalities have established strong reporting frameworks, including financial audits and annual and periodic performance status Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience N 147 reports. All of these reports are incorporated in the annual reports and are made available at public offices and on websites. To ensure competitive prices and flexibility in purchasing, the utilities generally follow public procurement regulations. To enhance account- ability, utilities are subject to technical and operational audits, not just financial audits, and have active internal audit departments. Use of nationwide benchmarking to ensure accountability The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication administers the Local Public Enterprise Law. The ministry leads an annual standardized national benchmarking exercise for all water supply and wastewater utili- ties. The benchmark database of all utilities for every year is published on the website of the ministry and municipalities. The benchmarking items total more than 100. They include service quality, financial efficiency, water losses, energy costs, revenue collection, financial performance, and other operational efficiency and performance indicators. The national benchmark exercise provides an opportunity for municipalities and utilities to monitor their own performance status as well as improvements across the country. The exercise thus makes them more accountable to their constituents because comparative results can be made regularly available to the public. This chapter has benefited from the national benchmark database in addition to the information collected directly from visited utility offices. Customer service ingrained as a key part of utility culture Although Japan’s water supply and sewerage utilities are monopolistic service providers, they are very responsive to their customers. Important aspects of customer orientation include friendliness of the customer bill- ing and collection system, orientation toward seeking customers’ opinions, timely information to customers on water service disruptions/changes, and response to customers’ complaints. Many utilities operate a one-stop call center for customers to take care of water service disruptions, reloca- tion, new subscriptions, and payment. Some utilities open customer windows for extended times, for example, to 8:00 p.m. on weekdays as well as Saturday hours. The utilities also establish water repair squads to conduct emergency repair and interrupted service recovery within 24 hours. As described earlier, water utilities usually offer multiple options by which their customers can pay their water and sewage bills. The options include electronic funds transfer and payment at commercial 148 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS banks, postal offices, and convenience stores. Customers can make service requests on the utility’s website. Effective Management of Human Resources Personnel management is highly meritocratic. The commissioners or directors general of utilities are appointed by the mayors of municipali- ties on the basis of expertise and experience. Some are selected from among respected in-house career officials. Staff salary and promo- tions are based on performance, academic credentials, and seniority reflecting overall experience. The third criterion provides incentives for staff to stay with the same utility. The average service duration of career staff of water and sewerage utilities is approximately 25 years. Staff are rotated within each organization to enable them to obtain wider experience. Those who display high potential are groomed for promotion. Staff turnover is very low and is due mostly to mandatory retirement. Staff skills and employee innovation are regarded as critical inputs to improve performance. Most utilities provide ample career development and training opportunities to their staff, which also keep turnover low. An extensive training plan covers professional skills development and corporate culture. The utilities provide various kinds of training programs for their staff as part of their annual performance review. The emphasis is on frontline staff who come into direct contact with customers and/or contractors. Innovation and knowledge-creation are important features of the water sector’s corporate culture. Some utilities plan technology develop- ment projects on a pilot scale and even obtain patents for successful pilots. Other utilities have built their own training facilities and field stations. Furthermore, the government-affiliated agencies and as- sociations, such as Japan Waterworks Association, Japan Sewerage Works Agency, and Japan Sewerage Association, have contributed studies for developing new technologies and disseminating technical guidelines and manuals. These publications are particularly useful for smaller utilities in rural areas that do not posses adequate numbers of technical staff. As a result, staff productivity is high. For water supply and sewer- age utilities combined, the average is 2 staff per 1,000 connections. Each utility maintains the staff level of 1 per 1,000 connections. This rate is much smaller than that of utility companies in other advanced Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience N 149 countries. Table 8.11 compares the water utility staff level per 1,000 connections between Japan and other countries. Table 8.12 Outsource Ratio of Operational Expenditures (%) Japan Campinas Guanajuato Types Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka average Type Singapore Johannesburg Brazil Mexico Water 14 20 7 30 14 Combined 25 10 21 20 Wastewater 26 40 28 49 28 Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan); Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes No. 9, May 2006. Note: The Japanese average of wastewater is based on local autonomous enterprise entities by law. Table 8.11 Number of Employees per 1,000 Connections Japan Campinas Guanajuato Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka average Singapore Philadelphia Tunisia Johannesburg Brazil Mexico 1.7 1.6 2.5 1.1 1.9 2.9 4.4 8.0 4.7 4.1 8.0 Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan); Tunisia (Country Report); Other Countries (Water Supply & Sanitation Working Notes No.9, May 2006). Note: The number of Japanese water and wastewater utilities staff are combined for international comparison. The household connections are counted as 1 for both water supply and sanitation although they can physically counted as 2, i.e., one for water supply and another for wastewater. The number of outsouced workers are not included as the number of regular staff for the Japanese utilities. Use of Outsourcing Wherever Possible While most utilities keep core business functions in-house, they have engaged private contractors whenever necessary. Typically, outsourcing takes place for (1) routine O&M of treatment plants and network pipes, (2) checking and executing repair works, (3) engineering design and con- struction supervision, (4) information and telecommunication technology services, and (5) metering and billing. The average outsourcing ratio for water supply utilities is approximately 15 percent; that of sewerage utili- ties is approximately 30 percent. The utilities gradually are increasing the outsource percentage through natural attrition of in-house career staff. Table 8.12 compares the outsourcing percentage of operational expenditures between the Japanese and international cases. The 1999 Private Finance Initiative Law encouraged public and semipublic entities to test private sector participation. Several utilities have begun trials of privatization and market testing. Some utilities are piloting innovative large-scale privatization schemes to build and operate specialized facilities, such as cogeneration power plants and sludge treatment and recycling plants. However, private funding of major investments remains the exception. 150 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Other semipublic supporting agencies and associations Some semi-public agencies support utilities. Based on prefectural or municipal utilities’ requests, the Japan Sewerage Works Agency provides technical support for construction, maintenance, and management of main facilities, such as wastewater treatment plants and pumping stations. The agency also conducts experiments, research, and training sessions. These activities are particularly important for small municipalities, as they do not have enough staff with the requisite management and technical skills. The Japan Waterworks Association and the Japan Sewerage Works Association carry out surveys and research related to water and sew- erage systems. They also help raise public awareness and disseminate information. In particular, the Japan Waterworks Association serves as the think-tank for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication and municipalities by preparing technical design manuals and guidelines, and organizing technical conferences and workshops. Focus on Total Water Quality Management Japan’s combination of central government regulation and corporate gov- ernance ensures attention to quality in all aspects of water management. Drinking water quality management Tap water is safe to drink anywhere in Japan. To maintain strict drinking quality standards, water utilities prepare and execute water quality examination plans. Each plan specifies the parameters to be analyzed and the frequency of analysis. The analyzed results are disclosed in the utility’s annual report and/or regularly posted on the internet. Water utilities in some areas adopt advanced water treatment methods, such as ozone treatment and biologically activated carbon- absorbing treatment, to eliminate odor, trihalomethane precursor, and other particulates that cannot be sufficiently removed by conventional treatment processes such as rapid sand filtration. Water utilities have installed automatic quality-monitoring devices at various points in wa- ter supply areas to continuously monitor residual chlorine. In addition, regular water quality analysis is conducted at rivers and reservoirs. Water distribution optimization and leak detection Most utilities have developed extensive water distribution pipe net- works. The water supply system is monitored around the clock at the Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience N 151 operations center to adjust to changing water demands. The utilities use operations systems, such as water distribution planning support systems, and dam inflow simulation and reservoir operation optimiza- tion systems. Water utilities typically develop water supply operational plans that consist of a (1) water intake plan, (2) water main networks op- eration plan, and (3) pumps operation plan. The utilities also have developed water demand forecast programs with parameters such as weather conditions, time, day of the week, and holidays. These plans apply to both ordinary days and emergencies, accidents, and drought periods. Some advanced utilities, such those as Fukuoka and Tokyo, have developed more advanced water distribution systems to regulate pressure and flow in distribution pipes. Such regulation promotes the effective use of water and minimizes water leaks. This system uses pressure gauges and flow meters that have been installed throughout the city. These measuring devices enable the Water Distribution Control Center to monitor conditions within the pipes on a 24-hour basis via telephone lines. Based on the information obtained from the gauges and meters, the motorized valves can be opened and closed remotely to regulate water pressure and flow. The system can automatically detect pipe bursts by checking the rate of flow and pressure changes and their correlation. If the abnormality continues above set thresholds, the system warns the operations center and site offices. Seismic design and preparedness Japan is prone to earthquakes. Water utilities have taken various mea- sures to ensure the best possible water supply for citizens immediately after earthquakes. Utilities have set high antiseismic design criteria for physical infrastructure and established emergency operation systems. They also have built auxiliary power plants and emergency water supply basins and tanks to secure water supply during emergencies. Wastewater treatment standards The water quality of discharged effluent from sewerage treatment plants is regulated by the Sewerage Law. Among many parameters, the limit for the BOD of effluents is set at 20 mg/l. For most sewer- age treatment plants, the BOD of treated effluents outflow is below 5 mg/l—much lower than the regulatory limits. The BOD of inflowing raw effluents typically ranges between 100 mg–200 mg/liter. 152 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Basin-wide water quality control plan The Water Pollution Control Law requires local governments to set environmental quality standards for each control point of rivers and lakes to meet the water quality requirements for the environment and human health. A comprehensive basin-wide water quality manage- ment approach is employed to reduce pollution and meet the required water quality level. Based on the required amount of pollution load reduction, local prefectural governments prepare a Comprehensive Basin-wide Sewerage System Development Plan. This plan specifies the basic parameters of sewerage collection and treatment systems in the basin. Sewerage utilities and environment departments coordinate closely to prepare the plan and monitor water quality. Industrial pollution control The Sewerage Law also stipulates water quality standards for effluents discharged by specified industrial factories/plants into sewerage treat- ment plants. In most cases, the maximum values of BOD and suspended solid (SS) are set at 600 mg/l, and heavy metals are strictly controlled. The specified factories and other commercial facilities, such as hotels, livestock farms, and cleaning businesses, are required to install onsite pollution control facilities to meet the quality standards. The Sewerage Law and the Water Pollution Control Law require local governments to conduct onsite inspections and compliance monitoring without notice and, if required, to provide administrative guidance and improvement orders. The owners could face imprisonment of up to 6 months and/or be fined up to $2,500 if they do not follow the improve- ment orders, such as installation of pollution treatment facilities at the plant. As noted earlier, local governments provide grant subsidies and interest-free loans to the owners to install required pollution control facilities/equipment. One of the most important factors in reducing industrial pollution loads is to significantly increase the internal water recy- cling of plants and factories. Dur- ing the past 40 years, the average internal water recycling rate increased from approximately 20 percent to 80 percent (figure 0 300 600 500 400 200 100 0% 30% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 20% 10% 1975 1960 1965 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 A n n u a l i n d u s t r i a l w a t e r s u p p l y ( 1 0 0 m i l . m 3 ) Figure 8.3 High Industrial Water Recycle Rate: Signifcantly Reduced Water Demands and Pollution Loads, 1960–2000 20.7% 18 25 65 16? 297 373 374 407 417 438 69 75 114 150 147 134 127 129 124 119 25.0% 36.3% 51.7% 67.0% 73.6% 74.6% 75.8% 77.2% 78.6% Recycle rate (%) Recycle water Fresh water supply Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience N 153 8.3). From the 1960s through the 1980s, Japan’s rivers and lakes were heavily polluted by rapid economic development. Over the past 20 years, however, water quality has been significantly improved thanks to the increase in industrial water recycling and the rapid development of sewerage management systems. Treated wastewater recycling The direct recycling rate of sewage effluent is very low (approximately 1.4 percent), except for toilet-flushing water and environmental flow augmentation in small rivers and canals in some urban districts. How- ever, in most urban areas, indirect recycling through river systems is quite common. Treated sewage effluent discharged to rivers is quite important for augmenting river environmental flows and thus for maintaining the ecology and scenic environment of rivers. Treated effluent is also important for supplying water to downstream water users. Historically, many cities and towns have been developed along rivers and rely on the natural water recycling system between the upstream and downstream of rivers. In some urban rivers, more than 50 percent of river water flow originates from treated effluents from sewerage treatment plants upstream. Sludge treatment Most sludge from treatment plants is dehydrated and incinerated to ashes, reducing the volume to approximately 1/40–1/50 of the original. In 2003, on average nationally, sludge was used for (1) landfill after incineration (approximately 40 percent), (2) construction materials after melting of incinerated ashes to sludge (approximately 40 percent), and (3) farmland improvement materials after dehydration of sludge. These operations are subsidized by government for environmental reasons. Stormwater discharge One of the important roles of a sewerage system is to prevent floods. A comprehensive flood-prevention master plan is prepared to define the required flood runoff and storage capacity. In some flood-prone areas, underground stormwater storage pipes and reservoirs are constructed under roads. Shield tunneling is used to build large tunnels and storm- water pipes. Permeable road pavements, onsite storage, and retarding ponds at schools and parks also are constructed to reduce flood peak volume. Technical coordination is established for urban flood control 154 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS between sewerage utilities and river administrators to ensure the proper operation of drainage pumps and other flood control facilities. The operations of treatment plants and pumping stations are based on information from rainfall radar and telemetry water-monitoring systems. Citizens can access the same information on the utilities’ websites. By March 2005, of a total of 1,896 systems, Japan had 23 combined wastewater/stormwater systems and 1,873 separate systems. Combined systems sometimes allow untreated wastewater to be discharged to public water bodies during flood periods. They therefore need to be upgraded to reduce heavy pollution loads from the first flush of flood water by building flood-storage facilities. Electronic sewer registration database Some advanced utilities have established computerized asset manage- ment systems. Tokyo Sewerage Utility has developed an electronic sewer mapping system at 1/500 scale indicating all sewer locations, depths, diameters, and types. All users can access this information on the Internet. This online data is useful in coordinating with other under- ground utility lines and assisting contractors’ designs and scheduling Water resource management Effective coordination among institutions underpins the success of Japan’s water resource management. Despite the country’s high rainfall, water resource management is an important challenge in Japan. Some Japanese regions are faced with water scarcity due to high population density. For example, the renewable water resource of the Kanto area, which includes the Tokyo metropolitan area, is only 905 m 3 per year per capita, which is equivalent to that of Egypt. In the early 1960s, Tokyo faced chronic water short- ages and had to cut approximately 45 percent of water supply to up to nearly 1 million households. During the scarcity, people used to call the city the “Tokyo Desert.” Moreover, because of steep terrain/river bed slope and a high fluctuation of rainfall among different seasons, river flows and water resources are difficult to regulate and manage without storage dams in the upstream reaches of rivers. Dams thus have played an increasing role in ensuring Japan’s water sup- ply. The share of water resources from dams increased from 19 percent in 1970 to 45 percent in 2005. In 2005 the number of dams with a height of more than 15 meters was 2,897, of which 627 were dams whose Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience N 155 functions included storing water for drinking. Other dams were used for flood control, irrigation water supply, and hydropower generation. River Management: Water Rights and Discharge Permits The River Bureau of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Trans- portation plays a pivotal role in water resource management. The River Law covers (1) flood control, (2) water use, and (3) water environment. The River Law designates the ministry’s regional river bureaus and river management offices as “river administrators.” 6 The law requires them to issue water rights and discharge permits based on the current and future water balance of river basins. The river administrators also are responsible for issuing permits for the installment/construction of any hydraulic structures and land use in rivers. Comprehensive water resources development The Specified Multipurpose Dams Law and Water Resources Develop- ment Promotion Law were legislated in 1957 and 1961, respectively. The former law stipulates the procedure for the execution of multipurpose dam projects, including cost allocation among participating parties. The latter law requires the preparation of comprehensive water resources development master plans for 5 (then 6) major basins, including Tokyo, Kyoto/Osaka, Nagoya, and Fukuoka. In 1962 it also established the Public Water Resources Development Corporation to execute major multipurpose dam projects in the designated basins. In 1973 the Dam Reservoir Resettlement Area Special Measures Act was enacted to provide stronger financial and technical support for the residents in upper watersheds who were to be relocated due to dam reservoir inundation. Conclusions and Lessons Japan has achieved the highest standards of water and sanitation service through a combination of sound institutional regulations, a strong work ethic, and the use of technology. From the evidence presented, the 6 The River Law was enacted in 1896 with an emphasis on flood control. It was amended in 1964 to fully address water use and allocation, and again in 1997 to address the environmental aspects of rivers. The 1997 amendment requires river administrators to establish multistakeholder river councils and, through the council meetings and public hearings, to develop basin management plans for all rivers. 156 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS reader can observe that the performance of Japan’s utilities benchmark with the best in the world. Does Japan’s experience provide any lessons for the MNA region’s utilities? There are clearly many factors that are different, notably, the homogeneous nature of Japanese society, the availability of adequate public financing in this second-largest economy in the world, and a unique work ethic. Nevertheless, several lessons could be relevant to MNA in the sense that water supply and sanitation policies have combined sound principles of public finance with local political and cultural institutions. To summarize, these lessons are: Clarity in roles and responsibilities, which leads to a very high 1. degree of external and internal accountability (chapter 2 of this volume). Clear distinction between the public good and private good aspect, 2. so that the financing burden is shared among the national govern- ment, local governments, and users. Use of standard technical and financial indicators of utility per- 3. formance that creates “peer pressure” among utilities to improve their performance. Completely nonideological use of public-private partnerships 4. through outsourcing contracts. Last but not least, maintaining excellent links between the service 5. provision aspect and the resource management aspect through an integrated planning process that fully respects the ABCDE principles described in the Introduction to this volume. 157 9 Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management Mohamed El Hedi Louati and Julia Bucknall Introduction Water is scarce, and its availability is also highly variable. In addition to its long history of earthquakes, hailstorms, and plagues of locusts, Tunisia has always suffered from droughts and floods. They are hard to predict as they do not follow any clear cyclical pattern. For more than a century (1640–1758), Tunisia had no droughts, whereas in modern times, it has had approximately 30. Over the centuries, the successive civilizations who have lived in Tunisia have developed management systems to cope with the risks of floods and droughts. They were not always successful. A series of severe droughts in the area that is now Tunisia lasted for approximately a decade from 870 CE. By the end of these droughts, the local administrator wrote that prices of wheat had increased steeply; and food had become so scarce that people had resorted to cannibalism (Talbit 1985, 112). Managing this scarce and variable water supply is critical for Tunisia’s development. The country engages in extensive political debate and strategizing, and the government has invested heavily in measuring, mobilizing, and managing resources. This chapter highlights Tunisia’s progress in managing water, showing the evolution from traditional practices to large government-led investments to store and transfer water (which could be characterized as “physical engineering”). The latter led to a third stage, beginning around the turn of the millennium, which continues physical investment but increases the emphasis on water management (and therefore could be characterized as “insti- tutional engineering”). Many aspects of Tunisia’s experience could be 158 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS improved, but, on the whole, this chapter suggests that Tunisia is an example of good planning and management. Availability of Water Resources Tunisia is one of the countries in the Mediterranean basin least well- endowed with water resources. The potential volume of available water, 4,836 Mm 3 per year, is less than 500 m 3 per inhabitant per year. This ratio will decline to 360 m 3 by 2030, when the population will have grown to approximately 13 million. To manage variable supplies, Tunisia balances surface and ground- water stocks and flows within and between years. It uses dams and groundwater reserves to store surplus water in wet years and uses these stocks in dry years. It also must distribute the water between different parts of the country. Maintaining a regional balance has been and will remain an essential element in Tunisia’s water supply planning and management. The population is concentrated along the coasts, where cities, industry, and tourism are well developed. Agriculture is the largest water user and is located throughout the country except in the southern desert. However, the country’s water supplies come mainly from the north and the interior of the country. Water transfers, therefore, have been a salient feature of Tunisia’s long history from the Roman aqueduct at Zaghouan (built in 72 AD) to the modern-day Mejerda-Cap Bon Canal (1982), whose distribution networks go all the way to Sfax. On a national scale, water resources are distributed unequally. Table 9.1 illustrates the geographic distribution of different categories of water in Tunisia. Eighty-one percent of the country’s resources are in the north, 11 percent in the center, and only 8 percent in the south. Table 9.1 Spatial Distribution of Water Resources in Tunisia (Mm 3 /yr) Far North North Center South Country total Supply of surface water (Mm 3 /yr) 960 1230 320 190 2700 Groundwater (Mm 3 /yr) 395 216 108 719 Deep groundwater (Mm 3 /yr) 269 326 822 1417 Total potential resource (Mm 3 /yr) 2854 862 1120 4836 % 59 18 23 100 Source: DGRE 1995. Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management N 159 Tunisia shares international surface water in the form of some riv- ers along the western border with Algeria. The two countries have reached agreements on how to mobilize and use this water, including agreeing the annual volume available in the relevant basins and how to distribute it between the two countries. These countries also have established a monitoring system, which enables both countries to track pollution as well as water volumes for the main international river, the Mejerda. In addition, the country has a considerable volume of international groundwater, located in the Djeffara coastal basin shared between Libya and Tunisia and, most importantly, in the North- west Saharan Aquifer System, shared between Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. The latter has more than one Mkm 3 of water with very limited recharge, of which some 80,000 km 3 are in Tunisia. Three countries have estab- lished a commission to monitor this aquifer and have agreed to cooperate on its management to minimize cross-border impacts. This is 1 of only 2 such agreements in the world. Tunisia uses water from this aquifer to irrigate greenhouse vegetables and dates (figure 9.1). Tunisia’s water policy aims to contribute to sustainable socioeco- nomic development while balancing two conflicting facts: Limited water supplies and increasing cost to generate or store and 1. transfer additional resources Growing demand for water. 2. The variability in water availability between years is huge. Dur- ing the past few decades, the maximum potential volume of surface water was 11 billion m 3 in 1969–70, and the minimum was 780 Mm 3 in 1993–94. Variability is high everywhere but much higher in the South. In the North, the wettest year was nine times wetter than the driest year. In the South, 180 times more water was available in the wettest year than in the driest. Figure 9.1 Cooling Tower Bringing Geothermal Water from the Sahara Down to a Temperature Usable in Irrigation Photo: Julia Bucknall. 160 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS This highly irregular supply affects the country in the form of floods and shortages of varying seriousness. However, the infrastructure available in recent decades has enabled Tunisia to store and transfer water, thus reducing the impacts of both flood and drought. As monitoring has improved, and particularly as hydrogeologists have discovered larger volumes of groundwater available, the estimates of the amount of water potentially available in Tunisia grew substantially between 1968 and 2007 (table 9.2). Despite the increase in known resources, estimated water availability per capita is declining (table 9.3). For groundwater, the calculation of water available refers to the maximum volume of water that can be extracted annually from the country’s groundwater resources under prevailing technical and economic conditions without leading to the long-term exhaustion of the underground resource base. For surface water resources, the calculation takes into account resources available for annual extraction in 95 percent of years. Tunisia has water quality problems in addition. Less than half of the country’s resources have less than 1.5 g/l of salt and therefore meet health and agronomic standards. Of this water with reasonable salinity Table 9.2 Tunisia: Estimates of Potential Water Supplies, 1968–2007 (Mm 3 /yr) 1968 1972 1980 1985 1990 1996 2000 2005 2007 Surface water 2000 2000 2580 2630 2700 2700 2700 2700 2700 Groundwater 160 230 490 590 670 720 737 745 745 Deep groundwater 600 900 1030 1100 1170 1250 1399 1419 1419 Total 2760 3130 4100 4320 4540 4670 4836 4864 4864 Sources: DGRE-MARH. Table 9.3 Tunisia: Change in Estimated Per Capita Long-term Water Availability, 1995–2005 (Mm 3 /yr) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Surface water (Mm 3 /yr) 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2200 Groundwater (Mm 3 /yr) 720 720 720 720 720 737 737 737 737 737 745 Deep groundwater (Mm 3 /yr) 1211 1217 1217 1225 1377 1399 1403 1403 1397 1411 1420 Total resources (Mm 3 /yr) 4031 4037 4037 4045 4197 4236 4240 4240 4234 4248 4365 Population (mil.) 8.957 9.089 9.215 9.333 9.456 9.563 9.65 9.75 9.84 9.93 10.03 Availability by inhabitant (m 3 /inhabitant/year ) 450 444 438 433 444 443 439 435 430 428 435 Source: INS and MARH. Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management N 161 levels, 72 percent is surface water, 20 percent deep groundwater, and scarcely 8 percent groundwater (tables 9.4 and 9.5). Surface water thus is used both for direct consumption and to improve the quality of other categories of water. As difficult as it is to manage Tunisia’s water resources now, the job will only get harder in the future. Studies show that Tunisia can expect an increase in average annual temperature (2 degrees C on av- erage), a modest fall in average precipitation (approximately 5 percent by 2030), and increased variability. 1 In particular, extreme phenomena (droughts, floods, and strong winds) will increase in both frequency and intensity, with very dry years likely to occur more often. These changes will have serious consequences for water resources, ecosys- tems, and agriculture; for urban dwellers; and therefore for the entire economy and society. Investments to Store and Transfer Water in Tunisia For the past three decades, Tunisia’s water resource management policy has been based on mobilizing water resources. Thematic strategies Table 9.4 Breakdown of Salinity of Water Resources (%) Salinity<1,5g/l 1,5<Salinity>3g/l Salinity>3g/l Total Surface water 72 22 6 100 Groundwater 8 32 60 100 Deep groundwater 20 57 23 100 Total 47 34 19 100 Source: Mamou 1993. Table 9.5 Breakdown of Water Resources Regarding Salinity in Relation to Total Potential Resources (Mm 3 ) Salinity<1,5g/l 1,5<Salinity>3g/l Salinity>3g/l Total Surface water 1944 594 162 2700 Groundwater 58 230 431 719 Deep groundwater 283 808 326 1417 Total 2285 1632 919 4836 % 47 34 19 100 Source: Mamou 1993. 1 MInistry of Agriculture and Water Resources 2006. 162 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS have been drawn up for agricultural water, rural and urban drinking water, urban sanitation, and the reuse of treated wastewater for ag- ricultural purposes. The Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MARH) has developed a model to help operate the country’s water systems and manage the risks associated with both droughts and floods. It compares available resources with expected needs under various planning scenarios including estimates of when different major infrastructure investments will begin operation. This model simulates all foreseeable demands to enable the government to ensure that needs are met and to plan infrastructure needs well in advance. The tools used to create the simulations are constantly updated and enhanced to account for variables related to demand levels, the performance of modern technology, and perverse effects of reality. The MARH’s model consists of a number of separate information systems: The first is the Optimal Water Resource Management model (known by its French acronym, G.E.O.R.E.) The idea of developing integrated water information systems was first proposed in a study that the gov- ernment had developed over 1990–95. This study, “Water Economy 2000,” was intended to enable the country to respond to water demand on a national level over the coming decades (first to 2010, then 2030). It collected, analyzed, and synthesized a wealth of data and information pertaining to water resources and requirements, both qualitative and quantitative. In this way, relational databases covering resources and supply were established. All the country’s water resources (conventional and nonconventional) were identified at both the regional and national levels. For the first time in this type of study in Tunisia, a geographic information system (GIS) was used to identify where water resources were located and used. The GIS was connected to numerical databases and simulation and optimization models. Thus, it enabled a review of the water management system under diverse planning scenarios and over different geographic areas. The optimization models, based on dynamic stochastic programming, enabled the assessment of the performance of the existing and projected future water system. The models calcu- lated fluctuations in both resources and consumption at varying scales and using various assumptions. By combining the relational database with the GIS assessments of the supply/demand balance, models were drawn up to determine the likely instances of over- and undersupply going forward in time and on a regional basis. Based on these results Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management N 163 and on statistical analysis, a critical load scenario was developed to serve as the basis for determining future measures to be taken. From there, measures were defined that would enable identified shortfalls to be made up or reduced and their economic costs and environmental impacts to be evaluated. The specified measures were organized by timing and location in the form of a set of alternative strategies from which a national water management strategy could be derived. The second information system is the agricultural map of the coun- try, completed in 2004. This map is in fact a series of regional maps. They give an overview of the agricultural area of each governorate, its resources, development potential, strengths, and weaknesses. The agricultural database was compiled into a GIS, comprising close to 50 layers of geographic data. The maps have the following objectives: To ascertain in a reliable and dynamic manner the status of a par- N ticular location regarding natural resources (land, water, forests), basic infrastructure (water, transport), and economics (processing, refining, and harvesting facilities for agricultural products) To ascertain the land allocation status N To identify the gap between current and optimal land use by com- N paring the land use map with the agro-economic potential map To simulate and spatially visualize decisionmaking scenarios based N on the modification of specific parameters, such as cost of entry, production prices, yields, and incentives. The third information system is the National Water Information System, known by its French acronym as SINEAU. It is being completed and is expected to be publicly available. It combines three different water information systems: one on ground and surface water, one on water pollution. and one on soil quality. The SINEAU links these three using a horizontal system of reference and unified spatial references. It will establish standards for describing data and sharing it with dif- ferent stakeholders as well as a system for managing and referencing the relevant data. Over the past three decades, Tunisia has developed significant water infrastructure aimed at meeting its ever-increasing demand. This infrastructure network had two purposes: to respond to different usage priorities and to enable flexible management. Decisions regarding the type and size of these storage and transfer facilities and the manner of their use were guided by a number of key constraints: 164 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Geological nature of the landscape. N This constraint led decisionmak- ers to deploy different types of facilities (multiple-arch concrete dams, buttressed dams, single-arch dams, gravity dams, compressed rolled concrete dams). Lithology of the landscape N through which the water flows naturally guided the design of certain facilities and the way in which they are managed. In the Mejerda Basin (the largest basin in northern Tunisia), several Triassic outcrops are largely responsible for the water’s increased salinity. These outcrops exist exactly on the sites chosen for the dams (which have the best topographical features). Thus, the outcrops have influenced decisions regarding the height of the dam and, as a result, the volume of water held behind it. (Sidi Salem is a case in point.) Location of demand. N Most water consumption is far from the source of supply, making transfer systems inevitable. Hydrological analysis N . Hydrological analysis of the country’s different catchment areas shows a high level of heterogeneity from the point of view of both water quality and regularity of natural supply. To ensure that water quantity is available in the place and at the time required, and to improve water quality through dilution, the in- frastructure was planned using three guiding principles: Allowing inter-annual storage to enable supplies to be regularized 1. from year to year, taking into account the historical frequency of drought (including repeated droughts) Creating interconnected dams situated in the same catchment 2. areas so that the system can capture any overflows of the dams in wet years Allowing water to be transferred from dams in one catchment to 3. dams in another both to balance stock levels in periods of regional drought and to improve water quality in particular reservoirs. From a hydrological point of view, the initial design of the detailed Northern Water Plan was based on 34 years of monthly supply ob- servations. The average supply figure served as a reference point for deciding the size of the facilities. After these water facilities had been in operation for a number of years, several complementary steps presented themselves as potentially useful for improving the system’s performance: Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management N 165 Minimize the effect of cyclical droughts N . To take advantage of the years of excess rainfall, 11 other sites for medium-sized dams were identified and earmarked for construction in the medium term. These facilities will fill up primarily during rainy years. These medium-sized structures also will safeguard the large dams from excessive silting. The water supply from these 11 dams was taken into account when the earlier dams were designed, Raise the height of specific existing facilities N to increase their storage capacity and to offset the effects of silting. Create local water subsystems N , as part of a national strategy of wa- ter mobilization via hillside dams (structures fewer than 10 meters high with a storage capacity of fewer than 5 Mm 3 ). These facilities lengthen the active life of the major water facilities and enable the creation of smaller local development centers. Currently, 225 such units are in place, providing approximately 200 Mm 3 of water. Extend the geographic range of the transfer systems N . This extension was a key component of the second phase of the national water usage strategy. It enabled the establishment of an integrated WRM structure (covering the use of both surface and groundwater resources). The hydraulic system for surface water in Tunisia was conceived essentially for the northern part of the country. In the system, 13 linked dams already are in place, and an additional 14 should be online by 2015, for a total of 27 interconnected dams. Their configuration is based on the fact that water demand can be divided into two basic demand categories, depending on the number and type of reservoirs that sup- ply it: “local” or “shared.” Local demand sources its water from one specific reservoir, whereas shared demand is supplied by more than one reservoir. Tables 9.6, 9.7, and 9.8 give details of the reservoirs and the areas that use the water from them as well as of the transfer schemes. Dams that serve more than one area are shown in table 9.6. Table 9.6 Tunisia’s Reservoirs and Number of Areas Served Dam Bou- heurtma Ben Metir Joumine Kasseb Lakhmess Mellegue Rmil Sidi El Barrak Sejnane Siliana Sidi Salem Zerga Zouitina No. of areas served 5 3 7 1 1 3 1 2 6 1 18 1 2 Source: Louati 2005. 166 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Table 9.7 Tunisia’s Reservoirs that Serve Multiple Uses Sejnane Joumine Ben Metir Mellegue Bouheurtma Kasseb Sidi Salem Ben Arous and Nabeul (irrigation) X X X Bizerte (drinking water) X X AG02 X X Grand Tunis (drinking water) X X X X X Cap Bon (drinking water) X X X X Sahel and Sfax (drinking water) X X X Source: Louati 2005. Table 9.8 Tunisia’s Main Water Transfer Systems and Their Characteristics Name of structure Length (km) Flow (m 3 /s) Diameter (mm) Pipelines from Sidi El Barrak-Sejnane 18 km over 2 lines 4–4.6 m 3 /s per line 1800 mm Pipelines from Sejnane to Taref station 13 km over 2 lines 12 m 3 /s 1800 mm Pipelines from Taref station to Sidi M’barek 23 km over 3 lines 12 m 3 /s 1800 mm Piplelines M’barek-Bejaoua 47 km over 3 lines 12 m 3 /s 1800 mm Mejerda Cap Bon canal 120 Km 16–8.8 m 3 /s Ben Metir pipeline 135 km 1.3–1.1 m 3 /s 1250 mm Kasseb pipeline 121 km 1.1–09 m 3 /s 1190–1250 mm Belly-Sahel pipeline: Belly-Sousse Sousse-Sfax 96 km (2 files) 118 km 1.5–2.3 m 3 /s (1st file) 3.6 m 3 /s (2nd file) 1.35 m 3 /s 1400–1200 mm 1600 mm 1400–1000 mm Jilma-Sfax pipeline Sbeitla-Sfax pipeline 151 km 148 km 0.73 m 3 /s 0.3 m 3 /s 1100–600 mm 600–325 mm Pipelines from Kairouanais Sidi Saad dam El Haoureb dam El Houareb S.Saad (projected) 18 km right bank 10 km left bank 12 km 24.8 km 1.935–1.5 m 3 /s 0.5–0.335 m 3 /s 1.0 m 3 /s 1.0 m 3 /s 1600–1250 mm 600–400 mm 1000–300 mm 1100 mm Nebhana pipeline 126 km 2.1–0.350 1400–600 mm Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources 2000. Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management N 167 To supplement its scarce natural supplies, Tunisia has a long experi- ence of generating nonconventional water and of innovative investments. Its experience in reuse of treated wastewater, desalination of salt and brackish water, and artificial recharge of aquifers is instructive and indicates a concern for integrated management of the water cycle. Since the 1970s, Tunisia has been formally reusing treated wastewater in agriculture and now has one of the world’s highest rates of reuse. Almost all of Tunisia’s 194 Mm 3 per year urban wastewater generated is treated to adequate standards (ONAS 2004). Approximately 30 percent of it is reused in agriculture supplying approximately 7,000 ha of fruit trees and fodder, following strict sanitary standards. The country plans to invest in significantly increasing that share over the next decade (figure 9.2). Experience indicates difficulties ensuring cost-recovery for wastewater reuse. At present, the service is subsidized. In addition, Tunisia uses treated wastewater for environmental purposes, in one case, to ensure flows to an ecologically important wetland. Despite being a country not endowed with energy resources, Tunisia has experience with de- salination of brackish and saline water. Desalination began in 1983 in Tunisia. The national agency responsible for drinking water, SONEDE, has capacity of 58,800 m 3 per day (table 9.9). Private operators have an ad- ditional capacity of 44.000 m 3 / day, mostly for tourism, although with some capacity in industrial 0 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 1990 2000 2004 2006 2009 2011 H e c t a r e s Years Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 6000 6630 7450 8000 10000 12000 12000 Figure 9.2 Growth in Treated Wastewater Used in Agriculture, Tunisia, 1990–2001 (ha) 10 Projects 12 Projects 17 Projects 22 Projects 23 Projects 32 Projects 6000 6630 7450 8000 10000 Table 9.9 Desalination Capacity in Tunisia, 1983–2000 Station Capacity (m 3 /day) Year operation started Technology Feed water salinity (g/l) Number of membranes Kerkenah 3300 1983 Reverse osmosis 3.6 144 Gabes 25500 1995 Reverse osmosis 3.2 1188 Zarzis 15000 1999 Reverse osmosis 3.2 1188 Jerba 15000 2000 Reverse osmosis 6.0 756 Total 58800 2844 Source: SONEDE, MARH 2004. 168 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS enterprises and high-value agriculture. In the South, the authorities have been able to use reverse osmosis technology to convert brackish groundwater into drinking water. The government subsidizes the private sector to invest in desalina- tion and considers this technology a key part of the long-term water management strategy for the country. It plans to increase public sector installed capacity to 50 Mm 3 day by 2030. In addition, the country has long experience of artificial ground- water recharge. This is a way of storing surplus water from one season for use during dry periods. The program of construction of small dams described above also included spate irrigation infrastructure to channel flood water. In addition to helping manage surface water f lows, these two types of in- vestment had a major impact on aquifer recharge (figure 9.3). Furthermore, Tunisia has proj- ects using quarries, old wells, and direct injection to increase aquifer recharge, in some cases including recharge with treated wastewater. To avoid potential contamination, these schemes usually are toward the mouth of the aquifers. One trial scheme uses treated wastewater at the mouth of the aquifer to protect against saline intrusion. The government plans to increase the volumes of artificial aquifer recharge to more than 200 Mm 3 per year in 2030 through small dams, check dams, and soil and water conservation investments in upper watersheds. Use of Water Resources The irrigation sector consumes close to 80 percent of Tunisia’s extracted water. Tunisia has approximately 420,000 ha of land that could be ir- rigated through both public and private schemes. Of this, 400,000 ha are actually irrigated. The government’s strategy aims to serve these lands with water, assuming that water is available, by 2010. The sector now uses approximately 2 billion m 3 per year. Demand should stabilize at 2.1 billion m 3 by 2010. 0 100 80 60 40 20 1992 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 2011 M m 3 Source: Louati 2008. Capacity in Mm 3 Number of projects Figure 9.3 Growth in Volumes and Schemes for Artifcial Aquifer Recharge in Tunisia 23 9 28 30 35 43 55 67 19 13 30 40 60 80 Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management N 169 Groundwater extraction has increased continuously since 1997, rising from 2,161 Mm 3 to 2,638 Mm 3 in 2006—an increase of ap- proximately 26 percent over 15 years (table 9.10). Yet, withdrawals are becoming unsustainable, while exploitation of deep groundwater is increasing slowly. On the positive side, there is potential for more or better use of surface water. In the last decade, overall usage rates of surface water have been low. The lack of good-quality water is becoming increasingly acute in the wake of unpredictable climate patterns. Thus, the country needs to find a way to improve the value-added from the water allocated to the agricultural sector. A technical, economic, organizational, institutional, and legislative framework has been set up to maximize the country’s irrigation potential as efficiently as possible. Water conservation con- stitutes a key component of this strategy. Since the end of the 1980s, with the introduction of conservation measures in irrigated areas, con- sumption per ha has begun to decline sharply, falling from 6,200 m 3 /ha in 1990 to approximately 5,500 m 3 /ha in 2005. In 1995 Tunisia’s water administration adopted a National Program of Irrigation Water Conservation (PNEEI). Its purpose was to ratio- nalize the use of water to ensure that the maximum economic value is derived from irrigation and to keep water demand at a sustainable level. The PNEEI has the following broad goals: Strengthen knowledge of appropriate technologies to ensure op- N timal water use Ensure that regional departments have a better grasp of tech- N niques and methods to conserve irrigation water suited to local conditions Encourage consumers to adopt water conservation techniques N Table 9.10 Tunisia’s Evolution of Water Consumption, 1997–2005 (Mm 3 ) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Surface water 399 361 445 499 248 561 510 464 688 Groundwater 757 764 771 778 778 778 778 778 807 Deep groundwater 1005 1014 1031 1078 1119 1135 1109 1127 1143 Total 2161 2139 2247 2355 2145 2474 2397 2369 2638 Sources: DGRE 2007a, 2007b. 170 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Make available to citizens the knowledge and technical support N required for them to put these techniques into practice Rapidly extend the introduction of on-farm water-saving equip- N ment; transfer public irrigated areas (PPI) to agricultural develop- ment groups (GDA) under appropriate operating conditions. The program provides a 40 percent–60 percent subsidy for efficient on-farm irrigation equipment, (upgraded gravity irrigation, sprinkler irrigation, and drip systems) with the exact rate depending on the category of ag- riculture. The program aimed to install efficient on-farm irrigation equipment on 90 percent of Tuni- sia’s 400,000 ha of irrigated land by 2006 and to improve irrigation efficiency to a level of at least 75 percent by the end of 2006. As of June 2006, the irrigated area with qualifying conservation systems in place covered close to 310,000 ha, or 75 percent of the irrigated area. The imple- mentation rate has been running at 15,000–25,000 ha per year. Figure 9.4 shows the take-up of the irrigation systems. Figure 9.5 shows how water allocations per ha have been changing. The breakdown of the area under irrigation is: 98,000 ha of drip irrigation (or 21.6 percent of the total irrigable N area) 106,000 ha of sprinkler irrigation (26.7 percent) N 106,000 ha of upgraded gravity irrigation (25 percent). N 0 400,000 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 90 70 80 60 50 40 30 20 10 1995 1998 2001 2005 2007 2008 A r e a ( h a ) Years E q u i p p e d a r e a / T o t a l a r e a ( % ) Source: DGGREE-MAHR 2007. Superfcie % Figure 9.4 Tunisia Irrigated Area Equipped with Efcient On-farm Irrigation Systems, 1995–2008 (%) 0 2,000 5,000 7,000 6,000 4,000 3,000 1,000 1990 1996 2005 2015 2025 2020 2010 2030 Source: DGGREE-MAHR 2007. Figure 9.5 Evolution of Mean Water Allocations per Irrigated Hectare, 1990–2030 (m 3 /ha) Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management N 171 Drip irrigation accounts for close to 25 percent of the total irrigable area, whereas it accounted for just 3 percent in 1995. Regional action plans have been put in place by the Regional Agricul- tural Development Commissions with a goal of covering 100 percent of the irrigated area by 2009. The implementation of the water conserva- tion program in irrigated areas is expected to bring water consumption per hectare down to approximately 4,000 m 3 /ha by 2030. The National Authority for Water Exploitation and Distribution (SONEDE), the body tasked with producing and distributing drinking water, has set up a strategy to ensure efficient water use. The changes in water allocated to SONEDE are shown in table 9.11 below. Irrigation water tariffs cover some O&M costs, but not the costs of capital investment, operation of bulk infrastructure, or value of the water itself. Tariffs for drinking water gradually are moving to a point at which they will completely cover running and financing costs, plus a significant portion of equipment costs. The current coverage is ap- proximately 87 percent. Policy Measures Regulatory Measures Water sector legislation related to water conservation covers investment incentives, investment regulation, and the rationalization of the water management system. The Water Code was promulgated in 1975. Its articles 12, 15, 16, 86, 102, 106, 90, and 96 relating to resources, planning and development, tariff rates, and the reuse and conservation of water were modified and completed by new laws in 1987, 1988, and 2001. Table 9.11 Trends in Production and Consumption of Drinking Water, 1996–2007 (Mm 3 ) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Production of drinking water 309 317 326 337 346 373 373 394 403 420 439 453 Consumption of drinking water 230 247 258 272 285 301 297 306 315 339 340 348 Specific consumption (liters consumed and billed/day/ inhabitant connected to the system) 65 68 69 71 73 75 75 75 76 78 80 82 Source: SONEDE 2008: Statistics on SONEDE’s water production since 1994, databases. 172 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Technical Measures Initiatives to improve the efficiency of communal irrigation and drinking water networks have been set in motion. The main results of these initiatives are: Water conservation project in small- and medium-sized water-consum- 1. ing areas in central Tunisia. It aims to restore and modernize public networks, promote on-farm water-saving equipment, and transfer the management of these operations to farmer groups (known by their French acronym as GICs). This project covers 11,000 ha of irrigated land at a cost of 24 Mdinars. Project to improve irrigated areas in the southern oases, covering 23,000 2. ha. Project aims to make the distribution system more watertight by constructing concrete canals or laying underground PVC pip- ing, and to install a drainage system to remove excess water and leach salts. Modernization project in the old irrigated areas of the Lower Mejerda 3. Valley. Underway, this. project aims to modernize a 4,300-ha por- tion of the old irrigated areas, which cover 27,000 ha in total. Water conservation program for public drinking water networks and 4. facilities. Its components include installing new equipment for metering and regulation, tracing leaks, renovating old meters and connections, and regulating pressure in the system. Measuring the volume of water produced and distributed plays a key role in water management. The government’s strategy is to equip every water system with an appropriate means of measurement and to divide networks into sections through the installation of local metering systems. This thorough deployment of meters will ensure an effective mechanism for tracing leaks. As of 2007, all of the reservoirs produc- ing drinking water were equipped with either meters or other means of measuring outflows. The government intends to equip all drinking water supply systems with appropriate regulation equipment. By 2007, 96.6 percent of supply systems (gravity and reverse-flow) had been fitted. Metering policy is centered on three key initiatives: Replacing jammed meters to reduce or eliminate the need to issue 1. pro-rata bills; then replacing unclassified meters. Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management N 173 Rehabilitating worn-out connections and networks by replacing 2. pipes and fittings to reduce leaks. In 1998 SONEDE began inven- torying these connections (329,000 in total) and scheduled their replacement within 10 years. The proportion of water consumers served by worn-out connections fell from 24 percent in 1998 to 6 percent in 2007. Resizing meters to bring them up to the necessary capacity. Regula- 3. tion at the water system level consists of equipping drinking water supply systems (gravitational or reversed-flow) with appropriate means of regulation (cut-off valves, ballcocks, altimetric water gates, and pilot lines, radios) to avoid wasting water through overflows and leaks. Leak detection uses either correlation or the acoustic method. Part of this detection work is done in-house; part is subcontracted. During 2007, some 8,300 km of the distribution network were inspected, and 2,011 leaks or broken pipes were detected—equivalent to 1 leak or breakage every 3.3 km. Table 9.12 shows the scale of investments in improving leak detection and metering for drinking water. Institutional Measures Tunisia’s experience of self-managed communal water systems goes back to the early 1900s, when user-owner associations were created. Among these associations were the irrigation syndicates created be- tween 1901 and 1906 to use the water of the wadis in central Tunisia. Examples are the irrigation syndicate at the Sbiba Wadi, created in 1901, and the irrigation syndicates at the Zroud and Marguellil Wadis, which were created in 1906. Between 1912 and 1919, associations were created to develop the southern Tunisian oases. In 1987 these associations were converted into communal interest groups. Their function was to develop public water resources; construct, maintain, and use public water works; Table 9.12 Number of Water Supply Meters Replaced or Improved, 2004–2007 (m) Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 Number of jammed meters repaired or replaced 41,134 37,586 34,267 51,082 Number of worn-out meters replaced 71,232 40,727 16,349 9,611 Number of meters resized 1,419 1,671 578 316 174 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS irrigate and decontaminate farmland; and develop drinking water supply systems. Regional committees to assess and ensure the implementation of the water conservation program were set up in March 1992 at the regional administrative level (Regional Offices for Agriculture Develop- ment, known by their French acronyms as CRDAs). The inauguration of the committees coincided with the launch of a program of training and promotion of water conservation in the irrigation sector. Regional strategies and a water conservation assessment and implementation system at a national level have been in place since 1993. In 1987 the management of all drinking water supply systems and borehole irrigation on public land was transferred to the GICs. In 1988 the GIC program was extended to large dam irrigation systems on pub- lic land. The purpose was to ensure that areas irrigated by boreholes and large dams were under the same management arrangements. By the end of 2005, 75,000 ha of public land serviced by large dams were under GIC management. In 2001 the PISEAU (Water Sector Investment Project) began to transfer the management of irrigation land to farmer groups (whose name had changed to agricultural development groups, known by their French acronym as GDAs). The project financed 10 technical assis- tance initiatives in 8 governorates to transfer management of 31,000 ha irrigated by large dams to GDAs and to reinforce GDAs’ capacity where they were already in place (16,000 ha). Separately, a technical assistance project for the GDAs in areas irrigated by boreholes was implemented, again to encourage water conservation in Tunisia’s small and medium-sized irrigated areas. This 7-year project (1999–2006) involved approximately 60 GDAs and cost roughly `1 million. Two additional TA projects were put in place to strengthen the technical capacity of the regional departments and GDAs involved in the supply of drinking water. The first to be launched began in 1997 and ended in 2008. It covered approximately 800 drinking water GICs in 8 governorates. The second initiative (2006–10) aims to boost the technical capacity of 160 drinking water GICs located in an additional 17 governorates. Performance Indicators Indicators have been adopted to evaluate water resource mobilization and management programs. Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management N 175 The effectiveness of dams in regulating flow is measured by a Regulation Index (table 9.13). This indicator is defined for any specific year as the ratio between the volume of regularized flows in that year and the average annual irregular water flow. The development of water resources is evaluated according to an index that measures the ratio between annual withdrawals of water and conventional, renewable, natural freshwater resources (table 9.14). Annual withdrawals of conventional, renewable natural water include losses incurred when the water is transported. The rate of groundwater exploitation is consistently above 100 percent. For deep groundwater, exploitation also is on the increase, and is at approximately 80 percent. Table 9.13 Evolution of Effectiveness of Dams at Regulating Irregular Flows, 1997–2006 (Mm 3 ) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average annual irregular flows (Mm 3 ) 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 Regularizable irregular flows (Mm 3 ) 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,652 1,660 1,682 Regularized irregular flows (Mm 3 ) 1,030 1,228 1,221 1,316 1,292 1,300 1,465 1,521 1,601 1,587 Regulation index (%) 49.05 58.48 58.14 62.67 61.52 61.90 69.76 72.43 76.24 75.57 Source: Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development 2007. Table 9.14 Evolution of Rate of Exploitation of Water Resources in Tunisia, 1997–2004 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Withdrawals of renewable underground water (Mm 3 ) 1,098 1,117 1,137 1,184 1,206 1,230 1,207 1,216 Withdrawals of surface water (Mm 3 ) 399 361 445 499 248 561 510 464 Available renewable underground resources (Mm 3 ) 1,273 1,284 1,432 1,423 1,408 1,408 1,430 1,498 Available surface resources (Mm 3 ) 1,030 1,228 1,221 1,316 1,292 1,300 1,465 1,521 Index of total exploitation of renewable resources (%) 65.00 58.84 59.63 61.45 53.85 66.14 59.31 55.65 Sources: National Statistics Institute and Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources. 176 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The system for evaluating and monitoring water conservation, along with a land survey carried out in 2001, has enabled a mid-term assessment of the National Water Conservation Program. The results confirmed that the program was both effective and economically vi- able in the agricultural sector. In particular, the evaluation shows that an extremely dynamic response from stakeholders led to a significant increase in the area of land equipped with water conservation systems. Promotional campaigns using a variety of means of communication have contributed greatly to water conservation in irrigation. Table 9.15 tracks the evolution of average yields for drinking water systems between 1997 and 2007, calculated as the ratio of consumed volume, plant volume, and briny water volume to plant entry volume. The overall network yield slipped from 78.2 percent in 2006 to 77.3 percent in 2007. This fall resulted from a 0.5-point drop in yields from conveyance (92.2 percent in 2007 and 92.7 percent in 2006) and a 0.6-point drop in yields from distribution networks (83.4 percent in 2007 vs. 84 percent in 2006). To gauge the efficiency of transfer networks, the transfer network yield is calculated. In 2007 this yield figure reached 99.5, compared to 92.2 for the conveyance networks and 83.4 for distribution networks. Conclusions and Recommendations The unavoidable reality facing Tunisia is the necessity to conserve and derive maximum benefit from its limited water resources. Conservation Table 9.15 Evolution of Average Yields for Drinking Water Systems in Tunisia, 1997–2007 (Mm 3 ) Designation 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Volume consumed 246.7 256.9 271.6 285.1 301.3 297.4 305.8 313.9 327.3 340.1 348.1 Service plant volume (VSS) 0.8 0.169 0.705 1.665 1.65 1.537 1.142 1.062 1.785 2.486 3.492 Conveyance plant volume (VSA) 1.6 0.026 Volume of briny water (VSM) 1.9 2.324 3.597 5.328 5.08 5.058 5.561 5.9186 5.3 5.9 6.9196 Plant entry volume (VES) 321.7 329.67 342.95 357.25 380.13 380.01 400.52 410.03 427.1 447.59 463.78 Overall network yield (Rg) (%) 77.5 78.7 80.4 81.7 81.0 80.0 78.0 78.3 78.3 78.2 77.3 Source: SONEDE 2008: Statistics on SONEDE’s water production since 1994, databases. Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management N 177 will be far more productive than looking for ways to secure new reserves. The substantial future savings that are needed will have to come from the major water-using sectors, especially agriculture, which consumes almost 80 percent of Tunisia’s available water resources. Tunisia must expect a future of water shortages exacerbated by more frequent droughts and climate change. Water supply manage- ment therefore must improve the operation of water infrastructure and harness technology to make optimal use of existing resources. The rationale for creating new irrigated areas should be examined in light of future water demands. Implementing a demand-based water management strategy will strengthen the case for a realignment of water sector institutions. Studies of Tunisia’s water management system often highlight gaps or weak points in the system, particularly in the relationship with private water users. The political trend is toward participatory man- agement. Thus, all levels of the administration have made great efforts to help local organizations (GICs/GDAs) to take control of operating and maintaining their water distribution facilities. It is important that regulatory texts reflect this trend toward greater participation by the beneficiaries/stakeholders. With increased involvement of users, water planning and implementation will see improved performance. In this regard, serious thought needs to be given to the ways in which these water users can be brought in to participate in defining Tunisia’s water management policy and strategy. New mechanisms need to be created to institutionalize the participation of different users at key stages of planning and operation. Increasing users’ participation in the water management system should enable projects to be planned and managed based on genuine knowledge of the needs and constraints of both parties—the state, which holds the resources and guarantees their continuity; and user groups, who are responsible for the viability and sustainability of their own activities. References Blue Plan (Plan Bleu)-UNEP. 2000. “Vision of the Mediterranean Regarding Water, Population and the Environment in the 21st Century.” Sophia-Antipolis/Marseille. www.planbleu.org/pub- lications. ____. 2002. “Analysis of Strategies and Prospects for Water in Tunisia.” Sophia-Antipolis/Marseille. www.planbleu.org/publications. 178 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS ____. 2005. “Mediterranean, Blue Plan Perspectives on the Envi- ronment and Development.” Sophia-Antipolis/Marseille. www. planbleu.org/publications. ____. 2006. Methodological documents of the 34 key indicators for the monitoring of the Mediterranean strategy for sustainable development. Sophia-Antipolis/Marseille. www.planbleu.org/ publications. DGGREE-MARH (Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources). 2007. “Report on the Preparation of the Investment Project in the Water Sector.” DGGREE/DGPRDIA-MARH (Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources). 2001. “Financial and Economic Evaluation of the Water Conservation Program in Irrigation.” DGRE (Directorate General of Water Resources)-MARH (Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources). 2007a.” Directory of Exploita- tion of Deep Aquifers.” ____. 2007b. “Directory of Exploitation of Shallow Aquifers.” DGREE- MARH (Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources). 2001–06. ____. 2001–06. Report analyzing communal interest groups in irriga- tion. ____. 2001–06. Statistics concerning communal interest groups in the irrigation sector and drinking water in rural areas. ____. 2001. Study assessing the national water conservation program in Tunisia. German Development Institute. 2003. “Reuse of Treated Wastewater in Tunisia.” Hamdane, A. 2002. “National Strategy for Water Conservation in Irrigation: The Case of Tunisia.” Forum: Advances in the Manage- ment of Water Demand. Blue Plan, Rome. Hamdane, A.-UNEP. 2006. ”Monitoring of Progress in the Water Sector and Promotion of Demand-Management Policies. National Report on Tunisia.” Blue-Mediterranean Sustainable Development Commission. Louati, M.H. 2005. “Optimization of Management Rules for Multiples Reservoirs Considering Risk.” ____. 2008. “Blue Plan, Efficiency of Water Utilization, National Studies: The Case of Tunisia.” Louati, M.H., and others. 1998. “Long-Term Strategy for the Water Sector in Tunisia, 2030.” Water XXI. Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management N 179 Louati, M.H., and others. 1999. “Practical Guide to Drought Manage- ment in Tunisia: Methodological Approach.” Louati, M.H., and G. Keser, 2000. “Optimized System for Water Management.” Mamou, A. 1993. “Principal Outline of National Planning, Environ- mental Limits 1996.” Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP), Program of Priority Actions, UNEP. 1998. “Directives for an Integrated Approach to the Development, Management and Utilization of Water Resources.” Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MARH). 1998. “Studies on the Water Sector.” ____. 2000. “Water Conservation 2000”: Resource Assessments, Requirements and Strategy for Water Management.” ____. 2006. “National Strategy for the Adaptation of Tunisia’s Agri- culture and Ecosystems to Climate Change.” Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MARH)-GTZ. 2004. “Guide Plan Concerning the Implementation of Real-Time Water Resource Management: Project to Optimize Management of Water Resources.” Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development. 1993–2005. “National Reports on the State of the Environment in Tunisia. ”Tunisian Research Institute for the Environment and Sustainable Development, ____. 2007. “Sustainable Management of Water Resources in Tuni- sia.” ____. 2008: “Indicators for a Sustainable Development, Tunisia.” Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development-DHV. 2005. “Updated Inventory of Sources of Water Pollution in Tunisia.” National Institute of Rural Engineering, Water and Forests-Thameur Chaibi. 2003. “An Integrated Approach to the Sustainable Manage- ment of Water Resources in the Mediterranean Basin: The Case of Cap Bon, Tunisia.” National Institute of Statistics. 2000 and 2004. “Tunisian Statistical Yearbooks.” Tunis. ____. 2005. “Annual Report on Infrastructure Indicators.” Tunis. ONAS (National Sanitation Office). 2004. Data. Tunis. Sahara and Sahel Observatory (OSS). 2004. www.oss-online.org SONEDE (National Water Supply Authority). 2005. Water Statistics in Tunisia. Tunis. 180 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS ____. 2008: Statistics on SONEDE’s water production since 1994, databases. ____. 2008. “Water Conservation Report 2007.” Talbit, M., ed. 1985. L’Emirat Aglabite, Dar Gharb Islami Beyrout. UNEP. 2000. “Blue Plan: 130 Indicators for Sustainable Development in the Mediterranean.” World Bank. 2003. “Analysis of Environmental Performance in Tu- nisia.” Zaara M. 2004. “Desalination in Tunisia: Reality and Perspectives.” Seminar in Almeria, Spain, November 23. 181 10 Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War Iraq Sana Agha Al Nimer T his chapter describes Iraq’s current water supply issues, government strategy, and key lessons for post-conflict countries In post-conflict countries, societies face distinctive challenges. They are immediate and urgent recovery along with the long-term objective of economic recovery, as well as social and political cohe- sion. One of the key challenges facing Iraqis is to develop credible and inclusive institutions that will lead to stability and sustainable economic prosperity. In the post-conflict context, rehabilitating and improving basic services such as water supply and sanitation are essential for improving the living conditions of the people. International experience in reconstruction efforts in post-conflict countries has shown that well- targeted expenditures on municipal services, especially water supply and sanitation (WSS), are especially important to alleviate suffering and to reduce the risk of further conflict. Sector Background Before the 1991 Gulf War, the population of Iraq enjoyed a relatively high level of water supply and sanitation services. The sector operated efficiently and utilized then-current technologies. Over 95 percent of the urban population and over 75 percent of the rural population had access to safe potable water. Water quality was satisfactory. Approximately 218 water treatment plants and approximately 1200 compact water treatment units were operating throughout the country. Sanitation services covered approximately 75 percent of the urban communities. Twenty-five percent of these communities were connected to sewer- age systems, and 50 percent had on-site septic tanks. 182 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Since 1991, the WSS sector has experienced a steady decline. Aging infrastructure, poorly maintained equipment, leaking water and sewer networks, and low technical capacity and morale are key problems of the sector. Today, most Iraqis have limited access to WSS, and to other basic services such as electricity and solid waste collection. The level of water supply coverage is approximately 73 percent for urban areas and 43 percent in rural areas. A high percentage of water produced does not meet the World Health Organization’s (WHO) water quality standards. In addition, the efficiency of service delivery is low due to the deteriorating condition of the water supply and waste- water facilities and electrical power cuts of up to 16 hours per day. Wastewater collection and treatment facilities are available in only few large cities. These facilities are in dire need of rehabilitation. Wastewater treatment covers approximately only 8 percent of the population in the 15 governorates. The remaining waste from more than 20 million people is discharged directly into the environment (river system or on-site septic tanks). Serious environmental and health risks associated with lack of basic services, contaminated water supplies, and poor disposal of sewage overburden the already stressed health system. Diseases associated with poor sanitation, unsafe water, and unhygienic practices have increased to alarming rates. These conditions have accounted for an estimated one-quarter of recent child mortalities. It is estimated that 40 percent of children who visit health centers suffer from gastrointestinal diseases due to the lack of safe drinking water. In the capital city of Baghdad, water supply and sewerage systems have fallen into disrepair from years of neglect and lack of maintenance, recent war damage, subsequent looting, and disruptions in electricity supply. Water production capacity is approximately 2.1 million cubic meters (m 3 ) per day, which is far below the country’s basic demand of approximately 3.4 million m 3 per day. The situation is exacerbated by a water loss rate of 50 percent–60 percent from leaking distribution networks and frequent pipe ruptures. Newly developed areas in city suburbs are not served with any potable water. The population depends entirely on raw water of low quality provided by private vendors. In addition, Baghdad’s three sewage treatment plants are inoperative. They discharge partially or untreated effluent into the Tigris River, the city’s main water source. One reason that operations and maintenance (O&M) are un- derfunded is the lack of cost recovery. Water tariffs for all Iraqi gov- ernorates, excluding the northern region, range from 0.0013US$/m³ Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War I raq N 183 to 0.0133US$/m³ per month for domestic customers. 1 In most gover- norates, the level of metering is low. Nonrevenue water (NRW) has increased due to 20 years of wars and sanctions. Lack of maintenance as well as damaged networks and infrastructure explain the NRW level of approximately 57 percent. Accurate estimates are difficult, because fewer than 10 percent of the connections are metered. Financial management systems are weak. Cash accounting is still used. The accounting makes no clear separation between operational and capital expenditures, and cash-flow statements are not prepared. Generally, the recorded water revenues are not the amounts billed but the revenue collected. Unpaid billings are not recorded sepa- rately from formal accounts. Depreciation is charged, but the assets are not periodically re-valued in line with inflation. Iraq also faces the rene- gotiation of the allocation and distribution of the resource with its upstream states, Syria and Turkey (figure 10.1). Since the majority of Iraq’s water origi- nates outside of its international borders, these negotiations add a level of complexity and urgency to the management of the sector. Government Strategy WSS is one of the key priorities of the Government of Iraq. The government’s immediate strategy is to ensure the safe provision of services, increase coverage through rehabilitation and reconstruction, and allocate sufficient resources for O&M. The strategy includes: 1 Substantially lower than the costs of production in well run water utilities with full cost recovery (see Ueda and Benouahi’s description of Japanese water utilities in this volume). Figure 10.1 Map of Iraq 184 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Continued rehabilitation and construction of water supply and N sewerage infrastructure Improvements to the quality of water supply services N Capacity building and training of sector staff N Provision of sufficient water resources for all regions in Iraq N Crash maintenance programs of the existing infrastructure, that is, N pumping stations and water supply and sewerage networks Appropriate monitoring of environmental issues N Development of realistic timetables for project implementation N Critical review of present subsidy policies and development of a plan N for the gradual increase in tariffs and elimination of cross-subsidies Public-private partnerships for water demand management. N Water Supply and Sanitation Investment Program Iraq’s Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (MMPW) has devel- oped a Water and Sanitation Investment Program (2007–20). It identi- fies approximately 575 projects consisting of 85 technical assistance (TA), 309 water supply, and 181 wastewater projects. The total cost for the investment program is an estimated US$30 billion. Due to the extensive needs in the sector, priority projects for the investment plan were identified based on six selection criteria. They were (1) additional population served by the project, (2) present water deficit, (3) environment and public health, (4) capital cost per capita, (5) project completion time, and (6) economic rate of return (ERR). Donor coordination Duplication of efforts is a risk as more donors become active in Iraq. A significant number of projects remain unfinanced. Pilot private sector involvement The private sector has not played a key role in financing large investments. However, some projects may be attractive to the private sector in the long term. With the prevailing set of political, economic, and security risks, a feasible option is to pilot management contracts (in addition to ongoing service contracts for construction, operations, and maintenance). Capacity building MMPW has received extensive support from the World Bank and other institutions for capacity building for all aspects of its work. Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War I raq N 185 Key Lessons for Post-Conflict Countries The Iraq experience reveals valuable lessons for other post-conflict situations. These lessons are summarized in a set of priority steps: Actively coordinate donors 1. Identify urgent investments 2. Restore water supply 3. Identify upgrades or replacement of critical equipment 4. Develop an implementation strategy 5. Ensure security in work and living areas 6. Involve the private sector at the appropriate time 7. Follow adequate implementation and procurement procedures. 8. Donor Coordination Donors active in Iraq include USAID, United Nations, World Bank, and bilateral donors. They have financed a total of approximately US$750 million targeting 33 identified projects, which has been dis- bursed since 2003. In the immediate post-conflict environment, speed of response and thor- oughness of initial assessment are essential. Donor coordination is critical to avoid duplication and maximize the impact of scarce resources. A key goal is to ensure that financing and assistance are targeted equitably throughout the country. Equity requires a damage assessment as well as awareness of the ethnic sensitivities of a post-conflict country. It is important to identify all relevant stakeholders, including community and civil society structures, and to include them in reconciliation and reconstruction. Following the 2003 conflict, the international community was quick to recognize the need for a multilateral approach to Iraq’s reconstruc- tion and development. At the request of the international community, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Group worked closely to assess Iraq’s reconstruction needs. In October 2003, the United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment estimated the total needs for 2004–07 to be US$55 billion. This amount comprised US$35.8 billion for the 14 sectors covered by the Needs Assessment, and US$19.4 billion estimated by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) for other sectors, including security and oil. The joint needs assessment served as a basis for various interna- tional donors’ conferences. The World Bank and the UN designed 186 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS an International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. As a result, the distribution of projects has been reasonably bal- anced throughout the country. The Baghdad Governorate has the most projects followed by Mayoralty of Baghdad, Maysan, Muthana, Erbil, Kerbala, Qadis- siyah, and Dhi Qar. Identification of Urgent Investments It is essential to identify areas that most urgently need assistance. Key investment projects, even if small, can be crucial in restoring services. It is important to note that not all infrastructure destroyed by conflict is suitable for restoration or is critical to the immediate needs of the population. Some areas in Iraq faced neglect from years of lack of services, and had high popu- lation densities. The World Bank Iraq Trust Fund project financing targeted a number of these areas, including Sadr City in Baghdad and Badawa in Erbil (figures 10.2–10.4). The impact on the population was significant. It is important to identify the local technicians and sector staff who are the best equipped to identify priority projects. Unfor- tunately, most Iraqi technicians have either migrated, are reluc- tant to work in the public sector, or perished in the conflict. External staff will also play a part in local recovery and recon- struction of infrastructure. To address issues more sensitively, these staff should be briefed adequately and have sufficient understanding of local conditions, Figure 10.2 Drainage Problems in Sadr City Figure 10.3 Badawa: A Polluted Urban Environment Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War I raq N 187 history, geography, and culture of the country. Timely Rehabilitation of Water Supply Service Water supply systems are often damaged in war, and sometimes deliberately targeted. Rehabilitation of water supply systems offers one of the greatest levels of development impact in a post-conflict setting. Emergency water supply systems consist of temporary tanks used to store clean water, which is trans- ported by tankers. In spite of the evidence, these systems generally are overlooked in favor of treatment works and pumping stations. In Iraq, water supply comes mainly from surface water. Therefore, to tackle the existing drinking water crises in major cities, temporary water treatments using unsophisticated technologies have been widely used as stop-gaps. These technologies include flocculation, chlorina- tion, and possibly simple sand filters (compact units with a life span of five years). Regarding the restoration of urban public supplies, issues to be considered include cross-contamination between sewers and water distributors, and lack of O&M and spare parts. Where they existed, sewerage systems in Iraq were less likely to have been targeted during the war. However, given the long period of inadequate maintenance and failure of power supplies, their conditions are generally very poor. Malfunctioning sewer systems are likely to pose health hazards by contaminating potable water supplies. Clean- ing sewers requires costly equipment and usually is a priority that gets addressed after clean water supplies have been restored. Until then, public authorities need to prioritize disseminating appropriate public education so that the public will take the essential health measures, such as boiling or chlorinating drinking water. Identify Upgrades or Replace Critical Equipment Post-conflict states often have under-resourced, poorly maintained, and out-of-date services infrastructure. Rehabilitation involves updating Figure 10.4 Badawa after Completion of Rehabilitation Works Source: Authors from Quarterly Progress Reports. 188 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS the system, catching up on maintenance, refurbishing plants, and car- rying out much needed repairs. After identifying the immediate needs as well as budgeting for the medium and long-term needs, the government has to prepare a budget to identify and estimate required costs. Generally, funds are limited, so prioritization becomes necessary. To avoid prejudice against any particular group, determining the priorities should involve as many lo- cal stakeholders as possible. Locals will have very high expectations, so addressing unrealistic local aspirations should be discussed openly by the complement of various stakeholders. Develop an Implementation Strategy An implementation strategy should be developed that reflects the needs of service users, local skills, construction security, the mix of local and external inputs, budget flows, and overall program management capacity. Local participation must be engaged. Early involvement of local people who are familiar with the technical and system backgrounds can help in setting realistic investment and implementation targets. The re-establishment of local contractors should be encouraged by developing small contracts, with external support to strengthen management skills where necessary. The skills mix of local and expa- triate staff and contractors in rebuilding has two benefits. It results in local employment and income. It also ensures a project’s sustainability through community buy-in and creating a culture of maintenance for the project. In scheduling, lengthy or overly bureaucratic procurement methods need to be anticipated. If possible, funding should be managed independently from gov- ernment systems. One option is to use a separate local bank account. The project management team would countersign payment checks with the local government officers. Payment currencies and systems for local contractors/suppliers/ consultants also must be planned ahead to prevent stoppages. When payments for salaries and goods are delayed, so is implementation. In Iraq, payments in US dollars are far easier to process than those in the local currency, which involve a particularly cumbersome process in the local banking system. Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War I raq N 189 Security in Work and Living Areas Even after a conflict, insecurity and danger may continue. It still is not safe enough for the international community to visit Iraq. Infrastructure contractors may be reluctant to undertake development work in insecure areas, which are often the very areas that most require development. The inability of international workers to work in the country increases the frustration of the local population toward external donors, con- tractors, and other outsiders. In the absence of a strong economy or currency, payments to local contractors may involve the added risks of storing and transporting cash payments. In prioritizing tasks and activities, donors and service providers should consider improving security as a key priority. In some areas, security ser- vices provision adds 30 percent to 50 percent to investment costs. Involve the Private Sector at Appropriate Time Major private investment is likely to be appropriate only after a period of some stability, or where appropriate guarantees can be made that offset the risks. Private investors are likely to be wary of investing before the conflict is fully resolved. Even then, investors may be discouraged by the weakness of government’s administrative capacity and the dif- ficulty of enforcing payment for services. However, some private organizations may come forward to fill important gaps for which the entry cost is relatively low and returns are rapid. An example is the provision of telecommunications immediately after conflict. The use of donor-funded guarantees and co-financing can facilitate private/public partnerships. Phased arrangements may be considered, including a planned pro- gression from modest forms of private participation in infrastructure, such as service or management contracts, to leases or long-term conces- sions. In Iraq, for the foreseeable future, pilot management contracts will be the most appropriate, with the government owning major assets and assuming a large proportion of the commercial risks. Appropriate Implementation and Procurement Procedures Post-conflict situations usually result in immediate and large financing needs on emergency projects. Procurement in a post-conflict situa- tion raises the risk of corruption and conflict over access to contracts, 190 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS employment, and services. It is critical to have a strategy in place for managing this risk. Sufficient training in procurement for all levels of government is very important and should be provided as soon as pos- sible. Through their requirements for procuring goods and equipment, the government benefits from advice from the donor agencies in the timely and transparent delivery of services. 2 References Government of Iraq. 2005. National Development Strategy (NDS) of the Transitional Government. Baghdad. United Nations/World Bank. 2003. United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment. Washington, DC. October. 2 See Calkins and Abu-Taleb in this volume for a discussion on governance and anticorruption problems and how to address them. # 191 Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector: Lessons from the Design of an Anticorruption Action Plan Maher Abu-Taleb and Richard Calkins T his chapter summarizes the key lessons learned while dealing with governance and corruption (GAC) issues in Yemen, and is based on the recent design of a water sector operation. Specifi- cally, the chapter presents a diagnostic of governance and corruption issues in Yemen’s water sector, the application of “smart project design” to improve governance at the sector level, and the development of an Anticorruption Action Plan (ACAP) to help ensure that the water sector project funds are used for the intended purposes. While the World Bank has been working on the broader issues of good governance at the country level for many years, with a few exceptions, the focus on sector- and project-related governance and corruption issues is relatively recent. In 2007–08, a team of World Bank and Yemeni government sector specialists were presented with the opportunity to design a water sector investment operation as part of a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). At that time, a strategic decision was made to make resources available to diagnose the governance is- sues in the sector, identify the vulnerabilities and potentials of ongoing reforms, and build consensus around a sector governance program. The project under discussion supports the Yemeni government’s US$1.5 billion 5-year National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (NWSSIP). More specifically, this project will support the Yemeni Government’s US$381 million Water Sector Support Program. It comprises US$141 million in counterpart financing from the govern- ment budget and the remainder from other development partners. 1 The 1 Details available in World Bank, Yemen Water Sector Support Project Appraisal Document, 2009. 11 192 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS SWAp framework builds on country-level governance and anticorrup- tion initiatives. The framework has piloted the design of the first specific Anticorruption Action Plan in the Middle East North Africa Region (MNA), to be implemented for the entire water sector as part of the Water Sector Support Programme (WSSP). The chapter is organized as follows. First, the brief overview gives the context for this work along with definitions to acquaint the reader with the relevant concepts. The overview is followed by a summary of the governance agenda at the country level. Next, an assessment of governance and corruption risks is presented along with the planned mitigation measures and the details of the Anticorruption Action Plan. Finally, a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework is outlined. As with any new initiative, the plan needs to be implementable to work as intended and ensure that benefits of enhanced development effective- ness actually exceed the costs. Context By world standards, Yemen is a country poorly endowed with water resources. Groundwater is being over-exploited. Consequently, the large part of the rural economy dependent on groundwater is under threat. In addition, both urban and rural settlements are poorly provided with safe water and sanitation services. Government has been aware of these reform challenges for decades and, over the last 15 years, has taken significant institutional steps. The government’s decision to prepare an update of its national water strategy that would run from 2009–15 provided an opportunity to incorporate institutional design elements that would improve gover- nance. The strategy update’s objective was to incorporate changes in light of the experiences of the past five years and to provide a basis for a sector-wide approach (SWaP) to financing. Under the supervision of an Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee of five ministers, a highly participatory process was adopted to evaluate experience to date and to prepare the updated national water strategy. The water sector project supports implementation of Yemen’s National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (NWSSIP). The strategy is intended to (1) strengthen institutions for sustainable water resource management, (2) improve community-based water resource management, (3) increase access to water supply and sanitation services, (4) increase returns to agricultural water use, and Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector N 193 (5) stabilize and reduce groundwater abstraction for agricultural use from critical water basins. The project is being prepared based on fundamental reforms re- lated to implementation efficiency, coordinated donor harmonization, and improved water sector governance. All three of these bases are prerequisites for poverty alleviation and agricultural income growth. Some major water sector donors in Yemen (the World Bank and aid agencies of the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom) have provided technical assistance to the government to harmonize and align efforts to support its national water strategy. Meanwhile, they are building local institutional capacity by progressively entrusting implementation to mandated national agencies. The project design includes a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that defines the obligations of the partners under a SWAp with common rules for coordinated support. In addition to the governance improve- ment built into the project design, specific anticorruption measures have been incorporated in the Anticorruption Action Plan, which will be implemented as part of the project. Before continuing, some definitions are presented below: Good governance is the exercise of power in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development. Good gov- ernance is associated with faster, private sector-led growth and with pro-poor development outcomes. Poor governance has the opposite effects and provides greater latitude for corruption. The World Bank’s new strategy to address governance and corruption issues emphasizes three key principles—referred to as the TAP Framework: Transparency 1. Accountability, 2. Participation (TAP) (box 11.1). 3. Corruption involves the use of public office for private gain. It occurs at all levels, from petty corruption to administrative corruption to grand corruption (including “state capture”). It is a symptom of poor governance and reduces development effectiveness. Smart Project Design is intended to help ensure that development objectives are achieved and that Bank/IDA funds are protected. It is country specific and reflects what has been learned about risks and risk mitigation in a particular country. While the definition of Smart 194 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Project Design is evolving, experience suggests six relatively standard elements: Pursuit of sector-level governance issues through a combination 1. of project-specific and “parallel track” initiatives Focus project design on reducing the negative impact of governance 2. and corruption on successful development outcomes Strengthen internal accountability and the project’s “control 3. environment” (procurement, financial management, auditing, information availability) Strengthen external accountability—responsiveness to the “demand 4. side” (consultations with affected communities, participation of beneficiaries in project design and implementation, and strength- ened community voice) Box 11.1 Three Key Principles of Good Governance A review of the literature on good governance suggests that practitioners should pay particular attention to three highly complementary and mutually reinforcing principles: transparency, accountability, and participation (TAP). 1. Transparency implies openness and visibility, which should apply to almost all aspects of the conduct of governmental affairs. It is the foundation on which both accountability and participation are built. Information in the public domain is the “currency” of transparency and, together with open and visible decisionmaking processes, signals that there is really nothing to hide. Transparency facilitates good governance. Its absence provides cover for conflicts of interest, self-serving deals, bribery, and other forms of corruption. 2. Accountability has many dimensions, both internal and external. Internal account- ability implies proper management of resources. External accountability refers to the responsiveness of political leaders to the needs and aspirations of the citizens. Ac- countability, of course, implies that the institutions—including the civil service—have the capacity to be responsive to the demands of the citizens and that salary levels and other incentives are consistent with those expectations. 3. Participation—or, as some have referred to it, inclusion—is important not just on principle but in practical terms. It represents the “demand side” of good governance. The benefits of participation are well documented on a global scale in most aspects of public governance. Participation of civil society organizations (CSOs), consumer groups, project beneficiaries, and affected communities in all stages of Bank-financed projects simultaneously can improve development outcomes and reduce opportunities for fraud and corruption. Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector N 195 Ensure that project design builds in effective oversight by imple- 5. menting agencies (possibly involving third-party oversight) and allows for effective supervision by the Bank/IDA Develop and implement a well-thought-out communications 6. plan designed to consistently send the right signals to all parties concerned. Anticorruption Action Plans (ACAPs) may be used to formalize some or all of the elements of Smart Project Design. ACAPs generally are not required for Bank/IDA projects. However, they have been mandated in some situations, such as when lessons from findings of the World Bank’s Department of Institutional Integrity (INT) investigations and Detailed Implementation Reviews (DIRs) appear applicable. 2 In other cases, ACAPs have been at the initiative of the relevant ministry as a way to increase the visibility and impact of its governance and anti- corruption efforts. The latter is the case for the Yemen Water Sector Support Project. Governance Agenda at the Country Level Over the past two years, Yemen has made significant progress in several areas of governance. While it continues to lag the MNA Region and other low-income economies, the country appears to have strength- ened its rankings in areas such as control of corruption, regulatory quality, and rule of law (figure 11.1). The main challenges remain low government effectiveness and ac- countability as well as very low political stability. Despite improve- ments in its control institutions, per- ceptions about corruption in Yemen remain unfavorable. Regarding voice and accountability, however, Yemen 2 DIRs, or Detailed Implementation Reviews, are carried out by INT (the Bank’s Department of Institutional Integrity) in response to multiple allegations of fraud and corruption in Bank/IDA projects in a given country, or at the request of the country team concerned—generally in connection with a review of corruption concerns within a given sector or country. Voice and accountability Political stability Government effectiveness Regulatory quality Rule of law Control of corruption o 25 50 75 100 Sources: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2008: Governance Matters VII: Governance Indicators for 1996–2007. Yemen Country’s percentile rank (0–100) Figure 11.1 Comparison with Regional Average (Middle East & North Africa) (lower bar) 196 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS scores better than other more developed nations of the region: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Tunisia. Recent Governance Accomplishments With strong support from the donor community, Yemen has made prog- ress on its governance agenda in a number of critical areas. Examples are the new procurement law, development of the High Tender Board policies and capacity, completion of the procurement laws implement- ing regulations, development of the proposed procurement database in key agencies, and staff training and development. In addition, progress has been achieved in the Cabinet-approved comprehensive financial management reform strategy. Areas of im- provement include budget execution; cash management and internal controls; internal and external auditing; financial reporting; and the role of oversight bodies such as the supreme audit agency, the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA). In 2007 the Government of Yemen (GOY) also finalized the Anticorruption Law. It will support enhanced information disclosure as a part of greater transparency and accountability, and as a pre- requisite for the wider participation of civil society, especially project beneficiaries. On a parallel track, the Bank and other donors have supported civil service reform and capacity building intended to help GOY achieve a more professional, competent, and merit-based government service. Others in the donor community have supported legal and judicial reforms—critical to strengthen the rule of law. As part of the 2007 Anticorruption Law, the Supreme National Agency for the Control of Corruption (SNACC) was created. The Bank is supporting the development of this new anticorruption agency through a program of technical assistance (TA). Governance and Corruption Issues in the Water Sector and Mitigation Measures in WSSP Water Challenges in Yemen Yemen has one of the lowest rates of per capita freshwater availability in the world (135 m 3 /cap/year), compared to the almost 10 times higher regional average, 1,250 m 3 /cap/year. The country has no perennial Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector N 197 rivers. Its water comes from rainfall, springs, seasonal spate flows, runoff, and groundwater. In the last decades, a massive and persistent problem of unsustainable groundwater extraction in both highland and coastal areas has arisen, threatening the agricultural economy, urban growth, and industrial development. In urban areas, approximately only 56 percent of the population has access to network water supply and only 31 percent to sewerage. In rural areas, approximately 45 percent of the population has access to safe water and only 21 percent to adequate sanitation. Water scarcity has created competing demands for its services, and these have greatly complicated the challenges of governance. GOY created the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) to implement an integrated approach to water management. In 2002 a water law was enacted, and in 2003 the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) was established. Thereafter, MWE prepared a consolidated strategy, action plan, and investment program for the water sector as a whole. The National Water Sector Strategy and In- vestment Program 2005–09 (NWSSIP) was adopted and published by GOY in 2004. NWSSIP aimed at recovering control of the groundwater resource and moving Yemen toward the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets for water supply and sanitation. In late 2007, GOY decided to prepare an update of NWSSIP to run from 2009–15. The objective was to incorporate changes in the light of experiences and to provide a basis for a sector-wide approach (SWAp) to financing. Overall, the NWSSIP process has brought significant advantages to water sector management: (1) a common framework for planning, financing, implementation, and monitoring; (2) a point of reference and a forum for stakeholders to maintain continuous dialogue through the Joint Annual Reviews; (3) a basis for an integrated intersectoral ap- proach to water resource management through pooled/joint financing; and (4) benchmarks to measure performance. Governance and Corruption Risks in the Water Sector Table 11.1 lists the 4 major issues identified in the assessment of gover- nance and corruption risks in the water sector. Corresponding mitigation measures also are presented and are elaborated below, as part of the Anticorruption Action Plan. 198 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Issue 1 Nonoptimality in selection of specific investment projects, including inter- ference by “influential persons” in decisionmaking at the national level, in some instances combined with an absence of feasibility studies and inflated cost estimates, which provide opportunities for excess profits and/or payment of bribes and kickbacks. Mitigation measures. Development of the National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Plan (NWSSIP), which clarifies the poli- cies for achieving sustainable use of water as a natural resource and specifies the corresponding investment priorities. NWISSIP will be supplemented by the elaboration of a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for the water sector—a three-year rolling public sector budget document. 3 In addition, under WSSP, investments to be supported by the pooled donor funding mechanism must meet specific investment criteria. These criteria will vary by subsector. They will include minimum internal rate of return (IRRs), maximum unit costs per capita or per hectare (ha), or financial rates of return (as for local utility companies). Table 11.1 Key GAC Issues and Mitigation Measures Issue Mitigation measures Sector-level Project-level Nonoptimality in selection of investment projects NWSSIP, MTEF Development of NWSSIP with clarified investment policies, elaboration of MTEF for water sector, development of specific investment criteria by subsector Lack of transparency in procurement process Adoption of new procurement law and enforcement of reforms Development of standard bidding documents, MIS system, e-procurement pilot, and Anticorruption Hot Line Short-changing investment projects by contractors, suppliers, and consultants during implementation Enhanced public disclosure Anticorruption Hot Line, expanded use of technical and/or “value for money”audits “Elite capture”of project benefits after completion of project Stakeholder participation in project design and implementation Improved information disclosure and Anticorruption Hot Line program 3 An MTEF is a consolidated financial document that links (1) public expenditures; (2) financing plan for those expenditures; and (3) outputs or “deliverables” that will be produced. The Water MTEF is timely because government and donors have de- cided to bring most financing of the water sector within a “SWAp” framework. The Water MTEF will provide the medium-term expenditure and financing framework within which the WSSP will be integrated Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector N 199 Issue 2 Lack of transparency in the procurement process, lack of good practices in public sector procurement, and shortages of experienced procurement professionals within implementation agencies. These three factors pro- vide opportunities for interference by “influential persons,” conflicts of interest, collusion among bidders, and irregular payments by bidders to influence outcomes. Mitigation measures. Adoption of the new national Procurement Law, which incorporates global “best practice” in processes and procedures; reform of the High Tender Board—including greater independence in decisionmaking and development of standard bidding documents for the procurement of goods, civil works, and consultant services. These reforms will be supplemented by the development of implementing regu- lations, staff training and development, and establishment of a MIS to support the new procurement procedures. In addition, ACAP includes a provision to improve information disclosure, pilot “e-procurement,” and develop an Anticorruption Hot Line Program to increase the probability that inappropriate interference in procurement will be reported. Issue 3 Short-changing investment projects by contractors, suppliers, and consultants during implementation. Means include irregular payments to supervi- sors to “look the other way,” submission and acceptance of fraudulent documentation (certificates of delivery or completion of work that do not accord with contract specifications), and irregular payments for the release of project funds or to secure the payment of invoices. Mitigation measures. Under WSSP, ACAP provides for enhanced disclosure of information about investment plans in the water sector, and participation of project beneficiaries and affected communities in project design and implementation. These initiatives will help com- munities to understand what should be done under WSSP projects, thus enabling them to monitor ongoing implementation activities. The Anticorruption Hot Line will provide a mechanism for community members to report suspicious activities. In addition, under the finan- cial management component of ACAP, WSSP will expand the use of technical and/or “value for money” audits that will help to identify any shortcomings in the performance of contractors and suppliers, and inconsistencies between certificates of delivery and completion and what actually exists “on the ground.” The communications program under ACAP will alert the contractors, suppliers, and consultants to 200 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS these initiatives, putting them on notice that short-changing projects during implementation is more likely to be discovered. Issue 4 “Elite capture” of project benefits after completion of the project. This term refers to diverting the benefits to groups other than the intended ben- eficiaries or for unintended purposes (for example, qat production). 4 Mitigation measures. The emphasis given by WSSP to participation by beneficiaries and affected communities in project design and imple- mentation significantly reduces the opportunities for subsequent “elite capture.” In addition, the ACAP Anticorruption Hot Line will provide a channel for citizens to report any diversion of project benefits. Anticorruption Action Plan The Anticorruption Action Plan (ACAP), developed as part of project design, is an innovative step in MNA operations, building on the progress achieved in the country-level governance and anticorruption agenda. It also complements the reform program of the water sector. The components of ACAP respond to the assessment of GAC risks in development projects in the water sector. Broader applicability to other sectors is being considered by the government. ACAP includes both “supply-side” components, which focus on strengthening country systems and the associated control environment within which investment projects are implemented; and “demand-side” components, which focus on enhancing external accountability through community voice and participation—including project oversight. A sum- mary is presented in box 11.2, and details of each component follow. Detailed Elements of an Anticorruption Action Plan Procurement reform and capacity development This element builds on the work done at the country level in procure- ment reform, described earlier. While the procurement component of the project focuses on the implementation of those reforms, ACAP provides additional funding to pilot special initiatives—such as the 4 Qat is a locally produced plant, the leaves of which are chewed as a stimulant. Consumption in Yemen is widespread and extensive. Excessive qat consumption at the national level accelerates drawing on water resources. Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector N 201 introduction of e-procurement. Progress in implementing the reform program will be critical to achieve the longer-term vision of the WSSP in moving toward reliance on country systems. Financial management reform and capacity development As in the case of procurement reforms, this element builds on the work done at the country level in the area of financial management and audit reform. Here also, the financial management component of the project will support the implementation of these reforms, including the introduction of an internal audit function. As part of the ACAP, particular attention will be given to the use of technical and/or per- formance audits to ensure that contractors, suppliers, and consultants are delivering on their contractual obligations. These special audits will be carried out in collaboration with the new internal audit function. Progress in these areas also is critical in moving toward reliance on country systems. Box 11.2 Overview of Anticorruption Action Plan Supply-side components include: Procurement reform and capacity development, supporting the implementation of N the new (international best practice) procurement law through training programs and innovative pilot initiatives at the sector and project levels Financial management reform and capacity development, supporting the implementa- N tion of the Cabinet-approved comprehensive public financial reform strategy covering budget preparation and execution, internal controls and audits, financial reporting, and improved oversight by the supreme audit agency Enhanced information disclosure, building on the 2007 Anticorruption Law, and tak- N ing full advantage of new technology to put information into the public domain and to support the scaling up of “best practice” cases of information disclosure within the water sector. Demand-side components include: Community participation and consultation, building on “best practice” models already N being implemented in some water sector projects Education and awareness program, to be carried out in cooperation with Supreme N National Agency for Combating Corruption (SNACC), as part of the water sector SWAp Program’s communications program Anticorruption Hot Line Program, to be implemented within the water sector, as N part of the “detection” program. 202 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Enhanced information disclosure This element builds on the information disclosure provisions of the 2007 Anticorruption Law. The intention is to take full advantage of new technology (web pages, public terminal displays) to put information into the public domain and to support the expansion of “best practice” disclosure. 5 In addition to annual investment and procurement plans, tender opportunities and outcomes, status of project implementation, and results, Yemen is looking at capturing and publishing relevant unit cost factors, results of various audits, and outcomes of “consumer surveys”/citizen report cards. Community participation and consultation To enhance the demand for greater transparency, accountability, and fairness, ACAP will pay particular attention to the use of consumer surveys. Examples are those completed recently in the rural water supply subsector and Poverty and Social Impact Assessments (PSIAs), such as in the urban subsector. Support also will be given to follow up consultations in selected localities; and, for urban centers, with the local corporations. Education and awareness This element, in cooperation with SNACC, is an education and aware- ness program. The intention is to pilot communications initiatives in the water sector toward applying them to other sectors in future. The target audiences are government staff in implementing agencies; private sector firms and individuals (contractors, suppliers, and con- sultants); and civil society, especially project beneficiaries in affected communities. The key messages are that GOY is giving new priority to reducing corruption and that all will have a role to play in this effort. Those involved will be reminded of their obligation to perform with professional integrity and the consequences of failing to do so. They also will be informed of the ACAP initiatives being introduced to prevent, detect, and deter fraud and corruption in water sector projects. Anticorruption hot line program This element supports the design and development of a Hot Line Program to increase the probability that fraud and corruption will be 5 Such as those developed by the General Authority for Rural Water Supply Proj- ects (GARWSP). Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector N 203 detected. To be operated by an independent third party, this program will include a hot line phone staffed every day of the year, fax line, web page, email address, and post office box—all for the receipt of complaints and allegations of fraud and corruption. After a prelimi- nary screening to sort out irrelevant complaints, the valid cases will be forwarded to the ACAP Advisor for referral to the appropriate authorities (SNACC, COCA, the implementing agency if more in- formation is needed). Monitoring and Evaluation Given ACAP’s innovative nature, monitoring how it is doing is essential, so as to learn from experience and adjust its approach accordingly. Features of the monitoring system include: Adopting a “learning by doing” approach that recognizes the ex- N perimental nature of many of the activities that will be attempted in this new area. For whatever initiatives are undertaken, defining clear objectives N for desired improvements in development outcomes or reductions in fraud and corruption. Selecting a limited number of monitorable indicators that will enable N tracking progress toward these objectives over time. Establishing baseline numbers for these indicators, wherever fea- N sible, and setting up monitoring systems that will report regularly on the direction of progress. Monitoring and evaluating the results and assessing the factors N that aided or hindered the effectiveness of the activities that were undertaken. Where the evaluation indicates that the activities were successful, N consider scaling up, as appropriate—in that sector at a minimum, and possibly in other sectors in the country. Where the evaluation indicates that the activities have not been N successful, suspending them until the conditions needed for suc- cess are attained. If total suspension is not practical, discontinue the activities and try a new approach. Using the mid-term review and end-of-project impact assessment N to evaluate all of the activities, and extract the lessons learned for future reference. 204 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS While all of the above sound simple, the unfortunate reality is that they are far more complicated than they sound. Some indicators of development outcomes are relatively straightforward; others are not. The results chain—from objectives to inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes—may not lend itself to precise measurement, especially when the objective involves reducing fraud and corruption. For example, there is not likely to be a meaningful “baseline” number for fraud and corruption. Moreover, the number of cases of fraud or corruption ac- tually should increase with improvements in detection measures such as expanded audits and the availability of complaints lines. For these reasons, a special effort will be required to define mean- ingful progress indicators—even if these are surrogates for what can- not be measured directly. It also will be necessary to develop M&E systems that will enable GOY and the Bank to track progress of key indicators at the country, sector, and project levels. For the reasons cited above, these indicators are foreseen to be reviewed in the initial phases of the project. Summary and Lessons Learned ACAP as a Learning Exercise The process of designing and implementing ACAP should be seen as a learning process for everyone involved, especially since this is the first such initiative in Yemen at the sector and project levels. Many of the components involve pilot projects to test the effectiveness of a particular approach. Every component will need to be monitored and evaluated carefully during implementation. If a particular element is not working as intended, it should be fixed or dropped and alternative approaches tried. If a particular element is working especially well, consideration should be given to adopting it on a wider scale, as appropriate. Supervising the Anticorruption Action Plan Overall, for projects that include an ACAP, it is vital to pay close atten- tion to how well this plan is being implemented and the extent to which it is meeting its objectives. Some of the key components of the plan are likely to involve new or pilot activities. These pilots should be approached with high hopes but modest expectations. The plan itself should be seen as a “work in progress” that is subject to review and modification as Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector N 205 needed, and as a learning experience for everyone involved. The plan should be treated as an important component of the overall project. It will be important to ensure adequate funding for supervision, avail- ability of the right skills and experience to guide the effort, and careful planning to optimize the use of supervision resources overall. The four key steps in the supervision process of ACAP are to: Establish a regular review of progress for each component, includ- 1. ing an assessment of what is going well, what is not going well, and why. Discuss and agree with government on adjustments needed to 2. enhance effectiveness. Record findings and required follow-up in supervision documents, 3. both to keep management informed of progress and as an aid to subsequent “lessons learned.” Include an impact assessment as part of the mid-term review of the 4. project and as part of the final evaluation of project outcomes. 206 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Appendix A1. Improving Governance and Reducing Corruption through Public Disclosure of Information The World Bank desired to support the development of an Anticorrup- tion Action Plan (ACAP) for the Yemen Water Sector Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) Program. To do so, the Bank examined the role of public disclosure of information and the prospects for improving gov- ernance and reducing corruption by enhancing the amount and type of information available to the public. One of the conclusions reached is that measures can and should be taken to collect and disseminate a variety of information about activities in the water sector and that these measures should feature prominently in the Anticorruption Ac- tion Plan. This conclusion is consistent with the three basic and inter- related principles of good governance: transparency, accountability, and participation (TAP). Transparency has to do with both more open decisionmaking processes and greater availability of information in the public domain; and is the foundation for both accountability and partici- pation. Fortunately, a number of initiatives to improve transparency by improving the availability of information already are underway in Yemen’s water sector. The Bank’s intention is to build on these initia- tives by supporting the spread of “best practice” disclosure methods in a number of critical areas. This appendix provides an overview of the kinds of information that should be disclosed, target audiences for different types of information, various methods to disclose information, and benefits expected from these initiatives. Information to Be Disclosed The current water sector strategy and investment plan have been updated. The next step will be the development of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). The details of the updated invest- ment program, MTEF (when it is available), and annual budget alloca- tions then should be published to make them available to the public. These disclosures should occur for each of the four key subsectors: urban water and sanitation, rural water and sanitation, irrigation, and integrated water resource management at the basin level. Similarly, at the project level, annual procurement plans should be published, followed by advertisement of specific tender opportunities. Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector N 207 Within the procurement process, information should be disclosed con- sistent with international best practice, including the announcement of winning bidders and prices. The ACAP for the SWAp Program also proposes piloting e-procurement for some of the largest contracts. In addition, ACAP will support the collection and publishing of pricing data from each of the four subsectors on selected, comparable unit costs. Unit costs will include pumps of various standard sizes, pipes of various composition and sizes, concrete storage tanks of various sizes, and trenching for various types of soil and terrain conditions. The data will be collected and published quarterly. Under the financial management component of ACAP, the propos- als include strengthening the capacity of internal and external audits and the extension of audit terms of reference (TOR) to include, on a selective basis, performance and/or technical audits. The Bank also will encourage implementing authorities to publish the audit reports. Engaging the community in project identification and design and establishing WUGs (water user groups)/WUAs obviously require an information campaign by project management to inform potential beneficiaries of the existence of the project, eligibility rules, procedures for application submission and approval, and the requirements for establishing WUGs and WUAs. A related “demand-side” initiative under the ACAP is the proposal for consumer satisfaction surveys and citizen report cards. The inten- tion is to disclose how well service providers are actually delivering their services. Given all of these areas in which information disclosure is critical for improved governance, ACAP includes a separate component focused specifically on enhancing information disclosure. Funding will be pro- vided for the launch of new pilot initiatives (such as e-procurement), identification of existing “best practice” disclosure activities, and scaling up “best practice” wherever feasible. Relevant Target Audiences Obviously, the target audience for information disclosure depends on the nature and purpose of the information. Given the critical nature of the water sector and the unsustainable water use practices in the country, the sector strategy and investment plans should be of interest to a fairly wide audience. The MTEF will be of interest to oversight agencies (including Parliament), those working in the sector agencies, 208 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS local governments, and civil society. Annual budgets, annual procure- ment plans, and specific tendering opportunities will be of primary interest to those engaged in program and project implementation, including private sector contractors, suppliers, and consultants. Unit cost data should be of interest to both implementing and oversight agencies, as well as to the business community. The results of internal and external audits— especially the results of performance and technical audits—will be particularly interesting to oversight agen- cies, but also to civil society, including the increasing number of CSOs that are focusing on governance and anticorruption. Information about project opportunities and eligibility criteria will be of obvious interest to potential project beneficiaries. Reports of consumer satisfaction and citizen report cards will be of interest to consumers, service providers, and relevant levels of government—particularly the oversight and regulatory agencies. Methods of Information Disclosure The most appropriate methods of disclosure depend on both the nature of the information or data to be disclosed and the characteris- tics of the target audience. At one end of the spectrum, “high-tech” disclosure methods may be appropriate, including through web pages and internet links (as for e-procurement). Of particular interest is the procurement MIS system that has been developed in the rural water supply and sanitation (WSS) sector under GARWSP with financial support from the Netherlands. This system is computer based, with terminals available in the lobby of GARWSP headquarters and branch offices, and makes available information on all stages of the project cycle. These ongoing updates enable project beneficiaries, contractors, suppliers and consultants, and GARWSP management and staff to see at a glance the status of project approval, procurement processes, and status of implementation (including the tracking of invoice submission, review, approval, and payment). These running updates are one of the “best practice” disclosure models that will be considered for “scaling up” under ACAP. In the mid-range of the spectrum, newspaper advertisements may be appropriate for notifying potential bidders of a tender opportunity. However, at the community level, printed word literacy cannot be as- sumed, let alone technical literacy. Consequently, radio and television may be the more appropriate channels for information dissemination. Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector N 209 These could be supported by community meetings and/or focus groups in which information is presented by project sponsors and discussed in a public forum. At the village level, community meetings may be supplemented by simple written materials posted on bulletin boards. Expected Benefits of Enhanced Information Disclosure Greater transparency and information disclosure in public procurement are important to reduce corruption and control costs. A key element of ACAP will be the analysis of unit costs across projects, subsectors, and areas of the country. In addition to publishing the data quarterly, the availability of these data will (a) enable the analysis of possible anomalies or unexplained differences in prices for comparable items and (b) provide a base-line (which does not now exist) to track move- ments in unit costs over time. Ideally, if other elements of ACAP are successful, there even could be a reduction in unit costs as a result of greater attention being paid to those costs. Regarding development effectiveness and the sustainability of project investments, the evidence is clear and compelling. Projects initi- ated without community participation (1) are less likely to meet the needs of the intended beneficiaries and (2) are unlikely to be maintained. The second is due to both the lack of ownership by the affected community and the absence of a community-based organization (CBO) tasked with managing and maintaining the relevant assets. In fact, many of the projects in the current water sector portfolio involve rehabilitation of earlier projects that failed due to a lack of participation. Finally, carrying out consumer surveys and citizen report card exercises and publicly disclosing the results should go a long way to strengthen the community demand for accountability and responsive- ness by service providers. Taken together, the proposed enhancements to the availability of information in the public domain should have a noticeable and positive impact on development effectiveness in Yemen’s water sector. Bargaining Bargaining 213 12 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco Rachid Abdellaoui T he Bitit irrigation perimeter is a small-scale irrigation system built in Morocco at the start of the twentieth century by farmers and managed by them. † The system lies at the foot of the Atlas Mountains at an average altitude of 600 meters above sea level, midway between the cities of Fes and Meknes. As farmers have put land and water to productive use, there naturally have been conflictual situations. An interesting dimension has been the emergence of markets for water rights as a means to bring transparency to bargaining for water. Water rights have mitigated conflicts over water for two constituencies: Among Bitit irrigation water users N Between these irrigators and the water utility, RADEM, which N supplies water to Meknes. The Irrigation System and Its Evolution State of Water Resources The Bitit irrigation perimeter is fed by three perennial springs (table 12.1). In the early 1980s, Morocco experienced a series of severe drought years. The government created 3 boreholes in the Bitit area to extract approximately 120 liters of water per second (l/s) to serve potable wa- ter needs. As a result, the perennial springs have witnessed lowered discharges. † Adapted by the editors from a background paper prepared for the “MNA Devel- opment Report on Water: Water Conflicts and Their Management Mechanisms in Morocco,” CEDARE Cairo, 2005. 214 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Appropriation of Land and Water At the start of the last century, land and water were exploited col- lectively by the Bitit area’s population, mainly as rangeland. The resources were plentiful, and each household had more land than it could exploit. Excess water discharges from the springs fed into the adjoining marshlands, causing malaria to become a common health problem in the Bitit community. However, by the 1920s, through both natural population growth and the growth of commercialization, pressures on land and water resources began to increase. The French colonial administration had two goals. On the political side, it intended to keep the peasants from joining the nationalists, who had become very active in both Fes and Meknes. On the economic side, the French meant to encourage market linkages for these rural communities. In the mid-1910s, the French had promulgated laws to place water resources in the public domain unless they had been regulated by spe- cific pre-existing water rights. Regarding Bitit, these laws established equal sharing of water between upstream (politically active Ait Oual- lal) and downstream (less politically active Ait Ayach) communities. Later, group and individual water rights were recognized and recorded. Both land and water then became private property that could be sold to both nationals and French private settlers. However, the nearby city of Meknes had growing demand for water and the local farmers resisted attempts to expropriate their rights. In 1949 a special decree fixed the share of the Public Domain of Bitit waters at 60 percent of availability, leaving only 40 percent of the water to the farmers. There was strong opposition from the latter. As compensation, the French offered to construct the main canal of Bitit, to reduce infiltration rates in the existing earthen canals (thus “justifying” the 60 percent reduction in water rights), and to improve Table 12.1 Three Perennial Springs That Feed Bitit (l/s) Spring name Estimated discharge during summer , 1974–79 (l/s) Estimated discharge during summer, 2005 (l/s) Sidi Tahar 1850 1450 Si L’Mir 120 0 Sbâa 600 400 Total 2570 1850 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 215 public health by reducing malarial mosquitoes. The canal was con- structed by 1954, after which 400 l/s were diverted for the potable water needs of Meknes. By the 1970s, Morocco was an independent country, but govern- ment decisions continued to respond to urban needs. Meknes needed more water, and water available in the public domain was estimated to be 1800 l/s (in peak irrigation season). However, there was still a need to avoid social unrest in the countryside. To justify the diversion of just an additional 400 l/s, the government undertook a rehabilitation project by which many more kilometers of earthen irrigation canals (seguias) were lined to reduce water infiltration losses, and thus com- pensate beneficiaries for the additional water diversion. By August 2005, although the municipal water demand had drastically increased, the overall water sharing had not changed. Meknes continues to divert 800 l/s, leaving the rest of the water resources with the farmers for three reasons, one political and two technical: On the political side, farmers’ opposition to further diversion of 1. water to which they considered they had water rights On the technical side, (a) the Office National de l’Eau Potable’s 2. (ONEP) using better drilling technology to enhance Meknes’ water supply with approximately 1200 l/s, and (b) higher treatment costs for the spring waters during the rainy season when they had high quantities of suspended matter. Table 12.2 summarizes this evolution of water allocations. Irrigation Canal Network and Water Shares The main canal, constructed in 1953, starts at the spring of Sidi Tahar. The canal feeds five large main seguias and several smaller ones before discharging downstream in Ait Ayach lands. All main seguias were lined in the 1980s. The subsequent rehabilitation of the irrigation network necessitated two developments: Construction of proper diversion and discharge partitioning struc- 1. tures Fixation of the seguia on which individual water rights could be 2. exercised led to the computation of the design discharge of the seguias. 216 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Table 12.2 Evolution of Water Allocations in Morocco, 1920s–2005 Period Groups of shareholders No. of shares Total discharge (%) Water right discharge (l/s) Discharge actually diverted (l/s) Important event/comments Early 1920’s Béni M’tir (Ait Ouallal) 48 2,420 2,420 Start of appropriation (by peasants) of waters and land previously collective Chorfa et Regraga 8 403 403 Intensive pressure on land and water by French settlers Caid 3.5 176 176 Total 59.5 100 3,000 3,000 Around 1925 Ait Ouallal 24 1,210 1,210 Laws of 1919 and 1924 related to water and definition of water domain Ait Ayache 24 1,210 1,210 Ait Aiyache—downstream users of Béni M’tir Chorfa et Regraga 8 403 403 Individual appropriation of land and water Caid 3.5 176 176 Total 59.5 100 3,000 3,000 1949 Ait Ouallal 24 484 1,210 Ait Ayache 24 484 1,210 Ait Ayache being downstream, they are probably not diverting all their right Chorfa et Regraga 8 161 403 Caid 3.5 71 176 Total 59.5 40 1,200 3,000 Public domain 60 1,800 0 Vizirial decree of November 23, 1994 (Official Bulletin of 30 December 1949) 1953–54 Ait Ouallal 24 484 1,049 Construction of main canal to compensate for the water appropriated by the public domain Ait Ayache 24 484 1,049 Chorfa et Regraga 8 161 350 Caid 3.5 71 153 Total 59.5 40 1,200 2,600 Public domain 60 1,800 400 Water is effectively diverted to Meknes 1983–88 Ait Ouallal 24 415 714 Rehabilitation of irrigation system consisting essentially of lining main seguias to compensate for additional 400 l/s diversion Ait Ayache 24 415 714 With creation of modern discharge partitioning structures Chorfa et Regraga 8 138 238 Small reduction of spring discharge Caid 3.5 60 104 Total 59.5 40 1,028 1,770 Public domain 60 1,542 800 Diversion to Meknes of an additional discharge of 400 l/s 2005 Ait Ouallal 24 298 424 Large reduction of discharge of various springs Ait Ayache 24 298 424 Chorfa et Regraga 8 99 141 3 tube wells with total discharge of 120 l/s are created. Caid 3.5 44 62 Total 59.5 40 740 1,050 Public domain 60 1,110 800 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 217 Actual measurements con- ducted after the rehabilitation project showed that water losses in irrigation canals effectively dropped from approximately 1.21 l/s/100 meters to 0.9 l/s/100 meters of the seguia. The farm- ers immediately recognized the benefits of lining the seguias, particularly as the overall net- work was very long. They also recognized the importance of concrete diversion structures that prevent water theft. Figure 12.1 is an approximate drawing of the irrigation network with seguia names. Table 12.3 gives the break- down of shareholders’ water rights by group of shareholders and by main seguia. The shares indicated in table 12.3 assume continuous water discharge of a water modulus. 1 The modulus varies depending on the spring discharge and thus the season. Field measurements conducted in 1987 indicated a variation of the water modulus ranging from 25 l/s to 35 l/s with an average of 30 l/s depending on the seguia and the precision of the flow-partitioning device on the main canal. Presently, farmers estimate that the water modulus is only approximately 20 l/s, which correlates perfectly with the reduction in spring discharge since then. In 1987 the total available discharge to peasants was approximately 1770 l/s, which, divided by 59.5 shares, equaled a water modulus of 29.75 l/s. In 2005 the figures were 1050 l/s and 17.65 l/s, respectively (table 12.2). For example, Seguia Boufadma carries 9 water modulus (which summed to ap- proximately 270 l/s in 1987, but now sums to only 160 l/s in peak-use periods) (table 12.3). S. ghellafa S. Tahar S. Kherichfa Si L’Mir S. bâa N main canal S. ichniouine S. Mouloua S. boufadma Figure 12.1 Bitit Irrigation Network with Seguia Names Source: Author. Note: Scale = 1: 70,000. 1 The bulk elastic properties of a material determine how much it will compress under a given amount of external pressure. The ratio of the change in pressure to the fractional volume compression is called the bulk modulus of the material. http:// hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/permot3.html 218 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Table 12.3 Water Shareholder Groups and Shares of Ait Ouallal by Main Seguia Group of shareholders No. of shares Guellafa Boufadma Kherichfa Moulouya Tichniouine Roz Batbatia Taoujdate Tighza Total Ait Moussa Hammi + Ait Akka 8 4 3 1 8 Ait Rbaa 4 2 2 4 Ait Ali Boubker 4 4 4 Ait Brahim 4 1 2 1 4 Ait Ammar 4 2 2 4 Chorfa et Regraga 8 4 1 2 1 8 Caid 3.5 1.5 2 3.5 Total shares (water modulus) 35.5 9.5 9 3 4 5 1 2 1 1 35.5 The irrigation turn duration originally was computed for each shareholder to receive the total water discharge of the seguia during a full day. For example, the households of Ait Moussa Hammi and Ait Akka villages originally numbered 52. Thus, their irrigation rotation on Boufadma followed a 52-day cycle, and each household received a 4 water modulus, totaling a discharge of 120 l/s every 52 days. As the water rights process fragmented due to population growth and demand grew because of crop intensification (as with the introduc- tion of summer vegetable crops), the irrigation frequency had to be increased. Consequently, over time, the water turn duration was reduced (table 12.4). To avoid having 6.5 days of irrigation turn and facilitate water distribution by making the rotation weekly, in 1990 rights were recom- puted proportionally. Presently, farmers’ water rights are expressed in Table 12.4 Evolution of Irrigation Turn Duration over Time (Ait Moussa Hammi and Ait Hakka), 1940s–1990s Period Length of irrigation turn (days) Until late 1940s 52 Until late 1960s 26 Until late 1980s 13 Since early 1990s 7 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 219 hours: In 2005 a farmer who owned 1 hour of water actually possessed 3600 seconds * 20 liters/second, that is, 72 m 3 every irrigation turn (= rotation) of 7 days. Cropping Pattern In the early 1980s, the total useful area of the Bitit irrigation system was estimated at 5000 hectares (ha). Of these, approximately 2000 ha were irrigable (900 ha during the summer + 1100 ha during winter). Since then, following many stone-clearing operations, the arable land has greatly increased. The preferred winter crops are cereals (primarily wheat planted in November and harvested in June), which receive supplemental ir- rigation if necessary. Ninety percent of summer crops are vegetables and tobacco. Orchards (mainly apples) have been abandoned due to low water availability. Tobacco acreage has decreased, and tobacco is kept only as an alternative crop to reduce farmers’ risk. Potato acreage also has de- creased. Some farmers switched from summer production of potatoes (planting in March, harvesting in August) to seed production of F1 and F2 generations (planting by mid-August, harvesting in January at the latest). 2 Onions are a popular crop. They are planted in March and harvested by mid-August, followed by seed potatoes. These crops appear to be the best combination that matches seasonal demand for water with existing market conditions. Irrigation System Management Traditional organization to manage conflicting interests Bitit’s irrigation system is managed by traditional organizations at the main seguia level. Before the start of each cropping season, after Friday prayers (which time was chosen to ensure maximum attendance), the shareholders of the seguia gather in a general assembly to take deci- sions to reduce potential conflicts among members: Shareholders elect a certain number of a. waqqaf (type of ditch rider) members. This task has the highest priority. 2 F1 and F2 refer to foundation seeds for potatoes of good quality. 220 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS After this vote, and with the expert assistance of the waqqaf, b. shareholders establish the Jrida of the seguia. This is a full list of the individual shareholders and their irrigation time durations, together with the exact location of the fields that each shareholder would like to irrigate in the forthcoming season. Last, the shareholders agree on the water distribution sequence c. during each irrigation turn. The number of waqqafs will depend on the number of sharehold- ers, the length of the seguia, and the degree to which irrigation land is dispersed along the seguia. In 1987, 5 waqqafs were elected to manage Seguia Boufadma (270 l/s at that time). The waqqaf members are required to live in the village, have an extensive knowledge of field locations and water rights, and fully un- derstand the spatial and temporal water distribution logic of the seguia. These persons therefore allocate their time to irrigation management and also are available at any time day or night. An implication is that waqqaf members tend to own little land and usually have either none or very few water rights. In 1987 each irrigator in the villages paid each waqqaf 300 DH/year for 24 hours of water rights, which corresponds to 12.5 DH/year/hour of water right. The first task of the waqqaf is to help to establish the Jrida during the general assembly and to work on it later until it is complete and exact. This process usually takes time as: The number of shareholders is very large. Therefore, it is not feasible a. to list all of them during one two-hour general assembly. Many of the small shareholding farmers often are not at the assem- b. bly, requiring the waqqaf to contact them later at their homes. Some transactions on water rights are not resolved immediately. Ad- c. ditional time is needed to make sure that no mistakes are made. The Jrida is of paramount importance because it is the basic manage- ment framework through which water allocation and distribution rules are established. Although the process of establishing/operationalizing the Jrida may seem to be and is challenging, the waqqaf usually is able to complete the process before irrigation season begins. The waqqaf uses local knowledge to simplify the Jrida. Irrigation quarters of variable acreage and limits are defined, to which one ir- rigation modulus ( fess, literally “a hand of water”) is allocated. Usually, Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 221 this process requires defining turns among the various field intakes. Topography, water rights, cropping patterns, and conflict reduction are the key criteria in determining the rules. The Jrida system is very flexible. It fully incorporates irrigators’ concerns by ensuring that allocation rules for each quarter are trans- parent for that irrigation season, including after crops are progressively harvested. Once the Jrida is established and the first irrigation turn is executed, the waqqaf’s responsibilities are reduced. The waqqaf has made every farmer aware of who his predecessors and successors are in the rotation process. Because the irrigation turn is exactly one week in length, the rotation is perfectly fixed. Each field receives the water on a given day at a given time for a given duration. However, problems do arise during the irrigation process that require waqqaf intervention. For example, while transplanting onions, farmers need low discharges (half of the water modulus) and can irrigate only during daylight hours. They often seek the waqqaf’s help with these specifics. Besides the irrigation management responsibilities, the waqqaf must manage conflicts among irrigators, particularly accusations of water stealing by irrigators. Modern WUAs continue to work according to traditional norms In December 1990, Law 2/84 (published in May 1992) established the rules by which water user associations (WUAs) (Associations des Usagers des Eaux Agricoles, or AUEA) are to be created and man- aged. The law also listed the benefits that WUAs could be expected to receive from government policies aimed at irrigation system reha- bilitation/improvement. In 2005, there were 5 WUAs in Bitit (1 for each of the 5 main seguias). All of them were created under the framework of Law 2/84. Nevertheless, old practices of the traditional organizations continue to dominate. While previously the waqqaf was earning 13 x 24 x 12.5 DH = 3900 DH/year, it now earns 7 x 24 x 30 DH = 5040 DH/year. When adjusted for inflation, the amount probably is very similar. Moreover, if the rotations are more frequent, they also are shorter. Conflicts over Water Conflicts over water among farmers Water conflicts are very rare because both traditional and legal water allocation and distribution rules are perfectly clear and well established 222 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS in writing. In addition, concrete discharge partitioning structures leave very little space for arguments. According to Ait Ouallal farmers, conflicts arise primarily when irrigators resort to water theft. For example, at the start of an irrigation season, water is relatively abundant, and farmers may overestimate the acreage of summer crops that they may be able to irrigate satis- factorily. Later, climatic conditions change, particularly when very hot and dry easterly winds known as chergui raise temperatures for several consecutive days during the peak growing months of July and August. Under these circumstances, to save their crops, irrigators may resort to water theft. The role of the waqqaf is to watch for such transgres- sions and enforce penalties on these irrigators. Tubewells play an important role in supplementary irrigation. Through tube wells, irrigators can meet any unexpected demand for irrigation water during the peak crop demand period without re- sorting to water theft. The farmers usually buy tubewell water on a volumetric basis. A recent proposal by a mineral water bottling company to pur- chase water rights (see further developments in this text) has caused disagreement among farmers. They all want to sell their water to the bottling company but cannot agree on how much water each one would be allowed to sell. Conflicts over water between farmers and the municipal water agency of Meknes The Régie Autonome de Distribution d’Eau de Meknes (RADEM) is the municipal water management agency of Meknes. Ait Ouallal farmers complain about the way that RADEM handles the diversion of the 800 l/s directly from the Sidi Taher Spring. The spring is protected by a concrete structure with a metallic door that has a single key kept by 2 guards hired by RADEM. Farmers are forbidden from verifying the discharge that is effectively diverted. The diversion takes place literally behind closed doors, and no flow measuring device is installed other than an imprecise concrete weir with a height that can easily be modified. Ait Ouallal farmers allege that RADEM is diverting more than its share, particularly during the peak summer season. Ait Ouallal farmers insist they will not accept further diversion of “their” water, whether or not authorities consider it part of the public domain. The farmers are adamant that RADEM should purchase water from them. Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 223 Effects of Water Markets on Women In Morocco, women can inherit property rights. The fact that water is a marketable good has been a factor in promoting the status of female household heads, because women without access to enough labor for irrigated farming can sell their water. Farmers sell the usage of water for one irrigation season if they need money or if they do not have the resources (labor and/or money) to grow irrigated crops themselves. While property owners are attached to land and sell it only as a last resort, there is much greater willingness to sell water rights, because they are a renewable resource. Water market in Bitit In Bitit, water has been a freely marketable good since the early 1930s. More importantly, water rights can be sold independently of land. Farmers like to say that water is “single,” that is, it is not “married” to the land it irrigates. Water is a free good that can travel to any field provided it does not move to a main seguia other than that on which the water right is registered. In other words, water rights are tied to a given main seguia. This customary law does not pose a constraint because there is much more land than water, and seguias are designed to transport their full discharge over their total length. As discussed below, water prices become a good mechanism to allocate resources efficiently and minimize conflicts. Water prices The price of water can give a good idea of the efficiency of its use. Annual rights In 1987 the price of 24 hours of water right was 5000 dirhams (DH)/ year. In 2005 the price of 1 hour of water right skyrocketed to 1400 DH/year. Water is valuable only from mid-March to mid-October Table 12.5 Price of Water, 1987 and 2005 (DH/m 3 ) Year Price of 1 hr of water (DH) Actual water modulus (l/s) Corresponding vol. every irrigation turn (m 3 ) Turn duration (days) Length of irrigation season (days) Total seasonal volume (m 3 ) Price of water (DH/m 3 ) 1987 208 30 108 13 210 1745 0.12 2005 1400 20 72 7 210 2160 0.65 224 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS (7 months). The prices of a cubic meter (m 3 ) of water in 1987 and 2005 have been computed in table 12.5. The price of water over the past 18 years thus has been multiplied by a factor of 5.4. The computations in table 12.5 assume that water is plentiful during the winter season (mid-October to mid-March). If, however, the rains have become less plentiful—as they have—and the irrigation season longer, then the increase in the price of water is not as great as shown in table 12.5. The official average annual inflation rate in Morocco during the last 18 years has been approximately 3 percent. Accordingly, prices should have increased by a factor of approximately 1.7 during the period 1987–2004/05. In comparison, from 1969–2005, the water tariff in the Tadla large-scale irrigation system varied as shown in table 12.6. While the water prices in Tadla and Bitit were similar in 1987 (0.1 DH/m 3 and 0.12 DH/m 3 , respectively), in 2004–05 they differed substantially (0.22 DH/m 3 and 0.65 DH/m 3 , respectively). The price increase in Tadla from 1987 to 2004 was substantially below the increase observed in Bitit. One could conclude that the free water market of Bitit enabled taking into account the greater scarcity of water over time and consequently its higher value. Tubewell water also can be purchased from AUEA for 40 DH/h of 20 l/s. The corresponding price is thus 0.55 DH/m 3 , slightly less than the surface water price. Who sells/buys water? Annual rights Farmers think that the water right they own is never sufficient because this resource, rather than the land, is the binding constraint on produc- tion. Usually, those who possess 2–4 hours sell their water. Those who possess more than 4 hours either sell their water or buy more water to extend their farming operations. Thus, selling and buying water is very common practice. Table 12.6 Comparison of Water Tariff in Tadla Irrigation System, 1969–2004 (DH/m 3 ) Year 1969 1972 1980 1984 1985 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2004 DH/m 3 0.024 0.024 0.048 0.079 0.090 0.100 0.100 0.120 0.120 0.150 0.160 0.170 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.200 0.220 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 225 Permanent rights Selling permanent water rights is still quite rare. Each year, only 50–60 hours of permanent water rights are sold, and usually by those who own very small time shares—so small (usually 10–30 minutes) that it is not profitable to retain the right. Rarely does anyone owning more than 3 hours sells his/her water right. Few shareholders buy water rights. Their strategy is to look for small shareholders and progressively concentrate water property by hourly purchases. The advantages of concentrating water property are reflected in prices; the smaller the share, the lower the price per hour. Ten minutes can be purchased at less than 7000 DH/h (half the normal price). Thirty minutes costs 10,000 DH/h. In this way, one powerful farmer has accumulated 100 hours of water rights. To ensure a reliable cash flow, he can profitably sell 50 hours for 70,000 DH/season. He himself can use the remaining 50 hours. Net benefits from a cubic meter of irrigation water to grow onions According to Ait Ouallal farmers, 1 ha of onions necessitates a water right of 10 hours for at least 4 months (April–July). This purchase amounts to 10 h * 3600 s/h * 20 l/s / 1000 l/m 3 = 720 m 3 every irrigation turn of 7 days. Over 4 months (17 turns), the crop water requirement is 12,340 m 3 . Apart from irrigated water, it costs on average of 30,000 DH/ha to produce onions. The average yield is 50 metric tons/ha. The onion selling price is highly variable (table 12.7). Farmers remember an exceptionally good year (1992) when onions sold for 5 DH/kg! One bad selling year, the farmers had to feed onions to their cattle because the price was too low. The milk ended up smelling of onions! With the benefit of irrigation, farmers estimate that, on average, the net benefit (receipts minus expenses) from onions is 30,000 DH/ha. This net profit corresponds to a water productivity of 30,000/12,340 = 2.43 DH/m 3 of water, and a profit of 2.34-0.65 = 1.78 DH/m 3 net of the price of water. Farmers remark that 1.78 DH/m 3 is higher than the lowest price that potable water is sold for in Meknes. If risk were not an issue, Bitit farmers should plant as many onions as possible because they look very profitable on average. However, in case of over-production, farmers risk losing profitability. In addition, the quantity of water used to produce Table 12.7 Onion Price, 2000–05 Year DH/kg 2005 2.5 2004 0.2 2003 3.0 2002 3.5 2001 1.5 2000 1.5 226 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS onions is very high. Logically, farmers should switch to a more efficient, on-farm water application type of irrigation, that is, from surface to drip irrigation. Farmers recognize that, under drip irrigation, onion yields double, while water consumption is almost halved. The water saved could be either sold or used to increase the irrigated acreage. These arguments are not convincing to farmers because they are particularly afraid of onion over-production. They prefer to cope with price variability by reducing risks and balancing their cropping pattern. Farmers have developed specific strategies such as, “If March is dry, the onion season will be good.” It would be very interesting to further study this question. Never- theless, the price of water at 0.65 DH/m 3 appears affordable compared to its productivity (2.43 DH/m 3 ). Alternative Markets for Water Municipal water The municipal water market is one alternative. According to farmers, so far the municipal water agency of Meknes (RADEM) does not appear interested in buying water from them as long as its water needs (ap- proximately 120,000 m 3 /day) are covered by the 800 l/s of spring water plus the additional tubewell water it buys from the Office National de l’Eau Potable (ONEP) at approximately 3 DH/m 3 . However, population growth is expanding demand for municipal water. Moreover, supply alternatives are becoming limited. Finally, aquifer levels fall every year while pumping costs increase. Farmers think this ever-growing demand may influence RADEM to enter into negotiations with them. To date, the balance of power is with RADEM. Farmers accuse RADEM of inefficient management, specifically, of having very low water efficiency in its conveyance and distribution to urban consumers. According to the farmers, a large water leak can be observed close to the municipal water intake from Si Tahar spring. Farmers believe that RADEM does not sell municipal water in Meknes at a high enough price to create incentives for efficient use. Farmers’ feelings are a mix, first, of apprehension of RADEM trying to appropriate more water from the springs, and, second, of hope that RADEM will buy water from them at a market price. If the Vizirial decree of November 23, 1924 is invoked, their apprehension of additional water diversion by RADEM is not unwarranted. Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 227 Mineral water Recently, in 2004, a mineral water bottling company proposed to buy water from Bitit farmers at 40 DH/m 3 . In the first stage, the factory would treat 40 l/s, which will be doubled in a later stage. This deal is seen as exceptionally good since a 1-hour water right corresponds to a monthly revenue of approximately 7,000 DH. However, farmers face two challenges. Securing the authorization from the Sebou River Basin Agency to 1. finalize the deal. Securing this authorization is not straightforward. Article 9 of the Law 10-95 of August 16, 1995 indicates that “…irrigation water rights can be sold with, and for the benefit, of the land it irrigates, or independently from the land but only under the express condition that the buyer owns land to which the water rights will be linked.” Bitit farmers believe that their water rights are not linked to any agricultural use of waters and that they are free to sell their water to consumers willing to pay the acceptable price. From their point of view, Law 10-95 is prohibiting maximization of water productivity and should be revised or better interpreted. Securing an agreement among farmers on how to work out a group 2. contract since every shareholder wants to sell his or her water right to the company. At present, farmers have almost stopped selling irrigation wa- ter rights among themselves because they believe that much better prices could be obtained from RADEM, or perhaps a mineral water company Conclusions Three important lessons from the Bitit irrigation system are of relevance to those who manage large-scale irrigation systems and to others who are in charge of water resource management in Morocco and even throughout the MNA Region: A 1. clear water allocation rule, internalized at the farmer level, is the basis for any good water management practice. Transparency in as- 228 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS signing water appropriation rights to farmers is the simplest water allocation rule to reduce conflicts. The 2. free water market of Bitit has contributed to keep water rights updated. Small water shares could be sold or hired, and consequently put to their highest economic use. Similarly, a free water market is the most effective way of keeping a clear water allocation rule updated. This rule is the cement that links the water users and keep- ing their association alive and active. What might have happened over time if water rights were not a marketable good? Free water market is certainly equally contributing to the search 3. for increasing productivity of water. A water price of 0.65 DH/m 3 is a good indicator. It is as much as 3 times the tariff of water in large-scale systems (Tadla, for instance). A net benefit of approxi- mately 2.63 DH/m 3 also is higher than the more modest values encountered in large-scale systems. However, application efficiency of water remains very low in Bitit. Why farmers are not improving their water application efficiency is a question that remains to be tackled. One would expect a rapid development of trickle systems, especially because they are heavily subsidized by government. 229 13 How Did a Small, Poor, and Remote Rural Village in Djibouti Recently Become a Government Priority to Receive Water Supply and Sanitation? Sarah Houssein, in collaboration with Julia Bucknall and Nathalie Abu-Ata T he case of Goubeto village in rural Djibouti illustrates the impor- tant role of local and traditional authorities, in the absence of state intervention, in solving conflicts through negotiations over the allocation of scarce water resources among community members. † Moreover, as a consequence of the severe and worsening water supply and sanitation crisis, progressive loss of traditional values, and rise of the previously marginalized voices of youth and women, an inclusive and participatory new structure was able to emerge and make water for their village a priority for the central government. Goubeto was established in 1910, first as a maintenance facility for the railway under construction between Djibouti and Ethiopia, and later as a train station depot. The village is not connected to the national road network and, except for Djibouti city, is far from any major cities. Goubeto is 71 km from the city of Ali-Sabieh, which is the district capital. Primarily former railway workers and their families, along with settled nomads, inhabit Goubeto. The climate is arid and hot, and the village is poorly endowed with water resources. Goubeto’s water reservoir has a maximum storage capacity of 200m 3 per month. The reservoir’s capacity is dependent on the regular provision of fuel for pumping, which is subject to a quota and is delivered from Ali-Sabieh. Until the early 1980s, villagers received potable water from Djibouti city, and trucks supplied the precious resource twice a week. Accord- † Background Paper for 2007 “MNA Development Report on Water.” 230 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS ing to the villagers, at that time, there were no major conflicts over the allocation of water. Attracted by the reliable water supply and the availability of basic social infrastructure, nomads, who had lost their livestock as a result of severe and frequent droughts, progressively settled in the village. The settlement of nomads was further encour- aged by the construction of a well in 1980, which supplied Goubeto with a certain amount of bulk water once a month. Water thus played a critical role in the growth and expansion of the village. However, beginning in the mid-1980s, water supply in Goubeto became erratic and scarce, in particular during the hot summer sea- sons, due to population growth and the lack of proper maintenance of water infrastructure. As a result, conflicts over water allocation flared on occasion between the settled populations and the nomads as well as among settlers themselves. For example, nomads would tamper with the water reservoirs and canals and collect the water without prior agreement with local villagers. Traditional authorities, such as the village chief or the community of elders (Conseil des Sages), played a critical role in efforts to mediate and solve these conflicts. The Conseil des Sages also oversaw repairs of tampered water infrastructure and made decisions on water al- location. However, because of its physical remoteness, the village of Goubeto was never a priority for the central government. Techni- cians were rarely sent from the central government to Goubeto to perform routine maintenance on water infrastructure. In spite of the involvement of traditional authorities in solving conflicts over the use of water, the community of Goubeto lacked the knowledge, financial capacity, and political connections to find a long-term solution to its intermittent water supply. In the late 1990s, as a result of worsening water quality, poor sani- tation and hygiene, recurrent droughts, and malnutrition, an epidemic of diarrhea broke out, killing 12 people. The deteriorating water quality clearly posed a serious environmental threat to the residents. Some of the villagers decided to take action and lobby the central government to obtain public assistance and funding to improve the water supply and sanitation systems. The fact that the villagers supported the political op- position provided another incentive for the government to react quickly to the rapidly deteriorating environmental health situation in Goubeto. As a result of the above developments, a water association was created in 2004. It serves as the interface between the central gov- ernment and the various communities in the village. The association How Did a Small, Poor, and Remote Rural Village in Djibouti Receive WSS? N 231 includes a broad representation of local stakehold- ers, including elders and delegates from youth and women groups. A project to drill a new well 1 km from Goubeto is underway, and it will be powered by a solar energy system. Goubeto offers a useful case study that illus- trates how traditional authorities can play a criti- cal role in providing water to local communities. However, because of the physical remoteness and political seclusion of the village vis-à-vis the central government, the traditional authorities were unable to significantly influence decisionmakers, nor could they count on the availability of decentralized local water institutions. This dynamic changed with the lobbying pressure imposed by the villagers and with the consequent establishment of a new village water associa- tion. Empowered by an externally funded project on environmental health, the villagers were successful in initiating the necessary links between the communities and the State. 233 14 Water Conflict in Yemen: The Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms Christopher Ward Y emen has one of the world’s lowest rates of per capita fresh- water availability (135 m 3 /cap/year) in the world. †1 The climate is largely semi-arid or arid. Rainfall is abundant only in the southern uplands. Rainfed agriculture is also possible in the central highlands and escarpments, usually with supplementary water manage- ment techniques. Annual rainfall is as low as 100 mm–300 mm in most of the north and east and in the coastal plains. There are no perennial rivers. Water comes from springs, seasonal spate flows, runoff, and groundwater. Historically, Yemenis have been adept at managing their water. They have used elaborate systems of terracing and runoff manage- ment, spate diversion, and shallow groundwater management, ac- cording to the nature of the resource and the local social organization. Elaborately negotiated systems of rules and organization accompanied the development and management of each water resource. Even so, frequent disputes arose. These were resolved by force of arms, local reconciliation procedures, or traditional judgment. † Background paper prepared for the “MNA Development Report on Water,” 2007. 1 This chapter draws on a background chapter prepared by Said Al-Shaybani and Abdul Salaam Al-Zubayri, “Water Conflicts: Taiz and Tuban Case Study,” as well as on previous work of, and conversations with, numerous colleagues including Said Al-Shaybani, Gerhard Lichtenthaler, H.E. Professor Mohammad Al-Eryani (Min- ster of Water and Environment, Republic of Yemen), Daniel Varisco, Nina Scherg (GTZ), and Robin Madrid (NDI). Thanks are also due to Jonathan Puddifoot, Gareth Richards, and Adam Taylor-Awny of CARE. The author is grateful for the guidance and comments of Khaled Abu Zeid and Amr Abdel-Megeed of CEDARE, Cairo; and of Julia Bucknall, Nathalie Abu-Ata, and Mesky Brhane of the World Bank, Washington, DC. 234 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS In the latter half of the twentieth century, outside forces began to influence these water management customs. These included supply- side forces such as innovations in spate irrigation technology and the irruption of the diesel-powered tubewell. New demand-side forces included the rapid development of market-driven agriculture, an in- creased consumption of water by households and industry, and a very fast rate of population growth. For years, government policies encouraged development of the re- source. Now, virtually all of Yemen’s water resources are in use. This rapid development has brought considerable growth to Yemen, particu- larly to the agricultural sector (box 14.1), which uses some 90 percent of the total available water resource. However, water demand is still rising; nonrenewable groundwater is being mined; and competition is inten- sifying among users at the local level and between town and country. Yemen’s central governmental structures are weak and uncertain. The decentralized traditional governance frameworks are facing novel prob- lems. For these reasons, competition has translated into conflict. This chapter examines the nature of this conflict and investigates the ability of Yemeni society to contain it (Ward 2000; World Bank 2005). Supply and Demand Societies developing their water resource have a range of supply and demand management solutions that can be deployed. In Yemen, the supply-side solutions have been largely exhausted, and the only addi- tional developments being made are of meager and marginal resources. For example, wastewater reuse is locally important for periurban pro- duction around the few towns that have sewerage plants. However, quantities of wastewater are very small so it is unlikely to be a major source of additional usable water. Numerous small dams are being built with government money to control seasonal wadi flows. However, this program is socially contentious because of the inevitable redistribution of water among communities within the basin. Moreover, this program is of uncertain economic benefit due to its high evaporation rates and sometimes little evidence of improvement in water availability and con- trol, or of incomes (Iskander and Ueda 1999; Lichtenthaler 1999, 10). As water becomes scarcer, the economics of water harvesting have improved slightly. For example, restoration of terraces can be profitable if qat is grown. Other examples are the revival of runoff and cistern and tank systems, often for potable water, as groundwater sources Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 235 Continued on next page dwindle. Some communities are resorting to increasingly marginal systems such as fog harvesting. On the supply side, interbasin water transfer, extraction of very deep groundwater (over 1 mile down), and desalination are the last—and hugely costly—solutions available. However, in such a poor country, these are a planner’s pipe dream. Despite being faced with growing water constraints, Yemen has done little to contain demand. In recent years, the government has reduced the economic incentives for water development. However, Box 14.1 Scarcity, Conflict, and Adaptation in the Sa’ada Basin Over the past 30 years, the already very dry Sa’ada Basin in Northern Yemen has experi- enced a huge population explosion. In 1975, 40,000 people lived n the basin; by 1997 there were 180,000. The population increase was due to natural growth, returning migrant workers, and internal in-migration in response to economic opportunity Much of this opportunity has been in agriculture. Interest in it initially was sharpened by the government crackdown on smuggling (previously a major income source) after the unification of the country. Returnees from the Gulf 1 brought capital in search of invest- ment opportunities, and investment in the land suited the traditional values of this tribal region. Government improved agricultural profitability with a fruit import ban, so that orange and pomegranate farming looked to be an attractive investment. More recently, soaring qat demand has made this crop very attractive to farmers. 2 Profitable growth of agriculture was based on the rapid development of groundwater. In Sa’ada, until the 1970s, most land was communally owned grazing land. However, the runoff rights from this land belonged to individual proprietors in the bottom lands. Agriculture was not allowed on the grazing lands because it would impair the runoff. Therefore, tubewell irrigation could not develop on the slopes. However, a deal was ne- gotiated that allowed the tribal owners of the pasture rights to convert half of the slope land to agriculture on condition that the owner of the runoff rights was compensated with the same right on the other half. In 1976 a local cleric promulgated this as a fatwa, and the rule change has been followed ever since. With the growing profitability of agriculture and the availability of remittance capital, this proposition was attractive. Many tribal communities privatized their common lands and distributed these lands to each household. Private tubewell development took off. These changes in the economic incentives and institutional framework for farming have driven very rapid economic and social change in the Sa’ada area. A new elite of com- mercial farmers has emerged. Land and water resources have been widely redistributed by market forces. Qat (previously scorned by proud tribesmen as “the tree of the devil”) is being planted on a wide scale. 236 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS the government has shied away from strict application of economic measures to manage demand, such as energy and water pricing or the development of water markets. The 2003 Water Law introduced a range of regulatory demand management measures, such as water rights, licensing, and regulatory control. 2 However, for the present, these are generally beyond the capability of the Yemeni administra- tion to implement. Technical solutions to reduce demand also are available. Some, such as PVC piping, have attained wide currency through the market. Government is promoting others, such as drip and bubbler micro- irrigation, through cost-sharing programs. Farmers have eagerly switched to higher value crops, including citrus, mangoes, and qat. Further intensification, for example, through greenhouse technology, is possible, but market profitability is not assured. In some areas, only qat provides high enough returns to justify additional investment in expensive water saving (Bazza 1999; Katariya 1999). As a result, the water table has plummeted, and springs have dried up. Conflicts over water and land have become more bitter. These tensions may be spilling over into the growing fundamentalist sectarianism and civil strife in the region. The Sa’ada story is a remarkable example of economic growth, aided by the capacity to adapt to market opportunities by changing the rules about farming the slopes. How- ever, communities in the region have not yet shown a comparable “downside” capacity to adapt to scarcity. There is growing awareness of the problem but little expectation of equitable or tribal solutions. “Tribal communities and villages are not yet addressing the groundwater problem cooperatively.” (Lichtenthaler) Source: Lichtenthaler 1999. Notes: 1. “The potential effects of the expulsion of over a million Yemeni workers from Gulf Cooperation Council states in retribution for Yemen’s support of Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War immediately increased Yemen’s population by 9 percent” (Millich and Al-Sabbry 1995, 1). 2. “Because the qat (Catha edulis) plant produces alkaloid stimulants, perhaps 75 percent of Yemeni adults chew qat leaves each afternoon, for a period lasting at least five hours. People spend about 25 percent–34 percent of their cash income on qat (Weir 1985). …The wealth generated by qat for its cultivators has undoubtedly stabilized the rate of rural-to-urban migration at around a 7 percent annual growth rate since 1970 (World Bank 1993)” (Milich and Al-Sabbry 1995, 1). Box 14.1 Scarcity, Conflict, and Adaptation in the Sa’ada Basin (continued) 2 For details on water laws and regulations in Yemen, see chapter on comparative water laws in this volume. Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 237 Scarcity Not surprisingly, Yemen shows proof of water scarcity. The rapid depletion of groundwater is well documented. Many wells have dried up, and groundwater salinization and pollution are worsening as aqui- fers are exhausted. In many areas, drawing down groundwater dried up the springs. Changes in water and land use have affected historical patterns of wadi flows and groundwater recharge. Many downstream com- munities now have less spate flow and groundwater than they had a few years ago. With less water available, many farmers and communities feel the pain. The economic and social impacts of scarcity are unevenly distributed. The process of “resource capture” involved in uncontrolled drilling and extraction of groundwater and in the “race to the bottom” of the aquifer has led to the economic marginalization of those unable to compete in power and money. Small farmers, poor downstream communities, and women and children bear the brunt of scarcity (Lichtenthaler 1999, 7; Al-Shaybani 2005, 10). Some farmers’ responses to scarcity were mentioned above. Econo- mizing through intensification is their typical first response (Moench 1997, 10). Some farmers turn to purchasing water or return to traditional water harvesting, as in the Sana’a Basin (Lichtenthaler 2003, 54). At a certain point, leaving the farm is the only option. In the Sa’ada Basin, many farmers who lived where groundwater levels had fallen more than 50 m have abandoned their farms. Some have sold the rights to the sand under their farms to building contractors (Lichtenthaler 1999, 10). Sometimes whole communities have disappeared: a village in Jabal Eial Yazeed district was abandoned due to lack of water. There are reports of villages in Abyan and Lahej disappearing and of a steady rhythm of depopulation in Hajja (Al-Zubayri 2005a). Conflict and Adaptation Managing conflict is crucial for Yemen. Conflict, the subject of this chapter, is only one of a range of responses to water scarcity and the most disruptive. With increasing reports of conflict (Ward 2005), water scarcity in Yemen is reaching a critical point at which it might not only constrain economic development but also threaten social stability. Thus, an examination of how conflicts are resolved is important. 238 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS However, conflict is a symptom, not the issue. Finding long-run economic and institutional solutions to the underlying problems is the key to both avoiding and resolving conflicts. Turton (1999) sees responses to scarcity and conflictual situations as a test of “adaptive capacity”: the ability of a society to accommodate change by adjusting rules. Some observers have traced evidence of adap- tive capacity in Yemen. Turton and Lichtenthaler (2002) found that “…there is a vibrant indigenous culture (in Yemen) embracing a tra- ditional value system…. . …adaptive capacity [may be] present in a form…capable of resisting resource capture if correctly harnessed.” Certainly, Yemen has a long history of conflict and of subsequent accommodation of change. In 1970, the early period of modern ground- water development, the tubewell was bursting into the finely balanced water economy of Wadi Dahr close to Sana’a. Wadi Dahr had a long, well-documented history of managing its water resource (box 14.2). A downstream community in the wadi complained to the court that upstream motor pumps had reduced the stream flow and disturbed “laws and customs…by which we have been guided for thousands of years” (Mundy 1995). However, this rhetoric was disingenuous. As Mundy (1995) amply records, the history of water management in the Wadi Dahr has been marked by conflict and contentious judgments, which have progres- sively crystallized into “established tradition” (Mundy 1995, 110). Wadi Dahl’s conflict also got resolved—but not by the courts. The rich and Box 14.2 For Centuries, Strict Rules Have Governed Water Management in Yemen’s Wadi Dahr In the tenth century CE, the geographer al-Hamden wrote: “In the irrigation system of Wadi Dahr, the fields are irrigated one after the other. Once, some of the guards of the Sultan diverted the stream to the Sultan’s vine- yards without the knowledge of the irrigation turn keeper (daily). The daily then destroyed all the vines, but the damage to the property of the Sultan did not dis- honor the daily. Indeed, if the da’il was not just in his duties, he was hanged.” Source: Mundy 1989, 99. Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 239 influential downstream farmers simply invested in the new pump technology themselves. “The stream dwindled and died, but no one with influence any longer cared.” A new equilibrium emerged: assets were rebalanced and concentrated a little more in the hands of the richer. The conflict was resolved—even if not fairly—and a new “established tradition” emerged (Mundy 1995, 116). Rules Governing Water Government as a Rule Maker The capacity of the Yemeni government to affect outcomes in the water sector is restricted by its weak technical, administrative, and enforcement capacity. Nevertheless, the government has played a critical role in setting the economic rules for water development and management. These economic rules have changed over time. During the early period of the modern state (up to 1990), government was able to promote development of water supply by setting the price of diesel, credit, and other inputs low; and by directing public and donor investment into rapid development of the water resource. A permissive attitude toward qat and the ban on fruit and vegetable imports increased farming profitability. Government thus was able to achieve three major objectives: expanding irrigation and thereby legitimizing itself, raising farmer incomes, and consolidating its alliances with many important power groups. By contrast, these same public policies penalized the traditional water harvesting and rainfed systems of the poor. In a second period (to 2000), signs of water scarcity were beginning to emerge. Government responded to these with at least five demand management measures: increases in the diesel price (that rapidly were overtaken by inflation); elimination of credit subsidies for agriculture; modification of the fruit and vegetable import ban; regulation and taxation of groundwater equipment; and projects to support increased water productivity in agriculture. Since 2000, it has been clear that measures taken to date are inadequate to deal with the problem of water scarcity. Reluctant to use the levers such as diesel pricing 3 that could really influence out- 3 In the 4th quarter of 2007, before the fuel price increases of 2008, the domestic price of diesel in Yemen was 20% of the free market benchmark price (World Bank 2009). 240 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS comes, government increasingly has turned to promoting water use efficiency through projects and to regulatory approaches. The 2003 Water Law defined water rights and instituted a system of licensing. The National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) was empowered to work with basin committees, local authorities, and local communi- ties on regulatory and self-regulation approaches. So far, the impact of both the projects and NWRA’s outreach programs has been limited. One bright spot is that the case studies discussed below show that in some areas, particularly nontribal areas, NWRA may be called in to arbitrate disputes. Local Rules for Water Management Over millennia, every community in Yemen has evolved rules for water management. Archaeology attests to rules for spate management in the pre-Islamic period that are recognizable today. Some water rules of today were documented in medieval times (Breton 1999, Al-Eryani and others 1998). These customary rules—‘urf—are generally consis- tent with the Shari’a. Al-Shaybani (2003, 23) records a Document of Seventy Rules drafted and signed by sheikhs three centuries ago to codify common understanding of customary rules. Historically (but much less so today), religious authorities were important in setting rules and determining disputes. Some principles of the Shari’a affecting water are generally accepted throughout Yemen: Water is N mubah, or “the property of no one.” However, the usufruct can be appropriated by those who develop it. Upstream riparians have priority: N al ‘ala fa al ‘ala. Water may not be alienated N from the land. Wells must be spaced a certain distance apart, outside a “protection N zone,” or harim (Rule 58 in the Document of Seventy Rules). No one can deny a person drinking water—“the right of thirst.” N The specific rules attached to each water source vary across the country. In spate irrigation, priority is given to upstream diversion structures. In most systems, the water channeled off at the diversion structure flows down from field to field. The water is released from the higher field when that field has “drunk”—this may be when the water has filled the field up to the height of a man’s knee or higher (Maktari 1971). In subsequent floods, the round may start with the Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 241 last field left unwatered previously, as in Wadi Zabid (box 14.3). In some schemes, canals may carry the water to farther fields. When the canal crosses the fields of others, a fee is payable. Additional diversion structures downstream may receive water only when the upstream structure is breached, which in the case of traditional structures is a regular occurrence. Alternatively, there may be rules that a proportion of each flood must pass down (Al-Shaybani 2005), or that the water in different periods is allocated to downstream diversion structures (as at Wadi Zabid, box 14.3). In Wadi al Jawf, the spring spate is allocated to one bank and the summer spate to the other. Box 14.3 Wadi Zabid Downstream Farmers Conflict with Upstreamers Water in Wadi Zabid’s spate system is managed according to rules devised over six centu- ries ago by the Moslem scholar, Sheikh Gebrati. The rules are based on “upstream first”: al ‘ala fa al ‘ala. The rules divide the waters among three “regions.” In the dry season, there are base flows only. They go to the upper region. In the rainy season, when the floods come, the spate is divided among: Upper region: First 97 days N Middle region: Next 20 days N Lower region: Last 35 days. N The channel master allocates water to plots and decides which plot will get irrigated first by the next flow. The rule is: “Not twice in 14 days.” The channel master collects charges proportional to the irrigated area. The rate is lower in the middle area, and neg- ligible in the lower area. Prior to 1973, many conflicts over water distribution were recorded. The conflicts claimed several lives each year. When a World-Bank-financed project modernized the system in 1973, the situation became better for all. Water control improved, and the state enforced water discipline. After 1985, matters deteriorated. The fruit import ban changed incentives, and the upstream farmers planted bananas, which needed irrigation every five days. There was also some expansion of the irrigated area upstream. Even some lands in the upper region no longer got base flow due to the demands of the bananas and to illegal diversions by big landowners. “Daily conflicts over water” were reported. Small farmers lower down were forced to sell and to become sharecroppers. Source: Al-Eryani and others 1998. 242 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Clearly, the rules for spate are highly evolved and locally dif- ferentiated. Al-Shaybani (2005, 25) lists 18 different rules that may govern spate water distribution in different systems. However, it also is clear that the unpredictability of spate events, progressive changes in wadi morphology, and information asymmetry between upstream and downstream rightholders create a rich arena for misunderstand- ing and dispute (box 14.4) (Dresch 1993; Maktari 1971; Varisco and others 2005). In springs, which have more stable flow regimes, rights normally are attached to the land. The rights are denominated in time-shares, for example, a certain number of hours once a fortnight. In Wadi Dahr, rights to spring water were divided exactly between lower and upper communities: 15 days each (until the springs dried up). These block allocations then were further divided within each community according to time-share ownership rights. These rights could be exchanged with other users to suit farming needs. Water distribution was overseen by local irrigation supervisors, not sheikhs, although sheikhs ruled in disputes (box 14.5) (Mundy 1995, 23, 62). Box 14.4 Bloody Conflict between Traditional Wadi Al Jawf Spate Rules and Modernization In the 1980s, the World Bank financed a project to develop farming in wadi al Jawf, a border province with an historical centrifugal tendency and characterized by strong tribal values. The major component was to improve spate irrigation in the wadi. Traditionally, the first spate season (seif ) was allocated to the tribe on one bank, and the second season (kharif ) to the tribe on the other bank. However, maintaining this distribution would have made for a very expensive project, as very large canals would have been needed on either bank. Instead, an agreement was made with the relevant tribes that, in future, each spate flow would be divided 60:40, roughly the historic ratios of the spring to the summer flood. The World Bank appraisal mission got confirmation of this agreement from the tribal sheikhs, and the project went ahead. A contract was let and the contractor mobilized. However, the tribe that was to receive the lesser share changed its mind. The first night after the contractor had mobilized, the tribe brought up guns and shelled the con- tractor’s camp. The contractor demobilized at once; the contract was cancelled; and the project quickly ended with minimal disbursement. Source: Ward 1994. Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 243 Runoff rights are assigned from specific slopes to parcels of bot- tom land in a proportion—sometimes up to 20 times the area of bottomland—adequate to grow a crop on the run-on land. These runoff rights are very important. It is claimed that, in Sa’adah, houses have no cisterns for domestic water because the cisterns would infringe the runoff rights of others (Lichtenthaler 2003, 51). Every landowner has the right to abstract groundwater by digging under owned land. There are some traditional rules over access, for example, harim well-spacing rules. However, no traditional rules ex- ist for quantities extracted or water charges (Al-Shaybani 2005, 3). In parts of Northern Yemen, shared wells are common. Each group of irrigators works out its own rules for sharing capital and operating costs and for taking water turns—usually a time-share. Rules govern- ing water sales are unclear. In some localities, water sales between farmers are common. In other locales water may be sold to outsid- ers, and become a business. Many wells near cities, including Ta’iz and Sana’a (which gets two-thirds of its water from private wells), are wholly or partly converted to urban water supply for profit (box 14.6) (Moench 1997). Factors Underlying Conflict Conflict over water in Yemen is nothing new. Lichtenthaler (1997, 73) records that “until the mid 1970s water scarcity in Sa’ada was at the heart of most tribal conflict.” In fact, groundwater seemed to offer a way out of old patterns of conflict. Groundwater freed farmers from tedious and risky cooperation for a very limited, fixed resource by offering an apparently unlimited new source. Ironically, it is this very freedom that is driving a new generation of conflicts (Al-Shaybani 2005; Lichtenthaler 2003). Box 14.5 Sheikhs Adjudicate a Water Dispute in Wadi Dahr A farmer was accused of moving a stone and deflecting the water flow of the spate course. The case was solved by traditional judicial means. Guarantors for each side agreed to hold their parties to any agreement. The sheikhs, assisted by the amin (legal clerk) and a surveyor, found that the claimant was in the right. The settlement was accepted by all parties (Mundy 1995, 64). 244 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Types of Competition Fast-rising demand and no new supply are creating intense competi- tion characteristic of scarcity. This section discusses some types of competition for scarce water. A classic form—upstream/downstream competition—has taken on a new form as upstreamers have employed new technology to capture more water (box 14.7). For example, the very poor farmers in the Tehama Plain have seen not only surface water but also groundwater recharge diminish, as spate-fed and pump-fed schemes have been de- veloped (Dresch 2000, 138; van Steenbergen 1997, 106). Similarly the many small dams now being constructed throughout the highlands are changing the upstream/downstream distribution of water (Katariya 1999; personal communication from Gerhard Lichtenthaler). The advent of the tubewell intensified competition for groundwater. Apart from local restrictions on well spacing, groundwater in Yemen is an open-access resource. To establish ownership, it is enough to drill a Box 14.6 Growing Water Sales around Ta’iz Raise Equity Questions In the Ta’iz area, a widespread response to water scarcity has been the emergence of informal water markets. Local farmers needing water may purchase it from adjacent well owners, or purchase tankers from farther afield to apply it sparingly to the highest value crops such as qat. The cost is huge, and farmers are charged more—more than $1/m 3 —if the crop is qat. For Ta’iz city, a large fleet of private tankers lines up at the wells around the city that have converted from agriculture to water supply, generally because of these wells’ proximity to the road. Domestic and industrial consumers or the numerous bottling shops around town then pay the tanker owners for supplies delivered to their door. Although doing so seems to run against Islamic principles, these water sales underline that water has become an economic commodity in the area. However, the fact that well owners sell at low prices to neighbors for agriculture and at much higher prices for the tanker market does seem to reflect the recognition of the traditional principles of local cooperation over water. As water sales become more common with the growing water scarcity, communities and government are giving thought to how water markets could be made equitable and less opportunistic. Source: Moench 1997. Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 245 well. Thereafter, the incentives are competitive exploitation and the “race to the bottom.” Farmers are only now coming to understand that, depending on the shape of the aquifer and the gradients and rates of flow, over-pumped tubewells will dry up one another and also may dry up hand-dug shallow wells (Dresch 2000, 165–67). There also is competition between groundwater and surface water. Hydrological connectivity means that overuse of groundwater can deplete springs. This fact has been documented for many areas of the highlands and for the southern uplands. Conversely, upstream diver- sion of surface water or runoff can reduce infiltration of groundwater for downstream users. With the effective privatization of the entire water resource, com- petition between well owners and the rest of the community is growing. The well owners get the benefit of groundwater from the aquifers, but the whole community must pay in terms of water scarcity and rising costs. Particular tension is emerging between farmers and community drinking water needs. The drying up of wells is reimposing on women and children the corvée of the daily trudge to and from more distant wells for drinking water. In some places, water shortage is constrain- ing certain crafts including tanning and leather working (Varisco and others 2005,11). All of Yemen’s growing towns are desperately short of water. Fierce rural-urban competition has taken hold over water resources in the urban environs, often becoming violent. Water in the periurban zone Box 14.7 Upstream Prospers but Downstream Area Desolate in Wadi Bani Khawlan The upper part of Wadi Bani Khawlan in Ta’iz Governorate is covered with crops and lush fruit trees. The lower area of the wadi, once also a rich agricultural zone, is now desolate. Dry wells dot the fields. In some areas, pipes still cross the ground ready to transport wa- ter to waiting fields, should water somehow return to the wells. In most areas, however, the pipes have been removed—sold since they no longer serve any purpose. Where wells still operate in the lower wadi (mostly at points at which minor side wadis enter the main one), women wait for 6–7 hours daily to fill up plastic containers of water for domestic use. Most men have migrated in search of work. A few remain, spending their time and the remittance money sent by others in the small dusty stores that are remnants of more prosperous days in the valley. Source: Moench 1997. 246 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS increasingly is a commodity for sale to towns. The same is true for the wells in al Dhabab that supply Ta’iz. In some villages, land and water sales have been prevented by community action. Generally, however, as is recorded for Sa’ada, well owners “form a dominant coalition that prevents others from blocking their sales” (Lichtenthaler 1999). How Competition under Scarcity Turns into Conflict As discussed above, conflict is only one possible outcome of scarcity and the pace of change. Under what conditions is scarcity likely to cause conflict? Varisco (1983) argued that predictability of the water flow influences the level of conflict. Unpredictable flows such as spate give rise to intense stresses and conflict. Predictable flows such as spring waters do not—once the ownership and management rules are agreed. Va- risco’s argument corresponds to the historical facts. Far more conflict Box 14.8 Urban Water Tactics Dry up and Pauperize Al Haima Twenty-five years ago, lower Al Haima wadi was a vibrant agricultural community. Local inhabitants grew high-value fruit, vegetables, and qat. The Department of Agriculture ran a small horticultural station. Now the area is dry. Dead trees surround the deserted agricultural extension office. Drying qat plants struggle to survive on water purchased from distant wells in tankers. Even drinking water is in very short supply. Children, women, and men travel long distances by donkey or camel to collect water at the few taps that still run. The problem began in the early 1980s, when Ta’iz city drilled some wells and pumped out water from the valley for its urban water supply. The villagers were told that the new wells were in the deep aquifer, 500m down, and would not affect the shallow farm wells. However, people found their shallow wells drying up. Ta’iz city came in 1987 to drill more wells, but the villagers were refused permission to deepen their own wells. The locals stopped the city’s drilling rigs by force of arms. The army came; the village men took to the hills with their arms; and five sheikhs were put in prison. Eventually, a minister came down from Sana’a and brokered a settlement. By 1992, the villagers’ wells were dry. They took up arms again and disconnected one of the water supply wells. Twenty truckloads of soldiers moved in. The President of the Republic intervened. The villagers were obliged to surrender their claims. Sources: Moench 1997; World Bank 1997. Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 247 is recorded over spate than over springs. However, his explanation does little to explain the surge of conflict in recent years in nonspate systems. A second factor that can affect the level of conflict is the number of people sharing in the system. Large systems of water-sharing among many irrigators generate more potential for stress at both the human and the hydraulic levels because individual control diminishes. By con- trast, individual well systems involve only their owners. A third factor is visibility. A moved boundary stone or a turn at a stream that lasts longer than agreed is a highly visible infraction. On the other hand, the depletion of an underground resource for which even the experts do not understand the hydrogeology and for which the pumps that are depleting the groundwater are on private land is hard to contest. A fourth factor is the degree of symmetry of cause and effect. Stealing a neighbor’s water concerns only two parties. Depleting groundwater affects a broader community. However, in the latter case, a direct cause and effect relationship is not as discernible, and it is more difficult to claim harm to identified individuals. Thus, it is not surprising that considerable conflict is reported over spate flows, but less over spring water. Until recently, conflict over groundwater was limited by the above factors, particularly visibility and symmetry. Now, however, rural people everywhere are aware that groundwater is a hydraulically connected and fast-depleting resource. Once the aquifer is fully developed, it becomes a zero-sum game. Every new well simply subtracts from the finite resource—and the wealth—available to existing participants. This growing awareness of the competitive nature of groundwater extraction has led to increasing conflict (previous section). One additional important factor influencing whether conflict will develop is power relations. The groundwater problem highlights the unequal competition between large farmers, who have bigger land areas to drill over and more financial resources to dig wells; and smaller farmers, whose wells dry up or who find it harder and more expensive to access communal or third-party sources. In al Dumayd, a big trader established a 10-ha citrus orchard with 8 pumps. As a result, a number of wells in the vicinity dried up, and the farmers in the adjacent smaller farms were forced to abandon them. Conflict did not ensue because “the [small] farmers were aware that a big neighbour has no obligation to share” (Lichtenthaler 2003, 188) A similar situation exists in spate 248 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS irrigation in which the “weak” tail-enders feel aggrieved but powerless to change things (case of Wadi Tuban Case Study D ahead). There is some evidence that conflict is becoming more frequent. Certainly, tribal confrontations over water and land of substantial scale and intensity receive frequent notice in the Yemeni press (box 14.9). Government interventions also seem to be more common. Public Intervention Also Can Provoke Conflict The role of the state in Yemen has grown enormously in recent years. In the 1970s, much of the development of infrastructure and services was privately funded by community associations and philanthropists. These funding sources dropped away with the decline of remittances and the politicization of the community development movement. Oil revenues now are centralized in government hands, and the growing volumes of donor aid are channeled through government. Consequently, the state has become the dominant investor in rural development. These interventions have not always had a positive Box 14.9 Water and Land Disputes Leave Many Dead “Six people were fatally shot and seven injured in tribal clashes in Hajja which broke out two weeks ago and continued till Tuesday between the tribes of al Hamareen and Bani Dawood. Security stopped the fighting and a cease fire settlement for a year was forged by key sheikhs and politicians, The fighting was triggered by controversy over agricultural lands and water of which both sides claim posses- sion. Meanwhile…there is speculation of retribution attacks on government forces which used heavy artillery and tanks to shell several villages in al-Jawf.…” (Al Thawra, April 29, 1999) “Sixteen people have been killed and tens injured since the outbreak of armed clashes between the villagers of Qurada and state troops, who used heavy artillery and rockets to shell the village.* Scores of villagers were arrested and hundreds fled their homes. The incident began when Qurada refused to share well water with neighbouring villagers….” (Al Shoura, June 20–21, 29 1999) Note: * = See more on the Qurada dispute in Case Study A ahead. Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 249 impact on water dispute and conflict (Varisco and others 2005, 12). Many conflictual situations have been caused, at least in part, by public interventions. The development of upstream diversion structures on spate schemes in a series of public projects from the 1950s to the 1990s led to a de facto change in the spate water allocation rules (UNDP 1992, 106–07). More land is now irrigated at the head of the schemes and less at the tail. The negative distributional effect of this is stronger because the head-enders (for example in Wadi Mawr and Wadi Rima) generally are the better off, larger landowners. A survey showed that, for more than 80 percent of farmers in Wadi Rima, water delivery was not improved by the World-Bank-financed improvements (Al-Eryani and others 1998, 32). Instead, head-enders were able to take all of the base flow with impunity, increase their cropping intensity, and grow higher value crops, including the very water-intensive bananas, which require irrigation seven times a month. Public interventions in rural water supply and sanitation also have created situations of potential conflict. Problems have included an ap- proach to siting projects that focused exclusively on engineering issues while ignoring community wishes and existing tensions (Al-Shaybani 2005, 20), inappropriate technology imposed on the community, and little thought given to how subsequent operations were to be man- aged and financed. The principal causes have been the lack of com- munity consultation and the inflexible, authoritarian approach of the implementing agencies, low professional standards, and alleged cor- ruption. Changes underway to “demand-driven” approaches should help. However, there is a legacy of disappointed expectations, low or nonexistent service, and a potent brew of tensions that often explode into conflict (Al-Shaybani 2005: 12–14, 18). The government-f inanced program for the construction of small dams also is creating many potential conflicts. Apart from the upstream/downstream stresses already mentioned, the poor performance of these dams creates conflictual stresses within the community and with government. Water quantities often have disap- pointed; siltation is very rapid; frequently no downstream develop- ment of irrigation canals has been provided for; and communities are not trained in operation and maintenance of the asset. The principal causes appear to be inadequate hydrological and engineering studies; an approach that focused exclusively on engineering issues and does not even ask how the water is to be used—sometimes it is not even 250 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS clear which villages or individuals are the intended beneficiaries— and generally no provision for adequate upstream and downstream consultations (Al-Shaybani 2005, 20; personal communication from Gerhard Lichtenthaler). Agricultural programs that have pushed farmers to invest in ground- water for cash crops are creating conflictual situations. The govern- ment’s 30-year promotion in Sa’ada of oranges and pomegranates through subsidies and protection bound farmers to a huge long-term investment in tree crops. In many places, these trees now cannot be sustained by the water resource. A similar pattern is arising with the mango groves at Abs. Mangoes were promoted by the public subsidy for drip irrigation, but the water resource is rapidly disappearing. In time, the farmers are likely to engage in some form of conflict with the government (Bazza 1999). Urban water supply. In the 1990s, the public utility aggressively transferred water from the southern end of the green al Haima Wadi to Ta’iz city. The ensuing drying up of that once fertile valley was a well documented national scandal. Since then, other communities in the Ta’iz region have fiercely guarded their water sources and chased off government prospectors. Government has learned the lesson and is trying other approaches. For example, government is using a form of contract in the Sana’a basin that is intended to reserve the deep aquifer for water supply, while giving farmers a free hand over the unconnected shallow alluvial aquifer. Box 14.10 Conflicts over Dam Construction in Hobah and Shahik End in Waste and Death At Hobah in Al-Mahweet, villagers obtained a grant from USAID to construct the Al- Makik Dam. However, they made no prior agreement about who the beneficiaries would be. Downstream farmers who already were using the water proved unwilling to share in costs and management with upstream farmers, who intended to pump the water to lands previously unirrigated. As a result of the incomplete planning, the project comprised only the completed dam, which was not used. The irrigation area was not developed. At Shahik in Khawlan Al-Tiyal district, disagreement over whether to use a new dam for groundwater recharge or for surface irrigation led to conflict in which one person was killed. Sources: Vermillion and others 2004; Ward 2005. Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 251 Water Conflict Can Trigger a Larger Pattern of Conflict Throughout Yemen, attachment to water and land is fierce and forms a central element of Yemeni identity. 4 Competition for these limited resources thus can quickly trigger a larger pattern of conflict. Yemeni rural society generally is arms bearing, and resort to violence is frequent. This is particularly true in the Northern Highlands, where tribal values of honor, shame, and revenge drive behavior, and where comparatively trivial origins can quickly escalate, especially when violence is employed. Socioeconomic factors also play a part: “unemployment and under employment mean many bored and frustrated young men sitting idle with their guns for much of the time, waiting for something exciting to happen” (Al-Shaybani 2005, 21). These factors are less evident in the Southern Uplands and the coastal zones, in which the agrarian system has a more landlord/peasant character with roots in a feudal system (Carapico 1998, 67–68; Varisco and others 2005, 12). In these areas, tribal values are muted or non- existent. Here it is the intense economic competition for the resource that can lead to broader conflict. Varieties of competition include that Box 14.11 Wadi Habir Resists Surrenders Its Water to Urban Use but Is Defeated through Violence In 1992 villagers in Habir discovered that their area had been proposed as the next source of water for Ta’iz city. They had seen the impact of water transfer on the neighboring valley of Al Haima so determined to resist. For three years, they succeeded in postpon- ing the project. When the rigs finally arrived in April 1995, the Habir villagers drove the drillers off the site by using petrol torches. Their sheikhs were imprisoned. Eventually, a “compensation” package was agreed, so the villagers allowed the drillers in. However, soon a farmer’s shallow well dried up. When he was refused permission to dig a new, deeper well, the villagers again stopped the drilling for Ta’iz. When the army arrived, the women and children threw stones and tried to disarm the soldiers. The soldiers fired, and two women were seriously injured. Eventually, the wells were drilled, but with a legacy of distrust and anger that persists to this day. Source: World Bank 1996. 4 Because water rights generally go with land, water and land disputes often are the same thing. 252 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS between large landowners and smallholders or sharecroppers, between town and country, or within communities over drinking water. What Forms Does Conflict Take—and Why? As background to this chapter, Al-Shaybani and Al-Zubayri (2005) carried out a field study of water conflict in Ta’iz and Lahej. The following four case studies from their findings illustrate many of the themes of this chapter. Case Study A. Murderous Dispute over Spring Water Rights Is Resolved in Yemen’s Highest Court In 1997, a dispute over water arose between two villages on Jabal Sabr, the huge mountain that towers over Ta’iz city. The dispute lasted until 2001, left many dead, and had to be resolved in the Court of Appeal after the intervention of the army and the President of the Republic. The story began in the mid-1990s, when one village—Qurada— received money from the government’s rural water supply agency to rehabilitate the village piped water supply system. This system was fed from springs belonging to Qurada that flowed into a collection tank. However, the tank was sited uphill of a spring that belonged to a second village, al Marzooh. Al Marzooh became afraid that the project would reduce the flow of their spring. In night raids, al Marzooh blew up part of the new project. The police made arrests, and the governor visited and ordered the project to continue. Al Marzooh responded by blowing up more installations and equipment. Soldiers sent in only exacerbated tensions (box 14.9). Although traditional mediation managed to get the case into court, the explosions continued. Gun battles left five dead (including one woman, a fact that really shocked the nation) and more than 20 injured. The situation got so out of hand that the President of the Republic inter- vened. Only then did both sides agree to go to court, from which the dispute rose all the way up to the Court of Appeal. The final court ruling was accepted reluctantly on both sides. The villages were to construct one collective tank for their water supply. Qurada could connect a 4" pipe, and al Marzooh a 2" pipe, with a pro-rata reduction in supply in case of shortage. It seems incredible that so much should be expended for such a seemingly small a problem. The lessons so dearly won were: Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 253 In some areas, water scarcity has reached a point that it is not ag- 1. riculture but the much smaller quantities needed for drinking water that are under threat. Ta’iz Governorate essentially is a nontribal area, so the dispute was not inflamed by tribal values. Rather, the very high value that the two communities placed on drinking water made them prepared to resort to violence to defend it. Public money, apparently allocated without proper understanding 2. of the issues, was at the origin of the dispute. Even when they were at each other’s throats, the villages were 3. highly opposed to outside intervention. When the army intervened, the villages effectively closed ranks against them. Ultimately, only the highest authorities in the land brought the villages to reconciliation. The tensions around water are so great that traditional rules of 4. mediation proved quite inadequate. Al Marzooh continued its as- saults even while mediation was going on. In the end, and only after extreme effort, the state was able to 5. impose settlement in this water dispute. Mobilization on this scale is plainly out of the question for every 2" pipe dispute that may arise. Case Study B. Two Village Water Committees Cooperate to Protect Their Resource—and Fight off Threat from Government Agency In the very water-scarce Qadas area of Ta’iz Governorate, al Karee- fah and al Dhunaib are neighboring villages. Each village has its own potable water scheme with its own management committee. Having seen the problems of water scarcity in other parts of Qadas, the two villages cooperate to protect the drinking water resource, which is their first priority. The committees keep an eye on the activities of local farmers and have stopped the digging of many new wells. Armed with a permit from the NWRA branch office in Taiz, one al Kareefah farmer started to drill a new well. The al Kareefah water management committee entered an objection with NWRA, which then cancelled the permit. Another farmer, this time from al Dhunaib, failed to get a permit but started to dig a well anyway, stealthily by night. By the time the village found out, the well was more than 20 meters deep and lined with reinforced concrete. The farmer threatened to kill anyone who came close. The al Dhunaib water committee chairman convened a meeting of the whole 254 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS community, and it was decided that the well should be filled in. Faced with this community solidarity, the farmer had no choice but to agree. The whole community took part in filling in the well. Ironically, the committees had the most problem with the official rural water agency, the General Authority for Rural Water and Sanita- tion Projects (GARWSP). GARWSP started to drill a borehole in the catchment area of the existing drinking water schemes of both villages, and within 400 meters of an existing well. The committees pointed out to GARWSP that this proximity violated the 500 meter harim rule. Their protest fell on deaf ears. The two villages were on the point of resorting to violence to stop the contractor when it was learned that the new well was dry. GARWSP made a second attempt to drill, this time within 200 meters of the water source of al Kareefah and in the direct catchment area of Al Dhunaib’s water source. This second at- tempt was met with armed resistance from both communities, and the contractor was forced to leave the area. The two committees then decided jointly to hand-dig a well for community use at the new site to prevent GARWSP from any future attempt to drill in this location. The lessons are: When water is very short, drinking water becomes the top priority 1. for groundwater use, and communities show solidarity in setting up and running potable water schemes. Community solidarity can influence or block even the most intran- 2. sigent water users. In situations of scarcity, cooperation among communities becomes 3. possible. Communities may deploy both traditional rules such as the 4. harim rule and modern rules such as licensing to defend their water source. Government agencies trying to help solve the water problem can 5. create more problems than they solve. In this case, GARWSP’s technical appraisal of the source was deficient. Furthermore, the agency totally lacked a “demand-driven” and participatory approach. Case Study C. Dispute between Farmers Is Settled by NWRA’s Proposal That New Well Be Used Largely for Drinking Water A conflict between villagers from Al Sayani district of Ibb concerned a well drilled close to a neighbor’s well without permission. The dispute Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 255 started when a downstream well owner made a complaint to NWRA, asking that it stop a farmer who was digging a new shallow well upstream. NWRA visited the site. Its team found that the new well was, in fact, close to two existing wells. The first well belonged to the complainant and was approximately 120 m downstream of the new well. The second old well belonged to the farmer who was digging the new well: it lay about 120 m upstream of the new well. The visit took place during the dry season, and all three wells were dry at the time of the visit. Although the new well breached the 500-meter distance require- ment under the harim rule, NWRA proposed that the well be regu- larized on condition that it be used only for the drinking supply of the villagers. Only surplus water during the rainy season could be used by the well owner for irrigation, and only on the condition that he paid the capital and operating costs of the well. This deal was agreed and confirmed in writing by all concerned. This small case in which again the priority accorded to drinking water is clear demonstrates three important lessons: The 1. harim rule is being widely invoked as a useful rule of thumb to protect water resources. The potential of the new well licensing procedures being introduced by NWRA is beginning to be explored by villagers as part of their armory of water management rules. Villagers may be willing to bring in NWRA as part of dispute 2. resolution. This willingness is probably stronger in nontribal areas such as Ibb. NWRA and the villagers proved capable of adapting the 3. harim rule to suit local conditions and to reconcile the interests of the two parties and of the community. Case Study D. Wadi Tuban Tail-Enders Say That Modernized Scheme Has Brought Them Less Water but That They Lack The Capacity to Fight for More In the Wadi Tuban spate irrigation scheme, by law, an irrigation council composed of officials and representatives of the water user associa- tions is responsible for deciding the rules of water distribution. These rules are quite precise (box 14.12). However, the field work done by 256 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Al-Shaybani and Al-Zubayri (2005) found that reality differed from theory. Downstream farmers said that they used to have access to spate water on average once every two years. Now the interval is 5–10 years. These farmers believe that upstream farmers are taking more water than before thanks to improved concrete diversion structures and to the upstreamers’ influence over the management agencies. The tail-enders believe that the traditional upstream first rule—al ‘ala fa al ‘ala—is abused by the big farmers upstream, who are expanding their irrigated areas, getting up to 4 floods in 1 year, and even planting bananas. However, the downstream farmers have not lodged a complaint. The reason in part is that they are unsure which agency is responsible. They believe that, in addition to the Irrigation Council, the Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation Department and the new elected local authori- ties all have a say. They do not know to which agency or to whom to complain, nor what the rules and penalties are. They do believe that it would be a long and expensive (due to bribes) business to complain. They grudgingly accept that spate flows are uncertain and that spate water rights for downstreamers are hard to assert. The case of Wadi Tuban reflects findings from previous studies in spate schemes. They showed that the benefits of spate improvement often go largely to the better-off upstream farmers. This case also shows other lessons: Box 14.12 Irrigation Council Water Allocation Rules In theory, water allocation is to be based on a fixed irrigation plan: When the spate flow is low (5 m N 3 /s–15 m 3 /s), priority is given to schemes in the upper part of the delta, namely, Ras Al Wadi and Al-Arais. When spate flow is of medium size (15 m N 3 /s–25 m 3 /s), priority is given to schemes in the middle part of the delta, including Beizag and Faleg systems. When spate floods are high (25 m N 3 /s–40 m 3 /s), the flow is directed at the main wadi bifurcation point at Ras al Wadi Weir: to either Wadi Kabir or Wadi Saghir, depend- ing on which one’s turn is due. When spate floods exceed 40 m N 3 /s, the flow is divided evenly between Wadi Kabir and Wadi Saghir. Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 257 The modernization programs that government has introduced have 1. focused more on physical improvements than on strengthening man- agement institutions. The user associations now being promoted in Tuban do not appear to have figured in the farmers’ discourse, and certainly were not seen as powerful champions of their rights. The old causes of friction regarding spate still exist. In fact, these 2. frictions are built into a system with such uncertain water rights. At present, the power relations are such that downstreamers feel badly treated. Furthermore, they shrink from conflict with the powerful upstreamers. Resolving Conflict What dispute resolution mechanisms exist and how have they evolved to meet these new challenges? Settling Disputes in Largely Tribal Areas “Although it is important not to overemphasize the nature of tribal- ism, it must still be recognized as the major system of governance and community organization in most highland rural communities” (Varisco and others 1995, 12). In these tribal areas, sheikhs and tribal leaders still play a vital role in settling disputes. Elected officials also have tribal affiliations, so tribal and modern power structures largely overlap. During a field survey, farmers in the Sana’a Plain were asked to explain the different mechanisms employed for resolving water conflict. The over- whelming majority of respondents (96 percent) said that water conflicts would be dealt with by local “arbitration systems.” In other words, water conflicts would be addressed first by tribal arbiters at the neighborhood level. If not resolved at the first level, conflicts move to the sheikh at the head of the tribe. Most respondents said that only when a dispute could not be resolved through these procedures would it be referred to the courts. In general, respondents felt that the courts were expensive (largely due to bribes), slow, and remote from tribal concerns. Al-Shaybani (2005, 22) argues that resolution of water conflict in tribal areas follows the same pattern as that of any other conflict. In a conflict, any respected person (modareek) can call a ceasefire. Then a mediation process takes place, often led by the clan head (aqil)) or the head of the tribe (sheikh), to agree the terms of a truce and to broker a 258 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS settlement. In case of legal technicalities, a tribal specialist on customary rights and duties (maragha) can be called in. His decision is final. In the past, the sheikh’s ability to mediate conflicts used to rest primarily on his social standing and on his knowledge of customary law. Over time, this has changed, as sheikhs have joined the political and economic elite of the country. It is now just as much the sheikh’s status as a rich man and his political influence and power at the re- gional and national level that give him the authority to decide disputes (Lichtenthaler 2003, 74) However, these additional sources of authority create a risk of conflict of interest. Sheikhs often are part of the problem because often they are the largest users of groundwater. Some sheikhs have become big commercial farmers and have benefited from their status in the tribe to build up large land holdings. In cases in Sa’ada, villages and communities have closed ranks to prevent their own sheikh from buying more land—and the water rights that come with it. Thus, while the cooperation of the sheikhs is crucial to conflict resolution in tribal areas, their role as big water users compromises their role as impartial mediators (Lichtenthaler 1999, 2, 14). Tribal mediation also is limited by population movement and land sales. These days more than ever, villages may be inhabited by multiple tribes who do not cooperate. For example, villages in Amran often are inhabited by different branches of the great Hashid and Bakil confed- erations, and some by sayyids (religious scholars who have a knowledge of water rules) (Moench 1997, 16; Lichtenthaler 1999, 14). In addition, within one village, economic interests may be different—agricultural, artisanal, and domestic. These different interests can conflict and thus undermine solidarity. Religious and cultural values play a role in reinforcing traditional dis- pute resolution mechanisms. These values recall principles of fairness, reconciliation, and integrity to a population still largely sensitive to these values. These values occasionally can be invoked directly in dispute reso- lution by the sayyids. Over the centuries, these religious scholars have been involved in the evolution of water rules. The recent revival of Zaydi scholarship and practice in Sa’ada has led to the emergence of a younger group of religious scholars and teachers. They invoke the Islamic principle of maslaha ‘amma (“welfare of the community over individual interest”). It was a Zaydi scholar in Sa’ada who issued the fatwa on conversion of runoff rights in 1976 (Lichtenthaler 1999, 2–3, 18). Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 259 Settling Disputes in Other Areas In nontribal areas of Yemen, traditional and modern community insti- tutions exist for water management and for dispute resolution. These institutions can be highly evolved, as was shown by the management of spate in Wadi Tuban (Case Study D above). In recent years, dedicated water management associations have emerged, most frequently for potable water supply. Some of these associations have grown into strong community institutions with a range of other activities, such as schooling, health services, rural roads, and water for livestock. The best documented example is that of the Administration of Local Projects of al Sinah near Turba (Moench 1997, 15). Water management associations focus on managing the water sup- ply scheme rather than on the resource itself, However, most schemes are now experiencing problems with the source, as illustrated by the Qadas case above. Thus, the associations are obliged to become active in settling disputes over water resources. In some cases, associations— or the community at large—have organized themselves (box 14.13). Some have resisted new drilling. Others have prevented the loss of community water and land resources to the rich and powerful—traders, speculators, absentee landlords (Lichtenthaler 1999, 2). Box 14.13 Sa’ada: Examples of Successful Community Initiatives To safeguard their water resources, villages cooperate in a range of way to resist sheikhs, traders, and land dealers. Three examples follow. In one case in Sa’ada, fearing decline in groundwater levels, the tribal group refused N the request from the community owning the runoff area to develop its groundwater resources. Now the sheikhs have agreed to a 20-year halt to any development of the land. In another area of Sa’ada, in consultation with the tribe, the sheikh ruled that no in- N dividual member was to sell land to people from outside the village. This community had seen what had happened when the neighboring tribe sold large amounts of land to investors, who then drained the area of groundwater. In several other cases in Sa’ada, villages and communities have closed ranks to prevent N their own sheikh from buying land from them. Source: Lichtenthaler 1999. 260 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Modern Civil Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Yemeni law provides for civil dispute resolution in courts. However, ru- ral Yemen is generally mistrustful of outside involvement. Conflicting parties tend to close ranks in the face of it. No data exist on the actual number of water disputes referred to the courts. However, in the survey of farmers in the Sana’a Plain discussed above (Al-Hamdi 2000, 81), only 4 percent of respondents said that water disputes would be referred to the civil courts rather than to local arbitration systems. The proportion may be higher in nontribal areas that lack trusted local dispute resolution mechanisms. In Wadi Tuban, cited above, downstream farmers do not have much confidence in the capacity or probity of the courts either. A referral to the court is generally forced on the disputants by the civil authority, particu- larly for violence. If one of the disputants voluntarily refers a case, he generally does so because he sees it as a way to gain additional advantages. Under the Water Law, NWRA has regulatory powers over water management. As a result, a number of disputes are now being referred to NWRA branches for a decision on the legality of well drilling and other issues. In four basins—Sana’a, Ta’iz, Sa’ada, and Amran—the central government has set up basin committees comprising represen- tatives of central and local government and civil society. It is too early to tell whether this joint forum will be effective in imposing order on WRM. The new, elected local district councils have responsibility for all local affairs. NWRA’s policy is to engage them in water resource regulatory activities. However, the little evidence that is available —for example, the local council involvement in spate water allocation in Wadi Tuban—suggests that this form of decentralization has multi- plied, rather than solved, problems (Al-Shaybani 2005, 26). In 2005, apparently alarmed at the prevalence of tribal disputes in general, the President of the Republic ordered a five-year truce. He established a National Supreme Committee for Dispute Resolution. This committee is chaired by a deputy prime minister and includes a large membership from the Cabinet, the judiciary, Parliament, and the sheikhs. Its mission is to put an end to tribal feuds through mediation. To date, there has been no indication of its effectiveness. Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 261 Power and Political Economy: Who Really Benefits from Water and How? From the discussion above, it will be clear that Yemen has moved a long way from the early Islamic moral economy of the “right of thirst.” Already in the nineteenth century, when the Ottomans installed the iltizam system of taxation of the agricultural surplus in the higher water- availability areas of the southern uplands and the eastern and southern escarpments and plains, control of water was readily identifi- able with an accumulation of power. In these areas, it took a feudal form. Great sheikhs held sway over numerous tax-paying ra’iyya, or peasants. This system is still traceable in the pattern of land and water holdings in these areas (Carapico 1998, 67–68). In the dry north and east areas, scant water meant virtually no taxable surplus. In these areas, the warrior-farmer character of tribalism proved able to resist both Ottoman conquest and the imposition of centralizing tax trans- fers. The more egalitarian political economy of the tribe persisted until a generation ago. Change in the use of water has brought profound shifts in eco- nomic and political power. In the southern uplands, the groundwater revolution is largely over. The process of appropriation of water by the locally powerful—and by the cities—has reduced the economic opportunities for small farmers. Appropriation is gradually returning most of these areas to the old rural ecology of rainfed agriculture. They have only sporadic access to supplementary irrigation and pumped drinking water. The political and social counterpart to this economic change seems to have given a new impetus to the civil society, local self-help mechanisms that have existed in the area for a generation or more. Associations of local people defend their communities’ interests and conserve and develop what resources are available. In the coastal regions, the brief improvement in the lives of down- stream farmers that came with spate upgrading and the tubewell is dwindling as large upstream landholders appropriate both the surface flows and the groundwater. In the tribal areas of the north and east, the end of the groundwater boom has left an impaired ecology of reduced groundwater and spring flow. These sources are less and less adequate to support the commercial farming that has developed. The available water and land resources have become more concentrated in the hands of tribal leaders. They have 262 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS benefited from traditional patterns of loyalty and cooperation and from their access to the modern centers of political and economic power. A new class of capitalist investor/trader has sprung up, too. Those left out of this process have been the smaller farmers, who have seen the economic boom come and go in a generation. Among them, there appears to be a process of change, not yet radical, that consolidates resistance to further resource capture. Whether this resistance will have a political counterpart—for example, a distancing of tribesmen from their tribal leader—is far from clear. These processes of capitalism and concentration of power have been readily abetted by the state through incentives for groundwater extraction and through direct investment. The rapid development of water resources helped to legitimize the state as a “development agent.” Meanwhile, the more discreet underlying processes of accumulation of wealth and power through growing control of water and land have consolidated the important political support of the military and capitalist elite around the central state. Lessons Civil Society Lessons Traditional Yemeni society and institutions have demonstrated con- siderable capacity to adapt to the changing challenges of water. The “upside” capacity to adapt to the changing supply and demand signals in the 1970s and 1980s was remarkable. Technology, farming systems, cropping patterns, and cultural and social attitudes adapted quickly to the market economy. Time-honored rules were adjusted; traditional institutions evolved; and new ones were established. Naturally, the country’s “downside” capacity to make the pain- ful adjustment to scarcity, competition, and conflict has been more limited. Yemenis adapted rapidly to the tubewell but have had great trouble adapting to the resultant water stress and scarcity. Nonethe- less, communities continue to evolve their own rules and have shown some ability to adapt to scarcity. Institutions have begun to adapt, and rules are being rewritten. The old harim rule on well spacing is now evoked almost everywhere to control new well drilling. Communities also may seek to restrict deepening, pumping time, or water sales. New users are being excluded by a variety of techniques. In tribal areas, the ambiguous role of the sheikh is a problem. Nonetheless, even there, some communities have combined to Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 263 neutralize the negative effects of the sheikh’s business interests. In nontribal areas, community associations are commonly found, with varying degrees of capability to manage water resources and resolve conflictual situations. Communities everywhere prefer to exclude government from their problems. This consensus is not surprising, given that government interventions frequently created rather than resolved conflict. Government Lessons The capacity of central government to regulate activities at the level of individual users is very limited. Typically, government intervention requires a show of disproportionate strength, justified only in extreme cases, after local dispute resolution methods have failed (Moench 1997, 3). Government can best influence outcomes positively by broad policy and institutional measures. Good examples are the sectoral policy frameworks, and a few enforceable regulatory measures, such as the ban on import of drilling rigs (Norton 1995). Government’s move to improve the professionalism of its water management services by setting up NWRA and decentralizing its pow- ers to local branches clearly was a step in the right direction. There is limited evidence that NWRA has helped in dispute resolution. The decentralization of some official responsibilities to the participatory basin committees and to the local authorities also may help. There is no reason to suppose that decentralized structures will be more ef- ficient or less politically driven than centralized ones. However, the decentralization at least may back up the power of local communities to control abstraction and drilling (Lichtenthaler 1997, 11). Evidence shows that it is not only scarcity, but also the supply side remedies introduced, that triggers conflict. Unfortunately, gov- ernment emerges as a leading source of conflict. Some of this conflict stems from poor water resource decisions—particularly for projects based on inadequate understanding of the water balance or of water rights. Other conflictual situations arise from inadequate social and institutional preparation. Programs frequently fail to ensure that the community structure that can deal with planned changes is in place. In the most flagrant cases, government has ridden roughshod over all local understanding of water rights and appropriated the resource for transfer to the towns (World Bank 2005). 264 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Looking to the Future In the Yemeni context, the only viable solutions are local and participa- tory, initiated by the water users. Moench (1997) details the reasons that these solutions work: Local people are the stakeholders. a. Government can never have the capacity nor the full confidence b. of local people. Every village has its own hydrology and history, and only micro- c. level solutions make sense. It is not government but millions of individuals at the local level who d. take the decisions about Yemen’s water management. Clearly, the future of water management and dispute resolution in Ye- men depends on local institutions. These institutions are creakily adapting to water scarcity. There is a role for government to lend a hand by supporting community self-management initiatives through education, training, and intelligent cost-sharing. Future government interventions must avoid creating new problems while trying to resolve others. To do so, government interventions in rural water and dams will have to be technically better prepared, demand driven, and negotiated by a more intelligent process that takes account of local social setups, institutional structures, and patterns of water rights. Longer-Term Lessons There is no “solution” to Yemen’s water crisis. Given the population increases and lack of alternative employment opportunities, demand will continue to far exceed supply. The depletion of natural capital will oblige economic retrenchment, with painful political and social con- sequences. Managing the transition to extreme scarcity and avoiding conflict at the local level will be an obligation of all Yemenis. However, the government is responsible for mitigating the underlying causes of scarcity as much as possible and for planning for the longer-term structural transition of the economy. Government must pay attention to the uncompleted demand man- N agement agenda. In particular, readjusting the incentive system can Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms N 265 reduce agricultural water use while equitably protecting incomes (Lichtenthaler 1999, 24; Norton 1995, 10–12) To replace the present ad hoc and arbitrary transfer systems, gov- N ernment needs to set fair rules for intersectoral transfer of water. These rules must require the development of equitable markets or other fair transfer mechanisms (Norton 1995, 13–14; Moench 1997, 4, 21). Government has to plan for a less water-intensive economy. The N planning should include measures to ease the intersectoral move- ment of labor and to create an environment friendly to alternative economic activities (Norton 1995, 16). References Al-Eryani, M., and M. al-Amrani. 1998. “Social and Organizational Aspects of the Operation and Maintenance of Spate Irrigation Systems in Yemen.” World Bank, Sana’a. al-Hamdi, M. 2000. Competition for Scarce Groundwater in the Sana’a Plain. Delft: Delft University of Technology. Al-Shaybani, S.R. 2005. “Conflict and Water Resources Assessment for al Jawf and Amran.” Hydro Yemen for CARE/DfID, Sana’a. Al-Shaybani, S.R., and A.S. Al-Zubayri. 2005. “Water Conflicts: Ta’iz and Tuban Case Study.” World Bank, Sana’a. Al Shoura. 1999. Article on deaths from armed clash between Qurada villagers and state troops over water. June 20–21, 29. Al Thawra. 1999. Article on deaths from armed tribal clashes in Hajja over water. April 29. 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Qat in Yemen: Consumption and Social Change. London: The Trustees of the British Museum (British Museum Publica- tions). ____. 2005. “Yemen: Proposal for a Study of Conflict in Water.” World Bank. World Bank. 1989. “Irrigation Sector Study.” Report 8030-YAR. World Bank. ____. 1994. Wadi Al-Jawf Agricultural Development Project.” Project Completion Report. Report 13822-ROY. World Bank. ____. 1996. “Yemen: Local Water Management in Rural Areas.” Washington DC and Sana’a. ____. 1997. “Yemen: Towards a Water Strategy.” World Bank. ____. 2005. “Yemen: Country Water Resources Assistance Strategy.” World Bank ____. 2009. “Tapping a Hidden Resource: Energy Efficiency in the Middle East and North Africa.” 269 15 Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century N. Vijay Jagannathan I n many parts of the world, competition among countries for water resources is being exacerbated by population growth, urbanization, and industrialization. When water resources are shared across na- tional boundaries, the challenge of sustainable management becomes even more complicated for several reasons. First, in the case of trans- boundary conflicts over water, international laws and conventions are not enforceable unless a process of ratification has been completed through national legislative bodies. Second, countries could cheat or not comply with water treaties unless these treaties are self enforcing. Finally, it would take just a small group of opponents of a water treaty to make any of these agreements “politically unacceptable.” In addition, two independent variables determine how countries interact when it comes to sharing international watercourses. First is the spatial configuration of the watercourse in relation to national boundaries: an upstream state has different incentives for cooperat- ing compared to a downstream state. Dinar (2006) describes these as through-border situations in that the downstream state’s ability to retali- ate and reciprocate through its water policies to externalities created from the upstream state is minimal. Other situations exist in which externalities become reciprocal: any harm to an open-access resource (such as an inland sea, lake, or shared aquifer) affects all states that share this resource. Dinar terms these border-creator situations. Second, relative political and economic strengths and weaknesses of countries that share the water resource influence their dealings with one another. If one state were far more economically advanced than its fellow riparians, its behavior would be influenced by the political and economic importance attached to maintaining and building on 270 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS relations with its neighbors. On the one hand, a situation of complete asymmetry of economic power could tempt the powerful country to display “hegemonic” tendencies. On the other hand, trade and market protection considerations very well could induce the powerful hegemon to collaborate with its weak neighbor(s). Asymmetry in economic well- being also affects the way that countries view pollution. The capacity to accept pollution may be higher in a poor country than in a rich one, whereas the ability to mitigate the problem is the opposite. When Do Bilateral Agreements Take Place? Political, spatial, and economic interests propel countries to work out international water agreements with one another with or without an exchange of financial investments. When scarcity or degradation induces parties to coordinate actions, country-level interests could be congru- ent through a desire to negotiate and cooperate. Dinar analyzed the characteristics of these agreements and concluded that through-border situations carry a much greater likelihood of side payments or sharing investment costs from the downstream state to the upstream state. The next paragraphs will discuss examples of situations in which a congruence of interests led to countries working out bilateral solutions to their water issues in the spirit of mutual accommodation. Typically, these solutions take place when the “low-hanging fruits” are obvious to all negotiating parties. For example, flood control and generation of hydroelectric power are obvious areas in which a downstream state perceives the need to cooperate. Iran paid Afghanistan; India has paid Bhutan and Nepal; the United States has paid Canada for hydropower, irrigation, and flood control. There could be other examples wherein congruence of interests led to bilateral agreements. Table 15.1 illustrates some bilateral agree- ments among the Mashreq countries of the MNA region. Challenge of Working through Bilateralism and beyond However, for every successful treaty, there are many more situations in which mutually beneficial agreements are not concluded. These arise because there are many political, geographic, and economic considerations that lead to countries being either unwilling or unable to collaborate to share water resources. Typically, disagreements arise when countries assert their “rights” to water quantities. A downstream Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century N 271 country with significant hydraulic investments, such as Egypt or the Netherlands, claims prior rights in that the water passing through its territory already has been put to productive use by its farmers and urban and industrial consumers and therefore needs to be safeguarded in any subsequent treaty. By contrast, an upstream country such Ethiopia or Turkey will claim sovereign rights to the water quantities flowing through its territory. In these situations, the absence of a vi- able international adjudication system often leads to a breakdown of the bilateral dialogue. As a consequence, countries situated along the watercourse often are unable to work toward optimal utilization of the water. If the number of countries is three or more, the transaction costs of reaching such agreements become even more complex because these countries often do not fully appreciate their interdependence. Examples are countries that share water from very large watercourses, such as the Nile, Mekong, and Brahmaputra-Ganges Rivers, Nubian aquifer, and Arabian Gulf. Instead, as with bilateral water relations, countries tend to perceive water rights synonymously with country interests. In such situations, crafting institutional platforms that facilitate water agreements becomes a formidable challenge. For example, since 1997, the UN Watercourse Convention has attempted to codify a Table 15.1 Disputes and Agreements in Mashreq Countries, 2008 Water conflict Issue Countries involved Outcome River Tigris Irrigation in Syria with Tigris Syria, Iraq, Turkey No formal agreements as yet waters Shatt al Arab River Boundary demarcation Iran and Iraq 1974 agreement by which the river is recognized as the boundary River Euphrates Sharing river for irrigation Syria and Iraq 1990 agreement to share waters 42:58 between Syria and Iraq River Orontes Sharing river for irrigation Syria, Lebanon, Turkey Lebanon gets 80mcm, Syria 430 mcm. Turkey gets adequate water for irrigated lands. River Jordan Sharing river for irrigation, Jordan and Syria Syria retains flow from springs above 250m. urban, and industrial use Maqarin Dam flows used by Jordan but 70% of power generated allocated to Syria Source: Hadadin 2008, 79–81. Notes: Mashreq = Eastern countries of the Arab Region. In border-creator situations, as the water or the externalities are shared, the tendency is to share (often equally) the costs of mitigating measures. For example, the Baltic countries saw clear advantages of sharing the benefits and the costs of protecting the Baltic Sea from land-based pollution. 272 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS broad framework for countries to work within to resolve water issues. 1 Despite almost 40 years of consultations and meetings, the suggested legal framework to govern international water agreements has not been ratified (table 15.2). Table 15.2 UN Watercourses Convention Timeline, 1970–1997 Year Result Comment 1970 UN asks International Law Commission to start codification 5 rapporteurs produced 15 reports 1997 UN passes draft Convention on Watercourses 103 countries vote for convention 2007 Only 15 states sign the convention Minimum of 35 states ratifying convention not achieved Source: Salman 2007. Delays in ratification have arisen principally because of differing interpretations of the relative importance of two articles of the Con- vention: Article 5, which enjoins participating states to ensure equitable 1. and rational utilization of shared waters Article 7, which obligates states to do no harm. 2. Upstream states emphasize the need to honor Article 5 (protects their sovereign right to exploit the economic potentials of watercourses running through their territories). Downstream states emphasize the importance of protecting historic investments in hydraulic infrastructure (from future or contemplated actions by the upstream states) that could adversely affect watercourse flows. When interpretations of water rights differ—as in any system of jurisprudence—there needs to be a body of tort law to guide the adjudication system. In the case of international water disputes, such a system is absent. Therefore, except in either the case of the “low-hanging fruits” referred to earlier, or cooperation through side- payments, differing interpretations of water rights quickly degenerate into zero-sum games. Under these circumstances, water diplomacy needs to focus on build- ing confidence and capacity among the parties sharing a watercourse. The full name is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non- 1 Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The convention was passed in final by the General Assembly in 1997. Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century N 273 Diplomacy can enable the parties to see beyond arguing about conflict- ing interpretations of rights. It leads them to recognize that, because of their interdependence, cooperation is the only way forward if the water is to be utilized to its highest economic and environmental po- tentials. Sadoff and others (2008) have articulated the advantages of benefit sharing. Three Phases of Interdependence Geographic Interdependence The fact that a watercourse is shared by two or more countries highlights the geographic or spatial interdependence of these countries. Whether it is a flow of a river from the headwaters to the sea, an aquifer across national boundaries, or a water body surrounded by countries, the resource is available through one ecosystem. Any action—water extractions or water insertions—taken by one state impacts all of the others. When populations were still relatively small and demands on the resource were low compared to the available resource, conflicting views of water rights could be resolved through bilateral agreements. These agreements took a static view of water availability (as validated by historical hydrological data): that future available quantities would be fully predictable. Economic Interdependence The second phase of water interdependence occurs as a consequence of growing economic interdependence. Through trade and commerce, countries have spun a complex web of interrelationships. As a result, often those sharing a watercourse become so economically interde- pendent that disagreements over water get resolved through “give and take” within a broader congruence of economic interests. In Europe, for example, disputes over the Danube and Rhine Rivers and other important international watercourses are no longer perceived by each country with the same degree of passion as in past centuries because the economic benefits from their interdependence far outweigh the advantages of nationalist rhetoric. Seeing beyond asserting rights to water quantity, these communities are moving forward toward insti- tutionalizing the rights to water quality for the benefit of the entire ecosystem. 274 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Water Interdependence A third phase of water interdependence recently acquired prominence because inter-temporal projections warn of entire water ecosystems around the world being affected by climate change. Variability in rainfall patterns, retreat of mountain glaciers, and higher evaporation rates in reservoirs impounding water (particularly in arid regions such as the Middle East) bring in new climatic risks that need immediate and long-term mitigation. For example, the Khabour River in Syria has a large command area of irrigation. The country has witnessed a steady decline in discharge at Ras Al Ain from an average of 60 m 3 per second between 1942 and 1972 to no water after 2001. Figure 15.1 indicates similar trends in Morocco. More fundamentally, predicting future water flows in a watercourse on the basis of past historical data is becoming a dubious exercise. In other words, country interpretations of quantity rights to international wa- tercourses already are affected by prolonged droughts in many parts of the Middle East and North Africa. These new climate-induced risks are forecast to get worse in the ensuing decades. This prediction makes it imperative for countries that share watercourses to recognize their joint and individual vulnerability to catastrophic events such as prolonged droughts, floods, or both. The three phases of water interdependence both influence and are influenced by different congruences of national interests. Historically, geographic interdependence has been the independent variable that has led to the largest number of international treaties on water. These treaties have institution- alized mechanisms for coopera- tion, even when the participating countries have widely differing economic and political power (Dinar 2000, 2005). In another paper, Dinar (2006) analyzed a wide cross-section of interna- tional water agreements. He concluded that treaties between countries for through-border configuration (water flows from one country to another) have -!ò.ò -1ò.ò -1!.ò -1!.ò -1ò.ò -z!.ò -zò.ò -¹!.ò -¹ò.ò -!.ò -ò M | ¢ e | t 0 a | ¢ + 0 a r + t + t + t e | a + ¢ | r M + r r + | e c | M e | a e . : e t t + t t + . + | | + a c + | e a | M e | | + | I + a a | e r Source: MN| :t+â |re.eat+t|ea ea t||m+te t|+aae |a MN|, zòò°. zò1ò zò!ò zò°ò Percent reduction of annual rainfall compared to the baseline (Pattern Scaling, A 2 Scenario, downscaled on HadCM 3 ) Figure 15.1 Secular Rainfall Trends in Morocco’s Major River Basins, 2030–80 (%) Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century N 275 involved tort-oriented outcomes in which richer downstream countries usually have financed upstream hydraulic infrastructure. By contrast, for border-creator configurations (waters are shared, as in an inland lake, or a river serves as an international boundary), treaties often have led to a more equal sharing of investment costs, even when power relations are asymmetric. There also could be situations in which the wealthier country agrees to finance a disproportionate amount for internal economic, social, or political reasons. Regarding economic interdependence, factors “beyond the water- course” have been the independent variables facilitating international cooperation along watercourses (Dinar 2005). For example: The US and Canada share a close political, cultural, and economic a. relationship that goes much beyond the water resources they share. The resulting congruence of economic and political interests has facili- tated agreements on sharing watercourses of 150 rivers and lakes. Similarly, the International Commission for the Protection of the b. Rhine has been able to establish itself as a supra-national body because of the common economic and political interests of the Rhine riparian states (Sadoff and others 2008). More recently, the European Water Framework Directive of 2000 c. (EU aquis) has created a binding legal framework to protect all European watercourses, over which the European Court of Justice has enforcement powers. These Water Directives become relevant in reshaping water policies for states that apply to join the European Union (notably Turkey). The directives have led to Turkey’s National Programme for the adoption of the EU aquis, with consequences for how the country deals with downstream riparians with which it shares geographic interdependence (IDRA 2004). There is also the example of the Mekong accord in which the d. riparians recognized their growing economic interdependence by agreeing to equal rights to the use of the Mekong waters according to economic and social needs. The third phase of environmental interdependence—due to climate change—has just begun and still is not fully internalized by most coun- tries. This concern was highlighted by the 2007 Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report. This report projected global warming with very serious consequences for rivers whose headwaters are in tropical and semitropical zones. A combination of increased 276 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS variability of rainfall with receding glaciers and rising temperatures makes the quantity of flows in the major international watercourses unpredictable. Certainly, historic data can offer no reliable forecast of the quantities and variability of future water. In fact, many arid countries already are witnessing prolonged droughts and irregular rainfall. In the MNA region, Morocco and countries in West Asia (Israel, Jordan, Palestine, and Syria) have been particularly affected. In the future, Egypt runs the risk of losing a con- siderable part of its populous Nile Delta lands to sea-level rise by the Mediterranean. At Egypt’s southern end, inflows to Lake Nasser/Nubia are projected to increase because extra precipitation in the Ethiopian highlands will exceed the reservoir capacity. This overflow will lead to two forms of wastage of the precious resource: Excess waters increasingly will have to be diverted to the Toshka a. depressions. These function as mega-sized evaporation ponds (these water bodies already are so large that they are captured by remote-sensing images). With the expected rise in temperatures, evaporation rates in Lake b. Nasser are expected to increase, thereby reducing the water stock available for use downstream of the High Aswan Dam. Table 15.3 summarizes the suggested three-phase typology and its consequences on water diplomacy. The first column represents the geographic interdependence phase. These are situations in which countries have worked out bilateral or multilateral agreements based on recogni- tion of common geography. The second column represents economic interdependence. In these situations, economic factors outside the ge- ography of sharing watercourses have acted as powerful instruments to Table 15.3 Typology of Interdependence Geographic interdependence leads to Economic interdependence leads to Environmental interdependence leads agreements between/among countries based on: agreements between/among to agreements between/among countries based on: countries based on: Recognizing and sharing ecosystem risks due to climate change Overall economic and political congruence through sharing economic benefits Territorial sovereignty and sharing water rights Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century N 277 promote international water agreements. The third column represents the additional phase of environmental interdependence. It signifies emerging situations in which global externalities will require countries that share watercourses to work with one another to mitigate these emerging risks to their economies. The biggest challenges to water diplomacy in the years ahead lie in this third arena. To sum up, the nature of interdependence among countries that share watercourses leads to either a congruence or lack of congru- ence of interests. These lead to either the success or failure of water diplomacy. Past disputes over international watercourses have arisen in the region from a variety of social, political, economic, and histori- cal reasons. With projected increased variability in rainfall and rising temperatures, countries simply cannot afford to risk water conflicts based on existing rights-based paradigms such as territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity. The development challenge is how to create a culture of learning and knowledge-sharing, so that policymakers are able to understand that growing environmental interdependence is forcing a much greater congruence of interests in managing water than has ever been necessary before. How Can Countries Be Persuaded to Recognize the Importance of Environmental Interdependence? The IPCC Report of 2007 generated global awareness of the risks of climate change, particularly in terms of rainfall declines and variability (figure 15.2). Specific adverse impacts and risks are becoming apparent to policymakers at country levels. Under these circumstances, politi- cal leadership has been quick to recognize the importance of adapting policies to meet the challenges of rainfall variabil- ity. Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, for example, has directed the country’s water utilities to explore how treated wastewater, which the country is discharging into the Mediter- ranean, instead can best be conveyed and reutilized in the drought-prone areas. –80 Temperature increase (degree Celsius) ...and water availability will further decrease, by 30–50% for a 2–3 temp degree increase % –70 –50 –40 –60 0 –10 –20 –30 0–1 1–2 2–3 3–4 4–5 Source: Stern Report Background Paper 2007. Figure 15.2 Climate Change Impacts in North Africa: Range of Change in Runoff (%) 278 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS In Morocco, many of the dams constructed over the past three decades are not filling to design capacity because of rainfall variability. Earlier, this variability was viewed as prolonged droughts. However, now it is being interpreted as the first stage of climate change. These shortages have affected carefully calculated allocations from the water stored in dams of the country’s river basins for use by farmers, industries, and urban communities. Such experiences are galvanizing policymakers to work on a new range of economic and investment policies. Table 15.4 describes recent simulations of the Rio Bravo Basin in Mexico that show the extent of economic damage with a decline in rainfall. Table 15.4 Simulations for Rio Bravo Basin, Mexico If runoff falls by 20%: $7.5B pesos of damages in the residential sector. · $5.3B pesos of damages in the industrial sector. · $69M pesos of damages in the agricultural sector. · Industrial and residential sectors will be damaged considerably more than agriculture because the third places a much higher value · on water. Overall welfare losses = $13.0B pesos annually. · If the reduction in runoff is 10%, the damages fall to $5.5B pesos. If the reduction in runoff is 5%, the damages are $2.6B pesos. Source: B. Debewo, personal communication, 2008. While country leaders have been quick to recognize the adverse impacts of rainfall variability and prolonged droughts on their economies, they are less familiar with the risks caused by the interdependence of countries that share watercourses and ecosystems. The need is urgent to build collaborative learning and knowledge-sharing on how countries that share watercourses can work with each other in a new world of global externalities. Regional resilience programs—similar to the one at country-levels—will be possible only when there is a universal rec- ognition of the congruence of interests to cooperate among nations sharing watercourses. Investment in Capacity Building Is Key Recognizing environmental interdependence, therefore, poses a major capacity building challenge to the development community. Recognition requires investments on three fronts: Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century N 279 1. Developing communication strategies and country dialogues Making clear information on resource publicly available to all N watercourse beneficiaries: How much water is available where, with what reliability, and of what quality to technical staff in all interested countries? Utilizing similar methods of data analysis, so that policymakers and N other national stakeholders receive objective, professional advice on available options to share the resources equitably and without causing any harm. Articulating the risks posed by climate change projections, par- N ticularly regarding (a) design assumption failures for hydraulic infrastructure and (b) dangers of misdirected investments and misdirected water and energy policies. Facilitating country-level dialogues aimed at mitigating this new N risk vector. 2. Build partnerships to understand and mitigate risk A second front is to build partnerships among scientific institutions, civil society, international and bilateral donor agencies, and national policymakers, so that the nature and consequences of emerging hy- drological risks are understood, and appropriate mitigating measures are taken. Some pilot initiatives are underway. The Red Sea-Dead Sea Study Program is a $15 million initiative financed by the international donor community in response to acute water shortage in the Jordan Valley and the rapid shrinking of the Dead Sea. Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority are collaborating on this study because all three countries recognize not only their geographic interdependence but also the critical importance of building up joint resilience to climate change predictions. The study is evaluating the feasibility of constructing a water conveyance system from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea to generate electricity and desalinating the water to meet the unmet water demand in Jordan. The feasibility of the project will be evaluated against other cost-effective options (including what is currently a politically unac- ceptable option of reducing water consumption by irrigated agriculture in Jordan and Israel), and establishing a common monitoring system for water resources in the Jordan Valley. 280 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 3. Develop regional investment programs to build regional resilience to climate change The third front would emerge after the basic awareness of environmen- tal interdependence and detailed technical knowledge are generated. The third front is to develop investment programs to build regional resilience to climate change. Of course, countries will need to agree to sign off on such programs. If they do, it could be the evidence that hydropolitics and the ensuing water diplomacy finally have recognized the third aspect of interdepen- dence: environmental interdependence. Awakening to this understanding is the challenge of water diplomacy in the early 21 st century. References Bates, B., Z. Kundzewicz, S. Wu, and J. Palutikof. 2008. “Climate Change and Water.” International Panel on Climate Change, Geneva. Debewo, B. 2008. Presentation on the Impacts of Climate Change on the River Rio Bravo. Dinar, S. 2000. “Negotiations and International Relations: A Frame- work for Hydropolitics.” ____. 2000. International Negotiations, 375–400. ____. 2006. “Assessing Side-Payment and Cost-Sharing Patterns in International Water Agreements: The Geographic and Economic Connection I.” Political Geography 412–37. ____. 2004. “Water Worries in Jordan and Israel: What May the Future Hold?” In A. Marquina ed., Environmental Challenges in the Mediterranean 2000–2050, 205–31. Kluwer Academic Publishers. ____. 2003. “Preventive Diplomacy, International Relations, Conflict Resolution and International Water Law: Implications for Success and Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” In International Journal for Global Economic Issues 3 (2). ____. 2005. “Treaty Principles and Patterns: Selected International Water Agreements as Lessons for the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Water Dispute.” In H. Vogtmann and N. Dobretsov, eds., Trans- boundary Water Resources: Strategies for Regional Security and Ecological Stability. Springer ____, and D. Ariel. 2000. “Negotiating in International Watercourses: Diplomacy, Conflict and Cooperation.” In International Negotiations 5: 193–200. Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century N 281 IRA (International Research Associates LLC). 2003. “The Thread of Life: A Survey of Hydropolitics and Security in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin.” Unpublished. Munther, H. 2008. “Neighbor to Neighbor.” In Jordan Business (Oc- tober): 79–83. Sadoff, C., T. Greiber, M. Smith, and G. Bergkamp. 2008. “Share Managing Water across Boundaries.” IUCN Water and Nature Initiative. Salman, M.A. Salman. 2007. “The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has Its Entry into Force Proven Difficult?” In Water International 32 (1) (March): 1–15. # Codification 285 16 Based on the “Report Submitted to the Ministry of Water and Electricity, King- 1 dom of Saudi Arabia,” 2005. The countries used for this study include (a) Lebanon, (b) Yemen, (c) Jordan, 2 (d) Morocco, (e) Tunisia, (f ) Egypt, and (g) Oman. 3 Editor’s note: Due to these authors’ comprehensive documentation of their sources, the citations are in footnote form rather than text note form, as in the other chapters. Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries Jackson Morill and Jose Simas C odification of water laws creates the institutional environment in which water resources and water service deliveries are managed. The countries selected for this study were Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, and Yemen. 1 Choosing a group of representative countries within the region to use in a compara- tive study was somewhat complicated, as the majority of countries do not possess a framework water law. Given the authors’ difficulty in locating legal texts, it is also hard to determine whether the analysis of each country represented in this study is totally complete. Laws may have changed or there may be new laws in force that have not been made public. 2 Methodology The methodology for this study was to divide the analysis of water laws in each country by religious and customary law background (addressed in the next section) and WRM topical areas. The topics are (1) prin- ciples and objectives, (2) water rights, (3) water allocation, (4) transfer of water rights, (5) water pricing, (6) management of water pollution, (7) flood control, (8) penalties, (9) planning, development and information, 286 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Conflict resolution usually involves some amount of “give and take,” or bargaining 4 (discussed in Bargaining), although bargaining does not lead to conflict resolution. Water laws have to take into account the limited capacity of those who are charged 5 with enforcement. However, it seems that the legal minds working in international water law have yet to identify a legal framework for pollution prevention that is workable in the context of areas with limited capacity. (10) groundwater management, and (11) institutional arrangements. 3 Several of these categories overlapped, and in these cases, the analysis was arbitrarily dedicated to one category and noted in the areas of overlap. The list of water issues above is certainly not comprehensive. The topics chosen for discussion represented the most common issues ad- dressed in the water laws of the region. There was a paucity of law in such areas as investment and conflict resolution. 4 If any law did exist in these areas, it was included in the institutional category. This chapter does not touch upon the larger question of the ad- ministration or enforcement of water law. Given the limited capacities of ministries, some of these laws appear difficult to administer. For example, in Yemen, 6–7 people working in the ministry are assigned to the Sana’a Basin Catchment Area, in which over 1.5 million people live and over-extract groundwater for agricultural activity (especially qat), as well as sell to several water vendors in the city of Sana’a. It is difficult to imagine that so few staff could enforce the entirety of the legal regime of water for such a large populous area. 5 Religious and Historical Influences on Water Law in Selected MNA Countries Countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) have a long, rich legal tradition in codifying water resource management (WRM). The scarcity of water in the region and its importance to early agrarian and nomadic societies necessitated the development of fairly complex systems of tribal law and Islamic doctrine to manage and share the re- source. In modern day MNA countries, population growth and changing economies, as well as globalization and common water management principles, have led many countries in the region to consider modern- izing their water law systems to address the modern-day issues of scarcity and demand management. The challenge for legal drafting in this region lies in aligning Islamic and customary law with the realities Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 287 As Caponera wrote, “Islam always reacted against tribal life by preaching equal- 6 ity and fraternity in the faith. Prophet Mohammed preached charity as the principal virtue to help the destitute and to show detachment from material things.” The idea of charity is represented in the basic principle of shafa. Where force was used to dictate water use in the tribal societies, water was made available to all in need. See D.A. Caponera, Water Laws in Muslim Countries, Irrigation and Drainage chapter (FAO 1973, 10) (hereinafter “Caponera”). 7 Figh can be found in the second part of the Shari’a. Figh governs the manner in which faithful Muslims should live their lives, including methods of worship, diet, and clothing. Id., 1. Within the Sunni tradition, there are four recognized schools: the Hanifites, Ma- 8 likites, Shafi’ites, and Hanbalites. The Shi’ite school has even more branches, including the Imamites, Ismailites, Zaidites, Carmatians, Assassins, Druses, Ahl-al Hagg, and Buhain-in. There are no separate branches within the Ibadite school. Id., 5. of modern day WRM law and policy. Any new water law framework must at least consider and respect the traditions built in the region over the centuries. Islamic religious law, or Shari’a, regulates all human actions, including the use of water resources. The Holy Qu’ran, the funda- mental text of the Islamic faith and the foundation of Muslim law, provides the central tenet of water resource management, which is that water is a gift of God and in principle belongs to the community. 6 This central tenet, in turn, creates a primary right of shafa (“drink”) for all individuals and domesticated livestock. All Islamic water law is shaped by this baseline principle, as evidenced by the examples of religious doctrine developed in the Prophet’s teachings, the hadiths and the figh. 7 The application of Islamic law in WRM becomes complex when examining the varied approaches adopted by the different schools within Islam. The three main schools are the Sunnites, Shi’ites, and Ibadites. Within each of these schools, there are different branches as well, 8 and each of these schools has a nuanced approach that may differ slightly in certain areas of WRM. For example, under the Sunni, Shi’ite, and Ibadite traditions, the right of thirst applies to all public waters. The Sunni and Ibadite traditions expand the right of thirst to some private waters as well, but the Shi’ites hold that no one other than the proprietor is entitled to the use of his private waters. Examining the issue even further within the Sunni school, one of the branches (Malikite) holds that the right of thirst applies to private waters as well. However, if the one in need has the financial means, he is liable to pay compensation. Under the Hanbalite and Shafi’ite 288 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 9 Id., 14. Late 1200s to 1922. 10 The Majalla was authored in the second half of the 19th Century by a council 11 of major Hanafi faqihs. It is very significant for several reasons. It was the first sys- tematic codification of Islamic law and was based on one school (Hanafi). It also consciously addressed many pressing issues in law. It came to conclusions that some- times were not “traditional” positions of the Hanafi school, although they always were grounded in the positions of the Hanafi school’s imams. The text was written so that someone without a deep background in the style and usage of classical fiqh texts could understand it. Lebanon still has in force Title 4, Chapter 10, Articles 1234–1328 of the 12 Majalla. schools, the right of thirst may be exercised without compensation under certain conditions. 9 While religious principles have maintained significant influence over WRM, practical needs also have had a significant effect on rules and regulations. Geography and the general availability of water vary within the region. Customary law also differs throughout the Muslim countries in this study. However, as Caponera writes in his article, “Water Law in Muslim Countries,” core principles can be gleaned from the varied customs in place. First, it is clear that, due to scarcity in the region, water ownership is important and is seen as real property. Water rights can be held individually or collectively. These rights may be sold, purchased, inherited, gifted, donated, or transferred. However, the rights of religious communities cannot be alienated. Water rights often have been recorded by local authorities. The Ottoman Empire, 10 which united the Middle East, also in- fluenced modern day water law in the region through the Majalla, or the Ottoman Code. 11 Within the Majalla, a large section governs water rights, and many of its precepts still hold true in countries such as Lebanon. 12 In addition, the subsequent colonial influences of Brit- ain and France are strong in MNA. Francophone countries possess a code-based system, whereas the British legacy was a more piecemeal, common law approach. As a result, some countries, for example, Mo- rocco, have passed fairly comprehensive Water Codes, whereas other countries, Jordan, for instance, have a group of laws that addresses various aspects of WRM. This historical background is not meant simply to elaborate on the diverse origins of water law in North African and Middle Eastern Islamic countries. While many modern water experts believe that the region is increasingly willing to stretch the bounds of Islamic and Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 289 customary law to better address modern issues of rising demand and rapidly decreasing supply, Government officials still have the clear inten- tion to respect legal traditions. This is why, as Caponera writes in his seminal work, many Muslim communities have a “justifiable mistrust” regarding water code projects developed by non-Muslims, because they fear that innovations may offend religious law. 13 Therefore, any legal reforms in the region must respect and attempt to incorporate the traditions of customary and Islamic law. Current Water Law in Selected MNA Countries The following sections will address the approaches to 11 issues in each country, highlighting best practices and possible approaches. Principles and Objectives Morocco and Yemen have been two of the first countries to put in force a framework water law that reflects modern water principles and attempts to address the country-specific issues faced in these coun- tries. Jordan, while it does not possess a framework law, does have a very well-developed set of water laws, which address groundwater, water rights, and water pollution; and the institutional mechanisms for managing them. Many “modern” framework water laws contain a statement of principles or objectives, or both. For example, the Brazilian Water Law includes both a set of principles and objectives at the beginning of its law to establish the broad national water policy (box 16.1). In the countries reviewed for this study, only Morocco and Yemen, the two countries with framework water laws in force, have a series of principles or objectives. Other countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon, clearly establish under their respective legal regimes the basic principle of water ownership by the state by virtue of its control of the public domain. However, each of these countries does not have any laws that begin with a set of principles and objectives. Of the two countries with framework laws, Morocco’s is the most complete. Yemen’s law focuses almost entirely on the specifics of water rights administration. 13 Id., 1. 290 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS See Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995), “Grounds for the Law” and “Benefits 14 of Water Legislation,” 1. The Moroccan law begins with a basic set of principles, focusing on the fact that water is an “essential commodity” that is both scarce and extremely vulnerable. 14 A set of objectives for the law follow, which begins with an overarching statement of purpose: “Water resources development must ensure the availability of water adequate in quantity and quality to meet the needs of all water us- ers, in accordance with the aspirations of balanced economic and social development, the guidelines of national land-use development Box 16.1 Brazilian Water Law 9.433, 1997 Chapter I: Basic Principles Art. 1. The National Water Resource Policy is based on the following principles: Water is public property. 1. Water is a limited natural resource, which has economic value. 2. When there is a shortage, priority in the use of water resources is given to human 3. consumption and the watering of animals. The management of water resources should always allow for multiple uses of wa- 4. ter. The river basin is the territorial unit for the implementation of the National Water Re- 5. sources Policy and the actions of National Water Resource Management System. The management of water resources should be decentralized and should involve 6. participation by the government, the users, and the communities. Chapter II: Objectives Art. 2. The objectives of the National Water Resources Policy are as follows: To ensure that present and future generations have the necessary access to water of 1. a quality adequate for their various uses. To ensure the rational and integrated use of water resources, including transportation 2. by aqueduct, with a view to achieving sustainable development. To prevent and protect against water crises due to either natural causes or the inap- 3. propriate use of natural resources. Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 291 15 Id., 2. 16 Id., 2–3. Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law 12/1982), 17 Art. 18. 18 Id. planning and the possibilities offered for harnessing potential water resources, all at lowest possible cost.” 15 The remaining objectives touch on issues of “coherent and flexible planning,” using the catchment basin as the method for decentralized management, seeking optimal use of the resource that is in line with the priority uses outlined in the law, protecting the resource (both in quantity and quality), and establishing the appropriate water ad- ministration. Finally, the law outlines a set of “principles” that flow from the objectives. They further define the tools and parameters for achieving sound water management through the implementation of the framework law. 16 Water Rights As outlined in the background section, the history of water rights in the Islamic world is complex. In many ways, the basic tenet of shafa (“drink”) continues today in all Muslim countries. However, how it is applied varies greatly. Most countries allow for customary private water rights to coexist with state-owned water administered by a permitting scheme. Several countries, most notably Egypt, tie water rights exclusively to land. Others separate water and land ownership/ use rights. Each country also varies as to the rights and obligations that accompany water rights. Because of these great differences, this chapter presents a separate section on each country. Egypt Egypt is unique in that surface water rights are tied to land, and thus are tied to land ownership. 17 Egyptian water law provides water rights only for irrigation purposes. No other uses are addressed under the law. Landowners must submit to the irrigation supervisor a scheduling table for irrigation based on the amount of land and the type of crops to be grown. This schedule will dictate the amount of water allocated, a process covered more extensively in the next section. 18 292 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 19 Id. at Art. 82. 20 Id. at Arts. 9 and 49. Jordan Water Authority Law (#18/1998), Art. 25. See also Underground Wa- 21 ter Control By-Law (#85/2002), Art. 3. Under the Underground Water By-Law, ownership of the land does not in fact include ownership of the underground water therein. Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002), Art. 3. 22 See Jordan Water Authority Law (#10/1998), Art. 25. 23 Id. Landowners have certain responsibilities that accompany their water use rights. The responsibilities include keeping the drains, mesqas, and canals clean and free of debris. For landowners holding water rights, a variety of actions are prohibited: Wasteful use of irrigation water through a private drain, public N drain, fallow land, or unlicensed land Impeding the irrigation network N Preventing flow in the main canal or any other action that might N compromise the water elevation Opening or closing any lock or any other regulation works N Demolishing any hydraulic infrastructure constructed by MWRI N Cutting banks of the Nile or canals or drains without license N Excavating in the banks or changing their elevation (hack filling N mud or clay or soil). 19 Licenses are required for any water-related works or operation of N equipment. 20 Jordan Jordan is distinct from the other countries primarily because it treats almost all water resources within the Kingdom, whether surface or groundwater, as state-owned property. 21 The slight exception lies with any waters that are not considered “under the management, responsibility or supervision of the Authority.” 22 These waters may not be used in excess of personal or domestic needs or other acceptable private usage. Moreover, they may not exceed the amounts set in laws pertaining to drinking water and irrigation rights. 23 Jordan also is somewhat unusual in that it maintains a separate law for the Jordan Valley that determines water and land use in that region. Under this law, waters acquired by means of government projects— and that were not used for irrigation purposes prior to the law—are considered government property. These waters may be leased, sold, or Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 293 Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001), Art. 18. 24 Decree #144, Art. 3. Note that these private rights are recorded in the Land 25 Registry. Id. Majalla, Title IV, Chapter 10, Arts. 1262 and 1265. 26 27 Id. at Art. 1254. For example, any person in full ownership of water in wells or streams is allowed to prohibit another’s right for cattle to drink or to irrigate crops in the area if another source exists that is available to the public. Id. at Art. 1268. 28 Id. at Art. 1269. Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 1 29 30 Id. at Art. 2. 31 Id. at Art. 6. otherwise disposed of as decided by the Water Board. In addition, for any irrigation project, any excess water not claimed under registered water rights is considered government property. 24 Lebanon The law in Lebanon holds that the state has exclusive ownership over the public domain. Nonetheless, some acquired private water rights remain protected. Generally, private water rights could be acquired through the usual means of property acquisition (inheritance, settlement, or purchase) if acquired before 1926. 25 The right of use that accompanies these rights is governed by the Majalla, which distinguishes between two rights: drinking water, and water for livestock and irrigation. 26 Both of these rights are limited by the condition that they do not infringe on the rights of others. The right to drink water has fewer limitations than the right to water livestock. 27 For irrigation rights, in particular, it is prohibited for anyone to change the periodicity of irrigation by transferring water to land belonging to him or her if he does not hold irrigation rights for said waterway. 28 Morocco The Moroccan Water Law holds that “Water is a public asset and as such…cannot be the object of private appropriation.” 29 The law lists 10 specific types of water body (natural and constructed) that are considered to be in the public domain. 30 Almost any conceivable surface water body falls within this definition. However, the law does provide that some vested rights over the public domain may be retained, provided that (1) ownership preceded the publication of the Dahir (law) (1914 and 1925) and (2) claims concerning these rights were filed within five years of publication of the law. After this date, no more claims may be filed. 31 These recognized water rights 294 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 32 Id. at Art. 8. 33 Id. at Art. 25. Id. 34 at Art. 26. 35 Id. at Art. 31. Oman Ministerial Decision No. 2/1990, Art. 4. 36 Tunisia Water Code (1975), Art. 53. 37 38 Id. at Art. 21. FAO, Water Law and Standards: Framework for Analyzing National Water 39 Laws, Tunisia, 3. www.who.int/waterlaw/WQ.exe$QU_Search will remain subject to the provisions concerning water use as laid down in the national water plan and in integrated water resources development master plans. 32 Landowners have certain rights and obligations for use of water that falls outside the public domain. Owners have the right to use rain falling on their lands. However, any attempt to artificially collect rainwater is subject to regulation. 33 An owner may dig a well on his or her land not to exceed a certain depth and subject to concessions and public domain regulation. 34 In addition, landowners abutting a water- course assigned to public use are subject to an easement within four meters of the freeboards. The easement will enable free passage for administration or catchment basin authority works. 35 Oman The available legal texts for Oman limited the analysis to groundwater. Under Article 2 of the Ministerial Decision No. 2/1990, all persons claiming ownership of existing wells, whether used or unused, must apply to the Ministry of Water Resources for registration. All wells were to be registered by July 1990. Any well that was not registered by that date would be considered illegal thereafter. 36 Tunisia Under the Tunisian Water Code, water use rights are private rights existing prior to the commencement of the law, provided that they are recognized by the Drainage Commission. 37 The code also provides that any existing water right at the time of the publication of the code be- comes a private right. 38 Water use rights are appurtenant to the land. As a result, when land on which a water right exists is sold or transferred, the water use right is transferred to the new landowner. In addition, if the land is parceled, then a new water right must be requested and issued to reflect the change. 39 Existing rights for the use of natural spring waters located on private lands also may be recognized by the Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 295 Tunisia Water Code (1975), Art. 30. 40 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 5. 41 42 Id. at Art. 27. 43 Id. at Art. 28. Id. at Art. 29. Note that these rights must be registered and also be used only 44 for their original purposes. Id. 45 Id. at Art. 30. 46 Id. at Art. 32. Ministry of Agriculture, provided that these rights are not suitable for exploitation and use for public purposes. 40 Yemen Under the 2002 Yemen framework water law, all watercourses in the wadis (natural streams) are the common property of all beneficiaries. In contrast, all water installations and wells set up by the government are considered public property and subject to registration and licensing. 41 As evidenced by this water rights regime, the Yemen water law provides for a significant number of private water rights. Existing and acquired water rights, whether prior to the issuance of the law or thereafter, are maintained. They are not touched by the government except in times of critical need and for the public welfare. The government should compensate any infringement on the right of use. 42 Traditional water rights derived from rainwater harvesting and natural runoff flows that are tied to irrigation are protected for all own- ers of agricultural lands. The law gives due consideration to customs, traditions, and irrigation systems in effect. 43 Traditional rights of use from natural springs, brooks, creeks, and surface wells (the depth of which can not exceed 60 meters) are maintained, provided they were held prior to the issuance of the law. 44 Finally, quantities of water may be collected in cisterns, pools, or streams, provided that this acquired right does not infringe on other acquired rights and that the use accords with traditional rights and customs. 45 The only caveat for all of these rights is that they must be registered with the Water Authority within three years of the date of the announcement of the issuance of this law. 46 Allocation of Public Water Every country examined in this study has in place a scheme to allocate publicly owned water. However, as might be expected, differences 296 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Since the water legislation was passed, the proportion of crops regulated by 47 licensing has fallen considerably. Egyptian law: Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law 48 #13/1982), Art. 36. 49 Id. 50 Id. at Art. 37. In fact, the Irrigation Director may alter the flow coming through a privately constructed withdrawal on the Nile or a main canal should she/he feel it exceeds irrigation needs. However, a public hearing is required, and any increase or decrease will be at the expense of the government. Id. at Art. 40. are significant depending on whether the water allocation is tied to the land or is considered a separate right. In addition, countries differ as to which type of water abstraction requires a permit and which does not. Some countries allow underground abstraction to a certain depth while others require a license for any underground abstraction. Finally, administration of the allocation system varies among countries. Egypt As mentioned previously, water rights in Egypt are tied exclusively to land, and water rights are used only for irrigation. The effect is to create a flexible system of water allocation based on factors similar to those of the Jordan Valley Development Law, including size of the land and crop rotations. Therefore, water rights allocations are tied to land-holding and the types of crops licensed to be grown on each parcel. 47 The Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWRI) is responsible for the distribution of water in all waterways up to the mesqa level and for determining and publishing the irrigation calendar. 48 MWRI reserves the right to modify the system in accordance with agricultural needs. 49 In fact, the Irrigation Director is empowered to stop diverting water from a main canal to ensure more equitable distribution or to avoid over-application. 50 To irrigate new lands, defined as lands that have never received an irrigation license, the MWRI must approve the appropriation to ensure that there is enough water. Then a license is required from the Irrigation Director. The licensee must include in the license application the acreage, soil classification, irrigation source, irrigation technology, and cropping calendars. The Irrigation Director is then responsible to validate the data and determine how much water to allocate and which irrigation technology should be used. Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 297 51 Id. at Arts. 9–16. 52 Id. at Arts. 39–44. 53 Id. at Arts. 49–60. 54 Id. at Art. 7. Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002), Arts. 4–42. 55 Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001), Arts. 18–24 56 The Water Authority Law calls for the Water Authority to “regulate the uses of 57 water, prevent its waste and conserve its consumption.” See The Water Authority Law (#18/1988), Art. 6(h). In addition, Article 25 provides that all waters available in the Kingdom are State-owned property and may not be distributed, except in compliance with this law. Id. However, no guidance is provided in this law as to how publicly owned water will be allocated. Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001), Art. 24. 58 59 Id. at Art. 21. The law also requires licensing for any water works completed on public lands, 51 or for any water intake established on the Nile or main canals, 52 to construct any pumping stations, 53 and even to cultivate lands. 54 Each of these requirements is designed to further control the withdrawal and use of public water resources drawn from the Nile. Jordan The amalgamation of laws in Jordan covers the allocation of underground water through the Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002) and of surface/groundwater in the Jordan Valley through the Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001). These two laws work in entirely different ways. The underground water law calls for a standard permit system for well digging and water abstraction. 55 The Jordan Valley law ties water allocation to land size and crop rotations. 56 In addition, it was not apparent from any of the laws reviewed for Jordan whether it has a national scheme for allocating surface water. 57 The surface and groundwater allocation system for the Jordan Valley Authority is managed by a Board. It sets all of the necessary regulations to control the use of water in farm units in the valley. The Board determines when to allocate or cut off water flows. It also fixes the maximum quantities in accordance with water availability and the nature of the crops planted in each unit. Finally, the Board enforces the water prices set by a Cabinet of Ministers upon recommendation by the Board. 58 The Authority also may expropriate any lands, water shares, or both, as necessary for projects, either by absolute expropriation with compensation or by lease for any period it deems appropriate. 59 The law establishes a fairly complex system for estimating the value of 298 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 60 Id. 61 Id. at 22. Note that no other Agency or Ministry can execute “any construction activities” in the Jordan Valley. Id. at Art. 32. Lebanon Decree 320/26 (Titles 2–3), Art. 3. 62 63 Id. at Art. 4. 64 Id. at Art. 5. Id. 65 the lands or water rights, and provides for appeals as to the amount granted for the expropriation. 60 The Authority also has the right to take all necessary measures to implement irrigation networks and improve their works. 61 To avoid overlap, the discussion of Jordan’s Underground Water Control By-Law appears in the groundwater section. Lebanon The Lebanese framework water law provides that the state has exclusive property rights over water resources in the public domain, Nevertheless, many private water rights are held in the country. The allocation law concerning private water rights seems to focus on water extraction. For example, the use of water from wells drilled on private lands, the flow of which does not exceed 100 m 3 per day, is exempt from any permit or other authorization. 62 Under Decree 320/26, the head of state or any other delegated authority can require specific permits for: Temporary erection of structures for the use of waters in the 1. public domain Extraction of materials from a permanent or seasonal water 2. body Planting or construction on the sides of waterways 3. Prospecting for underground water (but not for its use) 4. Structures designed to control and use waters from natural sources, 5. whose flows are not sufficient to justify needing these waters for public use. 63 To drill for underground waters, permits are required. 64 Any civil engineering works on waterways require a permit that specifies the scope of the work, its nature, materials to be used, and the overall management scheme. 65 Although the duration of a permit is usually provided case by case, some activities are accorded temporary use of Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 299 66 Id. at Art. 7. The activities include (1) permanent pumping of water from a wa- terway; (2) irrigation of lands by waters of the public domain by motorized methods or the use of such waters for energy; (3) use of underground and spring waters; (4) use of hot and mineral springs; and (5) purification and development of marshes. Id. Note also that these uses may be declared public and thus subject to the specific regulations of the concessions. In such cases, the length may not exceed 75 years. Id. at Art. 12. 67 Id. at Art. 10. Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 39. 68 69 Id. at Art. 38. 70 Id. at Art. 39. 71 Id. 72 Id. up to four years. 66 If the permit is issued to a farmer, it may be renewed indefinitely for successive periods of 40 years. 67 Morocco Morocco has in place a system for allocating all water held in the public domain through a permit system administered by Catchment Basin Authorities. 68 Permits are required to (1) prospect projects for tapping underground or out-welling water, (2) construct dug wells with depths exceeding the maximum provided in law (Art. 26), (3) establish works to impound and harness natural spring water on private property, (4) establish works meant for using waters of the public domain (for five-year intervals with possibility of renewal), (5) establish intakes from the underground water table in excess of the maximum set by regulation, (6) establish water intakes on watercourses or canals de- rived from wadis, (7) establish intake of water of any kind for sale or therapeutic use, and (8) operate ferries or crossings on watercourse. 69 The permit granted by the Catchment Basin Authority specifies the duration (not to exceed 20 years), and renewal is possible. 70 The per- mit also should include the measures to be taken by the recipient to prevent water degradation, amount of the fee and payment arrange- ments, and terms of use. 71 The Authority is granted the ability to revoke a permit at any time, without compensation, following written notice, if (1) the terms of the permit have not been met, (2) utilization of the permit does not begin within two years, (3) permit is assigned or transferred without agree- ment of the Authority, (4) fees or dues are not paid, and (5) water was used for a purpose other than that authorized by the permit. 72 The Authority also may revoke, amend, or restrict the permit for reasons 300 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 73 Id. 74 Id. at Art. 41. 75 Id. 76 Id. at Art. 44. 77 Id. at Art. 45. 78 Id. at Art. 47. 79 Id. at Art. 86. 80 Id. at Art. 87. Id. 81 at Art. 88. Water Code (1975), Art. 1. The water bodies include all watercourses and the 82 land comprised within their overflow banks, springs, groundwater, lakes and subkhas, aqueducts, wells and watering places constructed in the public interest, irrigation, and navigation canals including the land comprised within their overflow banks, and their appurtenances. All belong to the public domain of the State. Id. of the public interest, subject to prior notice of not fewer than 30 days. The permit holder is entitled to compensation. 73 In addition, the law provides for a system of concessions for various categories of works, including development of thermal springs, con- struction on public water domain, water storage, flood protection, or derivation works. 74 These concessions are considered real rights, but they do not entitle the holder to the right of ownership over the water. 75 The law limits what the concessionaire may do under the contract, 76 and specifies a set of events that would forfeit the concession contract. 77 The Authority may demolish any structure constructed without a permit or concession and order the offending party to restore the area to its original condition. 78 Finally, in cases of water shortage, the law provides that the ad- ministration can declare a state of shortage, define the affected area, and enact the necessary local temporary regulations to ensure, at the least, potable water for human and livestock consumption. 79 During this period, the administration is entitled to requisition water, provided it follows prevailing law. 80 The cost imposed may be borne in part by the government. During times of shortage, specific regulations that restrict water use apply to areas under irrigation. 81 Oman The available law for Oman provided guidance only on groundwater al- location. This guidance will be discussed in the groundwater section. Tunisia Under the 1975 Water Code, Article 1, it is clear that most water in Tunisia is within the public domain. 82 Water may be used subject to a Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 301 83 Id. at Arts. 21, 52, and 53. 84 Id. at Art. 52. 85 Id. at Art. 53. In certain cases, a concession may be decreed a public utility. Id. at Art. 56. 86 Id. at Art. 60. Id. at Art. 67. Forfeiture occurs in these instances: (1) nonobservance of the law; 87 (2) if the concessionaire uses waters for purposes other than those granted in the concession; (3) if charges are not paid; (4) if the concession is transferred without authorization of the responsible authority; (5) if water is not used for a consecutive period of one year from the issuing of the concession; or (6) if the concessionaire fails to make full beneficial use of the water for a consecutive period of two years. Id. 88 Id. at Art. 9. 89 Id. at Art. 33. 90 Id. at Art. 72. simple authorization or concession, or under a water use right. 83 An authorization is required (1) to use public domain water for nonper- manent waterworks; (2) to construct infrastructures located within the overflow banks of a watercourse or on canals, lakes, and subkhas; (3) for groundwater exploration and exploitation activities, but not for the use of the water; and (4) for the exploitation and use of natural spring waters that are located on private lands but are not suitable for exploitation and use for public purposes. 84 Concessions are granted for (1) permanent water intakes in wa- tercourse beds, (2) use of underground or spring waters, (3) use of mineral and thermal waters, (4) construction of permanent dams and use of the water stored therein, and (5) drainage of lakes and subkhas and their use. 85 Concessions may be renewed, but the law is silent on the duration. 86 The law does provide for specific instances in which concessions may be forfeited. 87 In addition, the law exempts some uses from licensing requirements, including any well dug no deeper than 50 meters 88 and rainwater falling on a landowner’s property. 89 The conces- sions or authorizations can be altered or forfeited if the water is needed for a public purpose so long as compensation is paid for any damages or loss. 90 Nothing in the legislation covers the recording of water rights or the monitoring and enforcement of water abstraction licenses. Yemen Yemen is approving a series of amendments to the Framework Water Law (#33/2002). Among many other issues, the government may al- ter the process for allocating water resources. Generally, the proposed amendments are designed to address the creation of the new Ministry of Water and Environment. It has taken over the functions of several 302 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS different ministerial bodies that either predated it or were created by the 2002 law. These amendments have not been passed, so it is not possible to speculate on their impact on the water allocation law or the other issues covered in this chapter. The only area for which reli- able information on the proposed amendments is available regards the division of administrative duties, a topic addressed in the institutional section of this chapter. The 2002 Yemen framework water law provides guidance on al- location of groundwater and of water between catchment basins or zones. However, the law says little about surface water. Article 5 of the law does provide that the wadis are property in common to all beneficiaries. Thus, all water installations and water wells set up by the government are considered public property and require a license. However, these requirements are the extent of the regulation for surface water allocation. What is interesting is that the law considers allocation among basins and provides specific guidance as to when these transactions might occur. Under certain conditions (listed in the law), after review- ing all possible options and alternatives, the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) may permit the pumping of specific volumes of ground or surface water from one basin to another on a temporary or permanent basis. The six conditions are that: Conveyance does not damage the potable and domestic water. 1. Furthermore, it creates no future adverse effect on quantity and quality of the water in the basin or zone from which it was con- veyed. Water is conveyed only for drinking and domestic uses in the re- 2. cipient region. Water in the recipient basin is either insufficient to meet the needs 3. due to the shortage of the water there, or unsuitable for drinking after all other uses have been suspended. Coordination and consultation have taken place with the local 4. authorities, water basin committees, and actual beneficiaries of the water basin from which the water is conveyed. If conveyance of water damages any existing interests of beneficia- 5. ries (the holders of use rights), such damages will be compensated fairly and only once. In some cases, several possible source basins exist, and the eco- 6. nomic costs of conveyance from all or some of these basins is close Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 303 Jordan Water Authority Law (#18/1988), Art. 25. 91 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 29. 92 Tunisia Water Code (1975), Art. 23. 93 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 29. 94 Morocco Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 40. 95 96 Id. at Art. 9. to the cost of conveyance from a single basin, In these cases, due consideration shall be given to drawing the required quantities of water from more than one source to distribute the effects of drawing water among the basins accordingly. The licensing regime for groundwater is discussed in the ground- water section. Transfer of Water Rights Generally, every country reviewed for this study allows the transfer of water rights, but the mechanisms vary. In Jordan, all natural or juridical bodies may sell or transfer water from any source only with advance written approval from the ministry. The conditions of the sale or transfer will be included in a contract between the transferring party and NWRA. 91 In Lebanon, water rights are transferable by sale or inheritance, provided they have been recorded in the Land Register and were acquired before the 1926 Decree 320. Yemen provides for the transfer of all traditional or vested rights (natural springs, streams, brooks, creeks, and maintained surface wells that do not exceed a depth of 60 meters). 92 Many countries tie the transfer of land to the transfer of water rights. In Tunisia, if the land on which a water right exists is sold, the water use right is transferred with the land. The new landowner must notify the ministry of the transfer within six months of the land sale. 93 In Yemen, if the land upon which a water right exists is partitioned, the rights are apportioned by land area. 94 In Morocco, when an irrigated landholding is transferred, the water use permit passes automatically to the new owner. He or she must declare this transfer to the Catch- ment Basin Authority within three months of the change. 95 If a water permit is held separately from a land holding, for the transfer to comply with the law, the buyer must own agricultural land to which the water rights can be attached. 96 Any transfer of a permit effected separately from the holding for which it was granted is null and void and, in 304 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 97 Id. at Art. 40. 98 Id. at Art. 10. Caponera, 20. 99 Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law #12/1982), 100 Art. 32. 101 Id. at Arts. 49, 53, and 73. 102 Id. at Art. 74. effect, revokes the permit. 97 Furthermore, the holders of vested rights over water, or over water they use only partially for their land, are required to assign all or part of the rights that they do not use to either individuals or juridical persons who own agricultural holdings that can benefit from the water. 98 Water Pricing In the Islamic world, this segment of water law is perhaps the most dif- ficult to implement due to the right of shafa (“drink”) for every Muslim and his or her livestock. The Shi’ites believe that water may be trans- ferred or sold on a volumetric basis but not in globo. However, several Sunni branches are not as open to selling or transferring water. The Hanifites and Hanbalites allow only the sale of water from receptacles. In contrast, the Shafi’ites and the Malakites follow the principle that the owner of a water supply may sell and dispose of it at will, except water in a well dug for livestock. 99 Clearly, these policies allow persons to sell water from private sources. Many MNA countries charge water user fees for public water. Egypt Egypt does not charge for the water itself. However, the law envisages that the state should recover the cost of all of the money expended in administering the water. MWRI is to accomplish this by preparing an inventory of expenditures for drainage and then adding 10 percent for administrative costs. These costs are to be shared proportionally among beneficiary land owners. 100 MWRI is to impose fees on the use of government-owned water intakes, pumps, and drains. 101 In addition, anyone who draws from a government-owned pump should pay for that water if it is not meant for agricultural use. 102 Jordan Jordan has a fairly well-developed system of water charges. It charges for the base resource as well as processing fees for ground- Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 305 In Jordan, as mandated by the Underground Water Control By-Law, the financial 103 resources of the Authority consist of (among others), revenues from water prices, subscriptions, deposits, and other fees the Authority may collect for its services. Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002), Art. 15. 104 Id. at Art. 37. 105 Id. at Art. 38. It is interesting to note that water extracted from the Al-Azraq-area licensed wells that fall within specified quantities are free. Charges for withdrawals up to and then exceeding 100,000 m 3 /yr incur two separate costs. Id. 106 Id. 107 Id. 108 Id. at Art. 39. water. 103 First, a series of fees are levied for drilling licenses, drilling permit renewal, well deepening, well maintenance, and possession or use of a drilling rig. 104 The prices levied annually for water ab- stracted from private sources are fixed by law. There is no charge for water use under 150,000 m 3 /yr. There is a 25 Fils charge/m 3 /yr from 151,000–200,000 m 3 /yr, and a 60 Fils charge/m 3 /yr for over 200,000 m 3 /yr. 105 Prices also are fixed for water extracted annually from government- owned wells, for industry-owned wells, for wells used for tourism or university purposes, and for active unlicensed agricultural wells whose status will be rectified under the law. 106 There is a charge of 250 Fils per m 3 for the sale of water from wells designated as drinkable water, as well as a lesser charge for water extracted from wells designated as nondrinkable. 107 Finally, the law provides for charges imposed by the government for services rendered in supervision, technical field inspections, and other monitoring activities. 108 Lebanon Lebanese law holds that beneficiaries and users of household, irrigation, and industrial water are subject to an annual contribution fixed by, or in proportion to, their water use. However, as in many of the countries reviewed in this region, these fees were fixed by law, making readjustment very difficult. As a result, almost all of the water charges are outdated and do not reflect the full cost of the water. However, this legal lag does not take away from the extraordinary commitment by many of the countries in the region to encourage controlled water use through water fees. Morocco In Morocco, any individual or juridical person using public domain water is required to pay a water user fee. It is unclear whether the regulations 306 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Morocco Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 37. 109 110 Id. Tunisia Water Code (1975), Art. 63. 111 The law also calls for the regulation of weed control and waterway pollution 112 by agrochemicals. Egyptian National Water Resources Plan (June 2004), 17. 113 have been passed that would govern the collection and quantification of the fees. 109 Collection of fees can be enforced against either the owner or the operator of a water intake (jointly and severally liable). 110 Tunisia also provides for water use fees for authorizations or conces- sions not declared of a public nature. Charges are calculated based on the volume of water granted in the agreement. 111 Management of Water Pollution The law on managing water pollution is very rich in some countries. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen are at the forefront. Egypt The basis for the protection of surface and groundwater may be found in the Protection of the Nile from Pollution Law (#48/1982). Under it, MWRI is responsible for licensing wastewater discharge, and the Ministry of Health is responsible for monitoring effluents. Only the discharge of treated effluent is permitted, and treated wastewater from animal or human sources can be discharged only into nonpot- able water. 112 Water quality standards are provided in the Executive Regulations to Law 48 for 5 categories of water bodies. Finally, the law establishes a fund to be supported by fines and cost recovery mechanisms that can be used for water administration, donations, research, and rewards. 113 Jordan Jordan has an extensive group of laws and regulations that govern water pollution. The identification of pollutants and their use and disposal are governed under two laws: (1) Protection of the Environment Law (#13/1995) and (2) Environment Protection Law (Temporary Law #1/2003). Under the 1995 law, the dumping, disposal, or piling up of any substance that is detrimental to the environment (solid, liquid, gaseous, radial, or heat in water sources) is prohibited. Storing any of these substances within a specified proximity to water sources also is Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 307 Jordan Protection of Environment Law (#13/1995), Art. 26. 114 The Environment Protection Law for Jordan (#1/2003), Arts. 6 and 11. 115 116 Id. at Art. 13. 117 Id. 118 Id. at Art. 17. Jordan Law of Public Health (#21/1971). 119 Jordan Wastewater Regulations (#36/1994). 120 prohibited. However, the law provide exceptions for certain substances: those used to treat pollutants, to fight epidemics (including weeds, flies, and rodents—all within approved specifications), and to carry out experiments or research. 114 The 2003 law expands upon the provisions of the 1995 law with articles that address the importation, use, storage, and disposal of environmentally detrimental substances. 115 This law also provides that any owner of a factory or workshop, or any person who practices any activity that negatively impacts the environment, should install devices to prevent or reduce the diffusion of such pollutants to meet the stan- dards established by the ministry. 116 In addition, this law entitles the minister to require any legal entity or party to prepare an environmental evaluation of its activities prior to the law’s coming into force. 117 A set of penalties applies to any violations of the law. 118 One other large body of law deals with the collection and treatment of wastewater. A Law on Public Health provides the basic framework for establishing the wastewater network in Jordan. 119 Supporting this law is a major Wastewater Regulation (#36/1994), which provides the regulations for the disposal of wastewater. Under the law, it is prohibited to dispose of waste and liquids (with some noted excep- tions) into the public watercourse without having treated the water and acquired a written approval from the Water Authority. The law also governs the management of public and private wastewater disposal with provisions mandating connection to public systems at a cost to the user. As would be expected, the Water Authority is entitled to act on any violation through fining or even blocking a watercourse to prevent further pollution. 120 As with the other water issues discussed previously, Jordan maintains a slightly different regime for the Jordan Valley. Articles of the Jordan Valley Development Law ban the importation of cer- tain chemicals. The authority is given the ability to monitor water pollution through periodic testing. The authority also possesses the right to cut off or alter water sources that have been polluted to 308 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001). 121 Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 51. 122 123 Id. at Art. 52. 124 Id. at Art. 54. 125 Id. at Art. 56. 126 Id. at Art. 55. 127 Id. at Art. 12. Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 24. 128 129 Id. at Art. 59. prevent further damage. A series of penalties are made available for enforcement. 121 Morocco The Moroccan framework water law empowers the administration to prescribe quality standards for water according to its use. Waste- water and polluted water are distinguished and treated separately. 122 Any person seeking to discharge effluents into surface or groundwater must apply for a permit with the Catchment Basin Authority. Thirty days are allowed for public inquiry, after which the permit may be is- sued for a fee. 123 The law outright forbids seven distinct activities such as dumping wastewater or solid waste into dry wadis, dug wells, or water sources; and washing linens or food products in water supply sources. 124 The Catchment Basin Authority is authorized to periodically monitor the point source. 125 The Authority may take any appropriate actions against any nuisance that could affect public health or safety. 126 The law also governs any kind of excavation or works that might affect a watercourse and, in a number of instances, calls for formal authorizations from the Authority. Certain acts that might damage a watercourse or its banks are prohibited. 127 Yemen Yemen also has a permit system in place, under the framework law, for any activity that changes the physical or chemical characteristics of water. 128 All entities that dispose of liquid, solid, radiation, thermal, or lubricant wastes must follow executive regulations (not yet in force) and the framework law regarding their transport, handling, and disposal. Special regulations (also not yet in force) will apply to the Protected Water Zones, which are determined by NWRA. The Authority also is empowered to protect all water resources from pollution. Last, NWRA monitors water quantity and quality. 129 NWRA is free to alter or change Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 309 130 Id. at Art. 58. 131 Id. at Art. 54. Morocco Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 94. 132 133 Id. at Art. 96. The law also provides a special provision for agricultural land, stating that the government may execute works necessary for the protection of property and utilization of water on such lands. Id. at Art. 85. Tunisian Water Code (1975), Art. 72. 134 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 61. 135 Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law #12/1982), 136 Art. 6. any permit in cases in which circumstances changed after the permit was issued and for which continued operation under the permit would cause damage. 130 The National Water Supply and Sanitation Author- ity (NWSA) is called on to regulate the disposal of industrial wastes, fertilizer, and pesticides; and other hazardous substances. 131 Flood Control Given the fact that most surface water sources (such as wadis) are fed seasonally, provisions for flood control have been made in several countries. In Morocco, the protection of public property is the only purpose for which the construction of submersible lands, dikes, or levees to hinder floodwater runoff does not require a permit. 132 The Catchment Basin Authority is entitled to construct any dike or other structure if doing so is in the public interest to prevent flooding. 133 Under Tunisian law, permits granted for water use may be forfeited or varied in case of flood. 134 The Yemen Water Law grants the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation the responsibility for controlling and regulating rainy areas that get rainwater runoff and flooding, their related collections areas, and the water flow and drainage passages. The ministry also is called on to prepare a plan for rainwater runoff and flood drainage outlets, and to collaborate with other related entities and local authorities in executing this plan. The law further provides several provisions on erosion control, including protecting agricultural terraces. 135 Egypt has in place a somewhat unique flood control legal regime. The Irrigation and Drainage Law is clear in granting the government immunity from any fault for flood damage to lands or infrastructure neighboring the Nile or main canals. 136 Because flooding can happen quickly, several people are authorized to gather citizens to prevent breaches of the banks of the Nile or main canal. The people empowered to organize flood prevention teams include the chief engineer and the 310 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 137 Id. at Arts. 78–80. 138 Id. at Art. 77. Morocco Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 114. 139 mayor or community leader. 137 MWRI also is entitled to take action when water levels are high. 138 Penalties The enforcement of water laws can be accomplished through a system of both carrots and sticks. It appears that the majority of countries in the region have opted more for the stick (command and control regula- tion) than the carrot approach. Every country except Egypt provides for the possibility of both imprisonment and/or fines. The penalties are meted out for violations of the laws that affect both the quality (anti- pollution provisions, effluent standards, permitting, implementation of best available technology) and quantity (drilling without a permit, illegal use of water) of the resource. Most countries include the penalties within the water legislation, but Lebanon has chosen instead to include all of the pollution control penalties in the penal code. Several countries, such as Morocco, have opted to leave many of the specifics as to fine amounts and terms of imprisonment to regulations. The majority of the other countries pro- vide specific maximum and/or minimum penalties for every offense. In the majority of countries, the lead water authority is charged with the enforcement of all penalties. However, Morocco takes a unique approach by calling on the police force, agents commissioned by the administration, and the Catchment Basin Authority to enforce the laws after swearing to uphold the law. 139 Planning and Development and Information The importance of long-term planning in the water sector has come into greater importance only in the last decade as water shortages coupled with dramatic increases in demand have captured the attention of policymakers. Only the most recent framework laws in the Middle East and North Africa region include any significant coverage of plan- ning for the water sector. Both Yemen and Morocco have developed significant legal frameworks for planning. However, as with enforce- ment, the larger issue is really how well the law is applied. Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 311 140 Id. at Art. 15. 141 Id. at Art. 16. 142 Id. at Art. 17. 143 Id. at Art. 16. Although information gathering is critical for planning, almost no law includes any significant attention to providing a structure to gather information and translate it into plans for the short, medium, and long term. Morocco The catchment basin is the chosen planning and organizational unit. 140 Under the water law, the administration is responsible for developing integrated water resources development master plans for each catch- ment basin or group of catchment basins. 141 These plans are designed to last for 20 years. The opportunity for revision is available every five years or if there are exceptional circumstances that require a change. Regulations govern the procedures for revision. 142 The law provides specifics as to what each integrated development master plan should include: Territorial boundaries of basin(s) to which it applies. 1. Assessment and development, in both quantity and quality, of 2. water resources and needs within the basin. Plan for water-sharing among the various sectors of basin and chief 3. water usages therein. Where appropriate, this plan shall specify which surplus water quantities may be transferred from one basin to another. Operations required for harnessing, distributing, protecting, and 4. restoring water resources and public water domain, notably water infrastructure. Quality goals and deadlines and required measures for achieving 5. them. Priority ranking to be applied in water-sharing pursuant to point(3) 6. above, and measures required to cope with exceptional climatic conditions. General scheme of water development of basin required to ensure 7. conservation of resources and their adaptation to needs. Safeguarding and interdiction perimeters. 8. Special conditions of water utilization, notably those relating to its 9. optimal use, preserving its quality, and combating waste. 143 312 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 144 Id. at Art. 19. Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 13. 145 146 Id. at Arts. 13–14. Id. 147 at Art. 16. 148 Id. at Art. 17. 149 Id. 150 Id. at Art. 19. 151 Id. at Art. 25. The administration also is responsible for developing a National Water Plan based on the results and conclusions of the catchment basin integrated water resources development master plans. The na- tional plan is approved by decree after consultation with the Council for Water and Climate. The national plan is prepared for at least 20 years, with the possibility of revision every 5 years. The law provides the specifics of what the national plan should cover, including national priorities, timetable and program for completion of all works, linkages to land-use development plans, support measures including education and grassroots work, and the conditions for transferring water among catchment basins in times of shortage. 144 Yemen In Yemen, the water planning units are water basins and water zones. 145 The NWRA is responsible for all planning. It is charged with devel- oping a classification system for water basins and water zones; and determining indicators of the water situation; trends for demand; and short-, medium-, and long-term water budgets. 146 The law provides that NWRA must develop water plans for each water basin and water zone. After they are ratified by the Council of Ministers, these plans become part of the National Water Plan. 147 The process for gathering the standards, data, and measures used to develop the unit plans is governed in separate executive regulations. However, the law does provide a list of what should be included in these plans. 148 Priority is given to critical water basins or zones by preparing these plans first. 149 Water plans are binding on everyone, and acting outside of their guidelines or contrary to their stipulations is forbidden under the law. 150 Coordination of the National Water Plan is important, because two other ministries are responsible for issuing plans in the water sector. The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation is charged with preparing and implementing plans and programs related to the control of wadi flows and general canals, monitoring rainwater runoff and floods, and overseeing the use of irrigation water and installations. 151 Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 313 152 Id. at Art. 26. 153 Id. at Art. 19. 154 Id. at Arts. 15 and 17. Egypt has a small provision in Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation 155 and Drainage (Law #12/1982) that states that drainage water may not be reused for irrigation unless MWRI issues a license. The reuse must be in accordance with the conditions of the permit. Art. 46. The Protection of the Nile from Pollution (Law #48/1982) regulates the reuse of drainage water. The Ministry of Electricity and Water is responsible for preparing policies and executive plans for the water and sanitation sector. 152 To facilitate cooperation among these plans, the National Water Plan is considered one of the components of the economic and social devel- opment plans of the government, thereby suggesting that it reaches the highest levels of Government. 153 NWRA is charged with reviewing other sectoral plans and coordinating with relevant concerned entities before preparing the National Water Plan. 154 Wastewater Reuse Wastewater reuse is of tremendous potential importance for the region. It can serve as additional supply for irrigated farming and groundwater injection, thereby reducing groundwater overdraws that plague many MNA countries. Fortunately, many countries have in place provisions to govern the handling, and in particular, the reuse of wastewater. Jordan, Morocco, Oman, and Yemen have included wastewater reuse provisions in their laws. 155 Jordan Under the Reclaimed Domestic Wastewater Standard Specification (Standard No. 893/2002), the reuse of reclaimed water to replenish artificial groundwater is allowed if its quality meets agreed standards. However, using groundwater replenishments for aquifers used for drinking is forbidden. Reclaimed water is prohibited in irrigating veg- etables eaten raw and in sprinkler irrigation. Irrigating fruit trees with reclaimed water must be stopped two weeks prior to harvest time. The uses for reclaimed water allowed by the law are split into three different classes, each requiring different quality standards: Field crops, industrial crops, and forest trees 1. Fruit trees, sides of roads outside city limits, and green areas 2. 314 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The Reclaimed Domestic Wastewater Standard Specification, Jordanian Stan- 156 dard, No. 893/2002. Morocco Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 57. 157 158 Id. at Art. 84. 159 Id. at Art. 57. Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 26. 160 161 Id. 162 Id. at Art. 47. Cooked vegetables, parks, playgrounds, and sides of roads within 3. city limits. 156 Morocco The central administration is charged with prescribing the conditions for the use of wastewater. Any use of wastewater requires an au- thorization granted by the Catchment Basin Authority. 157 The use of wastewater for agricultural purposes that do not meet the standards set in regulation is prohibited. 158 To encourage the proper reuse of wastewater, users are entitled to government financial assistance and technical assistance from Authority if the use achieves water economies and preserves water resources against further pollution. 159 Yemen The Ministry of Electricity and Water is responsible for the treatment and disposal of wastewater in accordance with a uniform system that conforms to qualitative and environmental standards. 160 However, the reuse of wastewater is allowed only after coordinating with NWRA and other affected populations nearby. 161 NWRA is responsible for issuing the reuse permits for treated wastewater that must meet spe- cific conditions, standards, and specifications described in separate regulations. 162 Oman Under Ministerial Decree (#5/1986) on Regulations for Wastewater Re-use and Discharge, it is permitted to reuse wastewater in four situations: (1) a buried drip-feed system to irrigate ornamental trees and shrubs in areas in which there should not be public exposure; (2) approved groundwater recharge areas in which there should not be public exposure (may include open lands or wadis); (3) reuse of treated effluent for industrial processes within a closed-circuit system that will pose no dangers to the workers; and (4) flood, hosepipe, Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 315 Oman Ministerial Decree (#5/1986) on Regulations for Wastewater Re-use 163 and Discharge, Art. 6. 164 Id. at Art. 15. 165 Id. at Art. 11. 166 Id. at Art. 14. 167 Id. at Art. 13. Jordan Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002), Art. 41. 168 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 33. 169 170 Id. at Art. 29. A permit is required only for drilling over 60 meters. Id. Morocco Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 26. The minimum depth at which a permit 171 is required is to be fixed by regulation. Id. Lebanon Decree No. 14438, Art. 2. Under this article, a permit is required only 172 for drilling over 150 meters. Id. Jordan Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002), Art. 8. 173 174 Id. at Arts. 31–33. sprinkler, or spray irrigation, on condition of prior consent from the ministry. The full details and nature of reuse of treated effluent for industrial purposes within a closed circuit system are provided in the permit for discharge. 163 Wastewater quality requirements for reuse and discharge are provided in table I of the Ministerial Decree (#5/1986). The reuse of wastewater or sludge containing radioactive material is not permitted. 164 The law provides specific instruction as to how owners of waste- water treatment plants should handle and transport sludge. Each is required to keep a detailed record specifying at least (1) date of delivery; (2) name and address of contractor or user of sludge; and (3) quantity delivered. 165 These regulations do not apply to owners of septic tanks and holding tanks, as they are subject to a separate set of regulations (not available). 166 Finally, if wastewater or sludge is used in a manner outside the stated limits and represents a risk to public health, the ministry or approved authorities reserve the right to inspect, record, and request samples and tests in accordance with a separate royal decree (#10/1982). 167 Groundwater Management All of the countries reviewed in this study require some form of au- thorization for drilling new wells, but this is their only similarity. Only Jordan 168 and Yemen 169 have laws with provisions for registering preex- isting wells. Yemen, 170 Morocco, 171 and Lebanon 172 do not require well permits unless the well will exceed a certain depth. Jordan requires a permit for all well-drilling activities regardless of depth. 173 Jordan 174 316 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Oman Ministerial Decision (#2/1990), Arts. 21–28. 175 Jordan Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002), Art. 34. 176 Egypt Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law 177 #12/1982), Art. 46. 178 Id. Without violating the provisions of the Jordan Valley Development Law in force, 179 the rules governing the construction of public and private water wells, methods of using the underground water extracted therefrom, and quantities thereof are determined by regulatory decisions issued by the Board upon the submission by the minister. Id. at Art. 7. 180 Id. at Arts. 8–31. 181 Id. at Art. 28. 182 Id. at Art. 27. 183 Id. at Arts. 31–35. 184 Id. at Arts. 40–42. However, there is no provision as to the creation of a cadastre for preexisting wells. 185 Id. at Arts. 11–12. and Oman 175 are the only countries to require a license for professional drillers. Jordan also requires a license for drilling rigs. 176 Given these significant differences, each country’s legal approach to groundwater management is detailed individually below. Egypt In accordance with relevant regulations, a license from MWRI is required to dig any groundwater well (shallow or deep) within na- tional lands. 177 For desert lands, Special Law #143/1981 applies. This law requires that a license must be obtained from MWRI, but only after meeting the approval of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation. 178 Jordan Jordan maintains perhaps the most complete and extensive legal framework for managing groundwater resources. The central piece of legislation is the Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002). 179 This by-law governs the permitting system for drilling any new well; 180 deepening, cleaning, or maintaining existing wells; 181 digging substitute wells; 182 and licensing drill operators and drilling rigs. 183 In addition, a system to register and monitor preexisting wells 184 and provisions governing the use of underground water and the transfer or sale of wells are in place. 185 Under the by-law, the ministry is charged with performing the technical studies for all underground water resources, including any exploratory activity; monitoring the quality and quantity of the resource; Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 317 186 Id. at Art. 4. The competent officials nominated by the minister or secretary general have the right to enter any land for conducting studies or investigation or collection of information related to underground water or for carrying out any mea- sures related to the by-law. Id. at Art. 6. The law requires that any landowner who discovers water seeping up on his or her land notify the secretary general in writing within seven days of the discovery. Id. at Art. 15. 187 Id. at Art. 6. An exception occurs when ministries, governmental departments, official institutes, universities, and the industry and tourism sectors find it impossible to secure their water needs from the public water supply network. In this case, the Board may grant any of them a license to drill wells in the prohibited areas pursuant to the provisions of the by-law. Id. at Art. 6. No drilling licenses may be granted in the Jordan Valley areas without consultation 188 with the Jordan Valley Authority. Id. at Art. 22. The board also retains the right to reject any drilling license application if the public interest requires it. Id. at Art. 23. 189 Id. at Art. 9. This process must be completed within six months of receipt of the permit application. Id. There are certain limitations to granting drilling permits: (a) the distance between 190 drilling permits granted can not be less than one km (Art. 25); (2) granting more than one license per plot of land is prohibited (Art. 30); (3) a drilling permit may not be given to anyone who holds a valid drilling license for another well that has not been completed (Art. 21); and (4) any person who has violated this by-law more than once is no longer eligible for a drilling permit (Art. 21). and identifying the appropriate uses of these resources. 186 On the submission of the minister, a board determines the maximum quantity of underground water permitted to be extracted annually from each groundwater basin, within the limits of safe yield. With board approval, the Council of Ministers can identify areas in which drilling is prohib- ited, provided such resolutions are published in the “Official Gazette” and two local newsletters. 187 The Water Authority is responsible for administering all of the permitting procedures. 188 The drilling permit system has the following key provisions. First, before granting a permit, the Water Authority is required to carry out a pumping test before the well may be used. The test measures the well production capacity and water quality to determine the amount of water that can be extracted annually, and the possible uses for the resource. 189 After the study performed by the Authority, the applica- tion for the drilling license may be submitted. It must include a recent real estate deed for the relevant plot of land. The secretary general publishes the application in two publications at the licensee’s expense. Any person has 15 days within which to raise an objection. After the expiration of this period, the secretary general presents the applica- tion to the board for final decision. If approved, the minister issues the drilling license, 190 which contains the specifics, including the permitted depth. The license is valid for one year, renewable by decision of the 318 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 191 Id. at Art. 21. 192 Id. at Art. 10. If any areas were found to be polluted or depleted, the board should take a decision to set the appropriate measures that would end such pollu- tion or depletion and restore the natural balance to the aquifer or the underground water basin. Such measures could include the rationalization or reduction of the extraction rate. Id. at Art. 16. 193 Id. at Art. 11. 194 Id. at Art. 17. 195 Id. at Art. 18. minister. The license is deemed cancelled if drilling is not completed within the established time. 191 Each drilling permit has a series of other conditions that apply, some of which are listed below: Licensee is prohibited from undertaking any activities that could N cause pollution or deplete the resource. 192 Owner or the possessor of a private well is prohibited from (1) ir- N rigating any land other than that specified in the water extraction license or selling this water for irrigation; and (2) selling the water extracted from the well by water-tankers for drinking or any other purpose without obtaining a prior written approval from the secre- tary general, or his delegate, and according to conditions outlined for this purpose. 193 On the submission of the secretary general, the board may cancel a drilling or extraction license if the licensee violates any of the license conditions, or if the public interest so requires. 194 In addition, the sec- retary general may take any of the following measures: (1) backfill any well drilled without a license in pursuance of the provisions of this by- law; (2) backfill any well whose owner did not abide by the conditions of the license granted thereto. The offender must bear the costs of rectifying these violations. Should the offender not rectify the offense, the license is cancelled. 195 Every owner of a drilling permit also must obtain a license for water abstraction from the secretary general or a delegated authority. Eight conditions are required to be included in the application: Maximum amount of water that may be extracted from the well 1. within a fixed period. Purpose of water use. 2. Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 319 196 Id. at Art. 29. 197 Id. at Art. 34. 198 Id. at Art. 35. 199 Id. at Art. 36. Lebanon Decree #320/1926, Art. 6. 200 Lebanon Decree #14438/1970, Art. 2. 201 202 Id. at Arts. 3–4. Maximum area that may be irrigated using water from the well 3. licensed for agricultural purposes. Installation, at the expense of the well owner, of a water meter 4. that has been approved and stamped by the Authority. This con- dition should be met prior to the issuance of the water extraction license. Notification of the Authority within a period not exceeding 48 5. hours in case of nonfunction of the water-meter. The owner of the well shall reimburse the Authority for the fixed maintenance expenses. Taking no measure that impedes the flow of water from the well 6. directly to the water meter that will measure it. Obligation of the licensee to pay to the Authority, in time, the 7. prices fixed for the extracted water. Maintaining by the licensee of a register, approved by the Author- 8. ity, in which all data relating to the well and extraction shall be registered regularly in accordance with instructions issued by the Authority. 196 A license for drilling operators may be obtained from the sec- retary general. It is valid for one year and renewable for the same period. 197 In turn, the Authority is required to keep official records of rigs and drillers and all activities related to the profession. 198 Licenses granted for drilling rigs themselves are obtained from the Authority. It is prohibited to transfer a drilling rig to a different site without an additional permit. 199 Lebanon Citizens may prospect for groundwater, provided an application is made to the administration 200 for any well that will exceed 150 meters. 201 Decree #14438/1970 provides details of what should be included in the application. Specifics include the location and aim of the works, copy of the land registry, and survey maps. 202 After the application 320 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 203 Id. at Art. 5. 204 Id. at Arts. 6 and 10. 205 Id. at Art. 11. 206 Id. at Arts. 15–16. 207 Id. at Art. 13. Morocco Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 26. 208 209 Id. at Art. 89. 210 Id. at Art. 92–93 211 Id. at Art. 49. 212 Id. at Art. 50. has been presented, the Directorate General for Equipment within the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity examines the permit and makes a recommendation to the minister. 203 Once granted, the proposal will provide the specifics as to the location of the well, modes of prospecting, data required for collection, and determination of taxes to be paid by the applicant. 204 Any use of underground water that did not result from the drilling of a well is governed by a decree that grants temporary occupation of four years. 205 The decree includes information on the nature of the use, number, and size of the properties concerned; maximum authorized quantities; and required equipment and installations. 206 A permit is not required for the use of water from a drilled well on private property if the use does not exceed 100 m 3 per day and the water does not come directly from a river or water course. 207 Morocco Under the Morocco Water Law, a license is required to drill any well that would exceed a depth to be determined by regulation. 208 Any person wishing to drill a well may approach the administration for information as to the technical, hydrological, and hydrogeological characteristics of the proposed site. Authorizations are granted by the Catchment Basin Authority. 209 After receiving the authorization, the well driller is required to provide the Authority with any data required and to permit the Authority to enter on his/her property at any time to do so. 210 One of the most interesting provisions deals with safeguard perimeters in areas in which groundwater levels appear to be low. Within these perimeters, prior authorization is required to drill, reconstruct wells, and/or extract water. 211 Some exceptions might be made in the case of severe shortages, but the water extracted could be used only for consumption by people or livestock. 212 Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 321 Oman Ministerial Decision (#2/1990), Art. 5. 213 214 Id. at Art. 7. 215 Id. at Art. 16. 216 Id. at Art. 14. 217 Id. at Art. 17. 218 Id. at Art. 21. Note that a contractor can appeal any refusal for certification. Id. at Art. 22. 219 Id. at Art. 23. 220 Id. at Art. 28. Tunisia Water Code (1975), Art. 52. 221 222 Id. at Art. 53. 223 Id. at Art. 75. It is not clear whether this decree has been passed and, if so, what provisions it includes. Oman The Ministry of Water Resources is charged with specifying the water quantity discharged from any well and is responsible for monitoring the use through well meters issued to each well owner. These meters are the responsibility of the well owner, who must keep them in working order. 213 Permits may be granted to landowners for any groundwater exploration activities. These include the construction of a new well, modifications to an existing well, change in the use of an existing well, or installation of a pump in a borehole. 214 The permit holder must reg- ister his/her well permit to obtain a Well Registration Certificate and a Well Registration Plate, to be placed on the well. To register, the responsible authority must verify that the permit holder has complied with the conditions set in the permit. 215 At any time, Ministry of Water Resources staff may enter the property of a permit holder to inspect, take samples, or carry out tests. 216 No well construction, development, maintenance, modification, yield testing, or pump installation on boreholes may be carried out except by a government-registered contractor. 217 Contractors are classified into categories that reflect their technical capabilities and qualifications. 218 Registration is valid for one year and subject to re- newal. 219 The contractor is responsible for making sure that any well s/he works on has a permit. 220 Tunisia Groundwater exploration activities are subject to an authorization. 221 In contrast, the extraction and use of groundwater are subject to a concession. 222 Detailed provisions on groundwater are said to be set by a specific decree (not available). 223 322 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Jordan Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002), Art. 29. 224 225 Id. at Art. 35. 226 Id. at Art. 39. 227 Id. at Art. 42. Id. at Art. 42. The following activities are considered: (1) drilling water wells; 228 (2) sites and general plans for water and irrigation installations; (3) general plans for water treatment and distillation; (4) protected wells, streams, creeks, and natural springs; (5) drilling equipment; and (6) pumps. Id. at Art. 46. 229 Id. at Art. 44. Yemen The Water Law provides a licensing regime to control drilling and to classify drilling operators, and provisions to control the equipment used in drilling wells. Under the drilling permit system, a permit is required for any well that will exceed a depth of 60 meters. 224 To deepen a well, no permit is required if it is the first time and the depth does not exceed an additional 20 meters. 225 All procedures for the administra- tion of the permit process are to be detailed in regulations yet to be formulated. However, there is some guidance on how to register the wells. Holders of permits to drill wells must approach the NWRA within three months of completing the authorized works to register the wells. Well owners acquire their water rights within 15 days of presenting the application. 226 Contractors and engineering offices must obtain a permit from the NWRA for three activities: (1) drilling water wells; (2) exploring for groundwater, executing consultancy studies, and carrying out works in the field of water resources: and (3) distributing well wa- ters, whether directly or indirectly, through private supply networks or by bottling it. 227 Any natural or legal person must register her/his offices or firms with the NWRA to obtain a license to undertake any groundwater exploration activities. 228 In addition, all important drilling rigs or water well metal casings must meet specifications issued by the NWRA. 229 Institutional Arrangements Jordan In 1992 the Administrative Organization for the Ministry of Water and Irrigation Law (#54/1992) consolidated the previous administrative system under one ministry. According to the law, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Water Authority, and Jordan Valley Authority all come Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 323 Jordan Administrative Organization for the Ministry of Water and Irrigation 230 Law (#54/1992), Art. 3. 231 Id. at Art. 4. 232 Id. at Art. 5. For their duties, as described within the law, see Articles 9–16 of the Jor- 233 dan Administrative Organization for the Ministry of Water and Irrigation Law (#54/1992). 234 Id. at Art. 6. 235 Id. at Art. 9. 236 Id. at Art. 17. 237 Id. at Art. 18. under the purview of the Minister of Water and Irrigation. 230 As a result, the minister assumes responsibility for WRM in the Kingdom. WRM includes the roles and responsibilities set out in the Water Authority Law (#18/1988) and the Jordan Valley Authority Law (#19/1988). 231 Ministry of Water and Irrigation The Ministry of Water and Irrigation consists of a secretary general, the minister’s office, and six directorates. They are (1) Planning, De- velopment and Information, (2) Financing and Loans, (3) Legal Affairs, (4) Citizens’ Service, (5) Financial and Administrative Affairs, and (6) Projects Follow-up. 232 The roles of these directorates are outlined in the law. 233 The secretary general is responsible for implementing the ministry’s policy and running its affairs according to the laws in force. 234 In addition, the directorates report to the secretary general, who channels the information to the minister. 235 The law creates one additional body, the Consultative Body, which is formed in the ministry and chaired by the minister. The Consultative Body’s three core members are the (1) Secretary General of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, (2) Secretary General of the Water Authority, and (3) Secretary General of the Jordan Valley Authority. Four additional members may be added, on the recommendation of the minister. 236 The consultative body is charged with providing the minister with technical, economic, legal, financial, and administrative advice on policy, water planning, and strategies. 237 Water Authority One of the key bodies incorporated under the Minister of Water and Irrigation is the Water Authority, created by law in 1988 as an autonomous body with financial and administrative independence. This ministry is charged with the full responsibility for all water and 324 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Jordan Water Authority Law and Amendments thereof (#18/1988). 238 239 Id. at Art. 6. 240 Id. at Art. 12. 241 Id. at Art. 23. 242 Id. at Arts. 8–9. 243 Id. at Art. 10. wastewater systems and related projects. 238 Among the many tasks and responsibilities assumed by the Water Authority are to (1) estab- lish plans and programs to implement water policies and exploit the resources for domestic and municipal purposes; (2) administer the licensing regime for groundwater; (3) study, design, construct, oper- ate, and maintain water and public wastewater projects; (4) develop standards and special requirements for the preservation of water and water basins (quality and quantity); (5) carry out related research and studies on water and wastewater; (6) regulate the uses of water, prevent its waste, and conserve its consumption. 239 The secretary general is the executing agent for the Water Au- thority. 240 The Authority is empowered to establish additional depart- ments for implementing all of its duties as it sees fit. In addition, water departments are to be established in all parts of the Kingdom, with a Water Council in each department. These councils are to provide citizens and local authorities with the opportunity to participate in deciding priorities regarding water and wastewater projects and plans for implementation. Gathering from all of these sources, the Author- ity is responsible to submit to the Council of Ministers a report on the Authority’s activities, general budget, and balance covering the preceding year. 241 Supporting the Authority is a Board of Directors made up of related ministries’ representatives. The board meets when called upon by the Minister of Water and Irrigation, who is its chairperson. 242 The board is responsible for setting water policy, approving policies and plans for the development and conservation of water, reviewing the Authority’s draft regulations and submitting them to the Council of Ministers for approval, reviewing the annual budget, obtaining foreign and local loans, recommending water fees and pricing tariffs, investing the Authority’s revenue, and appointing members to district Water Councils. 243 Jordan Valley Authority The other important body incorporated under the Minister of Wa- ter and Irrigation is the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), created by Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 325 Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001 as amended), Art. 3. 244 245 Id. at Art. 9. 246 Id. at Arts. 8–12. 247 Id. at Art. 13. 248 Id. at Art. 17. 249 Id. at Art. 36. law in 1988 under the Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001 as amended). The JVA is responsible for carrying out the social and economic development of the Valley, including the development of all water resources and the works associated with water use and con- servation. In particular, the JVA (1) carries out studies for evaluating water resources (both surface and groundwater); (2) plans, designs, and carries out irrigation projects and related works, including dams, hydropower stations, well-pumping stations, reservoirs, distribution networks, drainage works, and flood protection works; (3) surveys and classifies soil to determine lands suitable for irrigation; (4) settles disputes on water use; and (5) organizes and directs the construc- tion of private and public wells. In addition, the JVA is responsible for protecting and improving the environment in the Valley. The JVA’s duties also extend to developing tourism in the Valley and studying and improving the agricultural road network. 244 JVA is made up of the minister, board of directors, secretary general, executing staff, and administrative units. 245 These different groups work together in much the same way as the administration of the Water Authority. 246 Because the JVA is considered an autono- mous corporate body, it, too, may raise funds; lease, purchase, and acquire land or immovable properties; and borrow through bond is- sues. 247 JVA also may raise funds through fees and can benefit from national or international grants or loans. All funds raised are placed in a special account in the Central Bank to be administered by a Special Treasury established by the JVA. The withdrawal of any monies is to be governed by regulation. 248 Given the relative financial autonomy of the JVA, it is responsible for a series of reports to the Cabinet of Ministers, including annual reports on works undertaken or completed, audits, future planned works or projects, and any other data requested by the Cabinet. 249 Relevant ministries and coordination Two ministries share the responsibility for managing potable water and protecting water quality. The Ministry of Health is charged with the 326 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Jordan Temporary Public Health Law (#54/2002), Art. 39. 250 251 Id. at Art. 41. 252 Id. at Art. 52. Jordan Environment Protection Law (Temporary Law #1/2003), Art. 3. 253 Jordan Protection of Environment Law (#12/1995), Art. 6. 254 Jordan Environment Protection Law (Temporary Law #1/2003), Art. 4. 255 The Jordan Standards and Specifications Law (#22/2000), Art. 5. 256 257 Egypt’s Concerning the Issue on Irrigation and Drainage Law (#12/1982), Art. 4. 258 Id. at Art. 5. 259 Id. at Art. 18. 260 Id. at Art .5. 261 Id. at Art. 31. control of potable water to ensure its fitness for human consumption. 250 In so doing, it is entitled to control (1) potable water resources and their networks to ensure that they are not affected by pollution; and (2) the method used for treating, transmitting, and storing water. 251 The Ministry of Health also is charged with managing sewage networks, including all treatment stations, to ensure that health conditions are maintained. 252 The Ministry of Environment is the competent authority for devel- oping all standards and specifications governing environmental protec- tion, including water resources. 253 The Ministry of Water and Irrigation is a member of the Council for the Protection of the Environment, which is chaired by the Minister of Environment. 254 The Ministry of Environment conducts all research, issues all regulations and enforces them, prepares all emergency environmental plans, and executes all awareness-building efforts for the environment. 255 One final government body, the Standards and Specifications Cor- poration, is responsible for issuing all of the standard specifications and technical rules. In addition, the corporation is responsible for supervising the application of all standard specifications. 256 Egypt The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) oversees all public-water-related entities but can outsource management responsi- bilities to other ministries or public authorities. 257 MWRI’s responsibili- ties include the protection of Nile and Main Canal banks, O&M of all publicly owned infrastructure, 258 allocating water up to the main canals, adjudicating water rights conflicts, 259 enforcing the provisions of the Ir- rigation and Drainage Law (#12/1982), 260 and building and maintaining the covered drain systems. 261 Mayors and village elites are charged with Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 327 262 Id. at Art. 101. The local water offices are characterized by conflicts of jurisdiction and fraction- 263 alization. In fact, the state has begun gradually repurchasing hydraulic concessions granted to improve control of water use. Lebanon Decree No. 20 (1966). 264 Lebanon Decree No. 320, Arts. 30–56. 265 Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995), Arts. 13–14. 266 267 Id. at Art. 20. 268 Id. at Art. 13. protecting the industrial works for irrigation and drainage that have been handed over to them in accordance with MWRI decisions. 262 Lebanon At the national level, the Ministry of Energy and Water is charged with managing all water projects, applying the laws and regulations regarding the protection and use of public waters, supervising the work of 44 autonomous offices and the commissions responsible for water, 263 and controlling water concessions. The ministry is divided into two directorates: (1) Water Infrastructure and (2) Management. The Directorate for Water Infrastructure (équipement hydraulique) oversees the construction of all hydraulic equipment and has delegated to the 44 water offices and commissions the responsibility for distributing water to users. 264 The Directorate for Management has responsibility for overseeing the 44 water agencies (granted by decree from the state) and controls water concessions. Decree 320 provides for the possibility of owners to enter into partnerships to undertake certain works, including flood control, clean- up and maintenance of watercourses, marsh drainage, and organizing collective irrigation. The decree provides a series of administrative procedures for creating the partnership. In over 60 years of operation, only 1 project has come to fruition. 265 Morocco The Moroccan Water Law establishes two government bodies that are responsible to support the government’s role in managing water resources in the country. These bodies are the (1) High Council on Water and Climate 266 and (2) Catchment Basin Authority. 267 The High Council formulates the general guidelines of national water and climate policy. In particular, it is responsible for commenting on the national strategy to improve knowledge of the resources, the national water plan, and integrated WRM plans for the catchment basins. 268 Member- 328 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 269 Id. at Art. 14. 270 Id. at Art. 20. ship of the High Council includes government officials, scientific and academic communities, and community representatives. 269 The Moroccan Catchment Basin Authority (CBA) is the most complete attempt by any country in the region to decentralize the management of water resources. Each CBA is considered a public entity with a juridical personality and financial autonomy. The responsibilities of each CBA are to: Draw up the integrated water resources development master plan 1. for its particular area of operation Monitor implementation of the water resources integrated develop- 2. ment master plan within its particular area of operation Issue the public domain water usage authorizations and conces- 3. sions provided for in the water resources integrated development master plan for its particular area of operation Furnish any financial aid and provide any services, including TA, 4. to public or private persons who request it either to prevent water pollution or to develop or harness public domain water resources Carry out all piezometric measurements and gauge operations and 5. all hydraulic, hydrogeological, planning, and water management studies at both the quantitative and qualitative levels Perform all quality measurements and apply the provisions of cur- 6. rent legislation on the protection of water resources and restoration of water quality, in collaboration with the government authority with responsibility for the environment Propose and implement appropriate measures, particularly regula- 7. tory measures, to ensure water supply in the event of an officially declared water shortage or to prevent the risk of flooding Manage and control use of the water resources harnessed 8. Build the necessary structures to prevent and combat floods 9. Maintain a register of recognized water rights and of water intake 10. concessions and authorizations granted. 270 The CBA is administered by a Management Board chaired by the government authority responsible for water resources. The board is responsible for (1) examining the catchment basin integrated develop- ment master plan prior to its approval; (2) studying the authority’s Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 329 271 Id. at Art. 21. 272 Id. at Art. 101. 273 Id. at Art. 102. 274 Id. at Art. 19. WRM and development programs and its annual and multiannual programs of activities prior to their approval by the governmental water resources authority; (3) drawing up the authority’s budget and accounts; (4) determining pollution-related fees to specific water pol- lution correction measures; (5) proposing to the governmental water resources authority the charge base and rates for user fees remunerating the authority for its services; (6) drawing up the authority’s personnel rules, which shall be approved in accordance with the current legisla- tion governing public establishments’ personnel; and (7) approving agreements and concession contracts entered into by the Catchment Basin Authority. 271 At the local level, a Prefecture or Provincial Water Commission should be created to assist in the preparation of catchment basin wa- ter resources development plans, support water saving and pollution prevention activities in the municipalities, and help build public aware- ness. 272 Under the law, local communities can undertake partnership projects with the assistance of the CBA. These projects could include cleaning out watercourses, conserving water resources (in quality and quantity), and creating necessary flood prevention structures. 273 Outside of these new government bodies created under law, the “administration” maintains certain responsibilities related to develop- ing the catchment integrated development national water plan. These national water plans would result from the inputs from all of the vari- ous CBAs. 274 The law does not make it clear who the “administration” would be. Oman Finally, in Oman, there are two separate laws that created two enti- ties responsible for administering the country’s public water resources. This section will focus only on the more recent Ministry of Water Resources. The Ministry of Water Resources is charged with the develop- ment and conservation of all water resources in the Sultanate. The ministry is responsible for making general policies for the preparation of long-term plans consistent with the economic and social develop- 330 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Royal Decree #100/1989: For the Establishment of the Ministry of Water Re- 275 sources and Designation of its Duties and Responsibilities, Art. 4. ment plan of the Sultanate. The ministry also is endowed with all of the appropriate authorities to carry out 13 other activities: Undertaking the general plan for the development of water resources 1. and their conservation after coordination with other ministries and government units Establishing an information and data center for water resources 2. and programs related to the use of water resources Collecting data and information about ground and surface water 3. resources and springs, as well as the computation, classification, and filing of these data for use in related studies Undertaking research, studies, and surveys aimed at the explora- 4. tion of other water resources; executing studies on conservation and use of available water Operating, developing, and maintaining the hydrologic and hydro- 5. geologic monitoring networks in the Sultanate; recording, reviewing, and analyzing information on different uses of the resource Assessing the water balance and water availability in the 6. Sultanate Collecting water samples from wells and 7. aflaj (“traditional chan- nels”) and analyzing these samples to determine salinity rates, treatment methods, and suitability for different uses Undertaking site visits to new agricultural lands to ensure water 8. availability in new lands and to ensure their suitability for growing crops Coordinating with the Ministry of Agriculture and fisheries to 9. ensure the suitability of agricultural development Issuing permits for the construction of new wells that take into 10. consideration the regulation in regard to banned areas and distance from mother wells Providing TA and policy advice to government units in the water 11. field and providing methods for determining use Preparing regulations according to Royal Decree #100/1989, after 12. coordination with concerned authorities Undertaking the training and qualification of Omani employees 13. working in the Ministry of Water Resources. 275 Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 331 Tunisian Water Code (1975), Art. 4. 276 277 Id. at Art. 153. 278 Id. at Art. 154. Tunisia The Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources is entrusted with the administration and management of public domain waters. 276 Un- der the 1975 Water Code, within each governorate a “Water Interest Group” is to be established. These groups would prepare studies for the implementation of water works of public interest, advise the gov- ernorate on waterworks undertaken in the area, and control WUAs. 277 WUAs can be freely established upon the request of interested water users, or they can be established by the state. Responsibilities of WUAs could include the management of an irrigation system, drinking water system, and/or the undertaking of drainage works. 278 Yemen As mentioned, in 2003 the government of Yemen created a new Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE). The creation of MWE has since triggered a series of pending amendments to the Framework Water Law (#33/2002). MWE was created by pulling the environ- mental responsibilities from the Ministry of Tourism and the water responsibilities from the Ministry of Water and Electricity, leaving a self-standing, separate Ministry of Electricity. The NWRA, NWSA, General Authority for Rural Water and Sanitation Projects (GARWSP), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and local corporations that operate urban water supply and sanitation systems in a quasiprivatized manner all have been brought under MWE’s control. MWE is separate from the pre-existing NWRA, NWSA, and others. Internally, MWE’s responsibilities have been divided into two separate groups: (1) Environment and (2) Water Supply and Sanitation. Under the Environment group, there are subunits in charge of policies and programs, treaties and regulation, and emergencies. The Water Supply and Sanitation group has subunits for water resources, water supply and sanitation (WSS), and water sector reforms. It is clear that the pending amendments will alter the current structure posed by the 2002 Framework Law. However, it is unclear as to how much change will occur in the duties of the NWRA and the NWSA as outlined in the 2002 Law. This chapter therefore will provide a description of the 2002 Yemen Water Law’s institutional 332 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 74. Under this article, the law states that 279 NWRA should consult and coordinate with the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and the Ministry of Electricity and Water regarding their respective tasks. Id. 280 Id. at Art. 7. 281 Id. at Art. 12. 282 Id. at Art. 13. 283 Id. at Art. 17. 284 Id. at Art. 14. 285 Id. at Arts. 63–66. 286 Id. at Art. 17. 287 Id. at Art. 11. framework with the caveat that all may change after the passage of the amendments. The 2002 law centralizes authority under the NWRA. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Electricity and Water still hold important responsibilities over the irrigation and WSS sectors, respectively. 279 The central responsibility of the NWRA is to control the use of the country’s water resources. 280 Control includes monitoring, data collection, and information-gathering that can be used to estimate water budgets and evaluate demand and the quantities that can and may be exploited. 281 The NWRA also is charged with collecting the information that can serve as the basis for water planning, 282 as well as preparing the National Water Plan through reviewing sectoral and water basin plans. 283 The NWRA must devise a classification system for water basins and water zones to control water use. 284 Additional tasks include (1) enforcement of the law through inspectors, with the cooperation of the police and security forces; 285 (2) providing farmers with sup- port to new technologies and modern irrigation methods to improve water savings; (3) setting up water dams, dikes, and reservoirs to harvest rainwater and make optimal use of all surface water resources; (4) preventing desertification through conserving soil and water; and (5) encouraging community participation and education. 286 Finally, the NWRA is responsible for establishing Water Basin and Water Zone Committees to operate under its supervision. These basins or committees are encouraged to include nongovernmental organiza- tions (NGOs) and community representatives. The NWRA has yet to develop the Executive Regulations that would govern the operation of the basins and zones. 287 MAI rations the use of water for irrigation and potable water use in rural areas in accordance with the Water Plan developed by the NWRA. MAI’s other responsibilities include: Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries N 333 288 Id. at Art. 25. Executive Procedures are to be developed for setting the controls for coordination among MAI, NWRA, and the other relevant concerned entities accordingly. Preparing irrigation policies and executive plans, which ensure the 1. optimal benefit of the agricultural sector’s share of water. Undertaking theoretical and practical studies, implementing the 2. extension programs, and taking all the measures that will lead to the rationing of water use, increasing the productivity of water and agricultural crops, and encouraging the use of modern irrigation methods. All of these actions should be in keeping with economic feasibility and adjusted to the set allocation of water for such use and for the conservation of water and the environment. Setting up, operating, and maintaining water installations to lead to 3. benefit from the use of rainwater and rainwater runoff, within the context of the indicators of the national water plan, water budgets for the Water Basins and Zones, and Water Plan. Drawing up a plan for protection from rainwater runoff and flood- 4. ing; setting up meteorological agricultural surveillance stations; analyzing, recording, documenting, and exchanging the informa- tion picked up by these stations with the NWRA and with the beneficiaries thereof; and making use of the output of the national hydrological station network. Preparing and implementing the plans and programs related to 5. the control of wadi flows and general or public canals; monitoring the flow of rainwater runoff and floods; and monitoring the use of irrigation water and installations to ensure the safety of such instal- lations and the protection of water from waste and pollution. Preparing indicators for the short-, medium- and long-term demand 6. for irrigation water. Demand includes the need of private sector projects for irrigation water, whereby they constitute—after the review and assessment thereof—one of the inputs of the water plans. 288 Under the 2002 law, the former Ministry of Electricity and Water (MEW) was responsible for managing all water allocated to it through the NWRA’s Water Plan. The water was to be used largely for water supply and sanitation. MEW was charged with preparing policies and executive plans for the WSS sector; ensuring potable supply for do- mestic uses and applying the proper standards for water quality; and 334 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 289 Id. at Art. 26. 290 Id. at Art. 10. See World Bank, Project Appraisal Document for the Yemen Water Sector 291 Support Project, 2009. providing water supply to public and private industrial, tourism-related, or other service-provision areas. In addition, MEW was responsible for setting up and managing wastewater networks for collection, treatment, and disposal. MEW also oversaw projects in potable water supply and sanitation, with NWRA participation. The treatment of wastewater would be governed by a uniform system established by MEW. Any reuse would be strictly regulated and coordinated with the NWRA. 289 Finally, water user groups and beneficiary associations may be formed to involve the public and the beneficiaries of water in regulating water resources or in the O&M of water installations. The Executive Regulations would establish the implementation of this provision. 290 Conclusions Many MNA countries have successfully developed new water law re- gimes that address modern water demand and supply concerns, while remaining fully compatible with customary law and religious doctrine. Maintaining such a balance is feasible because society has internalized the customary laws and religious doctrines. Often, introducing new ideas and technologies is possible within the existing frameworks. For example, the region-wide interest in wastewater reuse has evolved gradually as stakeholders began appreciating that treated wastewater is a significant additional resource so long as treatment was adequate, and use restricted to tree crops and fodder crops. Where the balance has been disturbed (as in countries witnessing excessive drawdowns of groundwater), the problem has been caused by perverse economic incentives (such as the diesel subsidies in Yemen). 291 Good examples of modern legal approaches exist for such key issues as groundwater management, water rights allocation, and wastewater reuse. Other chapters that follow deal with specific aspects of codifica- tion, such as financing rules aimed to better target government subsidies to the poor, and bidding rules aimed at creating incentives for private sector participation in irrigation infrastructure. 335 17 For more information, visit Global Partnership on Output-Based AID’s (GPOBA) 1 website, www.gpoba.org Subsidies for the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach Providing Basic Services to Poor Periurban Neighborhoods in Morocco Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani What Is Output-Based Aid? Output-based aid (OBA) is an innovative approach to increase ac- cess to basic services for the poor in developing countries and to improve the delivery of services that exhibit positive externalities, such as reductions in CO 2 and improvements in health. 1 OBA is also known as “performance-based aid” or (in the health sector) “results-based financing.” OBA is part of a broader effort to ensure aid effectiveness. OBA links the payment of aid to the delivery of specific services, or “outputs” (box 17.1). These can include the connection of poor households to electricity grids or water and sanitation systems, the installation of solar heating systems, or the delivery of basic healthcare services. Under an OBA scheme, service delivery is contracted out to a third party—usually a private service provider but, in some cases, community or nongovernmental organizations or public sector utilities. The third party receives a subsidy to complement or replace connection fees for poor households (HH) that cannot afford to pay the full con- nection fee. The service provider is responsible for “pre-financing” the project until output delivery, when it receives reimbursement through an OBA subsidy. The subsidy is performance based, meaning that most of it is paid only after the services or outputs have been delivered and delivery verified by an independent agent. 336 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS OBA schemes contrast with traditional aid approaches, which usu- ally focus on financing “inputs” such as infrastructure (for example, a water treatment plant or a hospital) or equipment (such as books for schools) (figure 17.1). Under the OBA approach, the priority shifts from making a service generally available to ensuring that the poorest households actually benefit from the service. For instance, a traditional electricity project might finance the expansion of the electricity grid to poor areas. In contrast, an OBA project would subsidize the cost of connecting households in the poor areas to the grid, or it could sub- sidize off-grid solutions such as solar home systems for communities in remote areas. OBA schemes thus can complement traditional aid and make service delivery more inclusive. Why Is OBA Relevant for Morocco? By regional standards, Morocco already has good water infra- structure assets. Ninety percent of accessible resources are stored in 116 large dams; irrigation is de- veloped over 1.4 million hectares Box 17.1 Output-Based Aid: Core Concepts Increased transparency through the explicit targeting of subsidies N and tying these subsidies to defined outputs Increased accountability through shifting performance risk to service providers N by paying them after they have delivered an agreed output Increased engagement of private sector capital and expertise N by encouraging the private sector to serve customers, usually the poor, whom they might otherwise disregard Encouraging innovation and efficiency N by leaving the service “solutions” partly up to the service provider Increased sustainability of public funding N through the use of one-off subsidies and by linking ongoing subsidies to sustainable service Enhancing monitoring of results N since payments are made against agreed outputs Inputs (such as materials) Service provider Service provider Private financing mobilized by service provider Public financing linked to service delivery Service recipients Service recipients Public finance Private finance Traditional approach Output-based approach Inputs (such as materials) Figure 17.1 Input-Based Approach vs. Output-Based Approach Source: Author. Note: Scale = 1: 70,000. Subsidies for the Poor: An I nnovative Output-Based Aid Approach N 337 (ha); and potable water supply reaches almost all urban dwellers. In fact, with individual connections and continuous service for 83 percent of households, Morocco has one of the best potable water supply rates in the region. However, infrastructure is lagging for rural water supply (70 percent in 2007), urban sewerage (70 percent of households con- nected as of 2005), and wastewater treatment (5 percent of discharges treated in 2004). Access to service remains particularly inadequate in poor urban and periurban areas. Today, the country faces two challenges. First, it must adapt water usage to levels compatible with the renewable resources supplied by nature. Second, Morocco has to improve service access and efficiency while reducing the burden on the state and on poor consumers. Reforms have been initiated to address these challenges, including through policy and expenditure reorientation. The government developed a comprehensive reform program that focused on the integrated and sustainable management of water resources. This program included the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), launched by the King in May 2005. This initia- tive included a significant component to expand basic services to the poor, particularly those in urban and periurban settlements previously considered illegal and, therefore, ineligible for services. Pilot OBA schemes were set up to encourage water utilities to improve access in low-income communities. The next sections review the design and results of these pilot interventions. Nature of Service Deficit in Periurban Areas of Morocco Currently, approximately 2 million Moroccans remain without access to water supply and sanitation services (WSS) in illegal settlements surrounding the country’s major cities. 2 In the Casablanca metropolitan area alone, approximately 145,000 households (or 900,000 inhabit- ants) are estimated not to receive adequate water supply and sanita- tion services. These residents who lack access to reliable and clean water supply services get water from (1) contaminated shallow wells; (2) water providers selling nonpotable water at a relatively high unit price; In this context, “periurban” includes all settlements located at the outskirts of 2 a city and structures in city quarters or hamlets, illegal or not; and encompasses hamlets presenting characteristics of rural areas but not belonging to rural com- munes (municipalities). 338 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS “Social Connection” programs offer to pay HH for the full connection cost in 3 installments over time. However, the program requires that, to access these basic services, households get into debt for durations of 7 to 10 years. This outcome ap- pears neither plausible nor equitable. or (3) standposts located at the entrance of these areas, which often require women or children to stand for several hours in a queue. Access to basic sanitation is even more deficient. A majority of households use cesspits and poorly designed septic tanks. These rudi- mentary accommodations risk increasing the contamination of shal- low groundwater. A large number of inhabitants of the poorest areas remain without any form of sanitation. The situation described above directly affects people’s health, their ability to engage in income-generating activities, and, for children, to attend school. It also harms the water utilities’ finances, as cost recovery from these public standposts is usually very low. The municipalities (communes) responsible rarely pay the bills. Four factors have contributed to the lack of WSS for Morocco’s poor: Unplanned growth of periurban areas and the fact that they were N systematically not included in the service areas of water and sani- tation operators. Technical and administrative hurdles that made interventions by N operators in illegal settlements difficult, linked to, for instance, lack of title, poverty, and lack of basic access infrastructure. Operators’ difficulty in financing infrastructure for water users eli- N gible for the loss-making “social tranche” of existing water tariffs. Connection fees charged to the beneficiaries at their marginal N costs, to which a Participation au Premier Etablissement (PPE)” fee is added. The latter drives up costs of access to unaffordable levels for most HH living in the city outskirts, even when the option of payment by installments is available through the “Social Connec- tion” program. 3 Mobilization through the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) Since 2005, the National Initiative for Human Development (Initiative Nationale de Développement Humain, or INDH) and the government’s Subsidies for the Poor: An I nnovative Output-Based Aid Approach N 339 Households are offered the opportunity to pay their connection fees over time, 4 the terms varying by operator. For instance, in Meknes, the household contribution has to remain below MAD 9,240 for connections to WSS services, reimbursable in 84 monthly payments of MAD 110. Waiver of an important “First Settlement Fee- 5 Participation au Premier Etablisse- ment (PPE)” and of the 10% design and supervision fee otherwise charged by the operators. Cities Without Slums program (Ville Sans Bidonville, or VSB) have mobilized stakeholders to upgrade poor urban and periurban areas. INDH/VSB programs removed the most important obstacle by recognizing informal areas, and promoting their inhabitants’ resettlement to housing units in apartment buildings (relogement), their resettlement in fully or partially serviced plots (recasement), or “restructuring with on-site upgrading” through the expansion and strengthening of basic infrastructure. INDH also promotes service coverage expansion by pro- moting agreements among relevant stakeholders. The specific arrange- ments developed through INDH regarding the financial contribution of households 4 for a house connection to water and/or sanitation services 5 are of paramount importance in reaching coverage objectives. Although significant, the activities above only partly address the INDH’s water and sanitation access objectives for 2010: Due to lack of financing, connection development is inadequate a. for on-site upgrading areas. For example, in the metropolitan Casablanca area, INDH is considering expanding WSS only to the 65,000 households to be resettled either in housing units or in serviced plots. That leaves a population of approximately 80,000 households, representing over 500,000 inhabitants, targeted by the on-site upgrading approach for whom no service expansion solution is proposed. Implementation of INDH/VSB programs is not always optimal. For b. example, problems linked to coordination and implementation of network expansion works often prevent house connections from being established. INDH’s Urban Water Supply and Sanitation OBA Pilots The objectives of the project pilots are to demonstrate replicable OBA mechanisms to extend WSS services in poor and vulnerable communi- ties, as part of the INDH. 340 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Started in the spring of 2007, Morocco’s Urban WS&S OBA pilots aim at connecting 11,300 households to piped WSS in poor, unzoned, periurban neighborhoods of 3 municipalities: Casablanca, Meknes, and Tangiers. The pilots are funded through a US$7 million grant by the Global Partnership for Output-Based Aid (GPOBA). They are imple- mented by the respective service providers in these municipalities: 2 international private concessionaires, namely, Amendis in Tangiers and LYDEC in Casablanca; and 1 municipal utility, the Régie Autonome de Distribution d’Eau et d’Électricité de Meknès. The Government of Morocco is also a partner to this approach, playing an oversight and monitoring role. While the details of the schemes vary, the common objective of the pilots is to test an OBA subsidy mechanism specifically targeted toward poor neighborhoods and households; and bridging the gap between capacity to pay and a competitive cost of connection. In ad- dition to the waiver, for areas identified as part of the INDH program, the scheme offers a subsidized connection fee for some of the fees otherwise charged by the operator. The approach builds on previous “social connection” programs by which households were offered the opportunity to pay their connec- tion fees in installments. Awarded to individual eligible households who agree to pay the operator-specific beneficiary contribution, the subsidies are prefinanced by the operators, who first are required to complete the pipe and connection works. They get reimbursed after a verification process that certifies that the eligible household is in fact receiving piped WSS service (that is, the output). The built-in incentives of this OBA approach are designed to mitigate traditional impediments of service expansion programs in marginal neighborhoods. Impediments include (1) unaffordability of connection costs by households, (2) unsustainable program financing for operators, (3) complex technical and administrative obstacles to infrastructure development in poor unzoned areas, and (4) reticence by national and local governments to fund subsidy programs that have no accountability or guarantee of results. The outputs for which OBA subsidies are disbursed are individual HH network connections for simultaneous water supply and sewerage services in designated, predominantly poor periurban neighborhoods. These HH have the recognized right to access services through the INDH program. In Meknes, the output is the connection to either service. Subsidies for the Poor: An I nnovative Output-Based Aid Approach N 341 The disbursement profile of the individual subsidy follows: (1) 60 percent of unit subsidy is released upon verification of eligible water and sewerage household connection, and (2) 40 percent of unit subsidy is released upon verification of sustained service for at least 6 months. Subsidy Targeting Is Geographic in Nature The target neighborhoods are recognized as being among the poor- est in urban Morocco, and are on the INDH’s shortlist of 160 most disadvantaged urban and periurban communities. All households in the selected pilot areas are eligible to participate in the connection subsidy program. However, participation is strictly demand driven. It therefore requires communication campaigns to raise awareness about the program and explain its conditions. Operators also develop new means of reaching potential customers. They use dedicated teams who go to market places or to the heart of the targeted neighborhood to record the demands of beneficiaries who may not easily travel to one of the operator’s agencies. Scope and size aside, the project breaks new ground in many regards. It is the first OBA project in Morocco N Project involving multiple incumbent operators N Project involving a public operator N World-Bank-implemented OBA involving connection to sanitation N World-Bank-implemented OBA project in local currency. N Lessons Learned So Far A key element of the approach is to shift risks to incentivize all parties to perform. In this case, the financial and operational risk in extend- ing service requires a good assessment of the demand for services by the targeted population, as demand will determine the amount of subsidy the operator will receive. Another key element is the limitation of the risk of capture of outputs. As in former social connection programs, an authorization to connect from the municipality is required. Therefore, there is a risk that political pressure could be put on the operator to extend subsidized connections to populations who may otherwise have the means to 342 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Essentially, benefits are time savings but also can include reduced health costs 6 and improved hygiene practices. Further study would be necessary to quantify such benefits. pay the full cost of connection. The pilot is organized on a geographic basis, for lack of a better targeting mechanism. However, it targets poor neighborhoods that had been without piped services up to that point. Socioeconomic surveys carried out show that a significant share of the population living in these informal areas are below the poverty or vulnerability lines for Morocco. Nevertheless, to avoid the risk that the relatively wealthier house- holds could benefit from the subsidy, the operator and local authorities (province, governor) have developed additional eligibility criteria, for example, based on the number of stories or house size and appearance. Moreover, to increase transparency, the operator has requested that the list of beneficiaries be signed by the municipality and countersigned by the governor (local representative of the state). Although a substantial number of outputs have been delivered and verified in all three sites, the pilots experienced a slow start. The first 12 months of the pilot program have produced approximately only 2,000 connections, that is, 15 percent of the program’s 3-year objective. However, an independent midterm review of the pilots shows that the delay is due to implementation difficulties unrelated to the OBA approach: procurement procedures, upstream investment delays, and lack of clarity over land tenure. The parties appreciate that conventional financing would have resulted in fewer connections than OBA in the same circumstances. Thus, scaling up the OBA approach to other INDH areas now is considered possible before pilot program completion in December 2009. The midterm review confirmed important direct benefits 6 to house- holds, and recorded the high satisfaction of beneficiary households with the service provided. This information is further demonstrated by evidence of uptake significantly increasing after works start and a collection rate equal or superior to the average experienced by each operator in his/her service area. Operators and government generally are satisfied and appreciate the flexibility allowed by the pilot. The OBA approach is seen as help- ing to improve processes, overcome financing blockages, and mobilize stakeholder partnerships. In addition, all parties appreciate that quar- terly inspections by the Technical Independent Reviewer have proven Subsidies for the Poor: An I nnovative Output-Based Aid Approach N 343 effective in firming up the operators’ reporting requirements as well as improving their implementation methods. The demand-driven ap- proach contributed to refocus service provision around the households, which increased accountability, strengthened partnerships between local authorities and operators, and prioritized monitoring of service delivery. After a slow year 1, a dou- bling of connection rates is re- ported in year 2. Figure 17.2 shows connection realizations during the f irst two years of implementation. Lessons learned for the po- tential scale-up of the pilots include the need for: Better advance planning and a. working partnerships among operators, local governments, and neighborhood associa- tions to clarify eligibility and permitting questions Streamlining OBA-specific b. ex-post eligibility verification procedures. Scaling up OBA: Toward a National Strategy to Reduce Urban and Periurban Service Access Deficit Given the lack of targeted subsidy mechanisms for poor households, especially in informal urban settings, OBA is perceived as strategi- cally relevant to Morocco. The OBA pilots are taking place at a time that the government of Morocco is seeking new ways to deliver on INDH’s promise. The government has expressed interest in replicating, with due adaptation, the OBA approach on a citywide or nationwide scale. The Bank is working with the government on the best ways to evolve toward a scaled-up operation, while strengthening coordina- tion among institutions in charge of the different aspects of periurban utility service. 0% 80% 60% 40% 20% 100% Note: Figure 17.2 refects progress on the defned "outputs" under the project, namely, the working connections to water and/or sanitation services. The fgure does not refect the progress achieved on the upstream/trunk infrastructure development necessary to deliver the outputs. Therefore, it may not accurately refect the progress under the pilots. Remaining Year 2 Year 1 Figure 17.2 Connections Realized in the First Two Years of Implementation C a s a b l a n c a ( L Y D E C ) T a n g i e r s ( A M E N D I S - T a n g e r ) M e k n é s U r b a n W a t e r M e k n é s U r b a n S a n i t a t i o n T O T A L 345 18 Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani In a Nutshell As mentioned in an earlier chapter on Moroccan water strategies (Chauvot de Beauchêne and Mantovani 2009), developing access to potable water in rural areas became a policy priority only in 1995. Since then, Morocco’s PAGER (National Program for Rural Water Supply and Sanitation) has made big strides in developing drinking water sources. PAGER has provided over 87 percent of the rural population with access to drinking water, typically through public fountains. Today, the government of Morocco is aware of the need to redeploy its rural water supply (RWS) strategy to promote the development of RWS service through individual household (HH) connections. The RWS objective is the same as for urban and perirurban areas: to expand access to water supply services. However, the approach piloted in Morocco’s rural areas is rather different from the approaches pursued in urban areas. In rural areas, the National Water Supply Company (ONEP) is evolving from its core business of producing and delivering water to service providers to becoming a provider of water supply and sanitation services. To facilitate this new mission, ONEP has developed an important network of standpipes within rural communities. However, HH in these communities were asking for domestic con- nections. ONEP then engaged in the development of house connec- tions in small centers and rural areas. In fact, organizational structure and internal procedures translate into fixed costs that make service provision to smaller communities a loss-making business. ONEP is piloting the subcontracting water service provision and management in 8 rural communes (municipalities) to a private operator through a 346 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 10-year management subcontracting arrangement with aspects of an affermage-type contract. During the first years, the private sector will receive performance-based subsidies from ONEP under an output- based aid (OBA) approach. Specific outputs eligible for a subsidy are water production, service expansion to new settlements, and a working HH connection. The private operator will be selected competitively on the basis of the lowest total subsidy. This approach is expected to be win-win for all parties. ONEP will benefit from the efficiency gains of the private operator. From day 1, the private operator will have incentives to work to establish a profit-making business before the fifth year of service provision. While this OBA approach is still to be tested, it appears a very promising management model for water service provision in small towns and surrounding rural areas. In Morocco, local authorities are responsible for water supply and sanitation (WSS) services. Major cities have delegated WSS either to the private sector or to financially independent municipal utilities. ONEP is the national utility in charge of potable water production and transmission in bulk to large urban distribution utilities. Because small cities and rural areas lacked capacity, they increasingly requested ONEP’s assistance to manage their water distribution services. As a result, over time, ONEP’s mandate broadened to include the provision of water supply services to small towns and rural areas. More recently, ONEP has been mandated also to bring sanitation services to second- ary urban and rural centers. Urgency to Increase Rural Household Water Connections At the same time, the government decided to accelerate the pace of ONEP’s investments in RWS to reach the coverage target of 90 percent of the rural population by 2007. This coverage target was one destination on the way to the overarching objective: reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for Morocco by 2015. At the end of 2008, ONEP covered 80 percent of national water needs. It also is the country’s leader in water distribution and provides water to 28 percent of the Moroccan population. The national company distributes water to 5.6 million people in medium-sized cities and to 2.8 million people in rural areas. ONEP is a profit-making, autonomous public corporation. However, its organizational structure and internal procedures translate into fixed costs that are too high to make service provision in smaller scale operations profitable. Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco N 347 Morocco’s rural sector is composed of 31,000 localities (douars) with a total population of nearly 13 million. Prior programs contributed to provide water to 70 percent of the douars through public standpipes. Those programs left unserved approximately 10,000 douars. In addition, the demand for rural HH connections to water supply is estimated at 1,700,000. ONEP and village associations have already developed ap- proximately 680,000 HH connections in rural areas. Therefore, the challenge in the rural areas consists of connecting a little over 1,000,000 new HH to water supply. In the meantime, ONEP is facing the following constraints: (1) the necessity to satisfy so many new customers without hiring new staff; (2) the necessity to keep operational charges in line with its costs; and (3) the necessity to preserve its financial equilibrium, because its invest- ment needs are skyrocketing. Regarding point 2, the tariff structure is the same throughout Morocco. The tariff levels for bulk and retail water are fixed by the government. As for point 3, in recent years, ONEP has tested different models of private sector involvement, from established standpipe-managers to more comprehensive performance- based service contracts. Learning from these experiences, ONEP is ready to take private sector involvement in water service distribution in rural areas one step further. ONEP Pilots Innovative Public-Private Partnership to Increase Household Connections ONEP intends to pilot the first public-private partnership for ex- tended subcontracting of its water distribution responsibilities. The objective of the pilot is to provide sustainable water supply services and service expansion in rural areas served by ONEP through a new PPP approach that includes both technical and, for the first time, commercial management. The private sector would be expected to develop technically and financially efficient management of water distribution in rural areas. The private sector also would be encour- aged to develop access to piped water supply services through HH connections and to expand the service area to other douars. This approach should enable ONEP to significantly reduce its O&M costs in water provision while maintaining its current staffing level, thus ensuring its long-term financial sustainability. To sum up, the pilot will help ONEP to determine the future organization of water services management in rural areas. This is an important issue for Morocco’s 348 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS A rural household is estimated to include 6.4 people. 1 water sector sustainability, itself a focus of World Bank dialogue with the government. ONEP determined the pilot area based on six elements. They were (1) poverty and vulnerability levels; (2) readiness of primary and secondary infrastructure to enable quick service expansion; (3) high HH demand for house connections; (4) difficulties faced in providing an appropriate level of service; (5) size of the pilot area enough to enable financial and technical feasibility of the operation; and (6) posi- tive deliberations of councils of all concerned communes to authorize ONEP to develop the proposed PPP approach. For the pilot, ONEP selected the Sidi Kacem area in northwest Morocco, which comprises small towns and the surrounding rural areas. By bundling rural areas with more densely populated small towns, the pilot area has a population of 130,000 inhabitants. Of these, approxi- mately 25 percent are poor HH, 1 that is, HH with monthly incomes under US$201 (MAD 1745). Another 25 percent of HH are considered vulnerable, that is, their monthly incomes are below US$302 (150 per- cent of the poverty line). ONEP is providing services to approximately 7,200 of these vulnerable HH at a loss. As a result, ONEP has no incentive to connect additional vulnerable HH. In any event, poor or vulnerable HH would not be able to pay for the full connection, which costs on average US$577 (MAD 5,000). Using Output-Based Aid to Subsidize Rural HH Water Connections Although demand for house connections in the pilot area was high, demand correlated strongly with the cost of the connection fee. This correlation threatened the financial sustainability of the pilot and, there- fore, the interest of the private sector. Building on the output-based aid (OBA) approach developed in urban areas, ONEP decided to add to the proposed PPP an OBA approach that decreased the connection fee and subsidized house connections developed by the private opera- tor. The innovation is that the private operator must prefinance the outputs, for instance, the working connections to piped water supply service. The operator receives the subsidy after these outputs have been delivered and independently verified. ONEP requested support from the World Bank and the Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco N 349 The Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA) is a global partnership 2 administered by the World Bank. GPOBA was established in 2003, initially as a mul- tidonor trust fund to develop output-based aid (OBA) approaches across a variety of sectors including infrastructure, health, and education. OBA subsidies are designed to create incentives for efficiency and the long-term success of development projects. For more information on output-based aid approaches, go to www.gpoba.org. (GPOBA) 2 to design the OBA approach. GPOBA funded an important technical assistance contract to help design the pilot and help structure the OBA approach. GPOBA was not in a position to fund the pilot. Nonetheless, ONEP decided to use the approach and finance it. The main goal for ONEP is that the subcontracted private op- erator who takes on the management of small-scale operations for a 10-year period is able to reduce O&M costs to a level enabling ONEP to break even early enough to develop a profitable business within the existing tariff structure. The private operator would not receive a management fee but would be remunerated through the revenue col- lected from customers. In addition, the operator would have specific performance targets and associated outputs for which it will receive an OBA subsidy from ONEP. The three required outputs are (1) water sales in the pilot area, new douars or settlements reached, and new house connections. Each output was designed to help the private op- erator develop the critical mass of customers and water sales to make its business financially sustainable. To incentivize performance, the subsidies will be time bound. The outputs and associated subsidies appear in table 18.1. Table 18.1 Performance Targets and Outputs Required to Receive ONEP OBA Subsidy Contract objective Output Measuring unit Targets Subsidy available for the first Minimize initial Water sales in the operational deficit pilot area m 3 sold 3 million m 3 3 years of operation Expand service area to New douars or Linear meters (ml) of Initial estimates: 14 new douars settlements reached expanded network 40,000 ml 4 years of operation Increase customer base New working house through new house connections to piped 8,500 new house connections water supply House connection connections 5 years of operation The amount of subsidy, hence the unit cost per connection, would be determined by a competitive bidding process based on targets clearly stated in the bidding documents. The bidder requiring the least 350 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS This amount is to be confirmed and may increase. The current discounted fee 3 refers to 2005 prices. With support from the World Bank, an analysis is ongoing to update the information that will lead to the proposed revised discounted fee. amount of combined subsidy wins the bid. The allowable subsidy may be capped. The following paragraph details the OBA approach to house con- nections. The private operator would be expected to make approxi- mately 8,500 new connections during the 10-year contract period, thus increasing the connection coverage rate in the pilot area from 32 percent to over 68 percent of HH. The OBA subsidy for a house connection would equal the difference between a set discounted connection fee for the HH and the cost of connection. Household Connection Cost ONEP has promoted MAD 2,500 (US$289) as the country-wide set discounted connection fee in ONEP-managed rural areas. 3 To be eligible, a HH needs to express interest and provide a down payment of MAD 1,000 before the completion of service extension works in its area. Households that fail to do so will later be charged the full connection fee. Poor and vulnerable HH that meet the “social con- nections” criteria (monthly revenues lower than MAD 3,000) will have the option of paying the remaining MAD 1,500 in installments over 3 years at 5 percent interest (compared to the usual 18 percent microcredit rate). Under the proposed PPP, the user contribution to house connec- tion would amount to MAD 2,500 (US$289), that is, half of the con- nection cost. However, it will be up to the private operator to decide whether it wants to develop conditions similar to the ones proposed by ONEP, or to develop new ones that would better serve its interests in promoting house connections. Surveys carried out in the pilot area have demonstrated that 80 percent of HH would be willing to connect at the MAD 2,500 price. While only 50 percent of the pilot area population is below the vulnerability or poverty lines, the assumption is that the wealthiest HH are among the 7,400 already connected. For lack of a better targeting mechanism, it was decided that all HH located in the pilot area will be eligible for a subsidized connection, on a first come-first served basis. Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco N 351 At 2.54Dh for the first 6 m 4 3 and 7.91Dh for the following 14 m 3 . The scheme ensures that monthly payments for poor and vulnerable HH will be affordable, based on the unit price of water and projected monthly consumption after the connection. Currently, HH purchase water from standpipes within 500 meters of their settlements at an average price of MAD 10 per m 3 , and consume on average 8 liters/ capita/day. After connection, experience shows that the average monthly consumption increases over time to an average of 45 liters/ capita/day, corresponding to a unit cost of water of MAD 4.9 per m 3 . 4 On this basis, and assuming that payment is made under ONEP condi- tions, the cumulative user’s monthly payment represents approximately 5 percent, or 3.4 percent of the monthly spending of a HH at the poverty or vulnerability line, respectively. This cost is deemed afford- able, as demonstrated by the 100 percent collection rate experienced by ONEP nationwide. Multiple Benefits of Household Connection The expected benefits resulting from house connections include, first and foremost, having access to safe and reliable water supply at home, in appropriate quality and quantity, and at an affordable price. Additional benefits include time savings that can be used for income-generating activities primarily by adult women and improved education for chil- dren; reduced health costs and improved hygiene practices resulting in decreased morbidity and mortality rates, especially among children under 5; reduced medical expenditures; and improved labor productivity. Broader outcomes of the pilot will include the introduction of demand- driven service provision in rural areas. Currently, significant investments by ONEP to develop access to water through standpipes generate very little income because populations increasingly disregard the standpipes. Moreover, the pilot also will demonstrate and document one possible solution to reduce ONEP’s fixed and variable O&M costs, which, if replicable, might improve ONEP’s long-term financial sustainability. This pilot is very innovative. In fact, it will pave the way for a reform of water distribution management in Morocco’s rural areas for at least four reasons. The pilot: Will bring a new dimension of risk-sharing 1. by introducing the first PPP in water supply distribution in small towns and surrounding 352 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS rural areas in Morocco. For the first time, ONEP will subcontract utility management, including commercial risk. The pilot structure creates the right incentives: it provides targeted support until a critical mass of customers enables the financial sustainability of the operator. Namely, ONEP will retain the legal responsibility, and final beneficiaries will remain ONEP’s clients. The private operator will bear technical, financial, and commercial risk. The approach will provide both ONEP and the private operator with the highest incentives to perform. The private operator risks losing the subsidy funds if the outputs are not delivered. ONEP risks having to take over if the private operator does not perform. Will result in a win-win situation 2. . The pilot will test a possible so- lution to ensure ONEP’s long-term financial sustainability, while accompanying the creation of a new set of local operators for utility management. These local operators might, at a later stage, bid for full delegation of service and/or manage sanitation. May involve local commercial banks to channel the subsidies 3. . This ar- rangement might create favorable conditions for ONEP, the private operator, and that bank to develop integrated financial packages for HH through small short-term loans to HH to pay the whole of the users’ contributions. This arrangement would enable each party to concentrate on his/her respective core business and would give the private operator more assurance that it would get paid timely after the independent verification recommends the payment. Presents a window of opportunity for small and medium private-sector 4. firms (SMEs) in Morocco to develop a new expertise in the water sector. These firms have seen large, international private operators capture water business opportunities in large cities such as Casa- blanca, Rabat, and Tanger/Tetouan. This proposed rural water operation, with its smaller size, gives SMEs a chance to enter the water business on a scale that they can handle. The pilot is at advanced stages of procurement and has generated great interest from the private sector. Because of the pilot’s innovative nature, workshops were organized to gather prospective bidders to present the pilot and answer questions. Recently, another workshop was organized with prequalified bidders to explain the bidding docu- ments and go through the financial model it entails. The Bank financed consultants to help ONEP organize and moderate each of these work- shops, and Bank staff participated in and contributed to them. Given Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco N 353 the significant interest demonstrated by the private sector in ONEP’s two workshops, ONEP is confident that all shortlisted bidders will submit qualifying bids. If successful, this model for rural water supply can be scaled up in other bundles of small towns and surrounding rural areas in Morocco, thus presenting business opportunity for the Moroccan private sector while enhancing access to piped water services in rural areas. This pi- lot is a pivotal operation. It is providing the Moroccan private sector with unique market entry opportunities in the rural water sector and potentially in large urban centers. References Chauvot de Beauchêne, X., and P. Mantovani. 2009. “Subsidies for the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach. Providing Basic Services to Poor Peri-Urban Neighborhoods in Morocco,” this volume. 355 19 New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in Irrigation: Lessons from Egypt’s West Delta Project Aldo Baietti and Safwat Abdel-Dayem I n Middle East and North Africa (MNA) countries, the irrigation and drainage sector plays a vital role in food production and rural development. However, the sector has faced very difficult chal- lenges in financing capital and maintenance costs. Cost recovery in the sector has been exceedingly low, even for solely operation and maintenance (O&M) functions. Indeed, investment and O&M of irrigation schemes traditionally have been founded on massive public funding programs. In many cases, these resulted in a significant and unplanned fiscal burden on government, long after the programs’ initial commissioning. Following a prolonged period of inadequate funding for O&M, many schemes have been abandoned. Fortunately, the irrigation sector now is benefiting from new approaches to planning, design, and financing. There is particular emphasis on involving private investors and the farming community in sharing risks. Private-Public Partnerships in Irrigation A study by Tardieu and others (2004) examined the experience in private participation in the irrigation sector. The study reviewed ap- proximately 21 cases of projects with some level of private sector participation, most of which was in the form of service contracts for O&M and financing schemes for farmers to invest in on-farm pumping equipment. Moreover, these experiences limited the role of the private sector because they dealt primarily with smaller systems. 356 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS A similar model of public-private partnership is under implementation in Guerdaine, 1 Morocco, in an area close to Agadir. In this model, high-value export crops are being grown with irrigated water from rapidly depleting aquifers. 1 feddan = 0.42 hectares (ha). 2 Important developments are taking place in MNA in expanding the role of private participation in financing and operation. The West Delta Project is a large-scale project based on the “utility model,” which introduces reforms of the sector as well as new approaches to project development, transaction design, and public-private ar- rangements. 1 Useful lessons are already emerging from the West Delta design. West Delta Project Concept Since the late 1960s, with the support of the government, Egyptian commercial farmers have been reclaiming desert lands. The West Delta region is one of these areas (figure 19.1). It comprises 255,000 feddans (approximately 110,000 ha total) 2 on the fringes of the delta. Begin- ning in the early 1990s, through the exploitation of groundwater resources, the West Delta Region has been developed into a flourishing agricultural economy. Today, the West Delta Region contributes between $300 mil- lion–$500 million annually to the Egyptian economy. The area sup- plies domestic and European Union markets with high-value fruits and vegetables. Moreover, the area is now home to 500,000 people and provides approximately 250,000 jobs in the agriculture sector alone. However, the rapid development of the past few years has been ac- companied by excessive exploitation of groundwater reserves, resulting in costly and deeper pumping as well as eroded water quality. In response to concern about a possible collapse of this thriving agricultural economy, the Government of Egypt (GOE) conceived a surface water irrigation project that would replace groundwater pump- ing. However, the government also took this opportunity to advance a Figure 19.1 Aerial View of West Delta of Nile River Note: The West Delta area is located approximately 60 km north of Cairo to the west of the Nile Delta. The West Delta consists of 255,000 feddans of primarily commercial farms that cultivate high-value fruits and vegetables, much of which are exported to Europe and other markets. New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in I rrigation N 357 new vision for irrigation services. The new approach was founded on full cost recovery, volumetric pricing, formal water entitlements, and private-sector participation in financing and management. The proposed model was for a public-private partnership (PPP). A private investor would be identified through a competitive tender. The investor would build the irrigation system, operate the system, and earn a commercial return by collecting water fees from farmers. The private investor would be offered concessional credit from international financial institutions (IFIs) channeled via the GOE. The rest of this chapter describes the project design and the ra- tionale for the chosen approach in more detail. At the time of writing, bidders for the West Delta project are preparing their bids, so it is too early to judge its performance on the ground. This chapter instead describes the structure of project rules and incentives, as these have useful lessons for the practice of irrigation. Demand-Driven Approach to Project Design At government’s request, the World Bank commissioned an assess- ment in 2004–05 using a grant from the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF). The assessment presented a conceptual framework and transaction model for implementing a surface water irrigation system on a cost-recovery basis and with private sector participation. Farmers’ involvement in the design was essential to minimize the risk of low participation in the scheme. After an initial focus on de- mand forecasts and technical specifications, the emphasis of the design process therefore shifted to extensive user consultations and surveys. From these, the growers’ service requirements and their willingness to connect and pay would guide the development of technical design options. Each design option entailed a corresponding level of tariffs. A key feature of the West Delta preparation work involved a detailed “willingness to connect” survey of the farms in the area to understand their needs and willingness to pay for surface water. No longer could the government expect farmers to sign up to the system by GOE’s simply carrying out the required engineering stud- ies, forecasting an appropriate mix of crops and water requirements, and designing the layout of the main and subsidiary branch canals. Too many projects had been built around this top-down approach and were lying idle in red ink. 358 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS There also was concern that an open channel would lead to significant water theft 3 between the intake point on the River Nile and the project area. Instead, the West Delta approach placed the farmers in the driver’s seat and informed them so that they could: Understand what service and performance standards are expected 1. of them Understand their ability to absorb the cost of service and convince 2. them to buy into the project Take an early stake in the preparation. 3. Accordingly, the preparation work at the outset involved extensive consultations with farmers in the area as well as setting up an advisory group that would represent all beneficiaries throughout the entire project preparation process. Preference for a Piped System The technical work began with a longstanding preconception that an open channel system with several intakes and a network of main and subsidiary branches would be the most cost-effective technical option. However, user surveys revealed that, while the open channel system was perhaps the least-cost solution on a unit-cost basis, it could not fully meet the performance standards of farmers. 3 The closed conduit or piped system also was found to offer dis- tinct advantages to a prospective private operator, who would be expected to operate the system on commercial principles and assume the related risks. Most important, the piped system would enable the private investor to better manage its cash flow. A piped system could be constructed in smaller modules, thus spreading capital costs over time and allowing the private operator to generate revenue in the early phase of implementation, while other parts of the systems were under construction. The open channel model was cheaper on a unit-cost basis, but the piped system offered fewer risks for a PPP operator and better addressed the expressed needs of farmers (table 19.1). The piped system could (1) be implemented in smaller, financially sustainable modules based on the exact location of connecting con- sumers; (2) deliver a pressurized water flow directly to a connecting farm; (3) offer better control over water usage through metering, and New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in I rrigation N 359 lower evaporation, water losses and water theft; and (4) raise minimal right-of-way issues, land acquisition, and other environmental and safeguard concerns. In essence, the piped system was the preferred choice because it offered a prospective private operator better control over its financial operations. Risk Allocation and Mitigation Much of the PPP design work focused on the assessment and mitigation of risk factors and on determining which party should assume which risks. The financial analysis, which was supported by a dynamic financial model, analyzed how variation in key parameters such as construction period, conjunctive use of water, cost, capitalization requirements and financing plan, financing terms, currency movements, interest-rates, and bonding and insurance requirements would affect tariffs. The intent was to identify the transaction elements that would minimize tariffs and mitigate risks. Pre-eminent among the risks are N demand risk, due to the possibility of continued groundwater pumping; and system-planning risk due to oversized infrastructure. Either would lead to the system being underutilized. The project must not only yield positive returns but also ensure positive cash flows throughout the entire project, espe- cially during the critical early years. Maximizing utilization efficiency of the system from the outset would contribute significantly to this end. Two devices were introduced to mitigate demand risk: Tariff structure that would minimize the risk of conjunctive L groundwater use by employing a fixed-capacity charge. Table 19.1 Comparison of Characteristics of Piped and Open Channel Irrigation Feature Piped Open channel Cost Traditional low cost solution but high fixed Generally more costly per unit cost element Implementation Highly flexible. Can adjust system to actual demand Not adaptable to large variances in demand Land Acquisition Minimal Substantial. Can reduce agricultural area substantially Commercial Control High control for water theft, metering UFW, and disconnection Lower distribution efficiency, higher commercial risks Environmental If not supervised closely, channels can become Minimal dump sites 360 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS “Subscription period.” The selected operator would carry out L a subscription program to sign up farmers to the service. The operator would have the option to cancel in the event that the subscribing farmers came up short of the required 90,000 feddans. Moreover, it would be after the subscription that the operator would design the system. The analysis studied N financing risks, including securing the longest possible loan terms available to keep user tariff affordable. Need- less to say, the longer the debt repayment terms, the lower the user tariffs could be. The team further found that N construction delay is a major risk factor. The operator must therefore implement the construction program swiftly to take full advantage of the long term of initial IFI loans that were being made available through GOE. The preparation team also well understood the N political risk involved, given Egypt’s lack of experience in public-private partnerships and, most importantly, the lack of comparable successful efforts in the irrigation sector. Finally, the issue of N currency risk was daunting, given that the project was financed in foreign currency but generated revenues in Egyptian pounds. Although local currency financing was avail- able in Egypt, it could not be offered in the maturities needed to make the project viable. Cost Analysis and Minimum Bid and Project Size The technical analysis reviewed numerous design options to reduce the risk of oversizing. First, the analysis determined which basic infrastruc- ture was common to all scenarios (that is, the fixed cost component). Second, it simulated the addition of independent modules of land area (that is, the variable cost component) such that the operator could connect farmers on the basis of demand without jeopardizing his own cash flow. This was a critical element of the analysis. The analysis yielded the supply cost curve in figure 19.2. The cost analysis provided both important information on minimum project size to ensure that user tariffs remained affordable and incentives for the operator to expand coverage. On this basis, the minimum project size was determined to fall within the range of 60,000–90,000 feddans, this being the range at which the development cost per feddan would achieve the affordability New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in I rrigation N 361 The loan facility would reimburse a maximum of 85% of the total eligible construc- 4 tion costs to the private operator, meaning a minimum of 15% contribution from the private operator. The private operator may, in some circumstances, be required to increase its proportion of financing, particularly if the initial subscription by farmers exceeds 90,000 feddans. No restrictions are provided as to where the private operator can source this financing. It can be in the form of both equity and debt. thresholds indicated in the user survey. More importantly, the cost curve revealed that as the scheme approached 100 percent coverage, average costs would continue to drop. In other words, the private investor would con- tinue to have the incentive to expand the network and connect the additional farms. As such, the reference project for the bid tariff was set at 90,000 feddans. Structure of PPP Transaction The West Delta PPP transaction was to be a hybrid scheme, largely founded on the Design-Build-Operate (DBO) model. Under this model, the government contracts a private operator take over a concession area consisting of approximately 190,000 feddans in the southern portion of the West Delta. The operator will design, construct, and assume the full responsibilities of operating the system for 30 years, including taking on the associated demand and commercial risks. In turn, the public sector party will assume ownership of the assets and most of the financing-related responsibilities and risks, including the currency risk related to the potential devaluation of the Egyptian currency. For its part, GOE will make available financing on the order of US$175 million to the operator for the initial phase of the construc- tion. The funds were to be sourced through a loan facility that GOE had already established with the World Bank and Agence Française de Développement (AFD). The private operator, at its option, may draw up to 85 percent of total construction costs from the facility, leaving the private op- erator’s own contribution to be at least 15 percent. 4 As the operator draws down from the loan facility, it triggers an annual repayment obligation (annual concession fee) to GOE based on defined payment 0 30,000 25,000 20,000 5,000 15,000 10,000 20,000 38,000 50,000 70,000 90,000 115,000 135,000 170,000 190,000 A v e r a g e c o s t ( L E / f e d d a n ) Figure 19.2 Supply Cost Curve to Develop West Delta Project Bid project size Connected feddans 362 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS terms and conditions. The amount of the annual concession fee will be in direct proportion to the amount of funds drawn down and would cease upon the private operator’s fulfilling completely its full repayment obligations over 20 years. The concession fee is designed as a back-to-back payment to cover GOE’s loan obligations to the World Bank and AFD. Once the initial loan facility of $175 million is exhausted by initial construction costs, the operator will be obliged to source its own fund- ing by debt and equity to expand the system to the extent of additional demand. In this phase, the structure would revert more to a traditional concession Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, with the operator assuming full financing risks. The private operator would collect combined two-part tariffs de- nominated in Egyptian pounds (LE) from connecting farmers to recoup its costs. He will collect a fixed tariff (flat tariff) that will be charged on a per-feddan basis to connecting farmers over a 20-year period to defray the private operator’s concession fee, additional capital expenditures financed by the operator, replacement costs, and a return on invest- ment. The operator also will collect a volumetric tariff based on actual water consumption, which will defray the operator’s cost of operations and routine maintenance, and provide a management fee. Rationale This hybrid option was regarded as the preferred approach for the proposed project because it balanced risks evenly between the public and private parties. The DBO model transferred as much project risk as possible from public to private. A pure public model or a management contract would have had a high probability for successful implementation but would have transferred few risks to the private sector. By compari- son, a classic BOT concession would have transferred essentially all risks to the private sector. However, it would have been be too costly in the initial stage and likely would have received low interest from prospective private investors without sizable subsidy, as was recently demonstrated in the Guerdane Concession in Morocco. Institutional and Regulatory Arrangements Regulatory responsibilities would be shared between a Project Man- agement Unit (PMU) within the Ministry of Water Resources and New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in I rrigation N 363 Irrigation, a Regulatory Office (RO), and a Water User Council (WUC) representing farmers in the area. The PMU would manage the day-to-day business of the project, including financial management and disbursement functions. The PMU would also supervise the con- tractual arrangements for the initial construction and expansion of the irrigation system. The RO would regulate rate adjustments and tariff rebasing and oversee the contractual commitments of the operator with regard to prescribed service standards. Finally, an Independent Panel of Experts would be set up as needed to mediate disputes. The WUC was established as an independent farmers’ organization to take an active part in preparing the project and, ultimately, during implementation, in monitoring the relationships and potential conflicts among farmers on such matters as water entitlements, usage, and al- ternating hours of irrigation. The WUC also will monitor groundwater pumping in the area, along with the more official program that will be implemented by the PMU. Conclusion The challenge posed to the West Delta project was to provide quality ir- rigation services to a highly discriminating user group without significant public subsidy. The West Delta Project has responded by introducing a transaction concept that relies on full cost recovery, volumetric pric- ing, a balanced risk framework, user participation, tariff regulation, and technical specifications to reduce the financial exposure of private operators. The transaction would involve sharing the financing between GOE, a private operator, and farmers, with the debt portion underwritten by a government guarantee. While the project has its own specificities, in particular, a pre- existing community of commercial, successful, and technically savvy farmers, it provides useful lessons about the design of self-financing irrigation schemes. Whether the project’s formula for apportioning risks and rewards will succeed in the market remains to be seen. Whatever the outcome, however, the project will be keenly observed by MNA countries looking for new approaches to meet the service demands of their irrigated farmers. 364 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS References Tardieu, H., and others. 2004. “Public-Private Partnership in Irrigaiton and Drainage: Need for a Professional Third Party between Farm- ers and Governments.” Eighth International Seminar on Participa- tory Irrigation Management: Emerging Trends in Public-Private Partnerships in Irrigation. www.inpim.org/leftlinks/Seminars/ EighthSeminar.htm World Bank. 2007. “Emerging Public-Private Partnerships in Irrigation Development and Management.” Water Sector Board Discussion Paper 10. May. Delegation 367 20 Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen Naji Abu-Hatim and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed Y emen is among the poorest countries in the world. Its agriculture is an important driving force of economic growth, contributing 14 percent–23 percent to GDP. Agriculture also makes very significant indirect contributions by providing employment and income to more than 55 percent of the active population. Nevertheless, pov- erty is spread mainly throughout rural areas, which are home to 83 percent of the poor. They derive their livelihoods and incomes mainly from agriculture-related activities. Yemen is also one of the most populated among the Arab Peninsula countries. Yemen’s 3.2 percent demographic growth puts high pressure on its natural resources. Yemen is one of the most water-constrained countries in the world. With a per capita availability of 150m 3 a year, Yemen’s water availability is 10 percent of the regional average and 2 percent of the global average. The country also has one of the highest sectoral water allocations to agriculture: more than 90 percent of total use. With a largely arid to hyperarid climate and no perennial riv- ers, the country relies heavily on the exploitation of groundwater. Groundwater reserves are being critically depleted. Renewable re- sources, estimated at approximately 2,100 million cubic meters (m 3 ) a year, are being supplemented by groundwater mining from deep aquifers at a rate of approximately 1,300 million m 3 a year (with desalination and reclaimed wastewater accounting for a negligible percentage). In some areas, groundwater tables are dropping at 3 meters a year, and many farms are being abandoned. Spate flood is the second-order means of irrigation. However, as opposed to using groundwater, utilizing spate water proved costly to the government 368 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS since it requires developing and maintaining spate-regulating, off- farm infrastructure. Irrigation in Yemen has grown rapidly, both from groundwater and surface water. Traditionally, Yemenis had many ingenious techniques to husband their scant water. Early development of modern spate schemes in the 1950s successfully adapted traditional flood recession technology to a more controlled system. Later, in the 1970s, the in- troduction of the tubewell and motor pump revolutionized irrigation. Now, full or supplemental groundwater irrigation accounts for over two-thirds of the value of crop production. Irrigation efficiencies are low (nationwide average approximately 40 percent). Water consump- tion in the irrigation subsector continues to increase at an average annual rate of 30 million m 3 , or 5 percent. Already by 1990, irrigated agriculture alone was consuming 130 percent of Yemen’s renewable water resources, meaning that the overdraft beyond the “safe yield” was approximately 30 percent. By 2005, this figure had reached over 50 percent. If agricultural expansion continues, groundwater overdraft will reach 100 percent by 2025. However, many aquifers will be pumped dry long before then. Water markets exist in Yemen but only on the margins of the water-related activities. The private sector and market mechanisms are found only in irrigation water sales to water tankers. However, these markets are informal. Yemen lacks clear groundwater rules. Third- party externalities are not accounted for, and there is no enabling or regulatory environment. Water scarcity is exacerbated both by significant spatial and temporal variations and by significant water (rights) allocation problems. With the expected rapid population growth, by 2025, water availability per capita is estimated to decrease by 35 percent from 2005, well below levels generally reckoned to indicate severe water stress. As a result, one challenge facing Yemen is to reduce groundwater use in agriculture while maintaining the rural economy and farmers’ in- comes. A compounding challenge is to improve the sustainability of spate irrigation infrastructure and to reduce the government’s financial burden through strengthening farmers’ self-reliance on financing and maintaining spate irrigation systems. In the past, the government intentionally subsidized irrigation and drinking water to promote development, reduce the cost of living, raise farm incomes, and vest powerful influence groups with patronage. By the late 1990s, the government recognized that this pattern posed Participatory I rrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen N 369 economic and environmental pressures and that new pricing regimes were needed to target cost recovery and—to a lesser extent—demand management. Nevertheless, despite a de- centralization program for cost- sharing in water investment programs, government remains the dominant financier. During 2000–04, water sector capital expenditures were f inanced mai nl y by budget transfers (41 percent) and loans (29 per- cent). User fees financed only 28 percent of the investment program. According to the 5-year government investment plan proposed for 2005–09 (figures 20.1 and 20.2), budget transfers are expected to represent only 30 percent of total financing for the water sector. Funds committed by donors (loans/grants) amount to 31 percent. Therefore, 39 percent of additional financing—the balance—is required by 2009. Self-financing may be needed to cover most of this balance. Furthermore, the government has developed an ambitious investment plan for the water supply and sanitation (WSS) subsectors to achieve the MDGs (figure 20.1). Thus, the government would prioritize its sovereign financing of these subsectors over the irrigation and water resource management subsectors. For the irrigation subsector, it can be concluded from the above that cost recovery and demand management policies need to be coupled and fostered, thus replacing the old patronage and supply-driven approaches. The government has set f inancial autonomy as a policy for rural decentralized water supplies and has started to work with water user groups (WUGs) toward cost recovery, particularly in spate irrigation. 0 180,000 160,000 140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Source: DGGREE-Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, “Report on the Preparation of the Investment Project in the Water Sector,”2007. Water Investment Plan 2005–2009 Figure 20.1 WSS Subsectoral Five-Year Investment Plans, 2005–09 RWSS Group Irrigation Group Human Environment Group Water Resource Group UWSS Group Cross-Cutting Investment Self 0% Others 39% Loans 31% Budget tranfers 30% Self Budget tranfers Loans Others Capital financing 2005–09 Figure 20.2 Projected Sources of Capital Expenditures for Water Sector, 2005–09 (%) 370 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS This chapter presents success stories and lessons learned from the cost-sharing and water user-participation activities of the World- Bank-supported Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP) in Yemen. The chapter also presents comparable experiences from other demand- management-oriented projects in Yemen. Experiences from the Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP) To improve the use of spate irrigation in Yemen, the World Bank Institute (WBI) facilitated a review of the prospects for WUAs and the ultimate transfer of spate schemes to users. In 2001 this review envisioned the IIP: “…an Adaptable Program Loan to support physical rehabilitation and to move the reform agenda forward” (US$20 mil- lion). One IIP component aimed to establish water user organizations that would share investment/rehabilitation costs of the main irrigation system and gradually take over the operation and maintenance (O&M) of the secondary/tertiary system. Formulation of Water User Organizations toward Cost-Sharing The IIP was articulated around Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM). The project prompted the government to create enabling legal and institutional environments to establish two main irrigation-user organizations: water user associations (WUAs) and irrigation councils (ICs). Each WUA is in charge of implementing PIM in its respective irrigation command area. The WUA was to (1) provide reliable and sustainable irrigation services, (2) perform maintenance and rehabilitation, (3) collect fees from beneficiaries, and (4) develop the capability for self-reliant O&M. At later, more advanced stages, ICs were established in both Wadi Zabid and Wadi Tuban with potent representation from the WUAs. The ICs act as the High Executive and Administrative Authorities in each wadi (riverbed). The ICs are responsible for (1) applying the IC’s by-laws and implementing its executive procedures; (2) coordi- nating activities between government authorities that continue to be in charge of O&M of head works/primary canals and the WUAs in charge of O&M of the secondary and tertiary systems; (3) protecting water user rights and resolving conflicts and pending issues; and (4) monitoring the social, financial, and technical performance of WUAs. The ICs represent the local government, WUAs, and the Ministry of Participatory I rrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen N 371 Agriculture and Irrigation (through its Regional Development Author- ity/Agriculture Office). The project initiated the PIM approach through undertaking a comprehensive awareness program to inculcate the concept of PIM in farmers’ minds and to clarify the roles and responsibilities of irrigation beneficiaries within their representative user groups. The program targeted all relevant stakeholders, including farmers (owners, sharecrop- pers, and tenants), government officials, and local councils. As a result of the program, informal water user groups (WUGs) were formulated at the onset, which later metamorphosed into formal WUAs. ICs were formed at an advanced stage of IIP. The project then developed training activities to build the managerial and technical capabilities of the WUAs and ICs. PIM called for farmers’ participation in overall project activities starting from decisionmaking to completion of the rehabilitation and improvement works, as well as farmers’ contribution of 10 percent of investment costs in kind. Thereafter, farmers would take over responsibility and financing for the O&M of secondary and tertiary canals. IIP’s Approach to Community Cost-Sharing of Off-Farm Investments For the investment/rehabilitation works, as mentioned earlier, the IIP introduced an in-kind cost-sharing approach through community- implemented contracts. To enable low-income farmers to share the capi- tal costs of the project, IIP divided civil works into two categories: Priority works 1. to be fully financed by the project (government funds and loans). These works include feeder roads and flood/environ- mental protection works, which are deemed public goods outside the canal system and thus require no earmarked user fees. Participatory works, 2. requiring a 10 percent farmer contribution to rehabilitation/improvement capital costs. This percentage was agreed between the project government team and farmer repre- sentatives (initially the WUGs; eventually the WUAs). Farmers were allowed to contribute this percentage in kind: labor and mate- rial. In this arrangement, each WUA would implement 1–2 small community contract(s) up to $10,000 per contract, to an aggre- gate $1.4 million per project. To further persuade irrigation end- beneficiaries to contribute 10 percent in kind, the project guaranteed 372 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS that the unit rates of the contracts awarded to WUAs would be 30 percent cheaper than those implemented by the national/regional contractors. (These rates otherwise would have embodied signifi- cant profit margins for the WUA contractors.) This percentage thereby represents the total contribution from end-beneficiaries and, intrinsically, from the WUA contractors. Farmers’ Response to Joining WUAs and Sharing Capital Costs One major incentive for farmers to join WUAs was to vest the farmers with the authority to co-design and co-implement spate subprojects. Due to past, persistent centralized subsidies of irrigation in Yemen, farmers at first felt little incentive to buy in to the idea of forming WUAs under the project, especially since spate irrigation depends on erratic floodwater that is becoming ever more scarce and less predictable. However, through IIP’s public awareness program, many farmers have come forward and joined the WUAs. The farmers pay subscription and annual fees and play an active role in selecting the types of irrigation structures needed and contributing to subsequent implementation/ supervision of civil works contracts. Farmers became more interested after they were vested with the right to participate in decisionmaking and (as explained above) to directly implement small contracts in which they would cost-share the rehabilitation and improvement works. The project’s Credit Agree- ment included a prerequisite that civil works could not start before establishing the respective WUAs. Farmers also exhibited willingness to share costs of on-farm im- provements after the project evidenced improved yields and profits. The IIP included a major component to demonstrate improved irrigation technologies and agronomic practices at the on-farm level. The demonstrations were conducted with 360 farmers and 590 farmers at Wadis Zabid and Tuban, respectively. An additional 1500 farmers were involved in the associated awareness campaigns. As a result of the various on-farm interventions (table 20.1), some crop yields increased up to 100 percent! In the Rapid Appraisal Survey conducted in March 2005, farmers rated the overall outcome as highly satisfactory. They expressed willingness to share 25 percent and 50 percent of the on-farm costs of improved technologies for the spate and tube-well demonstrations, respectively. Participatory I rrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen N 373 Backstopping the WUAs and Tackling PIM Implementation Difficulties The project provided the needed training and necessary administra- tive, financial, and technical backstopping to WUAs. Primarily due to their weak legal and financial status at start-up, WUAs experienced various obstacles in actualizing their roles. These difficulties called for creating options to empower the WUAs in carrying out the com- munity contracts. For instance, it proved difficult for the WUAs to issue bank/commercial guarantees for the community contracts. Al- ternatively, they were permitted to issue guarantee letters endorsed by the governors. Backstopping the WUAs included the following five activities: A training program has been carried out for each WUA Board of 1. Directors and for their Auditing and Inspection Committees to enable them to understand the legal status, objectives, and admin- istration/financial management of O&M activities. The emphasis has been sustainable O&M. Table 20.1 Yield and Farm Revenue Increases Due to Improved Farming Practices: Planned Project Estimates vs. Actual Measurements (%) Crop Planned yield increase (%) Measured yield increase (end 2005) (%) Internal rate of return (%) Cotton 13 Zabid 45–100 Up to 6 15 Tuban Sorghum grain 5 Up to 98 9.5 Sorghum fodder 4 Zabid–8 Tuban Up to 44 4.5 Sesame 10 Up to 55 8 Maize 18 Zabid 62–97 Zabid NA Cucurbits 3 Tuban Up to 200 Up to 90 Tomatoes 20 87 4 Onions 20 12 to 25 2 Eggplant 20 Tuban 44 13 Red chilies 20 Tuban NA NA Banana 10–15 NA NA Mango 10 NA NA Okra 15 25 3 Water melon NA 28 Zabid NA 374 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) Agreements were prepared 2. in Arabic and were endorsed by the governors. The project team has trained the WUAs’ construction managers 3. on contracting procedures as well as procedures covered in the Project Operations Manual. The WUA representatives have participated in three workshops 4. at the regional and national levels on institutional assessment of the irrigation sector. The draft by-laws for establishing the ICs have been approved by 5. the project’s interministerial Steering Committee, thus hastening the establishment of an IC for each of the two wadis. Approximately 30 working papers and operational manuals have been prepared by the training consultants for the project’s PIM component. The cost of training and WUA-backstopping in the IIP has been considerable, amounting to approximately 20 percent of total project costs. The Yemeni government could seek to scale up the PIM concept after the completion of Bank-supported projects. If so, the government would need to secure financing for such software-type investments from the sovereign resources allocated to rural extension and research. From international experience, this is deemed one of the examples for “virtuous” subsidies that a “lean-and-mean” government (as opposed to the private sector or end-beneficiaries) could shoulder. Status and O&M Roles of WUAs/ICs, and Expected Progress Promising results have been observed thus far as irrigation stakehold- ers in the two wadis participated in the IIP design, cost-sharing, and implementation stages. All WUAs in Wadi Zabid and Wadi Tuban have been established and become fully operational with active boards of directors, proper bookkeeping, and bank accounts. The WUAs have worked closely with the project management units (PMUs) and the project consultants during the design and implementation of the rehabilitation and improve- ment activities. As part of the WUAs, Farmer Design Committees (FDCs) have been elected (with the facilitation of existing Farmers’ Organizations, or FOs) to determine priority ranking of rehabilitation needs and to participate in their design. Participatory I rrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen N 375 The WUAs have efficiently been implementing the participatory contracts and signing IMT Agreements for all secondary and tertiary canals. More importantly, they started to contribute to O&M costs of the secondary/tertiary system (as it has been agreed that the O&M costs of the main system be shouldered by the government). The IIP has prepared an O&M manual including a detailed inventory of required O&M items and a description of how WUAs could prepare O&M plans/budgets and collect O&M fees. The WUAs have been attending an extensive training program on how to use this manual and how to implement it. Thus far, WUAs have been collecting user fees for heavy-equipment rentals to carry out immediate O&M of the secondary/tertiary canals. The fees collected are deposited in WUAs’ bank accounts and disbursed from these accounts. To date, O&M fees are being collected ad hoc since O&M of the IIP- introduced works have not been in effect. However, it is reported that farmers are paying their contributions and that the collection process is transparent. The ICs also have started to hold regular meetings and discuss issues related to water rights and water distribution. The role of the WUAs and the ICs will become more obvious after completion of the rehabilitation/improvement works. One sign of WUAs’ effectiveness in Wadi Zabid was that they managed to persuade powerful farmers to restore canal cross-sections and to remove the control works that they had unilaterally placed in the canals to extend their irrigated areas. To summarize, thus far, IIP has been deemed a successful “process” project, in testing and scaling up the PIM concept. The beneficiaries formed grassroots-level WUAs and wadi-level ICs that have been successfully: Participating in decisionmaking and in selecting design options N Contributing to capital investment costs and to implementation N of civil works contracts Gradually taking over responsibilities for the recurrent financing N and O&M of the secondary and tertiary systems. The viability of this “process” project is to be assessed based on its far-reaching impacts. They include financial sustainability; natural- resource-base sustainability; reduction of avoidable transaction and overhead costs; and piloting, transferring, and scaling up best practices. Most of the off-farm rehabilitation and improvement activities are in 376 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS progress. Thus, it is too early to draw conclusions on the quality of irrigation services provided by ICs/WUAs, as opposed to those previ- ously provided by corresponding government entities. Experiences from the Groundwater Management Projects In the early 1990s, Yemen began tentative steps to reverse the groundwa- ter water mining problem and improve cost-sharing. A major constraint was the very weak legal governance environment and the strong traditions of tribal and local autonomy and fragmented water institutions that had virtually no influence over the water-extraction decisions made by tens of thousands of independent-minded farmers. In response, a decentral- ized partnership approach was proposed. The following sections touch on the PIM and cost-sharing experiences obtained from a number of irrigation demand-management-oriented projects in Yemen. Groundwater Management Called for Introducing PIM As one building block for an integrated approach to the water problem, the Bank-supported Land and Water Conservation Project (LWCP 1994–99) was launched to demonstrate a package of technical improve- ments to reduce water use at farm level. LWCP targeted improving Yemen’s very low (approximately 40 percent) overall irrigation efficien- cies. The project offered a package of technical advice to groundwater irrigators on water-saving technology and financed capital improve- ments on a cost-sharing basis, typically 30 percent from farmers and the balance from government. Technology comprised predominantly piped on-farm water distribution systems and the use of drip or bubbler micro-irrigation. The project decentralized implementation to local specialist teams and required farmers’ contributions up-front, with a credit facility available. The project was well received by farmers and achieved its water-saving objectives. A second phase—the Groundwater and Soil Conservation Project (GSCP)—began in 2003. It is extending the technical and financial package from 11 to 15 governorates. GSCP builds on the LWCP exercise by adding a key element: a technical advisory service. It complements physical investment in water-use-efficiency equipment with improved water management (through better irrigation scheduling and agronomic improvements), adjusted cropping patterns, and crop husbandry—all toward raising farm returns per m 3 of water. Participatory I rrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen N 377 The project deepens the innovative partnership approach that LWCP introduced. The government has created a framework of rights, regulations, and basin planning that—in Yemen’s weak governance context—can be implemented only through decentralized approaches and the cooperation of groundwater users. Ways to develop this cooperation through partnership approaches are being tested at two levels: the basin level through basin committees that are based on basin hydrological boundaries rather than on governorate boundaries; and the local level through WUAs similar to those introduced under IIP. Complementing the GSCP, a Japanese-grant-financed pilot program, the Community Water Management Project (CWMP), has been harnessed to test community self-management approaches to water conservation. CWMP groups the irrigators together for groundwater management and conservation, using participatory monitoring tech- niques (“peer monitoring”). Water Reforms Enable Coupling Demand Management with Cost-Sharing Alongside these field approaches, the government is strengthening groundwater governance. A 2003 water law defined water rights and set up a regulatory system of permits. Created in 1996, the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) is preparing basin plans, working with basin committees that bring together government and water users, and encouraging participatory and community-based solutions aimed at self-regulation and self-financing of recurrent costs by water users. The Sana’a Basin Water Management Project (SBWMP) is testing these approaches in the stressed basin around the nation’s capital. At the same time, government is fostering water conservation incentives by using macroeconomic measures, raising the price of diesel fuel, and phasing out border protection of irrigated commodi- ties. Government doubled the price of diesel in 2005, a key demand- management measure. Cost-Sharing Created Revolving Funds to Finance Water-Saving Practices The LWCP piloted improvements for groundwater management and innovative approaches to watershed management. The adoption of cost-sharing proved the key to demonstrating farmer commitment. 378 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Previously, projects had provided equipment free of charge, with disap- pointing results. Cost-sharing has created a revolving capital fund of approximately US$2 million to finance expansion of the LWCP. The project’s decentralized and participatory approach to identification, design, and implementation brought farmer knowledge and commit- ment into partnership with the skills and resources of government. LWCP also laid the basis for the current GSCP/CWMP phase in which the government will partner increasingly with user groups rather than with individual elites. Farmers jointly invested approximately US$250/ha to achieve wa- ter savings of approximately 2,300 m 3 /ha/year. The investment costs thus are approximately US$0.11/m 3 of annual water saving. Savings in pumping costs averaged US$0.06/m 3 . Thus, the investment cost is recouped by farmers in just two years, even without accounting for the opportunity value of the water saved in the aquifer. Political Economy of Introducing PIM to Groundwater Users Although combating groundwater mining generally seemed to be pro-poor in Yemen, the better-off may have been capturing most of the initial benefits. Under LWCP, a pro-poor filter was applied to the project’s subsidized investments in water-use efficiency by applying a ceiling on the area that the project would co-finance. However, this mechanism proved weak, and there was certainly a bias toward the better-off, who had land/water privileges and could afford the cost- sharing. It was clear that the better-off farmers control the lion’s share of groundwater. Therefore, Bank-supported actions to reduce mining inevitably had to deal with these farmers. However, WUAs are a means of helping the disadvantaged avail of the benefits. Forgoing WUAs would have risked excluding the poorer farmers, the landless, and women. Incidentally, this risk was a hot issue in the preceding Bank-supported Ta’iz Rural Water Supply Project. In it, there was a debate on the ethics of a Bank project dealing directly with the “sheikhs,” who controlled most groundwater, rather than with WUAs, who were poor but did not actually “own” much water. The design of the Japanese-financed CWMP (box 20.1) attempted to resolve this problem by promoting WUAs that integrate all water users, from big well-owners to those who own no resource at all, on the basis of common responsibility. Participatory I rrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen N 379 Community-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System To maintain sustainability, the IIP ensured that ICs closely monitor the performance of the WUAs. The project has established three broad performance indicators: (a) institutional, (b) financial, and (c) technical. Institutional performance indicators 1. include (a) representation (per- centage of farmers subscribing to membership in each WUA); (b) transparency and accountability (whether the chair and members Box 20.1 Yemen Community Water Management Project The Japanese government is providing a grant for a Community Water Management Project (CWMP). The project, which is executed by the World Bank, would test and develop replicable models for sustainable self-management of local water resources by poor farming communities in areas of Yemen in which water, particularly groundwater, is becoming increasingly scarce. The project would have three components: Participatory water management component. 1. Would (a) identify areas in which social conditions are appropriate for local community self-management of water resources, and (b) build the capacity of local user groups across a discrete hydrological unit to manage the resource Water management and monitoring component 2. . Would work with user groups to define the water balance and a hydraulic goal, to draw up and carry out water management plans, and to monitor progress against the plan Monitoring and evaluation component 3. . Would document the project in full, evaluate and disseminate results, propose ways of scaling up successes, and create and support a network of practitioners. At the end of the 4-year grant period, the project is expected to have developed mod- els and institutional capacity in at least 3 representative areas. In these areas, local user groups will have the capability to work in partnership with local and central government agencies. The groups also will be able to set, enforce, and monitor local water manage- ment plans that reduce both net water loss and losses from pumping from the aquifer, while sustaining incomes equitably. The project will have documented the proven models, created a network of practitioners capable of scaling up the models, and influenced the policies and practices of local and central government agencies to partner with communi- ties on local water management. 380 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS of the WUA executive body were properly elected; whether the executive body meets and produces minutes of meetings; whether WUAs members are being timely informed of the executive body decisions; whether WUAs adopted proper Internal Rules and Regulations and bookkeeping concerning managerial, financial, and technical aspects); and (c) authority (the degree to which WUAs have the power to execute their decisions). Financial performance indicators 2. monitor whether WUAs are will- ing and able to collect/receive adequate funds to cover O&M and whether WUAs maintain proper bank accounts and accounting records. Technical performance indicators 3. monitor whether WUA members master the O&M and supervision plans and are well informed of their foreseen costs. However, WUAs and ICs may need to be empowered to fully under- take the M&E, and ICs may need to be bottom-up rather than top-down entities. The water law enacted in 2003 enunciated that WUAs and ICs need to be established and need to contribute to the Wadi Integrated Water Management Plans, which are adopted by the government. With technical backstopping from the regional line agencies and local authorities/councils, WUAs and ICs need to gradually take over the role of overseeing service provision and facilitating the application of water-related incentives and regulations. They also can be entrusted with more monitoring/benchmarking roles in coordination with the regional line agencies, and with more enforcement roles in coordina- tion with local authorities. Nonetheless, the best alternative for a monitoring/benchmarking/ planning body would be the technical secretariat of a basin commit- tee. The basin committee would be based on hydrological boundaries. Its board would be composed of water user groups/federations, local authorities, local line agencies, and NGOs. This composition would reduce the immense forgone resource-economic costs posed by the administrative boundaries; and would limit the transaction costs posed by assigning monitoring/benchmarking roles to mono-user water groups. The technical secretariat for the SBWMP thus far has been the Sana’a branch of the National Water Resources Authority, which needs Participatory I rrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen N 381 to be capacitated. Basin committees are mentioned in the recent water law. However, the law/by-law is silent on: Whether the committee board would approve the basin plans (de- a. veloped by its technical secretariat) by consensus or by majority. An indispensable provision entailing that the board members be b. from user groups and local entities rather than from line agencies. (Sana’a’s board is not in compliance with this by-law as its members include many top ministerial officials.) A provision stipulating that the board members are to be elected c. rather than appointed, with the chairmanship of the board being rotated among them. Conclusions Five conclusions can be drawn from the cost-sharing and related PIM experiences in Yemen’s irrigation subsector: WUAs and ICs could play an important role in rendering (a) services 1. responsive to farmers’ demands, (b) easier expansion of irrigation coverage, and (c) more timely water delivery, thus matching crop water requirements. Farmer participation and cost-sharing create a sense of ownership 2. of irrigation schemes, since farmers (a) become more proactive in dealing with emerging problems and in resolving the long-lasting social and technical problems that the government failed to resolve; and (b) start to speak up openly about issues that were controversial in the past, such as revisiting water rights that no longer maintain equity between upstream and downstream users. Without sound water rights, rehabilitation and improvement of 3. the irrigation infrastructure would not contribute substantially to improve equity of water distribution between upstream and downstream users. In addition, the relationship between landlords and sharecropper/tenant farmers needs to be clearer on who does what and how much each should contribute, thus avoiding exploi- tation of poor farmers. Government can provide farmers with three key incentives to 4. participate in cost-sharing and to organize themselves in WUAs: (a) Producing public awareness activities prior to any physical in- terventions. Advance notice would ensure upfront transparency 382 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS and notify farmers of the benefits forgone by not opting into the PIM process; (b) entrusting farmers to participate in the design, implementation, supervision, and O&M activities of the feeder-level (as opposed to trunk-level) irrigation contracts; and (c) producing public awareness activities after the physical interventions have been completed so that farmers could witness the resultant increase in production and net revenue. Beneficiaries’ contributions to capital and O&M costs relieved 5. pressure on government budget and contingent liability. References MNSRE (Rural Development Water and Environment Group). 2004. Yemen Water Sector Public Expenditure Analysis. Draft. World Bank. ____. 2006. “Local Action: Partnership Approach to Sustainable Groundwater Management in Yemen.” Draft paper prepared for contribution to the 4th World Water Forum, “Groundwater Management in the MNA Region.” World Bank. World Bank. 2005. Yemen Country Water Resources Assistance Strategy. 383 Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen Susmita Dasgupta, Craig Meisner, Andrew Makokha, and Richard Pollard M eeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in water supply and sanitation in Yemen is a formidable challenge for several reasons. First, the country is challenged by an inhos- pitable and dry geography. Second, the predominantly (75 percent) rural population is typified by small tribal communities dispersed in scattered settlements. Third, many of these approximately 100,000 villages are situated on rocky mountain tops, making service delivery and outreach difficult and expensive. Finally, only 41 percent of the population has access to health services, and less than 31 percent has adequate access to water and sanitation services (WSS) (figure 21.1). These significant service deficit gaps obviously require substantial investments from the public sector, communities, and individuals. At the same time, many policy- makers are concerned whether publicly financed investments are providing sustainable services to communities once the project investment is completed and sup- port services are removed. In recent years, the Govern- ment of Yemen, with support from the World Bank, the Gov- ernment of the Netherlands, and UNICEF and other agencies, has initiated several projects and programs to improve WSS in ru- ral communities. These programs 21 Source: Project files. Figure 21.1 Rural Population Lacking Access to Public/Private/ Cooperative Water Supply Networks in Yemen Al-Mahrah Hadramout Al-Jawf Mareb Shabwah Abyan Al-Baida Al-Daleh Lahj Taiz Ibb Dhamar Sana’a Amran Sa’adah Hajjah Capital City Al-Hodeidah Al-Hodeidah Al- Mahweet Number of rural dwellings w.o pub/priv/coop water supply (’000) Reymah Aden 0 - 67 6.7 - 31.2 31.2 - 49.4 49.4 - 78.2 78.2 - 239.6 Socotra 384 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS have differing institutional and technical designs. Among other charac- teristics, they range from being strongly community-driven to strongly government-led programs in which communities are provided with infrastructure through centrally managed programs. Community-driven means that users are given extensive voice and choice in project plan- ning, implementation, and water system management along with train- ing and support to develop local water system management capacity. The World-Bank-funded Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (RWSSP) was perhaps the most community driven of the initiatives in that it provides users with a relatively open menu of choices of service levels (within the technical and resource limitations of the community) and management arrangements. RWSSP was prepared during a period of reform and institutional uncertainty in Yemen’s water and sanitation sector. As a result, one of the key elements built into the project was technical assistance to support the formulation of a national rural WSS strategy and the development of a subsector investment program based on the imple- mentation experience of RWSSP. Yemen now has comparatively streamlined water sector agencies. All the main government bodies working in the water supply and sanita- tion sector are located under the Ministry of Water and Environment. They include the General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP), the National Water Resources Authority, the National Water and Sanitation Authority, the Technical Secretariat for Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform, and the Environmental Protec- tion Authority. The Government of Yemen (GOY) issued a policy statement agreeing to the guiding principles of the RWSSP, namely, a “decen- tralized, demand-responsive approach (DRA) to RWSS development, integrating sanitation and hygiene education with water supply in order to maximize health benefits and the sustainability of RWSS systems.” The policy statement laid out three major principles of a demand- responsive approach: Communities self-select to participate in the project by applying for 1. assistance and meeting project conditions for local contributions and organizing for local management. Communities participate in the design of their water supply and 2. sanitation system and in the selection of the technology and ser- vice level that they consider suitable for their needs and for which Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen N 385 they are willing and able to pay partial investment costs and full operation and maintenance costs (O&M). Communities create formal water user associations (WUAs) to 3. manage their water and sanitation systems. A number of major investment projects and programs that were either underway or prepared in the early 2000s adhere, to varying degrees, to these principles. The main investment programs include the Social Fund for Development, the Public Works Program, the na- tional RWSS program executed by GARWSP, and UNICEF’s Water, Environment and Sanitation (WES) Programme in Yemen. User satisfaction with RWSS services provides a useful measure of the success or failure of a WSS investment program and the likelihood that the infrastructure will be sustained through its design life. An analysis of user satisfaction therefore can enable comparisons among the different approaches. The comparisons can indicate the relative sustainability of the WSS services that were constructed through the different programs. Yemen RWSSP Household Survey From October 2007 to September 2008, a household survey was conducted in the Abyan, Hajjah, and Ibb Governorates of Yemen to evaluate water users’ satisfaction with water and sanitation services. The objectives of the survey were to (1) assess the performance of the RWSSP with respect to several indicators of user satisfaction with the services provided and their ability to operate and maintain water systems, and (2) compare the RWSSP’s performance with that of other ongoing RWSS projects in Yemen. As mentioned above, the outcomes of this survey were to guide the design of rural water and sanitation interventions. Table 21.1 breaks down the total number of community water systems established through RWSSP and four other projects included in the survey as of June 2007. Survey Sample Sample selection for the survey was carried out in three stages. First, a record of all existing water supplies was culled from different sources and stakeholders. Next, with support from local governments and 386 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The initial selection of the number of water schemes was not necessarily repre- 1 sentative of all schemes. social workers, a field review was carried out at the district and Uzla (subdistrict) levels to establish which supplies were operational. Third, operational water suppliers were arranged by source of funding (do- nor or government). A sample of water schemes by each donor and governorate was then selected for the detailed survey (table 21.2). 1 A random sample of households was then selected from each of the 168 selected water schemes. In total, 5,035 households covering 41 districts and 152 Uzlas participated in the survey. Table 21.1 Number of Rural Water Schemes, June 2007 Governorate Total RWSSP GARWSP Public works (PWP) Social Fund (SFD) UNICEF Ibb 423 38 315 27 41 6 Abyan 248 33 153 38 8 23 Hajjah 176 19 96 28 34 1 Source: General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP). Table 21.2 Sample Composition No. of water schemes surveyed (no. HH surveyed) Governorate RWSSP GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF Abyan 7 29 6 4 6 (210) (870) (180) (120) (180) Hajjah 4 20 4 6 0 (120) (600) (120) (180) Ibb 17 38 11 10 6 (510) (1140) (330) (295) (180) Total 28 87 21 20 12 (840) (2610) (630) (595) (360) Description of Projects to Be Compared Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (RWSSP) In 2000 the Republic of Yemen received a US$20 million credit from the International Development Agency (IDA) for the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (RWSSP). The project’s overall objective is to expand sustainable rural water supply and sanitation service coverage Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen N 387 to approximately 400,000 mostly poor rural dwellers in 6 governorates: Abyan, Hajjah, Ibb, Amran, Lahje, and Al Dhalea. In 2007 the project was extended for one year to December 2008 with additional financ- ing to expand coverage to a total of approximately 800,000 people (including the original target population) through approximately 150 rural water supply systems. Table 21.3 summarizes rural water supply and sanitation service coverage within the six governorates covered by the project as of 2004, at which time the project had completed only a few water systems. Table 21.3 Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Coverage in the Six Governorates of Yemen Included in RWSSP Rural No access to water Governorate population No. of dwellings network (%) No sanitation (%) Ibb 1,748,126 259,492 69.8 44.0 Abyan 321,026 43,446 71.9 42.5 Hajjah 1,346,407 169,586 87.7 71.4 Lahj 657,652 104,882 71.6 40.1 Amran 728,562 80,408 86.1 53.2 Al-daleh 409,391 52,640 86.8 52.4 Average for rural Yemen 76.1 50.4 Source: CSO-Demographic Census 2004. The project was to achieve these targets by: Introducing demand-responsive, decentralized, community-managed N RWSS approaches Building and strengthening governorate, district, and local-level N RWSS systems’ implementation capacity Providing a platform for a national RWSS implementation strategy N based on the principles of demand-responsive, community-owned RWSS services Enhancing a learning process for RWSS systems sustainability N Implementing RWSS development schemes and expansion of N service coverage. The project is managed by a central Project Implementation Unit (PIU), which operates through governorate PIUs in each of the admin- istrative areas in which the project is active. The PIUs are independent of existing sector agencies to enable the units to develop and use de- centralized, demand-responsive, community-managed approaches. 388 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Nonetheless, the project is relatively “embedded” within government institutions. All major decisions pertaining to geographic priorities or changes in the project implementation strategy require approval from the Project Steering Committee, which is chaired by the Minister of Water and Environment. Subprojects are planned and managed with extensive water user group (WUG) involvement guided by social mobilization teams. Howev- er, design and construction are carried out by private firms contracted by the PIUs. Communities contribute a minimum of 5 percent of subproject costs. Communities co-sign the contracts and payment authorizations. RWSSP schemes tend to be large, piped, pumped water systems aimed at providing continuous or near-continuous water services through metered house connections. The project does not fund groundwater exploration or borehole drilling. Nonmechanized technologies such as hand pumps are supported only in cases in which piped services would not be feasible. The project uses existing water sources, or it coordinates with GARWSP, which locates water sources and drills and develops the boreholes that can be the sources of water for RWSSP systems. Table 21.4 summarizes the number of RWSSP schemes completed and incremental coverage achieved by June, 2007. General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP) The General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP) is the national agency that manages the Government of Yemen’s national rural water supply program. In addition to national funds, it receives sector budget support from the Netherlands. The program is highly centralized. Bulk procurement of raw materials (pipes, pumps) is carried out in Sana’a. Governorate offices of GARWSP coordinate with local governments to identify, design, and construct subprojects. As a national program, GARWSP is under considerable pressure to spread resources across all parts of the country, rather than Table 21.4 Coverage of RWSSP, June 2007 No. of RWSSP No. of villages Governorate water schemes served Population coverage % of total Ibb 38 184 117,508 6.7 Abyan 33 262 50,568 15.8 Hajjah 19 274 64,302 4.8 Source: RWSSP. Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen N 389 prioritize regions or respond to community self-selection. Budget al- locations are usually insufficient to enable individual subprojects to be completed in a single fiscal year. As a result, individual subprojects are implemented in phases so may require several years to be completed. Just as does Public Works Project (PWP), GARWSP has tended to focus on implementation rather than on community capacity building for O&M. However, in recent years, GARWSP has begun to support the establishment of water user groups (WUGs) for water scheme management. Public Works Project The Public Works Project (PWP) has an institutional and financial set- up similar to that of the Social Fund for Development (SFD). PWP is autonomous, financed through a special account, managed by a Project Management Unit (PMU) in Sana’a and six regional suboffices, and implemented through private contractors and consultants. PWP also is a multisector initiative with approximately 30 percent of funds going to water and sanitation subprojects. Beneficiaries contribute at least 5 percent of subproject costs. However, project financing is only for civil works, such as constructing a reservoir or pumping house station. PWP’s focus is on creating labor-intensive employment. This focus has led to financing only labor-intensive civil works rather than comprehensive infrastructure systems. This policy creates institutional constraints when communities apply for a mechanized water supply system. PWP then becomes reliant on other partners (GARWSP, UNI- CEF) to finance and implement the capital-intensive components of these subprojects. Conversely, communities often ask PWP to complete civil works components in unfinished community water supply schemes or to implement scheme designs prepared by other agencies. PWP has developed a reputation for rapid and efficient implementa- tion. However, it rarely offers communities much participation in plan- ning, choice of technology, service level, or user contributions. PWP focuses on implementation and does relatively little capacity building. Social Fund for Development The Social Fund for Development (SFD) was established in 1997 by law, which granted SFD a great degree of autonomy. In essence, and despite the managing director’s being a government minister, the law enables SFD to be managed as an independent body The fund’s ap- proach is to provide services in response to communities’ demands and 390 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS needs. Communities decide on their key priorities, contribute to the capital costs, and take a role in operation and maintenance (O&M) of the facilities. Now in its third phase, SFD has grown from a US$30 million project in 1997 to a $400 million national program supported by 10 multi- and bi-lateral donors. It is an “open menu” project providing funds for a wide variety of community-prioritized investments., Approximately 20 percent of the funds provided for community investments are spent on water subprojects. The subprojects designed are simple systems (standposts, rainwater collectors). SFD water projects are limited to water-harvesting schemes and water supplies based on shallow wells and springs. SFD does not have the same degree of flexibility as the RWSSP in respond- ing to community demands for piped systems with or without house connections. Therefore, the fund does not finance drilling for boreholes or mechanized systems. Activities with an environmental focus include wastewater management and solid waste management. SFD has been expanding community contracting in its subprojects, and most construction is undertaken by private contractors. Cash com- munity contributions amount to approximately 15 percent of subproject costs. Contributions in kind in the form of labor and local materials are growing. The project aims to provide only technical assistance and material inputs that are not available locally. UNICEF Through its Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) Program, UNICEF also finances water supply systems on a grant finance basis, although not on the same scale as the other projects. RWSSP and SFD have much greater sustained engagement with communities than PWP or GARWSP. One thus could hypothesize that user satisfaction would be greater in RWSSP and SFD than in the other two projects. Survey Findings Household connections and water use The percentage of households with connections in each subproject ranges from 100 percent in the RWSSP to approximately 80 percent for the other projects (table 21.5). The reasons for the range are that (a) not all technologies are amenable to piped house connections and (b) some of the projects (such as SFD as explained earlier) concentrate Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen N 391 on low-cost rainwater harvest- ing and other nonmechanized technologies. Irrespective of the manner of access and type of water scheme, almost all HH used the water provided through the sub- projects primarily for drinking, cooking, washing-bathing, and watering animals (figure 21.2). Very little of the water was used for irrigation. Adequacy of water All water users reported a level of dissatisfaction with the extent to which the projects met all house- hold needs (table 21.6). Reasons for inadequacy The four main reasons for inadequacy of water relate to water resource constraints (table 21.7) Due to seasonal variations, WUAs are forced to regulate availability of water in order to maintain service to an acceptable number of users. This regulation leads to intermittent nonavailability of project water. In addition, there also are a substantial number of cases in which water is inadequate because of breakdowns. Comparison of actual and scheduled water service provision The survey compared perceptions of the users of RWSSP to the per- ceptions of users of the other projects. In governorates—Hajjah, and Table 21.5 Surveyed Households with Connection to Piped Water Network (%) (no. of HH in parentheses) % RWSSP GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF Total others Abyan 100.0 85.8 83.3 75.0 40.6 78.4* Connection (210) (870) (180) (120) (180) (1350) Hajjah 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 — 100.0 Connection (120) (600) (120) (180) (900) Ibb 99.8 94.6 88.2 30.5 87.8 83.1 Connection (510) (1140) (330) (295) (180) (1945) Note: * = Sum of GARWSP, PWP, SFD, and UNICEF projects. Figure 21.2 Various Uses of RWSSP and Other Subprojects Water in Yemen, 2007–08 % R e p o r t i n g " Y e s " 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Drinking Cooking Washing and bathing Gardening Watering animals New water use RWSSP Non-Bank 392 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Ibb— RWSSP’s actual water delivery schedule was reported to be better than the other projects’ (tables 21.8a and 21.8b). The difference held good for both “dry” and “wet” seasons. All of the regions, particularly Abyan, needed much improvement. Such improvement would bring the ratio closer to 1.0 and increase the number of water days available. Scheme failures Even though respondents reveal that RWSSP performed better than the others, the need to reduce service failures is evident in all projects (table 21.9). Performance of water user associations (WUAs) On average, over 90 percent of consumers can contact their WUAs about services and bills and get attention (table 21.10a). This percent- age is higher than for most urban systems in the region. However, ap- proximately 10 percent of water users believe that the WUAs are just Table 21.6 HH Reporting That “Project Water” Was Not Meeting Their Entire Household Needs (%) (no. of HH in parentheses) RWSSP GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF Total others Abyan 40.0 44.4 23.3 44.2 75.6 45.7* (84) (386) (42) (53) (136) (617) Hajjah 25.8 31.5 50.0 67.8 — 41.2 (31) (189) (60) (122) (371) Ibb 16.3 36.7 51.8 69.8 16.1 42.4 (83) (418) (171) (206) (29) (824) Notes: * = Sum of GARWSP, PWP, SFD, UNICEF projects. Table 21.7 Top 7 Reasons Why “Project Water” Is Not Sufficient to Meet Entire Household Needs (%) (sample surveyed in parentheses) Reason RWSSP Total others Seasonal variation 4.9 (41) 14.6 (612) WUA regulates water consumption 4.5 (38) 8.9 (374) Quality of project water not good enough 4.5 (38) 9.2 (390) Project water not available all the time 4.0 (33) 3.1 (130) Frequent breakdowns in water delivery due to poor O&M 4.0 (32) 8.1 (338) Inadequate capacity of delivery network 2.0 (15) 5.2 (218) Project water not sufficient in dry season 1.5 (12) 2.0 (85) Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen N 393 looking out for themselves. Although small, this percentage points to a need to carry out even more community campaigns before project implementation. Nearly 50 percent of all users say it takes less than 1 day for project staff to fix a service problem; 28 percent say it takes 1–5 days; and 23 percent say it takes more than 5 days. In all cases, RWSSP users have the most positive responses: 56 percent report that RWSSP takes less than 1 day to fix problems (table 21.10b). Table 21.8a Actual vs. Scheduled Water Supply in Dry Season (no. of HH in parentheses) Governorate RWSSP GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF Total others Abyan Avg. no. of days/wk 5.3 4.9 4.3 5.1 3.9 4.7* Range: Days/wk (210) (870) (180) (120) (180) (1350) (Actual/ scheduled) 0.11–7.0 0.25–7.0 0.25–7.0 1–7.0 0.25–7.0 0.25–7.0 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.94 0.96 0.87 Hajjah Avg. no. of days/wk 5.7 3.5 2.2 7.0 — 4.0 Range: Days/wk (120) (600) (120) (180) (900) (Actual/ scheduled) 1–7.0 0.25–7.0 1–7.0 6–7.0 — 0.25–7.0 0.97 0.82 0.75 1.0 — 0.85 Ibb Avg. no. of days/wk 2.1 1.6 1.7 2.6 2.5 1.9 Range: Days/wk (509) (1106) (328) (285) (169) (1888) (Actual/ scheduled) 0.125–7.0 0.083–7.0 0.125–7.0 0.083–7.0 0.25–7.0 0.083–7.0 0.93 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.90 0.80 Note: * = Sum of GARWSP, PWP, SFD, and UNICEF projects. Table 21.8b Actual vs. Scheduled Water Supply in Wet Season Governorate RWSSP GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF Total others Abyan Avg. no. of days/wk 5.3 5.1 5.4 5.1 5.1 5.1* Range: Days/wk (210) (870) (180) (120) (180) (1350) (Actual/ scheduled) 0.11–7 0.25–7 1–7 1–7 0.25–7 0.25–7 0.82 0.87 0.92 0.94 0.88 0.88 Hajjah Avg. no. of days/wk 5.8 3.5 2.3 7.0 — 4.1 Range: Days/wk (120) (600) (120) (180) (900) (Actual/ scheduled) 1–7 0.25–7 1–7 7 -7 - 0.25–7 0.98 0.82 0.78 1.0 - 0.85 Ibb Avg. no. of days/wk 2.3 1.8 2.3 3.8 2.5 2.2 Range: Days/wk (509) (1108) (328) (285) (169) (1890) (Actual/ scheduled) 0.25–7 0.083–7 0.125–7 0.25–7 0.25–7 0.083–7 0.94 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.91 0.82 Note: * = Sum of GARWSP, PWP, SFD, and UNICEF projects. 394 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Table 21.9 Record of Service Failure on Scheduled Days in Past Year (% reporting) RWSSP GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF Total others Abyan: Several times 21.4 32.6 18.3 26.7 27.2 29.5* Few times 16.2 22.5 25.0 18.3 13.9 21.3 Once 10.5 20.1 16.1 16.7 39.4 21.9 Never 52.0 24.7 40.6 38.3 19.4 27.3 No. HH 210 870 180 120 180 1,350 Hajjah: Several times 3.3 29.2 50.8 1.7 - 26.6 Few times 0.8 17.7 20.8 2.2 - 15.0 Once 32.5 29.7 16.7 20.0 - 26.0 Never 63.3 23.5 11.7 76.1 - 32.4 No. HH 120 600 120 180 - 900 Ibb: Several times 8.8 26.4 24.5 18.0 3.0 22.7 Few times 10.0 13.1 19.5 17.0 2.4 13.8 Once 28.7 25.5 22.6 7.8 21.0 21.9 Never 52.5 35.1 33.4 57.2 73.7 41.5 No. HH 509 1,110 323 283 167 1,883 Note: *”Total others”= Sum of GARWSP, PWP, SFD, and UNICEF projects. Table 21.10a RWSSP and Other Projects: Users’ Perceptions Regarding Their WUAs (% reporting) HH reporting WUA does HH reporting WUA cannot be not take complaints seriously contacted about services and and makes no attempt HH reporting WUA is billing and have not received assistance to improve service just looking out for itself RWSSP: Abyan 1.9 3.8 3.8 Hajjah 9.2 11.7 21.7 Ibb 12.9 13.5 14.5 Other: Abyan 9.6 12.3 13.6 Hajjah 11.7 15.7 16.7 Ibb 17.5 21.4 23.3 Users’ satisfaction with water services In general, all respondents expressed increased satisfaction with the frequency and duration of water supply and water pressure, and reduced overcrowding near public standposts (figures 21.3a and 21.3b). However, Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen N 395 respondents from water schemes other than RWSSP have ex- pressed dissatisfaction with the current water charges. Their complaints contrast with the responses received from areas served by RWSSP schemes. Concerning water service, the survey reveals greater satis- faction with RWSSP schemes, compared to schemes supported by other programs in frequency of supply (days/week), duration of supply (hours/day), water pressure, and crowding near public standposts (table 21.11). The study also assessed consumer perceptions of the direction of change in water net- work maintenance after project completion. RWSSP communi- ties showed a greater percep- tion of change for the better than communities served by other projects (figures 21.4a and 21.4b). When the categories of “Satisfied,” “Changed to well,” Table 21.10b RWSSP and Other Projects: Average Time for WUA to Fix a Problem HH reporting (%) Less than 1 day 1–5 days 5+ days RWSSP Abyan 66.7 19.5 9.5 Hajjah 56.7 23.3 12.5 Ibb 46.9 35.5 13.3 Others Abyan 53.6 23.3 18.0 Hajjah 40.3 20.7 22.7 Ibb 35.5 28.0 25.9 Figures 21.3a & b Satisfaction with Water Services before and after RWSSP and Other Projects Note: Services = Location, frequency, duration, water charges, water pressure, and overcrowding. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Location Frequency of supply (days/week) Duration of supply (hours/day) Water charges Water pressure Over-crowding (if public standpost) Location Frequency of supply (days/week) Duration of supply (hours/day) Water charges Water pressure Over-crowding (if public standpost) % r e s p o n d i n g " S a t i s i f e d " 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 % r e s p o n d i n g " S a t i s i f e d " Before Current Before Current Figure 21.3b Satisfaction with Water Services before and after Other Projects Figure 21.3a Satisfaction with Water Services before and after RWSSP 396 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS and “Changed to better” are combined, RWSSP project HH are more satisfied with the main- tenance of their water network after project implementation. Levels of water network maintenance satisfaction are also higher for RWSSP projects. User preference for management of water schemes To elicit users’ preferences for the management of water schemes, survey questions included the current and preferred arrange- ment for ownership of water scheme, revenue collection, water allocation, budgeting, ex- penditure control, O&M, major repairs/replacements, and invest- ments in the expansion of the sys- tem. Potential choices included WUA, WUA chairperson, all consumers, operating staff, wa- ter scheme manager, the sheik, district committee, GARWSP branch office, the government, and other. Table 21.11 Differences between RWSSP and Other Projects in Service Satisfaction RWSSP Non-Bank Before Current Before Current Location 21.0 — 24.6 — Frequency of supply (days/week) 17.4 73.7 20.1 53.1 Duration of supply (hours/day) 16.4 73.9 20.2 53.1 Water charges 64.4 64.9 65.8 62.0 Water pressure 18.8 69.6 21.6 49.9 Overcrowding (if public standpost) 12.9 48.0 15.7 35.9 Figures 21.4a & b Consumers’ Perceptions of Direction of Change in Water System Maintenance after Completion of RWSSP and Other Projects Satisfactory Changed to well Repondent did not answer (0.1%) Changed to better Changed to poor Changed to worse (0.4%) 8.0% 18.3% 7.8% 19.7% 6.9% 4.4% 61.2% 49.3% 23.5% Satisfactory Changed to well Repondent did not answer (0.2%) Don’t know (0.4%) Changed to better Changed to poor Changed to worse Figure 21.4a Consumers’ Perceptions of Direction of Change in Water System Maintenance after RWSSP Completion (%) Figure 21.4b Consumers’ Perceptions of Direction of Change in Water System Maintenance after Completion in Projects Other Than RWSSP (%) Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen N 397 Survey responses for all projects (table 21.12) revealed clear pref- erences for: Ownership of water schemes: By N consumers. O&M scheme, revenue collection, and water allocation: By N op- erating staff. Budgeting, expenditure control, and investments in the expansion N of the system: By WUA. Major repairs and replacements: Respondents served by RWSSP N schemes are content with the lead role of the WUA. Respondents from “non-Bank” schemes expressed preferences for a dominant government role. Budgeting and expenditure control and investments to expand the N system: Although a plurality of both RWSSP and other respondents expressed a preference for water user groups to manage these 3 processes, the percentage was much higher for RWSSP respondents (46.8 percent) than for non-RWSSP beneficiaries (27.7 percent). These data suggests RWSSP communities’ comparatively high Table 21.12 User Preferences for Management of Water Schemes (% of HH reporting) Mgmt. alternatives: Ownership Revenue collection Water allocation Budgeting and expenditure control Operation & maintenance Major repairs and replacements Investments to expand system RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other WUA 28.5 7.4 27.6 11.3 29.6 17.9 46.8 27.7 19.9 9.4 42.3 20.6 46.1 25.3 WUA chairperson 7.5 0.8 6.4 1.4 12.2 5.1 19.0 3.4 5.5 0.6 16.6 2.0 17.2 2.4 All consumers 44.0 58.3 3.2 3.7 4.3 10.8 6.6 8.6 4.0 7.6 3.4 7.0 3.3 5.5 Operating staff 0.3 1.0 46.6 48.8 40.6 33.5 5.2 6.6 57.6 58.3 2.4 3.2 2.0 3.3 Water scheme manager 3.8 5.6 5.0 10.2 3.8 12.9 8.1 16.0 3.5 7.3 7.1 15.4 8.2 16.6 Sheik 3.5 7.5 1.5 4.4 1.3 5.3 2.2 8.4 1.5 4.1 3.3 8.6 3.3 8.6 District committee 2.8 3.2 1.3 2.3 1.1 2.5 2.3 5.6 1.3 2.5 3.8 4.6 3.3 4.6 GARWSP branch office 3.1 5.5 2.8 3.7 2.2 4.3 2.8 5.2 2.7 3.3 6.8 11.4 5.4 9.2 Government 6.5 9.6 5.1 5.7 4.7 5.8 6.6 8.5 4.0 5.8 13.5 22.9 10.9 16.8 Other 0.0 1.2 0.6 8.5 0.2 1.8 0.3 10.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 4.4 0.5 7.6 398 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS levels of confidence in the technical and financial management capabilities of the WUAs. Cost of water Table 21.13 portrays the change in average monthly water service charges paid by consumers. WUAs in RWSSP schemes are provided with train- ing and technical support to determine the actual tariffs that need to be charged to cover operation, maintenance, and rehabilitation costs for their water systems. Table 21.13 shows that post-completion water pay- ments for metered connections in RWSSP villages in all three districts are significantly higher than in other projects. The higher payments can be attributed to more accurate calculation of full costs, higher per-household water consumption (due partially to more reliable service), and limited but highly subsidized nonmetered access for the very poor. Conclusion and Lessons The Government of Yemen’s National Water Sector Strategy and action plan espouses four policies: Decentralizing implementation mechanisms 1. Enhancing beneficiary community roles and responsibilities 2. Adopting a demand-responsive approach to identify communities 3. for inclusion in sector programs and making this approach standard practice Table 21.13 Cost of Water Bill per Month in Unmetered and Metered HH, 2007–08 (YR) RWSSP Other Before After Before After Abyan Unmetered (YR) 846.2 335.7 696.9 1095.0 Metered (YR) 71.4 962.5 51..0 724.0 Hajjah Unmetered (YR) 293.3 261.7 278.2 437.0 Metered (YR) 0.0 1523.0 14.9 555.8 Ibb Unmetered (YR) 234.7 0.0 118.5 158.8 Metered (YR) 11.0 1178.0 39.4 724.5 Note: YR = Yemeni Rial. Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen N 399 Improving cost effectiveness by identifying means to implement 4. projects that meet basic needs at lower costs. The RWSSP was designed to develop and test approaches for sector programs that operationalize these policies. More than other projects that support rural water supplies and sanitation in Yemen, RWSSP has focused on developing the capacity of communities to take on the delegated responsibilities of planning and managing their own water and sanitation systems. The RWSSP invested considerable resources in establishing and building up the technical and financial management and planning capabilities of democratically elected water user associations (WUAs). The consumer satisfaction survey findings suggest that the project’s strategy for developing communities’ capacity and meaningful involvement in planning and managing their own water and sanitation systems is effective. The strategy has resulted in relatively high levels of beneficiary satisfaction and has increased the likelihood that the communities will sustain the systems over their design lives. RWSSP beneficiaries enjoy relatively reliable water systems. Over 60 percent of residents had one or no service failures within the past year. Confidence in WUAs as governing and management bodies for water schemes also is high. Beneficiaries are agreeing to and paying tariffs that cover O&M costs. In fact, they are paying the full costs and spending more per month, on average, for water service than they did before RWSSP was completed. Through their WUAs, com- munities are developing a range of mechanisms to prepare to finance major repairs. In addition to all of these positives, progress is needed in two areas: The RWSS subsector still lacks a clearly agreed strategy. 1. All programs need to follow this strategy and other water policies 2. consistently. GARWSP and the other projects and agencies work- ing in the subsector increasingly are cooperating. Nevertheless, further development of procedures for joint programming and for aligning their respective approaches to conform to national policies is still needed. 401 22 Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework: Case Study of Application in the Delta Region, Egypt Ayat Soliman, Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Maged Hamed, Wendy Wakeman, and Mohammed Mehany Case for a New Approach to Rural Sanitation in Egypt At the macroeconomic level, the analysis of public spending on water in Egypt concluded that spending more on wastewater collection and treatment would boost GDP by at least 1 percent. The antipollution measures in the 2003 National Water Resources Protection Plan would benefit Egypt by LE 2 billion. Adding community-based and self-financed sanitation programs would add an extra LE 1 billion in net benefits. Public spending is best focused on public goods: nonexcludable items that benefit many. However, in Egypt, much public expenditure has been on “private-like” goods (irrigation and urban households). The government therefore should shift resources toward controlling water pollution, which is a public health hazard; and away from subsidies for irrigation and urban water supply, which provide private benefits. Rural Poverty and Public Health Issues Are Correlated with Lack of Sanitation Services and Lack of Water-Quality-Management Solutions. In Egypt’s rural areas, there is a huge gap between water supply and sanitation coverage. Currently, 80 percent of the rural population relies on piped water supply, whereas only 4 percent is connected to sanitation systems. Even when HH are connected, the collected sewage is not always safely disposed of. Due to the narrowness of the Nile Valley in which the rural inhabitants live, the interconnection of 402 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS the irrigation/drainage system, and the extensive (often un- off icial) reuse of agricultural drainage water, the semi/mal- treated sewage diffuses into the waterways and reaches the food chain. This diffusion negatively affects public health, crop pro- duction and quality, and poverty (figure 22.1). Extending the “con- ventional” sanitation and treat- ment services to a larger share of the rural population would be prohibitively expensive. Low water tariffs undermine both the public and private sectors’ capability to maintain existing water supply and sanitation (WSS) facilities, let alone expand coverage. Conventional/Centralized Approaches to WSS Contributed to Fiscal Deficit. The efficiency of Egypt’s public spending on water falls short of interna- tional norms. Egypt’s WSS services are less financially efficient than their developing-country peers. They are possibly on a par with utilities in East- ern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa regarding public management. The Integrated Sanitation and Sewage Infrastructure Project (ISSIP) design envisages that entrusting the decentralized institutions to take over part of the WSS services could reduce such inefficiencies. Public spending on water would be more equitable and efficient by gradually transferring finance and management from the central- ized/public agencies to decentral- ized/autonomous utilities. Figures 22.1a & b Poverty-Sanitation Link 100 80 60 40 20 0 Drinking water Wastewater Poverty Urban Lower Egypt Upper Egypt Frontiers Governorates % o f p o p . c o v e r a g e Figure 22.1a Poverty Correlated with Lack of Water and Sanitation Services Figure 22.1b Socioeconomic Losses Due to Lack of Sanitation and Treatment 0 1 Crop (official reuse) 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 Health Crop (unofficial reuse) Fisheries Forgone benefits monetized in % of GDP Figure 22.2 Consequence at National Level: Escalating Public Debt, 2000–05 0 16,000,000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 14,000,000 12,000,000 10,000,000 8,000,000 6,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 2004/05 Years ( 1 0 0 0 L E ) WSS cumulative debt Irrigation cumulative debt Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework N 403 Environmental Damage The absence of proper wastewater collection and treatment, combined with inadequate solid waste disposal is causing severe environmental sanitation problems in the rural areas of the Nile Delta. These problems affect the life expectancy and morbidity of the population, cause health costs for treatment and care, reduce the possibilities for agricultural reuse, influence the costs of drinking water supply, and have an adverse effect on fisheries. In addition, families are forced to incur costs for sludge evacuation of their cesspits, provided they can afford them. New Approach Based on IWRM Providing sustainable sanitation solutions in rural areas faces three inherent challenges: Higher unit cost per capita due to the topography and dispersed 1. population Limited ownership and voice of the local communities in influencing 2. planning processes and decisionmaking at the central level Limited ability of many developing countries to provide sustainable 3. O&M over a large number of small systems, particularly in view of low cost-recovery ratios. Addressing these challenges can be assisted by applying the key principles of integrated water resource management: treating water as a Box 22.1 Untreated Sewage Results in National Economic Loss The latest Country Environmental Analysis of Egypt (World Bank 2005) estimated that the socio- economic cost of maltreated or untreated wastewater is higher than LE 9 billion, or 2% of GDP. These costs represent the harm caused to human health, agriculture, and fisheries. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Improving Wastewater Disposal T o t a l c o s t s ( L E b i l / y r ) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 BAU Central measures Central + community & hygiene measures Forgone benefits (damage costs) Cost of added treatment/control 404 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS holistic resource, management at the lowest appropriate level, and stakeholder participation. In addition, lessons from global implementation in several countries, including Brazil and India, provide helpful examples of how to manage the community interface and enhance local ownership. This chapter presents a recent case example in the Delta region in Egypt in which these principles have been integrated in the planning, management structures, monitoring arrangements, and community participation framework for rural sanitation service provision. The resulting methodology has been reflected in the design of the World Bank’s Integrated Sanitation and Sewerage Infrastructure Project (ISSIP), which will be implemented by the Government of Egypt (GOE) during 2009–14. Egypt has lacked a separate clear national strategy for addressing rural sanitation due partly to the priority in recent decades of increasing coverage for urban centers. With the more recent increased attention given to the problems resulting from poor sanitation infrastructure in rural areas, the rural sanitation issue moved to the forefront of the political Box 22.2 Local Context The ISSIP area in the three Governorates of Gharbeya, Kafr El Sheikh, and Beheira can be characterized as mostly flat agricultural land with a high water table (less than 5 meters). Most development is fairly recent in origin, and rights of way, other than through roads, are not raised much above the natural ground surface. The high water table in the area can pose problems. Annual rainfall is low, ranging from approximately 50mm per year in the south of Gharbeya to 100mm or more per year in the north of Kafr El Sheikh and Beheira. Villages in Gharbeya tend to be urban in character with many buildings rising to three stories or more. As a general rule, villages in Kafr El Sheikh and Beheira are more rural in character, but even in them, many buildings have more than 1 story and are occupied by more than 1 household. Rights of way tend to be narrow, often less than three meters, with houses built up to the road. Water use varies considerably among villages but is often in the range of 100–140 l/cd. Most households in the three governorates covered by the project already have water- flushed sanitation, although few are connected to sewers. Most houses that are not connected to sewers discharge wastewater to cesspits; a small percentage discharge directly to nearby drains. The high water table exacerbates existing inadequate sanitation arrangements, often resulting in very unhealthy environments. In many cases, this threat to human health has led to a very high demand for improved sanitation services. Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework N 405 agenda. The president has declared a national program for rural sanita- tion to increase the sewerage coverage in rural areas from 4 percent to 40 percent. In addition, in 2007 a national strategy for rural sanitation was initiated that incorporates several of the principles presented below. It is hoped that the lessons from ISSIP implementation will refine the methodology and provide lessons for wider replication. Planning around a Hydraulic Basin and the Concept of Clustering A number of challenges face the planner when a fragmented top-down approach to planning wastewater service delivery based on individual population centers is applied to rural areas. Planning for single cities or towns can yield clear results based on large urban population centers. However, when it comes to the rural setting, it is harder to prioritize investment allocations and establish the link between the inputs and desired outcomes. The example of the rural areas of the Delta in Egypt illustrates the need to shift the planning framework to a bottom-up approach based on a number of technical, environmental, and social criteria and considerations. Historically, central planners focused on providing services to the large cities and towns. Mother villages were included only if they were near planned urban systems. Hence, only 4 percent of Egypt’s rural areas were served with sewerage systems. The remainder often relied on failing on-site solutions that compounded water logging and groundwater pollution problems in the dense areas. Moreover, Egypt is a hydraulic society. Its historic system of irriga- tion canals and drains has shaped the rural landscapes and livelihoods for millennia. Thirty-seven percent of the population relies on surface water irrigation for agriculture. Increasing water quality deterioration in both canals and drains is due in large part to the discharge of untreated effluents (both domestic and industrial) into the waterways. Box 22.3 Egypt’s Rural Villages Egypt’s villages range in size from small remote hamlets with 200 inhabitants to larger “mother villages” that have up to 80,000 inhabitants. Of the 5,633 villages (main and satellite), 73% have populations of fewer than 10,000; 25% have population between 10,000 and 30,000; and 2% have populations exceeding 30,000. The average population density in rural areas is 1,500 persons/km 2 . 406 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The following were the considerations for putting in place a strategic sanitation plan for the Delta region. Planning Rural Sanitation Provisions around a Hydraulic Basin Increases Environmental Benefits. The first planning consideration is the need to shift from adminis- trative planning boundaries to integrating the hydraulic boundaries in the planning process. These boundaries are defined by hydraulic basins, or sub-basins in the case of Egypt, since the whole Nile valley can be considered one large interconnected basin. Within this basin, well-defined irrigation command areas include smaller sub-basins, typically around secondary drains with reaches in the range of 15–20 km. (Figure 22.3 illustrates the example of the Mahmoudia Canal Command Area in the western Delta, including its sub- basins.) This use of hydraulic boundaries enables the planner to select and group target vil- lages based on their locations vis-à-vis existing water bodies and to prioritize these village groups/waterways in which a combination of current water quality conditions and expected improvements from implement- ing rural sanitation in these areas would yield the highest environmental benefits. The tools and criteria elaborated in the fol- lowing sections of this chapter are proposed for such prioritization: (1) clustering villages (2) water quality modeling, and (3) applying multicriteria prioritization. The use of hydraulic boundaries also enables the mobilization of integrated water resource management institutions. Local institutional mechanisms for WRM, such as farmer groups and water user asso- ciations (WUAs), can be integrated with water supply and sanitation management within one monitoring framework. These aspects are further elaborated in the last two sections of this chapter. Figure 22.3 Mahmoudia Canal Command Area Sub-Basins Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework N 407 Clustering Concept Provides a Comprehensive and Cost-Effective Approach That Maximizes Technical Feasibility Based on Pollution Abatement Objectives. To facilitate planning, the grouping of villages around a hydraulic sub-basin needs to integrate several additional considerations. In this context, a cluster can be defined as a geographical unit of planning and implementation that provides comprehensive and cost-effective sanitation solutions for almost all villages falling within this unit, thereby maximizing the feasibility of technical solutions. Grouping villages into one cluster along hydraulic boundaries and taking into consideration technical criteria and administrative boundaries enable linking sanita- tion service provision with final environmental improvement impacts. Hence, the planner needs to set the final cluster boundaries to minimize expensive crossings, such as main canals and railways, and the number of administrative units for each cluster. Simultaneously, the planner needs to maximize the use of existing facilities and maintain a manageable overall cluster size from a technical and financial point of view. Too small a cluster would result in a very large number of small-scale sanitation solutions. In the case of the dense Delta areas, small-scale solutions would not be not cost effective, and would increase the management burden of water utilities. On the other hand, a cluster size that is too large would lead to crossing a large number of administrative boundaries and would bring the scale closer to those in urbanized settings. In addition, an over-sized cluster would limit the ability to apply small-scale, community-managed solutions and reduce the ability for com- munity oversight and financial cost recovery. The iterative planning and cluster-sizing process for the Mit Yazid Canal Command Area in the Delta (figure 22.4) illustrates this case. The first scenario, with an average cluster diameter of approximately 5 km, resulted in approximately 41 new proposed wastewater treatment plants with an average treatment capacity of approximately 3,000m 3 /day. The second scenario, with an average cluster diameter of approximately Figure 22.4 Applying Two Scenarios for Varying Cluster Sizes: Mit Yazid Command Area 408 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 10 km, reduced the number of new treatment plants to approximately 10. The average treatment capacity per plant of approximately 6,000 m 3 /day resulted in an overall investment plan that was deemed a more appropriate scale for the Egyptian setting. Applying Multicriteria Assessment to Prioritizing Village Clusters Targets Interventions at Areas in Which the Largest Impacts Can Be Achieved. In developing a strategic sanitation plan for a region, existing service needs should be compared with available funds to determine the extent of required prioritization. For the case examples of Mahmoudia and Mit Yazid in the Delta, a methodology for selecting priority areas/clusters was developed based on multicriteria analysis of the most relevant fac- tors. The criteria were population served, reuse potential of the irriga- tion canals, potential health benefits, and water quality improvement potential (see section below), potential for tie-in to existing treatment works, and proximity to water treatment plant intakes. 1 These factors are implicitly based on the key principle that interven- tions should target areas in which the largest impacts can be achieved. The result of the analysis con- stitutes the strategic sanitation plan, with prioritized ranking of clusters, so that a forecasting financing plan can be agreed by the decisionmakers. The result for the Mit Yazid Command Area is illustrated in figure 22.5, which ranks the areas (1 being the highest priority) that receive ISSIP financing. Furthermore, the application of advance (ex-ante) These criteria and the relative weighting for each should be a dynamic process, 1 to be modified and updated based on implementation progress and emerging considerations. Figure 22.5 Priority Ranking within the Mit Yazid Command Area Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework N 409 economic analysis, with consideration of national scale-up options, is elaborated below (“Assessing the Results of Water Quality Management Investments in Egypt” section) and provides additional information to policymakers in making final investment allocation decisions. Water Quality Modeling Is an Indispensable Tool in Identifying Which Groups of Villages to Serve Using Decentralized Treatment Approaches and Which Drains Have Enough Self-Purification Capacity to Enable Them to Assimilate the Partially Treated Rural Sewage. Limited financial resources often are a major constraint facing rural sanitation coverage expansion. In the case of ISSIP, limited funds lead to a trade-off between (a) implementing secondary wastewater treatment for a few villages, thus complying with Law 48 (the law that regulates discharges to inland waterways) effluent standards; and (b) implementing advanced primary treatment for a larger number of villages, allowing natural attenuation in the drains to reach ambient standards, even if falling short of Law 48 effluent standards. Mathematical modeling was used to make a judgment call on whether option (b) is possible and for which drains. Visual observation showed that, for some drains, self-purification processes can and do improve the water quality. Figure 22.6 illustrates three locations along Nishil drain in the ISSIP study area and shows water quality improvement along the downstream direction. Mathematical modeling confirmed that if the villages along this drain’s reach are served with advanced primary treatment, then the water quality of the drain can achieve Law 48 requirements downstream from the discharge points (figure 22.7). Figure 22.6 Example of Nishil Drain M i t Y a z e d C a n a l S a m a t a y D r a i n N a s h i l D r a i n E l G h a r b i a D r a i n Kafr Mhalat Masir Kafr El Ni’na’ai Samatay Maher Izbet Al Arab Mit El Shiekh Mohamed Wahby El Madrach El Abidia Ali Abdalah Notes: + ¯..| |.:|.' '.|.:+m | |': ..''+|: .+|:.+|:. :T.:||. .|.''.|:| .+|:. .| |.:+m ' !.||': |.:+m '+|:. . .''.|:| |.: | |...|| |': .||.:+|:| ..''+|: :.+|: . '.||.:+m '.||.|.+|| .m...:m:|| .| |': |.+.|' .+|:. |.+'.|¡ (a) (b) (c) 410 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Notwithstanding the ambi- ent water quality legislation, decisionmakers can accept the aforementioned decentralized treatment approach introduced by ISSIP as a transitional mea- sure so long as: A “free zone” without any N domestic-wastewater point sources is enforced along the drain, downstream of the ISSIP-introduced treatment point (with a free length of approximately 5 km–8 km for most drains). This free zone will enable the self-purification to function as modelled. Predominance of the diffuse source, the agricultural drainage N water, is maintained. The modelling results showed that the ag- riculture drainage water provided an overall “net dilution” factor along the drain. Achieving the necessary dilution rate requires a typical drainage catchment for third-order drains of 5,000–10,000 feddans. Another necessary factor is to have discharge flows along the drains no less than the following range: 0.6 mm/day (from Cairo up to Tanta City) to 7.5 mm/day (north from Tanta City up toward the coastal areas). There is N minimal upstream pollution load (headwater quality): with dissolved oxygen (DO) no less than 5 mg/l, biological oxygen demand (BOD) not exceeding 12 mg/l, and coliform bacteria not exceeding 8,000 most probable number (MPN)/100ml. The point-source villages and hamlets are small, N up to 500–1,500 capita each. In them, domestic wastewater would be much smaller than the agricultural drainage water, hence enabling sufficient dilution by the latter. An acceptable ratio between domestic and agricultural return flow would be 1:10 (or, to be on the safe side, a more conservative ratio of 1:20). Within-Cluster Optimization Based on Available Sanitation Options Balances Service Coverage with Financial Feasibility. The final step of the planning process concerns the selection of the appli- cable sanitation solution(s) within each cluster. It is important to emphasize that part of the integrated cluster approach maintains that the planner Figure 22.7 Simulation Results for the Self-Purification of BOD along Nishil Drain before and after the Decentralized Treatment 0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Distance (Km) Present With treatment Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework N 411 should seek to provide a type of sanitation service for 100 percent of the population living within the cluster, so that the anticipated resulting benefits can be achieved. However, given the varying typography and conditions for the individual villages within each cluster, a one-size-fits-all approach to the technology and proposed solution would not be feasible. The proportion of villages falling under each of the solution catego- ries is determined by an optimiza- tion process within each cluster, by which the cost comparison and technical feasibility of the different solutions is applied. Fig- ure 22.8 illustrates the technical solutions, within an ISSIP sample cluster, based on consideration of the different project intervention options. The options compared include tying remote villages to the central treatment plant, with stages of pumping along the way Box 22.4 ISSIP Intervention Categories The following three broad categories of sanitation solutions have been considered in the Egypt case study and related investment program: Centralized systems: 1. For villages with populations greater than 1,500 inhabitants and smaller villages in their proximity. These villages would be served by a sewerage col- lection network leading to a single central wastewater treatment plant. Smaller villages would be connected if the cost of doing so does not exceed the cost of decentralized treatment solutions. Decentralized systems: 2. For settlements with 500–1,500 inhabitants, not located along the networks serving larger villages. These villages would be served by local collec- tion systems discharging into simple treatment works providing advanced primary treatment, typically consisting of a communal septic tank followed by a series of anaerobic baffled reactors (ABRs). Effluent is then discharged into a nearby drain. Pumping should be avoided if possible. 3. Onsite systems: For settlements with fewer than 500 inhabitants. These will continue to use onsite sanitation systems based on cesspits or septic tanks. The capacity of the central treatment plant would take into account the septage resulting from these onsite systems. Figure 22.8 Within-Cluster Optimization Option 3 Option 4 Option 1 Option 2 Decentralized facility 412 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS (option 4), versus establishing decentralized facilities for 1 or 2 villages (options 1, 2, and 3). Assessing the Results of Water Quality Management Investments in Egypt Ex-ante Economic Assessment Used Cost-Benefit Analysis. The economic analysis of the ISSIP has been performed via a cost- benefit analysis (CBA) approach (see the logical framework for the economic analysis in appendix A22.1), rather than the cost-effectiveness approach commonly applied to assess sanitation projects. The CBA has been conducted by factoring in the following considerations: For phase 1, the weighted average of the unit capital cost is ap- N proximately $130 per target inhabitant (year 2040). Hence, the (amortized) capital cost per household/month is approximately 45 LE/month/family at maximum, and O&M costs are approximately 10 LE/month/family. The private benefits are estimated as the non-income-constrained N willingness to pay (WTP), per the “contingent valuation” method. A proxy for this WTP is the upper bound of the current payments that households pay vacuum trucks to empty their cesspits in some of the ISSIP command areas. Hence, approximately 50 LE/ month/family. The public benefits associated with fully improving rural sanitation N are estimated at approximately 81 LE/month/family. This is the summation of the monetized, incremental benefits accruing (or damages avoided) to the following subsectors: Health (avoided morbidity and mortality, plus avoided medica- L tion costs) Reuse of agricultural drainage (reduced BOD improves the L reuse potential) Fisheries (increased DO increases fish production and quality L ) Recreational activities related to waterways and northern lakes L . These incremental benefits have been calculated by estimating the impact of reducing the baseline concentration of sewage-related pollutants such as BOD, fecal coliforms, ammonia, and dissolved oxygen toward their ambient and user-specific standards. Using the Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework N 413 aforementioned (capital and recurrent) unit costs and (private plus public) unit benefits, the project’s economic rate of return (ERR) has been performed against (a) 2 strategic scenarios, which adjusted the valuation of the incremental public benefits as these benefits correspond to 2 alternative assumptions on 1 of the project’s major externalities: the “headwater quality” in the drains served by ISSIP; and (b) 3 sensitivity tests. The two strategic scenarios are: “Low” scenario 1. . This scenario assumes that ISSIP is not followed by a country-wide program that can scale up the ISSIP model. In that (unlikely) case, within ISSIP command areas, it is assumed that only 40 percent of ISSIP area drains will be cleaned. Factoring in the centralized systems’ secondary treatment along with the ad- vanced primary treatment provided by the decentralized systems, the overall improvement in these drains would only be “partial.” This partial improvement in the in-stream quality is estimated at 60 percent (incremental improvement of the baseline Water Quality Index, or WQI, toward the standards). The remaining drains (60 percent) cannot be sufficiently cleaned because of the already poor headwater quality. The “dose-response” relationship in this case has been estimated at 60 percent:70 percent (due to the “increas- ing returns to scale”). Under this scenario, the central estimate of the ERR would be approximately 10 percent. “High” (or optimistic) scenario. 2. This scenario assumes that this area eventually would be considerably cleaned, with the ISSIP con- cept being fully replicated (that is, through the nation-wide sanitation program for which 20 billion LE has been earmarked by the GOE). In this case, the incremental public benefits would be the product of 70 percent and 81 LE/month/family, hence 56 LE/month/family. The total (public cum private) benefits therefore would be 106 LE/month/ family. The resulting ERR would be on a safer side: 15 percent. Sensitivity tests have been performed to work out the ERR switching values (or strategic “flags”) that could bring ERR down to 10 percent or less: Marginal increase in unit costs (due to price escalations and/or 1. physical contingencies and contract variation orders) Marginal postponement of the benefits stream by a number of years, 2. for example, due to delays in construction/implementation 414 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Marginal reduction in public or private benefits (for example, due 3. to changes in unit prices or in other conditions or assumptions). The low/high scenario analysis and the sensitivity tests demon- strated that the project interventions can be socioeconomically viable. The “switching values” indicate that the ERR has some limited scope of accommodating marginal cost escalation, benefits reduction, and delays in implementation. However, both the sanitation (private) benefits and the water quality (public) benefits need to be fairly guaranteed. Ex-Post M&E Framework Needs to Reflect and Validate the IWRM Approach. Monitoring outcomes and impacts is a key focus of any project as it establishes the link between inputs (sanitation services in the case of ISSIP) and objectives (such as improvements in water quality and environmental conditions). The results-based M&E system under ISSIP will focus on monitoring outcomes and reporting on impacts of the implemented sanitation services, thus evaluating these impacts against the project development objectives (PDOs). The monitoring arrangements will, for the first time in Egypt, include the quantifica- tion of benefits occurring due to improved sanitation and feed into decisionmaking on allocating new funds and prioritizing investments. Many of the M&E activities will make use of the M&E tools/models, laboratories, and analysis results already existing per the mandate of the Ministries of Water Resources and Irrigation; Health and Popula- tion; and Housing, Utilities and Urban Development. Supplementing an ongoing irrigation improvement project being implemented in the same area, ISSIP’s development objective is to contribute to the sustainable improvement in (a) sanitation and envi- ronmental conditions for the resident communities and (b) water quality in the selected drainage basins within the served project areas. This ambitious objective entails looking beyond typical physical measures, such as service coverage ratio and the number of households connected. Instead, the project targets interacting with the community to evalu- ate satisfaction levels with local environmental conditions associated with improved wastewater management (local ponding, canal water quality), and conducting qualitative research to identify households practicing improved hygiene behavior. Improvements in water quality are another key objective of the project. To this end, an innovative M&E Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework N 415 application based on developing site-specific water quality indexes to be monitored has been adopted for ISSIP (box 22.5). To monitor intermediate outcomes under the centralized invest- ments, the M&E unit will coordinate with the mandated central or- ganization, the National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (NOPWASD), and with the respective subsidiary WSS utili- ties. As for monitoring intermediate outcomes under the decentralized sanitation systems, the M&E unit will coordinate with the respective subsidiary WSS utilities and with the beneficiary community develop- ment associations (CDAs). Community Participation Framework As noted earlier in the chapter, two key principles of integrated WRM are management at the lowest appropriate level, and stakeholder participa- tion. A participatory, demand-driven approach is used to help ensure sustainability by putting in place sanitation systems that users want and are willing to pay for and maintain. The Community Participation Framework (CPF) summarizes the concepts and principles for com- munity participation, mobilization, and awareness-raising techniques; roles of individual actors; and plans for community capacity building. Box 22.5 Water Quality Index M&E Application In the case of the ISSIP, there will be several subcatchment-specific water quality indexes. Each index is to be weighted by population served and by proximity to the (surface or groundwater) potable-water supply off-takes and drainage-reuse locations within each project subcatchment. The index can be based on in-stream ambient concentrations of fecal coliforms and BOD, as well as on any other user-specific in-stream concentrations (as applicable for each subcatchment) such as DO for fisheries and ammonia for potable water and for reuse of agricultural drainage. Provided that a water-quality-modeling tool will be used by the M&E unit (similar to what has been used for project preparation), monitoring and compliance regarding the “in-stream” concentrations would take precedence over the “at-effluent” concentrations. “In-stream concentrations” would take priority, especially for the drains/canals that used to be polluted by the untreated sewage from adjacent villages rather than from project externalities (effluents upstream of ISSIP’s command area). This approach would make use of the self-purification occurring along the monitored streams. 416 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Three overall steps are crucial to this process: information-sharing, demand verification, and institutional arrangements for community par- ticipation in implementation. Initially, communities being considered for interventions need to N be informed about the project and proposed options so that they can make informed choices about whether to participate. During the demand verification, communities’ willingness to par- N ticipate (their demand for the project) can be verified. Confirming demand is crucial to ensure that communities will use and pay toward the operation and maintenance (O&M) of the systems so that investments will not be wasted. Institutional arrangements need to be designed carefully, so that N management of systems is at the lowest appropriate level—the level at which systems are the most likely to be managed well and thus sustained. Institutional arrangements need to be as clear and simple as possible. In addition, the various stakeholders need to receive adequate capacity building and any ongoing support needed to ensure that they can fulfill their roles. An important part of the stakeholder participation principle includes identifying and addressing the needs/preferences of various groups of stakeholders. At the community level, this includes various community sub-groups such as men and women, youth, and the poor. The CPF should be implemented so that the needs and preferences of these sub-groups are addressed and so that they can play appropriate roles in implementation. Community Participation Implementation Framework While community participation will be more extensive in decentralized systems, in both centralized and decentralized systems, community participation in the project will cover the following phases: Information dissemination to communities N Community-level discussions on the project N Demand verification N Community selection (based on criteria) N Communication with communities during construction N Capacity building of community organizations (as appropriate) N Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework N 417 Involvement in hygiene promotion activities N Involvement in O&M (decentralized systems) N Involvement in participatory monitoring and evaluation (M&E). N Information Will Be Disseminated to Communities and Community-Level Discussions on the Project. The first step will be for Rural Sanitation Unit (RSU) staff, working in some cases with an NGO or staff of a consulting firm, to disseminate project information to communities that have been targeted for inclusion in the project. The information will include the type of system proposed (centralized or decentralized, type of technology), expected amount of monthly charges, expected level of community involvement, implemen- tation timeframe, and possible land acquisition requirements. Schemes should be presented to the communities as an oppor- tunity to participate in a public-private partnership (PPP) in which the government will be committing a huge amount of capital funds for infrastructure development (WWTPs and networks). ISSIPs will undertake to build necessary infrastructure in areas in which villagers are willing to pay for sewage disposal and treatment. RSU staff (in some cases, working with an NGO or local consulting firm) can present the basic project information to community members and then have a general discussion to answer questions. Meetings could take several forms: An open, public meeting N A meeting with the CDA and/or local unit staff N Separate meetings for community men and women, with steps N taken to ensure that other subgroups such as the poor and youth are involved. The goal is to spread information about the project as widely as possible in the proposed communities, discuss the proposed project with community members, and answer any questions they may have. Demand Verification and Community Selection After the community meetings have been held, verification of demand for the project can take place in communities that have indicated an initial interest in the project (that is, communities in which, after 418 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS receiving information at the community meetings, either the CDA or the local government unit has expressed an interest in the project). In both types of systems, the CDA or the local unit will need to send an initial letter indicating its interest in the project. In centralized communities, RSU staff working with consultants (or an NGO) can perform a simple willingness-to-pay survey, confirming that households would be willing to pay expected monthly tariffs. After this confirma- tion, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) can be signed between the CDA or the local unit and the project (RSU), agreeing to the conditions of the project. Demand verification will be more extensive in communities being considered for decentralized systems, as these communities will have larger roles to play in implementation. In the decentralized communi- ties, a more extensive willingness-to-pay survey will be conducted. It will include focus group discussions with various groups of community members to ensure that they understand all that will be expected of the community (concerning community management of systems) and that they are willing to undertake these roles. In this case, the MOU can be accompanied by a list of households agreeing to pay the monthly charge and willing to participate in the project. Construction During construction, RSU staff (working with the NGO/consultants) will keep communities informed of construction activities and answer any questions/address any complaints that arise. With decentralized systems, communities (CDA) may help monitor some construction activities. Capacity Building Communities will need capacity building related to their roles in the project. In centralized communities, CDAs/local units will receive capacity building in participatory monitoring and evaluation (M&E) during construction to enable them to help monitor the contractor as the system is being built and afterwards to help monitor system functioning and provide feedback to the RSU. There can be training in proper system usage (ways to prevent blockages). In decentralized communities, CDAs/local units will receive in- depth training before system start-up in how to operate and manage the system (financial, administrative, technical, and social aspects) as Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework N 419 well as training in M&E. This training can be provided by the NGO/ consulting firm, supervised by the RSU. Communities will be provided with manuals to assist them in their work. Hygiene Promotion The hygiene promotion campaign will be pivotal to convincing com- munity members to change hygiene and waste management behaviors. Hygiene promotion activities will target children as well as mothers and fathers of children under five (there may be other target groups as well). Hygiene promotion activities will take place during and after construction activities. Operation and Maintenance (O&M) In centralized systems, CDAs/local units will provide community feedback on system functioning to the RSU and alert the RSU to any problems that occur (system blockages) With decentralized systems, the CDA/local unit will manage the system, receiving back-up technical support from the RSU as needed. Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) In centralized and decentralized communities, CDAs/local units will be involved in participatory M&E, assessing project progress and then system functioning through monitoring specific indicators and related targets. 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( | e w e r a r | c e . ï | | a | e r c r e a a r e a a c t | e a | e w e r r + t e e l . + | t + c c a m a | + t | e a | a . e | | . ¬ | m a r e . e a ¡ | e | a . e . e r t | m e M e r e | + a a | a a r e a a c t | e a ( e l c | + | . c | e m e . ï 421 23 Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Abdulhamid Azad and Alexander Bakalian T he Middle East and North Africa (MNA) water team, along with counterparts from the various MNA countries, spent two weeks in July 2008 on a study tour of Spain. The tour included participating in the Zaragoza Water EXPO, and visiting Spanish institutions responsible for water resource management, water supply, irrigation, and desalination. The significance of Spain’s water sector to the MNA region is three-fold: They share similar climatic and hydrological conditions. 1. They share many common cultural and historical links dating back 2. to the Moorish period. Perhaps most importantly, in many areas of water services, Spain 3. appears to have transitioned its Integrated Water Resource Manage- ment (IWRM) practices to more decentralized decisionmaking and successful implementation of public-private partnerships (PPP). The first part of this chapter discusses the MNA water team observations from the field visits. The second part summarizes the key messages on climate change from the Water EXPO deliberations that the team attended. Observations from Field Visits Ebro River Basin Authority (Confederation Higrografica del Ebro) at Its headquarters in Zaragoza Spanish river basin authorities use reliable data, drought and flood con- trol tools, as well as coordinated operations of reservoirs and aquifers. 1 422 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS An advanced hydrological information system manages real-time data on meteorology, hydrology, and water resources (level of reservoirs, state of main water control gates, and discharge at control points) in the basin. This advanced information system enables good management and prediction, and supports an alarm system for flood prevention and drought management. One of the highlights of the tour was the visit to understand how Spain’s hydrological information system works. The operations room does real-time monitoring of data (Sistema Automático de Información Hidrológica, or SAIH). 2 The data comes through sensors in some 620 remote stations (dams, rivers, canals, rainfall measuring stations) and is processed for decisionmaking through a software developed for this purpose (decision support system, or SAD in Spanish). SAD allows real-time flood management and provides flow forecasts along the different stretches of the rivers in the basin as well as simulates the operation of the existing infrastructure. In addition, the automated Water Quality Information System monitors water quality in rivers and discharge points of industries and towns. The availability of reliable, easily understood (by stakeholders), real-time data has been a key factor behind the success of the governance structure. Canal de Isabel II by Water Supply and Sanitation Group Canal de Isabel II is the water utility for the Madrid autonomous re- gion. 3 This utility is considered one of the oldest in the world. It was founded 150 years ago (1858). It serves 6 million people and has ap- proximately 2250 employees. Unlike many countries’ water utilities, this canal manages the full water cycle: Water reservoirs (14) N Conveyance systems N Water treatment plants (11) N Distribution networks N Wastewater collection treatment (140 plants of all sizes, the largest N with 16 m 3 /sec capacity). 1 www.chebro.es 2 www.saihebro.com 3 www.cyii.es Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries N 423 Wastewater reuse The company reached the level of 100 percent wastewater treatment in 2006. Currently, it is implementing a treated wastewater reuse program that will provide irrigation water for 40 percent of the green areas in the Madrid region. (As a reference point, the MNA team was informed that the price for reused water is 0.15 Euro per m 3 ). Water supply The company provides different levels of service to the some 140 municipalities and towns in the Madrid autonomous region under dif- ferent arrangements: full concession contracts covering all activities; operations and maintenance (O&M) contracts; and contracts for commercial activities only (billing and tariff collection). Some key indicators given were (a) unaccounted-for-water (UFW): 22 percent, of which 11 percent is physical losses; and (b) tariff for water and wastewater: 1.3 Euro per m 3 for the consumption of less than 25 m 3 (per 2 months). It is noteworthy that the company has created a subsidiary that works as a successful private operator in a number of countries in South and Central America. Lessons for MNA countries. The Madrid utility could be considered as a “mature” organization, that is, one that has adapted over time to the local political realities and emerging environmental priorities. More fundamentally, the utility appears to have transitioned into an organization that is implementing IWRM while maintaining internal and external accountability. 4 Almeria Almeria is a desert area. The team visited two examples of conjunctive use of desalinated water with groundwater in the coastal areas of Nijar and Balerma (for irrigation through distribution networks extended to greenhouses). In addition, some of this desalinated water is supplied to coastal communities for household use and to the booming tourism industry. The desalinated water helps to both reduce the burden on depleted groundwater and counteract the sea-water intrusion in the See Jagannathan, “Principled Pragmatism: Lessons from the “MNA Development 4 Report on Water” in this volume. 424 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS water-supply wells. The models were quite similar to the conjunctive use models being developed in Morocco’s Guerdaine project (financed by IFC) and Egypt’s West Delta Project 5 (with surface water). The primary driver in both situations is the water demand from farmers who grow high-value crops for international markets. In addition, as most farmers are smallholders (<2 ha.), the model of technical assistance (TA) and marketing support has direct relevance to the project design in Egypt’s West Delta. For example, the water user commercializa- tion association in Balerma has developed a very interesting auctioning system for marketing the farm produce to the local/EU markets. The difference in the case of Almeria is that the production cost per unit of water is subsidized by the state budget and by EU subsidies. This subsidy was designed to function in a relatively targeted/objective man- ner. It was designed to achieve desired outcomes, for example, by writing off the interest on the state loan to farmers upon proof of improving the productivity per unit of water. The average water productivity is very high: 12 Euro/unit of water for vegetables such as tomatoes and peppers. In summary, Almeria’s approach has enabled scaling up the supply- side investments that are tied to the water user demand, thereby ensuring financial sustainability. The administration sees the subsidy as justified because it contributes to financing a regional/state “public good,” namely, that water availability has promoted a booming tourist industry along the coastline. Compared with MNA countries, Spain’s public subsidy comes at a lower social cost because public social spend- ing (notably health and education) is at a higher level. Observations on irrigation model Given its geographical position, Spain is vulnerable to climate change. However, Spain finds itself in a situation that may facilitate the adaptations needed for the supply, demand, and management of wa- ter resources. Regarding supply, two favorable circumstances are the (1) high level of regulation of the rivers and sufficient water control infrastructure and (2) current program to build desalination facilities. Demand is the subject of a series of programs for making improvements, such as the National Irrigation Modernization program. The visit to Almeria, officially Europe’s only desert, is instructive in this regard. Its 30,000 hectares (ha) are intensely farmed. This area is dedicated primarily to horticultural crops under greenhouses. See Baietti and Abdel-Dayen chapter on West Delta Project in this volume. 5 Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries N 425 The water supply is from surface water, groundwater, rainwater, and desalinated water. The greenhouses are very labor intensive—on the order of 700 person days/ha/year. The Almeria type of greenhouse is a low-cost structure of light materials. Plastic is used for the en- closure, and a two-layer cover captures the rainwater for irrigation. Under greenhouses, 1 to 2 crops per year are obtained. Production is interrupted in June and July, when there is considerable production of fruits and vegetables in other parts of Europe. Water productivity under greenhouses is approximately 12 Euro/m 3 . Assessment of water user associations The team visited two water user associations (WUAs) with very dif- ferent situations. The first was the Campo de Nijar WUA, which has 1,826 members and an irrigated area under greenhouses of 8,200 ha. Irrigation is by (deep) groundwater (200 m). The expansion of the ir- rigated area since 1970 has resulted in overexploitation of the aquifer and sea-water intrusion. Because of the highly saline water, many farmers started capturing the rainwater that falls on the greenhouses, mixing it with the well water. Since this solution was inadequate, they are now using desalinated seawater from the Carboneras plant. The desalinated water is provided on demand with a limit of 0.3 l/s/ha for 23 hours a day. The average investment cost to distribute this water is approximately 6,700 Euro/ha (using only water conveyance distri- bution systems). This cost is subsidized by the European Union, the central government, and provincial authorities. In addition, farmers obtain certain subsidies, up to 50 percent, for their private on-farm drip irrigation systems. The technologies used in this area can serve as a good example for the recently approved West Delta irrigation project in Egypt. The second visit was to the Solponiente WUA. It has 1454 mem- bers and an irrigated area under greenhouses of 1,800 ha. Irrigation is done conjunctively by surface and groundwater. The irrigation water is distributed on demand by a pressurized system. Irrigation water is allo- cated daily and administered using a sophisticated real-time control and monitoring system. Irrigation modernization recently was completed. It consisted of implementation of water metering and remote manage- ment (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA) of these meters, as well as an irrigation advisory service. The water metering and SCADA investment cost was approximately 3,000 Euro/ha. As a result, it was estimated that savings of 16 percent of irrigation water were 426 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS achieved. The irrigated area was not increased due to modernization. The average cost of irrigation water is approximately 0.18 Euro/m 3 . In future, this area also will be served by desalinated seawater, which will be used conjunctively with groundwater and surface water. Spain’s irrigation areas vary considerably. Nevertheless, the WUAs share many common characteristics: Constitution and legal status. N Organization and selection of leaders and functions. N Sharing the financing costs as well as participating in the manage- N ment of water resources. Water users being obliged by law to join a WUA ( N comunidad de usarios). When most members are farmers, it is called an irrigators association (comunidad de regantes). Rules of the associations written and approved by users. The rules N must be approved for compatibility with the law but may not be otherwise changed by the River Basin Agency. WUAs with a com- mon interest can form a general association around that issue. Existence of a National Federation of WUAs with the objective N of studying irrigation-related issues and presenting proposals to government. WUAs are managed by (1) a General Assembly composed of all members, (2) a Board of Governors elected by users to carry out direc- tives of the General Assembly, and (3) an Irrigation Jury, responsible for resolving conflicts between farmers. Observations on the desalination plants The team visited two desalination-supported water schemes in Nijar and Balerma that provide water not only for household water supply and tourism but also for irrigation (via distribution networks extended to greenhouses). The desalinated water also helps reduce the burden on the depleted groundwater and helps counteract the seawater intru- sion in the water-supply wells. The Carboneras desalination plant started operation in 2005. It uses reverse osmosis technology and has a treatment capacity of 120,000 m 3 /day. The desalinated seawater is used for irrigation of the greenhouse crops in Campo de Nijar (27 million m 3 /year), household supply (15 million m 3 /year), and industries (1 million m 3 /year). The desalination process is very energy intensive: it uses 4–8 kWh/m 3 . Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries N 427 Additionally, the desalinated water must be pumped to a reservoir with a dynamic head of 280 m. Thus, desalination does not appear to be an economically viable option. Because desalination costs are approximately 0.52 Euro/m 3 (3,000 Euro/ha), only highly profitable crops can be irrigated. Economies of scale (scaling up the desalination and water distribution works) and the ongoing technological advances have helped to dramati- cally reduce unit costs. In the past, the KWH per unit of desalinated water in the Canary Islands was as high as 40 KWH/m 3 , whereas, in the Nijar Desal plant (visited during the tour), it is only 4 KWH/m 3 . With improved developments of membranes, these costs already are reduced further to 2KWH/m 3 . The effluent brine is a negative externality that often is the environmental concern in scaling up desalination schemes in some countries. This brine is mitigated by dilution with the water used for the energy plants before being disposed to the sea. Role of subsidies As in the case of irrigation, the production cost per unit of water is subsidized by the state budget and by the EU. However, these subsi- dies are made in a relatively targeted/objective manner. The subsidy is relatively outcome-based (for instance, by writing off the interest on the state loan to farmers when they present proof of improving the productivity per unit of water). The water productivity is as high as 12 Euros/unit of water (for example, with tomatoes and peppers). Lessons Learned from the Field Visits The main lessons from the visit are: Overall management of water resources requires active participa- N tion from users. In addition, reliable, user-friendly, hydrological information that monitors the stocks and flows of water plays a key role in resolving various conflicts of interest. The Spanish river basin agencies have been able to play a critical role in sustainable water resource management, but these institutions have evolved over several decades. Irrigation improvements that enhance water productivity are likely N to lead to higher evapotranspiration (ET). Under these circum- stances, desalination offers sustainable solutions to coastal farmers who are already producing high-value crops. 428 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The Almeria model of providing small farmers with technical as- N sistance at three levels (on the farm, for meeting EU phytosanitary regulations, and for marketing) has interesting lessons for World Bank projects in Egypt and Morocco. Irrigation system modernization needs to attend to both physical N and operational aspects. Good water-level control and commu- nication facilities are essential to good irrigation management. In particular, there is a need for good water balance assessment, good understanding of internal system processes, and high flexibility in water delivery arrangements. Desalinated water could be put to conjunctive irrigation use N provided there is a high-value use (such as tourism) that can pay for cross- subsidies. However, this model is not replicable in MNA because the Spanish farmers benefit from a variety of subsidies available through EU agricultural policies. In general, desalinating costs are declining, and the costs of surface N water and groundwater are increasing. Therefore, desalination is becoming more competitive for urban uses. Reverse osmosis is the preferred desalination technology due to the cost reductions driven by improvements in membranes in recent years. For water-scarce regions similar to Almeria, such as coastal com- N munities in MNA countries, a hybrid solution may be relevant to enhance productivity of periurban agriculture for local markets. Such a hybrid would blend the relatively cheaper treated wastewater (once public acceptance is achieved through adequate environmental and social safeguards) with desalination plants, Technologies for tertiary wastewater treatment and desalination have very much in common. However, the cost of treatment varies depending on the type of treatment and the intended final use of the water. Spain has evolved a system whereby the state pays for major con- N struction works for water resource development and recovers the costs through water tariffs. Equally important is the availability of a strong legal framework that has empowered the WUAs. It takes many years for WUAs to evolve. Project designs need to recognize the long gestation periods before WUAs can become fully empowered. The Almeria experiences of conjunctive water use for growing vegetables are replicable in MNA in areas in which the farmers already have worked out supply chain/logistical issues essential to connect to Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries N 429 the export market. Examples of such areas in MNA are Agadir in Morocco, parts of Tunisia, Algeria, and possibly Gaza (once normalcy returns). Zaragoza Water Expo: Summary of Messages for MNA Countries on Climate Change Developing countries will be the most affected, notably those in N the MNA region. Climate change is 1 of the 4 causes of the N escalated water demand- supply imbalance (water scarcity). The other three causes are popula- tion growth, improved living standards, and increased system losses due to under-budgeted O&M. In some countries, these last three causes may dwarf the importance of climate change. In other countries, the incremental effect of climate change will be significant. Diver- sification and trade are key adaptation solutions, namely, “virtual water” to maximize net exports per unit of renewable water. In general, in MNA, climate change will: N Increase irrigation-water demand per ha (due to increased L temperature). Alter the flood and drought extremes, and shift the seasonal L rainfall and surface-water flow hydrographs. The Nile basin likely will encounter increased precipitation (and hence in- creased, rather than decreased, flows). One major challenge is the high uncertainty (of the demand and N supply forecasts to 2050 or 2070). High uncertainty means that, for designing and executing the adaptation interventions, MNA countries inevitably will take risks: Higher-income countries need to take some L capital-cost risk. For instance, they could design the water interventions to adapt to the most extreme (that is, highly unlikely) flood or drought (such as a 1-in-200 year flood/drought). Lower-income countries need to take some L damage risk. For instance, they could design the water interventions to avoid only the more probable floods/droughts. The adaptation options, including several supply augmentation and N demand management measures, need to be assessed by multiple criteria, including, importantly, the sustainability criterion. The cost-benefit ratio should not be the sole factor. MNA made a presentation at the EXPO emphasizing that the assessment and 430 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS implementation of adaptation options should be performed through the ABCDE approach, elaborated in chapter 1, as opposed to the common top-down engineering approach. In Algeria and Yemen, for example, the latter approach resulted in costly/oversized trunk works without real bottom-up societal demand. In some cases, the mitigation and adaptation agendas could overlap. N The planner needs to address this possibility to ensure a harmonized overlap. Examples include: Cropping shifts that save water (adaptation measure) without L resulting in increased greenhouse gases (GHGs) (mitigation measure) Reusing treated wastewater (adaptation measure) while se- L questering the emitted methane (mitigation measure) Capitalizing on the storage of bulk-waters (adaptation measure) L to develop clean solar-thermal energy (mitigation measure, as planned for Balerma reservoir, which the team visited during the tour). # Engineering 433 24 Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta Jose Simas, Juan Morelli, and Hani El Sadani Introduction and Statement of the Problem Egypt depends almost entirely on 55.5 billion m 3 per year of water from the Nile River. This allocation represents 95 percent of the available resource for the country. Approximately 85 percent of the Nile water is used for irrigation. Demand for water is growing while the options for increasing supply are limited. Egypt faces the challenge of improv- ing the productivity and sustainability of water use. To respond, the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) has been imple- menting an Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) Action Plan. Its key strategy is to improve demand management. This plan has had the support of the World Bank, Germany’s KfW, the Netherlands Development Cooperation, and other donors. The Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project (IIIMP) is an important measure of the IWRM action plan. IIIMP is implemented on 500,000 acres ( feddans) in the Nile Delta covering the command of 2 main canals, Mahmoudia and Mit Yazid. The project aims at improving the management of irrigation and drainage in the project area and increasing the efficiency of irrigated agriculture water use and services. The main interventions of the project are improving irrigation and drainage systems and improving the water management institutional structure. † This chapter was prepared in close collaboration with the staff of Egypt’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (Irrigation Improvement Sector; IIIMP Management Unit; Water Management Research Institute) and Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (Executive Authority for Land Improvement; Soil, Water and Environ- ment Research Institute; Center of Agricultural Economic and Statistics). 434 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The IIIMP interventions in irrigation modernization are based on the experience gained from several preceding and ongoing projects. The original concepts of irrigation modernization were developed in the early 1980’s and since then have received support from UNDP, USAID, Japan, World Bank, KfW, the Netherlands Government, and others. In 1996 implementation started on the World Bank/Kf W-financed Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP). It was the first large-scale appli- cation of the irrigation modernization program in Egypt. The project closed in December 2006. By that time, 50 percent of the tertiary and secondary systems of the command areas of the main canals of Mahmoudia and Mit Yazid had been modernized. The IIP included three types of improvements/innovations: Introduction of continuous flow. 1. The mode of operation of second- ary distribution canals was changed from rotational (for example, 5 days on/5 days off during the summer) to continuous flow (that is, water flows continuously in the secondary canals). The purpose of continuous flow was to improve water delivery services to the farmers. It has given more flexibility to the water management system to make it more suited to growing high-value crops. Providing a single lifting point 2. . The low-lying tertiary water systems (mesqas) were replaced by pressurized/elevated systems. Water is lifted from the secondary canal into the tertiary network through a single-point lifter rather than the old system. The latter allowed farmers to lift the water through several formal/informal control points without adequate control measures. The old system caused tremendous inequity in water distribution between upstream and tail-end users. The new system has led to better water distribution equity and reduced operation cost. Piping tertiary canals. 3. Earthen open tertiary canals were converted into piped canals. Piped canals allow for pressurized water delivery, reduce seepage losses, prevent discharge of solid waste and sewage into the tertiary system, and save approximately 2 percent of the total command area. The IIIMP widened the approach of the previous Irrigation Im- provement Project (IIP). The initial driver was based on the economic analysis of various technical irrigation improvement options, including the IIP approach. Average IIP improvement costs were exceeding LE 6,000 per feddan (extreme cases reached 12,000 LE/fed), due mainly Egypt: I rrigation I nnovations in the Nile Delta N 435 to over-design. In addition, IIP’s economic rate of return (ERR) was lower than expected at appraisal time. In addition to reducing the cost side of the interventions, a number of innovative measures were considered to maximize the benefit side of the project from both economic and financial points of view. For example, at this time, the Egyptian government was implementing diesel fuel cost increases. These increases not only have increased the operational cost of nonimproved systems but also would have increased operational costs for improved systems if the original choice of IIP of diesel single lifters had been adopted. The proposed response was to take advantage of the relatively good electrical transmission and subtrans- mission infrastructure in the Nile Delta and the economic efficiency, life span, and capital and running costs of the electro-pumps. In general, IIIMP adopted a three-point strategy: Proper sizing of the improved infrastructure to optimize capital 1. costs Technical innovations to increase cost-savings and functionality 2. Extension of the improvement package to the whole system (in- 3. cluding tertiary and on-farm improvements). Both (2) and (3) would have resulted in maximized benefits com- pared to the associated costs. Government engineers were reluctant to endorse the elements discussed during preparation for two reasons. First, this strategy had never been implemented in Egypt. Second, there was concern regarding possible rejection by farmers of innovative elements with which they may not have had experience before. It was clear that only a “sizeable pilot” could clarify the large number of issues and fine-tune the ap- propriate technology before scaling up to the national level. The objective of this chapter is to document the process of developing the pilot and to provide an interim evaluation based on real measured data. There is a real need for this evaluation at this time due to the fact that the irrigation modernization package implemented in this pilot has never been tested before under Egyptian conditions. Selection of Pilot Area The W-10 area in Kafr El Sheikh Governorate was selected to serve as the “sizeable pilot” for the new approach. It comprises approximately 436 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS 6,000 acres in the most down- stream tail-end command area of the Mit Yazid main canal. It is supplied by 3 branch canals and 2 sub-branch canals (table 24.1). The area was selected solely because it was the only subarea in which no IIP interventions had ever been made. As a tail-end area, W-10 has restricted water supply in the peak summer season and there- fore reuses drainage water. The water shortage and low farmer incomes meant that W-10 was a more difficult working environ- ment than the IIIMP overall. On the positive side, the W-10 area is close to the Sakha Experimental Station. 1 This fact, together with the support of the GTZ-MALR Agriculture Wa- ter Management Project, was considered a plus, because it would enable the provision of technical assistance and materials to implement the pilot actions. Package of Actions to Test for Scaling Up Substantial differences existed between the old design criteria imple- mented under IIP and the new approach applied in W-10. The latter featured 12 innovations: Electrification of single-point lifters (mesqa pump sets) rather than 1. diesel pumps. While this measure has had the benefits mentioned above, a new dedicated distribution grid was needed, and the MWRI was to take care of it. 1 Sakha is a subsection of the Soils, Water and Environment Research Institute (SWERI) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR). Figure 24.1 Layout Map for Northern Part of Mit-Yazid Canal Showing W-10 Subproject Area Egypt: I rrigation I nnovations in the Nile Delta N 437 Adoption of prepaid electrical cards to avoid delinquent payments 2. and facilitate supply logistics to user farmers. This measure was adopted because the electric utility companies were reluctant to accept the new users based on risks of delinquent monthly payments from farmers. The IIIMP team proposed a “new deal” through the use of modern “prepaid credit cards.” This was a win-win option for both farmers and utilities. New and cheaper equipment for the tertiary distribution systems 3. (mesqas): increased irrigation application time in the peak month from 12 hr to 20 hr; substantial reduction of pipe diameters; direct pumping rather than costly concrete standpipes; more compact pump houses equipped with smaller pump modules: 20, 40, and 60 l/s, instead of 60 and 90 l/s units (reducing water duties from 4–6 l/s/ha in extreme cases to 2 l/s/ha or 0.82 l/s/acre in Egyptian customary units). Improvement of head works control gates of branch canals through 4. telemetric instrumentation and remote operation of gates with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. Improvement of quaternary distribution systems ( 5. marwas) includ- ing the testing of two options: lining by brick and mortar or piping by low-pressure pipes up to the on-farm gate. MWRI had not been involved before in the improvement of marwas. However, the Soil, Water and Environment Research Institute (SWERI) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) was implementing a pilot program to line marwas using bricks and mortar. Thus, an interministerial agreement was made to enable SWERI to implement the marwa improvement activities, although MWRI would be responsible. Testing low-pressure pipes for marwas (class 2.5 bar instead of 6. 4 bar). Testing different types of valves for the mesqa-marwa interface 7. (ball, gate, and butterfly), different brands and specifications, optional manufacturing materials (metallic, polyvinyl chloride or PVC), PE, and different installation lay-outs. Developing and testing different individual farm-gate hydrants 8. for on-farm use allowing future use of hoses and gated pipes—all provided with pre-set constant flow and pressure. Application of laser land-leveling (LLL) practices to improve al- 9. location efficiencies (recently initiated). 438 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Introduction of rotational operation schedules of pumps, valves, 10. and hydrants to harmonize farmer needs and efficient use of water, labor, and energy. Introduction of on-farm water management improvements includ- 11. ing irrigation scheduling (to begin soon). Testing and introduction of modified/controlled drainage (tested 12. at station level and to be expanded soon). By 2009 the approach tested in the W-10 pilot area was being expanded within IIIMP to more than 500,000 acres in the Delta. This expansion depended on the collaboration among the special- ized agencies of the MWRI and MALR, working together with water user associations (WUAs) and informal farmer groups. The coop- eration between MWRI and MALR in the W-10 area provided the framework for MALR participation in the implementation of marwa and on-farm improvement programs. These programs included piped marwas, laser land-leveling, and training and capacity building of ben- eficiary farmers. The completion of the W-10 took more than four years due to contractors’ inexperience in implementing some of the new interven- tions and failures of some contractors to comply with the contractual schedule. The marwa implementation schedule was delayed because of delays in agreement on procedures for interagency transfer of funds and materials and other accountability mechanisms. After the proj- ect management unit (PMU) took over responsibility for completing the W-10 area project, the marwa improvement program began to accelerate. As noted above, the new W-10 approach was strongly resisted during the first few years. However, after the results of the W-10 pilot became evident, many of the skeptical parties became convinced that the project’s technical and organizational innovations could succeed. Evaluation of the New Approach The IIIMP Project Appraisal Document (PAD) envisaged (a) an aver- age increase in farmers’ annual income of approximately 15 percent, (b) water savings of approximately 22 percent, and (c) an overall ERR of 20.5 percent. An interim evaluation of W-10 pilot was conducted in late 2008. The aims were to: Egypt: I rrigation I nnovations in the Nile Delta N 439 Verify whether the new approach was feasible and whether the N PAD forecasts were accurate Inform the design of a results-oriented monitoring and evaluation N system. Investment Costs Most of the W-10 improvement costs were financed by IIP, which closed on December 31, 2006. The improvements at the quaternary and on- farm levels were taken on by the IIIMP. Despite having an estimated cost of approximately LE 120 per acre—less than 2 percent of the total improvement costs—laser land leveling is expected to have a significant impact. Figure 24.2 shows the break- down of the main components of the improvement costs in the W-10 pilot. Mesqa improvements represent 47 percent of all W-10 improvement costs. Improvement in Physical Performance of Irrigation System of the W-10 area At the time of writing of this report, the authors could not assess the full range of enhancements in irrigation system performance because the improvement package had not yet been implemented in full (for example, the crucial laser land-leveling improvement). However, through a number of ongoing M&E studies, the following preliminary observations have been evident: Impact of marwa improvement The N sufficiency indicator, which expresses whether enough water is diverted by the marwa to its served area, is the highest for pipeline marwas compared to lined and earthen marwas (earthen is the lowest). The N equity indicator, which measures adequacy of water distribu- tion, is the highest for pipeline marwas, compared to lined and earthen. Source: Authors based on data from ofcial records. Figure 24.2 Breakdown of W-10 Investment Mesqa improvements 47% Electrifcation 17% Mesqa pumpsets & pipeworks 8% Marwa improvements 13% Other costs (LLL, etc.) 6% Delivery system 9% 440 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS The N conveyance efficiency indicator depends on calculating water losses due to seepage, percolation, and evaporation from marwas between the source and the farm. This indicator was highest for piped marwas. Piped marwas resulted in substantial water saving compared to other interventions. The N irrigation time indicator indicates the superiority of improved marwas over earthen marvas. On-farm N (application, crop water use, and field water use) irrigation efficiency is highest for piped marwas. Water table depths N were deeper for improved marwas compared to earthen ones, indicating less water loss and lower drainage coefficients. The s N ocial assessment indicated that most farmers prefer piped mar- was. The farmers perceived four benefits from improving marwas: equity enhancement, land-saving, reduction in maintenance costs, and reduction in irrigation time. Impact of mesqa improvement The average total operating cost was significantly lower for W-10 N compared to the IIP regular improvement package. The average irrigation time was higher for W-10 compared to N the regular IIP-1 due to reduced pump size and pipe diameters in W-10 area. Relative water supply is better for the W-10 area compared to the N nonimproved areas, thus indicating better water availability. Benefits in W-10 Pilot Area Appendix 24.1 shows which irrigation improvements produced which benefits. Benefits could be summarized for one or several of the improve- ments by the following actual production parameters: Crop yield increases N (due to enhanced flexibility under continuous flow operation, timely irrigation, equity for tail-end farms, improved water quality and quantity, improved drainage and reduced water table and water and soil salinity, and reduction of weed infesta- tions) Change in cropping pattern N (due to improved reliability and timely access to water) Egypt: I rrigation I nnovations in the Nile Delta N 441 Land gains N for communal service space (due to replacement of open mesqas and marwas by buried pipes) Reduced irrigation costs N Increased water productivity N (due to reduced water losses, convey- ance efficiency, controlled drainage, laser land-leveling, higher yields, lower irrigation costs). The improved production parameters recorded above all are measurable and easy to introduce into crop and farm representative budget models. To estimate the benefits of the W-10 pilot package, the authors worked closely with officers of MALR’s Center of Agricultural Econom- ics and Statistics 2 to update with- and without-project crop patterns and budgets. Such figures were obtained primarily by field-sampling yields and some estimates based on qualified experts. Table 24.1 sum- marizes the resulting yields and net income parameters of the main crops cultivated in W-10. As can be seen from the physical quantities and values detailed in table 24.1, yields are increased by 12 percent–25 percent. Net incomes per cultivated acre are increasing by 20 percent–64 percent as a result Engineers Bayoumi Abd El Megued Bayoumi, Abd Elmahab, and Mohamed A. 2 El-din Mustafa (MALR). Table 24.1 Average Incremental Yields and Incomes by Crop Crop/activity Crop yields (kg/fed) Income (LE/fed) Without project With project Increase (%) Without project With project Increase (%) Maize 3.100 3.500 13 3,355 4,042 20 Rice 4.100 4.600 12 3,140 3,928 25 Seed cotton 1.130 1.330 18 1,769 2,602 47 Summer vegetable 15.000 18.000 20 3,450 5,254 52 Wheat 2.800 3.200 14 4,871 5,868 20 Broad beans 1.400 1.600 14 2,131 2,666 25 Winter vegetable 19.000 22.000 16 6,805 8,729 28 Berseem long season 25.000 28.000 12 2,504 3,085 23 Berseem short season 12.000 15.000 25 1,067 1,748 64 Sugar beet 18.000 21.000 17 2,332 3,186 37 Citrus 10,000 12,000 20 8,995 11,528 28 442 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS of the combined effects of increased productivity and reduction of the irrigation costs (depreciation and O&M of pumps). Table 24.2 summarizes three typical farm models. All models confirm the financial feasibility of the proposed improvements and the positive impact on beneficiaries’ family income. Through integrated on-farm and off-farm investments, the project not only saves approximately 20 percent–30 percent of water but also significantly increases household income by 8 percent–14.5 percent (table 24.2). As W-10 pilot area investments are completed with laser land-leveling and other on-farm improvements (training, irrigation scheduling), additional income gains will materialize. Financial and economic prices have been estimated using 2007–08 data. Conversion factors (CFs) for shadow pricing are based on estimates prepared for this quick illustrative analysis. Conversion factors for wheat (1.1), cotton (0.95), sugar beet and maize (0.9), and citrus fruits and tomato (0.8) were used. Given the high levels of existing subsidies to Egypt’s energy market prices, CFs of 4.0 and 2.5 were used for diesel and electricity, respectively. For nontraded commodities, such as ber- seem and other forages, financial prices are assumed to be in line with economic prices. According to the most recent forecasts of commodity prices prepared by the World Bank (November 2008), future economic prices for traded inputs and outputs are not expected to show major variations. The WB forecast made no adjustment for labor costs. Due to the short time available for preparing the analysis, no eco- nomic value was estimated for water saved. The farm model estimated that water consumption in W-10 was reduced by 30 percent from 49.6 million to 34.8 million m 3 as a result of the new improvement package being tested. However, water is gaining an increasing opportunity cost as irrigated area continues to expand in Egypt and water becomes more and more scarce. Table 24.2 Farm Models: Estimated Income Increases (LE/farm) Income increases (%) Model (feddan) W-10 Area per model (feddan) No. of farms Farmer’s net income Without project With project W-10 pilot area 6,000 5,583 Model 0.75 feddan (50% of area) 8.0 0.75 3,000 4,000 18,658 20,151 Model 1.5 feddan (33% of area) 11.9 1.50 2,000 1,333 23,222 25,988 Model 4 feddan (17% of area) 14.5 4.00 1,000 250 38,198 43,754 Egypt: I rrigation I nnovations in the Nile Delta N 443 The ERR for W-10 investments was estimated at 15.2 percent and the net present value (NPV) at LE 11 million at 12 percent discount rate. These numbers were achieved even without assigning any value to (1) the water being saved or (2) the significant reduction of carbon emissions due to substituting the more than 5,500 individual diesel pumps with approximately 100 single-point electric pump houses. Conclusions and Recommendations This analysis uses empirical data to confirm that the W-10 pilot improve- ments are economically viable. It produced this positive result despite the fact that the project was in its start-up phase. There were cost overruns as staff became familiar with the new approach, and not all project benefits had yet materialized. The exercise is a valid first approximation of an evaluation proce- dure that should be followed routinely. It should be updated regularly on the basis of systematic data collection. Other additional preliminary conclusions that could be drawn from the analysis are: As crop yields improve, the new designs introducing continuous 1. flow and significantly reducing the capacity of single-point mesqa irrigation pumps are proving to be adequate for crop and farm needs. These designs are showing the way to improve equity in the irrigation distribution systems, which, by design, have a limited water conveyance and delivery capacity. With the new improve- ments approach, tail-end farmers should be in a better position to obtain the water they need. Farmers located in the head will neither need, nor be able to capture, water in excess of their crop consumption needs. Electrification of the system also enables significant reductions of 2. the costs of irrigation. The reductions result from both the reduced depreciation and maintenance costs of electric pumps as opposed to the diesel pumps, and the lower cost of electricity as compared with diesel fuel. Electrification also substantially reduces a significant source of carbon emitted from the thousands of individual diesel pumps by substituting more efficient and environmentally friendly shared electric pump houses. There is still a great possibility to reduce costs of irrigation improve- 3. ment works, as implementation partners (Irrigation Improvement 444 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Sector of MWRI; Executive Agency for Land Improvement of MALR) and private contractors learn about the innovative ap- proaches. As investment costs are reduced with experience, the impact of the improvements will increase. Integrated irrigation improvements up to the marwa and the 4. on-farm levels are possible due to the institutional collaboration and strong support from MWRI and MALR that were developed during IIMP. These arrangements should be reinforced and more training provided. With the new approach, it is possible both to save approximately 20 5. percent–30 percent of the water used for irrigation and to achieve a significant increase in the value of production. The evaluation exercise showed that the productivity of water 6. increases by more than 80 percent when comparing the total net economic value of production per 1000 m 3 used for irrigation at project maturity with the pre-project productivity. Egypt: I rrigation I nnovations in the Nile Delta N 445 A p p e n d i x A 1 M o n i t o r i n g a n d E v a l u a t i o n F r a m e w o r k : I n t e g r a t e d I m p r o v e m e n t s C o m p o n e n t s a n d E x p e c t e d I m p a c t s T a b l e A 1 . 1 M o n i t o r i n g a n d E v a l u a t i o n F r a m e w o r k : I n t e g r a t e d I m p r o v e m e n t s C o m p o n e n t s a n d E x p e c t e d I m p a c t s I n f r a s t r u c t u r e n e t w o r k s l e v e l s R e l e v a n t u s e r s o r g a n i z a t i o n s I m p r o v e m e n t s u b c o m p o n e n t s ( i n p u t s ) I m p a c t r e s u l t s e x p e c t e d ( o u t p u t s ) I n t e r m e d i a t e o u t c o m e s F i n a l o u t c o m e s O n - f a r m W a t e r U s e r A s s o c i a t i o n s ( W U A s ) L a s e r l a n d - l e v e l i n g E ffi c i e n t o n - f a r m w a t e r m a n a g e m e n t L a b o r s a v i n g s f o r f a r m e r s N I n c r e m e n t a l c r o p y i e l d s N I n c r e m e n t a l e n e r g y a n d w a t e r s a v i n g s a t f a r m l e v e l N F e r t i l i z e r s a v i n g s N L a n d m a r k e t - v a l u e a p p r e c i a t i o n N C a l i b r a t e d f a r m h y d r a n t s a n d i r r i g a t i o n s c h e d u l i n g t r a i n i n g I n c r e a s e d c r o p y i e l d s S a l i n i t y c o n t r o l a g r o n o m i c p a c k a g e s Off-farm improvements and actions Minor networks Q u a t e r n a r y m a r w a s M a r w a s i m p r o v e m e n t ( p i p i n g / l i n i n g ) E ffi c i e n t , t i m e l y , a n d e q u i t a b l e w a t e r d i s t r i b u t i o n t o f a r m s A s s u r a n c e o f w a t e r a d e q u a c y , e q u i t y , a n d N t i m e l i n e s s t o f a r m s P u m p e n e r g y s a v i n g s N I n c r e a s e d y i e l d s N W a t e r a n d e n e r g y s a v i n g s N I n c r e m e n t a l i n c r e a s e o f l a n d v a l u e N L a b o r s a v i n g s N H y d r a n t s h a r m o n i z e d r o t a t i o n a l s c h e d u l i n g C o n t r o l l e d d r a i n a g e p i t s W a t e r a n d p u m p i n g s a v i n g s o n r i c e c r o p s W U A s t r a i n i n g o n O & M E ff e c t i v e a n d s u s t a i n a b l e O & M T e r t i a r y m e s q a s W U A e s t a b l i s h m e n t a n d e ff e c t i v e n e s s E n a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n t o a l l a c t i o n s / i m p r o v e m e n t s S u s t a i n a b l e u s e o f w a t e r d i s t r i b u t i o n w a t e r N a d e q u a c y , t i m e l i n e s s , a n d e q u i t y o f d i s t r i b u t i o n t o m a r w a s O & M c o s t r e c o v e r y t o m e s q a s N W a t e r a n d e n e r g y s a v i n g s N I n c r e a s e o f l a n d v a l u e N E m i s s i o n s r e d u c t i o n N P i p e d m e s q a + s i n g l e l i f t e r E n a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n f o r e q u i t y a n d s a v i n g E l e c t r i fi c a t i o n R e d u c t i o n o n p u m p i n g c o s t s , e m i s s i o n s , a n d n o i s e T r a i n i n g o n p u m p s a n d v a l v e s O & M a n d r o t a t i o n a l s c h e d u l i n g S u s t a i n a b l e u s e A d o p t i o n o f c o n t i n u o u s fl o w a t p e a k t i m e s E q u i t y a n d w a t e r s a v i n g s C o n t i n u e d o n n e x t p a g e 446 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS T a b l e A 1 . 1 M o n i t o r i n g a n d E v a l u a t i o n F r a m e w o r k : I n t e g r a t e d I m p r o v e m e n t s C o m p o n e n t s a n d E x p e c t e d I m p a c t s ( c o n t i n u e d ) I n f r a s t r u c t u r e n e t w o r k s l e v e l s R e l e v a n t u s e r s o r g a n i z a t i o n s I m p r o v e m e n t s u b c o m p o n e n t s ( i n p u t s ) I m p a c t r e s u l t s e x p e c t e d ( o u t p u t s ) I n t e r m e d i a t e o u t c o m e s F i n a l o u t c o m e s Off-farm improvements and actions Major networks S e c o n d a r y b r a n c h c a n a l s a n d s u r f a c e d r a i n s B r a n c h - c a n a l w a t e r u s e r a s s o c i a t i o n s ( B C W U A s ) I m p r o v e m e n t o f B C a n d r e l a t e d s t r u c t u r e s E n a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r m e s q a i m p r o v e m e n t s W a t e r a d e q u a c y , t i m e l i n e s s , a n d e q u i t y N o f d i s t r i b u t i o n t o m e s q a s B C h e a d w o r k s i m p r o v e m e n t a n d v o l u m e t r i c m e t e r i n g E n a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n f o r c o n t i n u o u s fl o w R e n e w i n g s u b s u r f a c e d r a i n s E n a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r c o n t r o l l i n g s a l i n i t y a n d w a t e r l o g g i n g S u s t a i n a b l e c r o p p r o d u c t i v i t y a n d y i e l d s : N w a t e r s a v i n g s o n r i c e c r o p s M o d i fi e d / c o n t r o l l e d d r a i n a g e R i c e w a t e r s a v i n g s S u r f a c e d r a i n s ( m a i n ) D i s t r i c t W a t e r B o a r d s ( D W B s ) M a i n s u r f a c e d r a i n s a n d r e l a t e d s t r u c t u r e s r e h a b i l i t a t i o n E n a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r c o n t r o l l i n g s a l i n i t y a n d w a t e r l o g g i n g S u s t a i n a b l e c r o p p r o d u c t i v i t y a n d y i e l d s N M a i n c a n a l s M a i n c a n a l a n d r e l a t e d s t r u c t u r e s r e h a b i l i t a t i o n E n a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n f o r c o n t i n u o u s fl o w f o r t a i l - e n d B C s O v e r a l l e q u i t y , a d e q u a c y , a n d t i m e l i n e s s N o f w a t e r d i s t r i b u t i o n t o B C s P u m p s t a t i o n s M a j o r p u m p i n g s t a t i o n s a n d r e l a t e d s t r u c t u r e s o v e r h a u l i n g 447 25 Water Reuse in the MNA Region: Constraints, Experiences, and Policy Recommendations Claire Kfouri, Pier Mantovani, and Marc Jeuland T he scarcity of freshwater in most countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) region is an increasingly acute prob- lem, particularly as populations continue to grow and place higher demands on water resources. Fourteen of 20 MNA nations are in water deficit (less than 500 m 3 of renewable water supply per capita per year) (FAO 2006). Due to demographic growth, countries that are relatively well endowed with water resources, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Syria, may join the water-deficient nations by 2050. As rapid urbanization continues, water scarcity will create pressure to shift water from agricultural to domestic and industrial uses. According to the latest collection of simulation results reviewed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, consensus is strong that precipitation will decrease substantially in MNA countries (IPCC 2007). Higher temperatures will lead to greater evaporation from surface water storage reservoirs and losses in soil moisture. Higher evapotranspiration rates in vegetated areas likely will decrease run- off and groundwater recharge rates and could increase crop-water requirements in agriculture (IPCC 2007, Trenberth and others 2003, Schneider and others 1990). In this context, the development of nonconventional resources such as desalinated water and reclaimed wastewater is increasingly relevant. Water Reuse On paper, water reuse, or the recycling of reclaimed wastewater for planned beneficial uses, is particularly attractive. It can limit or eliminate 448 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS effluent discharges, while generating an alternate resource. Reuse indi- rectly allows both the preservation of freshwater resources for higher quality uses (such as potable water supply) and the postponement of potentially more costly water supply approaches (storage, transfer, or desalination schemes). These and other environmental, public health, and economic benefits of water reuse are widely documented (Scott and others 2004, Asano and others 2007, Mantovani and others 2001). Water reuse is emerging as an established water management practice in several water-stressed countries and regions. Despite the perceived potential advantages for a region ranked as the most water-scarce in the world, the spread of water reuse across MNA countries is surprisingly uneven and slow. To date, few countries in the region have achieved the implementation of substantial reuse programs. To better understand the context of wastewater reuse in MNA and to assess its future and potential, this chapter addresses three key questions: Given the scarcity of water, why have many governments been 1. slow to promote wastewater reuse? What insights for the future of wastewater reuse can be gleaned 2. from regional and international experiences? How should policymakers adapt the wastewater management 3. agenda to their country’s economic context? This chapter argues, first, that the development and implementation of water reuse strategies in MNA are impeded by four factors: Insufficiency of economic analysis 1. Relatively high cost of wastewater treatment and conveyance, 2. coupled with pricing of irrigation water that does not adequately reflect its scarcity value Technical and social issues affecting the demand for reclaimed 3. water Difficulty in creating financial incentives for safe and efficient 4. water reuse. Second, the chapter asserts that only the most extreme scarcity or institutional discipline pushes countries to adopt widespread water reuse. Water Reuse in the MNA Region N 449 Water Reuse Constraints Many water reuse experiences in MNA are pilot projects. As such, their sustainability and replicability are uncertain. With some exceptions, most of the remaining (nonpilot-scale) projects involve the planned reuse of wastewater that is not treated to meet World Health Orga- nization (WHO) standards or unplanned reuse. Some locations have a policy climate favorable to wastewater reuse. However, even there, serious obstacles remain before many of these projects can become self-sufficient, both operationally (timely delivery of water), financially (cost recovery), and environmentally (salinity risks). The obstacles to wastewater reuse in MNA are discussed be- low: Constraint #1: The Need for More Complete Economic Analysis of Treatment and Reuse Options The decision to promote wastewater reuse should depend on a full accounting of the economic costs and benefits of projects. Economic assessment rarely encompasses all relevant aspects of reuse and rarely goes beyond financial feasibility analysis. The economic impacts of reusing wastewater depend on the degree of treatment and the nature of the reuse. A large number of costs and benefits should be considered in the context of the specific reuse approach (table 25.1). When considering the demand for the water that is being reused, one needs to pay careful attention to whether this water is replacing water from other sources. In such instances, the important measure- ment is the increase (or decrease) in benefits associated with using reclaimed water instead of the replaced alternative. There is therefore a risk of double-counting when considering changes in crop yields, cropping patterns, fertilizer savings, salinity impacts, and property value changes (IPCC 2007). In addition, project planning tends to overlook many of the costs of planned reuse (opportunity cost of water to be reused, regulatory costs, education and training of irrigators). For example, when treated or untreated effluents already are reused for some purpose (either in- directly or unplanned), their opportunity cost must be included when considering planned new uses. In many cases, the main impact of reuse will be to move a given supply of water from one place to another. 450 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Some of these various costs and benefits may fall disproportionately on certain stakeholder groups affected by the project. For example, farmers may have nonzero demand for untreated wastewater, to which they may lose access. Economic analysis therefore needs to consider the distributional impacts of reuse projects and address compensation. Similarly, irrigators are likely to face higher prices as a result of water-pricing reforms to promote reuse. In addition, the quality of the reclaimed water they receive may prevent unrestricted agriculture or present them with long-term productivity costs. Constraint #2: High Cost and Lack of Wastewater Treatment in MNA, and Their Impacts on Reuse The first major cost of water reuse development is the upfront invest- ment and cost-recovery challenge associated with wastewater collec- tion and treatment. Although MNA countries have made significant progress in extending sewerage to most of their urban populations, important gaps remain, and treatment capacity is very uneven. The applications and potential for wastewater reuse differ greatly depending on whether wastewater is managed through local or mu- nicipal sewerage systems or in on-site sanitation systems. The latter case, which is prevalent in small towns and across rural areas, is usually Table 25.1 Economic Impacts of Wastewater Reuse: Examples of Costs and Benefits Costs Benefits Value-added from displaced water (if any) Value-added from reused wastewater (varies based on quality and reliability differences) Opportunity cost of reused water (if any) Alternative use of displaced water (if any) Value of sanitation improvements Collection and treatment of wastewater, final disposal costs Reduced environmental degradation Conveyance/storage of reused water, including water losses (evaporation, leakage) and retrofitting costs for participating farmers Aquifer recharge, or value of reduced aquifer depletion Salinity-related impacts Increases in property values Other pollution (nitrates, heavy metals, toxic substances) Increased crop yields Health, odor, and nuisance costs Savings in fertilizer Ecological impacts (opportunity cost of reused water for minimum flow or other purposes) Value of improvements or reform in the water sector due to water reuse Water Reuse in the MNA Region N 451 incompatible with the types of reuse systems considered in this chapter. However, fully successful reuse agendas need to consider all possible options. The rate of treatment of collected wastewater is low in many MNA countries. 1 Much of the wastewater collected in MNA is discharged untreated into the sea or other surface water bodies, or on land. While much progress has been made in defining the risks associated with such practices, enforcement of regulations prohibiting them in MNA is patchy. Furthermore, to treatment costs must be added the cost of collec- tion and conveyance to treatment facilities from locations in which such infrastructure does not exist. Treatment facilities vary from location to location based on the infrastructure needed and the quality of the wastewater. Nevertheless, a review of costs indicates that the numbers are at the low end of the 0.46–0.74 US$/m 3 range and average at 0.53 US$/m 3 , as presented in Lee and others (2001): capital (0.10–0.16 US$ (2001 US$)/m 3 ), operation (0.25–0.40), maintenance (0.08–0.15), and miscellaneous (0.03). Many analysts argue that economic calculations for reuse projects require that “…only the marginal cost of wastewater recycling (addi- tional treatment, storage, and distribution) be considered, excluding Table 25.2 Cost of Wastewater Collection, Treatment, and Reuse Component Cost/m 3 (US$) Notes Source(s) Conveyance to treatment works Highly variable a Nonmechanized secondary treatment 0.10–0.22 Necessary for restricted reuse WHO 2005, Shelef 1996, Haruvy 1997, Amami 2005 Aerated secondary treatment/activated sludge 0.22–0.27 Lower land requirement Kamizoulis 2003, Shelef 1996, Shelef 1991, Haruvy 1997 Tertiary treatment (in addition to secondary) 0.07–0.18 Necessary for unrestricted reuse Shelef 1996, Haruvy 1997, Shelef 1994 Distribution 0.05–0.36 Shelef 1994 Total 0.16–0.53 Shelef 1994, Lee 2001 Note: a Costs come from a variety of sources and have not been standardized to a specific reference year. See appendix A25.1. 1 452 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS the cost of wastewater collection and treatment” (Lazarova and oth- ers 2001). Similarly, some analysts argue for subtracting the cost of safe disposal of treated wastewater from the cost of reuse. However, it only makes sense to exclude the cost of wastewater collection and treatment from the economic analysis if these services would have been in place and functioning in the absence of the recycling investment. This condition often is not satisfied in MNA. Indeed, many treatment plants are plagued by poor operation and maintenance (O&M) and are operated well beyond their design capac- ity. These conditions will result in degraded treatment reliability and diminished reuse possibilities. In such a situation, the cost of bringing wastewater collection and treatment up to the required standard is part of the cost of a reuse project. Constraint #3: Low Demand for Reclaimed Wastewater Robust evidence from numerous projects suggests that the demand for reclaimed water generally is lower than it is for alternative sources of freshwater, among farmers as well as households. This statement is true despite reused water’s potential to reduce fertilizer costs and promote higher yields (Benabdallah 2003). In MNA, many people re- main suspicious of reuse since they are uncertain about the quality of the water (WHO 2005). The availability of untreated wastewater free of charge may make it difficult to convince irrigators to pay anything for reclaimed water that is not of high quality. This distrust is apparent in Tunisia, for example, where, besides being well below cost, the price charged to farmers for reclaimed wastewater (0.02 US$ (2007)/m 3 ) reflects the lower demand for this water. Conventional water costs approximately 0.08US$ (2007)/m 3 (WHO 2005; Lahlou 2005; Shetty 2004). Similarly, in Syria and Ye- men, recycled wastewater is provided free of charge to farmers (Bazza 2003 and Baquhaizel 2006). Constraint #4: Under-Value Water Pricing The fourth obstacle to the development of wastewater recycling is the fact that the prices of water tend not to reflect its scarcity value, especially in the agricultural sector. In fact, in no MNA country does the price of freshwater delivered to irrigators reflect even the cost of Water Reuse in the MNA Region N 453 supply. The best that some countries (Morocco and Tunisia) do is to charge sufficient rates to cover O&M (Bucknall and others 2007; Bazza and others 2002). Most countries make no charge for or take no control of groundwater abstractions other than the private cost of pumping and the permitting process (Morocco, Palestine (Seibh 2003), Tunisia, and Yemen (Bassa 2003)). Tariff structures for irrigation and other water vary substantially. In Israel, the block tariff designed to promote conservation among farmers charges only the full average cost of delivering water in the final block: the average cost of water supply is 0.29 US$ (2002)/m 3 , corresponding to the final 20 percent of each farmer’s allotment (Becker 2002). Constraint #5: Wastewater Recycling in MNA Usually Requires an Indefinite Government Commitment to Provide Subsidies We have seen that freshwater is sold at below cost, that recycled water costs more to produce than freshwater, and that recycled water is seen by users as inferior to freshwater. In addition, households (HH) do not directly perceive the envi- ronmental benefit of wastewater treatment. So long as wastewater is collected and conveyed away from urban areas, householders consider that their service is adequate. Governments therefore find it easier to collect fees for connection and wastewater service than for eventual treatment. On the agricultural side, the seasonal nature of demand for irrigation water does not match the year-round supply of wastewater. Table 25.3 Prices for Irrigation Water in Select MNA Countries Country Irrigation water price (US$/m 3 ) Source Low Average High Algeria 0.14 (Bazza 2002)] Egypt (Bazza 2002 Jordan 0.01 0.049 0.05 (Bazza 2002, Dinar 2004) Morocco 0.02 0.053 (Bazza 2002 Syria Annual fees (Bazza 2002 Tunisia 0.025 0.066 0.08 (Bazza 2002, Dinar 2004) Yemen None (Bazza 2002 Israel 0.18 0.29 Becker 2002 Cyprus 0.108 (Bazza 2002 454 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Thus, it often is impossible for governments or utilities to recover the financial cost of additional treatment or distribution (typically 0.05–0.25 US$/m 3 , depending on the chosen level of additional treat- ment), let alone full treatment. Regulatory and monitoring costs also must be acknowledged. For all of these reasons, wastewater recycling in MNA usually requires a long-term government commitment to provide subsidies. Only with very widespread pricing and sector reform will there be any possibility of self-financing wastewater recovery investments. MNA Opportunities and Innovations Despite these obstacles, some countries have moved aggressively to promote wastewater reuse. In Israel, Jordan, and Tunisia, each country has taken a slightly different path, but they also are similar in important ways. MNA Experience #1. Reuse in Israel: Centralized Government Control and Technological Promotion One of the best-documented and analyzed experiences of wastewater reuse is that of Israel, where much innovation has taken place, particu- larly over the past three decades. Reuse proved a politically attractive means of increasing water sup- ply. The severe drought of 1990–91 brought dramatic cuts in freshwater allocations to agriculture. Consequently, it also stimulated the start of major increases in wastewater reuse (Shelef 1996) as government sought to postpone costly desalination projects (Becker 2002). Today, Israel has some 400 wastewater reuse projects, mostly highly subsidized (Libhaler 2007). Examples are the Dan Region Project (ir- rigating 16,000 ha with 120 mcm/yr of effluents from Tel Aviv) and the Jezreel Valley Project (reuse of 20 mcm/yr of high quality effluents from the Haifa area) (Shelef 1994; Hidalgo 2004; and Friedler 1999). As late as 2002, the state subsidized approximately 60 percent of infrastructure costs of reuse wastewater projects. Economists and the Finance Ministry in Israel long have pushed for pricing reforms and more extensive demand management, although with little success due to opposition from the agriculture sector (Becker 2002; Feitelson 2005; Menahem 1998; and Mizrahi 2004). The institutional organization of the water sector in Israel has played a critical role in allowing for the development of reuse. The Water Reuse in the MNA Region N 455 Water Commission wields enormous power over water resources and strictly limits irrigators’ withdrawals. Israel has no private wells; all such infrastructure belongs to the government. The Water Com- mission has full control over the planning of storage basins and other needed infrastructure. Within the zones that use reclaimed waste- water, irrigators have no alternative water source for irrigation. The price they pay for this water is only somewhat reduced (roughly 20 percent lower) from that of National Water Carrier water (Libhaber 2007). This governance structure largely solves problems of reduced demand while ensuring a regular supply of water. Another aspect that distinguishes Israel from most MNA countries is the fact that, for years, the proportion of collected wastewater that is treated has been relatively high (nearing 80 percent). Municipali- ties are responsible for financing this compulsory treatment, and are expected to treat wastewater to meet national standards. Approxi- mately 6 percent of the remaining wastewater is disposed of on site in central septic tank systems. The remaining 15 percent receives no treatment. The fact that secondary treatment is so widespread greatly ex- pands opportunities for reuse. In 1996 Israel had nearly 500 treatment plants, most of which were oxidation ponds (77 percent) or mechani- cal biological systems (14 percent) (Shelef 1996). A third type is the “Third Line” conveyance and distribution system, so called because it was the third major water artery linking the center of Israel to the arid south. The Third Line enables a supply of soil-aquifer treated (tertiary) reclaimed wastewater to reach southern Israel, thus lower- ing the infrastructure burden for new projects. Other infrastructure financed with government assistance includes small water conduits and sequential storage reservoirs or aquifer recharge systems that enable additional polishing treatment as well as regularization of water supply to irrigators (Juanico 2004). The country’s long history of reuse has enabled it to develop national expertise. As early as 1953, Israel drafted the world’s first set of standards for wastewater reuse, which have continued to evolve to reflect the latest scientific findings on microbiological and chemical risks (Tal 2006). During the 1970s, a major health effects study in 81 agricultural communities was carried out (Fattal 1981). Through this experience, Israel has largely perfected the use of simple technolo- gies for reuse (oxidation ponds, soil-aquifer treatment, simple storage schemes) (Juanico 2004; Libhaber 1987). 456 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Recirculation of water in oxidation pond systems has lessened odor problems (Shelef 1994). Water scarcity and tight quotas have pushed irrigators to adopt highly conserving technologies such as underground drip irrigation schemes, which also reduce salinity risks (Feitelson 2005; Oron 1998). The microbiological and nutrient composition of treated wastewa- ter is satisfactory in Israel and generally within the WHO norms for unrestricted reuse. Nevertheless, some technical concerns remain. As in other water-scarce countries, Israel has a substantial risk of long- term salinization of groundwater. Wastewater becomes more saline during municipal use and treatment. This concern has led to expanding research on developing more salinity-tolerant crops. The Dan Region treatment plant faces additional maintenance costs (for application of chlorine-based compounds) due to periodic bio-fouling of effluent pipelines. Bio-fouling also has proven to be a problem in Jordan, as it significantly increases energy needs for pumping (McCornick 2004; Icekson-Tal 2003). Nevertheless, Israel’s experience in wastewater reuse shows that the technical concerns associated with this management strategy generally can be addressed, although at a high cost. Experience #2. Reuse in Jordan: Flexible Policy Framework Coping with Rapid Demographic Change and Increasing Water Scarcity Jordan’s foray into the development of wastewater reuse capacity has been motivated by ever-tighter freshwater supplies (approximately 150 m 3 /capita/yr) (FAO 2006), combined with a degradation in the quality of groundwater sources. Indeed, Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the MNA region, and has some of the highest groundwater depletion rates, valued at 2.1 percent of GDP (Bucknall and others 2006). Agriculture has partially adapted to water scarcity: 62 percent of irrigated lands today use drip irrigation methods (Khouzam 2003). Few good options for augmenting water supply re- main. Recent projects have been the Al Wahda dam, begun in 2004; construction of the costly $600 million Disi-Amman aqueduct; and desalination works on the Red Sea (Henry 2005). The government is privatizing the operation of municipal water utilities to cut down on high unaccounted-for-water ratios (50 percent nationwide) (Quna 2006). However, water policy is somewhat inconsistent with agricultural policy. Master plans continue to discuss and present options for expanding Water Reuse in the MNA Region N 457 irrigation and investing in costly conveyance infrastructures. Further- more, even as water supplies become tighter, there is no consideration of options to discourage the irrigation of water-intensive crops (banana and citrus, which consume 35 percent and 21 percent, respectively, of JV irrigation water) (McCornick and others 2001b; 2001a). Well-defined policy, standards, and institutional structures govern- ing reuse exist in Jordan (McCornick and others 2001b; Baquhaizel 2006; and Nazzal and others 2000). However, its experience is different from Israel’s in that most reuse projects have been much less strictly regulated and planned. Reclaimed wastewater accounts for nearly 10 percent of the total water supply in Jordan, which is only slightly lower than the percentage in Israel. McCornick and others (2001a) describe three categories of reuse in Jordan: (1) planned direct use within or adjacent to wastewater treat- ment plants, (2) unplanned reuse in wadis, and (c) indirect reuse after mixing with surface water supplies (mainly in the Jordan Valley). Projects in the first category—planned direct reuse—generally are under the jurisdiction of the authority responsible for wastewa- ter treatment plants, the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ). With strong government support, WAJ has made a strong effort to reuse wastewater from all treatment plants, although much of the reuse remains indirect. Farmers involved in direct reuse have special contracts with the WAJ formalizing their rights to effluents. In addition, the National Wastewater Management Policy requires that prices cover at least O&M costs of delivery (McCornick and others 2001a), but not treat- ment or collection. Some projects supply private enterprises (such as the date palm plantations near the Aqaba treatment plant). A few are experimental pilot projects cosponsored by international donors such as USAID. In most of these direct reuse projects, users have no alternative water supply besides reclaimed wastewater (McCornick 2007). The second and third categories stem from mixing wastewater discharged into streams that either is first treated (indirect reuse); or not collected in sewers; or collected but not treated (unplanned reuse). In some streams (most notably the Wadi Zarqa near Amman), over- pumping of groundwater and decreased flow from natural springs has led to indirect and unplanned reuse water becoming an important and reliable augmenter of base flows. As a result, farmers in these zones have increased irrigation and pay little more than the costs of pump- ing river water to their fields. After receiving seasonal contributions 458 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS from runoff, and treated effluents from the Khirbet As-Samra plant (Amman’s treatment works), the Wadi Zarqa flows into the King Talal Reservoir. King Talal water is then mixed into the King Abdullah Canal, which supplies irrigation water to the southern Jordan Valley. Upstream of the King Talal reservoir, the Ministry of Health and WAJ enforce agricultural restrictions based on reuse standards wher- ever possible. These authorities use fines, destroy irrigation lands, or impose restrictions as necessary. Once in the King Abdullah canal, however, the water is no longer legally considered reclaimed and can be used without restrictions (McCornick and others 2001). McCor- nick states that indirect reuse will continue to dominate since demand for water in the Jordan Valley is generally greater than the supply of treated wastewater. The steady evolution of the wastewater policy framework suggests that flexibility and the ability to accommodate pressures for change have been useful in Jordan’s experience (Nazzai 2001). Standards are regularly reassessed, with contributions from technical experts, government agencies, the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), and the WAJ. Standards governing reuse have moved through four iterations, from those of the original WAJ (enacted in 1988) to updated versions of standards for the Discharge of Treated Domestic Wastewater (893/1995 and 893/2003) (McCornick and others 2001a) (Nazzai 2001). Jordan’s water standards are adapted to the needs of a severely water-constrained nation. The wastewater management policy of 1998 emphasizes such assertions as: “Wastewater shall not be disposed of, instead it shall be a part of 1. the water budget” “There shall be basin-wide planning for wastewater reuse” 2. “Fees for wastewater treatment may be collected from those who 3. use the water.” (Nazzal and others 2000). All three of these policy statements are unique and innovative in the region. Although the government has not achieved full success in implementing them, they represent a different way of thinking about wastewater reuse policy. Jordan also has extensive research on regional reuse planning in MNA, as evidenced in master plans and the general literature (McCornick and others 2001b; Al-Jayyousi 1995). The role that the As Samra plant (30 km from Amman) plays in Jordan’s reuse experience deserves special mention. It demonstrates both Water Reuse in the MNA Region N 459 the potential and the hazards of the Jordanian management approach. The plant is very large. In 2000, prior to the much needed expansion, it consisted of 32 ponds sitting on 200 ha. It processed approximately 55 mcm of wastewater each year, corresponding to approximately 75 percent of the country’s annual reclaimed wastewater (Nazzal and oth- ers 2000). The secondary-treated effluent flows into the Wadi Zarqa and then to the King Talal Reservoir. An expanding treatment plant also represents a potential gain for irrigators, who are willing to use reclaimed wastewater even as they lose rights to other sources of freshwater. However, the potential of using Amman wastewater to meet these demands must be considered carefully. In 1996 Shatanawi and Fayyad showed that the massive amount of wastewater released from As Samra into surface water bodies created major salinity threats dur- ing the dry summer season. Moreover, overloading the plant (which was designed to handle a mere 25 mcm/year) or poor operation (also pointed out by Bazza 2003) led to concerns over the quality of treated effluent. McCornick and others 2001b) state that fecal coliform counts exceed Jordanian standards 1 month in 4. As a result, confidence in the safety of recycled water among the general population, farmers, and agricultural exporters has suffered (Pasch 2005). Others suggest that the plant design itself may have been inadequate, due to a delayed awareness of low per capita water use in Amman and the resulting concentrated nature of its wastewater (Nazzal 2001). A third set of critics has emphasized what it perceives as a dangerous change in balance between natural and effluent flows in the Wadi Zarqa and King Talal Reservoir (Mrayyan 2005). Jordan’s development of wastewater reuse demonstrates that wastewater reuse has great potential in highly water-scarce areas; but that reuse planning must be integrated coherently with water resource planning, environmental management, and financing arrangements. Experience #3. Tunisia: Partial Steps, Experiments, and Commitment to Reuse Tunisian reuse policy has been tentative. Many experts state that there is strong government support for using treated wastewater in agriculture (Bahri 1996; Benabdallah 2003; Shetty 2004; and Bahri 2007), but this support has not translated into widespread reuse. Most analyses have focused on the social constraints to the use of recycled water in Tunisia. The logical question to ask is: What makes Tunisia 460 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS different from Jordan and Israel such that lower demand becomes an obstacle to reuse? The differences between Tunisia and the other two countries appear to stem from two key factors, which are interrelated and important when considering reuse in the MNA region as a whole. First, despite the fact that Tunisia is considered to be in water deficit, this country has much more renewable freshwater per capita (450 m 3 /yr) than does either Israel (250 m 3 /yr) or Jordan (150 m 3 /yr) (FAO 2006). Indeed, of the three countries, only Tunisia’s per capita water withdrawals are less than its available renewable freshwater. In 2002 Tunisian withdrawals were roughly 58 percent of renewable resources, whereas Israel and Jordan were at 122 percent and 116 percent, respectively. 2 Second, as a consequence of the wider availability of alternative water sources, irrigators and other users have many more choices about which type of water to use. Specifically, in distinct contrast to Israel and Jordan, in Tunisia reclaimed wastewater has not been mixed into or replaced alternative sources of freshwater. Recall that in Israel, this mixing occurs via controlled aquifer recharge, and in Jordan via mostly planned disposal into surface water bodies. As a result, in Tunisia, ir- rigators’ (as well as other users’) demand for reclaimed wastewater becomes vital for the success of reuse projects. There is ample evidence that Tunisian farmers prefer not to use reclaimed water. In many cases, irrigators continue to use groundwater after large efforts have made reclaimed wastewater available to them. Shetty (2004) details a number of problems of social acceptance, regu- lations concerning crop choices, and other agronomic considerations that affect these decisions. Farmers in the arid south express concerns about the long-term impacts of saline wastewater on their crops and soils. Such problems have been documented around the city of Moknine, where compensation for farmers’ damages today is provided through the delivery of free surface water from the Nebhana dam. There also appears to be a general inability to match the timing of supply and demand for the water due to inadequate storage of treated effluents. The reliability problems associated with reuse erode the confidence of farmers who would like timely irrigation water. Perhaps most importantly, the fact that reclaimed water cannot be used for These percentages have probably increased somewhat since then. 2 Water Reuse in the MNA Region N 461 high-value vegetable crops is discouraging to nearly half of all eligible farmers (Bahri 1996 and 2002). In response to the reluctance to use wastewater, a 1997 presidential decree set the price of treated wastewater (0.01 US$/m 3 , down from 0.03–0.07 US$/m 3 ) well below that of other freshwater (0.08 US$/m 3 ). Even so, the use of reclaimed wastewater has hardly changed (Shetty 2004 and Bahri 2007). Surveys also have shown that the demand for reclaimed wastewater is insensitive to price in a range between 0.01 and 0.04 US$ (1998)/m 3 , the previous average rate (Bahri 1996). Tunisia’s geography creates an economic alternative to recycling. Most wastewater facilities in Tunisia are near the population centers along the Mediterranean coast, so effluents can be disposed of rela- tively easily in the sea after secondary treatment. From a wastewater management perspective, dumping effluents from existing treatment plants into the sea rather than in surface waters or on lands (where demand for reuse is low) has always been the simplest solution. It also may be the most economic one, in contrast to Israel and Jordan, in which water is already insufficient to meet existing demands. The planning of irrigation with reused water in Tunisia has not been sufficiently coordinated or demand driven. Some 7300 ha are equipped for wastewater reuse (Atiri 2005), but only a fraction of these lands actually receives treated effluents (Bahri 1996; Madi 2002). As a result, the predicted economic benefits from projects have not been realized. In one particularly poorly coordinated project, supply to a reuse scheme was interrupted just as it was scheduled to go into operation due to an upgrade of the associated treatment plant (Boubaker 2007). Conscious of these issues, Tunisian planners are starting to pay more attention to demand issues (Bahri 2007). Despite these many problems, consumption of reclaimed wastewa- ter has increased substantially. Consumption grew from approximately 4 mcm to 18 mcm between 1996 and 2002, with annual increases of 23 percent, 3 percent, 19 percent, and 41 percent between 1999 and 2002 (Atiri 2005). Restrictions for reuse designed to protect public health have received considerable attention and are in line with WHO recommendations. There have long been a large number of reuse schemes throughout the country. Some projects such as La Soukra—irrigation of citrus orchards—have enjoyed longstanding success and few demand prob- lems (the unavailability of alternative sources is probably a factor). In areas along the northern coast with saltwater intrusion problems (Borj 462 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Touil District), resistance to using reclaimed water for irrigation has been relatively low despite higher-than-average rainfall (600 mm/yr) due to the lack of reliable alternative water sources (Shetty 2004), In addition, the country is involved in experiments to promote technical innovation. Tunisia is investigating shallow groundwater recharge, ur- ban beautification and recreation applications, and the improvement of crop yields (notably, olive trees and fodder) by using high-quality, stored, reclaimed water (Benabdallah 2003; Bahri 2002). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as in Jordan and Israel, Tu- nisian policymakers today treat reuse as an essential aspect of strategic water and wastewater sector planning, influencing such decisions as the location of wastewater treatment plants (Bahri 1998). Lessons Learned Based on the set of experiences with reclaimed wastewater reviewed in this chapter and the constraints described above, it is possible to draw attention to key messages that should be helpful in advancing the reuse agenda in MNA: 1. The countries that have expanded reuse most are those that ex- plicitly consider reuse opportunities as part of the planning of wastewater collection and treatment projects. 2. The state of wastewater collection and treatment is a critical issue in evaluating the economics of reuse projects. Countries or sites with little or poorly functioning wastewater collection and treatment infrastructure will find it impossible to justify investments in reuse (figure 25.1). 3. If there are alternative water sources, users usually will prefer them to recycled water. If irrigators’ or other users’ access to con- ventional sources of water is not restricted and water prices do not reflect costs of water delivery and resource scarcity, it generally will be be difficult for reuse applications to be competitive, unless conventional sources become overly degraded. 4. MNA countries in general lack demand-driven planning of reuse projects. Too often, reuse projects are high-level decisions made by well-meaning governments, water sector institutions, and/ or the international donor community that do not incorporate the preferences of future users. Water Reuse in the MNA Region N 463 5. Thus far, pilot projects have been useful in solving many techni- cal issues. However, they offer little help with scaling-up and strategic planning. This history of nonreplication is due largely to the lack of sustainability of pilot projects, the difficulty of interpret- ing costs and other management data related to pilot efforts, and/ or the low demand for the water. Recommendations Given these key messages, five recommendations for the MNA water reuse agenda emerge: Implement reuse projects 1. for which known demand exists for treated waste- water effluents, rather than attempt to generate demand once a reuse site has been identified. Develop sustainable fi- 2. nancing models. If a project is deemed economically fea- sible, careful consideration of the financial deal structure becomes necessary. Even under the most promising conditions, full cost recovery in reuse is unlikely, so some combina- tion of subsidies and consumer payments may be necessary. Consider reuse within an over-arching policy model designed 3. to address water scarcity, not as an adjunct to wastewater treatment. The benefits of reuse alone rarely will justify the costs of wastewater treatment. Target reducing freshwater withdrawals 4. . Demand manage- ment and water conservation strategies clearly are the most cost- effective approaches to reduce withdrawals. Investment in national water reuse strategies is difficult to justify if water allocations and demands are not effectively regulated. Address institutional problems 5. . Reuse must be considered via concerted discussion between water supply and sanitation agencies, On-site sanitation Sewerage Sewerage + treatment On-site treatment Planned reuse Type 3: Type 2 + sewers relayed to treatment facilities + environmental discharge Type 1: Household sanitation infrastructures, i.e., on-site disposal schemes and/or flush toilets connected to cesspools or septic tanks Type 2: Flush toilets relayed to conventional or small-diameter sewerswith environmental discharge Primary Secondary Tertiary Type 4: On-site sanitation infrastructure with on-site treatment using appropriate technologies Type 5: Type 3 + discharge to reuse schemes— directly in plantations or farms, and/or indirectly in surface waters or aquifers or Type 4 + Discharge to reuse schemes— directly in plantations or farms, and/or indirectly in surface waters or aquifers Figure 25.1 Recommended Steps in Wastewater Infrastructure Development 464 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS implying that governance at a higher, coordinating level will be necessary. Conclusions This chapter sets out to answer three questions related to wastewater reuse in the Middle East and North Africa region: Given the scarcity of water, why have many governments been 1. slow in promoting wastewater reuse? What insights for the future of wastewater reuse can be gleaned 2. from regional and international experiences? How should policymakers adapt the wastewater management 3. agenda to their country’s economic context? Although the answers to these questions have not been fully re- solved, important insights emerge from this study: Many constraints to more widespread reuse 1. Insufficient economic analysis of reuse and treatment options 2. Generally high costs and negative or low rates of return associated 3. with wastewater treatment Preference for freshwater 4. Lack of effective price signals 5. Difficulties in structuring financial deals, and inherent limitations 6. in the amount of water that can be used. For reuse to make sense, it must be part of a larger water strategy that includes demand management and conservation strategies, and that treats water as a scarce and valuable economic resource. In most MNA countries, irrigation schemes are inefficient; groundwater is over-pumped; and surface water resources are poorly managed. Such conditions eliminate the potential economic benefits of reuse. Meanwhile, population growth and urbanization are increasing the demand for domestic water and the production of wastewater. Climate change will reduce the amount of renewable freshwater resources in MNA. Trade networks, increasing tourism, and the preferences of a more educated urban populace and neighboring countries will affect plans for wastewater treatment, increase the demand for safe and Water Reuse in the MNA Region N 465 high-value agricultural products grown in the region, and encourage ecological and recreational uses of water. As countries face these evolving challenges, they will become more and more focused on reforming their water management systems and institutions, and will likely devote more attention to evaluating the op- tion of reuse. For the time being, the constraints in the sector make it unlikely that a reuse revolution in MNA is imminent. However, the importance of this policy option surely will increase over time. 466 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Appendix 25.1 Sewerage and Wastewater Treatment in MNA and Other Selected Countries Country Sewerage rate (%) Treatment rate (% collected) Volume treated (mcm/yr) Type of treatment Notes Urban Over-all Algeria 78–85 65 73 600 1 Secondary Mostly lagoons Bahrain 70–77 100 44.9 Secondary Activated sludge, some tertiary (ozone) Djibouti 5 4 0 0 None None Egypt 68 42 79 2971 19% primary; secondary Activated sludge, ponds, trickling filters Iran 17–20 11 4 130 Jordan 70 50 88 72 Secondary Lagoons and activated sludge; overloading frequent Kuwait 85 87 103 Tertiary Lebanon 40 2 4 Secondary Planning treatment and reuse around Beirut and Ba’albeck treatment plant (tertiary) Libya 54 54 7 40 Morocco 70 40 6–8 40 Secondary Effluents/raw sewage mostly discharged to sea and surface waters Oman 90 81 13 9.8 Secondary Activated sludge, aerated ponds Qatar 80 43 Saudi Arabia 45 37 75 548 Secondary Activated sludge, aerated ponds Syria 96 71 57–67 550 Secondary Activated sludge, lagoons Significant dumping of untreated waste; Damascus upgrade for reuse of tertiary-treated effluents Tunisia 68 50 79 148 Secondary Mostly activated sludge, ponds; moving to tertiary UAE 91 87 22 193 Secondary; tertiary West Bank and Gaza 25 23 34–54 14–24 Primary; secondary Sludge drying beds, ponds, frequent overloading, O&M problems Yemen 40 12 62 46 Secondary Ponds, frequent overloading Israel 92–95 79 296 Secondary; some tertiary Ponds, activated sludge, natural filtration + recharge Cyprus 73 60 100 6 Mostly tertiary Malta 95 13 2.5 Secondary; some tertiary Piloting RO to promote industrial reuse Water Reuse in the MNA Region N 467 References Ahmad, S. 1991. “Public Attitude towards Water and Water Reuse.” Water Science and Technology 23 (10–12): 2165–70. 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Technologies such as reverse osmosis, electrodialysis, and hybrids can deal with different types of input water and/or are more energy efficient. Unit sizes have increased, bringing economies of scale. These advances drove down prices from an aver- age of US$1.0/m 3 in 1999 to US$0.50/m 3 –0.80/m 3 in 2004 (World Bank and BNWP 2004). The MNA Region is relatively water poor. With approximately 1000 m 3 /capita per year, the region falls far below the world annual average of 8000 m 3 /capita. By 2025 MNA’s annual average water per person is expected to fall to less than 550 m 3 (Belloumi 2007). By the same year, climate change is expected to have led to more drought and This chapter does not discuss brackish water desalination, which is usually of 1 smaller scale than seawater desalination. Nevertheless, the former can make im- portant contributions to alleviate local water scarcity in inland locations by desali- nating brackish groundwater, spring water, or drainage water for both irrigation and domestic water supplies. 480 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS a 20 percent reduction in renewable fresh water resources (Doumani 2008; IPCC 4 2007). Seawater desalination is no panacea for the water woes of the MNA region. It is just one instrument among many within a framework of integrated water resource management (IWRM). Other instruments include appropriate agricultural and trade policies, efficient water utilities with low levels of nonrevenue water, appropriate cost recov- ery, limited use of targeted subsidies, and increased reuse of treated wastewater. This chapter summarizes the water demand and supply status in MNA and analyzes the projected demand growth and the water resources enhancement needed to bridge the gap. The chapter also gives a quick overview of the desalination technologies and their trend as well as a general cost analysis of reverse osmosis (RO) desalination based on recent figures. Furthermore, sensitivity analyses of the cost in relation to energy price, energy efficiency, and financing interest rate have been conducted. Desalination in the Geographic and Economic Context of MNA In 2007 the total population of the Middle East and North Af- rica (MNA) Region reached 300 million inhabitants (figure 26.1), with a rate of annual increase of 1.7 percent (World Bank 2007). The population is expected to reach more than 500 million by 2030. This population increase is taking place in a region that is largely arid and semi-arid. The annual per capita renewable wa- ter resource is limited to 1,100m 3 (figure 26.2). This low annual average puts MNA among the relatively water-poor countries. Sixty percent of the water originates outside the region, and the region is already exploiting more than 75 percent of its total available resources (Doumani 2008; FAO AquaStat, 1998–2002). These two realities make it even more difficult to achieve water security. Moreover, these limited resources are not equally distributed. They Figure 26.1 MNA Region Rural and Urban Population Trends, 1950–2030 (millions) 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 P o p u l a t i o n ( m i l l i o n s ) Total MNA Total urban MNA Total rural MNA 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 Source: World Bank 2007. Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region N 481 can vary from 0.0m 3 in Kuwait to 3000 m 3 /capita per year in Iraq (figure 26.3). In 14 countries in the region, per capita water resources are less than 500 m 3 per year. The scarcity of water re- sources has many negative con- sequences: Challenges the social stabil- N ity of a growing population Further disturbs and de- N grades “natural” systems by encouraging the use of low- quality irrigation water Leads to groundwater con- N tamination Reduces crop yields and N limits cultivation Raises the risk of long-term N damage to soils and aqui- fers that may not be easily recoverable Could lead to water con- N flicts. In terms of its water re- sources, the MNA region is ex- pected to be negatively affected by climate change. By 2050 the surface temperature is expected to increase by 2.5 o C. Precipitation is expected to decrease by 10.5 percent, and runoff may decrease by 20 percent–30 percent (Doumani 2008). Thus, the available renewable resource would decrease by ap- proximately 20 percent: from 400x10 9 m 3 /yr to approximately 320x10 9 m 3 /yr. However, most of this impact is expected to be felt after 2025. By 2025, renewable water resources are expected to decline by 30x10 9 m 3 /yr (7.5 percent)—equivalent to approximately half the flow of the Nile—to approximately 370x10 9 m 3 /yr. Figure 26.2 Actual Renewable Water Resources per Capita, by Region Australia and New Zealand Latin America and the Caribbean North America Europe and Central Asia Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia and Pacific (including Japan and Koreas Western Europe South Asia Middle East and North Africa 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 1,000 meters 3 /year Source: FAO AquaStat, 1998–2002. 198 213 271 333 440 496 752 1,150 1,426 2,022 2,892 3,292 156 145 0 78 91 104 116 Kuwait UAE KSA Libya Qatar Bahrain Jordan Yemen Israel Oman Algeria Tunisia Egypt Morocco Lebanon Syria Iran Iraq Turkey Water scarcity 1,000 m 3 /person W Bank-Gaza 886 Figure 26.3 Total Renewable Water Resources per Capita, by Country Source: Hamilton 2006. 482 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Water Demands and Future Trend Even though the region is severely stressed in meeting today’s water demands, the situation is expected to worsen. At 75 percent, the MNA region is rapidly approaching full use of its total available water resources. Water going to agriculture remains the most important requirement (85 percent) followed by the domestic, industry, and tour- ism sectors (10 percent–15 percent). Municipal, industrial, and tourism water requirements may double or triple by 2025. The forecast for water requirements depends on future economic and demographic trends as well as on agricultural policies and incen- tives for water conservation. Climate change also will increase water demand, as higher temperatures will increase both domestic and agri- culture demands through higher evapotranspiration (ET) by crops on the land under irrigation. However, the single largest factor influencing water demand will be the rate of increase of irrigated land, which in turn is determined largely by agricultural policies and public investment in irrigation infrastructure. Bridging the Gap and the Role of Desalination Desalination accounts for 1.8 percent of the region’s water supply. By 2025 it could reach 8.5 percent. However, the expected decline in re- newable water resources (30x10 9 m 3 /yr) is such that even the massive expected expansion of seawater desalination (24.2 x10 9 m 3 /yr) would only partially compensate the impact of climate change. Furthermore, these two major trends would impact sectors and countries differently. The increase in desalination capacity would be used for municipalities and industries, whereas the decline in renewable water resources is expected to affect primarily agriculture. In addition, the increase in desalination capacity will be concentrated almost exclusively in the high-income, energy-exporting wealthier countries of the region, pri- marily in the Gulf countries. The latter have no significant renewable water resources and thus will not be significantly affected by a decline in precipitation. The MNA countries that will be affected primarily by a decline in precipitation are the same ones that will find it more difficult to afford desalination. The speed at which desalination will be adopted in the region will be affected by how climate change will affect rainfall patterns. Droughts in Israel during 1998–2002 and in Algeria in 2004 triggered the choice Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region N 483 to invest in large-scale seawater desalination. If droughts become more frequent and severe as a result of climate change, governments will not want to their major cities to depend on drought-prone surface water resources. Thus, the extent and severity of droughts will be key factors driving desalination investments. The prospects for desalination vary greatly among MNA countries depending on their incomes and water scarcity and whether their major cities are located close to the coast. Coastal cities in wealthy, water- scarce countries have been and are likely to be the main drivers for future seawater desalination in MNA. The Gulf countries—Algeria, Israel, and Libya—with a combined total of less than 20 percent of the MNA population—belong to this first group of countries. The heavy energy subsidies in all of the countries in this group (except Israel) increase the financial viability of desalination. A second group of countries is water scarce but cannot take advan- tage of the benefits of desalination because of their settlement patterns, lack of financial resources, or ongoing conflicts. For example, most of the populations of Jordan, Syria, and Yemen live at high altitudes or far from the sea. The supply of desalinated water to highland cities is prohibitive, especially during times of high energy prices. Other parts of the region, such as Gaza, which had advanced plans for seawater desalination in the 1990s, cannot fulfill their potential due their current political circumstances. This diverse group of countries within MNA accounts for less than 10 percent of the region’s population. Finally, the third group of countries has sufficient water resources to satisfy most municipal needs for the time being. These countries, includ- ing Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Morocco, are home to close to 70 percent of the region’s population. Seawater desalination in these countries is likely to remain confined to their water-scarce coastal areas such as the Egyptian Red Sea coast and Southern Morocco. The bulk of these countries’ water supply will continue to be supplied by conventional water resources independent of climate change and future possible advances in desalination technology. Thus, to sum up, desalination is no panacea to solve water scarcity in MNA. It is only one of many instruments to bridge the gap between water supply and demand within an integrated water resource management framework. In many countries, desalination will play a subordinate role to other instruments. On the demand side, these alternatives include agricultural policies; water conservation; increasing water use efficiency, particularly in agriculture; increased metering; more appropriate pricing; 484 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS and on-site recycling and reuse. On the supply side, other options include leak and loss minimization and enhancing the use of reclaimed water (reuse of treated wastewater). For instance, application of wastewater reuse (50 percent of domestic demand), reducing leaks from 40 percent to 20 percent, and increasing irrigation efficiency by 10 percent will save approximately 104x10 9 m 3 /yr (table 26.1). This amount is approximately three times the expected increased desalination capacity. MNA has approximately 60 percent of the world’s desalination capacity (7.2x10 9 m 3 /yr). According to the countries’ plans and the historic desalination capacity increase, the total capacity is expected to reach 19.1x10 9 m 3 /yr by 2016 and possibly 31.4x10 9 m 3 /yr by 2025 (Balaban 2008). Water Desalination Trend: MNA and the World During the last 50 years, there has been a steady growth worldwide of desalination plants and their capacity (figures 26.4 and 26.5) (IDA 2002). Most of this growth has been in the oil-rich Middle East and has been based on distil- lation technology. However, al- ternative processes, most notably reverse osmosis (RO), also have been developed during this time. RO has grown spectacularly over this period and now dominates some sectors of the market. The desalination market is strong, with significantly in- creased orders over 2001–02 of Table 26.1 Expected Savings in Water Supply due to Application of Demand and Supply Management Techniques in MNA Region by 2025 Demand sector Total demand (109 m 3 /year) Fresh (109 m 3 /year) Reuse (109 m 3 /year) Leak reduction/ efficiency (109 m 3 /year) Saving (109m 3 /yr) Domestic 75 60.0 0 15.0 15.0 Agriculture 425 325.5 30 42.5 72.5 Total 500 385.5 30 57.5 87.5 0 Plant lifetime = 25 years Contracted 34,000,000 32,000,000 30,000,000 28,000,000 26,000,000 24,000,000 22,000,000 20,000,000 18,000,000 16,000,000 14,000,000 12,000,000 8,000,000 10,000,000 6,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 Contract year 1 9 0 1 – 1 9 6 5 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 5 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 5 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 5 2 0 0 0 909Diagramme-GESAMT In operation Figure 26.4 Cumulative Global Capacity of Contracted and Operated Desalination Plants, 1901–2000 Source: IDA 2002. C o n t r a c t e d c a p a c i t y [ m / d ] Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region N 485 approximately 3.0 m 3 and 1.5 m 3 /day globally and in MNA, respectively (f igure 26.4). In 2002, 15 million m 3 /day of the 24 million m 3 /day seawater de- salination plants’ global capacity exists in MNA (figure 26.4). Saudi Arabia is home to 30 percent of the MNA desalina- tion capacity. Production of desalinated water there reached 7.4 million m 3 /day in 2006 (Bala- ban 2007) (figure 26.5). Additional desalination in- vestment is planned in the MNA Gulf countries and elsewhere. The required investment up to 2025 is estimated at US$25 billion– 30 billion. 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 Morocco Tunisia Jordan Oman Egypt Israel Bahrain Algeria Libya Qatar Kuwait UAE S. Arabia Desalination capacity (1000 m 3 /day) C o u n t r y Figure 26.5 Potential Operational Desalination Capacity in MNA Countries, 2006 Source: Balaban 2008. Table 26.2 Desalination Capacity in MNA (1000 m 3 /day) Country Desalination capacity end 2006 Capacity forecast 2011 Capacity forecast 2016 Capacity forecast 2025 Algeria 727 3191 4985 8,214 a Egypt 432 528 888 1,536 Libya 899 1,869 3,775 7,206 Israel 440 1000 b 1,790 3,212 Morocco 59 285 491 862 Tunisia 89 195 297 481 Jordan 240 541 898 1,541 S. Arabia 7,410 12,564 17,654 26,816 Kuwait 2,081 3,446 4,617 6,725 Bahrain 519 1,183 1,977 3,406 Qatar 1,197 1,676 2,481 3,930 Oman 377 1,140 2,059 3,713 UAE 5,730 9,030 12,330 18,270 Total (103 m 3 /day) 20,200 36,648 54,242 85,911 Total (103 m 3 /yr) 7,373,000 13,376,520 19,798,330 31,357,588 Sources: Balaban 2008; GWI 2004; and DLR 2007. Notes: a Extrapolated. b Estimated. 486 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS As experience and technology have developed, production costs for desalination have fallen. Technologies such as reverse osmosis, electrodialysis, and hybrids can deal with different types of input water and/or are more energy efficient. Unit sizes have increased, bringing with them economies of scale. These advances have driven down prices from an average of US$1.0/m 3 in 1999 to between US$0.50/m 3 and US$0.80/m 3 in 2004 (World Bank and BNWP 2004). However, the future trajectory of desalination costs will depend on energy price trends. Desalination Technologies: Aspects and Limitations One convenient and useful way to classify desalination processes is to separate those that use a change of phase to separate the pure water from the feed water from those that accomplish this separation without a change of phase. 2 The phase-change processes are multi-stage flash (MSF), multi-effect boiling (MEB) or multi-effect distillation (MED), vapor compression (VC), thermal and mechanical and solar distillation (distillation processes); and freezing. The single-phase category comprises reverse osmosis (RO) and electrodialysis (ED) (membrane process). The ranges of the applicability of the various desalination processes vis-à-vis the quality of the feed water appear in figure 26.6. In general, the phase change pro- cesses tend to be used to treat high-salinity waters, particularly seawater. Membrane processes are used over a wide range of sa- linity from brackish to seawater. The application of electrodialysis is limited to brackish water appli- cations. In membrane processes, energy consumption is directly related to the salinity of the feed water. In distillation processes, the salinity of the feed water has little impact on the overall energy consumption. That is, from liquid to water vapor, or from liquid to ice. 2 10 5 10 4 103 10 2 10 1 10 0 10 0 10 1 10 2 10 3 10 4 10 5 T D S p p m Capacity m 3 /d Feed waters Product waters VC ED MSF Reverse osmosis Sea water WHO 500 ppm limit Figure 26.6 Ranges of Applicability for Desalination Processes Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region N 487 Other basic parameters that should be examined to select the most appropriate desalination process are: Co-generation. N In some instances, both power and water are required. To optimize cost, a careful analysis of the combina- tions of processes must be carried out. Availability of energy resources. N All desalination processes use energy. Theoretically, assuming a 100 percent efficiency rate, approximately 1.6 kWh/m 3 is the minimum energy requirement. However, the actual energy requirements are sometimes much higher (table 26.3).Consequently, desalination has been seen as a very energy-intensive process. The development of reverse osmosis and, more recently, the improvements in energy recovery devices (energy exchanger and pressure exchangers) have changed this situation. Bringing down energy consumption in Mediter- ranean seawater RO plants to 2.5 kWh/m 3 has put seawater desalination within reach of many communities. To determine the most cost-effective process for each community, planners should survey all the available energy resources—conventional or renewable energy sources as well as waste or low grade heat availability. Table 26.3 illustrates the specific energy consumption of the various processes. The figures for the thermal processes have remained almost the same for the last decade. Plant size. N The size of the desalination plant normally is dictated by the water demand. Before any process is selected, the size Table 26.3 Estimated Energy Consumption for Desalination Processes Process Steam energy (kWh/m 3 ) Elect. energy (kWh/m 3 ) Elect. energy equivalent (kWh/m 3 ) Seawater MSF 7.5–11.0 2.5–3.5 10.0–14.5 MED 4.0–7.0 2.0 6.0–9.0 VC — 7.0–15.0 7.0–15.0 SWRO — 2.5–8.0 2.5–8.0 Brackish BWRO — 0.5–2.5 0.5–2.5 ED — 0.7–2.5 0.7–2.5 Source: World Bank and BNWP 2004. Notes: MSF = multi-stage flash, MED = multiple effect boiling, VC = vapor compression, SWRO = seawater reverse osmosis, BWRO = brackish water reverse osmosis, ED = electrodialysis. 488 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS parameters of each process should be considered. The MSF pro- cess has been developed and adapted to very large applications (10,000–60,000 m 3 /day). In recent years, the size of MED and VC processes has been increased and may have some advantages over MSF. The largest MED plant built to date is 20,000m 3 /day. Due to the modularity of membrane processes, they can be used for a wide range of applications, from very small to large scale. The RO industry has grown very quickly, and the global ca- pacity has risen from 10 percent during the 1990s to approxi- mately 45 percent. RO is favor- able due to its modularity, low capital investment, technological advancement in the membrane industry, compact plant size, ease of automation, fewer envi- ronmental impacts, and low operation cost. The typical configuration of an RO plant is illustrated in figure 26.7. Desalination consists of placing a semipermeable membrane in contact with a saline solution under a pressure higher than the solu- tion osmotic pressure, typically 50–80 bar for seawater. The feed is pressurized by a high-pressure pump and made to flow across the membrane surface. Part of this feed passes through the membrane, which removes the majority of the dissolved solids. The remaining water and rejected salt emerge from the membrane modules as a concentrated reject stream under high pressure. In large plants, the reject brine pressure energy is recovered in a turbine, energy exchanger, or pressure exchanger. The pretreatment required is a function of the scaling tendency of the water and the level of undissolved solids. The key to the successful operation of this process takes place during pretreatment. The product water from RO usually has 100–500 ppm of total dissolved solid (TDS), which complies with WHO guidelines regarding drinking water quality Environmental Aspects of Desalination and Renewable Energy Desalination of seawater consumes a significant amount of energy, which is required for the process itself (approximately 90 percent) in the Saline feedwater High- pressure pump Membrane assembly Brine discharge Stabilized freshwater Post- treatment Pre- treatment Freshwater Figure 26.7 Schematic Diagram of Single-Pass RO Desalination Plant Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region N 489 form of thermal energy (distillation processes) or mechanical energy, usually obtained from electricity (RO process). Electrical energy also is needed in all plants to operate auxiliary equipment such as pumps and dosing systems. If fossil fuels are used as the primary energy source, the greenhouse (mainly CO 2 ) and acid rain gases (NO x , SO x ) emitted into the atmosphere have a major environmental impact. Desalination plants also emit gases that do not originate from fossil fuel combustion but were dissolved in the seawater. In thermal plants, the feed water is usually de- aerated, and gases evolve from the evaporating brine in flashing cham- bers. Both processes increase carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions, which are stored in the oceans in the form of bicarbonate and cause the release of other atmospheric gases (mainly O 2 and N 2 ) from seawater. Table 26.4 summarizes qualitative environmental impacts of RO, MSF, and ED desalination plants. Gaseous emissions. Distillation plants use both heat and electrical power. If the plant is large, such as those installed in the Gulf, the generation of power using fossil fuel is usually coupled to the production of water using MSF or MED distillation plants. Such plants use more total en- ergy than RO plants, which use only electrical power. RO emits less CO 2 than does distillation. In some areas, high-sulphur fossil fuels are used to generate electrical power; in these plants, SO 2 as well as CO 2 emissions may occur. Brine discharge. There is concern about brine discharge and its envi- ronmental impacts. In seawater plants, brine is discharged in the sea. Any chemicals added to the desalination process for scale and fouling prevention and corrosion reduction as well as corrosion products flow back into the sea. Coastal currents should be examined to ensure that discharges are not swept back around into the intake system. If discharge occurs in a small, enclosed bay or there is no coastal cur- rent, concentrations of the substances can build up, a situation that is clearly to be avoided. There is increasing concern in the Gulf about the amount of desalination taking place and the fact that the Gulf is a small, enclosed sea. This build-up can damage the fragile marine ecosystem and threatens marine life. Land-based brackish water plants can experience severe problems in disposing the brine discharge. The aquifer and the surrounding habi- tats can be endangered. There are three options: the discharge can be spread over the land and allowed to drain back into the ground; it can be 490 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS pumped into solar ponds for evaporation; or it can be re-injected back into the ground. None of these solutions is completely sustainable. Visual intrusion. Desalination plants can be visually intrusive. Seawa- ter plants usually are built on the coast. In areas in which tourism is important, a plant can be an eyesore. In Cyprus, the Dhekalia and the Larnaca plants were located some 500 meters from the shore to keep the shoreline clear. Noise emissions. Desalination plants also can be noisy. RO plants have high-speed pumps, which normally are housed in buildings to reduce the noise. Problems have arisen when, during the summer, doors have been left open to reduce building temperatures and have enabled the noise to escape. Greenhouse gas emissions from power plants associated with desalination plants pose a peculiar dilemma. Although desalina- tion plants are a tool to adapt to climate change by making water supplies less vulnerable to droughts, they themselves contribute to accelerate climate change. This dilemma could be resolved by either accelerating the development of renewable energy in the MNA region or by purchasing carbon credits to compensate for the GHG emissions of desalination plants. So far, neither of these options has been used in the region. Renewable Energy Alternatives for Desalination Large desalination plants in the MNA region typically are powered by fossil energy. The energy requirements for desalination plants can be met through renewable energy sources (RES), which produce no CO 2 Table 26.4 Qualitative Overview of Environmental Impacts of Three Desalination Technologies Effect/type of plant RO MSF E.D. Noise H M L Water effluent M H M Microelements L H L Toxic material M H M Air pollution L H M Industrial risk L H M Note: H = high, M = medium, L = low. Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region N 491 directly. Wind and photovoltaic (PV) energy are the most commonly used; wave power is possible in the future. Until recently, renewable energy was used as a power source for desalination only for small plants in remote areas that had no access to electricity from the grid. In recent years, research and development (R&D) in this field has intensified. Worldwide, several RES pilot desali- nation plants have been installed, and the majority has been operated successfully. Virtually all of these were custom designed for specific locations and utilize solar, wind, or geothermal energy to produce fresh water. For distillation technologies, power is supplied by using waste energy from adjacent power plants (co-generation). For membrane technologies, dedicated gas-fired power plants often are built next to the desalination plants. Medium-sized desalination plants receive electricity from the grid, which in the MNA region typically is gener- ated by fossil energy or large-scale hydropower. Outside MNA, the first large desalination plant powered almost entirely by renewable energy was commissioned in Perth, Australia, in 2008. The plant is powered primarily by an 80MW wind park devel- oped concurrently with the desalination plant and located more than 200 km from the plant. The wind park feeds into the grid, from which the desalination plant receives its power supply, which is independent of wind conditions. Despite the recent spike in world energy prices, similar joint developments of large-scale renewable energy and large desalination plants have not yet materialized in the MNA region. Desalination Cost Analysis For discussion, the desalination cost for SWRO plant is considered in this section. In general, the desalination cost is divided into capital and operating costs. Over the last decade, the capital and operating costs of seawater desalination plants have decreased significantly in real terms. The reasons are: Capital Costs Process design improvements N Membrane performance development and lower cost per m N 2 (RO) Manufacturing methods and increased volume N Increased competition N 492 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Operating Costs Process performance N Membrane life (RO) N Energy efficiency improvements N Interstage boost pumping (RO) N Improved chemicals N Reduced corrosion N Privatization. N As a consequence of this, costs to desalinate water have fallen consistently for many years. The price reached US$0.52/m 3 in the Ashkelon SWRO plant in Israel in 2005. The cost breakdown is il- lustrated in table 26.5. The cost can vary as the interest rate and/or the energy prices change. At 10 percent interest rate, the cost will rise to US$0.62/m 3 . Figures 26.8 and 26.9 illustrate the sensitivity analysis results for the change in the interest rate and the energy cost of the proposed SWRO in the Palestinian Gaza Strip. Private Sector Participation in Desalination As discussed above, desalination is a relatively capital intensive tech- nology and requires high operation and management skills. The Gulf countries initially financed desalination plants with their own resources and operated them through public agencies, such as the Saline Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC) in Saudi Arabia. However, in the 1990s, the Gulf countries switched to Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts. Under these, private companies financed, built, and operate Table 26.5 Typical Cost Breakdown for RO Desalination Plant Parameter Early 1990s Current Capital cost $1000 to $1200/m 3 /day capacity $800/m 3 /day capacity Capital cost/m 3 at 5% interest rate $0.26 $0.18 Energy consumption kW.h/m 3 6 3.5 Energy cost $/m 3 at $0.06/kW.hr $0.36 $0.21 Membrane replacement cost $/m 3 $0.16 $0.035 Labor and chemicals $/m 3 $0.14 $0.10 Total cost $/m 3 $0.92 $0.525 Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region N 493 desalination plants for a period of typically 30 years, during which they are being paid fees directly by the government or a public utility off-taker for their services. BOT contracts also have become the norm for the development of large desalina- tion plants in the MNA region outside the Gulf. However, some countries have been exceptions to this trend. For example, Malta oper- ates all of its desalination plants publicly. To compare the perfor- mance of the public and private operators, Israel has authorized its bulk water supply company, Mekorot, to develop one large desalination plant in parallel to a series of similar desalination plants under BOT contracts. Conclusions Based on the above discussion, 10 conclusions can be drawn: Desalination is playing and will continue to play a significant role 1. to respond to the MNA region’s growing water demands. The technology became well proven and has become cheaper. Climate change, which is expected to cause more frequent droughts 2. in the region, is likely to accelerate investments in desalination. Desalination is no panacea. To maximize net benefits, it needs to 3. be combined with other supply-side and demand-side approaches within the framework of integrated water resource manage- ment. Advances in desalination technologies have reduced the cost of 4. desalination to approximately US$0.52/m 3 . These advances have increased the affordability of desalinated water. 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% Interest rate (%) T o t a l c o s t ( $ / m 3 ) Figure 26.8 Interest Rate Sensitivity Analysis of Water Production Cost for SWRO Desalination Plant in Gaza Strip 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 2 3 4 5 6 7 !eec|0c eaere¡ ceasamet|ea (kW.hr/m 3 ) I e t a | c e s t ( $ / m 3 ) $0.05/kW.hr $0.1/kW.hr ||eare 1ã.9 laere¡ Cest !eas|t|º|t¡ kaa|¡s|s ef Water |re6act|ea Cest fer !Wk0 0esa||aat|ea ||aat |a 6ata !tr|e 494 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS MNA’s desalination capacity is increasing by 1.5x10 5. 6 m 3 /day every year. The capacity is expected to reach 31.4x10 6 m 3 /day. This fig- ure will entail an increase of approximately 20.0x10 6 m 3 /day from the current capacity. The required investment is approximately US$20.0 billion. Outside the Gulf countries, almost all new desalination plants are 6. using reverse osmosis. This preference is due to RO plants being flexible and modular and having low operation and capital costs, and to advances in the energy recovery devices. The cost of desalinated water is sensitive to the costs of both energy 7. and financing. Thus, low-interest-rate financing reduces the cost of desalination and increases the affordability of desalinized water. In most MNA countries, the private sector has been and will remain 8. a key player in promoting desalination. The private sector can provide capital and increase efficiency in management and operation. Desalination has both positive and negative environmental impacts. 9. On the positive side, desalination will conserve conventional water resources, which can preserve aquatic ecosystems in rivers, and will prevent groundwater depletion and saline intrusion due to over-abstraction. However, desalination also is associated with negative impacts including greenhouse gas emissions, brine discharge including chemicals from pre-treatment processes, and noise and visual pollution. The industry is well established, and mitigation measures are being implemented and refined continuously, par- ticularly concerning brine discharge. Greenhouse gas emissions from power plants associated with 10. desalination plants can be significant. These GHG pose a peculiar dilemma. While desalination plants are a tool to adapt to climate change by making water supplies less vulnerable to droughts, they simultaneously contribute to accelerated climate change. This di- lemma could be resolved by either accelerating the development of renewable energy in the MNA region or purchasing carbon credits to compensate for the GHG emissions of desalination plants. Nei- ther option yet has been used in MNA. Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region N 495 References Balaban, M. 2008. “Desalination in Maghreb.” Euromed Conference on Desalination Strategies in South Mediterranean Countries. Belloumi, M. 2007. “Desalination as an Option to Resolve Problems of Water Scarcity in MNA Region.” Second French Serbian Summer School Vrnja_ka Banja, October 7–13. Booz and others. 2006. “Public Private Partnership in the MNA Water Sector, Challenges and Opportunities.” OECD Conference on Public Private Partnership for Infrastructure Financing, Istanbul. November. Doumani, F.M. 2008. “Climate Change Adaptation in the Water Sec- tor in the Middle East and North Africa Region: A Review of Main Issues.” PAP/RAC Workshop, Sardinia, May 19–21. FAO (UN Food and Agriculture Organization). 1998–2002. “AquaStat.” German Aerospace Center (DLR). 2007. “Concentrating Solar Power for Seawater Desalination.” www.dlr.de.en. Global Water Intelligence (GWI). 2004. Desalination data. www. globalwaterintel.com. Remawi, E. 2006. “Entrepreneurship as Public Policy: Completing the Ecosystem with Technology Venture Capital.” HCT-MIT Entrepreneurship Conference. September. United Nations Population Division. 2003. “World Urbanization Pros- pect 2003.” www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm. ____. 2005. “Rural Water Supply and Sanitation in the Middle East and North Africa Region.” Wangnick, K. 2002. 2002 IDA Worldwide Desalting Plants Inventory. Produced by Wangnick Consulting for the International Desalina- tion Association, Gnarrenburg, Germany. World Bank. 2007. The World Bank Annual Report. World Bank and Bank-Netherlands Water Partnership (BNWP). 2004. “Seawater and Brackish Water Desalination in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia.” 497 27 Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Coastal Areas in Yemen: Case Study of Wadi Ahwar Arjen de Vries and Tarun Ghawana Supervised by Ahmed Shawky Mohamed Introduction Need to Integrate the Management of Spate Irrigation, Groundwater Irrigation, and Groundwater Recharge The recent increase of cultivated areas and yields in Yemen is due largely to the increased use of groundwater. The number of wells used in conjunction with spate flow has increased significantly, making ir- rigation possible between spate floods. Moreover, water productivity from groundwater-fed irrigation typically can be six times higher than from spate irrigation. Management systems no longer can be focused on the spate flow but also should take into account the impact of spate on recharging the groundwater. This chapter examines the interconnec- tions among spate irrigation, groundwater irrigation, and groundwater recharge from spate flows. The chapter explains how all three processes form part of an integrated water system. With specific reference to Wadi Ahwar, the chapter shows how an integrated water resource management approach can improve the overall system’s productivity and sustainability. Irrigation is a major source of livelihoods in rural Yemen. For cen- turies, inhabitants of the coastal areas have been harvesting spate rain, mostly for irrigation but sometimes for domestic use. However, unlike conventional irrigation schemes in Egypt or Iraq, spate irrigation in Ye- men is regulated only in space—but not in time. Flash floods are too fast or too erratic to be stored in conventional (multipurpose) surface 498 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS dams. The Yemenis regulate spate runoff by building surface-water “diversion” structures, thus maximizing the spatial utilization of runoff rather than storing the water for interseasonal use. The diversion struc- tures often are small scale and low cost because the unpredictability of spate flows makes large-scale investments uneconomic. This chapter discusses developing the “conjunctive use” potential of spate water in Yemen’s coastal areas. It presents unconventional low- cost/economic solutions for storing excess spate water in the groundwater (or in subsurface top soils). In these ways, the stored water can be used later to supplement irrigation in the low flood periods, or at least for domestic purposes. Harnessing the conjunctive use of surface and groundwater also can help reduce the mining of groundwater near the coast, thus reducing saline intrusion into (drinking) water wells. Artificial recharge is defined as any engineered system designed to introduce and store water in an aquifer (Topper and others 2004). However, an adverse connotation of “artificial,” in a society in which community participation in water resource management is becoming more prevalent has led to a new name: Managed Aquifer Recharge (MAR) (Gale 2005). MAR can be useful for many of today’s water issues and con- cerns. As an increasingly important tool for water managers, it may be useful for repressurizing aquifers subject to declining yields, saline intrusion, or land subsidence. MAR also can play an important role as Table 27.1 Characteristics of Groundwater Storage, Small Dam Storage, and Large Dam Reservoirs Groundwater storage Small dams and surface reservoirs Large dam reservoirs A d v a n t a g e s Little evaporation N Widely distributed N Operational efficiency N Available on demand N Water quality N Ease of operation N Response to rainfall N Multiple use N Groundwater recharge N Large, reliable yield N Carryover capacity N Low cost per m N 3 water stored Multipurpose (power and flood control) N Groundwater recharge N L i m i t a t i o n s Slow recharge rate N Groundwater contamination N Cost of extraction N Recoverable fraction N High evaporation losses N Relatively high unit cost N Absence of over-year storage N Complexity of operation N Siting N High initial investment cost N Time needed to plan & construct N K e y i s s u e s Declining water levels N Rising water levels N Management of access/use N Groundwater salinization N Groundwater pollution N Sedimentation N Adequate design N Dam safety N Environmental impacts N Social impacts N Environmental impacts N Sedimentation N Dam safety N Source: IWMI 2000. Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate I rrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen N 499 part of a package of measures to control over-abstraction and restore the groundwater balance (Gale 2005), or be applied to maintain or improve local ecology and environment. MAR may help to improve water quality in aquifers and infiltrate storm runoff for both damage control and subsequent reuse in drinking or irrigation supplies. MAR applications generally are not stand-alone interventions be- cause they are a component of the broader hydrological system and usually part of a larger water supply or water management system. Application of MAR should be considered in this broader framework to arrive at the most cost-effective solution. The great variety of available MAR techniques and the varying site specifics have led to a large variety in scheme design and construction (figure 27.1). MAR applications are subdivided into 5 principal techniques and 14 subtypes. The main techniques are chosen in relation to the type of technique used either to intercept the water or to get the water infil- trated. The subtypes are specific engineering techniques that are applied, many of which are known to stakeholders or often cited in references. Induced bank infiltration is a distinctive technique that cannot be listed under any other main MAR technique. Therefore, it is assigned to a separate class in which it is both technology and subtype. One thus can think of groundwater recharge from spate flows in Yemen as the missing piece of the three-way relationship among Source: Gale 2005. ||care 1I.1 Mkk C|ass|0cat|ea: 0ºerº|ew ef Mkk Iecha|caes aa6 !a|techa|caes Iechae|ec¡ !erea6|ac methe6s We|| shaft aa6 |erehe|e recharce ||ee6|ac 0|tch, farrew, 6ra|as |rr|cat|ea |a6ace6 |aak |a0|trat|ea 0eee we|| |a|ect|ea k!|Ik) k!k !ha||ew we|| shaft/e|t |a0|trat|ea kecharce 6ams !a|sarface 6ams !aa6 6ams Chaaae| serea6|ac 8arr|ers aa6 |aa6s Ireaches |a-chaaae| me6|0cat|eas kaae0 harºest|ac |a0|trat|ea eea6s & |as|as !a|t¡ee I e c h a | c a e s r e f e r r | a c e r | m a r | | ¡ t e | a t e r c e e t | a c t h e w a t e r I e c h a | c a e s r e f e r r | a c e r | m a r | | ¡ t e c e t t | a c w a t e r | a 0 | t r a t e 6 500 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS spate water use, groundwater use, and groundwater recharge from spate flows. For sustainable resource management, project interventions should balance the output from spate water in the high flood periods with the recharge to groundwater. When water storage solutions are developed, groundwater storage structures (as opposed to surface dams) often are ignored. In Yemen, storing water in the soil profile through subsurface or sand dams in semi- arid areas, including spate-irrigated areas, is more cost effective than constructing conventional dams. Very limited research has been carried out on the relationship between recharge and spate. However, most recharge is expected to take place in the wadi beds rather than in the channels and irrigation fields. Through spate, recharge can be enhanced through flatting the river slopes and through ponding. In general, the flow velocity should be reduced, thereby enhancing the recharge. From a geological point of view, it would be better to enhance infiltration upstream rather than downstream, because the sediment downstream is often loamy to clayey. Another important aspect to consider is the subsurface flow. This flow is the main source of downstream wells. By cutting this flow through building impervious structures (such as concrete dams), this downstream recharge may be reduced significantly. Applying the categorization of MAR techniques to Yemen, myriad options could enhance groundwater recharge and interseasonal con- junctive use: a. Artificial recharge. It penetrates fine soils or the impermeable un- derlying layers (for rainfall, runoff, or return flows such as from treated wastewater). b. Small recharge dams for inter/intraseasonal storage. These enhance the water infiltration upstream of the dam. However, sometimes (as in Oman) they are used to store the dam’s upstream runoff, then release it to recharge the groundwater downstream. For a given budget, having a cascade of small recharge dams is preferred to having one big recharge dam, as the latter may cause big evaporation losses. c. Small, low-cost sand-storage/subsurface dams for inter/intraseasonal storage (at least to provide rural water supply, if not irrigation). As sand accumulates upstream, these structures enhance the natural storage capacity of the river bed/banks. Even if the underlying layer is relatively impermeable, a significant amount of water can be stored in the river bed (above the impermeable layer) and in the river banks. In contrast to typical surface recharge dams, this method results in Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate I rrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen N 501 no evaporation and no sedimentation (bed load) issues. In addition, the weir can be designed so that the wash load overtops the weir’s sill, and subsequent flash floods will further wash out that load. d. Surface-water diversion system. This system can be designed to divert part of the runoff toward a location in which recharge/subsurface dams can perform better, that is, in which the soil porosity and/ or permeability/storativity/transmitivity of the underlying layers is good enough. This chapter shows how such techniques to enhance groundwater recharge could be applied in Wadi Ahwar. Water Management in Coastal Areas Needs Not Only Infrastructural Interventions but Also Institutional and Information Measures This chapter focuses on the groundwater issues of a typical coastal wadi, for which spate irrigation is one of the key elements of the water resources system. Spate irrigation is closely associated with groundwater use and recharge. Due to the increase of groundwater use in Wadi Ahwar, mainly through an increase in the number of shallow wells, agricultural production in the spate irrigation command area has increased. However, for conjunctive groundwater use to be efficient and effective, careful demand and resource management are essential. The over-abstraction of groundwater not only impacts the quality of the resource but also can lead to saltwater intrusion and hence water quality deterioration. Current observations on groundwater levels and saltwater intrusion in Wadi Ahwar indicate the need for a sustainable approach toward groundwater and its development. Stakeholders in the wadi agreed that intervention is urgently needed to reverse the unsustainable depletion of the resource, water quality deterioration, and saltwater intrusion. Although no conflict has yet arisen among water users such as farm- ers and rural water supply users, conflict may be imminent. Thus, the necessity for certain measures, including public awareness and com- munity involvement, is urgent. For sustainable water management, there are certain essential nonphysical requirements: 1. Extensive information is key. In most coastal wadis including Ahwar, the understanding of hydrogeological processes is still limited. This lack of understanding is due mainly to limited historical data. Floods 502 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS are the main contributor to groundwater recharge. Hence, the high temporal variance in floods translates into high temporal variance in recharge. Careful monitoring is essential to predict the recharge and thus the groundwater that can be utilized sustainably without jeopardizing the resource. Wadi Ahwar is characterized by a high spatial and temporal variability of rainfall. The temporal variability is relatively well known and can be measured from any adjacent meteorological station. However, information on the spatial variability is usually much more limited. Studies in the region illustrate that rainfall distribution is very spotty. In Saudi Arabian basins, there have been examples of wadi flows generated from zero observed rainfall. This phenomenon also illustrates the complexity of quantifying runoff based on conventional densities of rain-gauge networks. 2. Socioeconomic and institutional measures must support physical interventions. For example, similar projects in Ethiopia and Kenya have shown that insufficient involvement of local communities in water harvesting schemes is a major constraint to success. Even when good physical investments are made, groundwater use needs to be regulated. In Yemen, it is difficult to enforce this regulation through central control. In contrast, by capitalizing on the tribal culture dominant in Yemen, the needed regulation can be ensured by local communities, namely Irrigation Councils (ICs) and Water User Associations (WUAs). These have been successfully piloted in the World-Bank-financed Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP) in Wadi Zabid, Tuban, and Ahwar. Wadi Ahwar: Typical Spate-Reliant Coastal Basin in Yemen The use of spate water for irrigation is as ancient as humankind’s cultiva- tion of land. According to several archeological and historical evidences, Yemen was the first country in the world to practice spate irrigation. This unique system reached its zenith during the Shebean period in the first millennium BCE. The intense development of trade after the Islamic period may have promoted the spread of spate irrigation from Yemen to other arid and semi-arid regions. Yemen’s water resources have become unsustainable due to the neglect of the traditional spate irrigation system on the one hand, and over-exploitation of groundwater for its multiple uses on the other. In most spate irrigation systems in Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate I rrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen N 503 Yemen, the major floods occur between June and September, which is the time of heavy rainfall in upper catchments. Crop growth takes place exclusively between October and February. It depends on the water stored in the soil and adjacent low-lying fields. Deep soils are able to store ample moisture for the crops during periods with no precipitation. Wadi Ahwar is located in the southern Arabian Peninsula, in the eastern Abyan Governorate. Delta Ahwar is located approximately 200km east of Aden. Ahwar, Al Hanad, and Al Mabrak along the coast of the Arabian Sea are the major villages in the delta. Wadi Ahwar is formed by joining the two tributaries, Wadi Saba and Wadi Jahir. The total catchment area is estimated at 6352 km 2 . The active catchment of Wadi Ahwar to Faud Weir is 4052 km 2 , and up to Hanad Weir is 4062 km 2 , because approximately 36.2 percent of the total catchment of this wadi does not produce runoff during small or average flood. Wadi Ahwar is 160 km long and originates from the high mountains (altitude approximately 2350m), from which it receives high rainfall. After flowing down from the mountainous region, Wadi Ahwar has formed an alluvial plain that is the main agricultural area of Ahwar delta. Two modern structures are con- structed on Wadi Ahwar to irrigate 7000 ha of land by utilizing the available spate. The catchment has a tropical hot and arid climate with very poor rainfall and high evaporation. However, there is no credible meteorological station within the catchment to register the annual variations of meteorological parameters. The 2004 population of Wadi Ahwar was estimated at 34,646. The average family size was 10.2. Per the official statistics, the rural population was as high as 73.5 percent of the country. Rural population exceeds urban because agriculture and livestock production provide the country’s main livelihoods. The wide variation in topography and climate enables producing various crops, livestock, and honey. What Is the Safe Yield? Scientific Rationale Safe yield traditionally has been defined as the maintenance of a long- term balance between the amount of groundwater abstracted and the amount of groundwater recharged. Hence, pumping is restricted to the natural replenishment of groundwater. However, this definition 504 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS ignores the discharge from the system. If abstraction equals recharge, abstraction plus discharge is greater than recharge. Therefore, the safe yield does not equal the sustainable yield. Under natural conditions and over a long period, the discharge of an aquifer will equal the recharge. Additional discharge from wells de- stroys this equilibrium. The equilibrium can be restored only if recharge is augmented and/or the natural discharge is decreased. It therefore is important not to consider sustainable groundwater yield as a fixed volume of water that can be utilized but to address the system in a more integrated manner, that is, to take into account the whole water system including surface water. To establish a sustainable yield, three aspects should be consid- ered: 1. Conceptual water budget. In estimating the water budget, all stake- holders should be represented so that the balance reflects both the natural system and all users. The natural system should include both ground- and surface water. Initially, this budget can be an estimate. Eventually, modeling will be necessary to establish the budget more exactly and to predict how the system will respond to future changes such as increased demand or climate change. These models also can help to estimate terms such as changes in storage, discharge, and hydrogeological properties. 2. Spatial scale. If the spatial scale is not understood and defined, any approximation of sustainable yield is meaningless. Local abstractions might seem sustainable when compared to the regional sustainable yield. However, even limited local abstractions still may have a large negative impact, such as localized saltwater intrusion. Therefore, the scale at which the sustainable yield is determined should take into account possible local effects. 3. Temporal scale. Pumping and recharge are time dependent, varying over different time scales. To estimate the sustainable yield, the timing of future water needs and recharge should be understood. In other words, the sustainable yield is not a constant but could change continuously and must be related to a certain time period. In other words, should the sustainable yield be based on figures of the last 10 years, or on only the last year? The time factor is critical for defining the sustainable yield. Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate I rrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen N 505 The abovementioned uncertainties in the definition of the different terms of the water budget led to the idea that water resource sustain- ability must be considered within the framework of probability (Howard 2002). According to Howard, sustainability must be defined as “a system that maintains acceptable risk over an indefinite time hori- zon.” Our inexact understanding of the water budget means that we should focus on adaptive management: adapting to a changing physical and socioeconomic environment. Adaptive management does not mean that specifying fixed levels of water use through instruments such as permits is not required. It does mean that we must recognize that the specified quantities can change. Estimating Sustainable Yield in Wadi Ahwar The main intent of sustainable groundwater use is to optimize abstrac- tion while maintaining a minimum outflow to the ocean to prevent saltwater intrusion. To estimate the sustainable yield of Wadi Ahwar, it is not necessary to include aspects such as wetlands and stream base flow because perennial streams and wetlands are minimal or do not exist. Therefore, for Wadi Ahwar, the sustainable yield can be defined as almost equal to the natural recharge of the aquifer on an average annual basis, that is, because man-made abstraction almost equals total discharge. Recharge in the wadi is not well understood, so it is difficult to estimate aquifer sustainability. The aquifers receive recharge via un- derflow from the mountains or infiltration from surface wadis; or gap flow during periods of more intense rainfall, direct surface recharge from rainfall (likely to be insignificant), and agricultural return. Un- derstanding the relationship among the rainfall amount and intensity, surface hydrologic response, and aquifer recharge is of fundamental importance. Although rainfall is the primary hydrological input, in arid and semi-arid areas such as Wadi Ahwar, rainfall is characterized by extremely high spatial and temporal variability. The main input to estimate the sustainable yield is the surface runoff and hence the groundwater balance. Runoff flow is composed of two main elements: base flow, which has its origin in groundwater; and surface runoff, which is the accumulation of rainfall that drains to the stream. The basin characteristics that affect the base flow and the surface runoff include geology, soil type, vegetation cover, precipitation, drainage 506 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS area, and moisture condition. The variable rainfall conditions in Wadi Ahwar make it difficult to estimate average runoff and hence the sustainable yield. It therefore can be reasoned that, to estimate the safe yield, the variability of the hydrological and climate system can best be taken into account by taking average figures for a 10-year period. The cur- rent water balance suggests that the current safe yield (estimated in 2008) in Wadi Ahwar is 18 Mm 3 . The lack of data, both spatial and temporal, makes this figure highly approximate. Data Collection, Information, and Monitoring Monitoring is the main source for data and information. Examples of monitoring in Wadi environments include the assessment of water resources for future development and for rainwater and floodwater harvesting. Current Monitoring Activities and Well Inventory No groundwater monitoring takes place in Wadi Ahwar. The only infor- mation on available resources is based on old studies, such as the 1990 donor-funded study. Since the 1990s, many changes have taken place in both Yemen’s physical and socioeconomic systems. To provide more recent data and to develop a management plan with different scenarios, a monitoring network will have to be designed and developed. Based on the consultancy study, a proposal was drawn up for monitoring wells. For a monitoring network design, additional analyses of the hydrological system need to be carried out. However, based on a preliminary assessment, it seems logical to install a number of monitoring wells parallel to the wadi up to the coast, and a few wells across the wadi. Recommendations NWRA has limited experience with groundwater resource monitoring. Moreover, it has no clear vision of information management. The water authority should consider delegating different information systems tasks to the appropriate administrative level (national, regional, and local). In this way, NWRA should be capable of designing and managing the overall monitoring system. Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate I rrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen N 507 Given the above observations, the following short-term activities can be identified to develop a monitoring plan for Wadi Ahwar: Develop monitoring objectives and strategy. 1. Develop a monitoring plan that defines the required hardware, 2. software, and human resources. Design monitoring network based on hydrogeology. 3. Provide protocols, guidelines, tools, and standards for different 4. monitoring activities. These aspects should correspond to NWRA guidelines. Carry out an inventory of necessary capacity and equipment at 5. all levels. Set up communication with regional NWRA offices, and define 6. mandates for each NWRA office. Possible Measures in Wadi Ahwar Despite the lack of accurate hydrological data on Wadi Ahwar, it is clear that over-abstraction takes place and leads to saltwater intrusion. It also is believed that a great amount of water is being lost to sea (and through nonbeneficial evapotranspiration). These assessments suggest that there is opportunity for both conventional interventions such as rainwater harvesting, and nonconventional measures such as artificial recharge and demand management. Integrating these conventional and nonconventional measures can lead to sustainable conjunctive use. The desired outcome is to balance (1) reducing water losses and stor- ing excess water to optimize rural livelihood throughout the year; and (2) maintaining the minimum spillage to sea as needed to counteract seawater intrusion. Two main categories of proposed measures can be distinguished: Supply-oriented measures to make more water available for dif- 1. ferent users Demand-oriented measures to reduce water demand and con- 2. sequently reduce the groundwater abstraction and control the drawdown of the groundwater table. Such measures could be part of an overall sustainable water man- agement plan, as described below. 508 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS However, to decide on the appropriate measures, a better under- standing of the hydrogeological system is important. For example, it would be useful to know to what extent the excess wadi runoff can be recharged. If the amount of excess water is limited, proposed recharge structures will only redistribute the groundwater resources but not augment them. Furthermore, it is not yet completely clear whether the recharged water will be temporarily or permanently intercepted by the shallow aquifers. The available information does give some insights. However, given the sharp increase in groundwater development of the last 20 years, a 1990 donor-funded study will have to be updated before any recharge structures can be constructed. Nevertheless, the recent well and abstraction inventory indicates that the total volume of surface water used for irrigation has not in- creased. This fact suggests that a surplus outflow of water to sea still exists and can be intercepted and recharged. In addition, more efficient irrigation practices would lower evaporation and increase the volume of water available for recharge. For these measures to be effective, the abstraction of groundwater will need to be regulated. Although NWRA will play a key role in moni- toring abstractions and regulating the drilling of boreholes, enforcement obviously will be a very difficult issue. It is suggested that community-based groundwater management would be the most effective approach. All stakeholders in the water resources in the wadi agree that measures need to be taken to reverse the negative impacts of unsus- tainable abstraction. They result in depletion of the resources, quality deterioration, and saltwater intrusion. Although no conflicts have yet arisen, there is a clear need for awareness and stakeholder involvement in the use of the resource. Supply-Oriented Measures Storage and recovery of excess water To store excess water for later use, subsurface dams are probably the most feasible option. The use of injection boreholes requires little surface area and enables recharging an aquifer isolated from the surface by a semi-pervious or impervious layer. However, the technique is more vulnerable to disrup- tion and requires more high-tech maintenance than surface infiltration. To avoid frequent clogging of the well screen of an infiltration borehole, degassed water and high standard water quality are needed. Before Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate I rrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen N 509 large-scale implementation of injection boreholes, pilot schemes are required to test for the proper design and water quality characteristics to be used. Subsurface dams may operate at low hydraulic loading rates and also improve water quality. Subsurface dams are a relatively inexpen- sive intervention, require low-level technology, are easy to construct, and offer opportunity for community involvement. The infiltration rate is strongly dependent on the groundwater table, which must be relatively deep. Recovery is usually by abstraction wells located in the vicinity of the infiltration site. Suitable locations for subsurface dams are probably upstream, where the wadi basement is not yet at great depth and a dam would be relatively easy to realize. The storage capacity of a typical subsurface dam and reservoir of 4 m depth, 50 m width, and 500 m length would be some 10,000 m 3 , assuming a drainable storage coefficient of 0.10. Already the government of Yemen has made great effort to construct small or subsurface dams to recharge groundwater. Most of these dams have not been very effective in recharging the groundwater. Nonethe- less, the intervention is very promising in a wadi environment, subject to certain considerations: Siting of the dams is an important aspect of implementation N . The uncon- fined layer should be within a shallow-to-moderate depth (preferably not more than 10 m) and in a well-defined impermeable layer. Sites with saline soils should be avoided for dam construction. N While reduction in the salt levels through continuous water use is feasible, reduction requires operational procedures beyond those generally expected of small rural farmers. The economic conditions of the sites are such that participatory or N bottom-up approaches are essential in constructing the dam (and obtaining maximal socioeconomic benefits). Using locally avail- able materials and community labor reduces costs and enhances efficiency, acceptance, and dam life span. The human factor is essential for the success of underground dams. If there is no co- operative effort, and subsequent ownership, by the community, effective operation and adequate maintenance are unlikely. Suc- cessful examples of community involvement in dam construction can be found in Ethiopia and Kenya (box 27.1). The successful application of subsurface dams would require an N analysis of the hydrogeological system of Wadi Ahwar. Additional 510 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Box 27.1. Kitui Sand Dams, Kenya The Kitui Sand Dam project in Kenya is an example of how communities use their knowl- edge about water to cope with droughts. Since 1990, a local NGO in Kitui (Sahelian Solutions Foundation, or SASOL) has been assisting lo- cal communities to build small-scale sand dams, which store water in artificially created sandy aquifers. Water is stored within the sand and gravel particles, which accumulate against the dam wall. “Sand’ refers to the sand behind the dam wall that holds the water. The dam wall itself is made of concrete. Sand dams can store water in up to 35 percent of the total volume of sand stored upstream of the dam. The stored water is protected against high evaporation losses and contamination. The water is captured for use through a hand-dug well or tube well using a bucket or hand-pump. Downstream areas are not significantly influenced by the presence of a sand dam. The efficiency of the design is improved by constructing dams in cascade. Note: A total of 500 sand dams have been constructed in Kenya, creating a reliable source of water, even during droughts (as was proved in 2006). Box table 27.1. Socioeconomic Performance of Sand Storage Dams, Kitui, Kenya Vulnerability categories Vulnerability indicators Before dam construction After dam construction Agriculture # of cash crops 1.5 2.8 Irrigated crops (%) 37.0 68.0 Special aspects Water collection–domestic (mins.) 140.0 90.0 Water collection–livestock (mins.) 110.0 50.0 Gender Average walking distance to water–women (km) 3.0 1.0 Economic Income (US$/year) 230.0 350.0 Health Households suffering from malnutrition (%) 31.6 0.0 boreholes would be necessary to collect extra information on the geology and lithology of the subsoil, infiltration capacity, and po- tential storage. After construction of the subsurface dams, these boreholes should be used to continuously monitor the water levels and water quality sampling (see appendix A27.1, comments on monitoring). Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate I rrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen N 511 Saltwater intrusion barrier Many boreholes and dug wells in a 10 km-corridor along the coastal zone close to Ahwar have become saline. To stop saltwater intrusion, an intrusion barrier should be built. The principle of injecting fresh water into an aquifer to form a barrier against saltwater intrusion from the sea is to push back the saltwater– freshwater interface. Saliniza- tion and a scheme to stop the process are shown schematically in figure 27.2. The groundwater salinity in the Ahwar area probably is caused not only by a lateral shift in the saltwater–freshwater in- terface but also by upward coning of saltwater. Rising saline water can be counteracted by using 2 filters in 1 abstraction well. The lower well screen will intercept upcoming saline water; the up- per one will continually produce fresh water (figure 27.3). Before considering implementation of a freshwater antisalinity barrier, further investigation is neces- sary to study the mechanisms of increased salinity. The time required to reduce water salinity would be consider- able and could reach the order of tens of years. Hence, to decrease the rate of saline intrusion in underlying aquifers, the most effective practice may be to reduce the extraction of coastal zone groundwater for irrigation. Figure 27.2 Process of Saltwater Intrusion Saline water Sea Initial phase of pumping from coastal freshwater aquifer Landward shift of saltwater-freshwater interface due to pumping Saline water Freshwater Sea Recharge of aquifer with freshwater pushing back saltwater-freshwater interface Saline water Freshwater Sea Figure 27.3 Use of 2 Abstraction Wells at 1 Location to Counteract Salinization Brackish/saline Brackish/saline Brackish/saline Fresh Fresh Sea 512 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Demand-Oriented Measures As just noted, measures to strengthen groundwater recharge should be complemented by equally important actions to limit groundwater ab- straction. The design and implementation of such demand-management measures are extremely complex and political. They require consultation and bargaining among numerous stakeholder groups. Consequently, this chapter does not propose specific packages for the Wadi Anwar area, However, given that demand management is an essential com- ponent of an integrated approach to groundwater sustainability, the four options below merit further investigation. 1. Downstream/upstream tradable water rights. The aim would be to create a financial incentive for upstream water users to allow more water to flow downstream as surface or groundwater. The increased flows would improve downstream groundwater balances. Clearly, the design of such a system would be extremely high risk and complex, and would require a long period of consultation and bargaining among stakeholders. Strict monitoring would be re- quired to prevent farmers from both selling and using their water simultaneously. 2. Command and control measures, Regulatory measures could include requiring well-drilling permits and restrictions on abstractions. Water-saving measures, such as drip irrigation and the cultivation of more water-efficient crops, could be enforced. As for enhanced recharge, such measures would require better monitoring of the hydrogeological system. However, so long as groundwater is considered a free-access commodity, enforcement will be very difficult. 3. Community-based groundwater management. Given the difficulty of enforcing “command and control” measures, self-regulation seems to be the only approach to sustainable use of groundwater at the local level in rural areas. Self-regulation focuses on the develop- ment of local norms to control groundwater abstraction and use. As shown by projects in India (APWELL and APFAMGS), 1 rais- ing awareness of the resource among users increases the farmers’ commitment to proper groundwater use. In these projects, the farmers themselves measure the water levels and water yields. However, the main challenge is to translate this data into information that helps the farmer or community understand the groundwater Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate I rrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen N 513 dynamics, increases their awareness of the need for regulation, and informs good decisions regarding water shortages. 4. Incentives. Extension and training should be integral parts of the implementation of the new measures and regulations. Alternatively, negative incentives, such as groundwater pricing or higher diesel prices, could help to limit abstraction. Conclusions The welfare of the Wadi Ahwar population depends on re-establishing the area’s hydrogeological balance. The usual solution to encourage sustainable use of groundwater is to impose regulations. Examples are registering abstraction points and defining water rights. However, given the difficulty in enforcing regulation, self-regulation seems to be the only path toward sustain- able use. In addition, there is an opportunity to enhance groundwater recharge. It therefore is suggested to develop a groundwater management plan. The plan would cover all aspects of integrated groundwater management, on both the demand and the supply sides: water har- vesting, regulating use, alternative crops, and more efficient irrigation and monitoring. Establishing the groundwa- ter management plan should involve local stakeholders in three processes: assessing the resource, assessing the de- mand, and negotiating the adoption of resource manage- ment decisions. The ground- water management plan should include simple “rules of thumb” that focus on water use at the village level and help to con- trol the abstraction and use of FAO-India projects, Andhra Pradesh Ground Water Irrigation Schemes (AP- 1 WELL) and Andhra Pradesh Farmer-Managed Groundwater Systems Project (AP- FAMGS). The latter’s online masthead reads, “Demystifying Science for Sustainable Development.” Resource management Demand management Aquifer systems/ groundwater resources including their interaction with surface water Resources allocation and use Regulatory framework Use of economic instruments Shareholder participation Definition of water rights Water and land uses Water demand and contaminant load Costs and impacts Resources assessment and their evaluation Pollution control Prevention and mitigation of side effects Figure 27.4 Integrated Groundwater Management Plan 514 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS scarce groundwater resources. These management rules should be sustainable and environmentally sound. Options for resource enhance- ment also will be studied. The linkages among the water resource, resource management, and demand management are illustrated in figure 27.4. Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate I rrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen N 515 Appendix A27.1 Hydrogeological and Groundwater Analysis in Wadi Ahwar General Hydrogeological Setting Location The Ahwar Delta extends along the coastline and is approximately bordered by coordinates 130 26'-130 36' N and 460 39'-460 48' E. The total area of the delta is estimated to be approximately 150 km 2 , with the greatest width of approximately 17 km at the coast. The delta is part of a large catchment of approximately 6,400 km 2 to the south of a range of mountains running east from Mudiah and rising to over 2,000m some 70 km north of the coast. The steep escarpment of the mountains represents the narrow watershed, with catchments draining in a northeast direction toward the Ramlat as Sabatayn. Because the high ground approaches nearer to the coast, the delta of Wadi Ahwar is less extensive than the deltas of Wadis Tuban and Bana. The gradi- ent of the Wadi Ahwar bed is 1.5 percent–2.9 percent. Starting as a narrow canyon-shaped valley, the wadi eventually turns into piedmont plain, gradually widening to 2 km. The upper reaches of the wadi bed consist of pebbles, downstream sand, then semi-gravel, and eventually compact sand close to the sea. The shape of the bed is lost in the delta area. Figure A27.1 shows the location of Wadi Ahwar, outline of the catchment, and observed wells. The wadi drains a large area of highly dislocated basement rocks and the inland margins of the quaternary volcanic outcrop. The upper Source: Hydrosult, Inc. 2008a. Figure A27.1 Location of Wadi Ahwar, Yemen 516 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS catchment contains extensive areas of flat plain (Lawdar, Mudiah, De- man, and Guishan areas) that are underlain by alluvium and are reported to be extensively developed for agriculture. Landcover The Ahwar region landcover is dominated by rock outcrops and sandy areas. The wadi has scanty vegetation, mostly small shrubs. The small area of soil-covered land is used predominantly for agriculture. Based on satellite imagery, figure A27.2 gives an impression of the landcover of the whole catchment. Climate and rainfall The climate in the delta is arid and characterized by high sun- shine radiation with an average annual temperature of over 34.2°C. Potential evapotranspi- ration (ET) is very high, averaging 3,033 mm/year. Average annual rainfall of the whole catchment is 150 mm. Likewise, the estimated average precipitation for the delta is 49 mm. As long-term data are not available, it is difficult to indicate trends in annual rainfall. Also, as mentioned earlier, the spatial variation of rainfall in wadis can be significant. The accuracy of the estimations is therefore unknown. Groundwater resources system The water resources in the Ahwar area comprise the wadi flow and the interconnected groundwater system, which is recharged by the wadi flow and by infiltration of the irrigation water. The major part of the rainfall in the catchment generates the surface runoff to the wadi flow. Only a small portion of total precipitation directly infiltrates in the catchment and reaches the wadi flow as lateral groundwater inflow. Beyond the water resources themselves, the water resources system comprises irrigated land and infrastructure such as wells, canals, and weirs. The character of the delta is largely the product of the natural Figure A27.2 Interpreted Landcover, of Wadi Ahwar Region, Yemen Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate I rrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen N 517 flow of the runoff of the wadi through the delta, constructed surface water diversions, irrigation canal network, and irrigated fields. The wadi itself is shaped by the regular floods that have an average esti- mated duration of 68 hours. The maximum flood event was reported in March 1982 with a discharge rate of 5,340 m 3 /s. The surface runoff of the wadi is partially diverted and used for spate irrigation. The surface water balance in the wadi has the fol- lowing components: Infiltration and evaporation during irrigation N Infiltration and evaporation during wadi flow N Discharge to the sea. N The groundwater balance in the wadi comprises: Replenishment Lateral groundwater inflow N Recharge during irrigation (transmission losses) N Recharge during wadi runoff N Discharge Consumptive groundwater use N Groundwater outflow to the sea. N The groundwater system of the delta consists of three major aquifers that are interconnected and most likely form a single aquifer system. The shallow aquifer 10 m–50 m thick occurs in sand and gravel. It is unconfined and hydraulically connected with the deeper aquifers. The middle aquifer consists of gritstone and conglomerate with calcareous matrix. It occurs throughout the delta except for the apex. The thickness of the aquifer ranges between 20 m–40 m. The depth to the top of the aquifer increases to the south from 20 m to 40 m. The deeper aquifer lies at a depth ranging from 70 m to 200 m and consists of sandstone, limestone, and conglomerate. Groundwater Analysis Groundwater levels From June–September 2008, Hydrosult carried out a well inventory in the Ahwar area to ascertain well depths and water levels. The data 518 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS were converted into a spatial layer using the advanced GIS software, ARCGIS. By overlay- ing this data with the drainage layer, the spatial bias of the data is revealed in terms of location of all the observed wells only on the left hand side of the drainage flow direction. There are hardly any observed well data on the other side of the drainage network. These points are scattered well enough inside and outside the catchment area of the drainage to permit interpolation. To have an impression of the ground- water flow and occurrence on the right hand side of the flow, groundwater wells data points were used for interpolation, using the Inverse Weighted Distance method. Moran’s I Spatial Au- tocorrelation Index was used to measure clustering patterns and spatial autocorrelation. Figure A27.3 indicates shallow water levels in the area closer to the sea. The reason could be the intrusion of seawater in the groundwater aquifer zones. The spatial autocorrelation index is 3.1, which indicates clustering of the well water levels. Figure A27.4 illustrates the well-depth variance. It indicates a slight tendency for shallower well depths in the area closer to the sea, where water levels are shallow, and in the upper region. The deeper well depths occur in the central delta. The reason for the presence of the relatively low well depths in the upper region could be the availability of surface spate irrigation for longer periods. The middle area shows most of the deeper wells, whose presence could be due to the short duration of availability of surface irrigation as well as the distance from the sea. Groundwater balance A 1990 donor-funded study estimated total groundwater resources based on both analytical and mathematical simulations. The total Figure A27.3 Well Inventory and Extrapolated Groundwater Levels, Wadi Ahwar, Yemen Wadi Ahwar well water levels Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate I rrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen N 519 natural storage, defined as the volume of gravitational water accumulated in pores and fissures of water-bearing rock beneath the zone of multiyear fluctua- tions of groundwater level, was estimated at 1099 Mm 3 . Most of this storage is found in the central and southern delta. Storage in the upper two aquifers amounts to 845 Mm 3 , including 84 Mm 3 with salt content >5 g/l. The total estimate is based on a stor- age capacity of 0.19 for gravel/ pebbles, 0.1 for muddy sands, and 0.03 for conglomerates. Table A27.1 presents estimates of groundwater balance. The different studies provide very different estimates. Accord- ing to the 1990 study, the total influx from outside the delta is 4.3 Mm 3 –4.9 Mm 3 . However, the Hydrosult study suggests a total inflow from outside of only 0.7 Mm 3 . This difference cannot be explained. However, the difference of the Table A27.1 Groundwater Balance, Wadi Ahwar, Yemen Budget items (total in Mm 3 ) 1988–89 1972–88 Hydrosult’s 2008 estimate Groundwater influx from north 0.2 0.2 0.7 Lateral influx 4.7 4.1 Recharge from spate irrigation 19.5 18.0 10.5 Recharge from wadi runoff 7.4 Total credit 24.4 22.3 18.7 Groundwater outflow 8.9 9.4 Groundwater abstraction (netto) 5.8 3.3 19.0 Evaporation 9.4 9.7 9.7 Total debit 24.1 22.4 Balance 0.3 –0.1 –9.0 Source: Hydrosult, Inc. 2008b. Figure A27.4 Average Well Depth, Wadi Ahwar, Yemen Wadi Ahwar well depth levels 520 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS direct recharge from spate or runoff probably results from a reduction of the command area. Based on the Hydrosult estimate, it could be concluded that mining takes place at a rate of at least 9 Mm 3 per year on average. This rate is supported by field observations of such reported increase of saliniza- tion of certain wells. However, given the uncertainty of the figures, particularly the evaporation estimate, it is difficult to draw any hard conclusions regarding over-abstraction and safe yield. Given an average annual wadi flow of 66 Mm 3 , the outflow to sea amounts to almost 50 percent of the total flow. Based on the previous studies, it was estimated that, to prevent saltwater intrusion, ground- water outflow to sea should not be less than 9 Mm 3 . However, we would need to consider seasonal variation in wadi flow before concluding whether there is scope for additional safe abstraction. Groundwater quality and saltwater intrusion Groundwater salinity in the upper aquifer ranges from 2.5 grams/liter (g/l) to 4.5 g/l, possibly reaching values of 5-9.5 g/l. Total dissolved solids (TDS) concentration increases considerably toward the coastline, reaching a value of 15 g/l. For the middle aquifer, TDS concentra- tion ranges from 1.3 to 1.7 g/l at a reported 1km from the wadi chan- nel to 2.3 g/l measured at other locations. TDS concentration in the lower aquifer is reported to be no more than 2 g/l. The local population reportedly has to use brackish water for domestic pur- poses: with TDS of up to 1.5 g/l (3600 persons); 1.5–3 g/l (8400 persons, including the population of the city of Ahwar); and even more than 3 g/l (approximately 1,000 persons). No data is available from pre- vious studies about the position of the saltwater front in the delta. It was concluded, however, that a Figure A27.5 Average Electrical Conductivity Levels, Wadi Ahwar, Yemen Wadi Ahwar well electrical conductivity levels Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate I rrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen N 521 saltwater intrusion at some coastal producing wells is likely as a result of a continuous groundwater abstraction. A GIS analysis was performed on water quality data as observed by Hydrosult (2008) showing higher conductivity levels (that is, higher electrical conductivity, or EC) near the coast. Observations and discussions in the field also have shown strong evidence of saltwater intrusion, with a direct consequence on the viability of agriculture in these areas. However, lack of historic data prevents an analysis of trends over time. Figure A27.5 indicates the spatial occurrence of EC in the ground- water observations. The pattern suggests that conductivity not only is influenced by seawater intrusion but also may be affected by other factors such as soil types, leaching effects, and pre-existing saline groundwater. Future Water Demands No information is available about future water requirements in the delta. No strong population growth is expected. However, due to the increasing use of diesel pumps, abstraction of ground- water is expected to continue to grow. The growing abstraction will strongly determine future demand. References Haile, A.M. 2007. A Tradition in Transition: Water Management Reforms and Indigenous Spate Irrigation Systems in Eritrea. Taylor & Francis Group. The Netherlands: A.A. Balkema. Hydrosult, Inc. 2008a. Hydrosult Feasibility Study for Irrigation Im- provement in Wadi Ahwar, supported by the World Bank-financed Irrigation Improvement Project (2000–08). Montreal. www. hydrosult.com/ ____. 2008b. “Groundwater Assessment: Irrigation Improvement Project.” Draft report. Montreal. www.hydrosult.com/ IWMI. Water Scarcity and the Role of Storage in Development. IWMI. 2000. Research Report 39. Colombo. www.lk.iwmi.org/Pubs/Pub039 Water management Information needs Information utilization Information strategy Data analysis Data collection 522 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Maimore, M. 2004. “Defining and Managing Sustainable Yield.” Groundwater 42 (6). Wheater, H., and A.A. Radwan. 2002. “Hydrology of Wadi Systems.” IHP Regional Network on Wadi Hydrology in the Arab Region. UNESCO, Paris. World Bank. 2008. “Republic of Yemen, Groundwater and Soil Con- servation Project and Community-Based Water Management Project.” Technical Mission Report April 7–17. World Bank/GW-MATE (Groundwater Management Advisory Team). 2003. “Yemen: Rationalizing Groundwater Resource Utilization in the Sana’a Basin.” Case Profile 2. # 523 Appendix A1. List of Authors Safwat Abdel-Dayem Consultant [email protected] Rachid Abdellaoui Consultant Nathalie Abu-Ata Operations Officer WBIRC World Bank [email protected] Naji Abu-Hatim Senior Rural Development Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Maher Abu-Taleb Senior Water Resources Management Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Abdulhamid Azad Senor Irrigation Engineer MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Aldo Baietti Lead Technical Specialist WBISD World Bank [email protected] Alexander Bakalian Lead Water Resources Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Mohammed Benouahi Lead Water and Sanitation Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Julia Bucknall Lead Natural Resources Management Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Richard Calkins Consultant MNSSD World Bank [email protected] 524 N WATER I N THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTI VES AND I NNOVATI ONS Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne Water and Sanitation Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Susmita Dasgupta Lead Environmental Economist DECRG World Bank [email protected] Arjen de Vries Consultant Acacia Water (Solutions in Groundwater) [email protected] Hani El Sadani Senior Water Resources Engineer MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Tarun Ghawana Consultant Acacia Water (Solutions in Groundwater) [email protected] Maged Hamed Senior Environmental Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Sarah Houssein Consultant N. Vijay Jagannathan Sector Manager Water MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Khairy Al-Jamal Senior Infrastructure Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Marc Jeuland Consultant Claire Kfouri Water and Sanitation Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Alexander Kremer Senior Sector Economist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Manish Kumar Consultant [email protected] Mohamed El Hedi Louati Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, Tunisia [email protected] Andrew Makokha Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist AFTU2 World Bank [email protected] Pier Mantovani Lead Water and Sanitation Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] List of Authors N 525 Mohammed Mehany Operations Analyst MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Craig Meisner Environmental Economist ECSSD World Bank [email protected] Juan Morelli Consultant [email protected] Jackson Morill Consultant and Associate Beveridge & Diamond P.C. Washington DC [email protected] Sana Agha Al Nimer Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Bekele Debele Negewo Water Supply Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Christopher J. Perry Consultant [email protected] Richard Pollard Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Manuel Schiffler Senior Economist LCSUW World Bank Mschiffl[email protected] Ahmed Shawky Mohamed Senior Water Resources Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Jose Simas Consultant [email protected] Ayat Soliman Senior Natural Resources Management Specialist MNSSD [email protected] Satoru Ueda Senior Water Resources Specialist AFTWR World Bank [email protected] Wendy Wakeman Lead Social Development Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Christopher Ward Consultant and Researcher Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies University of Exeter [email protected] N. VIJAY JAGANNATHAN AHMED SHAWKY MOHAMED ALEXANDER KREMER Editors MI DDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRI CA REGI ON THE WORLD BANK THE WORLD BANK Middle East and North Africa Region (MNA) 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433 W a t e r i n t h e A r a b W o r l d : M a n a g e m e n t P e r s p e c t i v e s a n d I n n o v a t i o n s Water in the Arab World Management Perspectives and Innovations Water in the Arab World: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS N. Vijay Jagannathan Ahmed Shawky Mohamed Alexander Kremer Editors MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION THE WORLD BANK ©2009 The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank Middle East and North Africa (MNA) Region 1818 H St., NW Washington, DC 20433 All rights reserved. This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be a violation of applicable law. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Office of the Vice President, Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA. Cover photographs: World Bank MNSSD staff, clients, and consultants. Book design and typesetting: The Word Express. Contents Preface xv xvii Acknowledgments Acronyms and Abbreviations 1. Introduction: Beyond WRM— Unbundling Water Management in MNA Countries N. Vijay Jagannathan, Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, and Christopher J. Perry 1 SECTION 1. ASSESSMENT 17 2. Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management: Lessons from the “MNA Development Report on Water” N. Vijay Jagannathan 19 3. Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review Ahmed Shawky Mohamed and N. Vijay Jagannathan 37 4. Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: Spending Less for Better Services Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Alexander Kremer, and Manish Kumar 59 5. Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models in Water Resources Management and Planning in MNA Region Bekele Debele Negewo, Julia Bucknall, and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed 79 iii iv WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 6. Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World: New Analytical Tools for New Challenges Christopher J. Perry and Julia Bucknall 97 7. Egypt Case Study: Energy Efficiency CDM Program: Irrigation and Drainage Pumping Sector Abdulhamid Azad 119 8. Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience Satoru Ueda and Mohammed Benouahi 131 9. Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management Mohamed El Hedi Louati and Julia Bucknall 157 10. Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War Iraq Sana Agha Al Nimer 181 11. Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector: Lessons from the Design of an Anticorruption Action Plan Maher Abu-Taleb and Richard Calkins 191 SECTION 2. BARGAINING 211 12. Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco Rachid Abdellaoui 213 13. How Did a Small, Poor, and Remote Rural Village in Djibouti Recently Become a Government Priority to Receive Water Supply and Sanitation? Sarah Houssein, in collaboration with Julia Bucknall and Nathalie Abu-Ata 229 14. Water Conflict in Yemen: The Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms Christopher Ward 233 Contents v 15. Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century N. Vijay Jagannathan 269 SECTION 3. CODIFICATION 283 16. Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries Jackson Morill and Jose Simas 285 17. Subsidies for the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach Providing Basic Services to Poor Periurban Neighborhoods in Morocco Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani 335 18. Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani 345 19. New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in Irrigation: Lessons from Egypt’s West Delta Project Aldo Baietti and Safwat Abdel-Dayem 355 SECTION 4. DELEGATION 365 20. Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen Naji Abu Hatim and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed 367 21. Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen Susmita Dasgupta, Craig Meisner, Andrew Makokha, and Richard Pollard 383 22. Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework: Case Study of Application in the Delta Region, Egypt Ayat Soliman, Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Maged Hamed, Wendy Wakeman, and Mohammed Mehany 401 23. Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Abdulhamid Azad, and Alexander Bakalian 421 vi WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS SECTION 5. ENGINEERING 431 24. Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta Jose Simas, Juan Morelli, and Hani El Sadani 433 25. Water Reuse in the MNA Region: Constraints, Experiences, and Policy Recommendations Claire Kfouri, Pier Mantovani, and Marc Jeuland 447 26. Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region Khairy Al-Jamal and Manuel Schiffler 479 27. Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Coastal Areas in Yemen: Case Study of Wadi Ahwar Arjen de Vries and Tarun Ghawana. Supervised by Ahmed Shawky Mohamed 497 Appendix A1. List of Authors 523 Boxes 1.1 2.1 3.1 7.1 11.1 11.2 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 What a Water Steward Should Monitor 6 Water Is Everybody’s Business: Morocco 20 Water Management in the Philippines 53 Need for a New Approach to Emission Reductions 120 Three Key Principles of Good Governance 194 Overview of Anticorruption Action Plan 201 Scarcity, Conflict, and Adaptation in the Sa’ada Basin 235 For Centuries, Strict Rules Have Governed Water Management in Yemen’s Wadi Dahr 238 Wadi Zabid Downstream Farmers Conflict with Upstreamers 241 Bloody Conflict between Traditional Wadi Al Jawf Spate Rules and Modernization 242 Sheikhs Adjudicate a Water Dispute in Wadi Dahr 243 Growing Water Sales around Ta’iz Raise Equity Questions 244 Contents vii 14.7 14.8 14.9 14.10 14.11 14.12 14.13 16.1 17.1 20.1 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5 27.1. Upstream Prospers but Downstream Area Desolate in Wadi Bani Khawlan 245 Urban Water Tactics Dry up and Pauperize Al Haima 246 Water and Land Disputes Leave Many Dead 248 Conflicts over Dam Construction in Hobah and Shahik End in Waste and Death 250 Wadi Habir Resists Surrenders Its Water to Urban Use but Is Defeated through Violence 251 Irrigation Council Water Allocation Rules 256 Sa’ada: Successful Community Initiatives 259 Brazilian Water Law 9.433, 1997 290 Output-Based Aid: Core Concepts 336 Yemen Community Water Management Project 379 Untreated Sewage Results in National Economic Loss 403 Local Context 404 Egypt’s Rural Villages 405 ISSIP Intervention Categories 411 Water Quality Index M&E Application 415 Kitui Sand Dams, Kenya 510 Figures 1.1 Large-Scale Relative Changes in Annual Runoff for 2090–99, Relative to 1980–99 2 1.2 Conceptual Framework to Explain Ideal IWRM Outcomes 5 1.3 Water Consumptive Uses and Losses 7 2.1 Projected Decreases in Rainfall, 2000–70 21 2.2 North Africa Estimates of Change in Runoffs 22 2.3 Projected Changes in Flow of the River Indus, 2005–15 22 2.4 Role of Renewable, Nonrenewable, and Virtual Water in MNA Countries, 2005 23 2.5 Estimates of Environmental Degradation Costs, 2005 27 2.6 Cost of Over-extraction of Aquifers, 2006 27 2.7 Changing Nature of Accountability 33 3.1 Irrigation and WSS Expenditures 42 3.2a Trend of Irrigation Public Authorities’ Expenditures to Total Expenditures 43 viii WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 3.2b 3.3a 3.3b 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 Trend of Ratio of Expenditure of Irrigation Economic Authorities to Expenditures of all Economic Authorities 43 Trend of WSS Public Authorities’ Expenditures to Total Expenditures 44 Trend of Ratio of Expenditures of WSS Economic Authorities to Expenditures of all Economic Authorities 44 Irrigation O&M Cost Recovery Ratio 45 Financial Resources of Irrigation Sector, 2001–05 45 Financial Resources of the WSS Subsector: Cairo 46 Water Supply and Sanitation: Cost Recovery 46 Poverty and Access to Water and Wastewater 47 Cumulative Debts of WSS and Irrigation Subsectors 49 Actual Expenditures vs. Needs 55 Breakdown of Capital Spending between Public and Private Goods 60 Breakdown of GOE Recurrent Spending on Public and Private Goods 60 Seasonal Irrigation Water Supply per Unit Agricultural Area 61 On-Farm Water Demand/Supply Ratio 61 Canal-System Efficiency of Water Delivery 62 Annual Irrigation Supply per Unit Irrigated Area 62 Cost-Recovery Ratio 63 Average Depth to Shallow Water 63 Average Production Value per Unit of Irrigation Supply 63 Production Value per Unit Irrigation Supply 64 Production Value per Unit Irrigated Area, Including Multiple Cropping 64 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Improving Wastewater Disposal 67 Farmer Land and Income Distribution 68 Irrigation Subsidy as Share of Income 69 Mean Water Use by Crop Income Quintile 70 Use of Water-Saving Systems by Crop Income Quintile 70 Water Use per Cropped Area by Crop Income Quintile 70 Contents ix 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.2 8.1 8.2 8.3 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 Latest Technologies in Water Resources Data Collection, Assimilation, and Modeling to Improve Decisionmaking 80 Sample Applications of GIS (ArcVIEW) in SWAT Model Use 81 Availability of Remote Sensing Data at Various Spatial and Temporal Coverage 84 Where Is Water Not Used Productively? Data from Sacramento, CA 84 Water Productivity in Sacramento, CA: Liters of Water Needed to Produce 1 Liter of Wine 85 Agricultural Lands Served by “Mazzak” Canal in Wasit Governorate before and after Project Implementation 85 Major Components of the Hydrological Balance 88 Most Commonly Used Hydrological Models and Their Suitability in Both Physical and Spatial Scale 89 Cross-Section of a Qanat 99 Spate System in Yemen 101 Water-Dividing Structure in a Foggara, Algeria 102 GHG Projections for All Sectors, 1990–2017 122 AM0020, 2005 125 Historical Changes of Water Sources: Increasing Dam Storage Water 131 Urban Water Supply Progress and Benefits, 1875–1995 136 High Industrial Water Recycle Rate: Significantly Reduced Water Demands and Pollution Loads, 1960–2000 152 Cooling Tower Bringing Geothermal Water from the Sahara Down to a Temperature Usable in Irrigation 159 Growth in Treated Wastewater Used in Agriculture, Tunisia, 1990–2001 167 Growth in Volumes and Schemes for Artificial Aquifer Recharge in Tunisia 168 Tunisia Irrigated Area Equipped with Efficient On-Farm Irrigation Systems, 1995–2008 170 Evolution of Mean Water Allocations per Irrigated Hectare, 1990–2030 170 Map of Iraq 183 Drainage Problems in Sadr City 186 Badawa: A Polluted Urban Environment 186 Badawa after Completion of Rehabilitation Works 187 before and after Decentralized Treatment 410 22.1 Aerial View of West Delta of Nile River 256 19.2 Connections Realized in the First Two Years of Implementation 343 19.1 Bitit Irrigation Network with Seguia Names 217 15.3 Mahmoudia Canal Command Area Sub-Basins 406 22.2 Various Uses of RWSSP and Other Subprojects Water in Yemen. 2030–80 274 15.4a&b Consumers’ Perceptions of Direction of Change in Water System Maintenance after Completion of RWSSP and Other Projects 396 22.2 Breakdown of W-10 Investment 439 .1 Rural Population Lacking Access to Public/Private/ Cooperative Water Supply Networks in Yemen 383 21.1a&b Poverty-Sanitation Link 402 22.5 Priority Ranking within the Mit Yazid Command Area 408 22.x WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 11.3a&b Satisfaction with Water Services before and after RWSSP and Other Projects 395 21.7 Simulation Results for Self-Purification of BOD along Nishil Drain.2 Climate Change Impacts in North Africa: Range of Change in Runoff 277 17.8 Within Cluster Optimization 411 24. 2007–08 391 21.2 Consequence at National Level: Escalating Public Debt 402 22. 2005–09 369 21.1 Secular Rainfall Trends in Morocco’s Major River Basins.1 Input-Based Approach vs. Output-Based Approach 336 17.6 Example of Nishil Drain 409 22.2 Supply Cost Curve to Develop West Delta Project 361 20.1 Comparison with Regional Average (Middle East and North Africa) 195 12.2 Projected Sources of Capital Expenditures for Water Sector.1 Subsectoral Five-Year Investment Plans 369 20.1 Layout Map for Northern Part of Mit-Yazid Canal Showing W-10 Subproject Area 436 24.4 Applying Two Scenarios for Varying Cluster Sizes: Mit Yazid Command Area 407 22. 1 Recurrent Unit Costs and Associated Subsidies in WSS 4.5 Recommended Steps in Wastewater Infrastructure Development 463 MNA Region Rural and Urban Population Trends.3 27.2 A27. Yemen 520 Tables 3.3 26.1 27.1 Summary of Spatial Data Availability from Remote Sensing 83 6. Wadi Ahwar. Wadi Ahwar. by Country 481 Cumulative Global Capacity of Contracted and Operated Desalination Plants.1 26.1 A27.4 A27.1 26. Yemen 515 Interpreted Landcover of Wadi Ahwar Region. Wadi Ahwar. Yemen 519 Average Electrical Conductivity Levels. 1901–2000 484 Potential Operational Desalination Capacity in MNA Countries.1 Benchmarking Water and Sanitation Subsector 65 5. 2006 485 Ranges of Applicability for Desalination Processes 486 Schematic Diagram of Single-Pass RO Desalination Plant 488 Interest Rate Sensitivity Analysis of Water Production Cost for SWRO Desalination Plant in Gaza Strip 493 Energy Cost Sensitivity Analysis of Water Production Cost for SWRO Desalination Plant in Gaza Strip 493 MAR Classification: Overview of MAR Techniques and Subtechniques 499 Process of Saltwater Intrusion 511 Use of 2 Abstraction Wells at 1 Location to Counteract Salinization 511 Integrated Groundwater Management Plan 513 Location of Wadi Ahwar. by Region 481 Total Renewable Water Resources per Capita.4 26.6 26. 1950–2030 480 Actual Renewable Water Resources per Capita.2 26. Yemen 518 Average Well Depth.5 26.8 26. Yemen 516 Well Inventory and Extrapolated Groundwater Levels.4 A27.9 27.1 Ranges of Human Domestic Water Needs 98 47 .7 26.Contents xi 25.3 A27.2 27. 3 7. 2006 142 Water Cost Recovery: Unit Production Cost and Tariff.8 8. 1995–2005 160 Breakdown of Salinity of Water Resources 161 Breakdown of Water Resources Regarding Salinity in Relation to Total Potential Resources 161 Tunisia’s Reservoirs and Number of Areas Served 165 Tunisia’s Reservoirs That Serve Multiple Uses 166 Tunisia’s Main Water Transfer Systems and Their Characteristics 166 . March 31.7 9. 2010–18 127 Main Features of Visited Water Utilities and Japan.6 8.3 7.4 9.xii WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 6.2 9.9 8.1 7.4 8.11 8.2 7.1 9.2 8.7 8.5 9. 1968–2007 160 Tunisia: Change in Estimated Per Capita Long-Term Water Availability. 2006 143 Construction and Improvement Budget Sources of Sewerage Works. March 31. 2007 142 Income Statement of Sewerage Utilities.3 8.6 9.4 8. 1989–1995 99 Tabulation of Land Use Classes and Water Balances at Basin Scale 111 Irrigation and Drainage Service Quality Indicators 120 GHG Emissions as Reported to UNFCCC.2 6. 2006 144 Wastewater Cost Recover: Unit Operation Cost and Tariff 144 Number of Employees per 1.000 Connections 149 Outsource Ratio of Operational Expenditures 149 Spatial Distribution of Water Resources in Tunisia 158 Tunisia: Estimates of Potential Water Supplies.8 Spate Irrigation in Arab Countries.1 8. March 31.3 9.5 8. Average Year 136 Main Features of Visited Sewerage Utilities and Japan Average 137 Japan’s and International Water and Sewerage Utilities Working Ratios 139 Average User Tariff 139 Unaccounted-for Water 140 Income Statement of Water Supply Utilities.10 8. March 31.12 9. 1990 122 Change in Energy Use 123 Yearly Emission Reduction Resulting from Energy Savings. Contents xiii 9.9 9.10 9.11 9.12 9.13 9.14 9.15 11.1 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 18.1 19.1 20.1 21.1 21.2 21.3 Desalination Capacity in Tunisia, 1983–2000 167 Tunisia’s Evolution of Water Consumption, 1997–2005 169 Trends in Production and Consumption of Drinking Water, 1996–2007 171 Number of Water Supply Meters Replaced or Improved, 2004–2007 173 Evolution of Effectiveness of Dams at Regulating Irregular Flows, 1997–2006 175 Evolution of Rate of Exploitation of Water Resources in Tunisia, 1997–2004 175 Evolution of Average Yields for Drinking Water Systems in Tunisia, 1997–2007 176 Key GAC Issues and Mitigation Measures 198 Three Perennial Springs That Feed Bitit 214 Evolution of Water Allocations in Morocco, 1920s–2005 216 Water Shareholder Groups and Shares of Ait Ouallal by Main Seguia 218 Evolution of Irrigation Turn Duration over Time (Ait Moussa Hammi and Ait Hakka), 1940s–1990s 218 Price of Water, 1987 and 2005 223 Comparison of Water Tariff in Tadla Irrigation System, 1969–2004 224 Onion Price, 2000–05 225 Disputes and Agreements in Mashreq Countries, 2008 271 UN Watercourses Convention Timeline, 1970–1997 272 Typology of Interdependence 276 Simulations for Rio Bravo Basin, Mexico 278 Performance Targets and Outputs Required to Receive ONEP OBA Subsidy 349 Comparison of Characteristics of Piped and Open Channel Irrigation 359 Yield and Farm Revenue Increases Due to Improved Farming Practices: Planned Project Estimates vs. Actual Measurements 373 Number of Rural Water Schemes, June 2007 386 Sample Composition 386 Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Coverage in the Six Governorates of Yemen Included in RWSSP 387 xiv WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Coverage of RWSSP, June 2007 388 Surveyed Households with Connection to Piped Water Network 391 21.6 HH Reporting That “Project Water” Was Not Meeting Their Entire Household Needs 392 21.7 Top 7 Reasons Why “Project Water” Is Not Sufficient to Meet Entire Household Needs 392 21.8a Actual vs. Scheduled Water Supply in Dry Season 393 21.8b Actual vs. Scheduled Water Supply in Wet Season 393 21.9 Record of Service Failure on Scheduled Days in Past Year 394 21.10a RWSSP and Other Projects: Users’ Perceptions Regarding Their WUAs 394 21.10b RWSSP and Other Projects: Average Time for WUA to Fix a Problem 395 21.11 Differences between RWSSP and Other Projects in Service Satisfaction 396 21.12 User Preferences for Management of Water Schemes 397 21.13 Cost of Water Bill per Month in Unmetered and Metered HH, 2007–08 398 24.1 Average Incremental Yields and Incomes by Crop 441 24.2 Farm Models: Estimated Income Increases 442 A1.1 Monitoring and Evaluation Framework: Integrated Improvements Components and Expected Impacts 445 25.1 Economic Impacts of Wastewater Reuse: Examples of Costs and Benefits 450 25.2 Cost of Wastewater Collection, Treatment, and Reuse 451 25.3 Prices for Irrigation Water in Select MNA Countries 453 26.1 Expected Savings in Water Supply due to Application of Demand and Supply Management Techniques in MNA Region by 2025 484 26.2 Desalination Capacity in MNA 485 26.3 Estimated Energy Consumption for Desalination Processes 487 26.4 Qualitative Overview of Environmental Impacts of Three Desalination Technologies 490 26.5 Typical Cost Breakdown for RO Desalination Plant 492 27.1 Characteristics of Groundwater Storage, Small Dam Storage, and Large Dam Reservoirs 498 A27.1 Groundwater Balance, Wadi Ahwar, Yemen 519 21.4 21.5 Preface This volume is intended to serve as a water handbook. It represents the collective knowledge about water resources management acquired over recent years, both within the World Bank water team and with counterparts working in the Arab countries of North Africa and the Middle East (MNA). The chapters offer a cornucopia of ideas and themes. Some chapters are based on background papers prepared for the 2007 “MNA Development Report on Water.” Others draw on sector work prepared at the request of client countries. Yet others summarize observations based on study tours or other learning events sponsored by the World Bank. Upon reviewing this lodestone of embedded knowledge, we realized that bringing together our observations and analyses could serve a useful purpose for public officials, other practitioners, academics, and students who are interested in learning more about the complexities of managing water resources management in one of the driest parts of the world. N. Vijay Jagannathan Ahmed Shawky Mohamed Alexander Kremer xv Acknowledgments This book is the collective effort of the water team of the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) Region of the World Bank, which consists of staff members and consultants working on water issues in most countries of the Arab world and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The core team consisted of the three editors, N. Vijay Jagannathan (Sector Manager, Water), Ahmed Shawky Mohamed (Senior Water Resources Specialist), and Alexander Kremer (Senior Sector Economist), as well as Alicia Hetzner (Language Editor), and Georgine Seydi (Program Assistant). Our debt of gratitude extends to a long list of colleagues in the MNA water team who have contributed chapters, often toiling long beyond their working hours and facing impossible deadlines imposed by the substance editors. Among the several consultants who have contributed, Chris Perry—who came up with the ABCDE approach, the organizing framework for the book’s chapters—is gratefully acknowledged. The team would like to express appreciation for the guidance and support received from three colleagues in the World Bank: Nadereh Chamlou and Omer Karasapan, who gave us helpful advice; and Juan Diego Rodriguez, whose support made the production of this book possible. In addition, the two peer reviewers, Shawki Barghouti (Director General of the International Center for Biosaline Agriculture, Dubai) and Rory O’Sullivan (Consultant to the Bank’s working group on Embedded Knowledge), spent hours plowing through hundreds of pages of the various papers and giving very insightful comments and guidance to the team. xvii xviii WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Finally, the team would like to thank Laszlo Lovei, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Sustainable Development Department, for his unwavering support and confidence, without which this enterprise could never have been completed in the timeframe required; and Nadir Mohammed, Operations Director of the MNA Region, for his encouragement to include this volume as a contribution to the region’s Arab World Initiative. The MNA Region gratefully acknowledges the generous cofinancing of this work by the Dutch government via the Bank-Netherlands Water Partnership Program (BNWPP). Acronyms and Abbreviations AA ABCDE Administrative Agencies Assessment, Bargaining, Codification, Delegation, and Engineering ABR Anaerobic baffled reactors ACAP Anti-Corruption Action Plan AFD Agence Française de Développement AGOSD Alexandria General Organization for Sanitary Drainage AM0020 Approved Monitoring Methodology, “Monitoring Methodology for Water Pumping Efficiency Improvements” APFAMGS Andhra Pradesh Farmer-Managed Groundwater Systems Project (FAO-India) APWELL Andhra Pradesh Ground Water Irrigation Schemes (FAO-India) ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers AUEA Associations des Usagers des Eaux Agricoles (WUA) AWC Arab Water Council AWGA Alexandria Water General Authority AWI Arab World Initiative BAU Business as usual BC Branch canal BCM Billion cubic meters BCWUA Branch canal water user association BIA Benefit Incidence Assessment BOD Biological oxygen demand BOO Build-Operate-Own xix xx WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS BOT C/D CAP CAS CBA CBA CBO CDA CER CF CLEQM CMD COCA CPA CPA CRDA CSO CWMP DBL DBO DEM DEP DG GREE DGRE DH DIR DNA DO DWB EC ED EEAA EMWIS EPA Build-Operate-Transfer Codification and delegation Compliance Action Plan Country assistance strategy Cost-benefit analysis Catch Basin Authority (Morocco); cost-benefit analysis Community-based organization Community development association Certified Emissions Reduction (CDM) Conversion factor Central Laboratory for Environment Quality Monitoring (Egypt) Clean development mechanism Central Organization for Control and Auditing CDM Program Activity Design Document Coalition Provisional Authority Regional Center for Agriculture Development (Tunisia) Civil society organization Community Water Management Project (Yemen) Design-Build-Lease Design-Build-Operate Digital elevation maps Department of Environmental Protection (New York City) General Department of Agricultural Engineering and Water/Direction Générale du Génie Rural et de l’Exploitation des Eaux Director General of Water Resources (Tunisia) Dirham Detailed Implementation Review (WB INT) Designated Operational Entity Dissolved oxygen District Water Board Electrical conductivity Electrodialysis Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency Euro-Mediterranean Information System on KnowHow in the Water Sector (EU) US Environmental Protection Agency Acronyms and Abbreviations xxi EPADP EQO ER ERR ESRI ET FARMOD Egyptian Public Authority for Drainage Projects Environmental Quality Objective Emissions reduction Economic rate of return Environmental Services Research Institute Evapotranspiration Software developed by FAO and WB to evaluate agricultural projects FAS Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA) FDC Farmer Design Committee FO Farmer Organization G.E.O.R.E. Optimal Water Resource Management Project (Tunisia) GAC Governance and corruption GAFRD General Authority of Fish Resources Development (Egypt) GAP Good Agricultural Practices (certificate) GAPWSD General Authority for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (Egypt) GARPAD General Authority for Rehabilitation Projects and Agricultural Development (Egypt) GARWSP General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (Yemen) GDA Agricultural development group GFI Government financial institution GHG Greenhouse gas GIC Communal interest groups (Tunisia) GIS Geographic information system GLDAS Global Land Data Assimilation System GOE Government of Egypt GOFI General Organization for Industrialization (Egypt) GOGCWS General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply GOI Government of Indonesia GOSDC General Organization for Sanitary Drainage in Cairo GOY Government of Yemen GPOBA Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid GSCP Groundwater and Soil Conservation Project (Yemen) GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GWh Gigawatt hour xxii WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS GW-MATE ha HMSO HRU IC ICID ID IDRA IFI IIIMP IIP IIS IMT INDH INS INT IPCC IPTRID IRR IWMD IWMI IWRM KfW KRG KWH or Kw/h l/s LE LGU LLL LWCP LWUA M&E m3 Groundwater Management Advisory Team Hectare(s) Her Majesty’s Stationery Office Hydrologic response unit Irrigation Council International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage Irrigation Department (Egypt) Institute for Development Research and Alternatives International financial institution Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project Irrigation Improvement Project Irrigation Improvement Sector Irrigation Management Transfer (Egypt) National Initiative for Human Development/Initiative Nationale de Développement Humain National Statistical Institute/Institut National de la Statistique (Tunisia) Department of Institutional Integrity (WB) International Panel on Climate Change International Programme for Technology and Research in Irrigation and Drainage Internal rate of return Integrated Water Resources Management District International Water Management Institute Integrated Water Resources Management Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Entwicklungsbank (German development bank) Ministry of Municipalities of the Kurdistan Regional Government Kilowatt hour Liter/second Egyptian pound/livre égyptienne Local Government Unit Laser land-leveling Land and Water Conservation Project (Yemen) Local Water Utilities Administration Monitoring and evaluation Cubic meter Acronyms and Abbreviations xxiii m3/s MAD MAI MALR MAR MARH MDG MEB MED METRIC MEW MHUNC MIAC MIS Mm3 MMPW MNA MNSRE MOB MoEE MoHP MoI MoLD MoSEA MoT MPN MSF MTEF Mw MWE MWRI NASA NDS NIA NIB Cubic meters per second Moroccan currency Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (Yemen) Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (Egypt) Managed Aquifer Recharge Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources/Ministère de l’Agriculture et des Ressources Hydrauliques (Tunisia) Millennium Development Goal Multi-effect boiling Multi-effect distillation; Mechanical and Electrical Department (Egypt) Mapping Evapo-Transpiration with High Resolution and Internalized Calibration Ministry of Electricity and Water (Yemen) Ministry of Housing, Utilities and New Communities (Egypt) Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication Management Information System Million cubic meters Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (Iraq) Middle East and North Africa Region Middle East and North Africa Rural Development, Water and Environment Mayoralty of Baghdad Ministry of Electricity and Energy (Egypt) Ministry of Health and Population (Egypt) Ministry of Industry (Egypt) Ministry of Local Development (Egypt) Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (Egypt) Ministry of Transport (Egypt) Most probable number Multi-Stage Flash Medium-term expenditure framework Megawatt Ministry of Water and Environment (Yemen) Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (Egypt) National Aeronautics and Space Administration (US) National Development Strategy National Irrigation Administration (Egypt) National Investment Bank xxiv WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS NOPWASD National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (Egypt) NRW Nonrevenue water NWRA National Water Resources Authority (Yemen) NWRC National Water Research Center (Egypt) NWSSIP National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (Yemen) O&M Operation and maintenance OBA Output-based aid ONAS National Sanitation Agency ONEP National Water Supply Company/Office National de l’Eau Potable (Morocco) ORMVA Regional irrigation and agricultural development agencies/Offices régionaux de mise en valeur agricole (du Maroc) PAD Project appraisal document PAGER National Program for Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (Morocco) PDO Project development objective PER Public expenditure review PERSIANN Precipitation Estimation for Remotely Sensed Information Using Artificial Neural Networks PES Payment for environmental services PIM Participatory Irrigation Management PISEAU Water Investment Program (Tunisia) PIU Project implementation unit PMU Project management unit PNEEI National Program of Irrigation Water Conservation PoA DD Program of Activities Design Document (CDM) PPE Participation au Premier Etablissement PPI Public irrigation scheme PPIAF Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility PPIIGB [public land irrigated by large dams] (Tunisia) Ppm Parts per million PPP Public-private partnership PSIA Poverty and Social Impact Assessment PVC Polyvinyl chloride PWP Public Works Project (Yemen) RES Renewable energy source Rg Overall network yield . Regulatory Office (West Delta Project. and Participation Framework Total dissolved solids Task team leader Unaccounted-for-water United Nations Environment Programme US Department of Agriculture Vapor compression Plant entry volume . Egypt) Remote sensing Rural Sanitation Unit River Transport Authority (Egypt) Rural water supply Services Agencies Decision support system (Spain) Sistema Automatico de Informacion Hidrologica Sana’a Basin Water Management Project Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (Spain) Separable Costs Remaining Benefits Surface Energy Balance Algorithm of Land Stockholm Environment Institute See EMWIS Social Fund for Development (Yemen) Système d’Information National des Ressources en Eau (Tunisia) Small and medium enterprise Supreme National Agency for the Control of Corruption School of Oriental and African Studies National Authority for Water Exploitation and Distribution Strategic Research Unit (Egypt) Suspended solid Soil and Water Assessment Tool Saline Water Conversion Corporation (Saudi Arabia) Soils. Accountability.Acronyms and Abbreviations xxv RO RS RSU RTA RWS SA SAD SAIH SBWMP SCADA SCRB SEBAL SEI SEMIDE SFD SINEAU SME SNACC SOAS SONODE SRU SS SWAT SWCC SWERI TA TAP TDS TTL UFW UNEP USDA VC VES Reverse osmosis. Water and Environment Research Institute (MALR. Egypt) Technical assistance Transparency. r.t.xxvi WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS VSA VSB VSM VSS w. WAJ WASAMED WB WBI WEAP WES WQM WRM WSS WSSP WTP WUA WUG Conveyance plant volume Cities Without Slums/Ville Sans Bidonville Volume of briny water Service plant volume With respect to Water Authority of Jordan Water Saving in Mediterranean Agriculture World Bank World Bank Institute Water Evaluation and Planning System Water and Environmental Sanitation Program (UNICEF) Water quality management Water resource management Water supply and sanitation Water Sector Support Programme (Yemen) Willingness to pay Water user association Water user group . Consequently. Frederiksen (2005) distinguishes between resource stewardship (which is always a function of government. is made by World Bank 2004. and Christopher J. water management in the MNA countries has been strongly influenced by the idea of integrated water resource management (IWRM).1 If O The same point. conveyed. the stewardship function must set some of the boundaries for service provision to protect the interests of all users. although described for just the water supply and sanitation sector. In the MNA context. This process advocated new approaches for the assessment. management. private. 1 1 . They depend on the commitment of governments and communities to adopt new approaches and back them by “substantial and immediate investments. technology development. or cooperative). Once water resources are scarce and the possibility arises that one use affects another. have very few rivers—some of which carry runoff from other countries—and often rely on fragile (and sometimes nonrenewable) aquifers. Vijay Jagannathan. and legislative and institutional changes” (Salman 2006). their economies are much more sensitive to the way that water is extracted. public awareness campaigns. IWRM is particularly vital because hydraulic infrastructure plays such a critical economic role. and consumed than are the economies of other regions. Ahmed Shawky Mohamed. IWRM processes attempt to provide holistic solutions to water issues. These countries are in either the arid or hyper-arid zone.Introduction: Beyond WRM— Unbundling Water Management in MNA Countries N. exercised on behalf of the nation) and service provision (which may be public. Perry 1 ver the past two decades. and development of freshwater resources. depend on seasonal rainfall. capacity building programs. These changes . The key IPCC messages for MNA are the high incidence of reduced flows. and increasing evaporation (+5 percent to +20 percent) (IPCC. IPCC 2008. For North Africa and the Middle East region over the next century. and agreement (indicated by hatching in figure 1. conflicts. Climate change challenges these conventional assumptions and may alter the reliability of water management systems. severity of the projected declines in rainfall.8. figure 2. tion of change. the outcome will not be optimal. but rather. New Concern: Climate Change Looking ahead. declining runoff (–10 percent to –40 percent). for the MNA region. water managers have typically assumed that the natural resource base is reasonably constant over the medium term and.2 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS these institutional processes are inadequate or arbitrary.” —Bates and others. declining soils moisture (–5 percent to –10 percent). climate change poses additional challenges for IWRM: “Water managers have long dealt with changing demands for water resources.1) of the vast majority Sources: Milly and others 2005. showing the details for runoff. While average rainfall worldwide is anticipated to increase marginally.10 of the IPCC report. Hatched areas: More than 90% of models agree on the sign of change . the 2008 IPCC report anticipates declining rainfall (–10 percent to –25 percent). the picture is quite different. 48 This stark statement applies nowhere more forcefully than in the MNA countries. 2008. and unproductive water use. that past hydrological experience provides a good guide to future conditions. higher temperatures. one of wasted public finances. therefore. Notes: White areas: Less than 66% of the ensemble of 12 models agree on the sign of of models on the negative direcchange. interpreted from figures in text). To date.1 reproduces figure 2. Figure 1. ranges are indicative. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. policymakers are faced with the challenge to craft policy instruments that balance sustainable water management against the various political and social conflicts. . communities. Agriculture (which utilizes 80 percent–90 percent of water in most MNA countries)4 will not enjoy guaranteed water supply at past historical quantities. 3 See Sadoff and others (2008) for a description of how benefit-sharing concepts have led to greater cooperation among Nile riparian countries. who has been advising the water regulators of the Murray Darling Basin on how to regulate and manage these difficult trade-offs. and individuals over water. The future is likely to experience more competition and conflict among countries. The farmer lobby likely will demand more water. Urban water utilities will demand more water to meet the needs of growing. If there is increased variability in rainfall (as has been experienced in southeast Australia in the Murray-Darling Basin). 5 Personal communication from Professor Michael Young. 2.Introduction 3 will create a new and more difficult context for water management. At either the subregional or regional level.3 Under these circumstances. 4 Share of different subsectors’ water consumption in the MNA countries is available in the “MNA Development Report on Water” (World Bank 2007). increased environmental flows will continue to be necessary for rivers and streams to maintain and regenerate themselves. They further elevate the significance of the stewardship function of current generations of water managers for the future generations of water users for two reasons: 1. finding solutions to move water from one location to another (as from sparsely populated irrigated areas to growing cities. while learning what is working and what is not working in existing programs and policies. more prosperous populations. sectors. “Regional level” refers to watercourses that are shared between two or more countries. crafting politically acceptable policies that set in motion the required adjustments among all the affected stakeholders will require institutional mechanisms that mitigate conflicts and enhance a culture of benefit-sharing. Finally. increased requirements for municipal and industrial use will cut into agriculture’s water share. or from a municipal treatment plant to a water-stressed agricultural region for reuse) will meet stiff political and social resistance. arguing that crop needs increase with temperature and rainfall variability.2 At the macro and international levels.5 Farmers perforce will have to change water usage patterns at a time when plant water requirements 2 “Subregional level” refers to aquifers and river basins within a country. whereas the scarcity of water is in the area of very high population density (Nile Delta). Are the Arab Countries Well-Positioned to Face These New Challenges? Most countries in the MNA region face challenges on both fronts. the inflows into Lake Nasser-Nubia are likely to increase. The abundance of water is in an area of hyperaridity and very low population density (Toshka). In contrast.4 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS are increasing. political. the forthcoming challenge—due to climate change—will be to also manage the social.or regionspecific strategies for agricultural water management will need to be developed that focus on agricultural income productivity per unit of water. changing water use patterns will make management more difficult. For areas whose supplies currently are adequate (most of Egypt. with higher rainfall in the catchment areas of the Nile River. and industries. The outcomes 6 IPCC estimates suggest that. the entirely new challenge of managing alternating abundance and scarcity will arise. . and institutional processes of balancing the water use interests of present generations vs. leading to larger spillovers into the Toshka depression because of capacity constraints in this massive reservoir. economic. Meanwhile. For areas that already are operating with far less water than is required. downstream in lower Egypt. future generations. and technological fronts.7 In brief. for example). households. 8 See Briscoe and Malik 2007.” but “act disintegrated” approach to water management. See chapters by Bekele and others and Perry and Bucknall.8 What do these trends imply for IWRM programs in MNA countries? This volume argues that one needs to look beyond IWRM processes to learn more about the key actions that need to be taken on the institutional. mechanisms for allocating water among countries and among sectors within countries need to focus on generating sustainable outcomes. IWRM approaches so far have advocated a holistic “think integrated. municipal and industrial uses will continue to cut into the agricultural water share. In the case of water resource management. with regard to both managing water resources in a sustainable manner and ensuring affordable and reliable water service delivery to farmers. rather than per unit of land.6 Country. 7 The good news is that recent developments in technology have the potential to enable this shift in measurement. Figure 1. and more difMorocco ficult to control. which is easier to over-exploit. the resultant tendency to “backload” or defer maintenance.2 Conceptual Framework to Explain Ideal IWRM do relatively better in water re. several countries in the region have a vicious circle of poor service delivery exacerbated by high operations and maintenance (O&M) costs. The vertical axis classifies two situations: (1) one in which the financial sustainability of irrigation and water supply services has been achieved by recovering O&M costs from service users. poor services. minimizing prolonged conflicts among competing users). In addition. countries with sources of renewable surface water (such as large rivers) Figure 1. Regarding water service delivery. or the YES NO IWRM ideals. failures in policy. consequently. and the environmental aspect (that is. Predictably. and.2 represents four possible outcomes. water management in general has suffered from poor accountability (both external to service users and internal within resource management and service delivery organizations). It describes their success in achieving the stewardship function. Tunisia. The horizontal axis classifies countries in two categories: according to whether they have or have not been able to sustainably manage the water resource base.Outcomes source management compared to countries that depend wholly Jordan. Lebanon. Of the four possible outIraq and Iran comes. WB&G (the upper right box) will lead Syria to sustainable outcomes. More and more investments are being required to remedy the deferred maintenance of already installed hydraulic infrastructure in the region (World Bank 2007). soundly managing aquifers to avoid groundwater depletion. responding to user demand is a continuous challenge that will be exacerbated by climate change. some GCC YES on groundwater. In the other three Sustainable use of the WR base boxes. low end-user tariffs. conceptually only one NO Egypt Yemen. In summary. and maintaining instream water quality in rivers and lakes).Introduction 5 must be sustainable in both their social/political aspects (that is. or in the Financially sustainable services ? . and (2) the other in which there is inadequate cost recovery. comprising Recoverable fraction.6 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 1.” . the contingent liability in the Ministry of Finance will increase rapidly. operations. Once the system is constructed.9 9 Countries have major variations in cost recovery policies. transpiration from an irrigated crop. a stock. and maintenance can be recovered from the users. See Shawky chapter on “Benefit Incidence Analysis in Egypt’s Water Resources and Irrigation Sector. spending $1 on an irrigation system. and water) present the two key facets of IWRM. evaporation from a cooling tower. moist or waterlogged land. consisting of water evaporated or transpired for the intended purpose—for example. with consequences for benefit incidence. consisting of water that can be captured and reused—for example. Nonrecoverable fraction. consisting of water that is lost to further use—for example. and a flow.1 What a Water Steward Should Monitor To avoid the obvious confusion that arises when improved efficiency in one sector increases the water available for other uses. The vertical axis describes to what degree a country is managing its water in a financially sustainable manner. flows of brine from a desalination plant. unless costs of investments. weeds. Nonbeneficial consumption. The two axes of this diagram (finance. return flows from sewage systems. evaporation from water surfaces. There is an economic and political trade-off between spending $1 toward construction of an urban water supply system vs. flows to drains that return to the river system and percolation from irrigated fields to aquifers. a receipt. Nonconsumed fraction. The rules for financial accounting are known and proven—there is no debate about what constitutes a payment. implementation of policy. while improved efficiency in another sector decreases the availability for other uses. result in countries falling short of the IWRM ideals. consisting of water evaporated or transpired for purposes other than the intended use—for example. the following terminology was recently adopted by the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (Perry 2007): Consumed fraction (evaporation and transpiration) comprising Beneficial consumption. The term does not distinguish between uses that remove water from further use (evaporation from wet soil or wetlands. hydropower. of course). In a dry region such as MNA. nonconsumed fraction. comprising (1) groundwater sinks. while the whole purpose of an irrigation system is to increase crop water consumption. (b) Withdrawal is water abstracted from streams. If the latter is collected and treated (requiring capital-intensive investments. “Using” water is thus not as unambiguous Total as “spending” money. .3 shows these distinctions with illustrative data. or storage for any use. most of this water is released back to the water system as wastewater.Introduction 7 The horizontal axis describes how far a country is managing its water in an environmentally sustainable manner. transpiration from irrigated crops. This aspect is more complex in terms of monitoring and building up remedial actions. Urban water supply systems Figure 1. the receiving water body is able to regenerate itself in both quantity and quality. forests) and uses that have little quantitative impact on water availability (navigation. open canals) and optimizing the extraction 10 Definitions: (a) Water use is water made available deliberately by rainfall or other natural means for an identified activity. minimizing nonbeneficial consumption (such as evaporation from reservoirs. or (2) flows to the sea. most domestic uses). deep aquifers that are not economically exploitable. The proportions of the Nonconsumed two categories vary from region nonrecoverable to region.3 Water Consumptive Uses and Losses serve primarily nonconsumptive Consumed fraction users. because agriculture has both consumpConsumed. a cubic meter of water delivered to an irrigation project will largely be consumed— through transpiration by crops and evaporation. For example. The remaining part of the original diverted water is returned to the hydrological system. the sustainrecoverable ability of the water resource base could be severely jeopardized by unproductive consumption by agriculture and by inadequate policy attention being paid to managing the recoverable. when a cubic meter of water allocated to an urban water supply system goes to a household. In contrast.10 Figure 1. groundwater. nontive and nonconsumptive uses beneficial of water. Depending on agroNonconsumed climatic conditions. Taking a historical example. 5. The users at each level have agreed on the principles for sharing water (for example. 3. This is a BARGAINING process. 2. 4. This is DELEGATION. Finally. Where necessary—particularly for larger schemes in which a number of farmer groups exist—intermediate responsibilities and arrangements for implementation are defined. prioritized by use or shared in accordance with land-holding or contribution to the original development). but at least based on experience. Similarly. or Persian wheel. the users are able to ASSESS the availability of water and what institutional measures it would take to keep this availability in future years. Over time. the Egyptian irrigation system evolved over several millennia as riverine communities learned how to harness the annual floods to develop irrigated agriculture in an arid climate. these communities constructed inundation canals. in the coastal areas of Yemen. and forthcoming) that water management at a time of societal competition for the resource could be viewed in terms of five elements:11 1.8 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS of recoverable fractions (such as sewage flows and farm runoffs) clearly become key policy priorities of future stewardship. to lift water to their fields. delivering the service requires infrastructure— ENGINEERING. Organizational Framework for the Contributions to This Volume The volume is organized around the observation by Perry (2003. The agreed principles for sharing are translated into operational rules that govern day-to-day distribution of water. That the water supply is known and accessible to the user groups—not necessarily precisely. This is a process of CODIFICATION. and with experience. 2008. communities harnessed flash floods or spate flows from the highlands through an elaborate system of earthen dikes and irrigation structures to grow food and cash crops. Through collective action that involved defining individual and group roles and responsibilities. and later devised the sakia. . Developing complex institutional rules that created 11 The framework was adopted during a meeting in Abu Dhabi in July 2008 to consider the proposed Arab Water Academy as a hub for organizing research and training. For example. or constructed and operated by government. there will be significant implications for other components. The key is not particular patterns of ownership. public. and facilities may be collectively owned. Codification took place either informally through norms and conventions. Decisions on when and what to construct were based on a long process of community engagement that was fairly well grounded in terms of (1) awareness of water availability and constraints. Because they are integrated. Where there was more than one level of management (as in Egypt’s inundation systems. and mesqas in the Nile delta was based on the knowledge passed down from one generation to another of water stocks. Certain rights and responsibilities were delegated among farmers. qanat in Iran. aflaj in Oman. but rather that each component is compatible with the other parts. both written laws and customary practice are effective. Organizing this book around the ABCDE framework enables the reader to appreciate the multifaceted nature of water management. In other words. another key element was the learning and feedback loop. through which institutions evolve and more hydraulic infrastructure gets augmented. droughts. Successful water resource management requires that all the ABCDE elements are in place and are mutually compatible. or among the spate structures of Yemen). the organization of spate irrigation in Yemen. and seasonal variability. a variety of technologies are useful. simple technologies. or formally through Islamic jurisprudence. or irrigation technology. when any of these components is changed. (2) institutional rules that were accepted by community members. and predictability of natural events (floods. the framework can be applied at both levels—first allocating the main supply among user-groups. and (3) construction technologies familiar to communities.Introduction 9 incentives to collaborate and constructing physical structures that provided irrigation water to groups and to farmers within groups were the two key features of Yemen’s process. seasonal rainfalls). Obviously. Bargaining within groups led to the internalization and institutionalization of behaviors within and among groups. flows. types of water rights. private. . and individual actors all contribute to successful water resource management. Compatibility among the ABCDE components is a feature of traditional water management systems that are based on limited information but extensive experience. then allocating the group supply among individuals. while others devolved to village leaders and sheikhs. Once funds are made available. the water “surplus” can be used either without detriment. these capital-intensive investments substantially impacted delicate water balances. engineering solutions are implemented. as well as for codifying rules to access investment finances. .1). or with suitable compensation. particularly when energy subsidies gave wealthy landowners privileged access to powerful pumpsets. bargaining processes that had centered on local. The state agency also makes no attempt to define a formal specification of a water entitlement. and aggravated competition among water users. to existing users. Codification is focused around financing rules. altered the flow of rivers. not enough attention gets paid to assessing what worked and what did not work in existing informal institutional arrangements. Under these circumstances. increased the pace of groundwater extraction. The decline of informal norms and conventions led to examples of water capture by elites. because the state typically finances the capital investments. assessment of water availability is based on historical data and onsite technical investigations by a state agency. Overall. In the latter situation. Observed Variants of the ABCDE Model In this section. Financing options for lumpy investments changed relationships within communities and. well-understood norms and conventions were supplanted by communities “receiving” irrigation and water supply services from large government-sponsored programs. some observed “unbundled” practices are described in terms of the ABCDE framework. Under these circumstances. However. Moving Straight from A to C In this variant. Little attention is paid to water accounting (box 1. New technologies arrived that short-circuited traditional procedures for accessing and utilizing water.10 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Much of traditional water management has changed in the past 50 years. because water is available at the proposed investment location. state agencies assumed the full responsibility for the assessment phase. In practical terms. The state agencies usually assume that. it imposes weak conditionalities for cost recovery from users. the state appropriated the right to decide where and when to invest in hydraulic infrastructure and to whom to provide the resultant water services. more importantly. between communities and the state. A and B become immediate priorities. Concerning water resources. For example. the latter are paid by water users who benefit from using the service. or regional irrigation and agricultural development agencies) was designed based on rainfall data of past decades. Introducing B in the Process Given today’s climate change concerns. often in excess of safe yields. the MNA Sustainable Development Department’s economic and sector work (ESW) in Arab countries. and population shifts to cities require information and knowledge-sharing among all water stakeholders in the country. Irrigation infrastructure in the large-scale irrigation perimeters (ORMVAs. Farmers respond to the lack of reliable surface water by investing in pumping groundwater. financing constraints. . Under these uncertainties. Thus. there is no certainty that water entitlements are consistent with overall availability. First and most significant. the codification process recognizes the need to delegate responsibilities with a modified set of rules that separates the public and private good aspects. The former are paid by the state. Organization of Chapters The chapters of this book are organized to present MNA staff observations and analyses of various aspects of IWRM through 3 types of activities commissioned over the past 3 years: 1. assessments of water availability based on past data are no longer reliable. This work was summarized in the 2007 “MNA Development Report on Water” and in other initiatives of individual team members.(or aquifer-) level accounting framework. recent precipitation has been 30 percent–40 percent lower than the historical trends (although 2009 rainfall has been adequate). Different forms of bargaining and institutional arrangements ranging from informal contracts to tradable water rights become relevant policy options that need to be debated. Assessments and feedback of the risks to water resources from accelerating climate change. this infrastructure over-designed water conveyance networks and under-served the beneficiary farmers. in Morocco’s river basins.Introduction 11 Moving Straight from A to C and Then to D In response to the weaknesses of the earlier approach. in the absence of a basin. Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector: Lessons from the Design of an Anticorruption Action Plan N. Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War Iraq A10. The final section evaluates the emerging opportunities offered by innovative technologies that could be harnessed to meet the emerging water challenges. and Manish Kumar Bekele Debele Negewo. Egypt Case Study: Energy Efficiency CDM Program: Irrigation and Drainage Pumping Sector A7. Vijay Jagannathan Ahmed Shawky Mohamed and N. The second (B) section illustrates the importance of bargaining among water stakeholders to reach sustainable solutions. the assessment section has the largest and most diverse selection of chapters.12 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 2. The organizing principle for these chapters has been the ABCDE. Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience A8. They range from general themes such as governance and climate change to specific assessments of topics that offer useful learning and knowledge-sharing to the reader. Perry and Julia Bucknall Abdulhamid Azad Satoru Ueda and Mohammed Benouahi Mohamed El Hedi Louati and Julia Bucknall Sana Agha Al Nimer Maher Abu-Taleb and Richard Calkins . Predictably. 3. Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models in Water Resource Management and Planning in MNA Region A5. Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management A9. Julia Bucknall. Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: Spending Less for Better Services A4. Observations from study tours and project-level engagements by MNSSD staff. The third section reviews the various “rules of the game”—both formal codification experiences in the region vis-à-vis water laws and specific financing rules that alter incentives for water service delivery. Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management: Lessons from the “MNA Development Report on Water” A2. Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World: New Analytical Tools for New Challenges A6. Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review A3. Alexander Kremer. The fourth (D) section reports on specific country-level initiatives that have delegated water service responsibilities to the lowest appropriate level. and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed Christopher J. Insights and analyses by the MNA water unit staff on specific countryoriented topics that could be of general interest in Arab countries. Assessments of Water Availability and Water Management A1. Vijay Jagannathan Ahmed Shawky Mohamed. Vijay Jagannathan . The fourth chapter describes how remote-sensing (RS) data and modeling techniques provide new tools for water planners and project managers. and Remote Rural Village in Djibouti Recently Become a Government Priority to Receive Water Supply and Sanitation? B3. The fifth chapter looks at how irrigation management practices need to be changed to effectively respond to climate change predictions. and implications for global public goods. Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit. financing. with Julia Bucknall and Nathalie Abu-Ata Christopher Ward N. How Did a Small.” The second and third chapters describe the findings of a Public Expenditure Review (PER) on water in Egypt. The first chapter summarizes the lessons from the 2007 “MNA Development Report on Water.Introduction 13 The first 10 chapters summarize the World Bank Middle East and North Africa Region (MNA) findings from assessments of key policy issues relating to water management in terms of the resource itself (both in terms of quantity and quality). The seventh chapter presents the Japanese experience in benchmarking the performance of the water and sanitation service providers. The eighth chapter presents the case of inter-basin water transfers in Tunisia. The sixth chapter describes the new financing mechanisms made available to the irrigation sector in reaction to rising global concerns about climate. Poor. The ninth chapter describes the lessons learned in Iraq toward reforming the water supply and sanitation sector after the war. and analyze who among the various stakeholders have benefitted from existing public expenditures on water. Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century Rachid Abdellaoui Sarah Houssein. Bargaining among Water Stakeholders B1. Morocco B2. The last chapter discusses new institutional arrangements in Yemen aimed at governance and anticorruption reforms. Water Conflict in Yemen: The Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms B4. The next two chapters summarize an experience of targeting subsidies to poor households so that they are able to access safe drinking water with house connections in urban and rural areas in Morocco. The first chapter describes the region’s experience with formal codification through water laws and regulations. Craig Meisner. Codification Experiences in MNA C1. Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen Naji Abu Hatim and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed Susmita Dasgupta. The first chapter discusses how bargaining and consequent trading of informal water rights have taken place in a Moroccan village. The second chapter describes how a poor community in Djibouti was able to exercise its voice with the government. Andrew Makokha. The forth chapter describes a new set of project rules aimed at generating public-private partnerships in Egypt’s irrigation sector. Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen D 2. by which affected stakeholders are able to exercise voice and choice in decisions that relate to their water resources and water services. Subsidies for the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach Providing Basic Services to Poor Periurban Neighborhoods in Morocco C3. Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco C4. New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in Irrigation: Lessons from Egypt’s West Delta Project Jackson Morill and Jose Simas Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani Aldo Baietti and Safwat Abdel-Dayem The third group of chapters is elucidates codification in the water sector. The last chapter describes the emerging lessons for water diplomacy or bargaining among countries sharing watercourses.14 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS The second group of chapters is devoted to bargaining. Delegation to the Lowest Appropriate Level D1. Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries C2. and Richard Pollard . The third chapter describes the role of tribal and local traditions in resolving conflicts over water in Yemen. . Wendy Wakeman. During this trip. Juan Morelli. and Marc Jeuland Khairy Al-Jamal and Manuel Schiffler Arjen de Vries and Tarun Ghawana. Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries Ayat Soliman.Introduction 15 D3. and Hani El Sadani Claire Kfouri. Supervised by Ahmed Shawky Mohamed The fifth group discusses engineering aspects and comprises forward-looking studies of new water investment approaches. The second chapter evaluates user satisfaction with communitymanaged RWSS services in Yemeni villages. they learned how that country implemented delegation to the lowest appropriate level in both aspects of water management: the resource itself and water supply. The last chapter is a report based on a joint study tour to Spain by MNA water staff and counterparts. Ahmed Shawky Mohamed. Water Reuse in the MNA Region: Constraints. Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta E2. incorporating both extending sanitation services and improving water quality in receiving bodies. sanitation and irrigation services. Pier Mantovani. Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework: Case Study of Application in the Delta Region. Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region E4. whereby engineers “right-sized” design standards with community participation. Egypt D4. The third chapter discusses new planning approaches to rural sanitation in Egypt. and Policy Recommendations E3. and Alexander Bakalian The fourth group of chapters describes MNA staff experiences with delegation of services to the lowest appropriate level. Maged Hamed. Experiences. The first chapter analyzes an interesting experience in participatory irrigation management and cost-sharing in Yemen. The first chapter presents a very interesting experience in Egypt. Engineering New Approaches E1. Abdulhamid Azad. Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Coastal Areas in Yemen: Case Study of Wadi Ahwar Jose Simas. and Mohammed Mehany Ahmed Shawky Mohamed. ?The ABCDE of Water Management. and R. 2008.” . Share Managed Waters across Boundaries. given climate change. 2004. ____. 2007.” Journal of Environmental Engineering (May): 667–75.. Climate Change and Water. T.J. University of Delft. ?Efficient Irrigation.P. 2007. and G. Wu. 2006. which. “Regulatory Frameworks for Water Resource Management.16 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS The next two chapters summarize the findings of World Bank MNA staff studies that evaluate the potentials of wastewater reuse and desalination. J. Onn. B. 1994. and J. and others. 2005.S. Perry. H. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Briscoe. ____. “Addressing Water Crisis in Developing Countries." In Water Issues in Southeast Asia: Present Trends and Future Directions. Sadoff. L. April. Milly. Delft Hydraulics. X.” World Bank. 2007. C. Flawed Recommendations. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. “Public and Private Sector Roles in Water Supply and Sanitation Services. Frederiksen.. ____.” April.. Kundzewicz.” Research report. Greiber. "River Basin Agreements as Facilitators of Development. Geneva: IUCN Water and Nature Initiative.. are two important areas. S. ed.? Draft guidance note contribution to the draft paper for the Arab Water Academy courses. Salman M.P. Smith. World Bank. Wiley Interscience. Palutikof.A. A Handbook for Water Resource Management in India. Z. Bergkamp. Malik.D. 2008. ____. 2005. “A Framework for Water Resources Planning. References Bates. "Non-state Actors and Water Resources Development: An Economic Perspective. Forthcoming. M. 2003. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The last chapter looks at the findings of a study on conjunctive use of spate irrigation and groundwater in the coastal areas of Yemen." Non-State Actors and International Law 3: 103. 2008. C.? Irrigation and Drainage 56: 367?78. “MNA Development Report on Water. Inefficient Communication. American Society of Civil Engineers. # Assessment . . Fiscal prudence is inhibited by inadequate I 1 2 World Bank 2007. To this end. Vijay Jagannathan 2 n March 2007. trade liberalization. and analyses of water issues in the region. accountability—whether external to users of water. To improve water management. V. and public-private partnerships. agricultural.S. it needs a management strategy that goes beyond merely finding engineering solutions to include revisiting the rights regime. This conclusion applies to macroeconomic. This chapter is a modified version of an essay in honor of Dr. For example. regulatory framework. public policy choices get circumscribed by political. information about water—on both public expenditures and environmental impacts of existing patterns of use—should be fully shared among all stakeholders. studies. or internal to sector financiers and policymakers—needs to be deliberately promoted. the Middle East and North Africa Region (MNA) of the World Bank launched the “MNA Development Report on Water. or social considerations.Vyas (IDS 2009). and urban policies.Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management: Lessons from the “MNA Development Report on Water” N.2 The report had three main conclusions: 1. Water is scarce and has competing uses. 3. To improve water management. The overall point of the report is that although the principles of water policies are quite well understood. 2. reforms introducing sensible pricing and tradable water rights are constrained by political and social resistance. legal. 19 . policies outside the water sector often are as important as those within the sector.”1 It was the culmination of two years of consultations. Thus. and the potential of leveraging expanding knowledge of the surface and subsurface water cycle all are accepted by stakeholders. decisionmaking is severely constrained by political considerations. universal public reverence for clean water. many leaders are reluctant to charge for water services because they fear creating political opposition that could exploit a widely held belief that Islamic traditions require water to be a free commodity.” The Challenge The challenge confronting water policy lies in bridging the “practice” gap between choices that would lead to sustainable outcomes and the perceived feasible set. Water is everybody’s business. In countries of the Middle East. The winding river services the farms and a growing urban and regional economy. This practice gap could be construed as the chasm between the universally recognized principles (as confirmed in major sectoral events such as Dublin. Rio. Kyoto. Box 2. Water governance is the business of all levels of the government and is very sensitive to prevailing norms and conventions. these centers’ untreated wastes pollute the river downstream. Improved agricultural practices have been fuelled by excellent road connections to the export market for fruits and vegetables. Irrigation subsidies encourage crops that yield low “crop per drop. and Mexico City) and observed expediency in decisionmaking. Large urban centers have become magnets for migrants from rural areas. in the “pragmatic” dimension. However. for example. attracted by off-farm jobs. . However. For example. the importance of sound water management for sustainable economic development.20 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS monitoring of wasteful public expenditures in hydraulic infrastructure.1 Water Is Everybody’s Business: Morocco This photograph of a river basin in Morocco illustrates the reason that stakeholders outside the sector are so important for water reforms. and its management is influenced by policy within and outside the water subsectors. and irrigation agencies in the command areas struggle with rationing uncertain water supply to the politically important farmer Figure 2. . and what earlier was seen as a prolonged drought is now being interpreted as a secular decline in precipitation caused by global climate change (figures 2. dams constructed in Algeria and Morocco have been able to store. Morocco and Tunisia: that historic data on rainfall patterns no longer provide accurate projections for future precipitation. only approximately half their design capacity because of inadequate annual precipitation. on average.2). Bhu. “Outside Driver” 1: Climate Change The recent International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) findings confirm trends observed over past decades in Algeria.1 and 2. For example.3 For example. Stern Report. “Outside” Drivers That Bridge the Practice Gap in MNA Countries The most important driver from “outside” the water sector in MNA countries is the increasing political recognition of the irreversible adverse consequences of global warming.Source: Background paper. The IPCC report confirms these trends.Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management 21 If pragmatism requires focusing on the feasible set of policies. water resources in Bangladesh. the basic question is: Where does this leave policymakers in an environment in which politics triumphs over principles but in which every succeeding generation faces the cascading of the harmful consequences of past water policy missteps? The thesis of this chapter is that outside drivers often are critical factors in bringing about principled pragmatism. As a consequence. 2000–70 constituency. farmers have become acutely aware of the uncertainty of their water rights. over the last three decades.1 Projected Decreases in Rainfall. 3 Bates and others 2008. T he problems of global warming will affect other regions as well. 3 shows predicted declines in Indus River flows in Pakistan). and Pakistan are likely to face rapid Temperature increase shrinking because of reductions in water stored in the Himalayan glaciers as a result of changes in the duration and intensity of rainfall.03 degC/yr +0. the impacts will affect agriculture and urban water use (figure 2.22 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Figure 2. and seriously put in doubt past assumptions on how to design hydraulic infrastructure. Since the rivers flowing from this massif support the “breadbaskets” of South Asian countries.3 Projected Changes in Flow of the River Indus. The solution is to develop a package of reforms that tackle both the demand (incentives to shift to crops with high water productivity) and supply (water conservation through modernized irrigation and better tracking of the water/evapotranspiration cycle) sides. The secular decline and increased variability in rainfall will radically affect the flows and seasonality of major rivers in the subcontinent.2 North Africa Estimates of Change in Runoffs 0 –10 –20 –30 –40 –50 –60 –70 –80 0–1 tan. Figure 2. Nepal.10 degC/yr +0. China. The effects in the Western Himalayas are likely to be particularly dramatic—with 1–2 2–3 3–4 4–5 increased flows over the next 4 or North Africa 5 decades. India. 2005–15 (%) Indus at Bisham Cila 100 80 60 40 20 0 –20 –40 –60 –80 –100 0 2 4 6 8 Decade in the future +0.15 degC/yr 10 “Outside Driver 2”: High-Value Farming Changes the Politics of Irrigation A second set of factors outside the water sector that is helping to narrow the practice gap is the pressure from farmers benefiting from the recent growth of highvalue agriculture.05 degC/yr +0. Percent change . These farmers have secured significant gains in income by adopting agricultural and irrigation practices that have enabled them to join the supply chain to get high-value consumer Source: Rees 2005. followed by dramatic reductions—of 40 percent–60 percent of flow—over the subsequent century. Mexico.4 illustrates the trends of water use in MNA countries. Green represents renewable sources (from both surface and groundwater).4 Role of Renewable. Figure 2. and includes desalinated water. Nonrenewable. wheat. roads. and the western US. principally with Algeria. 2005 (%) pink shaded area represents the Internal renewable water resources External renewable water resources proportion of water extracted Non-renewable ground water Virtual Water 100% from nonrenewable sources. They earn significantly higher incomes per drop of water than conventional irrigators are able to earn. In these countries. that is. olives. since the transfer is voluntary—better off. users of low-security water sell their water to users of high-security water in times of scarcity. Each of these facilitated the growth of two-way trade. Jordan. The Figure 2. which is needed by those making major investments in annual crops and in industry. Morocco. dairy. high-security water. A similar pattern has occurred in all of these growth centers: Alg er Ba ia hra Dji in bo Ira u n.Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management 23 markets in Europe and North America. The hope is that such leading-edge farmers will support demandmanagement measures. making both parties—by definition. and vegetables generate equivalent or higher value exports with relatively low water use. and container terminals. namely. and low security water. For example. Their prosperity is reflected in a change in water consumption usage. Chile. 80% and the brown represents the 60% water “virtually” available as the 40% water used to grow agricultural 20% commodities that are imported 0% through trade. to local consumers. Isla Eg ti mi yp cR t ep of Ira q Isr Jor ael da Lib K n ya n A L uwa rab eb it Jam ano ah n i Mo riya roc c Om o an Sa Q ud ata iA r Syr rab ian Un Ara Tun ia ite b isi d A Re a rab pub Em lic ira We st B Ye tes an me k& n Ga za . and Virtual Water in MNA Countries. Egypt. and beef imports result in much more virtual water being available Source: World Bank 2007. The preconditions for high-value farm exports were the physical access and information access necessary for supply chain management. high-speed internet. The key policy question here is how to allocate water efficiently between its two different forms. which farmers use for annual crops when it is available. Israel. an important source of renewable water in the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. whereas exports of citrus. and Tunisia. increased rice. Managing water as different products is performed well by water markets in Australia. These include being irrigated by water that is free of contaminants. and to enable conveyance technologies to bring fresh farm products to the supermarkets within the contracted period (a few hours to Europe and a week to Canada and the US). 5.4 State-of-the-art technology is used to sort. citrus. Passing the GAP criteria. both chemical and biological. and store. 3. However. 2. 4 These crops generate more value per unit of evapotranspiration (ET) (see chapter by Perry and Bucknall for a discussion on the significance of ET). Agricultural practices have begun approximating the norms of efficient business enterprises. . the farm secures a Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) certificate from an independent European certification agency. S/he then invites the supermarket chain to inspect the facilities to ensure that the fruits and vegetables are produced using acceptable technologies.24 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 1. Thereafter. This seal of good housekeeping facilitates contracting with the very quality-conscious European supermarkets. and other fruits and vegetables—constituted the bulk of exports. The new paradigm suits the expectations of a changing labor force. rural youth desire a higher quality of life than the drudgery of traditional farming can provide. more jobs are generated in the logistics and supply chain aspects than in conventional employment of farm labor. pack. irrigable water. changing demand patterns in the EU encouraged large supermarket chains to search for reliable suppliers of cheaper. and by carefully monitoring his water quality. high-quality fruits and vegetables. Investors and farmers were able to respond to the growing demand for high-value farm products. a farm entrepreneur begins—with no support from the surface irrigation bureaucracy—by investing his or her private funds in water-conserving irrigation infrastructure (usually drip or sprinkler). Two key actions outside the water sector unleashed the potential of high-value agriculture: 4. On the supply side. On the demand side. good quality. the farmer’s ability to manage supply chain risks hinged on reliable. These products generated more value per drop. Farm products in which the Region has comparative advantage— olives. regarding labor productivity. herbs. Typically. Morocco. However. a major remaining risk is the farm’s ability to maintain water quality norms required by the importing country’s environmental regulations. While their entrepreneurship is laudable. then (b) developing a pressurized. citrus. these individual. and other fruits and vegetables. Farms on the desert and scrubland in the periphery of the Nile delta have been able to participate in the export market though groundwater-based irrigation systems. if any. one could argue that these groups have influenced political leaders and . Utilizing their knowledge and connections to obtain credit. The key point is that these entrepreneurial farms have invested in groundwater-based irrigation to informally create water rights for themselves. For example. They are aware that these public sector organizations have neither the institutional capability nor accountability mechanisms to serve the specific quality and timing requirements of the export-oriented farms. in the West Delta area of Egypt and in Guerdaine. and therefore not capable of meeting the demanding EU water quality standards for all edible export crops. Furthermore. Pressure from the high-value farm lobby is helping to narrow the practice gap in water management. and access to European markets. these groups have created large export-oriented markets for grapes. the income and employment generated in the regional economies also enabled them to successfully lobby governments for supplemental surface water irrigation once groundwater started getting depleted. Even when a farmer has been able to mitigate supply risks from surface water irrigation. private solutions are socially costly because productive farmlands are being lost to water storage. However. support from the substantial surface water irrigation infrastructure. On the positive side. Nowhere is this challenge more visible than in Egypt. or pivot irrigation distribution system. technical knowhow. investors financed highvalue agriculture in desert lands that have access to groundwater. piped drip. they privately finance investments to mitigate water supply risks by (a) excavating a part of the farmland as a storage reservoir.Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management 25 rather than the much laxer national regulatory laws. ensures respect for international water quality standards. these farmers expect little. sprinkler. hundreds of thousands of farmers in the delta a few miles east and north are unable to do so. In the few cases in which these farmers use surface irrigation. The surface water that they receive through Nile surface irrigation system is highly polluted. They also are inequitable because small farmers who lack financial resources and knowledge of supply chain management are de facto excluded. the investment costs were financed by an IBRD loan but were recovered from the water users. high-value farm exports generate better jobs with better pay in the services sector. in both Guerdaine and West Delta. For the latter. The preconditions for such investments are an adequate road infrastructure to ship the produce in a timely manner to markets and ports. they help reduce the exodus of the rural population to urban centers and Europe in search of better livelihoods. the demand for high-value crops is growing. Many countries are benefiting from a tourism boom. that is. However. countries have begun investing in large-scale investments in irrigation modernization. have not been able to take advantage of these opportunities because of beach contamination by polluted Nile waters. Obviously. For the West Delta project.5 Moreover. most of the transferred water will originate upstream of the delta barrages. such as the coastline of the Nile delta. before it gets polluted by the agricultural or sewage return waters. With a large and increasingly affluent urban middle class in MNA. and speeding up border procedures. Tour operators and resort owners are For example. These broad and deep changes must be made for demand for water-conserving irrigation technologies to become strong enough to increase pressure on policymakers for reform. The concentration of the water pollutants in the Rosetta branch culminates only in the downstream. and water conservation. half of the investment costs was financed by a capital subsidy from the government. For the former. stabilizing rural electricity services. some other high potential areas. many resorts have been developed in the past two decades to take advantage of this boom. there have been other contributors. 5 . financing has been obtained from the World Bank Group for surface irrigation infrastructure via public-private partnerships (PPPs). Along the Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts alone. irrigation modernization. as “package tours” from Europe and the Gulf countries to the historic and seaside resorts of several MNA countries have grown enormously. To meet this demand. “Outside Driver 3”: The Call for Clean Water A third set of factors outside the sector that is narrowing the practice gap has been political pressure on decisionmakers to focus more on water quality. the exporters of high-value farm products have been one of the influential lobby groups creating this pressure.26 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS water policymakers to appreciate the benefits of transferable water rights. By contrast. Both projects have enabled the governments to test new models of service provisioning (see Baietti chapter). Thus. Emerging Lessons from MNA for Bridging the Practice Gap The analysis suggests that countries in the region have taken steps to narrow the ”practice” gap in response to powerful poFigure 2.5 coalition of interests to demand 0 Algeria Egypt Iran Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria Tunisia better WQM. These estimates. particularly in Egypt. Adjusted Net ANS . with growing public dissatisfaction with water quality in irrigation canals. although usuEducation 15 Energy and expenditure mineral depletion ally only for their own narrow Pollution 10 Water reasons. including both water pollution and groundwater degradation (figure 2.6 Figure 2. 2006 (%) litical drivers outside the waFrom Gross Savings to Adjusted Net Savings ter sector. Leveraging these opporresources 5 depletion tunities to promote broad-based 0 Gross Nat. % of GNI Share of GDP . have joined environmentalists 2005 (%) Cost of Environmental Degradation of Water and farm exporters to lobby for 3 better water quality manage2. Inf luential groups 25 have highlighted the need for Consumption of 20 fixed capital water reforms. were disseminated to a wide range of stakeholders through workshops. and publications. the World Bank initiated a series of studies estimating the opportunity costs of environmental degradation in major MNA countries. For example. so were picked up by the media. 2 Analytical work also has 1. The study findings coincided.6 Cost of Over-extraction of Aquifers.5 ment (WQM). Net Nat.5).5 Estimates of Environmental Degradation Costs. shown as a percentage of forgone GDP.Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management 27 powerful interest groups who Figure 2. media events.6 estimates the opportunity costs to GDP due to savings losses. The studies’ conclusion that poor water management harmed the economy by slicing off percentage points of GDP resonated with decisionmakers in economic ministries and pushed governments to pledge significant increases in public funding for remedial actions. For 6 Estimates include opportunity costs of air pollution. Net Nat.5 1 helped build the case for this 0.Water reforms is the next big challenge Savings Savings Savings + EE Savings depletion to reduce the “practice” gap. 2.28 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS this. an initial driver of change (such as farmers’ demand for better water quality) could be leveraged if there were a preexisting broader coalition of stakeholders willing to support more broad-based reforms than the farming lobby wants to promote. environment. transport. 3. Housing. Non-water policies are critically central to water policy reforms because the coalition becomes energized when colleagues outside the water sector (agriculture. and citizens. Improved accountability of government organizations to users of water services is a third essential leg for reducing the gap. which in turn reduces the crop choices of farmers. For example. export-oriented crops because the water quality does not meet the minimum EU Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) irrigated water standards. and Environment must devise coordinated . governorates. in complementary actions. Based on past assessments. Local Government. How to Bridge the Practice Gap in Developing Countries Coordination and Strategic Monitoring of Water Policy Actions The problem of coordination is accentuated by divided responsibilities for water management among various levels of governance. trade. energy. policymakers need to regularly evaluate and feed back the lessons to the sectoral decisionmaking process. Health. or are willing to engage. a farmer in the Nile Delta cannot think of growing high-value. Agriculture. typically. The Ministries of Water Resources and Irrigation. the center. the “MNA Development Report” suggests three insights in this regard: 1. This institutional confusion is compounded by a tendency of rules and norms that focus more on the planning and resource allocation phase than on the actual implementation phase and on thoroughly evaluating outcomes. Reforms are inherently a political process and one in which the technical and political dynamics are difficult to separate. in large river basins such as the Nile Delta. to name a few) already are engaging. and banking. For example. Mechanisms for public accountability form the bridge between users of water and their governments by channeling relevant information and voice and ensuring fairness in resolving conflicts that may arise. pollution from human settlements affects water quality downstream. Politically. 7 Through . Raw sewage can be used for free for high-value fruits and vegetables by surrounding farmers because environmental regulations are neither enforced nor internalized by communities. drainage. most importantly. The untreated effluents are bypassed to downstream water bodies. so was not politically attractive to political leaders and even the local public. The practice gap can be bridged by coordination and strategic management with stakeholders who have an interest in achieving planned outcomes. and program beneficiaries in both planning and implementation. and planning) need to work together seamlessly to make the irrigation service meet the farmers’ needs for high-value agriculture. Within the Water Resources and Irrigation Ministry itself. Pollution abatement had downstream benefits. sewage treatment plants get shut off. agriculture and environment ministry staff. Common observations on factors that contributed to this practice gap are: Key stakeholder groups were disinterested. Moreover. the practice gap does not get bridged because tackling pollution requires staff from various agencies to work outside their silos. engage stakeholders who are outside their internal organizational structures. and. On the sanitation side. think laterally. Establish Water Executive Management Programs The solution is to radically redefine the learning and capacity building program for water management. Water executive education programs need to be developed to inspire and train water managers to see beyond their narrow specializations. Active engagement and dialogue are required among sewerage engineers with urban planners. The inspiration comes from successes in the field of business management through executive management programs that promoted “lateral” thinking by visionaries such as Alfred Sloan and Peter Drucker. multiple sectors (mechanical and electrical engineering. in a context in which tariffs are substantially below operating costs and environmental regulations rarely enforced. irrigation improvement.Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management 29 responses to this challenge. Operations and maintenance (O&M) burdens were heavy. and political leaders to civil servants. Inclusion of Stakeholders in Water Dialogues Water is both a finite resource and subject to intense competing demands. and self-provisioning by urban households (HH) for water supply and sanitation facilities. This consensus requires appreciating the human. the adverse environmental consequences have become unavoidable. or prevent. they have established an Arab Water Academy so that such learning events are organized and a new genre of “water managers” and water stewards are created from different disciplines and represent all sections of society. slum dwellers. media. despite the knowledge that the long-term consequences will be disastrous to these very same farming communities. Political realities in all developing countries hinder. water policymakers from using normal economic policy instruments. and technological aspects of water management through the systematic engagement of stakeholders in learning about water management. planners. and reach a common appreciation of what is required for long-term sustainability in water outcomes. Water management is as multidisciplinary as running a modern business enterprise. Key stakeholders need to debate and discuss the practice gap. Over time. Equally 7 McDonald and others 2003. The MNA countries have recognized this challenge. fuelled in most countries by subsidized energy. as mechanisms for resource allocation. notably in the form of continuous groundwater draw-downs.30 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS these programs. inadequate water resource regulations. business management became a more systematic process of directing and motivating people and entities to accomplish an enterprise’s goals. The most noticeable evidence of these are the explosive growth of tubewells. environmental. Through the leadership of the Arab Water Council (AWC). such as water pricing and transferable water rights. . In their absence. Business Week 2005. These sources provide the mainstay for farm production in several regions of the world. informal arrangements dominate the institutional environment (Shah 2007). other civil society. economists. The former requires the integration of the different ways of thinking of a diverse range of stakeholders from farmers. financial. and engineers. having a very low renewal rate. In some of the most affected countries. . fuelled in particular by cheap subsidized electricity.” especially those resulting from unchecked pollution of water bodies from urban. and agricultural runoffs. Managing the Equity Dimension of Water An equally important policy instrument is the use of redesigned subsidies to put in place incentives for public finance to target the poor and the environment. are already running out. sprinkler. industrial. In other words. or other more modern irrigation technologies River basins and sub-basins—by reimbursing utilities/operators for every unit of treated effluent that meets national standards. 8 See chapters 17 and 18 by Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani. such as Yemen. water management requires all individuals to understand that that they are a part of the problem as well as the possible solution. these households must pay tariffs for operating costs) Rural areas—rewarding water conservation in surface irrigation areas by subsidizing part of investment costs of low-income farmers who switch from open channels to drip. entire farm communities have had to leave their villages because the groundwater extraction rates greatly exceeded the replenishment rate.8 These subsidies work in: Urban areas—by targeting low-income households with free piped water supply connections (thereafter. MNA has other variants of this type of “tragedy of the commons. The way out is to communicate with and engage the affected stakeholders in finding solutions. No amount of executive training and management will work unless there is an educated and informed group of water users who are aware of the consequences of today’s actions on tomorrow.Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management 31 visible is the unequal access to this water by the poor in both rural and urban areas. Several MNA countries are facing the devastating consequences of similar trends because their groundwater resources. Some MNA countries now recognize using output-based subsidies as an effective tool. In both situations. with no follow-up to track outcomes of programs (as illustrated by GAP 1). The internal failure is accentuated by government pledges of general subsidies for the water sector. MNA countries have experienced institutional design failures. This power gets often misused through graft and corruption (Wade 1985. Participation of all stakeholders and use of targeted subsidies are suggested as the first and second legs of this model. Calkins. El Sadani. Simas. Abu-Taleb and R. Accountability has two dimensions: (1) an “internal” aspect in which water organizations are accountable to their financiers and management structures.7 illustrates how accountability gets diluted by three levels of scarcity observable in the region (World Bank 2007): 1. cross-subsidies for urban water supply reduce the incentives of utilities to manage services based on commercial principles. while this group benefits from the higher tariffs charged to industrial and service water users. canals. while the benefits end up being appropriated by the middle class urban consumers. predictable water rights on the basis of which they can plan their planting decisions. The practice gap has arisen because. and distribution systems. and H. farmers do not have clear. and chapter 24 by J. These solutions required large outlays of 9 For discussion on MNA initiatives to improve accountability. and (2) an “external” aspect in which they should respond to water user preferences and willingness to pay. J. for both aspects. see chapter 11 by M. officials of the various state irrigation bureaucracies have the discretion to assign irrigation turns to the water user associations (WUAs) and farmers. In the urban areas. the poor pay more while buying poor-quality water from vendors.32 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Focus on External and Internal Accountability The practice gap can be narrowed by developing a culture of lateral thinking in water management similar to modern business management practices. Instead. Jagannathan 1987). The third leg is putting in place mechanisms to enhance accountability. Morelli. In the irrigation sector.9 Figure 2. Furthermore. water service organizations have been unable to set in place governance mechanisms that ensure internal accountability of staff to the organizational goals and external accountability to the water users. Scarcity of the water resource. . In conditions of water scarcity the response has been to build “solutions” through dams. Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management 33 Figure 2. Scarcity of accountability to achieve sustainable outcomes In the past decade. . figure 1. As mentioned earlier. policy focus needs to shift to allocative efficiency among competing water uses. Scarcity of organizational Source: World Bank 2007. 3. high-value farmers. External accountability is generated when lobby groups outside the water sector (NGOs.11 The thesis of the “MNA Development Report” is that. and effective use of public funds that foster internal and external accountability. redesigning incentives that direct farmers toward maximizing income per drop is one obvious focus. or no one (sewerage investments). the focus needs to be on rationalizing water and sanitation subsidies. See chapter 1. user participation. which uses 80 percent–90 percent of all water. 10 11 See chapter 4 by Shawky Mohamed and others in this volume. and subsequent discussion on this topic. Establishing clear rules for subsidies that are based on measurable outcomes is one obvious solution. media) pressure political leaders for efficient and high quality water services. Tracking the effectiveness of public expenditures through regular public expenditure reviews is another obviously useful instrument. For irrigation. resort owners. As the MNA illustrations indicated. with the growing scarcity of water.7 Changing Nature of Accountability public funds. capacity to actually manage the demands of various water users. With experience. the IWRM proOverall Allocative More cesses recognized that demand efficiency value per management drop public investments do not More Water services necessarily lead to deServices use per End-use efficiency drop sired outcomes because organizational incentives More Supply Engineering water management may be misaligned.10 2. these fairly narrow drivers could be leveraged for broad-based reforms when the debate is opened up to the other suggestions in this chapter (targeted subsidies. with climate change concerns raising serious concerns about sharply declining water availability in the MNA region. general subsidies in MNA have tended to benefit the well-to-do (water). and meet the growing needs of the economy. this third level has assumed prominence.1. On the urban side. tour operators. provinces. . Over the last three decades. with no rules of the game. S. or aquifer-based user associations is necessary to create awareness of water management issues. Kundzewicz. 2005. Obviously.S. and J. Wu.” In Briscoe and Malik. there is a need to set up appropriate organizational structures to govern water management. discussion. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. and R. Briscoe. and industry—has been essentially a water privatization process. Handbook of Water Resources in India. and debate among all parts of society before the practice gap between principles and pragmatic solutions can be bridged.34 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS However. municipal users. What is needed now are to (1) acknowledge de facto rights and (2) make a major effort to educate and inform on the need for “rights. branch canal users.. but with rules. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. requires active engagement. therefore. B. and districts. Z. Business Week.P. These are relatively new organizations and have difficulty in acquiring legitimacy when faced with conflicts with established national or local political or administrative groupings. Water management. The experience of the MNA Region suggests that empowering river basin organizations. Malik. Concluding Remarks Bridging the practice gap requires a fundamental rethinking of the way that water is managed and that stakeholders learn about sustainable management of water resources and water services. J. such as governorates.” November 28. 2008. the dramatic shift from surface to groundwater in many parts of the world—by agriculture.. References Bates. there are no general solutions. Palutikof. 2007. Climate Change and Water.” The experience suggests that water managers must recognize and manage the several external drivers of water use. Each country must work out solutions that fit its own context. “India’s Water Economy: An Overview. Policies outside the water sector often cause unintentional harm to it. “The Man Who Invented Management: Why Peter Drucker’s Ideas Still Matter. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1985. N. Briscoe and R. Malik. Shah.” World Development 13 (4).P. 2007. 2003.” In J. Briscoe and R. “Water Rights and Entitlements. .S.P. 2007.” In J. Mohanty. Vyas. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Wade. “Economic Reforms through Principled Pragmatism.Malik. Handbook of Water Resources in India.M. Briscoe and R.S.” Jaipur: Institute for Development Studies. 2007. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Press. 2007.” In J. Chandler. T.S.Malik.D. Handbook of Water Resources in India.Malik. and A. V. “Scaling up Water Investments. Handbook of Water Resources in India.S. 2009. Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water Management in the Middle East and North Africa. ____. R. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. R. A Ghost’s Memoir: The Making of Alfred P.” In J.Vyas. “Bridging the Practice in Water Management: An Appreciation of V. Saleth. Informal Markets in Developing Countries. “Institutional and Policy Reforms.S. 2007. 1987.P. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. New York: Oxford University Press. Handbook of Water Resources in India.Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management 35 Jagannathan. MNA Development Report on Water. N. World Bank..V. “The Market for Public Offices: Why the Indian State Is Not Better at Development.P. McDonald. J. Sloan’s “My Years with General Motors. Briscoe and R.S. . the two major recipients of public financing in the water sector. fiscal dependence on the government remains. Vijay Jagannathan Key Findings In 2003–04. A 2002 World Bank study on the costs of environmental degradation estimates the damage costs at 1.697 billion LE in the WSS subsector.† Of this.1 † This chapter updates World Bank Water Policy Note 2 (2005). The latter has arisen because of pollution externalities in the lower Nile Delta. and explores the efficiency and equity implications of the current arrangements. On the positive side. a Government of Egypt-World Bank collaboration. there have been impressive gains in agricultural productivity due to water investment and in water supply and sanitation coverage. This chapter assesses the recent trends of public expenditures of the water sector. the Government of Egypt (GOE) budget spent 4. It focuses particularly on the irrigation and water supply and sanitation (WSS) subsectors. were allocated for new investments. On the negative side. It also investigates different sources of fiscal stress and sources of finance. and 6. the balance was allocated for recurrent costs. The outcomes of such significant public outlays have been mixed. respectively. and a new concern that requires significant public finance needs immediate policy attention.3 Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review Ahmed Shawky Mohamed and N. 1 See chapter 4. which are exacting a heavy toll on public health and the environment. approximately 79 percent and 61 percent. 37 .087 billion LE on water infrastructure in the irrigation and agriculture subsectors. “Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: Spending Less for Better Services” by Shawky Mohamed and others in this volume.2 percent of GDP.6 percent–3. written as part of the analytical work supporting the 2005 Public Expenditure Review (PER) in Egypt. However. Partly chapter 1: Wages that relate to O&M. b.38 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS The following is a summary of the key findings: Finding 1: Most investment as well as operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of water services in Egypt are funded from the national budget. Chapter 2: Goods and services for O&M. the sector is heavily indebted. it is generally lacking in the rural/southern areas. 2 O&M costs pertain to the following items in the budget chapters of the waterrelated ministries: a. as opposed to planning and other central administrative functions. Finding 4: Reallocating budget appropriations among different budget chapters of water agencies. Increase contributions from users. The main sources of “avoidable” transaction costs are overstaffing. and among water user groups (WUGs) requires a fundamental rearrangement of current budget planning and management. duplication of responsibilities. Decrease transaction costs and overhead expenditures through decentralization and improved efficiency in service delivery. c. among departments within agencies. and procurement inefficiency. These are identified in the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) Action Plan: a. oversized designs. Finding 5: The irrigation and water supply and sanitation (WSS) subsectors have three options available to finance future O&M and investment costs.2 Cost-recovery levels still are below international comparators. the composition of water-related public expenditures has changed. b. Partly chapter 3: Only regular/preventive rehabilitation (as opposed to occasional/major rehabilitation). Finding 3: Water service coverage (in relation to both drinking water and irrigation) is adequate in the Nile Delta area. . requiring changes in legislation. in which water services are particularly inequitable for low-income communities. A higher proportion is being allocated to new investments—at the expense of recurrent expenditures and debt repayments. suboptimal technology. thereby increasing the sector’s long-term liabilities. As a consequence. Finding 2: Over the last two decades. Importance of Water Resource Management for the Egyptian Economy The Nile-Lake-Nasser system is Egypt’s only renewable supply source for surface water. and constitutes 95 percent of the country’s total water resources. Under the present circumstances: a. respectively. and the needs of industries and agriculture (particularly in the reclaimed new lands). perhaps through a sector-wide approach (SWAp) operation. Of the subsectoral shares. rising living standards. Facilitate private sector participation in financing. Sector Background Egypt is an arid country with very limited rainfall. Future donor financing could be structured around assisting the holding company to achieve the above outcomes in the medium term. It consists of a series of large barrages. The Nile-LakeNasser system is one of the largest hydraulic infrastructure complexes in the world. Any debt write-off needs to be contingent on achieving monitorable financial and operational performance outcomes. and operating the irrigation systems in line with user preferences and willingness to pay. estimated at roughly one-quarter of the overall water . deserts. developing. canals.Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review 39 c.5 percent. it consumes approximately 70 percent of water. and water supply and sewerage networks. Finding 6: The WSS subsector is moving toward corporatization. water and sewage treatment plants. b. The rest of Egypt’s water resources is mainly fossil (nonrenewable) groundwater found in the coastal zones. Municipal/potable and industrial subsectors consume only 3. c. For the holding company to fulfill its mandate of reforming the sector. agriculture (including fisheries) is the major user. and Sinai. pumping stations. It urgently needs to address the debt overhang caused by the past policy of service expansion without cost recovery. restructuring and/or writing off existing debt is inevitable. The balance. Egypt’s water requirements are increasing as a result of growing population. and estimated at 3–4 BCM/yr.5 percent and 1. This figure is expected to fall to 670m³ by 2017. Available water per capita per annum amounts to some 900m³. Nonetheless. changes in incentive structures. drainage. the need for a more integrated approach became apparent due to: Continued deterioration of water quality Growing demand-supply gap Intensification of inter-sectoral and inter-regional water allocation problems Inadequacy of government funds to sustain new investments and O&M at current levels Poor operational performance of water agencies. Until the early 1990s. from both the national budget and donors. and technical innovations. Since then. which is already below the “water poverty” index of 1000 m³/capita/annum. by the mid-/late 1990s. The integrated water resources management (IWRM) approach seeks to address sectoral concerns through a mix of institutional reforms. GOE’s attention was focused on “balancing” water supply and demand through supply augmentation. and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure. a significant part of the hydraulic .40 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS stock. Sectoral Challenges A major challenge facing Egypt is to close the gap between the limited water resources available and the escalating demand for water from competing users. The result was significant investments in water supply. “Public-Good” Perspective to Water Services Water resource management (WRM) is seen as a cornerstone of national security. unless policies are implemented to sustainably manage growing demand. and. as drainage water (20 percent) discharged into the Mediterranean Sea and the desert fringes of the Nile system. is lost through evaporation (5 percent). the government policy has shifted to integrated water quality and quantity management. more significantly. Managing sustainably requires developing appropriate pricing and financing rules along with an institutional framework that encourages sustainable use. Consequently. there is both a public and a private good dimension because these users obtain privately appropriable benefits either by consumption or by using water as an input in production. While public money is financing private services. which include irrigation. greater user financing of water services requires a fundamental reorganization of Egyptian water delivery systems—from sectors and departments that rely on budgetary subventions to service-oriented utilities that respond to user preferences and willingness to pay. navigation. One could argue that apportioning the public and private costs in this very large. treatment. and main canals. users receive subsidized but poor quality services from utilities. However. A water supply consumer pays a tariff of approximately only 20 percent of the treatment and delivery costs. municipal. For example. and distribution of water to various users/subsectors from a system of dams. For the latter system. However. The rest of the “feeder” costs gets picked up in the public goods account. . Concerns with water quality distress urban and rural users of water in the Nile Delta area. in Egypt’s WSS subsector. This infrastructure includes not only the “trunk” system. comprising the production. unless higher tariffs are paid. a genuine public service is in desperate need of public funding: infrastructure to improve water quality. there clearly is significant potential to increase user contributions for water usage that yields private benefits. These consumers are unwilling to pay higher tariffs because their expectations of service improvements from these providers are low. Past policies have not rigorously distinguished these two aspects. integrated hydraulic system is complex. barrages.Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review 41 infrastructure is regarded as a public good and receives financing from the national budget. Nevertheless. industrial. but also the recipient or “feeder” subsectors. For example: An Egyptian farmer in the Nile Delta pays the incremental cost of water delivery at the farm level but not the conveyance (and lifting costs) from the river system. and hydropower users. The areas of concern require actions on several fronts: from technological innovations with greater user feedback and participation to improved coordination among water agencies. the utility will never be in a position to reduce its dependence on the national budget. Consequent Institutional Challenges Centralized but fragmented management and inadequate mechanisms for ensuring accountability to service users affect sectoral financial and operational performance. Figure 3. In recent years. before 0 they can be effective. The current attention on public expenditures provides one such opportunity. GOE began moving toward addressing these concerns. debt overhang. The eventual objective is to convert these holding companies to off-budget entities that attract private sector participation. There is no strategy on how to write off/restructure the overhanging debt and create organizational structures that can respond to user demand/attract private sector participation. . In the irrigation subsector.42 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS This vicious cycle of poor performance. responsibilities—planning. For the 2 WSS subsector. The explicit objective is to reduce the recurrent fiscal burden of the government. research. However. “holding companies” have been established for both irrigation services in the “new lands” outside the Nile Delta and for WSS services. On the institutional side. while improving the efficiency and sustainability of O&M services. and private sector lack of interest must be broken. these holdFY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 Total irrigation expenditures Total WSS expenditures ing companies face two major Source: MOF annual data on expenditures of the two subsectors.1 Irrigation and WSS Expenditures two holding companies have 3 been established: one for the South Valley/West Delta and one for Northern Sinai. For example. monitoring. These agencies are in the nature of “budget-maximizing” bureaucracies and have very little incentive to be accountable to the service users. operation. construction. and each is funded through a parallel budget line. There is still no suitable regulatory framework that enables tariffsetting to respond to user demand. 2. a holding company subsuming 14 subsidiary 1 companies nationwide has been established. challenges: Share of GDP (%) 1. design. and regulation—are carried out through multiple agencies and departments within these agencies. which is expected to be enacted by the end of 2009.0 its consistent appropriations to FY02 FY03 FY04 maintain the “trunk” hydraulic % of irrigation to total % of irrigation to total investments recurrent expenditures infrastructure. MWRI successfully delegated O&M responsibilities to water user associations (WUAs) at the tertiary-canal (mesqa) level. the IWRM action plan already has instituted measures that enhance user voice in the O&M of services.Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review 43 In the Nile Delta area. wastewater 0. The notable trend was variability in WSS project investments over 2001–05. Per capita potable water use Figure 3.2a Trend of Irrigation Public Authorities’ expansion phase that began 2 Expenditures to Total Expenditures (%) decades back.1 On the MWRI side. Assessment of Expenditure Trends Trends in Water Expenditures Total water expenditures.15 collection increased eight-fold. 0. respectively. It generated an 4 increase from 5.3 Sewerage and sanitation cover0. thus including investment and recurrent investments. MWRI also is embarking on an action plan to empower Water Boards to manage irrigation and drainage O&M at the secondary or branch-canal level.5 0 was almost 100 percent and FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 95 percent for the urban and % irrigation to total % irrigation to total % irrigation to total public investments debt repayments recurrent expenditures rural populations.05 was steadier. The key measure required is an amendment to Law 12/1984 (to empower WUAs). Coverage figures 2 achieved during this period were 1. 0.8 million m3 / 3.5 3 day in 1982 to 18.2 million m3/ 2. the trend line 0.5 day in 2000. implemented between 1981 and 2000 reached LE 23 billion. marking the end of an Figure 3. perhaps reflecting 0.5 quite impressive vis-à-vis MDGs: 1 potable water supply coverage 0.2b Trend of Ratio of Expenditure of Irrigation Economic increased from 130 liters/day in Authorities to Expenditures of all Economic Authorities (%) 1981 to 275 liters/day in 2000.25 age also increased substantially: 0.2 from 1982–2000. . These practices could lead to significant costs in the future in deferred maintenance and should be investigated.44 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS New Investments vs. For the overall 0 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 water sector. while investFigure 3. user/service fees represent only a few percentage points for most departments (figures 3.3b Trend of Ratio of Expenditures of WSS Economic Authorities to Expenditures of all Economic Authorities (%) ment spending has averaged only 30 20 percent of recurrent expenditures in other sectors. However. which repays approximately 28 percent).3a. Maintenance Unlike other sectors of the econ7 omy. or (c) expected to be repaid by holding companies that do not have the requisite cash flow from revenues.4 .2b. Sovereign Services Aid and Domestic Loans annually comprise on average approximately 75 percent of financing. there is a 20 declining trend in recurrent ex15 penditures and debt repayments.3b). which are responsible for these activities.3a Trend of WSS Public Authorities’ Expenditures to Total Expenditures (%) Water Resources and Irrigation Subsector Among MWRI departments. Within 25 the water subsectors. Figure 3. 0 This divergence suggests that FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 % WSS investments % WSS recurrent to new investments may be getting to total investments total recurrent expenditures higher priority than the operation and maintenance of existing assets. The reasons are that they are either (a) not repaid (for example.2a. Egyptian Public Authorities for Drainage Projects. and 3 3. 3. because of the significant 2 increase in water supply expan1 sion investments. investment spending by wa6 ter utilities was a relatively high 5 proportion of total expenditures 4 (figures 3. In general. or (b) only partly repaid (for example. National Water Resources Center). the ratio of invest% WSS to total % WSS to total % WSS to total ment-to-recurrent spending has public investments debt repayments recurrent expenditures ranged from 200 percent–300 percent since FY01. 3. domestic loans are actually long-term subsidies. or EPADP. 10 while investment expenditures 5 have remained relatively steady. 945 Sources of Financing MWRI – Irrigation Department Budget Services fees 4% Grants 7% Change in credits 3% Other sources 1% Domestic loans 38% Foreign loans 16% Sovereign services aid 31% Source: MWRI data.392 91. which accrue to local governments at a collection efficiency of 60 percent–75 percent.801 437.730 25.325 0 0 814.087. respectively.644 45.587 30.252 13.770 219.443 4.2 0.6 0.587 38.218.274 530 36.700 205. farmers are fully responsible for O&M of the improvements provided by MWRI at the tertiary-canal (or mesqa) level.231 2001/02 297.629 1. The same issue applies to the WSS subsector: Figures 3.150 800 40.514 11. while investments in tertiary-canal (or mesqa) improvements are partially recovered through the land tax.069 93.241 10.058.813 45.5 Financial Resources of Irrigation Subsector. 2001–05 2000/01 Sovereign 315.946 2003/04 356.0 0.547 service Domestic loans Foreign loans Grants Internal finance Services fees Change in credit Other sources Total 206.232 67. channeled by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to MWRI. The collected taxes amount to only 20 percent and 6 percent of the recurrent and total budget appropriations.8 0.629 486.336 1.720 701 35. . This level of spending translates to an average annual rate of 15 percent of total Egyptian public investments since 2000. Note: Ratios greater than 1 indicate user repayment not only for 0&M but also for Capital-replacement costs. Figure 3. User contributions: Costs of publicly financed investments in subsurface drainage are fully recovered from farmers.7. Figure 3. Overall.Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review 45 and 3.328 1. In some cases (such as the World-Bank-supported Irrigation Improvement Project).912 544.198.4 0.102 40. levied at 30 LE/feddan/year on average.008 175.609 390.0 Egypt Morocco India Phillippines Mexico Australia Source: World BanK 2003.220 58.243 71.2 1.5).101 177.988 93.872 1.799 0 0 2004/05 401.6 and 3.300 2002/03 307. farmers incur approximately 43 percent of the tertiarycanal improvement costs. Collections are made through land taxes.4 1. In aggregate terms.4 Irrigation O&M Cost Recovery Ratio (%) 1. from 2000 to 2005 approximately 12 billion LE has been spent on national irrigation infrastructure and waterresources related programs. 6 1. Normally. There is a wide a( Mo W& roc S) co Fes (W Ra ate ma r) lla h( Wa ter ) Jor da n( Tun W& lsla S) (Sa nit ati on Tun ) lsla (W ate En r) gla nd (W &S Mo ) roc co (ON EP ) Alg eri Eg yp t .8 1. institutional.2 1 0.932 104.433 125.234 174.847 0 1.925 3.513 1.599 796 210 167.032.544 285.720 2001–02 527.847 0 2004–05 468.242 2002–03 623.6 Financial Resources of the WSS Subsector: Cairo 2000–01 Sovereign service Domestic loans Foreign loans Grants Internal finance Services fees Change in credit Other sources Total 553.693 347.4 1.058. The WSS utilities are responsible for the management of water supply and sewerage networks serving domestic. MWRI has been testing new options to enhance cost recovery from water users in the Nile Delta. WSS Subsector Sovereign services aid 29% Services fees 25% Source: MWRI data.818 515.722.536 2003–04 493.6 0. poor services.662 130.630.8 0. In addition.645 285. Note: Ratio > 1 indicates user repayment not only for recurrent costs.500 229.000 4. and low consumer expectations of service improvements.076 2. The PER data indicated a continued reliance on the public budget. but also for capital costs.189 2.164 42 153.000 0 559.46 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Figure 3.183 411.7 Water Supply and Sanitation: Cost Recovery (%) 2.399 2. Through the Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project (IIIMP).068 576.402 387. there are two means of financing the rising O&M and investment costs: (1) increase contributions from users through reforms of the pricing system or (2) reduce costs by improving efficiency of service delivery.4 0.030 0 458.500 285. the proposed (World Bank-supported) West Delta irrigation project would test full cost recovery from farmers producing high-value agricultural products in the new lands reclaimed from the desert.089 220.0 1.962 1. perhaps because these utilities had been caught in a vicious circle of low tariffs.543.848 201.000 4. which increased consumer resistance to price increases. Figure 3. and industrial water users.2 0 Source: World Bank Cross-country data (2003–2004).000 0 494. these networks should be expected to recover at least all of the O&M costs.159 74.485 114.060 Sources of Financing Cairo Potable Water Authority Budget Domestic loans 8% Other sources 10% Change in credits 11% Internal finance 17% For the future.256 1. Recent attempts to increase Cairo’s tariffs are awaiting concurrence from the local councils and the national Parliament.8 0.8–1. since establishing NOPWASD (1981) and the economic authorities (1995). Low tariffs not only impose a heavy recurrent fiscal burden on the national budget but also generate disincentives for operational efficiency and responsiveness to consumers. the debt overhang of the WSS subsector reached 14 billion LE. These are applicable to the residential units. National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage. which have water meters.2 15–25 NAc NA 0. gap between the actual costs of water supply (0. governors had the authority to set water prices to a ceiling of LE 0. Wastewater tariff is 20% of water tariff for Cairo and 35% for Alexandria.1b 0. or 2. The O&M subsidies to the subsector were estimated at 3–4 billion LE/annum.0 percent–2. c. General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply.00 LE/m3) that they incur and the user-tariffs (average 0. although equally low (10 percent) for sanitation. For example.23 /m3. d. The final outcome was that domestic loans and sovereign services aid (figure 3. . e. Cairo water tariffs are among the lowest among developing country megacities and pay for only 25 percent and 10 percent of the actual costs of water supply and sanitation.6) became the sources of finances for even routine O&M. Thus. Those who do not have meters or whose meters are not working pay a fixed monthly charge for water consumption (LE 5–20 monthly/unit).15 LE/m3) that accrue to them.e 1.9 0. Cost recovery in secondary cities/towns is better for water supply (Alexandria’s is as high as 50 percent). b.1 Recurrent Unit Costs and Associated Subsidies in WSS System LE per m³ Estimated capital. Consequently. O&M costs Subsidy Average user feee Rate: Piaster /m3 d. The charge changes with house area. Prior to establishing the WSS holding company. not many governors utilized even this authorization.5 percent of total public recurrent expenditures. Although this ceiling was below actual production costs by a factor of 3–4.3 25–35 NOPWASD (Municipalities) GOGCWS (Cairo) AWGA (Alexandria) Notes: a. Alexandria Water General Authority. respectively.Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review 47 Table 3. these entities regularly have been bailed out through sovereign aid and domestic loans that are never repaid.2 15–25 1.0a 0. The consequence is “deferred maintenance. Second.9) for two reasons: a.15 LE/m3 on average) that accrue to them. First. Under (% of population) these circumstances. they often become biased toward paying wages rather than toward creating an effective O&M. these agencies are fully dependent on O&M government budget transfers. and the user-tariffs (0. The consequence is that since the National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (NOPWASD) was established in 1981. there is a wide gap between the actual cost of water supply (0. Source: World Bank 2005. The rehabilitation of WSS infrastructure triggers cycles of debt because the utilities/NOPWASD are forced to borrow from the National Investment Bank (NIB) or seek (often off-budget) subventions to meet their pressing rehabiliFigure 3. It simply passes on the problem to a new organization that 0 Urban Lower Egypt Upper Egypt Frontiers lacks the capacity to Poverty Drinking Water Wastewater manage the problem. these entities have been bailed out regularly by sovereign aid and domestic loans that rarely get repaid. b. Share of Population (%) .00 LE/m3) that the authorities incur. As these transfers often are based on historical precedents. or they become biased toward existing assets (such as water/wastewater plants and distribution networks) rather than new ones. 90 passing on the debt to the newly created 60 holding company does not resolve the prob30 lem. However.8 Poverty and Access to Water and Wastewater tation needs. WSS economic authorities (overseen by governorates) are expected to pay for their O&M costs through user fees.48 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Sources of Debt In Egypt the WSS debt overhang has escalated (figure 3. and the economic authorities in 1995. in the absence of adequate cash flow from service users.” a situation that leads to unnecessary deterioration of assets and (eventually) costly rehabilitation that could have been avoided by less costly routine/preventive maintenance.8–1. poor farmers already pay as much as 10 percent of their incomes for wastewater removal from cesspools. versus loans to. Customers in secondary cities and rural areas incur higher WSS service prices than in major cities. In the absence of targeting.9). GoE has not been as apprehen15 sive about the debt of the irrigation subsector as it has about 10 that of WSS. trunk-infrastructure investments of the “public good” type.Subsectors 20 panies for new lands. LE billions . A fee of 70 LE–100 LE per feddan/year is estimated to be adequate to meet the full O&M costs for irrigation services. which fact suggests their willingness to pay for a better service-provision option. not penalizing the wasteful users. Hence. increasing block tariff structures may end up targeting cross-subsidies on the nonpoor (for example. much of the irrigation debt has been used to finance Source: MOF annual data on the debt repayment by. Poorer areas have the worst WSS services (figure 3. First. 3. water vendors supply potable water to households that have standpipes. a percentage likely to be affordable to big and medium holders. compared to the poor). the irrigation and WSS subsectors (reference year is 2000). Inequitable Outcomes The equity impacts of the existing sectoral arrangements can be summed up in four points: 1. because the nonpoor may have smaller families or may be able afford to use water-saving appliances.8). The reasons are 5 two. subsidies are benefiting the richer farmers. charging more than 10 times the actual cost for piped-water prices. WSS tariffs are heavily subsidized. 2. irrigation debt has not reached such an unwieldy 0 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 level as has WSS (figure 3.9 Cumulative Debts of WSS and Irrigation applied to MWRI’s holding com. Irrigation cumulative debt WSS cumulative debt Second. 4. Moreover. However. In many rural/periurban areas. This amount would be an average reduction in farm incomes of 5 percent.Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review 49 A similar analogy can be Figure 3. which can be deemed sunk costs. who use the most water. There are as yet no policies for penalizing nonpaying customers. and management of irrigation and water supply infrastructure. Irrigation The Water Boards Project is testing ways to transfer water management responsibilities at the secondary level of the irrigation system from MWRI to user organizations. Water Supply While GOE’s efforts at WSS decentralization have focused on changing the institutional arrangements. unless the latter are made contingent on either increased labor productivity or improved O&M services. . operation. and for the WSS subsectors. This transfer would reduce the government’s contribution to O&M costs by approximately 50 percent. GOE proposes to encourage public-private partnerships (PPP) in the financing. (b) progressively turn over financial responsibility for O&M to water utilities or water user organizations. the latter have not as yet adequately addressed service efficiency concerns: Increased WSS tariff collection responsibilities at the governorate level very well could end up simply topping-up employee wages. Government and public sector institutions often are exempted from paying water bills. The extra burden on farmers is expected to be partially compensated by exempting them from paying land taxes to local governments. The IIIMP will be testing new organizational arrangements that link the MWRI’s investment and operational functions to user organizations’ responsibility for operating and maintaining the irrigation network below the branch canal level. Recently established holding companies are being encouraged to seek out private partners who can share capital and O&M costs for both the expanded irrigation network in Toshka and El-Salam canal.50 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Responding to Challenges: GOE Policy Actions Taken The government’s vision for sustainable financing for the water sector is to (a) explore alternative cost-sharing arrangements with decentralized service delivery institutions. and (c) establish full cost-recovery arrangements between the government and farmers/investors in the new lands. there is almost no sewerage in Upper Egypt or generally in rural areas. Sanitation has been defined as an urban public service. distribution. which is often substantially below the costs of delivering the service. However. These decisions have been based on economic. and El-Salam Canal east of the Nile Delta and Sinai have been implemented. Mega projects such as Toshka in southwest Egypt. social. significant budgetary savings could be accomplished by devolving irrigation and WSS service functions to locally accountable institutions. These companies also should be entrusted with more proactive roles beyond O&M and undertake new investments. there are significant . However. There also is a pronounced regional bias in WSS services that favors major cities in the Nile Delta and along the Suez Canal. Recommended Policy Orientations Increase Recovery of Recurrent Costs Egypt’s hydraulic infrastructure has been constructed over several millennia and is dependent on a storage. the medium-term policy should focus on recovering O&M and amortization costs from the users.Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review 51 The cost of water treatment and distribution has not been fully borne by industrial users because government subsidies supporting O&M costs benefit all users (for both water and wastewater treatment). and collection system around a single river. Concerning WSS services. To this end. and no institution/agency has adopted providing sanitation to the rural areas (figure 3. and political considerations that include developing agroindustrial communities and investment zones outside the Nile Valley to decongest the valley system. Even though rural population densities are high in the delta. holding companies should be vested with wider authorities to raise tariffs and recruit employees. Over recent decades. public finance of irrigation expansion in the “new lands” has taken place over vast expanses of the desert around the Nile River system. The public-good aspect of a significant part of MWRI expenditures (headworks and main canal systems) always will remain. On average. for example. Increased private sector interest will take place only when there is clear evidence of reliable cash flow from users. industries are billed 1 LE /m3 for water.8). 52 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS opportunity costs of these investments. Moreover. developing new assets financed through public appropriations5 should not substitute for public appropriations to maintain existing assets. the financing requirements to tackle the costs of environmental degradation are enormous and require significant long-term donor concessional commitments. which have absorbed billions of dollars of scarce public resources.6 The “old lands” in the Nile Valley are restricted by heavy soils. the focus could be on the low-income communities of Upper Egypt through national budgetary finance. Cost-recovery through volumetric pricing of water services. Future investments could follow two criteria: 1. Each of these restrictions impedes fostering a cropping pattern that maximizes net exports.3 2. ““Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: Spending Less for Better Services” in this volume.” meaning that the revenues generated from irrigated agriculture should focus on high-value crops that generate income and employment opportunities. 4 See Shawky and others. Concerning water quality. Use a Part of Recurrent Cost Savings to Leverage Investments That Focus on Low-Income Communities and Urgent Environmental Expenditures The recurrent cost savings could be used to leverage donor financing to support a nationwide targeted program aimed at improving water and sanitation services in low-income communities. 5 Chapters 3 and 4 of the budget (according to the budget structure of the Ministry of Finance in 2005). For water supply.4 Establish Criteria to Ensure That New Public Investments Do Not Substitute for the Maintenance of Existing Hydraulic Infrastructure Assets Until the above reforms are instituted. and traditional farming systems dating back thousands of years. 3 . In this case. Maximize “crop value per drop. 6 Chapter 2 of the budget for regular/preventive maintenance and chapter 3 for occasional/major rehabilitation. very small tenures. public expenditures will continue to be the main sources of maintaining existing assets. one subregion’s untreated wastewater becomes the downstream community’s pollution problem. the long-run success of decentralization requires the resolution of the debt overhang. the WSS holding company’s debts could be written off after the accomplishment of milestones linked to Box 3. such as municipal councils. and O&M of water works. Furthermore. and in supervision and quality control. For example. utilities need to be accountable to local users and elected bodies. local governments/ communities have been reluctant to take over the O&M of communal irrigation systems. Meaningful participation cannot be achieved unless there is greater transfer of responsibility. and resources to grassroots user groups.1). NIA also offered a pilot program in which a considerable part of the debt is waived if local governments/ communities contribute immediate equity through fostering local private investment in irrigation and raising user fees. Deal with Debt Most of the water sector’s domestic debts have short maturity and therefore are not appropriate instruments to finance this type of longterm investment. As in the Philippines (box 3. national legislation was necessary to write off most of the debt. in setting and administering tariffs. . its write-off by the government becomes inevitable. It requires the participation of water user groups in the planning. reluctance was due to the debt overhang that also was to be passed from NIA to the local governments/communities. as the domestic debt is not actually repaid through revenues from water tariffs. authority. implementation. In the WSS sector. design. Decentralization also intends to eliminate government involvement in routine O&M/ rehabilitation of irrigation systems.Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review 53 Decentralize Decentralization of governmental responsibilities and community participation in service planning and delivery must be deepened. In addition to the lack of capacity at the local level. after the law devolved O&M responsibilities from the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) to the local governments/communities. Eventually.1 Water Management in the Philippines In the Philippines. A possible solution is to link debt relief with the accomplishment of the key institutional reform milestones: improving financial and operational efficiency. often as “make-work” assignments for government staff. that is. and 100 percent metering of all water connections/subscriptions.000 connections. . total number of connections. Furthermore. Ensure Appropriate Design of Water Facilities and Choice of Technologies The technologies selected in providing water services often are oversized and not cost-effective. unaccountedfor-water (UFW) percent. An example from the irrigation subsector at the tertiary-canal level is pumping facilities (pump set and pump house) and pipelines that have been oversized to “guarantee” reliable irrigation deliveries. Address Procurement Inefficiencies One glaring example of procurement inefficiencies is the lack of transparency.7 number of staff per 1. 8 See example on Egypt’s WSS benchmarking indicators in chapter 4 by Shawky and others. Performance could be monitored through five key indicators. and increase O&M costs to users. the practice of retaining retirees as senior management advisors/consultants demotivates middle-level staff.54 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS financial and operational efficiency. Inappropriate procurement practices can be controlled if oversight of the tendering process explicitly involves the participation of beneficiary communities. Delays in awarding contracts and in honoring government payment commitments to contractors result in the lack of interest among highly competent Egyptian companies in bidding for government contracts. A cost-effective alternative would be to involve the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) in improving extension services and MWRI in improving the ability of a farmer to receive water on demand. Current procurement practices are designed to safeguard the integrity of public spending but often end up creating the opposite effect. through continuous 7 Unaccounted-for-water (UFW) includes leaks and water supplied to illegal connections. Overstaffing in departments has resulted in unnecessary procedures and paperwork.8 External support through a sector-wide approach (SWAp) operation or debt restructuring could improve service performance. such as debt service ratio. 9 ./annum Rationalize the Institutional Architecture There is room for cost-saving toward through reducing overhead costs. mental Affairs Agency (EEAA). Ministry of Planning. plus recurrent expenditure actually spent in 2004. and public health and public health NOPWASD.10. This is an example of an “allocative” efficiency. MWRI. actual public expenditure10 (light blue) vs. Egyptian EnvironSource: MOF (2004) data and World Bank (2005). sequential and prioritized spatial coverage of services and adoption of low-cost technologies should be sought.10 Actual Expenditures vs. 10 Summation of the long-term capital investments “annualized” for 2004. In figure 3. and Ministry of Local Development (MoLD). such as water quality. in which the W-10 pilot has tackled this oversizing issue (albeit on a demonstration scale). Needs (M LE/yr) tested in the IIIMP. technology choice should be 2000 based on comprehensive (multi1000 agency) and cost-effective plans. needs (orange plus blue) show that savings from expenditure rationalization can be reallocated to meet the unfunded needs.Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review 55 flow. Savings from the public expenditure can largely be achieved through: The aforementioned policy orientations 1 and 2: financing recurrent expenditure through targeted end-user fees will free some public funds that then can be spent on public-like needs. These are technical efficiencies Million L. Therefore.E. The WSS subsector has begun to reduce overheads through establishing See in this volume the chapter entitled “Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta” by Jose Simas and others. 0 These comprehensive plans Total ACTUAL Additional expenditures Additional expenditures NEEDED for the NEEDED for the expenditures of should be coordinated jointly the water sector irrigation subsector WSS subsector in 2004 to improve water quality to improve water quality by MoF. These concepts are being Figure 3.9 7000 Rather than being unilaterally 6000 5000 imposed by one agency solely to 4000 meet engineering/technical crite3000 ria. Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP). The aforementioned policy orientations 6 on procurement efficiency and 7 on “right-sizing” the works. namely. in the IWMDs. more advanced PPP models in irrigation and WSS need to be piloted. It is advisable to change the accounting practices by posting all water-related costs under one account within the general state budget. This structure is expected to reduce O&M transaction costs as well as to improve O&M at the district level. while improving local irrigation services. MWRI is piloting Integrated Water Management Districts (IWMDs).56 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS the holding company described above. Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) to water user associations/groups is envisaged to reduce the fiscal burden on the government. all MWRI departments are represented in one organization. . at the water directorates and water districts levels. The IWMDs are entities integrated at the district level based on hydrological rather than administrative boundaries. Supported by a USAID project and IIIMP. Form Partnerships with the Private Sector Beyond the adoption of holding companies. and administer user fees. In the irrigation subsector. However. Amend Law 12/1984. There is an enforceable legal basis for WUAs to raise (land) taxes to recover O&M costs of the tertiary canals. This change could unify the present fragmentation among different institutions. The lessons from these pilots will be used to scale up the concept throughout Egypt. which assume design and construction roles. because these canals are privately owned by farmers. Recommended Immediate Actions The short-term policy recommendations drawn from this PER analysis are: 1. The depth and mode of private participation will depend critically upon measures taken to improve cost-recovery. These groups need the authority to collect. retain. which assume the O&M roles. a. The next step is to pilot Integrated Water Management Directorates. To remedy the current fragmented structure. MWRI is piloting programs to reduce overheads within the governorate level. is not in place. the debt overhang restricts the flexibility of financial management. such as universal metering. The first decree. 2002. is concerned with the creation of a Holding Company for Drinking Water and Sanitation and its affiliated companies that include the General Economic Authorities for Drinking Water and Sanitation operating in the governorates. 11 . b. 2. covers the creation of the Central Authority for the Drinking Water and Sanitation Sector. two Presidential Decrees were issued that regulated the WSS subsector under the responsibility of the MHUNC. The basic infrastructure. The second Presidential Decree. This decree aims at regulating and monitoring for quality control and consumer-price control. Middle East and North Africa Region. 136 for 2004. “Cost Assessment of Environmental Degradation. and the organizations are heavily overstaffed. and Protection of the Consumer.11 a legal basis has been initiated for the WSS holding company and its affiliated companies to raise tariffs and achieve financial autonomy. By virtue of two presidential decrees. Report #25175.” A Sector Note.Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review 57 branch canals are public assets. In 2004. Unless Law 12/1984 is amended. 135 for 2004. the suggested reforms cannot be effected. June. However. these utilities face a difficult organizational challenge. and there is no legal basis for WUAs and Water Boards to recover O&M costs. users are skeptical of their capacity to improve services. Put in place a subsectoral investment and restructuring program in WSS. References World Bank. What is required is a wide-ranging investment and restructuring program to simultaneously improve service quality and the financial autonomy of WSS companies. . while reducing the burden on the government budget. the second on Egypt’s water sector. for the water resource base. meaning that one person’s use subtracts from another’s. and Manish Kumar 4 Background and Objective This chapter is a sequel to chapter 3 on water sector issues and expenditure patterns in Egypt.1 This chapter identifies how public expenditure could be reallocated to improve equity and productivity. meaning that one can 1 This chapter originated as Water Policy Note 2 (World Bank 2005b). flood control infrastructures. 2 This is true for the infrastructure although not. a collaboration between the Government of Egypt and the World Bank. They may be efficiently funded by flat charges or general/ sovereign revenues. The aim was to inform government decisionmaking on increasing the value added from water and curbing the socioeconomic costs of water pollution. and there is no reason to link end-user payments to their usage. However. Trunk water infrastructure2—multipurpose dams/barrages. when water reaches the end-user. and major water/wastewater treatment plants—are public goods. 59 . of course. multipurpose conveyance canals. Alexander Kremer. A public good is also “nonsubtractable”: one person’s use of the infrastructure or the service does not detract from another person’s use. it becomes a private good. and excludable.Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: Spending Less for Better Services Ahmed Shawky Mohamed. A private good is subtractable. Water Has Public and Private Features A public good is “nonexcludable” because it is costly or unrealistic to link end-user charges to usage. as part of the analytical work supporting the Public Expenditure Review (PER) in Egypt. 000.2 is more 0 dramatic: public recurrent expenPublic good Private good Mixed good diture has been almost entirely on private-good aspects of water delivery. Another example is household water supply and sanitation connections. Figure 4. These resources. would reduce the need for public funding of infrastructure rehabilitation. In other words.000 equate maintenance.000 Government Spends on Private Goods Egypt’s capital spending on irrigation is primarily for public goods. in turn.000 operations and maintenance 0 (O&M) could release public rePublic activity Private activity Mixed activity sources for priority maintenance of deteriorating upstream infrastructure.000 but the Egyptian government also makes a major allocation to 500. Egypt’s water infra600. One example of a private good is “on-farm” water.1). Increased user charges for downstream 200. the water flowing into tertiary/quaternary canals of the irrigation network.1 Breakdown of Capital Spending between Public and Private Goods Capital expenditures 1. 1.000 structure is suffering from inad400. it is efficient to charge the user and earmark user charges to cover the costs of the service. Charging can help to ensure that the good is not over-consumed.500. The message in figure 4. Figure 4. They also would release public resources for under-funded public priorities such as wastewater collec(1000 LE) (1000 LE) tion and treatment.60 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS stop nonpayers from using it.2 Breakdown of GOE Recurrent Spending on Public and Private Goods This observation can be couRecurrent expenditures pled with the observations of 800.000 private goods (figure 4. . Potential Efficiency Gains One can measure the potential for improved efficiency by benchmarking institutions’ performance.000 chapter 3 (first published as World Bank 2005a). 3–4. which may not be representative of the current nationwide See International Programme for Technology and Research in Irrigation and Drainage. assessed against engineering/technical benchmarks. b. of water application.fao. former World Bank Drainage Advisor.00 ity as the actual production 2. Excess) would be to assess productiv3.org/iptrid/ 3 . Name of branch canal These indicators may include Source: Agriculture and Rural Development Department (ARD). World Bank. 1. These compare system outputs with inputs.4 On-Farm Water Demand/Supply Ratio or through time. measured at the root zone and (2) the adequacy and reliability of irrigation delivery. www. Less than 1. Name of branch canal Source: Agriculture and Rural Development Department (ARD). (1) the intra-farm uniformity communicated by Safwat Abdel Dayem. World Bank. These indicators assess impacts of irrigated agriculture across comparable irrigation systems and/ Figure 4. An example (Ratios Exceeding 1 Indicate Shortage.50 1. Better use of water and efficient irrigation practices The analysis supported by figures 4.Neshil ElKadima Kadima On-farm water demand-to-supply ratio a.50 per unit of water divided by 2. c.50 0.00 the norm.Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies 61 Water for Irrigation Performance benchmarking in irrigation and agricultural drainage The three common types of irrigation benchmarking indicators are3: Figure 4. former World Bank Drainage Advisor.3 Seasonal Irrigation Water Supply per Unit Agricultural Area 14000 Cubic Meters per hectare 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 Besentway Zaweit Naim El Beida Daqalt Sanhour El. Comparative indicators.00 Besentway Zaweit Naim Daqalt Sanhour El-Kadima The performance benchmarking undertaken below for the irrigation subsector tends toward the internal and comparative types. Internal indicators. communicated by Safwat Abdel Dayem.00 0. The indicators may include (1) assessing the ratio of the water usage to the water actually delivered at various levels of the system and (2) economic efficiency (cost-benefit ratio). Service reliability indicators.11 draws from a 2002–03 dataset. below the trunk/main canal level.5 lack 2 of the 6 observations of figure 4. They show that some regions use water much more productively than others.6 Annual Irrigation Supply per Unit Irrigated Area canal-drainage system is a private (m3/ha) good from the branch-canal level 20.3 compares seasonal water supply per hectare. 18.00 depict a significant disparity in 12. However. Name of branch canal Figures 4.000.5 compares the canal-system efficiency of water delivery. MWRI distributes 8. the branch canal level is managed and financed by the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI).4 compares the on-farm water supply-demand ratios.4 and 4. irrigation technical efficiency of communicated by Safwat Abdel Dayem.00 area. Farm Level) (%) i00 i97 i99 lin d Yaq sag lin d lin d lin d Ma Ri o ram Ma Ma Ma Sri Ba laq tar 00 ui0 0 ar0 i98 0 4 Figures 4. as part of the –150.00 in proportion to crop water re2.62 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS context. The rationale was that the Figure 4.00 downward.000. Therefore.5 compare the Source: Agriculture and Rural Development Department (ARD). Therefore.00 water among command areas 4.0 Besentway Daqalt Sanhour for scaling up the benchmarking El-Kadima –50.3–4.3–4.0 exercise (when more ample data –100. 6 branch-canal command areas in Egypt.00 14. former World Bank Drainage Advisor. the results and the argumentation drawn may not apply to all irrigation 100.000.00 mand areas. figure 4.00 6.0 schemes in Egypt.3 due to lack of data.000. The branch canal level is the secondary level in the Egyptian irrigation delivery system. The inten50.0 sets are available).00 performance among the 6 com10. .0 tion was more to make a case Zaweit Naim 0. Figure 4. and figure 4. World Bank. Being under public ownership. the MWRI piloted various programs to hand over its management to Water Boards (World Bank 2005).000.000. adjusted for cropping 0.0 IWRM ASSESSMENT exercise –200.00 quirements.000.000.54 16.000. any variation in water availability per unit area at Figure 4.000.0 advocated in this volume.00 The data in figures 4.5 Canal-System Efficiency of Water Delivery (Water Supply at Canal Level vs. 00 Ma l in di9 8 Ma l in di9 7 Ma l in di9 9 Ba laq Ma l in di0 0 8 sag ar0 0 Figure 4. with comparable canals in India (Sriramsagar).9 compares the economic efficiency of irrigation in Egypt and other countries.00 4. figure 4.00 0.40 0. Economic efficiency of irrigation Figure 4.8 support the argument for transferring the management and f inance of the nonheadwork canal systems to water user organizations (with temporary technical backstopping from MWRI).20 1. The monetary value of agricultural production per unit of water is used as an indicator of economic efficiency.00 0.00 12.00 10. The comparison reveals a significant potential for improving the operational and managerial performance of the feeder level of Balaqtar.00 2.8 Average Depth to Shallow Water (m) 16.3–4.6 – 4. namely.00 8.5 0 Yemen Iran Egypt Mexico Chile Costa Rica Turkey Brazil Lebanon Sri ram Rio Ma Ma lin sag di9 Yaq ui0 0 tar 00 .9 clearly suggests that Figure 4. Figures 4.8 compare the technical and operational performance of Balaqtar.7 Cost-Recovery Ratio 1.00 6.60 0.00 0 ar0 0 00 Sri ram Rio Ma lin di9 7 0 ui0 di0 di9 9 tar Yaq lin Ma lin Ba laq Figure 4. a representative canal in Egypt.5 1 0.5 nominal US$ per m3/year of water 2 1.20 0. This would not only reduce public spending but also ensure more efficient irrigation practices (World Bank 2005).Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies 63 the field level can be attributed only to water management inefficiencies downstream of the allocation point. and Kenya (Malindi) (World Bank 2003). The data in figures 4.80 0. at the secondary level and below.00 14.9 Average Production Value per Unit of Irrigation Supply (US$/m3/annum) 2. Mexico (Rio Yaqui). Although the cropyield-per-unit-area in Egypt is quite high (particularly with rice). it reduces the return on irrigation sector investment. Unaccounted-for Water (UFW) Is High ar0 0 0 9 ui0 i00 00 i97 di9 tar nd Yaq nd Ma lin Ma li Unaccounted-for water (UFW) is one of the most important indicators of efficiency in the WSS subsector.20 0. and for flushing the water distribution system during maintenance. Apparent water loss arising from meter inaccuracies and improper accounting of water used in filling new mains. The causes of the low socioeconomic returns to irrigation water are twofold: ui0 0 i97 tar 00 ar0 i00 i99 lin d Ma Ma sag laq Yaq ram Sri a.00 2.60 0.50 0.00 the economic returns to irrigation water in Egypt are lower than international norms. UFW is defined as water that is not metered or billed to customers. Figure 4.11 Production Value per Unit Irrigated Area.11 (World Bank 2003) support this argument by comparing the performance of Balaqtar Canal with comparable canals in India.000. Including Multiple Cropping (US$/ha) 7. and service reservoirs.00 1.30 0. Costrecovery in Egypt is very low (table 4.00 3. UFW comprises: Rio ram Sri 1. Kenya. Figures 4. Low technical efficiency at the canal/farm level. Inefficiency in agricultural production and supply chains.64 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Figure 4.1).10 and 4.000.10 Production Value per Unit Irrigation Supply (US$/m3/season) 0.000.00 0. b.00 Rio Ba Ma Ma lin d lin d lin d i98 0 Potable Water and Sanitation Robust indicators for the WSS subsector have been established and used world-wide.70 0. and Mexico. It is calculated by subtracting the metered consumption from the total amount of water supplied to the water system.000.00 6.00 5.10 0.000. Even though this is outside the water sector.40 0.000. connections. Ba Ma li Ma lin sag laq di9 8 .00 4.000. quality UFW data is scarce. 2. In developed countries. In Egypt. Capital cost-recovery ratio = Revenues/total net fixed assets. Actual water loss due to leaks and theft. Studies on specific areas show UFW values from 50 percent–67 percent. This percentage is usually higher for smaller municipalities.Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies 65 Table 4. Comparing the indicators for Egypt with those observed from the comparable international norms. A data set for 15 governorates shows a UFW range among governorates of 15 (Cairo) to 56 percent (Fayoum). with a weighted average for the 15 governorates of 30 percent. staff/1000 connection 1 to 3 Wastewater 10 DNA NA NA 20 14 NA 6 DNA DNA 17 15 DNA 10 Source: Personal communication with USAID. UFW usually ranges from less than 10 percent for new systems to 25 percent for older systems.1 Benchmarking Water and Sanitation Subsector Governorate/ indicator Benchmark (norm) Aswan Alexandria Water Alexandria Wastewater Beheira Beni Suef Cairo Water Cairo Wastewater Dakahlia Damietta Fayoum Gharbia Kafr El Sheikh Minia Sharqeya Capital costrecovery ratio (%) 50 3 4 32 14 6 3 9 6 14 8 5 12 6 7 Consumption (liter/capita/day) 80 rural/150 urban Water 108 351 NA 85 52 252 NA DNA DNA 102 81 124 DNA 100 –383 –16 41 111 –8 –192 –450 –4 0 –15 –3 0 0 –4 NA 14 4 8 7 NA 14 6 7 4 7 7 9 6 Debt service ratio (%) No. 1. DNA = Data not available. or even 60 percent. 2. one can conclude: A number of staff per 1. However.000 population served well above 5. some Eastern European and African countries regularly reach 40 to 50 percent. Notes: NA = Not applicable. Debt service ratio = Debt service/operating profit (loss) before depreciation. indicating heavy overstaffing . Wastewater disposal is a case in point. Rate increases also would enable and encourage the utilities to improve technical efficiency (unit service per unit expenditure).66 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Very low cost-recovery ratios and debt service ratios Accurate UFW percentages not known. However. Option b plus community-based and hygiene measures to control the unsafe disposal of rural sewage. there are great unrealized opportunities for public spending on public goods. As part of the Country Environmental Analysis of Egypt (World Bank 2005). as proposed by the National Plan for the Protection of the Water Resources of Egypt (2003) 3. agriculture. Regarding water management efficiency.12). or 2 percent of GDP (figure 4. These costs represent the harm caused to human health. the government inevitably bails out loss-making utilities with grants from the Ministry of Finance and loans from the National Investment Bank (NIB). a study was undertaken to estimate the socioeconomic cost of the disposal of maltreated or untreated wastewater. and fisheries. Government policy is that water utilities should be financially autonomous. Three policy options were compared: 1. because of low end-user tariffs. At the same time. Higher rates would help GOE to achieve its goal of financial autonomy for water utilities. the status quo 2. but probably at typical developing-country levels (30 percent–50 percent) Large disparities in liter/capita/day usage rates across country. Government-led centralized actions including those executed in urban and suburban areas. Improved Wastewater Disposal Will Benefit the Entire Nation We have shown above that a disproportionate volume of public spending is allocated to private goods. The study has estimated that the socioeconomic cost of maltreated/ untreated wastewater is higher than LE 9 billion. Business as Usual (BAU). . the country’s services are possibly on a par with utilities in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. In conclusion. Egypt’s water and sanitation services are less financially sustainable than the developing-country norm. Switching to user charges would release public expenditures for priority public needs. water subsidies would play the role of a social welfare transfer from the taxpayer to the poor. The analysis is run for two samples of agricultural households from the western areas of the Delta region Total costs LE billion/year . such as wastewater treatment. The information acquired can be a useful input for policymakers concerned with the improved targeting of programs and subsidies. The addition of 0 community-based and self-fiBAU Central measures Central + community & hygiene measures nanced sanitation programs could produce an extra net benefit of LE 1 billion. one possible justification for public subsidies to downstream O&M is that it is an efficient way to support the incomes of poorer households. downstream O&M expenditures provide private goods and should be covered by user charges. However.12 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Improving is a classic case of a public good Wastewater Disposal because it would benef it the Forgone benefits (damage costs) Cost of added treatment/control 10 entire nation.Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies 67 Better wastewater disposal Figure 4. See details in appendix 2 and in chapter 3 (World Bank Policy Note 2005). According to this argument. Do Water Subsidies Support Incomes of Poorer Households? As argued above.1). This BIA analyzes whether the current irrigation subsidy is progressive (appendix A4. The methodology of Benefit Incidence Assessment (BIA) can test whether water subsidies are an effective social welfare transfer. particularly those 9 downstream who cannot easily 8 protect themselves. BIA studies the distributional impact of public expenditures and whether it is pro-poor. By imple7 6 menting the measures cited in 5 the 2003 National Plan for the 4 Protection of Water Resources. A subsidy is defined as progressive if the absolute value of the benefit is greater for a poor household than for a rich one. 3 2 Egypt could achieve a net benefit 1 of LE 2 billion. 68 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS There are inherent difficulties with BIA of the irrigation sector.7 percent of the total public subsidy is received by the poorest 25 percent of households.0 10. Two samples were taken at different times and in zones with different socioeconomic characteristics. there Mean income/hh Mean acres/hh is a strong correlation between a household’s income and its benefit from water subsidies. whereas only 25 percent benefits the poorest 50 percent.0 0. Irrigation water utilization is a function of area cultivated. this methodology is inadequate for irrigation because households use irrigation to different degrees.4 acres in the poorest decile.0 8. However.0 6. Therefore. irrigation water is not metered at canal-to-farm turnouts. exactly 75 percent of the water subsidy benefits the richest 50 percent of households. Households in the 40000 richest income decile own on av30000 erage 10. not the poor.13 shows the relationship Land and income distribution 60000 between households’ landholdings 50000 and incomes. but it is difficult to measure water utilized on a farm. 10000 On the assumption that wa0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ter use and subsidies are proDecile portional to landholdings. In fact. the study attempts to differentiate the level of participation among households. Ideally. Sample A was taken from districts in three governorates and used landholding as a proxy for water use. These findings indicate that irrigation subsidies are not justified as a policy instrument for the redistribution of income. Findings Figure 4.0 4. soil type. The main beneficiaries of subsidies are the rich. climate. Sample B was drawn from 7 villages in 1 governorate and included water-use data collected by interviewing a random sample of rural householders.0 2. crop type. compared with 20000 1. BIAs for education or health services utilize the difference in participation by the poor vis-a-vis the rich.13 Farmer Land and Income Distribution 12. According to the data in this sample.0 1 Sample A Figure 4. and on-farm irrigation technology. The richer households benefit most. Only 9. this differentiation would be achieved by measuring water utilized on each household’s farm. in Egypt. LE/household/year acres/household .8 acres. For Sample B. farm .5 percent–4 percent of Subsidy/income Subsidy/crop income 12. The required increase in crop income to compensate farmers for losing the irrigation subsidy would range from 6 percent–11 percent. This method would show the increase of crop income needed (as a result of better water management) to compensate farmers when the irrigation subsidy is withdrawn. The irrigation subsidy is Figure 4. Sample B Sample B represents 60 farms (not households) in the Western Delta area. more commercial operations specializing in high-value cropping.0% subsidy as a share of income. The required increase in crop production is higher for poorer farmers than for richer farmers. This zone of newly developed land is characterized by larger. The 2.0% There is no clear correlation 8. so the subsidy is lower as a share of their crop incomes.0% between household income and 6.0% irrigation subsidy is therefore not 0. 10. Using this figure. Delegation also would help farmers improve their crop yields through better water management. The delegation of the management and financing of downstream irrigation systems to water user associations (WUAs) would involve an increase in water charges to farmers. it is possible to (1) calculate the importance of the irrigation subsidy as a percentage of total household income for richer and poorer households and (2) see whether removing the subsidy would have a disproportionately severe impact on the livelihoods of poor households. Thus.14 Irrigation Subsidy as Share of Income worth 2.0% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 a major contributor to household Decile income for the poor. The reason is that richer farmers achieve higher levels of crop income per acre. it is useful to calculate the irrigation subsidy as a percentage share of farmers’ crop income.0% the income of rural households of all income classes (figure 4. However. it is not representative of Egyptian farming as a whole. the yield increases required are well within the range that is expected to result from improved water management.14). even for poorer farmers. Therefore.0% the importance of the irrigation 4.Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies 69 The average value of the irrigation subsidy is LE 137/acre. Figure 4. 80% Again. the 0 1 2 3 4 5 volume of water used per farm is slightly lower in the fourth and fifth income quintiles than in the third. and the 25 1 2 3 4 5 percent of farms with the lowest incomes receive only 13 percent of the subsidy. 300 instead of furrow irrigation.16 Use of Water-Saving Systems by Crop Income Quintile groups. Figure 4.15 Mean Water Use by Crop Income Quintile . meaning 60% 50% that most of it is captured by 40% high-income farms. the dataset for Sample B includes estimates 8.17 Water Use per Cropped Area The reason that the subsidy by Crop Income Quintile distribution in Sample B is less Mean water use m3/feddan crop area 900 regressive than that in Sample 800 A is that the larger farms in 700 Sample B are more likely to use 600 water-saving irrigation equip500 400 ment (drip and/or sprinkler). In this case. 6.000 of water use in irrigation by farm. 10. For 200 this reason.000 As noted above. even though the land 100 area is significantly larger.000 the assumption that water use 2. Investment in such systems is Figure 4. the allocation of the 70% subsidy is regressive. 30% the 50 percent of farms with the 20% lowest incomes receive only 36 10% 0% percent of the subsidy.16.000 Thus. Rates of usage of water-saving equipment are illustrated in figure 4.000 quintiles are established.000 according to which the income 12.000 is proportional to landholding. it is possible to do without 4.70 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS crop income—not household income—has been the measure Mean water use m3/year/farm 14. water use per unit area is significantly different among farmers of different income Figure 4. 0 1 2 3 4 5 Indeed.15 plots the benefit % of farms with drip/sprinkler 90% incidence by income quintiles. A disproportionate volume of public expenditure on water is on “private” (nonheadwork/trunk) water infrastructure and services. If the irrigation subsidy received by the richest 75 percent in Sample A instead were allocated to the poorest 25 percent. Conclusions from the Benefit Incidence Assessment Water use by the poorest 25 percent in Sample A was 9. it would raise their total household incomes by as much as 30 percent. approximately LE 1. or approximately 0. from which Sample B is drawn. Conclusions The findings of this analysis are: There is a pressing need for additional state expenditure on wastewater collection and treatment. a public good that could add at least 1 percent to GDP. could be being spent on irrigation subsidies for the non-poor. it is likely that the analysis above understates the regressivity of the water subsidy.3 percent of Egypt’s GDP. According to the data from Sample B. When benchmarked against established performance norms.Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies 71 a characteristic of the high-value commercial farming practiced in the Western Delta region.8 billion. However. leading to an underestimation of the regressivity of the water subsidy. implying that 90 percent of the irrigation subsidy is being captured by the non-poor. the volume of water used per cropped feddan in the fifth quintile is approximately a one-tenth of that in the other 4 (lower-income) quintiles (figure 4. There is no equity justification for public irrigation spending on private water benefits because most of these benefits are captured by the better-off farmers. this expenditure is inefficient. It is possible that the larger farmer operations have understated their levels of water consumption. Targeting this money at the poorest would significantly reduce poverty rates.6 billion annually. the differential is too great to be credible. . While part of this difference may be attributable to the use of water-saving systems.7 percent of the total. The annual subsidy in the irrigation subsector (recurrent plus amortized capital expenditures spent on quasiprivate goods/services) is approximately LE 1. Thus.17). 72 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS These findings provide a quantitative foundation for the recommendations proposed in chapter 3 in this volume. Such reforms would release funding for priority expenditures on public goods such as upstream maintenance and wastewater management. . These reforms also would improve the equity of water-financing by ensuring that farmers’ contributions are more proportionate to their benefits. namely. Responsibilities to be delegated to water user organizations would include water allocations and the assessment and collection of charges. the gradual transfer of the finance and management of downstream infrastructure and services from public agencies to WUAs and autonomous utilities. Depono (65). the first survey has data on area used for cultivation. They were conducted by local consultants over different periods and followed different methodologies. Besides other variables. the second includes actual irrigation water used. The review note states that in 2003–04 approximately LE 4. The total irrigated land in Egypt is 8. and the survey data represent 2 distinct rural compositions. of which nearly 79 percent was spent on new investments. May 2005. 4. net livestock. 7. Land owned by the household (net area cultivated) Gross income from the farm O&M cost for water management on the farm Net income from livestock Net income from off-farm activities Total net income (net farm. These governorates and the counties are listed below. The Sample A survey collected data at the household level for 2003–04 on the following: 1. Finally. El-Basrah (27) 3. The figures were taken from Egypt Public Expenditure Review. Table 1 of the review also gives MWRI expenditure as LE 1. Sample A and Sample. Beheira Governorate: Zarcoon (45). Matrouh Governorate: El Ola (30).45 million acres. and net off-farm income) Number of family members.04 billion collected as user fees.1 Data Used in the Benefit Incidence Assessment The B/A analysis is based on two separate surveys. The per-unit irrigation subsidy was computed using the expenditure of MWRI for the corresponding year. with the number of samples from each region in parentheses: 1. 3. Abu-Sombel (27). which includes 0. Alexandria Governorate: Mohagrein (20). 5. table 1 (World Bank 2005). 2. 6. Barseeq (40) 2. B. El-Tanmiah (30). Sample A was drawn from a random sampling survey conducted over 8 counties in 3 governorates of Egypt’s West Delta region. the sample sizes were different.2 billion. The per-unit irrigation subsidy therefore is computed as follows: .Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies 73 Appendix A4.09 billion was spent on water infrastructure by the irrigation and agriculture subsector. the survey provides insight into the differential subsidy allocation within the sample range. 2.74 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Unit subsidy = (1. 4. Sample B was undertaken over a short period and is representative of the rural area constituted by the villages above.2–0. the result of this analysis is not generalized for the country.04)/0. Sample B collected data from the following villages in the Western Delta area: 1. However. Consequently.00845 = LE 137 per acre (approx. 3. 7. 6.). . El Hussain Bostan Nobaria Bangar Souker/Banger Elsokar Rowaisat El Fekra Station El Omayed. 5. Weighing the discounted forgone benefits against the discounted expenses regarding each of the three inaction/action options. Transmission through contaminated aerosols from poorly managed water systems. each scenario reflects a different fecal-oral pathogen exposure. sanitation and hygiene. translation of the forgone benefits into monetary values. six exposure scenarios were considered. Transmission caused by lack of water linked to inadequate personal hygiene c. (2) centrally planned actions. Three policy options were analyzed: (1) Business as usual (BAU).” forgone as a result of the high TDS concentration (using FAO yield-to-salinity production functions). and each group was attributed a different relative risk (obtained from the literature) of contacting the disease. Health damages were based on relating the diarrhea incidence rates to the risk factors associated with the level of “water. the total respective incidence rates of diarrhea were estimated. Corresponding “dose-response” for estimating the fishery/crop losses. sanitation.Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies 75 Appendix A4. as of the National Plan for the Protection of the Water Resources of Egypt. Transmission through contact (through bathing or wading) in water containing organisms such as Schistosoma e. Each is associated with a combination of different levels of water supply.” as these factors are determined by the following transmission pathways: a. and corresponding “exposure-risk” for estimating the disease incidences. and total dissolved solids (TDS) for crop production benefits. Populations were grouped according to their level of water and sanitation access. For the BAU option. Thus. domestic. and hygiene. dissolved oxygen (DO) for fishery production benefits. Thereof. To a certain extent. the damage cost assessment undertaken for water pollution included two types of forgone benefits: 5 Agricultural damages were estimated at the “Consumer and Producer Surplus. or agricultural hygiene d. Transmission caused by poor personal. transmission through vectors proliferating in water reservoirs or other stagnant water or certain agricultural practices f.2 Assessing the Social Benefits of Sanitation As part of the Country Environmental Analysis of Egypt (World Bank 2005). The study factored in: Three key at-recipient parameters: Fecal coliforms (combined with “exposure-risk” parameters)5 to infer health benefits. Hence. and (3) the latter plus controlling rural water pollution (assuming both partial and full coverage). Transmission through ingestion of water b. one study evaluated the full social and economic costs and benefits of the country’s water use and disposal. . The study put particular emphasis on rural water and sanitation. The study included the additional costs of the erected hydraulic. as well as well-being losses. and (b) official reuse from main drains was halted because of pollution by untreated sewage. The above results suggest that the best option is the latter. the intervention corresponding to the National Plan for the Protection of the Water Resources of Egypt (Central Action) would cost approximately 1 billion LE/year.4 billion LE/year (undiscounted).8 percent of GDP (World Bank 2005. or 1. In 2014.5 billion/yr. including improved hygiene) could be carried out for a total cost of 2.5) billion. and electrical facilities that became idle due to the halting of a number of drainage reuse schemes.35 billion in 2003.5 billion LE/yr. .7 billion LE/yr.2 percent of national GDP. Results of the Study The study estimated the total cost of forgone benefits as approximately LE 5. On average.5 billion/yr or 3.7+2.3 billion/year (9. from 2003–14. Using this option.5-6. and occupational health impacts. low-cost/ unconventional remedies for rural areas (central plus decentralized actions. the forgone benefits will reach as high as LE 9. in 2014 the plan would reduce the damages to only 6. Cost of avoiding the use of polluted water such as (1) added cost of pumping groundwater when surface drainage water was too polluted to be reused and (2) forgone benefits when (a) farmers unofficially reused highly saline water from secondary drains. crop/ fishery/livestock production losses due to salinity and toxicity). figure 7). food chain contamination. factoring in population growth and if no additional actions are taken. or a decrease of 30 percent. mechanical. for example.0–2. An alternative intervention corresponding to the national plan but adapted to include community-driven-and-financed. if taken. from water-related diseases. It would comprise government central/sectoral plans for the urban/district areas augmented by community-driven-and-financed unconventional plans for controlling rural water pollution.76 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Income losses from the use of polluted water (for example. On the other hand. However. in 2014 the value of the damages avoided would be reduced by an additional LE 2. the costs of inaction would average 7. or by a total of LE 5. . 1997.. “Egypt and the Millennium Development Goals: Challenges and Opportunities. G. May. DC Workshop Proceedings. Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation. ____. “Cost Effectiveness and Equity in Egypt’s Water Sector. Lanjouw.. Government of Egypt. 2003. 2004. 2003. December. 2001. Experience and Application to Egypt. Van de Walle.” Egypt Public Expenditure Review. ____. “Marginal Benefit Incidence Analysis Using a Single Cross-Section of Data. “National Plan for the Protection of the Water Resources of Egypt. “Benefit Incidence and the Timing of Program Capture. World Bank. 2001. June. ”The Incidence of Public Social Expenditures in Zimbabwe. and M.” Washington. El-Saharty.” . and S.” IBRD Report 25175. and Q. July. D. The Netherlands. S.” Draft Policy Paper. “Egypt Country Environmental Analysis. Cairo.” World Bank.I.” World Bank. Richardson.” Delft University of Technology. P. Wodon.” World Bank. Ravallion. 2005b. “Water Demand Management: Approach. 2003. ____. Water Policy Note 1. M. Chase. A. 1998. Shawky. “Holistic Benchmarking in the Irrigation and Drainage Sector. “Cost Assessment of Environmental Degradation in Egypt. 2005a. March 6–7.Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies 77 References Ajwad.” World Bank. . consumptive use through irrigation could have a sizeable nonbeneficial component if either water from open canals and reservoirs is lost through evaporation. with the appropriate investments in treatment. For example.Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models in Water Resource Management and Planning in MNA Region Bekele Debele Negewo. concerning nonconsumptive water use. This chapter suggests the need to develop new approaches that comprehensively monitor the water balance as a means of managing variations in water supply as well as demand. Such an approach basically improves understanding of the sources and sinks of water by collecting better quality datasets and by employing state-of-the art models to advise water regulators. evapotranspiration (ET) rates become a key benchmark of efficient water use. Julia Bucknall. and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed 5 Water Resource Management (WRM): A New Approach for Monitoring Water Use The Introduction to this volume suggests that the management of water resources in the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) region is likely to become far more challenging in the rest of this century because of increased variability in rainfall and increased demands on the resource from rapidly growing populations. Similarly. despite increased urbanization. These new challenges require investing much greater effort in monitoring the use of water by various sectors of the economy than in the past—particularly on whether this resource is being put to its most beneficial use. Under these circumstances. or profitable plants (such as bananas) use up considerably more water through transpiration than other less water-intensive plants. policymakers. a growing proportion of wastewater is recoverable for beneficial use. and communities on the state of a country’s water resources at a given point in time. 79 . water quality Improved short-term & long-term predictions Use of Geographic Information System (GIS) Advances in GIS technology have revolutionized the way that spatially distributed water resources data are managed (ESRI 2008). AMSR-E Soil moisture) Physics Land surface models (LSM) Physical process models Noah. communities and policymakers (outside the narrow group of WRM specialists) are still not fully aware of the benefits of investing in reliable data on water usage.1 Latest Technologies in Water Resources ter supply and sanitation (WSS) Data Collection. undisputed information on water availability and consumption is a critical component of improving governance and accountability in the sector. Third. Nevertheless.g. data assimilation. and (2) how to combine these datasets with the latest hydrological modeling capabilities to produce outputs that facilitate making critical water resources decisions in waFigure 5. CLM. vegetation. VIC. Not too long ago. EKF) Physical space analysis system (PSAS) 3-D VAR Rule-based Surface states: snowpack LAI . TRMM. Decisionmaking Inputs Topography Soils (static) Land cover. visualizes. Second. runoff) Data assimilation modules (EnKF. Figure 5. On the supply side. Assimilation.. and Modeling to Improve and irrigation. hydroelectric power. neither definitions nor data management is standard across countries. and correlates spatial data. AMSR. GIS captures. leaf area index (MODIS).1 provides a detailed illustration of (1) how the latest technologies help collate both dynamic and static characteristics of the land. GOES. RS.80 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Applications of New Technologies to Collect and Process Water-Related Data An understanding of the availability and quality of water resources as well as current and future uses of these resources is necessary for sound water decisionmaking. station) Observed states (MODIS snow. soil moisture Applications Water supply & demand Agriculture. These advances include a combination of the use of geographic information systems (GIS). and modeling techniques. technological developments are beginning to enable scientists to combine traditional water data systems with models and remote sensing (RS) information in ways that greatly reduce the cost of collecting data and increase its accuracy. and climate. First. Fourth. Landsat ET. countries lack data management systems. data collection and analysis are costly. clear. SiB2. SRTM) Meteorology modeled (NOAA-NASA) Observed (TRMM. endangered species. it was practically unthinkable to spatially represent all Surface water fluxes (e. Furthermore. Catchment Outputs Surface energy fluxes (Qh. Qle) Evapotranspiration. developing and disseminating good information on water remains a challenge in MNA for a number of reasons. one needs to spatially identify the sources and sinks of water and associated pollutants.Source: DiLuzio and others 2002. and land use/ land cover distributions vary significantly with space. temperature. and for which the maximum dividend is expected Figure 5. wind) for use in one of the complex hydrological models (Soil and Water Assessment Tool. soils) and climate data (precipitation. Advances in GIS technology become especially important when dealing with complex river basins whose climate. GIS tools will help identify hotspots within a given basin whose WRM needs to be the focus. and analyzing spatial water-related data . displaying. if one has the primary data and model structure at any spatial scale. querying. Thanks to advances in computer capacity and GIS technology. resource managers can better mimic the reality on the ground.2 Sample Applications of GIS (ArcVIEW) in SWAT Model Use from implementation of some best management practices. computer capacity and GIS technology support the analyses to provide water resource managers and decisionmakers with the decision tools needed at the scale of interest. or SWAT) in WRM. GIS facilitates the manipulation of spatial data that otherwise are difficult (if not impossible) to handle. In water resource management. model designed to assess the impacts of land Note: SWAT is a complex hydrological ogy are extremely diverse: from management on water resources. GIS technology is equally important in addressing a basin being used and managed by multiple actors.2 depicts a sample application of GIS in organizing and assimilating physiographic data (topography.Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models 81 variables that directly or indirectly dictate the movement and availability of water resources in a basin to the extent that can be done today. soils. In this case. Figure 5. epidemiology (monitoring disease outbreaks) to analyzing the vulnerability of water resources to point or nonpoint source pollution. to facilitate optimal joint resources management and development decisions. soil moisture content. The manipulation includes storing. integrating. This array of variables includes topography and land use/land cover at as low as 30m resolution. and soils. Applications of GIS technol. and climate data at sub-km resolution. Today. land use/land cover. precipitation.2). The same GIS can help to determine stream orders. some variables can be assumed to be stable over a given swath of area (air temperature1) whereas others are not (soil properties. in which case the elevation lapse rate comes into play. 1 Air temperature can be assumed stable over a good-sized field unless the field has a sharp rise in elevation over a short distance. soils. precipitation). solar radiation). soil. topography) and climate variables (temperature. and aquifer storage of the soil. Similarly. without putting a sensor close to the objects of measurement. the smallest unit of water balance computation in some hydrological models (figure 5. Whereas some state variables can be assumed to be stable over a certain period (topography. or DEM) (figure 5. one can overlay the map of land use/land cover with a soils map to generate a unique map of hydrologic response unit (HRU). Finally. In WRM. elevation. For example. Table 5. soil moisture) By the same token. air temperature. soil texture). others change very frequently (weather conditions. using GIS. Applications of Remote Sensing Technologies in WRM Advances in RS technology in recent years have given water resource managers and decisionmakers the ability to capture—from a distance— the detailed characteristics of physiographic and natural resources (surface and groundwater. vegetation. moisture content. vegetation growth. RS technology also should offer such capability. Such hydrographic maps document stream networks in a given basin that drain water from one end of a basin to the basin outlet.2). the technology of remote sensing is such that one can now measure the amount of precipitable moisture in the atmosphere. lengths. evaporation and transpiration (ET). given the need to capture the variability of resources distribution across space and time. GIS is an extremely helpful tool in creating pleasing and easily accessible figures and tables. geology.82 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS in a complex basin.1 depicts a partial list of variables that can be measured/estimated by remote sensing. . For example. GIS is used to generate hydrographic maps from topographic maps (digital elevation maps. given its rich selection of colors and ability to designate each item with a different color. and slopes—all of which are critical factors in the computation of hydrological variables such as runoff and soil erosion. RADARSAT MODIS (30 m to 1 km). geology ET (based on. NEXRAD. IRS.Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models 83 In general. terrestrial water storage Irrigation water demand. however. it is imperative to select the most appropriate remote sensing technique (and data) to address a given water resource issue.1 also provides the spatial scope of a suite of satellite (mission names) in measuring/estimating water-related variables. MODIS GOES MODIS. LANDSAT Secondary spatial data 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 . 1 Data type Rainfall Skin soil moisture Root zone soil moisture Air temperature Solar radiation Leaf Area Index Biomass production Snow cover and snow accumulation Land use/land cover Crop types. LANDSAT MODIS ASTER. For example. LANDSAT LANDSAT. GOES. ESA AMSR-E Nimbus SSM/I (25km). irrigation intensity. METEOSAT. Common links to water-resource-related datasets also are provided in appendix A5. Table 5.1.g. MODIS GRACE MODIS. Table 5. that is. a RS technique that provides observations at 100-km pixel would not be appropriate to analyze the water resources issue at plot-scale level. vegetation fraction Crop yield Air humidity Wind speed and direction Water depletion by land cover Water productivity Stream flow and water quality Groundwater recharge/abstraction. e. AVHRR AVHRR MODIS. LANDSAT MODIS. most state variables in water resources vary both spatially and temporally. Similarly.1 Summary of Spatial Data Availability from Remote Sensing No. a 10-km by 10-km area. a satellite that provides observations every week may not be appropriate to study water resources issues on a daily basis. SPOT-4 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 30 m to 1 km 1 km 1 km 30 m to 1 km 30 m to 1 km 30 m to 1 km 30 m to 1 km 30 m 30 m 1 km 1 km 1 km 30 m 1 km 30 m to 1 km 30 m to 1 km 30 m to 1 km 30 m to 250 km 30 m to 1 km MODIS.. LANDSAT NASA’s UARS LIDAR MODIS MODIS LANDSAT. surface albedo. Therefore. and irrigation efficiency Carbon sequestration Topography. SEBAL and METRIC approaches) Spatial scale 3 to 25 km 25 km Satellite name/mission name TRMM (25km). national scale). monitoring deforestation and predicting the effects of climate change on glaciers in the Arctic and Antarctic to estimating the amount of water in the clouds. river basin scale. in figure 5. Sample applications of RS Remote sensing has been utilized for different purposes. Such information can be used to make decisions to reallocate water among different users.5 depict sample applications of RS technology in WRM. .3 Availability of Remote Sensing Data at Various Spatial and Temporal Coverage Figure 5. As can be seen from Note: Legend depicts a water productivity range of 50%–175% of the average water both figures. Some also use RS to estimate the amount of water lost to ET. and floods in real time.5. implying a wider range of water productivity. Figures 5. Figure 5. In figure 5. In contrast. leading to improved total water productivity.84 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Figure 5.3 depicts the availability of various RS data sources at different spatial resolutions and seasonal coverage (percent). from Source: Droogers 2006. In both figures. RS was used to analyze the productivity of water to spatially evaluate where water was being productively used. Still others also use RS to monitor changes in land use/land cover and soil moisture content.4 Where Is Water Not Used Productively? agriculture to guide WRM deciData from Sacramento. RS is used to gather relevant data to estimate water productivity in irrigated Figure 5. hurricanes. of wine. CA sions.4 and 5. RS was used to estimate the amount (liters) of water used to produce a liter Source: Bastiaanssen 2007. Some use RS to capture distributions of climate variables such as thunder storms. water productivity productivity in the Sacramento Valley.4.3 provides a menu of options for water-related data sources to be used under a range of data needs (small plot scale. Others use RS for early warning—including for flood and drought. 6). which was the approach followed in Iraq (figure 5. CA: mento Valley.5 Water Productivity in Sacramento.6) 2. particularly in making Source: Bastiaanssen 2007. Comparing the before-project and the after-project cases (thus comparing over time.5 clearly Liters of Water Needed to Produce 1 Liter of Wine shows that farmers in the northern parts of the valley use more water to produce the same amount of wine than do their southern counterparts. since 2003. including in areas in Wasit Governorate before and after Project Implementation Before rehab (FY06) After rehab (FY07) which collecting data through traditional means is constrained. For example. Such data are very important for WRM.6. The Bank is assisting several MNA governments to obtain more accurate and up-to-date water-related RS data in the water-stressed . comparing with an adjacent command area outside the project’s command borders). that is.6 Agricultural Lands Served by “Mazzak” Canal in data gaps. In contrast. the World Bank has been using RS techniques to supervise the implementation of Bank-supported irrigation projects in Iraq.Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models 85 is not uniform across the Sacra. differences between after rehabilitation of the canal systems.Figure 5. The impact evaluation for the incremental outcomes can be performed through either of two approaches: 1. incremental productivity (project outcomes) has been validated through low-resolution satellite images. Comparing the without-project and the with-project cases (thus comparing in space. Note: The red rectangles on the “After” map show areas that were put under cultivation figure 5. areas served by the Wazzak Canal before and after the canal rehabilitation are notable. Figure 5. As can be seen from Source: World Bank 2006. in which ground accessibility has been limited for security reasons (figure 5. and pricing. RS also can be used to augment available data and to fill Figure 5. decisions on water allocation Note: Legend depicts the amount (liters) of water needed to produce one liter of wine across the Sacramento Valley. the final word is that. Similarly. To keep up with such rapid advances. Applications of Hydrological Models in WRM Need for Hydrology For any realistic implementation of WRM at a basin scale. it often starts from the beginning without first talking to the other agencies/countries to find out what data they already have. a better and fuller understanding of the hydrology of the basin is crucial. satellites lack the ability to take measurements over small footprints (smaller spatial resolution). To this end. to ensure a reality check. For . As a result of coordination among the Arab Water Council. a new regional initiative is being launched to help MNA make better WRM decisions and share comparable data across member countries. Moreover. multiple agencies collect similar data. and the World Bank. when one agency/country wants to do an assessment. Agencies should instead first identify what already has been done. NASA. Such coordination envisages developing a set of tools that. The amount of wasted resources expended in this way cannot be underestimated. and Yemen). often not knowing that the other agencies are collecting the same data. However. satellites currently are unable to have “active” systems that can penetrate the soil below a certain depth. taking advantage of the latest technologies. Data-sharing also is cost-sharing and obtaining better data. it is very important to calibrate the data collected through RS techniques against those collected on the ground. RS measurements can provide important augmentations to other data to improve the quality and spatial coverage of existing data. accurate. RS technology changes rapidly. Cautionary note: The latest RS technologies have enabled water resources decisionmakers to use easily accessible information to make better decisions. will provide regular. Nonetheless. USAID. in the foreseeable future. data-sharing among agencies and/or countries is a prerequisite. RS will not replace ground measurements.86 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS areas (Egypt. Morocco. then document and improve upon the data already present. Moreover. and standardized information on the availability and consumption of water resources in the Arab world. In many MNA countries. one needs to continually compare the quality of data derived from each generation of techniques with those obtained on the ground. For now. West Bank. Gaza. Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models 87 example. 2 below. energy.7) as in Eq. 1) where m and n are the different categories of outputs (extracts) from the system and inputs (additions) to the system. Eq. the number of hydrological models today is so large that many users spend a great deal of time selecting the most appropriate model for the problem(s) at hand. respectively. WRM requires a good hydrology dataset to provide an accurate basis for water accounting. the quantity and quality of runoff measured at a basin/subbasin outlet are a collective signal of the characteristics of the whole basin/sub-basin. and momentum balances. Therefore. 1 is rewritten by expanding the water balance components (figure 5. there have been many improvements in the understanding of the physical processes and interrelationships between climate-soils and ecosystem response. physically based and distributed parameter models. For most common hydrological models. A large number of mathematical equations have been developed to mimic the understanding of these interrelationships—from simple black-box empirical models to more sophisticated. . in the same way that pathological tests can tell much about the well-being of a person. which dictates that the summation of all inflows n • n Inflowi i =1 minus the summation of all outflows • Outflow i =1 i over a period of time (t) should equal the change in storage (Δ Storage) over the same period of time (t). As a result. 1) provides the general continuity equation of hydrological balance. Hydrological Models In parallel with the advances in GIS and RS. n m • i =1 Inflowi − Outflow j • j =1 t = ( Storage) t (Eq. Equation 1 (Eq. The fundamental principle of any hydrological model emanates from closing the mass. All hydrological models should respect at least one fundamental principle: a mass balance signifying continuity. and ΔS is the change in water storage of the system over a given period of time—the same period over which total inflow and outflow are computed. For example. (2) above intact is still very important.88 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS PCP − ET + Runoff + Rdeep = S ( ) (Eq. incoming energies r • Einco min g i i =1 minus the summation of all outgoing energies . In this case. the ET in Eq. Equation 2 above could equally be subdivided into water consumptive uses and losses as described in the Introduction (figure 1.1). whereas it is feasible to further divide the water balance components into consumable/nonconsumable and recoverable/nonrecoverable for water accounting purposes. Runoff from the system could be subdivided into recoverable fraction and nonrecoverable fraction based on where the water that is lost to runoff is destined. the summation of all Source: Toll 2008. return flows. 2) where PCP = total precipitation (snowfall + rainfall).7 Major Components of the Hydrological Balance based on their accessibility for further use. Rdeep = is the net water amount lost to deep aquifer (this is a net figure after subtracting extractions from deep aquifer). ET = amount of water lost to evapotranspiration. especially for hydrological analysis in the upland watershed. Runoff = total net water amount that leaves the system as surface and subsurface runoff (this is a net figure after subtracting inflow to the system from adjacent basins—runon. Similarly. In a similar way. and inter-basin transfer). for the energy balance. keeping Eq. the amount of water that is percolating to deep aquifer and stored in the upper soil horizon could be subdivided into recoverable and nonrecoverable components Figure 5. (2) could be subdivided into beneficial and nonbeneficial ET based on where in the basin the water is lost to ET. • i =1 Einco min g i − EOutgoing j • j =1 t = (E Stored t ) (Eq. Hydrological mod. empirical models). and temporal coverage High Low Physical detail (event-based models. 3). others are developed Spatial scale SLURP/DHS VM/DL BRM SWAT/HSPF MIKE SHE WEAP IQQM SWAP WaterMod . evaluation of policy impacts on water resources. water allocation among different users (riparian countries. such as for water quantity and/or quality assessment. or a combination of all balances). els also can be grouped based on their uses. sectors).Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models 89 r • Einco min g i i =1 must equal the change in the amount of energy stored (E Stored ) r s within the system (Eq. Whereas some models are multipurpose in their applications. lumped parameter Field models).8 Most Commonly Used Hydrological Models and Their Suitability in Both Physical and Spatial Scale Continent Hydrological models commonly are categorized based on their Basin physical detail (physically based models. mass and momentum. Figure 5. Another very important issue to consider when dealing with hydrological models is the spatial scale to be incorporated in the model and how much physical detail should be included. or payment for environmental services or assessment of climate change impacts. mass and energy. spaSystem tial coverage (spatially distributed models.8 illustrates the negative correlation between the physical detail of the model applied and the spatial scale of application. Figure 5.8 also depicts the position of some commonly used hydrological models in this continuum. Application of Hydrological Modeling and Its Classification Figure 5. 3) where r and s are the different incoming and outgoing energy categories. continuous time models).Source: Debele 2008 modified from Droogers 2006. respectively. More complex and physically based models account for more than one physical principle (for instance. Models that come under this category include the physically based and spatially distributed models that simulate the interrelationships among soils.90 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS to tackle specific water-related problems. and vegetation response in the ecosystem. in the case of water productivity monitoring in the Sacramento Valley. Models advance scientific understanding in water resources and help identify knowledge gaps. the Bank’s use of RS data to (1) monitor project implementation progress in Iraq and (2) estimate water productivity using a combination of hydrological model and RS tools are good examples of how models can be used as an M&E tool. models also could be used for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of water projects. the model can be used as a tool to monitor the implications of changes in inputs or outputs. These models provide additional benefits. Hydrological models have also been successfully used to monitor and evaluate the impacts of best management practices on in-situ soil and water conservation. METRIC stands for Mapping Evapo-Transpiration with High Resolution and Internalized Calibration. a hydrological model (in combination with SEBAL2) was used to determine crop water consumption. 3 2 . Scenario analysis could be done without having access to observed input data. Once a model is calibrated against available data and the state of the system as a whole. Alternatively. and the causal relationship is established. Models are economically more feasible than monitoring (M&E). With the help of the latest technologies in RS and GIS to collect and process/assimilate data. As indicated in the previous section. instead of collecting primary input and output data at every time interval. a METRIC3 approach could equally be used to determine the amount of water consumed by crops. This is a very powerful advantage of models: they help not only to monitor but also to guide any future decisions. such as running scenario analyses to guide decisionmaking in WRM. climate. Some models also are tools to further understand the linkages among different variables and how each factor dictates overall water movement in and above the soil surface. Models under this category usually are developed SEBAL stands for Surface Energy Balance Algorithm of Land. For example. and management of groundwater recharge and diffuse pollution. The following are the main reasons that most people use hydrological models. In this way. The NYC Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) uses hydrological models to identify areas that are hotspots in the watershed to bargain (to support onsite land management and/or provide cash for easements) with farmers who own the lands to implement best management practices that will reduce diffuse pollution. In an IWRM setting. or after project implementation to monitor and evaluate the impacts of such interventions on the end results. For example. momentum. models are used to guide the selection of policy choices in the water sector. This function ranges from identifying what datasets to collect for what sets of decisions to make to achieve certain goals in an integrated water resource management (IWRM) setup. In a similar fashion. as required by the US government). the city benefits by preserving the pristine water quality of NYC (instead of spending billions of dollars to treat its water supply to the EPA standards. one can employ a combined hydrological and economic model to assess the implications of various water allocation measures/ policies on different sectors that are competing for shares of the same water. one can use hydrological models (especially those that are physically based and spatially distributed) to assess the implications of different best management practices on improving insitu soil moisture and groundwater recharge. Similarly. many models have been developed to identify the optimum number and locations of water projects and compensation mechanisms (payment for environmental services. For example. or combining a few parameters. models are useful to identify the optimum objectives that take into account the social. Models are tools best suited for guiding decisionmaking at various levels. All other models are derived from models under this category by simplifying one or another parameter.Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models 91 from mathematical equations that fulfill the continuity. and reducing nonpoint source pollution. including interests of its upstream and downstream riparian users. One very good (win/win) example of models’ applications in PES is the New York City (NYC) water supply. or PES). The farmers also benefit by obtaining funds (PES) . and environmental issues in a given basin. Such an exercise can be done either before project implementation to see the implications of various “IF” scenarios. Such models are used primarily to deepen one’s understanding of the processes involved in water resources movement and storage. Models enable good decisionmaking and guide policy options. economic. and energy balances in all relevant dimensions. Therefore. soil storage. in the end. including sprinkler and drip irrigation. . the amount of water saved at a basin scale might be none or even become negative (more water withdrawn than previously under traditional irrigation schemes). For example. The study concluded that although implementation of watersaving investments is very important. The authorities used hydrological models to identify areas in the watersheds in which groundwater recharge is significant and pay farmers accordingly for the environmental services that their lands provide. and runoff) and was able to evaluate the impacts of water-saving investments on the country’s overall water resources availability. ET. if one decides to use the saved water to increase irrigation intensity and/or horizontally expand the area of irrigated land. It disaggregated the water balance into its components (precipitation. As indicated earlier. investing in modern irrigation schemes may reduce the amount of water that is applied to a given farm land. For example. the Tunisian government has been implementing modern irrigation schemes. regional integration and inter-regional collaboration on development and management of shared resources have been weak. equally essential is the need to properly manage the saved water.92 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS from NYC to protect their lands. This initiative is very successful in reducing the rate of both deforestation and groundwater contamination. the World Bank has supported the government of Tunisia in its assessment of the implications of water-saving investments in Tunisian agriculture (World Bank 2008). in the Arab region. For this reason. the latest advances in GIS and RS technologies have improved the application of hydrological models to assess the implications of different water projects on overall water resources availability. The study used remotely sensed data to determine the water balance in its irrigated areas. to better manage its agricultural water resources. one needs to approach water resource management from a comprehensive water balance perspective and at a basin scale. a combination of objective waterrelated data and decision-aiding hydrological models would be very useful in the use and management of their shared water resources. To date. Over the last decade. Another equally important but less known application of such models is in the implementation of the PES initiative in Costa Rica. However. The purpose is to reduce deforestation to (a) sequester carbon dioxide and (b) improve the water quality of groundwater for mineral water production industries. and hence protect the NYC water supply watersheds. L.. 2006. K. Ghabayen. DOI: 10. It highlights the applications of such technologies to capture. “Numerical Simulation of the Movement of Saltwater under Skimming and Scavenger Pumping in the Pleistocene Aquifer of Gaza and Jericho Areas.1007/s00254-008-1354-5. J. “Applications of Hydrological Models in Watershed Management. 2002. such as GIS.H. in the WRM of the MNA Region..H. Bastiaanssen. Mackay. and S. The chapter also explores the many types of hydrological models available and their very useful and flexible applications to guide decisionmaking and balance the demands of different uses. Conclusions This chapter discusses the use of the latest technologies.” Grassland. Washington. Almasri M.” Training at World Bank Water Week 2008. “Adaptation to Climate Change: New Technologies for Water Management and Impact Assessment. Yaqubi. Temple.. El Nahry. DiLuzio. “Hydro-Environmental Status and Soil Management of the River Nile Delta. User’s Manual. W. USDA Agricultural Research Service. Debele. “Analysis of Nitrate Contamination of Gaza Coastal Aquifer.M. R. 2001. . Egypt.” Journal of Transport in Porous Media (43) 195–12.G. RS. optimal allocation of limited water among various competing needs/sectors can be addressed using a combination of hydrological and economic/social models.Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models 93 Moreover. and S. Palestine.N. “ArcVIEW Interface for SWAT 2000. Droogers. TX. A. A. and A. Jayyou.. P. A. even at a country/basin level.” Lecture at the World Bank. Washington.” Lecture at World Bank Water Week 2006. Palestine.S. B.” Journal of Hydrologic Engineering. and A.S. Mushtaha. Soil and Water Research Laboratory. Srinivasan. Arnold. “Applications of Watershed Management Tools for Bank Operations: Pushing the Frontiers of River Basin IWRM. 2008. store. DC. M.” Journal of Environmental Geology. References Aliewi. Elewa H. and process most datasets needed for making water resources decisions. 2008. R. 2008. and hydrological models. DC. 2007. 13 (2): 132–40. Nasereddin. Neitsch. com/index. “The Euphrates and the Tigris: The South Boundary Utilization and Views. M.L. Solomon. ____.K. Chen.94 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS ESRI (Environmental Services Research Institute). K. Salman.” IPTRID. De Vlegher. Regional Climate Projections. Washington. and M. 2007.” ____. 2008. B.documentation.” Unpublished report. L. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. “Irrigation Performance and Waterlogging and Salinity. D. Toll. 1998. “Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water Management Results in the Middle East and North Africa. Tignor. 2007. Miller.” Journal of Irrigation and Drainage Systems. Smedema. 2008.3 Desktop extensions @ http://support. IPCC (International Panel on Climate Change). Averyt.viewDoc&PID=83&MetaID= 1404 Goossens R. ArcGIS 9.” NASA presentation made at World Bank. M.B. and H.M. 2006. “Applications of NASA’s Modeling and Satellite Products in Water Resource Management. Z. “Water Logging and Soil-Salinity Modeling Using Remote Sensing and GIS: A Case Study for a Sebkha Area South of Ismailia (Egypt).. De Dapper. 2004. M. 2008. World Bank. FAO.” Presentation of Mission Report. S. AGL. 2005. Rome. Quin. . MNA Development Report on Water. DC. “Water Balance and Evaluation of Water-Saving Investments in Tunisian Agriculture.1007/BF01103714. Manning. M. Cambridge University Press. “Supervision of Project Implementation Progress Using Remote Sensing Techniques: Iraq Emergency Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project. Marquis. Ed. DOI: 10. Washington.cfm?fa= knowledgebase. Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.esri. (4):367–74. DC. D.” Journal of Natuur-en Geneeskundige Vennootschap 78 (1–4): 137–48. uci.kimberly.nasa.html Stream flow Monitoring and the Dartmouth Flood Observatory http://www.uidaho.1 URLs for Water-Resources-Related Datasets Real-time Heavy Rain Maps (updated every 3 hours) http://trmm.Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models 95 Appendix A5.nasa.edu/ .dartmouth.gov http://www.cimis.gov/ Global Hazard System (Floods) Quasi-global Runoff Model Running in Real-Time http://trmm.gsfc.edu/~floods/ Remote Sensing Application In Irrigation http://www.edu/ref-et/ http://www.sebal.unesco.nasa.water.org/water/ihp/help Regional Visualization and Monitoring System (“SERVIR”) http://servir.msfc.gsfc.wisc.web. Life and Policy http://www.gov/publications_dir/potential_flood_ hydro.gov Hydrology for the Environment.nl/ Real-time Precipitation Forecast and Other Remote Sensing Products http://chrs.ca.edu ET Estimation http://www.sage. . Even within this select group of water-short countries. 2 Based on a background paper prepared by the authors for the Arab Water Council for the Fifth World Water Forum. UAE.1 This chapter shows the role of hydrological information as a basic element of establishing sustainable water management. societies in Arab countries developed arrangements for water management that reflected the region’s conditions of extreme water scarcity. especially as climate change exacerbates the imbalances. The chapter concludes by showing how remote sensing (RS) applications can contribute to knowledge of the status and trends in hydrological data. Saudi Arabia. Tunisia. Perry and Julia Bucknall 6 his chapter examines how. Gaza. Kuwait.2 Definitions of water availability are not always consistent. which can lead to confusion when different source materials are quoted. Qatar. “hydrology” is used to include both surface and groundwater. exacerbated by new technologies that disturb stable traditional systems. With very limited exceptions. is to build a shared understanding of the hydrology of the system in which one is working. only Sudan ranked above the bottom quartile. Oman. over millennia. The first step toward putting replacement arrangements in place. and Yemen—were in the bottom 10 percent. Istanbul. T 1 Throughout this chapter. the disparities in endowment were enormous. Of the Arab countries. UNESCO (2002) used the FAO-AQUASTAT database and FAOSTAT population data to rank 180 countries on the basis of water availability. It notes that these traditional arrangements have been undermined by growing imbalances between demand and supply.Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World: New Analytical Tools for New Challenges Christopher J. Jordan. The most water plentiful of this group. 97 . the Arab countries are water short. Libya. 2009. and supplies are highly variable from year to year. The majority of Arab countries—including Bahrain. However. the timing and location of supply may be quite different from the timing and location of demand. In contrast. local and individual levels) have developed indigenous approaches to cope with water scarcity. (Of course.1 Ranges of Human Domestic Water Needs (1/cap/day) Drinking water Sanitation Bathing Cooking/kitchen Average total 2–5 0–75 5–70 10–50 50 (= 18 m3/year) Thus. Yemen—widely identified as one of the most seriously water-short countries in the world—is endowed with more than 200 m3/cap/year. In the Arab world. Historically. Kuwait. Four examples with several millennia of experience are: . only Kuwait (10 m3/cap/year) has less than the total human requirement. the demand for water for irrigated agriculture in Yemen creates a situation of extreme scarcity. The basic human needs for drinking and sanitation are rather small. According to these data. with less water per capita than Yemen. In striking contrast. Thus. or the absolutely fundamental need for drinking water for as much as 1 year.) The problem. it is useful to examine how the problem has been dealt with during millennia of experience in the Arab world. countries (at the national. has less than 0. Therefore. Singapore. has less than 25 percent of the availability of Sudan. irrigated agriculture is the dominant user of water and is thus the primary topic of this chapter. is not considered water scarce because the water is used almost exclusively for residential and industrial needs. 1 m3 of water supplies the various needs of 1 individual for 20 days. the competition.5 percent of the availability of Sudan. The least plentiful.98 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Tunisia. Scarcity of water in the Arab countries is not a new phenomenon—although population growth and economic development exacerbate the scarcity. Gleick (1996) researched actual water use in various scenarios and climates and estimated the following ranges of water needs (in liters per capita per day): Table 6. and the scarcity arise when irrigated agriculture is significant: the same 1 m3 of water that provides drinking water for 1 person for 1 year produces only 1 kg of food grain when used for irrigation in a dry climate. probably after originating in Iran. in the early part of the last millennium. the Moors took the technology to Spain (where some are still functioning).258.8 13.4 7.” It is an effective technology for lifting water from canals with animal or mechanical power to irrigate farmlands. These systems consist of dams—often temporary—that divert water from fast-flowing ephemeral streams onto farmers’ fields after heavy rain. eventually intersecting the water table Source: Livius. Inundation canals in Egypt diverted the Nile’s annual floods onto farmers’ lands via below-grade channels.Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World 99 1. Qanats are essentially manmade springs that provide a route for infiltration from higher areas to flow out at a single point.500 1.520 Spate (%) 19.4 3. They account for approximately 20 percent of the irrigated area in Algeria and Yemen. usually operating in groups.000 46. Qanats (also variously known as kareez.8 20.1 Cross-Section of a Qanat that starts at ground level in foothills and is cut into the hill. A qanat consists of a tunnel Figure 6. Spate irrigation systems have been significant in a number of Arab countries since the early 1990s (table 6. and qanats are now found in Peru and Chile as well. The Spanish.000 98. foggara.2 Spate Irrigation in Arab Countries.1). would pump water by animal-powered sakias. aflaj) are found in many Arab countries. with permission in the hillside (figure 6. The vertical shafts allow access during Sakia is also known as the “Persian wheel.200 1. Table 6. 1989–1995 Country Algeria Morocco Sudan Tunisia Yemen Rep.946.1 2. in turn.2). 3 farm .320 Total irrigation (ha) 555.Org.000 165.200 385. took the technology to Mexico. Certainly.000 481. Data (yr) 1992 1989 1995 1991 1994 Spate irrigation (ha) 110.3 2. sloping upward at a lesser angle than the ground so that the tunnel becomes progresbedrock sively deeper. from which the farmers.200 30. there have been laws as to how to distribute water fairly among various small and large villages on the kariz routes to prevent any disagreements resulting in consequent disorder. diversion of irregular flash-foods in wadis. and sometimes in the case of wells). is limited by actual rainfall and the resulting runoff. they have a number of important similarities that offer important insights into how scarce water has been managed successfully. clashes or disturbance. Some qanats are kilometers long. the scale of the system was already such that there were at least two levels of management: one for the major diversion structures and one for the local distribution of water among users at the sakia. by the time that flood irrigation had evolved millennia ago. Nevertheless. Differences in cropping patterns might require nonuniform allocation of water. contributions might not have been equal. For qanats. However. Each approach exploits natural flows. the beneficiary group was already clear. wells had to be shallow due to the limits of suction lift pumps (approximately 10 meters). Shallow wells are found everywhere that the groundwater table is relatively near the surface. In Egypt. One example in Jordan exceeds 90km. These are four quite different technical approaches to enhance local water availability: exploitation by inundation of the regular heavy Nile River floods. These restrictions.100 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS construction. This knowledge has provided the basis for them to decide how the water should be allocated. Experience over the years has given water users a clear idea of how much water to expect—on average—in a wet year and in a dry year. Where farmers had collectively built the infrastructure (as in the case of qanats and spate systems. If the flow of . therefore. productively. or priority to domestic or livestock use. and sustainably by irrigators in the Arab world. 4. “The distribution of the water of a kariz route is based on time as determined by the users through their representatives. in turn. Mehraby (undated) describes the distribution process as follows: “Since ancient times. Each approach. mean that over-exploitation is not possible (unless shallow wells are over 10 meters in depth). for example. exploitation of infiltration into hillsides. Historically. and exploitation of shallow water tables. for example. There are rules implementing the allocation (“based on time”). it is reported that the farmer is entitled to take water until the depth reaches his knee.4 While this may seem crude. personal communication. The principles for allocation of the water among users have been agreed. The nature of the rules and Figure 6. the infrastructure also may comprise facilities 4 Charles Abernethy. 2.2). the distribution of the water has to be under a trustworthy official known as mirab who is chosen by the joint users or the government and is paid a certain salary. priorities for sharing.2 Spate System in Yemen how they are implemented will vary among these different technologies. it ideally suits the need in a spate system to share a very uncertain quantity on the basis of simple rules and quick communication. and management arrangements— combine to define.” Mehraby’s brief summary delineates three elements: 1. among users in a wadi (figure 6. The infrastructure of all of these systems provides the capacity to deliver the service that the other elements—how much water is available. A management structure to oversee the operation may be necessary. rules. The signal that the next irrigator should divert the water to his field is for the first farmer to fire a gun into the air. In addition to the channel or diversion structures that deliver the water. 3. In Yemeni spate systems. The outcome is an apparently rather uniform distribution of water Photo: Gerhardt Lichtenthaeler. .Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World 101 a kariz is considerably high and the users of the water are numerous. This brief review of the successful and sustainable local approaches that have developed in the Middle East to deal with water scarcity supports some significant. Photo: Gerhardt Lichtenthaeler.5 Figure 6. Abdullah Al-Ghafri and others (undated) describe various timing devices. For example. Water management systems are now out of tune with water availability patterns. These techniques are designed to enable water shares. to complex.102 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS to assist in allocation. and E = Engineering. and Frederiksen and Vissia (1998) for an engineering viewpoint. and then subdivided by time among individual farmers. but the expertise exists in the region to make the best of whatever is available.3 Water-Dividing Structure in a Foggara.3 shows a water-dividing structure in a foggara in Algeria. see Trawick (2003) for a sociologist’s perspective. Europe and South America. we know the ingredients of sustainable and productive water resource management. derived largely from experience in the Andes. Figure 6. C = Codification. These are described in the Introduction to this volume as the ABCDE approach. Such features are identifiable worldwide in successful systems. D = Delegation. Algeria Current Challenges Thus. and implemented in. seasonally adjusted sundials. We can assume that farmers receiving scarce but well-defined water supplies will use these as productively as circumstances such as market opportunities and input availability permit. ranging from pots with holes in the bottom that provide a measure of time while slowly sinking. the Arab countries have developed successful approaches that have been exported to. first divided among user groups by structures such as shown in figure 6. which reached similar—certainly compatible—conclusions. B = Bargaining. Overall production may be lower because water availability will be lower. So what is the problem? The central problem is that variations in availability have surpassed the “typical” range to which “traditional” operations were adapted. .3. requiring changes in the associated processes to determine which 5 A = Assessment. Moreover. generalizable conclusions. In many areas. Specifically in the case of groundwater. Unsustainable. the assessment of availability is partial and unreliable. rainfall generated runoff and infiltration supplied the traditional water systems. there are few if any examples of successful control of dispersed groundwater exploitation anywhere in the world. As water sources have become individually owned and operated. understanding how much water is actually available in total or on a renewable basis is extremely difficult. Infrastructure also may require modification. and require new or revised institutional responsibilities. The logic of the “tragedy of the commons” provides an incentive for the individual to derive benefits as extensively and quickly as possible. Aquifers are complex and difficult to observe—especially deep aquifers. Thus. and utilization was low. Controlling such use is even more difficult. “Individualized” Withdrawals Over recent decades. Then. 6 . may change the rules of operation. as noted. b. The individual farmer who has invested in the pump or well feels entitled to exploit it. Their advent has had three profound negative consequences: a. There are.6 Indeed. users can and now do “mine” aquifers. They enabled farmers to withdraw water from any source at much higher rates than with animal power and to tap deep aquifers by using submersible pumps. to the authors’ knowledge. as rainfall on surrounding hills moves down to the valleys and plains. In the past. the amount of water actually being abstracted has become difficult to measure.Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World 103 sectors or users will suffer and by how much. Setting the rules (codification) and enforcing them (delegation) is extremely difficult. availability was low. for many countries. Recharge may be vertical from rainfall. the most important development has been the break of the “natural” link between the renewable supply and the level of use. These changes require the political bargaining process to be reopened. or lateral. cheap pumps and tubewell technology arrived. in the 1970s. Four important challenges to “traditional” water management systems can be identified: 1. Geological structures can constrain or redirect recharge. If rainfall was low. dams constructed over the last three decades have been able to store. rules. US. it is reported that the qanats serving palmeries around Marrakech dried up in the 1970s so wells are now the main source of water. and infrastructure is in doubt. Apart from natural variability. the relationship between rainfall and runoff is not linear. Irrigation agencies in the command areas struggle to ration uncertain water supplies to the politically important farmer constituency. Falling water tables reduce flows to qanats. Variability has local and regional implications. For the individual farmer. on average. Therefore. For example. the foundation for current allocation priorities. Thus. IPCC projections imply increased variability and reduced river flows in areas that rely on surface storage in reservoirs. India shows considerable early promise. An ongoing collective effort in Andhra Pradesh.104 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS c. The Israeli water utility affects the availability of water in Palestine and however. Excessive pumping from one reach of a river or canal affects all other users. farmers have become acutely aware of the uncertain nature of their access to water. investments in hydraulic infrastructure by upstream riparians change water availability to downstream users. Pakistan. with some 95 percent of its water coming from the Nile. 3. Runoff typically declines much more sharply than precipitation. investing in the inputs for high-value crops is less attractive if there is a possibility of water shortage affecting yields. many examples of uncontrolled depletion: much of India. institutional arrangements. This situation already is a reality in parts of the Arab region. . For example. Political Uncertainty of Cooperation with Upstream Riparians The Arab countries are dependent for some two-thirds of their water supplies on transboundary water. Egypt is the most extreme case. the Greater Anatolia Project affects water availability in Syria and Iraq. At the regional level. and Yemen. Mexico. 2. The effects of over-exploitation go beyond the direct users. Increased Variability and Reduction in Rainfall Adding to this problem of unsustainable water use. For example. As a consequence. only approximately half of their design capacity. due to reduced annual precipitation. variability is concentrated in the downstream areas. in Morocco. development of other high potential areas—such as the coastline of the Nile Delta—is constrained by beach contamination from polluted Nile waters. many countries are benefiting from tourism to historic and seaside resorts. Although their details vary. They have been demanding that municipal and agricultural pollution be cleaned out of their canals and rivers. Dams constructed in Ethiopia and Sudan affect the calculus of Egyptian water planners. Deterioration is caused either from saline water that flows laterally into the depleted zone (especially near coasts). Among farmers. in the congested rural settlements along the Nile River Delta. However. there is ample evidence that scarcity has been successfully managed in the Arab world for centuries. An IWMI survey of government irrigation officials in Egypt in 1995 produced the surprising result that many ranked pollution as the most important problem facing the sector. Tour operators and resort owners are powerful interest groups who have thus joined environmentalists and farm exporters to lobby for enhanced water quality management. a bargaining process among the users to determine how water should be allocated. climate change is likely to increase the imbalance between supply and demand for water in the Arab countries. For example. Deteriorating Water Quality A fourth factor has been the political and economic pressure on decisionmakers to focus more on water quality. along the Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts. A problem facing many countries in which groundwater is overused is the deterioration in quality that occurs as water tables fall. Understanding the Present: Traditional and New Data Sources To recapitulate. or from the deeper layers of water. similar patterns have been common across many MNA countries for centuries.Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World 105 Jordan. However. However. Similarly. residents and farmers have become an important lobbying group. 4. The components required to manage scarcity are information on resource availability. traditional processes increasingly are . and infrastructure to deliver the service. resulting in rules and responsibilities. which are more saline. exporters of high-value farm products have been concerned that the marketability of their products is affected by water pollution. among many factors. for an irrigation engineer. The process that will be induced by declining availability. more uncertainty and variability. treat. preferably including all of the salts that were in the original abstraction. designed irrigation systems to maximize the amount . Without agreement over the definitions of concepts such as “efficiency” and “consumption. one design objective often is to recover. for example. Terminology for Water Accounting Before discussing how water management can adjust to reflect the new context of declining availability and increased demand. but a downstream environmental “water user” might be puzzled to find that. It will draw in hydrologists. Success will depend. agriculturalists. we need to clarify our terminology. when urban water efficiency improves. on (1) the ability of the participants in the process to communicate as effectively and unambiguously as possible across disciplines—that is. A poorly functioning system would return a much smaller percentage and with a heavy pollution load. the design objective is to return as little as possible (perhaps 10 percent) of withdrawals to the system. it will depend on developing a common terminology—and (2) placing the analysis of options in a basin context.” it is not possible to have a consistent view of what constitutes a successful water management policy. and institutional specialists—just as the ABCDE process does. how a different viewpoint on the water resource gives a different understanding of efficiency in water management: For a water supply and sanitation engineer. and declining quality will be multidisciplinary. s/he gets more and cleaner water. Climate change is adding to the strain. The source of this paradox is simple. quite rationally. The same downstream user would find that improvements in irrigation efficiency reduce water availability and perhaps increase the salt load. Consider.106 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS under threat from ever-growing demand and new technologies that upset the “traditional” balance between availability and utilization. Irrigation engineers have. economists. and return to the hydrological system in good condition as much as possible (perhaps 95 percent) of the water withdrawn. engineers. In contrast. Individual cases will vary. lawyers. Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World 107 of water that reaches the crop. an improvement as observed at one location may have a negative impact elsewhere. the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID) recently published a review of the literature on irrigation efficiency (Perry 2007) and recommended terms that were suitable for application in all water sectors. This approach to water sector terminology has a number of important features: . However. this “local” perspective is unhelpful. and industries) and nonconsumed water (usually in the form of environmental flows or as groundwater stock). In response to this problem. or for the individual irrigator with a well. or a rate of withdrawal. to that extent. Certainly. The draft was for reviewed by all of ICID’s relevant national committees and working groups. and understanding how much water arrives at its destination is central to operational planning and designing cropping patterns.” Improving on this indicator (by lining canals. transpiration is greater and. Thus. even misleading. return flows will be reduced. Return flows to rivers may contribute to downstream human. and is then consumed in transpiration. Infiltration to aquifers from leaking canals or excessive irrigation applications contributes to groundwater recharge. For irrigation. water supply. or natural demands. or an irrigation “turn”). The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) is debating a change in terminology. agricultural. Recent research publications take the same view (Ward and Pulido-Vasquez 2008). Other writers and organizations have similar views. From this perspective. Improvements often will lead to substantial increases in the area irrigated (and hence consumption of water by crops) for the same quantity withdrawn. if the irrigated area is increased. and thereby represents a wide consensus. water allocations usually are defined in terms of right to withdraw water (either as a volume per season. The California Department of Water Resources makes no mention of efficiency in its regular accounts of water allocation and use in the state. The recommendations have been summarized in terms of water consumed by users (irrigation. or using modern irrigation technology) is a valid objective at the project level. A common irrigation performance indicator is “how much area did we irrigate per unit of water withdrawn. the question of where the “losses” actually were going is critical. when water is scarce at the wider basin or aquifer scale. This is the purpose of an irrigation system. respected authorities can quote data suggesting that production can be substantially increased while water use is cut by 50 percent–75 percent (Brown 2008).108 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 1. the consumptive use of water is proportionately increased. For example. . In water-short environments. the expectation is that crop production will be increased. not water consumed. Reducing nonbeneficial consumption b. in reality. In the framework proposed by ICID. and that crop water transpiration is linearly related to crop production—so that. The fractions add up to unity at any given level of aggregation). 5. Consumption we want (transpiration by irrigated crops) is distinguished from unwanted consumption (such as transpiration by weeds and evaporation from wet soil). rather. This wording could indicate this outcome without clarifying that the “saving” is in water applied. One conventional response to scarcity is to introduce “watersaving” technologies. the ambiguity can generate misconceptions. and water will be saved. Most MNA countries are pursuing such interventions (either government sponsored or farmer initiated). It differentiates between consumptive and nonconsumptive uses (so that the water supply and sanitation sector is characterized quite differently from irrigation). these terms enable sectoral specialists to communicate unambiguously to point directly to the priorities that will deliver more benefits from the same—or less—water: a. the water-saving indicator does not signify water consumed in the irrigation process but. The source of water for that increase then must be traced. such interventions must be very carefully evaluated: To the extent that transpiration is increased. Recovering as much as possible of the recoverable flows. Typically. Outflows that are recoverable are distinguished from those that are not. 4. Minimizing nonrecoverable flows c. It closely follows hydrological concepts (conservation of mass. normally. 3. 2. When these terms are not used carefully. beneficial water consumption will increase with crop production. water applied to the process. The use of these terms greatly clarifies the discussion of interventions. However. At the opposite end of the spectrum. However. the outcome fully positive. and evaporation. The balance is met by natural inflows. recoverable/nonrecoverable flow categories. and saline sinks—are “sinks”in which consumption exceeds precipitation.Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World 109 If the impact is to shift nonbeneficial evaporation into beneficial transpiration. precipitation exceeds local use and the excess goes to runoff or groundwater recharge. runoff. The uses can further be classified into the ICID beneficial/nonbeneficial. that is. once irrigation practices are reasonable. River Basin Context For each part of a river basin. and changes to storage as end uses (or destinations). 2. transpiration. the proportion of applied water going to evaporation is rather small. a water balance can be constructed comprising precipitation and surface inflows as sources. with completely notional data. Table 6. If the water is fully or partially recovered. of how basin accounts can be represented in accordance with this approach. The resource cost is zero. the literature suggests that. At one extreme. water that otherwise would have been unproductive makes a full contribution to crop transpiration and hence production. or pumping. managed diversions. However. then production is increased at no incremental water cost. Other areas —including wetlands. The impact of improved irrigation “efficiency” and irrigation management always will be somewhere between two extremes on a spectrum of possible impacts: 1. . irrigated areas.3 provides a schematic. if the impact of the intervention is to reduce runoff or infiltration. models are available that enable various data types to be integrated into this format. As is discussed later. Some areas are “sources” of water. incremental water consumption as a result of improved irrigation technology in one location takes water away from a more productive alternative use in another location—future domestic consumption. for example—so the impact is strongly negative. the ultimate destination of that excess must be identified. the actual saving is proportionately reduced. Recoverable river flows (209 units) are entirely utilized. Additional use of surface water would require either transfers from one sector to another. The set clarifies the most significant water sources and uses: Natural forest is the most significant source of stream flow. The data in each column—which correspond to a water balance for that use class—then can be estimated. The third is managed water use. Clearly. This basin-scale overview would be complemented by more detailed analyses of specific areas of interest. Sources of water consist of rainfall and any committed inflows (in this case. and natural forests often may be considered as environmentally useful. hence a beneficial use. riparian vegetation. hence crop production. In the next row. a political decision. restricted to the requirement for irrigation). typical classes within these categories and the percentage of the area under each class are specified. Thus. in large measure. Some are essentially natural and “unmanaged.110 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS The first row of table 6. The rainfall is distributed across land classes—here. the estimated overall net groundwater recharge of 45 units (recoverable recharge = 145 units. The remaining lines correspond to the ICID classification of uses. in proportion to area. However. . calculated. as is water that evaporates from bare soil (after rainfall or during poorly managed irrigation). without negative impacts on downstream areas. better management or technologies offer scope for significant increases in beneficial use. water that is consumed by weeds among irrigated crops is nonbeneficial. the data in the table are invented.” Others consist of managed land use. or modeled for each cell (elaborated below). transfers to irrigation = 100 units) may well disguise areas in which recharge is substantially positive or negative. water evaporated and transpired from wetlands.3 defines the major categories of land and water use. for simplicity. so changes in this land use class should be monitored carefully. What is deemed “nonbeneficial” is. or construction of facilities to capture more of the currently nonrecoverable flows. As mentioned. For example. but the advantages for a country of creating such a data set are considerable. Nonbeneficial use in irrigated areas is significant. 3 Tabulation of Land Use Classes and Water Balances at Basin Scale Natural landcover (water and land not managed) Managed land use Managed water use Basin Mm3 1 125 1.000 25 500 50 100 75 250 75 25 5 40 1 20 2 4 3 10 3 1 Rocks (%) 5 125 209 100 1 700 1 45 15 15 0 30 20 0 10 50 0 10 10 0 60 0 60 0 70 0 80 0 10 –30 0 0 0 0 20 60 –15 20 0 20 140 –15 30 –30 20 200 –15 100 –30 20 30 10 5 5 20 80 100 40 100 0 80 15 300 80 30 120 80 50 30 20 10 20 20 0 80 800 40 400 80 80 45 200 10 5 5 65 40 10 30 25 10 15 5 50 50 0 –25 –30 –30 0 5 30 4 25 –21 400 250 150 34 30 Glacier (%) Desert (%) Natural forest (%) Lakes (%) Cities (%) Saline sink (%) Grazing Natural land wetland (%) (%) Forest Rainfed plantation ag (%) (%) Managed Irrigated wetlands ag (%) (%) Transfers 5 Sources 209 100 Rainfall 2.500 125 25 Surface water transfer Groundwater transfer Uses Evapotranspiration 2.Table 6.191 5 Beneficial 1.535 Nonbeneficial 656 5 Surplus/deficit 618 120 24 Runoff 0 0 359 95 24 (Rec) 209 80 24 –209 (Non-rec) 150 15 Recharge 259 25 (Rec) 145 –100 Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World (Non-rec) 114 25 111 . at best. and groundwater storage. which is an essential basis for understanding and analysis. only as good as the data we put in to them. it has become possible to identify more classes with greater precision and at higher resolution. data from this and other sources have been integrated through the PERSIANN (Precipitation Estimation from Remotely Sensed Information Using Artificial Neural Networks) algorithm to generate rainfall data at a resolution of 0. However.25 degrees (25km) at the equator. at 3-hour intervals. . The output from models is. to stream flow. launched in 1997. Land-Use Classes One of the earliest uses of RS data was to classify land use. Thus. so in these areas there could be scope to develop groundwater and thus increase agricultural production. from rainfall through evapotranspiration (ET) (with the potential to distinguish between the beneficial and nonbeneficial components). Rainfall The Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission. in the past decade or so.3. Initially. This framework forces recognition of the linkages among the components of a basin. Information from Remote Sensing This section summarizes the potential contribution of RS information to the various information needs identified in table 6.112 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Rainfed agricultural areas contribute substantial recharge. lake levels. Remote sensing (RS) now offers important additional sources of information. More recently. Each of these data types—especially when combined with ground-truthed observations—now can be estimated at various scales through RS technologies. provides real-time estimates of rainfall derived from microwave data at 1 degree resolution. more and more characteristics have become observable with different sensors and the data can be processed in computers. classification was little more than visual identification. RS data also is beginning to make a contribution in this area. Whether a given vegetation type is considered beneficial or not is essentially a political decision. the total runoff and recharge for a given area can be estimated as the difference between these two. The Surface Energy Balance for Land (SEBAL) (Bastiaanssen and others 1998) has been applied successfully in a large number of countries. already such information provides a degree of independent confirmation of other observations or modeling results. but not easy to make. It generates frequent estimates of ET at a resolution of 5km–10km. Integration of these data with finer resolution sources enables downscaling the ET estimates. The potential T is known. Some nonbeneficial ET is evaporation from wet soil and can be identified because it occurs in the absence of vegetation. there is nonbeneficial evaporation when irrigation deliveries are excessive or poorly managed at the farm level. it can be anticipated that. depending on the source data. Table 6. Perhaps most importantly for irrigation managers. It provides spatial estimates of ET at resolutions from a few meters to several kilometers.Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World 113 Evaporation and Transpiration One of the most active areas of research in the interpretation of RS data in the last decade has been evapotranspiration (ET). To date. Partitioning further between runoff and recharge generally requires ground data. in future. so if ET exceeds this figure. measures variations in the water stored in the soil and underlying aquifers. Anderson and others (1997) use an approach that does not rely on ground-based information. Estimates of the distribution of ET between E and T also can be made based on known crop characteristics. Similarly. The METRIC algorithm (Allen and others 2007) is computationally similar to SEBAL. The GRACE project. Runoff and Recharge Once precipitation and evapotranspiration are mapped. sponsored by NASA.3 disaggregates ET into beneficial and nonbeneficial components. the resolution of these data is coarse (approximately 100km). ET occurs from nonbeneficial vegetation. However. and/or further modeling. Thus. making it hard to interpret local changes. the excess must be evaporation. . estimates at finer resolution will be possible. This separation is important. releases from reservoirs. and pumping groundwater. hydrological models are most relevant. Models can address either very narrow issues in great detail— for example. but to identify the most relevant processes. cropping patterns and planting dates.114 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Information from Conventional Measurements The information sources outlined above provide important clues to how a basin is operating. One of the most important issues to consider is the spatial scale to be incorporated in the study and how much physical detail is to be included. Additional. land cover. Using the same search engine to find “water resources model” came up with 86 million pages. These data sets are basic to the formulation of a hydrological model. more traditional sources of information are essential to complement and confirm such data. The main challenge is not to try to build in all the processes that we can model. This model then adds the capacity to define the interactions between storing and diverting runoff. The number of online pages that include the words. Table 6. a critical question for hydrological model studies relates to the selection of the most appropriate model. Integrating Information and Scenario Analysis: Hydrological and WEAP Models An appropriate model can greatly facilitate the process of organizing the analysis. “hydrological model. It was created in 1988 to be a flexible.2 million (Google January 2007). integrated.” is over 1. and applications are growing rapidly. especially. WEAP (Water Evaluation and Planning System) is well suited to integrate the types of data described above to produce a practical “accounting framework” for planners and decisionmakers. how stomata react to salt—or much broader issues at a lower level of detail. Therefore. and meteorological data. and. and transparent planning tool to evaluate the sustainability of current water demand and supply patterns and to explore alternative long-range scenarios (SEI 1997). exploring the impact of future scenarios. For the type of analysis relevant to the issues of concern here.3 makes clear that RS data can contribute extensively to identify the main “sources and uses” (rainfall and ET) components as well as to understand recharge. linking components of the system. They include streamflows. A gargantuan number of hydrological models exist. water table information. . These interactions are susceptible to managed interventions. The data structure and level of detail easily can be customized to meet the requirements of a particular analysis and to reflect the limits imposed by available data. water allocation among sectors. This holistic approach gives the planner access to a comprehensive view of the broad range of factors that must be considered in managing water resources. municipal and agricultural systems. WEAP is applicable to many scales. WEAP. single catchments. investment in infras-tructure such as water treatment or desalinization plants.Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World 115 WEAP is freely available to academic. groundwater. indeed. Operating on these basic principles. . is an effective tool for examining alternative water development and management options. groundwater pumping) of water systems. the analyst can represent all of the system’s complexities: supply sources (rainfall. evapotranspirative demands. making this model suitable for simulating many of the freshwater problems that exist in the world. water quality and ecosystem preservation modules. or complex transboundary river systems. the most important aspect of choosing a model is its capacity to explore different scenarios. and agricultural irrigation practices). runoff. and pollution generation. WEAP follows an integrated approach to water development that places water projects in the context of multisectoral. creeks. rivers. WEAP incorporates not only water allocation but also. which linkages are the most important are very powerful features of an appropriate modeling system. WEAP also is distinguished by its integrated approach to simulating both the natural (rainfall. transmission and wastewater treatment facilities. water demands. governmental. and reservoirs). However. Scenarios may be driven either by exogenous factors such as population growth and climate change (Droogers and Aerts 2005) or by management decisions (reservoir operation rules. Understanding how changes in one part of the basin are likely to impact on other areas and. if required. SEI 2005 and Droogers 2008 explain more about the WEAP model and present an example—loosely based on a known basin—with guidance for operating and modifying the model to explore future scenarios. and nonprofit organizations in developing countries. baseflow) and engineered components (reservoirs. ecosystem requirements. withdrawal. WEAP operates on the basic principles of a water balance. Using this tool. diversions. and ecosystem preservation and protection. thus. prioritized demands. water quality. inequitable distribution. These conditions have existed for millennia so a variety of approaches evolved to ensure that whatever water is available is productively and sustainably used. responsibilities for administering the rules were assigned. and the appropriate infrastructure to deliver the service is implied by this entire process. Climate change is an additional destabilizing factor. Consequently. they also have important common features: the group sharing the water had a clearly defined water source. Addressing these issues must be a multidisciplinary effort. However. However. and the demand for water is high. Sharp declines in water availability are projected over the coming century. a political bargaining process to establish priorities for allocation. complexity. communication among the participants in unambiguous terminology about the nature of water use will be essential—to distinguish between consumptive and nonconsumptive uses of water. Hydrology provides the scientific framework within which solutions must be found. the elements that provide for stability are clearly identifiable across a wide range of countries and techniques. and purpose. the precarious balance that developed over centuries to manage naturally available water supplies has been disturbed in many countries by the pressures of economic development and demographics as well as the introduction of new technologies that made over-exploitation for irrigation purposes easier to practice and harder to control. However. . thus accentuating the deficit between supply and demand. The outcome is often chaotic competition. as well as to carefully identify which return flows are already exploited elsewhere and which are genuine losses to the system. agreed priorities for allocating the water formed the basis of formal or informal rules. They comprise an understanding of availability (assessment). and over-exploitation. In fact. codification of the results of this process into laws and rules. Presenting hydrological information to policymakers and planners is not always easy.116 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Conclusions and Recommendations The water situation facing most Arab countries is difficult: water supplies are scarce. technology. Increasing temperature and aridity will increase crop-water demand. Water management arrangements vary in scale. delegation of powers to institutions and governmental and nongovernment agencies: and engineering works suitable to deliver the water to the users (ABCDE). the combination of modern analytical tools. in many countries. pdf Anderson.” University of Hokkaido. R.” www.C. W.unu. “A Remote Sensing Surface Energy Balance Algorithm for Land (SEBAL). Nagasawa. and A. technical options. Menenti.Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World 117 new sources of spatial data. 198–212. Mecikalski. 1997.G. RS can provide historical time series as well as near-real-time data about the major components of the hydrological cycle: rainfall.drought. G. However. W. www. ET.P. It will require restoration of the historic linkages among assessment of availability. offer powerful ways to improve knowledge for all concerned. 2007.gov/imageserver/NIDIS/ workshops/remotesensing/abstracts/graeme_aggett. and engineering (ABCDE). The potential contribution of new RS techniques to these efforts is substantial. well-formulated models enable exploration of possible scenarios that can reflect management options. .. as far as possible. Part 1: Formulation. Feddes. codification. and new technologies. Restoring hydrological equilibrium in the Arab world is critical for sustainability.” Remote Sensing of Environment 60: 195–216. T. Inoue. carrying it out will be difficult. on facts rather than assertions. and equity between generations. and countries to better understand how these data interrelate and will enable the inevitable disputes about allocation to be based. bargaining.pdf Allen R.R.” Journal of Hydrology: 212–13. M. “Satellite-Based Energy Balance for Mapping Evapotranspiration with Internalized Calibration (METRIC) Model. delegation. and diligent measurements of key “ground” data provide a proven base. productivity. Furthermore. M.. and J. Holtslag. and investment options in the context of projected climate scenarios.. and changes in groundwater. J. and T. Integrating these data sources will enable sectors.R. M. regions. A. 2007. Trezza.edu/ inweh/drylands/Publications/AlGhafri. especially RS techniques. Through different types of satellites and analysis. Kustas. Tasumi. Information about availability is the foundation for this structure. Bastiaanssen. land use.M. “A Two-Source Time-Integrated Model for Estimating Surface Fluxes Using Thermal Infrared Remote Sensing.inweh.A. M.G.A.M. and R. “Irrigation Scheduling of Aflaj of Oman. 1998. Norman.. References Al-Ghafri. irrigated areas. Diak. J.com/Kariz_(Qanat). 2008. SEI (Stockholm Environmental Institute): Stockholm 1998. DOI 10.seib. P. 2009. 1998.P. “Basic Water Requirements for Human Activities: Meeting Basic Needs. IPCC Secretariat.. and E.” International Water Management Institute. “Climate Change and Water.” Irrigation and Drainage.D. www. Stanford University Press. D. Battisti.B. T. P.J.pdf Ward. and J..org/weap Trawick. Vissia. Naylor.orgcgidoi10. Water Evaluation and Planning System.H. 2008. Pulido-Velasquez. “Water Conservation in Irrigation Can Increase Water Use. and R.” Free online through the PNAS open access option.” Water International 21: 83–92. July.L. B.118 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Bates. C. and R. 1996. Inefficient Communication.” “Proceedings of the National Academy of Science. “Efficient Irrigation.. eds. 2005.destinationiran. Palutikof.pnas. Perry. org/bpi/wwdr/WWDR_chart1_eng.” Science 323 (240). Flawed Recommendations. “Historical Warnings of Future Food Insecurity with Unprecedented Seasonal Heat.. H. S.0805554105 . The Struggle for Water in Peru: Comedy and Tragedy in the Andean Commons. Colombo. Wu. Hsiao. Frederiksen. F.S. R.” www. www. UNESCO. Z.. 2007.unesco.C. “Water Availability per Person per Year.1073pnas.1007/s00271-007-0064-1. Fereres.C.W. Geneva. Kundzewicz.” Irrigation Science. and M.htm) Steduto.A. www. P.” Technical Paper of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. Gleick. “On the Conservative Behaviour of Biomass Water Productivity. 2009. 2003. “Considerations in Formulating the Transfer of Services in the Water Sector. Mehraby. The main purpose of this mechanism is to assist host countries with sustainable development through the transfer of cleaner technology and financial resources for specific projects. The most important instrument permitting industrialized countries to finance emissions-avoiding projects in developing countries and receive credit for doing so is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) proposed under article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. I † This chapter was prepared on the basis of project documents in the recently completed World-Bank-financed Egypt Pumps III Project and the preparatory work for a proposed operation with Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) engagement. The result is that even the potentially most attractive. the Protocol contains provisions allowing industrialized countries some flexibility to meet their obligations through projects generating emission reductions (ERs) elsewhere. energy efficiency improvements of irrigation and drainage pumping stations are still being bypassed due to lack of operational policy frameworks and pilot projects. a framework convention aimed at stabilizing climate-altering greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. which was adopted under the UNFCCC and entered into force on February 2005. commits industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by an average of 5.† The Kyoto Protocol. 119 .Egypt Case Study Energy Efficiency CDM Program: Irrigation and Drainage Pumping Sector Abdulhamid Azad 7 n 1992 over 180 countries adopted the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). To meet these commitments in the most cost-effective manner.2 percent below their 1990 levels by 2012. while contributing to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover. Despite the rapid growth of global carbon finance transactions. most of the pumping stations also are suffering from an overall lack of investments in the energy efficiency improvements. benefits. Irrigation and Drainage Sector Egypt has no significant rainfall and is dependent on its 55. project idea 10 percent of the current market.5 billion cubic meters (m3 ) per annum share of Nile water. which includes adopting energy-efficient technologies.1 Need for a New Approach to Emission Reductions low-cost carbon mitigation projects encounter significant difficulties obtaining funding (box 7. Energy efficiency potentially could account for This case study presents more than half of energy-related greenhouse analytical issues related to CDM gas reductions achievable over the next 20–40 projects for the irrigation and years.1). which CDM methodology is to be used for the pumping sector. and duration of supply Drainage Ability to dispose excess water in minimal time to prevent damage Confidence in ability to dispose excess water Fair distribution of risks Flexibility Ability to choose the time. note preparation. rate. drainage sector such as baseEnergy-efficient projects account for less than line def initions.1 Irrigation and Drainage Service Quality Indicators Service quality Adequacy Reliability Equity Irrigation Ability to meet water demand for optimal plant growth Confidence in supply of water Fair distribution of share of water shortage risks and minimize the head and tail equities (poverty aspect) Ability to choose the frequency. Table 7. The energy-intensive Egyptian irrigation and drainage sector plays a vital part in food production and in maintaining the rural economy. Agriculture accounts for 20 percent of GDP and 35 percent of the labor force. and yearly emission reductions resulting from energy savings.1). rate. The success of irrigated agriculture depends to a large extent on the effective operation and maintenance (O&M) of the irrigation and drainage system to maintain the quality of the level of irrigation and drainage services (table 7. and duration of drainage water disposal . The country therefore must improve returns from its available water resources in an environmentally sound and sustainable manner.120 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 7. declines in reliable water supplies for irrigation will dampen the increase in cereals yield that policymakers expect as a result of improving irrigation infrastructure and techniques. overall water availability for irrigation and other uses will decrease. reduced reliability is expected to reduce yields in the Nile River basins by 11 percent.Egypt Case Study Energy Efficiency CDM Program 121 Given the very flat topography in most parts of the country. climate change will exacerbate the current supply-demand imbalance. floods. In water-scarce regions such as in Egypt. Given this system’s strategic importance to the country. As a consequence. such as energy efficiency aspects. and the pumping stations are subject to contingency repairs. which would help combat seawater intrusion. By world standards. Climate models also predict an increase in amplitude and frequency of extreme weather events such as droughts. financing is made available from the government’s budget. Approximately half of these stations have very old pumping units operating inefficiently and incurring high energy costs (70 percent of total operating costs). The expected rise in temperature will increase evaporation. There is evidence that temperatures already have increased in the last two decades. Redesign also would enable the continuation of rice cultivation in the Nile Delta. Given such scenarios in the face of growing demand. there are over 743 pumping stations that are of vital importance for Egypt’s agriculture in the Nile Valley and Delta. while drainage water needs to be pumped out. International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) climate models predict additional increases in temperature. Pumping drainage water also is needed to control groundwater levels and salinity to preserve crop yields. However. and storms. In a context of increasing water scarcity. with pumping capacities ranging from 2 m3/s to 75 m3/s. water in open conveyance channels needs to be lifted at certain critical points to provide irrigation. Pumping heights range from 5 meters–50 meters. At the same time. In the Nile Delta. Major investments will . By 2025. drainage pumping stations will need to be redesigned to “climate-proof ” the investment so that they can help to counter the effect of the expected seawater intrusion. there is generally no serious questioning of either the economics or the technological choices made. water availability will become more erratic and thus harder to manage. The allocation of funds to maintenance activities is small. and that drought episodes have intensified. They command large irrigated and drainage areas with a high cropping intensity ranging from 180 percent–200 percent. while a rise in the seawater level will cause salt-water intrusion in coastal groundwater reservoirs. most of these pumping stations are large. by sector.60 Total emissions (%) 71 9 15 5 100 Source: Egypt National Greenhouse Gases Inventory 1990–91. an approved methodology . GHG Emissions Characteristics The aggregate national GHG emissions without the impacts of land-use changes were estimated at over 116 million tons of CO2 equivalent in the baseline year 1990–91. t) 82. 1990 (million t CO2) Sector All energy Industry (other than energy) Agriculture Wastes Total CO2 emissions (mil.2 GHG Emissions as Reported to UNFCCC. mainly from the Figure 7.gov.122 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 7.27 17.eg be needed to (a) modernize irrigation and drainage pumping stations and (b) improve on-farm irrigation efficiency. 350 300 250 200 150 100 20 0 1990–1991 1996–1997 2001–2002 2006–2007 2011–2012 2016–2017 Selling Emission Reductions under the Kyoto Protocol to Support Program Implementation Million tons of CO2 Enery Industrial processes Agriculture Waste Total To register a CDM program such as this with the CDM Executive Board. The agriculture sector was the second largest GHG source. To avoid the harmful effects on crops of irrigation and drainage pump failures and reduce the O&M cost of the pumping stations.eeaa. 1990–2017 steel and cement industries 400 (EEAA 1999).72 10. are presented in table 7. www. mainly from enteric fermentation and rice cultivation.1 GHG Projections for All Sectors. followed by the noncombustion-related industrial emissions of CO2.2. The relative contributions of greenhouse gases in 1990–91 to the total emissions. the government has set up a long-term program to rehabilitate the irrigation and drainage pumping network of the Nile Water Resource Management System.69 116.93 5. Adaptation may require switches in cropping patterns to new crops or varieties more tolerant of water scarcity. 593 3. The last is implementing Energy Efficiency Programs including auditing energy consumption.376. how does the CDM work in the case of this project? Energy savings resulting from energy efficiency improvements reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To meet their agreed emission reductions targets. Drainage Authority. AM0020. Most of the project investments will relate to electromechanical equipment for the pumping stations. Pumping stations that. or there is no stand-by unit. These programs have had some success with domestic water supply and wastewater treatment pumping stations. Building is in very poor condition. New pumps will be installed if the cost of rehabilitation exceeds 70 percent of the cost of new pumps. Capacity is inadequate.Egypt Case Study Energy Efficiency CDM Program 123 must exist. Drainage and static head requirements have changed.054. gear boxes.055.690 1. including major structural deficiencies. Efforts will be directed toward establishing better linkages among the Irrigation Department.637 1. namely.” In brief.3 Change in Energy Use Pumping station Type of intervention Complete rehabilitation Partial replacement Provision of spare parts Total Irrigation (%) –22 –13 –9 Drainage (%) –10 –5 –7 Annual energy savings (US$) 624.920 . and corrosion. There are problems with switch gear. “Monitoring Methodology for Water Pumping Efficiency Improvements. which are not obliged to reduce their GHG emissions. Average operating hours per unit exceed 100. OECD countries that have agreed to reduce their emissions of GHG then can purchase these emission reductions from such projects located in developing countries.000. in principle. are eligible to participate in this CDM program will need to meet the following criteria: Age of the equipment exceeds 20 years. Table 7. and the Ministry of Electricity and Energy. In this case. an approved methodology exists. . A comprehensive Management Information System (MIS) has been developed for this database. resulting in immediate cost savings. The current operational conditions and performance of the pumping stations will be documented and organized in a database that will be used as a reference for the future emissions reductions evaluation.124 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS The recent pumping station rehabilitation project analyzed the overall impact on energy use by rehabilitation alone (table 7. Annual savings in maintenance costs were estimated at 5 percent of the capital costs of rehabilitation and 1 percent of spare parts.500 GWh/year or will increase. The energy efficiency measures will be based on energy audits of the pumping stations and will include: Electricity demand-side management Power subscription adjustment Power factor improvement Changing mismatched pumps Impellers adjustments High-efficiency motors Preventive pump maintenance Energy efficiency monitoring and evaluation. reducing GHG emissions. for which a Program of Activities Design Document (PoA DD) will need to be prepared and registered with the CDM Executive Board. The PoA DD will describe the overall program. CDM Program of Activities Design Document A CDM program will be implemented through what is termed a Program of Activities. The program’s emission reductions correspond to GHG emissions that would have been produced in the absence of the program activities. The electricity consumption of the pumping stations will stay at the current order of 1. Rehabilitation increased the operational efficiency of motors and pumps and reduced the amount of maintenance required.3). The proposed CDM Program Activity Design Document (CPA) will describe all the energy efficiency measures to be implemented in a specific pumping station(s). The program activity will improve the energy performance of the pumping stations and will save electricity. In the absence of the program activity. the pumping stations will continue to be operated at the same energy performance level or worse. “Monitoring Methodology for Water Pumping Efficiency Improvements” (figure 7. The CDM monitoring requirements are defined in the Ap. Electricity tariffs are low in Egypt so the energy bill savings are not sufficiently motivating for program implementation.2). This requirement will ensure that only emissions reductions up to the existing capacity of the system will be considered. . Improve energy efficiency in overall water pumping. The AM0020 methodology is not applicable to cases in which the project activities consist of building entirely new schemes to augment existing capacity. 2005 proved Monitoring Methodology AM0020. There is no regulation or incentive scheme in place covering the program’s activities. This methodology will apply to the new scheme only up to the measured delivery capacity (annual amount of delivered water) of the old scheme. in which The existing efficiency (of water and energy) is being improved. CDM Methodology to Be Used The AM0020 methodology is applicable to project activities that: Seek to reduce GHG emissions by explicitly reducing the amount of energy required to deliver a unit of water to end-users in municipal water utilities. b.2 AM0020. c.Figure 7. or A new scheme is being developed to replace completely the old scheme. as well as the energy efficiency of the pumping scheme that consumes electricity from the electricity grid.Egypt Case Study Energy Efficiency CDM Program 125 Additionality The program’s additionality can be justified by the following barrier arguments: a. The program faces significant financial barriers and possibly will have to be supported by a World Bank loan. including reducing technical losses and leaks. An amendment to the methodology will be required to accommodate off-grid pumps. However.126 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS This methodology requires the following monitoring arrangements: Water from the entire scheme entering in the water system postproject must be metered and the total numbers adjusted to make sure that increases in water supply from the new scheme are not counted. efficiency measurement and control. and preventive pumps maintenance. these activities are not widely practiced in Egypt.”1 In other words. The technology employed is widely used and commercially available. Most of the program activities concern water demand management and best practices for energy efficiency improvement and pumping stations and canals maintenance. pdf 1 . the CO2 output per Mw or kW/h of electricity will need to be calculated and monitored. The program also supports and maintains the improvement of energy efficiency of the pumping stations through energy audits. The main GHG targeted is CO2.unfccc.4.int/methodologies/Tools/EB35_repan12_Tool_grid_emission. GHG Emissions Reductions Electricity savings resulting from energy efficiency improvement will reduce the emissions of GHG associated with power generation in Egypt. The carbon content of the electricity employed by the water system must be calculated using the combined margin approach outlined in the “Tool to Calculate the Emission Factor for an Electricity System. if the water pumps are linked to the national energy grid. The expected emissions reductions associated with the CDM program activities are evaluated in table 7. If the water pumps operate from off-grid sources such as diesel generators. This information generally is made available by the authorities each year. http://cdm. energy management programs. the annual consumption of related diesel fuel will need to be calculated. Energy consumption in the form of kWh required to move the water within the boundaries of the system must be calculated. Default values for the carbon content of the diesel will be used for this calculation. 141.423.565.070.565.6 4.0 203.0 232.25 6.565.5 87.423.4 174.423.5 12.070.0 232.565.565.1 116.0 232.4 Yearly Emission Reduction Resulting from Energy Savings.565.4 232.0 232.8 203.5 2012 t CO2 29.353.5 12.0 232.25 12.5 12.565.0 232.211.211.282.565.1 174.0 232.9 116.353.0 232.5 12.Egypt Case Study Energy Efficiency CDM Program 127 Table 7.565.9 58.3 29.5 12.0 232.6 58.565.3 87.565.8 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 t CO2 t CO2/year .5 145.494.5 12.0 232.8 145.282.565.565.0 232.0 232.141.4 174.565. 2010–18 (%) Activity start date EE program implementation period 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Year of start of crediting period Emission reductions Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12 Year 13 Year 14 Year 15 Year 16 Year 17 Year 18 Year 19 Year 20 Year 21 Year 22 Year 23 Year 24 Year 25 Year 26 Year 27 Year 28 Total Average 2010 2010–18 (%) 6.883.494.0 232.865. In Egypt. excluding the Designated Operational Entity (DNA fee). registration. . It helps to build a viable PPP scheme and thereby facilitates the transfer of the O&M of the pumping stations to the private sector. The additional CDM pre-operational development costs (feasibility assessment. The program contributes to CDM development in Egypt and helps ensure the sustainable development of the country. It demonstrates Egypt’s efforts to reduce GHG emissions and to reinforce its sustainable development strategy. The required CDM monitoring plan will be integrated in the monitoring and reporting procedures of the pump modernization program so the additional costs for CDM monitoring will be minimal.2 Benefits of the CDM Program Besides the expected additional revenues that the CDM can generate.128 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS They are derived from the total annual electricity bill of the pumping stations and the assumed current and target pumping station efficiencies.000/year. validation) are estimated at US$150. project design document. CDM Implementation Cost The estimated cost of the irrigation and drainage pumping stations modernization program will be detailed in the project concept design document. an additional budget for the CDM project operational phase should be foreseen for CER verification and issuance.000. However. It reduces electricity consumption and helps preserve the country’s fossil fuel resources. Training and education of pumping stations operators will create awareness of the efficient use of electricity and proper energy management’s positive effect on the environment. this fee is fixed at 3 percent of the Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) for energy efficiency projects. 3 Estimated at US$30. the implementation of a CDM program for the pumping stations modernization project offers multiple advantages: GOE will need to provide fewer irrigation subsidies and energy subsidies and can reallocate the reduced expenditures elsewhere. It reinforces the CDM capacity of the concerned stakeholders. 4 Program Risks As part of the pumping station modernization project. 4 This is a rough estimate of the CDM potential revenues. on the post-2012 CDM status and future market. the CDM program could generate US$40–100 million during its 28-year lifespan. the program provides opportunities for policymakers to introduce. 5 Egypt’s low electricity prices facilitate the justification of the CDM additionality of energy efficiency projects. On the positive side. modernized management of this important sector. besides the intrinsic project risks. the CDM program will share in the risks of project implementation. The expected revenues from the CDM program depend greatly on the commercial carbon credits selling terms and the risk-taking of transaction costs and ERs certification. predominantly. the specific CDM risks can be summarized as: Registration risks associated with the CDM program’s additionality5 Uncertainty of the future of CDM beyond 2012 Higher transaction costs Relevant stakeholders’ insufficient motivation and awareness of CDM benefits. However. their amount will depend on the project implementation and the energy performance reached and. . The carbon price can vary from US$8–16 per ton eq.Egypt Case Study Energy Efficiency CDM Program 129 The project will encourage a greater investment and will provide more resources to reduce water losses through fixing leaks and faulty pumps. The project supports the overall financial performance by reducing the unit cost of supplying water. It provides employment during the implementation and monitoring phases of the project activity. In fact. Accordingly. through energy efficiency measures. CO2. . 0 development was booming along 8. Japan has succeeded in achieving the highest standards of service through a combination of sound institutional regulations.1 Historical Changes of Water Sources: kyo.0 6.1). Japan is vulnerable to too much water. due to very high concentration of population in some major metropolitan areas. At the opposite extreme of countries that are battling desertification.Figure 8. many aspects of Japanese water and sanitation governance would interest MNA policymakers. notably destructive typhoons and floods.0 Olympic Games in 1964. and high seasonal variation Increasing Dam Storage Water. a large network of reservoir storage and well-managed regulation of flows has ensured reliable water services (figure 8.0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 to intensive and repeated water Year cutoff in rotation lasting for sevDam Surface water Sub-surface water Wells eral months. Also. when economic 10. Although Japan’s social and economic contexts are very different from MNA’s. Tokyo 2.0 with the hosting of the Tokyo 4.0 was called “Tokyo Desert” due 0.0 to be developed rapidly in the 16.0 1960s–1980s. and the use of technology. As the country’s rivers are short and fast flowing. Particularly in To14.0 12.0 kyo in the 1960s.8 Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience Satoru Ueda and Mohammed Benouahi E xternal accountability is considered a key foundation for wellfunctioning water and sanitation utilities. water resources had 18. Water intake volume (BCM) 2005 Others 131 . a strong work ethic. Japan has adequate rainfall (1600 millimeters (mm)/year). such as To. 1970–2005 National water intake volume changes in rainfall. and report to mayors and/or municipal councils.132 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS This chapter briefly describes the institutional set-up in Japan.804 in September 2007. reviews the performance of its water and sewerage utilities. the Health Bureau. the Water Supply Division. Japan has a comprehensive system of water laws and regulations. In principle. Local governments can organize and delegate their functions to autonomous semigovernmental enterprises. At the national level. the number of municipalities has been greatly decreasing. specified multipurpose dam law Drinking water supply: Waterworks Law (1957) Industrial water supply: Industrial Water Supply Law Irrigation water: Land Improvement Law Sewage management: Sewerage Law (1958). and draws some lessons for the Middle East and North Africa region. the Ministry of Internal Affairs and .232 in March 1999 to 1. WSS services are principally the responsibility of local governments. such as prefectures and municipalities. from 3. The findings are based on an August 2007 2-week study tour by the authors. Water supply and sanitation (WSS) services are delegated by law to the lowest appropriate level. Thus. and (3) municipalities (cities. As part of the governmental system reform. towns. all recurrent expenses of utility services are required to be fully covered by tariffs. multiple entities are responsible for the water supply: the Ministry of Health. and villages). The main water-related legislation includes: Public utility management: Local Public Enterprise Law (1952) and Local Government Autonomy Law Water resources development and management: River Law. Legislative and Institutional Framework The Japanese government operates at three levels: (1) the national government. Labor and Welfare. which comprises the prime minister’s office and 11 ministries. (2) 47 prefectural governments. City Planning Law Water quality and environment: Fundamental Environment Law and Water Pollution Control Law. These utility entities carry out local governmental mandates and management of daily operations. Water Resources Development Promotion Law. on key business decisions. when referring to water and sewerage utilities. and their main offices are housed in the municipality’s office buildings. Regulations for Providing Water Supply Services From the institutional perspective. tariff increases. as the head of the utility and approved by the municipal council. which is administered by the Ministry of Health. operational. The commissioner reports to the owners/ regulators. . namely. and Local Public Financial Bureaus.” Therefore. Finally. the Ministry of Health. the Local Public Enterprise Law (1952) is the most important. An independent commissioner is appointed. and auditing. Infrastructure. National ministries establish the regulations and guidelines for technical and service standards. This arrangement has required the development of a well-developed accounting system so that water supply assets can be separated from other municipal accounts and charged specifically to the water supply operation.Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience 133 Communication (MIAC). Labor and Welfare and the Ministry of Land. They also review and approve utilities’ business plans regarding their basic scope. For sewerage services. and Transportation. and MIAC are in charge. Labor and Welfare.1 This legislation requires water utilities to supply water to improve public welfare. and service standards stipulated in the 1957 Waterworks Law. Infrastructure and Transportation subsidize prioritized infrastructure construction. usually by the mayor. this chapter uses “enterprise” instead of “corporation” for those that adopt corporate financing procedures according to the Local Public Enterprise Law’s financial clauses. These ministries are not involved in operational aspects of water supply and sewerage utilities. the City and Regional Development Bureau. while operating economically as independent and autonomous business entities/public enterprises. Water utilities also are required to follow the technical. under the terms of the Waterworks Law and the Sewerage Law. the Ministry of Land. and investment schedule. but are merely informed of. The utilities are to collect revenues from customers to cover recurrent costs. The 1 The standard translation of the Japanese law uses “Enterprise” instead of “Corporation. design. such as annual investment/operation plans. municipal councils. changes in tariff levels. They do not approve. the Sewerage Department. Most water utilities are established to serve the population/area within a single municipality. 2. given its public-good nature. drinking-water quality standards. Thus. Costs are divided between sewage treatment and urban drainage. all construction and operating and maintenance (O&M) costs are covered by municipal general revenue.134 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Waterworks Law stipulates the basic management of waterworks. and the heads of sewerage departments/divisions are civil servants. The remaining 885 small-scale utilities were not subject to this law. almost all sewerage utility offices are accommodated within local governments’ office buildings. sewerage management is handled separately from water supply. As opposed to water supply utilities. most sewerage utility offices are established as internal departments or divisions within local governments (prefectures or municipalities). and the responsibilities of utilities commissioners and personnel. of which 1. such as major treatment plants and pipelines construction. whereas the latter is considered a public good and therefore charged to general tax revenues.469 were established as statutory entities under the Local Public Enterprise Law. The former is considered a private good and is recovered through user fees. Regarding stormwater discharge. Stormwater discharge operations are clearly separated from sewage collection and treatment operations. Some exceptions exist. including staff costs. such as licensing for drinking-water-supply utilities establishment and operations. In 2006. local governments have established standard formulas to apportion costs. The sewage tariff is billed and collected together with the water tariff by water supply utilities and transferred to the sewerage department based on prior agreement. utilities in small towns and villages are better managed by local communities. However. which does not distinguish between urban and rural water. The user-pays principle is also applied to wastewater collection and treatment. recurrent expenses are fully covered by user charges. 2 . Thus. in principle. construction and administration of water supply systems.2 Regulations for wastewater service management In general. subsidies for investment schemes for planned improvement of facilities. all of these utilities are subject to the Waterworks Law. For combined sewerage systems. such as Kyoto City. As in other parts of the world. between sewage and stormwater operations.334 water supply utilities existed. 213 sewerage utilities apply the corporate accounting system under the Local Public Enterprise Law.1 indicates 96. licensing for construction and operational plans. Infrastructure and Transportation. regulatory/monitoring/sanction measures. Table 8. excluding small-scale utilities.1% for water utilities. and operational aspects of sewerage systems (including networks and treatment plants). Among sewerage offices visited by the authors. In 2005 the number of sewerage utilities was 3. sewerage utilities/departments also are required to coordinate with the environment departments of prefectures and municipalities regarding the quality and quantity of effluent discharges into rivers and lake basins.2). Water supply coverage increased significantly after the passage of the Waterworks Law in 1957. Of these. operational. which is governed by the Ministry of Land.Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience 135 Sewerage utilities are required to meet the technical.1 percent of Japan’s 129 million population. Tokyo.699. According to the clauses of the Fundamental Environment Law and Water Pollution Control Law. Kyoto.486 utilities apply the general government accounting system. waterborne diseases and infant mortality have dropped dramatically to almost nil (figure 8. and service standards stipulated in the Sewerage Law (1958).3 up from 26 percent in 1946. subsidies for investment schemes. Performance Assessment Water Supply In 2005 water supply utilities served 97. and Sapporo adopt independent corporate accounting systems under the Local Public Enterprise Law. . As water supply coverage expanded. Fukuoka. design. 3 Table 8.1 shows the main features of some major water supply utilities as well as the average data for all of Japan. the maximum pollution level of discharges from factories/ plants. while 3. The Sewerage Law stipulates the planning. The number of the sewerage utilities under this law is still small but is increasing for large cities. and the responsibilities of sewerage utilities’ managers and staff. whereas Shiga prefecture employs a general governmental accounting system as a part of the prefectural government mandates. water quality standards for outflows from treatment plants. thanks to improved water-saving equipment and public information campaigns.151 13. Wastewater Services In 1958 expansion of coverage was accelerated by the passage of the Sewerage Law. 100 90 80 70 60 50 10 40 8 30 6 20 4 10 2 0 0 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 Cholera patients (10.873.9 909 1.085.000 persons) Water supply coverage (%) Planned water supply coverage (%) Infant mortality rate (10.64 2.733a 1.794 99. the 20 Tokyo water started chlorination in 1921 18 average per capita daily water 16 consumption rate of households in 14 12 Tokyo is estimated at 244 liters.087 100.01 46 Japan average 124.2 presents the main features of the sewerage utilities studied by the authors.100 5.000 persons/million) No.1% is covered by community/ individual household septic systems approved and subsidized by the Ministry of Environment.136 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 8.644 8. most of the remaining areas also are covered by individual onsite sanitation facilities. of employees per 1000 connections Water tariff (USD/m3) Working ratio (%) 12.50 1.0 406.625a 96.000 persons) Water supply coverage (%) Average daily water consumption per capita is approximately 314 liters.0 590. In 1961 wastewater services coverage was only 6 percent.33 49 Note: a The numbers of populations and employees are not the average of water utilities.3% is covered by sewerage collection and treatment systems under the Sewerage Law. of patients & infant mortality (10. However.1 Main Features of Visited Water Utilities and Japan.74 63 Sapporo 1. However. of which 73.89 1.427. The remaining 9. 4 .87 1.4 Table 8.0 4.5 58.215 99. The 82.420.707 99.37 54 Fukuoka 1. thereafter. By 2006 coverage reached 82.4 percent of the population.925 9. of employees No. as well as the average of all utilities in Japan.393 5.19 1.354.1 403 0. consumption has been decreasing slightly to approximately 314 liters.90 57 Kyoto 1.8 546.563 0.000 persons) Water-borne diseases patients (10. Average Year Tokyo Population served Service coverage (%) Average daily water supply (m3/day) Unaccounted for water (%) No.246.4% represents the population coverage by the national-governmentauthorized schemes. If heavy water users such as hotels and public baths are excluded. and the households are equipped with flush toilets.1 57. but total in Japan.8 4. It increased from 169 liters in 1965 to 322 liters in 1995.1 713 0. 238 0.92 62 285 0. of employees No.6 1.62 8.84 52 582 0. b The data of Shiga Prefecture is the average of Shiga Prefacture Government (regional integrated sewerage system) and 19 municipalities (regular sewerage) within the area of Shiga Prefecture.20 41 3.726.260 28.17 42 16. is remarkably good. Tokyo Bay and Osaka Bay—are further treated to the tertiary level.358 b 46.858. the utilities enjoy considerable autonomy for their daily operations and are relatively insulated from political issues.213 6 1.244.87 Working ratio (Maint.037.800 1. Lessons for MNA Water Utilities The Japanese model is highly relevant to MNA countries.2 Main Features of Visited Sewerage Utilities and Japan Average Tokyo 23 wards Population served Population coverage (%) Sewerage treatment capacity (m3/day) Unaccounted for sewage (%) Sewage tariff ($/m ) 3 Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka Shiga Enterprise national average Nonenterprise national average 86. d Represents the sanitation utilities employing general governmental accounting.9 6.000 9 1.050 20 1.000 30 0.102 0. which is well below the national effluent standard of 20 mg/l.081 1.419.13 67 21. such as Biwa Lake.58 38 304 0.4 31.9 96.3 99.091 1.879.594 a 1. Thanks to their semiprivate status and obligation to recover costs.566. c The average of sanitation utilities employing corporate accounting under the Local Public Enterprise Law. All wastewater collected by public sewers is treated at secondarylevel treatment plants. the measured effluents’ biological oxygen demand (BOD) is 3 mg/l–10 mg/l.38 18 1.88 99. Approximately 15 percent—all effluents discharged into closed water bodies. Its key features of interest for MNA are the semipublic corporate institutional framework under the Local Public Enterprise Law on the one hand. of employees per 1.336. and the central regulation of operational and technical standards by the Waterworks Law and the Sewerage Law on the other. In general.000 connections Notes: a The column indicated the information only for 23 wards of Tokyo excluding Tama Wester Municipalities.5 99.290 12 1. Building the trust .262 1. The legal framework balances the strong public ownership and oversight functions with the private sector’s financial autonomy and operational economic efficiency.900.516 0.05 747.173. even from secondary-level treatment.4 671.14 35 637 1.48 94.384.940 d 87.74 27 1.359. Japan’s discharged effluent quality.Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience 137 Table 8. costs/ tariff) (%) No.506 c 99. 138 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS and confidence between the utilities and service users has been one of the bedrock principles of Japan’s utility management. Enhanced public welfare though a stable water supply and sanitation service b. Effectively managing human resources g. In the following sections. Excellent goodwill among water customers e. (2) a balance sheet. Keeping unaccounted-for water (UFW) very low in both water and sewerage utilities c. The Japanese model is thereby able to deliver : a. They are: a. . Legislating and Regulating for Cost Recovery Under the Local Public Enterprise Law. this chapter details key strategies and achievements of the Japanese water and sanitation system (WSS). Legislating/regulating effective governance and accountability mechanisms f. water utilities are required to make annual financial statements by processing separately (1) an income statement in the current year. Large-scale investment in infrastructure development according to a long-term plan d. Except for a few (1% of total) very small ones. and (3) documentation of the source and application of funds. Managing river water rights and discharge permits. Focusing on total water quality management i. water utilities employ the corporate financing system. Outsourcing wherever possible h. Municipality-based utilities tailored to unique local settings. Legislating and regulating for cost recovery b. Making available several investment-financing options for water and sewerage utilities e. Maintaining clarity in accounting between recurrent and capital costs d. Financial autonomy achieved through tariffs and a sound management system c. others adopt the governmental financial system.5 5 Some of Japan’s larger urban wastewater utilities adopt the corporate financing system under the Public Enterprise Law. 08 Philadelphia 1. Table 8. Berlin.Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience 139 The WSS utilities generate healthy operating surpluses.98 0. This figure compares with approximately 3 percent and 2 percent for electricity and gas bills. the combined water and sewage tariffs of US$2.5 Istanbul 1.5 (sewage) 0.50 per cubic meter (m3) account for approximately 1 percent of the average HH income. Japan).54 0.4 and 0.7 Brussels 2. Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes No. Notes: The average tariff of Singapore is estimated on the tariff structure on the PUB website.01 Tunisia 0. The working ratio is one of the important indicators of operational efficiency and the profitability of utilities.53 (water) 1.8 Kyoto 2.9 Jedda 0.51 0. May 2006.5 Singapore 1.67 0. The working ratio is the relationship of operating expenses to operating revenues. Singapore (estimate by the PUB website tariff table). The tariffs of Japanese water and wastewater are combined for international comparison with some assumptions. respectively.3 Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006.6.4 Campinas Brazil 0. and Jedda (counry reports). Even though they cover operating and nonoperating costs. London. Tunisia.46 0. Tunisia (Country Report). Other Countries (Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes No. Japan’s national average working ratio of water and sewerage utilities ranges between 0.7 Japan average 2. Japan). the less contribution margin is available to cover nonoperating costs.3 Damascus 0. 9.6 Johannesburg 0. Damascus.77 Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006. The higher the ratio. tariffs are affordable to households and compare well with those of other high-income countries. May 2006).43 Japan Campinas Guanajuato average Singapore Philadelphia Tunisia Johannesburg Brazil Mexico 0.9 London 3.7 Egypt 0.2 Sapporo 2.4 compares the combined water and sewage tariff between the Japanese and international cases.3 Table 8. Brussels. UK data on OFWAT annual report (2005).79 0. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication.56 Kyoto Fukuoka 0.8 Fukuoka 3.4 Average User Tariff (US$/m3) Tokyo 2. When measured against one HH’s total expenditures. Table 8.3 Japan’s and International Water and Sewerage Utilities Working Ratios Tokyo Sapporo 0. 9. .58 0. Table 8. compares the combined working ratio of water and sewerage utilities of Japanese and international cases. such as depreciation and financial charges. Note: The working ratio of the Japanese water and wastewater utilties are combined for international comparison with some assumptions. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication.9 Guanajuato Mexico 0. They also have been upgrading distribution pipes from cast iron to ductile iron. The most competent utilities.0 35.3 percent in 2006—also meant that. most utilities have been able to achieve financial balance through periodic tariff increases (every 3–4 years).2 35. The national UFW average is 8.1 13.0 37. and service pipes from lead to stainless steel. May 2006). Nevertheless. As in other countries.5 4.0 26. they can put forward proposals for tariff increases based on their overall revenue requirements. In .8 9.140 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Utilities do not have the authority to raise tariffs without approval from municipal councils.5 compares water utilities’ UFW in Japan and other countries. Procedures are in place to minimize physical losses. even in situations in which tariffs did not increase. the overall financial performance of water and sewerage utilities did not significantly deteriorate. have attained approximately 5 percent. Table 8.0 20.9 percent in 2003 to –0. Other Countries (Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes No. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication. Water utilities generally repair surface leakage on the same day that a problem is detected on a 24-hour operational basis. 9. They regularly detect potential underground leakage by electronic and correlation-type detectors. UK data from OFWAT Annual Report (2005). Furthermore. Thanks to Japan’s high operational standards and customer service. Japan’s negative inflation rate—which changed from –0.1 8. Japan). Iran (county report). Keeping Unaccounted-for Water Very Low in Both Water and Sewerage Utilities Water utilities and unaccounted-for water A lmost all water supply utilities have achieved ver y low unaccounted-for water (UFW). such as Tokyo and Fukuoka.9 5.5 Unaccounted-for Water (%) Japan Shiraz Campinas Guanajuato Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka average Singapore UK Philadelphia Tunisia Iran Johannesburg Brazil Mexico 5.0 32. including developed countries. This low percentage of UFW is highly significant compared to losses in the range of 15 percent–40 percent for water utilities in many countries globally.5 percent. most water utilities maintain their administrative UFW at almost nil. However. Table 8. the decision to raise tariffs sometimes gets delayed or even reversed due to political considerations.8 15.0 Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006. whereas Sapporo’s is close to 30 percent. However. The Tokyo Metropolitan Water Bureau is perhaps one of the best-run utilities in the world. If required.6 billion) fully covers operational costs.7 shows the 2006 unit operational and capital costs of water production in comparison with the water tariff. While Tokyo’s water tariff (approximately US$2.6 breaks down the O&M costs of several water supply utilities and the national total. the utilities easily can exert their authority to cut off water supply to defaulters. No collected wastewater is discharged without treatment. Table 8. Clarity in Accounting for Recurrent and Capital Costs Water supply services Water supply utilities’ accounting systems are a powerful management tool. The costs are clearly distinguished between (1) operational costs and (2) capital costs. The higher UFW of the latter may be attributed to underground water leakage into sewer networks or erroneous connection of rain sewers to sewage sewers. Tokyo’s UFW is approximately 9 percent.5 percent. Very few other countries conduct this level of UFW measurement in sewerage systems.4 million m3. The balance of approximately 5 percent is covered by the investments and subsidies from the municipalities’ general accounts. The national average tariff . They calculate the UFW using a concept similar to that used for water supply. because customers pay their bills. for enterprise utilities and nonenterprise utilities. disconnection is very rarely required. including depreciation costs and bond interest costs.Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience 141 2006 the nationwide average was 1. The average daily water supply volume is approximately 4. UFW stands at approximately 5. Table 8. The relationship between costs and revenues is immediately apparent. Sewerage utilities and unaccounted-for water All sewerage utilities/departments measure the amount of treated wastewater and compare it to the amount of sewerage for which treatment fees are collected. respectively. and the total length of distribution pipes is 24. Defaulting customers are automatically disconnected.782 kilometers (km).8 percent with 100 percent coverage of a population of approximately 12 million. the tariff of the 3 other visited cities and the national average do not fully cover capital costs (see Cost Recovery section below). The national average UFW is 17 percent and 12 percent. 90 1.37 0.37 Fukuoka 2. These figures show that the cost recovery ratio (including capital portion) was approximately 97 percent.53 1.72 1.93 1.) Cities Personnel expenses Energy expenses Repair expenses Chemicals/materials Outsource fee Bulk water purchase Others Operation costs Bond Depreciation costs Capital costs for bulk water Capital costs Total Water tariff General & other accounts Miscellaneous Total Surplus/deficit Tokyo 385 77 510 66 238 0 377 1. was US$1. Table 8.788 Note: The exchange rate was US$ = JPY115 during the August 2007 mission.691 1.641 213 93 2. March 31. sewerage utilities’ accounting systems provide a powerful management tool.686 519 1.00 1.74 Sapporo 2.347 27.75 0.33 Notes: US$ = JPY 115 in August 2007.09 0.01 Japan Average 1.8 breaks down O&M costs of several water sewerage .62 1. March 31.90 Kyoto 1.09 0.72 1. Unit production costs = Unit operation costs + unit capital costs (depreciation and bond interests).357 1.415 2. Sewerage services As for water supply.947 489 Sapporo 66 3 43 14 40 0 31 199 67 97 0 164 363 346 28 5 378 16 Kyoto 76 6 19 10 9 0 17 139 52 81 0 133 272 254 19 1 275 3 Fukuoka 29 4 17 3 40 19 19 131 47 73 42 163 294 283 6 20 310 15 National total 4.444 3. 2006 (US$ mil.6 Income Statement of Water Supply Utilities.7 Water Cost Recovery: Unit Production Cost and Tariff. Table 8.158 871 1. while the average production cost was US$1.458 2.47 0.655 195 609 0 804 2.460 25.16 2.759 7.37/m3.440 13.142 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 8.987 1.65 0.09 0. 2007 (US$ per m3) Cities Unit production costs Unit operation costs Unit capital costs Unit average tariff Tokyo 1.261 2.904 24.735 1.33/m3. enabling the comparison of costs and revenues.060 12. 2006 (US$ mil.821 3. utilities.073 209 1. costs are clearly distinguished between (1) running costs and (2) capital costs. the stormwater portion is covered by the municipal general budget. b Rain storm discharge fee is paid by cities’ general accounts.604 1.9 breaks down sources of investment funds for four major utilities and the national total in Japan’s FY05 budget.690 2.768 6.) Tokyo Personnel expenses Energy expenses Repair expenses Chemicals/materials Outsource fee Others Total operation costs Bond interests Depreciation costs Total capital costs Grant total costs Sewerage service tariff Rain storm discharge fee Other operation revenue General accounts subsidy Miscellaneous Total revenue Surplus/deficit b Sapporo 41 13 14 7 56 9 140 104 137 241 381 176 187 2 12 1 378 –3 Kyoto 50 11 6 4 36 22 129 158 163 320 450 230 177 7 41 1 456 6 Fukuoka 13 9 9 4 65 32 131 150 140 290 420 233 148 6 31 2 420 0 National enterprise total 1.8 Income Statement of Sewerage Utilities. Table 8.947 11.837 233 Notes: US$ = JPY115 in August 2006.697 4. An additional 35 percent of the budget is supplemented by the local government general accounts. The sewage tariff covers on average 53 percent of sewerage running and capital costs at the national level. The national average bond share was 48 percent.250 7.Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience 143 Table 8. For sewerage utilities that adopted the corporate financing system under the Local Public Enterprise Law.280 4. While the wastewater collection and treatment portion is fully covered by the sewage tariff.185 417 248 a 90 211 13 238 116 915 700 989 1.215 57 59 20 2. The management accounting framework makes it possible for costsharing schemes to be established for wastewater-and-stormwatercombined operations.487 1. which was higher than that for water supply. including depreciation costs and bond interest costs. The national average subsidy share was 38 percent for .058 755 3. a Tokyo figures refer to 23 wards only.504 119 12. March 31.058 348 481 120 1. 3/m3 for enterprise utilities and US$2.443 Enterprise national total 3. Based on these.344 2.310 15.950b 7.10 shows unit sewerage running costs and capital costs. large cities.078 1. March 31.42 0. the national average cost recovery rate (including capital costs) is 91 percent for enterprise utilities and 47 percent for nonenterprise utilities.177 Sapporo 106 62 11 6 185 Kyoto 106 63 5 11 185 Fukuoka 139 79 4 21 243 National total 9.00 0.61 1.205 21.42 and 0.20 Sapporo 0.84 Kyoto 1.92 Enterprise national average 1. 2006 (US$ mil.152 Nonenterprise national total 6. since stormwater discharge costs are fully covered by the municipal general account.76 0.58 Shiga 3.10 Wastewater Cost Recover: Unit Operation Cost and Tariff (US$/m3) Unit costs Unit production costs Unit operation costs Unit capital costs Unit average tariff Tokyo 23 wards 1.4/m3 for nonenterprise utilities.37 0. Recurrent costs are fully covered by all utilities. The working ratios are 0. Unit production costs = Unit operation costs + unit capital costs (depreciation costs and bond interests).000 1.29 0. Table 8. The reliance on bonds and subsidies was a result of the delayed development of the sewerage systems.944 1. as compared with the sewage tariff. The balance was covered by the municipal general account. The national average total cost is approximately US$1.15 1. such as .950 5.) Tokyo Enterprise bonds National subsidies Other works/beneficiaries share General accounts support and other revenue Total investment budget 478a 314 68 317 1.14 Fukuoka 1.80 1. Table 8.19 2. b National total is the sum of (a) enterprise national total and (b) nonenterprise national total.44 0.49 0.49 0.9/m3.54 1.33 1.8/m3 –1.60 1.81 0. sewerage—also much higher than that for water supply.67.9 Construction and Improvement Budget Sources of Sewerage Works.992 266 894 6.10 deals only with wastewater collection and treatment costs.02 0.40 0. respectively.13 Notes: US$ = JPY 115 in August 2007.953 1.17 Nonenterprise national average 2.76 1.14 1. Table 8. In general.291 Notes: US$ = JPY115 in August 2007.144 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 8.66 1. for enterprise and nonenterprise utilities. The sewage tariff ranges between US$0. a Tokyo figures refer to 23 wards only. In these circumstances. For waterworks. some strong utilities would be able to secure funds on their own financial credentials if allowed to do so.Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience 145 Tokyo. in recent years. Their unit costs. For . People are more willing to pay a higher tariff for drinking water than for wastewater. some rural sewerage utilities become very dependent on funds from the municipal general account. in rural areas. including the capital portion. particularly capital costs. and many other nonenterprise areas. are much higher than those of urban areas. The Tokyo Metropolitan Office’s credit rating is AAA. Some wealthy municipalities’ financial standing is very good. The difference reflects the fact that these rural utilities developed their systems in much more scattered areas with smaller economies of scale and. Infrastructure and Transportation subsidizes 55 percent of the construction of treatment plants and 50 percent of pipe-networks development. Making Available Several Investment-Financing Options for Water and Sewerage Utilities Most water supply and sewerage utilities mobilize external funds in addition to internal funds. it is not easy to collect an adequate level of sewage tariff to fully meet costs. Three major external financing sources are available. This dependency is negatively affecting municipalities’ financial status and their ability to provide other public services. For sewerage works. without a historically developed infrastructure stock. can recover all costs. despite the fact that sewerage system development costs are higher than those of water supply systems. Although utilities do not issue bonds on their own credentials. This differential reflects the public’s willingness to pay. Bonds Utilities issue bonds with the authorization of and backed by municipal governments. through the sewage tariff. In contrast. the Ministry of Health. Labor and Welfare subsidizes up to one-third of investment costs for large-scale systems development and renovation as well as to introduce advanced treatment systems. such as Shiga. The sewage tariff is generally set lower than the water tariff. the Ministry of Land. National subsidy The national ministries subsidize investment for large-scale infrastructure. Most municipalities have established strong reporting frameworks. The municipal councils or mayors are kept informed of the utility’s operations by the commissioner or director general and review its annual/quarterly operational reports. water production. the subsidy rate increases to 60 percent of the construction of treatment plants. including financial audits and annual and periodic performance status . As noted earlier. the grant works as an incentive for local governments to issue bonds for infrastructure development. National tax allocation to local governments The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication allocates block grants from national taxes to local governments. the value of municipality bonds issued for infrastructure development. including water and wastewater systems. which collect sewage from more than 2 municipalities. Water supply utility commissioners are accountable to the municipal councils for achieving the targets. Good Sector Governance and Accountability Mechanisms Japanese water utilities have established accountability mechanisms that combine the merits of both private and public entities: (1) the high economic efficiency and financial autonomy of the private sector and (2) the oversight functions of the public sector. customer service. Among the many parameters of the allocation criteria. Nonetheless. For water utilities. Most utilities in Japan set well-defined targets for key performance indicators. Japan has a strong tradition of utilities being accountable to local elected officials and of transparent information-sharing. and new connections. the total allocated amount of national subsidies is much higher for sewerage systems than for water supply systems. such as mayors. is taken into account. particularly for smaller rural municipalities that have few other sources of revenue. This national tax allocation to local governments is designed to ensure the national minimum standards of public services. drinking-water quality. financial performance.146 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS integrated basin-level sewerage systems. water consumption. The directors general of sewerage utilities/departments report to the heads of municipalities. they typically include total revenue. they do not interfere in the daily operations. The grant is not allocated directly to water and sewerage utilities’ accounts but to the general accounts of local governments. However. They include service quality. Use of nationwide benchmarking to ensure accountability The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication administers the Local Public Enterprise Law.Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience 147 reports. water losses. utilities are subject to technical and operational audits. The benchmark database of all utilities for every year is published on the website of the ministry and municipalities. and other operational efficiency and performance indicators. and response to customers’ complaints. Many utilities operate a one-stop call center for customers to take care of water service disruptions. new subscriptions. they are very responsive to their customers. financial efficiency. To enhance accountability. for example. The ministry leads an annual standardized national benchmarking exercise for all water supply and wastewater utilities. The benchmarking items total more than 100. The options include electronic funds transfer and payment at commercial . The exercise thus makes them more accountable to their constituents because comparative results can be made regularly available to the public. Some utilities open customer windows for extended times. and have active internal audit departments. The utilities also establish water repair squads to conduct emergency repair and interrupted service recovery within 24 hours. water utilities usually offer multiple options by which their customers can pay their water and sewage bills. This chapter has benefited from the national benchmark database in addition to the information collected directly from visited utility offices. Customer service ingrained as a key part of utility culture Although Japan’s water supply and sewerage utilities are monopolistic service providers. and payment. timely information to customers on water service disruptions/changes. As described earlier. revenue collection. to 8:00 p. on weekdays as well as Saturday hours. energy costs. financial performance. relocation. orientation toward seeking customers’ opinions. The national benchmark exercise provides an opportunity for municipalities and utilities to monitor their own performance status as well as improvements across the country. To ensure competitive prices and flexibility in purchasing. not just financial audits. the utilities generally follow public procurement regulations. All of these reports are incorporated in the annual reports and are made available at public offices and on websites. Important aspects of customer orientation include friendliness of the customer billing and collection system.m. Furthermore. Staff are rotated within each organization to enable them to obtain wider experience. Effective Management of Human Resources Personnel management is highly meritocratic. postal offices. Each utility maintains the staff level of 1 per 1. such as Japan Waterworks Association. Innovation and knowledge-creation are important features of the water sector’s corporate culture. As a result. The emphasis is on frontline staff who come into direct contact with customers and/or contractors. academic credentials. and seniority reflecting overall experience. Staff salary and promotions are based on performance.000 connections. and convenience stores. which also keep turnover low. These publications are particularly useful for smaller utilities in rural areas that do not posses adequate numbers of technical staff. An extensive training plan covers professional skills development and corporate culture. the government-affiliated agencies and associations. the average is 2 staff per 1. The third criterion provides incentives for staff to stay with the same utility. Some are selected from among respected in-house career officials. have contributed studies for developing new technologies and disseminating technical guidelines and manuals. Staff skills and employee innovation are regarded as critical inputs to improve performance. Those who display high potential are groomed for promotion.148 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS banks. Customers can make service requests on the utility’s website. This rate is much smaller than that of utility companies in other advanced . Staff turnover is very low and is due mostly to mandatory retirement. The utilities provide various kinds of training programs for their staff as part of their annual performance review. The commissioners or directors general of utilities are appointed by the mayors of municipalities on the basis of expertise and experience. Some utilities plan technology development projects on a pilot scale and even obtain patents for successful pilots. The average service duration of career staff of water and sewerage utilities is approximately 25 years. and Japan Sewerage Association. Other utilities have built their own training facilities and field stations.000 connections. Most utilities provide ample career development and training opportunities to their staff. Japan Sewerage Works Agency. staff productivity is high. For water supply and sewerage utilities combined. Other Countries (Water Supply & Sanitation Working Notes No.12 compares the outsourcing percentage of operational expenditures between the Japanese and international cases. (4) information and telecommunication technology services.1 8.11 Number of Employees per 1.7 Campinas Guanajuato Brazil Mexico 4. The number of outsouced workers are not included as the number of regular staff for the Japanese utilities.12 Outsource Ratio of Operational Expenditures (%) Types Water Wastewater Tokyo Sapporo 14 26 20 40 Japan Kyoto Fukuoka average Type 7 28 30 49 14 28 Combined Singapore Johannesburg 25 10 Campinas Guanajuato Brazil Mexico 21 20 Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006. Note: The number of Japanese water and wastewater utilities staff are combined for international comparison. The 1999 Private Finance Initiative Law encouraged public and semipublic entities to test private sector participation.9 4. Some utilities are piloting innovative large-scale privatization schemes to build and operate specialized facilities.e.000 Connections Japan Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka average Singapore Philadelphia Tunisia 1. Table 8. i. The utilities gradually are increasing the outsource percentage through natural attrition of in-house career staff. Note: The Japanese average of wastewater is based on local autonomous enterprise entities by law. Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes No. The household connections are counted as 1 for both water supply and sanitation although they can physically counted as 2. 9.4 8. .000 connections between Japan and other countries.11 compares the water utility staff level per 1. outsourcing takes place for (1) routine O&M of treatment plants and network pipes..0 Johannesburg 4. May 2006). The average outsourcing ratio for water supply utilities is approximately 15 percent. Tunisia (Country Report).1 1. Table 8. (3) engineering design and construction supervision.Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience 149 countries. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication.9 2. (2) checking and executing repair works. and (5) metering and billing. Typically. Use of Outsourcing Wherever Possible While most utilities keep core business functions in-house.5 1. Table 8. that of sewerage utilities is approximately 30 percent. one for water supply and another for wastewater. May 2006.0 Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006.6 2. Several utilities have begun trials of privatization and market testing.7 1. such as cogeneration power plants and sludge treatment and recycling plants. private funding of major investments remains the exception. Japan). Table 8. However. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication. Japan). they have engaged private contractors whenever necessary.9. Focus on Total Water Quality Management Japan’s combination of central government regulation and corporate governance ensures attention to quality in all aspects of water management. such as wastewater treatment plants and pumping stations. the Japan Waterworks Association serves as the think-tank for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication and municipalities by preparing technical design manuals and guidelines. to eliminate odor. The agency also conducts experiments. such as ozone treatment and biologically activated carbonabsorbing treatment. They also help raise public awareness and disseminate information. as they do not have enough staff with the requisite management and technical skills. Based on prefectural or municipal utilities’ requests. In particular. the Japan Sewerage Works Agency provides technical support for construction. Each plan specifies the parameters to be analyzed and the frequency of analysis. Water utilities in some areas adopt advanced water treatment methods. The water supply system is monitored around the clock at the . and management of main facilities. research. regular water quality analysis is conducted at rivers and reservoirs. Water utilities have installed automatic quality-monitoring devices at various points in water supply areas to continuously monitor residual chlorine. Drinking water quality management Tap water is safe to drink anywhere in Japan. water utilities prepare and execute water quality examination plans. In addition. These activities are particularly important for small municipalities. The analyzed results are disclosed in the utility’s annual report and/or regularly posted on the internet. trihalomethane precursor.150 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Other semipublic supporting agencies and associations Some semi-public agencies support utilities. and training sessions. and organizing technical conferences and workshops. maintenance. and other particulates that cannot be sufficiently removed by conventional treatment processes such as rapid sand filtration. The Japan Waterworks Association and the Japan Sewerage Works Association carry out surveys and research related to water and sewerage systems. To maintain strict drinking quality standards. Water distribution optimization and leak detection Most utilities have developed extensive water distribution pipe networks. Water utilities typically develop water supply operational plans that consist of a (1) water intake plan. The utilities use operations systems. Based on the information obtained from the gauges and meters. time. For most sewerage treatment plants. day of the week. and (3) pumps operation plan. Among many parameters. The system can automatically detect pipe bursts by checking the rate of flow and pressure changes and their correlation. the limit for the BOD of effluents is set at 20 mg/l. If the abnormality continues above set thresholds. These plans apply to both ordinary days and emergencies. . This system uses pressure gauges and flow meters that have been installed throughout the city. Water utilities have taken various measures to ensure the best possible water supply for citizens immediately after earthquakes. and holidays. the BOD of treated effluents outflow is below 5 mg/l—much lower than the regulatory limits. Utilities have set high antiseismic design criteria for physical infrastructure and established emergency operation systems. The utilities also have developed water demand forecast programs with parameters such as weather conditions. Such regulation promotes the effective use of water and minimizes water leaks. These measuring devices enable the Water Distribution Control Center to monitor conditions within the pipes on a 24-hour basis via telephone lines. the motorized valves can be opened and closed remotely to regulate water pressure and flow. Some advanced utilities. and dam inflow simulation and reservoir operation optimization systems. The BOD of inflowing raw effluents typically ranges between 100 mg–200 mg/liter. and drought periods. (2) water main networks operation plan.Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience 151 operations center to adjust to changing water demands. They also have built auxiliary power plants and emergency water supply basins and tanks to secure water supply during emergencies. Seismic design and preparedness Japan is prone to earthquakes. have developed more advanced water distribution systems to regulate pressure and flow in distribution pipes. Wastewater treatment standards The water quality of discharged effluent from sewerage treatment plants is regulated by the Sewerage Law. such those as Fukuoka and Tokyo. such as water distribution planning support systems. the system warns the operations center and site offices. accidents. 0% 70% 500 60% pollution loads is to significantly 373 51. Sewerage utilities and environment departments coordinate closely to prepare the plan and monitor water quality. such as installation of pollution treatment facilities at the plant.3 High Industrial Water Recycle Rate: Significantly to install required pollution control Reduced Water Demands and Pollution Loads. The owners could face imprisonment of up to 6 months and/or be fined up to $2. 1960–2000 facilities/equipment.6% 80% 600 73. and cleaning businesses.7% 100 147 Fresh water supply internal water recycling rate 119 10% 18 25 150 124 114 134 127 129 69 75 0% 0 increased from approximately 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20 percent to 80 percent (figure Annual industrial water supply (100 mil. In most cases. the average 65 20% 20.2% 78.6% 74.3% 40% 300 cling of plants and factories.7% 374 417 407 400 438 50% Recycle rate (%) increase the internal water recy297 36. The specified factories and other commercial facilities.152 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Basin-wide water quality control plan The Water Pollution Control Law requires local governments to set environmental quality standards for each control point of rivers and lakes to meet the water quality requirements for the environment and human health. As noted earlier. if required. and heavy metals are strictly controlled. Based on the required amount of pollution load reduction. livestock farms. Dur16? Recycle water 30% 25. m3) .8% factors in reducing industrial 67. local governments provide grant subsidies and interest-free loans to the owners Figure 8. to provide administrative guidance and improvement orders. such as hotels. are required to install onsite pollution control facilities to meet the quality standards. the maximum values of BOD and suspended solid (SS) are set at 600 mg/l. local prefectural governments prepare a Comprehensive Basin-wide Sewerage System Development Plan.0% 200 ing the past 40 years. This plan specifies the basic parameters of sewerage collection and treatment systems in the basin. A comprehensive basin-wide water quality management approach is employed to reduce pollution and meet the required water quality level.6% 75. The Sewerage Law and the Water Pollution Control Law require local governments to conduct onsite inspections and compliance monitoring without notice and. One of the most important 77.500 if they do not follow the improvement orders. Industrial pollution control The Sewerage Law also stipulates water quality standards for effluents discharged by specified industrial factories/plants into sewerage treatment plants. except for toilet-flushing water and environmental flow augmentation in small rivers and canals in some urban districts. Over the past 20 years. (2) construction materials after melting of incinerated ashes to sludge (approximately 40 percent). In some urban rivers.Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience 153 8. Historically. Japan’s rivers and lakes were heavily polluted by rapid economic development. In 2003. A comprehensive flood-prevention master plan is prepared to define the required flood runoff and storage capacity. in most urban areas. reducing the volume to approximately 1/40–1/50 of the original. water quality has been significantly improved thanks to the increase in industrial water recycling and the rapid development of sewerage management systems. onsite storage. Treated effluent is also important for supplying water to downstream water users. Stormwater discharge One of the important roles of a sewerage system is to prevent floods. Permeable road pavements. sludge was used for (1) landfill after incineration (approximately 40 percent). however. Shield tunneling is used to build large tunnels and stormwater pipes. on average nationally. many cities and towns have been developed along rivers and rely on the natural water recycling system between the upstream and downstream of rivers. Technical coordination is established for urban flood control . and retarding ponds at schools and parks also are constructed to reduce flood peak volume. However. indirect recycling through river systems is quite common. From the 1960s through the 1980s. more than 50 percent of river water flow originates from treated effluents from sewerage treatment plants upstream. Sludge treatment Most sludge from treatment plants is dehydrated and incinerated to ashes. These operations are subsidized by government for environmental reasons. underground stormwater storage pipes and reservoirs are constructed under roads. Treated sewage effluent discharged to rivers is quite important for augmenting river environmental flows and thus for maintaining the ecology and scenic environment of rivers. and (3) farmland improvement materials after dehydration of sludge. In some flood-prone areas.3).4 percent). Treated wastewater recycling The direct recycling rate of sewage effluent is very low (approximately 1. diameters. This online data is useful in coordinating with other underground utility lines and assisting contractors’ designs and scheduling Water resource management Effective coordination among institutions underpins the success of Japan’s water resource management. Some Japanese regions are faced with water scarcity due to high population density. For example. Japan had 23 combined wastewater/stormwater systems and 1. Electronic sewer registration database Some advanced utilities have established computerized asset management systems. and types. which is equivalent to that of Egypt. The operations of treatment plants and pumping stations are based on information from rainfall radar and telemetry water-monitoring systems. Combined systems sometimes allow untreated wastewater to be discharged to public water bodies during flood periods. Dams thus have played an increasing role in ensuring Japan’s water supply. people used to call the city the “Tokyo Desert. depths. is only 905 m3 per year per capita. the renewable water resource of the Kanto area. Tokyo faced chronic water shortages and had to cut approximately 45 percent of water supply to up to nearly 1 million households. They therefore need to be upgraded to reduce heavy pollution loads from the first flush of flood water by building flood-storage facilities. which includes the Tokyo metropolitan area.897. In 2005 the number of dams with a height of more than 15 meters was 2.873 separate systems. By March 2005.154 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS between sewerage utilities and river administrators to ensure the proper operation of drainage pumps and other flood control facilities. of a total of 1.896 systems. of which 627 were dams whose . because of steep terrain/river bed slope and a high fluctuation of rainfall among different seasons. Tokyo Sewerage Utility has developed an electronic sewer mapping system at 1/500 scale indicating all sewer locations. Despite the country’s high rainfall. During the scarcity. water resource management is an important challenge in Japan. Citizens can access the same information on the utilities’ websites.” Moreover. The share of water resources from dams increased from 19 percent in 1970 to 45 percent in 2005. All users can access this information on the Internet. river flows and water resources are difficult to regulate and manage without storage dams in the upstream reaches of rivers. In the early 1960s. In 1973 the Dam Reservoir Resettlement Area Special Measures Act was enacted to provide stronger financial and technical support for the residents in upper watersheds who were to be relocated due to dam reservoir inundation. Kyoto/Osaka. From the evidence presented. The former law stipulates the procedure for the execution of multipurpose dam projects. Nagoya. respectively. The river administrators also are responsible for issuing permits for the installment/construction of any hydraulic structures and land use in rivers. a strong work ethic. irrigation water supply. Comprehensive water resources development The Specified Multipurpose Dams Law and Water Resources Development Promotion Law were legislated in 1957 and 1961. to develop basin management plans for all rivers. and hydropower generation. The River Law covers (1) flood control. River Management: Water Rights and Discharge Permits The River Bureau of the Ministry of Land. It was amended in 1964 to fully address water use and allocation. Conclusions and Lessons Japan has achieved the highest standards of water and sanitation service through a combination of sound institutional regulations. In 1962 it also established the Public Water Resources Development Corporation to execute major multipurpose dam projects in the designated basins. The River Law designates the ministry’s regional river bureaus and river management offices as “river administrators. . and the use of technology. the 6 The River Law was enacted in 1896 with an emphasis on flood control. and Fukuoka. and (3) water environment. through the council meetings and public hearings. The latter law requires the preparation of comprehensive water resources development master plans for 5 (then 6) major basins. including cost allocation among participating parties.Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience 155 functions included storing water for drinking. and again in 1997 to address the environmental aspects of rivers.”6 The law requires them to issue water rights and discharge permits based on the current and future water balance of river basins. The 1997 amendment requires river administrators to establish multistakeholder river councils and. Other dams were used for flood control. (2) water use. Infrastructure and Transportation plays a pivotal role in water resource management. including Tokyo. 156 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS reader can observe that the performance of Japan’s utilities benchmark with the best in the world. notably. 4. Use of standard technical and financial indicators of utility performance that creates “peer pressure” among utilities to improve their performance. local governments. these lessons are: 1. Nevertheless. maintaining excellent links between the service provision aspect and the resource management aspect through an integrated planning process that fully respects the ABCDE principles described in the Introduction to this volume. Clarity in roles and responsibilities. the homogeneous nature of Japanese society. 2. several lessons could be relevant to MNA in the sense that water supply and sanitation policies have combined sound principles of public finance with local political and cultural institutions. the availability of adequate public financing in this second-largest economy in the world. . 5. 3. To summarize. Clear distinction between the public good and private good aspect. which leads to a very high degree of external and internal accountability (chapter 2 of this volume). Last but not least. Does Japan’s experience provide any lessons for the MNA region’s utilities? There are clearly many factors that are different. Completely nonideological use of public-private partnerships through outsourcing contracts. so that the financing burden is shared among the national government. and a unique work ethic. and users. The latter led to a third stage. This chapter highlights Tunisia’s progress in managing water. and plagues of locusts. and managing resources. which continues physical investment but increases the emphasis on water management (and therefore could be characterized as “institutional engineering”). and food had become so scarce that people had resorted to cannibalism (Talbit 1985. showing the evolution from traditional practices to large government-led investments to store and transfer water (which could be characterized as “physical engineering”). 112). A series of severe droughts in the area that is now Tunisia lasted for approximately a decade from 870 CE. In addition to its long history of earthquakes. The country engages in extensive political debate and strategizing. and its availability is also highly variable. They are hard to predict as they do not follow any clear cyclical pattern. hailstorms. They were not always successful. Over the centuries. For more than a century (1640–1758). the successive civilizations who have lived in Tunisia have developed management systems to cope with the risks of floods and droughts. whereas in modern times. the local administrator wrote that prices of wheat had increased steeply. and the government has invested heavily in measuring. Tunisia has always suffered from droughts and floods. Tunisia had no droughts.9 Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management Mohamed El Hedi Louati and Julia Bucknall Introduction Water is scarce. Managing this scarce and variable water supply is critical for Tunisia’s development. beginning around the turn of the millennium. mobilizing. Many aspects of Tunisia’s experience could be 157 . it has had approximately 30. By the end of these droughts. have been a salient feature of Tunisia’s long history from the Roman aqueduct at Zaghouan (built in 72 AD) to the modern-day Mejerda-Cap Bon Canal (1982). whose distribution networks go all the way to Sfax. Agriculture is the largest water user and is located throughout the country except in the southern desert.1 illustrates the geographic distribution of different categories of water in Tunisia. 11 percent in the center. Table 9. water resources are distributed unequally. is less than 500 m3 per inhabitant per year. Availability of Water Resources Tunisia is one of the countries in the Mediterranean basin least wellendowed with water resources. 4. The potential volume of available water. This ratio will decline to 360 m3 by 2030. However. Maintaining a regional balance has been and will remain an essential element in Tunisia’s water supply planning and management. but. where cities. It uses dams and groundwater reserves to store surplus water in wet years and uses these stocks in dry years. Eighty-one percent of the country’s resources are in the north. industry. this chapter suggests that Tunisia is an example of good planning and management. It also must distribute the water between different parts of the country. Table 9. Tunisia balances surface and groundwater stocks and flows within and between years.1 Spatial Distribution of Water Resources in Tunisia (Mm3/yr) Far North Supply of surface water (Mm /yr) 3 North 1230 395 269 2854 59 Center 320 216 326 862 18 South 190 108 822 1120 23 Country total 2700 719 1417 4836 100 960 Groundwater (Mm3/yr) Deep groundwater (Mm /yr) 3 Total potential resource (Mm3/yr) % Source: DGRE 1995. on the whole. On a national scale. and only 8 percent in the south. when the population will have grown to approximately 13 million. The population is concentrated along the coasts. therefore. Water transfers. . the country’s water supplies come mainly from the north and the interior of the country. and tourism are well developed.158 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS improved.836 Mm3 per year. To manage variable supplies. In the North. including agreeing the annual volume available in the relevant basins and how to distribute it between the two countries. and the minimum was 780 Mm3 in 1993–94. the Mejerda. Tunisia’s water policy aims to contribute to sustainable socioeconomic development while balancing two conflicting facts: 1. Limited water supplies and increasing cost to generate or store and transfer additional resources 2. Variability is high everywhere but much higher in the South. Three countries have established a commission to monitor this aquifer and have agreed to cooperate on its management to Photo: Julia Bucknall. Libya.1). 180 times more water was available in the wettest year than in the driest. In addition. located in the Figure 9. Tunisia uses water from this aquifer to irrigate greenhouse vegetables and dates (figure 9.1 Cooling Tower Bringing Geothermal Water from the Djeffara coastal basin shared Sahara Down to a Temperature Usable in Irrigation between Libya and Tunisia and. This is 1 of only 2 such agreements in the world. The two countries have reached agreements on how to mobilize and use this water. most importantly. and Tunisia. minimize cross-border impacts. The variability in water availability between years is huge. in the Northwest Saharan Aquifer System. of which some 80. The latter has more than one Mkm3 of water with very limited recharge. During the past few decades.000 km3 are in Tunisia. which enables both countries to track pollution as well as water volumes for the main international river. shared between Algeria.Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management 159 Tunisia shares international surface water in the form of some rivers along the western border with Algeria. These countries also have established a monitoring system. . In the South. Growing demand for water. the maximum potential volume of surface water was 11 billion m3 in 1969–70. the country has a considerable volume of international groundwater. the wettest year was nine times wetter than the driest year. 333 433 1999 2100 720 1377 4197 9.2 Tunisia: Estimates of Potential Water Supplies. the calculation of water available refers to the maximum volume of water that can be extracted annually from the country’s groundwater resources under prevailing technical and economic conditions without leading to the long-term exhaustion of the underground resource base. For surface water resources. the estimates of the amount of water potentially available in Tunisia grew substantially between 1968 and 2007 (table 9. Table 9.2).93 428 2005 2200 745 1420 4365 10. 1968–2007 (Mm3/yr) 1968 Surface water Groundwater Deep groundwater Total Sources: DGRE-MARH. the infrastructure available in recent decades has enabled Tunisia to store and transfer water. 1995–2005 (Mm3/yr) 1995 Surface water (Mm3/yr) Groundwater (Mm3/yr) Deep groundwater (Mm /yr) 3 1996 2100 720 1217 4037 9. Of this water with reasonable salinity . However. Table 9. estimated water availability per capita is declining (table 9.03 435 2100 720 1211 4031 8. Less than half of the country’s resources have less than 1.5 g/l of salt and therefore meet health and agronomic standards.65 439 2002 2100 737 1403 4240 9. the calculation takes into account resources available for annual extraction in 95 percent of years.089 444 1997 2100 720 1217 4037 9. As monitoring has improved. and particularly as hydrogeologists have discovered larger volumes of groundwater available.456 444 2000 2100 737 1399 4236 9. For groundwater. thus reducing the impacts of both flood and drought. 1972 2000 230 900 3130 1980 2580 490 1030 4100 1985 2630 590 1100 4320 1990 2700 670 1170 4540 1996 2700 720 1250 4670 2000 2700 737 1399 4836 2005 2700 745 1419 4864 2007 2700 745 1419 4864 2000 160 600 2760 Despite the increase in known resources.563 443 2001 2100 737 1403 4240 9.) Availability by inhabitant (m3/inhabitant/year ) Source: INS and MARH.957 450 Total resources (Mm3/yr) Population (mil.215 438 1998 2100 720 1225 4045 9.75 435 2003 2100 737 1397 4234 9.3).160 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS This highly irregular supply affects the country in the form of floods and shortages of varying seriousness.3 Tunisia: Change in Estimated Per Capita Long-term Water Availability. Tunisia has water quality problems in addition.84 430 2004 2100 737 1411 4248 9. .5). These changes will have serious consequences for water resources. Thematic strategies 1 MInistry of Agriculture and Water Resources 2006. 1. the job will only get harder in the future. 20 percent deep groundwater.4 and 9. and strong winds) will increase in both frequency and intensity. and agriculture. 72 percent is surface water. Tunisia’s water resource management policy has been based on mobilizing water resources. Studies show that Tunisia can expect an increase in average annual temperature (2 degrees C on average). Table 9.Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management 161 levels.5g/l Surface water Groundwater Deep groundwater Total Source: Mamou 1993. Surface water thus is used both for direct consumption and to improve the quality of other categories of water.4 Breakdown of Salinity of Water Resources (%) Salinity<1.5 Breakdown of Water Resources Regarding Salinity in Relation to Total Potential Resources (Mm3) Salinity<1. and therefore for the entire economy and society. extreme phenomena (droughts.5<Salinity>3g/l 594 230 808 1632 34 Salinity>3g/l 162 431 326 919 19 Total 2700 719 1417 4836 100 1944 58 283 2285 47 As difficult as it is to manage Tunisia’s water resources now.5g/l Surface water Groundwater Deep groundwater Total % Source: Mamou 1993. ecosystems. for urban dwellers. with very dry years likely to occur more often. and increased variability. Investments to Store and Transfer Water in Tunisia For the past three decades.1 In particular. a modest fall in average precipitation (approximately 5 percent by 2030). and scarcely 8 percent groundwater (tables 9.5<Salinity>3g/l 22 32 57 34 Salinity>3g/l 6 60 23 19 Total 100 100 100 100 72 8 20 47 Table 9. 1. floods. It compares available resources with expected needs under various planning scenarios including estimates of when different major infrastructure investments will begin operation. This study.O. and the reuse of treated wastewater for agricultural purposes. based on dynamic stochastic programming. All the country’s water resources (conventional and nonconventional) were identified at both the regional and national levels. Thus. urban sanitation.) The idea of developing integrated water information systems was first proposed in a study that the government had developed over 1990–95. The MARH’s model consists of a number of separate information systems: The first is the Optimal Water Resource Management model (known by its French acronym. The models calculated fluctuations in both resources and consumption at varying scales and using various assumptions.E. analyzed.E. G.R. it enabled a review of the water management system under diverse planning scenarios and over different geographic areas. rural and urban drinking water. and perverse effects of reality. For the first time in this type of study in Tunisia. The GIS was connected to numerical databases and simulation and optimization models. Based on these results . By combining the relational database with the GIS assessments of the supply/demand balance. enabled the assessment of the performance of the existing and projected future water system. the performance of modern technology. The tools used to create the simulations are constantly updated and enhanced to account for variables related to demand levels. It collected. relational databases covering resources and supply were established. The optimization models. “Water Economy 2000.162 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS have been drawn up for agricultural water. models were drawn up to determine the likely instances of over. then 2030). both qualitative and quantitative. This model simulates all foreseeable demands to enable the government to ensure that needs are met and to plan infrastructure needs well in advance. In this way.” was intended to enable the country to respond to water demand on a national level over the coming decades (first to 2010. a geographic information system (GIS) was used to identify where water resources were located and used.and undersupply going forward in time and on a regional basis. The Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MARH) has developed a model to help operate the country’s water systems and manage the risks associated with both droughts and floods. and synthesized a wealth of data and information pertaining to water resources and requirements. The maps have the following objectives: To ascertain in a reliable and dynamic manner the status of a particular location regarding natural resources (land. The third information system is the National Water Information System. development potential. measures were defined that would enable identified shortfalls to be made up or reduced and their economic costs and environmental impacts to be evaluated. They give an overview of the agricultural area of each governorate. The agricultural database was compiled into a GIS. its resources. production prices. such as cost of entry. one on water pollution. The specified measures were organized by timing and location in the form of a set of alternative strategies from which a national water management strategy could be derived. known by its French acronym as SINEAU.Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management 163 and on statistical analysis. It combines three different water information systems: one on ground and surface water. strengths. and one on soil quality. water. The second information system is the agricultural map of the country. From there. Decisions regarding the type and size of these storage and transfer facilities and the manner of their use were guided by a number of key constraints: . and harvesting facilities for agricultural products) To ascertain the land allocation status To identify the gap between current and optimal land use by comparing the land use map with the agro-economic potential map To simulate and spatially visualize decisionmaking scenarios based on the modification of specific parameters. Over the past three decades. and weaknesses. transport). yields. This infrastructure network had two purposes: to respond to different usage priorities and to enable flexible management. and incentives. basic infrastructure (water. a critical load scenario was developed to serve as the basis for determining future measures to be taken. It is being completed and is expected to be publicly available. Tunisia has developed significant water infrastructure aimed at meeting its ever-increasing demand. forests). completed in 2004. This map is in fact a series of regional maps. and economics (processing. The SINEAU links these three using a horizontal system of reference and unified spatial references. It will establish standards for describing data and sharing it with different stakeholders as well as a system for managing and referencing the relevant data. comprising close to 50 layers of geographic data. refining. and to improve water quality through dilution. the infrastructure was planned using three guiding principles: 1. This constraint led decisionmakers to deploy different types of facilities (multiple-arch concrete dams. Creating interconnected dams situated in the same catchment areas so that the system can capture any overflows of the dams in wet years 3. single-arch dams. From a hydrological point of view. Hydrological analysis. the outcrops have influenced decisions regarding the height of the dam and.164 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Geological nature of the landscape. To ensure that water quantity is available in the place and at the time required. several Triassic outcrops are largely responsible for the water’s increased salinity. Most water consumption is far from the source of supply. Allowing water to be transferred from dams in one catchment to dams in another both to balance stock levels in periods of regional drought and to improve water quality in particular reservoirs. Hydrological analysis of the country’s different catchment areas shows a high level of heterogeneity from the point of view of both water quality and regularity of natural supply. making transfer systems inevitable. (Sidi Salem is a case in point. the initial design of the detailed Northern Water Plan was based on 34 years of monthly supply observations. In the Mejerda Basin (the largest basin in northern Tunisia). The average supply figure served as a reference point for deciding the size of the facilities. Thus. After these water facilities had been in operation for a number of years. gravity dams. several complementary steps presented themselves as potentially useful for improving the system’s performance: . Allowing inter-annual storage to enable supplies to be regularized from year to year. These outcrops exist exactly on the sites chosen for the dams (which have the best topographical features). the volume of water held behind it. buttressed dams.) Location of demand. compressed rolled concrete dams). taking into account the historical frequency of drought (including repeated droughts) 2. Lithology of the landscape through which the water flows naturally guided the design of certain facilities and the way in which they are managed. as a result. for a total of 27 interconnected dams. Dams that serve more than one area are shown in table 9. . Table 9. Tables 9.6. and 9. whereas shared demand is supplied by more than one reservoir. of areas served BouBen Sidi El Sidi heurtma Metir Joumine Kasseb Lakhmess Mellegue Rmil Barrak Sejnane Siliana Salem Zerga Zouitina 5 3 7 1 1 3 1 2 6 1 18 1 2 Source: Louati 2005. Extend the geographic range of the transfer systems. The water supply from these 11 dams was taken into account when the earlier dams were designed.6 Tunisia’s Reservoirs and Number of Areas Served Dam No. Create local water subsystems. Currently. Their configuration is based on the fact that water demand can be divided into two basic demand categories. This extension was a key component of the second phase of the national water usage strategy.8 give details of the reservoirs and the areas that use the water from them as well as of the transfer schemes. In the system. 11 other sites for medium-sized dams were identified and earmarked for construction in the medium term.7. 225 such units are in place. To take advantage of the years of excess rainfall. These facilities will fill up primarily during rainy years.6. providing approximately 200 Mm3 of water. These facilities lengthen the active life of the major water facilities and enable the creation of smaller local development centers. It enabled the establishment of an integrated WRM structure (covering the use of both surface and groundwater resources). as part of a national strategy of water mobilization via hillside dams (structures fewer than 10 meters high with a storage capacity of fewer than 5 Mm3).” Local demand sources its water from one specific reservoir. The hydraulic system for surface water in Tunisia was conceived essentially for the northern part of the country. 9. depending on the number and type of reservoirs that supply it: “local” or “shared. Raise the height of specific existing facilities to increase their storage capacity and to offset the effects of silting. and an additional 14 should be online by 2015.Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management 165 Minimize the effect of cyclical droughts. These medium-sized structures also will safeguard the large dams from excessive silting. 13 linked dams already are in place. 5–2.1 m3/s 1.935–1.35 m3/s 0.5 m3/s 0.3 m3/s (1st file) 3.350 1600–1250 mm 600–400 mm 1000–300 mm 1100 mm 1400–600 mm .7 Tunisia’s Reservoirs that Serve Multiple Uses Sejnane Ben Arous and Nabeul (irrigation) Bizerte (drinking water) AG02 Grand Tunis (drinking water) Cap Bon (drinking water) Sahel and Sfax (drinking water) Source: Louati 2005.8 km 126 km 1.5–0.166 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 9.73 m3/s 0.1–09 m3/s 1.335 m3/s 1.8 Tunisia’s Main Water Transfer Systems and Their Characteristics Name of structure Pipelines from Sidi El Barrak-Sejnane Pipelines from Sejnane to Taref station Pipelines from Taref station to Sidi M’barek Piplelines M’barek-Bejaoua Mejerda Cap Bon canal Ben Metir pipeline Kasseb pipeline Belly-Sahel pipeline: Belly-Sousse Sousse-Sfax Jilma-Sfax pipeline Sbeitla-Sfax pipeline Pipelines from Kairouanais Sidi Saad dam El Haoureb dam El Houareb S.3 m3/s 3 Diameter (mm) 1800 mm 1800 mm 1800 mm 1800 mm 1250 mm 1190–1250 mm 1400–1200 mm 1600 mm 1400–1000 mm 1100–600 mm 600–325 mm 18 km right bank 10 km left bank 12 km 24.3–1.6 m /s per line 12 m3/s 12 m3/s 12 m3/s 16–8.0 m3/s 1.6 m3/s (2nd file) 1. Length (km) 18 km over 2 lines 13 km over 2 lines 23 km over 3 lines 47 km over 3 lines 120 Km 135 km 121 km 96 km (2 files) 118 km 151 km 148 km Flow (m3/s) 4–4.0 m3/s 2.Saad (projected) Nebhana pipeline Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources 2000.1–0.8 m3/s 1. Joumine X X Ben Metir Mellegue Bouheurtma Kasseb Sidi Salem X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Table 9. in one case.2 Growth in Treated Wastewater Used in Agriculture. Tunisia. Experience indicates difficulties ensuring cost-recovery for wastewater reuse. Desalination began in Projects 8000 8000 23 1983 in Tunisia. Approximately 30 percent of it is reused in agriculture supplying approximately 7.6 3. desalination of salt and brackish water. 2000 Projects Private operators have an ad0 ditional capacity of 44. SONEDE. 1983–2000 Station Kerkenah Gabes Zarzis Jerba Total Source: SONEDE. Almost all of Tunisia’s 194 Mm3 per year urban wastewater generated is treated to adequate standards (ONAS 2004). although with some capacity in industrial Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 1990–2001 (ha) Tunisia has experience with de12000 12000 salination of brackish and saline 10000 10000 32 10000 water. The national 7450 7450 8000 6630 Projects 6630 12000 6000 6000 agency responsible for drinking 6000 22 Projects 17 water. The country plans to invest in significantly increasing that share over the next decade (figure 9. Its experience in reuse of treated wastewater. endowed with energy resources. has capacity 4000 12 Projects 10 Projects of 58.800 m3 per day (table 9. MARH 2004.9). Capacity (m3/day) 3300 25500 15000 15000 58800 Year operation started 1983 1995 1999 2000 Technology Reverse osmosis Reverse osmosis Reverse osmosis Reverse osmosis Feed water salinity (g/l) 3.9 Desalination Capacity in Tunisia. Tunisia has been formally reusing treated wastewater in agriculture and now has one of the world’s highest rates of reuse. mostly for tourism.2 6.2 3. Hectares Table 9.0 Number of membranes 144 1188 1188 756 2844 . Since the 1970s. following strict sanitary standards. Tunisia has a long experience of generating nonconventional water and of innovative investments. At present. In addition. to ensure flows to an ecologically important wetland. and artificial recharge of aquifers is instructive and indicates a concern for integrated management of the water cycle. the service is subsidized.000 ha of fruit trees and fodder.2). Tunisia uses treated wastewater for environmental purposes.000 m3/ 1990 2000 2004 2006 2009 2011 Years day. Despite being a country not Figure 9.Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management 167 To supplement its scarce natural supplies. In addition. Mm3 3 Use of Water Resources The irrigation sector consumes close to 80 percent of Tunisia’s extracted water. One trial scheme Source: Louati 2008. Of this.168 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS enterprises and high-value agriculture. and soil and water conservation investments in upper watersheds. the authorities have been able to use reverse osmosis technology to convert brackish groundwater into drinking water. by 2010. Demand should stabilize at 2. in some cases 40 55 30 40 43 including recharge with treated 13 19 35 23 30 wastewater. 400. the country has long experience of artificial groundwater recharge. . 80 and direct injection to increase 60 60 67 aquifer recharge.3).3 Growth in Volumes and Schemes for Artificial vestment had a major impact Aquifer Recharge in Tunisia on aquifer recharge (figure 9. Tunisia has proj80 ects using quarries. It plans to increase public sector installed capacity to 50 Mm3 day by 2030. The government’s strategy aims to serve these lands with water. The government plans to increase the volumes of artificial aquifer recharge to more than 200 Mm3 per year in 2030 through small dams. check dams. The government subsidizes the private sector to invest in desalination and considers this technology a key part of the long-term water management strategy for the country. Tunisia has approximately 420. In the South.000 ha of land that could be irrigated through both public and private schemes. In addition to helping manage surface water f lows. assuming that water is available. old wells. The sector now uses approximately 2 billion m3 per year.1 billion m3 by 2010. these schemes 9 0 1992 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 2011 usually are toward the mouth of Capacity in Mm Number of projects the aquifers. these two types of inFigure 9. To avoid potential 28 20 contamination.000 ha are actually irrigated. This is a way of storing surplus water from one season for use during dry periods. 100 Furthermore. The program of construction of small dams described above also included spate irrigation infrastructure to channel flood water. uses treated wastewater at the mouth of the aquifer to protect against saline intrusion. 200 m3/ha in 1990 to approximately 5. while exploitation of deep groundwater is increasing slowly. Table 9. with the introduction of conservation measures in irrigated areas. rising from 2. withdrawals are becoming unsustainable. Since the end of the 1980s. economic. and legislative framework has been set up to maximize the country’s irrigation potential as efficiently as possible. overall usage rates of surface water have been low. In the last decade. In 1995 Tunisia’s water administration adopted a National Program of Irrigation Water Conservation (PNEEI). A technical. there is potential for more or better use of surface water. the country needs to find a way to improve the value-added from the water allocated to the agricultural sector. organizational.161 Mm3 to 2. Thus.638 Mm3 in 2006—an increase of approximately 26 percent over 15 years (table 9. 2007b.500 m3/ha in 2005.10 Tunisia’s Evolution of Water Consumption. The PNEEI has the following broad goals: Strengthen knowledge of appropriate technologies to ensure optimal water use Ensure that regional departments have a better grasp of techniques and methods to conserve irrigation water suited to local conditions Encourage consumers to adopt water conservation techniques . Water conservation constitutes a key component of this strategy.10). institutional. consumption per ha has begun to decline sharply. 1997–2005 (Mm3) 1997 Surface water Groundwater Deep groundwater Total Sources: DGRE 2007a. Yet. 1998 361 764 1014 2139 1999 445 771 1031 2247 2000 499 778 1078 2355 2001 248 778 1119 2145 2002 561 778 1135 2474 2003 510 778 1109 2397 2004 464 778 1127 2369 2005 688 807 1143 2638 399 757 1005 2161 The lack of good-quality water is becoming increasingly acute in the wake of unpredictable climate patterns. falling from 6. On the positive side.Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management 169 Groundwater extraction has increased continuously since 1997. Its purpose was to rationalize the use of water to ensure that the maximum economic value is derived from irrigation and to keep water demand at a sustainable level. sprinkler irrigation.000 50.000 0 1990 1996 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 Source: DGGREE-MAHR 2007.000 0 Years % Source: DGGREE-MAHR 2007.4 shows the take-up of the irrigation systems. 1990–2030 (m3/ha) 7.000 350.000 150.6 percent of the total irrigable area) 106.000 6. Figure 9. the irrigated area with qualifying conservation systems in place covered close to 310.5 Evolution of Mean Water Allocations per Irrigated Hectare.000 ha of sprinkler irrigation (26.000 2. (upgraded gravity irrigation. The program aimed to install efficient on-farm irrigation equipment on 90 percent of Tunisia’s 400.000 ha of irrigated land by 2006 and to improve irrigation efficiency to a level of at least 75 percent by the end of 2006.000 ha of drip irrigation (or 21.000 200. or 75 percent of the irrigated area. 98. The breakdown of the area under irrigation is: Figure 9.000 1. Figure 9.000 100. and drip systems) with the exact rate depending on the category of agriculture.000 300.5 shows how water allocations per ha have been changing.000 4. transfer public irrigated areas (PPI) to agricultural development groups (GDA) under appropriate operating conditions. The implementation rate has been running at 15.000 ha of upgraded gravity irrigation (25 percent).000 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1995 1998 2001 Superficie 2005 2007 2008 Area (ha) 250. Equipped area/Total area (%) . Figure 9.000 5. 1995–2008 (%) 400.4 Tunisia Irrigated Area Equipped with Efficient On-farm Irrigation Systems.000 3.000 ha.7 percent) 106.000–25. The program provides a 40 percent–60 percent subsidy for efficient on-farm irrigation equipment. As of June 2006.000 ha per year.170 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Make available to citizens the knowledge and technical support required for them to put these techniques into practice Rapidly extend the introduction of on-farm water-saving equipment. 1996–2007 (Mm3) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Production of drinking water Consumption of drinking water Specific consumption (liters consumed and billed/day/ inhabitant connected to the system) 309 230 65 317 247 68 326 258 69 337 272 71 346 285 73 373 301 75 373 297 75 394 306 75 403 315 76 420 339 78 439 340 80 453 348 82 Source: SONEDE 2008: Statistics on SONEDE’s water production since 1994. 106. 16. Irrigation water tariffs cover some O&M costs. operation of bulk infrastructure. .11 Trends in Production and Consumption of Drinking Water. investment regulation. 90. 102. Tariffs for drinking water gradually are moving to a point at which they will completely cover running and financing costs. the body tasked with producing and distributing drinking water. The implementation of the water conservation program in irrigated areas is expected to bring water consumption per hectare down to approximately 4. and 2001. databases. has set up a strategy to ensure efficient water use. Regional action plans have been put in place by the Regional Agricultural Development Commissions with a goal of covering 100 percent of the irrigated area by 2009. 15. whereas it accounted for just 3 percent in 1995. or value of the water itself. 86. and 96 relating to resources. The changes in water allocated to SONEDE are shown in table 9.11 below. Its articles 12.Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management 171 Drip irrigation accounts for close to 25 percent of the total irrigable area. Policy Measures Regulatory Measures Water sector legislation related to water conservation covers investment incentives. planning and development. plus a significant portion of equipment costs. Table 9. but not the costs of capital investment. The current coverage is approximately 87 percent. The National Authority for Water Exploitation and Distribution (SONEDE). 1988. tariff rates. and the reuse and conservation of water were modified and completed by new laws in 1987. The Water Code was promulgated in 1975.000 m3/ha by 2030. and the rationalization of the water management system. 172 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Technical Measures Initiatives to improve the efficiency of communal irrigation and drinking water networks have been set in motion. Water conservation project in small.300-ha portion of the old irrigated areas. and to install a drainage system to remove excess water and leach salts. The main results of these initiatives are: 1. 4. Its components include installing new equipment for metering and regulation.000 ha in total. This project covers 11. Water conservation program for public drinking water networks and facilities. By 2007. Modernization project in the old irrigated areas of the Lower Mejerda Valley. This thorough deployment of meters will ensure an effective mechanism for tracing leaks.000 ha.and medium-sized water-consuming areas in central Tunisia. which cover 27. . As of 2007. project aims to modernize a 4. tracing leaks. promote on-farm water-saving equipment. this. Underway. 96. Measuring the volume of water produced and distributed plays a key role in water management. and regulating pressure in the system.000 ha of irrigated land at a cost of 24 Mdinars. 2. renovating old meters and connections. Project to improve irrigated areas in the southern oases. and transfer the management of these operations to farmer groups (known by their French acronym as GICs).6 percent of supply systems (gravity and reverse-flow) had been fitted. Metering policy is centered on three key initiatives: 1. covering 23. 3. It aims to restore and modernize public networks. Replacing jammed meters to reduce or eliminate the need to issue pro-rata bills. Project aims to make the distribution system more watertight by constructing concrete canals or laying underground PVC piping. all of the reservoirs producing drinking water were equipped with either meters or other means of measuring outflows. The government’s strategy is to equip every water system with an appropriate means of measurement and to divide networks into sections through the installation of local metering systems. then replacing unclassified meters. The government intends to equip all drinking water supply systems with appropriate regulation equipment. 12 Number of Water Supply Meters Replaced or Improved. Rehabilitating worn-out connections and networks by replacing pipes and fittings to reduce leaks. associations were created to develop the southern Tunisian oases. Leak detection uses either correlation or the acoustic method.267 16. Among these associations were the irrigation syndicates created between 1901 and 1906 to use the water of the wadis in central Tunisia. some 8.349 578 2007 51.727 1.000 in total) and scheduled their replacement within 10 years. Table 9. when user-owner associations were created. Examples are the irrigation syndicate at the Sbiba Wadi. and pilot lines. and 2.419 2005 37. radios) to avoid wasting water through overflows and leaks. Resizing meters to bring them up to the necessary capacity.011 leaks or broken pipes were detected—equivalent to 1 leak or breakage every 3. maintain.586 40.Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management 173 2. Part of this detection work is done in-house. Regulation at the water system level consists of equipping drinking water supply systems (gravitational or reversed-flow) with appropriate means of regulation (cut-off valves. Between 1912 and 1919.671 2006 34. part is subcontracted. In 1998 SONEDE began inventorying these connections (329.300 km of the distribution network were inspected. . construct.3 km. altimetric water gates. which were created in 1906. Table 9. Their function was to develop public water resources. During 2007.232 1. In 1987 these associations were converted into communal interest groups. 3. and the irrigation syndicates at the Zroud and Marguellil Wadis. 2004–2007 (m) Year Number of jammed meters repaired or replaced Number of worn-out meters replaced Number of meters resized 2004 41. ballcocks. The proportion of water consumers served by worn-out connections fell from 24 percent in 1998 to 6 percent in 2007.082 9.611 316 Institutional Measures Tunisia’s experience of self-managed communal water systems goes back to the early 1900s.12 shows the scale of investments in improving leak detection and metering for drinking water. and use public water works. created in 1901.134 71. Performance Indicators Indicators have been adopted to evaluate water resource mobilization and management programs. Regional committees to assess and ensure the implementation of the water conservation program were set up in March 1992 at the regional administrative level (Regional Offices for Agriculture Development. In 1988 the GIC program was extended to large dam irrigation systems on public land. 75. a technical assistance project for the GDAs in areas irrigated by boreholes was implemented. By the end of 2005. In 2001 the PISEAU (Water Sector Investment Project) began to transfer the management of irrigation land to farmer groups (whose name had changed to agricultural development groups.000 ha). In 1987 the management of all drinking water supply systems and borehole irrigation on public land was transferred to the GICs. and develop drinking water supply systems. This 7-year project (1999–2006) involved approximately 60 GDAs and cost roughly 1 million.174 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS irrigate and decontaminate farmland. It covered approximately 800 drinking water GICs in 8 governorates.000 ha irrigated by large dams to GDAs and to reinforce GDAs’ capacity where they were already in place (16. known by their French acronym as GDAs). The second initiative (2006–10) aims to boost the technical capacity of 160 drinking water GICs located in an additional 17 governorates. Two additional TA projects were put in place to strengthen the technical capacity of the regional departments and GDAs involved in the supply of drinking water. The first to be launched began in 1997 and ended in 2008. The purpose was to ensure that areas irrigated by boreholes and large dams were under the same management arrangements.000 ha of public land serviced by large dams were under GIC management. . again to encourage water conservation in Tunisia’s small and medium-sized irrigated areas. Separately. The inauguration of the committees coincided with the launch of a program of training and promotion of water conservation in the irrigation sector. The project financed 10 technical assistance initiatives in 8 governorates to transfer management of 31. known by their French acronyms as CRDAs). Regional strategies and a water conservation assessment and implementation system at a national level have been in place since 1993. This indicator is defined for any specific year as the ratio between the volume of regularized flows in that year and the average annual irregular water flow.221 58.221 59.682 1. Table 9.292 53.90 2003 2.76 2004 2.408 2002 1.100 1.647 1. 1997–2004 1997 Withdrawals of renewable underground water (Mm3) Withdrawals of surface water (Mm3) Available renewable underground resources (Mm3) Available surface resources (Mm3) Index of total exploitation of renewable resources (%) 1.117 361 1.Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management 175 Table 9.498 1.342 1.300 66.098 399 1.00 1.342 1.228 58.660 1.52 2002 2. renewable natural water include losses incurred when the water is transported.100 1.63 1.652 1. natural freshwater resources (table 9.100 1.601 76. Annual withdrawals of conventional.316 61. 1997–2006 (Mm3) 1997 Average annual irregular flows (Mm3) Regularizable irregular flows (Mm3) Regularized irregular flows (Mm3) Regulation index (%) 2.05 1998 2. The development of water resources is evaluated according to an index that measures the ratio between annual withdrawals of water and conventional.292 61.273 1998 1.587 75.430 2004 1.100 1.84 1.647 1.465 69.228 58.14 Evolution of Rate of Exploitation of Water Resources in Tunisia.030 49.465 59. .43 2005 2.13 Evolution of Effectiveness of Dams at Regulating Irregular Flows.408 2003 1.24 2006 2.316 62.230 561 1.14 2000 2.300 61.342 1.521 72.14 1.030 65.100 1. For deep groundwater. The effectiveness of dams in regulating flow is measured by a Regulation Index (table 9.432 2000 1.13).423 2001 1.207 510 1.45 1.100 1.521 55.100 1.48 1999 2.31 1.216 464 1.100 1. renewable.57 Source: Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development 2007.100 1.100 1.137 445 1.14).184 499 1. exploitation also is on the increase. and is at approximately 80 percent.67 2001 2.647 1.206 248 1.65 Sources: National Statistics Institute and Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources.647 1. The rate of groundwater exploitation is consistently above 100 percent.85 1.284 1999 1. 15 tracks the evolution of average yields for drinking water systems between 1997 and 2007.65 2002 297.7 77.597 5.176 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS The system for evaluating and monitoring water conservation.9186 5. along with a land survey carried out in 2001.95 357.9 6.6 0. the evaluation shows that an extremely dynamic response from stakeholders led to a significant increase in the area of land equipped with water conservation systems. Conservation .9 0.25 380. To gauge the efficiency of transfer networks.9 321.59 463.785 2006 340.3 percent in 2007.15 Evolution of Average Yields for Drinking Water Systems in Tunisia. has enabled a mid-term assessment of the National Water Conservation Program.0 78.486 1.7 percent in 2006) and a 0. compared to 92. The overall network yield slipped from 78.4 81.4 percent in 2007 vs.9196 329. Table 9.0 80.01 400.2 77.1 2.026 5.537 2003 305. calculated as the ratio of consumed volume.5 2.7 80.3 1. databases.4 1.3 1997 246.8 1. Promotional campaigns using a variety of means of communication have contributed greatly to water conservation in irrigation.5.78 78.3 427.3 Source: SONEDE 2008: Statistics on SONEDE’s water production since 1994. 1997–2007 (Mm3) Designation Volume consumed Service plant volume (VSS) Conveyance plant volume (VSA) Volume of briny water (VSM) Plant entry volume (VES) Overall network yield (Rg) (%) 1.13 380. The results confirmed that the program was both effective and economically viable in the agricultural sector. Table 9.7 81.5-point drop in yields from conveyance (92.324 3.058 5.328 5.67 342.492 0.1 1.9 1.2 percent in 2006 to 77. In particular.705 2000 285.8 1998 256.561 5.169 1999 271.6-point drop in yields from distribution networks (83. In 2007 this yield figure reached 99.7 0. Conclusions and Recommendations The unavoidable reality facing Tunisia is the necessity to conserve and derive maximum benefit from its limited water resources.3 78.08 5.665 2001 301. the transfer network yield is calculated.2 percent in 2007 and 92.2 for the conveyance networks and 83.4 for distribution networks. 84 percent in 2006). plant volume.1 3. This fall resulted from a 0.0 78.52 410.6 2007 348.142 2004 313.1 447.03 78.062 2005 327.3 1. and briny water volume to plant entry volume. particularly in the relationship with private water users. Population and the Environment in the 21st Century. “Analysis of Strategies and Prospects for Water in Tunisia. and user groups. . ____. www. It is important that regulatory texts reflect this trend toward greater participation by the beneficiaries/stakeholders. all levels of the administration have made great efforts to help local organizations (GICs/GDAs) to take control of operating and maintaining their water distribution facilities. In this regard. serious thought needs to be given to the ways in which these water users can be brought in to participate in defining Tunisia’s water management policy and strategy.Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management 177 will be far more productive than looking for ways to secure new reserves. Thus. 2000. “Vision of the Mediterranean Regarding Water. Tunisia must expect a future of water shortages exacerbated by more frequent droughts and climate change. New mechanisms need to be created to institutionalize the participation of different users at key stages of planning and operation.org/publications. which consumes almost 80 percent of Tunisia’s available water resources. Studies of Tunisia’s water management system often highlight gaps or weak points in the system. which holds the resources and guarantees their continuity.org/publications. Increasing users’ participation in the water management system should enable projects to be planned and managed based on genuine knowledge of the needs and constraints of both parties—the state.planbleu. The political trend is toward participatory management. www.” Sophia-Antipolis/Marseille. The substantial future savings that are needed will have to come from the major water-using sectors. especially agriculture. The rationale for creating new irrigated areas should be examined in light of future water demands. who are responsible for the viability and sustainability of their own activities.planbleu. water planning and implementation will see improved performance. Implementing a demand-based water management strategy will strengthen the case for a realignment of water sector institutions.” Sophia-Antipolis/Marseille. Water supply management therefore must improve the operation of water infrastructure and harness technology to make optimal use of existing resources. 2002. References Blue Plan (Plan Bleu)-UNEP. With increased involvement of users. 2006.H. German Development Institute. “Mediterranean. Rome. ____.” Directory of Exploitation of Deep Aquifers. Methodological documents of the 34 key indicators for the monitoring of the Mediterranean strategy for sustainable development.” Forum: Advances in the Management of Water Demand. “Financial and Economic Evaluation of the Water Conservation Program in Irrigation. Sophia-Antipolis/Marseille. 2007. 1998.” Hamdane. 2002. 2001–06. . “Optimization of Management Rules for Multiples Reservoirs Considering Risk. A. DGGREE-MARH (Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources). “Reuse of Treated Wastewater in Tunisia. ”Monitoring of Progress in the Water Sector and Promotion of Demand-Management Policies. Statistics concerning communal interest groups in the irrigation sector and drinking water in rural areas. 2005. Blue Plan.” Louati. 2007a. 2001–06.” DGREE. “National Strategy for Water Conservation in Irrigation: The Case of Tunisia. planbleu. 2030. Efficiency of Water Utilization.-UNEP. “Blue Plan. 2007b.” DGGREE/DGPRDIA-MARH (Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources).178 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS ____. 2001. ____. Louati. www.” ____.planbleu.” Blue-Mediterranean Sustainable Development Commission.org/ publications. 2001. “Long-Term Strategy for the Water Sector in Tunisia. 2001–06. National Report on Tunisia. “Directory of Exploitation of Shallow Aquifers. M. 2003.org/publications.” Sophia-Antipolis/Marseille. Report analyzing communal interest groups in irrigation. National Studies: The Case of Tunisia. Hamdane.” ____.” Water XXI. Study assessing the national water conservation program in Tunisia. www. 2008. 2005.” DGRE (Directorate General of Water Resources)-MARH (Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources). 2006. and others. ____. A. Blue Plan Perspectives on the Environment and Development. “Report on the Preparation of the Investment Project in the Water Sector.H..MARH (Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources). M. ____. “National Reports on the State of the Environment in Tunisia. 2004.” Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MARH)-GTZ.. Keser. Sahara and Sahel Observatory (OSS). Requirements and Strategy for Water Management. 2000 and 2004. Tunisia. M. 2005.” Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP).H.” Tunis. 2003. “An Integrated Approach to the Sustainable Management of Water Resources in the Mediterranean Basin: The Case of Cap Bon. Program of Priority Actions. “National Strategy for the Adaptation of Tunisia’s Agriculture and Ecosystems to Climate Change. and G. ____. Water and Forests-Thameur Chaibi.” Mamou. “Directives for an Integrated Approach to the Development. 2000. M. “Principal Outline of National Planning. 2005. 2004.oss-online. Environmental Limits 1996.” Tunis. ONAS (National Sanitation Office).” Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development-DHV.. . 2004. “Water Conservation 2000”: Resource Assessments. ____. 1998. 1998.org SONEDE (National Water Supply Authority). “Sustainable Management of Water Resources in Tunisia. Tunis. Management and Utilization of Water Resources. 2005. “Tunisian Statistical Yearbooks. ”Tunisian Research Institute for the Environment and Sustainable Development. UNEP. “Guide Plan Concerning the Implementation of Real-Time Water Resource Management: Project to Optimize Management of Water Resources.” Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development. Water Statistics in Tunisia. 2008: “Indicators for a Sustainable Development. “Annual Report on Infrastructure Indicators. “Practical Guide to Drought Management in Tunisia: Methodological Approach. 1993–2005. “Optimized System for Water Management.” National Institute of Rural Engineering. 2006.” ____. Tunisia. and others. “Updated Inventory of Sources of Water Pollution in Tunisia. Data.” Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MARH). 1999. 2000. A. “Studies on the Water Sector.” ____. 2007. Tunis. 1993.” National Institute of Statistics.” Louati. www.” ____.Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management 179 Louati.H. November 23.” Seminar in Almeria. Dar Gharb Islami Beyrout. Spain. “Analysis of Environmental Performance in Tunisia. 2003.” Zaara M. “Desalination in Tunisia: Reality and Perspectives.. “Blue Plan: 130 Indicators for Sustainable Development in the Mediterranean.180 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS ____. L’Emirat Aglabite.” Talbit. 1985. “Water Conservation Report 2007. 2004.” World Bank. 2008. M. ed. 2008: Statistics on SONEDE’s water production since 1994. ____. UNEP. 2000. . databases. One of the key challenges facing Iraqis is to develop credible and inclusive institutions that will lead to stability and sustainable economic prosperity. and key lessons for post-conflict countries In post-conflict countries. the population of Iraq enjoyed a relatively high level of water supply and sanitation services. 181 . especially water supply and sanitation (WSS). and 50 percent had on-site septic tanks. government strategy. Sanitation services covered approximately 75 percent of the urban communities. International experience in reconstruction efforts in post-conflict countries has shown that welltargeted expenditures on municipal services. The sector operated efficiently and utilized then-current technologies. are especially important to alleviate suffering and to reduce the risk of further conflict. Twenty-five percent of these communities were connected to sewerage systems. as well as social and political cohesion. In the post-conflict context. Sector Background Before the 1991 Gulf War. rehabilitating and improving basic services such as water supply and sanitation are essential for improving the living conditions of the people.Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War Iraq Sana Agha Al Nimer 10 T his chapter describes Iraq’s current water supply issues. Approximately 218 water treatment plants and approximately 1200 compact water treatment units were operating throughout the country. Water quality was satisfactory. Over 95 percent of the urban population and over 75 percent of the rural population had access to safe potable water. societies face distinctive challenges. They are immediate and urgent recovery along with the long-term objective of economic recovery. Baghdad’s three sewage treatment plants are inoperative. poorly maintained equipment. In the capital city of Baghdad. the efficiency of service delivery is low due to the deteriorating condition of the water supply and wastewater facilities and electrical power cuts of up to 16 hours per day. Wastewater collection and treatment facilities are available in only few large cities. and unhygienic practices have increased to alarming rates. In addition. One reason that operations and maintenance (O&M) are underfunded is the lack of cost recovery.1 million cubic meters (m3) per day. range from 0. The situation is exacerbated by a water loss rate of 50 percent–60 percent from leaking distribution networks and frequent pipe ruptures. leaking water and sewer networks. They discharge partially or untreated effluent into the Tigris River. Water production capacity is approximately 2.182 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Since 1991. The remaining waste from more than 20 million people is discharged directly into the environment (river system or on-site septic tanks). The level of water supply coverage is approximately 73 percent for urban areas and 43 percent in rural areas. excluding the northern region. which is far below the country’s basic demand of approximately 3. and disruptions in electricity supply. Wastewater treatment covers approximately only 8 percent of the population in the 15 governorates. A high percentage of water produced does not meet the World Health Organization’s (WHO) water quality standards. These conditions have accounted for an estimated one-quarter of recent child mortalities.4 million m3 per day. Diseases associated with poor sanitation. In addition. Water tariffs for all Iraqi governorates.0013US$/m³ . Serious environmental and health risks associated with lack of basic services. the city’s main water source. subsequent looting. recent war damage. The population depends entirely on raw water of low quality provided by private vendors. the WSS sector has experienced a steady decline. These facilities are in dire need of rehabilitation. and to other basic services such as electricity and solid waste collection. Today. water supply and sewerage systems have fallen into disrepair from years of neglect and lack of maintenance. and low technical capacity and morale are key problems of the sector. unsafe water. Newly developed areas in city suburbs are not served with any potable water. and poor disposal of sewage overburden the already stressed health system. Aging infrastructure. It is estimated that 40 percent of children who visit health centers suffer from gastrointestinal diseases due to the lack of safe drinking water. most Iraqis have limited access to WSS. contaminated water supplies. 1 Map of Iraq rately from formal accounts. The accounting makes no clear separation between operational and capital expenditures. Financial management systems are weak.1).Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War Iraq 183 to 0. Cash accounting is still used. The government’s immediate strategy is to ensure the safe provision of services. Generally. Iraq also faces the renegotiation of the allocation and distribution of the resource with its upstream states. the level of metering is low. The strategy includes: 1 Substantially lower than the costs of production in well run water utilities with full cost recovery (see Ueda and Benouahi’s description of Japanese water utilities in this volume). Lack of maintenance as well as damaged networks and infrastructure explain the NRW level of approximately 57 percent. the recorded water revenues are not the amounts billed but the revenue collected. . Government Strategy WSS is one of the key priorities of the Government of Iraq. and allocate sufficient resources for O&M. Accurate estimates are difficult. Unpaid billings are not recorded sepaFigure 10. increase coverage through rehabilitation and reconstruction. Depreciation is charged. because fewer than 10 percent of the connections are metered.1 In most governorates.0133US$/m³ per month for domestic customers. and cash-flow statements are not prepared. Syria and Turkey (figure 10. Since the majority of Iraq’s water originates outside of its international borders. Nonrevenue water (NRW) has increased due to 20 years of wars and sanctions. these negotiations add a level of complexity and urgency to the management of the sector. but the assets are not periodically re-valued in line with inflation. Donor coordination Duplication of efforts is a risk as more donors become active in Iraq. Pilot private sector involvement The private sector has not played a key role in financing large investments. However. and 181 wastewater projects. and security risks. priority projects for the investment plan were identified based on six selection criteria. They were (1) additional population served by the project. a feasible option is to pilot management contracts (in addition to ongoing service contracts for construction. The total cost for the investment program is an estimated US$30 billion. that is. and (6) economic rate of return (ERR). Capacity building MMPW has received extensive support from the World Bank and other institutions for capacity building for all aspects of its work. A significant number of projects remain unfinanced. Due to the extensive needs in the sector. pumping stations and water supply and sewerage networks Appropriate monitoring of environmental issues Development of realistic timetables for project implementation Critical review of present subsidy policies and development of a plan for the gradual increase in tariffs and elimination of cross-subsidies Public-private partnerships for water demand management. (4) capital cost per capita. some projects may be attractive to the private sector in the long term. 309 water supply. (5) project completion time. With the prevailing set of political. and maintenance). (3) environment and public health. . It identifies approximately 575 projects consisting of 85 technical assistance (TA).184 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Continued rehabilitation and construction of water supply and sewerage infrastructure Improvements to the quality of water supply services Capacity building and training of sector staff Provision of sufficient water resources for all regions in Iraq Crash maintenance programs of the existing infrastructure. operations. economic. Water Supply and Sanitation Investment Program Iraq’s Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (MMPW) has developed a Water and Sanitation Investment Program (2007–20). (2) present water deficit. 7. These lessons are summarized in a set of priority steps: 1.Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War Iraq 185 Key Lessons for Post-Conflict Countries The Iraq experience reveals valuable lessons for other post-conflict situations. In the immediate post-conflict environment. including security and oil. United Nations. 6. 2. including community and civil society structures. speed of response and thoroughness of initial assessment are essential. The joint needs assessment served as a basis for various international donors’ conferences. the United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment estimated the total needs for 2004–07 to be US$55 billion. and US$19. Donor coordination is critical to avoid duplication and maximize the impact of scarce resources. 5. Actively coordinate donors Identify urgent investments Restore water supply Identify upgrades or replacement of critical equipment Develop an implementation strategy Ensure security in work and living areas Involve the private sector at the appropriate time Follow adequate implementation and procurement procedures. Equity requires a damage assessment as well as awareness of the ethnic sensitivities of a post-conflict country. and to include them in reconciliation and reconstruction. It is important to identify all relevant stakeholders. World Bank. In October 2003.8 billion for the 14 sectors covered by the Needs Assessment. A key goal is to ensure that financing and assistance are targeted equitably throughout the country. and bilateral donors. They have financed a total of approximately US$750 million targeting 33 identified projects. the international community was quick to recognize the need for a multilateral approach to Iraq’s reconstruction and development. the World Bank and the United Nations Development Group worked closely to assess Iraq’s reconstruction needs. Donor Coordination Donors active in Iraq include USAID. 3. 8.4 billion estimated by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) for other sectors. The World Bank and the UN designed . This amount comprised US$35. 4. Following the 2003 conflict. which has been disbursed since 2003. At the request of the international community. 2–10. The World Bank Iraq Trust Fund project financing targeted a number of these areas. most Iraqi technicians have either migrated.4). are reluctant to work in the public sector. and Dhi Qar. Figure 10. can be crucial in restoring services.3 Badawa: A Polluted Urban Environment It is important to identify the local technicians and sector staff who are the best equipped to identify priority projects. Kerbala.186 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Figure 10. Muthana. To address issues more sensitively. Some areas in Iraq faced neglect from years of lack of services. Key investment projects. these staff should be briefed adequately and have sufficient understanding of local conditions. . including Sadr City in Baghdad and Badawa in Erbil (figures 10. It is important to note that not all infrastructure destroyed by conflict is suitable for restoration or is critical to the immediate needs of the population. Qadissiyah. Erbil. or perished in the conflict.2 Drainage Problems in Sadr City an International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. The Baghdad Governorate has the most projects followed by Mayoralty of Baghdad. The impact on the population was significant. As a result. the distribution of projects has been reasonably balanced throughout the country. Identification of Urgent Investments It is essential to identify areas that most urgently need assistance. External staff will also play a part in local recovery and reconstruction of infrastructure. even if small. Maysan. Unfortunately. and had high population densities. water supply comes mainly from surface water. given the long period of inadequate maintenance and failure of power supplies. Rehabilitation involves updating . In spite of the evidence.4 Badawa after Completion of Rehabilitation Works Timely Rehabilitation of Water Supply Service Water supply systems are often damaged in war. and culture of the country. poorly maintained. Therefore. Where they existed. chlorination. and lack of O&M and spare parts. sewerage systems in Iraq were less likely to have been targeted during the war. In Iraq. Cleaning sewers requires costly equipment and usually is a priority that gets addressed after clean water supplies have been restored. Rehabilitation of water supply systems offers one of the greatest levels of development impact in a post-conflict setting. Malfunctioning sewer systems are likely to pose health hazards by contaminating potable water supplies. store clean water. Emergency water supply systems consist of temporary tanks used to Source: Authors from Quarterly Progress Reports. their conditions are generally very poor.Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War Iraq 187 history. temporary water treatments using unsophisticated technologies have been widely used as stop-gaps. and out-of-date services infrastructure. which is transported by tankers. However. geography. These technologies include flocculation. to tackle the existing drinking water crises in major cities. Identify Upgrades or Replace Critical Equipment Post-conflict states often have under-resourced. such as boiling or chlorinating drinking water. and sometimes deliberately targeted. these systems generally are overlooked in favor of treatment works and pumping stations. public authorities need to prioritize disseminating appropriate public education so that the public will take the essential health measures. Regarding the restoration of urban public supplies. Until then. Figure 10. issues to be considered include cross-contamination between sewers and water distributors. and possibly simple sand filters (compact units with a life span of five years). and carrying out much needed repairs. local skills. Early involvement of local people who are familiar with the technical and system backgrounds can help in setting realistic investment and implementation targets. funds are limited. and overall program management capacity. so addressing unrealistic local aspirations should be discussed openly by the complement of various stakeholders. budget flows. Locals will have very high expectations. One option is to use a separate local bank account. It results in local employment and income. To avoid prejudice against any particular group. The skills mix of local and expatriate staff and contractors in rebuilding has two benefits. the government has to prepare a budget to identify and estimate required costs. refurbishing plants. which involve a particularly cumbersome process in the local banking system. It also ensures a project’s sustainability through community buy-in and creating a culture of maintenance for the project. If possible. Generally. funding should be managed independently from government systems. Payment currencies and systems for local contractors/suppliers/ consultants also must be planned ahead to prevent stoppages. determining the priorities should involve as many local stakeholders as possible. The re-establishment of local contractors should be encouraged by developing small contracts. . catching up on maintenance. The project management team would countersign payment checks with the local government officers. lengthy or overly bureaucratic procurement methods need to be anticipated. with external support to strengthen management skills where necessary. payments in US dollars are far easier to process than those in the local currency. the mix of local and external inputs.188 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS the system. When payments for salaries and goods are delayed. so prioritization becomes necessary. In Iraq. After identifying the immediate needs as well as budgeting for the medium and long-term needs. so is implementation. construction security. In scheduling. Develop an Implementation Strategy An implementation strategy should be developed that reflects the needs of service users. Local participation must be engaged. Infrastructure contractors may be reluctant to undertake development work in insecure areas. The inability of international workers to work in the country increases the frustration of the local population toward external donors. In Iraq. to leases or long-term concessions. or where appropriate guarantees can be made that offset the risks. such as service or management contracts. including a planned progression from modest forms of private participation in infrastructure. However. In prioritizing tasks and activities. Phased arrangements may be considered. insecurity and danger may continue. Procurement in a post-conflict situation raises the risk of corruption and conflict over access to contracts. donors and service providers should consider improving security as a key priority. payments to local contractors may involve the added risks of storing and transporting cash payments. Appropriate Implementation and Procurement Procedures Post-conflict situations usually result in immediate and large financing needs on emergency projects. investors may be discouraged by the weakness of government’s administrative capacity and the difficulty of enforcing payment for services. Involve the Private Sector at Appropriate Time Major private investment is likely to be appropriate only after a period of some stability. In some areas. An example is the provision of telecommunications immediately after conflict. pilot management contracts will be the most appropriate. security services provision adds 30 percent to 50 percent to investment costs. Private investors are likely to be wary of investing before the conflict is fully resolved. contractors. which are often the very areas that most require development. It still is not safe enough for the international community to visit Iraq. Even then.Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War Iraq 189 Security in Work and Living Areas Even after a conflict. and other outsiders. for the foreseeable future. with the government owning major assets and assuming a large proportion of the commercial risks. In the absence of a strong economy or currency. The use of donor-funded guarantees and co-financing can facilitate private/public partnerships. some private organizations may come forward to fill important gaps for which the entry cost is relatively low and returns are rapid. . 2003. DC. Washington. See Calkins and Abu-Taleb in this volume for a discussion on governance and anticorruption problems and how to address them.2 References Government of Iraq. United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment. National Development Strategy (NDS) of the Transitional Government. United Nations/World Bank. October. and services. the government benefits from advice from the donor agencies in the timely and transparent delivery of services. 2005. Through their requirements for procuring goods and equipment. 2 .190 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS employment. Sufficient training in procurement for all levels of government is very important and should be provided as soon as possible. It is critical to have a strategy in place for managing this risk. Baghdad. In 2007–08. More specifically. this project will support the Yemeni Government’s US$381 million Water Sector Support Program. and the development of an Anticorruption Action Plan (ACAP) to help ensure that the water sector project funds are used for the intended purposes. the chapter presents a diagnostic of governance and corruption issues in Yemen’s water sector. a team of World Bank and Yemeni government sector specialists were presented with the opportunity to design a water sector investment operation as part of a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). the application of “smart project design” to improve governance at the sector level. 2009. and is based on the recent design of a water sector operation.11 # Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector: Lessons from the Design of an Anticorruption Action Plan Maher Abu-Taleb and Richard Calkins his chapter summarizes the key lessons learned while dealing with governance and corruption (GAC) issues in Yemen.and project-related governance and corruption issues is relatively recent. a strategic decision was made to make resources available to diagnose the governance issues in the sector. Specifically. identify the vulnerabilities and potentials of ongoing reforms.5 billion 5-year National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (NWSSIP). and build consensus around a sector governance program. the focus on sector. with a few exceptions. While the World Bank has been working on the broader issues of good governance at the country level for many years. At that time. It comprises US$141 million in counterpart financing from the government budget and the remainder from other development partners. Yemen Water Sector Support Project Appraisal Document. 191 1 . The project under discussion supports the Yemeni government’s US$1.1 The T Details available in World Bank. The strategy is intended to (1) strengthen institutions for sustainable water resource management. Government has been aware of these reform challenges for decades and. the large part of the rural economy dependent on groundwater is under threat. The strategy update’s objective was to incorporate changes in light of the experiences of the past five years and to provide a basis for a sector-wide approach (SWaP) to financing. and . has taken significant institutional steps. (4) increase returns to agricultural water use. As with any new initiative. In addition. Under the supervision of an Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee of five ministers. Consequently. to be implemented for the entire water sector as part of the Water Sector Support Programme (WSSP).192 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS SWAp framework builds on country-level governance and anticorruption initiatives. a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework is outlined. Context By world standards. the plan needs to be implementable to work as intended and ensure that benefits of enhanced development effectiveness actually exceed the costs. Yemen is a country poorly endowed with water resources. Finally. First. (2) improve community-based water resource management. the brief overview gives the context for this work along with definitions to acquaint the reader with the relevant concepts. over the last 15 years. Groundwater is being over-exploited. Next. The water sector project supports implementation of Yemen’s National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (NWSSIP). an assessment of governance and corruption risks is presented along with the planned mitigation measures and the details of the Anticorruption Action Plan. The government’s decision to prepare an update of its national water strategy that would run from 2009–15 provided an opportunity to incorporate institutional design elements that would improve governance. The overview is followed by a summary of the governance agenda at the country level. both urban and rural settlements are poorly provided with safe water and sanitation services. The chapter is organized as follows. a highly participatory process was adopted to evaluate experience to date and to prepare the updated national water strategy. The framework has piloted the design of the first specific Anticorruption Action Plan in the Middle East North Africa Region (MNA). (3) increase access to water supply and sanitation services. While the definition of Smart . coordinated donor harmonization.Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector 193 (5) stabilize and reduce groundwater abstraction for agricultural use from critical water basins. private sector-led growth and with pro-poor development outcomes. and improved water sector governance. It is country specific and reflects what has been learned about risks and risk mitigation in a particular country. Poor governance has the opposite effects and provides greater latitude for corruption. which will be implemented as part of the project. Accountability.1). Smart Project Design is intended to help ensure that development objectives are achieved and that Bank/IDA funds are protected. The World Bank’s new strategy to address governance and corruption issues emphasizes three key principles—referred to as the TAP Framework: 1. Some major water sector donors in Yemen (the World Bank and aid agencies of the governments of Germany. All three of these bases are prerequisites for poverty alleviation and agricultural income growth. specific anticorruption measures have been incorporated in the Anticorruption Action Plan. and United Kingdom) have provided technical assistance to the government to harmonize and align efforts to support its national water strategy. Participation (TAP) (box 11. some definitions are presented below: Good governance is the exercise of power in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development. The project design includes a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that defines the obligations of the partners under a SWAp with common rules for coordinated support. Before continuing. Transparency 2. It occurs at all levels. Corruption involves the use of public office for private gain. the Netherlands. they are building local institutional capacity by progressively entrusting implementation to mandated national agencies. The project is being prepared based on fundamental reforms related to implementation efficiency. It is a symptom of poor governance and reduces development effectiveness. In addition to the governance improvement built into the project design. 3. Good governance is associated with faster. Meanwhile. from petty corruption to administrative corruption to grand corruption (including “state capture”). 1 Three Key Principles of Good Governance A review of the literature on good governance suggests that practitioners should pay particular attention to three highly complementary and mutually reinforcing principles: transparency. consumer groups. and other forms of corruption. both internal and external. participation of beneficiaries in project design and implementation. and participation (TAP). financial management. accountability. Accountability has many dimensions. of course. Participation—or. information availability) 4. Pursuit of sector-level governance issues through a combination of project-specific and “parallel track” initiatives 2. 1. bribery. 3. Internal accountability implies proper management of resources. signals that there is really nothing to hide. Participation of civil society organizations (CSOs). It is the foundation on which both accountability and participation are built. It represents the “demand side” of good governance. which should apply to almost all aspects of the conduct of governmental affairs. 2. and strengthened community voice) . Transparency implies openness and visibility. Its absence provides cover for conflicts of interest. Strengthen external accountability—responsiveness to the “demand side” (consultations with affected communities. experience suggests six relatively standard elements: 1. Information in the public domain is the “currency” of transparency and. and affected communities in all stages of Bank-financed projects simultaneously can improve development outcomes and reduce opportunities for fraud and corruption. self-serving deals. Focus project design on reducing the negative impact of governance and corruption on successful development outcomes 3. together with open and visible decisionmaking processes. as some have referred to it. The benefits of participation are well documented on a global scale in most aspects of public governance. Project Design is evolving. project beneficiaries. Transparency facilitates good governance.194 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 11. Accountability. Strengthen internal accountability and the project’s “control environment” (procurement. inclusion—is important not just on principle but in practical terms. External accountability refers to the responsiveness of political leaders to the needs and aspirations of the citizens. auditing. implies that the institutions—including the civil service—have the capacity to be responsive to the demands of the citizens and that salary levels and other incentives are consistent with those expectations. such as when lessons from findings of the World Bank’s Department of Institutional Integrity (INT) investigations and Detailed Implementation Reviews (DIRs) appear applicable. 2 DIRs. Anticorruption Action Plans (ACAPs) may be used to formalize some or all of the elements of Smart Project Design. are carried out by INT (the Bank’s Department of Institutional Integrity) in response to multiple allegations of fraud and corruption in Bank/IDA projects in a given country. or at the request of the country team concerned—generally in connection with a review of corruption concerns within a given sector or country. they have been mandated in some situations. ACAPs generally are not required for Bank/IDA projects. Kaufmann. the Figure 11. Yemen has made significant progress in several areas of governance.(Middle East & North Africa) (lower bar) ened its rankings in areas such as Yemen control of corruption. Governance Agenda at the Country Level Over the past two years. Yemen Governance Indicators for 1996–2007. and M. Ensure that project design builds in effective oversight by implementing agencies (possibly involving third-party oversight) and allows for effective supervision by the Bank/IDA 6.Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector 195 5. Mastruzzi 2008: Governance Matters VII: and accountability. Despite improveControl of corruption ments in its control institutions. Regarding voice Sources: D. The latter is the case for the Yemen Water Sector Support Project. However. however.2 In other cases.1). While it continues to lag the MNA Region and other low-income economies. ACAPs have been at the initiative of the relevant ministry as a way to increase the visibility and impact of its governance and anticorruption efforts. Develop and implement a well-thought-out communications plan designed to consistently send the right signals to all parties concerned. Political stability The main challenges remain low Government effectiveness government effectiveness and acRegulatory quality countability as well as very low Rule of law political stability. A. and rule of law (figure 11. Kraay. pero 25 50 75 ceptions about corruption in Yemen Country’s percentile rank (0–100) remain unfavorable. 100 . or Detailed Implementation Reviews. regulatory Voice and accountability quality.1 Comparison with Regional Average country appears to have strength. and Tunisia. The country has no perennial . Examples are the new procurement law. Others in the donor community have supported legal and judicial reforms—critical to strengthen the rule of law. development of the proposed procurement database in key agencies. Libya. cash management and internal controls. progress has been achieved in the Cabinet-approved comprehensive financial management reform strategy. and the role of oversight bodies such as the supreme audit agency. In addition. Iraq. As part of the 2007 Anticorruption Law. Saudi Arabia. especially project beneficiaries. the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA). and staff training and development. The Bank is supporting the development of this new anticorruption agency through a program of technical assistance (TA). development of the High Tender Board policies and capacity. It will support enhanced information disclosure as a part of greater transparency and accountability. and as a prerequisite for the wider participation of civil society. the Bank and other donors have supported civil service reform and capacity building intended to help GOY achieve a more professional. Iran. Recent Governance Accomplishments With strong support from the donor community. Governance and Corruption Issues in the Water Sector and Mitigation Measures in WSSP Water Challenges in Yemen Yemen has one of the lowest rates of per capita freshwater availability in the world (135 m3/cap/year). Areas of improvement include budget execution. compared to the almost 10 times higher regional average. and merit-based government service. competent. Syria. 1.250 m3/cap/year. the Supreme National Agency for the Control of Corruption (SNACC) was created. financial reporting. On a parallel track.196 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS scores better than other more developed nations of the region: Egypt. internal and external auditing. Yemen has made progress on its governance agenda in a number of critical areas. completion of the procurement laws implementing regulations. In 2007 the Government of Yemen (GOY) also finalized the Anticorruption Law. MWE prepared a consolidated strategy. The National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program 2005–09 (NWSSIP) was adopted and published by GOY in 2004. In rural areas. Corresponding mitigation measures also are presented and are elaborated below. NWSSIP aimed at recovering control of the groundwater resource and moving Yemen toward the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets for water supply and sanitation. GOY decided to prepare an update of NWSSIP to run from 2009–15. threatening the agricultural economy. and in 2003 the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) was established. approximately only 56 percent of the population has access to network water supply and only 31 percent to sewerage. runoff. In urban areas.1 lists the 4 major issues identified in the assessment of governance and corruption risks in the water sector. the NWSSIP process has brought significant advantages to water sector management: (1) a common framework for planning. Water scarcity has created competing demands for its services. springs. The objective was to incorporate changes in the light of experiences and to provide a basis for a sector-wide approach (SWAp) to financing. (3) a basis for an integrated intersectoral approach to water resource management through pooled/joint financing. seasonal spate flows. (2) a point of reference and a forum for stakeholders to maintain continuous dialogue through the Joint Annual Reviews. Thereafter. as part of the Anticorruption Action Plan. Its water comes from rainfall. a massive and persistent problem of unsustainable groundwater extraction in both highland and coastal areas has arisen. urban growth. In the last decades. In 2002 a water law was enacted. implementation. . approximately 45 percent of the population has access to safe water and only 21 percent to adequate sanitation.Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector 197 rivers. and (4) benchmarks to measure performance. GOY created the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) to implement an integrated approach to water management. and monitoring. and investment program for the water sector as a whole. and industrial development. Overall. In late 2007. and these have greatly complicated the challenges of governance. action plan. Governance and Corruption Risks in the Water Sector Table 11. financing. and groundwater. The Water MTEF will provide the medium-term expenditure and financing framework within which the WSSP will be integrated 3 . elaboration of MTEF for water sector. maximum unit costs per capita or per hectare (ha).198 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 11. e-procurement pilot. expanded use of technical and/or “value for money” audits Improved information disclosure and Anticorruption Hot Line program Lack of transparency in procurement process Short-changing investment projects by contractors.3 In addition. MTEF Sector-level Project-level Development of NWSSIP with clarified investment policies.1 Key GAC Issues and Mitigation Measures Mitigation measures Issue Nonoptimality in selection of investment projects NWSSIP. development of specific investment criteria by subsector Development of standard bidding documents. which provide opportunities for excess profits and/or payment of bribes and kickbacks. and Anticorruption Hot Line Anticorruption Hot Line. The Water MTEF is timely because government and donors have decided to bring most financing of the water sector within a “SWAp” framework. Development of the National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Plan (NWSSIP). Mitigation measures. including interference by “influential persons” in decisionmaking at the national level. which clarifies the policies for achieving sustainable use of water as a natural resource and specifies the corresponding investment priorities. An MTEF is a consolidated financial document that links (1) public expenditures. (2) financing plan for those expenditures. and (3) outputs or “deliverables” that will be produced. NWISSIP will be supplemented by the elaboration of a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for the water sector—a three-year rolling public sector budget document. investments to be supported by the pooled donor funding mechanism must meet specific investment criteria. and consultants during implementation “Elite capture” of project benefits after completion of project Adoption of new procurement law and enforcement of reforms Enhanced public disclosure Stakeholder participation in project design and implementation Issue 1 Nonoptimality in selection of specific investment projects. These criteria will vary by subsector. in some instances combined with an absence of feasibility studies and inflated cost estimates. under WSSP. MIS system. suppliers. They will include minimum internal rate of return (IRRs). or financial rates of return (as for local utility companies). ” and develop an Anticorruption Hot Line Program to increase the probability that inappropriate interference in procurement will be reported.” submission and acceptance of fraudulent documentation (certificates of delivery or completion of work that do not accord with contract specifications). Mitigation measures. under the financial management component of ACAP. pilot “e-procurement.” conflicts of interest. Adoption of the new national Procurement Law. suppliers.” The communications program under ACAP will alert the contractors. Mitigation measures. ACAP includes a provision to improve information disclosure. and consultant services. Issue 3 Short-changing investment projects by contractors. and consultants to . and inconsistencies between certificates of delivery and completion and what actually exists “on the ground. These initiatives will help communities to understand what should be done under WSSP projects. and establishment of a MIS to support the new procurement procedures. collusion among bidders. and irregular payments for the release of project funds or to secure the payment of invoices. thus enabling them to monitor ongoing implementation activities. civil works. Under WSSP.Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector 199 Issue 2 Lack of transparency in the procurement process. ACAP provides for enhanced disclosure of information about investment plans in the water sector. In addition. reform of the High Tender Board—including greater independence in decisionmaking and development of standard bidding documents for the procurement of goods. The Anticorruption Hot Line will provide a mechanism for community members to report suspicious activities. suppliers. and irregular payments by bidders to influence outcomes. These reforms will be supplemented by the development of implementing regulations. WSSP will expand the use of technical and/or “value for money” audits that will help to identify any shortcomings in the performance of contractors and suppliers. which incorporates global “best practice” in processes and procedures. Means include irregular payments to supervisors to “look the other way. These three factors provide opportunities for interference by “influential persons. and shortages of experienced procurement professionals within implementation agencies. and consultants during implementation. and participation of project beneficiaries and affected communities in project design and implementation. lack of good practices in public sector procurement. In addition. staff training and development. the leaves of which are chewed as a stimulant. Broader applicability to other sectors is being considered by the government. ACAP provides additional funding to pilot special initiatives—such as the 4 Qat is a locally produced plant. and details of each component follow.4 Mitigation measures. which focus on strengthening country systems and the associated control environment within which investment projects are implemented. The components of ACAP respond to the assessment of GAC risks in development projects in the water sector.2. which focus on enhancing external accountability through community voice and participation—including project oversight. . the ACAP Anticorruption Hot Line will provide a channel for citizens to report any diversion of project benefits. qat production). building on the progress achieved in the country-level governance and anticorruption agenda. Consumption in Yemen is widespread and extensive. Anticorruption Action Plan The Anticorruption Action Plan (ACAP). developed as part of project design. Excessive qat consumption at the national level accelerates drawing on water resources. described earlier. Detailed Elements of an Anticorruption Action Plan Procurement reform and capacity development This element builds on the work done at the country level in procurement reform. The emphasis given by WSSP to participation by beneficiaries and affected communities in project design and implementation significantly reduces the opportunities for subsequent “elite capture. It also complements the reform program of the water sector. ACAP includes both “supply-side” components.200 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS these initiatives. is an innovative step in MNA operations.” In addition. A summary is presented in box 11. and “demand-side” components. Issue 4 “Elite capture” of project benefits after completion of the project. While the procurement component of the project focuses on the implementation of those reforms. This term refers to diverting the benefits to groups other than the intended beneficiaries or for unintended purposes (for example. putting them on notice that short-changing projects during implementation is more likely to be discovered. . this element builds on the work done at the country level in the area of financial management and audit reform. and taking full advantage of new technology to put information into the public domain and to support the scaling up of “best practice” cases of information disclosure within the water sector. and consultants are delivering on their contractual obligations.2 Overview of Anticorruption Action Plan Supply-side components include: Procurement reform and capacity development.Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector 201 Box 11. as part of the water sector SWAp Program’s communications program Anticorruption Hot Line Program. Progress in implementing the reform program will be critical to achieve the longer-term vision of the WSSP in moving toward reliance on country systems. Here also. supporting the implementation of the Cabinet-approved comprehensive public financial reform strategy covering budget preparation and execution. including the introduction of an internal audit function. building on “best practice” models already being implemented in some water sector projects Education and awareness program. to be implemented within the water sector. introduction of e-procurement. suppliers. the financial management component of the project will support the implementation of these reforms. building on the 2007 Anticorruption Law. supporting the implementation of the new (international best practice) procurement law through training programs and innovative pilot initiatives at the sector and project levels Financial management reform and capacity development. As part of the ACAP. Financial management reform and capacity development As in the case of procurement reforms. to be carried out in cooperation with Supreme National Agency for Combating Corruption (SNACC). Demand-side components include: Community participation and consultation. and improved oversight by the supreme audit agency Enhanced information disclosure. internal controls and audits. Progress in these areas also is critical in moving toward reliance on country systems. financial reporting. as part of the “detection” program. These special audits will be carried out in collaboration with the new internal audit function. particular attention will be given to the use of technical and/or performance audits to ensure that contractors. They also will be informed of the ACAP initiatives being introduced to prevent. The key messages are that GOY is giving new priority to reducing corruption and that all will have a role to play in this effort. with the local corporations. status of project implementation. detect. and deter fraud and corruption in water sector projects. The intention is to pilot communications initiatives in the water sector toward applying them to other sectors in future. and civil society. accountability.5 In addition to annual investment and procurement plans. ACAP will pay particular attention to the use of consumer surveys. and. public terminal displays) to put information into the public domain and to support the expansion of “best practice” disclosure. such as in the urban subsector. suppliers. is an education and awareness program. in cooperation with SNACC. and consultants). The target audiences are government staff in implementing agencies. The intention is to take full advantage of new technology (web pages. tender opportunities and outcomes. Education and awareness This element. results of various audits. and fairness. Examples are those completed recently in the rural water supply subsector and Poverty and Social Impact Assessments (PSIAs). Yemen is looking at capturing and publishing relevant unit cost factors. and results.202 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Enhanced information disclosure This element builds on the information disclosure provisions of the 2007 Anticorruption Law. for urban centers. private sector firms and individuals (contractors. 5 . Community participation and consultation To enhance the demand for greater transparency. Support also will be given to follow up consultations in selected localities. especially project beneficiaries in affected communities. and outcomes of “consumer surveys”/citizen report cards. Anticorruption hot line program This element supports the design and development of a Hot Line Program to increase the probability that fraud and corruption will be Such as those developed by the General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP). Those involved will be reminded of their obligation to perform with professional integrity and the consequences of failing to do so. Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector 203 detected. Monitoring and evaluating the results and assessing the factors that aided or hindered the effectiveness of the activities that were undertaken. and post office box—all for the receipt of complaints and allegations of fraud and corruption. as appropriate—in that sector at a minimum. Where the evaluation indicates that the activities were successful. consider scaling up. this program will include a hot line phone staffed every day of the year. wherever feasible. After a preliminary screening to sort out irrelevant complaints. defining clear objectives for desired improvements in development outcomes or reductions in fraud and corruption. COCA. If total suspension is not practical. Monitoring and Evaluation Given ACAP’s innovative nature. Establishing baseline numbers for these indicators. and extract the lessons learned for future reference. fax line. web page. For whatever initiatives are undertaken. and possibly in other sectors in the country. To be operated by an independent third party. Where the evaluation indicates that the activities have not been successful. discontinue the activities and try a new approach. so as to learn from experience and adjust its approach accordingly. the implementing agency if more information is needed). the valid cases will be forwarded to the ACAP Advisor for referral to the appropriate authorities (SNACC. and setting up monitoring systems that will report regularly on the direction of progress. suspending them until the conditions needed for success are attained. monitoring how it is doing is essential. Using the mid-term review and end-of-project impact assessment to evaluate all of the activities. email address. Selecting a limited number of monitorable indicators that will enable tracking progress toward these objectives over time. Features of the monitoring system include: Adopting a “learning by doing” approach that recognizes the experimental nature of many of the activities that will be attempted in this new area. . Supervising the Anticorruption Action Plan Overall. as appropriate. If a particular element is not working as intended. These pilots should be approached with high hopes but modest expectations. consideration should be given to adopting it on a wider scale. For the reasons cited above. The plan itself should be seen as a “work in progress” that is subject to review and modification as . sector. a special effort will be required to define meaningful progress indicators—even if these are surrogates for what cannot be measured directly. these indicators are foreseen to be reviewed in the initial phases of the project. The results chain—from objectives to inputs. the unfortunate reality is that they are far more complicated than they sound.204 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS While all of the above sound simple. especially when the objective involves reducing fraud and corruption. Every component will need to be monitored and evaluated carefully during implementation. and project levels. It also will be necessary to develop M&E systems that will enable GOY and the Bank to track progress of key indicators at the country. especially since this is the first such initiative in Yemen at the sector and project levels. there is not likely to be a meaningful “baseline” number for fraud and corruption. it should be fixed or dropped and alternative approaches tried. for projects that include an ACAP. Moreover. Some indicators of development outcomes are relatively straightforward. the number of cases of fraud or corruption actually should increase with improvements in detection measures such as expanded audits and the availability of complaints lines. and outcomes—may not lend itself to precise measurement. If a particular element is working especially well. Summary and Lessons Learned ACAP as a Learning Exercise The process of designing and implementing ACAP should be seen as a learning process for everyone involved. For example. others are not. For these reasons. Some of the key components of the plan are likely to involve new or pilot activities. outputs. Many of the components involve pilot projects to test the effectiveness of a particular approach. it is vital to pay close attention to how well this plan is being implemented and the extent to which it is meeting its objectives. activities. what is not going well. Discuss and agree with government on adjustments needed to enhance effectiveness. including an assessment of what is going well. 2. and why. 3. and as a learning experience for everyone involved. The four key steps in the supervision process of ACAP are to: 1. It will be important to ensure adequate funding for supervision. Record findings and required follow-up in supervision documents. Establish a regular review of progress for each component.” 4. and careful planning to optimize the use of supervision resources overall. availability of the right skills and experience to guide the effort. The plan should be treated as an important component of the overall project. . both to keep management informed of progress and as an aid to subsequent “lessons learned.Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector 205 needed. Include an impact assessment as part of the mid-term review of the project and as part of the final evaluation of project outcomes. target audiences for different types of information. This conclusion is consistent with the three basic and interrelated principles of good governance: transparency. Fortunately. annual procurement plans should be published. The Bank’s intention is to build on these initiatives by supporting the spread of “best practice” disclosure methods in a number of critical areas. The details of the updated investment program. To do so. These disclosures should occur for each of the four key subsectors: urban water and sanitation. Improving Governance and Reducing Corruption through Public Disclosure of Information The World Bank desired to support the development of an Anticorruption Action Plan (ACAP) for the Yemen Water Sector Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) Program.206 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Appendix A1. Similarly. This appendix provides an overview of the kinds of information that should be disclosed. rural water and sanitation. followed by advertisement of specific tender opportunities. and integrated water resource management at the basin level. and is the foundation for both accountability and participation. and benefits expected from these initiatives. The next step will be the development of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). a number of initiatives to improve transparency by improving the availability of information already are underway in Yemen’s water sector. . Transparency has to do with both more open decisionmaking processes and greater availability of information in the public domain. various methods to disclose information. One of the conclusions reached is that measures can and should be taken to collect and disseminate a variety of information about activities in the water sector and that these measures should feature prominently in the Anticorruption Action Plan. irrigation. and participation (TAP). Information to Be Disclosed The current water sector strategy and investment plan have been updated. the Bank examined the role of public disclosure of information and the prospects for improving governance and reducing corruption by enhancing the amount and type of information available to the public. MTEF (when it is available). at the project level. accountability. and annual budget allocations then should be published to make them available to the public. In addition. Funding will be provided for the launch of new pilot initiatives (such as e-procurement). comparable unit costs. the target audience for information disclosure depends on the nature and purpose of the information. The intention is to disclose how well service providers are actually delivering their services. procedures for application submission and approval. Given all of these areas in which information disclosure is critical for improved governance. those working in the sector agencies. Relevant Target Audiences Obviously. the sector strategy and investment plans should be of interest to a fairly wide audience. Under the financial management component of ACAP. and trenching for various types of soil and terrain conditions. including the announcement of winning bidders and prices. The data will be collected and published quarterly. A related “demand-side” initiative under the ACAP is the proposal for consumer satisfaction surveys and citizen report cards. ACAP will support the collection and publishing of pricing data from each of the four subsectors on selected. and scaling up “best practice” wherever feasible. and the requirements for establishing WUGs and WUAs. eligibility rules. performance and/or technical audits. the proposals include strengthening the capacity of internal and external audits and the extension of audit terms of reference (TOR) to include. information should be disclosed consistent with international best practice. ACAP includes a separate component focused specifically on enhancing information disclosure.Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector 207 Within the procurement process. pipes of various composition and sizes. Given the critical nature of the water sector and the unsustainable water use practices in the country. concrete storage tanks of various sizes. on a selective basis. The MTEF will be of interest to oversight agencies (including Parliament). The ACAP for the SWAp Program also proposes piloting e-procurement for some of the largest contracts. identification of existing “best practice” disclosure activities. Engaging the community in project identification and design and establishing WUGs (water user groups)/WUAs obviously require an information campaign by project management to inform potential beneficiaries of the existence of the project. . Unit costs will include pumps of various standard sizes. The Bank also will encourage implementing authorities to publish the audit reports. Unit cost data should be of interest to both implementing and oversight agencies. and GARWSP management and staff to see at a glance the status of project approval. and specific tendering opportunities will be of primary interest to those engaged in program and project implementation.208 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS local governments. Information about project opportunities and eligibility criteria will be of obvious interest to potential project beneficiaries. and payment). let alone technical literacy. and relevant levels of government—particularly the oversight and regulatory agencies. These running updates are one of the “best practice” disclosure models that will be considered for “scaling up” under ACAP. At one end of the spectrum. newspaper advertisements may be appropriate for notifying potential bidders of a tender opportunity. annual procurement plans. Annual budgets. Consequently. at the community level. contractors. service providers. and consultants. However. Reports of consumer satisfaction and citizen report cards will be of interest to consumers. printed word literacy cannot be assumed. approval. and civil society. including through web pages and internet links (as for e-procurement). suppliers. In the mid-range of the spectrum. with terminals available in the lobby of GARWSP headquarters and branch offices. These ongoing updates enable project beneficiaries. and makes available information on all stages of the project cycle. and status of implementation (including the tracking of invoice submission. procurement processes. “high-tech” disclosure methods may be appropriate. suppliers and consultants. The results of internal and external audits— especially the results of performance and technical audits—will be particularly interesting to oversight agencies. Methods of Information Disclosure The most appropriate methods of disclosure depend on both the nature of the information or data to be disclosed and the characteristics of the target audience. This system is computer based. . as well as to the business community. radio and television may be the more appropriate channels for information dissemination. but also to civil society. including the increasing number of CSOs that are focusing on governance and anticorruption. including private sector contractors. Of particular interest is the procurement MIS system that has been developed in the rural water supply and sanitation (WSS) sector under GARWSP with financial support from the Netherlands. review. the evidence is clear and compelling. In fact. Finally. Regarding development effectiveness and the sustainability of project investments. if other elements of ACAP are successful. Taken together. many of the projects in the current water sector portfolio involve rehabilitation of earlier projects that failed due to a lack of participation. In addition to publishing the data quarterly. At the village level. carrying out consumer surveys and citizen report card exercises and publicly disclosing the results should go a long way to strengthen the community demand for accountability and responsiveness by service providers. A key element of ACAP will be the analysis of unit costs across projects. and areas of the country. The second is due to both the lack of ownership by the affected community and the absence of a community-based organization (CBO) tasked with managing and maintaining the relevant assets.Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector 209 These could be supported by community meetings and/or focus groups in which information is presented by project sponsors and discussed in a public forum. Ideally. Projects initiated without community participation (1) are less likely to meet the needs of the intended beneficiaries and (2) are unlikely to be maintained. Expected Benefits of Enhanced Information Disclosure Greater transparency and information disclosure in public procurement are important to reduce corruption and control costs. community meetings may be supplemented by simple written materials posted on bulletin boards. the proposed enhancements to the availability of information in the public domain should have a noticeable and positive impact on development effectiveness in Yemen’s water sector. subsectors. . the availability of these data will (a) enable the analysis of possible anomalies or unexplained differences in prices for comparable items and (b) provide a base-line (which does not now exist) to track movements in unit costs over time. there even could be a reduction in unit costs as a result of greater attention being paid to those costs. . Bargaining . . which supplies water to Meknes. there naturally have been conflictual situations. The government created 3 boreholes in the Bitit area to extract approximately 120 liters of water per second (l/s) to serve potable water needs. RADEM. The Irrigation System and Its Evolution State of Water Resources The Bitit irrigation perimeter is fed by three perennial springs (table 12. As farmers have put land and water to productive use. † The system lies at the foot of the Atlas Mountains at an average altitude of 600 meters above sea level.12 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit. In the early 1980s. As a result. the perennial springs have witnessed lowered discharges.1). Morocco experienced a series of severe drought years. 213 . An interesting dimension has been the emergence of markets for water rights as a means to bring transparency to bargaining for water. † Adapted by the editors from a background paper prepared for the “MNA Development Report on Water: Water Conflicts and Their Management Mechanisms in Morocco.” CEDARE Cairo. Morocco Rachid Abdellaoui T he Bitit irrigation perimeter is a small-scale irrigation system built in Morocco at the start of the twentieth century by farmers and managed by them. Water rights have mitigated conflicts over water for two constituencies: Among Bitit irrigation water users Between these irrigators and the water utility. midway between the cities of Fes and Meknes. 2005. The French colonial administration had two goals. On the political side. these laws established equal sharing of water between upstream (politically active Ait Ouallal) and downstream (less politically active Ait Ayach) communities. the French meant to encourage market linkages for these rural communities. by the 1920s. There was strong opposition from the latter. Regarding Bitit. and each household had more land than it could exploit. In the mid-1910s.214 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 12. and to improve . group and individual water rights were recognized and recorded. As compensation. the nearby city of Meknes had growing demand for water and the local farmers resisted attempts to expropriate their rights. 2005 (l/s) 1450 0 400 1850 Appropriation of Land and Water At the start of the last century. it intended to keep the peasants from joining the nationalists. Both land and water then became private property that could be sold to both nationals and French private settlers. land and water were exploited collectively by the Bitit area’s population. leaving only 40 percent of the water to the farmers. Later.1 Three Perennial Springs That Feed Bitit (l/s) Spring name Sidi Tahar Si L’Mir Sbâa Total Estimated discharge during summer . In 1949 a special decree fixed the share of the Public Domain of Bitit waters at 60 percent of availability. Excess water discharges from the springs fed into the adjoining marshlands. the French offered to construct the main canal of Bitit. who had become very active in both Fes and Meknes. through both natural population growth and the growth of commercialization. to reduce infiltration rates in the existing earthen canals (thus “justifying” the 60 percent reduction in water rights). the French had promulgated laws to place water resources in the public domain unless they had been regulated by specific pre-existing water rights. On the economic side. 1974–79 (l/s) 1850 120 600 2570 Estimated discharge during summer. causing malaria to become a common health problem in the Bitit community. However. mainly as rangeland. However. pressures on land and water resources began to increase. The resources were plentiful. However. Meknes needed more water. but government decisions continued to respond to urban needs. after which 400 l/s were diverted for the potable water needs of Meknes. (a) the Office National de l’Eau Potable’s (ONEP) using better drilling technology to enhance Meknes’ water supply with approximately 1200 l/s. the government undertook a rehabilitation project by which many more kilometers of earthen irrigation canals (seguias) were lined to reduce water infiltration losses. The subsequent rehabilitation of the irrigation network necessitated two developments: 1. By the 1970s. the overall water sharing had not changed. farmers’ opposition to further diversion of water to which they considered they had water rights 2. Construction of proper diversion and discharge partitioning structures 2. and thus compensate beneficiaries for the additional water diversion. Table 12.2 summarizes this evolution of water allocations. The canal feeds five large main seguias and several smaller ones before discharging downstream in Ait Ayach lands.Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit. The canal was constructed by 1954. By August 2005. Fixation of the seguia on which individual water rights could be exercised led to the computation of the design discharge of the seguias. All main seguias were lined in the 1980s. On the political side. Morocco 215 public health by reducing malarial mosquitoes. On the technical side. Morocco was an independent country. starts at the spring of Sidi Tahar. and water available in the public domain was estimated to be 1800 l/s (in peak irrigation season). although the municipal water demand had drastically increased. constructed in 1953. one political and two technical: 1. Irrigation Canal Network and Water Shares The main canal. and (b) higher treatment costs for the spring waters during the rainy season when they had high quantities of suspended matter. To justify the diversion of just an additional 400 l/s. . leaving the rest of the water resources with the farmers for three reasons. Meknes continues to divert 800 l/s. there was still a need to avoid social unrest in the countryside. 5 24 24 8 3.800 415 1.5 59.000 1.600 400 714 24 No. 1920s–2005 Groups of shareholders Béni M’tir (Ait Ouallal) Chorfa et Regraga Caid Total Ait Ouallal Ait Ayache Chorfa et Regraga Caid Total Ait Ouallal Ait Ayache Chorfa et Regraga Caid Total Public domain Ait Ouallal 1953–54 Ait Ayache Chorfa et Regraga Caid Total Public domain Ait Ouallal 1983–88 Ait Ayache Chorfa et Regraga Caid Total Public domain 2005 Ait Ouallal Ait Ayache Chorfa et Regraga Caid Total Public domain 24 24 8 3.420 403 176 3.200 1.049 350 153 2.210 403 176 3.110 714 238 104 1.000 0 1. they are probably not diverting all their right Laws of 1919 and 1924 related to water and definition of water domain Ait Aiyache—downstream users of Béni M’tir Individual appropriation of land and water Period Early 1920’s Important event/comments Start of appropriation (by peasants) of waters and land previously collective Intensive pressure on land and water by French settlers Around 1925 1949 24 Water is effectively diverted to Meknes Rehabilitation of irrigation system consisting essentially of lining main seguias to compensate for additional 400 l/s diversion With creation of modern discharge partitioning structures Small reduction of spring discharge .5 59.5 59.210 1.000 1.542 298 298 99 44 740 1. 24 8 3. of shares 48 8 3.210 403 176 3.770 800 424 424 141 62 1.210 1. 1994 (Official Bulletin of 30 December 1949) Construction of main canal to compensate for the water appropriated by the public domain Ait Ayache being downstream.5 40 60 484 161 71 1.5 40 60 100 100 Total Water right Discharge discharge discharge actually (%) (l/s) diverted (l/s) 2.800 484 2.000 484 484 161 71 1.420 403 176 3.5 59.210 1.5 40 60 415 138 60 1.5 59.5 24 24 8 3.028 1.2 Evolution of Water Allocations in Morocco.5 59.5 40 60 24 8 3.200 1.000 1.216 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 12.049 Vizirial decree of November 23.210 403 176 3.050 800 Diversion to Meknes of an additional discharge of 400 l/s Large reduction of discharge of various springs 3 tube wells with total discharge of 120 l/s are created. gsu. The ratio of the change in pressure to the fractional volume compression is called the bulk modulus of the material. Table 12.3).1 is an approximate Si L’Mir N drawing of the irrigation network with seguia names. Field measurements conducted in 1987 indicated a variation of the water modulus ranging from 25 l/s to 35 l/s with an average of 30 l/s depending on the seguia and the precision of the flow-partitioning device on the main canal. The farmS. but now sums to only 160 l/s in peak-use periods) (table 12. divided by 59. S. They also S. For example.2). 1 The bulk elastic properties of a material determine how much it will compress under a given amount of external pressure. down of shareholders’ water rights by group of shareholders and by main seguia. In 2005 the figures were 1050 l/s and 17.75 l/s. Morocco 217 Actual measurements conFigure 12.Note: Scale = 1: 70.5 shares.000.edu/hbase/permot3. farmers estimate that the water modulus is only approximately 20 l/s. equaled a water modulus of 29. Seguia Boufadma carries 9 water modulus (which summed to approximately 270 l/s in 1987. Source: Author.1 The modulus varies depending on the spring discharge and thus the season. boufadma work was very long. Kherichfa recognized the importance of concrete diversion structures S. which correlates perfectly with the reduction in spring discharge since then.3 gives the break.Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit.1 Bitit Irrigation Network with Seguia Names ducted after the rehabilitation project showed that water losses in irrigation canals effectively dropped from approximately 1. Tahar Figure 12.21 l/s/100 meters to 0. The shares indicated in table 12. main particularly as the overall netS. which. Mouloua ers immediately recognized the canal S. respectively (table 12. In 1987 the total available discharge to peasants was approximately 1770 l/s. ichniouine S.phy-astr. ghellafa benefits of lining the seguias.3 assume continuous water discharge of a water modulus.html . http:// hyperphysics.65 l/s. Presently.9 l/s/100 meters of the seguia. bâa that prevent water theft. 5 4 5 1 2 1 1 35. the irrigation frequency had to be increased.4). To avoid having 6. For example. 1940s–1990s Period Until late 1940s Until late 1960s Until late 1980s Since early 1990s Length of irrigation turn (days) 52 26 13 7 . the households of Ait Moussa Hammi and Ait Akka villages originally numbered 52.3 Water Shareholder Groups and Shares of Ait Ouallal by Main Seguia Group of No. and each household received a 4 water modulus. Presently.5 The irrigation turn duration originally was computed for each shareholder to receive the total water discharge of the seguia during a full day. totaling a discharge of 120 l/s every 52 days. of shareholders shares Guellafa Boufadma Kherichfa Moulouya Tichniouine Roz Batbatia Taoujdate Tighza Total Ait Moussa Hammi + Ait Akka Ait Rbaa Ait Ali Boubker Ait Brahim Ait Ammar Chorfa et Regraga Caid Total shares (water modulus) 8 4 3 1 8 4 4 4 4 8 3. farmers’ water rights are expressed in Table 12. in 1990 rights were recomputed proportionally.5 35.5 4 1. As the water rights process fragmented due to population growth and demand grew because of crop intensification (as with the introduction of summer vegetable crops). Thus. the water turn duration was reduced (table 12. Consequently.5 days of irrigation turn and facilitate water distribution by making the rotation weekly.5 4 2 2 4 4 1 2 1 2 9 3 2 2 2 1 1 4 4 8 3.218 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 12.4 Evolution of Irrigation Turn Duration over Time (Ait Moussa Hammi and Ait Hakka).5 9. over time. their irrigation rotation on Boufadma followed a 52-day cycle. They are planted in March and harvested by mid-August. 72 m3 every irrigation turn (= rotation) of 7 days. These crops appear to be the best combination that matches seasonal demand for water with existing market conditions.2 Onions are a popular crop. after Friday prayers (which time was chosen to ensure maximum attendance). approximately 2000 ha were irrigable (900 ha during the summer + 1100 ha during winter). harvesting in August) to seed production of F1 and F2 generations (planting by mid-August. followed by seed potatoes. the shareholders of the seguia gather in a general assembly to take decisions to reduce potential conflicts among members: a. This task has the highest priority. Morocco 219 hours: In 2005 a farmer who owned 1 hour of water actually possessed 3600 seconds * 20 liters/second. . Potato acreage also has decreased. Of these. Tobacco acreage has decreased. the arable land has greatly increased. The preferred winter crops are cereals (primarily wheat planted in November and harvested in June). Some farmers switched from summer production of potatoes (planting in March. Shareholders elect a certain number of waqqaf (type of ditch rider) members. the total useful area of the Bitit irrigation system was estimated at 5000 hectares (ha). harvesting in January at the latest). following many stone-clearing operations. Orchards (mainly apples) have been abandoned due to low water availability. Ninety percent of summer crops are vegetables and tobacco. that is. which receive supplemental irrigation if necessary. 2 F1 and F2 refer to foundation seeds for potatoes of good quality. and tobacco is kept only as an alternative crop to reduce farmers’ risk. Irrigation System Management Traditional organization to manage conflicting interests Bitit’s irrigation system is managed by traditional organizations at the main seguia level.Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit. Since then. Cropping Pattern In the early 1980s. Before the start of each cropping season. An implication is that waqqaf members tend to own little land and usually have either none or very few water rights. Although the process of establishing/operationalizing the Jrida may seem to be and is challenging. literally “a hand of water”) is allocated. These persons therefore allocate their time to irrigation management and also are available at any time day or night. Many of the small shareholding farmers often are not at the assembly. In 1987 each irrigator in the villages paid each waqqaf 300 DH/year for 24 hours of water rights. which corresponds to 12. This is a full list of the individual shareholders and their irrigation time durations. The number of waqqafs will depend on the number of shareholders. the length of the seguia.220 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS b.5 DH/year/hour of water right. Last. have an extensive knowledge of field locations and water rights. Additional time is needed to make sure that no mistakes are made. The first task of the waqqaf is to help to establish the Jrida during the general assembly and to work on it later until it is complete and exact. together with the exact location of the fields that each shareholder would like to irrigate in the forthcoming season. The Jrida is of paramount importance because it is the basic management framework through which water allocation and distribution rules are established. 5 waqqafs were elected to manage Seguia Boufadma (270 l/s at that time). Usually. and the degree to which irrigation land is dispersed along the seguia. shareholders establish the Jrida of the seguia. b. c. c. The number of shareholders is very large. Some transactions on water rights are not resolved immediately. to which one irrigation modulus ( fess. The waqqaf uses local knowledge to simplify the Jrida. In 1987. the shareholders agree on the water distribution sequence during each irrigation turn. it is not feasible to list all of them during one two-hour general assembly. and fully understand the spatial and temporal water distribution logic of the seguia. Irrigation quarters of variable acreage and limits are defined. Therefore. After this vote. This process usually takes time as: a. The waqqaf members are required to live in the village. the waqqaf usually is able to complete the process before irrigation season begins. requiring the waqqaf to contact them later at their homes. and with the expert assistance of the waqqaf. . Conflicts over Water Conflicts over water among farmers Water conflicts are very rare because both traditional and legal water allocation and distribution rules are perfectly clear and well established . cropping patterns. it now earns 7 x 24 x 30 DH = 5040 DH/year. Besides the irrigation management responsibilities. particularly accusations of water stealing by irrigators. Once the Jrida is established and the first irrigation turn is executed. In 2005. The law also listed the benefits that WUAs could be expected to receive from government policies aimed at irrigation system rehabilitation/improvement. farmers need low discharges (half of the water modulus) and can irrigate only during daylight hours. The Jrida system is very flexible. they also are shorter. the amount probably is very similar. The waqqaf has made every farmer aware of who his predecessors and successors are in the rotation process. the waqqaf’s responsibilities are reduced. Law 2/84 (published in May 1992) established the rules by which water user associations (WUAs) (Associations des Usagers des Eaux Agricoles. Nevertheless. Morocco 221 this process requires defining turns among the various field intakes. All of them were created under the framework of Law 2/84. old practices of the traditional organizations continue to dominate. While previously the waqqaf was earning 13 x 24 x 12. or AUEA) are to be created and managed. if the rotations are more frequent. Each field receives the water on a given day at a given time for a given duration. and conflict reduction are the key criteria in determining the rules. while transplanting onions. the waqqaf must manage conflicts among irrigators.5 DH = 3900 DH/year. They often seek the waqqaf’s help with these specifics. water rights. It fully incorporates irrigators’ concerns by ensuring that allocation rules for each quarter are transparent for that irrigation season. Modern WUAs continue to work according to traditional norms In December 1990.Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit. Moreover. problems do arise during the irrigation process that require waqqaf intervention. For example. the rotation is perfectly fixed. However. including after crops are progressively harvested. Because the irrigation turn is exactly one week in length. Topography. there were 5 WUAs in Bitit (1 for each of the 5 main seguias). When adjusted for inflation. Tubewells play an important role in supplementary irrigation. According to Ait Ouallal farmers. A recent proposal by a mineral water bottling company to purchase water rights (see further developments in this text) has caused disagreement among farmers. The farmers usually buy tubewell water on a volumetric basis. In addition. The farmers are adamant that RADEM should purchase water from them. particularly when very hot and dry easterly winds known as chergui raise temperatures for several consecutive days during the peak growing months of July and August. irrigators may resort to water theft. They all want to sell their water to the bottling company but cannot agree on how much water each one would be allowed to sell. and farmers may overestimate the acreage of summer crops that they may be able to irrigate satisfactorily. . water is relatively abundant. The spring is protected by a concrete structure with a metallic door that has a single key kept by 2 guards hired by RADEM. Later. at the start of an irrigation season. The diversion takes place literally behind closed doors. to save their crops. irrigators can meet any unexpected demand for irrigation water during the peak crop demand period without resorting to water theft. For example. particularly during the peak summer season. Under these circumstances. The role of the waqqaf is to watch for such transgressions and enforce penalties on these irrigators. Farmers are forbidden from verifying the discharge that is effectively diverted. climatic conditions change. Ait Ouallal farmers insist they will not accept further diversion of “their” water. and no flow measuring device is installed other than an imprecise concrete weir with a height that can easily be modified. Ait Ouallal farmers allege that RADEM is diverting more than its share. conflicts arise primarily when irrigators resort to water theft. Through tube wells. whether or not authorities consider it part of the public domain. Ait Ouallal farmers complain about the way that RADEM handles the diversion of the 800 l/s directly from the Sidi Taher Spring.222 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS in writing. concrete discharge partitioning structures leave very little space for arguments. Conflicts over water between farmers and the municipal water agency of Meknes The Régie Autonome de Distribution d’Eau de Meknes (RADEM) is the municipal water management agency of Meknes. Annual rights In 1987 the price of 24 hours of water right was 5000 dirhams (DH)/ year. water has been a freely marketable good since the early 1930s. water rights can be sold independently of land.” that is. Water market in Bitit In Bitit. In other words. Water prices The price of water can give a good idea of the efficiency of its use. every irrigation Turn turn (m3) duration (days) 108 72 13 7 Length of irrigation season (days) 210 210 Total seasonal volume (m3) 1745 2160 Price of water (DH/m3) 0. Farmers sell the usage of water for one irrigation season if they need money or if they do not have the resources (labor and/or money) to grow irrigated crops themselves. The fact that water is a marketable good has been a factor in promoting the status of female household heads. and seguias are designed to transport their full discharge over their total length. women can inherit property rights.65 Year 1987 2005 . it is not “married” to the land it irrigates. water prices become a good mechanism to allocate resources efficiently and minimize conflicts. 1987 and 2005 (DH/m3) Price of 1 hr of water Actual water (DH) modulus (l/s) 208 1400 30 20 Corresponding vol. Water is valuable only from mid-March to mid-October Table 12. While property owners are attached to land and sell it only as a last resort.Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit. there is much greater willingness to sell water rights. As discussed below. Morocco 223 Effects of Water Markets on Women In Morocco. This customary law does not pose a constraint because there is much more land than water. water rights are tied to a given main seguia. because they are a renewable resource.12 0. More importantly.5 Price of Water. In 2005 the price of 1 hour of water right skyrocketed to 1400 DH/year. Farmers like to say that water is “single. because women without access to enough labor for irrigated farming can sell their water. Water is a free good that can travel to any field provided it does not move to a main seguia other than that on which the water right is registered. 224 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS (7 months). The prices of a cubic meter (m3) of water in 1987 and 2005 have been computed in table 12.5. The price of water over the past 18 years thus has been multiplied by a factor of 5.4. The computations in table 12.5 assume that water is plentiful during the winter season (mid-October to mid-March). If, however, the rains have become less plentiful—as they have—and the irrigation season longer, then the increase in the price of water is not as great as shown in table 12.5. The official average annual inflation rate in Morocco during the last 18 years has been approximately 3 percent. Accordingly, prices should have increased by a factor of approximately 1.7 during the period 1987–2004/05. In comparison, from 1969–2005, the water tariff in the Tadla large-scale irrigation system varied as shown in table 12.6. Table 12.6 Comparison of Water Tariff in Tadla Irrigation System, 1969–2004 (DH/m3) Year 1969 1972 1980 1984 1985 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2004 DH/m3 0.024 0.024 0.048 0.079 0.090 0.100 0.100 0.120 0.120 0.150 0.160 0.170 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.200 0.220 While the water prices in Tadla and Bitit were similar in 1987 (0.1 DH/m3 and 0.12 DH/m3, respectively), in 2004–05 they differed substantially (0.22 DH/m3 and 0.65 DH/m3, respectively). The price increase in Tadla from 1987 to 2004 was substantially below the increase observed in Bitit. One could conclude that the free water market of Bitit enabled taking into account the greater scarcity of water over time and consequently its higher value. Tubewell water also can be purchased from AUEA for 40 DH/h of 20 l/s. The corresponding price is thus 0.55 DH/m3, slightly less than the surface water price. Who sells/buys water? Annual rights Farmers think that the water right they own is never sufficient because this resource, rather than the land, is the binding constraint on production. Usually, those who possess 2–4 hours sell their water. Those who possess more than 4 hours either sell their water or buy more water to extend their farming operations. Thus, selling and buying water is very common practice. Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco 225 Permanent rights Selling permanent water rights is still quite rare. Each year, only 50–60 hours of permanent water rights are sold, and usually by those who own very small time shares—so small (usually 10–30 minutes) that it is not profitable to retain the right. Rarely does anyone owning more than 3 hours sells his/her water right. Few shareholders buy water rights. Their strategy is to look for small shareholders and progressively concentrate water property by hourly purchases. The advantages of concentrating water property are reflected in prices; the smaller the share, the lower the price per hour. Ten minutes can be purchased at less than 7000 DH/h (half the normal price). Thirty minutes costs 10,000 DH/h. In this way, one powerful farmer has accumulated 100 hours of water rights. To ensure a reliable cash flow, he can profitably sell 50 hours for 70,000 DH/season. He himself can use the remaining 50 hours. Net benefits from a cubic meter of irrigation water to grow onions According to Ait Ouallal farmers, 1 ha of onions necessitates a water right of 10 hours for at least 4 months (April–July). This purchase amounts to 10 h * 3600 s/h * 20 l/s / 1000 l/m3 = 720 m3 every irrigation turn of 7 days. Over 4 months (17 turns), the crop water requirement is 12,340 m3. Apart from irrigated water, it costs on average of 30,000 DH/ha to produce onions. The average yield is 50 metric tons/ha. The onion selling price is highly variable (table 12.7). Farmers remember an exceptionally good year (1992) when onions sold for 5 DH/kg! One bad selling year, the farmers had to feed onions to their cattle because the price was too low. The milk ended up smelling of onions! With the benefit of irrigation, farmers estimate that, on average, the net benefit (receipts minus expenses) from onions is 30,000 DH/ha. This net profit corresponds to a water productivity of 30,000/12,340 = 2.43 DH/m3 of water, and a profit of 2.34-0.65 Table 12.7 Onion Price, 2000–05 = 1.78 DH/m3 net of the price of water. Farmers remark that 1.78 DH/m3 is higher than the lowest Year DH/kg price that potable water is sold for in Meknes. 2005 2.5 If risk were not an issue, Bitit farmers should 2004 0.2 plant as many onions as possible because they look 2003 3.0 very profitable on average. However, in case of 2002 3.5 1.5 over-production, farmers risk losing profitability. 2001 2000 1.5 In addition, the quantity of water used to produce 226 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS onions is very high. Logically, farmers should switch to a more efficient, on-farm water application type of irrigation, that is, from surface to drip irrigation. Farmers recognize that, under drip irrigation, onion yields double, while water consumption is almost halved. The water saved could be either sold or used to increase the irrigated acreage. These arguments are not convincing to farmers because they are particularly afraid of onion over-production. They prefer to cope with price variability by reducing risks and balancing their cropping pattern. Farmers have developed specific strategies such as, “If March is dry, the onion season will be good.” It would be very interesting to further study this question. Nevertheless, the price of water at 0.65 DH/m3 appears affordable compared to its productivity (2.43 DH/m3). Alternative Markets for Water Municipal water The municipal water market is one alternative. According to farmers, so far the municipal water agency of Meknes (RADEM) does not appear interested in buying water from them as long as its water needs (approximately 120,000 m3/day) are covered by the 800 l/s of spring water plus the additional tubewell water it buys from the Office National de l’Eau Potable (ONEP) at approximately 3 DH/m3. However, population growth is expanding demand for municipal water. Moreover, supply alternatives are becoming limited. Finally, aquifer levels fall every year while pumping costs increase. Farmers think this ever-growing demand may influence RADEM to enter into negotiations with them. To date, the balance of power is with RADEM. Farmers accuse RADEM of inefficient management, specifically, of having very low water efficiency in its conveyance and distribution to urban consumers. According to the farmers, a large water leak can be observed close to the municipal water intake from Si Tahar spring. Farmers believe that RADEM does not sell municipal water in Meknes at a high enough price to create incentives for efficient use. Farmers’ feelings are a mix, first, of apprehension of RADEM trying to appropriate more water from the springs, and, second, of hope that RADEM will buy water from them at a market price. If the Vizirial decree of November 23, 1924 is invoked, their apprehension of additional water diversion by RADEM is not unwarranted. Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco 227 Mineral water Recently, in 2004, a mineral water bottling company proposed to buy water from Bitit farmers at 40 DH/m3. In the first stage, the factory would treat 40 l/s, which will be doubled in a later stage. This deal is seen as exceptionally good since a 1-hour water right corresponds to a monthly revenue of approximately 7,000 DH. However, farmers face two challenges. 1. Securing the authorization from the Sebou River Basin Agency to finalize the deal. Securing this authorization is not straightforward. Article 9 of the Law 10-95 of August 16, 1995 indicates that “…irrigation water rights can be sold with, and for the benefit, of the land it irrigates, or independently from the land but only under the express condition that the buyer owns land to which the water rights will be linked.” Bitit farmers believe that their water rights are not linked to any agricultural use of waters and that they are free to sell their water to consumers willing to pay the acceptable price. From their point of view, Law 10-95 is prohibiting maximization of water productivity and should be revised or better interpreted. 2. Securing an agreement among farmers on how to work out a group contract since every shareholder wants to sell his or her water right to the company. At present, farmers have almost stopped selling irrigation water rights among themselves because they believe that much better prices could be obtained from RADEM, or perhaps a mineral water company Conclusions Three important lessons from the Bitit irrigation system are of relevance to those who manage large-scale irrigation systems and to others who are in charge of water resource management in Morocco and even throughout the MNA Region: 1. A clear water allocation rule, internalized at the farmer level, is the basis for any good water management practice. Transparency in as- 228 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS signing water appropriation rights to farmers is the simplest water allocation rule to reduce conflicts. 2. The free water market of Bitit has contributed to keep water rights updated. Small water shares could be sold or hired, and consequently put to their highest economic use. Similarly, a free water market is the most effective way of keeping a clear water allocation rule updated. This rule is the cement that links the water users and keeping their association alive and active. What might have happened over time if water rights were not a marketable good? 3. Free water market is certainly equally contributing to the search for increasing productivity of water. A water price of 0.65 DH/m3 is a good indicator. It is as much as 3 times the tariff of water in large-scale systems (Tadla, for instance). A net benefit of approximately 2.63 DH/m3 also is higher than the more modest values encountered in large-scale systems. However, application efficiency of water remains very low in Bitit. Why farmers are not improving their water application efficiency is a question that remains to be tackled. One would expect a rapid development of trickle systems, especially because they are heavily subsidized by government. How Did a Small, Poor, and Remote Rural Village in Djibouti Recently Become a Government Priority to Receive Water Supply and Sanitation? Sarah Houssein, in collaboration with Julia Bucknall and Nathalie Abu-Ata 13 he case of Goubeto village in rural Djibouti illustrates the important role of local and traditional authorities, in the absence of state intervention, in solving conflicts through negotiations over the allocation of scarce water resources among community members.† Moreover, as a consequence of the severe and worsening water supply and sanitation crisis, progressive loss of traditional values, and rise of the previously marginalized voices of youth and women, an inclusive and participatory new structure was able to emerge and make water for their village a priority for the central government. Goubeto was established in 1910, first as a maintenance facility for the railway under construction between Djibouti and Ethiopia, and later as a train station depot. The village is not connected to the national road network and, except for Djibouti city, is far from any major cities. Goubeto is 71 km from the city of Ali-Sabieh, which is the district capital. Primarily former railway workers and their families, along with settled nomads, inhabit Goubeto. The climate is arid and hot, and the village is poorly endowed with water resources. Goubeto’s water reservoir has a maximum storage capacity of 200m3 per month. The reservoir’s capacity is dependent on the regular provision of fuel for pumping, which is subject to a quota and is delivered from Ali-Sabieh. Until the early 1980s, villagers received potable water from Djibouti city, and trucks supplied the precious resource twice a week. Accord- T † Background Paper for 2007 “MNA Development Report on Water.” 229 230 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS ing to the villagers, at that time, there were no major conflicts over the allocation of water. Attracted by the reliable water supply and the availability of basic social infrastructure, nomads, who had lost their livestock as a result of severe and frequent droughts, progressively settled in the village. The settlement of nomads was further encouraged by the construction of a well in 1980, which supplied Goubeto with a certain amount of bulk water once a month. Water thus played a critical role in the growth and expansion of the village. However, beginning in the mid-1980s, water supply in Goubeto became erratic and scarce, in particular during the hot summer seasons, due to population growth and the lack of proper maintenance of water infrastructure. As a result, conflicts over water allocation flared on occasion between the settled populations and the nomads as well as among settlers themselves. For example, nomads would tamper with the water reservoirs and canals and collect the water without prior agreement with local villagers. Traditional authorities, such as the village chief or the community of elders (Conseil des Sages), played a critical role in efforts to mediate and solve these conflicts. The Conseil des Sages also oversaw repairs of tampered water infrastructure and made decisions on water allocation. However, because of its physical remoteness, the village of Goubeto was never a priority for the central government. Technicians were rarely sent from the central government to Goubeto to perform routine maintenance on water infrastructure. In spite of the involvement of traditional authorities in solving conflicts over the use of water, the community of Goubeto lacked the knowledge, financial capacity, and political connections to find a long-term solution to its intermittent water supply. In the late 1990s, as a result of worsening water quality, poor sanitation and hygiene, recurrent droughts, and malnutrition, an epidemic of diarrhea broke out, killing 12 people. The deteriorating water quality clearly posed a serious environmental threat to the residents. Some of the villagers decided to take action and lobby the central government to obtain public assistance and funding to improve the water supply and sanitation systems. The fact that the villagers supported the political opposition provided another incentive for the government to react quickly to the rapidly deteriorating environmental health situation in Goubeto. As a result of the above developments, a water association was created in 2004. It serves as the interface between the central government and the various communities in the village. The association How Did a Small, Poor, and Remote Rural Village in Djibouti Receive WSS? 231 includes a broad representation of local stakeholders, including elders and delegates from youth and women groups. A project to drill a new well 1 km from Goubeto is underway, and it will be powered by a solar energy system. Goubeto offers a useful case study that illustrates how traditional authorities can play a critical role in providing water to local communities. However, because of the physical remoteness and political seclusion of the village vis-à-vis the central government, the traditional authorities were unable to significantly influence decisionmakers, nor could they count on the availability of decentralized local water institutions. This dynamic changed with the lobbying pressure imposed by the villagers and with the consequent establishment of a new village water association. Empowered by an externally funded project on environmental health, the villagers were successful in initiating the necessary links between the communities and the State. Water Conflict in Yemen: The Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms Christopher Ward 14 Y emen has one of the world’s lowest rates of per capita freshwater availability (135 m3/cap/year) in the world.†1 The climate is largely semi-arid or arid. Rainfall is abundant only in the southern uplands. Rainfed agriculture is also possible in the central highlands and escarpments, usually with supplementary water management techniques. Annual rainfall is as low as 100 mm–300 mm in most of the north and east and in the coastal plains. There are no perennial rivers. Water comes from springs, seasonal spate flows, runoff, and groundwater. Historically, Yemenis have been adept at managing their water. They have used elaborate systems of terracing and runoff management, spate diversion, and shallow groundwater management, according to the nature of the resource and the local social organization. Elaborately negotiated systems of rules and organization accompanied the development and management of each water resource. Even so, frequent disputes arose. These were resolved by force of arms, local reconciliation procedures, or traditional judgment. † Background paper prepared for the “MNA Development Report on Water,” 2007. 1 This chapter draws on a background chapter prepared by Said Al-Shaybani and Abdul Salaam Al-Zubayri, “Water Conflicts: Taiz and Tuban Case Study,” as well as on previous work of, and conversations with, numerous colleagues including Said Al-Shaybani, Gerhard Lichtenthaler, H.E. Professor Mohammad Al-Eryani (Minster of Water and Environment, Republic of Yemen), Daniel Varisco, Nina Scherg (GTZ), and Robin Madrid (NDI). Thanks are also due to Jonathan Puddifoot, Gareth Richards, and Adam Taylor-Awny of CARE. The author is grateful for the guidance and comments of Khaled Abu Zeid and Amr Abdel-Megeed of CEDARE, Cairo; and of Julia Bucknall, Nathalie Abu-Ata, and Mesky Brhane of the World Bank, Washington, DC. 233 234 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS In the latter half of the twentieth century, outside forces began to influence these water management customs. These included supplyside forces such as innovations in spate irrigation technology and the irruption of the diesel-powered tubewell. New demand-side forces included the rapid development of market-driven agriculture, an increased consumption of water by households and industry, and a very fast rate of population growth. For years, government policies encouraged development of the resource. Now, virtually all of Yemen’s water resources are in use. This rapid development has brought considerable growth to Yemen, particularly to the agricultural sector (box 14.1), which uses some 90 percent of the total available water resource. However, water demand is still rising; nonrenewable groundwater is being mined; and competition is intensifying among users at the local level and between town and country. Yemen’s central governmental structures are weak and uncertain. The decentralized traditional governance frameworks are facing novel problems. For these reasons, competition has translated into conflict. This chapter examines the nature of this conflict and investigates the ability of Yemeni society to contain it (Ward 2000; World Bank 2005). Supply and Demand Societies developing their water resource have a range of supply and demand management solutions that can be deployed. In Yemen, the supply-side solutions have been largely exhausted, and the only additional developments being made are of meager and marginal resources. For example, wastewater reuse is locally important for periurban production around the few towns that have sewerage plants. However, quantities of wastewater are very small so it is unlikely to be a major source of additional usable water. Numerous small dams are being built with government money to control seasonal wadi flows. However, this program is socially contentious because of the inevitable redistribution of water among communities within the basin. Moreover, this program is of uncertain economic benefit due to its high evaporation rates and sometimes little evidence of improvement in water availability and control, or of incomes (Iskander and Ueda 1999; Lichtenthaler 1999, 10). As water becomes scarcer, the economics of water harvesting have improved slightly. For example, restoration of terraces can be profitable if qat is grown. Other examples are the revival of runoff and cistern and tank systems, often for potable water, as groundwater sources most land was communally owned grazing land. Qat (previously scorned by proud tribesmen as “the tree of the devil”) is being planted on a wide scale. Government improved agricultural profitability with a fruit import ban. this proposition was attractive. the runoff rights from this land belonged to individual proprietors in the bottom lands. and the rule change has been followed ever since. returning migrant workers. Conflict. The population increase was due to natural growth. until the 1970s. Yemen has done little to contain demand. However. extraction of very deep groundwater (over 1 mile down). Box 14. Interest in it initially was sharpened by the government crackdown on smuggling (previously a major income source) after the unification of the country. In recent years. tubewell irrigation could not develop on the slopes. Private tubewell development took off.000 people lived n the basin. Despite being faced with growing water constraints. In Sa’ada. the government has reduced the economic incentives for water development. On the supply side.2 Profitable growth of agriculture was based on the rapid development of groundwater. Some communities are resorting to increasingly marginal systems such as fog harvesting. and desalination are the last—and hugely costly—solutions available. More recently.1 Scarcity. soaring qat demand has made this crop very attractive to farmers. However. However. These changes in the economic incentives and institutional framework for farming have driven very rapid economic and social change in the Sa’ada area. these are a planner’s pipe dream. Continued on next page . a deal was negotiated that allowed the tribal owners of the pasture rights to convert half of the slope land to agriculture on condition that the owner of the runoff rights was compensated with the same right on the other half. Land and water resources have been widely redistributed by market forces. and Adaptation in the Sa’ada Basin Over the past 30 years. Agriculture was not allowed on the grazing lands because it would impair the runoff. by 1997 there were 180. the already very dry Sa’ada Basin in Northern Yemen has experienced a huge population explosion. In 1976 a local cleric promulgated this as a fatwa. Returnees from the Gulf 1 brought capital in search of investment opportunities. A new elite of commercial farmers has emerged. With the growing profitability of agriculture and the availability of remittance capital. In 1975. Therefore. so that orange and pomegranate farming looked to be an attractive investment. and investment in the land suited the traditional values of this tribal region. However.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 235 dwindle. Many tribal communities privatized their common lands and distributed these lands to each household. in such a poor country. and internal in-migration in response to economic opportunity Much of this opportunity has been in agriculture.000. interbasin water transfer. 40. see chapter on comparative water laws in this volume. These tensions may be spilling over into the growing fundamentalist sectarianism and civil strife in the region.2 However. only qat provides high enough returns to justify additional investment in expensive water saving (Bazza 1999. However. the water table has plummeted. 2. “The potential effects of the expulsion of over a million Yemeni workers from Gulf Cooperation Council states in retribution for Yemen’s support of Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War immediately increased Yemen’s population by 9 percent” (Millich and Al-Sabbry 1995. Government is promoting others. For details on water laws and regulations in Yemen. such as water rights.” ( Lichtenthaler) Source: Lichtenthaler 1999.236 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 14. 2 . Katariya 1999). such as drip and bubbler microirrigation. have attained wide currency through the market. The Sa’ada story is a remarkable example of economic growth. and Adaptation in the Sa’ada Basin (continued) As a result. People spend about 25 percent–34 percent of their cash income on qat (Weir 1985). mangoes. perhaps 75 percent of Yemeni adults chew qat leaves each afternoon. but market profitability is not assured. In some areas. through cost-sharing programs. There is growing awareness of the problem but little expectation of equitable or tribal solutions. the government has shied away from strict application of economic measures to manage demand. The 2003 Water Law introduced a range of regulatory demand management measures. including citrus. such as PVC piping. communities in the region have not yet shown a comparable “downside” capacity to adapt to scarcity. for the present. is possible. …The wealth generated by qat for its cultivators has undoubtedly stabilized the rate of rural-to-urban migration at around a 7 percent annual growth rate since 1970 (World Bank 1993)” (Milich and Al-Sabbry 1995. and springs have dried up. 1). Notes: 1. for a period lasting at least five hours. such as energy and water pricing or the development of water markets. Conflicts over water and land have become more bitter. aided by the capacity to adapt to market opportunities by changing the rules about farming the slopes.1 Scarcity. and regulatory control. Conflict. licensing. and qat. “Because the qat (Catha edulis) plant produces alkaloid stimulants. Further intensification. Farmers have eagerly switched to higher value crops. “Tribal communities and villages are not yet addressing the groundwater problem cooperatively. 1). Technical solutions to reduce demand also are available. through greenhouse technology. Some. these are generally beyond the capability of the Yemeni administration to implement. for example. and women and children bear the brunt of scarcity (Lichtenthaler 1999. Small farmers. water scarcity in Yemen is reaching a critical point at which it might not only constrain economic development but also threaten social stability. Conflict and Adaptation Managing conflict is crucial for Yemen. Thus. Changes in water and land use have affected historical patterns of wadi flows and groundwater recharge. Al-Shaybani 2005. the subject of this chapter. Many wells have dried up. Sometimes whole communities have disappeared: a village in Jabal Eial Yazeed district was abandoned due to lack of water. Economizing through intensification is their typical first response (Moench 1997. There are reports of villages in Abyan and Lahej disappearing and of a steady rhythm of depopulation in Hajja (Al-Zubayri 2005a). Some farmers’ responses to scarcity were mentioned above.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 237 Scarcity Not surprisingly. The economic and social impacts of scarcity are unevenly distributed. With less water available. 7. . Some farmers turn to purchasing water or return to traditional water harvesting. 10). 54). is only one of a range of responses to water scarcity and the most disruptive. At a certain point. Many downstream communities now have less spate flow and groundwater than they had a few years ago. Yemen shows proof of water scarcity. many farmers who lived where groundwater levels had fallen more than 50 m have abandoned their farms. many farmers and communities feel the pain. 10). poor downstream communities. Conflict. drawing down groundwater dried up the springs. an examination of how conflicts are resolved is important. leaving the farm is the only option. as in the Sana’a Basin (Lichtenthaler 2003. With increasing reports of conflict (Ward 2005). The process of “resource capture” involved in uncontrolled drilling and extraction of groundwater and in the “race to the bottom” of the aquifer has led to the economic marginalization of those unable to compete in power and money. The rapid depletion of groundwater is well documented. 10). In the Sa’ada Basin. Some have sold the rights to the sand under their farms to building contractors (Lichtenthaler 1999. and groundwater salinization and pollution are worsening as aquifers are exhausted. In many areas. In 1970. the history of water management in the Wadi Dahr has been marked by conflict and contentious judgments. Once. Strict Rules Have Governed Water Management in Yemen’s Wadi Dahr In the tenth century CE. but the damage to the property of the Sultan did not dishonor the daily. Wadi Dahr had a long. some of the guards of the Sultan diverted the stream to the Sultan’s vineyards without the knowledge of the irrigation turn keeper (daily). this rhetoric was disingenuous. …adaptive capacity [may be] present in a form…capable of resisting resource capture if correctly harnessed. Some observers have traced evidence of adaptive capacity in Yemen. 110). the tubewell was bursting into the finely balanced water economy of Wadi Dahr close to Sana’a. he was hanged.2). the fields are irrigated one after the other.” Certainly. conflict is a symptom. A downstream community in the wadi complained to the court that upstream motor pumps had reduced the stream flow and disturbed “laws and customs…by which we have been guided for thousands of years” (Mundy 1995). Indeed.” Source: Mundy 1989. As Mundy (1995) amply records. The rich and Box 14. . which have progressively crystallized into “established tradition” (Mundy 1995. Turton and Lichtenthaler (2002) found that “…there is a vibrant indigenous culture (in Yemen) embracing a traditional value system…. The daily then destroyed all the vines. However. . well-documented history of managing its water resource (box 14. Wadi Dahl’s conflict also got resolved—but not by the courts. Yemen has a long history of conflict and of subsequent accommodation of change.2 For Centuries. not the issue. if the da’il was not just in his duties. Finding long-run economic and institutional solutions to the underlying problems is the key to both avoiding and resolving conflicts. the geographer al-Hamden wrote: “In the irrigation system of Wadi Dahr. Turton (1999) sees responses to scarcity and conflictual situations as a test of “adaptive capacity”: the ability of a society to accommodate change by adjusting rules. 99. the early period of modern groundwater development.238 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS However. before the fuel price increases of 2008. administrative. raising farmer incomes. it has been clear that measures taken to date are inadequate to deal with the problem of water scarcity. Nevertheless. credit. 3 . elimination of credit subsidies for agriculture. “The stream dwindled and died. but no one with influence any longer cared. During the early period of the modern state (up to 1990). These economic rules have changed over time. 116). Government responded to these with at least five demand management measures: increases in the diesel price (that rapidly were overtaken by inflation). the government has played a critical role in setting the economic rules for water development and management. regulation and taxation of groundwater equipment. and other inputs low. Rules Governing Water Government as a Rule Maker The capacity of the Yemeni government to affect outcomes in the water sector is restricted by its weak technical. signs of water scarcity were beginning to emerge. By contrast. In a second period (to 2000). modification of the fruit and vegetable import ban. and consolidating its alliances with many important power groups. Government thus was able to achieve three major objectives: expanding irrigation and thereby legitimizing itself.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 239 influential downstream farmers simply invested in the new pump technology themselves. A permissive attitude toward qat and the ban on fruit and vegetable imports increased farming profitability.” A new equilibrium emerged: assets were rebalanced and concentrated a little more in the hands of the richer. the domestic price of diesel in Yemen was 20% of the free market benchmark price (World Bank 2009). and enforcement capacity. these same public policies penalized the traditional water harvesting and rainfed systems of the poor. and by directing public and donor investment into rapid development of the water resource. government was able to promote development of water supply by setting the price of diesel. Since 2000. Reluctant to use the levers such as diesel pricing3 that could really influence out- In the 4th quarter of 2007. The conflict was resolved—even if not fairly—and a new “established tradition” emerged (Mundy 1995. and projects to support increased water productivity in agriculture. or “the property of no one. So far. Archaeology attests to rules for spate management in the pre-Islamic period that are recognizable today. outside a “protection zone.240 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS comes. The 2003 Water Law defined water rights and instituted a system of licensing. One bright spot is that the case studies discussed below show that in some areas. The water is released from the higher field when that field has “drunk”—this may be when the water has filled the field up to the height of a man’s knee or higher (Maktari 1971). government increasingly has turned to promoting water use efficiency through projects and to regulatory approaches. Some water rules of today were documented in medieval times (Breton 1999. The National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) was empowered to work with basin committees. the impact of both the projects and NWRA’s outreach programs has been limited. Al-Shaybani (2003. Some principles of the Shari’a affecting water are generally accepted throughout Yemen: Water is mubah. Upstream riparians have priority: al ‘ala fa al ‘ala. priority is given to upstream diversion structures. In subsequent floods. religious authorities were important in setting rules and determining disputes. local authorities. the water channeled off at the diversion structure flows down from field to field. 23) records a Document of Seventy Rules drafted and signed by sheikhs three centuries ago to codify common understanding of customary rules. and local communities on regulatory and self-regulation approaches. No one can deny a person drinking water—“the right of thirst. Wells must be spaced a certain distance apart. In spate irrigation.” However. Water may not be alienated from the land. Local Rules for Water Management Over millennia. every community in Yemen has evolved rules for water management. the round may start with the . Al-Eryani and others 1998). NWRA may be called in to arbitrate disputes. These customary rules—‘urf—are generally consistent with the Shari’a. In most systems.” or harim (Rule 58 in the Document of Seventy Rules). the usufruct can be appropriated by those who develop it. particularly nontribal areas.” The specific rules attached to each water source vary across the country. Historically (but much less so today). In some schemes. They go to the upper region. . Sheikh Gebrati. When a World-Bank-financed project modernized the system in 1973. the situation became better for all. “Daily conflicts over water” were reported. Even some lands in the upper region no longer got base flow due to the demands of the bananas and to illegal diversions by big landowners. The rate is lower in the middle area. or that the water in different periods is allocated to downstream diversion structures (as at Wadi Zabid. there may be rules that a proportion of each flood must pass down (Al-Shaybani 2005). When the canal crosses the fields of others. Additional diversion structures downstream may receive water only when the upstream structure is breached. and the upstream farmers planted bananas. Source: Al-Eryani and others 1998.3). as in Wadi Zabid (box 14. The channel master allocates water to plots and decides which plot will get irrigated first by the next flow. and negligible in the lower area.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 241 last field left unwatered previously. canals may carry the water to farther fields. The rules divide the waters among three “regions. Small farmers lower down were forced to sell and to become sharecroppers. Box 14. In the rainy season. the spring spate is allocated to one bank and the summer spate to the other. The fruit import ban changed incentives. There was also some expansion of the irrigated area upstream. which in the case of traditional structures is a regular occurrence. there are base flows only. The rules are based on “upstream first”: al ‘ala fa al ‘ala. which needed irrigation every five days.3).” The channel master collects charges proportional to the irrigated area. and the state enforced water discipline. In Wadi al Jawf. After 1985. The conflicts claimed several lives each year.3 Wadi Zabid Downstream Farmers Conflict with Upstreamers Water in Wadi Zabid’s spate system is managed according to rules devised over six centuries ago by the Moslem scholar. Prior to 1973. many conflicts over water distribution were recorded.” In the dry season. Water control improved. box 14. The rule is: “Not twice in 14 days. when the floods come. the spate is divided among: Upper region: First 97 days Middle region: Next 20 days Lower region: Last 35 days. matters deteriorated. a fee is payable. Alternatively. These block allocations then were further divided within each community according to time-share ownership rights. The contractor demobilized at once. Water distribution was overseen by local irrigation supervisors. However.242 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 14. Source: Ward 1994.4 Bloody Conflict between Traditional Wadi Al Jawf Spate Rules and Modernization In the 1980s. Al-Shaybani (2005. although sheikhs ruled in disputes (box 14. a certain number of hours once a fortnight. and the project quickly ended with minimal disbursement.5) (Mundy 1995. The first night after the contractor had mobilized. Traditionally.4) (Dresch 1993. each spate flow would be divided 60:40. In springs. the tribe brought up guns and shelled the contractor’s camp. and information asymmetry between upstream and downstream rightholders create a rich arena for misunderstanding and dispute (box 14. Clearly. Varisco and others 2005). a border province with an historical centrifugal tendency and characterized by strong tribal values. roughly the historic ratios of the spring to the summer flood. In Wadi Dahr. However. 25) lists 18 different rules that may govern spate water distribution in different systems. which have more stable flow regimes. . rights to spring water were divided exactly between lower and upper communities: 15 days each (until the springs dried up). The World Bank appraisal mission got confirmation of this agreement from the tribal sheikhs. in future. Maktari 1971. Instead. The major component was to improve spate irrigation in the wadi. for example. 23. as very large canals would have been needed on either bank. 62). and the second season (kharif ) to the tribe on the other bank. the first spate season (seif ) was allocated to the tribe on one bank. the tribe that was to receive the lesser share changed its mind. A contract was let and the contractor mobilized. the rules for spate are highly evolved and locally differentiated. not sheikhs. rights normally are attached to the land. the World Bank financed a project to develop farming in wadi al Jawf. and the project went ahead. progressive changes in wadi morphology. However. the contract was cancelled. These rights could be exchanged with other users to suit farming needs. an agreement was made with the relevant tribes that. The rights are denominated in time-shares. maintaining this distribution would have made for a very expensive project. it also is clear that the unpredictability of spate events. The settlement was accepted by all parties (Mundy 1995. 64). 51). . In other locales water may be sold to outsiders. The case was solved by traditional judicial means. Groundwater freed farmers from tedious and risky cooperation for a very limited. assisted by the amin (legal clerk) and a surveyor. However. in Sa’adah. Each group of irrigators works out its own rules for sharing capital and operating costs and for taking water turns—usually a time-share. including Ta’iz and Sana’a (which gets two-thirds of its water from private wells). There are some traditional rules over access. Factors Underlying Conflict Conflict over water in Yemen is nothing new. Runoff rights are assigned from specific slopes to parcels of bottom land in a proportion—sometimes up to 20 times the area of bottomland—adequate to grow a crop on the run-on land. 73) records that “until the mid 1970s water scarcity in Sa’ada was at the heart of most tribal conflict. It is claimed that. for example. 3). These runoff rights are very important. Many wells near cities.6) (Moench 1997). Lichtenthaler 2003). found that the claimant was in the right. In some localities. shared wells are common. it is this very freedom that is driving a new generation of conflicts (Al-Shaybani 2005. and become a business. Ironically. Lichtenthaler (1997.” In fact. houses have no cisterns for domestic water because the cisterns would infringe the runoff rights of others (Lichtenthaler 2003. Guarantors for each side agreed to hold their parties to any agreement. Every landowner has the right to abstract groundwater by digging under owned land. harim well-spacing rules. The sheikhs. Rules governing water sales are unclear. water sales between farmers are common. fixed resource by offering an apparently unlimited new source.5 Sheikhs Adjudicate a Water Dispute in Wadi Dahr A farmer was accused of moving a stone and deflecting the water flow of the spate course.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 243 Box 14. groundwater seemed to offer a way out of old patterns of conflict. are wholly or partly converted to urban water supply for profit (box 14. In parts of Northern Yemen. no traditional rules exist for quantities extracted or water charges (Al-Shaybani 2005. van Steenbergen 1997. Local farmers needing water may purchase it from adjacent well owners. a large fleet of private tankers lines up at the wells around the city that have converted from agriculture to water supply. As water sales become more common with the growing water scarcity. This section discusses some types of competition for scarce water. personal communication from Gerhard Lichtenthaler). 138. 106). To establish ownership. Types of Competition Fast-rising demand and no new supply are creating intense competition characteristic of scarcity. generally because of these wells’ proximity to the road. The cost is huge. communities and government are giving thought to how water markets could be made equitable and less opportunistic. Source: Moench 1997. the fact that well owners sell at low prices to neighbors for agriculture and at much higher prices for the tanker market does seem to reflect the recognition of the traditional principles of local cooperation over water. the very poor farmers in the Tehama Plain have seen not only surface water but also groundwater recharge diminish. Although doing so seems to run against Islamic principles.7). The advent of the tubewell intensified competition for groundwater. For example. However. these water sales underline that water has become an economic commodity in the area. or purchase tankers from farther afield to apply it sparingly to the highest value crops such as qat. A classic form—upstream/downstream competition—has taken on a new form as upstreamers have employed new technology to capture more water (box 14. it is enough to drill a .244 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 14. groundwater in Yemen is an open-access resource. For Ta’iz city. a widespread response to water scarcity has been the emergence of informal water markets.6 Growing Water Sales around Ta’iz Raise Equity Questions In the Ta’iz area. as spate-fed and pump-fed schemes have been developed (Dresch 2000. Domestic and industrial consumers or the numerous bottling shops around town then pay the tanker owners for supplies delivered to their door. and farmers are charged more—more than $1/m3 —if the crop is qat. Similarly the many small dams now being constructed throughout the highlands are changing the upstream/downstream distribution of water (Katariya 1999. Apart from local restrictions on well spacing. ” Farmers are only now coming to understand that. In some places. Conversely. In some areas. the incentives are competitive exploitation and the “race to the bottom. Thereafter. should water somehow return to the wells. often becoming violent. Water in the periurban zone . once also a rich agricultural zone. women wait for 6–7 hours daily to fill up plastic containers of water for domestic use. With the effective privatization of the entire water resource. Fierce rural-urban competition has taken hold over water resources in the urban environs. Dry wells dot the fields. A few remain. but the whole community must pay in terms of water scarcity and rising costs. This fact has been documented for many areas of the highlands and for the southern uplands. All of Yemen’s growing towns are desperately short of water. spending their time and the remittance money sent by others in the small dusty stores that are remnants of more prosperous days in the valley. is now desolate. Source: Moench 1997. water shortage is constraining certain crafts including tanning and leather working (Varisco and others 2005. There also is competition between groundwater and surface water. the pipes have been removed—sold since they no longer serve any purpose. depending on the shape of the aquifer and the gradients and rates of flow. In most areas. The drying up of wells is reimposing on women and children the corvée of the daily trudge to and from more distant wells for drinking water. Most men have migrated in search of work.7 Upstream Prospers but Downstream Area Desolate in Wadi Bani Khawlan The upper part of Wadi Bani Khawlan in Ta’iz Governorate is covered with crops and lush fruit trees. however. upstream diversion of surface water or runoff can reduce infiltration of groundwater for downstream users.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 245 Box 14. well. The lower area of the wadi. Hydrological connectivity means that overuse of groundwater can deplete springs. The well owners get the benefit of groundwater from the aquifers.11). pipes still cross the ground ready to transport water to waiting fields. Particular tension is emerging between farmers and community drinking water needs. over-pumped tubewells will dry up one another and also may dry up hand-dug shallow wells (Dresch 2000. Where wells still operate in the lower wadi (mostly at points at which minor side wadis enter the main one). competition between well owners and the rest of the community is growing. 165–67). World Bank 1997. lower Al Haima wadi was a vibrant agricultural community. the village men took to the hills with their arms. the villagers’ wells were dry. The Department of Agriculture ran a small horticultural station. They took up arms again and disconnected one of the water supply wells. increasingly is a commodity for sale to towns.246 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 14. The villagers were told that the new wells were in the deep aquifer. Generally. Local inhabitants grew high-value fruit. Even drinking water is in very short supply. and qat. Eventually. Ta’iz city came in 1987 to drill more wells. Predictable flows such as spring waters do not—once the ownership and management rules are agreed. The same is true for the wells in al Dhabab that supply Ta’iz. Varisco’s argument corresponds to the historical facts. conflict is only one possible outcome of scarcity and the pace of change.8 Urban Water Tactics Dry up and Pauperize Al Haima Twenty-five years ago. women. land and water sales have been prevented by community action. Under what conditions is scarcity likely to cause conflict? Varisco (1983) argued that predictability of the water flow influences the level of conflict. The locals stopped the city’s drilling rigs by force of arms. Far more conflict . when Ta’iz city drilled some wells and pumped out water from the valley for its urban water supply. and men travel long distances by donkey or camel to collect water at the few taps that still run. and would not affect the shallow farm wells. The army came. The villagers were obliged to surrender their claims. The problem began in the early 1980s. By 1992. Twenty truckloads of soldiers moved in. Now the area is dry. Unpredictable flows such as spate give rise to intense stresses and conflict. Sources: Moench 1997. however. but the villagers were refused permission to deepen their own wells. as is recorded for Sa’ada. The President of the Republic intervened. 500m down. In some villages. However. a minister came down from Sana’a and brokered a settlement. and five sheikhs were put in prison. How Competition under Scarcity Turns into Conflict As discussed above. Drying qat plants struggle to survive on water purchased from distant wells in tankers. well owners “form a dominant coalition that prevents others from blocking their sales” (Lichtenthaler 1999). people found their shallow wells drying up. Dead trees surround the deserted agricultural extension office. vegetables. Children. conflict over groundwater was limited by the above factors. One additional important factor influencing whether conflict will develop is power relations. rural people everywhere are aware that groundwater is a hydraulically connected and fast-depleting resource. A fourth factor is the degree of symmetry of cause and effect. Depleting groundwater affects a broader community. individual well systems involve only their owners. By contrast. A second factor that can affect the level of conflict is the number of people sharing in the system. particularly visibility and symmetry. Large systems of water-sharing among many irrigators generate more potential for stress at both the human and the hydraulic levels because individual control diminishes. Every new well simply subtracts from the finite resource—and the wealth—available to existing participants. On the other hand.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 247 is recorded over spate than over springs. In al Dumayd. and the farmers in the adjacent smaller farms were forced to abandon them. and smaller farmers. Stealing a neighbor’s water concerns only two parties. however. a direct cause and effect relationship is not as discernible. This growing awareness of the competitive nature of groundwater extraction has led to increasing conflict (previous section). However. a big trader established a 10-ha citrus orchard with 8 pumps. it becomes a zero-sum game. A third factor is visibility. in the latter case. Once the aquifer is fully developed. the depletion of an underground resource for which even the experts do not understand the hydrogeology and for which the pumps that are depleting the groundwater are on private land is hard to contest. Now. However. Thus. As a result. A moved boundary stone or a turn at a stream that lasts longer than agreed is a highly visible infraction. but less over spring water. who have bigger land areas to drill over and more financial resources to dig wells. and it is more difficult to claim harm to identified individuals. it is not surprising that considerable conflict is reported over spate flows. 188) A similar situation exists in spate . a number of wells in the vicinity dried up. The groundwater problem highlights the unequal competition between large farmers. Conflict did not ensue because “the [small] farmers were aware that a big neighbour has no obligation to share” (Lichtenthaler 2003. whose wells dry up or who find it harder and more expensive to access communal or third-party sources. Until recently. his explanation does little to explain the surge of conflict in recent years in nonspate systems. Meanwhile…there is speculation of retribution attacks on government forces which used heavy artillery and tanks to shell several villages in al-Jawf.* Scores of villagers were arrested and hundreds fled their homes. the state has become the dominant investor in rural development.9 Water and Land Disputes Leave Many Dead “Six people were fatally shot and seven injured in tribal clashes in Hajja which broke out two weeks ago and continued till Tuesday between the tribes of al Hamareen and Bani Dawood. Security stopped the fighting and a cease fire settlement for a year was forged by key sheikhs and politicians. . In the 1970s.9). Consequently. Certainly. There is some evidence that conflict is becoming more frequent.…” (Al Thawra. These interventions have not always had a positive Box 14.248 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS irrigation in which the “weak” tail-enders feel aggrieved but powerless to change things (case of Wadi Tuban Case Study D ahead). Oil revenues now are centralized in government hands. much of the development of infrastructure and services was privately funded by community associations and philanthropists.” (Al Shoura. who used heavy artillery and rockets to shell the village. 29 1999) Note: * = See more on the Qurada dispute in Case Study A ahead. Public Intervention Also Can Provoke Conflict The role of the state in Yemen has grown enormously in recent years. April 29. 1999) “Sixteen people have been killed and tens injured since the outbreak of armed clashes between the villagers of Qurada and state troops. The fighting was triggered by controversy over agricultural lands and water of which both sides claim possession. Government interventions also seem to be more common. These funding sources dropped away with the decline of remittances and the politicization of the community development movement. June 20–21. and the growing volumes of donor aid are channeled through government. tribal confrontations over water and land of substantial scale and intensity receive frequent notice in the Yemeni press (box 14. The incident began when Qurada refused to share well water with neighbouring villagers…. low professional standards. The principal causes appear to be inadequate hydrological and engineering studies. frequently no downstream development of irrigation canals has been provided for. A survey showed that. Instead. However. which require irrigation seven times a month. Public interventions in rural water supply and sanitation also have created situations of potential conflict. for more than 80 percent of farmers in Wadi Rima. low or nonexistent service. 18). the poor performance of these dams creates conflictual stresses within the community and with government. Many conflictual situations have been caused. Changes underway to “demand-driven” approaches should help. The development of upstream diversion structures on spate schemes in a series of public projects from the 1950s to the 1990s led to a de facto change in the spate water allocation rules (UNDP 1992. siltation is very rapid. Water quantities often have disappointed. at least in part. and a potent brew of tensions that often explode into conflict (Al-Shaybani 2005: 12–14. Apart from the upstream/downstream stresses already mentioned. The negative distributional effect of this is stronger because the head-enders (for example in Wadi Mawr and Wadi Rima) generally are the better off. including the very water-intensive bananas. an approach that focused exclusively on engineering issues and does not even ask how the water is to be used—sometimes it is not even . inappropriate technology imposed on the community. and grow higher value crops. and communities are not trained in operation and maintenance of the asset. 106–07). increase their cropping intensity. there is a legacy of disappointed expectations. authoritarian approach of the implementing agencies. The principal causes have been the lack of community consultation and the inflexible. water delivery was not improved by the World-Bank-financed improvements (Al-Eryani and others 1998. and little thought given to how subsequent operations were to be managed and financed. and alleged corruption. More land is now irrigated at the head of the schemes and less at the tail. 12). 20).Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 249 impact on water dispute and conflict (Varisco and others 2005. larger landowners. head-enders were able to take all of the base flow with impunity. 32). Problems have included an approach to siting projects that focused exclusively on engineering issues while ignoring community wishes and existing tensions (Al-Shaybani 2005. by public interventions. The government-f inanced program for the construction of small dams also is creating many potential conflicts. A similar pattern is arising with the mango groves at Abs. clear which villages or individuals are the intended beneficiaries— and generally no provision for adequate upstream and downstream consultations (Al-Shaybani 2005. Government has learned the lesson and is trying other approaches.250 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 14. In the 1990s. Ward 2005. other communities in the Ta’iz region have fiercely guarded their water sources and chased off government prospectors. The ensuing drying up of that once fertile valley was a well documented national scandal. In many places. . Mangoes were promoted by the public subsidy for drip irrigation. these trees now cannot be sustained by the water resource. 20. personal communication from Gerhard Lichtenthaler). However. Agricultural programs that have pushed farmers to invest in groundwater for cash crops are creating conflictual situations. The irrigation area was not developed. Urban water supply. government is using a form of contract in the Sana’a basin that is intended to reserve the deep aquifer for water supply. which was not used. Since then. villagers obtained a grant from USAID to construct the AlMakik Dam. but the water resource is rapidly disappearing. As a result of the incomplete planning. disagreement over whether to use a new dam for groundwater recharge or for surface irrigation led to conflict in which one person was killed. In time. who intended to pump the water to lands previously unirrigated. At Shahik in Khawlan Al-Tiyal district. the public utility aggressively transferred water from the southern end of the green al Haima Wadi to Ta’iz city. they made no prior agreement about who the beneficiaries would be. the farmers are likely to engage in some form of conflict with the government (Bazza 1999). the project comprised only the completed dam. while giving farmers a free hand over the unconnected shallow alluvial aquifer. Sources: Vermillion and others 2004. For example. The government’s 30-year promotion in Sa’ada of oranges and pomegranates through subsidies and protection bound farmers to a huge long-term investment in tree crops.10 Conflicts over Dam Construction in Hobah and Shahik End in Waste and Death At Hobah in Al-Mahweet. Downstream farmers who already were using the water proved unwilling to share in costs and management with upstream farmers. the wells were drilled. Source: World Bank 1996. 21). the villagers again stopped the drilling for Ta’iz. deeper well. This is particularly true in the Northern Highlands. attachment to water and land is fierce and forms a central element of Yemeni identity. Varieties of competition include that 4 Because water rights generally go with land. shame. the women and children threw stones and tried to disarm the soldiers. For three years. .4 Competition for these limited resources thus can quickly trigger a larger pattern of conflict. These factors are less evident in the Southern Uplands and the coastal zones. but with a legacy of distrust and anger that persists to this day. Eventually. 12). soon a farmer’s shallow well dried up. water and land disputes often are the same thing. The soldiers fired. However. especially when violence is employed.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 251 Box 14. and resort to violence is frequent. Water Conflict Can Trigger a Larger Pattern of Conflict Throughout Yemen. Their sheikhs were imprisoned. 67–68. and revenge drive behavior. in which the agrarian system has a more landlord/peasant character with roots in a feudal system (Carapico 1998. and two women were seriously injured. Eventually. When the rigs finally arrived in April 1995. waiting for something exciting to happen” (Al-Shaybani 2005. they succeeded in postponing the project. When he was refused permission to dig a new. When the army arrived. the Habir villagers drove the drillers off the site by using petrol torches. Here it is the intense economic competition for the resource that can lead to broader conflict. a “compensation” package was agreed. and where comparatively trivial origins can quickly escalate. Varisco and others 2005. In these areas. Yemeni rural society generally is arms bearing.11 Wadi Habir Resists Surrenders Its Water to Urban Use but Is Defeated through Violence In 1992 villagers in Habir discovered that their area had been proposed as the next source of water for Ta’iz city. so the villagers allowed the drillers in. Socioeconomic factors also play a part: “unemployment and under employment mean many bored and frustrated young men sitting idle with their guns for much of the time. where tribal values of honor. tribal values are muted or nonexistent. They had seen the impact of water transfer on the neighboring valley of Al Haima so determined to resist. with a pro-rata reduction in supply in case of shortage. the huge mountain that towers over Ta’iz city. a dispute over water arose between two villages on Jabal Sabr. The police made arrests. It seems incredible that so much should be expended for such a seemingly small a problem. What Forms Does Conflict Take—and Why? As background to this chapter. Al Marzooh became afraid that the project would reduce the flow of their spring.252 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS between large landowners and smallholders or sharecroppers. The story began in the mid-1990s. The following four case studies from their findings illustrate many of the themes of this chapter. al Marzooh blew up part of the new project. The final court ruling was accepted reluctantly on both sides. The lessons so dearly won were: . and the governor visited and ordered the project to continue. However. The situation got so out of hand that the President of the Republic intervened. and had to be resolved in the Court of Appeal after the intervention of the army and the President of the Republic. Murderous Dispute over Spring Water Rights Is Resolved in Yemen’s Highest Court In 1997. The dispute lasted until 2001. a fact that really shocked the nation) and more than 20 injured. Al-Shaybani and Al-Zubayri (2005) carried out a field study of water conflict in Ta’iz and Lahej. This system was fed from springs belonging to Qurada that flowed into a collection tank. In night raids. Only then did both sides agree to go to court. al Marzooh. the explosions continued. Although traditional mediation managed to get the case into court. Case Study A. from which the dispute rose all the way up to the Court of Appeal. when one village—Qurada— received money from the government’s rural water supply agency to rehabilitate the village piped water supply system. the tank was sited uphill of a spring that belonged to a second village. Gun battles left five dead (including one woman. Qurada could connect a 4" pipe. The villages were to construct one collective tank for their water supply. Soldiers sent in only exacerbated tensions (box 14. or within communities over drinking water. between town and country. and al Marzooh a 2" pipe. Al Marzooh responded by blowing up more installations and equipment.9). left many dead. Even when they were at each other’s throats. 4. When the army intervened. Rather. the very high value that the two communities placed on drinking water made them prepared to resort to violence to defend it. 3. Two Village Water Committees Cooperate to Protect Their Resource—and Fight off Threat from Government Agency In the very water-scarce Qadas area of Ta’iz Governorate. Each village has its own potable water scheme with its own management committee. the two villages cooperate to protect the drinking water resource. the villages were highly opposed to outside intervention. which is their first priority. Al Marzooh continued its assaults even while mediation was going on. this time from al Dhunaib. al Kareefah and al Dhunaib are neighboring villages. The al Dhunaib water committee chairman convened a meeting of the whole . which then cancelled the permit. Another farmer. the state was able to impose settlement in this water dispute. Public money. Mobilization on this scale is plainly out of the question for every 2" pipe dispute that may arise. The committees keep an eye on the activities of local farmers and have stopped the digging of many new wells. 5. By the time the village found out. one al Kareefah farmer started to drill a new well. Ultimately. The farmer threatened to kill anyone who came close. 2. and only after extreme effort. water scarcity has reached a point that it is not agriculture but the much smaller quantities needed for drinking water that are under threat. In some areas. The al Kareefah water management committee entered an objection with NWRA. only the highest authorities in the land brought the villages to reconciliation. failed to get a permit but started to dig a well anyway. Armed with a permit from the NWRA branch office in Taiz. In the end. stealthily by night. Case Study B. Having seen the problems of water scarcity in other parts of Qadas. was at the origin of the dispute. so the dispute was not inflamed by tribal values. the well was more than 20 meters deep and lined with reinforced concrete. The tensions around water are so great that traditional rules of mediation proved quite inadequate.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 253 1. Ta’iz Governorate essentially is a nontribal area. the villages effectively closed ranks against them. apparently allocated without proper understanding of the issues. GARWSP started to drill a borehole in the catchment area of the existing drinking water schemes of both villages. The two committees then decided jointly to hand-dig a well for community use at the new site to prevent GARWSP from any future attempt to drill in this location. and within 400 meters of an existing well. GARWSP’s technical appraisal of the source was deficient. This second attempt was met with armed resistance from both communities. and communities show solidarity in setting up and running potable water schemes. the agency totally lacked a “demand-driven” and participatory approach. In situations of scarcity. the committees had the most problem with the official rural water agency. GARWSP made a second attempt to drill. When water is very short. the farmer had no choice but to agree. 4. and it was decided that the well should be filled in. The two villages were on the point of resorting to violence to stop the contractor when it was learned that the new well was dry. In this case. 5. this time within 200 meters of the water source of al Kareefah and in the direct catchment area of Al Dhunaib’s water source. Case Study C. drinking water becomes the top priority for groundwater use. The committees pointed out to GARWSP that this proximity violated the 500 meter harim rule. Their protest fell on deaf ears. Community solidarity can influence or block even the most intransigent water users. and the contractor was forced to leave the area. Dispute between Farmers Is Settled by NWRA’s Proposal That New Well Be Used Largely for Drinking Water A conflict between villagers from Al Sayani district of Ibb concerned a well drilled close to a neighbor’s well without permission. 2. Furthermore. Faced with this community solidarity.254 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS community. The lessons are: 1. Ironically. 3. the General Authority for Rural Water and Sanitation Projects (GARWSP). The dispute . Government agencies trying to help solve the water problem can create more problems than they solve. Communities may deploy both traditional rules such as the harim rule and modern rules such as licensing to defend their water source. The whole community took part in filling in the well. cooperation among communities becomes possible. NWRA proposed that the well be regularized on condition that it be used only for the drinking supply of the villagers. by law. This willingness is probably stronger in nontribal areas such as Ibb. 2. This small case in which again the priority accorded to drinking water is clear demonstrates three important lessons: 1. in fact. The first well belonged to the complainant and was approximately 120 m downstream of the new well. Although the new well breached the 500-meter distance requirement under the harim rule. Wadi Tuban Tail-Enders Say That Modernized Scheme Has Brought Them Less Water but That They Lack The Capacity to Fight for More In the Wadi Tuban spate irrigation scheme. 3.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 255 started when a downstream well owner made a complaint to NWRA. This deal was agreed and confirmed in writing by all concerned. The harim rule is being widely invoked as a useful rule of thumb to protect water resources. The second old well belonged to the farmer who was digging the new well: it lay about 120 m upstream of the new well.12). Villagers may be willing to bring in NWRA as part of dispute resolution. These rules are quite precise (box 14. and only on the condition that he paid the capital and operating costs of the well. Case Study D. close to two existing wells. an irrigation council composed of officials and representatives of the water user associations is responsible for deciding the rules of water distribution. asking that it stop a farmer who was digging a new shallow well upstream. and all three wells were dry at the time of the visit. The potential of the new well licensing procedures being introduced by NWRA is beginning to be explored by villagers as part of their armory of water management rules. Only surplus water during the rainy season could be used by the well owner for irrigation. Its team found that the new well was. the field work done by . The visit took place during the dry season. NWRA and the villagers proved capable of adapting the harim rule to suit local conditions and to reconcile the interests of the two parties and of the community. However. NWRA visited the site. Al-Shaybani and Al-Zubayri (2005) found that reality differed from theory. The reason in part is that they are unsure which agency is responsible. the flow is divided evenly between Wadi Kabir and Wadi Saghir. This case also shows other lessons: . When spate floods exceed 40 m3/s. They believe that. They grudgingly accept that spate flows are uncertain and that spate water rights for downstreamers are hard to assert. When spate floods are high (25 m3/s–40 m3/s). priority is given to schemes in the upper part of the delta. The tail-enders believe that the traditional upstream first rule—al ‘ala fa al ‘ala—is abused by the big farmers upstream. depending on which one’s turn is due. However. When spate flow is of medium size (15 m3/s–25 m3/s). the flow is directed at the main wadi bifurcation point at Ras al Wadi Weir: to either Wadi Kabir or Wadi Saghir. including Beizag and Faleg systems. Downstream farmers said that they used to have access to spate water on average once every two years. Now the interval is 5–10 years. the downstream farmers have not lodged a complaint. and even planting bananas. Ras Al Wadi and Al-Arais. They do believe that it would be a long and expensive (due to bribes) business to complain. They do not know to which agency or to whom to complain.256 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 14. namely. getting up to 4 floods in 1 year. The case of Wadi Tuban reflects findings from previous studies in spate schemes. They showed that the benefits of spate improvement often go largely to the better-off upstream farmers. nor what the rules and penalties are. in addition to the Irrigation Council. who are expanding their irrigated areas.12 Irrigation Council Water Allocation Rules In theory. water allocation is to be based on a fixed irrigation plan: When the spate flow is low (5 m3/s–15 m3/s). the Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation Department and the new elected local authorities all have a say. These farmers believe that upstream farmers are taking more water than before thanks to improved concrete diversion structures and to the upstreamers’ influence over the management agencies. priority is given to schemes in the middle part of the delta. The old causes of friction regarding spate still exist. it must still be recognized as the major system of governance and community organization in most highland rural communities” (Varisco and others 1995.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 257 1. In a conflict. any respected person (modareek) can call a ceasefire. often led by the clan head (aqil)) or the head of the tribe (sheikh). The modernization programs that government has introduced have focused more on physical improvements than on strengthening management institutions. In fact.” In other words. In these tribal areas. At present. respondents felt that the courts were expensive (largely due to bribes). so tribal and modern power structures largely overlap. the power relations are such that downstreamers feel badly treated. Elected officials also have tribal affiliations. to agree the terms of a truce and to broker a . Most respondents said that only when a dispute could not be resolved through these procedures would it be referred to the courts. During a field survey. Then a mediation process takes place. 12). sheikhs and tribal leaders still play a vital role in settling disputes. conflicts move to the sheikh at the head of the tribe. Furthermore. Al-Shaybani (2005. farmers in the Sana’a Plain were asked to explain the different mechanisms employed for resolving water conflict. If not resolved at the first level. In general. slow. The user associations now being promoted in Tuban do not appear to have figured in the farmers’ discourse. The overwhelming majority of respondents (96 percent) said that water conflicts would be dealt with by local “arbitration systems. and remote from tribal concerns. they shrink from conflict with the powerful upstreamers. 2. 22) argues that resolution of water conflict in tribal areas follows the same pattern as that of any other conflict. these frictions are built into a system with such uncertain water rights. and certainly were not seen as powerful champions of their rights. water conflicts would be addressed first by tribal arbiters at the neighborhood level. Resolving Conflict What dispute resolution mechanisms exist and how have they evolved to meet these new challenges? Settling Disputes in Largely Tribal Areas “Although it is important not to overemphasize the nature of tribalism. and domestic. within one village. Sheikhs often are part of the problem because often they are the largest users of groundwater. 14). 14). their role as big water users compromises their role as impartial mediators (Lichtenthaler 1999. villages may be inhabited by multiple tribes who do not cooperate. reconciliation. these religious scholars have been involved in the evolution of water rules. these additional sources of authority create a risk of conflict of interest. Thus. His decision is final. 16. villages and communities have closed ranks to prevent their own sheikh from buying more land—and the water rights that come with it. These values occasionally can be invoked directly in dispute resolution by the sayyids. villages in Amran often are inhabited by different branches of the great Hashid and Bakil confederations. In cases in Sa’ada.258 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS settlement. Lichtenthaler 1999. artisanal. In case of legal technicalities. These values recall principles of fairness. a tribal specialist on customary rights and duties (maragha) can be called in. 18). The recent revival of Zaydi scholarship and practice in Sa’ada has led to the emergence of a younger group of religious scholars and teachers. In addition. These different interests can conflict and thus undermine solidarity. 74) However. the sheikh’s ability to mediate conflicts used to rest primarily on his social standing and on his knowledge of customary law. as sheikhs have joined the political and economic elite of the country. It was a Zaydi scholar in Sa’ada who issued the fatwa on conversion of runoff rights in 1976 (Lichtenthaler 1999. while the cooperation of the sheikhs is crucial to conflict resolution in tribal areas. It is now just as much the sheikh’s status as a rich man and his political influence and power at the regional and national level that give him the authority to decide disputes (Lichtenthaler 2003. Over the centuries. 2. Religious and cultural values play a role in reinforcing traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. and some by sayyids (religious scholars who have a knowledge of water rules) (Moench 1997. In the past. For example. These days more than ever. Some sheikhs have become big commercial farmers and have benefited from their status in the tribe to build up large land holdings. this has changed. economic interests may be different—agricultural. and integrity to a population still largely sensitive to these values. They invoke the Islamic principle of maslaha ‘amma (“welfare of the community over individual interest”). . Over time. 2–3. Tribal mediation also is limited by population movement and land sales. Thus. as was shown by the management of spate in Wadi Tuban (Case Study D above).13). most frequently for potable water supply. Source: Lichtenthaler 1999.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 259 Settling Disputes in Other Areas In nontribal areas of Yemen. In one case in Sa’ada. such as schooling. . Some of these associations have grown into strong community institutions with a range of other activities. Others have prevented the loss of community water and land resources to the rich and powerful—traders. In another area of Sa’ada. the tribal group refused the request from the community owning the runoff area to develop its groundwater resources. most schemes are now experiencing problems with the source. in consultation with the tribe. who then drained the area of groundwater. In some cases. traders. absentee landlords (Lichtenthaler 1999. traditional and modern community institutions exist for water management and for dispute resolution. dedicated water management associations have emerged. Some have resisted new drilling. 2). as illustrated by the Qadas case above. associations— or the community at large—have organized themselves (box 14. Three examples follow. villages and communities have closed ranks to prevent their own sheikh from buying land from them. Box 14. However. Now the sheikhs have agreed to a 20-year halt to any development of the land. 15). health services. speculators. This community had seen what had happened when the neighboring tribe sold large amounts of land to investors. the associations are obliged to become active in settling disputes over water resources. fearing decline in groundwater levels. rural roads. and water for livestock.13 Sa’ada: Examples of Successful Community Initiatives To safeguard their water resources. In several other cases in Sa’ada. The best documented example is that of the Administration of Local Projects of al Sinah near Turba (Moench 1997. villages cooperate in a range of way to resist sheikhs. and land dealers. Water management associations focus on managing the water supply scheme rather than on the resource itself. In recent years. the sheikh ruled that no individual member was to sell land to people from outside the village. These institutions can be highly evolved. and the sheikhs. The new. It is too early to tell whether this joint forum will be effective in imposing order on WRM. downstream farmers do not have much confidence in the capacity or probity of the courts either. problems (Al-Shaybani 2005. In four basins—Sana’a. only 4 percent of respondents said that water disputes would be referred to the civil courts rather than to local arbitration systems. Under the Water Law. In Wadi Tuban. This committee is chaired by a deputy prime minister and includes a large membership from the Cabinet. Sa’ada. cited above. the local council involvement in spate water allocation in Wadi Tuban—suggests that this form of decentralization has multiplied. the little evidence that is available —for example. However. apparently alarmed at the prevalence of tribal disputes in general. he generally does so because he sees it as a way to gain additional advantages. To date. Conflicting parties tend to close ranks in the face of it. However. there has been no indication of its effectiveness. In 2005. particularly for violence. The proportion may be higher in nontribal areas that lack trusted local dispute resolution mechanisms. the President of the Republic ordered a five-year truce. However. No data exist on the actual number of water disputes referred to the courts. Parliament. He established a National Supreme Committee for Dispute Resolution. 81). As a result. rural Yemen is generally mistrustful of outside involvement. the judiciary. in the survey of farmers in the Sana’a Plain discussed above (Al-Hamdi 2000. NWRA has regulatory powers over water management. a number of disputes are now being referred to NWRA branches for a decision on the legality of well drilling and other issues. If one of the disputants voluntarily refers a case. 26). and Amran—the central government has set up basin committees comprising representatives of central and local government and civil society. NWRA’s policy is to engage them in water resource regulatory activities. Its mission is to put an end to tribal feuds through mediation. A referral to the court is generally forced on the disputants by the civil authority. rather than solved. Ta’iz.260 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Modern Civil Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Yemeni law provides for civil dispute resolution in courts. elected local district councils have responsibility for all local affairs. . Appropriation is gradually returning most of these areas to the old rural ecology of rainfed agriculture. The political and social counterpart to this economic change seems to have given a new impetus to the civil society. the groundwater revolution is largely over. In these areas.availability areas of the southern uplands and the eastern and southern escarpments and plains. In these areas. Change in the use of water has brought profound shifts in economic and political power. These sources are less and less adequate to support the commercial farming that has developed. In the southern uplands. In the coastal regions. local self-help mechanisms that have existed in the area for a generation or more. The more egalitarian political economy of the tribe persisted until a generation ago. when the Ottomans installed the iltizam system of taxation of the agricultural surplus in the higher water. 67–68). The available water and land resources have become more concentrated in the hands of tribal leaders. the brief improvement in the lives of downstream farmers that came with spate upgrading and the tubewell is dwindling as large upstream landholders appropriate both the surface flows and the groundwater. or peasants. control of water was readily identifiable with an accumulation of power. The process of appropriation of water by the locally powerful—and by the cities—has reduced the economic opportunities for small farmers. In the tribal areas of the north and east. Great sheikhs held sway over numerous tax-paying ra’iyya. the end of the groundwater boom has left an impaired ecology of reduced groundwater and spring flow. They have .” Already in the nineteenth century. it took a feudal form. This system is still traceable in the pattern of land and water holdings in these areas (Carapico 1998. In the dry north and east areas. scant water meant virtually no taxable surplus.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 261 Power and Political Economy: Who Really Benefits from Water and How? From the discussion above. Associations of local people defend their communities’ interests and conserve and develop what resources are available. the warrior-farmer character of tribalism proved able to resist both Ottoman conquest and the imposition of centralizing tax transfers. They have only sporadic access to supplementary irrigation and pumped drinking water. it will be clear that Yemen has moved a long way from the early Islamic moral economy of the “right of thirst. and cultural and social attitudes adapted quickly to the market economy.262 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS benefited from traditional patterns of loyalty and cooperation and from their access to the modern centers of political and economic power. the country’s “downside” capacity to make the painful adjustment to scarcity. Whether this resistance will have a political counterpart—for example. the ambiguous role of the sheikh is a problem. there appears to be a process of change. cropping patterns. Yemenis adapted rapidly to the tubewell but have had great trouble adapting to the resultant water stress and scarcity. These processes of capitalism and concentration of power have been readily abetted by the state through incentives for groundwater extraction and through direct investment. a distancing of tribesmen from their tribal leader—is far from clear. Time-honored rules were adjusted. Lessons Civil Society Lessons Traditional Yemeni society and institutions have demonstrated considerable capacity to adapt to the changing challenges of water. competition. who have seen the economic boom come and go in a generation. pumping time. even there. farming systems. A new class of capitalist investor/trader has sprung up. Nonetheless. Naturally. not yet radical. The “upside” capacity to adapt to the changing supply and demand signals in the 1970s and 1980s was remarkable. Nonetheless. communities continue to evolve their own rules and have shown some ability to adapt to scarcity. New users are being excluded by a variety of techniques. and rules are being rewritten. the more discreet underlying processes of accumulation of wealth and power through growing control of water and land have consolidated the important political support of the military and capitalist elite around the central state. and new ones were established. The old harim rule on well spacing is now evoked almost everywhere to control new well drilling. some communities have combined to . In tribal areas. or water sales. and conflict has been more limited. traditional institutions evolved. Those left out of this process have been the smaller farmers. Technology. Institutions have begun to adapt. Communities also may seek to restrict deepening. Among them. The rapid development of water resources helped to legitimize the state as a “development agent.” Meanwhile. too. that consolidates resistance to further resource capture. . This consensus is not surprising. 3). government intervention requires a show of disproportionate strength. 11).Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 263 neutralize the negative effects of the sheikh’s business interests. government emerges as a leading source of conflict. government has ridden roughshod over all local understanding of water rights and appropriated the resource for transfer to the towns (World Bank 2005). In the most flagrant cases. Government’s move to improve the professionalism of its water management services by setting up NWRA and decentralizing its powers to local branches clearly was a step in the right direction. Government can best influence outcomes positively by broad policy and institutional measures. Some of this conflict stems from poor water resource decisions—particularly for projects based on inadequate understanding of the water balance or of water rights. given that government interventions frequently created rather than resolved conflict. but also the supply side remedies introduced. Unfortunately. Typically. justified only in extreme cases. Good examples are the sectoral policy frameworks. Programs frequently fail to ensure that the community structure that can deal with planned changes is in place. and a few enforceable regulatory measures. Communities everywhere prefer to exclude government from their problems. after local dispute resolution methods have failed (Moench 1997. that triggers conflict. Government Lessons The capacity of central government to regulate activities at the level of individual users is very limited. There is limited evidence that NWRA has helped in dispute resolution. such as the ban on import of drilling rigs (Norton 1995). There is no reason to suppose that decentralized structures will be more efficient or less politically driven than centralized ones. However. with varying degrees of capability to manage water resources and resolve conflictual situations. the decentralization at least may back up the power of local communities to control abstraction and drilling (Lichtenthaler 1997. Other conflictual situations arise from inadequate social and institutional preparation. Evidence shows that it is not only scarcity. community associations are commonly found. In nontribal areas. The decentralization of some official responsibilities to the participatory basin committees and to the local authorities also may help. 264 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Looking to the Future In the Yemeni context. Government must pay attention to the uncompleted demand management agenda. demand driven. b. It is not government but millions of individuals at the local level who take the decisions about Yemen’s water management. readjusting the incentive system can . demand will continue to far exceed supply. To do so. Longer-Term Lessons There is no “solution” to Yemen’s water crisis. the future of water management and dispute resolution in Yemen depends on local institutions. government interventions in rural water and dams will have to be technically better prepared. initiated by the water users. The depletion of natural capital will oblige economic retrenchment. the government is responsible for mitigating the underlying causes of scarcity as much as possible and for planning for the longer-term structural transition of the economy. Local people are the stakeholders. and patterns of water rights. However. Managing the transition to extreme scarcity and avoiding conflict at the local level will be an obligation of all Yemenis. and negotiated by a more intelligent process that takes account of local social setups. and intelligent cost-sharing. and only microlevel solutions make sense. There is a role for government to lend a hand by supporting community self-management initiatives through education. d. In particular. Every village has its own hydrology and history. These institutions are creakily adapting to water scarcity. Clearly. institutional structures. c. Government can never have the capacity nor the full confidence of local people. Moench (1997) details the reasons that these solutions work: a. with painful political and social consequences. the only viable solutions are local and participatory. training. Future government interventions must avoid creating new problems while trying to resolve others. Given the population increases and lack of alternative employment opportunities. Civil Society in Yemen. 1998. 24. “Social and Organizational Aspects of the Operation and Maintenance of Spate Irrigation Systems in Yemen. 10–12) To replace the present ad hoc and arbitrary transfer systems. Sana’a.R.S. Arabia Felix. Norton 1995. Tribes.” World Bank. al-Amrani. Government and History in Yemen. . 1999. Breton. Moench 1997. These rules must require the development of equitable markets or other fair transfer mechanisms (Norton 1995. M. 1993. Sana’a. Sana’a. 2005a.. References Al-Eryani. 2000. 1999. Dresch. South Bend. P. Al-Zubayri. S. 4. Carapico. Sana’a. Al-Shaybani. Article on deaths from armed clash between Qurada villagers and state troops over water. 1999. Al Thawra. Competition for Scarce Groundwater in the Sana’a Plain. Delft: Delft University of Technology. 1999.” World Bank.” World Bank. J. 29. 2005. Sana’a. 2005b. “Water Conflicts: Ta’iz and Tuban Case Study. “Technical and Economic Aspects of Water Saving. “Abandoned Villages Due to the Shortage of Water. Government has to plan for a less water-intensive economy. S. 13–14.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 265 reduce agricultural water use while equitably protecting incomes (Lichtenthaler 1999. Al Shoura. government needs to set fair rules for intersectoral transfer of water.. Sana’a. The planning should include measures to ease the intersectoral movement of labor and to create an environment friendly to alternative economic activities (Norton 1995. and A. al-Hamdi.R. “Water Conflicts: Field Visits Report. ____. 2005. M.S. June 20–21. M. 16). 1998. 21). “Conflict and Water Resources Assessment for al Jawf and Amran. London: Oxford University Press.-F. and M. S.” Hydro Yemen for CARE/DfID. Al-Shaybani.” World Bank. Article on deaths from armed tribal clashes in Hajja over water. IN: University of Notre Dame Press. April 29. Al-Zubayri. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bazza.” LWCP (Land and Water Conservation Project)/FAO (UN Food and Agriculture Organization). A. Iskander. “Local Water Management: Options and Opportunities in Yemen.R. http://ag. London: I. Sana’a. 1995.” Report WRAY 35. 1995. and G. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Oriental Publications... M. 1999.266 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS ____.” Water Issues Group.edu/~lmilich/yemen. R. NWRA (National Water Resources Association). “Natural Resource Reconstruction and Traditional Value Systems: A Case Study from Yemen. 1995. 1997. and S.” World Bank. 1999. Katariya. 1997. Domestic Government: Kinship. Government of Yemen. London: Ashgate. G. A. Al-Sabbry. SOAS Water Issues Study Group.arizona. Sana’a. S. 2000. Mundy. London: Oxford University Press. ____. Norton. M. MOMR and TNO.” World Bank. 1999. Turton. A. “Yemen: Water Scarcity and Social Adaptive Capacity. “Water Management and Community Participation in the Sa’adah Basin of Yemen.. Society and Economy in Northern Yemen. “Irrigation and Society in a Yemeni Valley. Community and Polity in North Yemen. Milich. 1971. 1989. Lichtenthaler. London: SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies). L. “A Note on Economic Policies for Water Management in Yemen. Sana’a. 1999. Turton A. “The Water Resources of Yemen. Water Rights and Irrigation Practices in Lahj: A Study of the Application of Customary and Shari’ah Law in South-West Arabia. “Water Resource Management Strategies in the Ta’iz Region. Taurus. Sana’a.R.D.” Peuples Mediterranéens 46.” Occasional Paper 14.” NWRA. Sana’a. . London.” World Bank. 2003. School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS).” World Bank. M. 2002.” LWCP/FAO. “Yemen: Preliminary Assessment of the Existing Dams. ____. Ueda. “Improved Agricultural Practices in Sana’a Governorate. Survey Report of the Decentralized Management Study. A Political Ecology of Water: Factors and Perceptions Influencing Groundwater in the Sa’adah Basin.html Moench. London.B. 1999. A History of Modern Yemen. ____. Maktari. and M. Political Ecology and the Role of Water: Environment.” Development 3 (1995). “The ‘Rational Peasant’ vs. Lichtenthaler.R. Sustainable Livelihoods: The Case of Qat in Yemen. ” World Bank. ____. London. World Bank.. Weir. Qat in Yemen: Consumption and Social Change. United Kingdom Government. London: The Trustees of the British Museum (British Museum Publications). Varisco.” World Bank. D. “Yemen: Proposal for a Study of Conflict in Water. “The Political Economy of Irrigation Water Pricing in Yemen. 2000. van Steenbergen. 1997. “Small Dams and Social Capital in Yemen.aspx Ward. Wadi Al-Jawf Agricultural Development Project. 2005.. S. High Water Council and UNDP. 1998. Vermillion. F. “Yemen: Country Water Resources Assistance Strategy. Sana’a.. World Bank. C.” World Bank ____. “Yemen: Towards a Water Strategy. “Practical Responses to Extreme Groundwater Overdraft in Yemen.” In A. 1997. 2005. Report 13822-ROY.” Final Report.” IWMI (International Water Management Institute). 1996. Arnhem: Academic Press. ____. “Yemen: Local Water Management in Rural Areas. ____. 2005.” Report 8030-YAR. and S. “Yemen: Water Resource Management and Economic Development. Dinar. “Tapping a Hidden Resource: Energy Efficiency in the Middle East and North Africa.” Washington DC and Sana’a. 1989. ____. ____.” World Bank. 1992. 1952. Understanding the Sociology of Spate Irrigation. World Bank. 2004. 2009. Colombo. ____. “Yemen: Sustainable Livelihoods Analysis. Al-Shaybani.org/index. London: Oxford University Press.” . The Political Economy of Water Pricing. Report on the Abyan Scheme. “Irrigation Sector Study. Sana’a. ed. D. www.” World Bank.Water Conflict in Yemen: the Case for Strengthening Local Resolution Mechanisms 267 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme).cgiar.iwmi. HMSO (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office). 1985. 1994.” Project Completion Report. . international laws and conventions are not enforceable unless a process of ratification has been completed through national legislative bodies. First. When water resources are shared across national boundaries. and industrialization. First is the spatial configuration of the watercourse in relation to national boundaries: an upstream state has different incentives for cooperating compared to a downstream state. If one state were far more economically advanced than its fellow riparians.” In addition. relative political and economic strengths and weaknesses of countries that share the water resource influence their dealings with one another. competition among countries for water resources is being exacerbated by population growth. Vijay Jagannathan n many parts of the world. its behavior would be influenced by the political and economic importance attached to maintaining and building on 269 I . Other situations exist in which externalities become reciprocal: any harm to an open-access resource (such as an inland sea. Second. urbanization. lake. Dinar terms these border-creator situations. Dinar (2006) describes these as through-border situations in that the downstream state’s ability to retaliate and reciprocate through its water policies to externalities created from the upstream state is minimal. Second.15 Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century N. Finally. two independent variables determine how countries interact when it comes to sharing international watercourses. the challenge of sustainable management becomes even more complicated for several reasons. countries could cheat or not comply with water treaties unless these treaties are self enforcing. in the case of transboundary conflicts over water. it would take just a small group of opponents of a water treaty to make any of these agreements “politically unacceptable. or shared aquifer) affects all states that share this resource. the United States has paid Canada for hydropower. Table 15. there are many more situations in which mutually beneficial agreements are not concluded. Typically. Dinar analyzed the characteristics of these agreements and concluded that through-border situations carry a much greater likelihood of side payments or sharing investment costs from the downstream state to the upstream state. The capacity to accept pollution may be higher in a poor country than in a rich one. When Do Bilateral Agreements Take Place? Political.1 illustrates some bilateral agreements among the Mashreq countries of the MNA region. On the one hand. geographic. for every successful treaty. Asymmetry in economic wellbeing also affects the way that countries view pollution. The next paragraphs will discuss examples of situations in which a congruence of interests led to countries working out bilateral solutions to their water issues in the spirit of mutual accommodation. On the other hand. a situation of complete asymmetry of economic power could tempt the powerful country to display “hegemonic” tendencies. spatial. There could be other examples wherein congruence of interests led to bilateral agreements. Iran paid Afghanistan. trade and market protection considerations very well could induce the powerful hegemon to collaborate with its weak neighbor(s). and economic interests propel countries to work out international water agreements with one another with or without an exchange of financial investments. and flood control. Challenge of Working through Bilateralism and beyond However. A downstream . When scarcity or degradation induces parties to coordinate actions. These arise because there are many political. India has paid Bhutan and Nepal.270 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS relations with its neighbors. and economic considerations that lead to countries being either unwilling or unable to collaborate to share water resources. country-level interests could be congruent through a desire to negotiate and cooperate. these solutions take place when the “low-hanging fruits” are obvious to all negotiating parties. whereas the ability to mitigate the problem is the opposite. irrigation. Typically. flood control and generation of hydroelectric power are obvious areas in which a downstream state perceives the need to cooperate. For example. disagreements arise when countries assert their “rights” to water quantities. the transaction costs of reaching such agreements become even more complex because these countries often do not fully appreciate their interdependence. Turkey gets adequate water for irrigated lands. In border-creator situations. an upstream country such Ethiopia or Turkey will claim sovereign rights to the water quantities flowing through its territory. countries situated along the watercourse often are unable to work toward optimal utilization of the water. crafting institutional platforms that facilitate water agreements becomes a formidable challenge. For example. countries tend to perceive water rights synonymously with country interests. Mekong. since 1997. If the number of countries is three or more. Turkey Jordan and Syria Outcome No formal agreements as yet 1974 agreement by which the river is recognized as the boundary 1990 agreement to share waters 42:58 between Syria and Iraq Lebanon gets 80mcm. such as Egypt or the Netherlands. and Brahmaputra-Ganges Rivers. and industrial use Countries involved Syria. country with significant hydraulic investments. as the water or the externalities are shared. Iraq. 79–81. In such situations. claims prior rights in that the water passing through its territory already has been put to productive use by its farmers and urban and industrial consumers and therefore needs to be safeguarded in any subsequent treaty. such as the Nile. 2008 Water conflict River Tigris Shatt al Arab River River Euphrates River Orontes River Jordan Issue Irrigation in Syria with Tigris waters Boundary demarcation Sharing river for irrigation Sharing river for irrigation Sharing river for irrigation.1 Disputes and Agreements in Mashreq Countries. as with bilateral water relations. As a consequence. By contrast. In these situations. the absence of a viable international adjudication system often leads to a breakdown of the bilateral dialogue. Syria retains flow from springs above 250m. Instead. the Baltic countries saw clear advantages of sharing the benefits and the costs of protecting the Baltic Sea from land-based pollution. the UN Watercourse Convention has attempted to codify a .Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century 271 Table 15. Turkey Iran and Iraq Syria and Iraq Syria. and Arabian Gulf. For example. Lebanon. Notes: Mashreq = Eastern countries of the Arab Region. Syria 430 mcm. Maqarin Dam flows used by Jordan but 70% of power generated allocated to Syria Source: Hadadin 2008. the tendency is to share (often equally) the costs of mitigating measures. Nubian aquifer. urban. Examples are countries that share water from very large watercourses. Delays in ratification have arisen principally because of differing interpretations of the relative importance of two articles of the Convention: 1. When interpretations of water rights differ—as in any system of jurisprudence—there needs to be a body of tort law to guide the adjudication system. water diplomacy needs to focus on building confidence and capacity among the parties sharing a watercourse. the suggested legal framework to govern international water agreements has not been ratified (table 15. or cooperation through sidepayments.1 Despite almost 40 years of consultations and meetings. The convention was passed in final by the General Assembly in 1997. Article 5. which enjoins participating states to ensure equitable and rational utilization of shared waters 2. differing interpretations of water rights quickly degenerate into zero-sum games. 1 The full name is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses. Under these circumstances.2 UN Watercourses Convention Timeline. 1970–1997 Year 1970 1997 2007 Result UN asks International Law Commission to start codification UN passes draft Convention on Watercourses Only 15 states sign the convention Comment 5 rapporteurs produced 15 reports 103 countries vote for convention Minimum of 35 states ratifying convention not achieved Source: Salman 2007. In the case of international water disputes. Downstream states emphasize the importance of protecting historic investments in hydraulic infrastructure (from future or contemplated actions by the upstream states) that could adversely affect watercourse flows. Therefore.2). Article 7. Upstream states emphasize the need to honor Article 5 (protects their sovereign right to exploit the economic potentials of watercourses running through their territories).272 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS broad framework for countries to work within to resolve water issues. except in either the case of the “low-hanging fruits” referred to earlier. which obligates states to do no harm. . Table 15. such a system is absent. cooperation is the only way forward if the water is to be utilized to its highest economic and environmental potentials. conflicting views of water rights could be resolved through bilateral agreements. often those sharing a watercourse become so economically interdependent that disagreements over water get resolved through “give and take” within a broader congruence of economic interests. When populations were still relatively small and demands on the resource were low compared to the available resource. It leads them to recognize that. countries have spun a complex web of interrelationships. Seeing beyond asserting rights to water quantity. these communities are moving forward toward institutionalizing the rights to water quality for the benefit of the entire ecosystem. because of their interdependence. Through trade and commerce. These agreements took a static view of water availability (as validated by historical hydrological data): that future available quantities would be fully predictable. an aquifer across national boundaries. or a water body surrounded by countries. the resource is available through one ecosystem.Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century 273 Diplomacy can enable the parties to see beyond arguing about conflicting interpretations of rights. disputes over the Danube and Rhine Rivers and other important international watercourses are no longer perceived by each country with the same degree of passion as in past centuries because the economic benefits from their interdependence far outweigh the advantages of nationalist rhetoric. Whether it is a flow of a river from the headwaters to the sea. . Economic Interdependence The second phase of water interdependence occurs as a consequence of growing economic interdependence. Three Phases of Interdependence Geographic Interdependence The fact that a watercourse is shared by two or more countries highlights the geographic or spatial interdependence of these countries. As a result. for example. Sadoff and others (2008) have articulated the advantages of benefit sharing. Any action—water extractions or water insertions—taken by one state impacts all of the others. In Europe. Historically. or both. predicting future water flows in a watercourse on the basis of past historical data is becoming a dubious exercise. Variability in rainfall patterns. Basins. The three phases of water interdependence both influence and are influenced by different congruences of national interests.274 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Water Interdependence A third phase of water interdependence recently acquired prominence because inter-temporal projections warn of entire water ecosystems around the world being affected by climate change. In other words. the Khabour River in Syria has a large command area of irrigation. retreat of mountain glaciers. 2005). These new climate-induced risks are forecast to get worse in the ensuing decades. For example. even when the participating countries have widely differing economic and political power (Dinar 2000. downscaled on HadCM ) tion. floods. country interpretations of quantity rights to international watercourses already are affected by prolonged droughts in many parts of the Middle East and North Africa. Figure 15. He concluded that treaties between countries for through-border configuration (water flows from one country to another) have Source: 2 3 . A Scenario. Dinar (2006) analyzed a wide cross-section of international water agreements. More fundamentally. In another paper. 2030–80 (%) These treaties have institutionPercent reduction of annual rainfall compared to the baseline alized mechanisms for coopera(Pattern Scaling. The country has witnessed a steady decline in discharge at Ras Al Ain from an average of 60 m3 per second between 1942 and 1972 to no water after 2001.1 indicates similar trends in Morocco. geographic interdependence has been the independent variable that has led to the largest number of Figure 15. This prediction makes it imperative for countries that share watercourses to recognize their joint and individual vulnerability to catastrophic events such as prolonged droughts. and higher evaporation rates in reservoirs impounding water (particularly in arid regions such as the Middle East) bring in new climatic risks that need immediate and long-term mitigation.1 Secular Rainfall Trends in Morocco’s Major River international treaties on water. cultural. even when power relations are asymmetric. These Water Directives become relevant in reshaping water policies for states that apply to join the European Union (notably Turkey). Similarly. The resulting congruence of economic and political interests has facilitated agreements on sharing watercourses of 150 rivers and lakes. with consequences for how the country deals with downstream riparians with which it shares geographic interdependence (IDRA 2004). There is also the example of the Mekong accord in which the riparians recognized their growing economic interdependence by agreeing to equal rights to the use of the Mekong waters according to economic and social needs. By contrast. The third phase of environmental interdependence—due to climate change—has just begun and still is not fully internalized by most countries. The directives have led to Turkey’s National Programme for the adoption of the EU aquis. The US and Canada share a close political. Regarding economic interdependence. social. This concern was highlighted by the 2007 Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report. d. as in an inland lake.Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century 275 involved tort-oriented outcomes in which richer downstream countries usually have financed upstream hydraulic infrastructure. factors “beyond the watercourse” have been the independent variables facilitating international cooperation along watercourses (Dinar 2005). c. the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine has been able to establish itself as a supra-national body because of the common economic and political interests of the Rhine riparian states (Sadoff and others 2008). or political reasons. the European Water Framework Directive of 2000 (EU aquis) has created a binding legal framework to protect all European watercourses. over which the European Court of Justice has enforcement powers. or a river serves as an international boundary). This report projected global warming with very serious consequences for rivers whose headwaters are in tropical and semitropical zones. More recently. For example: a. A combination of increased . and economic relationship that goes much beyond the water resources they share. b. There also could be situations in which the wealthier country agrees to finance a disproportionate amount for internal economic. treaties often have led to a more equal sharing of investment costs. for border-creator configurations (waters are shared. In these situations. These are situations in which countries have worked out bilateral or multilateral agreements based on recognition of common geography. These function as mega-sized evaporation ponds (these water bodies already are so large that they are captured by remote-sensing images).276 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS variability of rainfall with receding glaciers and rising temperatures makes the quantity of flows in the major international watercourses unpredictable. Egypt runs the risk of losing a considerable part of its populous Nile Delta lands to sea-level rise by the Mediterranean. In the future. Excess waters increasingly will have to be diverted to the Toshka depressions. thereby reducing the water stock available for use downstream of the High Aswan Dam. Certainly. The second column represents economic interdependence. evaporation rates in Lake Nasser are expected to increase. many arid countries already are witnessing prolonged droughts and irregular rainfall. b. In the MNA region.3 Typology of Interdependence Geographic interdependence leads to agreements between/among countries based on: Economic interdependence leads to agreements between/among countries based on: Environmental interdependence leads to agreements between/among countries based on: Recognizing and sharing ecosystem risks due to climate change Overall economic and political congruence through sharing economic benefits Territorial sovereignty and sharing water rights . economic factors outside the geography of sharing watercourses have acted as powerful instruments to Table 15. Jordan. Palestine. This overflow will lead to two forms of wastage of the precious resource: a. With the expected rise in temperatures. In fact. At Egypt’s southern end. Morocco and countries in West Asia (Israel. The first column represents the geographic interdependence phase. inflows to Lake Nasser/Nubia are projected to increase because extra precipitation in the Ethiopian highlands will exceed the reservoir capacity. Table 15. historic data can offer no reliable forecast of the quantities and variability of future water. and Syria) have been particularly affected.3 summarizes the suggested three-phase typology and its consequences on water diplomacy. It signifies emerging situations in which global externalities will require countries that share watercourses to work with one another to mitigate these emerging risks to their economies. These lead to either the success or failure of water diplomacy. How Can Countries Be Persuaded to Recognize the Importance of Environmental Interdependence? The IPCC Report of 2007 generated global awareness of the risks of climate change. and historical reasons. instead can best be Temperature increase (degree Celsius) . Tunisian President Zine El –20 –30 Abidine Ben Ali. the nature of interdependence among countries that share watercourses leads to either a congruence or lack of congruence of interests. The development challenge is how to create a culture of learning and knowledge-sharing. With projected increased variability in rainfall and rising temperatures. The third column represents the additional phase of environmental interdependence..2 Climate Change Impacts in North Africa: recognize the importance of Range of Change in Runoff (%) adapting policies to meet the 0 challenges of rainfall variabil–10 ity. –40 has directed the country’s water –50 utilities to explore how treated –60 wastewater.and water availability will further decrease. The biggest challenges to water diplomacy in the years ahead lie in this third arena. particularly in terms of rainfall declines and variability (figure 15.Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century 277 promote international water agreements. Source: Stern Report Background Paper 2007.. To sum up. political leadership has been quick to Figure 15. Past disputes over international watercourses have arisen in the region from a variety of social. countries simply cannot afford to risk water conflicts based on existing rights-based paradigms such as territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity. which the country –70 is discharging into the Mediter–80 0–1 1–2 2–3 3–4 4–5 ranean. % . economic. Under these circumstances. political. Specific adverse impacts and risks are becoming apparent to policymakers at country levels. for example. by 30–50% for a 2–3 temp degree increase conveyed and reutilized in the drought-prone areas.2). so that policymakers are able to understand that growing environmental interdependence is forcing a much greater congruence of interests in managing water than has ever been necessary before. 3B pesos of damages in the industrial sector. These shortages have affected carefully calculated allocations from the water stored in dams of the country’s river basins for use by farmers. personal communication.6B pesos. While country leaders have been quick to recognize the adverse impacts of rainfall variability and prolonged droughts on their economies. Mexico If runoff falls by 20%: $7. Recognition requires investments on three fronts: . Such experiences are galvanizing policymakers to work on a new range of economic and investment policies. the damages are $2. and urban communities. The need is urgent to build collaborative learning and knowledge-sharing on how countries that share watercourses can work with each other in a new world of global externalities.4 Simulations for Rio Bravo Basin. $5.4 describes recent simulations of the Rio Bravo Basin in Mexico that show the extent of economic damage with a decline in rainfall.0B pesos annually. many of the dams constructed over the past three decades are not filling to design capacity because of rainfall variability. they are less familiar with the risks caused by the interdependence of countries that share watercourses and ecosystems. However. Table 15. Table 15. Source: B. the damages fall to $5. If the reduction in runoff is 10%. Debewo.278 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS In Morocco. Overall welfare losses = $13. poses a major capacity building challenge to the development community. industries. Earlier. $69M pesos of damages in the agricultural sector. Investment in Capacity Building Is Key Recognizing environmental interdependence. If the reduction in runoff is 5%. 2008. Industrial and residential sectors will be damaged considerably more than agriculture because the third places a much higher value on water. this variability was viewed as prolonged droughts.5B pesos of damages in the residential sector. therefore. Regional resilience programs—similar to the one at country-levels—will be possible only when there is a universal recognition of the congruence of interests to cooperate among nations sharing watercourses. now it is being interpreted as the first stage of climate change.5B pesos. Facilitating country-level dialogues aimed at mitigating this new risk vector. Articulating the risks posed by climate change projections. and establishing a common monitoring system for water resources in the Jordan Valley. Some pilot initiatives are underway. The study is evaluating the feasibility of constructing a water conveyance system from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea to generate electricity and desalinating the water to meet the unmet water demand in Jordan. Israel and the Palestinian Authority are collaborating on this study because all three countries recognize not only their geographic interdependence but also the critical importance of building up joint resilience to climate change predictions. Build partnerships to understand and mitigate risk A second front is to build partnerships among scientific institutions. Jordan. so that the nature and consequences of emerging hydrological risks are understood.Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century 279 1. and of what quality to technical staff in all interested countries? Utilizing similar methods of data analysis. The Red Sea-Dead Sea Study Program is a $15 million initiative financed by the international donor community in response to acute water shortage in the Jordan Valley and the rapid shrinking of the Dead Sea. professional advice on available options to share the resources equitably and without causing any harm. and national policymakers. Developing communication strategies and country dialogues Making clear information on resource publicly available to all watercourse beneficiaries: How much water is available where. . 2. so that policymakers and other national stakeholders receive objective. The feasibility of the project will be evaluated against other cost-effective options (including what is currently a politically unacceptable option of reducing water consumption by irrigated agriculture in Jordan and Israel). particularly regarding (a) design assumption failures for hydraulic infrastructure and (b) dangers of misdirected investments and misdirected water and energy policies. international and bilateral donor agencies. civil society. and appropriate mitigating measures are taken. with what reliability. “Climate Change and Water. Wu. 2008. “Negotiations and International Relations: A Framework for Hydropolitics. S.” ____. Ariel. Awakening to this understanding is the challenge of water diplomacy in the early 21st century.. References Bates. and J. “Water Worries in Jordan and Israel: What May the Future Hold?” In A. and D. Kundzewicz. Transboundary Water Resources: Strategies for Regional Security and Ecological Stability. The third front is to develop investment programs to build regional resilience to climate change. ____. “Assessing Side-Payment and Cost-Sharing Patterns in International Water Agreements: The Geographic and Economic Connection I.. Marquina ed. “Negotiating in International Watercourses: Diplomacy. . “Treaty Principles and Patterns: Selected International Water Agreements as Lessons for the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Water Dispute. 2003. S. Dobretsov.280 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 3. Geneva.” In H. Springer ____.” International Panel on Climate Change. 2000. ____. 2004. 375–400. Conflict and Cooperation.” In International Journal for Global Economic Issues 3 (2). Z. ____. it could be the evidence that hydropolitics and the ensuing water diplomacy finally have recognized the third aspect of interdependence: environmental interdependence. International Negotiations. 2006. 2000. Debewo. Of course. Palutikof. International Relations. eds. Conflict Resolution and International Water Law: Implications for Success and Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. countries will need to agree to sign off on such programs. 205–31. ____. “Preventive Diplomacy. Kluwer Academic Publishers.. Develop regional investment programs to build regional resilience to climate change The third front would emerge after the basic awareness of environmental interdependence and detailed technical knowledge are generated. Vogtmann and N. Dinar.” In International Negotiations 5: 193–200.” Political Geography 412–37. 2005. Presentation on the Impacts of Climate Change on the River Rio Bravo. B. B. Environmental Challenges in the Mediterranean 2000–2050. If they do. 2000. 2008. 2003. “The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has Its Entry into Force Proven Difficult?” In Water International 32 (1) (March): 1–15. 2008. . “Share Managing Water across Boundaries.Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century 281 IRA (International Research Associates LLC). Greiber. H. Munther. C. M.A.” IUCN Water and Nature Initiative. and G. “Neighbor to Neighbor. Bergkamp.” Unpublished. M. 2008.. Salman. 2007. Smith. Salman. “The Thread of Life: A Survey of Hydropolitics and Security in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin. T. Sadoff.” In Jordan Business (October): 79–83. . # Codification . . Jordan.2 C Methodology The methodology for this study was to divide the analysis of water laws in each country by religious and customary law background (addressed in the next section) and WRM topical areas.1 Choosing a group of representative countries within the region to use in a comparative study was somewhat complicated. Laws may have changed or there may be new laws in force that have not been made public. (e) Tunisia. (c) Jordan. (8) penalties. The topics are (1) principles and objectives. (7) flood control. and Yemen. (2) water rights. Tunisia. and (g) Oman. (6) management of water pollution. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (b) Yemen. 3 Editor’s note: Due to these authors’ comprehensive documentation of their sources.16 Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries Jackson Morill and Jose Simas odification of water laws creates the institutional environment in which water resources and water service deliveries are managed. (9) planning. it is also hard to determine whether the analysis of each country represented in this study is totally complete. (5) water pricing. Given the authors’ difficulty in locating legal texts. 285 . (3) water allocation. Morocco. Lebanon. development and information. The countries selected for this study were Egypt. Oman.” 2005. 2 The countries used for this study include (a) Lebanon. the citations are in footnote form rather than text note form. (d) Morocco. (4) transfer of water rights. 1 Based on the “Report Submitted to the Ministry of Water and Electricity. as the majority of countries do not possess a framework water law. as in the other chapters. (f) Egypt. 5 Water laws have to take into account the limited capacity of those who are charged with enforcement.5 Religious and Historical Influences on Water Law in Selected MNA Countries Countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) have a long. The challenge for legal drafting in this region lies in aligning Islamic and customary law with the realities Conflict resolution usually involves some amount of “give and take. in which over 1. some of these laws appear difficult to administer.286 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS (10) groundwater management. 4 . There was a paucity of law in such areas as investment and conflict resolution. For example. the analysis was arbitrarily dedicated to one category and noted in the areas of overlap.” or bargaining (discussed in Bargaining). In modern day MNA countries. The list of water issues above is certainly not comprehensive. However. It is difficult to imagine that so few staff could enforce the entirety of the legal regime of water for such a large populous area. The topics chosen for discussion represented the most common issues addressed in the water laws of the region. This chapter does not touch upon the larger question of the administration or enforcement of water law. rich legal tradition in codifying water resource management (WRM). 6–7 people working in the ministry are assigned to the Sana’a Basin Catchment Area. although bargaining does not lead to conflict resolution. and (11) institutional arrangements. as well as sell to several water vendors in the city of Sana’a. The scarcity of water in the region and its importance to early agrarian and nomadic societies necessitated the development of fairly complex systems of tribal law and Islamic doctrine to manage and share the resource. population growth and changing economies. have led many countries in the region to consider modernizing their water law systems to address the modern-day issues of scarcity and demand management.5 million people live and over-extract groundwater for agricultural activity (especially qat). it seems that the legal minds working in international water law have yet to identify a legal framework for pollution prevention that is workable in the context of areas with limited capacity. as well as globalization and common water management principles.4 If any law did exist in these areas. in Yemen. Given the limited capacities of ministries.3 Several of these categories overlapped. it was included in the institutional category. and in these cases. Shafi’ites. The Sunni and Ibadite traditions expand the right of thirst to some private waters as well. under the Sunni. provides the central tenet of water resource management.. Carmatians. Assassins. including methods of worship. one of the branches (Malikite) holds that the right of thirst applies to private waters as well.7 The application of Islamic law in WRM becomes complex when examining the varied approaches adopted by the different schools within Islam. and clothing. there are different branches as well. There are no separate branches within the Ibadite school. or Shari’a. Within each of these schools. 1. Ahl-al Hagg. 5. The three main schools are the Sunnites. 10) (hereinafter “Caponera”). Druses. Where force was used to dictate water use in the tribal societies. regulates all human actions. Malikites. Any new water law framework must at least consider and respect the traditions built in the region over the centuries. 7 Figh can be found in the second part of the Shari’a. the fundamental text of the Islamic faith and the foundation of Muslim law. See D. Examining the issue even further within the Sunni school. Id. The Shi’ite school has even more branches. creates a primary right of shafa (“drink”) for all individuals and domesticated livestock. Caponera. including the Imamites. as evidenced by the examples of religious doctrine developed in the Prophet’s teachings. Prophet Mohammed preached charity as the principal virtue to help the destitute and to show detachment from material things. 6 . Irrigation and Drainage chapter (FAO 1973. Under the Hanbalite and Shafi’ite As Caponera wrote. and Ibadite traditions. However. “Islam always reacted against tribal life by preaching equality and fraternity in the faith.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 287 of modern day WRM law and policy. 8 Within the Sunni tradition. Id. Shi’ite. Ismailites. but the Shi’ites hold that no one other than the proprietor is entitled to the use of his private waters. which is that water is a gift of God and in principle belongs to the community.A. including the use of water resources. The Holy Qu’ran. and Hanbalites. Water Laws in Muslim Countries. For example.. if the one in need has the financial means. Shi’ites. the hadiths and the figh. he is liable to pay compensation. All Islamic water law is shaped by this baseline principle. water was made available to all in need.” The idea of charity is represented in the basic principle of shafa. and Ibadites.6 This central tenet. in turn. diet. Islamic religious law.8 and each of these schools has a nuanced approach that may differ slightly in certain areas of WRM. and Buhain-in. Zaidites. the right of thirst applies to all public waters. Figh governs the manner in which faithful Muslims should live their lives. there are four recognized schools: the Hanifites. 12 In addition. 11 The Majalla was authored in the second half of the 19th Century by a council of major Hanafi faqihs. and many of its precepts still hold true in countries such as Lebanon. 14. The text was written so that someone without a deep background in the style and usage of classical fiqh texts could understand it. It came to conclusions that sometimes were not “traditional” positions of the Hanafi school. Articles 1234–1328 of the Majalla. or the Ottoman Code. The Ottoman Empire. practical needs also have had a significant effect on rules and regulations. donated. It was the first systematic codification of Islamic law and was based on one school (Hanafi). although they always were grounded in the positions of the Hanafi school’s imams. or transferred. However. 12 Lebanon still has in force Title 4.11 Within the Majalla. the right of thirst may be exercised without compensation under certain conditions. However. whereas other countries. have a group of laws that addresses various aspects of WRM. “Water Law in Muslim Countries. a large section governs water rights. the subsequent colonial influences of Britain and France are strong in MNA. Jordan. While many modern water experts believe that the region is increasingly willing to stretch the bounds of Islamic and Id. gifted. Water rights can be held individually or collectively. for example. Morocco. water ownership is important and is seen as real property.9 While religious principles have maintained significant influence over WRM. Customary law also differs throughout the Muslim countries in this study. due to scarcity in the region. It is very significant for several reasons. First.. Water rights often have been recorded by local authorities. Francophone countries possess a code-based system. whereas the British legacy was a more piecemeal. also influenced modern day water law in the region through the Majalla. It also consciously addressed many pressing issues in law. have passed fairly comprehensive Water Codes. 10 9 . This historical background is not meant simply to elaborate on the diverse origins of water law in North African and Middle Eastern Islamic countries. purchased. As a result. common law approach.” core principles can be gleaned from the varied customs in place.288 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS schools. the rights of religious communities cannot be alienated. it is clear that.10 which united the Middle East. Late 1200s to 1922. Geography and the general availability of water vary within the region. some countries. Chapter 10. for instance. as Caponera writes in his article. These rights may be sold. inherited. water rights. only Morocco and Yemen. or both. Government officials still have the clear intention to respect legal traditions. the Brazilian Water Law includes both a set of principles and objectives at the beginning of its law to establish the broad national water policy (box 16. Current Water Law in Selected MNA Countries The following sections will address the approaches to 11 issues in each country. clearly establish under their respective legal regimes the basic principle of water ownership by the state by virtue of its control of the public domain. as Caponera writes in his seminal work. while it does not possess a framework law. any legal reforms in the region must respect and attempt to incorporate the traditions of customary and Islamic law. and water pollution. does have a very well-developed set of water laws. Of the two countries with framework laws. This is why.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 289 customary law to better address modern issues of rising demand and rapidly decreasing supply. have a series of principles or objectives. Principles and Objectives Morocco and Yemen have been two of the first countries to put in force a framework water law that reflects modern water principles and attempts to address the country-specific issues faced in these countries. highlighting best practices and possible approaches. Jordan. Morocco’s is the most complete. each of these countries does not have any laws that begin with a set of principles and objectives. Yemen’s law focuses almost entirely on the specifics of water rights administration. However.13 Therefore.1). Many “modern” framework water laws contain a statement of principles or objectives.. . 1. many Muslim communities have a “justifiable mistrust” regarding water code projects developed by non-Muslims. For example. In the countries reviewed for this study. such as Jordan and Lebanon. and the institutional mechanisms for managing them. which address groundwater. the two countries with framework water laws in force. because they fear that innovations may offend religious law. 13 Id. Other countries. To ensure the rational and integrated use of water resources. The management of water resources should always allow for multiple uses of water. focusing on the fact that water is an “essential commodity” that is both scarce and extremely vulnerable. including transportation by aqueduct. 4. 5. The management of water resources should be decentralized and should involve participation by the government. The objectives of the National Water Resources Policy are as follows: 1. 2. 14 . the users.1 Brazilian Water Law 9. To ensure that present and future generations have the necessary access to water of a quality adequate for their various uses. priority in the use of water resources is given to human consumption and the watering of animals. which begins with an overarching statement of purpose: “Water resources development must ensure the availability of water adequate in quantity and quality to meet the needs of all water users. with a view to achieving sustainable development. 6. Water is a limited natural resource. To prevent and protect against water crises due to either natural causes or the inappropriate use of natural resources.290 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 16. in accordance with the aspirations of balanced economic and social development. “Grounds for the Law” and “Benefits of Water Legislation. 1. 2. and the communities.433. which has economic value. 2. When there is a shortage. 3.” 1.14 A set of objectives for the law follow. The river basin is the territorial unit for the implementation of the National Water Resources Policy and the actions of National Water Resource Management System. The National Water Resource Policy is based on the following principles: 1. Chapter II: Objectives Art. 1997 Chapter I: Basic Principles Art. the guidelines of national land-use development See Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995). The Moroccan law begins with a basic set of principles. Water is public property. 3. protecting the resource (both in quantity and quality). a process covered more extensively in the next section. this chapter presents a separate section on each country. Several countries. 17 Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law 12/1982).”15 The remaining objectives touch on issues of “coherent and flexible planning.16 Water Rights As outlined in the background section.18 Id. Finally. They further define the tools and parameters for achieving sound water management through the implementation of the framework law.. 18 Id.17 Egyptian water law provides water rights only for irrigation purposes. However. Each country also varies as to the rights and obligations that accompany water rights. Landowners must submit to the irrigation supervisor a scheduling table for irrigation based on the amount of land and the type of crops to be grown. the basic tenet of shafa (“drink”) continues today in all Muslim countries. seeking optimal use of the resource that is in line with the priority uses outlined in the law. 2. No other uses are addressed under the law. 16 15 . In many ways..” using the catchment basin as the method for decentralized management. Art. most notably Egypt. 18. how it is applied varies greatly. Others separate water and land ownership/ use rights. Most countries allow for customary private water rights to coexist with state-owned water administered by a permitting scheme. Egypt Egypt is unique in that surface water rights are tied to land. and thus are tied to land ownership. and establishing the appropriate water administration. all at lowest possible cost. Id. tie water rights exclusively to land. the history of water rights in the Islamic world is complex. 2–3. the law outlines a set of “principles” that flow from the objectives.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 291 planning and the possibilities offered for harnessing potential water resources. This schedule will dictate the amount of water allocated. Because of these great differences. Art. at Art. 82.292 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Landowners have certain responsibilities that accompany their water use rights. Art. Under this law. Under the Underground Water By-Law. fallow land. a variety of actions are prohibited: Wasteful use of irrigation water through a private drain. 23 Id. 3. 25. Moreover.”22 These waters may not be used in excess of personal or domestic needs or other acceptable private usage. or unlicensed land Impeding the irrigation network Preventing flow in the main canal or any other action that might compromise the water elevation Opening or closing any lock or any other regulation works Demolishing any hydraulic infrastructure constructed by MWRI Cutting banks of the Nile or canals or drains without license Excavating in the banks or changing their elevation (hack filling mud or clay or soil). mesqas. 25. 22 See Jordan Water Authority Law (#10/1998). 21 Jordan Water Authority Law (#18/1998). 20 19 . or Id. responsibility or supervision of the Authority. For landowners holding water rights. Art.20 Jordan Jordan is distinct from the other countries primarily because it treats almost all water resources within the Kingdom.21 The slight exception lies with any waters that are not considered “under the management. 9 and 49. Id. Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002). The responsibilities include keeping the drains. sold. waters acquired by means of government projects— and that were not used for irrigation purposes prior to the law—are considered government property. whether surface or groundwater. at Arts.19 Licenses are required for any water-related works or operation of equipment. ownership of the land does not in fact include ownership of the underground water therein. they may not exceed the amounts set in laws pertaining to drinking water and irrigation rights. public drain. and canals clean and free of debris. 3. See also Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002).23 Jordan also is somewhat unusual in that it maintains a separate law for the Jordan Valley that determines water and land use in that region. as state-owned property. These waters may be leased. Art. in particular. the law does provide that some vested rights over the public domain may be retained. for any irrigation project. Art. at Art. Chapter 10. Arts. any person in full ownership of water in wells or streams is allowed to prohibit another’s right for cattle to drink or to irrigate crops in the area if another source exists that is available to the public.30 Almost any conceivable surface water body falls within this definition. Id. Title IV. 1269. 27 Id. The right to drink water has fewer limitations than the right to water livestock. at Art. 1268.28 Morocco The Moroccan Water Law holds that “Water is a public asset and as such…cannot be the object of private appropriation. at Art. 26 Majalla. it is prohibited for anyone to change the periodicity of irrigation by transferring water to land belonging to him or her if he does not hold irrigation rights for said waterway. 25 24 . 1 30 Id.24 Lebanon The law in Lebanon holds that the state has exclusive ownership over the public domain. Note that these private rights are recorded in the Land Registry. However. provided that (1) ownership preceded the publication of the Dahir (law) (1914 and 1925) and (2) claims concerning these rights were filed within five years of publication of the law. For example.25 The right of use that accompanies these rights is governed by the Majalla.26 Both of these rights are limited by the condition that they do not infringe on the rights of others. 6. no more claims may be filed.27 For irrigation rights.31 These recognized water rights Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001). and water for livestock and irrigation.”29 The law lists 10 specific types of water body (natural and constructed) that are considered to be in the public domain. Id. Decree #144. 31 Id. settlement. at Art. 3. Nonetheless. Art. After this date. Art. at Art. private water rights could be acquired through the usual means of property acquisition (inheritance. 28 Id. or purchase) if acquired before 1926. some acquired private water rights remain protected. 2. which distinguishes between two rights: drinking water. 29 Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995). 1262 and 1265. Generally. 18. any excess water not claimed under registered water rights is considered government property. 1254.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 293 otherwise disposed of as decided by the Water Board. In addition. at Art. Owners have the right to use rain falling on their lands.37 The code also provides that any existing water right at the time of the publication of the code becomes a private right. at Art. then a new water right must be requested and issued to reflect the change. landowners abutting a watercourse assigned to public use are subject to an easement within four meters of the freeboards.34 In addition. whether used or unused. if the land is parceled. water use rights are private rights existing prior to the commencement of the law. 39 FAO. Id.33 An owner may dig a well on his or her land not to exceed a certain depth and subject to concessions and public domain regulation. The easement will enable free passage for administration or catchment basin authority works. 3. 21. Tunisia.int/waterlaw/WQ. Any well that was not registered by that date would be considered illegal thereafter.35 Oman The available legal texts for Oman limited the analysis to groundwater.39 Existing rights for the use of natural spring waters located on private lands also may be recognized by the 32 33 Id. 37 Tunisia Water Code (1975).294 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS will remain subject to the provisions concerning water use as laid down in the national water plan and in integrated water resources development master plans. All wells were to be registered by July 1990. 4. must apply to the Ministry of Water Resources for registration. at Art. all persons claiming ownership of existing wells. In addition. As a result. 31. 8.32 Landowners have certain rights and obligations for use of water that falls outside the public domain. 53. any attempt to artificially collect rainwater is subject to regulation. 25. provided that they are recognized by the Drainage Commission. the water use right is transferred to the new landowner.38 Water use rights are appurtenant to the land. 26. 36 Oman Ministerial Decision No. Under Article 2 of the Ministerial Decision No. However.36 Tunisia Under the Tunisian Water Code. 2/1990. 35 Id. at Art. Water Law and Standards: Framework for Analyzing National Water Laws.exe$QU_Search . Art. www. when land on which a water right exists is sold or transferred. Art. 2/1990. at Art.who. 38 Id. 34 Id. 32. provided that these rights are not suitable for exploitation and use for public purposes. the Yemen water law provides for a significant number of private water rights.44 Finally. provided they were held prior to the issuance of the law. or streams.45 The only caveat for all of these rights is that they must be registered with the Water Authority within three years of the date of the announcement of the issuance of this law. Art. Yemen Water Law (#33/2002). quantities of water may be collected in cisterns. The law gives due consideration to customs. 46 Id. all water installations and wells set up by the government are considered public property and subject to registration and licensing.43 Traditional rights of use from natural springs. and irrigation systems in effect. Note that these rights must be registered and also be used only for their original purposes. 28. Existing and acquired water rights. at Art. at Art. 29. 41 40 . creeks. as might be expected. However. provided that this acquired right does not infringe on other acquired rights and that the use accords with traditional rights and customs. The government should compensate any infringement on the right of use. 44 Id. 43 Id. are maintained. traditions. 27. Art. brooks. whether prior to the issuance of the law or thereafter. all watercourses in the wadis (natural streams) are the common property of all beneficiaries. pools.40 Yemen Under the 2002 Yemen framework water law. and surface wells (the depth of which can not exceed 60 meters) are maintained.42 Traditional water rights derived from rainwater harvesting and natural runoff flows that are tied to irrigation are protected for all owners of agricultural lands. at Art. 30. 45 Id. 5.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 295 Ministry of Agriculture. at Art. They are not touched by the government except in times of critical need and for the public welfare. Id.46 Allocation of Public Water Every country examined in this study has in place a scheme to allocate publicly owned water. differences Tunisia Water Code (1975).41 As evidenced by this water rights regime. at Art. 30. In contrast. 42 Id. In fact. The licensee must include in the license application the acreage. irrigation source. water rights in Egypt are tied exclusively to land. 49 Id. and water rights are used only for irrigation. Egypt As mentioned previously. and any increase or decrease will be at the expense of the government. Therefore. countries differ as to which type of water abstraction requires a permit and which does not. 48 Egyptian law: Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law #13/1982). water rights allocations are tied to land-holding and the types of crops licensed to be grown on each parcel. Then a license is required from the Irrigation Director. irrigation technology. Id.296 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS are significant depending on whether the water allocation is tied to the land or is considered a separate right. The Irrigation Director is then responsible to validate the data and determine how much water to allocate and which irrigation technology should be used.49 In fact. 36. the Irrigation Director may alter the flow coming through a privately constructed withdrawal on the Nile or a main canal should she/he feel it exceeds irrigation needs. Since the water legislation was passed. In addition. and cropping calendars. The effect is to create a flexible system of water allocation based on factors similar to those of the Jordan Valley Development Law. 37. 50 Id. defined as lands that have never received an irrigation license. Some countries allow underground abstraction to a certain depth while others require a license for any underground abstraction. at Art. a public hearing is required.47 The Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWRI) is responsible for the distribution of water in all waterways up to the mesqa level and for determining and publishing the irrigation calendar. the MWRI must approve the appropriation to ensure that there is enough water. soil classification. the Irrigation Director is empowered to stop diverting water from a main canal to ensure more equitable distribution or to avoid over-application. at Art. Finally.48 MWRI reserves the right to modify the system in accordance with agricultural needs. the proportion of crops regulated by licensing has fallen considerably. However. 40. administration of the allocation system varies among countries. 47 .50 To irrigate new lands. including size of the land and crop rotations. Art. except in compliance with this law.58 The Authority also may expropriate any lands.56 In addition. either by absolute expropriation with compensation or by lease for any period it deems appropriate.52 to construct any pumping stations. 52 51 .Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 297 The law also requires licensing for any water works completed on public lands. 55 Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002). 21. water shares. 56 Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001). the Board enforces the water prices set by a Cabinet of Ministers upon recommendation by the Board. However. at Art. as necessary for projects. Arts. Article 25 provides that all waters available in the Kingdom are State-owned property and may not be distributed. 4–42. 49–60. The Board determines when to allocate or cut off water flows. Id. It sets all of the necessary regulations to control the use of water in farm units in the valley. 9–16.53 and even to cultivate lands.54 Each of these requirements is designed to further control the withdrawal and use of public water resources drawn from the Nile. 53 Id. at Arts. Art. at Arts.57 The surface and groundwater allocation system for the Jordan Valley Authority is managed by a Board. prevent its waste and conserve its consumption.” See The Water Authority Law (#18/1988). These two laws work in entirely different ways. no guidance is provided in this law as to how publicly owned water will be allocated. Jordan The amalgamation of laws in Jordan covers the allocation of underground water through the Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002) and of surface/groundwater in the Jordan Valley through the Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001). it was not apparent from any of the laws reviewed for Jordan whether it has a national scheme for allocating surface water. 59 Id. Id. Finally. Arts. 7. 24.51 or for any water intake established on the Nile or main canals. or both.55 The Jordan Valley law ties water allocation to land size and crop rotations. In addition. 58 Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001). at Arts. 18–24 57 The Water Authority Law calls for the Water Authority to “regulate the uses of water. 39–44. Art. 54 Id. The underground water law calls for a standard permit system for well digging and water abstraction. 6(h). It also fixes the maximum quantities in accordance with water availability and the nature of the crops planted in each unit.59 The law establishes a fairly complex system for estimating the value of Id. at Art. 298 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS the lands or water rights. the head of state or any other delegated authority can require specific permits for: 1. at Art. 63 Id. Id. 5. Lebanon The Lebanese framework water law provides that the state has exclusive property rights over water resources in the public domain. 62 Lebanon Decree 320/26 (Titles 2–3). materials to be used. and provides for appeals as to the amount granted for the expropriation.60 The Authority also has the right to take all necessary measures to implement irrigation networks and improve their works. permits are required. whose flows are not sufficient to justify needing these waters for public use. 64 Id. at Art. Prospecting for underground water (but not for its use) 5. 4. the use of water from wells drilled on private lands. The allocation law concerning private water rights seems to focus on water extraction. is exempt from any permit or other authorization. Extraction of materials from a permanent or seasonal water body 3. 32. the discussion of Jordan’s Underground Water Control By-Law appears in the groundwater section.64 Any civil engineering works on waterways require a permit that specifies the scope of the work. at 22. the flow of which does not exceed 100 m3 per day.61 To avoid overlap.62 Under Decree 320/26. For example.65 Although the duration of a permit is usually provided case by case. Structures designed to control and use waters from natural sources. Id. some activities are accorded temporary use of Id. Nevertheless. Note that no other Agency or Ministry can execute “any construction activities” in the Jordan Valley. and the overall management scheme. 3. many private water rights are held in the country. Art.63 To drill for underground waters. at Art. its nature. 65 Id. Planting or construction on the sides of waterways 4. 61 60 . Temporary erection of structures for the use of waters in the public domain 2. 39.71 The Authority is granted the ability to revoke a permit at any time. 38. (3) use of underground and spring waters. Id. 69 Id. (4) fees or dues are not paid. without compensation. and renewal is possible. it may be renewed indefinitely for successive periods of 40 years. (5) establish intakes from the underground water table in excess of the maximum set by regulation. Note also that these uses may be declared public and thus subject to the specific regulations of the concessions.70 The permit also should include the measures to be taken by the recipient to prevent water degradation. at Art.67 Morocco Morocco has in place a system for allocating all water held in the public domain through a permit system administered by Catchment Basin Authorities. (2) irrigation of lands by waters of the public domain by motorized methods or the use of such waters for energy. In such cases. 12. 68 Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995). 70 Id. and (5) purification and development of marshes.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 299 up to four years. and (8) operate ferries or crossings on watercourse. and (5) water was used for a purpose other than that authorized by the permit. 72 Id. (7) establish intake of water of any kind for sale or therapeutic use.66 If the permit is issued to a farmer. (3) establish works to impound and harness natural spring water on private property. (6) establish water intakes on watercourses or canals derived from wadis. (2) construct dug wells with depths exceeding the maximum provided in law (Art. (3) permit is assigned or transferred without agreement of the Authority. 7. 26). Art. amount of the fee and payment arrangements. 71 Id.72 The Authority also may revoke. at Art. The activities include (1) permanent pumping of water from a waterway. amend. following written notice. and terms of use. the length may not exceed 75 years. at Art. at Art. if (1) the terms of the permit have not been met. (4) use of hot and mineral springs. 67 Id. or restrict the permit for reasons 66 Id. at Art. . 10. 39. Id. (2) utilization of the permit does not begin within two years.68 Permits are required to (1) prospect projects for tapping underground or out-welling water. (4) establish works meant for using waters of the public domain (for five-year intervals with possibility of renewal).69 The permit granted by the Catchment Basin Authority specifies the duration (not to exceed 20 years). and their appurtenances. and enact the necessary local temporary regulations to ensure. 44. aqueducts.300 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS of the public interest. During times of shortage. at Art. the law provides that the administration can declare a state of shortage.80 The cost imposed may be borne in part by the government. potable water for human and livestock consumption. and navigation canals including the land comprised within their overflow banks. 75 Id. Id. All belong to the public domain of the State. specific regulations that restrict water use apply to areas under irrigation. 86. including development of thermal springs. the law provides for a system of concessions for various categories of works. it is clear that most water in Tunisia is within the public domain. define the affected area. 1. at Art. 82 Water Code (1975). wells and watering places constructed in the public interest.75 The law limits what the concessionaire may do under the contract.74 These concessions are considered real rights. 47. lakes and subkhas. Art. at Art. the administration is entitled to requisition water. This guidance will be discussed in the groundwater section. 79 Id.78 Finally. Tunisia Under the 1975 Water Code. The permit holder is entitled to compensation. but they do not entitle the holder to the right of ownership over the water. 78 Id. at Art. construction on public water domain. flood protection. springs. The water bodies include all watercourses and the land comprised within their overflow banks.81 Oman The available law for Oman provided guidance only on groundwater allocation. 77 Id. 45.82 Water may be used subject to a Id. at the least. irrigation. provided it follows prevailing law. 76 Id. 88. at Art. in cases of water shortage. 87. subject to prior notice of not fewer than 30 days. groundwater. 41.79 During this period. at Art. 80 Id. water storage. at Art.76 and specifies a set of events that would forfeit the concession contract. or derivation works. 74 73 . Article 1.73 In addition. Id.77 The Authority may demolish any structure constructed without a permit or concession and order the offending party to restore the area to its original condition. 81 Id. 33.87 In addition. (2) if the concessionaire uses waters for purposes other than those granted in the concession. and 53.85 Concessions may be renewed. 85 Id. at Art. 84 83 . 89 Id.86 The law does provide for specific instances in which concessions may be forfeited. 87 Id. including any well dug no deeper than 50 meters88 and rainwater falling on a landowner’s property. and (5) drainage of lakes and subkhas and their use. the proposed amendments are designed to address the creation of the new Ministry of Water and Environment. the law exempts some uses from licensing requirements. at Art. (4) construction of permanent dams and use of the water stored therein. and (4) for the exploitation and use of natural spring waters that are located on private lands but are not suitable for exploitation and use for public purposes. (3) if charges are not paid. It has taken over the functions of several Id. Among many other issues. 52. at Art. Yemen Yemen is approving a series of amendments to the Framework Water Law (#33/2002). Forfeiture occurs in these instances: (1) nonobservance of the law. In certain cases. Id. at Art.90 Nothing in the legislation covers the recording of water rights or the monitoring and enforcement of water abstraction licenses. (5) if water is not used for a consecutive period of one year from the issuing of the concession. a concession may be decreed a public utility. (2) to construct infrastructures located within the overflow banks of a watercourse or on canals.84 Concessions are granted for (1) permanent water intakes in watercourse beds. 52. Id. the government may alter the process for allocating water resources. but the law is silent on the duration.83 An authorization is required (1) to use public domain water for nonpermanent waterworks. at Art. (3) for groundwater exploration and exploitation activities. at Art. lakes. or under a water use right. 72. (4) if the concession is transferred without authorization of the responsible authority. but not for the use of the water. 56. 9. (3) use of mineral and thermal waters. 88 Id. 90 Id. at Art. 67. 86 Id.89 The concessions or authorizations can be altered or forfeited if the water is needed for a public purpose so long as compensation is paid for any damages or loss. at Arts. Generally.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 301 simple authorization or concession. (2) use of underground or spring waters. 21. at Art. or (6) if the concessionaire fails to make full beneficial use of the water for a consecutive period of two years. and subkhas. 60. Id. 53. 302 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS different ministerial bodies that either predated it or were created by the 2002 law. 3. it creates no future adverse effect on quantity and quality of the water in the basin or zone from which it was conveyed. The 2002 Yemen framework water law provides guidance on allocation of groundwater and of water between catchment basins or zones. or unsuitable for drinking after all other uses have been suspended. If conveyance of water damages any existing interests of beneficiaries (the holders of use rights). after reviewing all possible options and alternatives. 4. Water in the recipient basin is either insufficient to meet the needs due to the shortage of the water there. These amendments have not been passed. Under certain conditions (listed in the law). a topic addressed in the institutional section of this chapter. such damages will be compensated fairly and only once. all water installations and water wells set up by the government are considered public property and require a license. What is interesting is that the law considers allocation among basins and provides specific guidance as to when these transactions might occur. Coordination and consultation have taken place with the local authorities. The only area for which reliable information on the proposed amendments is available regards the division of administrative duties. However. water basin committees. these requirements are the extent of the regulation for surface water allocation. However. 6. several possible source basins exist. 5. In some cases. Conveyance does not damage the potable and domestic water. the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) may permit the pumping of specific volumes of ground or surface water from one basin to another on a temporary or permanent basis. and the economic costs of conveyance from all or some of these basins is close . the law says little about surface water. Water is conveyed only for drinking and domestic uses in the recipient region. The six conditions are that: 1. Thus. 2. Article 5 of the law does provide that the wadis are property in common to all beneficiaries. so it is not possible to speculate on their impact on the water allocation law or the other issues covered in this chapter. and actual beneficiaries of the water basin from which the water is conveyed. Furthermore. the rights are apportioned by land area. creeks. when an irrigated landholding is transferred. due consideration shall be given to drawing the required quantities of water from more than one source to distribute the effects of drawing water among the basins accordingly. if the land upon which a water right exists is partitioned. Art. 25. if the land on which a water right exists is sold. In Jordan. Yemen provides for the transfer of all traditional or vested rights (natural springs. 23.92 Many countries tie the transfer of land to the transfer of water rights.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 303 to the cost of conveyance from a single basin.95 If a water permit is held separately from a land holding. Yemen Water Law (#33/2002). Art. the water use right is transferred with the land. Art. water rights are transferable by sale or inheritance. Transfer of Water Rights Generally. 96 Id.91 In Lebanon. In Tunisia. 9. 93 Tunisia Water Code (1975). Art. in 91 Jordan Water Authority Law (#18/1988). The conditions of the sale or transfer will be included in a contract between the transferring party and NWRA.93 In Yemen. The licensing regime for groundwater is discussed in the groundwater section. at Art. brooks. 94 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002).96 Any transfer of a permit effected separately from the holding for which it was granted is null and void and. every country reviewed for this study allows the transfer of water rights. for the transfer to comply with the law.94 In Morocco. streams. 40. provided they have been recorded in the Land Register and were acquired before the 1926 Decree 320. and maintained surface wells that do not exceed a depth of 60 meters). 29. 92 . the buyer must own agricultural land to which the water rights can be attached. but the mechanisms vary. He or she must declare this transfer to the Catchment Basin Authority within three months of the change. Art. all natural or juridical bodies may sell or transfer water from any source only with advance written approval from the ministry. 29. 95 Morocco Water Law (#10/1995). In these cases. The new landowner must notify the ministry of the transfer within six months of the land sale. the water use permit passes automatically to the new owner. these policies allow persons to sell water from private sources. 98 97 . It charges for the base resource as well as processing fees for groundId. MWRI is to accomplish this by preparing an inventory of expenditures for drainage and then adding 10 percent for administrative costs. 101 Id. are required to assign all or part of the rights that they do not use to either individuals or juridical persons who own agricultural holdings that can benefit from the water. Egypt Egypt does not charge for the water itself.100 MWRI is to impose fees on the use of government-owned water intakes.304 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS effect. In contrast. the holders of vested rights over water. at Art. 53.102 Jordan Jordan has a fairly well-developed system of water charges. several Sunni branches are not as open to selling or transferring water. at Art. The Hanifites and Hanbalites allow only the sale of water from receptacles. The Shi’ites believe that water may be transferred or sold on a volumetric basis but not in globo.98 Water Pricing In the Islamic world. 102 Id. 20. anyone who draws from a government-owned pump should pay for that water if it is not meant for agricultural use.97 Furthermore. 10. Id. Many MNA countries charge water user fees for public water. and drains. These costs are to be shared proportionally among beneficiary land owners. the Shafi’ites and the Malakites follow the principle that the owner of a water supply may sell and dispose of it at will. 32. However. this segment of water law is perhaps the most difficult to implement due to the right of shafa (“drink”) for every Muslim and his or her livestock.101 In addition. 49. at Arts. at Art. or over water they use only partially for their land. 74. However. Art. 40.99 Clearly. 100 Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law #12/1982). pumps. 99 Caponera. except water in a well dug for livestock. the law envisages that the state should recover the cost of all of the money expended in administering the water. revokes the permit. and 73. 000 m3/yr.000 m3 /yr incur two separate costs. Morocco In Morocco.106 There is a charge of 250 Fils per m3 for the sale of water from wells designated as drinkable water.108 Lebanon Lebanese law holds that beneficiaries and users of household. making readjustment very difficult. 39. and other monitoring activities. Art. almost all of the water charges are outdated and do not reflect the full cost of the water. or in proportion to. deposits. these fees were fixed by law. However. their water use. technical field inspections. Id. 106 Id. and a 60 Fils charge/m3/yr for over 200. and possession or use of a drilling rig. and other fees the Authority may collect for its services. as in many of the countries reviewed in this region. As a result. the financial resources of the Authority consist of (among others). as mandated by the Underground Water Control By-Law. well maintenance. well deepening. 107 Id. There is a 25 Fils charge/m3/yr from 151. revenues from water prices. There is no charge for water use under 150. and industrial water are subject to an annual contribution fixed by. Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002). any individual or juridical person using public domain water is required to pay a water user fee. 15.000–200. irrigation. the law provides for charges imposed by the government for services rendered in supervision. and for active unlicensed agricultural wells whose status will be rectified under the law. 37. 38. 104 Id.105 Prices also are fixed for water extracted annually from governmentowned wells. 105 Id. for industry-owned wells. Charges for withdrawals up to and then exceeding 100.000 m3/yr.103 First. this legal lag does not take away from the extraordinary commitment by many of the countries in the region to encourage controlled water use through water fees. a series of fees are levied for drilling licenses. 108 Id. drilling permit renewal.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 305 water. for wells used for tourism or university purposes. at Art. subscriptions.107 Finally. . It is unclear whether the regulations 103 In Jordan. However. as well as a lesser charge for water extracted from wells designated as nondrinkable.000 m3/yr. It is interesting to note that water extracted from the Al-Azraq-area licensed wells that fall within specified quantities are free. at Art. at Art.104 The prices levied annually for water abstracted from private sources are fixed by law. MWRI is responsible for licensing wastewater discharge. or piling up of any substance that is detrimental to the environment (solid.112 Water quality standards are provided in the Executive Regulations to Law 48 for 5 categories of water bodies. liquid. Only the discharge of treated effluent is permitted. Finally. Under the 1995 law. and the Ministry of Health is responsible for monitoring effluents. Under it. Egypt. 63. 37. The identification of pollutants and their use and disposal are governed under two laws: (1) Protection of the Environment Law (#13/1995) and (2) Environment Protection Law (Temporary Law #1/2003). Storing any of these substances within a specified proximity to water sources also is Morocco Water Law (#10/1995). the dumping. Egypt The basis for the protection of surface and groundwater may be found in the Protection of the Nile from Pollution Law (#48/1982). Id. Art. 17.109 Collection of fees can be enforced against either the owner or the operator of a water intake (jointly and severally liable).111 Management of Water Pollution The law on managing water pollution is very rich in some countries. 113 Egyptian National Water Resources Plan (June 2004). Art. research. radial. 111 Tunisia Water Code (1975).306 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS have been passed that would govern the collection and quantification of the fees. and Yemen are at the forefront. 112 The law also calls for the regulation of weed control and waterway pollution by agrochemicals. or heat in water sources) is prohibited. and treated wastewater from animal or human sources can be discharged only into nonpotable water. 110 109 .110 Tunisia also provides for water use fees for authorizations or concessions not declared of a public nature. Jordan. disposal. and rewards. gaseous. Morocco. the law establishes a fund to be supported by fines and cost recovery mechanisms that can be used for water administration. donations. Charges are calculated based on the volume of water granted in the agreement.113 Jordan Jordan has an extensive group of laws and regulations that govern water pollution. 119 Supporting this law is a major Wastewater Regulation (#36/1994). A Law on Public Health provides the basic framework for establishing the wastewater network in Jordan. use. 115 . The authority also possesses the right to cut off or alter water sources that have been polluted to 114 Jordan Protection of Environment Law (#13/1995). Articles of the Jordan Valley Development Law ban the importation of certain chemicals. and rodents—all within approved specifications). this law entitles the minister to require any legal entity or party to prepare an environmental evaluation of its activities prior to the law’s coming into force. The Environment Protection Law for Jordan (#1/2003). 120 Jordan Wastewater Regulations (#36/1994). 6 and 11. flies. at Art. and to carry out experiments or research.116 In addition. The authority is given the ability to monitor water pollution through periodic testing. 119 Jordan Law of Public Health (#21/1971). Arts.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 307 prohibited. which provides the regulations for the disposal of wastewater.115 This law also provides that any owner of a factory or workshop. Art.114 The 2003 law expands upon the provisions of the 1995 law with articles that address the importation. storage. the Water Authority is entitled to act on any violation through fining or even blocking a watercourse to prevent further pollution.118 One other large body of law deals with the collection and treatment of wastewater. 118 Id. it is prohibited to dispose of waste and liquids (with some noted exceptions) into the public watercourse without having treated the water and acquired a written approval from the Water Authority. Jordan maintains a slightly different regime for the Jordan Valley. However. 116 Id. the law provide exceptions for certain substances: those used to treat pollutants. The law also governs the management of public and private wastewater disposal with provisions mandating connection to public systems at a cost to the user. at Art. 26. should install devices to prevent or reduce the diffusion of such pollutants to meet the standards established by the ministry. or any person who practices any activity that negatively impacts the environment. Under the law.120 As with the other water issues discussed previously. to fight epidemics (including weeds. 13. 17.117 A set of penalties applies to any violations of the law. As would be expected. 117 Id. and disposal of environmentally detrimental substances. 12. at Art. at Art. Wastewater and polluted water are distinguished and treated separately. Art. at Art. 24. 122 . Last. A series of penalties are made available for enforcement. at Art. 55. thermal. or water sources. 127 Id. under the framework law. 123 Id. 125 Id. 128 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002).129 NWRA is free to alter or change 121 The Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001). after which the permit may be issued for a fee. 54.127 Yemen Yemen also has a permit system in place. which are determined by NWRA. Certain acts that might damage a watercourse or its banks are prohibited. radiation. solid.121 Morocco The Moroccan framework water law empowers the administration to prescribe quality standards for water according to its use. Art. and disposal. 126 Id. 124 Id. 56. for any activity that changes the physical or chemical characteristics of water. The Authority also is empowered to protect all water resources from pollution. 52.308 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS prevent further damage. at Art. 51. dug wells. or lubricant wastes must follow executive regulations (not yet in force) and the framework law regarding their transport. Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995).126 The law also governs any kind of excavation or works that might affect a watercourse and. NWRA monitors water quantity and quality. 59. and washing linens or food products in water supply sources.122 Any person seeking to discharge effluents into surface or groundwater must apply for a permit with the Catchment Basin Authority.124 The Catchment Basin Authority is authorized to periodically monitor the point source. handling. 129 Id.128 All entities that dispose of liquid. Thirty days are allowed for public inquiry. at Art. in a number of instances. calls for formal authorizations from the Authority.123 The law outright forbids seven distinct activities such as dumping wastewater or solid waste into dry wadis. Special regulations (also not yet in force) will apply to the Protected Water Zones.125 The Authority may take any appropriate actions against any nuisance that could affect public health or safety. the protection of public property is the only purpose for which the construction of submersible lands. 85. permits granted for water use may be forfeited or varied in case of flood. at Art. 96. Id. including protecting agricultural terraces. provisions for flood control have been made in several countries. 132 Morocco Water Law (#10/1995). or levees to hinder floodwater runoff does not require a permit. and other hazardous substances. dikes. 136 Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law #12/1982). Art. 135 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002). 6. Art. 61. The ministry also is called on to prepare a plan for rainwater runoff and flood drainage outlets.135 Egypt has in place a somewhat unique flood control legal regime. Id. stating that the government may execute works necessary for the protection of property and utilization of water on such lands. at Art. 94. 58. The Irrigation and Drainage Law is clear in granting the government immunity from any fault for flood damage to lands or infrastructure neighboring the Nile or main canals. The law further provides several provisions on erosion control. The people empowered to organize flood prevention teams include the chief engineer and the Id. 133 Id. several people are authorized to gather citizens to prevent breaches of the banks of the Nile or main canal.131 Flood Control Given the fact that most surface water sources (such as wadis) are fed seasonally. and to collaborate with other related entities and local authorities in executing this plan. In Morocco.133 Under Tunisian law. fertilizer.136 Because flooding can happen quickly. The law also provides a special provision for agricultural land. 131 130 .134 The Yemen Water Law grants the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation the responsibility for controlling and regulating rainy areas that get rainwater runoff and flooding. 72. 134 Tunisian Water Code (1975). at Art. Art. at Art. their related collections areas.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 309 any permit in cases in which circumstances changed after the permit was issued and for which continued operation under the permit would cause damage.130 The National Water Supply and Sanitation Authority (NWSA) is called on to regulate the disposal of industrial wastes. and the water flow and drainage passages.132 The Catchment Basin Authority is entitled to construct any dike or other structure if doing so is in the public interest to prevent flooding. Art. and pesticides. 54. implementation of best available technology) and quantity (drilling without a permit. permitting. the larger issue is really how well the law is applied. However. the lead water authority is charged with the enforcement of all penalties. have opted to leave many of the specifics as to fine amounts and terms of imprisonment to regulations. but Lebanon has chosen instead to include all of the pollution control penalties in the penal code. In the majority of countries.138 Penalties The enforcement of water laws can be accomplished through a system of both carrots and sticks. agents commissioned by the administration. at Art. 77. The penalties are meted out for violations of the laws that affect both the quality (antipollution provisions. 78–80. Both Yemen and Morocco have developed significant legal frameworks for planning. It appears that the majority of countries in the region have opted more for the stick (command and control regulation) than the carrot approach. effluent standards. However. Most countries include the penalties within the water legislation. at Arts. Morocco takes a unique approach by calling on the police force. Several countries.139 Planning and Development and Information The importance of long-term planning in the water sector has come into greater importance only in the last decade as water shortages coupled with dramatic increases in demand have captured the attention of policymakers. Id. The majority of the other countries provide specific maximum and/or minimum penalties for every offense.137 MWRI also is entitled to take action when water levels are high.310 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS mayor or community leader. 114. such as Morocco. 138 . illegal use of water) of the resource. 139 Morocco Water Law (#10/1995). 137 Id. Art. Only the most recent framework laws in the Middle East and North Africa region include any significant coverage of planning for the water sector. Every country except Egypt provides for the possibility of both imprisonment and/or fines. as with enforcement. and the Catchment Basin Authority to enforce the laws after swearing to uphold the law. the administration is responsible for developing integrated water resources development master plans for each catchment basin or group of catchment basins. . Id. Special conditions of water utilization. The opportunity for revision is available every five years or if there are exceptional circumstances that require a change. in both quantity and quality. Quality goals and deadlines and required measures for achieving them. 8. notably those relating to its optimal use. this plan shall specify which surplus water quantities may be transferred from one basin to another. and combating waste. at Art. notably water infrastructure. and measures required to cope with exceptional climatic conditions. almost no law includes any significant attention to providing a structure to gather information and translate it into plans for the short. Operations required for harnessing. 15. 3.142 The law provides specifics as to what each integrated development master plan should include: 1. 2. 16. at Art. 9. Assessment and development. distributing. 4. Morocco The catchment basin is the chosen planning and organizational unit. 5. Regulations govern the procedures for revision. Where appropriate. preserving its quality. 143 Id. 6. Territorial boundaries of basin(s) to which it applies. of water resources and needs within the basin. and long term. 142 Id. and restoring water resources and public water domain. General scheme of water development of basin required to ensure conservation of resources and their adaptation to needs. medium. 7. Plan for water-sharing among the various sectors of basin and chief water usages therein. at Art. at Art. 17. 16. Priority ranking to be applied in water-sharing pursuant to point(3) above.141 These plans are designed to last for 20 years.140 Under the water law. protecting.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 311 Although information gathering is critical for planning. Safeguarding and interdiction perimeters.143 140 141 Id. . Art. at Art. at Art. The national plan is prepared for at least 20 years. and overseeing the use of irrigation water and installations. including national priorities. 17.148 Priority is given to critical water basins or zones by preparing these plans first. 146 Id. linkages to land-use development plans. because two other ministries are responsible for issuing plans in the water sector. However. and acting outside of their guidelines or contrary to their stipulations is forbidden under the law. Yemen Water Law (#33/2002). and long-term water budgets. support measures including education and grassroots work. The national plan is approved by decree after consultation with the Council for Water and Climate.312 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS The administration also is responsible for developing a National Water Plan based on the results and conclusions of the catchment basin integrated water resources development master plans. After they are ratified by the Council of Ministers. It is charged with developing a classification system for water basins and water zones. 13–14.146 The law provides that NWRA must develop water plans for each water basin and water zone. 151 Id. and short-. at Art. 149 Id. trends for demand. monitoring rainwater runoff and floods. and determining indicators of the water situation. 16. data. these plans become part of the National Water Plan. at Arts. and measures used to develop the unit plans is governed in separate executive regulations.150 Coordination of the National Water Plan is important. 13. with the possibility of revision every 5 years.151 144 145 Id. The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation is charged with preparing and implementing plans and programs related to the control of wadi flows and general canals. The law provides the specifics of what the national plan should cover.147 The process for gathering the standards. medium-. 150 Id. at Art. 19. 25. the law does provide a list of what should be included in these plans. 148 Id. 19.144 Yemen In Yemen. at Art. and the conditions for transferring water among catchment basins in times of shortage. 147 Id.145 The NWRA is responsible for all planning.149 Water plans are binding on everyone. the water planning units are water basins and water zones. timetable and program for completion of all works. each requiring different quality standards: 1. Reclaimed water is prohibited in irrigating vegetables eaten raw and in sprinkler irrigation. at Art. 26. thereby reducing groundwater overdraws that plague many MNA countries. many countries have in place provisions to govern the handling. Field crops. industrial crops. thereby suggesting that it reaches the highest levels of Government. the reuse of reclaimed water to replenish artificial groundwater is allowed if its quality meets agreed standards. 19. 153 152 . 893/2002). The uses for reclaimed water allowed by the law are split into three different classes. at Arts. the reuse of wastewater. the National Water Plan is considered one of the components of the economic and social development plans of the government. Oman. The Protection of the Nile from Pollution (Law #48/1982) regulates the reuse of drainage water. Art. sides of roads outside city limits. The reuse must be in accordance with the conditions of the permit. and in particular.154 Wastewater Reuse Wastewater reuse is of tremendous potential importance for the region.152 To facilitate cooperation among these plans. and green areas Id. and Yemen have included wastewater reuse provisions in their laws. Jordan.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 313 The Ministry of Electricity and Water is responsible for preparing policies and executive plans for the water and sanitation sector. Id. However. and forest trees 2. Morocco. at Art. Fortunately. using groundwater replenishments for aquifers used for drinking is forbidden. Fruit trees.155 Jordan Under the Reclaimed Domestic Wastewater Standard Specification (Standard No. Irrigating fruit trees with reclaimed water must be stopped two weeks prior to harvest time.153 NWRA is charged with reviewing other sectoral plans and coordinating with relevant concerned entities before preparing the National Water Plan. 155 Egypt has a small provision in Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law #12/1982) that states that drainage water may not be reused for irrigation unless MWRI issues a license. 154 Id. It can serve as additional supply for irrigated farming and groundwater injection. 46. 15 and 17. 160 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002). Jordanian Standard.156 Morocco The central administration is charged with prescribing the conditions for the use of wastewater.158 To encourage the proper reuse of wastewater. 84. 159 Id.314 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 3. at Art.161 NWRA is responsible for issuing the reuse permits for treated wastewater that must meet specific conditions. 158 Id. 26. and specifications described in separate regulations. 161 Id. 47. 57. Any use of wastewater requires an authorization granted by the Catchment Basin Authority. parks. playgrounds.157 The use of wastewater for agricultural purposes that do not meet the standards set in regulation is prohibited. Cooked vegetables. 57. it is permitted to reuse wastewater in four situations: (1) a buried drip-feed system to irrigate ornamental trees and shrubs in areas in which there should not be public exposure. at Art. Art. (2) approved groundwater recharge areas in which there should not be public exposure (may include open lands or wadis).160 However. standards. and (4) flood. Art. No.162 Oman Under Ministerial Decree (#5/1986) on Regulations for Wastewater Re-use and Discharge. 157 Morocco Water Law (#10/1995). 156 The Reclaimed Domestic Wastewater Standard Specification. at Art. . (3) reuse of treated effluent for industrial processes within a closed-circuit system that will pose no dangers to the workers. hosepipe. users are entitled to government financial assistance and technical assistance from Authority if the use achieves water economies and preserves water resources against further pollution. 893/2002.159 Yemen The Ministry of Electricity and Water is responsible for the treatment and disposal of wastewater in accordance with a uniform system that conforms to qualitative and environmental standards. and sides of roads within city limits. the reuse of wastewater is allowed only after coordinating with NWRA and other affected populations nearby. 162 Id. 14. Art. 13.163 Wastewater quality requirements for reuse and discharge are provided in table I of the Ministerial Decree (#5/1986). 166 Id. 167 Id. 26. 8. if wastewater or sludge is used in a manner outside the stated limits and represents a risk to public health. record. The reuse of wastewater or sludge containing radioactive material is not permitted. 14438. 29.164 The law provides specific instruction as to how owners of wastewater treatment plants should handle and transport sludge. Only Jordan168 and Yemen169 have laws with provisions for registering preexisting wells. The full details and nature of reuse of treated effluent for industrial purposes within a closed circuit system are provided in the permit for discharge. 168 Jordan Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002).173 Jordan174 163 Oman Ministerial Decree (#5/1986) on Regulations for Wastewater Re-use and Discharge. A permit is required only for drilling over 60 meters. Art. Yemen. The minimum depth at which a permit is required is to be fixed by regulation. 165 Id. 2. 174 Id. Art. Art. Id.171 and Lebanon172 do not require well permits unless the well will exceed a certain depth. as they are subject to a separate set of regulations (not available). 11. at Art. 170 Id. 169 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002). 6. Jordan requires a permit for all well-drilling activities regardless of depth. at Art. at Art. 31–33. 173 Jordan Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002).Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 315 sprinkler. 41. the ministry or approved authorities reserve the right to inspect. and request samples and tests in accordance with a separate royal decree (#10/1982). on condition of prior consent from the ministry. 171 Morocco Water Law (#10/1995). a permit is required only for drilling over 150 meters. 172 Lebanon Decree No.166 Finally.170 Morocco. . at Arts. 164 Id. 15.165 These regulations do not apply to owners of septic tanks and holding tanks. Id. but this is their only similarity. (2) name and address of contractor or user of sludge. Art. or spray irrigation. at Art. Art. Each is required to keep a detailed record specifying at least (1) date of delivery. and (3) quantity delivered. Id.167 Groundwater Management All of the countries reviewed in this study require some form of authorization for drilling new wells. Under this article. at Art. 33. the ministry is charged with performing the technical studies for all underground water resources.182 and licensing drill operators and drilling rigs. there is no provision as to the creation of a cadastre for preexisting wells. Egypt In accordance with relevant regulations. 184 Id. 178 Id. Oman Ministerial Decision (#2/1990). and quantities thereof are determined by regulatory decisions issued by the Board upon the submission by the minister.180 deepening. Jordan also requires a license for drilling rigs. a license from MWRI is required to dig any groundwater well (shallow or deep) within national lands. at Art. Id. Arts.178 Jordan Jordan maintains perhaps the most complete and extensive legal framework for managing groundwater resources. 8–31. 177 Egypt Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law #12/1982). 179 Without violating the provisions of the Jordan Valley Development Law in force. 34.316 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS and Oman175 are the only countries to require a license for professional drillers. This law requires that a license must be obtained from MWRI. at Art.179 This by-law governs the permitting system for drilling any new well. 11–12. 27. cleaning. 28. 176 175 . 185 Id. at Arts. 21–28.183 In addition. or maintaining existing wells. 180 Id. including any exploratory activity. Jordan Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002).177 For desert lands. Art. Special Law #143/1981 applies.181 digging substitute wells. 40–42. 7. 182 Id. 46. Art. The central piece of legislation is the Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002). at Arts. monitoring the quality and quantity of the resource. However. at Art. 183 Id. at Arts. methods of using the underground water extracted therefrom. 181 Id. a system to register and monitor preexisting wells184 and provisions governing the use of underground water and the transfer or sale of wells are in place. 31–35. the rules governing the construction of public and private water wells. but only after meeting the approval of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation. each country’s legal approach to groundwater management is detailed individually below. at Arts.185 Under the by-law.176 Given these significant differences. 187 The Water Authority is responsible for administering all of the permitting procedures. official institutes. universities. 25). 188 No drilling licenses may be granted in the Jordan Valley areas without consultation with the Jordan Valley Authority.189 After the study performed by the Authority. The secretary general publishes the application in two publications at the licensee’s expense. before granting a permit. Id. at Art. 30). the minister issues the drilling license. The competent officials nominated by the minister or secretary general have the right to enter any land for conducting studies or investigation or collection of information related to underground water or for carrying out any measures related to the by-law. It must include a recent real estate deed for the relevant plot of land. 190 There are certain limitations to granting drilling permits: (a) the distance between drilling permits granted can not be less than one km (Art. The board also retains the right to reject any drilling license application if the public interest requires it. 6. and the possible uses for the resource. In this case. The test measures the well production capacity and water quality to determine the amount of water that can be extracted annually. 23. After the expiration of this period. 21). at Art. Any person has 15 days within which to raise an objection. within the limits of safe yield.186 On the submission of the minister. (2) granting more than one license per plot of land is prohibited (Art. including the permitted depth. at Art. and (4) any person who has violated this by-law more than once is no longer eligible for a drilling permit (Art. Id. With board approval. and the industry and tourism sectors find it impossible to secure their water needs from the public water supply network. 9. The license is valid for one year. 186 . Id. governmental departments. First. This process must be completed within six months of receipt of the permit application. at Art. 6. at Art. provided such resolutions are published in the “Official Gazette” and two local newsletters. 187 Id. the application for the drilling license may be submitted. Id. The law requires that any landowner who discovers water seeping up on his or her land notify the secretary general in writing within seven days of the discovery. An exception occurs when ministries. 4. 189 Id. Id. renewable by decision of the Id. a board determines the maximum quantity of underground water permitted to be extracted annually from each groundwater basin. Id. at Art. the Board may grant any of them a license to drill wells in the prohibited areas pursuant to the provisions of the by-law. 21). 15.188 The drilling permit system has the following key provisions. (3) a drilling permit may not be given to anyone who holds a valid drilling license for another well that has not been completed (Art. at Art. 6. the secretary general presents the application to the board for final decision. at Art.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 317 and identifying the appropriate uses of these resources. the Council of Ministers can identify areas in which drilling is prohibited. If approved.190 which contains the specifics. the Water Authority is required to carry out a pumping test before the well may be used. 22. 10. at Art.194 In addition. at Art. Maximum amount of water that may be extracted from the well within a fixed period. Id. at Art. Such measures could include the rationalization or reduction of the extraction rate. at Art.318 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS minister.193 On the submission of the secretary general. 11. Purpose of water use. the board should take a decision to set the appropriate measures that would end such pollution or depletion and restore the natural balance to the aquifer or the underground water basin. 192 191 . and according to conditions outlined for this purpose.191 Each drilling permit has a series of other conditions that apply. the secretary general may take any of the following measures: (1) backfill any well drilled without a license in pursuance of the provisions of this bylaw. 195 Id. at Art.192 Owner or the possessor of a private well is prohibited from (1) irrigating any land other than that specified in the water extraction license or selling this water for irrigation. 18. or his delegate. at Art. 16. some of which are listed below: Licensee is prohibited from undertaking any activities that could cause pollution or deplete the resource. The license is deemed cancelled if drilling is not completed within the established time. 193 Id. the license is cancelled. 17. and (2) selling the water extracted from the well by water-tankers for drinking or any other purpose without obtaining a prior written approval from the secretary general. Id.195 Every owner of a drilling permit also must obtain a license for water abstraction from the secretary general or a delegated authority. 194 Id. or if the public interest so requires. 2. The offender must bear the costs of rectifying these violations. 21. Eight conditions are required to be included in the application: 1. If any areas were found to be polluted or depleted. the board may cancel a drilling or extraction license if the licensee violates any of the license conditions. Id. Should the offender not rectify the offense. (2) backfill any well whose owner did not abide by the conditions of the license granted thereto. Maximum area that may be irrigated using water from the well licensed for agricultural purposes. of a water meter that has been approved and stamped by the Authority. 7. and survey maps. 201 Lebanon Decree #14438/1970.198 Licenses granted for drilling rigs themselves are obtained from the Authority.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 319 3.199 Lebanon Citizens may prospect for groundwater.201 Decree #14438/1970 provides details of what should be included in the application. the Authority is required to keep official records of rigs and drillers and all activities related to the profession. 8. Maintaining by the licensee of a register. 36. 3–4. 198 Id. the prices fixed for the extracted water. 6. Obligation of the licensee to pay to the Authority.196 A license for drilling operators may be obtained from the secretary general. at Art. at the expense of the well owner. It is prohibited to transfer a drilling rig to a different site without an additional permit. 6. The owner of the well shall reimburse the Authority for the fixed maintenance expenses. in time. 35. at Art. 2. Installation. Art. provided an application is made to the administration200 for any well that will exceed 150 meters. Art. 5. 4. Id. copy of the land registry. Notification of the Authority within a period not exceeding 48 hours in case of nonfunction of the water-meter. 199 Id. This condition should be met prior to the issuance of the water extraction license. approved by the Authority. in which all data relating to the well and extraction shall be registered regularly in accordance with instructions issued by the Authority. 202 Id. . Taking no measure that impedes the flow of water from the well directly to the water meter that will measure it. 34.197 In turn. at Arts. 200 Lebanon Decree #320/1926. at Art. Specifics include the location and aim of the works. 29. at Art.202 After the application 196 197 Id. It is valid for one year and renewable for the same period. modes of prospecting. at Arts.211 Some exceptions might be made in the case of severe shortages. and size of the properties concerned. Art.203 Once granted. at Art. and required equipment and installations. and determination of taxes to be paid by the applicant. 205 Id. 208 Morocco Water Law (#10/1995). at Art.209 After receiving the authorization. a license is required to drill any well that would exceed a depth to be determined by regulation. at Art. 206 Id. 212 Id. 89. the well driller is required to provide the Authority with any data required and to permit the Authority to enter on his/her property at any time to do so. the Directorate General for Equipment within the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity examines the permit and makes a recommendation to the minister. 6 and 10. 207 Id.210 One of the most interesting provisions deals with safeguard perimeters in areas in which groundwater levels appear to be low. data required for collection. 26.205 The decree includes information on the nature of the use. at Arts. Within these perimeters.212 203 Id. at Art.208 Any person wishing to drill a well may approach the administration for information as to the technical. 49. 15–16. 50. at Art. at Art. hydrological. Authorizations are granted by the Catchment Basin Authority. 209 Id. 13. 92–93 211 Id. Id. but the water extracted could be used only for consumption by people or livestock. 11. maximum authorized quantities. reconstruct wells. 210 Id.207 Morocco Under the Morocco Water Law.204 Any use of underground water that did not result from the drilling of a well is governed by a decree that grants temporary occupation of four years.320 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS has been presented. 204 . prior authorization is required to drill. at Art. number. 5. and hydrogeological characteristics of the proposed site.206 A permit is not required for the use of water from a drilled well on private property if the use does not exceed 100 m3 per day and the water does not come directly from a river or water course. the proposal will provide the specifics as to the location of the well. and/or extract water. or pump installation on boreholes may be carried out except by a government-registered contractor. 7. Id. the responsible authority must verify that the permit holder has complied with the conditions set in the permit. 222 Id. 16. at Art. 23. what provisions it includes.216 No well construction. Art. 22. Id. 53. change in the use of an existing well. 217 Id. To register. to be placed on the well.215 At any time. 75. 216 Id. It is not clear whether this decree has been passed and. 220 Id. 218 Id. Note that a contractor can appeal any refusal for certification. 223 Id. at Art. or carry out tests.214 The permit holder must register his/her well permit to obtain a Well Registration Certificate and a Well Registration Plate. 21.223 Oman Ministerial Decision (#2/1990). Art.222 Detailed provisions on groundwater are said to be set by a specific decree (not available). development. 214 213 . at Art. the extraction and use of groundwater are subject to a concession. modification. 17.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 321 Oman The Ministry of Water Resources is charged with specifying the water quantity discharged from any well and is responsible for monitoring the use through well meters issued to each well owner. modifications to an existing well. at Art.218 Registration is valid for one year and subject to renewal. maintenance. at Art. at Art. 219 Id. 221 Tunisia Water Code (1975). 52. 14. at Art. at Art.221 In contrast. or installation of a pump in a borehole.219 The contractor is responsible for making sure that any well s/he works on has a permit. These include the construction of a new well. 28. take samples. at Art. yield testing. These meters are the responsibility of the well owner. 5. at Art. Ministry of Water Resources staff may enter the property of a permit holder to inspect.217 Contractors are classified into categories that reflect their technical capabilities and qualifications. 215 Id. if so.213 Permits may be granted to landowners for any groundwater exploration activities.220 Tunisia Groundwater exploration activities are subject to an authorization. who must keep them in working order. Art. 227 Id. at Art. all important drilling rigs or water well metal casings must meet specifications issued by the NWRA. 44. Water Authority. Well owners acquire their water rights within 15 days of presenting the application. the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. 39. and Jordan Valley Authority all come Jordan Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002). 228 Id. (2) exploring for groundwater. Under the drilling permit system. 35.225 All procedures for the administration of the permit process are to be detailed in regulations yet to be formulated. there is some guidance on how to register the wells. and (6) pumps. Holders of permits to drill wells must approach the NWRA within three months of completing the authorized works to register the wells. whether directly or indirectly. a permit is required for any well that will exceed a depth of 60 meters.322 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Yemen The Water Law provides a licensing regime to control drilling and to classify drilling operators. 226 Id. 29. at Art. 42.228 In addition. 225 224 . (3) general plans for water treatment and distillation. However. executing consultancy studies.226 Contractors and engineering offices must obtain a permit from the NWRA for three activities: (1) drilling water wells. creeks. 229 Id. 46. at Art. Id.224 To deepen a well. and carrying out works in the field of water resources: and (3) distributing well waters. at Art. and natural springs. through private supply networks or by bottling it. According to the law. and provisions to control the equipment used in drilling wells.227 Any natural or legal person must register her/his offices or firms with the NWRA to obtain a license to undertake any groundwater exploration activities. 42. Id. streams. (5) drilling equipment. at Art. at Art.229 Institutional Arrangements Jordan In 1992 the Administrative Organization for the Ministry of Water and Irrigation Law (#54/1992) consolidated the previous administrative system under one ministry. (2) sites and general plans for water and irrigation installations. no permit is required if it is the first time and the depth does not exceed an additional 20 meters. The following activities are considered: (1) drilling water wells. (4) protected wells. 235 The law creates one additional body. at Art. They are (1) Planning.230 As a result. on the recommendation of the minister. who channels the information to the minister. (2) Secretary General of the Water Authority. 237 Id. (5) Financial and Administrative Affairs. 5. WRM includes the roles and responsibilities set out in the Water Authority Law (#18/1988) and the Jordan Valley Authority Law (#19/1988). (2) Financing and Loans.234 In addition. and six directorates.236 The consultative body is charged with providing the minister with technical. and (3) Secretary General of the Jordan Valley Authority. at Art.232 The roles of these directorates are outlined in the law.233 The secretary general is responsible for implementing the ministry’s policy and running its affairs according to the laws in force. 232 Id. at Art. financial. water planning. This ministry is charged with the full responsibility for all water and 230 Jordan Administrative Organization for the Ministry of Water and Irrigation Law (#54/1992). as described within the law. at Art. 3. at Art. 18. economic. (4) Citizens’ Service. Art. (3) Legal Affairs. and (6) Projects Follow-up. and administrative advice on policy. the Consultative Body. 236 Id. 4. legal. see Articles 9–16 of the Jordan Administrative Organization for the Ministry of Water and Irrigation Law (#54/1992). . the directorates report to the secretary general. 6. created by law in 1988 as an autonomous body with financial and administrative independence. and strategies.237 Water Authority One of the key bodies incorporated under the Minister of Water and Irrigation is the Water Authority. which is formed in the ministry and chaired by the minister. at Art. 9. the minister assumes responsibility for WRM in the Kingdom. 17. Four additional members may be added. the minister’s office.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 323 under the purview of the Minister of Water and Irrigation. Development and Information. 235 Id.231 Ministry of Water and Irrigation The Ministry of Water and Irrigation consists of a secretary general. 234 Id. 233 For their duties. The Consultative Body’s three core members are the (1) Secretary General of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. 231 Id. 6. (5) carry out related research and studies on water and wastewater. obtaining foreign and local loans. (4) develop standards and special requirements for the preservation of water and water basins (quality and quantity). 242 Id. 10. recommending water fees and pricing tariffs. who is its chairperson. and maintain water and public wastewater projects. at Arts.243 Jordan Valley Authority The other important body incorporated under the Minister of Water and Irrigation is the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA). created by 238 239 Jordan Water Authority Law and Amendments thereof (#18/1988). at Art. operate. . (6) regulate the uses of water. reviewing the Authority’s draft regulations and submitting them to the Council of Ministers for approval. In addition. These councils are to provide citizens and local authorities with the opportunity to participate in deciding priorities regarding water and wastewater projects and plans for implementation. The board meets when called upon by the Minister of Water and Irrigation. water departments are to be established in all parts of the Kingdom. (2) administer the licensing regime for groundwater. at Art. approving policies and plans for the development and conservation of water. and balance covering the preceding year. 243 Id. and appointing members to district Water Councils. design.242 The board is responsible for setting water policy. with a Water Council in each department. 241 Id. at Art.324 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS wastewater systems and related projects. general budget. investing the Authority’s revenue.241 Supporting the Authority is a Board of Directors made up of related ministries’ representatives.239 The secretary general is the executing agent for the Water Authority. 8–9. Id. prevent its waste. and conserve its consumption. Gathering from all of these sources. construct. 240 Id.238 Among the many tasks and responsibilities assumed by the Water Authority are to (1) establish plans and programs to implement water policies and exploit the resources for domestic and municipal purposes. reviewing the annual budget. at Art. 23. the Authority is responsible to submit to the Council of Ministers a report on the Authority’s activities. 12. (3) study.240 The Authority is empowered to establish additional departments for implementing all of its duties as it sees fit. and acquire land or immovable properties. audits. executing staff. drainage works.244 JVA is made up of the minister. All funds raised are placed in a special account in the Central Bank to be administered by a Special Treasury established by the JVA. Art. 247 Id. purchase.247 JVA also may raise funds through fees and can benefit from national or international grants or loans. In addition. the JVA (1) carries out studies for evaluating water resources (both surface and groundwater). (4) settles disputes on water use. and administrative units. at Art. including dams. 248 Id. designs.248 Given the relative financial autonomy of the JVA. and (5) organizes and directs the construction of private and public wells. .245 These different groups work together in much the same way as the administration of the Water Authority. (3) surveys and classifies soil to determine lands suitable for irrigation. 13. and carries out irrigation projects and related works. 249 Id. hydropower stations. (2) plans. well-pumping stations. 36. and any other data requested by the Cabinet. board of directors. at Art. the JVA is responsible for protecting and improving the environment in the Valley. distribution networks. reservoirs. The Ministry of Health is charged with the 244 245 Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001 as amended). The JVA is responsible for carrying out the social and economic development of the Valley. secretary general. The JVA’s duties also extend to developing tourism in the Valley and studying and improving the agricultural road network. it is responsible for a series of reports to the Cabinet of Ministers. 246 Id.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 325 law in 1988 under the Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001 as amended). including the development of all water resources and the works associated with water use and conservation. lease.246 Because the JVA is considered an autonomous corporate body. may raise funds. 3. 17. at Art. In particular. Id. 9. and flood protection works. The withdrawal of any monies is to be governed by regulation. at Art. it. too. including annual reports on works undertaken or completed. 8–12. future planned works or projects. and borrow through bond issues.249 Relevant ministries and coordination Two ministries share the responsibility for managing potable water and protecting water quality. at Arts. 41. Art. it is entitled to control (1) potable water resources and their networks to ensure that they are not affected by pollution.254 The Ministry of Environment conducts all research.260 and building and maintaining the covered drain systems. 4. Art. 253 Jordan Environment Protection Law (Temporary Law #1/2003).252 The Ministry of Environment is the competent authority for developing all standards and specifications governing environmental protection. 18. at Art.253 The Ministry of Water and Irrigation is a member of the Council for the Protection of the Environment. the Standards and Specifications Corporation. at Art. and executes all awareness-building efforts for the environment. 258 Id. issues all regulations and enforces them. 259 Id.251 The Ministry of Health also is charged with managing sewage networks. which is chaired by the Minister of Environment. 254 Jordan Protection of Environment Law (#12/1995). transmitting. including all treatment stations. O&M of all publicly owned infrastructure. to ensure that health conditions are maintained.326 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS control of potable water to ensure its fitness for human consumption. 4. adjudicating water rights conflicts. 256 The Jordan Standards and Specifications Law (#22/2000). 255 Jordan Environment Protection Law (Temporary Law #1/2003). prepares all emergency environmental plans. at Art.255 One final government body. at Art. is responsible for issuing all of the standard specifications and technical rules. and storing water. 5. Art. 252 Id. Art. Art.258 allocating water up to the main canals. 52. 31.256 Egypt The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) oversees all public-water-related entities but can outsource management responsibilities to other ministries or public authorities. at Art . Art. and (2) the method used for treating.250 In so doing.261 Mayors and village elites are charged with 250 251 Jordan Temporary Public Health Law (#54/2002).257 MWRI’s responsibilities include the protection of Nile and Main Canal banks.5. the corporation is responsible for supervising the application of all standard specifications. 257 Egypt’s Concerning the Issue on Irrigation and Drainage Law (#12/1982). including water resources. .259 enforcing the provisions of the Irrigation and Drainage Law (#12/1982). 3. 6. Id. at Art. 261 Id. In addition. 260 Id. 5. 39. and integrated WRM plans for the catchment basins. 30–56. the state has begun gradually repurchasing hydraulic concessions granted to improve control of water use. Decree 320 provides for the possibility of owners to enter into partnerships to undertake certain works. 101. and organizing collective irrigation. These bodies are the (1) High Council on Water and Climate266 and (2) Catchment Basin Authority.262 Lebanon At the national level. 20. at Art. at Art. The decree provides a series of administrative procedures for creating the partnership. including flood control. 320. 264 Lebanon Decree No. the Ministry of Energy and Water is charged with managing all water projects. Arts. In particular. at Art. . the national water plan. Arts. 266 Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995). 265 Lebanon Decree No. 13–14.263 and controlling water concessions.264 The Directorate for Management has responsibility for overseeing the 44 water agencies (granted by decree from the state) and controls water concessions. applying the laws and regulations regarding the protection and use of public waters. The local water offices are characterized by conflicts of jurisdiction and fractionalization. 20 (1966). only 1 project has come to fruition. it is responsible for commenting on the national strategy to improve knowledge of the resources. The ministry is divided into two directorates: (1) Water Infrastructure and (2) Management. marsh drainage. The Directorate for Water Infrastructure (équipement hydraulique) oversees the construction of all hydraulic equipment and has delegated to the 44 water offices and commissions the responsibility for distributing water to users. 268 Id. cleanup and maintenance of watercourses. 267 Id. In fact.268 Member262 263 Id. In over 60 years of operation.267 The High Council formulates the general guidelines of national water and climate policy.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 327 protecting the industrial works for irrigation and drainage that have been handed over to them in accordance with MWRI decisions.265 Morocco The Moroccan Water Law establishes two government bodies that are responsible to support the government’s role in managing water resources in the country. supervising the work of 44 autonomous offices and the commissions responsible for water. 13. 328 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS ship of the High Council includes government officials.270 The CBA is administered by a Management Board chaired by the government authority responsible for water resources. including TA. Propose and implement appropriate measures. particularly regulatory measures. Build the necessary structures to prevent and combat floods 10. in collaboration with the government authority with responsibility for the environment 7. at Art. to public or private persons who request it either to prevent water pollution or to develop or harness public domain water resources 5. (2) studying the authority’s 269 270 Id. scientific and academic communities. . hydrogeological. 14. Perform all quality measurements and apply the provisions of current legislation on the protection of water resources and restoration of water quality. Maintain a register of recognized water rights and of water intake concessions and authorizations granted. Id. to ensure water supply in the event of an officially declared water shortage or to prevent the risk of flooding 8. The board is responsible for (1) examining the catchment basin integrated development master plan prior to its approval. planning. The responsibilities of each CBA are to: 1. and water management studies at both the quantitative and qualitative levels 6. Draw up the integrated water resources development master plan for its particular area of operation 2. Furnish any financial aid and provide any services. Manage and control use of the water resources harnessed 9. Carry out all piezometric measurements and gauge operations and all hydraulic. Issue the public domain water usage authorizations and concessions provided for in the water resources integrated development master plan for its particular area of operation 4. and community representatives. Monitor implementation of the water resources integrated development master plan within its particular area of operation 3. 20. at Art. Each CBA is considered a public entity with a juridical personality and financial autonomy.269 The Moroccan Catchment Basin Authority (CBA) is the most complete attempt by any country in the region to decentralize the management of water resources. 271 At the local level. 273 Id. at Art. at Art. and creating necessary flood prevention structures. local communities can undertake partnership projects with the assistance of the CBA. (6) drawing up the authority’s personnel rules. The ministry is responsible for making general policies for the preparation of long-term plans consistent with the economic and social develop- 271 Id. a Prefecture or Provincial Water Commission should be created to assist in the preparation of catchment basin water resources development plans. 274 Id. conserving water resources (in quality and quantity). and (7) approving agreements and concession contracts entered into by the Catchment Basin Authority.272 Under the law. (3) drawing up the authority’s budget and accounts. This section will focus only on the more recent Ministry of Water Resources. and help build public awareness. which shall be approved in accordance with the current legislation governing public establishments’ personnel. in Oman. 21. These national water plans would result from the inputs from all of the various CBAs.274 The law does not make it clear who the “administration” would be.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 329 WRM and development programs and its annual and multiannual programs of activities prior to their approval by the governmental water resources authority. 102. at Art. at Art. Id. the “administration” maintains certain responsibilities related to developing the catchment integrated development national water plan. there are two separate laws that created two entities responsible for administering the country’s public water resources. These projects could include cleaning out watercourses. The Ministry of Water Resources is charged with the development and conservation of all water resources in the Sultanate. support water saving and pollution prevention activities in the municipalities. 272 . (4) determining pollution-related fees to specific water pollution correction measures.273 Outside of these new government bodies created under law. 101. 19. (5) proposing to the governmental water resources authority the charge base and rates for user fees remunerating the authority for its services. Oman Finally. and maintaining the hydrologic and hydrogeologic monitoring networks in the Sultanate. studies. Undertaking site visits to new agricultural lands to ensure water availability in new lands and to ensure their suitability for growing crops 9. Art. Undertaking the training and qualification of Omani employees working in the Ministry of Water Resources. recording. 4.275 Royal Decree #100/1989: For the Establishment of the Ministry of Water Resources and Designation of its Duties and Responsibilities. Preparing regulations according to Royal Decree #100/1989. The ministry also is endowed with all of the appropriate authorities to carry out 13 other activities: 1. Operating. Collecting water samples from wells and aflaj (“traditional channels”) and analyzing these samples to determine salinity rates. Assessing the water balance and water availability in the Sultanate 7. Establishing an information and data center for water resources and programs related to the use of water resources 3. reviewing. Coordinating with the Ministry of Agriculture and fisheries to ensure the suitability of agricultural development 10. Undertaking research. and suitability for different uses 8.330 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS ment plan of the Sultanate. and analyzing information on different uses of the resource 6. treatment methods. developing. executing studies on conservation and use of available water 5. 275 . classification. Collecting data and information about ground and surface water resources and springs. Undertaking the general plan for the development of water resources and their conservation after coordination with other ministries and government units 2. and surveys aimed at the exploration of other water resources. after coordination with concerned authorities 13. and filing of these data for use in related studies 4. as well as the computation. Issuing permits for the construction of new wells that take into consideration the regulation in regard to banned areas and distance from mother wells 11. Providing TA and policy advice to government units in the water field and providing methods for determining use 12. separate Ministry of Electricity. 4. Art. This chapter therefore will provide a description of the 2002 Yemen Water Law’s institutional 276 Tunisian Water Code (1975). The Water Supply and Sanitation group has subunits for water resources. MWE’s responsibilities have been divided into two separate groups: (1) Environment and (2) Water Supply and Sanitation. Under the Environment group. or they can be established by the state.277 WUAs can be freely established upon the request of interested water users. within each governorate a “Water Interest Group” is to be established. It is clear that the pending amendments will alter the current structure posed by the 2002 Framework Law. General Authority for Rural Water and Sanitation Projects (GARWSP).Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 331 Tunisia The Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources is entrusted with the administration and management of public domain waters. The NWRA. at Art. treaties and regulation. advise the governorate on waterworks undertaken in the area. 277 . and local corporations that operate urban water supply and sanitation systems in a quasiprivatized manner all have been brought under MWE’s control. and control WUAs. These groups would prepare studies for the implementation of water works of public interest. The creation of MWE has since triggered a series of pending amendments to the Framework Water Law (#33/2002). and/or the undertaking of drainage works. Responsibilities of WUAs could include the management of an irrigation system. there are subunits in charge of policies and programs. 154. and water sector reforms. and others. it is unclear as to how much change will occur in the duties of the NWRA and the NWSA as outlined in the 2002 Law. and emergencies.276 Under the 1975 Water Code. drinking water system. water supply and sanitation (WSS). leaving a self-standing. NWSA. Internally. 153. Id. in 2003 the government of Yemen created a new Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE).278 Yemen As mentioned. MWE was created by pulling the environmental responsibilities from the Ministry of Tourism and the water responsibilities from the Ministry of Water and Electricity. 278 Id. at Art. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). However. MWE is separate from the pre-existing NWRA. NWSA. respectively. data collection. 284 Id. The NWRA has yet to develop the Executive Regulations that would govern the operation of the basins and zones.279 The central responsibility of the NWRA is to control the use of the country’s water resources. 285 Id. 74. dikes. 17. and information-gathering that can be used to estimate water budgets and evaluate demand and the quantities that can and may be exploited. These basins or committees are encouraged to include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community representatives.332 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS framework with the caveat that all may change after the passage of the amendments. 11. .282 as well as preparing the National Water Plan through reviewing sectoral and water basin plans. 63–66. at Art. Under this article. (3) setting up water dams. 283 Id. 280 Id. the NWRA is responsible for establishing Water Basin and Water Zone Committees to operate under its supervision. at Art.283 The NWRA must devise a classification system for water basins and water zones to control water use. MAI’s other responsibilities include: 279 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002). 12.281 The NWRA also is charged with collecting the information that can serve as the basis for water planning. at Art. 17. at Art. at Art. 13. Id.287 MAI rations the use of water for irrigation and potable water use in rural areas in accordance with the Water Plan developed by the NWRA. at Arts. 286 Id. Art.280 Control includes monitoring. and reservoirs to harvest rainwater and make optimal use of all surface water resources. (4) preventing desertification through conserving soil and water. and (5) encouraging community participation and education. 281 Id. 7. the law states that NWRA should consult and coordinate with the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and the Ministry of Electricity and Water regarding their respective tasks. 14. Nevertheless. 287 Id. 282 Id.284 Additional tasks include (1) enforcement of the law through inspectors. the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Electricity and Water still hold important responsibilities over the irrigation and WSS sectors. at Art.286 Finally.285 (2) providing farmers with support to new technologies and modern irrigation methods to improve water savings. The 2002 law centralizes authority under the NWRA. with the cooperation of the police and security forces. at Art. and exchanging the information picked up by these stations with the NWRA and with the beneficiaries thereof. Setting up. which ensure the optimal benefit of the agricultural sector’s share of water. 3. monitoring the flow of rainwater runoff and floods. and making use of the output of the national hydrological station network. documenting. MEW was charged with preparing policies and executive plans for the WSS sector. whereby they constitute—after the review and assessment thereof—one of the inputs of the water plans.and long-term demand for irrigation water. medium. and Water Plan. All of these actions should be in keeping with economic feasibility and adjusted to the set allocation of water for such use and for the conservation of water and the environment. implementing the extension programs. 2. water budgets for the Water Basins and Zones. The water was to be used largely for water supply and sanitation. 25. and monitoring the use of irrigation water and installations to ensure the safety of such installations and the protection of water from waste and pollution.Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries 333 1. 5. at Art. 6. Executive Procedures are to be developed for setting the controls for coordination among MAI. and encouraging the use of modern irrigation methods. NWRA. 4. the former Ministry of Electricity and Water (MEW) was responsible for managing all water allocated to it through the NWRA’s Water Plan. Preparing and implementing the plans and programs related to the control of wadi flows and general or public canals. operating. and maintaining water installations to lead to benefit from the use of rainwater and rainwater runoff. . and the other relevant concerned entities accordingly. ensuring potable supply for domestic uses and applying the proper standards for water quality.288 Under the 2002 law. Preparing indicators for the short-. recording. and taking all the measures that will lead to the rationing of water use. increasing the productivity of water and agricultural crops. setting up meteorological agricultural surveillance stations. Demand includes the need of private sector projects for irrigation water. Drawing up a plan for protection from rainwater runoff and flooding. and 288 Id. within the context of the indicators of the national water plan. Preparing irrigation policies and executive plans. Undertaking theoretical and practical studies. analyzing. water rights allocation. Project Appraisal Document for the Yemen Water Sector Support Project. water user groups and beneficiary associations may be formed to involve the public and the beneficiaries of water in regulating water resources or in the O&M of water installations. and bidding rules aimed at creating incentives for private sector participation in irrigation infrastructure. Id. at Art. tourism-related. Where the balance has been disturbed (as in countries witnessing excessive drawdowns of groundwater). 2009. and disposal. at Art. or other service-provision areas. introducing new ideas and technologies is possible within the existing frameworks. while remaining fully compatible with customary law and religious doctrine. The Executive Regulations would establish the implementation of this provision. such as financing rules aimed to better target government subsidies to the poor. treatment.290 Conclusions Many MNA countries have successfully developed new water law regimes that address modern water demand and supply concerns. 290 289 .289 Finally. and use restricted to tree crops and fodder crops. For example. Often. Other chapters that follow deal with specific aspects of codification.291 Good examples of modern legal approaches exist for such key issues as groundwater management. MEW also oversaw projects in potable water supply and sanitation. with NWRA participation. In addition. Any reuse would be strictly regulated and coordinated with the NWRA. MEW was responsible for setting up and managing wastewater networks for collection. Id. the problem has been caused by perverse economic incentives (such as the diesel subsidies in Yemen). Maintaining such a balance is feasible because society has internalized the customary laws and religious doctrines. The treatment of wastewater would be governed by a uniform system established by MEW. the region-wide interest in wastewater reuse has evolved gradually as stakeholders began appreciating that treated wastewater is a significant additional resource so long as treatment was adequate. 10. and wastewater reuse. 26. 291 See World Bank.334 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS providing water supply to public and private industrial. The subsidy is performance based.org 335 1 . in some cases. such as reductions in CO2 and improvements in health.1 OBA is also known as “performance-based aid” or (in the health sector) “results-based financing. meaning that most of it is paid only after the services or outputs have been delivered and delivery verified by an independent agent. the installation of solar heating systems.Subsidies for the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach Providing Basic Services to Poor Periurban Neighborhoods in Morocco Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani 17 What Is Output-Based Aid? Output-based aid (OBA) is an innovative approach to increase access to basic services for the poor in developing countries and to improve the delivery of services that exhibit positive externalities. community or nongovernmental organizations or public sector utilities. when it receives reimbursement through an OBA subsidy.” OBA is part of a broader effort to ensure aid effectiveness. or “outputs” (box 17. The third party receives a subsidy to complement or replace connection fees for poor households (HH) that cannot afford to pay the full connection fee. www. or the delivery of basic healthcare services. These can include the connection of poor households to electricity grids or water and sanitation systems. The service provider is responsible for “pre-financing” the project until output delivery.gpoba. For more information. service delivery is contracted out to a third party—usually a private service provider but. visit Global Partnership on Output-Based AID’s (GPOBA) website. OBA links the payment of aid to the delivery of specific services. Under an OBA scheme.1). whom they might otherwise disregard Encouraging innovation and efficiency by leaving the service “solutions” partly up to the service provider Increased sustainability of public funding through the use of one-off subsidies and by linking ongoing subsidies to sustainable service Enhancing monitoring of results since payments are made against agreed outputs OBA schemes contrast with traditional aid approaches. usually the poor. Output-Based Approach inclusive. or it could subsidize off-grid solutions such as solar home systems for communities in remote areas. Traditional approach Inputs (such as materials) Private finance Public finance Output-based approach Inputs (such as materials) Private financing mobilized by service provider Service provider Public financing linked to service delivery Service recipients Service recipients Why Is OBA Relevant for Morocco? By regional standards.1). Ninety percent of accessible resources are stored in 116 large dams. For instance. .1 Input-Based Approach vs. irrigation is developed over 1. a traditional electricity project might finance the expansion of the electricity grid to poor areas. Under the OBA approach. the priority shifts from making a service generally available to ensuring that the poorest households actually benefit from the service.336 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 17. which usually focus on financing “inputs” such as infrastructure (for example. Morocco already has good water infrastructure assets.1 Output-Based Aid: Core Concepts Increased transparency through the explicit targeting of subsidies and tying these subsidies to defined outputs Increased accountability through shifting performance risk to service providers by paying them after they have delivered an agreed output Increased engagement of private sector capital and expertise by encouraging the private sector to serve customers. In contrast.000.4 million hectares Service provider Source: Author. an OBA project would subsidize the cost of connecting households in the poor areas to the grid. Note: Scale = 1: 70. OBA schemes thus can complement traditional aid and make service delivery more Figure 17. a water treatment plant or a hospital) or equipment (such as books for schools) (figure 17. First. approximately 2 million Moroccans remain without access to water supply and sanitation services (WSS) in illegal settlements surrounding the country’s major cities.000 households (or 900. infrastructure is lagging for rural water supply (70 percent in 2007). with individual connections and continuous service for 83 percent of households. launched by the King in May 2005. particularly those in urban and periurban settlements previously considered illegal and. Today. The next sections review the design and results of these pilot interventions. In fact. Morocco has one of the best potable water supply rates in the region. illegal or not.Subsidies for the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach 337 (ha).2 In the Casablanca metropolitan area alone. therefore. Nature of Service Deficit in Periurban Areas of Morocco Currently. and wastewater treatment (5 percent of discharges treated in 2004). and potable water supply reaches almost all urban dwellers. including through policy and expenditure reorientation. Pilot OBA schemes were set up to encourage water utilities to improve access in low-income communities. The government developed a comprehensive reform program that focused on the integrated and sustainable management of water resources. approximately 145. However. Access to service remains particularly inadequate in poor urban and periurban areas. Second. “periurban” includes all settlements located at the outskirts of a city and structures in city quarters or hamlets. and encompasses hamlets presenting characteristics of rural areas but not belonging to rural communes (municipalities). This initiative included a significant component to expand basic services to the poor.000 inhabitants) are estimated not to receive adequate water supply and sanitation services. 2 In this context. Morocco has to improve service access and efficiency while reducing the burden on the state and on poor consumers. ineligible for services. (2) water providers selling nonpotable water at a relatively high unit price. urban sewerage (70 percent of households connected as of 2005). These residents who lack access to reliable and clean water supply services get water from (1) contaminated shallow wells. . This program included the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH). Reforms have been initiated to address these challenges. the country faces two challenges. it must adapt water usage to levels compatible with the renewable resources supplied by nature. linked to. their ability to engage in income-generating activities. or INDH) and the government’s 3 “Social Connection” programs offer to pay HH for the full connection cost in installments over time. households get into debt for durations of 7 to 10 years. to access these basic services. the National Initiative for Human Development (Initiative Nationale de Développement Humain. to which a Participation au Premier Etablissement (PPE)” fee is added. for instance. Connection fees charged to the beneficiaries at their marginal costs.338 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS or (3) standposts located at the entrance of these areas. even when the option of payment by installments is available through the “Social Connection” program. These rudimentary accommodations risk increasing the contamination of shallow groundwater. However. A large number of inhabitants of the poorest areas remain without any form of sanitation. A majority of households use cesspits and poorly designed septic tanks. Access to basic sanitation is even more deficient. Operators’ difficulty in financing infrastructure for water users eligible for the loss-making “social tranche” of existing water tariffs. and lack of basic access infrastructure. Four factors have contributed to the lack of WSS for Morocco’s poor: Unplanned growth of periurban areas and the fact that they were systematically not included in the service areas of water and sanitation operators. It also harms the water utilities’ finances. the program requires that. The latter drives up costs of access to unaffordable levels for most HH living in the city outskirts. . lack of title. which often require women or children to stand for several hours in a queue. The situation described above directly affects people’s health.3 Mobilization through the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) Since 2005. Technical and administrative hurdles that made interventions by operators in illegal settlements difficult. The municipalities (communes) responsible rarely pay the bills. as cost recovery from these public standposts is usually very low. This outcome appears neither plausible nor equitable. for children. and. to attend school. poverty. The specific arrangements developed through INDH regarding the financial contribution of households4 for a house connection to water and/or sanitation services5 are of paramount importance in reaching coverage objectives. 5 Waiver of an important “First Settlement Fee.000 inhabitants. targeted by the on-site upgrading approach for whom no service expansion solution is proposed. INDH also promotes service coverage expansion by promoting agreements among relevant stakeholders.000 households to be resettled either in housing units or in serviced plots. in the metropolitan Casablanca area. Due to lack of financing. the terms varying by operator. their resettlement in fully or partially serviced plots (recasement).Participation au Premier Etablissement (PPE)” and of the 10% design and supervision fee otherwise charged by the operators. INDH/VSB programs removed the most important obstacle by recognizing informal areas. or “restructuring with on-site upgrading” through the expansion and strengthening of basic infrastructure. or VSB) have mobilized stakeholders to upgrade poor urban and periurban areas. and promoting their inhabitants’ resettlement to housing units in apartment buildings (relogement). in Meknes. as part of the INDH. For example.000 households. problems linked to coordination and implementation of network expansion works often prevent house connections from being established. connection development is inadequate for on-site upgrading areas. representing over 500. the household contribution has to remain below MAD 9. b. the activities above only partly address the INDH’s water and sanitation access objectives for 2010: a.Subsidies for the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach 339 Cities Without Slums program (Ville Sans Bidonville.240 for connections to WSS services. That leaves a population of approximately 80. reimbursable in 84 monthly payments of MAD 110. . Implementation of INDH/VSB programs is not always optimal. 4 Households are offered the opportunity to pay their connection fees over time. For example. Although significant. INDH’s Urban Water Supply and Sanitation OBA Pilots The objectives of the project pilots are to demonstrate replicable OBA mechanisms to extend WSS services in poor and vulnerable communities. INDH is considering expanding WSS only to the 65. For instance. unzoned. the output). periurban neighborhoods of 3 municipalities: Casablanca. who first are required to complete the pipe and connection works. The Government of Morocco is also a partner to this approach. the subsidies are prefinanced by the operators. the output is the connection to either service. for areas identified as part of the INDH program. . predominantly poor periurban neighborhoods.300 households to piped WSS in poor. Meknes. playing an oversight and monitoring role. The built-in incentives of this OBA approach are designed to mitigate traditional impediments of service expansion programs in marginal neighborhoods. Impediments include (1) unaffordability of connection costs by households. In Meknes. and Tangiers. The outputs for which OBA subsidies are disbursed are individual HH network connections for simultaneous water supply and sewerage services in designated. (2) unsustainable program financing for operators. They are implemented by the respective service providers in these municipalities: 2 international private concessionaires. In addition to the waiver. They get reimbursed after a verification process that certifies that the eligible household is in fact receiving piped WSS service (that is. Awarded to individual eligible households who agree to pay the operator-specific beneficiary contribution.340 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Started in the spring of 2007. namely. The pilots are funded through a US$7 million grant by the Global Partnership for Output-Based Aid (GPOBA). the Régie Autonome de Distribution d’Eau et d’Électricité de Meknès. While the details of the schemes vary. These HH have the recognized right to access services through the INDH program. and (4) reticence by national and local governments to fund subsidy programs that have no accountability or guarantee of results. Amendis in Tangiers and LYDEC in Casablanca. The approach builds on previous “social connection” programs by which households were offered the opportunity to pay their connection fees in installments. (3) complex technical and administrative obstacles to infrastructure development in poor unzoned areas. the scheme offers a subsidized connection fee for some of the fees otherwise charged by the operator. and 1 municipal utility. Morocco’s Urban WS&S OBA pilots aim at connecting 11. the common objective of the pilots is to test an OBA subsidy mechanism specifically targeted toward poor neighborhoods and households. and bridging the gap between capacity to pay and a competitive cost of connection. It therefore requires communication campaigns to raise awareness about the program and explain its conditions. and are on the INDH’s shortlist of 160 most disadvantaged urban and periurban communities. It is the first OBA project in Morocco Project involving multiple incumbent operators Project involving a public operator World-Bank-implemented OBA involving connection to sanitation World-Bank-implemented OBA project in local currency. participation is strictly demand driven. Subsidy Targeting Is Geographic in Nature The target neighborhoods are recognized as being among the poorest in urban Morocco. Scope and size aside. Lessons Learned So Far A key element of the approach is to shift risks to incentivize all parties to perform. Another key element is the limitation of the risk of capture of outputs. as demand will determine the amount of subsidy the operator will receive. However. In this case. Operators also develop new means of reaching potential customers. As in former social connection programs. the project breaks new ground in many regards. All households in the selected pilot areas are eligible to participate in the connection subsidy program. and (2) 40 percent of unit subsidy is released upon verification of sustained service for at least 6 months. Therefore. there is a risk that political pressure could be put on the operator to extend subsidized connections to populations who may otherwise have the means to . They use dedicated teams who go to market places or to the heart of the targeted neighborhood to record the demands of beneficiaries who may not easily travel to one of the operator’s agencies. an authorization to connect from the municipality is required. the financial and operational risk in extending service requires a good assessment of the demand for services by the targeted population.Subsidies for the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach 341 The disbursement profile of the individual subsidy follows: (1) 60 percent of unit subsidy is released upon verification of eligible water and sewerage household connection. that is. the pilots experienced a slow start. and mobilize stakeholder partnerships. to avoid the risk that the relatively wealthier households could benefit from the subsidy.000 connections. Socioeconomic surveys carried out show that a significant share of the population living in these informal areas are below the poverty or vulnerability lines for Morocco. all parties appreciate that quarterly inspections by the Technical Independent Reviewer have proven 6 Essentially. and lack of clarity over land tenure. The midterm review confirmed important direct benefits6 to households. . to increase transparency. The parties appreciate that conventional financing would have resulted in fewer connections than OBA in the same circumstances. based on the number of stories or house size and appearance. In addition. governor) have developed additional eligibility criteria. Nevertheless. However. 15 percent of the program’s 3-year objective. Operators and government generally are satisfied and appreciate the flexibility allowed by the pilot. it targets poor neighborhoods that had been without piped services up to that point. upstream investment delays.342 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS pay the full cost of connection. the operator has requested that the list of beneficiaries be signed by the municipality and countersigned by the governor (local representative of the state). However. The OBA approach is seen as helping to improve processes. and recorded the high satisfaction of beneficiary households with the service provided. Further study would be necessary to quantify such benefits. Although a substantial number of outputs have been delivered and verified in all three sites. scaling up the OBA approach to other INDH areas now is considered possible before pilot program completion in December 2009. Thus. The first 12 months of the pilot program have produced approximately only 2. The pilot is organized on a geographic basis. Moreover. the operator and local authorities (province. This information is further demonstrated by evidence of uptake significantly increasing after works start and a collection rate equal or superior to the average experienced by each operator in his/her service area. for example. for lack of a better targeting mechanism. benefits are time savings but also can include reduced health costs and improved hygiene practices. overcome financing blockages. an independent midterm review of the pilots shows that the delay is due to implementation difficulties unrelated to the OBA approach: procurement procedures. the OBA approach on a citywide or nationwide scale. The figure does not reflect the progress achieved on the upstream/trunk infrastructure development necessary to deliver the outputs. Better advance planning and working partnerships among operators. Scaling up OBA: Toward a National Strategy to Reduce Urban and Periurban Service Access Deficit Given the lack of targeted subsidy mechanisms for poor households. Therefore. it may not accurately reflect the progress under the pilots.Subsidies for the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach 343 effective in firming up the operators’ reporting requirements as well as improving their implementation methods.2 reflects progress on the defined "outputs" under the project. Streamlining OBA-specific ex-post eligibility verification procedures. with due adaptation.Figure 17.of Implementation ported in year 2. (LY D ca Urb lan ND IS Tan an és rs ( AM E Me kn Ca gie Tan Remaining Me kn Year 2 és Urb sab an Year 1 Note: Figure 17. strengthened partnerships between local authorities and operators. which increased accountability.2 100% shows connection realizations 80% during the f irst two years of 60% implementation. namely. After a slow year 1. while strengthening coordination among institutions in charge of the different aspects of periurban utility service. and neighborhood associations to clarify eligibility and permitting questions b. a dou. The OBA pilots are taking place at a time that the government of Morocco is seeking new ways to deliver on INDH’s promise. and prioritized monitoring of service delivery. TO TA L Wa ter EC ge r) . OBA is perceived as strategically relevant to Morocco. the working connections to water and/or sanitation services. Lessons learned for the po40% tential scale-up of the pilots 20% include the need for: 0% ) Sa nit ati on a. local governments. Figure 17. The demand-driven approach contributed to refocus service provision around the households.2 Connections Realized in the First Two Years bling of connection rates is re. The Bank is working with the government on the best ways to evolve toward a scaled-up operation. especially in informal urban settings. The government has expressed interest in replicating. . In rural areas. the government of Morocco is aware of the need to redeploy its rural water supply (RWS) strategy to promote the development of RWS service through individual household (HH) connections. Since then. ONEP has developed an important network of standpipes within rural communities. organizational structure and internal procedures translate into fixed costs that make service provision to smaller communities a loss-making business. typically through public fountains. the approach piloted in Morocco’s rural areas is rather different from the approaches pursued in urban areas. Today. PAGER has provided over 87 percent of the rural population with access to drinking water. However. the National Water Supply Company (ONEP) is evolving from its core business of producing and delivering water to service providers to becoming a provider of water supply and sanitation services. developing access to potable water in rural areas became a policy priority only in 1995. HH in these communities were asking for domestic connections. The RWS objective is the same as for urban and perirurban areas: to expand access to water supply services. To facilitate this new mission. ONEP is piloting the subcontracting water service provision and management in 8 rural communes (municipalities) to a private operator through a 345 .Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani 18 In a Nutshell As mentioned in an earlier chapter on Moroccan water strategies (Chauvot de Beauchêne and Mantovani 2009). In fact. Morocco’s PAGER (National Program for Rural Water Supply and Sanitation) has made big strides in developing drinking water sources. However. ONEP then engaged in the development of house connections in small centers and rural areas. ONEP has been mandated also to bring sanitation services to secondary urban and rural centers. The national company distributes water to 5. Major cities have delegated WSS either to the private sector or to financially independent municipal utilities. It also is the country’s leader in water distribution and provides water to 28 percent of the Moroccan population. its organizational structure and internal procedures translate into fixed costs that are too high to make service provision in smaller scale operations profitable. autonomous public corporation. the private operator will have incentives to work to establish a profit-making business before the fifth year of service provision. From day 1. At the end of 2008.346 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 10-year management subcontracting arrangement with aspects of an affermage-type contract. the private sector will receive performance-based subsidies from ONEP under an outputbased aid (OBA) approach. While this OBA approach is still to be tested. they increasingly requested ONEP’s assistance to manage their water distribution services. ONEP covered 80 percent of national water needs. ONEP is a profit-making. Because small cities and rural areas lacked capacity. . ONEP’s mandate broadened to include the provision of water supply services to small towns and rural areas.8 million people in rural areas. Urgency to Increase Rural Household Water Connections At the same time. The private operator will be selected competitively on the basis of the lowest total subsidy. the government decided to accelerate the pace of ONEP’s investments in RWS to reach the coverage target of 90 percent of the rural population by 2007. During the first years. As a result. However. ONEP is the national utility in charge of potable water production and transmission in bulk to large urban distribution utilities. local authorities are responsible for water supply and sanitation (WSS) services. Specific outputs eligible for a subsidy are water production. This coverage target was one destination on the way to the overarching objective: reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for Morocco by 2015.6 million people in medium-sized cities and to 2. service expansion to new settlements. More recently. and a working HH connection. it appears a very promising management model for water service provision in small towns and surrounding rural areas. In Morocco. ONEP will benefit from the efficiency gains of the private operator. over time. This approach is expected to be win-win for all parties. the demand for rural HH connections to water supply is estimated at 1. This is an important issue for Morocco’s . To sum up.Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco 347 Morocco’s rural sector is composed of 31. In the meantime.000 douars. Regarding point 2. ONEP is facing the following constraints: (1) the necessity to satisfy so many new customers without hiring new staff.000 localities (douars) with a total population of nearly 13 million.000 new HH to water supply. (2) the necessity to keep operational charges in line with its costs.000. Learning from these experiences. ONEP has tested different models of private sector involvement. thus ensuring its long-term financial sustainability. the challenge in the rural areas consists of connecting a little over 1. ONEP and village associations have already developed approximately 680. and (3) the necessity to preserve its financial equilibrium. In addition. commercial management. ONEP Pilots Innovative Public-Private Partnership to Increase Household Connections ONEP intends to pilot the first public-private partnership for extended subcontracting of its water distribution responsibilities. This approach should enable ONEP to significantly reduce its O&M costs in water provision while maintaining its current staffing level. The private sector also would be encouraged to develop access to piped water supply services through HH connections and to expand the service area to other douars.700. The private sector would be expected to develop technically and financially efficient management of water distribution in rural areas.000. in recent years. Prior programs contributed to provide water to 70 percent of the douars through public standpipes.000 HH connections in rural areas. Those programs left unserved approximately 10. The objective of the pilot is to provide sustainable water supply services and service expansion in rural areas served by ONEP through a new PPP approach that includes both technical and. the pilot will help ONEP to determine the future organization of water services management in rural areas. because its investment needs are skyrocketing. for the first time. the tariff structure is the same throughout Morocco. Therefore. from established standpipe-managers to more comprehensive performancebased service contracts. ONEP is ready to take private sector involvement in water service distribution in rural areas one step further. As for point 3. The tariff levels for bulk and retail water are fixed by the government. that is. The operator receives the subsidy after these outputs have been delivered and independently verified. (5) size of the pilot area enough to enable financial and technical feasibility of the operation. ONEP determined the pilot area based on six elements. ONEP is providing services to approximately 7. The innovation is that the private operator must prefinance the outputs.200 of these vulnerable HH at a loss. approximately 25 percent are poor HH. Of these.1 that is. As a result. Another 25 percent of HH are considered vulnerable.348 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS water sector sustainability. HH with monthly incomes under US$201 (MAD 1745). (4) difficulties faced in providing an appropriate level of service. ONEP has no incentive to connect additional vulnerable HH. which costs on average US$577 (MAD 5. demand correlated strongly with the cost of the connection fee. This correlation threatened the financial sustainability of the pilot and. They were (1) poverty and vulnerability levels. Building on the output-based aid (OBA) approach developed in urban areas.000). the working connections to piped water supply service. For the pilot. (3) high HH demand for house connections. itself a focus of World Bank dialogue with the government. poor or vulnerable HH would not be able to pay for the full connection.4 people. In any event. . ONEP requested support from the World Bank and the Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid 1 A rural household is estimated to include 6. (2) readiness of primary and secondary infrastructure to enable quick service expansion. for instance. the pilot area has a population of 130. By bundling rural areas with more densely populated small towns. the interest of the private sector. ONEP decided to add to the proposed PPP an OBA approach that decreased the connection fee and subsidized house connections developed by the private operator. and (6) positive deliberations of councils of all concerned communes to authorize ONEP to develop the proposed PPP approach.000 inhabitants. their monthly incomes are below US$302 (150 percent of the poverty line). therefore. which comprises small towns and the surrounding rural areas. Using Output-Based Aid to Subsidize Rural HH Water Connections Although demand for house connections in the pilot area was high. ONEP selected the Sidi Kacem area in northwest Morocco. Each output was designed to help the private operator develop the critical mass of customers and water sales to make its business financially sustainable. The main goal for ONEP is that the subcontracted private operator who takes on the management of small-scale operations for a 10-year period is able to reduce O&M costs to a level enabling ONEP to break even early enough to develop a profitable business within the existing tariff structure. new douars or settlements reached.gpoba. hence the unit cost per connection. go to www.1. and education. Nonetheless. GPOBA funded an important technical assistance contract to help design the pilot and help structure the OBA approach. GPOBA was not in a position to fund the pilot. would be determined by a competitive bidding process based on targets clearly stated in the bidding documents. In addition. OBA subsidies are designed to create incentives for efficiency and the long-term success of development projects.1 Performance Targets and Outputs Required to Receive ONEP OBA Subsidy Contract objective Minimize initial operational deficit Expand service area to 14 new douars Increase customer base through new house connections Output Water sales in the pilot area New douars or settlements reached New working house connections to piped water supply Measuring unit m3 sold Linear meters (ml) of expanded network Targets 3 million m3 Initial estimates: 40. ONEP decided to use the approach and finance it. the operator would have specific performance targets and associated outputs for which it will receive an OBA subsidy from ONEP. The three required outputs are (1) water sales in the pilot area. GPOBA was established in 2003. To incentivize performance. The private operator would not receive a management fee but would be remunerated through the revenue collected from customers. health. the subsidies will be time bound. The outputs and associated subsidies appear in table 18. 2 .000 ml 8. and new house connections.500 new house connections Subsidy available for the first 3 years of operation 4 years of operation House connection 5 years of operation The amount of subsidy. Table 18.org. For more information on output-based aid approaches. initially as a multidonor trust fund to develop output-based aid (OBA) approaches across a variety of sectors including infrastructure. The bidder requiring the least The Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA) is a global partnership administered by the World Bank.Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco 349 (GPOBA)2 to design the OBA approach. Poor and vulnerable HH that meet the “social connections” criteria (monthly revenues lower than MAD 3. it was decided that all HH located in the pilot area will be eligible for a subsidized connection. that is. it will be up to the private operator to decide whether it wants to develop conditions similar to the ones proposed by ONEP. Household Connection Cost ONEP has promoted MAD 2. a HH needs to express interest and provide a down payment of MAD 1. on a first come-first served basis. The following paragraph details the OBA approach to house connections.500 price.000) will have the option of paying the remaining MAD 1. The current discounted fee refers to 2005 prices. The private operator would be expected to make approximately 8. The allowable subsidy may be capped. Surveys carried out in the pilot area have demonstrated that 80 percent of HH would be willing to connect at the MAD 2.400 already connected. With support from the World Bank. half of the connection cost. The OBA subsidy for a house connection would equal the difference between a set discounted connection fee for the HH and the cost of connection. Households that fail to do so will later be charged the full connection fee. Under the proposed PPP.3 To be eligible.000 before the completion of service extension works in its area. 3 This amount is to be confirmed and may increase.500 in installments over 3 years at 5 percent interest (compared to the usual 18 percent microcredit rate). or to develop new ones that would better serve its interests in promoting house connections. thus increasing the connection coverage rate in the pilot area from 32 percent to over 68 percent of HH.500 (US$289) as the country-wide set discounted connection fee in ONEP-managed rural areas. . the user contribution to house connection would amount to MAD 2. an analysis is ongoing to update the information that will lead to the proposed revised discounted fee.350 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS amount of combined subsidy wins the bid.500 (US$289). However. the assumption is that the wealthiest HH are among the 7. For lack of a better targeting mechanism. While only 50 percent of the pilot area population is below the vulnerability or poverty lines.500 new connections during the 10-year contract period. the pilot also will demonstrate and document one possible solution to reduce ONEP’s fixed and variable O&M costs. Currently. which. HH purchase water from standpipes within 500 meters of their settlements at an average price of MAD 10 per m3. and at an affordable price. The pilot: 1. and consume on average 8 liters/ capita/day. . reduced medical expenditures. reduced health costs and improved hygiene practices resulting in decreased morbidity and mortality rates. In fact. This pilot is very innovative. in appropriate quality and quantity. if replicable. After connection. and assuming that payment is made under ONEP conditions. first and foremost.4 percent of the monthly spending of a HH at the poverty or vulnerability line.Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco 351 The scheme ensures that monthly payments for poor and vulnerable HH will be affordable. Will bring a new dimension of risk-sharing by introducing the first PPP in water supply distribution in small towns and surrounding 4 At 2. Multiple Benefits of Household Connection The expected benefits resulting from house connections include. corresponding to a unit cost of water of MAD 4. respectively. Additional benefits include time savings that can be used for income-generating activities primarily by adult women and improved education for children. Moreover. and improved labor productivity.9 per m3. as demonstrated by the 100 percent collection rate experienced by ONEP nationwide. Broader outcomes of the pilot will include the introduction of demanddriven service provision in rural areas. Currently. the cumulative user’s monthly payment represents approximately 5 percent. having access to safe and reliable water supply at home. or 3.91Dh for the following 14 m3. it will pave the way for a reform of water distribution management in Morocco’s rural areas for at least four reasons. significant investments by ONEP to develop access to water through standpipes generate very little income because populations increasingly disregard the standpipes. might improve ONEP’s long-term financial sustainability. This cost is deemed affordable.4 On this basis.54Dh for the first 6 m3 and 7. experience shows that the average monthly consumption increases over time to an average of 45 liters/ capita/day. based on the unit price of water and projected monthly consumption after the connection. especially among children under 5. another workshop was organized with prequalified bidders to explain the bidding documents and go through the financial model it entails. The approach will provide both ONEP and the private operator with the highest incentives to perform. Namely.352 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS rural areas in Morocco. The pilot will test a possible solution to ensure ONEP’s long-term financial sustainability. and commercial risk. For the first time. 4. ONEP will retain the legal responsibility. The pilot is at advanced stages of procurement and has generated great interest from the private sector. while accompanying the creation of a new set of local operators for utility management. Recently. Will result in a win-win situation. and Bank staff participated in and contributed to them. Rabat. and Tanger/Tetouan. These firms have seen large. with its smaller size. workshops were organized to gather prospective bidders to present the pilot and answer questions. financial. This arrangement would enable each party to concentrate on his/her respective core business and would give the private operator more assurance that it would get paid timely after the independent verification recommends the payment. Because of the pilot’s innovative nature. international private operators capture water business opportunities in large cities such as Casablanca. bid for full delegation of service and/or manage sanitation. 3. This arrangement might create favorable conditions for ONEP. Presents a window of opportunity for small and medium private-sector firms (SMEs) in Morocco to develop a new expertise in the water sector. May involve local commercial banks to channel the subsidies. These local operators might. and that bank to develop integrated financial packages for HH through small short-term loans to HH to pay the whole of the users’ contributions. including commercial risk. This proposed rural water operation. the private operator. at a later stage. Given . gives SMEs a chance to enter the water business on a scale that they can handle. 2. ONEP risks having to take over if the private operator does not perform. The Bank financed consultants to help ONEP organize and moderate each of these workshops. The private operator will bear technical. The private operator risks losing the subsidy funds if the outputs are not delivered. The pilot structure creates the right incentives: it provides targeted support until a critical mass of customers enables the financial sustainability of the operator. and final beneficiaries will remain ONEP’s clients. ONEP will subcontract utility management. . This pilot is a pivotal operation. thus presenting business opportunity for the Moroccan private sector while enhancing access to piped water services in rural areas. 2009. It is providing the Moroccan private sector with unique market entry opportunities in the rural water sector and potentially in large urban centers.Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply Service Market in Morocco 353 the significant interest demonstrated by the private sector in ONEP’s two workshops.” this volume. ONEP is confident that all shortlisted bidders will submit qualifying bids. References Chauvot de Beauchêne. the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach. If successful. and P Mantovani. “Subsidies for . this model for rural water supply can be scaled up in other bundles of small towns and surrounding rural areas in Morocco. Providing Basic Services to Poor Peri-Urban Neighborhoods in Morocco. X. . . Cost recovery in the sector has been exceedingly low. 355 . and financing. most of which was in the form of service contracts for O&M and financing schemes for farmers to invest in on-farm pumping equipment. design. The study reviewed approximately 21 cases of projects with some level of private sector participation. the sector has faced very difficult challenges in financing capital and maintenance costs. Indeed. these resulted in a significant and unplanned fiscal burden on government. In many cases. the irrigation and drainage sector plays a vital role in food production and rural development. I Private-Public Partnerships in Irrigation A study by Tardieu and others (2004) examined the experience in private participation in the irrigation sector. Moreover. Fortunately. There is particular emphasis on involving private investors and the farming community in sharing risks. many schemes have been abandoned. the irrigation sector now is benefiting from new approaches to planning. Following a prolonged period of inadequate funding for O&M. even for solely operation and maintenance (O&M) functions.New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in Irrigation: Lessons from Egypt’s West Delta Project Aldo Baietti and Safwat Abdel-Dayem 19 n Middle East and North Africa (MNA) countries. these experiences limited the role of the private sector because they dealt primarily with smaller systems. long after the programs’ initial commissioning. investment and O&M of irrigation schemes traditionally have been founded on massive public funding programs. However. The West Delta region is one of these areas (figure 19. the West Delta Region contributes between $300 million–$500 million annually to the Egyptian economy.000 people and provides approximately 250. the West Delta Region has been developed into a flourishing agricultural economy. The area supplies domestic and European Union markets with high-value fruits and vegetables. and public-private arrangements. In response to concern about a possible collapse of this thriving agricultural economy. However.000 feddans (approximately 110.356 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Important developments are taking place in MNA in expanding the role of private participation in financing and operation. in an area close to Agadir. Today.1 Aerial View of West Delta of Nile River 1 A similar model of public-private partnership is under implementation in Guerdaine. the government also took this opportunity to advance a Figure 19. It comprises 255. Moreover. West Delta Project Concept Since the late 1960s. the rapid development of the past few years has been accompanied by excessive exploitation of groundwater reserves. the Government of Egypt (GOE) conceived a surface water irrigation project that would replace groundwater pumping. The West Delta consists of 255.000 feddans of primarily commercial ning in the early 1990s.” which introduces reforms of the sector as well as new approaches to project development. much of which are exported to Europe and other markets. with the support of the government. Morocco.1).000 ha total)2 Note: The West Delta area is located approximately 60 km north of Cairo to the west of on the fringes of the delta. resulting in costly and deeper pumping as well as eroded water quality. The West Delta Project is a large-scale project based on the “utility model. transaction design. the area is now home to 500. In this model. 2 1 feddan = 0. .1 Useful lessons are already emerging from the West Delta design.42 hectares (ha). through farms that cultivate high-value fruits and vegetables. high-value export crops are being grown with irrigated water from rapidly depleting aquifers. the exploitation of groundwater resources. Egyptian commercial farmers have been reclaiming desert lands. However. Beginthe Nile Delta.000 jobs in the agriculture sector alone. From these. At the time of writing. formal water entitlements. A private investor would be identified through a competitive tender. bidders for the West Delta project are preparing their bids. the World Bank commissioned an assessment in 2004–05 using a grant from the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF). volumetric pricing. No longer could the government expect farmers to sign up to the system by GOE’s simply carrying out the required engineering studies. Demand-Driven Approach to Project Design At government’s request. so it is too early to judge its performance on the ground. Too many projects had been built around this top-down approach and were lying idle in red ink. . and earn a commercial return by collecting water fees from farmers. operate the system. After an initial focus on demand forecasts and technical specifications. Farmers’ involvement in the design was essential to minimize the risk of low participation in the scheme. The investor would build the irrigation system.New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in Irrigation 357 new vision for irrigation services. The proposed model was for a public-private partnership (PPP). and designing the layout of the main and subsidiary branch canals. as these have useful lessons for the practice of irrigation. The assessment presented a conceptual framework and transaction model for implementing a surface water irrigation system on a cost-recovery basis and with private sector participation. the emphasis of the design process therefore shifted to extensive user consultations and surveys. This chapter instead describes the structure of project rules and incentives. and private-sector participation in financing and management. the growers’ service requirements and their willingness to connect and pay would guide the development of technical design options. forecasting an appropriate mix of crops and water requirements. The rest of this chapter describes the project design and the rationale for the chosen approach in more detail. Each design option entailed a corresponding level of tariffs. A key feature of the West Delta preparation work involved a detailed “willingness to connect” survey of the farms in the area to understand their needs and willingness to pay for surface water. The new approach was founded on full cost recovery. The private investor would be offered concessional credit from international financial institutions (IFIs) channeled via the GOE. the piped system would enable the private investor to better manage its cash flow. while other parts of the systems were under construction.1). Preference for a Piped System The technical work began with a longstanding preconception that an open channel system with several intakes and a network of main and subsidiary branches would be the most cost-effective technical option. A piped system could be constructed in smaller modules. The open channel model was cheaper on a unit-cost basis. Accordingly. However. user surveys revealed that. The piped system could (1) be implemented in smaller. thus spreading capital costs over time and allowing the private operator to generate revenue in the early phase of implementation. (3) offer better control over water usage through metering. it could not fully meet the performance standards of farmers. the West Delta approach placed the farmers in the driver’s seat and informed them so that they could: 1. 3 . (2) deliver a pressurized water flow directly to a connecting farm. financially sustainable modules based on the exact location of connecting consumers. the preparation work at the outset involved extensive consultations with farmers in the area as well as setting up an advisory group that would represent all beneficiaries throughout the entire project preparation process. who would be expected to operate the system on commercial principles and assume the related risks. while the open channel system was perhaps the least-cost solution on a unit-cost basis. and There also was concern that an open channel would lead to significant water theft between the intake point on the River Nile and the project area. Take an early stake in the preparation. Understand what service and performance standards are expected of them 2.3 The closed conduit or piped system also was found to offer distinct advantages to a prospective private operator. Understand their ability to absorb the cost of service and convince them to buy into the project 3.358 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Instead. but the piped system offered fewer risks for a PPP operator and better addressed the expressed needs of farmers (table 19. Most important. Two devices were introduced to mitigate demand risk: Tariff structure that would minimize the risk of conjunctive groundwater use by employing a fixed-capacity charge. metering UFW. land acquisition. The financial analysis. Can adjust system to actual demand Minimal High control for water theft.New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in Irrigation 359 Table 19. and bonding and insurance requirements would affect tariffs. and other environmental and safeguard concerns. conjunctive use of water. which was supported by a dynamic financial model. due to the possibility of continued groundwater pumping. channels can become dump sites lower evaporation. water losses and water theft. Either would lead to the system being underutilized. especially during the critical early years. currency movements. cost. Risk Allocation and Mitigation Much of the PPP design work focused on the assessment and mitigation of risk factors and on determining which party should assume which risks. The intent was to identify the transaction elements that would minimize tariffs and mitigate risks. The project must not only yield positive returns but also ensure positive cash flows throughout the entire project. interest-rates. Can reduce agricultural area substantially Lower distribution efficiency. capitalization requirements and financing plan. higher commercial risks If not supervised closely. and (4) raise minimal right-of-way issues. analyzed how variation in key parameters such as construction period. Pre-eminent among the risks are demand risk. financing terms. and disconnection Piped Open channel Traditional low cost solution but high fixed cost element Not adaptable to large variances in demand Substantial. . and system-planning risk due to oversized infrastructure. In essence. the piped system was the preferred choice because it offered a prospective private operator better control over its financial operations. Maximizing utilization efficiency of the system from the outset would contribute significantly to this end.1 Comparison of Characteristics of Piped and Open Channel Irrigation Feature Cost Generally more costly per unit Implementation Land Acquisition Commercial Control Environmental Minimal Highly flexible. Cost Analysis and Minimum Bid and Project Size The technical analysis reviewed numerous design options to reduce the risk of oversizing. The analysis studied financing risks. given that the project was financed in foreign currency but generated revenues in Egyptian pounds. The operator would have the option to cancel in the event that the subscribing farmers came up short of the required 90. the fixed cost component). this being the range at which the development cost per feddan would achieve the affordability . the lack of comparable successful efforts in the irrigation sector. The preparation team also well understood the political risk involved.000–90. the minimum project size was determined to fall within the range of 60. Moreover.000 feddans. Finally. including securing the longest possible loan terms available to keep user tariff affordable. The cost analysis provided both important information on minimum project size to ensure that user tariffs remained affordable and incentives for the operator to expand coverage. it would be after the subscription that the operator would design the system. The operator must therefore implement the construction program swiftly to take full advantage of the long term of initial IFI loans that were being made available through GOE. Although local currency financing was available in Egypt. the analysis determined which basic infrastructure was common to all scenarios (that is. On this basis. it could not be offered in the maturities needed to make the project viable. First.360 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS “Subscription period.2. the lower the user tariffs could be. the issue of currency risk was daunting. the longer the debt repayment terms. the variable cost component) such that the operator could connect farmers on the basis of demand without jeopardizing his own cash flow.000 feddans. Second. most importantly. it simulated the addition of independent modules of land area (that is. The team further found that construction delay is a major risk factor. This was a critical element of the analysis.” The selected operator would carry out a subscription program to sign up farmers to the service. Needless to say. given Egypt’s lack of experience in public-private partnerships and. The analysis yielded the supply cost curve in figure 19. 000 coverage. In other words. average costs would Bid project size 15.000 survey. The private operator. including taking on the associated demand and commercial risks. the reference project for the bid tariff was set at 90. largely founded on the Design-Build-Operate (DBO) model.000 feddans.000 tinue to have the incentive to Connected feddans 0 expand the network and connect 20. More importantly.000 scheme approached 100 percent 20.000 115. As such.000 90. particularly if the initial subscription by farmers exceeds 90.000 135. It can be in the form of both equity and debt.000 70. Under this model. may draw up to 85 percent of total construction costs from the facility. the cost curve revealed that as the 25.000 the additional farms.000 feddans.New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in Irrigation 361 thresholds indicated in the user Figure 19.000 38.000 50. it triggers an annual repayment obligation (annual concession fee) to GOE based on defined payment The loan facility would reimburse a maximum of 85% of the total eligible construction costs to the private operator. the public sector party will assume ownership of the assets and most of the financing-related responsibilities and risks. leaving the private operator’s own contribution to be at least 15 percent. 4 Average cost (LE/feddan) .000 190. The private operator may. Structure of PPP Transaction The West Delta PPP transaction was to be a hybrid scheme.000 the private investor would con5. construct. GOE will make available financing on the order of US$175 million to the operator for the initial phase of the construction. In turn.000 170.4 As the operator draws down from the loan facility. at its option. For its part. including the currency risk related to the potential devaluation of the Egyptian currency. the government contracts a private operator take over a concession area consisting of approximately 190. The funds were to be sourced through a loan facility that GOE had already established with the World Bank and Agence Française de Développement (AFD). The operator will design. and assume the full responsibilities of operating the system for 30 years. No restrictions are provided as to where the private operator can source this financing. in some circumstances.000 feddans in the southern portion of the West Delta. 10.2 Supply Cost Curve to Develop West Delta Project 30.000 continue to drop. be required to increase its proportion of financing. meaning a minimum of 15% contribution from the private operator. the operator will be obliged to source its own funding by debt and equity to expand the system to the extent of additional demand. A pure public model or a management contract would have had a high probability for successful implementation but would have transferred few risks to the private sector. a classic BOT concession would have transferred essentially all risks to the private sector. it would have been be too costly in the initial stage and likely would have received low interest from prospective private investors without sizable subsidy. He will collect a fixed tariff (flat tariff) that will be charged on a per-feddan basis to connecting farmers over a 20-year period to defray the private operator’s concession fee. Rationale This hybrid option was regarded as the preferred approach for the proposed project because it balanced risks evenly between the public and private parties. as was recently demonstrated in the Guerdane Concession in Morocco. The amount of the annual concession fee will be in direct proportion to the amount of funds drawn down and would cease upon the private operator’s fulfilling completely its full repayment obligations over 20 years. Once the initial loan facility of $175 million is exhausted by initial construction costs. and a return on investment. The DBO model transferred as much project risk as possible from public to private. By comparison. Institutional and Regulatory Arrangements Regulatory responsibilities would be shared between a Project Management Unit (PMU) within the Ministry of Water Resources and . the structure would revert more to a traditional concession Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model. which will defray the operator’s cost of operations and routine maintenance. In this phase. additional capital expenditures financed by the operator.362 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS terms and conditions. The private operator would collect combined two-part tariffs denominated in Egyptian pounds (LE) from connecting farmers to recoup its costs. replacement costs. with the operator assuming full financing risks. The operator also will collect a volumetric tariff based on actual water consumption. However. and provide a management fee. The concession fee is designed as a back-to-back payment to cover GOE’s loan obligations to the World Bank and AFD. however. The transaction would involve sharing the financing between GOE. during implementation. The RO would regulate rate adjustments and tariff rebasing and oversee the contractual commitments of the operator with regard to prescribed service standards. The PMU would manage the day-to-day business of the project. along with the more official program that will be implemented by the PMU. Finally. a balanced risk framework. successful. a preexisting community of commercial. and technically savvy farmers. the project will be keenly observed by MNA countries looking for new approaches to meet the service demands of their irrigated farmers. The WUC also will monitor groundwater pumping in the area. Whatever the outcome. and a Water User Council (WUC) representing farmers in the area. While the project has its own specificities. usage. a private operator. and alternating hours of irrigation. . in particular. Conclusion The challenge posed to the West Delta project was to provide quality irrigation services to a highly discriminating user group without significant public subsidy.New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in Irrigation 363 Irrigation. The WUC was established as an independent farmers’ organization to take an active part in preparing the project and. user participation. in monitoring the relationships and potential conflicts among farmers on such matters as water entitlements. with the debt portion underwritten by a government guarantee. it provides useful lessons about the design of self-financing irrigation schemes. The PMU would also supervise the contractual arrangements for the initial construction and expansion of the irrigation system. and farmers. an Independent Panel of Experts would be set up as needed to mediate disputes. a Regulatory Office (RO). tariff regulation. The West Delta Project has responded by introducing a transaction concept that relies on full cost recovery. ultimately. and technical specifications to reduce the financial exposure of private operators. including financial management and disbursement functions. Whether the project’s formula for apportioning risks and rewards will succeed in the market remains to be seen. volumetric pricing. org/leftlinks/Seminars/ EighthSeminar. and others. H. “Public-Private Partnership in Irrigaiton and Drainage: Need for a Professional Third Party between Farmers and Governments.htm World Bank. www. . 2007.” Water Sector Board Discussion Paper 10. May.” Eighth International Seminar on Participatory Irrigation Management: Emerging Trends in Public-Private Partnerships in Irrigation.364 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS References Tardieu.. 2004. “Emerging Public-Private Partnerships in Irrigation Development and Management.inpim. Delegation . . Yemen’s water availability is 10 percent of the regional average and 2 percent of the global average. With a per capita availability of 150m3 a year. Spate flood is the second-order means of irrigation. which are home to 83 percent of the poor. The country also has one of the highest sectoral water allocations to agriculture: more than 90 percent of total use. groundwater tables are dropping at 3 meters a year. the country relies heavily on the exploitation of groundwater. Agriculture also makes very significant indirect contributions by providing employment and income to more than 55 percent of the active population. Its agriculture is an important driving force of economic growth. Groundwater reserves are being critically depleted.300 million m3 a year (with desalination and reclaimed wastewater accounting for a negligible percentage). as opposed to using groundwater. are being supplemented by groundwater mining from deep aquifers at a rate of approximately 1. With a largely arid to hyperarid climate and no perennial rivers. utilizing spate water proved costly to the government 367 Y .2 percent demographic growth puts high pressure on its natural resources.20 Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen Naji Abu-Hatim and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed emen is among the poorest countries in the world. Renewable resources. In some areas. They derive their livelihoods and incomes mainly from agriculture-related activities. Yemen is one of the most water-constrained countries in the world. estimated at approximately 2. poverty is spread mainly throughout rural areas. Yemen’s 3. Yemen is also one of the most populated among the Arab Peninsula countries.100 million cubic meters (m3 ) a year. However. contributing 14 percent–23 percent to GDP. and many farms are being abandoned. Nevertheless. In the past. this figure had reached over 50 percent. By the late 1990s. As a result. If agricultural expansion continues. A compounding challenge is to improve the sustainability of spate irrigation infrastructure and to reduce the government’s financial burden through strengthening farmers’ self-reliance on financing and maintaining spate irrigation systems. Later. Early development of modern spate schemes in the 1950s successfully adapted traditional flood recession technology to a more controlled system. irrigated agriculture alone was consuming 130 percent of Yemen’s renewable water resources. by 2025. the government intentionally subsidized irrigation and drinking water to promote development. Water consumption in the irrigation subsector continues to increase at an average annual rate of 30 million m3. With the expected rapid population growth. meaning that the overdraft beyond the “safe yield” was approximately 30 percent. the introduction of the tubewell and motor pump revolutionized irrigation. and there is no enabling or regulatory environment. Traditionally. By 2005. raise farm incomes. Now. one challenge facing Yemen is to reduce groundwater use in agriculture while maintaining the rural economy and farmers’ incomes. The private sector and market mechanisms are found only in irrigation water sales to water tankers. Irrigation efficiencies are low (nationwide average approximately 40 percent). However. Yemen lacks clear groundwater rules. However. Water markets exist in Yemen but only on the margins of the water-related activities. well below levels generally reckoned to indicate severe water stress. many aquifers will be pumped dry long before then. groundwater overdraft will reach 100 percent by 2025. offfarm infrastructure.368 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS since it requires developing and maintaining spate-regulating. full or supplemental groundwater irrigation accounts for over two-thirds of the value of crop production. or 5 percent. these markets are informal. Irrigation in Yemen has grown rapidly. and vest powerful influence groups with patronage. reduce the cost of living. Water scarcity is exacerbated both by significant spatial and temporal variations and by significant water (rights) allocation problems. Thirdparty externalities are not accounted for. the government recognized that this pattern posed . Yemenis had many ingenious techniques to husband their scant water. in the 1970s. both from groundwater and surface water. Already by 1990. water availability per capita is estimated to decrease by 35 percent from 2005. 000 cost recovery and—to a lesser 160.Preparation of the Investment Project in the Water Sector. 39 percent of additional financing—the balance—is required by 2009.1 and 20. the government has developed an ambitious investment plan for the water supply and sanitation (WSS) subsectors to achieve the MDGs (figure 20. despite a de100. Funds committed by donors (loans/grants) amount to 31 percent. 2005–09 (%) management policies need to Capital financing 2005–09 Self 0% be coupled and fostered.000 extent—demand management.000 60.2).000 the dominant financier. For the irrigation subsector. it can be concluded from the above Figure 20. thus replacing the old patronage and Budget tranfers 30% supply-driven approaches.” 2007.2 Projected Sources of Capital Expenditures for that cost recovery and demand Water Sector. 140. water sector capital Human Environment Group RWSS Group Water Resource Group UWSS Group Irrigation Group Cross-Cutting Investment expenditures were f inanced mainly by budget transfers Source: DGGREE-Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources.1). User fees financed only 28 percent of the investment program. budget transfers are expected to represent only 30 percent of total financing for the water sector. “Report on the (41 percent) and loans (29 per. Therefore.000 programs. Self-financing may be needed to cover most of this balance.000 120. Furthermore. Thus. cent).1 WSS Subsectoral Five-Year Investment Plans. particularly in spate Self Budget tranfers Loans Others irrigation. government remains 20. During 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2000–04. pressures and that new pricing 2005–09 Water Investment Plan 2005–2009 regimes were needed to target 180.000 sharing in water investment 40.Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen 369 economic and environmental Figure 20. The government has set f inancial Others 39% autonomy as a policy for rural decentralized water supplies and has started to work with water user groups (WUGs) toward cost Loans 31% recovery. .000 Nevertheless. According to the 5-year government investment plan proposed for 2005–09 (figures 20. the government would prioritize its sovereign financing of these subsectors over the irrigation and water resource management subsectors.000 centralization program for cost80. financial. (3) collect fees from beneficiaries. One IIP component aimed to establish water user organizations that would share investment/rehabilitation costs of the main irrigation system and gradually take over the operation and maintenance (O&M) of the secondary/tertiary system.370 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS This chapter presents success stories and lessons learned from the cost-sharing and water user-participation activities of the WorldBank-supported Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP) in Yemen. The chapter also presents comparable experiences from other demandmanagement-oriented projects in Yemen. WUAs. Experiences from the Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP) To improve the use of spate irrigation in Yemen. Each WUA is in charge of implementing PIM in its respective irrigation command area. The ICs act as the High Executive and Administrative Authorities in each wadi (riverbed). The project prompted the government to create enabling legal and institutional environments to establish two main irrigation-user organizations: water user associations (WUAs) and irrigation councils (ICs). the World Bank Institute (WBI) facilitated a review of the prospects for WUAs and the ultimate transfer of spate schemes to users. ICs were established in both Wadi Zabid and Wadi Tuban with potent representation from the WUAs. The WUA was to (1) provide reliable and sustainable irrigation services. The ICs are responsible for (1) applying the IC’s by-laws and implementing its executive procedures. In 2001 this review envisioned the IIP: “…an Adaptable Program Loan to support physical rehabilitation and to move the reform agenda forward” (US$20 million). (3) protecting water user rights and resolving conflicts and pending issues. At later. Formulation of Water User Organizations toward Cost-Sharing The IIP was articulated around Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM). (2) coordinating activities between government authorities that continue to be in charge of O&M of head works/primary canals and the WUAs in charge of O&M of the secondary and tertiary systems. and (4) monitoring the social. The ICs represent the local government. more advanced stages. and the Ministry of . (2) perform maintenance and rehabilitation. and technical performance of WUAs. and (4) develop the capability for self-reliant O&M. the project guaranteed . This percentage was agreed between the project government team and farmer representatives (initially the WUGs. and local councils. The project then developed training activities to build the managerial and technical capabilities of the WUAs and ICs. As a result of the program. as mentioned earlier. PIM called for farmers’ participation in overall project activities starting from decisionmaking to completion of the rehabilitation and improvement works. Farmers were allowed to contribute this percentage in kind: labor and material. each WUA would implement 1–2 small community contract(s) up to $10. These works include feeder roads and flood/environmental protection works. 2.000 per contract. which later metamorphosed into formal WUAs. sharecroppers. eventually the WUAs). To further persuade irrigation endbeneficiaries to contribute 10 percent in kind. to an aggregate $1. including farmers (owners. Priority works to be fully financed by the project (government funds and loans). IIP divided civil works into two categories: 1. The program targeted all relevant stakeholders. as well as farmers’ contribution of 10 percent of investment costs in kind. informal water user groups (WUGs) were formulated at the onset. The project initiated the PIM approach through undertaking a comprehensive awareness program to inculcate the concept of PIM in farmers’ minds and to clarify the roles and responsibilities of irrigation beneficiaries within their representative user groups. Participatory works. government officials. which are deemed public goods outside the canal system and thus require no earmarked user fees. requiring a 10 percent farmer contribution to rehabilitation/improvement capital costs. ICs were formed at an advanced stage of IIP. the IIP introduced an in-kind cost-sharing approach through communityimplemented contracts. To enable low-income farmers to share the capital costs of the project.Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen 371 Agriculture and Irrigation (through its Regional Development Authority/Agriculture Office). In this arrangement. and tenants).4 million per project. farmers would take over responsibility and financing for the O&M of secondary and tertiary canals. IIP’s Approach to Community Cost-Sharing of Off-Farm Investments For the investment/rehabilitation works. Thereafter. some crop yields increased up to 100 percent! In the Rapid Appraisal Survey conducted in March 2005. farmers rated the overall outcome as highly satisfactory. many farmers have come forward and joined the WUAs. intrinsically. An additional 1500 farmers were involved in the associated awareness campaigns. The demonstrations were conducted with 360 farmers and 590 farmers at Wadis Zabid and Tuban. As a result of the various on-farm interventions (table 20. The farmers pay subscription and annual fees and play an active role in selecting the types of irrigation structures needed and contributing to subsequent implementation/ supervision of civil works contracts. from the WUA contractors. The project’s Credit Agreement included a prerequisite that civil works could not start before establishing the respective WUAs. farmers at first felt little incentive to buy in to the idea of forming WUAs under the project.1). However.372 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS that the unit rates of the contracts awarded to WUAs would be 30 percent cheaper than those implemented by the national/regional contractors. .) This percentage thereby represents the total contribution from end-beneficiaries and. especially since spate irrigation depends on erratic floodwater that is becoming ever more scarce and less predictable. respectively. Farmers’ Response to Joining WUAs and Sharing Capital Costs One major incentive for farmers to join WUAs was to vest the farmers with the authority to co-design and co-implement spate subprojects. (These rates otherwise would have embodied significant profit margins for the WUA contractors. through IIP’s public awareness program. persistent centralized subsidies of irrigation in Yemen. respectively. They expressed willingness to share 25 percent and 50 percent of the on-farm costs of improved technologies for the spate and tube-well demonstrations. Due to past. The IIP included a major component to demonstrate improved irrigation technologies and agronomic practices at the on-farm level. Farmers also exhibited willingness to share costs of on-farm improvements after the project evidenced improved yields and profits. Farmers became more interested after they were vested with the right to participate in decisionmaking and (as explained above) to directly implement small contracts in which they would cost-share the rehabilitation and improvement works. objectives. Alternatively.1 Yield and Farm Revenue Increases Due to Improved Farming Practices: Planned Project Estimates vs.5 4. and administration/financial management of O&M activities.Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen 373 Table 20. Primarily due to their weak legal and financial status at start-up. Actual Measurements (%) Crop Cotton Sorghum grain Sorghum fodder Sesame Maize Cucurbits Tomatoes Onions Eggplant Red chilies Banana Mango Okra Water melon Planned yield increase (%) 13 Zabid 15 Tuban 5 4 Zabid–8 Tuban 10 18 Zabid 3 Tuban 20 20 20 Tuban 20 Tuban 10–15 10 15 NA Measured yield increase (end 2005) (%) 45–100 Up to 98 Up to 44 Up to 55 62–97 Zabid Up to 200 87 12 to 25 44 NA NA NA 25 28 Zabid Internal rate of return (%) Up to 6 9. it proved difficult for the WUAs to issue bank/commercial guarantees for the community contracts. financial. For instance. These difficulties called for creating options to empower the WUAs in carrying out the community contracts. WUAs experienced various obstacles in actualizing their roles. . The emphasis has been sustainable O&M. A training program has been carried out for each WUA Board of Directors and for their Auditing and Inspection Committees to enable them to understand the legal status. and technical backstopping to WUAs. Backstopping the WUAs included the following five activities: 1. they were permitted to issue guarantee letters endorsed by the governors.5 8 NA Up to 90 4 2 13 NA NA NA 3 NA Backstopping the WUAs and Tackling PIM Implementation Difficulties The project provided the needed training and necessary administrative. and Expected Progress Promising results have been observed thus far as irrigation stakeholders in the two wadis participated in the IIP design. If so. The cost of training and WUA-backstopping in the IIP has been considerable. The project team has trained the WUAs’ construction managers on contracting procedures as well as procedures covered in the Project Operations Manual. . or FOs) to determine priority ranking of rehabilitation needs and to participate in their design. and implementation stages. amounting to approximately 20 percent of total project costs. Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) Agreements were prepared in Arabic and were endorsed by the governors. cost-sharing. proper bookkeeping. the government would need to secure financing for such software-type investments from the sovereign resources allocated to rural extension and research. and bank accounts. All WUAs in Wadi Zabid and Wadi Tuban have been established and become fully operational with active boards of directors. The draft by-laws for establishing the ICs have been approved by the project’s interministerial Steering Committee.374 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 2. Approximately 30 working papers and operational manuals have been prepared by the training consultants for the project’s PIM component. Farmer Design Committees (FDCs) have been elected (with the facilitation of existing Farmers’ Organizations. The WUA representatives have participated in three workshops at the regional and national levels on institutional assessment of the irrigation sector. thus hastening the establishment of an IC for each of the two wadis. 4. this is deemed one of the examples for “virtuous” subsidies that a “lean-and-mean” government (as opposed to the private sector or end-beneficiaries) could shoulder. Status and O&M Roles of WUAs/ICs. The Yemeni government could seek to scale up the PIM concept after the completion of Bank-supported projects. The WUAs have worked closely with the project management units (PMUs) and the project consultants during the design and implementation of the rehabilitation and improvement activities. As part of the WUAs. From international experience. 5. 3. WUAs have been collecting user fees for heavy-equipment rentals to carry out immediate O&M of the secondary/tertiary canals. it is reported that farmers are paying their contributions and that the collection process is transparent. they started to contribute to O&M costs of the secondary/tertiary system (as it has been agreed that the O&M costs of the main system be shouldered by the government). O&M fees are being collected ad hoc since O&M of the IIPintroduced works have not been in effect. To date. However. Most of the off-farm rehabilitation and improvement activities are in .Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen 375 The WUAs have efficiently been implementing the participatory contracts and signing IMT Agreements for all secondary and tertiary canals. Thus far. IIP has been deemed a successful “process” project. thus far. The viability of this “process” project is to be assessed based on its far-reaching impacts. The IIP has prepared an O&M manual including a detailed inventory of required O&M items and a description of how WUAs could prepare O&M plans/budgets and collect O&M fees. and piloting. More importantly. The WUAs have been attending an extensive training program on how to use this manual and how to implement it. naturalresource-base sustainability. To summarize. The role of the WUAs and the ICs will become more obvious after completion of the rehabilitation/improvement works. One sign of WUAs’ effectiveness in Wadi Zabid was that they managed to persuade powerful farmers to restore canal cross-sections and to remove the control works that they had unilaterally placed in the canals to extend their irrigated areas. and scaling up best practices. in testing and scaling up the PIM concept. The ICs also have started to hold regular meetings and discuss issues related to water rights and water distribution. reduction of avoidable transaction and overhead costs. They include financial sustainability. transferring. The fees collected are deposited in WUAs’ bank accounts and disbursed from these accounts. The beneficiaries formed grassroots-level WUAs and wadi-level ICs that have been successfully: Participating in decisionmaking and in selecting design options Contributing to capital investment costs and to implementation of civil works contracts Gradually taking over responsibilities for the recurrent financing and O&M of the secondary and tertiary systems. LWCP targeted improving Yemen’s very low (approximately 40 percent) overall irrigation efficiencies. typically 30 percent from farmers and the balance from government. GSCP builds on the LWCP exercise by adding a key element: a technical advisory service. a decentralized partnership approach was proposed. the Bank-supported Land and Water Conservation Project (LWCP 1994–99) was launched to demonstrate a package of technical improvements to reduce water use at farm level. The project offered a package of technical advice to groundwater irrigators on water-saving technology and financed capital improvements on a cost-sharing basis. A second phase—the Groundwater and Soil Conservation Project (GSCP)—began in 2003. It complements physical investment in water-use-efficiency equipment with improved water management (through better irrigation scheduling and agronomic improvements). and crop husbandry—all toward raising farm returns per m3 of water. Technology comprised predominantly piped on-farm water distribution systems and the use of drip or bubbler micro-irrigation. A major constraint was the very weak legal governance environment and the strong traditions of tribal and local autonomy and fragmented water institutions that had virtually no influence over the water-extraction decisions made by tens of thousands of independent-minded farmers. It is extending the technical and financial package from 11 to 15 governorates. adjusted cropping patterns. Groundwater Management Called for Introducing PIM As one building block for an integrated approach to the water problem. as opposed to those previously provided by corresponding government entities. with a credit facility available. The project was well received by farmers and achieved its water-saving objectives.376 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS progress. The following sections touch on the PIM and cost-sharing experiences obtained from a number of irrigation demand-management-oriented projects in Yemen. In response. The project decentralized implementation to local specialist teams and required farmers’ contributions up-front. Thus. Yemen began tentative steps to reverse the groundwater water mining problem and improve cost-sharing. . it is too early to draw conclusions on the quality of irrigation services provided by ICs/WUAs. Experiences from the Groundwater Management Projects In the early 1990s. has been harnessed to test community self-management approaches to water conservation. CWMP groups the irrigators together for groundwater management and conservation. A 2003 water law defined water rights and set up a regulatory system of permits. a Japanese-grant-financed pilot program. government is fostering water conservation incentives by using macroeconomic measures. . and basin planning that—in Yemen’s weak governance context—can be implemented only through decentralized approaches and the cooperation of groundwater users. The adoption of cost-sharing proved the key to demonstrating farmer commitment. regulations. and the local level through WUAs similar to those introduced under IIP. the Community Water Management Project (CWMP). Ways to develop this cooperation through partnership approaches are being tested at two levels: the basin level through basin committees that are based on basin hydrological boundaries rather than on governorate boundaries. a key demandmanagement measure. The Sana’a Basin Water Management Project (SBWMP) is testing these approaches in the stressed basin around the nation’s capital.Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen 377 The project deepens the innovative partnership approach that LWCP introduced. and phasing out border protection of irrigated commodities. and encouraging participatory and community-based solutions aimed at self-regulation and self-financing of recurrent costs by water users. the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) is preparing basin plans. At the same time. Created in 1996. using participatory monitoring techniques (“peer monitoring”). the government is strengthening groundwater governance. Government doubled the price of diesel in 2005. raising the price of diesel fuel. The government has created a framework of rights. Cost-Sharing Created Revolving Funds to Finance Water-Saving Practices The LWCP piloted improvements for groundwater management and innovative approaches to watershed management. working with basin committees that bring together government and water users. Complementing the GSCP. Water Reforms Enable Coupling Demand Management with Cost-Sharing Alongside these field approaches. the better-off may have been capturing most of the initial benefits.” who controlled most groundwater. with disappointing results. rather than with WUAs. However. this risk was a hot issue in the preceding Bank-supported Ta’iz Rural Water Supply Project. Farmers jointly invested approximately US$250/ha to achieve water savings of approximately 2. The project’s decentralized and participatory approach to identification. Thus. Under LWCP. .378 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Previously. and women. Forgoing WUAs would have risked excluding the poorer farmers. Cost-sharing has created a revolving capital fund of approximately US$2 million to finance expansion of the LWCP.1) attempted to resolve this problem by promoting WUAs that integrate all water users.11/m3 of annual water saving. Incidentally. who were poor but did not actually “own” much water. Therefore. The investment costs thus are approximately US$0. the landless. Savings in pumping costs averaged US$0. Political Economy of Introducing PIM to Groundwater Users Although combating groundwater mining generally seemed to be pro-poor in Yemen. who had land/water privileges and could afford the costsharing. and there was certainly a bias toward the better-off. design. this mechanism proved weak. WUAs are a means of helping the disadvantaged avail of the benefits.300 m3/ha/year. However. projects had provided equipment free of charge. a pro-poor filter was applied to the project’s subsidized investments in water-use efficiency by applying a ceiling on the area that the project would co-finance. there was a debate on the ethics of a Bank project dealing directly with the “sheikhs. on the basis of common responsibility. It was clear that the better-off farmers control the lion’s share of groundwater. Bank-supported actions to reduce mining inevitably had to deal with these farmers. LWCP also laid the basis for the current GSCP/CWMP phase in which the government will partner increasingly with user groups rather than with individual elites. even without accounting for the opportunity value of the water saved in the aquifer.06/m3. from big well-owners to those who own no resource at all. the investment cost is recouped by farmers in just two years. In it. and implementation brought farmer knowledge and commitment into partnership with the skills and resources of government. The design of the Japanese-financed CWMP (box 20. and (c) technical. which is executed by the World Bank. enforce. local user groups will have the capability to work in partnership with local and central government agencies. evaluate and disseminate results. Participatory water management component. Water management and monitoring component. Would (a) identify areas in which social conditions are appropriate for local community self-management of water resources. The project has established three broad performance indicators: (a) institutional. to draw up and carry out water management plans. is becoming increasingly scarce. (b) transparency and accountability (whether the chair and members . while sustaining incomes equitably. (b) financial. particularly groundwater. and (b) build the capacity of local user groups across a discrete hydrological unit to manage the resource 2. The project will have documented the proven models. the IIP ensured that ICs closely monitor the performance of the WUAs. The project. Institutional performance indicators include (a) representation (percentage of farmers subscribing to membership in each WUA). The project would have three components: 1. In these areas. 1. created a network of practitioners capable of scaling up the models. would test and develop replicable models for sustainable self-management of local water resources by poor farming communities in areas of Yemen in which water. Would work with user groups to define the water balance and a hydraulic goal. propose ways of scaling up successes.Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen 379 Box 20. and influenced the policies and practices of local and central government agencies to partner with communities on local water management. the project is expected to have developed models and institutional capacity in at least 3 representative areas. At the end of the 4-year grant period. and create and support a network of practitioners. and monitor local water management plans that reduce both net water loss and losses from pumping from the aquifer. The groups also will be able to set. Community-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System To maintain sustainability. and to monitor progress against the plan 3.1 Yemen Community Water Management Project The Japanese government is providing a grant for a Community Water Management Project (CWMP). Monitoring and evaluation component. Would document the project in full. With technical backstopping from the regional line agencies and local authorities/councils. WUAs and ICs may need to be empowered to fully undertake the M&E. and with more enforcement roles in coordination with local authorities. Nonetheless. whether the executive body meets and produces minutes of meetings. 2. local line agencies. and would limit the transaction costs posed by assigning monitoring/benchmarking roles to mono-user water groups. However. financial. This composition would reduce the immense forgone resource-economic costs posed by the administrative boundaries. Financial performance indicators monitor whether WUAs are willing and able to collect/receive adequate funds to cover O&M and whether WUAs maintain proper bank accounts and accounting records. and ICs may need to be bottom-up rather than top-down entities.380 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS of the WUA executive body were properly elected. They also can be entrusted with more monitoring/benchmarking roles in coordination with the regional line agencies. The basin committee would be based on hydrological boundaries. 3. WUAs and ICs need to gradually take over the role of overseeing service provision and facilitating the application of water-related incentives and regulations. whether WUAs members are being timely informed of the executive body decisions. which needs . and (c) authority (the degree to which WUAs have the power to execute their decisions). The water law enacted in 2003 enunciated that WUAs and ICs need to be established and need to contribute to the Wadi Integrated Water Management Plans. Technical performance indicators monitor whether WUA members master the O&M and supervision plans and are well informed of their foreseen costs. Its board would be composed of water user groups/federations. whether WUAs adopted proper Internal Rules and Regulations and bookkeeping concerning managerial. local authorities. and NGOs. the best alternative for a monitoring/benchmarking/ planning body would be the technical secretariat of a basin committee. and technical aspects). The technical secretariat for the SBWMP thus far has been the Sana’a branch of the National Water Resources Authority. which are adopted by the government. Whether the committee board would approve the basin plans (developed by its technical secretariat) by consensus or by majority. thus avoiding exploitation of poor farmers. and (b) start to speak up openly about issues that were controversial in the past. 4. the law/by-law is silent on: a. since farmers (a) become more proactive in dealing with emerging problems and in resolving the long-lasting social and technical problems that the government failed to resolve.Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen 381 to be capacitated. rehabilitation and improvement of the irrigation infrastructure would not contribute substantially to improve equity of water distribution between upstream and downstream users. Farmer participation and cost-sharing create a sense of ownership of irrigation schemes. and (c) more timely water delivery. A provision stipulating that the board members are to be elected rather than appointed. Advance notice would ensure upfront transparency . WUAs and ICs could play an important role in rendering (a) services responsive to farmers’ demands. with the chairmanship of the board being rotated among them. However.) c. Basin committees are mentioned in the recent water law. such as revisiting water rights that no longer maintain equity between upstream and downstream users. b. 3. Government can provide farmers with three key incentives to participate in cost-sharing and to organize themselves in WUAs: (a) Producing public awareness activities prior to any physical interventions. In addition. Without sound water rights. 2. (Sana’a’s board is not in compliance with this by-law as its members include many top ministerial officials. thus matching crop water requirements. An indispensable provision entailing that the board members be from user groups and local entities rather than from line agencies. the relationship between landlords and sharecropper/tenant farmers needs to be clearer on who does what and how much each should contribute. (b) easier expansion of irrigation coverage. Conclusions Five conclusions can be drawn from the cost-sharing and related PIM experiences in Yemen’s irrigation subsector: 1. and (c) producing public awareness activities after the physical interventions have been completed so that farmers could witness the resultant increase in production and net revenue.382 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS and notify farmers of the benefits forgone by not opting into the PIM process. 5. supervision. Yemen Country Water Resources Assistance Strategy. Draft. Yemen Water Sector Public Expenditure Analysis. World Bank.” Draft paper prepared for contribution to the 4th World Water Forum. World Bank. “Local Action: Partnership Approach to Sustainable Groundwater Management in Yemen. 2004. Beneficiaries’ contributions to capital and O&M costs relieved pressure on government budget and contingent liability. implementation. 2005. and O&M activities of the feeder-level (as opposed to trunk-level) irrigation contracts. .” World Bank. (b) entrusting farmers to participate in the design. References MNSRE (Rural Development Water and Environment Group). 2006. “Groundwater Management in the MNA Region. ____. communities.2 has initiated several projects and 31. First. Craig Meisner.2 .4 .o pub/priv/coop water supply (’000) 0 .239.000 villages are situated on rocky mountain tops.2 78. the predominantly (75 percent) rural population is typified by small tribal communities dispersed in scattered settlements.78.67 6. Third.31.1 Rural Population Lacking Access to Public/Private/ publicly financed investments are Cooperative Water Supply Networks in Yemen providing sustainable services to communities once the project investment is completed and supSa’adah Al-Mahrah Al-Jawf port services are removed. and Richard Pollard 21 eeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in water supply and sanitation in Yemen is a formidable challenge for several reasons. many policymakers are concerned whether Figure 21. Andrew Makokha. many of these approximately 100.49. These programs Source: Project files. Finally. At the same time. M 383 .2 . These significant service deficit gaps obviously require substantial investments from the public sector. the country is challenged by an inhospitable and dry geography. and less than 31 percent has adequate access to water and sanitation services (WSS) (figure 21.1). and individuals. and Aden UNICEF and other agencies. Number of rural dwellings w. Second.Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen Susmita Dasgupta. the GovernCity Mareb Shabwah ment of Yemen. making service delivery and outreach difficult and expensive. with support Al-Hodeidah Sana’a Dhamar Al-Baida Reymah Ibb Al-Daleh from the World Bank. Hadramout Amran AlMahweet Hajjah Capital In recent years. only 41 percent of the population has access to health services.4 49.6 programs to improve WSS in rural communities.7 . the GovAbyan Socotra Taiz Lahj ernment of the Netherlands. The World-Bank-funded Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (RWSSP) was perhaps the most community driven of the initiatives in that it provides users with a relatively open menu of choices of service levels (within the technical and resource limitations of the community) and management arrangements.” The policy statement laid out three major principles of a demandresponsive approach: 1.384 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS have differing institutional and technical designs. the Technical Secretariat for Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform. and the Environmental Protection Authority. they range from being strongly community-driven to strongly government-led programs in which communities are provided with infrastructure through centrally managed programs. one of the key elements built into the project was technical assistance to support the formulation of a national rural WSS strategy and the development of a subsector investment program based on the implementation experience of RWSSP. All the main government bodies working in the water supply and sanitation sector are located under the Ministry of Water and Environment. the National Water Resources Authority. implementation. They include the General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP). Communities participate in the design of their water supply and sanitation system and in the selection of the technology and service level that they consider suitable for their needs and for which . integrating sanitation and hygiene education with water supply in order to maximize health benefits and the sustainability of RWSS systems. As a result. Yemen now has comparatively streamlined water sector agencies. 2. the National Water and Sanitation Authority. Among other characteristics. The Government of Yemen (GOY) issued a policy statement agreeing to the guiding principles of the RWSSP. Communities self-select to participate in the project by applying for assistance and meeting project conditions for local contributions and organizing for local management. namely. Community-driven means that users are given extensive voice and choice in project planning. RWSSP was prepared during a period of reform and institutional uncertainty in Yemen’s water and sanitation sector. demand-responsive approach (DRA) to RWSS development. and water system management along with training and support to develop local water system management capacity. a “decentralized. User satisfaction with RWSS services provides a useful measure of the success or failure of a WSS investment program and the likelihood that the infrastructure will be sustained through its design life. The objectives of the survey were to (1) assess the performance of the RWSSP with respect to several indicators of user satisfaction with the services provided and their ability to operate and maintain water systems. Environment and Sanitation (WES) Programme in Yemen. As mentioned above. the national RWSS program executed by GARWSP. The main investment programs include the Social Fund for Development. a household survey was conducted in the Abyan. a record of all existing water supplies was culled from different sources and stakeholders. An analysis of user satisfaction therefore can enable comparisons among the different approaches. Yemen RWSSP Household Survey From October 2007 to September 2008. Next. with support from local governments and . and Ibb Governorates of Yemen to evaluate water users’ satisfaction with water and sanitation services.Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen 385 they are willing and able to pay partial investment costs and full operation and maintenance costs (O&M). Hajjah. Table 21. A number of major investment projects and programs that were either underway or prepared in the early 2000s adhere. The comparisons can indicate the relative sustainability of the WSS services that were constructed through the different programs. Communities create formal water user associations (WUAs) to manage their water and sanitation systems. First. the outcomes of this survey were to guide the design of rural water and sanitation interventions.1 breaks down the total number of community water systems established through RWSSP and four other projects included in the survey as of June 2007. and (2) compare the RWSSP’s performance with that of other ongoing RWSS projects in Yemen. and UNICEF’s Water. the Public Works Program. to these principles. 3. Survey Sample Sample selection for the survey was carried out in three stages. to varying degrees. 1 Number of Rural Water Schemes. Third. HH surveyed) Governorate Abyan Hajjah Ibb Total RWSSP 7 (210) 4 (120) 17 (510) 28 (840) GARWSP 29 (870) 20 (600) 38 (1140) 87 (2610) PWP 6 (180) 4 (120) 11 (330) 21 (630) SFD 4 (120) 6 (180) 10 (295) 20 (595) UNICEF 6 (180) 0 6 (180) 12 (360) Description of Projects to Be Compared Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (RWSSP) In 2000 the Republic of Yemen received a US$20 million credit from the International Development Agency (IDA) for the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (RWSSP).2).1 A random sample of households was then selected from each of the 168 selected water schemes. A sample of water schemes by each donor and governorate was then selected for the detailed survey (table 21. Table 21. The project’s overall objective is to expand sustainable rural water supply and sanitation service coverage The initial selection of the number of water schemes was not necessarily representative of all schemes. a field review was carried out at the district and Uzla (subdistrict) levels to establish which supplies were operational. of water schemes surveyed (no. In total. 5. operational water suppliers were arranged by source of funding (donor or government). social workers. June 2007 Governorate Ibb Abyan Hajjah Total 423 248 176 RWSSP 38 33 19 GARWSP 315 153 96 Public works (PWP) 27 38 28 Social Fund (SFD) 41 8 34 UNICEF 6 23 1 Source: General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP). 1 .035 households covering 41 districts and 152 Uzlas participated in the survey.386 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 21.2 Sample Composition No. Hajjah. Rural population 1.000 mostly poor rural dwellers in 6 governorates: Abyan.2 52. which operates through governorate PIUs in each of the administrative areas in which the project is active.0 42.6 86.446 169.4 40. Amran.126 321. Table 21. district.5 71. and local-level RWSS systems’ implementation capacity Providing a platform for a national RWSS implementation strategy based on the principles of demand-responsive.1 53. Table 21.4 50.Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen 387 to approximately 400.1 No sanitation (%) 44. .4 The project was to achieve these targets by: Introducing demand-responsive.346.026 1. decentralized. community-managed RWSS approaches Building and strengthening governorate.3 summarizes rural water supply and sanitation service coverage within the six governorates covered by the project as of 2004.407 657. at which time the project had completed only a few water systems. Lahje.8 71.408 52. Ibb. In 2007 the project was extended for one year to December 2008 with additional financing to expand coverage to a total of approximately 800. and Al Dhalea. The project is managed by a central Project Implementation Unit (PIU). of dwellings 259.391 No.3 Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Coverage in the Six Governorates of Yemen Included in RWSSP Governorate Ibb Abyan Hajjah Lahj Amran Al-daleh Average for rural Yemen Source: CSO-Demographic Census 2004.000 people (including the original target population) through approximately 150 rural water supply systems.7 71. demand-responsive. community-managed approaches.562 409. community-owned RWSS services Enhancing a learning process for RWSS systems sustainability Implementing RWSS development schemes and expansion of service coverage.748.882 80.1 86.652 728.9 87.8 76.640 No access to water network (%) 69.492 43. The PIUs are independent of existing sector agencies to enable the units to develop and use decentralized.586 104. the project is relatively “embedded” within government institutions. The program is highly centralized. Communities contribute a minimum of 5 percent of subproject costs. Communities co-sign the contracts and payment authorizations. Nonmechanized technologies such as hand pumps are supported only in cases in which piped services would not be feasible. design.4 Coverage of RWSSP. RWSSP schemes tend to be large. it receives sector budget support from the Netherlands. All major decisions pertaining to geographic priorities or changes in the project implementation strategy require approval from the Project Steering Committee. The project uses existing water sources. However. Table 21. or it coordinates with GARWSP. which is chaired by the Minister of Water and Environment. GARWSP is under considerable pressure to spread resources across all parts of the country. Bulk procurement of raw materials (pipes. Table 21.302 Population coverage % of total 6. As a national program. piped.7 15. The project does not fund groundwater exploration or borehole drilling. design and construction are carried out by private firms contracted by the PIUs. June 2007 Governorate Ibb Abyan Hajjah Source: RWSSP. pumps) is carried out in Sana’a. of RWSSP water schemes 38 33 19 No.4 summarizes the number of RWSSP schemes completed and incremental coverage achieved by June.568 64.508 50. Governorate offices of GARWSP coordinate with local governments to identify.8 4. No. rather than . of villages served 184 262 274 117.8 General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP) The General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP) is the national agency that manages the Government of Yemen’s national rural water supply program. which locates water sources and drills and develops the boreholes that can be the sources of water for RWSSP systems. In addition to national funds.388 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Nonetheless. Subprojects are planned and managed with extensive water user group (WUG) involvement guided by social mobilization teams. and construct subprojects. 2007. pumped water systems aimed at providing continuous or near-continuous water services through metered house connections. individual subprojects are implemented in phases so may require several years to be completed. or user contributions. Beneficiaries contribute at least 5 percent of subproject costs. GARWSP has begun to support the establishment of water user groups (WUGs) for water scheme management. communities often ask PWP to complete civil works components in unfinished community water supply schemes or to implement scheme designs prepared by other agencies. which granted SFD a great degree of autonomy. Public Works Project The Public Works Project (PWP) has an institutional and financial setup similar to that of the Social Fund for Development (SFD). managed by a Project Management Unit (PMU) in Sana’a and six regional suboffices. in recent years. Conversely. and despite the managing director’s being a government minister. and implemented through private contractors and consultants. However. Social Fund for Development The Social Fund for Development (SFD) was established in 1997 by law.Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen 389 prioritize regions or respond to community self-selection. Just as does Public Works Project (PWP). PWP’s focus is on creating labor-intensive employment. UNICEF) to finance and implement the capital-intensive components of these subprojects. In essence. such as constructing a reservoir or pumping house station. This focus has led to financing only labor-intensive civil works rather than comprehensive infrastructure systems. it rarely offers communities much participation in planning. the law enables SFD to be managed as an independent body The fund’s approach is to provide services in response to communities’ demands and . As a result. However. This policy creates institutional constraints when communities apply for a mechanized water supply system. financed through a special account. PWP is autonomous. PWP has developed a reputation for rapid and efficient implementation. project financing is only for civil works. PWP focuses on implementation and does relatively little capacity building. PWP also is a multisector initiative with approximately 30 percent of funds going to water and sanitation subprojects. service level. GARWSP has tended to focus on implementation rather than on community capacity building for O&M. However. Budget allocations are usually insufficient to enable individual subprojects to be completed in a single fiscal year. choice of technology. PWP then becomes reliant on other partners (GARWSP. Therefore. SFD has been expanding community contracting in its subprojects. RWSSP and SFD have much greater sustained engagement with communities than PWP or GARWSP. UNICEF also finances water supply systems on a grant finance basis. The project aims to provide only technical assistance and material inputs that are not available locally. Cash community contributions amount to approximately 15 percent of subproject costs. although not on the same scale as the other projects.. and most construction is undertaken by private contractors. SFD has grown from a US$30 million project in 1997 to a $400 million national program supported by 10 multi. Survey Findings Household connections and water use The percentage of households with connections in each subproject ranges from 100 percent in the RWSSP to approximately 80 percent for the other projects (table 21. UNICEF Through its Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) Program. One thus could hypothesize that user satisfaction would be greater in RWSSP and SFD than in the other two projects. Activities with an environmental focus include wastewater management and solid waste management.5). It is an “open menu” project providing funds for a wide variety of community-prioritized investments. Approximately 20 percent of the funds provided for community investments are spent on water subprojects. SFD does not have the same degree of flexibility as the RWSSP in responding to community demands for piped systems with or without house connections.390 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS needs. The reasons for the range are that (a) not all technologies are amenable to piped house connections and (b) some of the projects (such as SFD as explained earlier) concentrate . and take a role in operation and maintenance (O&M) of the facilities.and bi-lateral donors. contribute to the capital costs. The subprojects designed are simple systems (standposts. rainwater collectors). SFD water projects are limited to water-harvesting schemes and water supplies based on shallow wells and springs. the fund does not finance drilling for boreholes or mechanized systems. Now in its third phase. Contributions in kind in the form of labor and local materials are growing. Communities decide on their key priorities. 1 (1945) Note: * = Sum of GARWSP. SFD.6).4* (1350) 100.0 (120) 99. In governorates—Hajjah.0 (600) 94. Comparison of actual and scheduled water service provision The survey compared perceptions of the users of RWSSP to the perceptions of users of the other projects.0 (120) 0.0 (900) 83. and .0 (120) 88.6 (180) — 87.8 (870) 100. on low-cost rainwater harvesting and other nonmechanized technologies. and watering animals (figure 21. Very little of the water was used for irrigation.7) Due to seasonal variations. there also are a substantial number of cases in which water is inadequate because of breakdowns.5 (295) UNICEF 40. PWP.3 (180) 100. Irrespective of the manner of access and type of water scheme. 2007–08 RWSSP 100 90 80 % Reporting "Yes" 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Drinking Cooking Washing and Gardening bathing New water use Watering animals Non-Bank Adequacy of water All water users reported a level of dissatisfaction with the extent to which the projects met all household needs (table 21. of HH in parentheses) % Abyan Connection Hajjah Connection Ibb Connection RWSSP 100. This regulation leads to intermittent nonavailability of project water. In addition. washing-bathing.0 (210) 100. Reasons for inadequacy The four main reasons for inadequacy of water relate to water resource constraints (table 21. Figure 21. and UNICEF projects.Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen 391 Table 21.8 (510) GARWSP 85.8 (180) Total others 78. cooking.2 (330) SFD 75. almost all HH used the water provided through the subprojects primarily for drinking.2 Various Uses of RWSSP and Other Subprojects Water in Yemen. WUAs are forced to regulate availability of water in order to maintain service to an acceptable number of users.5 Surveyed Households with Connection to Piped Water Network (%) (no.2).6 (1140) PWP 83.0 (180) 30. Such improvement would bring the ratio closer to 1.2 (218) 2.8 (171) SFD 44.6 HH Reporting That “Project Water” Was Not Meeting Their Entire Household Needs (%) (no.9). over 90 percent of consumers can contact their WUAs about services and bills and get attention (table 21.7 (418) PWP 23.1 (130) 8.2 (53) 67.8 (31) 16.9 (374) 9.6 (136) — 16. the need to reduce service failures is evident in all projects (table 21.4 (386) 31.2 (371) 42.8b). All of the regions. This percentage is higher than for most urban systems in the region. UNICEF projects.8 (206) UNICEF 75.7* (617) 41.9 (41) 4.1 (338) 5. of HH in parentheses) RWSSP Abyan Hajjah Ibb 40. Scheme failures Even though respondents reveal that RWSSP performed better than the others.2 (390) 3. SFD.392 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 21.8 (122) 69.6 (612) 8.8a and 21. particularly Abyan.0 (32) 2.0 (15) 1.3 (42) 50.0 and increase the number of water days available. needed much improvement. Table 21.10a).1 (29) Total others 45.5 (38) 4.0 (33) 4.0 (84) 25.4 (824) Notes: * = Sum of GARWSP.5 (189) 36.3 (83) GARWSP 44. However.5 (12) Total others 14. PWP. approximately 10 percent of water users believe that the WUAs are just . Performance of water user associations (WUAs) On average. The difference held good for both “dry” and “wet” seasons.0 (85) Ibb— RWSSP’s actual water delivery schedule was reported to be better than the other projects’ (tables 21.0 (60) 51.7 Top 7 Reasons Why “Project Water” Is Not Sufficient to Meet Entire Household Needs (%) (sample surveyed in parentheses) Reason Seasonal variation WUA regulates water consumption Quality of project water not good enough Project water not available all the time Frequent breakdowns in water delivery due to poor O&M Inadequate capacity of delivery network Project water not sufficient in dry season RWSSP 4.5 (38) 4. 94 GARWSP 5.86 UNICEF 5.82 Hajjah Ibb Note: * = Sum of GARWSP. of days/wk Range: Days/wk (Actual/ scheduled) Avg.87 4.125–7.0 0.75 SFD 5.083–7 0.083–7 0.83 2. no.0 0.25–7.3 (328) 0.0 (180) 7 -7 1.5 (600) 0. no.0 0.25–7 0.0 0.3 (120) 1–7 0. of HH in parentheses) Governorate Abyan Avg.0 1.125–7 0.4 (180) 1–7 0.78 PWP 4.25–7 0.97 2.25–7. 28 percent say it takes 1–5 days.25–7.0 0.82 5.8 (285) 0.2 (1890) 0.3 (210) 0.0 0.11–7 0. SFD.25–7 0.3 (180) 0.78 2.10b).84 3.92 2.87 3.0 UNICEF 3.25–7 0.8 (120) 1–7 0. In all cases.083–7.0 0. of days/wk Range: Days/wk (Actual/ scheduled) RWSSP 5.88 4. Scheduled Water Supply in Dry Season (no.85 2.6 (1106) 0.125–7. no.9 (180) 0.0 0.94 7.0 (180) 6–7.083–7.Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen 393 Table 21. no.25–7. no.25–7 0.0 0.85 2.1* (1350) 0.93 GARWSP 4.25–7 0.7* (1350) 0. Although small. this percentage points to a need to carry out even more community campaigns before project implementation. Table 21.0 0.98 2.82 1. looking out for themselves. RWSSP users have the most positive responses: 56 percent report that RWSSP takes less than 1 day to fix problems (table 21.1 (120) 1–7 0. no. PWP.9 (870) 0.83 SFD 5. of days/wk Range: Days/wk (Actual/ scheduled) Avg. of days/wk Range: Days/wk (Actual/ scheduled) RWSSP 5.11–7.0 0.91 Total others 5.25–7 0.9 (169) (1888) 0.80 Note: * = Sum of GARWSP. PWP.2 (120) 1–7.82 1.1 (120) 1–7. SFD.5 (169) 0. and UNICEF projects.5 (600) 0. . of days/wk Range: Days/wk (Actual/ scheduled) Avg.25–7.25–7.0 0.1 (180) 0.0 0.0 0.25–7.6 (328) (285) 0.1 (509) 0.80 0.94 7. and UNICEF projects.8a Actual vs.8b Actual vs.5 1.0 (900) 0.1 (870) 0. Nearly 50 percent of all users say it takes less than 1 day for project staff to fix a service problem.88 — 2. of days/wk Range: Days/wk (Actual/ scheduled) Avg.083–7.0 3.85 Hajjah Ibb 1.96 — — — Total others 4.3 (210) 0.0 0.90 0. Scheduled Water Supply in Wet Season Governorate Abyan Avg. and 23 percent say it takes more than 5 days.7 (120) 1–7.82 5.3 (509) 0.8 (1108) 0.0 0.7 2.80 PWP 5.25–7 0.1 (900) 0. 7 38.3 25.1 24.5 19.0 16.0 210 32.7 21.3 15.7 13.4 13.0 2.2 13. SFD.1 180 26.2 283 3.4 323 18.8 11.0 7.7 14.9 Record of Service Failure on Scheduled Days in Past Year (% reporting) RWSSP Abyan: Several times Few times Once Never No.7 23.8 57.5 20.7 52.1 25.2 10.5 1.110 24.3 1.883 3.0 26.3 120 27.6 22.350 GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF Total others Note: *”Total others” = Sum of GARWSP.7 23.10a RWSSP and Other Projects: Users’ Perceptions Regarding Their WUAs (% reporting) HH reporting WUA cannot be contacted about services and billing and have not received assistance RWSSP: Abyan Hajjah Ibb Other: Abyan Hajjah Ibb 9.5 509 26.3 21.9 39.7 18. HH Hajjah: Several times Few times Once Never No.4 13.5 52.7 167 22.3 120 29.3a and 21.5 600 50. and reduced overcrowding near public standposts (figures 21.9 3.5* 21.9 41.2 12.1 40.0 32.7 17.9 9. However.8 20.6 16.9 27.4 21.0 76.8 21. all respondents expressed increased satisfaction with the frequency and duration of water supply and water pressure.0 73.0 28.5 22.0 17.8 32.7 29. Table 21.7 870 18. PWP. HH 8.8 10. .7 13.3b).8 21.7 2.4 16.5 63.5 35.5 3.3 1.5 12.6 15.5 HH reporting WUA does not take complaints seriously and makes no attempt to improve service HH reporting WUA is just looking out for itself Users’ satisfaction with water services In general. and UNICEF projects.3 0. HH Ibb: Several times Few times Once Never No.4 19.7 120 1.2 20.7 11.394 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 21.6 11.6 33.8 16.4 180 29.2 17.6 180 26.1 1.4 900 21.3 16. and crowding near public standposts (table 21.0 18. water charges.4b). Concerning water service.9 66.3b Satisfaction with Water Services before and after Other Projects Before 80 Current % responding "Satisifed" 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Location Frequency of Duration of supply supply (days/week) (hours/day) Water charges Water pressure Over-crowding (if public standpost) Note: Services = Location.3 35.6 40.4a and 21.3 35. duration.7 46. and overcrowding.3a & b Satisfaction with Water Services before and after RWSSP and Other Projects Figure 21.” “Changed to well. RWSSP communities showed a greater perception of change for the better than communities served by other projects (figures 21. The study also assessed consumer perceptions of the direction of change in water network maintenance after project completion.5 23.7 56. the survey reveals greater satisfaction with RWSSP schemes.5 13.9 19. water pressure. . Their complaints contrast with the responses received from areas served by RWSSP schemes. When the categories of “Satisfied. duration of supply (hours/day). frequency.0 22.3a Satisfaction with Water Services before and after RWSSP 80 Before Current % responding "Satisifed" 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Location Frequency of Duration of supply supply (days/week) (hours/day) Water charges Water pressure Over-crowding (if public standpost) Figure 21.11).” Figures 21.10b RWSSP and Other Projects: Average Time for WUA to Fix a Problem HH reporting (%) Less than 1 day RWSSP Abyan Hajjah Ibb Others Abyan Hajjah Ibb 53.Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen 395 Table 21. water pressure.5 23.5 12.7 28.3 20.5 9.7 25. compared to schemes supported by other programs in frequency of supply (days/week).3 1–5 days 5+ days respondents from water schemes other than RWSSP have expressed dissatisfaction with the current water charges. 2%) Don’t know (0.7 73.11 Differences between RWSSP and Other Projects in Service Satisfaction RWSSP Before Location 21.8 Current — 73. and investments in the expansion of the system.9% 8. RWSSP project HH are more satisfied with the maintenance of their water network after project implementation. operating staff. WUA chairperson. water scheme manager.4 64.0% Figure 21.0 17. and other.4a Consumers’ Perceptions of Direction of Change in Water System Maintenance after RWSSP Completion (%) Satisfactory Changed to well 23. all consumers.8 21. Levels of water network maintenance satisfaction are also higher for RWSSP projects. Changed to better Repondent did not answer (0.4b Consumers’ Perceptions of Direction of Change in Water System Maintenance after Completion in Projects Other Than RWSSP (%) Satisfactory Changed to well 19.1 62. the sheik.9 64. O&M.1 20.1%) Changed to worse (0.7 35.2% and “Changed to better” are combined.7% 49. district committee.8% 18. User preference for management of water schemes To elicit users’ preferences for the management of water schemes.3% Changed to better Repondent did not answer (0. Potential choices included WUA.2 65.396 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 21.9 Frequency of supply (days/week) Duration of supply (hours/day) Water charges Water pressure Overcrowding (if public standpost) 12.1 53.9 48.4%) Changed to worse Changed to poor 4.0 49.6 Non-Bank Current — 53. survey questions included the current and preferred arrangement for ownership of water scheme.6 Before 24.3% .4% 7.0 15. major repairs/replacements. expenditure control.6 20.4a & b Consumers’ Perceptions of Direction of Change in Water System Maintenance after Completion of RWSSP and Other Projects Figure 21.5% 61. GARWSP branch office.9 69.9 Figures 21.4 16. revenue collection. the government. water allocation.4 18. budgeting.4%) Changed to poor 6. 7 4.7 20.0 8. expenditure control.8 58.6 4.9 5.0 0.2 15.0 0.3 5.0 3.5 29.3 2.2 4.5 0.3 27. Budgeting.7 5.3 1.1 2.6 6.3 3.3 5.4 2.4 8.5 3.1 17.4 3. revenue collection.3 16.1 0.6 9.4 0.8 33.12) revealed clear preferences for: Ownership of water schemes: By consumers.5 4.4 7.7 8.5 1.4 8.7 0.5 7.3 2. Respondents from “non-Bank” schemes expressed preferences for a dominant government role. and water allocation: By operating staff.0 7.8 46.6 11.8 3.5 4.6 3. Budgeting and expenditure control and investments to expand the system: Although a plurality of both RWSSP and other respondents expressed a preference for water user groups to manage these 3 processes.3 5.3 3. These data suggests RWSSP communities’ comparatively high Table 21.9 0.6 5.3 3. alternatives: RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other WUA WUA chairperson Operating staff Water scheme manager Sheik District committee GARWSP branch office Government Other 28.2 46.5 7.Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen 397 Survey responses for all projects (table 21.4 5.4 5.0 9.6 3.6 5.1 6.1 2.5 9.3 3.0 57.6 6.3 2.8 13.6 12.5 1.5 25.6 11.6 16. and investments in the expansion of the system: By WUA.8 1.1 3.8 10.0 1.2 3.3 7.6 4.3 1.3 16.8 percent) than for non-RWSSP beneficiaries (27.0 5.7 3.5 3.0 19.9 4.2 4.6 Revenue collection Water allocation All consumers 44.5 2.8 19.3 2. Major repairs and replacements: Respondents served by RWSSP schemes are content with the lead role of the WUA.6 3.2 2.0 6.12 User Preferences for Management of Water Schemes (% of HH reporting) Major Budgeting and Operation repairs expenditure & and control maintenance replacements Investments to expand system Ownership Mgmt.5 12.2 17.5 0.3 2.4 10.3 4.2 27.8 1.4 3.4 2.6 7.4 22.0 8.8 7.8 6.2 5.6 1.3 2.8 1.6 7.2 3.6 58.1 2.2 4. the percentage was much higher for RWSSP respondents (46.7 percent).1 10.4 0.7 48.9 5.8 3.0 .3 1.6 2.9 5.2 8.5 1.2 16.6 0.0 42.5 10.6 8.5 3.8 6. O&M scheme.4 46.6 5.3 40.8 5.2 8. 5 Conclusion and Lessons The Government of Yemen’s National Water Sector Strategy and action plan espouses four policies: 1. Adopting a demand-responsive approach to identify communities for inclusion in sector programs and making this approach standard practice . WUAs in RWSSP schemes are provided with training and technical support to determine the actual tariffs that need to be charged to cover operation.2 724.0 234.4 293.3 Metered (YR) Hajjah Unmetered (YR) 51. 2007–08 (YR) RWSSP Before After 335. Decentralizing implementation mechanisms 2.. higher per-household water consumption (due partially to more reliable service). Cost of water Table 21. and rehabilitation costs for their water systems. Enhancing beneficiary community roles and responsibilities 3.8 Metered (YR) Note: YR = Yemeni Rial.7 Before 696.8 158.13 Cost of Water Bill per Month in Unmetered and Metered HH.4 724.0 437.0 Abyan Unmetered (YR) 846.0 278.9 118.0 Metered (YR) Ibb Unmetered (YR) 0. 11. The higher payments can be attributed to more accurate calculation of full costs.9 Other After 1095. Table 21.398 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS levels of confidence in the technical and financial management capabilities of the WUAs.7 1523.13 portrays the change in average monthly water service charges paid by consumers. and limited but highly subsidized nonmetered access for the very poor.0 0.13 shows that post-completion water payments for metered connections in RWSSP villages in all three districts are significantly higher than in other projects.2 71.0 14.0 39. Table 21.7 962.5 261.0 1178. maintenance.5 555. communities are developing a range of mechanisms to prepare to finance major repairs. RWSSP beneficiaries enjoy relatively reliable water systems. further development of procedures for joint programming and for aligning their respective approaches to conform to national policies is still needed. In fact. In addition to all of these positives. on average. .Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen 399 4. The RWSSP invested considerable resources in establishing and building up the technical and financial management and planning capabilities of democratically elected water user associations (WUAs). Improving cost effectiveness by identifying means to implement projects that meet basic needs at lower costs. Over 60 percent of residents had one or no service failures within the past year. The RWSS subsector still lacks a clearly agreed strategy. for water service than they did before RWSSP was completed. Through their WUAs. 2. Nevertheless. they are paying the full costs and spending more per month. All programs need to follow this strategy and other water policies consistently. The consumer satisfaction survey findings suggest that the project’s strategy for developing communities’ capacity and meaningful involvement in planning and managing their own water and sanitation systems is effective. RWSSP has focused on developing the capacity of communities to take on the delegated responsibilities of planning and managing their own water and sanitation systems. Confidence in WUAs as governing and management bodies for water schemes also is high. The strategy has resulted in relatively high levels of beneficiary satisfaction and has increased the likelihood that the communities will sustain the systems over their design lives. More than other projects that support rural water supplies and sanitation in Yemen. progress is needed in two areas: 1. The RWSSP was designed to develop and test approaches for sector programs that operationalize these policies. GARWSP and the other projects and agencies working in the subsector increasingly are cooperating. Beneficiaries are agreeing to and paying tariffs that cover O&M costs. . Public spending is best focused on public goods: nonexcludable items that benefit many. The government therefore should shift resources toward controlling water pollution. Maged Hamed. However. in Egypt. there is a huge gap between water supply and sanitation coverage. 80 percent of the rural population relies on piped water supply. the interconnection of 401 . Currently. and Mohammed Mehany 22 Case for a New Approach to Rural Sanitation in Egypt At the macroeconomic level. Rural Poverty and Public Health Issues Are Correlated with Lack of Sanitation Services and Lack of Water-Quality-Management Solutions. The antipollution measures in the 2003 National Water Resources Protection Plan would benefit Egypt by LE 2 billion. Due to the narrowness of the Nile Valley in which the rural inhabitants live. Adding community-based and self-financed sanitation programs would add an extra LE 1 billion in net benefits. Wendy Wakeman. Ahmed Shawky Mohamed.Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework: Case Study of Application in the Delta Region. Egypt Ayat Soliman. which is a public health hazard. the analysis of public spending on water in Egypt concluded that spending more on wastewater collection and treatment would boost GDP by at least 1 percent. In Egypt’s rural areas. Even when HH are connected. the collected sewage is not always safely disposed of. which provide private benefits. much public expenditure has been on “private-like” goods (irrigation and urban households). whereas only 4 percent is connected to sanitation systems. and away from subsidies for irrigation and urban water supply. 2 0 Crop (official reuse) Health Crop (unofficial reuse) Fisheries Forgone benefits monetized in % of GDP the irrigation/drainage system.000.000. Low water tariffs undermine both the public and private sectors’ capability to maintain existing water supply and sanitation (WSS) facilities. Conventional/Centralized Approaches to WSS Contributed to Fiscal Deficit. The Integrated Sanitation and Sewage Figure 22.000 6.000.000.8 0.1b Socioeconomic Losses Due to Lack of Sanitation and Treatment 1 0. This diffusion negatively affects public health. and the extensive (often unoff icial) reuse of agricultural drainage water.000.000 management from the central0 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 ized/public agencies to decentralYears ized/autonomous utilities.000 Public spending on water would 8.402 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Figures 22. 10. the semi/maltreated sewage diffuses into the waterways and reaches the food chain. coverage 80 60 40 20 0 Urban Lower Egypt Upper Egypt Wastewater Frontiers Poverty Governorates Drinking water Figure 22. let alone expand coverage.1a & b Poverty-Sanitation Link Figure 22. crop production and quality.000. The efficiency of Egypt’s public spending on water falls short of international norms.1a Poverty Correlated with Lack of Water and Sanitation Services 100 % of pop.000 the decentralized institutions to 14.000 take over part of the WSS services 12.4 0.000 gradually transferring finance and 2. Egypt’s WSS services are less financially efficient than their developing-country peers.2 Consequence at National Level: Escalating Infrastructure Project (ISSIP) Public Debt. They are possibly on a par with utilities in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa regarding public management. and poverty (figure 22.000. 2000–05 design envisages that entrusting WSS cumulative debt Irrigation cumulative debt 16.000. Extending the “conventional” sanitation and treatment services to a larger share of the rural population would be prohibitively expensive. (1000 LE) .1).000 could reduce such inefficiencies.000 be more equitable and efficient by 4.6 0. families are forced to incur costs for sludge evacuation of their cesspits. Limited ownership and voice of the local communities in influencing planning processes and decisionmaking at the central level 3.Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework 403 Box 22. New Approach Based on IWRM Providing sustainable sanitation solutions in rural areas faces three inherent challenges: 1. provided they can afford them. agriculture. These problems affect the life expectancy and morbidity of the population. Limited ability of many developing countries to provide sustainable O&M over a large number of small systems. combined with inadequate solid waste disposal is causing severe environmental sanitation problems in the rural areas of the Nile Delta. In addition. and fisheries. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Improving Wastewater Disposal Forgone benefits (damage costs) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 BAU Central measures Central + community & hygiene measures Cost of added treatment/control Environmental Damage The absence of proper wastewater collection and treatment. Addressing these challenges can be assisted by applying the key principles of integrated water resource management: treating water as a Total costs (LE bil/yr) . particularly in view of low cost-recovery ratios. influence the costs of drinking water supply. or 2% of GDP. cause health costs for treatment and care.1 Untreated Sewage Results in National Economic Loss The latest Country Environmental Analysis of Egypt (World Bank 2005) estimated that the socioeconomic cost of maltreated or untreated wastewater is higher than LE 9 billion. These costs represent the harm caused to human health. reduce the possibilities for agricultural reuse. and have an adverse effect on fisheries. Higher unit cost per capita due to the topography and dispersed population 2. 404 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 22.2 Local Context The ISSIP area in the three Governorates of Gharbeya, Kafr El Sheikh, and Beheira can be characterized as mostly flat agricultural land with a high water table (less than 5 meters). Most development is fairly recent in origin, and rights of way, other than through roads, are not raised much above the natural ground surface. The high water table in the area can pose problems. Annual rainfall is low, ranging from approximately 50mm per year in the south of Gharbeya to 100mm or more per year in the north of Kafr El Sheikh and Beheira. Villages in Gharbeya tend to be urban in character with many buildings rising to three stories or more. As a general rule, villages in Kafr El Sheikh and Beheira are more rural in character, but even in them, many buildings have more than 1 story and are occupied by more than 1 household. Rights of way tend to be narrow, often less than three meters, with houses built up to the road. Water use varies considerably among villages but is often in the range of 100–140 l/cd. Most households in the three governorates covered by the project already have waterflushed sanitation, although few are connected to sewers. Most houses that are not connected to sewers discharge wastewater to cesspits; a small percentage discharge directly to nearby drains. The high water table exacerbates existing inadequate sanitation arrangements, often resulting in very unhealthy environments. In many cases, this threat to human health has led to a very high demand for improved sanitation services. holistic resource, management at the lowest appropriate level, and stakeholder participation. In addition, lessons from global implementation in several countries, including Brazil and India, provide helpful examples of how to manage the community interface and enhance local ownership. This chapter presents a recent case example in the Delta region in Egypt in which these principles have been integrated in the planning, management structures, monitoring arrangements, and community participation framework for rural sanitation service provision. The resulting methodology has been reflected in the design of the World Bank’s Integrated Sanitation and Sewerage Infrastructure Project (ISSIP), which will be implemented by the Government of Egypt (GOE) during 2009–14. Egypt has lacked a separate clear national strategy for addressing rural sanitation due partly to the priority in recent decades of increasing coverage for urban centers. With the more recent increased attention given to the problems resulting from poor sanitation infrastructure in rural areas, the rural sanitation issue moved to the forefront of the political Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework 405 agenda. The president has declared a national program for rural sanitation to increase the sewerage coverage in rural areas from 4 percent to 40 percent. In addition, in 2007 a national strategy for rural sanitation was initiated that incorporates several of the principles presented below. It is hoped that the lessons from ISSIP implementation will refine the methodology and provide lessons for wider replication. Planning around a Hydraulic Basin and the Concept of Clustering A number of challenges face the planner when a fragmented top-down approach to planning wastewater service delivery based on individual population centers is applied to rural areas. Planning for single cities or towns can yield clear results based on large urban population centers. However, when it comes to the rural setting, it is harder to prioritize investment allocations and establish the link between the inputs and desired outcomes. The example of the rural areas of the Delta in Egypt illustrates the need to shift the planning framework to a bottom-up approach based on a number of technical, environmental, and social criteria and considerations. Historically, central planners focused on providing services to the large cities and towns. Mother villages were included only if they were near planned urban systems. Hence, only 4 percent of Egypt’s rural areas were served with sewerage systems. The remainder often relied on failing on-site solutions that compounded water logging and groundwater pollution problems in the dense areas. Moreover, Egypt is a hydraulic society. Its historic system of irrigation canals and drains has shaped the rural landscapes and livelihoods for millennia. Thirty-seven percent of the population relies on surface water irrigation for agriculture. Increasing water quality deterioration in both canals and drains is due in large part to the discharge of untreated effluents (both domestic and industrial) into the waterways. Box 22.3 Egypt’s Rural Villages Egypt’s villages range in size from small remote hamlets with 200 inhabitants to larger “mother villages” that have up to 80,000 inhabitants. Of the 5,633 villages (main and satellite), 73% have populations of fewer than 10,000; 25% have population between 10,000 and 30,000; and 2% have populations exceeding 30,000. The average population density in rural areas is 1,500 persons/km2. 406 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS The following were the considerations for putting in place a strategic sanitation plan for the Delta region. Planning Rural Sanitation Provisions around a Hydraulic Basin Increases Environmental Benefits. The first planning consideration is the need to shift from administrative planning boundaries to integrating the hydraulic boundaries in the planning process. These boundaries are defined by hydraulic basins, or sub-basins in the case of Egypt, since the whole Nile valley can be considered one large interconnected basin. Within this basin, well-defined irrigation command areas include smaller sub-basins, typically around secondary drains with reaches in the range of 15–20 km. (Figure 22.3 illustrates the example of the Mahmoudia Figure 22.3 Mahmoudia Canal Command Area Sub-Basins Canal Command Area in the western Delta, including its subbasins.) This use of hydraulic boundaries enables the planner to select and group target villages based on their locations vis-à-vis existing water bodies and to prioritize these village groups/waterways in which a combination of current water quality conditions and expected improvements from implementing rural sanitation in these areas would yield the highest environmental benefits. The tools and criteria elaborated in the following sections of this chapter are proposed for such prioritization: (1) clustering villages (2) water quality modeling, and (3) applying multicriteria prioritization. The use of hydraulic boundaries also enables the mobilization of integrated water resource management institutions. Local institutional mechanisms for WRM, such as farmer groups and water user associations (WUAs), can be integrated with water supply and sanitation management within one monitoring framework. These aspects are further elaborated in the last two sections of this chapter. Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework 407 Clustering Concept Provides a Comprehensive and Cost-Effective Approach That Maximizes Technical Feasibility Based on Pollution Abatement Objectives. To facilitate planning, the grouping of villages around a hydraulic sub-basin needs to integrate several additional considerations. In this context, a cluster can be defined as a geographical unit of planning and implementation that provides comprehensive and cost-effective sanitation solutions for almost all villages falling within this unit, thereby maximizing the feasibility of technical solutions. Grouping villages into one cluster along hydraulic boundaries and taking into consideration technical criteria and administrative boundaries enable linking sanitation service provision with final environmental improvement impacts. Hence, the planner needs to set the final cluster boundaries to minimize expensive crossings, such as main canals and railways, and the number of administrative units for each cluster. Simultaneously, the planner needs to maximize the use of existing facilities and maintain a manageable overall cluster size from a technical and financial point of view. Too small a cluster would result in a very large number of small-scale sanitation solutions. In the case of the dense Delta areas, small-scale solutions would not be not cost effective, and would increase the management burden of water utilities. On the other hand, a cluster size that is too large would lead to crossing a large number of administrative boundaries and would bring the scale closer to those in urbanized settings. In addition, an over-sized cluster would limit Figure 22.4 Applying Two Scenarios for Varying Cluster Sizes: the ability to apply small-scale, Mit Yazid Command Area community-managed solutions and reduce the ability for community oversight and financial cost recovery. The iterative planning and cluster-sizing process for the Mit Yazid Canal Command Area in the Delta (figure 22.4) illustrates this case. The first scenario, with an average cluster diameter of approximately 5 km, resulted in approximately 41 new proposed wastewater treatment plants with an average treatment capacity of approximately 3,000m3/day. The second scenario, with an average cluster diameter of approximately 408 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 10 km, reduced the number of new treatment plants to approximately 10. The average treatment capacity per plant of approximately 6,000 m3/day resulted in an overall investment plan that was deemed a more appropriate scale for the Egyptian setting. Applying Multicriteria Assessment to Prioritizing Village Clusters Targets Interventions at Areas in Which the Largest Impacts Can Be Achieved. In developing a strategic sanitation plan for a region, existing service needs should be compared with available funds to determine the extent of required prioritization. For the case examples of Mahmoudia and Mit Yazid in the Delta, a methodology for selecting priority areas/clusters was developed based on multicriteria analysis of the most relevant factors. The criteria were population served, reuse potential of the irrigation canals, potential health benefits, and water quality improvement potential (see section below), Figure 22.5 Priority Ranking within the Mit Yazid potential for tie-in to existing Command Area treatment works, and proximity to water treatment plant intakes.1 These factors are implicitly based on the key principle that interventions should target areas in which the largest impacts can be achieved. The result of the analysis constitutes the strategic sanitation plan, with prioritized ranking of clusters, so that a forecasting financing plan can be agreed by the decisionmakers. The result for the Mit Yazid Command Area is illustrated in figure 22.5, which ranks the areas (1 being the highest priority) that receive ISSIP financing. Furthermore, the application of advance (ex-ante) 1 These criteria and the relative weighting for each should be a dynamic process, to be modified and updated based on implementation progress and emerging considerations. Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework 409 economic analysis, with consideration of national scale-up options, is elaborated below (“Assessing the Results of Water Quality Management Investments in Egypt” section) and provides additional information to policymakers in making final investment allocation decisions. Water Quality Modeling Is an Indispensable Tool in Identifying Which Groups of Villages to Serve Using Decentralized Treatment Approaches and Which Drains Have Enough Self-Purification Capacity to Enable Them to Assimilate the Partially Treated Rural Sewage. Limited financial resources often Figure 22.6 Example of Nishil Drain are a major constraint facing rural sanitation coverage expansion. In the case of ISSIP, limited funds lead to a trade-off between (a) implementing secondary wastewater treatment for a Kafr Mhalat Masir few villages, thus complying Maher Izbet Al Arab with Law 48 (the law that Kafr El Ni’na’ai Ali Abdalah regulates discharges to inland Samatay Mit El Shiekh waterways) effluent standards; and (b) implementing advanced Mohamed Wahby primary treatment for a larger El Madrach El Abidia number of villages, allowing (a) (b) natural attenuation in the drains to reach ambient standards, even if falling short of Law 48 effluent standards. Notes: Mathematical modeling was used to make a judgment call on whether option (b) is possible and for which drains. Visual observation showed that, for some drains, self-purification processes can and do improve the water quality. Figure 22.6 illustrates three locations along Nishil drain in the ISSIP study area and shows water quality improvement along the downstream direction. Mathematical modeling confirmed that if the villages along this drain’s reach are served with advanced primary treatment, then the water quality of the drain can achieve Law 48 requirements downstream from the discharge points (figure 22.7). d Canal Mit Yaze ata yD rain Sam Dra in Nas El Gharb ia (c) Drain hil 410 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Figure 22.7 Simulation Results for the Self-Purification of BOD along Nishil Drain before and after the Decentralized Treatment Present 100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 0 2 4 6 8 10 Distance (Km) 12 14 16 With treatment Notwithstanding the ambient water quality legislation, decisionmakers can accept the aforementioned decentralized treatment approach introduced by ISSIP as a transitional measure so long as: A “free zone” without any domestic-wastewater point sources is enforced along the drain, downstream of the ISSIP-introduced treatment point (with a free length of approximately 5 km–8 km for most drains). This free zone will enable the self-purification to function as modelled. Predominance of the diffuse source, the agricultural drainage water, is maintained. The modelling results showed that the agriculture drainage water provided an overall “net dilution” factor along the drain. Achieving the necessary dilution rate requires a typical drainage catchment for third-order drains of 5,000–10,000 feddans. Another necessary factor is to have discharge flows along the drains no less than the following range: 0.6 mm/day (from Cairo up to Tanta City) to 7.5 mm/day (north from Tanta City up toward the coastal areas). There is minimal upstream pollution load (headwater quality): with dissolved oxygen (DO) no less than 5 mg/l, biological oxygen demand (BOD) not exceeding 12 mg/l, and coliform bacteria not exceeding 8,000 most probable number (MPN)/100ml. The point-source villages and hamlets are small, up to 500–1,500 capita each. In them, domestic wastewater would be much smaller than the agricultural drainage water, hence enabling sufficient dilution by the latter. An acceptable ratio between domestic and agricultural return flow would be 1:10 (or, to be on the safe side, a more conservative ratio of 1:20). Within-Cluster Optimization Based on Available Sanitation Options Balances Service Coverage with Financial Feasibility. The final step of the planning process concerns the selection of the applicable sanitation solution(s) within each cluster. It is important to emphasize that part of the integrated cluster approach maintains that the planner Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework 411 Box 22.4 ISSIP Intervention Categories The following three broad categories of sanitation solutions have been considered in the Egypt case study and related investment program: Centralized systems: For villages with populations greater than 1,500 inhabitants and smaller villages in their proximity. These villages would be served by a sewerage collection network leading to a single central wastewater treatment plant. Smaller villages would be connected if the cost of doing so does not exceed the cost of decentralized treatment solutions. 2. Decentralized systems: For settlements with 500–1,500 inhabitants, not located along the networks serving larger villages. These villages would be served by local collection systems discharging into simple treatment works providing advanced primary treatment, typically consisting of a communal septic tank followed by a series of anaerobic baffled reactors (ABRs). Effluent is then discharged into a nearby drain. Pumping should be avoided if possible. 3. Onsite systems: For settlements with fewer than 500 inhabitants. These will continue to use onsite sanitation systems based on cesspits or septic tanks. The capacity of the central treatment plant would take into account the septage resulting from these onsite systems. 1. should seek to provide a type of sanitation service for 100 percent of the population living within the cluster, so that the anticipated resulting benefits can be achieved. However, given the varying typography and conditions for the individual villages within each cluster, a one-size-fits-all approach to the technology and proposed solution would not be feasible. The proportion of villages falling under each of the solution categories is determined by an optimizaFigure 22.8 Within-Cluster Optimization tion process within each cluster, by which the cost comparison and technical feasibility of the different solutions is applied. Figure 22.8 illustrates the technical Option 4 solutions, within an ISSIP sample cluster, based on consideration of Option 1 the different project intervention Option 2 Option 3 options. The options compared include tying remote villages to the central treatment plant, with Decentralized facility stages of pumping along the way 412 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS (option 4), versus establishing decentralized facilities for 1 or 2 villages (options 1, 2, and 3). Assessing the Results of Water Quality Management Investments in Egypt Ex-ante Economic Assessment Used Cost-Benefit Analysis. The economic analysis of the ISSIP has been performed via a costbenefit analysis (CBA) approach (see the logical framework for the economic analysis in appendix A22.1), rather than the cost-effectiveness approach commonly applied to assess sanitation projects. The CBA has been conducted by factoring in the following considerations: For phase 1, the weighted average of the unit capital cost is approximately $130 per target inhabitant (year 2040). Hence, the (amortized) capital cost per household/month is approximately 45 LE/month/family at maximum, and O&M costs are approximately 10 LE/month/family. The private benefits are estimated as the non-income-constrained willingness to pay (WTP), per the “contingent valuation” method. A proxy for this WTP is the upper bound of the current payments that households pay vacuum trucks to empty their cesspits in some of the ISSIP command areas. Hence, approximately 50 LE/ month/family. The public benefits associated with fully improving rural sanitation are estimated at approximately 81 LE/month/family. This is the summation of the monetized, incremental benefits accruing (or damages avoided) to the following subsectors: Health (avoided morbidity and mortality, plus avoided medication costs) Reuse of agricultural drainage (reduced BOD improves the reuse potential) Fisheries (increased DO increases fish production and quality) Recreational activities related to waterways and northern lakes. These incremental benefits have been calculated by estimating the impact of reducing the baseline concentration of sewage-related pollutants such as BOD, fecal coliforms, ammonia, and dissolved oxygen toward their ambient and user-specific standards. Using the Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework 413 aforementioned (capital and recurrent) unit costs and (private plus public) unit benefits, the project’s economic rate of return (ERR) has been performed against (a) 2 strategic scenarios, which adjusted the valuation of the incremental public benefits as these benefits correspond to 2 alternative assumptions on 1 of the project’s major externalities: the “headwater quality” in the drains served by ISSIP; and (b) 3 sensitivity tests. The two strategic scenarios are: 1. “Low” scenario. This scenario assumes that ISSIP is not followed by a country-wide program that can scale up the ISSIP model. In that (unlikely) case, within ISSIP command areas, it is assumed that only 40 percent of ISSIP area drains will be cleaned. Factoring in the centralized systems’ secondary treatment along with the advanced primary treatment provided by the decentralized systems, the overall improvement in these drains would only be “partial.” This partial improvement in the in-stream quality is estimated at 60 percent (incremental improvement of the baseline Water Quality Index, or WQI, toward the standards). The remaining drains (60 percent) cannot be sufficiently cleaned because of the already poor headwater quality. The “dose-response” relationship in this case has been estimated at 60 percent:70 percent (due to the “increasing returns to scale”). Under this scenario, the central estimate of the ERR would be approximately 10 percent. 2. “High” (or optimistic) scenario. This scenario assumes that this area eventually would be considerably cleaned, with the ISSIP concept being fully replicated (that is, through the nation-wide sanitation program for which 20 billion LE has been earmarked by the GOE). In this case, the incremental public benefits would be the product of 70 percent and 81 LE/month/family, hence 56 LE/month/family. The total (public cum private) benefits therefore would be 106 LE/month/ family. The resulting ERR would be on a safer side: 15 percent. Sensitivity tests have been performed to work out the ERR switching values (or strategic “flags”) that could bring ERR down to 10 percent or less: 1. Marginal increase in unit costs (due to price escalations and/or physical contingencies and contract variation orders) 2. Marginal postponement of the benefits stream by a number of years, for example, due to delays in construction/implementation 414 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 3. Marginal reduction in public or private benefits (for example, due to changes in unit prices or in other conditions or assumptions). The low/high scenario analysis and the sensitivity tests demonstrated that the project interventions can be socioeconomically viable. The “switching values” indicate that the ERR has some limited scope of accommodating marginal cost escalation, benefits reduction, and delays in implementation. However, both the sanitation (private) benefits and the water quality (public) benefits need to be fairly guaranteed. Ex-Post M&E Framework Needs to Reflect and Validate the IWRM Approach. Monitoring outcomes and impacts is a key focus of any project as it establishes the link between inputs (sanitation services in the case of ISSIP) and objectives (such as improvements in water quality and environmental conditions). The results-based M&E system under ISSIP will focus on monitoring outcomes and reporting on impacts of the implemented sanitation services, thus evaluating these impacts against the project development objectives (PDOs). The monitoring arrangements will, for the first time in Egypt, include the quantification of benefits occurring due to improved sanitation and feed into decisionmaking on allocating new funds and prioritizing investments. Many of the M&E activities will make use of the M&E tools/models, laboratories, and analysis results already existing per the mandate of the Ministries of Water Resources and Irrigation; Health and Population; and Housing, Utilities and Urban Development. Supplementing an ongoing irrigation improvement project being implemented in the same area, ISSIP’s development objective is to contribute to the sustainable improvement in (a) sanitation and environmental conditions for the resident communities and (b) water quality in the selected drainage basins within the served project areas. This ambitious objective entails looking beyond typical physical measures, such as service coverage ratio and the number of households connected. Instead, the project targets interacting with the community to evaluate satisfaction levels with local environmental conditions associated with improved wastewater management (local ponding, canal water quality), and conducting qualitative research to identify households practicing improved hygiene behavior. Improvements in water quality are another key objective of the project. To this end, an innovative M&E The index can be based on in-stream ambient concentrations of fecal coliforms and BOD.5).Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework 415 Box 22. especially for the drains/canals that used to be polluted by the untreated sewage from adjacent villages rather than from project externalities (effluents upstream of ISSIP’s command area). and with the respective subsidiary WSS utilities. . the M&E unit will coordinate with the respective subsidiary WSS utilities and with the beneficiary community development associations (CDAs). mobilization. there will be several subcatchment-specific water quality indexes. As for monitoring intermediate outcomes under the decentralized sanitation systems. the National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (NOPWASD). as well as on any other user-specific in-stream concentrations (as applicable for each subcatchment) such as DO for fisheries and ammonia for potable water and for reuse of agricultural drainage. Provided that a water-quality-modeling tool will be used by the M&E unit (similar to what has been used for project preparation). and plans for community capacity building.5 Water Quality Index M&E Application In the case of the ISSIP. roles of individual actors. This approach would make use of the self-purification occurring along the monitored streams. A participatory. and awareness-raising techniques. “In-stream concentrations” would take priority. The Community Participation Framework (CPF) summarizes the concepts and principles for community participation. Each index is to be weighted by population served and by proximity to the (surface or groundwater) potable-water supply off-takes and drainage-reuse locations within each project subcatchment. monitoring and compliance regarding the “in-stream” concentrations would take precedence over the “at-effluent” concentrations. To monitor intermediate outcomes under the centralized investments. demand-driven approach is used to help ensure sustainability by putting in place sanitation systems that users want and are willing to pay for and maintain. application based on developing site-specific water quality indexes to be monitored has been adopted for ISSIP (box 22. Community Participation Framework As noted earlier in the chapter. two key principles of integrated WRM are management at the lowest appropriate level. the M&E unit will coordinate with the mandated central organization. and stakeholder participation. demand verification. An important part of the stakeholder participation principle includes identifying and addressing the needs/preferences of various groups of stakeholders. communities being considered for interventions need to be informed about the project and proposed options so that they can make informed choices about whether to participate. community participation in the project will cover the following phases: Information dissemination to communities Community-level discussions on the project Demand verification Community selection (based on criteria) Communication with communities during construction Capacity building of community organizations (as appropriate) . and the poor. Confirming demand is crucial to ensure that communities will use and pay toward the operation and maintenance (O&M) of the systems so that investments will not be wasted. Institutional arrangements need to be as clear and simple as possible. and institutional arrangements for community participation in implementation. in both centralized and decentralized systems. The CPF should be implemented so that the needs and preferences of these sub-groups are addressed and so that they can play appropriate roles in implementation. Initially.416 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Three overall steps are crucial to this process: information-sharing. the various stakeholders need to receive adequate capacity building and any ongoing support needed to ensure that they can fulfill their roles. Community Participation Implementation Framework While community participation will be more extensive in decentralized systems. During the demand verification. In addition. youth. At the community level. this includes various community sub-groups such as men and women. Institutional arrangements need to be designed carefully. communities’ willingness to participate (their demand for the project) can be verified. so that management of systems is at the lowest appropriate level—the level at which systems are the most likely to be managed well and thus sustained. communities in which. Meetings could take several forms: An open. with steps taken to ensure that other subgroups such as the poor and youth are involved. expected level of community involvement. Information Will Be Disseminated to Communities and Community-Level Discussions on the Project. working with an NGO or local consulting firm) can present the basic project information to community members and then have a general discussion to answer questions. verification of demand for the project can take place in communities that have indicated an initial interest in the project (that is. type of technology). The goal is to spread information about the project as widely as possible in the proposed communities. discuss the proposed project with community members. Schemes should be presented to the communities as an opportunity to participate in a public-private partnership (PPP) in which the government will be committing a huge amount of capital funds for infrastructure development (WWTPs and networks). The first step will be for Rural Sanitation Unit (RSU) staff. and answer any questions they may have. working in some cases with an NGO or staff of a consulting firm. Demand Verification and Community Selection After the community meetings have been held. after . to disseminate project information to communities that have been targeted for inclusion in the project. RSU staff (in some cases. ISSIPs will undertake to build necessary infrastructure in areas in which villagers are willing to pay for sewage disposal and treatment. public meeting A meeting with the CDA and/or local unit staff Separate meetings for community men and women. expected amount of monthly charges.Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework 417 Involvement in hygiene promotion activities Involvement in O&M (decentralized systems) Involvement in participatory monitoring and evaluation (M&E). and possible land acquisition requirements. implementation timeframe. The information will include the type of system proposed (centralized or decentralized. CDAs/local units will receive capacity building in participatory monitoring and evaluation (M&E) during construction to enable them to help monitor the contractor as the system is being built and afterwards to help monitor system functioning and provide feedback to the RSU. In this case. administrative. technical. RSU staff working with consultants (or an NGO) can perform a simple willingness-to-pay survey. After this confirmation. agreeing to the conditions of the project. Construction During construction. the MOU can be accompanied by a list of households agreeing to pay the monthly charge and willing to participate in the project. In decentralized communities. With decentralized systems. In the decentralized communities. and social aspects) as . confirming that households would be willing to pay expected monthly tariffs.418 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS receiving information at the community meetings. communities (CDA) may help monitor some construction activities. either the CDA or the local government unit has expressed an interest in the project). There can be training in proper system usage (ways to prevent blockages). a more extensive willingness-to-pay survey will be conducted. In centralized communities. as these communities will have larger roles to play in implementation. In both types of systems. Capacity Building Communities will need capacity building related to their roles in the project. Demand verification will be more extensive in communities being considered for decentralized systems. It will include focus group discussions with various groups of community members to ensure that they understand all that will be expected of the community (concerning community management of systems) and that they are willing to undertake these roles. RSU staff (working with the NGO/consultants) will keep communities informed of construction activities and answer any questions/address any complaints that arise. In centralized communities. a memorandum of understanding (MOU) can be signed between the CDA or the local unit and the project (RSU). the CDA or the local unit will need to send an initial letter indicating its interest in the project. CDAs/local units will receive indepth training before system start-up in how to operate and manage the system (financial. such as women and men and youth. receiving back-up technical support from the RSU as needed. Various community sub-groups can be involved in this monitoring. Hygiene promotion activities will take place during and after construction activities. Communities will be provided with manuals to assist them in their work. Hygiene promotion activities will target children as well as mothers and fathers of children under five (there may be other target groups as well). the CDA/local unit will manage the system. . Hygiene Promotion The hygiene promotion campaign will be pivotal to convincing community members to change hygiene and waste management behaviors. assessing project progress and then system functioning through monitoring specific indicators and related targets. Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) In centralized and decentralized communities.Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework 419 well as training in M&E. This training can be provided by the NGO/ consulting firm. Operation and Maintenance (O&M) In centralized systems. CDAs/local units will provide community feedback on system functioning to the RSU and alert the RSU to any problems that occur (system blockages) With decentralized systems. CDAs/local units will be involved in participatory M&E. supervised by the RSU. 420 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS . and desalination. drought and flood control tools. They share many common cultural and historical links dating back to the Moorish period. Perhaps most importantly. They share similar climatic and hydrological conditions. irrigation. water supply. Abdulhamid Azad and Alexander Bakalian 23 T he Middle East and North Africa (MNA) water team. as well as coordinated operations of reservoirs and aquifers. The first part of this chapter discusses the MNA water team observations from the field visits. 3. along with counterparts from the various MNA countries. spent two weeks in July 2008 on a study tour of Spain.Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries Ahmed Shawky Mohamed. 2. Observations from Field Visits Ebro River Basin Authority (Confederation Higrografica del Ebro) at Its headquarters in Zaragoza Spanish river basin authorities use reliable data. The significance of Spain’s water sector to the MNA region is three-fold: 1. The second part summarizes the key messages on climate change from the Water EXPO deliberations that the team attended.1 421 . The tour included participating in the Zaragoza Water EXPO. Spain appears to have transitioned its Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) practices to more decentralized decisionmaking and successful implementation of public-private partnerships (PPP). and visiting Spanish institutions responsible for water resource management. in many areas of water services. rivers.saihebro. This advanced information system enables good management and prediction.3 This utility is considered one of the oldest in the world. or SAD in Spanish).es www. the automated Water Quality Information System monitors water quality in rivers and discharge points of industries and towns. rainfall measuring stations) and is processed for decisionmaking through a software developed for this purpose (decision support system. or SAIH). and water resources (level of reservoirs. It was founded 150 years ago (1858).422 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS An advanced hydrological information system manages real-time data on meteorology. and discharge at control points) in the basin. real-time data has been a key factor behind the success of the governance structure. In addition.2 The data comes through sensors in some 620 remote stations (dams. The availability of reliable.cyii. the largest with 16 m3/sec capacity). Unlike many countries’ water utilities.com 3 www. and supports an alarm system for flood prevention and drought management. It serves 6 million people and has approximately 2250 employees. this canal manages the full water cycle: Water reservoirs (14) Conveyance systems Water treatment plants (11) Distribution networks Wastewater collection treatment (140 plants of all sizes. 1 www. One of the highlights of the tour was the visit to understand how Spain’s hydrological information system works. hydrology. easily understood (by stakeholders). state of main water control gates. SAD allows real-time flood management and provides flow forecasts along the different stretches of the rivers in the basin as well as simulates the operation of the existing infrastructure. Canal de Isabel II by Water Supply and Sanitation Group Canal de Isabel II is the water utility for the Madrid autonomous region. The operations room does real-time monitoring of data (Sistema Automático de Información Hidrológica.chebro.es 2 . canals. (As a reference point. of which 11 percent is physical losses.15 Euro per m3).Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries 423 Wastewater reuse The company reached the level of 100 percent wastewater treatment in 2006. and (b) tariff for water and wastewater: 1. the MNA team was informed that the price for reused water is 0. The Madrid utility could be considered as a “mature” organization. Some key indicators given were (a) unaccounted-for-water (UFW): 22 percent. It is noteworthy that the company has created a subsidiary that works as a successful private operator in a number of countries in South and Central America. the utility appears to have transitioned into an organization that is implementing IWRM while maintaining internal and external accountability. one that has adapted over time to the local political realities and emerging environmental priorities. 4 .3 Euro per m3 for the consumption of less than 25 m3 (per 2 months). Currently. some of this desalinated water is supplied to coastal communities for household use and to the booming tourism industry. it is implementing a treated wastewater reuse program that will provide irrigation water for 40 percent of the green areas in the Madrid region. More fundamentally. In addition. Water supply The company provides different levels of service to the some 140 municipalities and towns in the Madrid autonomous region under different arrangements: full concession contracts covering all activities. The desalinated water helps to both reduce the burden on depleted groundwater and counteract the sea-water intrusion in the See Jagannathan. and contracts for commercial activities only (billing and tariff collection). operations and maintenance (O&M) contracts.4 Almeria Almeria is a desert area. The team visited two examples of conjunctive use of desalinated water with groundwater in the coastal areas of Nijar and Balerma (for irrigation through distribution networks extended to greenhouses). that is. Lessons for MNA countries. “Principled Pragmatism: Lessons from the “MNA Development Report on Water” in this volume. Its 30. In addition. Compared with MNA countries. and management of water resources. for example.). by writing off the interest on the state loan to farmers upon proof of improving the productivity per unit of water. such as the National Irrigation Modernization program. two favorable circumstances are the (1) high level of regulation of the rivers and sufficient water control infrastructure and (2) current program to build desalination facilities. demand. 5 See Baietti and Abdel-Dayen chapter on West Delta Project in this volume. The models were quite similar to the conjunctive use models being developed in Morocco’s Guerdaine project (financed by IFC) and Egypt’s West Delta Project5 (with surface water). Spain’s public subsidy comes at a lower social cost because public social spending (notably health and education) is at a higher level. Observations on irrigation model Given its geographical position. The visit to Almeria. In summary. However. that water availability has promoted a booming tourist industry along the coastline.424 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS water-supply wells. The administration sees the subsidy as justified because it contributes to financing a regional/state “public good. The average water productivity is very high: 12 Euro/unit of water for vegetables such as tomatoes and peppers. the model of technical assistance (TA) and marketing support has direct relevance to the project design in Egypt’s West Delta.” namely. It was designed to achieve desired outcomes. For example. is instructive in this regard. This area is dedicated primarily to horticultural crops under greenhouses. thereby ensuring financial sustainability. . The difference in the case of Almeria is that the production cost per unit of water is subsidized by the state budget and by EU subsidies.000 hectares (ha) are intensely farmed. Demand is the subject of a series of programs for making improvements. as most farmers are smallholders (<2 ha. Spain is vulnerable to climate change. the water user commercialization association in Balerma has developed a very interesting auctioning system for marketing the farm produce to the local/EU markets. The primary driver in both situations is the water demand from farmers who grow high-value crops for international markets. Regarding supply. This subsidy was designed to function in a relatively targeted/objective manner. Almeria’s approach has enabled scaling up the supplyside investments that are tied to the water user demand. officially Europe’s only desert. Spain finds itself in a situation that may facilitate the adaptations needed for the supply. The desalinated water is provided on demand with a limit of 0. This cost is subsidized by the European Union. Irrigation modernization recently was completed. It has 1454 members and an irrigated area under greenhouses of 1.3 l/s/ha for 23 hours a day. Since this solution was inadequate. The Almeria type of greenhouse is a low-cost structure of light materials. for their private on-farm drip irrigation systems.200 ha. rainwater. Irrigation is by (deep) groundwater (200 m). The irrigation water is distributed on demand by a pressurized system. and a two-layer cover captures the rainwater for irrigation. when there is considerable production of fruits and vegetables in other parts of Europe. The water metering and SCADA investment cost was approximately 3. and desalinated water. Plastic is used for the enclosure. farmers obtain certain subsidies. Irrigation is done conjunctively by surface and groundwater. The second visit was to the Solponiente WUA. 1 to 2 crops per year are obtained. It consisted of implementation of water metering and remote management (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries 425 The water supply is from surface water.826 members and an irrigated area under greenhouses of 8. which has 1. The expansion of the irrigated area since 1970 has resulted in overexploitation of the aquifer and sea-water intrusion. it was estimated that savings of 16 percent of irrigation water were . The average investment cost to distribute this water is approximately 6. mixing it with the well water. many farmers started capturing the rainwater that falls on the greenhouses. and provincial authorities.700 Euro/ha (using only water conveyance distribution systems). The first was the Campo de Nijar WUA.800 ha. The greenhouses are very labor intensive—on the order of 700 person days/ha/year. As a result. or SCADA) of these meters. Irrigation water is allocated daily and administered using a sophisticated real-time control and monitoring system. the central government. The technologies used in this area can serve as a good example for the recently approved West Delta irrigation project in Egypt. Production is interrupted in June and July.000 Euro/ha. Under greenhouses. Water productivity under greenhouses is approximately 12 Euro/m3. as well as an irrigation advisory service. groundwater. up to 50 percent. In addition. Assessment of water user associations The team visited two water user associations (WUAs) with very different situations. Because of the highly saline water. they are now using desalinated seawater from the Carboneras plant. The desalination process is very energy intensive: it uses 4–8 kWh/m3. Rules of the associations written and approved by users.18 Euro/m3. responsible for resolving conflicts between farmers. Spain’s irrigation areas vary considerably. When most members are farmers. which will be used conjunctively with groundwater and surface water. The irrigated area was not increased due to modernization. The desalinated seawater is used for irrigation of the greenhouse crops in Campo de Nijar (27 million m3/year). . the WUAs share many common characteristics: Constitution and legal status. Organization and selection of leaders and functions. In future. household supply (15 million m3/year). Nevertheless. Observations on the desalination plants The team visited two desalination-supported water schemes in Nijar and Balerma that provide water not only for household water supply and tourism but also for irrigation (via distribution networks extended to greenhouses).000 m3/day.426 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS achieved. WUAs with a common interest can form a general association around that issue. WUAs are managed by (1) a General Assembly composed of all members. Water users being obliged by law to join a WUA (comunidad de usarios). Sharing the financing costs as well as participating in the management of water resources. and (3) an Irrigation Jury. It uses reverse osmosis technology and has a treatment capacity of 120. The average cost of irrigation water is approximately 0. The Carboneras desalination plant started operation in 2005. Existence of a National Federation of WUAs with the objective of studying irrigation-related issues and presenting proposals to government. and industries (1 million m3/year). it is called an irrigators association (comunidad de regantes). this area also will be served by desalinated seawater. The desalinated water also helps reduce the burden on the depleted groundwater and helps counteract the seawater intrusion in the water-supply wells. (2) a Board of Governors elected by users to carry out directives of the General Assembly. The rules must be approved for compatibility with the law but may not be otherwise changed by the River Basin Agency. Economies of scale (scaling up the desalination and water distribution works) and the ongoing technological advances have helped to dramatically reduce unit costs. these costs already are reduced further to 2KWH/m3.52 Euro/m3 (3. Under these circumstances. With improved developments of membranes. hydrological information that monitors the stocks and flows of water plays a key role in resolving various conflicts of interest. . The subsidy is relatively outcome-based (for instance. The effluent brine is a negative externality that often is the environmental concern in scaling up desalination schemes in some countries. these subsidies are made in a relatively targeted/objective manner. The Spanish river basin agencies have been able to play a critical role in sustainable water resource management. with tomatoes and peppers). but these institutions have evolved over several decades. the production cost per unit of water is subsidized by the state budget and by the EU. in the Nijar Desal plant (visited during the tour). However. reliable. user-friendly. This brine is mitigated by dilution with the water used for the energy plants before being disposed to the sea. the KWH per unit of desalinated water in the Canary Islands was as high as 40 KWH/m3.Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries 427 Additionally. Irrigation improvements that enhance water productivity are likely to lead to higher evapotranspiration (ET). only highly profitable crops can be irrigated. In addition. desalination does not appear to be an economically viable option. by writing off the interest on the state loan to farmers when they present proof of improving the productivity per unit of water). whereas. the desalinated water must be pumped to a reservoir with a dynamic head of 280 m. Lessons Learned from the Field Visits The main lessons from the visit are: Overall management of water resources requires active participation from users. desalination offers sustainable solutions to coastal farmers who are already producing high-value crops. Because desalination costs are approximately 0.000 Euro/ha). Role of subsidies As in the case of irrigation. it is only 4 KWH/m3. The water productivity is as high as 12 Euros/unit of water (for example. Thus. In the past. the cost of treatment varies depending on the type of treatment and the intended final use of the water. Therefore.428 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS The Almeria model of providing small farmers with technical assistance at three levels (on the farm. this model is not replicable in MNA because the Spanish farmers benefit from a variety of subsidies available through EU agricultural policies. The Almeria experiences of conjunctive water use for growing vegetables are replicable in MNA in areas in which the farmers already have worked out supply chain/logistical issues essential to connect to . Reverse osmosis is the preferred desalination technology due to the cost reductions driven by improvements in membranes in recent years. However. there is a need for good water balance assessment. It takes many years for WUAs to evolve. Good water-level control and communication facilities are essential to good irrigation management. and the costs of surface water and groundwater are increasing. and high flexibility in water delivery arrangements. Desalinated water could be put to conjunctive irrigation use provided there is a high-value use (such as tourism) that can pay for crosssubsidies. Irrigation system modernization needs to attend to both physical and operational aspects. Project designs need to recognize the long gestation periods before WUAs can become fully empowered. Spain has evolved a system whereby the state pays for major construction works for water resource development and recovers the costs through water tariffs. Technologies for tertiary wastewater treatment and desalination have very much in common. such as coastal communities in MNA countries. desalination is becoming more competitive for urban uses. and for marketing) has interesting lessons for World Bank projects in Egypt and Morocco. Equally important is the availability of a strong legal framework that has empowered the WUAs. good understanding of internal system processes. Such a hybrid would blend the relatively cheaper treated wastewater (once public acceptance is achieved through adequate environmental and social safeguards) with desalination plants. for meeting EU phytosanitary regulations. In particular. a hybrid solution may be relevant to enhance productivity of periurban agriculture for local markets. However. In general. For water-scarce regions similar to Almeria. desalinating costs are declining. including. Algeria. Zaragoza Water Expo: Summary of Messages for MNA Countries on Climate Change Developing countries will be the most affected. improved living standards. In other countries. for designing and executing the adaptation interventions. these last three causes may dwarf the importance of climate change. need to be assessed by multiple criteria. and increased system losses due to under-budgeted O&M.Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant for MNA Countries 429 the export market. including several supply augmentation and demand management measures. For instance. in MNA. The Nile basin likely will encounter increased precipitation (and hence increased. One major challenge is the high uncertainty (of the demand and supply forecasts to 2050 or 2070). they could design the water interventions to adapt to the most extreme (that is. The adaptation options. importantly. The other three causes are population growth. Lower-income countries need to take some damage risk. parts of Tunisia. In some countries. namely. MNA countries inevitably will take risks: Higher-income countries need to take some capital-cost risk. climate change will: Increase irrigation-water demand per ha (due to increased temperature). Alter the flood and drought extremes. High uncertainty means that. they could design the water interventions to avoid only the more probable floods/droughts. the sustainability criterion. and possibly Gaza (once normalcy returns). highly unlikely) flood or drought (such as a 1-in-200 year flood/drought). For instance. rather than decreased. notably those in the MNA region. MNA made a presentation at the EXPO emphasizing that the assessment and . Diversification and trade are key adaptation solutions. flows). Climate change is 1 of the 4 causes of the escalated water demandsupply imbalance (water scarcity). The cost-benefit ratio should not be the sole factor. “virtual water” to maximize net exports per unit of renewable water. and shift the seasonal rainfall and surface-water flow hydrographs. Examples of such areas in MNA are Agadir in Morocco. In general. the incremental effect of climate change will be significant. In Algeria and Yemen. In some cases. which the team visited during the tour). the mitigation and adaptation agendas could overlap. Examples include: Cropping shifts that save water (adaptation measure) without resulting in increased greenhouse gases (GHGs) (mitigation measure) Reusing treated wastewater (adaptation measure) while sequestering the emitted methane (mitigation measure) Capitalizing on the storage of bulk-waters (adaptation measure) to develop clean solar-thermal energy (mitigation measure.430 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS implementation of adaptation options should be performed through the ABCDE approach. as opposed to the common top-down engineering approach. the latter approach resulted in costly/oversized trunk works without real bottom-up societal demand. The planner needs to address this possibility to ensure a harmonized overlap. elaborated in chapter 1. as planned for Balerma reservoir. for example. . # Engineering 24 Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta Jose Simas, Juan Morelli, and Hani El Sadani Introduction and Statement of the Problem Egypt depends almost entirely on 55.5 billion m3 per year of water from the Nile River. This allocation represents 95 percent of the available resource for the country. Approximately 85 percent of the Nile water is used for irrigation. Demand for water is growing while the options for increasing supply are limited. Egypt faces the challenge of improving the productivity and sustainability of water use. To respond, the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) has been implementing an Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) Action Plan. Its key strategy is to improve demand management. This plan has had the support of the World Bank, Germany’s KfW, the Netherlands Development Cooperation, and other donors. The Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project (IIIMP) is an important measure of the IWRM action plan. IIIMP is implemented on 500,000 acres ( feddans) in the Nile Delta covering the command of 2 main canals, Mahmoudia and Mit Yazid. The project aims at improving the management of irrigation and drainage in the project area and increasing the efficiency of irrigated agriculture water use and services. The main interventions of the project are improving irrigation and drainage systems and improving the water management institutional structure. This chapter was prepared in close collaboration with the staff of Egypt’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (Irrigation Improvement Sector; IIIMP Management Unit; Water Management Research Institute) and Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (Executive Authority for Land Improvement; Soil, Water and Environment Research Institute; Center of Agricultural Economic and Statistics). 433 † 434 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS The IIIMP interventions in irrigation modernization are based on the experience gained from several preceding and ongoing projects. The original concepts of irrigation modernization were developed in the early 1980’s and since then have received support from UNDP, USAID, Japan, World Bank, KfW, the Netherlands Government, and others. In 1996 implementation started on the World Bank/KfW-financed Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP). It was the first large-scale application of the irrigation modernization program in Egypt. The project closed in December 2006. By that time, 50 percent of the tertiary and secondary systems of the command areas of the main canals of Mahmoudia and Mit Yazid had been modernized. The IIP included three types of improvements/innovations: 1. Introduction of continuous flow. The mode of operation of secondary distribution canals was changed from rotational (for example, 5 days on/5 days off during the summer) to continuous flow (that is, water flows continuously in the secondary canals). The purpose of continuous flow was to improve water delivery services to the farmers. It has given more flexibility to the water management system to make it more suited to growing high-value crops. 2. Providing a single lifting point. The low-lying tertiary water systems (mesqas) were replaced by pressurized/elevated systems. Water is lifted from the secondary canal into the tertiary network through a single-point lifter rather than the old system. The latter allowed farmers to lift the water through several formal/informal control points without adequate control measures. The old system caused tremendous inequity in water distribution between upstream and tail-end users. The new system has led to better water distribution equity and reduced operation cost. 3. Piping tertiary canals. Earthen open tertiary canals were converted into piped canals. Piped canals allow for pressurized water delivery, reduce seepage losses, prevent discharge of solid waste and sewage into the tertiary system, and save approximately 2 percent of the total command area. The IIIMP widened the approach of the previous Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP). The initial driver was based on the economic analysis of various technical irrigation improvement options, including the IIP approach. Average IIP improvement costs were exceeding LE 6,000 per feddan (extreme cases reached 12,000 LE/fed), due mainly Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta 435 to over-design. In addition, IIP’s economic rate of return (ERR) was lower than expected at appraisal time. In addition to reducing the cost side of the interventions, a number of innovative measures were considered to maximize the benefit side of the project from both economic and financial points of view. For example, at this time, the Egyptian government was implementing diesel fuel cost increases. These increases not only have increased the operational cost of nonimproved systems but also would have increased operational costs for improved systems if the original choice of IIP of diesel single lifters had been adopted. The proposed response was to take advantage of the relatively good electrical transmission and subtransmission infrastructure in the Nile Delta and the economic efficiency, life span, and capital and running costs of the electro-pumps. In general, IIIMP adopted a three-point strategy: 1. Proper sizing of the improved infrastructure to optimize capital costs 2. Technical innovations to increase cost-savings and functionality 3. Extension of the improvement package to the whole system (including tertiary and on-farm improvements). Both (2) and (3) would have resulted in maximized benefits compared to the associated costs. Government engineers were reluctant to endorse the elements discussed during preparation for two reasons. First, this strategy had never been implemented in Egypt. Second, there was concern regarding possible rejection by farmers of innovative elements with which they may not have had experience before. It was clear that only a “sizeable pilot” could clarify the large number of issues and fine-tune the appropriate technology before scaling up to the national level. The objective of this chapter is to document the process of developing the pilot and to provide an interim evaluation based on real measured data. There is a real need for this evaluation at this time due to the fact that the irrigation modernization package implemented in this pilot has never been tested before under Egyptian conditions. Selection of Pilot Area The W-10 area in Kafr El Sheikh Governorate was selected to serve as the “sizeable pilot” for the new approach. It comprises approximately 436 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Figure 24.1 Layout Map for Northern Part of Mit-Yazid Canal Showing W-10 Subproject Area 6,000 acres in the most downstream tail-end command area of the Mit Yazid main canal. It is supplied by 3 branch canals and 2 sub-branch canals (table 24.1). The area was selected solely because it was the only subarea in which no IIP interventions had ever been made. As a tail-end area, W-10 has restricted water supply in the peak summer season and therefore reuses drainage water. The water shortage and low farmer incomes meant that W-10 was a more difficult working environment than the IIIMP overall. On the positive side, the W-10 area is close to the Sakha Experimental Station.1 This fact, together with the support of the GTZ-MALR Agriculture Water Management Project, was considered a plus, because it would enable the provision of technical assistance and materials to implement the pilot actions. Package of Actions to Test for Scaling Up Substantial differences existed between the old design criteria implemented under IIP and the new approach applied in W-10. The latter featured 12 innovations: 1. Electrification of single-point lifters (mesqa pump sets) rather than diesel pumps. While this measure has had the benefits mentioned above, a new dedicated distribution grid was needed, and the MWRI was to take care of it. Sakha is a subsection of the Soils, Water and Environment Research Institute (SWERI) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR). 1 Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta 437 2. Adoption of prepaid electrical cards to avoid delinquent payments and facilitate supply logistics to user farmers. This measure was adopted because the electric utility companies were reluctant to accept the new users based on risks of delinquent monthly payments from farmers. The IIIMP team proposed a “new deal” through the use of modern “prepaid credit cards.” This was a win-win option for both farmers and utilities. 3. New and cheaper equipment for the tertiary distribution systems (mesqas): increased irrigation application time in the peak month from 12 hr to 20 hr; substantial reduction of pipe diameters; direct pumping rather than costly concrete standpipes; more compact pump houses equipped with smaller pump modules: 20, 40, and 60 l/s, instead of 60 and 90 l/s units (reducing water duties from 4–6 l/s/ha in extreme cases to 2 l/s/ha or 0.82 l/s/acre in Egyptian customary units). 4. Improvement of head works control gates of branch canals through telemetric instrumentation and remote operation of gates with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. 5. Improvement of quaternary distribution systems (marwas) including the testing of two options: lining by brick and mortar or piping by low-pressure pipes up to the on-farm gate. MWRI had not been involved before in the improvement of marwas. However, the Soil, Water and Environment Research Institute (SWERI) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) was implementing a pilot program to line marwas using bricks and mortar. Thus, an interministerial agreement was made to enable SWERI to implement the marwa improvement activities, although MWRI would be responsible. 6. Testing low-pressure pipes for marwas (class 2.5 bar instead of 4 bar). 7. Testing different types of valves for the mesqa-marwa interface (ball, gate, and butterfly), different brands and specifications, optional manufacturing materials (metallic, polyvinyl chloride or PVC), PE, and different installation lay-outs. 8. Developing and testing different individual farm-gate hydrants for on-farm use allowing future use of hoses and gated pipes—all provided with pre-set constant flow and pressure. 9. Application of laser land-leveling (LLL) practices to improve allocation efficiencies (recently initiated). 438 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 10. Introduction of rotational operation schedules of pumps, valves, and hydrants to harmonize farmer needs and efficient use of water, labor, and energy. 11. Introduction of on-farm water management improvements including irrigation scheduling (to begin soon). 12. Testing and introduction of modified/controlled drainage (tested at station level and to be expanded soon). By 2009 the approach tested in the W-10 pilot area was being expanded within IIIMP to more than 500,000 acres in the Delta. This expansion depended on the collaboration among the specialized agencies of the MWRI and MALR, working together with water user associations (WUAs) and informal farmer groups. The cooperation between MWRI and MALR in the W-10 area provided the framework for MALR participation in the implementation of marwa and on-farm improvement programs. These programs included piped marwas, laser land-leveling, and training and capacity building of beneficiary farmers. The completion of the W-10 took more than four years due to contractors’ inexperience in implementing some of the new interventions and failures of some contractors to comply with the contractual schedule. The marwa implementation schedule was delayed because of delays in agreement on procedures for interagency transfer of funds and materials and other accountability mechanisms. After the project management unit (PMU) took over responsibility for completing the W-10 area project, the marwa improvement program began to accelerate. As noted above, the new W-10 approach was strongly resisted during the first few years. However, after the results of the W-10 pilot became evident, many of the skeptical parties became convinced that the project’s technical and organizational innovations could succeed. Evaluation of the New Approach The IIIMP Project Appraisal Document (PAD) envisaged (a) an average increase in farmers’ annual income of approximately 15 percent, (b) water savings of approximately 22 percent, and (c) an overall ERR of 20.5 percent. An interim evaluation of W-10 pilot was conducted in late 2008. The aims were to: Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta 439 Verify whether the new approach was feasible and whether the PAD forecasts were accurate Inform the design of a results-oriented monitoring and evaluation system. Investment Costs Most of the W-10 improvement costs were financed by IIP, which closed on December 31, 2006. The improvements at the quaternary and onfarm levels were taken on by the IIIMP. Despite having an estimated cost of approximately LE 120 per Figure 24.2 Breakdown of W-10 Investment acre—less than 2 percent of the Other costs (LLL, etc.) 6% Marwa improvements 13% total improvement costs—laser Delivery system 9% land leveling is expected to have Mesqa pumpsets & pipeworks 8% a significant impact. Figure 24.2 shows the breakElectrification 17% down of the main components of the improvement costs in the W-10 pilot. Mesqa improvements Mesqa improvements 47% represent 47 percent of all W-10 improvement costs. Source: Authors based on data from official records. Improvement in Physical Performance of Irrigation System of the W-10 area At the time of writing of this report, the authors could not assess the full range of enhancements in irrigation system performance because the improvement package had not yet been implemented in full (for example, the crucial laser land-leveling improvement). However, through a number of ongoing M&E studies, the following preliminary observations have been evident: Impact of marwa improvement The sufficiency indicator, which expresses whether enough water is diverted by the marwa to its served area, is the highest for pipeline marwas compared to lined and earthen marwas (earthen is the lowest). The equity indicator, which measures adequacy of water distribution, is the highest for pipeline marwas, compared to lined and earthen. 440 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS The conveyance efficiency indicator depends on calculating water losses due to seepage, percolation, and evaporation from marwas between the source and the farm. This indicator was highest for piped marwas. Piped marwas resulted in substantial water saving compared to other interventions. The irrigation time indicator indicates the superiority of improved marwas over earthen marvas. On-farm (application, crop water use, and field water use) irrigation efficiency is highest for piped marwas. Water table depths were deeper for improved marwas compared to earthen ones, indicating less water loss and lower drainage coefficients. The social assessment indicated that most farmers prefer piped marwas. The farmers perceived four benefits from improving marwas: equity enhancement, land-saving, reduction in maintenance costs, and reduction in irrigation time. Impact of mesqa improvement The average total operating cost was significantly lower for W-10 compared to the IIP regular improvement package. The average irrigation time was higher for W-10 compared to the regular IIP-1 due to reduced pump size and pipe diameters in W-10 area. Relative water supply is better for the W-10 area compared to the nonimproved areas, thus indicating better water availability. Benefits in W-10 Pilot Area Appendix 24.1 shows which irrigation improvements produced which benefits. Benefits could be summarized for one or several of the improvements by the following actual production parameters: Crop yield increases (due to enhanced flexibility under continuous flow operation, timely irrigation, equity for tail-end farms, improved water quality and quantity, improved drainage and reduced water table and water and soil salinity, and reduction of weed infestations) Change in cropping pattern (due to improved reliability and timely access to water) Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta 441 Table 24.1 Average Incremental Yields and Incomes by Crop Crop yields (kg/fed) Crop/activity Maize Rice Seed cotton Summer vegetable Wheat Broad beans Winter vegetable Berseem long season Berseem short season Sugar beet Citrus Without project 3.100 4.100 1.130 15.000 2.800 1.400 19.000 25.000 12.000 18.000 10,000 With project 3.500 4.600 1.330 18.000 3.200 1.600 22.000 28.000 15.000 21.000 12,000 Increase (%) 13 12 18 20 14 14 16 12 25 17 20 Without project 3,355 3,140 1,769 3,450 4,871 2,131 6,805 2,504 1,067 2,332 8,995 Income (LE/fed) With project 4,042 3,928 2,602 5,254 5,868 2,666 8,729 3,085 1,748 3,186 11,528 Increase (%) 20 25 47 52 20 25 28 23 64 37 28 Land gains for communal service space (due to replacement of open mesqas and marwas by buried pipes) Reduced irrigation costs Increased water productivity (due to reduced water losses, conveyance efficiency, controlled drainage, laser land-leveling, higher yields, lower irrigation costs). The improved production parameters recorded above all are measurable and easy to introduce into crop and farm representative budget models. To estimate the benefits of the W-10 pilot package, the authors worked closely with officers of MALR’s Center of Agricultural Economics and Statistics2 to update with- and without-project crop patterns and budgets. Such figures were obtained primarily by field-sampling yields and some estimates based on qualified experts. Table 24.1 summarizes the resulting yields and net income parameters of the main crops cultivated in W-10. As can be seen from the physical quantities and values detailed in table 24.1, yields are increased by 12 percent–25 percent. Net incomes per cultivated acre are increasing by 20 percent–64 percent as a result Engineers Bayoumi Abd El Megued Bayoumi, Abd Elmahab, and Mohamed A. El-din Mustafa (MALR). 2 2 summarizes three typical farm models.000 Farmer’s net income No.988 43. Conversion factors for wheat (1.5 feddan (33% of area) Model 4 feddan (17% of area) 8.1).9). future economic prices for traded inputs and outputs are not expected to show major variations. Conversion factors (CFs) for shadow pricing are based on estimates prepared for this quick illustrative analysis.2 Farm Models: Estimated Income Increases (LE/farm) Income increases (%) W-10 pilot area Model 0.75 1.5 0. of farms 5.583 4. Given the high levels of existing subsidies to Egypt’s energy market prices. Table 24.00 W-10 Area per model (feddan) 6. irrigation scheduling).658 23. respectively.333 250 18.000 1. water is gaining an increasing opportunity cost as irrigated area continues to expand in Egypt and water becomes more and more scarce. additional income gains will materialize. Through integrated on-farm and off-farm investments. As W-10 pilot area investments are completed with laser land-leveling and other on-farm improvements (training.8 million m3 as a result of the new improvement package being tested.000 3. cotton (0. sugar beet and maize (0. financial prices are assumed to be in line with economic prices. The WB forecast made no adjustment for labor costs.754 Without project With project Model (feddan) .222 38.442 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS of the combined effects of increased productivity and reduction of the irrigation costs (depreciation and O&M of pumps).5 were used for diesel and electricity.000 2. Due to the short time available for preparing the analysis. For nontraded commodities. However. the project not only saves approximately 20 percent–30 percent of water but also significantly increases household income by 8 percent–14.198 20.000 1.6 million to 34.2).9 14. CFs of 4. Table 24.151 25. According to the most recent forecasts of commodity prices prepared by the World Bank (November 2008). Financial and economic prices have been estimated using 2007–08 data.0 and 2. such as berseem and other forages. All models confirm the financial feasibility of the proposed improvements and the positive impact on beneficiaries’ family income. no economic value was estimated for water saved.5 percent (table 24. and citrus fruits and tomato (0. The farm model estimated that water consumption in W-10 was reduced by 30 percent from 49.0 11.50 4.95).8) were used.75 feddan (50% of area) Model 1. Electrification of the system also enables significant reductions of the costs of irrigation. Farmers located in the head will neither need. The exercise is a valid first approximation of an evaluation procedure that should be followed routinely. The reductions result from both the reduced depreciation and maintenance costs of electric pumps as opposed to the diesel pumps. and not all project benefits had yet materialized. as implementation partners (Irrigation Improvement . It should be updated regularly on the basis of systematic data collection. nor be able to capture.500 individual diesel pumps with approximately 100 single-point electric pump houses. have a limited water conveyance and delivery capacity. There were cost overruns as staff became familiar with the new approach. tail-end farmers should be in a better position to obtain the water they need. These designs are showing the way to improve equity in the irrigation distribution systems. water in excess of their crop consumption needs. by design. Other additional preliminary conclusions that could be drawn from the analysis are: 1. which. It produced this positive result despite the fact that the project was in its start-up phase. There is still a great possibility to reduce costs of irrigation improvement works. and the lower cost of electricity as compared with diesel fuel. Conclusions and Recommendations This analysis uses empirical data to confirm that the W-10 pilot improvements are economically viable. 2. These numbers were achieved even without assigning any value to (1) the water being saved or (2) the significant reduction of carbon emissions due to substituting the more than 5. 3. the new designs introducing continuous flow and significantly reducing the capacity of single-point mesqa irrigation pumps are proving to be adequate for crop and farm needs. As crop yields improve.2 percent and the net present value (NPV) at LE 11 million at 12 percent discount rate. Electrification also substantially reduces a significant source of carbon emitted from the thousands of individual diesel pumps by substituting more efficient and environmentally friendly shared electric pump houses. With the new improvements approach.Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta 443 The ERR for W-10 investments was estimated at 15. 4. Integrated irrigation improvements up to the marwa and the on-farm levels are possible due to the institutional collaboration and strong support from MWRI and MALR that were developed during IIMP. Executive Agency for Land Improvement of MALR) and private contractors learn about the innovative approaches. 5. These arrangements should be reinforced and more training provided. 6. With the new approach. The evaluation exercise showed that the productivity of water increases by more than 80 percent when comparing the total net economic value of production per 1000 m3 used for irrigation at project maturity with the pre-project productivity.444 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Sector of MWRI. As investment costs are reduced with experience. the impact of the improvements will increase. it is possible both to save approximately 20 percent–30 percent of the water used for irrigation and to achieve a significant increase in the value of production. . timely.1 Monitoring and Evaluation Framework: Integrated Improvements Components and Expected Impacts Impact results expected (outputs) Improvement subcomponents (inputs) Laser land-leveling Calibrated farm hydrants and irrigation scheduling training Salinity control agronomic packages Marwas improvement (piping/lining) Hydrants harmonized rotational scheduling Controlled drainage pits WUAs training on O&M Effective and sustainable O&M Water and pumping savings on rice crops Efficient. equity.Appendix A1 Monitoring and Evaluation Framework: Integrated Improvements Components and Expected Impacts Table A1. and equity of distribution to marwas O&M cost recovery to mesqas Water and energy savings Increase of land value Emissions reduction Continued on next page 445 . timeliness. and noise Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta Off-farm improvements and actions Equity and water savings Sustainable use of water distribution water adequacy. and equitable water distribution to farms Increased crop yields Efficient on-farm water management Intermediate outcomes Final outcomes Labor savings for farmers Incremental crop yields Incremental energy and water savings at farm level Fertilizer savings Land market-value appreciation Assurance of water adequacy. emissions. and timeliness to farms Pump energy savings Increased yields Water and energy savings Incremental increase of land value Labor savings Infrastructure networks levels Relevant users organizations On-farm Water User Associations (WUAs) Quaternary marwas Minor networks WUA establishment and effectiveness Piped mesqa + single lifter Electrification Training on pumps and valves O&M and rotational scheduling Adoption of continuous flow at peak times Sustainable use Tertiary mesqas Enabling condition to all actions/ improvements Enabling condition for equity and saving Reduction on pumping costs. timeliness. and timeliness of water distribution to BCs Enabling conditions for controlling salinity and water logging Enabling condition for continuous flow Sustainable crop productivity and yields: water savings on rice crops Enabling conditions for mesqa improvements Intermediate outcomes Final outcomes Water adequacy. adequacy.446 Table A1. and equity of distribution to mesqas Infrastructure networks levels Relevant users organizations Secondary branch canals Branch-canal and surface drains water user associations (BCWUAs) Major networks Surface drains (main) District Water Boards (DWBs) WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Off-farm improvements and actions Main canals Pump stations .1 Monitoring and Evaluation Framework: Integrated Improvements Components and Expected Impacts (continued) Impact results expected (outputs) Improvement subcomponents (inputs) Improvement of BC and related structures BC headworks improvement and volumetric metering Renewing subsurface drains Modified/controlled drainage Main surface drains and related structures rehabilitation Main canal and related structures rehabilitation Major pumping stations and related structures overhauling Rice water savings Enabling conditions for controlling salinity and water logging Enabling condition for continuous flow for tail-end BCs Sustainable crop productivity and yields Overall equity. the development of nonconventional resources such as desalinated water and reclaimed wastewater is increasingly relevant. Trenberth and others 2003. Experiences. or the recycling of reclaimed wastewater for planned beneficial uses. Due to demographic growth. and Syria. water scarcity will create pressure to shift water from agricultural to domestic and industrial uses. According to the latest collection of simulation results reviewed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. such as Egypt. Pier Mantovani. consensus is strong that precipitation will decrease substantially in MNA countries (IPCC 2007). may join the water-deficient nations by 2050. Higher evapotranspiration rates in vegetated areas likely will decrease runoff and groundwater recharge rates and could increase crop-water requirements in agriculture (IPCC 2007.Water Reuse in the MNA Region: Constraints. Schneider and others 1990). Water Reuse On paper. Lebanon. Fourteen of 20 MNA nations are in water deficit (less than 500 m3 of renewable water supply per capita per year) (FAO 2006). is particularly attractive. water reuse. and Policy Recommendations Claire Kfouri. particularly as populations continue to grow and place higher demands on water resources. As rapid urbanization continues. It can limit or eliminate 447 . Higher temperatures will lead to greater evaporation from surface water storage reservoirs and losses in soil moisture. In this context. countries that are relatively well endowed with water resources. and Marc Jeuland 25 T he scarcity of freshwater in most countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) region is an increasingly acute problem. Morocco. Second. few countries in the region have achieved the implementation of substantial reuse programs. this chapter addresses three key questions: 1. What insights for the future of wastewater reuse can be gleaned from regional and international experiences? 3. coupled with pricing of irrigation water that does not adequately reflect its scarcity value 3. while generating an alternate resource. public health. Despite the perceived potential advantages for a region ranked as the most water-scarce in the world. Mantovani and others 2001). and economic benefits of water reuse are widely documented (Scott and others 2004. To date. These and other environmental. Water reuse is emerging as an established water management practice in several water-stressed countries and regions. How should policymakers adapt the wastewater management agenda to their country’s economic context? This chapter argues. Reuse indirectly allows both the preservation of freshwater resources for higher quality uses (such as potable water supply) and the postponement of potentially more costly water supply approaches (storage. Technical and social issues affecting the demand for reclaimed water 4. first. Difficulty in creating financial incentives for safe and efficient water reuse.448 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS effluent discharges. Relatively high cost of wastewater treatment and conveyance. To better understand the context of wastewater reuse in MNA and to assess its future and potential. why have many governments been slow to promote wastewater reuse? 2. the spread of water reuse across MNA countries is surprisingly uneven and slow. the chapter asserts that only the most extreme scarcity or institutional discipline pushes countries to adopt widespread water reuse. or desalination schemes). that the development and implementation of water reuse strategies in MNA are impeded by four factors: 1. Asano and others 2007. Given the scarcity of water. . transfer. Insufficiency of economic analysis 2. The obstacles to wastewater reuse in MNA are discussed below: Constraint #1: The Need for More Complete Economic Analysis of Treatment and Reuse Options The decision to promote wastewater reuse should depend on a full accounting of the economic costs and benefits of projects. project planning tends to overlook many of the costs of planned reuse (opportunity cost of water to be reused. and property value changes (IPCC 2007). The economic impacts of reusing wastewater depend on the degree of treatment and the nature of the reuse. In addition.Water Reuse in the MNA Region 449 Water Reuse Constraints Many water reuse experiences in MNA are pilot projects. However. As such. Some locations have a policy climate favorable to wastewater reuse. . financially (cost recovery).1). There is therefore a risk of double-counting when considering changes in crop yields. In many cases. serious obstacles remain before many of these projects can become self-sufficient. both operationally (timely delivery of water). and environmentally (salinity risks). fertilizer savings. regulatory costs. even there. cropping patterns. With some exceptions. their opportunity cost must be included when considering planned new uses. In such instances. When considering the demand for the water that is being reused. Economic assessment rarely encompasses all relevant aspects of reuse and rarely goes beyond financial feasibility analysis. the important measurement is the increase (or decrease) in benefits associated with using reclaimed water instead of the replaced alternative. A large number of costs and benefits should be considered in the context of the specific reuse approach (table 25. For example. their sustainability and replicability are uncertain. education and training of irrigators). the main impact of reuse will be to move a given supply of water from one place to another. one needs to pay careful attention to whether this water is replacing water from other sources. when treated or untreated effluents already are reused for some purpose (either indirectly or unplanned). most of the remaining (nonpilot-scale) projects involve the planned reuse of wastewater that is not treated to meet World Health Organization (WHO) standards or unplanned reuse. salinity impacts. final disposal costs Conveyance/storage of reused water. Constraint #2: High Cost and Lack of Wastewater Treatment in MNA. For example. The latter case. Similarly. leakage) and retrofitting costs for participating farmers Salinity-related impacts Other pollution (nitrates. irrigators are likely to face higher prices as a result of water-pricing reforms to promote reuse.450 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 25. heavy metals. Although MNA countries have made significant progress in extending sewerage to most of their urban populations.1 Economic Impacts of Wastewater Reuse: Examples of Costs and Benefits Costs Value-added from displaced water (if any) Opportunity cost of reused water (if any) Collection and treatment of wastewater. and treatment capacity is very uneven. including water losses (evaporation. which is prevalent in small towns and across rural areas. The applications and potential for wastewater reuse differ greatly depending on whether wastewater is managed through local or municipal sewerage systems or in on-site sanitation systems. odor. and nuisance costs Ecological impacts (opportunity cost of reused water for minimum flow or other purposes) Benefits Value-added from reused wastewater (varies based on quality and reliability differences) Alternative use of displaced water (if any) Value of sanitation improvements Reduced environmental degradation Aquifer recharge. In addition. the quality of the reclaimed water they receive may prevent unrestricted agriculture or present them with long-term productivity costs. is usually . farmers may have nonzero demand for untreated wastewater. important gaps remain. Economic analysis therefore needs to consider the distributional impacts of reuse projects and address compensation. and Their Impacts on Reuse The first major cost of water reuse development is the upfront investment and cost-recovery challenge associated with wastewater collection and treatment. toxic substances) Health. or value of reduced aquifer depletion Increases in property values Increased crop yields Savings in fertilizer Value of improvements or reform in the water sector due to water reuse Some of these various costs and benefits may fall disproportionately on certain stakeholder groups affected by the project. to which they may lose access. Furthermore. Nevertheless.53 US$/m3.27 Lower land requirement 0. Treatment.18 0.1.07–0. Many analysts argue that economic calculations for reuse projects require that “…only the marginal cost of wastewater recycling (additional treatment.22–0. storage. Haruvy 1997.46–0. and distribution) be considered. and Reuse Component Conveyance to treatment works Nonmechanized secondary treatment Cost/m3 (US$) Highly variablea 0. incompatible with the types of reuse systems considered in this chapter.40).10–0.03).36 0. operation (0. enforcement of regulations prohibiting them in MNA is patchy.15). Shelef 1994 Shelef 1994 Shelef 1994. a review of costs indicates that the numbers are at the low end of the 0.Water Reuse in the MNA Region 451 Table 25. Shelef 1996. or on land. to treatment costs must be added the cost of collection and conveyance to treatment facilities from locations in which such infrastructure does not exist.53 Necessary for unrestricted reuse Note: a Costs come from a variety of sources and have not been standardized to a specific reference year.25–0. The rate of treatment of collected wastewater is low in many MNA countries. While much progress has been made in defining the risks associated with such practices. However. Haruvy 1997. Lee 2001 Notes Source(s) Aerated secondary treatment/activated sludge Tertiary treatment (in addition to secondary) Distribution Total 0.08–0. excluding 1 See appendix A25. Haruvy 1997 Shelef 1996.74 US$/m3 range and average at 0.16 US$ (2001 US$)/m3). Amami 2005 Kamizoulis 2003.16–0.05–0. Shelef 1991.22 Necessary for restricted reuse WHO 2005. fully successful reuse agendas need to consider all possible options. .1 Much of the wastewater collected in MNA is discharged untreated into the sea or other surface water bodies. Treatment facilities vary from location to location based on the infrastructure needed and the quality of the wastewater.10–0.2 Cost of Wastewater Collection. maintenance (0. Shelef 1996. and miscellaneous (0. as presented in Lee and others (2001): capital (0. These conditions will result in degraded treatment reliability and diminished reuse possibilities. it only makes sense to exclude the cost of wastewater collection and treatment from the economic analysis if these services would have been in place and functioning in the absence of the recycling investment. This condition often is not satisfied in MNA. where. in Syria and Yemen. the price charged to farmers for reclaimed wastewater (0. many treatment plants are plagued by poor operation and maintenance (O&M) and are operated well beyond their design capacity. especially in the agricultural sector.02 US$ (2007)/m3) reflects the lower demand for this water. for example. the cost of bringing wastewater collection and treatment up to the required standard is part of the cost of a reuse project.08US$ (2007)/m3 (WHO 2005. Shetty 2004). among farmers as well as households. Constraint #3: Low Demand for Reclaimed Wastewater Robust evidence from numerous projects suggests that the demand for reclaimed water generally is lower than it is for alternative sources of freshwater. Conventional water costs approximately 0. This distrust is apparent in Tunisia. Similarly. besides being well below cost. The availability of untreated wastewater free of charge may make it difficult to convince irrigators to pay anything for reclaimed water that is not of high quality. However. In fact. In such a situation. Constraint #4: Under-Value Water Pricing The fourth obstacle to the development of wastewater recycling is the fact that the prices of water tend not to reflect its scarcity value. in no MNA country does the price of freshwater delivered to irrigators reflect even the cost of . Similarly. In MNA. This statement is true despite reused water’s potential to reduce fertilizer costs and promote higher yields (Benabdallah 2003). recycled wastewater is provided free of charge to farmers (Bazza 2003 and Baquhaizel 2006). Indeed. some analysts argue for subtracting the cost of safe disposal of treated wastewater from the cost of reuse. Lahlou 2005. many people remain suspicious of reuse since they are uncertain about the quality of the water (WHO 2005).452 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS the cost of wastewater collection and treatment” (Lazarova and others 2001). households (HH) do not directly perceive the environmental benefit of wastewater treatment. and that recycled water is seen by users as inferior to freshwater.05 0. the seasonal nature of demand for irrigation water does not match the year-round supply of wastewater.08 0. Dinar 2004) (Bazza 2002 Becker 2002 (Bazza 2002 Constraint #5: Wastewater Recycling in MNA Usually Requires an Indefinite Government Commitment to Provide Subsidies We have seen that freshwater is sold at below cost. the block tariff designed to promote conservation among farmers charges only the full average cost of delivering water in the final block: the average cost of water supply is 0. Governments therefore find it easier to collect fees for connection and wastewater service than for eventual treatment. householders consider that their service is adequate.Water Reuse in the MNA Region 453 supply.01 0. Table 25.108 0. Tunisia. that recycled water costs more to produce than freshwater. In addition. .066 None 0. Bazza and others 2002). Palestine (Seibh 2003). In Israel.18 0. and Yemen (Bassa 2003)). Dinar 2004) (Bazza 2002 (Bazza 2002 (Bazza 2002. corresponding to the final 20 percent of each farmer’s allotment (Becker 2002). The best that some countries (Morocco and Tunisia) do is to charge sufficient rates to cover O&M (Bucknall and others 2007. Tariff structures for irrigation and other water vary substantially. So long as wastewater is collected and conveyed away from urban areas.049 0. On the agricultural side.02 Annual fees 0.14 High Source (Bazza 2002)] (Bazza 2002 (Bazza 2002.29 US$ (2002)/m3.025 0.053 Low Average 0.3 Prices for Irrigation Water in Select MNA Countries Irrigation water price (US$/m3) Country Algeria Egypt Jordan Morocco Syria Tunisia Yemen Israel Cyprus 0.29 0. Most countries make no charge for or take no control of groundwater abstractions other than the private cost of pumping and the permitting process (Morocco. 000 ha with 120 mcm/yr of effluents from Tel Aviv) and the Jezreel Valley Project (reuse of 20 mcm/yr of high quality effluents from the Haifa area) (Shelef 1994. where much innovation has taken place. Economists and the Finance Ministry in Israel long have pushed for pricing reforms and more extensive demand management. it often is impossible for governments or utilities to recover the financial cost of additional treatment or distribution (typically 0. and Friedler 1999). The severe drought of 1990–91 brought dramatic cuts in freshwater allocations to agriculture. The . it also stimulated the start of major increases in wastewater reuse (Shelef 1996) as government sought to postpone costly desalination projects (Becker 2002). Consequently. Reuse proved a politically attractive means of increasing water supply. Feitelson 2005. Israel has some 400 wastewater reuse projects. wastewater recycling in MNA usually requires a long-term government commitment to provide subsidies. but they also are similar in important ways. Examples are the Dan Region Project (irrigating 16. Reuse in Israel: Centralized Government Control and Technological Promotion One of the best-documented and analyzed experiences of wastewater reuse is that of Israel. Jordan. For all of these reasons. and Mizrahi 2004). the state subsidized approximately 60 percent of infrastructure costs of reuse wastewater projects. and Tunisia. Regulatory and monitoring costs also must be acknowledged. MNA Opportunities and Innovations Despite these obstacles.454 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Thus. Hidalgo 2004. some countries have moved aggressively to promote wastewater reuse. In Israel. particularly over the past three decades. Menahem 1998. mostly highly subsidized (Libhaler 2007). The institutional organization of the water sector in Israel has played a critical role in allowing for the development of reuse. As late as 2002.25 US$/m3. MNA Experience #1. Only with very widespread pricing and sector reform will there be any possibility of self-financing wastewater recovery investments. depending on the chosen level of additional treatment). let alone full treatment. although with little success due to opposition from the agriculture sector (Becker 2002. Today. each country has taken a slightly different path.05–0. The price they pay for this water is only somewhat reduced (roughly 20 percent lower) from that of National Water Carrier water (Libhaber 2007). Israel has largely perfected the use of simple technologies for reuse (oxidation ponds. Municipalities are responsible for financing this compulsory treatment. In 1996 Israel had nearly 500 treatment plants. soil-aquifer treatment. The country’s long history of reuse has enabled it to develop national expertise.Water Reuse in the MNA Region 455 Water Commission wields enormous power over water resources and strictly limits irrigators’ withdrawals. irrigators have no alternative water source for irrigation. The fact that secondary treatment is so widespread greatly expands opportunities for reuse. a major health effects study in 81 agricultural communities was carried out (Fattal 1981). simple storage schemes) (Juanico 2004. Libhaber 1987). A third type is the “Third Line” conveyance and distribution system. As early as 1953. Another aspect that distinguishes Israel from most MNA countries is the fact that. Israel has no private wells. Through this experience. The Third Line enables a supply of soil-aquifer treated (tertiary) reclaimed wastewater to reach southern Israel. Israel drafted the world’s first set of standards for wastewater reuse. and are expected to treat wastewater to meet national standards. which have continued to evolve to reflect the latest scientific findings on microbiological and chemical risks (Tal 2006). so called because it was the third major water artery linking the center of Israel to the arid south. Within the zones that use reclaimed wastewater. During the 1970s. all such infrastructure belongs to the government. for years. The Water Commission has full control over the planning of storage basins and other needed infrastructure. most of which were oxidation ponds (77 percent) or mechanical biological systems (14 percent) (Shelef 1996). Approximately 6 percent of the remaining wastewater is disposed of on site in central septic tank systems. The remaining 15 percent receives no treatment. Other infrastructure financed with government assistance includes small water conduits and sequential storage reservoirs or aquifer recharge systems that enable additional polishing treatment as well as regularization of water supply to irrigators (Juanico 2004). thus lowering the infrastructure burden for new projects. . This governance structure largely solves problems of reduced demand while ensuring a regular supply of water. the proportion of collected wastewater that is treated has been relatively high (nearing 80 percent). Israel’s experience in wastewater reuse shows that the technical concerns associated with this management strategy generally can be addressed. However. Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the MNA region. This concern has led to expanding research on developing more salinity-tolerant crops. Nevertheless. Reuse in Jordan: Flexible Policy Framework Coping with Rapid Demographic Change and Increasing Water Scarcity Jordan’s foray into the development of wastewater reuse capacity has been motivated by ever-tighter freshwater supplies (approximately 150 m3/capita/yr) (FAO 2006). some technical concerns remain. which also reduce salinity risks (Feitelson 2005. Few good options for augmenting water supply remain. as it significantly increases energy needs for pumping (McCornick 2004. As in other water-scarce countries. combined with a degradation in the quality of groundwater sources. Water scarcity and tight quotas have pushed irrigators to adopt highly conserving technologies such as underground drip irrigation schemes. Nevertheless. Oron 1998). Experience #2. valued at 2. and has some of the highest groundwater depletion rates. Agriculture has partially adapted to water scarcity: 62 percent of irrigated lands today use drip irrigation methods (Khouzam 2003). Indeed. The microbiological and nutrient composition of treated wastewater is satisfactory in Israel and generally within the WHO norms for unrestricted reuse. water policy is somewhat inconsistent with agricultural policy. and desalination works on the Red Sea (Henry 2005). construction of the costly $600 million Disi-Amman aqueduct. although at a high cost. Icekson-Tal 2003). Bio-fouling also has proven to be a problem in Jordan. Recent projects have been the Al Wahda dam. The Dan Region treatment plant faces additional maintenance costs (for application of chlorine-based compounds) due to periodic bio-fouling of effluent pipelines. Wastewater becomes more saline during municipal use and treatment. Master plans continue to discuss and present options for expanding .456 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Recirculation of water in oxidation pond systems has lessened odor problems (Shelef 1994).1 percent of GDP (Bucknall and others 2006). The government is privatizing the operation of municipal water utilities to cut down on high unaccounted-for-water ratios (50 percent nationwide) (Quna 2006). Israel has a substantial risk of longterm salinization of groundwater. begun in 2004. respectively. With strong government support.Water Reuse in the MNA Region 457 irrigation and investing in costly conveyance infrastructures. or collected but not treated (unplanned reuse). McCornick and others (2001a) describe three categories of reuse in Jordan: (1) planned direct use within or adjacent to wastewater treatment plants. there is no consideration of options to discourage the irrigation of water-intensive crops (banana and citrus. or not collected in sewers. Farmers involved in direct reuse have special contracts with the WAJ formalizing their rights to effluents. Reclaimed wastewater accounts for nearly 10 percent of the total water supply in Jordan. the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ). As a result. In some streams (most notably the Wadi Zarqa near Amman). farmers in these zones have increased irrigation and pay little more than the costs of pumping river water to their fields. Furthermore. However. which consume 35 percent and 21 percent. even as water supplies become tighter. and Nazzal and others 2000). of JV irrigation water) (McCornick and others 2001b. In most of these direct reuse projects. Baquhaizel 2006. Projects in the first category—planned direct reuse—generally are under the jurisdiction of the authority responsible for wastewater treatment plants. The second and third categories stem from mixing wastewater discharged into streams that either is first treated (indirect reuse). Some projects supply private enterprises (such as the date palm plantations near the Aqaba treatment plant). its experience is different from Israel’s in that most reuse projects have been much less strictly regulated and planned. WAJ has made a strong effort to reuse wastewater from all treatment plants. Well-defined policy. A few are experimental pilot projects cosponsored by international donors such as USAID. and institutional structures governing reuse exist in Jordan (McCornick and others 2001b. 2001a). users have no alternative water supply besides reclaimed wastewater (McCornick 2007). and (c) indirect reuse after mixing with surface water supplies (mainly in the Jordan Valley). (2) unplanned reuse in wadis. but not treatment or collection. After receiving seasonal contributions . although much of the reuse remains indirect. In addition. overpumping of groundwater and decreased flow from natural springs has led to indirect and unplanned reuse water becoming an important and reliable augmenter of base flows. standards. the National Wastewater Management Policy requires that prices cover at least O&M costs of delivery (McCornick and others 2001a). which is only slightly lower than the percentage in Israel. These authorities use fines. The wastewater management policy of 1998 emphasizes such assertions as: 1. as evidenced in master plans and the general literature (McCornick and others 2001b. and treated effluents from the Khirbet As-Samra plant (Amman’s treatment works). The steady evolution of the wastewater policy framework suggests that flexibility and the ability to accommodate pressures for change have been useful in Jordan’s experience (Nazzai 2001). and the WAJ. government agencies. McCornick states that indirect reuse will continue to dominate since demand for water in the Jordan Valley is generally greater than the supply of treated wastewater. “There shall be basin-wide planning for wastewater reuse” 3. “Wastewater shall not be disposed of. which supplies irrigation water to the southern Jordan Valley. Standards governing reuse have moved through four iterations. It demonstrates both . The role that the As Samra plant (30 km from Amman) plays in Jordan’s reuse experience deserves special mention.” (Nazzal and others 2000). the water is no longer legally considered reclaimed and can be used without restrictions (McCornick and others 2001). they represent a different way of thinking about wastewater reuse policy. instead it shall be a part of the water budget” 2. All three of these policy statements are unique and innovative in the region. King Talal water is then mixed into the King Abdullah Canal. however. the Ministry of Health and WAJ enforce agricultural restrictions based on reuse standards wherever possible. Although the government has not achieved full success in implementing them. from those of the original WAJ (enacted in 1988) to updated versions of standards for the Discharge of Treated Domestic Wastewater (893/1995 and 893/2003) (McCornick and others 2001a) (Nazzai 2001).458 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS from runoff. Standards are regularly reassessed. with contributions from technical experts. or impose restrictions as necessary. Jordan’s water standards are adapted to the needs of a severely water-constrained nation. Al-Jayyousi 1995). the Wadi Zarqa flows into the King Talal Reservoir. Once in the King Abdullah canal. “Fees for wastewater treatment may be collected from those who use the water. the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA). Upstream of the King Talal reservoir. destroy irrigation lands. Jordan also has extensive research on regional reuse planning in MNA. A third set of critics has emphasized what it perceives as a dangerous change in balance between natural and effluent flows in the Wadi Zarqa and King Talal Reservoir (Mrayyan 2005). who are willing to use reclaimed wastewater even as they lose rights to other sources of freshwater. overloading the plant (which was designed to handle a mere 25 mcm/year) or poor operation (also pointed out by Bazza 2003) led to concerns over the quality of treated effluent. Tunisia: Partial Steps. prior to the much needed expansion. The plant is very large. Many experts state that there is strong government support for using treated wastewater in agriculture (Bahri 1996. McCornick and others 2001b) state that fecal coliform counts exceed Jordanian standards 1 month in 4. Experiments. confidence in the safety of recycled water among the general population.Water Reuse in the MNA Region 459 the potential and the hazards of the Jordanian management approach. corresponding to approximately 75 percent of the country’s annual reclaimed wastewater (Nazzal and others 2000). but this support has not translated into widespread reuse. Jordan’s development of wastewater reuse demonstrates that wastewater reuse has great potential in highly water-scarce areas. the potential of using Amman wastewater to meet these demands must be considered carefully. Shetty 2004. and agricultural exporters has suffered (Pasch 2005). and Bahri 2007). Experience #3. It processed approximately 55 mcm of wastewater each year. However. Others suggest that the plant design itself may have been inadequate. and Commitment to Reuse Tunisian reuse policy has been tentative. An expanding treatment plant also represents a potential gain for irrigators. As a result. Most analyses have focused on the social constraints to the use of recycled water in Tunisia. it consisted of 32 ponds sitting on 200 ha. In 2000. and financing arrangements. due to a delayed awareness of low per capita water use in Amman and the resulting concentrated nature of its wastewater (Nazzal 2001). but that reuse planning must be integrated coherently with water resource planning. environmental management. The logical question to ask is: What makes Tunisia . In 1996 Shatanawi and Fayyad showed that the massive amount of wastewater released from As Samra into surface water bodies created major salinity threats during the dry summer season. Benabdallah 2003. The secondary-treated effluent flows into the Wadi Zarqa and then to the King Talal Reservoir. farmers. Moreover. Perhaps most importantly. irrigators continue to use groundwater after large efforts have made reclaimed wastewater available to them. this country has much more renewable freshwater per capita (450 m3/yr) than does either Israel (250 m3/yr) or Jordan (150 m3/yr) (FAO 2006). in Tunisia reclaimed wastewater has not been mixed into or replaced alternative sources of freshwater. Shetty (2004) details a number of problems of social acceptance. As a result. irrigators’ (as well as other users’) demand for reclaimed wastewater becomes vital for the success of reuse projects. in Tunisia. Farmers in the arid south express concerns about the long-term impacts of saline wastewater on their crops and soils. in distinct contrast to Israel and Jordan. In 2002 Tunisian withdrawals were roughly 58 percent of renewable resources. and in Jordan via mostly planned disposal into surface water bodies. Such problems have been documented around the city of Moknine. There is ample evidence that Tunisian farmers prefer not to use reclaimed water.460 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS different from Jordan and Israel such that lower demand becomes an obstacle to reuse? The differences between Tunisia and the other two countries appear to stem from two key factors. Indeed. which are interrelated and important when considering reuse in the MNA region as a whole. irrigators and other users have many more choices about which type of water to use. regulations concerning crop choices. There also appears to be a general inability to match the timing of supply and demand for the water due to inadequate storage of treated effluents. respectively. . Recall that in Israel. where compensation for farmers’ damages today is provided through the delivery of free surface water from the Nebhana dam. The reliability problems associated with reuse erode the confidence of farmers who would like timely irrigation water. First. whereas Israel and Jordan were at 122 percent and 116 percent. as a consequence of the wider availability of alternative water sources. the fact that reclaimed water cannot be used for 2 These percentages have probably increased somewhat since then. Specifically. despite the fact that Tunisia is considered to be in water deficit. In many cases. this mixing occurs via controlled aquifer recharge. only Tunisia’s per capita water withdrawals are less than its available renewable freshwater.2 Second. of the three countries. and other agronomic considerations that affect these decisions. Tunisian planners are starting to pay more attention to demand issues (Bahri 2007). 19 percent. and 41 percent between 1999 and 2002 (Atiri 2005). with annual increases of 23 percent. dumping effluents from existing treatment plants into the sea rather than in surface waters or on lands (where demand for reuse is low) has always been the simplest solution. In one particularly poorly coordinated project. the previous average rate (Bahri 1996).01 US$/m3.01 and 0.04 US$ (1998)/m3. Some projects such as La Soukra—irrigation of citrus orchards—have enjoyed longstanding success and few demand problems (the unavailability of alternative sources is probably a factor). Most wastewater facilities in Tunisia are near the population centers along the Mediterranean coast. In response to the reluctance to use wastewater. It also may be the most economic one. in which water is already insufficient to meet existing demands. 3 percent. in contrast to Israel and Jordan. but only a fraction of these lands actually receives treated effluents (Bahri 1996. Restrictions for reuse designed to protect public health have received considerable attention and are in line with WHO recommendations. From a wastewater management perspective.Water Reuse in the MNA Region 461 high-value vegetable crops is discouraging to nearly half of all eligible farmers (Bahri 1996 and 2002).07 US$/m3) well below that of other freshwater (0. supply to a reuse scheme was interrupted just as it was scheduled to go into operation due to an upgrade of the associated treatment plant (Boubaker 2007). Conscious of these issues. As a result. Even so. down from 0. The planning of irrigation with reused water in Tunisia has not been sufficiently coordinated or demand driven.08 US$/m3). In areas along the northern coast with saltwater intrusion problems (Borj . consumption of reclaimed wastewater has increased substantially. Despite these many problems. Some 7300 ha are equipped for wastewater reuse (Atiri 2005). so effluents can be disposed of relatively easily in the sea after secondary treatment. the use of reclaimed wastewater has hardly changed (Shetty 2004 and Bahri 2007). Surveys also have shown that the demand for reclaimed wastewater is insensitive to price in a range between 0. Tunisia’s geography creates an economic alternative to recycling.03–0. Madi 2002). a 1997 presidential decree set the price of treated wastewater (0. Consumption grew from approximately 4 mcm to 18 mcm between 1996 and 2002. the predicted economic benefits from projects have not been realized. There have long been a large number of reuse schemes throughout the country. stored. urban beautification and recreation applications. it generally will be be difficult for reuse applications to be competitive. 2. Tunisian policymakers today treat reuse as an essential aspect of strategic water and wastewater sector planning. If irrigators’ or other users’ access to conventional sources of water is not restricted and water prices do not reflect costs of water delivery and resource scarcity.462 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Touil District). resistance to using reclaimed water for irrigation has been relatively low despite higher-than-average rainfall (600 mm/yr) due to the lack of reliable alternative water sources (Shetty 2004). water sector institutions. reclaimed water (Benabdallah 2003. Bahri 2002). 4. and/ or the international donor community that do not incorporate the preferences of future users. MNA countries in general lack demand-driven planning of reuse projects. The state of wastewater collection and treatment is a critical issue in evaluating the economics of reuse projects. and perhaps most importantly. 3. as in Jordan and Israel. Too often. users usually will prefer them to recycled water. and the improvement of crop yields (notably. Tunisia is investigating shallow groundwater recharge. Lessons Learned Based on the set of experiences with reclaimed wastewater reviewed in this chapter and the constraints described above. it is possible to draw attention to key messages that should be helpful in advancing the reuse agenda in MNA: 1. olive trees and fodder) by using high-quality. the country is involved in experiments to promote technical innovation. In addition. unless conventional sources become overly degraded. reuse projects are high-level decisions made by well-meaning governments. Countries or sites with little or poorly functioning wastewater collection and treatment infrastructure will find it impossible to justify investments in reuse (figure 25. If there are alternative water sources. influencing such decisions as the location of wastewater treatment plants (Bahri 1998). Finally.1). . The countries that have expanded reuse most are those that explicitly consider reuse opportunities as part of the planning of wastewater collection and treatment projects. Type 5: Type 3 + discharge to reuse schemes— 2. Consider reuse within an over-arching policy model designed to address water scarcity. Implement reuse projects for which known demand Type 3: Type 2 + sewers relayed to treatment facilities + environmental Primary exists for treated wasteSewerage + treatment discharge Secondary water effluents. Recommendations Given these key messages. 3.. i. rather than Tertiary attempt to generate demand Type 4: On-site sanitation infrastructure On-site treatment with on-site treatment using appropriate once a reuse site has been technologies identified. Thus far. This history of nonreplication is due largely to the lack of sustainability of pilot projects.Water Reuse in the MNA Region 463 5. Even under the most promising conditions.1 Recommended Steps in Wastewater Infrastructure Development Type 1: Household sanitation infrastructures. Demand management and water conservation strategies clearly are the most costeffective approaches to reduce withdrawals. the difficulty of interpreting costs and other management data related to pilot efforts. The benefits of reuse alone rarely will justify the costs of wastewater treatment. Type 2: Flush toilets relayed to conventional or small-diameter sewerswith environmental discharge Sewerage . full cost recovery in reuse is unlikely. 4. Target reducing freshwater withdrawals. and/ or the low demand for the water. pilot projects have been useful in solving many technical issues. so some combination of subsidies and consumer payments may be necessary.e. and/or nancing models. they offer little help with scaling-up and strategic planning. 5. five recommendations for the MNA water reuse agenda emerge: Figure 25. However. Address institutional problems. Reuse must be considered via concerted discussion between water supply and sanitation agencies. on-site disposal schemes and/or flush toilets connected to cesspools or septic tanks On-site sanitation 1. careful consideration of indirectly in surface waters or aquifers the financial deal structure becomes necessary. Investment in national water reuse strategies is difficult to justify if water allocations and demands are not effectively regulated. and/or sible. not as an adjunct to wastewater treatment. If a project indirectly in surface waters or aquifers Planned reuse or is deemed economically feaType 4 + Discharge to reuse schemes— directly in plantations or farms. Develop sustainable fidirectly in plantations or farms. coordinating level will be necessary. Lack of effective price signals 6. it must be part of a larger water strategy that includes demand management and conservation strategies. Many constraints to more widespread reuse 2. groundwater is over-pumped.464 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS implying that governance at a higher. How should policymakers adapt the wastewater management agenda to their country’s economic context? Although the answers to these questions have not been fully resolved. Preference for freshwater 5. Such conditions eliminate the potential economic benefits of reuse. and surface water resources are poorly managed. Meanwhile. Trade networks. For reuse to make sense. increasing tourism. and the preferences of a more educated urban populace and neighboring countries will affect plans for wastewater treatment. Given the scarcity of water. irrigation schemes are inefficient. increase the demand for safe and . In most MNA countries. Climate change will reduce the amount of renewable freshwater resources in MNA. What insights for the future of wastewater reuse can be gleaned from regional and international experiences? 3. and inherent limitations in the amount of water that can be used. Insufficient economic analysis of reuse and treatment options 3. important insights emerge from this study: 1. Difficulties in structuring financial deals. why have many governments been slow in promoting wastewater reuse? 2. and that treats water as a scarce and valuable economic resource. Conclusions This chapter sets out to answer three questions related to wastewater reuse in the Middle East and North Africa region: 1. Generally high costs and negative or low rates of return associated with wastewater treatment 4. population growth and urbanization are increasing the demand for domestic water and the production of wastewater. they will become more and more focused on reforming their water management systems and institutions. and will likely devote more attention to evaluating the option of reuse. For the time being.Water Reuse in the MNA Region 465 high-value agricultural products grown in the region. the importance of this policy option surely will increase over time. However. the constraints in the sector make it unlikely that a reuse revolution in MNA is imminent. and encourage ecological and recreational uses of water. As countries face these evolving challenges. . trickling filters Lagoons and activated sludge. overloading frequent Planning treatment and reuse around Beirut and Ba’albeck treatment plant (tertiary) Effluents/raw sewage mostly discharged to sea and surface waters Activated sludge. ponds. Damascus upgrade for reuse of tertiary-treated effluents Mostly activated sludge. some tertiary (ozone) None Activated sludge. lagoons Significant dumping of untreated waste. natural tertiary filtration + recharge Mostly tertiary Secondary. aerated ponds Activated sludge. O&M problems Ponds. moving to tertiary Libya Morocco 54 70 54 40 7 6–8 40 40 Secondary Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria 90 45 96 81 80 37 71 13 75 57–67 9. secondary Secondary Tertiary Secondary Notes Mostly lagoons Activated sludge.8 43 548 550 Secondary Secondary Secondary Tunisia UAE West Bank and Gaza Yemen Israel Cyprus Malta 68 91 25 40 50 87 23 12 92–95 79 22 34–54 62 79 100 13 148 193 14–24 46 296 6 2. some Piloting RO to promote industrial tertiary reuse 73 60 95 . tertiary Primary.466 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Appendix 25. secondary Secondary Sludge drying beds. some Ponds.1 Sewerage and Wastewater Treatment in MNA and Other Selected Countries Sewerage rate (%) Country Algeria Bahrain Djibouti Egypt Iran Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Urban 78–85 70–77 5 68 17–20 70 4 42 11 50 85 40 Over-all 65 Treatment rate Volume treated (% collected) (mcm/yr) 73 100 0 79 4 88 87 2 600 1 44. frequent overloading. ponds. aerated ponds Activated sludge.9 0 2971 130 72 103 4 Type of treatment Secondary Secondary None 19% primary. activated sludge. ponds.5 Secondary Secondary. frequent overloading Secondary. 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O.” Water Resources Research 41: W03003. and M.wssinfo. “Research and Pilots Program on Municipal Wastewater Reclamation and Reuse in China. Salgot. .” World Bank Water Forum.A. G. Palestine. “Prospects of Efficient Wastewater Management and Water Reuse in Palestine.Water Reuse in the MNA Region 477 WHO/UNICEF.org.. 2006. “Evaluating the Costs of Desalination and Water Transport. P. and M. Zheng. and R..” Desalination 164 (3): 225–40.” Water Studies Institute. R. X. “Facing Water Shortage in a Mediterranean Tourist Area: Seawater Desalination or Water Reuse?” Water Science and Technology: Water Supply 3(3): 63–70. Zimmo. Madi. Birzeit University. F. 2005.. . The MNA Region is relatively water poor. including the Middle East and North Africa (MNA). By the same year. By 2025 MNA’s annual average water per person is expected to fall to less than 550 m3 (Belloumi 2007). or drainage water for both irrigation and domestic water supplies. the former can make important contributions to alleviate local water scarcity in inland locations by desalinating brackish groundwater. Nevertheless. reaching or exceeding the limits of renewable water resources in some areas. bringing economies of scale. which is usually of smaller scale than seawater desalination. electrodialysis. over the past decades.26 Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region Khairy Al-Jamal and Manuel Schiffler eawater desalination has the potential to help alleviate global water scarcity.0/m3 in 1999 to US$0. and its environmental footprint has been reduced These trends are likely to continue.50/m3 –0. These advances drove down prices from an average of US$1. the region falls far below the world annual average of 8000 m3/capita. and hybrids can deal with different types of input water and/or are more energy efficient. With approximately 1000 m3/capita per year. Unit sizes have increased. production costs for desalination have fallen. the cost of desalination and its energy intensity have decreased drastically.80/m3 in 2004 (World Bank and BNWP 2004).1 In the past century. 479 1 . climate change is expected to have led to more drought and S This chapter does not discuss brackish water desalination. Meanwhile. global water consumption levels increased almost 10-fold. Technologies such as reverse osmosis. As experience and technology have developed. spring water. 2). and the region is already exploiting more than 75 percent of its total available resources (Doumani 2008. This low annual average puts MNA among the relatively water-poor countries. The annual per capita renewable waSource: World Bank 2007. The chapter also gives a quick overview of the desalination technologies and their trend as well as a general cost analysis of reverse osmosis (RO) desalination based on recent figures. Moreover. limited use of targeted subsidies. FAO AquaStat.100m3 (figure 26. They Figure 26. 500 with a rate of annual increase of 400 1. These two realities make it even more difficult to achieve water security. Desalination in the Geographic and Economic Context of MNA In 2007 the total population of the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) Region reached 300 600 million inhabitants (figure 26. 1998–2002). Seawater desalination is no panacea for the water woes of the MNA region. Furthermore. and increased reuse of treated wastewater.1). energy efficiency.480 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS a 20 percent reduction in renewable fresh water resources (Doumani 2008. appropriate cost recovery. these limited resources are not equally distributed. efficient water utilities with low levels of nonrevenue water. IPCC 4 2007). It is just one instrument among many within a framework of integrated water resource management (IWRM). sensitivity analyses of the cost in relation to energy price. 300 The population is expected to 200 reach more than 500 million by 100 2030. This population increase is 0 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 taking place in a region that is Total MNA Total urban MNA Total rural MNA largely arid and semi-arid.7 percent (World Bank 2007). Sixty percent of the water originates outside the region. and financing interest rate have been conducted. ter resource is limited to 1. 1950–2030 (millions) Population (millions) . This chapter summarizes the water demand and supply status in MNA and analyzes the projected demand growth and the water resources enhancement needed to bridge the gap. Other instruments include appropriate agricultural and trade policies.1 MNA Region Rural and Urban Population Trends. 426 Syria 1. renewable water resources are expected to decline by 30x109 m3/yr (7. by Region Australia and New Zealand Latin America and the Caribbean North America Europe and Central Asia Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia and Pacific (including Japan and Koreas Western Europe South Asia Middle East and North Africa 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 1. Figure 26. By 2050 the surface temperature is expected to increase by 2. . by climate change. the available renewable resource would decrease by approximately 20 percent: from 400x109 m3/yr to approximately 320x109 m3/yr. 1998–2002.150 Lebanon 886 Morocco Egypt 752 Tunisia 496 440 Algeria Oman 333 Israel 271 W Bank-Gaza 213 Yemen 198 Jordan 156 Bahrain 145 Qatar 116 Libya 104 KSA 91 Water scarcity 1. Precipitation is expected to decrease by 10.2 Actual Renewable Water Resources per Capita.3).892 In terms of its water resources. the MNA region is expected to be negatively affected Source: Hamilton 2006. By 2025.Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region 481 can vary from 0. However.292 2.3 Total Renewable Water Resources per Capita.5oC.000 m3/person UAE 78 Kuwait 0 3.0m3 in Kuwait to 3000 m3/capita per year in Iraq (figure 26.5 percent)—equivalent to approximately half the flow of the Nile—to approximately 370x109 m3/yr. In 14 countries in the region. Thus.5 percent.022 Iran 1. most of this impact is expected to be felt after 2025. The scarcity of water resources has many negative consequences: Challenges the social stability of a growing population Further disturbs and degrades “natural” systems by encouraging the use of lowquality irrigation water Leads to groundwater contamination Reduces crop yields and limits cultivation Raises the risk of long-term damage to soils and aquifers that may not be easily recoverable Could lead to water conflicts.000 meters3/year Source: FAO AquaStat. per capita water resources are less than 500 m3 per year. by Country Turkey Iraq 2. and runoff may decrease by 20 percent–30 percent (Doumani 2008). Figure 26. The latter have no significant renewable water resources and thus will not be significantly affected by a decline in precipitation. the single largest factor influencing water demand will be the rate of increase of irrigated land. industrial. energy-exporting wealthier countries of the region. The speed at which desalination will be adopted in the region will be affected by how climate change will affect rainfall patterns. Municipal. as higher temperatures will increase both domestic and agriculture demands through higher evapotranspiration (ET) by crops on the land under irrigation. Climate change also will increase water demand. which in turn is determined largely by agricultural policies and public investment in irrigation infrastructure. the expected decline in renewable water resources (30x109 m3/yr) is such that even the massive expected expansion of seawater desalination (24. However. Droughts in Israel during 1998–2002 and in Algeria in 2004 triggered the choice .482 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Water Demands and Future Trend Even though the region is severely stressed in meeting today’s water demands. and tourism sectors (10 percent–15 percent). The increase in desalination capacity would be used for municipalities and industries. Bridging the Gap and the Role of Desalination Desalination accounts for 1. In addition.2 x109 m3/yr) would only partially compensate the impact of climate change. However. primarily in the Gulf countries.8 percent of the region’s water supply. The MNA countries that will be affected primarily by a decline in precipitation are the same ones that will find it more difficult to afford desalination.5 percent. Water going to agriculture remains the most important requirement (85 percent) followed by the domestic. By 2025 it could reach 8. The forecast for water requirements depends on future economic and demographic trends as well as on agricultural policies and incentives for water conservation. the situation is expected to worsen. At 75 percent. the increase in desalination capacity will be concentrated almost exclusively in the high-income. and tourism water requirements may double or triple by 2025. the MNA region is rapidly approaching full use of its total available water resources. these two major trends would impact sectors and countries differently. industry. whereas the decline in renewable water resources is expected to affect primarily agriculture. Furthermore. Coastal cities in wealthy. . more appropriate pricing. increasing water use efficiency. governments will not want to their major cities to depend on drought-prone surface water resources. most of the populations of Jordan. This diverse group of countries within MNA accounts for less than 10 percent of the region’s population. especially during times of high energy prices.Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region 483 to invest in large-scale seawater desalination. The prospects for desalination vary greatly among MNA countries depending on their incomes and water scarcity and whether their major cities are located close to the coast. cannot fulfill their potential due their current political circumstances. including Egypt. The Gulf countries—Algeria. On the demand side. Iraq. the extent and severity of droughts will be key factors driving desalination investments. The bulk of these countries’ water supply will continue to be supplied by conventional water resources independent of climate change and future possible advances in desalination technology. are home to close to 70 percent of the region’s population. such as Gaza. water conservation. and Yemen live at high altitudes or far from the sea. and Libya—with a combined total of less than 20 percent of the MNA population—belong to this first group of countries. desalination will play a subordinate role to other instruments. Thus. Iran. waterscarce countries have been and are likely to be the main drivers for future seawater desalination in MNA. Israel. It is only one of many instruments to bridge the gap between water supply and demand within an integrated water resource management framework. these alternatives include agricultural policies. particularly in agriculture. or ongoing conflicts. increased metering. Other parts of the region. to sum up. Syria. lack of financial resources. Seawater desalination in these countries is likely to remain confined to their water-scarce coastal areas such as the Egyptian Red Sea coast and Southern Morocco. Finally. For example. Thus. These countries. A second group of countries is water scarce but cannot take advantage of the benefits of desalination because of their settlement patterns. The supply of desalinated water to highland cities is prohibitive. The heavy energy subsidies in all of the countries in this group (except Israel) increase the financial viability of desalination. In many countries. desalination is no panacea to solve water scarcity in MNA. If droughts become more frequent and severe as a result of climate change. which had advanced plans for seawater desalination in the 1990s. the third group of countries has sufficient water resources to satisfy most municipal needs for the time being. and Morocco. 000.000.000. there has been a steady growth worldwide of desalination plants and their Figure 26.000 0 The desalination market is strong.000 lation technology.000. 12.5 385.000.000 has been in the oil-rich Middle 909Diagramme-GESAMT 32.000 RO has grown spectacularly over 8.000 30. most notably 20.0 325.5 Demand sector Domestic Agriculture Total and on-site recycling and reuse.000 some sectors of the market. According to the countries’ plans and the historic desalination capacity increase. 1901–2000 (IDA 2002).000.000 18.000. al24.000. MNA has approximately 60 percent of the world’s desalination capacity (7. and increasing irrigation efficiency by 10 percent will save approximately 104x109 m3/yr (table 26.2x109 m3/yr). Water Desalination Trend: MNA and the World During the last 50 years.0 42.000 4.000.4 Cumulative Global Capacity of Contracted and capacity (figures 26.000.000 In operation 14.1x109 m3/yr by 2016 and possibly 31. However. also have 16. On the supply side. the total capacity is expected to reach 19.000.000 Plant lifetime = 25 years ternative processes. For instance.000 Contracted 22.000.000 this period and now dominates 6.000.000. with significantly inContract year creased orders over 2001–02 of Source: IDA 2002.5) Operated Desalination Plants.000 26.4 and 26.000 been developed during this time. reducing leaks from 40 percent to 20 percent.5 57.5 Saving (109m3/yr) 15. 2.5 Reuse (109 m3/year) 0 30 30 Leak reduction/ efficiency (109 m3/year) 15. This amount is approximately three times the expected increased desalination capacity.000.0 72.484 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Table 26.000 10.000 East and has been based on distil28.5 87.000 reverse osmosis (RO). Contracted capacity [m/d] 1901–1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 . Most of this growth 34.4x109 m3/yr by 2025 (Balaban 2008).1 Expected Savings in Water Supply due to Application of Demand and Supply Management Techniques in MNA Region by 2025 Total demand (109 m3/year) 75 425 500 Fresh (109 m3/year) 60.000. application of wastewater reuse (50 percent of domestic demand). other options include leak and loss minimization and enhancing the use of reclaimed water (reuse of treated wastewater).000.1). 330 Capacity forecast 2025 8. Country 3 Table 26. Notes: a Extrapolated.2 Desalination Capacity in MNA (1000 m3/day) Country Algeria Egypt Libya Israel Morocco Tunisia Jordan S. vestment is planned in the MNA Gulf countries and elsewhere. Arabia UAE 2002.713 18.869 1000 285 195 541 12.200 7.5).183 1.4).617 1.030 36.725 3.541 26. Desalination capacity (1000 m /day) Additional desalination inSource: Balaban 2008.000 Capacity forecast 2011 3191 528 1. and DLR 2007. In S. b Estimated. 2006 respectively (figure 26.197 377 5.446 1.648 13. 15 million m3/day of the Kuwait 3 24 million m /day seawater deQatar salination plants’ global capacity Libya Algeria exists in MNA (figure 26.140 9.406 3.775 1. .212 862 481 1.214 a 1.206 3. Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Qatar Oman UAE Total (103 m3/day) Total (103 m3/yr) Desalination capacity end 2006 727 432 899 440 59 89 240 7.730 20.0 m3 and 1.676 1.816 6. GWI 2004.654 4. Production of Jordan Tunisia desalinated water there reached Morocco 3 7.081 519 1.911 31.270 85.Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region 485 approximately 3.410 2.798.588 Sources: Balaban 2008. The required investment up to 2025 is estimated at US$25 billion– 30 billion.930 3.373.564 3.5 Potential Operational Desalination Capacity m3/day globally and in MNA.4 million m /day in 2006 (Bala0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 ban 2007) (figure 26.5 Figure 26.536 7.481 2.376.242 19. in MNA Countries.059 12. Bahrain Saudi Arabia is home to 30 Israel Egypt percent of the MNA desalinaOman tion capacity.357.330 54.977 2.520 b Capacity forecast 2016 4985 888 3.4).790 491 297 898 17. In membrane processes. multi-effect boiling (MEB) or multi-effect distillation (MED). bringing with them economies of scale. the salinity of the feed water has 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 little impact on the overall energy Capacity m /d consumption. The single-phase category comprises reverse osmosis (RO) and electrodialysis (ED) (membrane process). Unit sizes have increased.0/m3 in 1999 to between US$0. .80/m3 in 2004 (World Bank and BNWP 2004). the phase change pro10 cesses tend to be used to treat Sea VC MSF water high-salinity waters. In distillation processes. and hybrids can deal with different types of input water and/or are more energy efficient. electrodialysis. In general. ED WHO 500 ppm The application of electrodialysis limit is limited to brackish water appliProduct 10 waters cations. Membrane processes Reverse osmosis Feed are used over a wide range of sawaters linity from brackish to seawater. However. These advances have driven down prices from an average of US$1. particularly 10 seawater. energy consumption is directly 10 related to the salinity of the feed water. 5 4 TDS ppm 103 2 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 3 2 That is. from liquid to water vapor. The ranges of the applicability of the various desalination processes vis-à-vis the quality of the feed Figure 26. Desalination Technologies: Aspects and Limitations One convenient and useful way to classify desalination processes is to separate those that use a change of phase to separate the pure water from the feed water from those that accomplish this separation without a change of phase. thermal and mechanical and solar distillation (distillation processes). the future trajectory of desalination costs will depend on energy price trends.50/m3 and US$0. or from liquid to ice. and freezing.2 The phase-change processes are multi-stage flash (MSF). vapor compression (VC).6 Ranges of Applicability for Desalination Processes water appear in figure 26. production costs for desalination have fallen.486 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS As experience and technology have developed. Technologies such as reverse osmosis.6. Table 26. The size of the desalination plant normally is dictated by the water demand. However. . energy (kWh/m3) Elect.0–15. BWRO = brackish water reverse osmosis. energy equivalent (kWh/m3) Source: World Bank and BNWP 2004.7–2.0 10. the actual energy requirements are sometimes much higher (table 26.6 kWh/m3 is the minimum energy requirement. In some instances. the improvements in energy recovery devices (energy exchanger and pressure exchangers) have changed this situation.5–11. The development of reverse osmosis and. Plant size.3 Estimated Energy Consumption for Desalination Processes Process Seawater MSF MED VC SWRO Brackish BWRO ED — — 0.0 7.7–2. assuming a 100 percent efficiency rate.0–14.5 2.5–8.0 Steam energy (kWh/m3) Elect.3 illustrates the specific energy consumption of the various processes.5 0.0 7.0 — — 2. To determine the most cost-effective process for each community.5 kWh/m3 has put seawater desalination within reach of many communities. VC = vapor compression. The figures for the thermal processes have remained almost the same for the last decade. more recently.5–2.5 6. a careful analysis of the combinations of processes must be carried out.0–9.5–2. desalination has been seen as a very energy-intensive process. Theoretically.0 4. both power and water are required. planners should survey all the available energy resources—conventional or renewable energy sources as well as waste or low grade heat availability. Availability of energy resources. All desalination processes use energy. To optimize cost.Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region 487 Other basic parameters that should be examined to select the most appropriate desalination process are: Co-generation.5 7.5–8.5 0. the size Table 26.0–7. ED = electrodialysis.0–15.5 0.5–3. approximately 1. MED = multiple effect boiling. Notes: MSF = multi-stage flash.3). Before any process is selected. Bringing down energy consumption in Mediterranean seawater RO plants to 2.0 2.0 2. SWRO = seawater reverse osmosis.Consequently. Part of this feed passes through the membrane. In large plants.7.000–60. RO is favortreatment able due to its modularity. the reject brine pressure energy is recovered in a turbine. The MSF process has been developed and adapted to very large applications (10. which complies with WHO guidelines regarding drinking water quality Environmental Aspects of Desalination and Renewable Energy Desalination of seawater consumes a significant amount of energy. fewer environmental impacts. The typical configuration of an RO plant is illustrated in figure 26. The largest MED plant built to date is 20. energy exchanger. which is required for the process itself (approximately 90 percent) in the .000 m3/day). typically 50–80 bar for seawater. Due to the modularity of membrane processes. they can be used for a wide range of applications. The key to the successful operation of this process takes place during pretreatment. The product water from RO usually has 100–500 ppm of total dissolved solid (TDS). compact plant size. ease of automation.000m3/day. Figure 26. The feed is pressurized by a high-pressure pump and made to flow across the membrane surface. Desalination consists of placing a semipermeable membrane in contact with a saline solution under a pressure higher than the solution osmotic pressure. The remaining water and rejected salt emerge from the membrane modules as a concentrated reject stream under high pressure. or pressure exchanger. and the global capacity has risen from 10 percent HighMembrane pressure assembly Freshwater during the 1990s to approxipump PostPretreatment mately 45 percent.7 Schematic Diagram of Single-Pass RO Desalination Plant Saline feedwater The RO industry has grown very quickly. The pretreatment required is a function of the scaling tendency of the water and the level of undissolved solids. technological Brine discharge advancement in the membrane industry.488 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS parameters of each process should be considered. which removes the majority of the dissolved solids. from very small to large scale. low Stabilized freshwater capital investment. In recent years. and low operation cost. the size of MED and VC processes has been increased and may have some advantages over MSF. In thermal plants. Distillation plants use both heat and electrical power. There are three options: the discharge can be spread over the land and allowed to drain back into the ground. high-sulphur fossil fuels are used to generate electrical power. brine is discharged in the sea. Gaseous emissions. In seawater plants. There is increasing concern in the Gulf about the amount of desalination taking place and the fact that the Gulf is a small. Coastal currents should be examined to ensure that discharges are not swept back around into the intake system.Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region 489 form of thermal energy (distillation processes) or mechanical energy. Such plants use more total energy than RO plants. The aquifer and the surrounding habitats can be endangered. enclosed sea. If the plant is large. which are stored in the oceans in the form of bicarbonate and cause the release of other atmospheric gases (mainly O2 and N2) from seawater. the generation of power using fossil fuel is usually coupled to the production of water using MSF or MED distillation plants. Desalination plants also emit gases that do not originate from fossil fuel combustion but were dissolved in the seawater. Any chemicals added to the desalination process for scale and fouling prevention and corrosion reduction as well as corrosion products flow back into the sea. Table 26. If fossil fuels are used as the primary energy source. There is concern about brine discharge and its environmental impacts. and gases evolve from the evaporating brine in flashing chambers. In some areas. This build-up can damage the fragile marine ecosystem and threatens marine life. Brine discharge. Electrical energy also is needed in all plants to operate auxiliary equipment such as pumps and dosing systems. in these plants. the feed water is usually deaerated. and ED desalination plants. which use only electrical power. concentrations of the substances can build up. SOx) emitted into the atmosphere have a major environmental impact. the greenhouse (mainly CO2) and acid rain gases (NOx. Both processes increase carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. MSF. such as those installed in the Gulf. a situation that is clearly to be avoided. usually obtained from electricity (RO process). it can be . SO2 as well as CO2 emissions may occur. enclosed bay or there is no coastal current. If discharge occurs in a small. Land-based brackish water plants can experience severe problems in disposing the brine discharge. RO emits less CO2 than does distillation.4 summarizes qualitative environmental impacts of RO. D. Table 26.490 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS pumped into solar ponds for evaporation. This dilemma could be resolved by either accelerating the development of renewable energy in the MNA region or by purchasing carbon credits to compensate for the GHG emissions of desalination plants. or it can be re-injected back into the ground. Desalination plants can be visually intrusive. doors have been left open to reduce building temperatures and have enabled the noise to escape. L = low. L M L M M M Greenhouse gas emissions from power plants associated with desalination plants pose a peculiar dilemma. In areas in which tourism is important. neither of these options has been used in the region. So far. which produce no CO2 . during the summer. Visual intrusion. In Cyprus. Renewable Energy Alternatives for Desalination Large desalination plants in the MNA region typically are powered by fossil energy. which normally are housed in buildings to reduce the noise. Problems have arisen when. The energy requirements for desalination plants can be met through renewable energy sources (RES). Noise emissions. Desalination plants also can be noisy. a plant can be an eyesore. Seawater plants usually are built on the coast. None of these solutions is completely sustainable. Although desalination plants are a tool to adapt to climate change by making water supplies less vulnerable to droughts. they themselves contribute to accelerate climate change. RO plants have high-speed pumps. M = medium.4 Qualitative Overview of Environmental Impacts of Three Desalination Technologies Effect/type of plant Noise Water effluent Microelements Toxic material Air pollution Industrial risk Note: H = high. the Dhekalia and the Larnaca plants were located some 500 meters from the shore to keep the shoreline clear. RO H M L M L L MSF M H H H H H E. Outside MNA. dedicated gas-fired power plants often are built next to the desalination plants. power is supplied by using waste energy from adjacent power plants (co-generation). the first large desalination plant powered almost entirely by renewable energy was commissioned in Perth. Medium-sized desalination plants receive electricity from the grid. the desalination cost for SWRO plant is considered in this section. Over the last decade. Worldwide. Virtually all of these were custom designed for specific locations and utilize solar. Until recently. For membrane technologies. In general. The plant is powered primarily by an 80MW wind park developed concurrently with the desalination plant and located more than 200 km from the plant. For distillation technologies. Australia. In recent years. wave power is possible in the future. research and development (R&D) in this field has intensified. which is independent of wind conditions. similar joint developments of large-scale renewable energy and large desalination plants have not yet materialized in the MNA region. wind. Desalination Cost Analysis For discussion. in 2008. the capital and operating costs of seawater desalination plants have decreased significantly in real terms. the desalination cost is divided into capital and operating costs. several RES pilot desalination plants have been installed. The reasons are: Capital Costs Process design improvements Membrane performance development and lower cost per m2 (RO) Manufacturing methods and increased volume Increased competition . Despite the recent spike in world energy prices. renewable energy was used as a power source for desalination only for small plants in remote areas that had no access to electricity from the grid. from which the desalination plant receives its power supply. The wind park feeds into the grid. Wind and photovoltaic (PV) energy are the most commonly used. which in the MNA region typically is generated by fossil energy or large-scale hydropower.Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region 491 directly. and the majority has been operated successfully. or geothermal energy to produce fresh water. However. As a consequence of this. Under these. Table 26. built.16 $0. private companies financed. and operate . At 10 percent interest rate.52/m3 in the Ashkelon SWRO plant in Israel in 2005. Private Sector Participation in Desalination As discussed above. costs to desalinate water have fallen consistently for many years.26 6 $0. such as the Saline Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC) in Saudi Arabia. in the 1990s.14 $0.21 $0.5 $0.035 $0.5.92 3 Current $800/m3/day capacity $0.525 Energy cost $/m3 at $0. The price reached US$0.5 Typical Cost Breakdown for RO Desalination Plant Parameter Capital cost Capital cost/m3 at 5% interest rate Energy consumption kW.h/m 3 Early 1990s $1000 to $1200/m /day capacity $0. Figures 26.9 illustrate the sensitivity analysis results for the change in the interest rate and the energy cost of the proposed SWRO in the Palestinian Gaza Strip. The Gulf countries initially financed desalination plants with their own resources and operated them through public agencies.492 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Operating Costs Process performance Membrane life (RO) Energy efficiency improvements Interstage boost pumping (RO) Improved chemicals Reduced corrosion Privatization. The cost breakdown is illustrated in table 26. desalination is a relatively capital intensive technology and requires high operation and management skills.10 $0.hr Membrane replacement cost $/m3 Labor and chemicals $/m3 Total cost $/m 3 The cost can vary as the interest rate and/or the energy prices change.36 $0.62/m3.06/kW.8 and 26.18 3. the Gulf countries switched to Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts. the cost will rise to US$0. . Climate change.60 0. which is expected to cause more frequent droughts in the region.8 Interest Rate Sensitivity Analysis of Water Production Cost for SWRO Desalination Plant in Gaza Strip 0. For example.30 2 3 4 5 6 7 (kW. 10 conclusions can be drawn: 0. 3. Malta operates all of its desalination plants publicly.90 0. Advances in desalination technologies have reduced the cost of desalination to approximately US$0.hr ($/m3) 0.60 Total cost ($/m3) 0. To maximize net benefits. Desalination is no panacea.40 0.40 Conclusions Based on the above discussion. is likely to accelerate investments in desalination.10 0. BOT contracts also have become the norm for the development of large desalination plants in the MNA region outside the Gulf.20 0.30 0. Figure 26.90 0. some countries have been exceptions to this trend.80 0.80 $0. Desalination is playing and will continue to play a significant role to respond to the MNA region’s growing water demands.hr/m3) 1.50 0.52/m3.1/kW.00 0. These advances have increased the affordability of desalinated water.70 0.Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region 493 desalination plants for a period of typically 30 years.hr 1. to develop one large desalination plant in parallel to a series of similar desalination plants under BOT contracts. The technology became well proven and has become cheaper. However.70 0. 4. To compare the performance of the public and private operators. Israel has authorized its bulk water supply company.00 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% Interest rate (%) $0.05/kW. during which they are being paid fees directly by the government or a public utility off-taker for their services.50 0. Mekorot. 2. it needs to be combined with other supply-side and demand-side approaches within the framework of integrated water resource management. 4x106 m3/day. This dilemma could be resolved by either accelerating the development of renewable energy in the MNA region or purchasing carbon credits to compensate for the GHG emissions of desalination plants. particularly concerning brine discharge. This preference is due to RO plants being flexible and modular and having low operation and capital costs. Thus. The required investment is approximately US$20. they simultaneously contribute to accelerated climate change. The cost of desalinated water is sensitive to the costs of both energy and financing. The capacity is expected to reach 31. low-interest-rate financing reduces the cost of desalination and increases the affordability of desalinized water. and noise and visual pollution. . desalination will conserve conventional water resources. Greenhouse gas emissions from power plants associated with desalination plants can be significant. and will prevent groundwater depletion and saline intrusion due to over-abstraction. and to advances in the energy recovery devices. brine discharge including chemicals from pre-treatment processes. which can preserve aquatic ecosystems in rivers. 9.0x106 m3/day from the current capacity. On the positive side. This figure will entail an increase of approximately 20. 8. MNA’s desalination capacity is increasing by 1.0 billion. the private sector has been and will remain a key player in promoting desalination. Neither option yet has been used in MNA. Desalination has both positive and negative environmental impacts. While desalination plants are a tool to adapt to climate change by making water supplies less vulnerable to droughts. almost all new desalination plants are using reverse osmosis.494 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS 5. The industry is well established. These GHG pose a peculiar dilemma. 10.5x106 m3/day every year. The private sector can provide capital and increase efficiency in management and operation. and mitigation measures are being implemented and refined continuously. 6. desalination also is associated with negative impacts including greenhouse gas emissions. In most MNA countries. 7. However. Outside the Gulf countries. “Entrepreneurship as Public Policy: Completing the Ecosystem with Technology Venture Capital. globalwaterintel.de. September. M. “Climate Change Adaptation in the Water Sector in the Middle East and North Africa Region: A Review of Main Issues. 2002 IDA Worldwide Desalting Plants Inventory. November. Doumani.un. www.org/esa/population/unpop.dlr. ____. M.en. Remawi.” . Belloumi.” German Aerospace Center (DLR).com. “Desalination in Maghreb.” Wangnick. Challenges and Opportunities. “Rural Water Supply and Sanitation in the Middle East and North Africa Region.Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa Region 495 References Balaban. 2008. 2006. “World Urbanization Prospect 2003. E. May 19–21. 1998 –2002.” PAP/RAC Workshop. Istanbul. North Africa and Central Asia. 2007. Booz and others. United Nations Population Division.” www.htm.” OECD Conference on Public Private Partnership for Infrastructure Financing. The World Bank Annual Report. Produced by Wangnick Consulting for the International Desalination Association. Global Water Intelligence (GWI). 2003.” HCT-MIT Entrepreneurship Conference.M. October 7–13. “Public Private Partnership in the MNA Water Sector. 2004. “Seawater and Brackish Water Desalination in the Middle East. 2006. World Bank and Bank-Netherlands Water Partnership (BNWP). 2008. 2002. Gnarrenburg.” www. K. Desalination data. 2007.” Second French Serbian Summer School Vrnja_ka Banja. Germany. “AquaStat. FAO (UN Food and Agriculture Organization). 2005. “Desalination as an Option to Resolve Problems of Water Scarcity in MNA Region. “Concentrating Solar Power for Seawater Desalination. 2007. Sardinia. World Bank.” Euromed Conference on Desalination Strategies in South Mediterranean Countries. 2004. F. . Flash floods are too fast or too erratic to be stored in conventional (multipurpose) surface 497 . With specific reference to Wadi Ahwar. and groundwater recharge from spate flows. Irrigation is a major source of livelihoods in rural Yemen. groundwater irrigation. Moreover. However. mostly for irrigation but sometimes for domestic use. The number of wells used in conjunction with spate flow has increased significantly.Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Coastal Areas in Yemen: Case Study of Wadi Ahwar Arjen de Vries and Tarun Ghawana Supervised by Ahmed Shawky Mohamed 27 Introduction Need to Integrate the Management of Spate Irrigation. The chapter explains how all three processes form part of an integrated water system. spate irrigation in Yemen is regulated only in space—but not in time. Groundwater Irrigation. the chapter shows how an integrated water resource management approach can improve the overall system’s productivity and sustainability. This chapter examines the interconnections among spate irrigation. Management systems no longer can be focused on the spate flow but also should take into account the impact of spate on recharging the groundwater. inhabitants of the coastal areas have been harvesting spate rain. and Groundwater Recharge The recent increase of cultivated areas and yields in Yemen is due largely to the increased use of groundwater. unlike conventional irrigation schemes in Egypt or Iraq. water productivity from groundwater-fed irrigation typically can be six times higher than from spate irrigation. making irrigation possible between spate floods. For centuries. or at least for domestic purposes. reliable yield Carryover capacity Low cost per m3 water stored Multipurpose (power and flood control) Groundwater recharge Complexity of operation Siting High initial investment cost Time needed to plan & construct Social impacts Environmental impacts Sedimentation Dam safety Source: IWMI 2000. This chapter discusses developing the “conjunctive use” potential of spate water in Yemen’s coastal areas. MAR can be useful for many of today’s water issues and concerns. Key issues Limitations Artificial recharge is defined as any engineered system designed to introduce and store water in an aquifer (Topper and others 2004). thus maximizing the spatial utilization of runoff rather than storing the water for interseasonal use. the stored water can be used later to supplement irrigation in the low flood periods. However. an adverse connotation of “artificial.” in a society in which community participation in water resource management is becoming more prevalent has led to a new name: Managed Aquifer Recharge (MAR) (Gale 2005). The Yemenis regulate spate runoff by building surface-water “diversion” structures. or land subsidence. MAR also can play an important role as . Table 27. Small Dam Storage. saline intrusion. it may be useful for repressurizing aquifers subject to declining yields.1 Characteristics of Groundwater Storage. The diversion structures often are small scale and low cost because the unpredictability of spate flows makes large-scale investments uneconomic. In these ways. It presents unconventional lowcost/economic solutions for storing excess spate water in the groundwater (or in subsurface top soils).498 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS dams. and Large Dam Reservoirs Groundwater storage Little evaporation Widely distributed Operational efficiency Available on demand Water quality Slow recharge rate Groundwater contamination Cost of extraction Recoverable fraction Declining water levels Rising water levels Management of access/use Groundwater salinization Groundwater pollution Advantages Small dams and surface reservoirs Ease of operation Response to rainfall Multiple use Groundwater recharge High evaporation losses Relatively high unit cost Absence of over-year storage Sedimentation Adequate design Dam safety Environmental impacts Large dam reservoirs Large. As an increasingly important tool for water managers. thus reducing saline intrusion into (drinking) water wells. Harnessing the conjunctive use of surface and groundwater also can help reduce the mining of groundwater near the coast. .Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen 499 part of a package of measures to control over-abstraction and restore the groundwater balance (Gale 2005). many of which are known to stakeholders or often cited in references. or be applied to maintain or improve local ecology and environment. MAR applications are subdivided into 5 principal techniques and 14 subtypes. One thus can think of groundwater recharge from spate flows in Yemen as the missing piece of the three-way relationship among Source: Gale 2005.1). Induced bank infiltration is a distinctive technique that cannot be listed under any other main MAR technique. The great variety of available MAR techniques and the varying site specifics have led to a large variety in scheme design and construction (figure 27. The main techniques are chosen in relation to the type of technique used either to intercept the water or to get the water infiltrated. MAR applications generally are not stand-alone interventions because they are a component of the broader hydrological system and usually part of a larger water supply or water management system. Application of MAR should be considered in this broader framework to arrive at the most cost-effective solution. Therefore. The subtypes are specific engineering techniques that are applied. MAR may help to improve water quality in aquifers and infiltrate storm runoff for both damage control and subsequent reuse in drinking or irrigation supplies. it is assigned to a separate class in which it is both technology and subtype. runoff. Small recharge dams for inter/intraseasonal storage. or return flows such as from treated wastewater). is more cost effective than constructing conventional dams. Very limited research has been carried out on the relationship between recharge and spate. groundwater use. a significant amount of water can be stored in the river bed (above the impermeable layer) and in the river banks. low-cost sand-storage/subsurface dams for inter/intraseasonal storage (at least to provide rural water supply. For sustainable resource management. this method results in . b. When water storage solutions are developed. However. and groundwater recharge from spate flows. However. Through spate. thereby enhancing the recharge. Artificial recharge. the flow velocity should be reduced. having a cascade of small recharge dams is preferred to having one big recharge dam. In general. Even if the underlying layer is relatively impermeable. this downstream recharge may be reduced significantly. As sand accumulates upstream. By cutting this flow through building impervious structures (such as concrete dams). if not irrigation). In Yemen. In contrast to typical surface recharge dams. storing water in the soil profile through subsurface or sand dams in semiarid areas. sometimes (as in Oman) they are used to store the dam’s upstream runoff. these structures enhance the natural storage capacity of the river bed/banks. Small. including spate-irrigated areas. because the sediment downstream is often loamy to clayey. Applying the categorization of MAR techniques to Yemen. most recharge is expected to take place in the wadi beds rather than in the channels and irrigation fields. then release it to recharge the groundwater downstream. Another important aspect to consider is the subsurface flow. These enhance the water infiltration upstream of the dam. For a given budget. This flow is the main source of downstream wells. it would be better to enhance infiltration upstream rather than downstream. From a geological point of view. as the latter may cause big evaporation losses. recharge can be enhanced through flatting the river slopes and through ponding. c.500 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS spate water use. myriad options could enhance groundwater recharge and interseasonal conjunctive use: a. groundwater storage structures (as opposed to surface dams) often are ignored. project interventions should balance the output from spate water in the high flood periods with the recharge to groundwater. It penetrates fine soils or the impermeable underlying layers (for rainfall. for conjunctive groundwater use to be efficient and effective. Due to the increase of groundwater use in Wadi Ahwar. However. and subsequent flash floods will further wash out that load. Current observations on groundwater levels and saltwater intrusion in Wadi Ahwar indicate the need for a sustainable approach toward groundwater and its development. the weir can be designed so that the wash load overtops the weir’s sill. For sustainable water management. Spate irrigation is closely associated with groundwater use and recharge. for which spate irrigation is one of the key elements of the water resources system. mainly through an increase in the number of shallow wells. This chapter shows how such techniques to enhance groundwater recharge could be applied in Wadi Ahwar. Floods . In addition. Surface-water diversion system. agricultural production in the spate irrigation command area has increased. This lack of understanding is due mainly to limited historical data. and saltwater intrusion. Thus. water quality deterioration. Stakeholders in the wadi agreed that intervention is urgently needed to reverse the unsustainable depletion of the resource. is urgent. Water Management in Coastal Areas Needs Not Only Infrastructural Interventions but Also Institutional and Information Measures This chapter focuses on the groundwater issues of a typical coastal wadi. careful demand and resource management are essential.Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen 501 no evaporation and no sedimentation (bed load) issues. in which the soil porosity and/ or permeability/storativity/transmitivity of the underlying layers is good enough. including public awareness and community involvement. conflict may be imminent. In most coastal wadis including Ahwar. the understanding of hydrogeological processes is still limited. that is. The over-abstraction of groundwater not only impacts the quality of the resource but also can lead to saltwater intrusion and hence water quality deterioration. This system can be designed to divert part of the runoff toward a location in which recharge/subsurface dams can perform better. the necessity for certain measures. Extensive information is key. there are certain essential nonphysical requirements: 1. d. Although no conflict has yet arisen among water users such as farmers and rural water supply users. information on the spatial variability is usually much more limited. In Yemen. However. The temporal variability is relatively well known and can be measured from any adjacent meteorological station. Wadi Ahwar is characterized by a high spatial and temporal variability of rainfall. and Ahwar. This phenomenon also illustrates the complexity of quantifying runoff based on conventional densities of rain-gauge networks. Tuban. According to several archeological and historical evidences. by capitalizing on the tribal culture dominant in Yemen. In most spate irrigation systems in . Wadi Ahwar: Typical Spate-Reliant Coastal Basin in Yemen The use of spate water for irrigation is as ancient as humankind’s cultivation of land. there have been examples of wadi flows generated from zero observed rainfall. similar projects in Ethiopia and Kenya have shown that insufficient involvement of local communities in water harvesting schemes is a major constraint to success.502 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS are the main contributor to groundwater recharge. Yemen’s water resources have become unsustainable due to the neglect of the traditional spate irrigation system on the one hand. Socioeconomic and institutional measures must support physical interventions. Studies in the region illustrate that rainfall distribution is very spotty. Even when good physical investments are made. the high temporal variance in floods translates into high temporal variance in recharge. In Saudi Arabian basins. Yemen was the first country in the world to practice spate irrigation. groundwater use needs to be regulated. In contrast. These have been successfully piloted in the World-Bank-financed Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP) in Wadi Zabid. namely Irrigation Councils (ICs) and Water User Associations (WUAs). 2. it is difficult to enforce this regulation through central control. The intense development of trade after the Islamic period may have promoted the spread of spate irrigation from Yemen to other arid and semi-arid regions. Hence. the needed regulation can be ensured by local communities. For example. and over-exploitation of groundwater for its multiple uses on the other. This unique system reached its zenith during the Shebean period in the first millennium BCE. Careful monitoring is essential to predict the recharge and thus the groundwater that can be utilized sustainably without jeopardizing the resource. 2 percent of the total catchment of this wadi does not produce runoff during small or average flood. The total catchment area is estimated at 6352 km2. Per the official statistics. It depends on the water stored in the soil and adjacent low-lying fields.2. Wadi Saba and Wadi Jahir. the major floods occur between June and September. After flowing down from the mountainous region. and honey. Hence. Al Hanad. Rural population exceeds urban because agriculture and livestock production provide the country’s main livelihoods. Ahwar. from which it receives high rainfall. Deep soils are able to store ample moisture for the crops during periods with no precipitation. which is the time of heavy rainfall in upper catchments. in the eastern Abyan Governorate. Two modern structures are constructed on Wadi Ahwar to irrigate 7000 ha of land by utilizing the available spate. livestock. Wadi Ahwar has formed an alluvial plain that is the main agricultural area of Ahwar delta. What Is the Safe Yield? Scientific Rationale Safe yield traditionally has been defined as the maintenance of a longterm balance between the amount of groundwater abstracted and the amount of groundwater recharged. this definition . Wadi Ahwar is located in the southern Arabian Peninsula. Delta Ahwar is located approximately 200km east of Aden. The catchment has a tropical hot and arid climate with very poor rainfall and high evaporation. The average family size was 10. The active catchment of Wadi Ahwar to Faud Weir is 4052 km2. the rural population was as high as 73. The wide variation in topography and climate enables producing various crops. The 2004 population of Wadi Ahwar was estimated at 34.Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen 503 Yemen. Crop growth takes place exclusively between October and February.646. there is no credible meteorological station within the catchment to register the annual variations of meteorological parameters. pumping is restricted to the natural replenishment of groundwater. Wadi Ahwar is formed by joining the two tributaries. However. and up to Hanad Weir is 4062 km2. because approximately 36. Wadi Ahwar is 160 km long and originates from the high mountains (altitude approximately 2350m).5 percent of the country. However. and Al Mabrak along the coast of the Arabian Sea are the major villages in the delta. The equilibrium can be restored only if recharge is augmented and/or the natural discharge is decreased. These models also can help to estimate terms such as changes in storage. However. should the sustainable yield be based on figures of the last 10 years. Local abstractions might seem sustainable when compared to the regional sustainable yield. 3. In estimating the water budget. Eventually. It therefore is important not to consider sustainable groundwater yield as a fixed volume of water that can be utilized but to address the system in a more integrated manner. the safe yield does not equal the sustainable yield. even limited local abstractions still may have a large negative impact. Pumping and recharge are time dependent. To estimate the sustainable yield.and surface water. If the spatial scale is not understood and defined. modeling will be necessary to establish the budget more exactly and to predict how the system will respond to future changes such as increased demand or climate change. Spatial scale. 2. to take into account the whole water system including surface water. that is. such as localized saltwater intrusion. To establish a sustainable yield. any approximation of sustainable yield is meaningless. the sustainable yield is not a constant but could change continuously and must be related to a certain time period. Temporal scale. Initially. the discharge of an aquifer will equal the recharge.504 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS ignores the discharge from the system. Additional discharge from wells destroys this equilibrium. varying over different time scales. In other words. Therefore. . three aspects should be considered: 1. abstraction plus discharge is greater than recharge. the timing of future water needs and recharge should be understood. If abstraction equals recharge. the scale at which the sustainable yield is determined should take into account possible local effects. The natural system should include both ground. Therefore. or on only the last year? The time factor is critical for defining the sustainable yield. and hydrogeological properties. all stakeholders should be represented so that the balance reflects both the natural system and all users. Conceptual water budget. Under natural conditions and over a long period. this budget can be an estimate. In other words. discharge. which is the accumulation of rainfall that drains to the stream. and aquifer recharge is of fundamental importance. Recharge in the wadi is not well understood. Understanding the relationship among the rainfall amount and intensity. surface hydrologic response. vegetation cover. Adaptive management does not mean that specifying fixed levels of water use through instruments such as permits is not required. sustainability must be defined as “a system that maintains acceptable risk over an indefinite time horizon. The main input to estimate the sustainable yield is the surface runoff and hence the groundwater balance. According to Howard. and surface runoff. precipitation. which has its origin in groundwater. because man-made abstraction almost equals total discharge. drainage . Estimating Sustainable Yield in Wadi Ahwar The main intent of sustainable groundwater use is to optimize abstraction while maintaining a minimum outflow to the ocean to prevent saltwater intrusion. so it is difficult to estimate aquifer sustainability. and agricultural return. Runoff flow is composed of two main elements: base flow.Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen 505 The abovementioned uncertainties in the definition of the different terms of the water budget led to the idea that water resource sustainability must be considered within the framework of probability (Howard 2002). It does mean that we must recognize that the specified quantities can change. direct surface recharge from rainfall (likely to be insignificant). that is. the sustainable yield can be defined as almost equal to the natural recharge of the aquifer on an average annual basis. Therefore.” Our inexact understanding of the water budget means that we should focus on adaptive management: adapting to a changing physical and socioeconomic environment. The aquifers receive recharge via underflow from the mountains or infiltration from surface wadis. The basin characteristics that affect the base flow and the surface runoff include geology. it is not necessary to include aspects such as wetlands and stream base flow because perennial streams and wetlands are minimal or do not exist. for Wadi Ahwar. To estimate the sustainable yield of Wadi Ahwar. rainfall is characterized by extremely high spatial and temporal variability. soil type. Although rainfall is the primary hydrological input. or gap flow during periods of more intense rainfall. in arid and semi-arid areas such as Wadi Ahwar. Current Monitoring Activities and Well Inventory No groundwater monitoring takes place in Wadi Ahwar. it seems logical to install a number of monitoring wells parallel to the wadi up to the coast. Information. Moreover. In this way. additional analyses of the hydrological system need to be carried out. For a monitoring network design. Recommendations NWRA has limited experience with groundwater resource monitoring. . Since the 1990s. NWRA should be capable of designing and managing the overall monitoring system. and local). regional. The water authority should consider delegating different information systems tasks to the appropriate administrative level (national. The only information on available resources is based on old studies. makes this figure highly approximate. Data Collection. to estimate the safe yield. Examples of monitoring in Wadi environments include the assessment of water resources for future development and for rainwater and floodwater harvesting.506 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS area. based on a preliminary assessment. the variability of the hydrological and climate system can best be taken into account by taking average figures for a 10-year period. and a few wells across the wadi. both spatial and temporal. it has no clear vision of information management. However. and Monitoring Monitoring is the main source for data and information. The variable rainfall conditions in Wadi Ahwar make it difficult to estimate average runoff and hence the sustainable yield. Based on the consultancy study. To provide more recent data and to develop a management plan with different scenarios. and moisture condition. a proposal was drawn up for monitoring wells. It therefore can be reasoned that. many changes have taken place in both Yemen’s physical and socioeconomic systems. The lack of data. such as the 1990 donor-funded study. a monitoring network will have to be designed and developed. The current water balance suggests that the current safe yield (estimated in 2008) in Wadi Ahwar is 18 Mm3. Develop monitoring objectives and strategy. it is clear that over-abstraction takes place and leads to saltwater intrusion. Provide protocols. . software. and human resources. Develop a monitoring plan that defines the required hardware. Supply-oriented measures to make more water available for different users 2. Integrating these conventional and nonconventional measures can lead to sustainable conjunctive use. Carry out an inventory of necessary capacity and equipment at all levels. and standards for different monitoring activities. and nonconventional measures such as artificial recharge and demand management. guidelines. These aspects should correspond to NWRA guidelines. Demand-oriented measures to reduce water demand and consequently reduce the groundwater abstraction and control the drawdown of the groundwater table. These assessments suggest that there is opportunity for both conventional interventions such as rainwater harvesting. the following short-term activities can be identified to develop a monitoring plan for Wadi Ahwar: 1. Set up communication with regional NWRA offices. The desired outcome is to balance (1) reducing water losses and storing excess water to optimize rural livelihood throughout the year.Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen 507 Given the above observations. 3. Design monitoring network based on hydrogeology. and define mandates for each NWRA office. and (2) maintaining the minimum spillage to sea as needed to counteract seawater intrusion. It also is believed that a great amount of water is being lost to sea (and through nonbeneficial evapotranspiration). 5. Two main categories of proposed measures can be distinguished: 1. 4. tools. 6. Possible Measures in Wadi Ahwar Despite the lack of accurate hydrological data on Wadi Ahwar. Such measures could be part of an overall sustainable water management plan. as described below. 2. the recent well and abstraction inventory indicates that the total volume of surface water used for irrigation has not increased. However. For these measures to be effective. Nevertheless. there is a clear need for awareness and stakeholder involvement in the use of the resource. However. the technique is more vulnerable to disruption and requires more high-tech maintenance than surface infiltration. subsurface dams are probably the most feasible option. Although NWRA will play a key role in monitoring abstractions and regulating the drilling of boreholes. a better understanding of the hydrogeological system is important. the abstraction of groundwater will need to be regulated. enforcement obviously will be a very difficult issue. Before . it is not yet completely clear whether the recharged water will be temporarily or permanently intercepted by the shallow aquifers. and saltwater intrusion. to decide on the appropriate measures. it would be useful to know to what extent the excess wadi runoff can be recharged.508 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS However. In addition. If the amount of excess water is limited. The available information does give some insights. Supply-Oriented Measures Storage and recovery of excess water To store excess water for later use. proposed recharge structures will only redistribute the groundwater resources but not augment them. They result in depletion of the resources. Although no conflicts have yet arisen. It is suggested that community-based groundwater management would be the most effective approach. The use of injection boreholes requires little surface area and enables recharging an aquifer isolated from the surface by a semi-pervious or impervious layer. To avoid frequent clogging of the well screen of an infiltration borehole. quality deterioration. Furthermore. more efficient irrigation practices would lower evaporation and increase the volume of water available for recharge. degassed water and high standard water quality are needed. given the sharp increase in groundwater development of the last 20 years. This fact suggests that a surplus outflow of water to sea still exists and can be intercepted and recharged. All stakeholders in the water resources in the wadi agree that measures need to be taken to reverse the negative impacts of unsustainable abstraction. a 1990 donor-funded study will have to be updated before any recharge structures can be constructed. For example. The infiltration rate is strongly dependent on the groundwater table. by the community. and offer opportunity for community involvement. If there is no cooperative effort. The human factor is essential for the success of underground dams. assuming a drainable storage coefficient of 0.Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen 509 large-scale implementation of injection boreholes. are easy to construct. Subsurface dams are a relatively inexpensive intervention. The economic conditions of the sites are such that participatory or bottom-up approaches are essential in constructing the dam (and obtaining maximal socioeconomic benefits). While reduction in the salt levels through continuous water use is feasible. reduction requires operational procedures beyond those generally expected of small rural farmers. 50 m width. Recovery is usually by abstraction wells located in the vicinity of the infiltration site.10. Nonetheless. effective operation and adequate maintenance are unlikely. where the wadi basement is not yet at great depth and a dam would be relatively easy to realize. which must be relatively deep. The storage capacity of a typical subsurface dam and reservoir of 4 m depth. Subsurface dams may operate at low hydraulic loading rates and also improve water quality.1). Sites with saline soils should be avoided for dam construction. Successful examples of community involvement in dam construction can be found in Ethiopia and Kenya (box 27. require low-level technology. and subsequent ownership.000 m3. the intervention is very promising in a wadi environment. pilot schemes are required to test for the proper design and water quality characteristics to be used. and dam life span. Suitable locations for subsurface dams are probably upstream. Additional . Using locally available materials and community labor reduces costs and enhances efficiency. subject to certain considerations: Siting of the dams is an important aspect of implementation. acceptance. The successful application of subsurface dams would require an analysis of the hydrogeological system of Wadi Ahwar. Most of these dams have not been very effective in recharging the groundwater. and 500 m length would be some 10. Already the government of Yemen has made great effort to construct small or subsurface dams to recharge groundwater. The unconfined layer should be within a shallow-to-moderate depth (preferably not more than 10 m) and in a well-defined impermeable layer. 0 boreholes would be necessary to collect extra information on the geology and lithology of the subsoil.1. even during droughts (as was proved in 2006). The water is captured for use through a hand-dug well or tube well using a bucket or hand-pump.0 50. Since 1990. Kitui Sand Dams. Kitui.0 140.0 3.5 37. The efficiency of the design is improved by constructing dams in cascade. Downstream areas are not significantly influenced by the presence of a sand dam.1. which accumulate against the dam wall.8 68.0 230. Water is stored within the sand and gravel particles.) Water collection–livestock (mins. The stored water is protected against high evaporation losses and contamination. The dam wall itself is made of concrete. infiltration capacity. or SASOL) has been assisting local communities to build small-scale sand dams.0 1.1. Socioeconomic Performance of Sand Storage Dams. . Note: A total of 500 sand dams have been constructed in Kenya.0 90.0 31. Box table 27. Kenya The Kitui Sand Dam project in Kenya is an example of how communities use their knowledge about water to cope with droughts.0 350. creating a reliable source of water. which store water in artificially created sandy aquifers. After construction of the subsurface dams. “Sand’ refers to the sand behind the dam wall that holds the water.0 110. comments on monitoring).0 0. and potential storage. Sand dams can store water in up to 35 percent of the total volume of sand stored upstream of the dam.6 After dam construction 2. a local NGO in Kitui (Sahelian Solutions Foundation. Kenya Vulnerability categories Agriculture Special aspects Gender Economic Health Vulnerability indicators # of cash crops Irrigated crops (%) Water collection–domestic (mins. these boreholes should be used to continuously monitor the water levels and water quality sampling (see appendix A27.510 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Box 27.) Average walking distance to water–women (km) Income (US$/year) Households suffering from malnutrition (%) Before dam construction 1. The lower well screen will intercept Saline water upcoming saline water. Rising saline water can be counteracted by using 2 Sea Freshwater filters in 1 abstraction well. Salinization and a scheme to stop the Sea process are shown schematically Freshwater in figure 27. The principle Saline water of injecting fresh water into an aquifer to form a barrier against saltwater intrusion from the sea Landward shift of saltwater-freshwater interface due to pumping is to push back the saltwater– freshwater interface. Before considering implementation of a Figure 27. the upper one will continually produce fresh water (figure 27. Saline water The groundwater salinity in the Ahwar area probably is Recharge of aquifer with freshwater caused not only by a lateral shift pushing back saltwater-freshwater interface in the saltwater–freshwater interface but also by upward coning of saltwater. an intrusion barrier should be built. Hence. Fresh The time required to reduce Sea water salinity would be considerable and could reach the order of Brackish/saline Brackish/saline tens of years. to decrease the rate of saline intrusion in underlying aquifers. to Counteract Salinization further investigation is necesBrackish/saline Fresh sary to study the mechanisms of increased salinity. the most effective practice may be to reduce the extraction of coastal zone groundwater for irrigation.Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen 511 Saltwater intrusion barrier Figure 27. . To stop saltwater Sea intrusion.3 Use of 2 Abstraction Wells at 1 Location freshwater antisalinity barrier.3).2 Process of Saltwater Intrusion Many boreholes and dug wells Initial phase of pumping from coastal freshwater aquifer in a 10 km-corridor along the coastal zone close to Ahwar have become saline.2. Strict monitoring would be required to prevent farmers from both selling and using their water simultaneously. In these projects. enforcement will be very difficult. However. Given the difficulty of enforcing “command and control” measures. Clearly. the four options below merit further investigation. Water-saving measures. and would require a long period of consultation and bargaining among stakeholders. The increased flows would improve downstream groundwater balances. measures to strengthen groundwater recharge should be complemented by equally important actions to limit groundwater abstraction. 2. 3. Command and control measures. 1. Consequently. They require consultation and bargaining among numerous stakeholder groups. Community-based groundwater management. As shown by projects in India (APWELL and APFAMGS). given that demand management is an essential component of an integrated approach to groundwater sustainability. the farmers themselves measure the water levels and water yields. such as drip irrigation and the cultivation of more water-efficient crops. self-regulation seems to be the only approach to sustainable use of groundwater at the local level in rural areas. However. this chapter does not propose specific packages for the Wadi Anwar area. The design and implementation of such demand-management measures are extremely complex and political. Downstream/upstream tradable water rights. As for enhanced recharge. the main challenge is to translate this data into information that helps the farmer or community understand the groundwater . could be enforced. Regulatory measures could include requiring well-drilling permits and restrictions on abstractions.1 raising awareness of the resource among users increases the farmers’ commitment to proper groundwater use.512 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Demand-Oriented Measures As just noted. However. the design of such a system would be extremely high risk and complex. Self-regulation focuses on the development of local norms to control groundwater abstraction and use. so long as groundwater is considered a free-access commodity. such measures would require better monitoring of the hydrogeological system. The aim would be to create a financial incentive for upstream water users to allow more water to flow downstream as surface or groundwater. 4 Integrated Groundwater Management Plan involve local stakeholders in Resource management Demand management three processes: assessing the resource. The plan would cover all aspects of integrated groundwater management. and informs good decisions regarding water shortages. It therefore is suggested to develop a groundwater management plan. on both the demand and the supply sides: water harvesting. and negotiating the Resources allocation Definition of and use water rights Aquifer adoption of resource managesystems/ Regulatory Resources assessment ment decisions. “Demystifying Science for Sustainable Development. there is an opportunity to enhance groundwater recharge. and more efficient irrigation and monitoring. The groundgroundwater framework and their evaluation Water and resources land uses water management plan should Shareholder including their Pollution control participation interaction with include simple “rules of thumb” surface water Prevention and Use of economic that focus on water use at the mitigation of side effects instruments village level and help to conCosts and impacts trol the abstraction and use of 1 FAO-India projects. regulating use. assessing the deWater demand and contaminant load mand. In addition. could help to limit abstraction. Alternatively. alternative crops. Establishing the groundwater management plan should Figure 27. Andhra Pradesh Ground Water Irrigation Schemes (APWELL) and Andhra Pradesh Farmer-Managed Groundwater Systems Project (APFAMGS).” . Incentives. Extension and training should be integral parts of the implementation of the new measures and regulations. self-regulation seems to be the only path toward sustainable use. negative incentives. The latter’s online masthead reads. given the difficulty in enforcing regulation. increases their awareness of the need for regulation. such as groundwater pricing or higher diesel prices. Conclusions The welfare of the Wadi Ahwar population depends on re-establishing the area’s hydrogeological balance.Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen 513 dynamics. 4. However. The usual solution to encourage sustainable use of groundwater is to impose regulations. Examples are registering abstraction points and defining water rights. and demand management are illustrated in figure 27. Options for resource enhancement also will be studied. resource management.514 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS scarce groundwater resources.4. These management rules should be sustainable and environmentally sound. The linkages among the water resource. . outline of the catchment. Starting as a narrow canyon-shaped valley. The steep escarpment of the mountains represents the narrow watershed. then semi-gravel.Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen 515 Appendix A27.9 percent. The total area of the delta is estimated to be approximately 150 km2.400 km2 to the south of a range of mountains running east from Mudiah and rising to over 2.5 percent–2.1 Hydrogeological and Groundwater Analysis in Wadi Ahwar General Hydrogeological Setting Location The Ahwar Delta extends along the coastline and is approximately bordered by coordinates 130 26'-130 36' N and 460 39'-460 48' E.1 Location of Wadi Ahwar. gradually widening to 2 km. Because the high ground approaches nearer to the coast. Figure A27. downstream sand. with catchments draining in a northeast direction toward the Ramlat as Sabatayn. the delta of Wadi Ahwar is less extensive than the deltas of Wadis Tuban and Bana. The gradient of the Wadi Ahwar bed is 1. The wadi drains a large area of highly dislocated basement rocks and the inland margins of the quaternary volcanic outcrop. Yemen Source: Hydrosult. 2008a. The upper Figure A27. The delta is part of a large catchment of approximately 6. the wadi eventually turns into piedmont plain. Inc.000m some 70 km north of the coast. The shape of the bed is lost in the delta area. and observed wells. and eventually compact sand close to the sea.1 shows the location of Wadi Ahwar. The upper reaches of the wadi bed consist of pebbles. with the greatest width of approximately 17 km at the coast. . The small area of soil-covered land is used predominantly for agriculture. The wadi has scanty vegetation. Likewise. it is difficult to indicate trends in annual rainfall. Groundwater resources system The water resources in the Ahwar area comprise the wadi flow and the interconnected groundwater system. Figure A27. Based on satellite imagery. canals. Average annual rainfall of the whole catchment is 150 mm.2 gives an impression of the landcover of the whole catchment. which is recharged by the wadi flow and by infiltration of the irrigation water. Deman. averaging 3. Yemen Landcover The Ahwar region landcover is dominated by rock outcrops and sandy areas.2 Interpreted Landcover.516 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS catchment contains extensive areas of flat plain (Lawdar. the estimated average precipitation for the delta is 49 mm. of Wadi Ahwar Region. Potential evapotranspiration (ET) is very high. Beyond the water resources themselves. and weirs. The accuracy of the estimations is therefore unknown. Mudiah. Also. as mentioned earlier. mostly small shrubs. figure A27. Climate and rainfall The climate in the delta is arid and characterized by high sunshine radiation with an average annual temperature of over 34. The major part of the rainfall in the catchment generates the surface runoff to the wadi flow. The character of the delta is largely the product of the natural . Only a small portion of total precipitation directly infiltrates in the catchment and reaches the wadi flow as lateral groundwater inflow.033 mm/year. the water resources system comprises irrigated land and infrastructure such as wells.2°C. the spatial variation of rainfall in wadis can be significant. and Guishan areas) that are underlain by alluvium and are reported to be extensively developed for agriculture. As long-term data are not available. and irrigated fields. The wadi itself is shaped by the regular floods that have an average estimated duration of 68 hours. The thickness of the aquifer ranges between 20 m–40 m. It is unconfined and hydraulically connected with the deeper aquifers. constructed surface water diversions. Hydrosult carried out a well inventory in the Ahwar area to ascertain well depths and water levels. It occurs throughout the delta except for the apex. The groundwater system of the delta consists of three major aquifers that are interconnected and most likely form a single aquifer system. irrigation canal network. and conglomerate. The surface water balance in the wadi has the following components: Infiltration and evaporation during irrigation Infiltration and evaporation during wadi flow Discharge to the sea. The shallow aquifer 10 m–50 m thick occurs in sand and gravel.Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen 517 flow of the runoff of the wadi through the delta. The depth to the top of the aquifer increases to the south from 20 m to 40 m. limestone. Groundwater Analysis Groundwater levels From June–September 2008.340 m3/s. The middle aquifer consists of gritstone and conglomerate with calcareous matrix. The deeper aquifer lies at a depth ranging from 70 m to 200 m and consists of sandstone. The groundwater balance in the wadi comprises: Replenishment Lateral groundwater inflow Recharge during irrigation (transmission losses) Recharge during wadi runoff Discharge Consumptive groundwater use Groundwater outflow to the sea. The surface runoff of the wadi is partially diverted and used for spate irrigation. The data . The maximum flood event was reported in March 1982 with a discharge rate of 5. using the Inverse Weighted Distance method. where water levels are shallow. There are hardly any observed well data on the other side of the drainage network.3 indicates shallow water levels in the area closer to the sea. ARCGIS. the spatial bias of the data Wadi Ahwar well water levels is revealed in terms of location of all the observed wells only on the left hand side of the drainage flow direction. groundwater wells data points were used for interpolation. To have an impression of the groundwater flow and occurrence on the right hand side of the flow.4 illustrates the well-depth variance. It indicates a slight tendency for shallower well depths in the area closer to the sea. Yemen were converted into a spatial layer using the advanced GIS software. The deeper well depths occur in the central delta.1. The middle area shows most of the deeper wells. Moran’s I Spatial Autocorrelation Index was used to measure clustering patterns and spatial autocorrelation. By overlaying this data with the drainage layer. which indicates clustering of the well water levels. Figure A27. Wadi Ahwar. Figure A27. The spatial autocorrelation index is 3.518 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Figure A27. These points are scattered well enough inside and outside the catchment area of the drainage to permit interpolation. The reason for the presence of the relatively low well depths in the upper region could be the availability of surface spate irrigation for longer periods. and in the upper region.3 Well Inventory and Extrapolated Groundwater Levels. Groundwater balance A 1990 donor-funded study estimated total groundwater resources based on both analytical and mathematical simulations. The reason could be the intrusion of seawater in the groundwater aquifer zones. The total . whose presence could be due to the short duration of availability of surface irrigation as well as the distance from the sea. However.4 Average Well Depth. 2008b. The total estimate is based on a storage capacity of 0. Storage in the upper two aquifers amounts to 845 Mm3.1 presents estimates of groundwater balance. the total influx from outside the delta is 4. However.1 18.4 24. The different studies provide very different estimates. Yemen Budget items (total in Mm3) Groundwater influx from north Lateral influx Recharge from spate irrigation Recharge from wadi runoff Total credit Groundwater outflow Groundwater abstraction (netto) Evaporation Total debit Balance Source: Hydrosult.1 0.1 Groundwater Balance. Inc. 0. was estimated at 1099 Mm3.Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen 519 natural storage. the difference of the Table A27. According to the 1990 study. Wadi Ahwar.7 10. Most of this storage is found in the central and southern delta.9 Mm3. and 0.3 Mm3 –4.4 –0.19 for gravel/ pebbles.5 24.0 .7 –9.2 4.7 Mm3. the Hydrosult study suggests a total inflow from outside of only 0.8 9.4 8. defined as the Figure A27.7 19.4 18.5 7.0 9. Yemen volume of gravitational water accumulated in pores and fissures of water-bearing rock beneath Wadi Ahwar well depth levels the zone of multiyear fluctuations of groundwater level.1 Hydrosult’s 2008 estimate 0.03 for conglomerates.3 9.7 22. Wadi Ahwar. This difference cannot be explained.4 3.1 for muddy sands.3 9.2 4. including 84 Mm3 with salt content >5 g/l. 1988–89 0.3 1972–88 0. Table A27.7 19.9 5.0 22. given the uncertainty of the figures. particularly the evaporation estimate.7 g/l at a Wadi Ahwar well reported 1km from the wadi chanelectrical conductivity nel to 2. it could be concluded that mining takes place at a rate of at least 9 Mm3 per year on average. it is difficult to draw any hard conclusions regarding over-abstraction and safe yield.3 to 1. it was estimated that. including the population of the city of Ahwar).000 persons). possibly reaching values of 5-9.520 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS direct recharge from spate or runoff probably results from a reduction of the command area. Yemen middle aquifer.5 g/l. the outflow to sea amounts to almost 50 percent of the total flow. Total dissolved solids (TDS) concentration increases considerably toward the coastline. we would need to consider seasonal variation in wadi flow before concluding whether there is scope for additional safe abstraction. For the Ahwar. This rate is supported by field observations of such reported increase of salinization of certain wells. TDS concentration in the lower aquifer is reported to be no more than 2 g/l. It was concluded. Given an average annual wadi flow of 66 Mm3. Figure A27. However.5 g/l. TDS concentration ranges from 1. and even more than 3 g/l (approximately 1.5 grams/liter (g/l) to 4. however. to prevent saltwater intrusion.5 g/l (3600 persons). However. groundwater outflow to sea should not be less than 9 Mm3. Based on the Hydrosult estimate. The local population reportedly has to use brackish water for domestic purposes: with TDS of up to 1. Groundwater quality and saltwater intrusion Groundwater salinity in the upper aquifer ranges from 2. Wadi reaching a value of 15 g/l.5 Average Electrical Conductivity Levels. Based on the previous studies.5–3 g/l (8400 persons. No data is available from previous studies about the position of the saltwater front in the delta. 1. that a .3 g/l measured at other levels locations. www. due to the increasing use of diesel pumps. leaching effects. and pre-existing saline groundwater. The growing abstraction will strongly determine future demand. Taylor & Francis Group. Water Scarcity and the Role of Storage in Development. abstraction of groundwater is expected to continue to grow.com/ ____. A Tradition in Transition: Water Management Reforms and Indigenous Spate Irrigation Systems in Eritrea. 2008b. However.com/ IWMI. Colombo. Hydrosult. hydrosult. A GIS analysis was performed on water quality data as observed by Hydrosult (2008) showing higher conductivity levels (that is.A. Balkema.iwmi. www. IWMI.Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation through Conjunctive Use in Yemen 521 saltwater intrusion at some coastal producing wells is likely as a result of a continuous groundwater abstraction. Future Water Demands No information is available about future water requirements in the delta. Montreal. The pattern suggests that conductivity not only is influenced by seawater intrusion but also may be affected by other factors such as soil types. Hydrosult Feasibility Study for Irrigation Improvement in Wadi Ahwar. supported by the World Bank-financed Irrigation Improvement Project (2000–08). www. Observations and discussions in the field also have shown strong evidence of saltwater intrusion.5 indicates the spatial occurrence of EC in the groundwater observations.M. 2008a. Water management Information needs Information utilization Information strategy Data analysis Data collection References Haile. The Netherlands: A. 2007. Montreal. However. Inc. lack of historic data prevents an analysis of trends over time. A. “Groundwater Assessment: Irrigation Improvement Project.hydrosult. No strong population growth is expected. or EC) near the coast.” Draft report.lk. with a direct consequence on the viability of agriculture in these areas.org/Pubs/Pub039 . Research Report 39. higher electrical conductivity. 2000. Figure A27. Paris. Wheater.” Case Profile 2. H. “Defining and Managing Sustainable Yield. M. 2004.” Groundwater 42 (6).A.” Technical Mission Report April 7–17. UNESCO.” IHP Regional Network on Wadi Hydrology in the Arab Region. World Bank/GW-MATE (Groundwater Management Advisory Team).522 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Maimore. . “Hydrology of Wadi Systems. 2003. Groundwater and Soil Conservation Project and Community-Based Water Management Project.. Radwan. World Bank. 2002. and A. “Republic of Yemen. 2008. “Yemen: Rationalizing Groundwater Resource Utilization in the Sana’a Basin. org .org Maher Abu-Taleb Senior Water Resources Management Specialist MNSSD World Bank mabutaleb@worldbank. List of Authors Safwat Abdel-Dayem Consultant [email protected] Rachid Abdellaoui Consultant Nathalie Abu-Ata Operations Officer WBIRC World Bank nabuata@worldbank.# Appendix A1.org Julia Bucknall Lead Natural Resources Management Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] 523 Aldo Baietti Lead Technical Specialist WBISD World Bank [email protected] Alexander Bakalian Lead Water Resources Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Naji Abu-Hatim Senior Rural Development Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Mohammed Benouahi Lead Water and Sanitation Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Abdulhamid Azad Senor Irrigation Engineer MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Richard Calkins Consultant MNSSD World Bank rcalkins@worldbank. tn Andrew Makokha Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist AFTU2 World Bank [email protected] Marc Jeuland Consultant Claire Kfouri Water and Sanitation Specialist MNSSD World Bank ckfouri@worldbank. Tunisia [email protected] Pier Mantovani Lead Water and Sanitation Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Hani El Sadani Senior Water Resources Engineer MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Sarah Houssein Consultant N.org Susmita Dasgupta Lead Environmental Economist DECRG World Bank [email protected] Alexander Kremer Senior Sector Economist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Mohamed El Hedi Louati Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources.org Tarun Ghawana Consultant Acacia Water (Solutions in Groundwater) Tarun.524 WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne Water and Sanitation Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] .org Arjen de Vries Consultant Acacia Water (Solutions in Groundwater) Arjen.agrinet.org Khairy Al-Jamal Senior Infrastructure Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected]@[email protected] Maged Hamed Senior Environmental Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Manish Kumar Consultant manishkr67@gmail. Vijay Jagannathan Sector Manager Water MNSSD World Bank Njagannathan@worldbank. org Craig Meisner Environmental Economist ECSSD World Bank [email protected] Satoru Ueda Senior Water Resources Specialist AFTWR World Bank [email protected]. Perry Consultant [email protected] Richard Pollard Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Bekele Debele Negewo Water Supply Specialist MNSSD World Bank bdebelenegewo@worldbank. Washington DC [email protected] Wendy Wakeman Lead Social Development Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Jackson Morill Consultant and Associate Beveridge & Diamond P.org Juan Morelli Consultant [email protected] Sana Agha Al Nimer Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Ayat Soliman Senior Natural Resources Management Specialist MNSSD [email protected] Ahmed Shawky Mohamed Senior Water Resources Specialist MNSSD World Bank [email protected] Christopher J.org Christopher Ward Consultant and Researcher Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies University of Exeter [email protected] Manuel Schiffler Senior Economist LCSUW World Bank Mschiffl[email protected] Jose Simas Consultant [email protected] of Authors 525 Mohammed Mehany Operations Analyst MNSSD World Bank [email protected] . THE WORLD BANK Middle East and North Africa Region (MNA) 1818 H Street. N. Washington.W. DC 20433 .