The Indian Penal Code, 1860Joint Liability An overview of the principle of Joint Criminal Liability under IPC, with special reference to Sections 34 & 149 Submitted to:Dr. Pushpinder Kaur Gill Assistant Professor in Laws University Institute of Legal Studies Panjab University Chandigarh Submitted by:Iti Jhanji B. A. LL.B. (Hons.) 5th Semester Section B Roll No.-46/09 Acknowledgement Upon the successful completion of this project, I would wish to thank everyone who has been a part of it. First and the foremost I thank Prof. Sangita Bhalla, Director, University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh for providing me with the esteemed opportunity of presenting a project report on The Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Dr. Pushpinder Kaur Gill, Assistant Professor in Laws from the same department for the clear concepts which she provided us about the principles of IPC,1860, which rendered great support during the drafting of this submission. And lastly, my heartiest gratitude towards all the respected authors of the numerous books I referred to, during the research process for this submission. It is truly said, Books are our best friends. 8. 7. It ensures justice is done by looking into the claimant's need for compensation. body etc. reputation. 4. which is paid by the defendant who has .Table of Contents 1. 2. 5. 6. 3. The Concept of Vicarious Liability Principle of Liability Joint Criminal Liability Section 34 and its Ingrediets Section 35 Section 149 and its Ingredients Difference between Section 34 and Section 149 Bibliography The Concept of Vicarious Liability The law of tort has been used for many centuries to protect personal interests such as property. that the imposition of liability should encourage the employer to ensure the highest possible safety standards in running his business. the law makes one person being liable for the harm caused by another.committed a breach of duty. liability is generally linked to a breach of one’s own duty and a person is liable for the wrongs committed by him only. and employer and employee etc. The Latin maxim ‘qui facit per alium facit per se’ that means he who acts through another shall deemed to have acted on his own and ‘respondeat superior’ (“let the master answer”) is commonly used in employer employee relationships. Thus Vicarious Liability is a form of strict liability. owner of a vehicle and driver. husband and wife. The persons who are held vicariously liable need not be personally connected to the tort or be in anyway responsible. Vicarious Liability is an aberration from the norm of holding the tortfeasor liable for damage caused by their own tortuous liability. The word 'vicarious' is derived from the Latin word for 'change' or ‘alteration’.. It is also referred to as imputed negligence. i. . This is known as the doctrine of Vicarious Liability. that the employer is in a better position to absorb the legal costs either by purchasing insurance or increasing his prices. However. Many reasons have been advanced to justify this departure from the fault principle. because of some legally relevant relationship between the two. Secondly. The general rule in tort law is that liability is personal. in certain scenarios.e. It is commonly said that the reasons behind the doctrine of Vicarious Liability are first. Legal relationships that can lead to imputed negligence include the relationship between parent and child. In the case of a private nuisance. inconvenience or damage to the public. two exceptions have been recognised in English common law: 1. A master is vicariously liable for libel published by his servant. 2. It would very often be difficult to check effectively acts of public nuisance by menial servants. 36. it is open to a master-proprietor to show in defence that the libel was published without his authority and with no lack of care on his part. Under Indian Penal Code. 149 and under many other sections.Notwithstanding these exceptions. Vicarious Liability is incorporated under section(s) 34. should not be extended to criminal law. 141. 35. A master is vicariously responsible for a public nuisance committed by his servant1. it is now generally regarded as a compelling principle of justice that a man should not be penalised for the wrong of another. 1860. 1 A public nuisance is an act which causes obstruction. a master will be held civilly liable and the same principle is applied to public nuisance also. But to this rule of non-liability. 114. unless their masters are made responsible. which plays an important part in torts and civil law generally. It generally means when the ‘actus reus’ and the resultant consequences thereof are attributed to another person and he is made to answer for those consequences. However. 37. The principle of Vicarious Liability. . 146. Jack's father owns the automobile and he. and so would a co-signer who guarantees it. The father's responsibility is based on "statutory liability" even though he personally breached no duty. A contractor who has agreed to complete a building has liability to the owner if he fails to complete on time. A signer of promissory note has liability for money due if it is not paid. thus making him/her subject to conviction and punishment. Liability also applies to alleged criminal acts in which the defendant may be responsible for his/her acts which constitute a crime. and therefore has liability for Sarah's injuries. In order to win a lawsuit the suing party (plaintiff) must prove the legal liability of the defendant if the plaintiff's allegations are shown to be true. may have liability to Sarah based on a statute which makes a car owner liable for any damages caused by the vehicle he owns. and the connection (proximate cause) of that failure to some injury or harm to the plaintiff. However.Joint Criminal Liability: An Overview Definition of Liability Liability means legal responsibility for one's acts or omissions. the failure to fulfil that duty. . Example: Jack Jumpstart runs a stop sign in his car and hits Sarah Stepforth as she is crossing in the cross-walk. Jack has a duty of care to Sarah (and the public) which he breaches by his negligence. Failure of a person or entity to meet that responsibility leaves him/her/it open to a lawsuit for any resulting damages or a court order to perform (as in a breach of contract or violation of statute). and gives her the right to bring a lawsuit against him. too. This requires evidence of the duty to act. When he sets a third party to commit the crime. In IPC. 3. or crimes that are a foreseeable result of undertaking a common purpose. Helps the offender. it is important to understand the basics of JCE liability. in screening him from Law. A “Joint Criminal Enterprise” is not an element of a crime. The second point is what joint liability is.Joint Criminal Liability Joint Criminal Liability or Joint Criminal Enterprise (hereinafter referred to as JCE) is an important concept in international criminal law. one scholar argues that the JCE doctrine has the potential “to stretch criminal liability to a point where the legitimacy of international criminal law will be threatened. There are several ways in which a person becomes a participant in a crime1. In these cases. 4. Rather.” Before stepping in deep. He himself commits it.” Indeed. 2. and many scholars have called for limited and cautious application of a principle that could lead to “guilt by association. the persons committing it either have common intention or common object. There are several provisions in the Indian Penal Code which determine the liability of a person committing a crime in combination of some others. . The development of JCE has been controversial from the beginning. the criminal liability is determined by the in which the person is associated with the crime. Joint Criminal Enterprise is a mode of liability whereby members are attributed with criminal culpability for crimes committed in furtherance of a common purpose. He shares in the commission of the crime. In order to bring home the charge of common intention. therefore.) . whether direct or circumstantial. sections 34-38 and 149 of IPC deals with situations where Joint Criminal Liability is formed but to understand Joint Criminal Liability. the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. State of Uttar Pradesh. that there was plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34. C. the prosecution has to establish by evidence. Direct proof of common intension is seldom available and. 2008 I Cri. sections 34 and 149 are important to be understood. LJ 802 (S. The distinctive feature of the section is the element of participation in action 2. The section does not say “the common intentions of all” nor does it say “an intention common to all”. but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. Section 34 Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intentionWhen a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all. The liability of one person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the person who join in committing the crime. be its pre-arranged or on the spur of the moment.Basically. The true concept of the section is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly. Section 34 has been enacted on principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. Under the provisions 2 Sewa Ram vs. each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. the section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. even if they were not present at the scene of crime or did not participate in the commission of the crime..of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. similar or diverse acts by several persons." a bench of Justice M. Common intention implies a pre arranged plan. The criminal act must be done to further the common intention of all. Persons acting in furtherance to common intention to commit a crime would all be liable to the whole crime. A criminal act must be done by several persons. Common intent comes into light before the commission of the crime. in law it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone.B. but it is necessary to prove the meeting up of minds prior to the actual commission of crime. which means prior meeting up of minds. render each of such persons liable for the result of them all.. Merely seeing two accused at the same spot does not account to the common intention. as if he had done them by himself. the Supreme Court has stated that "even the doing of separate. Shah and Justice Doraiswamy Raju said. when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them... so long as they are done in furtherance of a common intention. 2. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34. and . Ingredients of Section 34 There are three main ingredients of this section: 1.. Act done in furtherance of common intention of all. . Thus. AIR 2004 SC 1308.3. 4 Pandurang Tukia and Bhilia vs. The plan to execute a crime need not be elaborate. This is based on the common sense principle that when several persons are alleged to have committed a criminal act. In other words. The scheme may be chalked out suddenly. AIR 1955 SC 331. but all the members must consent to it. then there is every possibility that different members would have actively given encouragement. but they must be actuated by the same common intention. that is.The essence of joint liability under section 34 lies in the existence of a common intention to do a criminal act in furtherance of the common objective of all the members of the group.The term ‘act’ in the section refers to a series of acts as a single act. there must be a prior concert among the 3 Girija Shankar vs. State of Hyderabad. Criminal act done by several persons. The acts done by each of the participants may differ and may vary in character. a prior meeting of minds and participation of all the members of the group in the execution of that plan 4. protection and support. even though a particular act may have been committed by an individual. State of Uttar Pradesh. then all of them are held liable for that offence. as also actively participated or otherwise engaged in the commission of the criminal act itself. so also the coverage of the provision is attracted only when there are more than one person involved in committing the criminal act. In the absence of common intention the criminal liability of the members of the group might differ according to the degree and mode of the individual’s participation in the act. There must be participation of all persons in furthering the common intention3. The word ‘common intention’ implies a prior concert. help. nor is a particular interval of time required for the purpose. and they had all acted in furtherance of that common intention. where common intention exists. they were accosted by Quasim Shah. Hearing this. and sentenced him to death. On seeing them. they were warned by Mohammad Shah. . Mahboob Shah went on appeal to the Privy 5 AIR 1945 PC 118. The trial court sentenced Mahboob Shah to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment for attempting to commit murder. so that each of them is aware of the act to be committed. convicted him also for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34. IPC. Mahboob Shah fired at Hamidullah causing him slight injuries. Wali Shah was never caught thereafter. when they continued to cut and load reeds into their boat. Emperor5. not to cut reeds from the land belonging to him. However. Allah Dad and his friend Hamidullah tried to escape by fleeing from the place. This made Quasim Shah cry out for help. A mile from the place where they started. In this case. Wali Shah shot at Allah Dad killing him instantaneously. Guiding Principle of Common Intention The principle of common intention came to be enunciated in what has come to be known as the ‘Indus River Case’ or the case of Mahboob Shah vs. nephew of Mohammad Shah. They were prevented from running by Wali Shah and Mahboob Shah who stood in front of them obstructing their path. Wali Shah and Mahboob Shah appeared on the scene carrying loaded guns. the latter struck him with a thick bamboo pole used for rowing and steering the boat. When he pushed Allah Dad. however. the deceased Allah Dad and few others were going in a native boat down the river Indus to cut and collect reeds growing on the bank of the river.members of the group in regard to the design in question. The Lahore High Court. who tried to remove the reeds from them and prevent them from moving. father of Wali Shah (who absconded and never apprehended). 4. . if it is so then liability for the crime may be imposed on any one of the persons in the same manner as if the acts were done by him alone. Care must be taken not to confuse same or similar intention with common intention. Very interestingly. and to convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should be proved that the criminal acts were done pursuant to the prearranged plan. 3. animating the accused. 2. Common intention within the meaning of Section 34 implies a prearranged plan. the distinction is real and substantial and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice. The following principles were laid down by the Privy Council: 1. the partition which divides “their bounds” is often very thin. It is difficult. leading to doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. the Privy Council set aside his conviction for murder and allowed Mahboob Shah’s appeal on the ground that there was no evidence to prove that there was a common intention between Mahboob Shah and absconding Wali Shah. it must be shown that the criminal act complained against was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention. if not impossible to procure direct evidence to prove the intention of an individual. 5. nevertheless. in most cases it has to be inferred from his act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case.Council against the conviction for murder and the death sentence awarded to him. To invoke the aid of Section 34 successfully. Under Section 34 of IPC. essence of liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention. concluded that there was no evidence to show that they shared a common intention to commit the criminal act that resulted in Allah Dad’s death. the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all. They were probably ready to use the same to defend Quasim Shah. It is not always necessary that all the accused have meditated the 6 AIR 1955 SC 331. Intention on the Spot In certain cases. and shot at Hamidullah. however.6. the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that’ it is well established that a common intention presupposes prior concert. The judges of the Privy Council. The inference of common intention should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the circumstance of the case. Concluding that at best the evidence showed that there was only a common intention to protect Quasim Shah when Mahboob Shah and Wali Shah heard his shouts for help and appeared at the site carrying their guns. The incriminating facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation on any other reasonable hypothesis. an intention can be formed on the spot. held. . The inference of common intention within the meaning of the term under section 34 should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deductable from the circumstances of the case. It requires pre-arranged plan because before a person can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another. State of Hyderabad6. Common Intention should be Prior to the Occurrence In Pandurang vs. Mahboob Shah accosted. whereas Wali Shah confronted Allah Dad and shot at him. killing him intantly. In this context. Participation of all in Furthering the Common IntentionParticipation is a necessary element or condition precedent to finding of joint liability. The Supreme Court in the case of Kantiah Ramayya Munipally vs.crime. but nevertheless the distinction is very real and substantial. In Balbir Singh vs. whereas this is not so in the case of same or similar intention. the trial court and the High Court had held that there was a free fight and every assailant was accountable for his own acts committed. To constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each person be known to all the others and be shared by them. one person died. State of Bombay 8 observed that. Both. in a free fight. especially when there is a free fight between them. all the accused may at a point decide to take out their revolvers and shoot the people of the other party. In cases. Joint Liability in context of Free Fight The issue of liability of different members of a group of people divided into mutually antagonistic or hostile groups. the intention can be formed on the spot. State of Punjab 7. it is the essence of Section 34 that the person must be 7 AIR 1995 SC 1956. The partition that divides same or similar intention and common intention is often very thin. However. the Supreme Court held that. Here the decision of killing the people of the other party was taken on the spot. In a fight. there was a movement of body of the victims and assailants and in such a situation it will be difficult to specifically ascribe to one accused the intention to cause injuries sufficient to cause death. in order to kill them. well in advance. . is one of the most difficult aspects of joint liability. a similar question was raised. wherein four persons each belonging to two different groups attacked each other and in the result. ‘Common’ intention is different from ‘same’ or ‘similar’ intention. each with different intention or knowledge from the others. for instance. A was held guilty for murder whereas B was charged with grievous hurt. each one would be liable for the offence as if he had done the act alone. where A and B beat C who died. He need not be present on the actual spot. 8 AIR 1955 SC 287. If several persons. 324. A had an intention to murder C. but if several persons join in the act. stand outside to warn his companions about any approach of danger.physically present at the actual commission of crime. It reads that When such an act is criminal by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intentionWhenever an act. B on the other hand intended to cause grievous hurt and did not know that his act will cause C’s death. 9 AIR 1927 Cal. is done by several persons. and knew that his act would cause his death. each of such persons who joins in the act with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention. . Reference can be made to the case of Adam Ali Taluqdar9. having the same criminal intention or knowledge jointly murder. Section 35 Section 35 of the IPC is in furtherance of the preceding section 34. each is liable according to his own intention or knowledge. He can. Hence. which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention. . is guilty of that offence. There must be at least five people in such an assembly. There must be some common object of such an unlawful assembly. it means “common to all and known to the rest of them and also shared by them”. every person who. or such as the members or that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. the following ingredients must be present1.Section 149 Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common objectIf an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly. 2. 5. 1860. There must be a commission of offence by anyone or more members of such unlawful assembly. Here the word “common” must be distinguished from “similar”. Essential Elements To invoke section 149 IPC. is a member of the same assembly. The commission of such offence must be in prosecution of the common object shared by all and each of the members of such unlawful assembly. 10 Section 141 of Indian Penal Code. 4. There must be an unlawful assembly 10. at the time of the committing of that offence. The offence committed in prosecution of a common object must be such that each one of the members of such unlawful assembly knew was likely to be committed. 3. the member not actually committing the offence will be liable for that offence only if he knew that such offence was likely to be committed in the course of prosecution of the common object to commit the offence originally thought of. grave injuries were inflicted on A’s limb and he was dragged out of the house to some distance where either J or K shot him with a hidden pistol. . which was actually committed. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 695. The first is where the other members commit an offence. the liability of the other members for the offence committed during the occurrence rests upon the fact whether the other members knew beforehand that the offence actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. the accused X. it was held that section 149 IPC has two parts. Further. it imports a higher degree of probability. Y. In such a case. J and K were alleged to have entered into A’s house in order forcible possession of the house. Under section 149. arms or behaviour at or before the scene of action12. State of Uttar Pradesh11. such as might or might not happen. For example. it indicates a state of mind at the time of commission of the offence and not the knowledge acquired in the light of subsequent events. The liability of a member of an unlawful assembly may arise for an offence committed by any member of the assembly in two ways. The second is where the common object to commit an offence was different from the offence. Z. which was in fact the common object of the assembly. Such knowledge may be reasonably collected from the nature of the assembly. 11 AIR 1959 SC 572.In Mizaji vs. 12Gajanand vs. With the lathis they were carrying. The expression “know” does not mean a mere possibility. Indian Penal Code. deal with issues of constructive liability. On the other hand. Section 149 creates ‘constructive criminal liability’ for acts done in prosecution of the common object of the assembly. Section 149. differences in the scope and nature of operation of the two offences. 15 Dhansai vs. There are. In other words. 14 Ibid. membership in an unlawful assembly itself is specifically made liable to punishment. however. In such contexts. provided the essential conditions for being an unlawful assembly are fulfilled. is sought to be substituted at a later stage for a charge under Section 34 of the IPC. The difference comes crucial when a charge under Section 149.Common Intention13 Common Object14 distinct from (Difference between Section 34 and Section 149) Both Section 34 and 149. . 2. Thus. the courts would have to carefully examine the evidence to see whether some element of common intention exists which makes the accused persons criminally liable. then all of them are held liable for all acts committed. Section 34 only lays down a principle of joint criminal liability and does not create a separate offence 15 whereas Section 149 creates a specific offence. while ‘common object’ 13 Section 34. IPC. 1860. State of Orissa AIR 1969 Ori 105. While Section 34 creates joint criminal liability. a situation when criminal liability attaches to persons for acts not necessarily done by them. in which if individuals share a common intention and do acts furthering the same. especially when some accused are acquitted and the number of accused falls below five. IPC. ‘Common intention’ in Section 34 is undefined and therefore unlimited in its operation. 1. . vs. While in Section 34. State of Bihar 2004 CrLJ 3328 (SC). is a pre-requisite for being made liable. in Section 149. 4. tried and convicted for commission of offences under Section 302 and 307 read with Section 34 and 394 of IPC 16 Dani Singh and Ors. 3. common object may be formed without these ingredients 17. State of Haryana AIR 2000 SC 1833. however. Girija Shankar Pradesh vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 2003 SC 796. the crucial factor is that of ‘participation’ in Section 149. however small. The crucial difference between common intention and common object is that while common intention requires prior meeting of mind and unity of intention. the mere fact of being an unlawful assembly itself is sufficient to fix liability. 18 Jaswant Singh vs. in Section 149 there is no need for active participation or contribution for attaining the common intention18. Thus. State of Uttar (AIR 2004 SC 1308) In this case Girija Shankar along with three other persons were charge sheeted. membership of the unlawful assembly is a sufficient precondition. However. in Section 149. 5. it is sufficient if there are more than two persons involved. there have to be a minimum of five persons and more to attract coverage of the provision. 6. some overt act. For offence under Section 34.in Section 149 cannot go beyond the five objects specifically indicated in Section 141 of the IPC16. For invoking Section 34. 17 Chittarmal with Moti vs. Tiwari claimed to know.by the trial court. It was also alleged that the gold ring and watch of deceased were removed by Junglee and H. Girija Shankar preferred the appeal and questioned the legality of his conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34. They were proceeding towards Raj Bahadur Singh’s house when they were attacked upon. Their appeal before the Hon’ble High Court met with the fate of dismissal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed that on reaching at the said conclusion the Trial Court and the High Court did not appreciate the fact that there was neither any direct nor any circumstantial evidence showing pre-concert of the minds of the accused persons in causing the death of the deceased.P. Suddenly one of the accused Devi Shankar fired two shots. The (PWs) however. It had become dark and was raining. During the pendency of the appeal two persons namely. Iqbal Shankar and Junglee died and the appeal stood abated. To prove the prosecution case seven witnesses were examined and the Trial Court observed that there was no direct evidence showing pre-concert or meeting of minds amongst the accused and the possibility of it having developed on the spot cannot be ruled out. Arun Singh. They decided to stay at the house of Raj Bahadur Singh whom H. According to the prosecution version.P. Dilating on the provisions of Section 34 the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India quoted- . one of which hit the deceased and the other hit H. They shouted at them being notorious and should be beaten.P. Tiwari (PWs) and the deceased decided to stay in village Bhawalia when they were on the way to their village after seeing a village fair at Bhuvreshwar as they wanted to purchase ‘beedi’. resisted their allegations and disclosed their purpose of staying in the village. Tiwari. In the meantime. and Section 307 read with 34.P. Tiwari’s gun was snatched by Devi Shankar. H. the accused persons saw them and thought them as criminals. Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. The Section does not say "the common intention of all". when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34.“Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. in law it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. In order to bring home the charge of common intention. The liability of one person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. nor does it say "and intention common to all". the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India took into consideration these . The true concept of Section is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them”. be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment. the prosecution has to establish by evidence. therefore. that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34. whether direct or circumstantial. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34. but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The distinctive feature of the Section is the element of participation in action. such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. IPC. Pulla Reddy and Ors. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that the evidence on record does not show that the accused persons shared common intention to kill the deceased. The Court also set aside the conviction under Section 394.observations made in the cases of Ashok Kumar vs. IPC qua the appellant Girija Shankar on account of no evidence against him. They further observed that there was no evidence to show that Devi Shankar had any gun and an intention to use the same and set aside the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 but observed that the accused assaulted the injured having shared the common intention to cause the death and maintained the conviction under Section 307 read with Section 34. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1993 SC 1899). Bibliography . They did not chase the injured and the deceased after they reacted that the deceased and injured are criminals and notorious and should be beaten. State of Punjab (AIR 1977 SC 109) and Ch. 2011. Volume 1. 2006. Central Law Agency. 6th Edition. Gaur. S.com . D. K. D.org www. T. Nagpur. N. Gaur. M. K. New Delhi.inrebus. 2nd Edition.org www. Indian Penal Code. Allahabad. Eastern Book Company.com www. Allahabad. Webeography www.lexisnexis. Indian Penal Code. The Indian Penal Code. K.com www. Central Law Publications.legalsutra. 10th Edition. Criminal Law: Cases and Materials. PSA Pillai’s Criminal Law. Mishra.legalserviceindia. 16th Edition. Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa.com www. 2010.indiankanoon. Prof. 5th Edition. Universal Law Publishing Co. 2009. Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa. A Textbook on Indian Penal Code. L. B. 4th Edition. Bhattacharyya. 2009. Vibhute. Gandhi. Bishop’s Commentaries on Criminal Law. Lucknow.lawyersclubindia. 2008.
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