US Role in Philippine Counter-insurgency OperationsNuns lead march against US troops in the Philippines By BENJIE OLIVEROS Bulatlat.com September 26, 2010 In a speech during a Peace and Security forum held at the Mandarin Hotel last April 22, 2010, then presidential candidate Benigno Aquino III outlined his National Security Policy, which he said focuses on four key elements: Governance – ―The government must be present and accountable to its citizens especially those living in the poorest and most remote areas.‖ (An effective political strategy focuses on strengthening the government’s capability and capacity to respond—and be seen to be responding—to the needs of its people.) Delivery of basic services – ―To alleviate the plight of innocent civilians caught in the conflict, we must renew government programs that build access roads, school buildings for basic and adult education, provide potable water and sanitation facilities, basic health care, electricity, assist in shelter reconstruction, and provide temporary livelihood interventions.‖ Economic Reconstruction and Sustainable Development – the national government, in partnership with international donor organizations, must assist the new ARMM regional government in building a capable bureaucracy with streamlined and transparent procedures to increase the region’s absorptive capacity for development projects that will come its way. (The economic and development function in COIN includes immediate humanitarian relief and the provision of essential services such as safe water, sanitation, basic heath care, livelihood assistance, and primary education, as well as longer- term programs for development of infrastructure to support agricultural, industrial, educational, medical and commercial activities. It also includes efforts to build the absorptive capacity of local economies and generate government and societal revenues from economic activity (much of which may previously have been illicit or informal). Assistance in effective resource and infrastructure management, including construction of key infrastructure, may be critically important to COIN efforts.) Security Sector Reform – ―Reforming the Security Sector must begin with restoring the pride and honor of our uniformed services. We need strong, capable and disciplined security forces serving under *firm democratic civilian control *to achieve and sustain peace and security in our land.‖ (Physical security efforts must not focus too greatly on strengthening the military and police forces of the affected nation. Such capacity building should only be part of a broader process of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in which the whole system is developed, including the civil institutions that oversee the security forces and intelligence services, the legal framework and the justice institutions (prosecution services, judiciary and prisons) that implement it. It is particularly important that a sense of civil ownership and accountability should extend to the local level and that all elements of the security apparatus should be trusted by the population.) Those in italics were lifted from the US Counterinsurgency Guide released last January 2009. Is it surprising that current Philippine president Benigno Aquino III adopted the 2009 US Counterinsurgency Guide in framing his government’s National Security Policy? Not really for a fair-haired boy of the Americans. It could be recalled that during the heat of the presidential campaign, exactly two weeks before the May 10 elections, Time magazine featured Aquino in an article with the title, The Next Aquino: Can Noynoy Save The Philippines? He is only the second presidential candidate who was featured by a major US publication such as Time even before he was elected. The first one was Ferdinand E. Marcos. among the major influences in the development of US counterinsurgency strategy are the Philippine-American War of 1901 and the Huk pacification campaign during the 1950s. in deference to the desires of the U. improve the capability of the AFP in waging wars against the perceived enemies of the U. to sign the Rome Statute which created the ICC. equipment. This partnership is being underpinned by the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951. and supplies to the AFP. and the threat of a pandemic outbreak that arise from non-state actors and transcend national borders. This paved the way for the ―semi-permanent basing‖ of US troops in the country. and funding that the US could provide.S. and Philippine armed forces to conduct joint operations under the former’s command and direction. US influence. military assistance to the Philippines increased dramatically. forces in the country immunity from prosecution before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Under the Military Assistance Pact. provide strategic and tactical direction to. It could be remembered that the last two government agencies turned over by the US colonial government to the first Philippine puppet government were the Education and Defense departments. are also aimed at improving the capacity of the U. the US Armed Forces is able to. military assistance increased 1. The study was completed in 2003 and resulted in the formulation of the Philippine Defense Reform Program. transnational crime. A US-RP Joint Defense Assessment was conducted to assess the capabilities of the AFP and its counterinsurgency campaign.111 percent from 2001 to 2002. which is being supervised by the US. . The provision of arms. Also the year 2002 marked the start of a series of Balikatan Joint US-RP military exercises. the Defense Policy Board was created thereby allowing the US to control the policies and decisions of the Philippine Department of National Defense.S. the Visiting Forces Agreement was signed. and provided for the establishment of the Joint US Military Advisory Group (Jusmag).-RP Non-Surrender Agreement thereby granting U. newly-assigned US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. The joint exercises and other trainings conducted by the U. Thus.S.And a mere 11 days after the May 10 elections. US troops were sighted joining AFP troops in combat operations against the bandit group Abu Sayyaf and the secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front. on a continuing basis. Agreements and Structures of Continuing Control After the Philippine Senate rejected the renewal of the US-RP Military Bases Agreement in 1992. and exercise intelligence coordination with the AFP. troops. and supplies to the AFP is also being coursed through the Jusmag. over Philippine counterinsurgency strategy dates back way before Aquino. natural and man-made disasters. From then on.In 2002. which was mandated to reorganize the AFP and train its officers and personnel. 2006 purportedly to serve as the mechanism for consultation and planning of measures and arrangements focused on addressing non-traditional security concerns such as international terrorism. Part of the aid package was the grant of scholarships to AFP officers for training to US military schools. The Philippines has refused. On February 1998.S. IBON Foundation computed that U. nay control. U. the AFP has long been a junior partner of the the US Armed Forces. and on this basis. In May 2003. However.S.S. even before the term ―surrogate army‖ was coined by the 2006 US Quadrennial Defense Review. In fact.S. It took effect after was the Philippine Senate ratified it in May 1999. and contribute to the combat experience of U. an American think tank comprised of neoconservatives. ammunition. ammunition. and its local puppets. the US supplied arms. Another mechanism called the Security Engagement Board was created in March 24. It was supposedly a five-year program but has been running for eight years now. Through the Jusmag. This further tightened the grip of the US Armed Forces on the AFP.S. field expertise. Before the MDT was the US-RP Military Bases Agreement and the US-RP Military Assistance Pact of March 1947. equipment. In the year 2000. President Arroyo signed a U. maritime safety and security. Thomas already visited Aquino at his Times street residence. up to the present. the US has been seeking ways to justify the posting of its troops in the country. Also by the late 90s. the Project for a New American Century.S. was pushing for ―promoting American global leadership‖ (read: assert American politco-military hegemony). determine the technical assistance. A Trademark of US Counterinsurgency Operations Oplan Bantay Laya. On paper. clear-hold-consolidate-develop. and civil society institutions such as NGOs. Oplan Bantay Laya. Strategic Holistic Approach. currently the most powerful cabinet cluster on the national level. In terms of military tactics. Even NGOs and other civil society groups are forced to surrender their independence and to cooperate with the AFP or risk being branded as ―terrorist or front organizations‖ and be dealt with accordingly The US calls this the ―whole-of-government‖ approach to counterinsurgency engagement. and other sectors such as NGOs in an area for the purpose of conducting counterinsurgency operations. This is an adaptation of the four stages of US counterinsurgency operations. and civil-military integration is required at the strategic. AFP documents reveal that Oplan Bantay Laya has three strategies namely.‖ (US Government Counterinsurgency Guide. theater/operational and local/tactical levels. These areas were subjected to heavy troop deployments and sustained military operations. Most successful COIN campaigns have achieved this unity of effort through unified authority. It divided military operations into four stages. Bicol. and at the last stage the AFP ―develops‖ the area by introducing livelihood and development projects. local officials are virtually stripped of decision-making authority and are even threatened by AFP commanders if they question the latter’s actions. intelligence. The Strategic Holistic Approach is the AFP’s solution to what it perceived as the lack of coordination between and among government agencies. the counterinsurgency program is directed by the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security. January 2009) Consistent with the strategies of Win-Hold-Win and Sustained Operations. As in other counterinsurgency programs of the AFP it had the trademark of US counterinsurgency. the AFP and Philippine National Police (PNP). Southern Tagalog. and civic action or triad operations. the AFP identified thirteen priority areas in seven regions namely. Bohol in Central Visayas. The Estrada Regime launched Oplan Makabayan in 1998 and Oplan Balangai in 2000. during the Marcos dictatorship. Oplan Bantay Laya is the same as previous counterinsurgency programs. As part of the Strategic Holistic Approach. is the latest in a series of counterinsurgency programs of the AFP. Military operations are conducted to ―clear‖ the area of insurgents. Ilocos-Cordillera. the US-AFP partnership came out with the counterinsurgency program Oplan Bantay Laya. which was implemented beginning 2002. . III. Central Luzon. which was launched in 2002. local government agencies. IV of the Aquino and Ramos administrations. Compostela Valley in Southern Mindanao.After tighter strategic and tactical control over the AFP was accomplished. II. These centers coordinate AFP and PNP units. Oplan Bantay Laya employs the same combination of intensive military operations. Essentially. ―Diplomacy. At the local level. development and defense are interdependent at every level of a COIN effort. This was followed by Oplan Lambat Bitag I . and Sustained Operations. The president heads the machinery for the Strategic Holistic Approach while the AFP and PNP are in-charge of military operations and Area Coordinating Centers. Caraga. The first ―comprehensive and coordinated‖ counterinsurgency program implemented by the AFP. civilian authority is practically subjugated by the chain of command of the AFP. the objective of this strategy is to comprehensively approach the insurgency problem. was Oplan Katatagan (Operation Stability) in 1982. Win-HoldWin. Under Oplan Bantay Laya. the AFP then ―consolidates‖ the area by improving its relations with the civilian population through civic action operations such as medical and dental missions. Only when the AFP has achieved its military objective of wiping out the insurgency and has formed a civilian self-defense force in an area does it transfer majority of its troops to another area which it then subjects to intense and sustained military operations. counter-terror operations. paramilitary groups and an intelligence network are formed to ―hold‖ the area. these ―professionals. There had been 205 victims of enforced disappearances.028 victims of torture.‖ on the other hand. First. Army Operations against Guerrilla Forces (FM 31-20) and the 1960 Special Forces manual.‖ According to the manuals. The island was subjected to intense and sustained military operations that resulted in numerous cases of political killings and other human rights violations. To prevent the terror tactics from backfiring on the counterinsurgent. counterfeiting. Tarlac and Pampanga were subjected to heavy troop deployments and military operations before the AFP units were transferred to Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. or other acts designed to prevent use of an installation.S. With its target research component. bombing. training manuals.S.‖ referring to paramilitary units. ―Terror Operations. the guerrilla uses terror to subjugate the local population and can therefore be effectively neutralized with the use of counter-terror by the counter-insurgent. Oplan Bantay Laya is deemed as the most brutal because it also directs its attacks on political activists. provocation of incidents. product.S. Counterinsurgency Operations. sabotage.While essentially no different from previous counterinsurgency programs. mutilation. issuing false or misleading orders or reports. the guerrilla/terrorist assumes an illegal status and therefore his life is forfeit if apprehended. must not be identified with the counterinsurgents trying to win the hearts and minds of the population.S. manual on ―Operations Against Irregular Forces‖ defined ―overt irregular activities‖ to include terrorism by assassination.‖ with quarterly targets for ―neutralization. This resulted in the extrajudicial killing of 1. dissemination of propaganda and rumors. Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) particularly that on ―low intensity conflict.An example is Mindoro. The key people in these ―sectoral front organizations‖ are placed in a ―sectoral Order of Battle (OB). and denial activities. theft. counterinsurgency operations. or facility. area. and kidnapping. demolition. or paramilitary forces based on lists provided by military intelligence units. to create a disincentive to discourage the local population from providing resources to the insurgents. and French experts in counterinsurgency instructed that these must be carried out by ―professionals.S.‖ by the counterinsurgent includes assassinations. Army Psychological Operations manual (FM33-5) stated that unconventional warfare against the enemy should have a multiplier effect by creating an atmosphere of fear. and its puppet armies in many countries in subsequent decades.190 political activists from January 2001 to March 2010. The May 1961 U. ―Covert irregular activities. These terror operations were carried out overtly or covertly.‖ These intelligence operations are carried out by units and personnel of the Military Intelligence Group-Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (MIG-ISAFP) lodged at the battalion level.‖ These can be found in U. and hundreds of thousands were forcibly displaced in rural areas as a result of military operations. These units are given ―Intelligence Task Allocations. These terror operations were implemented by the U. disappearances.S. These killings and forcible disappearances are carried out by death squads composed by special operations units of the army. When the AFP thought that the island was saturated enough and that all political and people’s organizations had been destroyed. blackmail. Fear was being created to force the local population to transfer loyalties from the insurgent to the counterinsurgent. police. The 1965 U. a surge of killings of political activists took place from 2002 onwards. . such as arson. mercenaries. U. 1. Two underlying principles are integral to U. and remained as a hallmark of the counterinsurgency state in the 1980s. use of chemical or biological agents.S. Justification for terror operations can be read in U. they transferred the troops and the operations to Batangas. reprisals. torture. Second. assassination. extortion. Army manuals of the 1960s and 1980s such as the manual of the U. intelligence operations are directed at what it calls ―sectoral front organizations‖.‖ Thus. and to make the supporters and the insurgent themselves lose confidence on the strength of their own army. The counterinsurgency programs of the AFP are based on the unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency strategies developed by the U. delaying or misdirecting orders. and identifying individuals for terroristic attack. In Central Luzon. included espionage. or special units assigned as death squads. flooding. and holding of hostages. armed robbery.S.S. and mass executions. teachers.‖ and identified priests and nuns as terrorists. described Operation Phoenix as. 2005 the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq issued a human rights report stating that. and drone missile attacks and renditions being done by the US Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency. or parties that have goals. Navy SEALS. Serious allegations of extrajudicial executions underline a deterioration in the situation of law and order…. using truth serum to obtain information. intelligence units provided names of suspected Vietcongs for neutralization to PRUs. the US Armed Forces is equating counter-terror with counterinsurgency operations. where the US trained Latin American soldiers.The extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the Philippines are no different from Operation Phoenix. Accounts consistently point to the systematic use of torture during interrogations at police stations and within other premises belonging to the Ministry of the Interior. adviser from Special Forces units. ―Corpses appear regularly in and around Baghdad and other areas. ―…an assassination program plain and simple. U. military and used between 1987 and 1991 for intelligence training courses in Latin America and at the US Army School of the Americas (SOA). 2005 alone. funded and directed the Wolf Brigade. false imprisonment. Thus. The manuals described universities as ―breeding grounds for terrorists.S.S. testified that PRUs were ordered to kill suspected members of the Vietcong infrastructure in villages. designed. tax collectors-anyone who aided the functioning of the NLF’s parallel government in the South. which it describes as a ―war with no borders‖. Counterintelligence agents were advised that one of their functions is ―recommending targets for neutralization.‖ And the targets for ―neutralization‖ or other punitive actions were very broad. political parties.S. On September 8. beliefs or ideologies contrary or in opposition to the National Government‖. which was implemented during the late 60s in Vietnam. and community organizations. The idea was to cripple the Nationalist Liberation Front (NLF) by killing influential people like mayors. blackmail. The CIA’s Greatest Hits: Called Operation Phoenix.This is where the concepts of ―target research‖. or ―teams of hostile organizations whose objective is to create dissension or cause restlessness among the civilian population in the area of operations. Under the US ―global war and terror‖. physical abuse.‖ These tactics and methods were also implemented in Latin America and were described in seven training manuals prepared by the U. During Operation Phoenix in Vietnam. who served as advisers to PRUs. the use of same approaches and methods. contain description of tactics such as executing guerrillas. . The US created. It advised intelligence units to infiltrate youth groups. the CIA funded. US efforts of strengthening the Iraqi government and instituting ―democratic processes‖ were complemented by counter-terror operations.S. and ―intelligence task allocations‖ contained in Oplan Bantay Laya were derived. In Iraq. it was much easier to shoot somebody rather than wait for intelligence operations to bear fruit especially since they were working on a monthly quota.800 persons per month. student groups. Lt. The Associated Press tallied a total of 539 persons killed by the Wolf Brigade from April to October 7. Wilbur said. doctors. which was responsible for the killing and abduction of civilians deemed as hostile to the government. Each province in Vietnam had a PRU and each PRU had a U.‖ These methods could also be seen in the terror listings. labor unions. which according to reports reached a high of 1. Mark Zepezauer in his book. John Wilbur and Barton Osborn. Sometimes. Each PRU was given a quota. and paying bounties for enemy dead. These included ―local or national political party teams. ―sectoral front organizations‖. and advised Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU). Two U. Most bear signs of torture and appear to be victims of extrajudicial executions…. with the balance between the two changing over time.‖ The guide admits that counterinsurgency campaigns always include the two elements. With no substantial reforms forthcoming. which would be implemented on January 2011. More important is the fact that the crisis in the country is still deepening and by all indications. eventually the magic of the reformist image would wane. Thus.Singing a Different Tune? President Benigno Aquino III and AFP Chief of Staff Ricardo David announced that they are in the process of formulating a new counterinsurgency program. and the population-centric approach. it appears that the Aquino government would just be implementing the same globalization policies that were pushed by the previous Arroyo administration. This is why the US supported the presidential campaign of Aquino. . The Philippines is very important to the US. and with it. namely the enemy-centric approach. against a dictator at that. The US thinks that President Aquino is in the best position to win over the support of the population because of the image of ―reform‖ he carries due to the history of his parents being in the opposition. the military solution or the enemy-centric approach would take on a more dominant role. which ―shifts the focus of COIN from defeating the insurgent organization to maintaining or recovering the support of the population. the people’s unrest would intensify. especially now that it is in a deep crisis. any threat to its interests in the country would merit its strong intervention. which passed on the burden of the crisis to the Filipino people. They said respect for human rights would characterize the new counterinsurgency program. which focuses on defeating the insurgent militarily. Would the counterinsurgency program of the Aquino government be any different from Oplan Bantay Laya? The extrajudicial killings have not stopped and the Aquino government had no qualms about extending Oplan Bantay Laya for six months. The Philippines is also strategically located making it an ideal place to project US military hegemony in the region. Again this is a copy of the two approaches to counterinsurgency described by the US counterinsurgency guide. The US is one of the three top investors in the country and the top three sources of imports and destination of exports.