Understanding the Third World Welfare State After Neoliberalism the Politics of Social Provision in Chile and Mexico

Understanding the Third World Welfare State after Neoliberalism: The Politics of Social Provision in Chile and MexicoAuthor(s): Marcus J. Kurtz Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Apr., 2002), pp. 293-313 Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4146955 Accessed: 22/08/2008 18:33 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=phd. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org Understandingthe ThirdWorldWelfareState after Neoliberalism The Politics of Social Provision in Chile and Mexico MarcusJ Kurtz While much attentionhas been focused on the political foundationsof social welfare regimes in the advanced industrial countries, less is known about the politics of social provision in underdevelopedareas, in LatinAmerica in particular. Discussions highlight the fiscal constraintsattendantupon free market economic reforms, questions of policy efficiency, and the political uses and abuses of antipovertyspending.1 This emphasis is jarring, however,in the face of a voluminous literatureon the emergence of the first world welfare state that emphasizes interests (business, labor), institutions (federalism, corporatism),ideas and culture, social structure(development, industrialization),and politics (left or Catholic power).2 Moreover, the pressures of globalization and economic liberalization are not sufficient to justify the technocratic focus. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that even small or poor states have substantial capacity to govern markets and support welfare regimes.3 Finally, arguments that emphasize pressures for convergence around a minimalist social welfare regime in poor countriesrun afoul of an empiricalreality of persistent difference. This article examines welfare regime formation and reformationin three politically competitive polities: Chile from 1932 to 1973, Mexico from 1988 to 2000, and Chile from 1989 to 2000.4 Not surprisingly,the first Chilean welfare effort, during the heyday of statism, was universalistic and redistributivein focus. But much less recognized are the dramaticdifferences between Mexico and Chile in the 1980s and 1990s. Mexico emphasized means-based targeting of consumption subsidies and efforts to support the integrationof the poor into the market economy, while Chile since democratization has moved to quasi-universal support of consumption and invested relatively little on the market integration side. This contrast is particularly striking given the strong commitmentof contemporaryChile and Mexico to neoliberal policies, usually seen as inducing convergence around narrowly targeted and austere models of social provision. Moreover, background similarities among the cases in terms of position in the internationaldivision of labor, level of economic development, cultural area, and statist policy legacies suggest further reasons for convergence. How, then, can these widely varying welfare regime outcomes be 293 Structuralfeatures of a developmentalmodel can be economically inconsistentwith some antipovertypolicies. After a period of narrowtargeting duringmilitary rule (1973-89) the center-leftgovernmentsof Chile's second democratic regime have begun to rebuild a quasi-universalbut less generous welfare state on the consumption side.much more specifically targetingsocial benefits at the very poor (and.Consumptionsupport dividedinto highly targeted(or means tested) and more universallyappliedbenefits. broadly understood. The coalitional basis of consumptionand productionoutcomes is shaped by.did not always break with the Mexican traditionof clientelistic state-society relations. policies that benefit the poor are disaggregatedby target. and patterns of political alliance. development models are accompanied by development ideologies that further narrowpotential responses. among other factors. This approachwas apparent in Salinas's (1988-94) PRONASOL program.6 These differing outcomes are a result of political dynamics situatedwithin particular developmental models and their ideological underpinnings (see Table 1). or do they subsidize consumption? assets and Productivistpolicies are furtherdisaggregatedinto those that redistribute of those thatcorrectmarketfailuresthatblock the economic participation the poor (for policies are example.Are they oriented toward the production process. This welfare approach. Where the poor are organizedand ally themselves with middle sectorpoliti294 . Within the wide arena defined by developmental model and ideology. has taken a decidedly differentroad.5 Mexico. As important.while in theory guided by efficiency criteria.access to credit. antipovertypolicies are political outcomes. These ideologies frame the very definition of the problem of poverty and thus the political terrainwithin which solutions are debated. The three cases under study can be sorted along these dimensions.it bypassed traditional corporatist organizations and avoided any sense of universal entitlement. as well as its successor during Zedillo's administration(1994-2000). potential supportersof the political opposition).failings of humancapital).To begin.Politics Comparative April 2002 explained?The answer lies in the dynamics of political competition as it is framed and ideationalconstraints.and what accountsfor it? Welfareregimes include the gamut of policies designed to amelioratepoverty. pento sions. by a broadset of structural What exactly is the range of variationto be explained. since the economic catastropheof the 1980s. however. the degree of organization of the poor. it utilized national planning and eventually asset redistribution achieve poverty abatementon the productionside. In Chile under its earlier democratic regime (1932-73) a substantial welfare state emerged and aimed at universalism on the consumption side of social citizenship (health. the competitivenessof the party system. placing wide but strict boundaries on policy. while making only limited moves towardthe correctionof marketfailures on the productionside.of course.both invested large sums in targeted support of consumption and production-orientedpoverty abatementefforts. However. PROGRESA. incomes). efforts will emphasize production and avoid obviously redistributionistoutcomes. Where the poor are not well organized and the level of political competition is lower.and dissent-mitigatingforms.politics-the self-organizationof the poor. and Welfare Regimes While the foundationsof differing regimes of social provision are principallypolitical. the antipovertyeffort will be greaterand more universal. Moreover. In party systems where more assembled behind transparently than one reformist party competes for the support of the poor.1989-2000 Low Low High Neoliberal Quasi-Universal Support Consumption withLimited Market AccessEffort Mexico. They will simultaneously provide benefits to the poor and middle sector interestsby channelingresourcesthroughthe latter.since the immediate needs of the poor have a means of entry onto the national political agenda and a sizable coalition can be redistributivepolicies. their alliances. as well as the explanations of them. more targeted.7Targetedefforts would tend to divide such coalitions. a bidding dynamic may ensue. Policy will also tend toward consumption supports over interventionsin production. More critically. antipovertyefforts will tend toward smaller.1964-1973 for to Incentives Parties Bidfor Support withSocialPolicy(competitiveness) to of ClassGroups Capacity Lower SocialPolicy(organization) Demand of Incorporation PoorintoMulti-Class Reformist Coalition(alliance structure) Development Model SOCIAL WELFARE OUTCOME Chile. Development Ideologies. Scholars should be more attentiveto the ideological and political foundations of contemporarysocial policies. leading to social welfare provision even in advance of direct pressure from below.1988-2000 Medium Low Low Neoliberal Targeted* Consumption Support Market andExtensive AccessEffort High High High Substitution Import Universalistic Consumption Support withAsset coupled Redistribution * '"Targeted" of strata society. Development Models. Although studies that emphasize constraints on policymaking are importantand interesting. the struggles that shape them are fought in an arena that is bounded by the pre295 . and party system competitiveness-is as critical as democracy itself in embedding the effective alleviation of poverty in the nationalpolitical agenda. to is heremeant implyeffortsto support the verypoorest only cal actors. even in those states where neoliberal economic models are dominant. they have obscured the variations in design and efficacy of social welfare regimes in Latin America.MarcusJ Kurtz Table 1 Social WelfareRegimes in Chile and Mexico Chile. that states are inefficient and where possible ought not interferewith markets. particularlyif they redistributedsubstantialportions of nationalincome. while not impossible. a valorization of the role of public intervention. aiming specifically at those left out of the marketeconomy. and a suspicion of internationaleconomic pressures. The structuralboundariesimposed by neoliberal developmentare quite different.a commitmentto macroeconomicbalance and low tax burdens constrainsthe ability of states to pursue fiscal expansion or widespreaddistribution. Importsubstitution industrialization was rooted in the belief that international markets are biased against primary products and that neither local nor foreign investorswould The intellectual conseinitiate sustained industrializationwithout public support. discussion and will begin with the import-substituting neoliberal developmentmodels that conwelfare regimes. would be much more vulnerable to political attack on both efficiency and economic grounds.Under neoliberalismuniversalpolicies. Neoliberalism carries almost precisely the opposite assumptions. on productionfor a protected domestic market.the relative value of public action.8 How does the adoption of a neoliberal or an import-substitutingdevelopment strategy help condition social welfare policy outcomes? Under import substitution is industrialization. but they would redirect resources away from the sorts of domestic market expansion that could underwriteindustrial growth and deepening.Politics Comparative April 2002 vailing developmentalmodel and its associated ideational system. as they would prohibitivelyraise risk perceptions for potential investors.10 In ideational terms the models have contrastingimplications as well. Targetedantipovertypolicies are not precluded. efforts on the production side to redistributeassets aie unlikely. The constraintsboth are structuraland are rooted in the strained development ideologies that shape decision-makers'perspectives on such issues as nationalism versus internationalism. and typically only middle and working class consumers have incomes sufficient to drive economic growth.9 In this context. Similarly.This ideationalsystem is consistent with a redistributive and universal approach to welfare provision. they can also serve as blinders to the empirical evaluationof some policy strategies."1 quence is a loss of faith in market forces. at least initially. the efficacy boundariesof privatepropof marketsas allocative mechanisms.potentiallyunderminingthe effort to amelioratepoverty.While such belief systems simplify problemsand make decision makerty ing easier.Its elective affinity is for targetedpolicies. and the appropriate relations. Thus. Since the attractionof foreign capital is a crucial neoliberal goal. disproportionately middle sector groups rather than the most needy informal workers and peasants. social welfare supporting systems will tend to be linked to formal employment.industrialization based. 296 . even on the political right. It included substantial spending on housing. and social quiescence producedan austerebut broad-basedwelfare system aimed at mitigating the worst aspects of the open economic strategy.7 to 46. Structuralistideas and nationalist economic policies had deep roots. and a statist national developmentalideology combined to produce a universalwelfare state geared to the redistributionof wealth and income.Soon thereafterAllende's administration nationalized the mines. PresidentFrei's Chileanizationforced joint ownershipon U. S.In the first period (1932-73) highly competitive politics. interpartycooperation. multinationalcorporations. mining.consumptionpolicies focused on universalismin part because planning. Nationalization did not simply result from the election of a Marxist president. In the second period. price controls on basic necessities. and explicit incomes policies.12The Socialist Allende administration(1970-73) did not so much change this model as intensify it. Under the Christian Democratic (PDC) Frei administration (1964-70) it expanded still further. especially in the areas of consumer subsidies and price controls. Its form is telling: increases in consumption standards were providedthroughthe universalizationof social benefits formerly limited to the middle sectors and urbanworking classes and throughthe encouragementof broadbased tradeunionism.and much domestic consumption was not directly linked to the availability of foreign exchange). a free market developmental ideology. The parliamentapprovedit unanimously. The ideological foundationsof this approachto poverty alleviation were linked to the nationalistand inward-lookingdevelopment strategy. and Welfare in Precoup Chile The statist and redistributivemode of social provision began in earnest in Chile under the Popular Front administrations (1938-52). and Moreover. 297 . nationalization (in mining). health.These tendencies are clearest in the primaryexport sector.9 between 1965 and 1970. following seventeen years of military rule.13 marketbroadeningfor domestic manufactureswas a high priorityand because fiscal balance was comparativelyless important(there was limited foreign investment. and education. Development Ideology. Politics. mobilized popular sector constituencies.lifting public spending as a percentage of GDP from 35.MarcusJ1Kurtz Social Provision in Chile: From Redistribution of Wealth to Welfare The change in social welfare regime across the two periods in Chile was sharp but perhapsnot as dramaticas is sometimes argued. On the productionside public interventionincreased dramatically with the massive 1967 land reform and the wave of nationalizationsof the early 1970s. The devalorization of market forces (especially international trade) and the need to expand domestic markets were intellectually consonant with antipoverty strategies that stressed asset redistribution (in agriculture). It is also importantto note that the welfare system became most comprehensiveafter 1964 when two clearly defined and competing reformist political currents-Christian Democrats and the Unity coalition-became the centralaxis of political competition. Socialists.19But careful analysis indicates a substantialbroadening of the recipient base of social welfare policies.20 This change is linked to the process of democratizationand the attendantreemergence of political competition. successfully. While the posttransitiongovernmentscertainlyincreasedthe level of spending on poverty relief. and they were generally fiercely competitiveamong themselves. many of which were eventually carriedout after the election of Allende in 1970. Particularlyby the 1950s and 1960s the expanding Christian Democratic Party explicitly targetedthe urbanand rural poor as it sought. if anything. opposition and competition from both left and right guaranteedthe autonomyof popularorganizationsand their continuedpolitical importance. most analysts have argued that it remains narrowly aimed at the very poor. The conventional wisdom Social Provision in Chile after Redemocratization with respect to Chilean social policy in the postmilitary era (1989-2000) is that it largely follows the targetedlogic developed duringthe military'sneoliberaltransformation of the economy. and later also Christian Democrats. competition among parties for supportgave them substantialleverage. While the PDC tried to gain clientelistic control over the organizationsof the poor (especially in the urban areas).821 between 1967 and 1969. it vigorously tried to organize and provide benefits to these constituencies. expanded.16This dynamic turned even more militant after 1970 when land invasions became prevalent. too. Left Christians.'sWhile these groups were tightly linked to political parties. In agriculture strike activity rose from a mere fifty-four disputes from 1960 to 1964 to 1. Since the 1930s many reformist parties-initially Communists.regressively organizedbefore the trans298 . This model of social provision differs from the earlier Chilean regime. The pre1973 Chilean welfare state was.Politics Comparative April 2002 The expanding reach of the redistributive state in precoup Chile is further explained by the mobilized and competitive politics of the period.15 left The was forced to respondwith ever more radicalproposals. The result has been a shift to quasi-universalpolicy outcomes on the consumption side and the emergence for the first time since 1973 of serious welfare efforts on the productionside. to establish an electoral presence. as promotionalefforts by the PDC and a new laborlaw created a reinforcing dynamic between mobilization and policy enactment. Indeed.17Similarmobilization and organizationoccurredin the urbanformaland informal sectors as strikes and property seizures there.14Once the PDC won the presidencyin 1964. and the Revolutionary Left-competed against each other. they were autonomousof state control. and Radicals. FRAP/Popular The poor themselves helped to furtherpropel redistributive reform. 100 326.000 766. 1995).065 n/d Recipients Value Recipients n/d n/d n/d n/d 527.but the program'ssize had been capped in 1986.5 85.000 3.000 879. which covers only those citizens affiliated with a private or public pension system (almost exclusively formal sector. per Month) TARGETEDASSISTANCE CashTransfers(SUF) Year 1970 1974 1977 1981 1983 1986 1989 1991 1996 Poverty Pensions (PASIS) Value Vue 0 0 6989 9819 9901 9059 7840 9430 10. Distribucidn Impacto e Distributivo GastoSocialen los Hogares1996(Santiago. but enforcementand implementationwere more established among middle sector and unionized formal sector workersthan among the poor concentratedin the countryside and urban informal sectors. (Washington. During the course of military rule many of these entitlementprogramswere replaced with means-testedand much less generous forms of welfare.3 119. the two periods of interest.072 27.200.929.964 24.082 n/d n/d n/d 2. forvalueof SUF.024.200 229.dramaticexpansions were made in more universal aspects of poverty relief.326 UNIVERSALASSISTANCE Family Allowance Recipients Value n/d n/d n/d 3. urbanworkers). Adjustment. "Chile: and in and Poverty.8 88.021."Lafijaci6n Salario 1992).0 108. Benefits were generally structuredas universalentitlements.Together.however. Coverage declined thereafteras recipients leaving the programwere not replaced. 151.all years. del 1998). With democratization. Vial.246. para 299 .354 16.031 1. Realminimum wage.the means-tested and family allowance subsidies are of comparablesize and are granted to compleTable 2 The Transformation and Retransformation of Social Welfare (Pesos of 1990.528 26.000 156.000 4.9 103. the beneficiary base was quite dramaticallybroadened.ed.4 128.000 3. Moreover.229 26. Inequality Chile:Mideplan.the commitment to targeting diminished Table2 presents the scope and characterof social welfare policy across dramatically. 12-20.184 17.700 292.22 unit value of means-testedwelfare transfers(SUF) was increased. are out SUFrecipients.000 3.400 324.246 951 1155 1164 0 0 66. Sources:ForPensions.however. With the returnof democracy.604 1.DavidBravoandJoaquin 45 (June1997).900 289.000 896. Minimo Chile:Elementos unaDiscusi6n. en Chile: Sociales:Su lm eato los flogaresChilenos (Santiago." en Coleccidn Estudios CIEPLAN. Value 31. SocialPolicyin the 1980s" NoraLustig.000 2429 2547 2118 1987 1564 1119 696 903 895* Real Minimum WageIndex (1970=100) 100.7 109..21 While the Chilean democraticgovernmentdid not wholly abandontargetedsocial The spending. from1970-1991: Allowances and Dagmar Family Raczynski PilarRomaguera.086.817.447 *Theaverage threerates: of subsidies phased atthe highestincomelevels.to 1991:MIDEPLAN.000 1. CopingwithAusterity: Poverty in Latin America Institution DC:TheBrookings 297: for 1996:MIDEPLAN. Once the neoliberal model was entrenchedin the social policy arena in the early 1980s. the program is a complement to the family allowances scheme. targeted forms of provision became the norm. especially increases in the family allowance (a subsidy paid per child principallyto formal sector workers)and the minimum wage.724 30. Programas del MIDEPLAN.3 138.MarcusJ Kurtz formationsof the neoliberal era.000 4.0 Civilian Pensions Avg.962. 2 percent. It entailed redistribution deemed at once inefficient and unjustby the Chicago-school economists who shaped 300 .23 Investment in production with an antipoverty component has taken principally two forms in Chile.24 has a welfare effect. fully fifty percent of the new and substantialsocial developmentrevenues raised in the 1990 tax reform went to the somewhat regressive family allowance and pension increases.25 Neoliberalism. The neoliberal developmentalmodel designed by these economists in the 1970s produced public policies that strongly prioritizedmarket forces. as it does not involve asset redistribution. and Quiescence: Thin but Broad Welfare Provision The social policy of the governing center-left Concertacidn alliance (1989-2000) in Chile is quasi-universalon the consumptionside. while public action was vilified as inherently inefficient and bureaucratic. Indeed. Indeed. excluding only the very wealthy. aimed at encouraging human capital formation. In addition.whose fundinghas stagnatedat a comparativelysmall US$50 million. insteadof abandoning poverty-targetedprograms. they are nearly universal. From 1989 to 1994 decentralized spending increased 178 percent in real This productionspending terms. This policy is not identical to Chilean policy before 1973. many of whom entered the military governmentafter the coup. they did not expand substantiallyuntil democratization. It also involved the posttransitionalliance between center and left parties.Politics Comparative April 2002 mentaryconstituencies. the formeruniversaland redistributive form of social provision became ideologically untenable. by the late 1980s technocraticapproachesto policy were becoming dominanteven among the opposition. while overall public investmentrose 80. but it is not nearly as focused on the goal of poverty alleviation as the FOSIS program. Although these regional development funds have existed since 1976. the Concertacidn. Chile has complemented them with public supports to the middle and working classes. as well as the political parameters agreed upon as part of the democratization process itself.Thus. supportingmicro-enterprises.collectively.and improving infrastructure in marginalized areas. The most well-developed local supporterswere led by a group of Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago.nor is it as universal and generous in its benefits.26 In Chile free marketideas began to make headway after the 1973 coup. there are the decentralized regional and local development funds (FNDR and ISAR) that give some priorityin their fund allocation to the needs of poorer areas. An importantpart of this difference can be explainedby the way in which new ideas about the state and its relationshipto society and market developed alongside the free market development model.27Free markets came to be valorized by the right as neutral and efficient.28 With this change in developmentalmodel. with limited market failure correction on the productionside. The most explicit is the social investmentfund (FOSIS). and did not substantiallyredistributeincome. under military rule. when pressure from mobilized constituencies was weak. social provision took on a minimalist.the rise to power of reformist center-left governments.In an intellectual environmentthat assertedthe primacy of marketsand the inefficiency of states. lic action in accord with political circumstances.As a result. distributingthem widely across its constituencies in the middle and lower classes.Qualitativechanges involving a redefinition of the state'srole in society or an end to private provision lack a widely shared intellectual foundation in Chilean society.30 Finally. no electoral bidding dynamic-the competitive expansion of the welfare state drivenby political conflict between center and left that characterizedthe 1960s and early 1970s-has emerged.32Changes in social policy have as a consequence been negotiated at the highest levels of the party leaderships.33 Lacking political traction.34As noted above. It placed little burdenon the public purse. judged guilty by association with import substitution industrialization. leaving only highly targeted and meager public assistance on the consumption side. this policy had the benefit of providing resources only to individualsunable to participatein the marketeconomy. Ideologically. targetedform. the organized social constituencies and competitive political dynamics that historically propelled welfare policy have declined substantially. With the transitionto democracy. a large proportionof the increase in social spending after democratiza301 . Importantly. This form of social welfare provision was not caused by neoliberal ideology. has governed since the democratic transition. then. was still shapedby the neoliberal development ideology (now shared by the center and most of the left).any more explicitly redistributiveor statist approacheswould leave political leaders open to charges of attemptingto reintroduce"failed" policies from the past.the Concertacidnalliance has moderatedthe policy proposals of the Socialist left and has implementedonly gradualincreases in social spending. political debate could center only on the level of spending and the degree of targeting. most interventionwas halted. in keeping with neoliberal norms about low tax and spending levels. both the it level and scope of antipovertyspending increased.MarcusJ Kurtz the military'seconomic policy. The Concertaci6n coalition of Christian Democratic and Socialist parties. thus insulating them from the pressures of the Concertacidn'sown organizedsocial constituencies. In particular. one side of the bipolar democratic/authoritariancleavage that has become central to Chilean politics. Even under authoritarianism.31The alliance is strongly reinforcedby an electoral law that places a premiumon cross-partycooperation. Competition among reformist parties has been replaced by a "responsible"centerleft alliance with an emphasis on fiscal probity in competition with a neoliberal right pushing minimalist government. ideology only shaped pubthough it was framed by it. and emergence of previously pent-up demands.29 On the productionside. Thus. policy reforms are broad but fiscally quite moderate.35 tics is so limited that even under center-left governmentsthe relative importanceof public assistance has not been maintainedacross time.38This policy indirectlyaffects large swathes of income earnersin Chile and costs the treasurylittle. for all its successes. organized labor.how this leverage is partly structuredby party system dynamics. and what political alliances have they struck? 302 .Politics Comparative April 2002 tion went to the broadlyapplied family allowance. Persistently high inequality underlines the fact that even the Concertaci6n'ssocial policy does not aim at real redistribution. Indicative of the restraintimplicit in a neoliberal developmentalmodel is the fact that the largestreal increases in the incomes of the poor came throughthe minimumwage. health. It includes a commitmentto the broad outlines of the neoliberal model and the agrariancounterreform. but the very poor were the only actors lacking a seat at the negotiatingtable. serving all but the highest income categories. the Chilean "economic miracle"merely reduced poverty to its dramatically. The characterand level of antipovertyactivity are also intimately linked to the amount of leverage that the poor themselves can apply directly to the political system. But it also reflects the power that the popular sector has as an actor in its own right or as an ally of others. a decline of over fifty percent for The independentpolitical weight of beneficiaries in Chileanpolithe very poorest.and to the markeddecline in povertybetween 1987 and 1996 can not be attributed redistributive social spending.36 historic levels. a broadeningof spending was inevitable. Two issues impinge here. but by modest amounts. but some were expanded.37 Thus. particularlythe level of competition and the presence of competing reformist parties.to the extent that policy was constructedthroughsocial concertationamong representatives of business. Governmenttransferpayments as a proportionof income droppedfor all income quartiles over this period. fiscal caution was the watchwordof the posttransitiongovernments.The entire increase in the welfare family allowance (SUF) between 1989 and 1996 amounted to little more than US$1 per month. Indeed. while overall inequality has increased Thus.it must be rememberedthat. Moreover. the poor in Chile have only recently reestablished the living standardsthey had in 1970. While it could be arguedthat this decline reflects the success of growth-mediatedpoverty abatement. and industrial privatizationswere not only let stand. Direct transfersincreased in value (though overall spending increasedonly moderatelyas coverage declined).Pension. Furtherevidence of the moderatingeffects of the presentbipolar party system on political competition can be found in the host of issues that were explicitly removed from the political agenda before PresidentAylwin took office and in the programof governmentof the Concertaci6n. As noted earlier. and the state. This increase contrastedwith a long period of decline but was substantiallyless than the 44 percent real increase in the minimum wage over the same period. How organizedare the poor. 40 Even the briefly hopeful signs of organizationamong the urban popular sectors in the mid 1980s quickly evaporated. its community development (social) aspect 303 .MarcusJ Kurtz When the poor as a group are mobilized and capable of allying themselves with other major actors. labor law. Individualization was the watchword. their ability to affect policy decisions is notably weak. and the pension system. as the state largely ceased to have direct responsibility for the levels of benefit or the terms of labor agreements.in Chile they lack political connections to the right and have only weak organizational linkages to the center-left.39But this atomization disproportionatelyaffected the poorest elements of society. Much of the organizationalweakness of the popular sectors can be attributedto the social effects of the neoliberal developmental model pursued since the late 1970s. it provides micro-enterprisefunding for peasants and indigenous groups. Consequently. was the disarticulation of what had formerly been exceedingly powerful beneficiary coalitions. they can overcome the disadvantagesof a less competitive party system. savings and loan institutions. in marked contrast to the 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed. but it has obtained only minor changes in the labor code and has recently been marginalized from discussions over the minimumwage. it deliberately involves the private sector in its project structure.these groups are largely captive constituencies of the Concertaci6n.despite ten years of governmentby political allies. First. In addition.41 Thus. But popular sector interestsmust be representedby powerful intermediaries that are valuable allies for middle class actors and are capable of punishing politicians who fail to implement their promises. the peasant sector has had virtuallynone of its key demands addressed. since they have no alternativepolitical home. particularly in social provision. while the national peasant (CNC) and labor (CUT) confederations are directly tied to the governing parties of the Concertaci6n alliance. but it largely offers credit indirectlythroughthe private financial system by subsidizing banks. Indeed.Moreover.42 The productioninvestments of the FOSIS programhave some potential to mitigate this problemif they are undertakenon a sufficiently large scale. Unfortunately. Indeed. and this alliance reinforces its stability across time. undertaking no projects directly but instead operating through private firms or organized social groups.Second. The labor movement has been slightly more successful.one of the key aims of many of the reforms of the military era. Politically. the program is structuredaround a cross-class alliance. encouraging local self-organization among the poor was one of its goals. systematic political repression coupled with extremely "flexible" labor markets(and two waves of severe unemploymentand recession) served to undermine most organized actors in civil society. and nongovernmentalorganizations.the most disadvantaged sectors of society-the informal sectors in the peri-urbanareas and the peasantryare also those least likely to have strong organizationalintermediation. For example. as organizationin the countryside all but disappeared. but now under the leadership of a presidenttrainedin neoclassical economic thought and committedto interAs national integration. social welfare reform finally took center stage under the presidency of Carlos Salinas (1988-94). lately culminatingin loss of the presidency. Two changes were critical.2 percent per year. It is explicitly hoped that these committees will survive after the initial seed money from FOSIS disappears. leading to improvements in local governance and increased capacity to articulate and promote interests. wing of the governing PRI completed its ascendancy.After decades of inattentionto poverty. during the sexenio of Miguel de la Madrid(1982-88) social developmentspending contractedby 6.46 embodied in the National Solidarity Program(PRONASOL). the government initiated an extensive policy that targetedproductionand consumption. In 1988 Mexico held the first truly competitive presidentialelection since the revolution. as resourceswere redirectedto paymentof externalobligations. the program is quite small and has remainedso.punctuatedin the 1970s only by a in limited returnto asset redistribution land. not transformationof social welfare. Neoliberalism. These first six years of crisis were a period of redefinition along severalaxes that culminatedin the election of Carlos Salinas in 1988 and the establishmentof a new model of poverty alleviation.43 Mexico: Political Competitiveness. The existing form of social provision largely based on universal consumption subsidies (especially for wage foods) quickly became fiscally unsustainable. It targetedsocial programs directly at those most in need and bypassed corporatist and clientelist institutions that had formerly been central channels of state-society interaction.and the technocratic Salinas'santipovertystrategy. Unfortunately.47 Salinas also hoped it would rebuild support for the severely weakened governing 304 .despite a dramaticupsurgein poverty.45It declined even more steeply than generalrevenues.Indeed.44 politics became competitive (the odds of oppositionvictoin Mexico in 1988 were greaterthan the likelihood of the right'swinning in Chile ry in 1989 or 1993) and disquiet from below mounted. was the watchwordof the day. and the Shift to ProductionOriented and Targeted Poverty Alleviation Antipoverty policy in Mexico has undergone dramatic transformationsbecause of catastrophiceconomic crisis and the sudden decline in the traditionalpolitical hegemony of the InstitutionalRevolutionaryParty(PRI).Initially.Politics Comparative April 2002 operates through and promotes the creation of local development committees. austerity. National political competition became in part organized aroundwelfare provision. The debt crisis of 1982 delivered a blow to the long-standingstatist developmental model from which it would never recover.was designed to make social spending compatible with neoliberal adjustmentstrategies. on the other. It included very importantlythe provision of working and investment capital for peasants who would otherwise lack access to credit.176-190. foodaid) Production-Side Supports Development Regional Infrastructure DirectAidsto Production 1. by by pricesas reported the Bankof Mexico.801 (893. market failure corrections.766) Bdsicasobrela Ejecuci6n Desarrollo de Nacional Solidaridad: Sources:DatafromSEDESOL.153. (includes and housing.684) (1. and social investment funds) Table 3 Productionand ConsumptionOrientedPRONASOL Spending.020 1. Indeed. forms of consumption and.000 local solidarity committees during its six year life. the life of PRONASOLended with economic crisis and the election of a new president.672.854) (1.266. means-testedconsumptionsubsidies and investmentin productionremainedthe central axes.474.488.594) (1.The programoperatedthrough some 250. while the administration of the program was altered.038) (853.998.264 2.729.683. in 1994.050.053 1.526.277 2." infrastructural improvementsfor indigenous communities. PRONASOLwas marketfriendly.254. y Informaci6n Programa variation consumer in del Programa to 1994). agricultural credit. Ernesto Zedillo. while the federal governmentwas officially relegated only to the definition of broad goals.668 (613.States and municipalitieswere for the first time given an importantrole in national antipovertypolicy.062) (1.953. the bulk of social spending was channeledthroughthe federal structure.045) (879.748) (1.892 2. he restructured the administrationof social welfare funds.unlike earlier efforts.on the one hand. 1989-1994 (Thousandsof New Pesos of 1989) 1989 Consumption-Side Supports education. subsidies and credit to and "social enterprises.197.431.343.MarcusJ Kurtz This very ambitiousprogramreorientedMexican antipovertypolicy. many of the core subprogramsof PRONASOL (for example.271) (801. but the principle of using social welfare funds simultaneously to alleviate poverty and create local social capital was a core innovation of the program.human and social capital formation.involving neither price controls nor direct competitionwith the privatesector.817.772. indigenous community development.617 1993 3.259) (1. The participationof local social groups in both the design and execution of projects to be funded was a key aspect of PRONASOL.50The committees' political independenceand grass-rootscharactervaried a great deal.354) 1. 305 . It highparty.520.314) (437.502 1994 2.adjusted theDecember December (MexicoCity:SEDESOL.475 1991 2.and microenterprisefinance in production.48 ly targeted.919 1990 1.49 Table 3 presents a breakdown of the considerable resources allocated to this program. health.53 It is crucial to note that.52 Like so many grand projects in Mexico.51Importantly.213 1992 3. While Zedillo retained much of PRONASOL's policy orientation. Instead of allocating funds through the solidarity committees directly linked to the central government. The first moves in this direction occurred underPresidentde la Madrid. In Mexico. the implementationof a neoliberal developmentalmodel marked a dramaticbreak with the past.Similarly.the emergence of an ideological commitmentto neoliberalismcan be seen in the willingness of Mexican presidentsto challenge the sacred cows of the revolutionary legacy. Nor was it able to form strong linkages to democratic. a commitment to neoliberalism required a rethinking of state-society relations that manifested itself in changes to the regime of social provi306 . and property rights guarantees amounted to a public renunciationof a strong state role in economic guidance.54The changes were quantitative. of ever. and Civil Society: The Limits of Poverty Alleviation The very featuresthat made poverty relief initially more substantialin scope in Mexico than in Chile. In ideological terms.the popular sector lacked the ability to keep its needs squarely on the national agenda. Policy outcomes in this context then remainedhighly targetedon the consumptionside (both in political and socioeconomic terms). and import substitution-has been thoroughly discredited.pridevelopment ideology vatization. populism. the domestic political dynamics that shapedthe policies differed substantially. while the momentary threat to PRI dominance in 1988 brought a large policy response via PRONASOL. and funding declined with electoral competitivenessand public austerity.reformist forces on the left (the PRD) or the right (the PAN) that might make it a locus of political competitionratherthan a PRI captive.whose constitutionalreforms (Article 25) strengthened the state'srole in the economy but transformedits function from engine of growthto While neoliberalism as a development ideology may not private sector regulation. the historical alternative-nationalism. Neoliberalism.Actual was outlays declined as economic crisis forced austerity. Reforms to Article 27 of the constitutionand the passage of the 1992 LeyAgraria ended the land reform and broughta guaranteeof propertyrightsto private landowners.Crucially. as in Chile. Since the autonomous organizational capacity of the poor was low (or displaced by the presence of official organizations). As important. this response was designed simultaneouslyto improve living conditions and underminedissent. The combination of tariff reduction. eventually underminedits continuation. as the economic effects that these changes wrought was the transformation that they embodied.Politics Comparative April 2002 simply continued under their own names.While the generalboundariesto policy were defined in similarways by the overarchingdevelopmentalideology. greatercompetitiveness in the party system but little real linkage between the poor and reformistparties.and programadministration decentralized. Political Competition.any pretense of the nationalismhistorically so centralto howregime legitimacy was abandonedin the ratificationof NAFTA.55 be as widely accepted across the Mexican political spectrumas in Chile. Indeed. 56This change squared an important ideological and political circle. It permittedthe state to interveneto mitigate poverty but intellectually justified its intervention in nineteenth century terms of social liberalism rather than the broad-basedclaims of distributivejustice that had formerly prevailed. While party politics became substantiallymore competitive after the 1988 presidentialelections. In Chile. with the left (PRD) and right (PAN) oppositions winning importantelections. With the historic blending of state and party resources. The response to the crisis was austerity and even a disproportionate decline in antipoverty spending. FOSIS and PRONASOL). the PRI.7 and 10. there was little incentive for PRI elites to provide costly. Their social constituencies in the corporatistorganizationswere unable to demand them.linked to the implementationof liberal economic policies and propelledpolitically by the IME. autonomous. Some have gone so far as to suggest that the creation of this neoliberal form of social welfare was largely imposed externally. As efficiency criteriabegan to govern state action and an emphasis on market price signals became axiomatic. antipovertypolicies were pushed in a more targeted and means-tested direction. The onset of the debt crisis made this situation all too clear. before the authoritarianinterlude. even its poorest segments. politics had always been highly competitive.59The dynamic in Mexico. society. while not involving the brutalauthoritarianismof the Pinochet dictatorship.5 percent per year between 1983 and 1988 and implicit unemploymentreached 20. Since the revolution the state had been dominatedby a single political force.and organized opposition.58 However.57In intellectualterms. Social welfare was cut even as real wages collapsed between 7. Moreover. Here the crucial variablesare located in the political system. and broad-based social benefits. alternationin federal executivepower did not become possible for anothertwelve years. Thus. it also borrowedfrom the Chilean military'sapproachto rendering social and economic policy consistent by utilizing privateagents where possible and emphasizing the perfection of market function (for example. and all tendencies had a meaningful chance of assuming national executive power. When such autonomousmobilization among the poor occasionally developed. peasant confederations. it typito incipient dissatisfaction in an ad hoc fashion ratherthan through cally responded institutionalizedwelfare channels. and oppositionparties had few connections to similar groups with which to initiate a bidding dynamic.60 Since national alternationof power did not occur until 2000.3 percent 307 . had become well organized by the 1960s. the Mexican governing party was in a somewhat differentposition than its Chilean counterparts.public welfare reestablishedregime legitimacy and political quiescence.and popular sector organizations) kept its position secure in the absence of a powerful. stable.has been quite different. the neoliberal development ideology-a feature shared with the contemporary Chilean case-does not explain the marked differences in social policy across these two countries.Marcus J Kurtz sion. Until at least the 1970s the viability of corporatist social institutions (labor unions. 61This response was possible precisely because the PRI's political hegemony was unchallengeduntil 1988.000 solidaritycommitteesceased to function.the Mexican efforts have been intermittentand usually politically targeted.ComparativePolitics April 2002 by 1985. the PRONASOL program was And the actually administereddirectly out of the office of the presidentuntil 1992.64 shift to Zedillo's PROGRESAprogramsealed the fate of the organization-building aspects of welfare policy. there has been no sustainedalleviation of poverty. however.there were no organized intermediariesconnected to opposition political parties that might have pressed social demands in an ongoing and effective way.62 ed to 61 percent of the vote. in Mexico much of this political terrainwas already occupied by corporatist or state-influenced organizations.and small business interests. Unlike Chile. For PRONASOLto have embodied a truly effective form of social and human capital formation. by 1994 most of the 250.the governing party was incapableof this degree of neutrality.Resourceswere targeted not simply by degree of poverty.who faced a powerful and organized political threat from the left in the form of Cuauhtemoc Cirdenas and the PRD.While neither representsthe best of all possible worlds. Then the resources allocated through local solidarity committees might have been effective seed grants for the constructionof local organization and social capital. It also naturallyreflects in part the austerityimposed by the 1994-95 economic downturn.nor has there been a sustainedstrategyfor its alleviation.it would have had to be severed from the discretionary political control of the PRI.and the programwas frequentlyused in a clientelistic fashion. Here the linkage between political competitiveness and autonomousorganization becomes crucial. In contrastto Chile. Unfortunately. The consequences of this catastrophewere left to the next president.worker. but also to areas of opposition strength. the reduced level of political competition in the early to mid 1990s made the alleviation of poverty less importantto the PRI.63 In a move that emphasized its political character.If the Chileanefforts at poverty alleviation have been cautious and broadly targeted.In this fashion he sought to relegitimatethe governmentand turnback the Indeed. The profoundweakness of particularlyruralcivil society may help to explain the discontinuitiesin Mexican antipovertypolicy.65Actors seeking to represent these interestsmust overcome the dual barriersof an atomized and fragmentedsociety and the presence of (quasi) official organizationsthat seek to monopolize most available political space.by the 1991 midtermelections PRI supporthad reboundopposition threat. This feat was remarkableindeed. especially given the scope of the economic catastropheof the 1980s. and in part.Salinas. at least in Chile by universalizing policy outputs sus308 . where the advent of democratizationled directlyto the reemergence of authentic(if dramatically weakened) intermediariesfor peasant. In part. Rising political competitiveness provoked a response: Salinas launchedthe PRONASOLpoverty relief program. as in Chile before 1973. in contrast. indeed disproportionately the more marginalizedsectors of civil society. Where several reformist parties compete with each other.66 Mexico. More substantial initiatives would require a more competitivepolitical environmentthan that faced by the first two Concertaci6n In administrations.if the recent triumph of even a conservative (PAN) opposition presidentialcandidatelike Vicente Fox marks the opening of a truly competitive era in Mexican politics.the recent shift towardmore free market forms of economic organization has an atomizing effect on civil society. Where only one political party has as part of its goals serious antipovertyefforts. However. change would require strong links between the PAN and groups representing the poor. once the PRI's near-deathexperience had few organized actors could protest the decline of the briefly formidable and passed. will have a greaterlikelihood of sparkingsuch a virtuous cycle. Autonomous organization and participationin cross-class alliances have sustained the modest and quasiuniversal antipoverty effort in Chile. ultimately has lessons for the other. However. and responsiveness to actors in civil society in general is reduced. Similarly. Conclusions What do the experiences of Chile and Mexico tell about the conditions that undergird different programs of poverty eradication? First and foremost. but it has tended to take the form of means-tested programs to combat short-runproblems and reduce the potential for dissent. even where the impoverishedpopulation is quite large. In comparativelyuncompetitive contexts states may well engage in poverty relief. Each case. antipovertyprograms that supportthe organizationof the poorer sectors of civil society.poor voters can not become a captive constituency.Thus. that is. the popular sectors must generate autonomousrepresentativeorganizations. If an initial effort results in the 309 . potentiallyinnovativeantipovertyeffort of the Salinas sexenio. Second. development strategies and ideologies place boundaries on the range of politically viable approachesto poverty relief. especially on the production side. the impoverished sectors can more easily be subordinatedto other goals. however.MarcusJ Kurtz tained and increased spending has been possible. links that do not yet exist.party system dynamics and the level of political inclusiveness (the quality of democratic practice) are crucial mediators. Finally. If coalion tions supporting a substantial welfare state are to be formed. Rather.and antipovertyefforts and political accountabilityare likely to be highest. open democratic competition by itself is insufficient to drive social welfare. it raises the possibility of responsiveness and greater stability in the realm of social provision. those that support social capital formation. but democracy should be thought of in terms of degrees. political competition and conflict in the context of democracyare critical in determiningpolicy within these limits. esp. Charles Ragin..Ann Orloff. The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. "The Difficult Transitionfrom Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico. Studies 1. Peter Evans. 46 (January1994)."QuarterlyJournal ofEconomics. see Kenneth Roberts. Transformationsand Perspectives. This argument is commonly made for the American case. 82 (February1968)." WorldPolitics.. 310 . JonathanFox.Private Marketsfor Public Goods: Raising the Stakes in Economic Reform (Washington."AmericanJournal ofSociology."in Riidiger Dornbuschand Sebastian Edwards. and Linda Weiss. I do not wish to ascribe excessive rigidity or internalconsistency to the emergence of development models or ideologies. Robert Kaufman and BarbaraStallings. Evelyne Huber. "Three Worlds of Welfare State Research." Comparative Studies. Stephens. these very same social actors will become increasinglyattractiveas coalition partnersand will be more able to sustainthe antipovertyefforts that gave birthto them.: The Brookings Institution.Politics Comparative April 2002 generation of more powerful representativesof the poor in national politics. Albert Hirschman. 1988). "The Political Economy of Import Substituting Industrialization in Latin America. "The Populist Road to MarketReform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina. 31 (October 1998). 33 (August-September 2000). 1998).1993). 48 (1996). See MargaretWeir. 99 (November 1993).eds. and Theda Skocpol. 99 (November 1993). 41 (Fall 1999). See also Carol Graham. 2. 3. 7. 4 (Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute."Democracy and Social Policy Series Working Paper No. and KurtWeyland. EdwardGibson. ChristianDemocracy. and John D. 1960-82. On the emergence of import substitution industrialization. 9. EmbeddedAutonomy: States and Industrial Transformation(Princeton: Princeton University Press. in 4.27 (February1999). The Macroeconomicsof Populism in Latin America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. "Political Resources and the Growthof Welfare in Affluent CapitalistDemocracies.D. 6. 49 (April 1997). see Dagmar Raczynski. 1995). 5.see John Waterbury. and William J. NOTES I am again deeply indebted to Peter Houtzagerand Andrew Schrankfor their advice on (many) draftsof this article and to the Instituteof Development Studies for financial support."Economic Policy in Chile's New Democracy. and Alexander Hicks and Joya Misra. WhenWork Disappears: The World of the New UrbanPoor (New York:Vintage. I say competitive instead of democraticbecause of the partialityof Mexican democratization the 1980s. and Theda Skocpol. 32. See Paul Pierson. "Social Democracy."Journal of Inter-American and World Affairs."AmericanJournal of Sociology. p. eds."World Politics."ComparativePolitical Studies. "The Futureof Social Policy in the United States: Political Constraintsand Possibilities" in MargaretWeir. On political effects of antipoverty policy. 12. 8." World Politics.Ann Orloff."The Long Gestation and World Brief Triumphof Import-Substituting Industrialization.C.and the WelfareState. The Politics of Social Policy in the UnitedStates (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press. only to consider how they can shape outcomes throughtheir elective affinities. "Social Policies in Chile: Origin."Swallowingthe Political Bitter Pill: Sources of PopularSupport for Neoliberal Reform in Latin America. KurtWeyland. Wilson. 1998)." Development.ConstitutionalStructure. "The Political Economy of Latin American Populism. 1991). chs. For social policy during military rule. 1996). 1-2. "Neoliberalism and the Transformationof Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case. by removing expatriated 14." American Economic Review. 17. 1994).C. Rethinkingthe Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth and TwentiethCentury Chile (Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press.1993). 19." in J. El Cascabel al Gato: La Batalla por la Reforma Previsional (Santiago: Zig-Zag."MarketEconomy. ArturoValenzuela. Jose Pifiera. 18. see Kenneth Roberts. 324. 26. 1978). On strikes. Waterbury. p. Carlos Acufia. 69-79. eds. 25. Ratl Prebisch."The InstitutionalRoots of PopularMobilization: State Transformation RuralPolitics in Brazil and Chile. 1972).42 (June 1996). 161. 311 . 17. The Breakdownof Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press. in education policy sustained support for the MECE programto improve infrastructure in roughly half the country'smunicipal schools contrastswith severe budget cuts in the P900 program specifically targetedat the bottom ten percent of schools. The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington. Timothy Scully.Fondos de InversionSocial enAmerica Latina (Santiago: PREALC/OIT. "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries. 141. Patricio Silva.. p. 248. it lifts the living standardsof the many whose earnings are relativelynearbut above or below its level.1994). "In Search of a Manual for Technopols" in John Williamson. and StructuralReformin LatinAmerica (New Brunswick:Transaction. 49 (May 1959). 20. Samuel Valenzuela and ArturoValenzuela. 36. D. 1986). 22. 23. Social Welfare. Calculated from Claudio Serrano." in William C. 31 (May 1999). 153.MarcusJ Kurtz 10. "From the Barricades to the Ballot Box: Redemocratizationand Political Realignment in the Chilean Left. p. Pilar Vergara." 28. 16."NACLA Report on theAmericas. 29. p. JuanCarlos Marin. 1989). 21. and John Williamson. p. "Changes in the Economic Function of the Chilean State under the Military Regime. "Chile's Neo-liberal Revolution: IncrementalDecisions and Structural Journal of LatinAmericanStudies."Journal of LatinAmericanStudies. 29 (May-June1996). ed. See Graham. Jual Gabriel Valdes. Smith. For example." Colecci6n Estudios CIEPLAN. and Eduardo Gamarra. Nationalization can be (and was) seen as both a developmentaland an antipovertystrategy. and Democratic Consolidation in Chile. Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions(Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press. 23 (May 1991). Markets. For example. These political dynamics also affect the ability of the poor to organize themselves. Evolucitn de las Politicas Sociales en Chile. and Hernin Biichi. La Escuela de Chicago: Operacitn Chile (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Zeta."ComparativeStudies in Society and History. Ministerio de Planificaci6n y Cooperaci6n (MIDEPLAN). Lifting the minimum wage is quasi-universalin effect because it forms a floor for the formal labor force as well as a reference point for informal (especially agricultural)workers. eds. 27. Democracy. and Marcus Kurtz. Pilar Vergara.pp. Jose Wurgaft.since privateprofits it released funds for both reinvestmentand redistribution. Transformation. 1992). Pilar Vergara. 1991)."Politics and Society. "Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks. "In Pursuit of 'Growth with Equity': The Limits of Chile's Free-Market Social Reforms. 24. 11. Scully... "Gobierno Regional e Iversitn Pfblica Descentralizada. p. 42 (April 2000). 15. p. 30. 67-68.Las Tomas(Santiago:ICIRA. 1993). 23 (December 1995). 1920-1991 (Santiago:MIDEPLAN. 1991).see ibid. 12. See Peter and Houtzagerand MarcusKurtz. La Transformacidn Econtmica de Chile: Del Estatitismo a la Libertad Econtmica (Barcelona:Grupo EditorialNorma.: Institute for International Economics. p. Its effects on incomes in Chile are thus certainlynot restrictedto the poor. 13. On the conversion of the bulk of the Chilean left to free market economic ideas. 86.. 247. p. pp." Comparative Political Studies. 344-46. de 39. 43. Cuauht6moc Cardenas. MIDEPLAN.. see Rhoda Rabkin. 1994). pp. Fox. 32. and MIDEPLAN. 57 (October-December1995). from HarvardUniversity in 1978 and was among the new generation of technocraticPresidents. 23.The governmenthas shown little flexibility. See Agiiero and Tironi. Solidaridad: Seis Ahiosde Trabajo(Mexico City: SEDESOL/SOLIDARIDAD. 1995). OrganizingCivil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Strugglefor Democracyin Chile (University Park:PennsylvaniaState University Press. "Free Markets and Democratic Consolidation in Chile: The National Politics of Politics and Society. ed. Initially. since the left tends to be the third strongest electoral force. demands 37."Estudios Publicos." 41.p.Nora Lustig."Journal of LatinAmerican Studies. 49.:The Brookings Institution. Informacidn Basica sobre la Ejecuci6n y Desarrollo del Programa (Mexico City: SEDESOL. 51. 50. 35. p. Arturo Le6n. and Party Strategies in Chile. see Bravo andVial. Many observers wonder whether the leftist opposition candidate. In practice."Democracy and Social Policy Series WorkingPaperNo. On the centripetal tendencies created by the electoral system. Electoral Engineering.the Concertaci6n saw the minimum wage as an issue for corporatistbargainingbetween the chamberof commerce (CPC) and the laborconfederation(CUT). "Redemocratization. 113-26. Wurgaft."Revista demands. 34. Mexicana de Sociologia. 23. Programa Nacional de Solidaridad. 1989-1995. 59. esp. "Empresarios."Social Welfare Policy and Political Opening in Mexico. 8 (Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute. the electoral law provides a powerful incentive for center-leftparties to remain in the Concertaci6n alliance and poses a serious barrierfor the at Communistpartyto achieve any representation all. and recently the governmenthas preferredto impose minimum wage increases unilaterallywithout coming to an agreementwith the CUT. RuralTransformation.El Proceso Politico Chileno (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana Ciencias Sociales. In each districtthe first and second place lists receive seats.D.1995).ComparativePolitics April 2002 31. 30. 1994). 74 (Autumn 1999).El ProgramaNacional de Solidaridad: Una Visi6nde la Modernizacidnde MWxico (Mexico City: Fondo de CulturaEcon6mica.D. Felipe Agilero and Eugenio Tironi.3 percentof the vote. 11-12. 38. 1994). 36. 1983). 25 (October 1993). and Arianna Legovini. Consejo Consultivo del ProgramaNacional de Solidaridad. unless the first place list receives double the votes of the second. Marcus Kurtz. 45.evidence that the Concertaci6nhas proven unwilling to addressthe redistributive of even its organized social constituencies such as the labor movementcan be found in the fact thatthese groups have recently turnedto strikes and mobilization ratherthan negotiation to force attentionto their Neoliberalismo y Transici6nDemocritica en Chile. 42. was denied victory only by fraud. The Chilean legislatureis elected entirely from two member districts. Coping with Austerity: Poverty and Inequalityin LatinAmerica (Washington. 151.p.and it has not been punished for this stance.After a suspicious computercrash Salinas was credited with 50. 312 . On the minimumwage. "UrbanPoverty in Chile: Its Extent and Diversity.ProgramasSociales. p. 165-74. Manuel Antonio Garret6n. Santiago Friedmann. 40. 44. 33. 161. Philip Oxhorn. 27 (June 1999). Peter Ward. p. The CPC quickly withdrewfromthe process. 1994). SEDESOL. "iSobrevivird el Nuevo Paisaje Politico Chileno?.Distribuci6n. pp. Carlos Salinas received his Ph. 48. See Patricio Silva. 29 (June 1996).C. 47. "Mexico: Social Spending and Food Subsidies during Adjustment in the 1980s" in Nora Lustig. Indeed. 46. on the Concertaci6n'selectoral base. 166. eds. Fox. 334-41. Ann Craig. 313 . See James Petras. 55. Hira Gortari and Alicia Ziccardi. SEDESOL. 1994). A good example is the brief returnto serious agrarianreform in the early 1970s under President Echeverriain response to rising unrest in the late 1960s. 58." in Las Politicas Sociales de Mixico en los Aios Noventa.. see Kenneth Shadlen.3 percent against the right's 48. p. 1992). eds. Ward.Ann Craig. extend and equalize access to health care across public and private sectors. and reformthe labor law. 63. 226. Transforming State-SocietyRelations in Mexico. Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress. pp. p.S. Friedmann. See Armando Bartra. 35 (2000). Wayne Cornelius. Seminario de Actualizaci6n sobre Politica Social Integral: Sintesis Programdtica (Mexico City: SEDESOL. 1995-2000 (Mexico City: Secretaria de Hacienday Cr6ditoPfiblico. eds.p. Mexico under Zedillo (Boulder: LynneRienner. 65.7 percent) may augurjust such a change. 62. Guillermo Trejo and Claudio Jones. and Jonathan Fox. "Political Dilemmas of Welfare Reform: Poverty and Inequality in Mexico. 64. 1998).pp. It is notable that critical policy initiatives of the first year of Lagos's administrationfurther universalized and expanded Chilean social provision. 54. 10-11. pp. 181. and Small Business PoliticalActivism in Contemporary Mexico. "Mexico's National Solidarity Program: An Overview. 57. "Instituciones y Clientelas de la Politica Social: Un Esbozo Hist6rico. 628. Corporatism. and Fox. 53. 124. "Neoliberalism. 1999).MarcusJ Kurtz 52.-Mexican Studies. and JonathanFox. p. 1996)."LatinAmericanResearch Review. Poder Ejecutivo Federal.p. 66.. 249-50. 1995). Craig.Los herederos de Zapata: Movimientoscampesinosposrevolucionarios en Mexico (Mexico City: Ediciones Era. p. 61. 1969). For an insightful look at the difficulties of autonomous self-organizationin such contexts with an emphasis on small business. Ward. 60. "Electoral Determinants and Consequences of National Solidarity"in Cornelius. Juan Horcasitas and Jeffrey Weldon. They include proposals to create an unemploymentinsurance fund. "Entrela Eficiencia y la Legitimidad:El PRONASOL como Politica Social. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Sara Gordon. 59. Transforming State-SocietyRelations in Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy (San Diego: Center for U. 626." in Las Politicas Sociales de Mixico en los Ahos Noventa (Mexico City: UNAM/FLACSO/Plazay Vald6s." in Susan KaufmanPurcell and Luis Rubio."in WayneCornelius. The recent narrow election of Socialist Ricardo Lagos (51. 56. 1867-1994..