TLO Southern Cluster Report (22May08)

March 23, 2018 | Author: Matthieu DuPee | Category: Sampling (Statistics), Kandahar, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Agriculture


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TRIBAL LIAISON OFFICEAfghanistan Border-Districts Exploratory Assessment SouthernCluster : Zabul,Kandahar Helmand,Nimroz , 1 © 2008 Tribal Liaison Office T able of Content INTRODUCTION Methodology ECONOMIC OVERVIEW Markets Agricultural Production – Export/Import Goods Labour Migration Currency and Prices Land and land ownership POLITICAL OVERVIEW Influence of jiahdi commanders Insurgency Cross-border linkages/Refugee Warrior Communities Small Arms Flow Drug Economy TRIBAL OVERVIEW Cluster remits of tribes The Kuchi – Nomads of Afghanistan 2 18 21 21 24 26 26 30 33 36 37 40 41 45 49 54 63 TRIBAL RELATIONS Ghilzai-Durrani fault line – historical context Panjpai and Zirak Durrani struggle over power and resources Intra-Zirak Durrani power struggle Other tribal conflicts RECOMMENDATIONS Politics and Security Economy Research 66 68 70 72 73 77 78 79 81 . 2 .1). Helmand and Nimroz into the Southern cluster comes from the overall inter-connectedness of these provinces into the Southern region (also including Uruzgan).1 Overview of provinces and Districts in Southern Cluster The reason for placing Kandahar. FIGURE 1. which links up in the east with the South-eastern province of Paktika and Ghazni (see Figure 1.1 Introduction Chapter T he southern cluster runs from the province of Nimroz in the Southwest over Helmand and Kandahar in the South to Zabul. with Kandahar forming the regional capital. Zabul. The entire area called Registan (including Dishu and Khanishin in Helmand. Maruf (the link to Zabul in the Northeast) borders both Zhob and Pishin (Quetta) in Pakistan. Its strategic location has made it a desired area of settlement since ancient times. thus Table 1. Paktika. borders Chagai only. which lies in the East of the Southern cluster. Dishu and Khanishin (both bordering Chagai).2). while Arghistan and Spin Boldak only border Pishin. Zabul is in the middle of major crossroads for the insurgency. Its border with Zhob in Pakistan is disputed. as there are many linkages between districts in Kandahar. Atghar provides the link with Kandahar (Maruf). Even though Helmand has two districts that border Pakistan. Day Kundi. As many of their animals perished. they have been forces to settle down and take up new businesses. its border is slightly shorter than that of Nimroz. The drought has also affected the Kuchi populations inhabiting the area. Ghazni (Nawa) in the North. as some claim that there is none. Zabul can be considered a buffer between the Southern and Southeastern cluster.1 does not provide an entry for the length of Atghar’s border with Zhob. has two districts bordering with Pakistan and the shortest border to Pakistan of all three Southern provinces. the link to Helmand. Arghistan. Reg in Kandahar and all of southern Nimroz) is nearly all sand-desert with villages in Dishu and Khanishin being located along the Helmand River in the Northern part. Narcotics from Nangarhar and Wana in South Waziristan meet in Zabul where they are directed through the Daman desert in Kandahar to the Baramcha bazaar in South Helmand and on to Europe via Iran and Turkey (see also discussions in the Southeastern cluster report). While Shamulzayi district borders Zabul (Shinkay) in the west. Shorabak and Reg) • It is considered the centre of the South (both politically and economically). Spin Boldak.Large areas along the borders are only sparsely populated. Waza Khwa in Paktika in the East. Leftover or stockpiled weapons from jihad times from weapons depots in Northern Afghanistan are smuggled via Bamiyan. with Kandaharcity being the regional capital. 3 . Zabul. a total of 401 km. but our research indicated it to be Khanishin (see box and Figure 1. • Kandahar has five districts bordering with Pakistan and also the most extensive border. drug and weapons trade: • • Insurgents move along the mountain ranges running from Quetta district between Maruf and Arghistan through Zabul to Ghazni. Ghazni to Zabul and on to Paktika and Wana in South Waziristan. Ghazni and Zabul. Helmand is wedged between Kandahar to the East (Reg district) and Nimroz to the west (Dishu district). destroying most of the land that might be used for agricultural purposes. and Reg. Shorabak borders Pishin and Chagai. Kandahar is the most dominant province for two reasons: • It has the most extensive border with Pakistan (5 border-districts running east to south: Maruf. There is a slight disagreement as to which of the Helmand districts actually border Pakistan: Khanishin or Garamsir. and Zhob district in Pakistan. Kandahar was the capital of Afghanistan until Timur Shah established Kabul as his capital in 1775. The drought has had an extreme effect over the past few years in this area. These findings make sense since the entire area occupied by Dishu and Khanishin in Helmand. Zahir Shah.FIGURE 1. This border dispute highlights two important points: a) that there are different 4 . Registan is a natural border with Pakistan and has always presented an obstacle for conventional military forces.2 “Where in Helmand is Khanishin” (=Reeg): ISAF vs. AIMS. A main mapping source commonly used. yet more recent maps drawn by ISAF reflect a reality that corresponds closer to our own findings (which are based on interviews and not satellite imagery or GPS coordinates). The ISAF boundaries show Reeg (which is Khanishin in Helmand). as Khanishin is essentially another word as Reg. While maps do show this reality. shows Garamsir (or Garmser in the map on Figure 1. Reg in Kandahar and southern parts of Nimroz belong to an area called Registan (meaning “Sand land” or “land of Sand” in Persian). AIMS Unclear boundaries – the Case of Khanishin and Garamsir The two border-districts of Dishu and Khanishin used to be part of Garamsir but were separated out as their own districts during the rule of the last Afghan King. with contradictory information as to which of the two districts actually borders Pakistan. there seems to be an unclear demarcation between Khanishin and Garamsir. bordering Pakistan (look for the red boundaries).2) bordering Pakistan. All natives are considered Balochi even if they do not speak Balochi. The demographics of Nimroz differ from the other Southern provinces. Pakistan and Afghanistan. Balooch. one could note that district elections could prove a dangerous endeavour if district boundaries remain unclear. all of which are majority Pashtun.understandings of district boundaries and b) that there is a dire need to redraw maps that are available to the general public. has only one district (Chahar Burja) that borders both Pakistan and Iran. close-knit relationships between communities are very difficult. at 129 Km. The area is named after the numerous Baloch (or Baluch. a flourishing culture before much of it was destroyed during the Mongol invasion. if not impossible. Persian. Pashto.” http://en. the Baluch. between Iran. For example. an Iranian people. Balouch.. Its border to Pakistan.D. and Brahui languages are also spoken in the region. at 188 Km) is longer than that to Iran.wikipedia. to a lesser degree. Balush. else our work is informed by wrong information. Baloush) tribes. while in Nimroz (and especially Chahar Burja) the nonPashtun tribe. Balosh.org/wiki/Balochistan_%28region%29 1 5 . Baloosh. The southern part of Balochistan is known as Makran. Nimroz is one of the most sparsely populated provinces in the country. Nimroz is oriented very closely to the Iranian and. 1000. the province farthest to the west. With difficult terrain (which it shares with much of Southern Helmand and parts of Southern Kandahar) and strong winds. Historically it formed part of ancient Sistan. constitute the majority. the Pakistani parts of Baluchistan (see Figure 1.1 Border Lengths between the Southern Districts and Pakistan Province District Zabul Shamulzayi Atghar TOTAL Maruf Arghistan Spin Boldak Shorabak Reg TOTAL Helmand Khanishin Dishu TOTAL Border in km 45 km *km km 91 km 20 km 93 km 112 km 85 km 401 km 55 km 55 km 110 km 188 km Nimroz Chahar Burja TOTAL SOUTH Kandahar 744 km * Allegedly no border with Pakistan although this is under dispute Nimroz.3) 1 “Balochistan or Baluchistan is an arid region located in the Iranian Plateau in Southwest Asia and South Asia. Nimroz is a buffer province toward the West of Afghanistan. TABLE 1. who moved into the area from the west around A. There are several border crossings between the Southern cluster and Pakistan and Iran.3 lists the most important ones.4 provides a general overview of the districts included in the Southern Cluster. is very influential in the Southwestern border districts. Thus. as well as Reg in Kandahar and parts of Shorabak and Spin Boldak in Kandahar where it ends.FIGURE 1. this minority population with an ancient territory divided between several countries. both official and unofficial.3 Overview of Baluchistan What Figure 1. given that the territory they define as « theirs » (Baluchistan) runs from Nimroz in the West (part of Chahar Burja). 6 . Table 1. Table 1.3 further illustrates is the influence of the Baluch in the Southern border districts. encompassing nearly entirely the two border districts in Helmand (Dishu and Khanishin). the latter bordering only with Nimroz. 2-3 pick ups daily and motorbikes) • Isatscha (Pakistan. Panjwai. Main one goes to Pishin in Pakistan • Main crossing is to Shin Narai and Tujana in Pakistan • Smaller crossings in the Khwaja Aman mountain range • Paved highway to Chaman in Pakistan • Other animal and motorbike paths. and Helmand • Moradali Kalay (Pakistan.3 Overview of Border Crossings in the Southern Cluster Province District Zabul Shamulzayi Atghar Maruf Arghistan Name of Crossing • Official/Unofficial Countless small crossings.TABLE 1. for example to Wesh bazaar near the border • Road from Shorabak to Sarlat village on to Panjpai village in Pakistan • Road leads from the district centre to Taraki village and on to Nuschki village in Pakistan • Road leads from the district centre to Mashkran village and on to Nuschki in Pakistan. main one around the smuggler’s bazaar in Baramcha Numerous smaller crossings in the desert • Unofficial Unofficial Unofficial Official Unofficial All unofficial Spin Boldak Kandahar Shorabak All unofficial Reg Helmand Khanishin Dishu All unofficial Unofficial Unofficial Nimroz Chahar Burja Band-e.Kamal khan crossing and 3 more smaller crossings. 7 . • Road leads from Shorabak to Goaray village and on to Kashingay in Pakistan • Road leads from the district centre to Sayedbus village and on to Reg district. by animals) • Zaro (Pakistan. Main ones is Unofficial to Muslim Bagh Reportedly no direct crossing point Many small crossings in the mountains. by animals) Numerous smaller crossings in the desert. It borders Maruf (Kandahar) in the Southwest. Ghilzai (90%): Tokhi (88%) Shamulzai (80%) Basokhel (5%) Babuzai (3%) Kakar (2%) Zirak-Durrani: Yusofzai (5%) Safee (2%) Other Pashtun: Lodin (3%) There are five unpaved main roads: 1) Shamulzayi to Qalat 2) Shamulzayi to Muslim Bagh (Pakistan) 3) Shamulzayi to Ghazni (Nawa) 4) Shamulzayi to Paktika 5) Shamulzayi to Maruf (Kandahar) Allegedly there have never been any secular schools in Shamulzayi. Drugs are bought in neighbouring Maruf (Kandahar) district. Livelihood is based on agriculture and animal husbandry. Of the arable land 50% is irrigated and 50% is rain fed. In addition. There are two wiala (canals). goats) is owned by 3% of population that does not own land.000 Villages: 193 8 . the Rez Wiala and the Jahan Gyr wiala. The richest person owns 1’000 – 2’000 almond trees. There are 5 pharmacies located in Shamulzai and Sanzir bazaar. There is the Ibni Sina Health Clinic in the district centre. The border with Pakistan is 45 km long and there are countless small crossings. Radio : BBC.: 35. There is a tradition of almond production. There is no telephone coverage except for satellite phones. and Zhob district of Pakistan in the South.972 km2 located in the Southeast of Zabul province. 100-150 cars and trucks cross the border on a busy day.TABLE 1. Very windy district making agricultural production difficult. few people have generators for wells and their shops. In addition there are more than 100 kareez. There is no state electricity. Nawa (Ghazni) in the North. which is in a bad condition. Waza Khwa (Paktika) in the East. Livestock (sheep. Food items are brought in from Kandahar or Pakistan Economy Zabul Shamulzayi Pop Size est. there are more than 100 wells that are more than 30 meters deep.4 Overview of Districts in Southern Cluster Province District Tribal Composition Population Size Villages Infrastructure Shamulzayi district is a large arid district with a surface of 2. VoA. The Rez and Jahan Gyr riverbeds carry water in spring. Locals allege that there is no poppy cultivation as the soil is bad and there is water shortage but UNODC figures claim that 159 ha were used for poppy fields in 2007. Shinkay (Zabul) in the West. The richest person owns about 1’000 almond trees. only a few shops with doctors. there is almond production.153 km2.000 Villages: 100-130 There are three unpaved main roads: 1) from Qalat to Atghar. It borders Shamulzayi district to the east and north. Economy There is no lack of land. There are 70 kareez. although some people allege it has no direct border with Pakistan. 9 . which has a long tradition in the district. VoA The Atghar riverbed carries water only in winter and spring.Province District Tribal Composition Population Size Villages Infrastructure Atghar district is located in the Southwest of Zabul Province and has a surface of 1. Naw Bahar to the north. The only telephones working in the district are satellite telephones. Due to a poor economy and unemployment many people work either in coal mines in Pakistan or in the poppy harvest in Helmand. In addition there is the Atghar Wiala (canal). the main source of drinking water. There is no state electricity and no telephone coverage. but lack of water. Aside from agriculture. and Maruf (Kandahar) to the South and Southwest. 60. Literacy is poor (5%) There is no clinic. It borders with Zhob district of Pakistan in the South. In addition to some subsistence agriculture. the district engages in animal herding. 3) from Shamulzai to Maruf There were one or two schools for boys in tents but they closed due to insecurity. Radio: BBC. Shinkay to the west. 2) from Atghar to Maruf. Zabul Ghilzai: Hotak 95% Atghar Karyani: Wardak (5%) Pop Size est. A poppy production only accounts for 10% of the arable land and is one of the lowest in Zabul (about 16 ha in 2007). The border with Pakistan is 91 km long. 10 . donkeys) Kandahar Maruf Panjpai Durrani: Alizai (25%) Ishaqzai (8%) Khugiani (2%) Ghilzai: Kakar (15%) Pop Size est. Maruf is a mountainous district with many rugged mountain passes towards Pakistan. a few doctors prescribe medicine. There are two primary schools (although 29 are registered) in tents in the centre. The only telephones in the district are satellite phones. Shinkay (Zabul) and Atghar (Zabul) districts to the North and Shamulzai (Zabul) to the Northeast. from Maruf to Pishin in Pakistan In order to reach Maruf. both were closed in 2003 due to insecurity. Legal agricultural products are wheat. grapes (raisins). corn.000 (surveyors) Villages: 340 There are three unpaved road: 1. There are no functioning wells although 295 were drilled several years ago. only in spring) and Arghistan/Atghar river. which translates to about 914 ha. Irrigation through kareezes (150) fed by natural springs and open canals/wialas (20) receiving water from seasonal rivers (Salisun river. apricots. There is no state electricity or telephone coverage. Radio: BBC. Wikipedia) to 130. The district centre is Maruf. The highest peaks reach 2. It borders Arghistan district to the West. cows. Maruf borders Quetta district of Pakistan in the Southwest and Zhob district of Pakistan in the Southeast. About 18% of the land is used for poppy production.935 meters above sea level. In addition the population engages in animal husbandry (goats.300 (2006. The problems are decreasing levels of ground water or technical problems. 29. Maruf forms the upper end of the Arghistan valley. from Maruf (via Arghistan) to Kandahar 2. VoA. Economy Zirak Durrani: Barakzai (50%) The majority of the population engages in agriculture (95%).702 km2. Wheat and corn is grown for personal consumption only while raisins and almonds are exported. people from Kandahar often travel via Spin Boldak. located in the northern part of the district. and almonds. from Maruf to Spin Boldak 3. There are no hospitals or clinic.Province District Tribal Composition Population Size Villages Infrastructure Maruf district is located in the East of Kandahar Province and comprises a surface of 3. Maruf has about 60% arable land. BBC. AWCC. Road between Arghistan district & Surai district of 3. There are more than 10 secular schools in Arghistan district but all of them are closed due to insecurity. Road between Arghistan district & Boldak district. Arghistan ties with Spin Boldak became even stronger as the population had to get their supplies in Spin Boldak.Province District Tribal Composition Population Size Villages Infrastructure Arghistan is situated in the Eastern part of Kandahar Province and comprises a surface of 3. In the South the valley is part of De Hadi Ghar (Hada Hills. Alizai. 7% of the land is irrigated by wells (about 70/50m deep). There are seven unofficial pharmacies in the district bazaar and some villages. There is a newly constructed district governor’s building and a comprehensive health care centre in the district centre. goats. Economy Kandahar Arghistan Zirak Durrani Barakzai (25%) Mohammadzai (25%) Alkozai (15%) Popalzai (20%) As well as some Achekzai and Sayed families Panjpai Durrani 15%: Ishaqzai. smuggler path). with peaks up to 2. Indeed. Road from centre of Arghistan district to Shin Narai and Tujana of Pakistan (4 cars a day. Khugiani The main livelihood is subsistence agriculture (95%) and animal husbandry (cows. 1.100 m above sea level. Few people have generators to pump water from wells. its poppy production is relatively small with only 310 ha in 2007 (UNODC). donkeys). Inhabitants of Arghistan go to Kandahar. watermelon. There are a few export products: pomegranates. Pop Size est. Radio: Milli radio. Daman to the West. Telephone coverage: Roshan. Road between Arghistan district & Maruf district 4. mountainous and desert. The border with Pakistan is 20 km long. Maruf to the East. It borders Spin Boldak to the South and West.500 (wikipedia) to 85’000 (surveyors) Villages: 234 11 . creates a natural barrier with Pakistan. Azad Afghan radio. The other roads are unpaved. The latter is in bad conditions and staffed with only 3-4 nurses. Arghistan has historically strong economic links to Spin Boldak as it is situated on an old trade route used by Achekzai traders to bring almonds from Shah Wali Kot to Shahre Safa in Pakistan.098 meters) and in the Southeast the Khwaja Amran Range. The road between Kandahar and Arghistan is currently being paved. When Spin Boldak fell to the mujahideen and Kandahar was still controlled by the PDPA. Shinkay (Zabul) to the North. There is no hospital.665 km2. wheat and corn Local allege that there is no poppy cultivation which they attribute to water shortage and the fact that many inhabitants are Popalzai (who follow the orders of President). There is no state electricity. There are almost 130 kareezs fed by natural springs and 100 open wiala/canals fed by seasonal rivers (Lowra and Khooshki) and Arghistan river. with peaks reaching up to 2. 30. Arghistan is a large valley around 1. VoA. grapes (raisins). Spin Boldak or Pakistan to see doctors. and Quetta district of Pakistan to the East and South. 2.547 meters. and other electronics. and Telenore (Pakistani communication company which can be used near the border). melon and cumin. most of them operate two shifts to accommodate all students. 60% are farmers. Wikipedia) to around 150. TV: ATR. chicken. 100. Kandahar Spin Boldak Panjpai Durrani: Nurzai (45%) Zirak Durrani: Achekzai (55%) Pop size est. 55% are shopkeepers and 15% are both. 1. Nevertheless. pomegranates. computers. There are no schools for girls. Most people are involved in the car business including spare parts and electronics. 2. There are 7 health posts (10 more are planned) and 3 basic health care centres. VoA. Tolo. Roshan. fruit gardens are mainly for personal consumption. Sha Shak River feeding the Buldak canal/wiala (about 20 km). carpets. Economy The economic situation of the population is one of the best in Kandahar due to its strategic location on the border of the Kandahar-Quetta highway. It is the second major port of entry between Afghanistan and Pakistan and major transporting. There are more than 20 pharmacies without government registration. wheat. Villages: 265 12 . A paved highway links the district with Kandaharcity to the north and Chaman in Pakistan to the south. Spin Boldak to Shorabak The entire district has 19 schools (including two high schools and two secondary schools). sheep. 768 ha land is used for poppy cultivation (UNODC 2007). It borders Arghistan to the North. which gradually turns into sand desert in the West. There are several roads in addition to animal and motorbike paths. Spin Boldak to Loy Karez to Arghistan 3. Areeba. for example. Dried fruit. to the Wesh bazaar near the border. In the north of the district are the De Hadi Ghar or Hada Hills\) with peaks up to 2. About 5% of Spin Boldak is mountainous. wool.Province District Tribal Composition Population Size Villages Infrastructure Spin Boldak is located in the Southeast of Kandahar province and comprises a surface of 5898 km2. grapes. Azad Afghan radio. Legal crops include. Cross-border smuggling networks are functioning well especially that of vehicles and electrical appliances.400 (2006.098 meters above sea level. Khibar. There are almost 450 deep wells (not all are functioning) which are used for drinking and a few khareezes. Spin Boldak is the only district with a significant amount of the population mainly employed in the service sector. Radio: Milli radio. poppy. and in the east is the Khwaja Amran. and wood are also sold to Pakistan. The border with Pakistan is 93 km long. Shorabak to the South. There are seasonal rivers (spring/winter): Kadani River. There are more than 15 wialas from the Mel river located in Tachtapul district. watermelon. There is no state electricity but many people have generators. The most important markets such as Boldak Bazaar/Wesh Bazaar/The Lowi Kariz Bazaar are for cars. Quetta governmental radio. shipping and receiving site between the two countries. the rest is flat land. and cows. Lemar. Aryana. BBC. car parts. PTV Telephone coverage: AWCC. Daman to the West and Quetta district of Pakistan to the East. Livestock includes goats.000 (surveyors). There is little agricultural land. Panjwai. It borders Reg to the West. The people in Shorabak are poor since the agricultural output is weak. Radio: Milli radio. construction has not yet started. The population believes that decreasing security has lead to an increase in poppy cultivation. and Helmand. all are used for smuggling. 5. Road from the district centre to Sayedbus village and on to Reg district. 2.Province District Tribal Composition Population Size Villages Infrastructure Shorabak is a remote district situated in the Southeastern part of Kandahar Province comprising a surface of 4374 km2. Spin Boldak to the North and Quetta district of Pakistan to the East and South. Most goods are imported from Pakistan. 6. The most important legal crop is cumin which is exported to Pakistan. Many of them are therefore engaging in the smuggling business.200 (2006. In the East Shorabak borders the Khwaja Amran and the Sarlath mountain ranges. Most involved in the smuggling are allegedly the Baluch who live on both sides of the border. There are no schools in the district or telephone coverage. and Helmand. and the Bares tribe. 10. Plans for a hospital are currently under discussion with the government and the PRT. 7. Wasta river bed). The border with Pakistan is 112 km long. Road from the district centre to Mashkran village and on to Nuschki in Pakistan. The district roads are unpaved and in poor conditions.000 (surveyors) Villages: 17 13 . Two roads from Shorabak to Boldak district. Quetta government radio. Road from the district centre to Taraki village on to Nuschki village in Pakistan. Shorabak is a big transit route for narcotics and weapons smuggling between Iran and Pakistan. There is a pharmacy in the centre with a doctor who sells medicine. Road from Shorabak to Sarlat village on to Panjpai village in Pakistan. 1. Kandahar Shorabak Bares (98%) Baluch and Sayed make up 2% Pop Size est. Panjwai. Road leads from Shorabak to Bedawansa village and on to Registan. Road from Shorabak to Goaray village and on to Kashingay in Pakistan. Most inhabitants are engaged in animal husbandry. wikipedia) to 48. In addition there are more than 100 wells (60-90 meters) and 8 kareez. People travel from Kandahar city via Pakistan to reach this district faster. 4. The district has no bazaar. There are three seasonal riverbeds with water only in spring (Lora. Economy Agriculture is the main livelihood of the district. Mastan. About 20% of the agricultural land is used for poppy cultivation but the production levels are not high in comparison to other districts in Kandahar (308 ha in 2007). The rest is flat land which turns into a sand desert in the West. The land is very barren with little water resources. BBC. About 5% of the people have generators. mostly used for pumps on wells. 3. Panjwai and Daman to the North. Khanishin (Helmand) to the West and Quetta district of Pakistan to the South. There are more than 60 wells (300 feet deep).500 (surveyors) to 7. There is a high rate of smuggling (narcotics. no school or clinic. It shares boundaries with Shorabak in the East. People go to Pakistan for medical service. Radio: Milli radio. There is no river or riverbed.729 km2. the only other year that opium production was registered. The district centre has no government buildings. more motorbikes and animals Due to the distance from Kandahar city (and the poor road conditions). Villages: 9 14 . Reg is mostly a vast sand desert situated on a plateau at 1. but only about 1 pick up passes daily.280 meters. Kandahar Reg(istan) Baluch (100%): Mangal (40%) Mohammadsani (25%) Sasoni (20%) Chanal (10%) Pir Kani (5%) Pop Size est. Quetta governmental radio. 3. Panjwai (Kandahar) and Helmand by a very rough road that is usable only with jeeps. BBC. There is no bazaar in the district. Zaro (Pakistan. Economy Low population density with inhabitants being mostly nomads who are engaged in animal husbandry. goods and trafficking of humans).Province District Tribal Composition Population Size Villages Infrastructure Reg district is located in the South of Kandahar and comprises a surface of 14.100 meters above sea level. but it had higher levels in 2005 (327 ha). just two generators for wells. by animals). Isatscha (Pakistan. only 2 are working right now. people go to Nushki in Pakistan. people travel to this district via Pakistan.000-1. There is only about 20% agricultural lands. In the Southeast of the district there are mountains with peaks up to 2. 2-3 pick ups daily and motorbikes). Shorabak. There is no state electricity. 3. The mafia is old and longstanding. Moradali Kalay (Pakistan. by animals).900 (2006. There are several unpaved roads in the district that link the the district centre. There are 272 water holes that are used to collect rainwater. The border with Pakistan is 85 km long. More than 10 land cruisers pass daily mostly for (narcotics) smuggling. 1. the others are destroyed from jihad times and have not been reconstructed. wikipedia). 2. The only telephones working are satellite phones. About 4 ha were used for opium production in 2007 (UNODC). most poppy of Afghanistan is collected in Baramcha from where it is transported through Iran to Turkey and Europe. The 2007 UNODC survey reports that 8. Reg (Kandahar) to the East. There are three unpaved main roads : 1) From Garamsir district to the Khanishin district centre. 22. There is no government or public service (schools. The main water source is the Helmand river. and Quetta district of Pakistan to the South. People use water pumps (aroeund 35-40) to irrigate their fields with water form the river. Even thought the drought has impacted badly on the agriculture. Helmand Khanishin Pashtuns (50%): Ishaqzai (30%) Alizai (5%) Khugiani (5%) Achekzai and Nurzai (5%) Popalzai (5%) Baluch (50%) Population est. clinics or electricity) in Khanishin. Generators are used for the shops. Garmser to the Northeast. The border with Pakistan is 55 km long. Other goods are imported mostly Baramcha and thus Gerdi Jangal in Pakistan. diesel. Many shops have been destroyed during fighting between insurgents and NATO/ISAF/ANA troops. which is located in the district centre. Depending on the current market situation. Khanishin is (as other poppy producing districts in the South) a magnet for labourers from the whole South and the East who come to work on the poppy fields in harvest times. kerosene) is imported from Iran and Pakistan. Fuel (gas.000 (surveyors) Villages: 13 Khanishin district is situated in the Southern part of Helmand Province and comprises a surface of 7414 km2. Most villages are located along the Helmand River on its western bank given that the majority of the district is almost a desert (unused dry land). VoA and Quetta government radio. mainly poppy cultivation. 2) From Khanishin to Dishu district. 3) From Khanishin to Baramcha bazaar. Khanishin district has only one bazaar with about 20-25 shops. the livelihood revolves around agriculture.Province District Tribal Composition Population Size Villages Infrastructure Economy As in many parts of Helmand. It borders Chahar Burja and Dishu to the West. Nad Ali to the North. Radio : Teheran Radio. BBC. 15 .400 (wikipedia) and 70. The only telephone converage is through satellite phones. opium cultivation is alleged to cover about 60-70 of all agricultural land. Baramcha bazaar located in Dishu is the single most important hub for narcotics in Afghanistan.484 ha of land are being used for poppy cultivation. Economy Pashtuns (55%): Panjpai Durrani: Ishaqzai (32%) Zirak Durrani: Barakzai (5%) Even though Dishu is one of the districts with the lowest opium production in Helmand (1’160 ha in 2007. There are three unpaved main roads in Dishu: 1) From Marja district to the Dishu district centre. UNODC). There is one private clinic and a pharmacy in the Baramcha bazaar. camels. donkey. where there also about 30 small generators. Baramcha bazaar located in Dishu is the single most important hub for narcotics in Afghanistan. It borders Chahar Burja (Nimroz) to the West. Other goods are imported mostly from Gerdi Jangal in Pakistan.600 (wikipedia) and 70’000 (surveyors) Villages: 18 16 . Khanishin to the East and North and Quetta district to the south Pakistan. and chicken). Fuel (gas. 12-15 deep wells and 30-40 water pumps used alongside the river. Helmand Dishu Ghilzai: Kakar (5%) Other Pashtuns: Bares (10%) Farsiwan (3%) Baluch (40%) Other: Sayed (5%) Population est. VoA and Quetta government Radio. it still dominates the agricultural sector. covering about 50-60% of all agricultural land. 3) From Baramcha bazaar to the Khwaja Ali area. The only telephones working in the district are satellite phones. diesel. sheep. There are no schools or state electricity. There is no government presence in Dishu. Dishu is (as other poppy producing districts in the South) a magnet for labourers from the whole South and the East who come to work on the poppy fields in harvest times. Most of the settlements in the district are along the Helmand River. Depending on the current market situation. There are about 4 main wialas/canals. A great part of Dishu is desert (unused dry land). 20. kerosene) is imported from Iran and Pakistan. Radio: Teheran Radio. BBC. The insurgency has destroyed the police and district headquarters. The main bazaar has also been heavily destroyed due to the fighting between the insurgency and ISAF/GoA The Helmand river is the main source for irrigation of crops. most poppy of Afghanistan is collected in Baramcha from where it is transported through Iran to Turkey and Europe. In addition people grow wheat and vegetable for personal consumption and engage in animal husbandry (cows. 2) From the Dishu district centre to Baramcha bazaar.Province District Tribal Composition Population Size Villages Infrastructure Dishu is a district in the south of Helmand Province and comprises a surface of 9782 km2. goats. The border with Pakistan is 55 km long. With 87 ha in 2007 it is not a major producer although the past two years had higher yields. cows. Baramcha to Chahar Burja district. Legal crops include wheat and barley. livestock are mostly sheep. and camels are used in agricultural work. There is also one major smuggling route famous by the name of Bandi Kamal Khan road. There is no state electricity. and chicken.119 ha in 2006). There are about 30-40 generators in the district used for shops and houses. Chahar Burja is one of the two (sometimes three) districts in Nimroz where opium is cultivated. Most villages are situated along the Helmand river. Zaranj city to Chahar Burja district.035 km2.Province District Tribal Composition Population Size Villages Infrastructure Chahar Burja is located in the South of Nimroz province and comprises a surface of 21. Telephone coverage is possible with sattelite telephones. 2. 5’000 Villages: 69 17 . There is no big bazaar in Chahar Burja. Chakhansur and Zaranj to the North. Most villages have one to four shops. Donkeys. The border with Pakistan is 188 km long and the border with Iran is 129 km. goats. There is one hub for narcotics by the name of Bandi Kamal Khan. oil) are imported from Latak Bazaar located in Zabul province of Iran and to a lesser degree from Pakistan or from the provincial capital in Nimroz . There are 3 unpaved main roads in Chahar Burja : 1. Economy Agriculture and animal husbandry are the two main livelihoods in this district. Patients are taken to Iran. This amount has decreased drastically due to a shortage of water (1. Khawaja Ali to Chahar Burja district 3. poppy is cultivated on 20% of the agricultural land. horses. Information on other telephone coverage. It borders Iran to the West. most goods (especially fuel. radio or TV was not obtained. Approximately 100 water pumps are installed on the Helmand river for irrigation purposes. flour.Zaranj. Nimroz Chahar Burja Baluch (97%) Pashtuns: Bares (3%) Population est. As they are usually cheaper. Khanishin and Dishu (Helmand) to the East and Quetta district of Pakistan to the South. There are no schools in Chahar Burjak. which unpaved. In addition there are about 70-80 deep wells. According to our research. There are no clinics or pharmacies. and is an important part of triangulation used in research to verify data through various methods of data collection. This is reflected by the selection of surveyors. surveyors did not disclose that they were conducting formal research. We decided to hire individuals from the districts in question given their prior knowledge of the context and ability to gather information efficiently without drawing too much attention to themselves. trustworthiness and ability to conduct interviews. due to security. each of the surveyors conducted 30 different informal interviews/conversations in order to cover the questionnaire and be able to crosscheck information received (triangulation). However. where one surveyor covered both districts in each province due to their knowledge of the area. the number of interviews conducted allowed for this kind of method to work due to the ability to crosscheck missing information later on. Unless the Southern coordinator knew the surveyor for several years. Our Southern coordinator had knowledge of trustworthy individuals in the Southern districts which helped to expedite the selection of surveyors.Methodology The methodology used for data collection in this reports approximates a pragmatic approach to a first rapid and explorative assessment in a difficult and insecure territory where obtaining information is not without danger. Sampling Size and Triangulation of Data 18 . background checks were conducted with other individuals of trust to assure that the surveyors were fit for the job. Again. excect for Helmand and Zabul. After surveyors were selected they were trained on the survey questionnaire and information to be collected. sampling technique and triangulation of data. This helped. Data Collection method Except for the two interviews in Kabul security reasons forced most surveyors to not take notes during the interviews but to write findings from memory afterwards. their level of education. political and economic context. They were informed about the intent of the interview and notes were directly taken. Surveyors tended to supplement interview data with information gathered through participant observation while working in the districts in question. The exception was two formal interviews held in Kabul with tribal elders from Maruf and Spin Boldak. at times. Selection of Surveyors We worked with one surveyor per district. Surveyors used their knowledge about individuals in the district to engage them into an informal discussion covering various topics. On average. surveyors worked on their own. or the organization for which they worked with. Those interviewed were mainly village and district elders as well as members of the business community for the economic background questions (see also discussion on sampling technique). to put information into the relevant social. This did introduce some gaps in the data collected as we had to rely on the memory of the surveyors. Surveyors were carefully chosen as to their existing knowledge on the district and its power-holders. In order to decrease attention and to integrate themselves into the communities. The methodology was adjusted to informal discussions where surveyors engaged people into conversation and casually asked for information. For security reasons only a few formal interviews were conducted in the South. This again helped to reduce risk as the surveyors were able to move from very trusted individuals they knew onto the next ones that were suggested to them as being knowledgeable and trustworthy. This only worked due to the careful selection of the surveyors based on their previous experience and knowledge of the districts included in this study. Some of the more critical data was also verified with knowledgeable elders from the district (or tribe) in question.. here. Thus. this meant that we did not necessarily need to have information from a good cross-section of the population. the sample is selected because they are convenient. As the name implies. While this technique dramatically reduces risk. 19 . as surveyors had to decide on an ad hoc basis who was best to interview and in what location and time. the interviewing of shop keepers for price information). surveyors also used a snowballing technique. usually a subset of the population is selected that share at least one common characteristic. as we wanted to gain a good overview of the situation in the districts. After this dataquality check. Insecurity also made representative and random sampling difficult. we settled on a mix of non-probability sampling techniques which can potentially lead to a bias of the results presented here.. Convenience sampling is usually an “inexpensive” approximation of the truth and an adequate sampling technique for rapid and explorative assessments in insecure contexts. • o An important part of the convenience sampling was a method of judgment sampling whereby surveyors used their best judgment on whom to include in the interview process. Last but not least. but could rely on key informants. Nevertheless. Thus. meaning that they relied on referrals from initial interview partners to identify additional ones. There is overall inadequate knowledge of the exact population in the four provinces of Zabul.After the data was collected the Southern coordinator checked the content of the data for gaps. Yet.and unclear information and then identified the need for further inquiry. tribal elders or individuals with relevant knowledge on topics were included in the study (e. there are no adequate statistics that can inform representative sampling. surveyors returned to the field to improve upon the data collected. it does come at the expense of introducing bias because the technique itself reduces the likelihood that the sample will represent a good cross-section from the population. o Furthermore. Kandahar. Helmand and Nimroz. two independent interviews by Kabul staff were held in Kabul with elders from the region in order to double-check some of the findings.g. Women and very young individuals were not interviewed for this study. within each cluster (or district) we did try to attempt to reach out to different individuals in terms of tribal background as well as age. We tried to manage the bias as much as possible through triangulation of data: • Purposive/stratified sampling – In stratified sampling. • Cluster sampling – Obviously the focus on the border districts already indicated a cluster approach with focusing on interviewing individuals living in those specific districts. Sampling Techniques For several reasons representative and random sampling was not used for this report. those interviewed by no means reflect the views of the entire population in the areas studied. as the purpose of this study was a rapid assessment. Thus. Firstly. we cannot guarantee fully the accuracy of data presented here. and highlight the main limitations of the rapid assessment conducted. all linked to the nature of a rapid assessment (time) in an insecure terrain (security). Even though we attempted as much as possible to double-check and triangulate information. As a result. the report is clearly based on a non-representative sample of people living in the districts of the border-districts Southern cluster. we did try to conduct the research with as much care as possible without jeopardising the lives of our surveyors. conducting an assessment based on high scientific standards and rigor has limitations. Second. we have tried to describe our research methodology as detailed as possible. This again impacts on the accuracy of the data as well as the scientific rigor of results. security considerations impacted greatly on the kind of methodology used (such as informal discussions over semi-structured interviews) which results in an approximation of the truth so findings in this rapid assessment cannot claim a more scientific rigor.Limitations of Assessment This study was limited by several factors. even though interview-partners were selected as the most adequate sources to echo and reflect the views and experiences of the local population in the context of an exploratory study. Nevertheless. such as the border-districts of the Southern cluster. Third. It has to be understood that in an insecure environment. time for a more thorough data collection (or cross verification) was also limited (especially if wanting to apply social anthropological rigor). 20 . S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t 2 Economic Overview Chapter he economy of Southern Afghanistan is closely linked to Pakistan for districts in Kandahar and Zabul, and Iran for Nimroz. Helmand is linked to both Iran and Pakistan. The dependence on Pakistan is even stronger for border districts where access to Pakistani markets is easier than to internal markets. For example, Reg and Shorabak in Kandahar and Atghar and Shamulzai in Zabul, Dishu and Khanishin in Helmand all tend to get the majority o their goods from Pakistan. Many food items and most other items of daily use are imported from Pakistan and to a lesser degree from Iran, except for Nimroz where the Iranian influence is stronger. As goods and services in Iran are cheaper and easier to access, most residents of Nimroz do not only import the majority of their goods from Iran, but also take their patients there in case of illness. From the Southern cluster border districts illegal goods such as poppy/opium, heroin and marble stones for construction purposes are exported. Legal export products, mostly to Pakistan, include dried fruits, grapes, almonds, and pomegranates. Exported fruits and vegetables are cool-stored in Pakistan and resold in Afghanistan in winter. T Markets The Southern border district cluster orients itself either to the markets in Kandahar-city or the border district of Spin Boldak for the provinces of Zabul and Kandahar. In Helmand, the most important economic centre for food items is Lashkar Gah. In addition, Baramcha, a big smugglers market at the border to Pakistan is the main trading point for all kinds of illegal goods,including drugs and weapons, and also the trafficking of humans to Iran. Nimroz, as noted earlier, is oriented towards Zabul province in Iran. In the Zabul border districts there is no market of regional importance. Here, Qalat, the district centre, as well as different markets in Pakistan or Maruf (Kandahar) is more important for trading for Zabul district residents. Pakistani markets of regional importance for the Southern border districts are, for example, Nushki (especially for Reg and Shorabak districts), Muslimbagh (for Shamulzai), Pishin (for Maruf and Atghar), and Gerdi Jangal (Helmand). All these markets, especially at the border, 21 S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t function as intersections for the flow of economic goods to the neighbouring districts and provinces. The importance of Pakistani markets and goods is reflected by the predominance of Pakistani Rupees in the border districts. Afghan traders buy imported goods in Pakistani Rupees,- selling them in the same currency makes profit calculations easier and avoids losses due to fluctuations of exchange rates. Similarly, the importance of Iran for Nimroz, and also the border districts of Helmand, is indicated through the fact that Iranian currency is used (for everything in Nimroz and smuggling only in Helmand). The locals call the currency Toman, which is the name of the old currency of Iran that was replaced in 1932 by the Rial.2 See the section on Currencies and Prices in this chapter for an explanation of the Toman in the Afghan context. After Torkham in Nangarhar, Spin Boldak functions as the second most important port of entry to Afghanistan from Pakistan (linking up to Chaman in Pakistan). The cross-border market Wesh is the most important regional market for vehicles and electronic equipment. Most important Afghan traders actually live in Pakistan (many having Pakistani IDs) and cross the border to trade in their shops on the Afghan side in Spin Boldak. Thereore, despite an official border, the Wesh market essentially flows freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition to these legal markets, Baramcha in Helmand (Dishu) is likely the most important smugglers market for the South (goods, but also drugs and weapons), and single most important narcotics hub in all Afghanistan. The Baluch run this market. Table 2.1 provides an overview of all major markets in the districts of the Southern cluster. Table 2.1 Major Markets in Southern Cluster Districts Province District Main market Secondary market Other markets Zabul People from all over the district come to these two big bazaars by motorbikes, horses and donkeys. Shamulzayi The main bazaar is located in the district centre close to the police headquarter. Currency: Pakistani Rupee The Sanzir bazaar is in Sanzir, a border checkpoint with Pakistan. Currency: Pakistani Rupee The majority of villages have small shops 2 The toman (‫ توم ان‬in Persian, pronounced [tomæn]), derived from a Turkic word meaning ten thousand, was the currency of Iran until 1932. In 1932, the rial replaced the toman at a rate of 1 toman = 10 rials (i.e., 1 rial = 1 qiran). 22 S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Province District Main market Secondary market Other markets Atghar The main bazaar is in the district centre with about 50-80 shops, some of which have eroded due to the weather. Most residents buy their food items here, which are imported from Kandahar-city or Pakistan to Maruf and from Maruf to Atghar, or Pakistan- Shamulzayi-Atghar or from Qalat city-Shinkai–Atghar. Pishin (Pakistan) is an important market for Atghar where people sell cumin and almonds and import items of daily use. The decline of Qalat’s importance as a market for Atghar is a direct consequence of security conditions. The road to Qalat is considered insecure due to robbers and allegedly insurgents have laid out mines on the road. Most items that can be stored are bought during the summer since heavy snow in the winter months makes travelling difficult. Currency: Pakistani Rupees and Afghanis. Some villages have small shops and these shops have some items (candy, cooking oil, kerosene) are available. Zabul Maruf There is only one bazaar in Maruf district, which is located in the centre of Maruf and has about 200-250 shops. About 130-150 shops are in good condition while 100-120 was destroyed due to weather conditions and fighting between Taliban and GoA/NATO forces. Most of the shopkeepers import food items from Pishin (Pakistan) and Spin Boldak .The food from Pakistan comes via an unpaved road called Toba. Currency: Pakistani Rupees and Afghanis The only bazaar is located in Arghistan village, the district centre. Arghistan has historically strong links to Spin Boldak as it is situated on the trade route used by Achekzai traders to bring almonds from Shah Wali Kot (Kandahar) to Shahre Safa in Pakistan. In addition, when Spin Boldak fell to the Mujahideen and Kandahar was still controlled by the PDPA, inhabitants of Arghistan turned to Spin Boldak to get supplies. Currency: Pakistani Rupees and Afghanis Kandahar Arghistan Weapons can be bought via jihaid commanders. Spin Boldak There are several imported bazaars in Spin Boldak such as the Boldak Bazaar, Wesh Bazaar, and Lowi Kariz Bazaar, which extends across the border to Chaman in Pakistan. It is mainly known for vehicles and vehicle spare parts imported from Dubai and electronics, but other things can also be bought there. Spin Boldak is the second most important port of entry for goods from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Currency: Pakistani Rupees There is no bazaar in Shorabak; people from Shorabak buy their items of daily use across the border in the Pakistani village of Nushki. Currency: Pakistani Rupees There is no bazaar in Reg or neighbouring Shorabak; people from Reg buy their items of daily use in villages across the border in Pakistan (Nushki, Muradali Kalay, Isatscha). Currency: Pakistani Rupees Shorabak Reg(istan) 23 S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Province District Main market Secondary market Other markets There are also some small shops in some villages too. In order to buy vehicles, residents of Khanishin have to go to the Baramcha bazaar in neighbouring Dishu. Khanishin Khanishin district has only one bazaar, which is located close to the “police headquarters” in the district centre. All items are imported from the Baramcha bazaar. This bazaar has about 100-150 shops; all but 20-25 shops destroyed due to fighting between insurgency and GoA. Some shops were also destroyed by heavy rain. All the district residents obtain their daily food items from this bazaar and there are also few mechanics that fix motorbikes, generators, bicycles and some parts of the vehicle. Currency: Pakistani Rupee and Afghanis Helmand Baramcha bazaar (100-150 shops, two car showrooms), which is located near the Pakistani border, is the main (smugglers market). Most Dishu residents obtain items of daily use from here. Most drug smugglers live close to this bazaar, which is owned by Haji Sharafudin. Baramcha is the single most important narcotics hub in Afghanistan. Necessary items are imported from the Dal Ban Din Bazaar located in Baluchistan, Pakistan. Dishu Kochini Rabaat (Kohi Malak) bazaar is located in the Kochini Rabaat area. There are about 10 to 15 shops, and the shopkeepers import fuel and other necessary items from Zaidan in Iran. Bazaar in Dishu district centre with only about 2-3 functioning shops out of 50-60 in existence. The majority was destroyed due to the war between Taliban and ISAF/ GoA. There are also some small shops in some villages too. Currency: Pakistani Rupee, Afghanis and Iranian Toman There is no bazaar in Chahar Burja district. Most villages have 1 to 4 shops. Fuel, flour, oil and other items of daily use are imported from the Latak Bazaar located in Zabul province of Iran and to a lesser degree from Pakistan. Some people import Iranian goods via the Zaranj bazaar in the capital of Nimroz province. Currency: Iranian Toman Nimroz Chahar Burja There is one big hub for narcotics smuggling in Chahar Burja district called Bandi Kamal Khan. Agricultural Production – Export/Import Goods The Southern cluster is, generally speaking, not a very wealthy region, although the more recent increase in drug production has changed this to some extent, especially in Helmand. Traditionally, as in most rural areas of Afghanistan, the population focuses its economic activities on agriculture (in many places mostly subsistence) and animal husbandry, with poppy becoming an increasingly dominant crop, especially in Helmand where it covers about 50-70% of all arable land in the two border districts Dishu and Khanishin. As these 24 At present the coverage of agricultural land (16. Baluch and Pashtuns both have strong cross border economical links. While Chahar Burja (the border district) is the only other district that currently also has poppy fields (Zaranj had some last year. and Spin Boldak and is exported to Pakistan. The Baluch tribesmen control much of the cross border smuggling trade. Chahar Burja had 1. neither district is one of Helmand’s biggest poppy producers (which is reserved for Nahri Sarraj and Nad Ali. as in 2006. In Kandahar.produces nearly all opium in the entire province.421 ha) . both Shamulzayi (159 ha) and Atghar (16 ha) have some poppy fields. learned about poppy cultivation through migrant labourers returning from Helmand. almonds and poppy dominate. Spin Boldak (768 ha). In Nimroz. wheat. with almonds orchards being considered a traditional craft with a long history in the area. cumin. although only one district .611 ha). kerosene). and vegetables are predominant in agricultural products. The latter is likely so low due to the scarcity of water in the district. Most Baluch living in Chahar Burja district have a house in Iran’s Zabul province. grapes. corn. almonds. but seems unsuccessful).615 ha) in the entire province is not even as high as the several individual districts in Helmand. producing over twice as much as much as Khanishin and twenty times as much as Dishu). As the overwhelming majority of the population is Baluch (a nomadic tribe). pomegranates.119 ha of poppy fields. animal husbandry also plays also an important role in the economy.Khash Rod (6. Yet all border districts do grow opium: Maruf (914 ha). People have only recently. petrol. watermelon. poppy cultivation is increasing in the Kandahar border districts. The importance of this illicit economy has turned Helmand into a pulling point for labour migrants from other provinces. As in all other districts. are largely dry land (desert). Arghistan (310 ha). In the two Zabul border districts wheat. with the entire province covering only slightly more agricultural land than Dishu in Helmand (which as noted above is the second smallest opium producer in that province. another centre pf poppy production. Cumin is an important cash crop in Shorabak. Poppy cultivation has somewhat been reduced by water shortages there. it currently only has 87 ha of land covered in it. Zabul overall does not figure much in the Southern poppy production (1. the district with the biggest landmass covered with poppy fields is Daychopan with 389 ha). The other mentioned tribes are involved in the trade from Chahar Burja to Lashkar Gah. This is not necessarily due to lack of trying but due to an incompatibility between crop and soil (it does not grow well) and lack of water. The Baluch control the fuel import from Iran to the Southern Helmand districts by the route of Daftan (Iran). Nurzai and Baluch (the latter being a non-Pashtun tribe).S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t districts. Skilled labourers and poppy cultivation experts from Kandahar. Alkozai. The most important trade with Iran concerns fuel (diesel. Nevertheless. Legal business between Helmand and Iran is divided between the Barakzai. 25 . corn. If water availability was less of a problem in Nimroz poppy cultivation would increase drastically (given that all but one district have tried to grow or has grown it in the past). alledgedly. however. and Kang tried for years. Reg. Shorabak (308 ha) and Reg (4 ha). The Achekzai and Nurzai tribes both have very strong economic ties in the Spin Boldak/Chaman area where they dominate business and constitute much of the population overlapping the border. wheat and barley are the main legal crops whereas the most important cash crop is poppy. Helmand and Nangarhar also work in South Waziristan (Pakistan). Nimroz. locally called Toman (see the box).2 provides an overview of the major food and fuel/heating prices in the Southern border-districts. even requiring the use of outside migrant workers. Traders importing goods from Pakistan and Iran prefer to sell them in the same currency they bought them in as a way of avoiding fluctuations in the exchange rates and making profit calculations easier. Wardak) come to Helmand to work in the poppy fields during harvesting times. especially in areas where goods are imported mainly from Pakistan. Table 2. b) the transport route from Iran might be shorter in order to get goods into Nimroz. since the poppy production and associated businesses allegedly provide enough work to Helmand residents. on average. Labour migration plays a different role in different parts of the Southern cluster. Nangarhar. This has led to a shortage of available employment in the provinces that has resulted with many men (especially youth) being forced to engage in seasonal labour migration. Otherwise. where even animal husbandry is hard to maintain. From Zabul provinces. people migrate to Muslim Bagh in Pakistan or to coalmines in Punjab during the winter. the border areas are still under the heavy influence of the Pakistani Rupee. Helmand is also a major hub from all over Afghanistan (including Northern provinces) for illegal labour migration to Iran via human trafficking networks. and hence Chahar Burjak. As noted earlier. The only exception among the Southern border districts is Chahar Burja in Nimroz which is mainly oriented towards Iran for its economy and labour migration. In the winter months the importing of goods is nearly impossible to these two districts. The same currency is used in the drug trade in Helmand. turning many areas into (semi) deserts. a fair bit cheaper. Zabul). Costs are very similar with the exception of the two neighbouring districts of Atghar in Zabul and Maruf in Kandahar. the industrial centres of Pakistan and Iran are a main destination for labour migration. 26 . Since the poppy production has taken hold of Helmand a great proportion of young men from all over the Southern districts (Uruzgan. Currency and Prices Despite the official currency in Afghanistan being the Afghani. or c) there is a problem with the exchange rate provided (see box).S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Labour Migration The long period of drought in the South has further impacted on the already dry and harsh terrain. for example. but also as far as the East and Southeast (Laghman. except for the above mentioned skilled labourers that go to South Waziristan (Pakistan). There is no labour migration from Helmand residents to other countries or provinces. are an exception as they depend on Iranian currency. Prices in Chahar Burja are also different from the rest of the Southern district. which is why storable goods are stockpiled before snowfall. The reasons for these higher costs are the longer import route via Pakistan through rugged mountain terrain and goods passing through more middlemen on the way. This could be due to several things: a) goods from Iran can be obtained at a cheaper price than those from Pakistan. 000 tomans or 1. at least in a context of food. The majority of people from Kandahar buy their cars either in Kandahar-city. a main vehicle market for the South).5 for Zaranj in Nimroz. is small in comparison to that in Spin Boldak (which is. many Iranians (and in this case Afghans) still use the term Toman in everyday transactions for an amount of about 10 Rial. the prices are recorded in the currency they are traded in.2). The reader can then make his/her own assessment. All vehicle prices are for cars imported from Dubai. The closest showroom in Nimroz is in Zaranj.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t The value of a Toman in Afghanistan Although the Rial has become the official currency of Iran. where residents of Chahar Burja buy their cars if they do not end up in Baramcha in Helmand (Dishu).3 provides an overview of vehicle prices in Spin Boldak. Table 2. guns or drugs. 1 AFA = 10 Toman (about half). due to conversion problems. 27 . The only car showrooms in the border districts of Afghanistan reside in Spin Boldak (Kandahar) and Baramcha (Helmand).5 Toman. and it is more likely that. When asked what a Toman was worth. which is roughly the same as 20 Toman suggested above. the provincial capital. Table 2. Due to the problematic conversion of the Toman (see earlier discussions). given that the exchange rate used for food prices may not translate into the same amount for vehicles. as the indication Toman may also refer to either 1. we will try to refrain from making price conversions. as noted earlier. unless of course. with the order of the magnitude depending on the context and goods. In Helmand. it appears that this exchange rate may still too high. as in unofficial circumstances. If we apply the suggested rate of 10 Rial = 1 Toman. Spin Boldak or across the border in Pakistan (see Table 2. In light of the above.Again. keeping this information in mind. Using a price comparison of food prices (see Table 2. the people from Dishu and Khanishin go to the smugglers bazaar in Baramcha in Dishu.262.81 Rial (IRR).5 simply provides the prices in the currency they are traded in. then we would arrive at: 1 AFA = 18. The selection of cars. however.000 Tomans. Table 2. our researchers were told that 1.3 for prices). which is very close to the Pakistani border (see Table 2. food prices in Nimroz are over 50% cheaper than in other districts in the Southern cluster.000. Most cars and trucks are not registered and therefore have neither official papers nor number plates.000 Toman = 50 Afghani which results in: 1 AFA = 20 Toman The official exchange rate for 50 AFA = 9. Kandahar-city also has cars coming from Canada (or Europe) which are much more expensive. The value of the Toman was hard to gauge.4 for Baramcha in Helmand and Table 2. Kandahar.4 for prices). however. 7 AFA 47 PKR 65 AFA 85 AFA 85 Rice 1 kg *People from Reg buy their food items in Pakistan 1 AFA = 1.2 Price Comparisons.00 AFA 140 PKR 60 PKR 60 466.630.793104 AFA # original prices in Nimroz are in Iranian Toman Assumption made here is : 1 AFA = 10 28 .00 AFA 163 1.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t TABLE 2.2 AFA 18 AFA 18 AFA 167 AFA 150 PKR 173-178 AFA 133 AFA 130 AFA 60 AFA 50 PKR 220 PKR 266 PKR 266 1.4 AFA 29 AFA 44 AFA 35 AFA 32 AFA 26 Atghar AFA 60-65 AFA 60-65 AFA 75-80 Arghistan Spin Boldak AFA 39 AFA 38 AFA 43 AFA 62 AFA 8 Dishu PKR 40 PKR 40 PKR 45 PKR 50 PKR 12 PKR 90 AFA 100-105 AFA 100-105 PKR 23 AFA 26 AFA 26 Food Items Sugar 1 kg Flour 1 kg Tea/green 1 kg tea Black tea 1 kg PKR 45 PKR 33 PKR 200 PKR 180 AFA 50 AFA 35 AFA 190 AFA 220 AFA 50 AFA 35 AFA 190 AFA 220 AFA 40 AFA 37 AFA 37 AFA 23 PKR 40 PKR 38 PKR 30 PKR 22 PKR 30 PKR 22 175 182.5 kg Shamulzai PKR 58 PKR 48 PKR 65 Kandahar* Maruf AFA 60-65 AFA 60-65 AFA 75-80 AFA 37 AFA 41 AFA 60 AFA 25 Helmand Shorabak Khanishin PKR 40 PKR 59 PKR 40 PKR 45 PKR 50 AFA 8 PKR 12 Nimroz Chahar Burja # 290 444 350 316 264.400.26087 PKR 1 PKR = 0. Southern Cluster Zabul Fuel/heating Kerosene Diesel Petrol Gas Wood 1 litre 1 litre 1 litre 1 kg 1mn = 4. 87 £2. Saracha Toyota. Corolla 2007 Small Hino.47 £13.76 $27.975.93 1 PKR = 0.536 PKR 1 USD = 62.532. Cursing Middle Hino.322.000 PKR 600.000 PKR 550.027.974. Land Curser Bigger Hino.897.951.91 USD $6.44 £4.987.78 £15. Mazda Toyota.951.76 $31.48 $8.569.000 PKR 2.82 $11.58 £1.975.7000 PKR GBP £3.3 Vehicle Prices in Spin Boldak.164. 4x4 Toyota.000 PKR 400.000 PKR 415.24 $3. Kandahar Type Car Car Car Car Truck Car Car Car Truck Truck Car Truck Car Truck Car Car Truck Car Car Car Car Car Unit Toyota.00790291 GBP 1 PKR = 0.43 £1.27 $11.000 PKR 250. Land Cruiser Middle Hino.000 PKR 2.185.113.784.38 £1.913. Parado Toyota.379.434.000 PKR 130.70 £5.37 $2. Mazda Bigger Hino.000 PKR 800.48 $7.35 £1.618.974.000 PKR 160.14 £6. Corolla 1990 Toyota.000 PKR 700.000 PKR 900.46 £1.000 PKR 300.44 £3.000 PKR 740.987.161.802.805. 4x4 Toyota.000 PKR 600.88 $2.000 1 GBP = 126. Mazda Toyota.366.370. Saracha Toyota.000 PKR 500.897.987.000.000 PKR 250. Lexus Toyota.72 £1.000 PKR 150.04 £3.83 $3.93 $31.073.72 £2.16 £3.000 PKR 500.93 $9.975.741.848.392.161.59 $6.136.60 £9.59 $7.000 PKR 650.02 £5.000 PKR 200.000 PKR 1.000 PKR 1.31 £9.38 $10.72 £1.000 PKR 1.580.4 Vehicle Prices in Baramcha (Dishu). Surf Toyota.47 £15.83 $14.72 £1.138. Surf Toyota.000.741.63 $6.0159490 USD TABLE 2.700.112.07 $19.73 £5.17 $19.24 $4.000 1 GBP = 126.569. Mazda Toyota.16 £3.138.24 $3.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t TABLE 2.189.000 PKR 250.379.987.000 PKR 250.845.0159490 USD 29 .741.346.483. Prado Small Hino.483.78 USD $1.200.200. Mazda Toyota. Helmand Type Car Tractor Car Tractor Car Car Car Unit Sifa 2005 Small Tractor Toyota 2006 Big Tractor Toyota with one set 1985 4x4 2006 Land Cruiser 2006 Unit/Price in PKR PKR 400.24 $3.24 1 PKR = 0.59 £4.73 £4. Lexus Unit/Price PKR PKR 120.23 $12.38 $9.88 £7.551.805.536 PKR 1 USD = 62.79 $3.354.69 $5.00790291 GBP 1 PKR = 0.264.7000 PKR GBP £948.34 $2. Mazda Toyota. Cruiser Toyota.975.771.000 PKR 360.279.759. 000-3.000 7. This is especially true for Reg and Shorabak in Kandahar.6). Table 2. Landowners in the Helmand districts own the most land (2.e. For example. 40-50 in Shamulzai).000 1. such as in Atghar. Toyota Pick up trucks. This. owning even a small amount of fertile land (such as plots with 1-2’000 almond trees in Zabul) make a man rich.000 2.000 11. Despite an abundance of available land. Availability of land. fruit orchards vs. 30 . has an influence on a society where landownership traditionally has an impact on the standing of tribal elders.000 3. This makes price comparison difficult. In areas where agricultural land is scarce. It is hard to say exactly what the reasons for this difference is. Kandahar and Dishu. Chahar Burja in Nimroz. In the districts where there is no government.000. Toyota Unit/Price (Toman) 60.240.025.7 provides an overview of land prices in the Southern Cluster. of course. In the districts with land of little value. The amount of land however. also influences the market for farming. of course.000 jarebs in Dishu). 100-600 in Spin Boldak. and the districts in Helmand (except for land along the Helmand river). Nimroz Type Parado Land Cruiser. landowners in Kandahar (350 jarebs in Arghistan.000. Toyota Big Tractor Second hand Land Cruiser Small Tractor Corolla Saracha Toyota Pick up trucks.000.000 2. and allegedly they do not sell their land for cultural reasons (the same as in Shorabak) Therefore people are allowed to build houses but not own the land on which the house is built. This could lead to conflicts in the future if the government regains power there. no use). grazing vs. but we assume a combination of land condition (fertile vs.000. as the availability and access to water is an important determinant of land value. commercial and housing plots.000 Land and land ownership Land in the Southern districts is of little value. Reg. the Bares in Shorabak seem to own the land with value (i.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t TABLE 2.000 7. people simply squat on government land. own the land.000.000. 70 to 80 in Maruf. water) in Reg (which used to be a sub-district in Shorabak). harsh climate and water shortage limit the use (for agricultural purposes) and hence lower the value of land in many of the Southern border districts. and also the kind of people who inhabit vs.000 35. Districts vary greatly in terms of what makes a big landowner (see Table 2.000. and 20 jarebs in Shorabak) and in Zabul (60-70 jarebs in Atghar. dry-land).125.025.000-5. Zabul. there is no real land market or prices.000-4. followed by landowners in Nimroz (500 jarebs in Chahar Burja). land usage (agriculture vs. is generally only of limited explanatory value. Helmand.5 Vehicle Prices in Zaranj. 6 Overview of Landownership (in jareb) Province District Shamulzayi Atghar Maruf Arghistan Spin Boldak Shorabak Reg(istan) Khanishin Helmand Dishu 2’000-3’000 500 150-200 100-500 20-40 Big Landowner 40-50 60-70 70-80 350 100-600 60-120 Land belongs to Bares tribe in Shorabak 3’000-6’000 1’000-2’000 100-600 30-50 Medium Landowner Small/Average Landowner 5-8 5-10 <50 20 Zabul Kandahar Nimroz Chahar Burja 31 .S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t TABLE 2. AFA 70'250 .000300. 1936 sqm 1 jareb = 1'600-1'764 sqm 1 jareb = 1'600-1'764 sqm Atghar PKR 40'00070'000 Maruf PKR 60'000100'000 Kandahar* Arghistan AFA 50. Zabul * Neither Reg nor Shorabak in Kandahar have land prices as land is not really sold there (low quality of desert land) # original prices in Nimroz are in Iranian Toman 1 AFA = 10 (sometimes 20) Toman 32 . in Helmand the proximity to the Bazaar seems more important New shops costs more than old ones in Atghar.000 Spin Boldak Helmand Khanishin Dishu Nimroz Chahar Burja# 1'405'0002'107'500 AFA 140'500 210'750 PKR 250.000 210'750.000 PKR 60. Southern Cluster Zabul Land Agricultural.000 PKR 150'000900'000 Access to water increases agricultural land in Zabul and Nimroz.42'150 Shop in local Bazaar/ 18-40 sqm Commercial Fruit Garden 2-10 jareb PKR 50.000 PKR 20.98'350 983'500 PKR 100.000 PKR 25'00030'000 PKR 18.000 702'500.000 PKR 60.000 PKR 120.PKR 100'000400'000 50'000 150'000 Housing plot 600 sqm AFA 200.000 PKR 15.000 PKR 10'00050'000 PKR 2'000'0005'000'000 (Almond) PKR 50'000100'000 PKR 2'000'0005'000'000 (Grape) AFA 150.000 PKR 35.000 PKR 100'000.PKR 30'000.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t TABLE 2.AFA 21'075 421'500 .000 PKR 100. close to Bazaar (or very fertile land) Agricultural. far from Bazaar (or good access to water) Agricultural (or some access to water) Shamulzai 1 jareb = 1'600-1'764.7 Land Price Comparison. Arghistan and Maruf. we are seeing a repeat in the Souther cluster of what happened following the collapse of the Communist government . with neither being in power. however. The influence of the insurgency. due to the limited reach of the Government. the government’s control is limited often only to a small radius outside the police and army headquarters. or those in Helmand. In Reg the reason for this may simply be the lack of value in the desert-like territory and lack of hiding opportunities for insurgents. This continues to be the case given that the family of the current president (Hamid Karzai) and their tribe (the Popalzai) is running affairs in the regional capital. is more limited than in the neighbouring districts of Zabul. The Government maintains relative control in the Kandahar districts Reg and Spin Boldak. while in Spin Boldak the importance of the crossborder market may be a driving stability force. whose power has been somewhat diminished since he was moved from the post of Governor of Kandahar to that of the province of Nangarhar. In Shamulzayi district. Increasingly. and in all other districts. Only in Spin Boldak is the government perceived to be able to provide security to the population. In Helmand it controls nothing. Security is a very scarce commodity in the border districts of the Southern cluster. P 33 . One can argue that there is a stalemate between government and insurgency in these three districts.complete anarchy where nobody in in control. does the Government control more than the district centre. Only in two districts in Kandahar (Reg and Spin Boldak) and one in Nimroz (Chahar Burja). The population resented this move by the government since the security was relatively good as long as the coexistence agreement was in place. The only real rival of the Popalzai is the Barakzai leader Gul Agha Sherzoi.which was broken in 2006 by the newly incoming Chief of District. In the border-districts of Zabul the insurgency controls everything outside the district centre. Other strongmen and tribal figures are currently trying to stay low-key and maintain relations with the Popalzai in order to access resources. the government holds the control of the district centre only. The situation functioned on a loose coexistence agreement between insurgents and the local government. In the other three districts of Shorabak. the Taliban was never fully ousted at the end of 2001.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t 3 Political Overview Chapter olitics in the Southern border cluster has historically been dominated from Kandahar. considered corrupt and linked to the smuggling networks. control is maintained by the insurgency. Insurgency has mined the road from Atghar to Qalat. TABLE 3. the government has lost complete control.3 Medium Risk --------------------------. The clearest expressions of anti-government feelings were found in the two border districts in Helmand (which are controlled by the insurgency and smugglers). a combination of insurgency and smuggling networks control the district. At the same time. hence keeping an upper hand. the tribe of the Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Table 3. The insurgency seems to be able to intimidate traditional elders. Outside. as otherwise armed conflict may erupt. Allegedly the only reason why there are still Afghan border police posts is because the police protect the Shamulzayi communities against attacks from the Naser living on the Pakistani side of the border. with the insurgency and smugglers in control. this arrangement between government and smugglers is said to contribute to security. the government control is said to extend to 30 km around the district centre therefore it might not be much different from the other districts. they tend not to attack local communities and do not allow other insurgent groups to operate in the district. Shamulzayi Zabul • • HIGHER RISK (4) The power of the government is limited to the district centre and a 10 km radius. As the insurgency is all from the Shamulzayi tribe. Outside. • Outside of this radius the insurgency is in control.1 District Risk Assessments Southern Cluster Lowest Risk 1 -------------------------. with the latter bribing their way through government and insurgency territories. The district is almost totally populated by the Hotak.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t In the two border districts of Helmand (Dishu and Khanishin). making them close to the insurgency. The insurgency imports their weapons via Shamulzayi. Government office holders tend to be interested only in their own enrichment and tend to alienate the population. Local government is said to be weak. A coexistence agreement between local government and insurgency was broken in 2006. especially the police headquarters. .1 provides an overview of the current security situation in the border districts of the Southern Cluster (based on our own assessment).5 Higher Risk Province District Name Risk Assessment HIGHER RISK (4) The power of the state is limited to a 2 km radius around the district centre. In light of the above. where government posts are simply seen as a commodity that can be bought. In Chahar Burjak (Nimroz). in most districts the government does not have a good reputation and much faith in the government has been lost through bad governance. Atghar 34 . Insurgency enters from Pakistan via Spin Boldak. Few border-police check-posts • MEDIUM RISK (3) A STALE MATE exists with neither insurgency nor government controlling the district. the father of the district police chief cannot even visit due to insecurity. Cross-border smuggling networks are functioning well. • • LOWER RISK (2) A STALE MATE exists with neither insurgency nor government fully controlling the district. The insurgency controls the mountains and move easily across the border from Pakistan. An Afghan National Army base limits insurgency activities. attacking pro-government individuals (and elders) from the mountains. • LOWER RISK (2) Government is in control • Spin Boldak Considered relatively stable. At the same time there are complaints about a corrupt Government. thus limiting the control of the government. Government is strongest in the district centre and the insurgency does not permanently hold territory. Kandahar Arghistan • The insurgency does not necessarily have full control of the district as they tend to move from village to village. The major insurgency stronghold is the region between Arghistan and Maruf. Maruf • Insurgency leads a guerrilla war. an agreement between Bares tribal elders and the Government helps the security situation. • 35 . they just pass through on their way to Helmand. Shorabak • Allegedly. insurgents can hide well. As there are a lot of mountains at border to Pakistan. This has improved. Fighting is infrequent and never very heavy. but do not fight there. Government is strongest in the district centre and the insurgency does not permanently hold territory. For example. used to be instable in the past (2005) when insurgents crossed from Pakistan.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Province District Name Risk Assessment HIGHER RISK (4) A STALE MATE exists with neither insurgency nor government controlling the district. Heavy smuggling activity. The insurgency is influential since most leaders are from the Baluch tribe who control the district. Criminal networks are old and longstanding. Insurgency and narcotics mafia is in control. Armed fighters enter here from Pakistan. There is a high rate of smuggling (drugs.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Province District Name Risk Assessment LOWER RISK (2) Limited insurgency influence. Many insurgents are also from the former Taliban regime. Armed fighters enter here from Pakistan. Chief of Police). power went back to jihadi commanders in the first years of the current government. HIGHER RISK (5) Khanishin Government lost control of the entire district. jihadi commanders who were close to the Rabbani government or did not switch over to the Taliban tend to keep a low profile. grazing lands (sand) with little population. a Tokhi who had established links with President Karzai in Quetta and who moved to Zabul from Kabul during the military campaign to oust the Taliban. Mostly Kuchi. Warlords occupy powerful local government positions (District Governor. Hamidullah. In contrast. • Influence of jiahdi commanders Jihadi commanders that integrated into Taliban forces in the mid 1990s or more recently seem to have kept their influence since the insurgency now control large amounts of rural areas. District Chief and Head of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) at the same time. In Zabul. Insurgency and narcotics mafia is in control. Smugglers or insurgency control the rest of the district. The Chief of Police is not present in the district but lives in the provincial capital. goods and trafficking of human) by Baluch. Chahar Burja • The Government is allegedly closely linked to smuggling networks. Kandahar Reg(istan) • • HIGHER RISK (5) Helmand Dishu Government lost control of the entire districts. MEDIUM RISK (3) Nimroz Government controls a radius of 30 km around the district. • One-man show with one person being Chief of Police. was 36 . . other factors (e. Most powerful government positions in Kandahar districts are occupied by former Zirak Durrani jihadi commanders with the exception of Maruf.The power of former jihadi commanders has been reduced. Allegedly even Popalzai are involved in the insurgency (in Arghistan. Ackekzai.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Provincial Governor for two and a half years.benefiting from the poor behaviour of strong jihadi commanders. but often only those individuals who felt marginalized and left out. as the insurgency has regained much of its former strength. Najibullah and later also with the Rabbani regime. 37 . however. Insurgency Even after the fall of the Taliban the Southern region remained a stronghold of the Taliban. Particularly in remote areas throughout the South. religious indoctrination for 3 The Fedayin faction was lead by Ismat Muslim and comprised mostly of Achekzai. where the District Chief is an Alizai and Reg. the Taliban was never fully ousted at the end of 2001. smaller commanders may be engaged in providing security arrangements to the drug mafia but their influence is likely to be weak in insurgency-controlled territory of the border districts.g. Many tribes (e. The Achekzai from the former Fedayin jihadi faction occupy many powerful government positions (especially District Chief and Chief of Police) in the border districts of Kandahar province. Nurzai.g. They fought against the Soviets but then switched and worked with Dr. In Chahar Burja (Nimroz) all powerful government positions are currently held by former warlords.. one should not exaggerate tribal allegiances as not entire tribes stand behind the Taliban. Alkozai. While much of the insurgency is controlled by prominent Afghan figures that are still residing in Pakistan (in Helmand for example the Gerdi Jangal refugee camp in Baluchistan plays a prominent role). However. including their ability to exploit the main tribal and factional conflicts and fault lines existing in the districts to their advantage. The insurgency has in fact shown an ability to capitalize on the mistakes of the government in the past five years. not all insurgents are Afghan nationals. In Helmand. the insurgency is currently able to recruit support from marginalized elements within all tribes. where the District Chief is Baluch and the Chief of the Border Police is an Ishaqzai from the Fedayin 3 faction. In Chahar Burja (Nimroz). the Taliban was never fully defeated (especially in Zabul). they are a uniting factor among the underdogs in the tribal areas. Thus. Furthermore. They controlled much of the southern Kandahar and epecially the highway between Kandahar and Spin Boldak. Some may have also switched sides to work with the insurgency. There is recurrent insurgency in all of the Southern cluster districts from across the border in Pakistan. and Kakar) and Kuchis have strong cross-border linkages to Pakistan. Kandahar). It is important to recall that in Shamulzayi district. but also members of Ghilzai or Panjpai tribes who are tired o being excluded from government and under the control of the Durrani. Many Achekzai affiliated with the Fedayin left the area when the Taliban came to power and returned under the current government. the leaders of the current insurgency were associated with the former Taliban regime or studied in madrassas in Pakistan in that time. Insurgent groups include Taliban and al-Qaeda. Links to neighbouring Dishu district in Helmand are strong. Baluch. for example. As such. while unarmed fighters may cross the border in Spin Boldak. Dishu and Khanishin in Helmand or Reg and Shorabak in Kandahar. Many insurgents enjoy the backing of their tribesmen or became popular throughout Kandahar as religious figures. Taliban are Islamic students. Names were difficult to confirm at present due to their sensitivity.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t example) also play a role. Pakistan. as many local communities see it the same way and become irritated if outsiders speak about the Taliban only without acknowledging the diversity of the insurgency and complexity of their motives. Our interviews indicate that the majority of insurgents and their weapons tend to enter Afghanistan via Shamulzayi in Zabul. and individuals join the fight against the government and international military forces out of one or more of the following reasons: • ideology (Neo-Taliban. Afghans can enter Pakistan without documentation. This is the reason why we have chosen to speak of « the insurgency » in this report. Old Garde Taliban. The insurgency has been able to recruit among many different groups capitalising on the mistakes made by the Afghan government as well as the international community (especially military forces). Even if the Taliban/insurgency as such are not really liked. Still it seems the Neo-Taliban is now managing to draw overall support from a larger group of tribes than during their first emergence. “Stop calling them Taliban for a start. It is crucial to understand that the insurgency are not uniform and differ from district to district in their appearance and ability to draw on tribal support. such as Spin Boldak. For the purpose of clarification. if you ask me to squeal on a Taliban. Of course. no one will accept to see him handed over to the foreign forces. they are able to provide one single important service to the local community they so very much desire: justice and security. rather than « the Taliban ». It has become in many ways a safe haven for Taliban (much of the former Taliban Cabinet resides there) with the Taliban having the ability to move freely without interferences from the Pakistani government. Sympathy for the insurgency has intensified due to the general perception that the Southern region was not part in the Bonn Accord. Kandahar resident on the western profiling of the insurgency: Much of the disturbance potential in the South is controlled from Quetta. Thereore only very general observations can tentatively be made about the level of tribal support towards the insurgency. common criminals) • opportunity (getting back at « old » enemies). it is important to note that the word insurgency would fit better to describe the diversity behind the current anti-government movement. has been sidelined in the political 38 . people who study God. Even at major border crossing points. while we often use the term Taliban and insurgency almost synonymously. Until the government is able to offer the same it is unlikely to receive popular local support. Call them bandits or insurgents and nobody will give a damn”. It is worth mentioning here that neither the Afghan nor the Pakistan governments are able or willing to control their borders. international terrorists) • grievances (political and economic marginalisation) • greed (drug trade. After all. the insurgency has been known to attack eradication efforts in an effort to undermine and weaken the government. Many would prefer the fighting to stop. the government is allegedly in a coexistence agreement (i. Coexistence agreements: Shamulzayi (Zabul) and Chahar Burja (Nimroz) Until 2005. this arrangement may also be interpreted as a more general coexistence agreement between government. our research also indicated a war-tiredness among the communities in the Southern cluster. has however created a stronger opposition between the population in general and the Government and created a rift between the Shamulzayi and Yusofzai. In Chahar Burjak. they do levy poppy production as extra income. However. in Helmand) and allows in turn the smuggling of fighters into Afghanistan in the empty containers returning to the border districts. This changed with the appointment of Wazir (Yusofzai) as District Chief and Shah Khan (Yusofzai) as Police Chief. our research indicates that it is more accurate to describe their relationship with the narcotics mafia as symbiotic. especially if they manage to decreases insecurity. corruption) with smuggling networks involved in narcotics and other trafficking across the Afghan-Iranian border. Wazir allegedly broke the coexistence agreement between the insurgency and the government by telling the government the whereabouts of the famous Taliban Commander Mohammad Hussain (aka Mustasayad). This “betrayal” of the District Chief. the Taliban did issue a fatwa (religious decree) in 2000 that reduced poppy production in Afghanistan nearly altogether. • • In areas controlled by the insurgency. one way or the other.g. In the areas that are controlled by the government. Even though the insurgency is often blamed for controlling the drug trade in Afghanistan. They currently seem to mutually benefit from eachother as the drug mafia often hires insurgents for securing their convoys (e. as long as the insurgents are not firmly in power. The fact that both the District Chief and the Police Chief are Yusofzai does not necessarily translate into political power for the Yusofzai tribe. who was subsequently killed by the Afghan National Army. political power in Shamulzayi was vested in an informal coexistence agreement between the government and the insurgency. especially as the District Chief is very unpopular within his own tribe and has lost the honour of tribal eldership. the insurgency is in full control from dusk till dawn.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t process and is excluded from the development process.e. In many of the Southern borderdistricts. but then some government officials are also alleged to do the same. As smuggling networks are closely linked to the current insurgency. Nevertheless. 39 . such a fatwa is unlikely.. How long this mutually beneficial relationship between the insurgency and the narcotics mafia will continue is unclear. which explains why local communities often do not oppose co-existence agreements between the insurgency and government officials. smuggling networks and insurgents. Many have lost their livelihood and are essentially without permanent settlement groups. many of which were increased during the Afghan wars and long years of displacement in Pakistan. Many of these historical political and economical links were fostered in the jihad when there were important cross-border population movements. that the Pakistani government has favoured supporting resistance groups with strong religious ideologies in a hope that they would drop the « nationalistic agenda » of trying to reclaim « Pashtunistan ». Iranian or Pakistani. there seems to be a « cyclical » relationship here. however. In particular. • • • Many Helmandi families. Pakistan. Both support independence movements for their respective ethnic group in Pakistan. have moved back to Pakistan (Dal Ban Din area of Baluchistan). is Mahmud Khan. for example. Another problem with displacement that little is known about are Kuchis. The Baluch are said to have great solidarity among each other and inter-marriages between Afghan. Recent fighting between the insurgency and NATO/ISAF/ANA has led to renewed population displacement. For this reason. Distinguishing Afghanistan Baluch from Iranian and Pakistani Baluch is nearly impossible since they do not have ID Cards or Tazkira to indicate whether their nationality is Afghan. Pashtun tribes also have established cross-border links. for example. The Baluch – « Identity without borders » Most Baluch in Chahar Burja have houses in both Chahar Burja and Zabul Province of Iran. Many tribes from Kandahari districts still have populations living in refugee camps in the Pishin area between Quetta and Chaman in Pakistan. In addition to the Baluch. One could also argue. One of the most important Achekzai leaders. especially in Helmand. and the Baluch also to Iran. we destabilize you). the leader of the Pashtun-based nationalist party Pakhtun-khwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) active in the Pashtun speaking areas of Baluchistan. Thus. Most narcotics traffickers allegedly live on the Iranian side of the border. see especially the Eastern cluster report). The support of Pashtun nationalists goes back to the Durand-line issue and a hope to regain Pashtun territory. with both governments meddling in each other’s political affairs (on the Durand-line issue. still have families in the Gerdi Jangal (Girdi Jungle) refugee camp in Baluchistan. Iranian of Pakistani Baluch are quite frequent.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Cross-border linkages/Refugee Warrior Communities Baluch and Pashtuns both have strong political cross-border links to Pakistan. Some of the Kandahari tribes as well as tribes from Zabul districts also have families still living in Muslim Bagh (Pakistan). populations who had left Afghanistan during the Jihad and had since returned to Afghanistan. The Afghan state has traditionally been close to and supported Baluch and Pashtun nationalist movements in their quest for independence in Pakistan. It is said that this is a response to the Pakistani government supporting Taliban fighters (you destabilize us. 40 . 2 provides an overview of weapons sold in the Southern cluster districts and their prices. accessed 1 March 2008 7 ‘Afghanistan: Hundreds flee fighting in Helmand Province. • Those who flee more generally from existing or anticipated violence and fighting in districts of Taliban insurgency.aspx?ReportId=75722.org/Report. 4 ‘Afghanistan: Conflict-affected displacement “major” humanitarian challenge . The feeling of not receiving attention. Table 3. narcotics and human trafficking is the Baramcha bazaar in Southern Helmand at the border to Pakistan. 16 August 2007) 6 and displacement is continuing.g. southwest and east of the country (IRIN. 20 November 2007).org/Report. Snapshot: Renewed Internal Displacement in Southern Afghanistan The Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) recently described conflict-induced displacement in Southern Afghanistan as a ‘major’ humanitarian challenge (IRIN.org/ 8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/DFADB5842F9262BF802570A7004BA6F0?OpenDocument 6 ‘Afghanistan: UN highlights conflict’s impact on civilians. accessed 1 March 2008 5 http://www.. predominantly in the south.000 individuals) in the provinces of Helmand. or assistance.aspx?ReportId=73759.irinnews. weapons and drug smugglers can deal with each other or the insurgency openly. 7 UNHCR has raised its concern with both the Afghan government and international military forces about the protection of these individuals.irinnews.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t many Kuchis either return to Pakistan or squat in makeshift displacement camps. Two groups can be differentiated: • Political IDPs consisting of families related to pro-government strongmen who flee out of fear of persecution from the Taliban insurgency in their native district. many do not return out of the same fears. ranging from semi-automatic handguns.’ 06 December 2007 (IRIN) http://www.Afghan Red Crescent. Many flee proactively. to machine guns (e.. Recent and ongoing displacements result from insecurity and escalation of conflict in the South (insurgency) and East.g.’16 August 2007 (IRIN) http://www. and elsewhere in the Southern cluster is diverse and plentiful. assault rifles (e.’ 20 November 2007 (IRIN) http://www. Small Arms Flow As noted earlier.000 families (about 100. The availability of small arms on this market.irinnews.org/Report.4 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2007). Kalashnikov type machine guns-PKMs) and RPGs (rocket propelled grenades). They are generally unassisted due to lack of access. estimates IDPs in Afghanistan to be around 300. 5 This figure increased drastically in 2007 when the UN estimated in August 2007 that some 80. accessed 1 March 2008 41 . Kalashnikov). Violence and fighting between NATO and Afghan National Army forces and the insurgency had displaced about 20. one of the most important smugglers market for illegal goods including weapons.000 with an increasing tendency.aspx?ReportId=75399. fearing NATO/US bombardment in areas where Taliban has taken control. As the government has no control in this area.internal-displacement. semi-automatic rifles. Kandahar and Uruzgan by the end of 2006.000 people have been displaced by insecurity. is a major contributing factor for Kuchis to orient themselves toward the insurgency. 000-421.5001. Pakistani Makariovs and TTs.00025.000 281.750 PKR 40.000 PKR 120.000 PKR 30.000 PKR 25.00025.000 (old) PKR 17.000 PKR 25.000 130.0001.000 1.000 (new) PKR 40.000 25.000 PKR 15.000.000 PKR 15.500-562.T (new) American 9mm (new) PK Chinese PK Russian PK Iranian (new) Russian RPG (new) Chinese RPG (new) RPG Iranian (new) RGP (unknown make) PKR 20.00022.000(old) 28.250-562.000 PKR 20.000130.000 PKR 80.000 (old) Atghar PKR 20.00025.00033.000(old) 22. Zabul Type AK 47 Chinese AK 47 Russian AK 47 Iranian (new) Russian Makarov Chinese T.000 PKR 20.000.000 PKR 25.000 421.000 Dishu/ Chahar Burja Khanishin (Toman) PKR 30.000 PKR 100.000-491.000 42 .000(old) 18.000 PKR 12. Czech and Hungarian make. Iraqi.000 PKR 25.500 983.000 PKR 100.000 (old) PKR 17.000 (new) PKR 100.000120.500 (new) PKR 30.000 PKR 17.000 20.000 210.000 120.PKR 80.000 Shamulzayi PKR 20.000 (old) PKR 20.2 Weapon’s Prices in the Southern Cluster (Other weapons found are AKs of German.000 PKR 20.000 PKR 35.000. RPG with one and two handles).250 (new) 281.000.000 (old) PKR 20.000 PKR 20.405.000 Helmand Nimroz PKR 20.PKR 16.00018.000220.00030.PKR 14.000 PKR 110.000120.000 PKR 50.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t TABLE 3.000120000 PKR 110.000 351.545.405.000 PKR 17.00042.000 Maruf Kandahar Arghistan Shorabak/Spin Reg Boldak PKR 18.PKR 110.750-351. box) on the difficulty to exactly determine the value of a Toman in specific business transaction. Farah. He supplies weapons to the Taliban/insurgency in Helmand and Kandahar city and has an extensive network of employees/associates across the region working with him. which are sold purely for profit-reasons without much thinking about the political impact they may have. Nontheless the lucrative weapons trade is definitely cashing on the arms demand within the insurgency active areas in Afghanistan and across tribal areas of Pakistan. These also come from Iran. The other kind of weapons is what we would label «business» weapons. There is an alleged link between the weapons and narcotics trade. One of the big weapon’s dealers in the Baramcha bazaar is Abdul Nabi.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Similar to most other goods in the Southern clusters. Of course. weapon’s prices are in Pakistani Rupee. Miram Shah used to be more important than Wana. thus no attempt was made to convert it for the small arms prices. but the recent increased military presence in North Waziristan has shifted this importance to Wana. Karachi (MQM) or to Baluch fighters (in Baluchistan province. Haji Wakil Nurzai (of the Nurzai tribe) and Hajji Abdul Rahim Baloch (of the Baluch tribe) are also partners in the weapon smuggling business. and some of the ones coming via the northern route may also have links to political groups (as a porous border allows for diverse business transactions). • • Haji Bilal and Haji Sharfadin (both Baluch) are partners in weapons and narcotics smuggling and bring in weapons from Iran for the insurgents. They tend to come from old stockpiles from jihad times usually in the Northern provinces in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent from central Asian countries. and ends up in Wana and Miram Shah in South and North Waziristan in Pakistan. The Baramcha market in Helmand can be considered the end-point or transshipment centre at the end of one of the two big weapons smuggling routes with weapons mostly coming from Iran via Herat. and Nimroz into the Baramcha market in Southern Helmand and also the Baluch area at the Pakistan border. which makes it important for the insurgency to have support among them. Pakistan). an Ishaqzai originally from Maywand district of Kandahar who now lives in the Gerdi Jangal refugee camp in Pakistan. • There are two kinds of weapons available on the Baramcha market. 43 . Most weapons find their way to Waziristan before they are redistributed according to the need of fighters in Afghanistan. which are imported by the insurgency from Pakistan (Girdi Jangal) and are allegedly linked to diverse political groups. some of the weapons coming from Iran and Pakistan may also be «business» weapons. with drug convoys being used to smuggle drugs out and weapons (and fighters) in. Kashmir. The second big trafficking route for weapons runs mostly from northern Afghanistan through the Hazarajat to Southern and Southeastern Afghanistan. Chahar Burja in Nimroz is again an exception as its orientation to Iran also influences weapons being dealt with in Iranian currency (the Toman). This smuggling route is under the control of the non-Pashtun Baluch tribe. See earlier discussions in Chapter 2 (section on Currencies and Prices. They smuggle weapons for the Taliban/insurgency from Pakistan. the first we label «political» weapons. Wana and Miram Shah are thus even more important than Baramcha in terms of weapons as it is the single most important hub of weapons in the Afghan-Pakistan region. S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t While some small arms in Wana and Miram Shah do also come via Baramcha (those from Iran. Arabs. Dautani. The buyer becomes the transporter here and thus there are a multitude of different factions/tribes (mostly Ahmadzai. As in Baramcha. 44 . instability in Sindh and the Baluch freedom movement. Usually the town indicated in the map with exception of Chitral are used by insurgency to arm their fighters and re-distribution of weapons in to Afghanistan to support insurgency. Qarabagh. but also the Kashmir conflict. Up to this point the transport structure is quite organized. • • • Figure 3. Stanikzai. into the hands of Pashtun smugglers in the South and Southeast (thus moving from northern Afghanistan through the Hazarajat to Southern and Southeastern Afghanistan into Pakistan). either bribing border security guards for passage or utilising isolated mountain passes for transborder trade. Allegedly the northern network runs in the following steps: • Former jihadi commanders and weapon supply networks from jihad times linked to the Northern Alliance/United Front. It is based on the old trade routes for smuggling weapons that were used by the mujahideen fighters during the 1980s. In Wana weapons are supplied to the insurgency. The interests of the weapon smugglers involved in this complicated network range from pure business interests linked to profit calculations to political interests linked to support of insurgents in Afghanistan. buy weapons from former commanders. Thus. Muqqur (Ghazni) to Dila (Paktika) and on to the border where bribes and countless passes lead to the South Waziristan’s centre of Wana. there is a mix of «business» and «political» weapons. this map is an approximation of the truth for the current weapons trade. Our research indicates that many of these routes are still active however the change is that many of these border town markets are now also getting supplies from inside Afghanistan as well. and local tribes in exchange for cash. while the Pakistani ones in Baramcha in turn may come from Wana and Miram Shah). as well as mid and low level ex. From the Hazara areas. Hazara transport the weapons on to southern Ghazni where Pashtun tribes take over. As for the route to Baramcha. it is also a big destination for weapons from the North of Afghanistan. Uzbek and Hazara smugglers. Al Qaeda. Thus in addition to the routes indicated in the map below there are also weapons flowing to these Pakistan border towns from Afghanistan as well. Niazi and Wazir) engaged in the transport through Abband. Taliban. Jumbesh etc. The trafficking route for small arms that runs from Northern Afghanistan is interesting in as much as it in an interesting example of inter-ethnic cooperation between Northern dealers (mostly Tajik and Uzbek). Daulatzai. Uzbeks will transport it to Hazara territory usually Day Kundi (northern Part of Uruzgan) and Bamiyan and Hazara parts of Ghazni.and current commanders. Uzbeks. there is also a complicated linkage between the small arms and narcotics trade with networks cooperating with each other. foot soldiers and old stockpiles. Weapons sellers are usually provided safe passage (in exchange for money) in territories they cross.1 provides a map that tries to illustrate the different routes taken for the smuggling of weapons. but in the Pashtun territory the situation becomes chaotic. These areas are allegedly considered “a good business environment” since little attention is focused there. But there are obviously variations that still need to be researched further. An astonishing 50% of the whole Afghan opium crop comes from one single province: Helmand. this relatively rich southern province has become the world’s biggest source of illicit drugs. http://www. Especially favourable weather conditions (more rain) have lead to a high opium output of about 42.5 kg/ hectare (again an increase from last year of 37 kg/ha).unodc. With just 2. 8 Afghanistan has cultivated 193. opium cultivation has exploded to unprecedented levels. The UNODC (2007) survey confirmed “In south-west Afghanistan. The agricultural land used for poppy production is now larger than that used for coca cultivation in Colombia. Morocco (cannabis). “Leaving aside 19th century China. iv).5 million inhabitants.000 hectares of opium poppies (17% more than in 2006). Peru and Bolivia combined. no other country in the world has ever produced narcotics on such a deadly scale” (UNODC 2007. Opium from Afghanistan thus amounts for 93% of the global drug market.1 Historic Weapons flow into Afghanistan during the 1980s (Source: The Bear Trap by authors Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Major Mark Adkin) Drug Economy According to (UNODC). This year around 70% of the country’s poppies were grown in five provinces along the border with Pakistan. surpassing the output of entire countries like Colombia (coca). that had a population at that time 15 times larger than today’s Afghanistan.pdf 45 . and Myanmar (opium) – which have populations up to twenty times larger” 8 UNODC (200): Afghanistan Opium Survey.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t FIGURE 3.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web. despite relatively higher levels of income. the border districts included in this study are not necessarily the strongest producers within their respective provinces. especially Helmand. • • • Even though the Southern provinces. the difficult economic situation in Atghar. TABLE 3. iv). Combined.878 ha). only Maruf (914 ha) comes closets to these levels. Shah Wali Kot (1.4 for a more specific overview of opium cultivation in the districts in the Southern Cluster. The few poppy growers in Atghar (Zabul) sell their products in Maruf (Kandahar).3 for a general overview of opium cultivation in the Southern Cluster.220) are leading poppy cultivation. See Table 3. Only 43 ha of opium poppy were eradicated in 2007 in Nimroz.3 General Overview of Opium Cultivation in the Southern Cluster Zabul • About 50% decrease in poppy cultivation. Maywand (2. 46 . This is also reflected in the low levels of cultivation of the two border districts: Shamulzayi (159 ha) and Atghar (16 ha). the area under opium poppy has more than tripled. According to our interviews. from 3. Since then.615 ha in 2007 (despite the eradication of 7. but also water scarcity. Majority of the cultivation located in Khash Rod district. lead people to migrate to Helmand to obtain employment in poppy cultivation. jointly accounting only for about 11% of the total production in Zabul. All Kandahar border districts rank at the lower end of opium production in the province.611 ha in 2007 • Kandahar Increase by onethird from 2006 to 16.905 ha of opium poppy) Sharp increase started already in 2004 when only 4.959 ha were cultivated. compared to 69. the border districts discussed in this report only account for about 9% of the entire opium cultivation in Afghanistan’s South (which includes Uruzgan).770 ha in 2007. including unemployment.258 ha) and Dand (1. Fifty-three per cent of total opium poppy cultivation of Afghanistan • Nimroz Opium poppy cultivation tripled since 2006 reaching 6. accounting jointly for about 14% of all opium cultivation in the province. Ghorak (1.445). provide the majority of Afghanistan’s opium production. The poppy production in the border-districts of Zabul is linked to Helmand as well as Kandahar. Allegedly they heard over the radio that there is a lot of money to be made from growing opium in Helmand.507 ha in 2007. • Helmand Increase by almost 50% reaching 102. See Table 3.210 ha in 2006 to 1. A lot of this is linked to the unfavourable climate that prevails in the border-districts. Zabul is such an example where incompatibility between the opium crop and soil.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t (UNODC 2007. It is there they also learned how to grow and harvest poppy. where a scarcity of water and subsequent years of drought have diminished agricultural land. does not allow for major opium cultivation in the entire province (even though it was attempted).324 ha in 2006 (tripled since 2002). thus poppy production. The trucks that arrived with weapons are usually filled with opium and return often through the same routes as weapons to their destination (see Figure 3. money obtained from opium sales may be invested in buying small arms. Provincial coverage) ha 2007 Shamulzayi 2003 Atghar 2003 TOTAL Zabul Early Maruf 1990s Arghistan 1999 Early Spin Boldak 1990s Shorabak 2003 Reg 2005 TOTAL Kandahar Khanishin 2000 Dishu 2004 TOTAL Helmand Chahar 2004 Nimroz Burja Zabul Kandahar Helmand nil 10% 651 ha 2. with little success).616 2.683 ha 65 ha 526 ha 1. An anecdote told by local researchers tells the following tale: «They bring in entire trucks full of money.765 ha 369 ha 911 ha 851 ha 4. While Dishu ranks only slightly above Washer.484 ha 1.86% 15% nil 30% 20% nil % of Total 2008 (est. and Kang tried for years.262 ha 3.163 2.210 ha Most of the narcotics trafficking in Helmand and Chahar Burja in Nimroz involving the Baluch smugglers are done in Iranian currency (Toman.045 ha). TABLE 3. such as via 47 . which is resold for a profit.111 1. Security guards are tied on top of bundles of money so they do not fall off a truck driving very fast while possibly also having to fight off attackers». As noted earlier.474 ha 7.449 ha 303 ha 45 ha 0 218 ha 19 ha 327 ha 1.769 ha) and Nad Ali (20.4 District overview of poppy production in the Southern Cluster Province District Name First Year Poppy recorded 2004 44 ha 32 ha 76 ha 117 ha 2005 16 ha 86 ha 102 ha 150 ha 2006 35 ha 36 ha 71 ha 464 ha 784 ha 454 ha 409 ha 0 2007 159 ha 16 ha 175 914 ha 310 ha 768 ha 308 ha 4 ha 2. Both districts account for about 9% of the opium cultivation in Helmand.1).S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t In Helmand.519 ha 7. the district with the lowest coverage of poppy fields in Helmand. there is often a linkage between the weapons and drug smuggling networks.160 ha 9.304ha 8.87% 70-90% 70-90% 10. poppy cultivation would increase drastically (given that all but one district have tried to grow or grown it in the past).34% 8. Chahar Burjak (87 ha) is the only other district in Nimroz that currently also has poppy fields (Zaranj had some last year.893 ha 2.644ha 87 ha 9. see discussions in Chapter 2 under Currencies and Prices).93% 10% 13. Money generated by selling weapons is often used to buy poppy. Similarly.116 3.772 ha 3. the two biggest opium cultivation districts in 2007 also did not come from the border area: Nahir Sarraj (22.119 ha TOTAL SOUTH Cluster 3. If water availability was less of a problem in Nimroz.34%) to the main producing district (Khash Rod). but fades in comparison (1.38% 1.917ha 12. Khanishin is very much in the middle-field with all other districts cultivating poppy. with Pashtun tribes also being involved in the trade. not so much for recreational drug use. The northern route sends the drugs to the Central Asian countries. there is also a value-addition to the raw opium as many heroin labs are located there. In the North. our research suggest more of a symbiosis between the drug mafia and insurgents. 48 . via Russia also onto the European and international market. The drug smuggling networks are usually business-oriented dealers. Even though it is often alleged that the insurgency is also part of the opium mafia. Sibi. Especially alarming is the use of opium as sleep inducer (sedation) especially for small infants. but the substitution of other kinds of medicine with opium. in many parts of the Southern Cluster linked to Baluch smugglers (who also smuggle weapons). and Qalat in Pakistan also goes straight to the Baramcha market for sale. The drugs that are sold toward the North are transported in smaller quantities than the bigger convoys that go via Baluchistan into Iran and Turkey. The easy availability of opium has also created a local market.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Baramcha to Iran onwards to Turkey and the European and international market. The former control drug production and trade while the latter tax opium yields and provide security for the drug convoys. Poppy from Loralai. and are only found in Zabul province in the Southern border districts (Atghar. and influence. a population group that traces its origins to one common ancestor. Hazara. The Durrani and the Ghilzai Pashtuns jointly account for over two-thirds of all Afghan Pashtuns. with the latter being relatively small and insignificant in Afghan tribal politics. but mostly illegal linked to narcotics and weapons). Nimroz and Reg district of Kandahar. are another minority in Kandahar (Shorabak. 10 Naqilin tribes and ethnic groups such as Turkmen. 9 Note on the Panjpai: Panjpai tribes were originally Ghilzai tribes that have been partially integrated into the Durrani confederation in the South over the centuries (the Panjpai tribes in the East and Southeast of the country still consider themselves as Ghilzai). In addition. and retain a distinct character. The Durrani confederation is further divided into two «sub»-confederations. they do hold some dominance in the border areas. For example. They have however often not been fully considered Durranis when it comes to power sharing at the provincial and regional levels. Helmand. where the Wardak form a small minority). however. Arghistan) and Helmand (Dishu).98% in Shorabak. they are treated as a separate group throughout the survey. we find naqilin (migrants linked to population relocations favored by the state) tribes in the Southern cluster as well. The Southern cluster clearly lies in Pashtun dominated territory. This dominance does not necessarily come from their population size and certainly not from state power. Qais Abdul Rasheed. The Karyani are more important in the Southeast and also Pakistan (see Southeaster cluster report). and Karyani. Among the Pashtuns that fall outside these three main confederations are the Bares.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t 4 Tribal Overview Chapter T he border districts in the Southern cluster do not necessarily reflect the tribal patterns in the entire South. There are three main tribal confederations: Durrani. 10% in Dishu. who trace themselves directly back to the prophet Mohammad (MBUH). Ghilzai. positions. Because of this. and a small minority tribe of the Farsiwan (3% in Dishu. and 3% in Chahar Burjak in Nimroz. They do. Uzbek and eastern and Southeastern Pashtuns are non-native tribes that moved to the area in the 1950 and 1960.1 for an overview of the tribes that fall within the Pashtun confederations discussed here. while the Ghilzai predominate in the East and Southeast of Afghanistan. The Durrani tend to dominate in the South and SouthWest of Afghanistan. the Zirak Durrani and the Panjpai9 .10 See Table 4. also trace their ancestry to Qais Abdul Rasheed. Kandahar. Their power rather comes from the fact that they control strategic border crossings. 49 . The Sayed. Helmand). while the Baluch are a relative minority in the South. especially in Helmand. Usually Sayed minorities can be found in many places throughout Afghanistan. including cross-border trade (legal. TABLE 4. including parts of Pakistan. and Iran. Balooch. Baloush) are an Iranian people inhabiting the region of Balochistan in the southeast corner of the Iranian plateau in Southwest Asia and the northwestern Indian Subcontinent. Helmand (making up about 50% of the population in both border districts) and Kandahar (100% in Reg and a minority in Shorabak – less than 2%).Popalzai Barakzai Mohammadzai Alkozai Acheckzai Yusofzai • • • • • Panjpai Nurzai Alizai Ishaqzai Khugiani Mako The Baloch (‫ .1 Overview of Tribes and Ethnic Groups in the Southern Cluster Southern Cluster • • • • • • • Ghilzai Hotak Tokhi Kakar Shamulzai Barokhail Babuzai Kuchis Durrani • • Karyani Wardak Wazir • • • Others Pashtun Bares Farsiwan Baluch Sayed • • • • • • Zirak . Afghanistan.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t As noted. Bloach. the biggest non-Pashtun group are the Baluch11 . 11 50 . Baloosh.بل وچ‬alternative transliterations Baluch. Balush. Balosh. which dominate in Nimroz (nearly all of Chahar Burjak). Balouch. The Zirak Durrani make for a majority in the three Kandahari districts that are not dominated by either the Bares (Shorabak. Khugiani. with some scattered tribes also in Arghistan. especially in Kandahar. the Hotak in Atghar and the Tokhi in Shamulzayi.2 provides an overview of the geographic distribution of the tribes in the Southern cluster. 30%. and Achekzai). where the Ghilzai tribes are the majority. 100%): Arghistan (25% Barakzai. Alizai 5%. In contrast to the Ghilzai Pashtun and non-Pashtun Baluch. Spin Boldak (45% Nurzai) and Maruf (Alizai. the Ghilzai can only be found in the Kandahar border district of Maruf (15% Kakar) and Dishu in Helmand (5% Kakar). In addition to the sedentary Ghilzai tribes various Kuchi tribes can be found in all border districts. the Zirak and Panjpai Durrani confederations are far more scattered between Helmand and Kandahar. 25% Mohammadzai. As in the rest of the country. Outside Zabul. some Achekzai).S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t The Ghilzai confederation is mostly dominant in the two Zabul border districts where they make up a majority. Table 4. the Kuchi feel marginalized due to their migratory lifestyle. Zabul links up to the Southeastern cluster. even though they are part of the Ghilzai confederation. They are in the minority in Helmand (Popalzai. Maruf (50% Barakzai) and Spin Boldak (55% Achekzai). The Panjpai Durrani mainly live between Kandahar. 5%) and Dishu (Ishaqzai 32%). 25%) in Kandahar. 98%) or Baluch (Reg. and 20% Popalzai. There are more Ghilzai in non-border districts in these provinces. Barakzai. and Helmand (where the Ishaqzai dominate): Khanishin (Ishaqzai. and both are more strongly represented. 51 . Mohammadzai) Alkozai Ackekzai Yusofzai Nurzai Zabul Kandahar Arghistan (20%) Maruf (50%) Arghistan (50%).2 Overview of Tribal Composition of Southeastern Cluster Confederation Tribe Popalzai Barakzai (incl.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t TABLE 4. 25% are Mohammadzai Arghistan (15%) Spin Boldak (55%) Arghistan Helmand Khanishin (5%) Dishu (5%) Nimroz Zirak Durrani Khanishin Shamulzayi (5%) Spin Boldak (45%) Maruf (25%) Arghistan Maruf (8%) Arghistan Arghistan Maruf (2%) Atghar (95%) Shamulzayi (88%) Maruf (15%) Shamulzayi (7%) Atghar (5%) Shorabak (98%) Reg (100%) Shorabak Shorabak Arghistan Dishu (10%) Khanishin (50%) Dishu (40%) Dishu (5%) Chahar Burjak (3%) Chahar Burjak (97%) Dishu (5%) Khanishin Khanishin (5%) Dishu (32%) Khanishin (30%) Khanishin (5%) Panjpai Ghilzai Karyani Other Alizai Ishaqzai Khugiani Hotak Tokhi Kakar Smaller Ghilzai tribes Wardak Bares Baluch Sayed 52 . thereby founding the Durrani dynasty. This caused many traditional leaders to take up the struggle – jihad – in defence of their power. a very young Abdali leader.‫ گیب یق ل ن ادر‬or Tahmāsp Qoli Khān .افش ار ش اه ن ادر‬also known as Nāder Qoli Beg .S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t The regional political dominance by the Zirak Durrani has historical roots. 12 53 . Ahmad Shah Abdali (1724-1773) of the Popalzai. Among the Durrani. He renamed his own Pashtun confederation and name (Abdali) into Durrani (Dur-i Durrani. Nāder Shāh Afshār (Persian: ‫ . Hereby he referred to tribal ideals and underlined his position as a primus inter pares (the first under equals. mostly joining one of the seven jihadi factions (Peshawar seven). Thus one cannot speak of a clear domination by one of the two confederations. the Zirak Durrani have been more powerful than the Panjpai. which are a sub-tribe of the Barakzai. The rule under the mujahideen government was very diverse. Most of the kings were actually Mohammadzai. The Durrani-rule of Afghanistan was disrupted for only 23 years. Since this period. some historians have described him as the Napoleon of Persia or the Second Alexander. Other traditional leaders went into exile in Pakistan. however. 2. took power and established an empire stretching from Eastern Iran to Northern India. khans and religious leadership. who died in 2007. They were not able to maintain their power base for very long. The Ghilzai and non-Pashtun tribes are next in the line of power. this referring to the ideal type of Pashtun societies where all (men) are equal).19 June 1747) ruled as Shah of Iran (1736–47) and was the founder of the Afsharid dynasty. The PDPA government put not only an end to the Durrani dynastic rule but. and in the South linked to jihadi commanders from various tribal groups. with many commanders dominating small areas. albeit in some regions the Durrani did have the upper hand. when Mirwais Nika (or Mīr Wais Khān Hōtak. 1673-1715) of the Ghilzai tribe of the Hotak. The Ghilzai were the first to rule the South. pearl under pearls). In 1730 Nadir Shah12 destroyed the Ghilzai rule over Persia and established himself as the new emperor. The first PDPA president Noor Mohammad Taraki (1978-79) was a Taraki Ghilzai and his successor Hafizullah Amin (1979) a Kharoti Ghilzai. who had served in Nadir Shah’s army and was later in charge of his home security. conquered Kandahar from the Persian Safavids in 1709 founding the Hotaki dynasty that rule Persia from 1722 to 1729. 1688 or 6 August 1698 . tried to extinguish the larger Durrani royal family encompassing thousands of members.‫( )خان یق ل تھماس پ‬November. The situation was much more of a patchwork. After his death in 1747. Because of his military genius. This makes the Durrani tribes in the South the most influential as they have traditionally been close to the Government and associated influential positions and resources. all kings of Afghanistan came from the Durrani confederation until the last one: Zahir Shah. 1. moreover. Furthermore. starting with the Communist (PDPA) government (1978-1992). the PDPA government de-emphasized traditional rule altogether and actively tried to break the backbone of the Afghan power-holders composed of traditional landowners. the short rule of the mujahideen government (1992-1996) and the Taliban rule (1996-2001). even though not in the border-districts of Helmand. Table 4.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t 3.3 provides an overview of the cluster remits of the major tribes in the Southern cluster. belongs to the Hotak tribe of the Ghilzai confederation. The Baluch tribesmen control much of the cross border smuggle in southern Helmand and Chahar Burja district of Nimroz. tried to avoid the tribal split between the Durrani and Ghilzai. Tribal myth goes that Zirak Durrani had four sons . the Achekzai and Nurzai tribes both have very strong economic ties in the Spin Boldak/Chaman area where they dominate business and constitute much of the population. The term Kandahari for the core members of the Taliban became popular and members of both tribal confederations were found in the top ranks of the Taliban. The Zirak Durrani tribes. The Barakzai have maintained influence through successive regimes from monarchy to communism until today. the Taliban were not free of tribal nepotism. Mullah Omar. Important pre-Taliban jihadi commanders who had achieved an important status in the jihad or who came from traditional landowning elites came back to power. Both the non-Pashtun Baluch as well as the Pashtuns have strong cross-border economic and political links. the third Achek. which emerged in late summer 1994. After the death of Zirak. Cluster remits of tribes Table 4. the mystic leader of the Taliban. He was furthermore considered a reincarnation of 18th century Mir Wais and was seen as a re-newer of Afghanistan after years of war and destruction. can be considered the leadership tribes of the Pashtun South – albeit in the border districts discussed here their influence is limited mostly to Kandahar and partially in Helmand.Barak (the oldest). The Taliban. the Taliban were an expression of social mobility as they brought to power social groups and tribes that had been previously excluded from power. Nevertheless. Ridding their former strongholds and areas of influence from the Taliban was usually a violent process.4 at the end of the tribal overview provides a final summary of the tribes discussed here. They are also in significant number in Helmand province. Helmand. the second son. In addition. the Barakzai (tribe of former Governor Gul Agha Sherzoi) are most prominent in controlling politics in Kandahar. supporting opportunistic clientele networks. especially those from the eastern cluster. The Taliban core remained mainly composed of Ghilzai and Panjpai Durrani coming from Kandahar. In tribal terms. which are described in more detail below. Uruzgan and Zabul. However. Abusing state power. the Taliban power base was very much an expression of its geographical origins. Taliban from the Southeastern and eastern clusters were less integrated into the core Taliban leadership. • Among the Zirak Durrani tribes. the second Popal. The exit of the Taliban changed the tribal power structure yet again. 54 . Among the Pashtun tribes. and harassing former foes all added to communal grievances and increased the distance between tribal groups and communities and the state and created a renewed backlash on which the current insurgency builds on. and Barak the rule. the rule was passed on to Popal. Education and power in the government has made them important power brokers with elite families having maintained influence over their respective Durrani tribes. especially the Popalzai (but also Barakzai and Achekzai). and Aloko the last one – giving them the power over the Zirak Durrani region. 3 Cluster Remits of the Major Tribes in the Southern Cluster Border Districts Confederation Tribe Politics/ business/ Landownership power trade jihad links Religious/ spiritual Nomadic pops CrossInsurgency border Marginalized Smuggling (support) linkages Popalzai Barakzai Zirak Durrani Mohamadzai Alkozai Ackekzai Yusofzai Nurzai Alizai Ishaqzai Hotak Tokhi Kakar Kuchi (historic) (Pakistan) Karyani Wardak Bares Baluch Sayed Other Ghilzai Panjpai 55 .S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Table 4. They are also politically influential in Pakistan. There are also large Nurzai communities in the non-border districts of Kandahar Province (Rabat. however. as Mahmud Khan. Grishk. • • • The Panjpai Durrani tribes are second in terms of influence in the South. politically very astute and had good relations with all influential individuals in Kandahar with the exception of Gul Agha Sherzoi. The Mohammadzai live in Arghistan. In Pakistan tribes of other Pashtun confederations (such as the Panjpai Nurzai and Ghilzai Kakar) support the Achekzai leader politically. the Mohammadzai have become a tribe in its own right. The Head of Police of Kandahar province. as well as in other Helmand districts such as northern Helmand districts of Sangin. the leader of the Pashtun-based nationalist party Pakhtun-khwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) is an Achekzai. In the past the Achekzai would trade almonds from Shah Wali Kot and Shahre Safa to Pakistan. They were originally Kuchis and became settled about 100 years ago. Haji Gurrani (ex HiG commander). he had good links to the provincial and central government as well as Rabbani (Jamiat) who he fought for during the mujahideen years. an ex-jihadi commander). He was known to change sides when it suited him. To this day. since the grave of Mohammad Baba is in Arghistan. In addition. As they are only in Arghistan. they control much of the trade and business in Spin Boldak and have important communities living on the Pakistani side of the border (Quetta) as well as in Dubai. For example. The Mohammdazi allegedly originate from this district. the brother of Haji Gul Ali (ex-jihadi commander of Mahaz). due to being linked to the Durrani dynasty. we have included the Mohammadzai with the Barakzai in all of our tables (but noting the separately). he used his influence to allow a blood-less take-over of Kandahar from the mujahideen to the Taliban and later on from the Taliban to the current government. They live mostly in Spin Boldak. The Ishaqzai live in the two border districts of southern Helmand. The Popalzai are the tribe of President Hamid Karzai. The Popalzai are also influential in neighbouring Uruzgan province in Helmand and they try to build alliances to Zabul leaders as well. Again. In Kandahar they are a large and prosperous tribe with a large business community owning the best land in Spin Boldak and having much better access to water than the Achekzai tribe. • The Durand line particularly divides the Nurzai. The Achekzai who live mostly in Spin Boldak and in Quetta district of Pakistan are considered to be a wealthy tribe. Although originally a Barakzai sub tribe. their influence again is limited mostly to Kandahar and Helmand. The Alkozai are the biggest tribe in Kandahar and currently the most vulnerable tribal group due to the recent killings of their most important leaders: Mullah Naqibullah Akhund (Mullah Naqib. Kandahar and Quetta district of Pakistan. Many Afghan kings belonged to the Mohammadzai tribe. which has gained him respect and gratitude from the Kandahari population. The Achekzai in Spin Boldak have historically been involved in trade. Mohammad Akram Khakriz Wal. Mullah Naqib was a known operator. especially outside Kandahar-city. They are still close to the Barakzai and join them in elections and when there are problems.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t • The Popalzai follow the Barakzai in political influence. Kadanai) as well as in Farah and Herat. They have been historically marginalized and were considered • 56 . in the border districts discussed here. He was badly injured in a bomb explosion in 2007 and later died of his wounds. Nawzad but also Lashkargah and Garamsir. Haji Abdel Hakim Jan (ex-jihadi commander for Mahaz). thereby holding influence over power-holders in the district. which is headed in Southern Afghanistan by his brother Ahmad Wali Karzai who also heads the Provincial shura. The Hotak tribes also live in Uruzgan and Kandahar. especially the Hotak had links to rulers (Hotak dynasty. This has changed to some extent since they recently achieved wealth in the narcotics trade and power by supporting the insurgency and becoming strong in its power structures. and Taliban). The Ishaqzai have strong roots among religious leadership and produce many spiritual figures and pirs. with the majority residing in Zhob and Quetta districts in Pakistan. Nevertheless. at least historically. Smangan and Kunduz which are currently located in Mukhtar camp area of Lashkargah . • The Alizai are the second biggest tribe in Maruf district of Kandahar and have a few families in Arghistan as well. but not in the border districts studied here where they only make up for about 5% in Khanishin. especially during the current regime. In the Southern border districts they are a minority in Maruf. Today. the Ghilzai have somewhat been pushed into the position of a political underdog in Southern Afghanistan. the Tokhi in Shamulzayi feel marginalized as they feel insufficiently represented in the provincial government of Zabul. Kandahar (15) and Dishu. who is a Hotak. where they dominate Atghar (98% Hotak) and Shamulzayi (88% Tokhi). The Bares make up the majority of the population in Shorabak in Kandahar (98%). The Hotak dynasty (17221729) was the first Pashtun (Ghilzai) rule over Persia (including Afghanistan’s South) until the Persians under Nadir Shah defeated them in 1730 (who were then succeeded by the Durrani dynasty). There are important Alizai communities in Helmand as well (Musa Qala). especially in Maruf. restored some of the power of the Hotak when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan (1996-2001). the third Pashtun confederation. Helmand (10%) and in Chahar Burjak in Nimroz (3%). With the power and associated politics being mainly dominated by the Durrani. 57 . and form a minority in Dishu. The Alizai are linked to smuggling and the Taliban/insurgency. which is now also being infringed upon from the Durrani tribes. Larger Ishaqzia communities have been kicked out of northern Afghanistan (Faryab. In the border districts we are studying. Sari Pul. PDPA government. where most of their important elders live. Balkh. The Ishaqzai also have a large Kuchi population that have been effected by drought and post Taliban operession. The Tokhi make up most of the population in Shamulzayi (88%). • As noted earlier. Mullah Omar. • • As noted earlier. As with the Hotak. the Karyani is not well represented in the Southern border districts. There is one other Pashtun tribe that does not belong to any of the three confederations that lives in the Southern border districts. with the Wardak only accounting for 5% in Atghar. indicating there is some traditional support for the Taliban by the Hotak. Traditionaly the Hotak have been strong in the business sectors and one of the dominant tribes in power structures of Zabul and over all dominant in the insurgency. there is a strong support for the Taliban. Helmand (5%). they boast a specific strength in Zabul. The Hotak seem to have concentrated on dominating the trade sector. Zabul. the Hotak are the majority in Atghar in Zabul. several of the Ghilzai tribes. their disillusionment has reached so far that they do not even bother anymore to request anything from their representatives in the provincial shura. They are also scattered across the Durand line and have strong ties to Nushki situated in Baluchistan province of Pakistan. The Kakar are on of the largest Pashtun tribes with cross-border ties in the South.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t poor. Apparently. Poppy from the rest of Helmand. are to a large extent smuggled though Baluch territory. As they stand united and control the major transportation/logistics routes from Chahar Burjak in Nimroz. This gives them great importance for the cross-border insurgency. and other parts of Afghanistan. In their view. The Baluch are currently living in a symbiotic and mutual beneficial/rewarding relationship with the insurgency. The Baluch actually seem to benefit a great deal from the growing rift among the Pashtun tribes (especially the two big confederations) and the power struggles between the insurgents and Afghan government/NATO/ISAF. weapons and fuel trade. Southern Helmand and Reg in Kandahar. the survival of the insurgency in southern Afghanistan largely rests on the support of the Baluch tribe as the insurgency needs the Baluch for the entry and exit of fighters (and weapons) to and from Afghanistan. State presence and influence in Baluch territory is either weak or absent. 58 . Helmand. This means in order to survive. the Baluch and Pashtun tribes enjoy a peaceful coexistence. Thus. Afghanistan and Iran. for example. The interpretation of the population. both the insurgency and Afghan government (need to) work with the Baluch. The growth of the war economy (mainly through the smuggling of opium and weapons) lies in the Baluch tribal interest as it provides ample opportunities to a marginalised population.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t As noted earlier. which could add to the instability of Pakistan. and Reg district of Kandahar to the Pakistani and Iranian border. mostly due to poor infrastructure and remoteness of the territory. the Baluch tribe is quite important in the Southern border districts. with the exception of the Nurzai in Southern Nimroz (see Chapter 5). however. control in Baluch areas lies either with Baluch smuggler’s networks or insurgents. The tribal system within the Baluch is quite strong and there are few fault-lines among the various sub-tribes of the Baluch. western Pakistan and Southeastern Iran are largely populated by the Baluch tribe. The Baluch in Afghanistan are also linked to the larger Baluch cause such as the oppression of Baluch in Pakistan. Many Baluch living in Chahar Burja also have houses in Zabul province of Iran. especially due to their predominance in the isolated border areas of Nimroz. In addition to southern Afghanistan. As the Pashtun tribes in the Baluch areas also benefit from the poppy trade it is unlikely that a larger conflict could emerge between the Pashtuns and Baluch unless livelihoods would drastically change from opium to more legal business. As the insurgency is gaining foothold in the Baluch areas for strategic reasons (as it did in FATA Pakistan) it is likely that extremist support will further grow within the Baluch tribe. as well as the poppy. Outsiders usually perceive them to be united. The state has provided few opportunities for the local population to engage in the legal economy in the remote Baluch areas. thus highlighting state weakness. a standoff would only lead to armed struggle. the local population is almost forced to move toward narcotics. the Baluch tribe has largely remained outside the polarizing Pashtun power struggles. is quite different. They see this alliance between government and smugglers as a stability factor that enhances security. Due to their geographic isolation. the Baluch government actors are allegedly linked to smuggling networks. In Chahar Burjak (Nimroz). outside the Pashtun tribes. In turn. weapons and human trafficking. In turn. the Afghan Baluch have strong cross-border support from Iranian and Pakistani Baluch making it difficult for Pashtun tribes or the state to control or dominate them. Thus. S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t This symbiotic relationship between the Baluch and insurgents is not historic. There are. no Baluch in the current insurgency who have had positions in the former Communist government. however. 59 . The Communist government and Soviet Union was sympathetic towards the Baluch national liberation struggle and supported two Baluch sub-tribes: the Mangal (who are strong in Baluch Nationalist politics) and Mahmundsani (and vice versa). 4 Overview of Major Tribes in the Southern Cluster Border Districts Cluster tasks (remits). political. such as Ahmad Shah Durrani. majority in Kandahar-city (regional capital) Biggest landowners (together with Barakzai. current president They are influential especially in Kandahar city (the regional capital) due to giving land to Ahmad Shah Durrani (a Popalzai) for building Kandahar-city Biggest tribe in South Biggest landowners (together with Popalzai. Barakzai and Nurzai) Many influential jihadi commanders Important businessmen 2007 saw the killing of many important • Popalzai Ruling clan since first ruler Ahmad Shah Durrani created the Durrani dynasty Strong in property and business • Barakzai Zirak Durrani (including Mohammadzai) Kandahar Maruf (50%) Arghistan (50%. Alkozai and Nurzai) Tribe of former governor. Alkozai and Nurzai) Many big and wealthy businessmen Many influential jihadi commanders Tribe of past leaders and kings. but 25% of those are Mohammadzai) Helmand Dishu (5%) • • • • • • • • • • • • Strong in agriculture and property (due to landownership) Politics Business Alkozai Zirak Durrani Kandahar Arghistan (15%) • • • 60 • • • Politics Land Business .S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Table 4. insurgency Tribes Confederation Province Border Districts • • Kandahar Arghistan (20%) Zirak Durrani Helmand Khanishin (5%) • • • • Determinants of power Second biggest tribe in the South. Gul Agha Sherzoi Many big and wealthy businessmen Many influential jihadi commanders Most of the kings were Mohammadzai which are a sub-tribe of Barakzai tribe Inherited leadership (linked to Zirak Durrani) Biggest tribe in Kandahar Biggest landowners (together with Popalzai. very close in size to Barakzai. possibly subdivide in econ. political. and Alkozai) Linked to Popalzai through political marriage • Rich business men Influential jihadi commanders. Uruzgan Historic merchants nomads Business and land in Spin Boldak Supporters of insurgency Smuggler tribe.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Tribes Confederation Province Border Districts Determinants of power Alkozai leaders such as Mullah Naqib of Arghandab. smugglers Strong in insurgency in Zabul and Uruzgan Strong in insurgency in Zabul. (traditional narcotics smuggling) Support insurgency 61 . possibly subdivide in econ. insurgency Ackekzai Zirak Durrani Kandahar Spin Boldak (55%) Arghistan Helmand Khanishin. Strong in Zabul • Majority in Shamulzayi district Traditionally united under one leader • Strong cross border links Large population in Pakistan Sizeable population Biggest landowners (together with Popalzai. Helmand • • • Hotak Ghilzai Zabul Atghar (95%) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Tokhi Kakar Ghilzai Ghilzai Zabul Shamulzayi (88%) • Kandahar Maruf (15%) Helmand Dishu (5%) Nurzai Panjpai Durrani Kandahar Spin Boldak (45%) Helmand Khanishin Alizai Panjpai Durrani Kandahar Maruf (25%) Rich and business men Political power in Pakistan • Many former Achekzai jihadi commanders of the Fedayin faction of the late Ismat Muslim now occupy powerful political positions in the Kandahar border districts Majority in Atghar district Big landowners Link to jihadi commanders • Weak relations to government Traditional rulers prior to Durrani dynasty Tribe of the former Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Cluster tasks (remits). • Inherited leadership from father and grandfathers Supporter of Taliban Second largest in Maruf district • Traditionally in trade and business. • Barakzai. possibly subdivide in econ. insurgency • • • • • Smuggling of narcotics Link to insurgency Poppy production Drug smuggling Strong roots in religious leadership (produce many spiritual figures and Sayed affiliations) Narcotics. now strong in insurgency Wealth related to poppy production High level of solidarity Reg (100%) Kandahar Shorabak Baluch Baluch Khanishin (50%) Helmand Dishu (40%) Nimroz Bares No confederation Chahar Burja (97%) • • • Irani and Pakistani Baluch support the Baluch in Afghanistan and vice versa Control border areas between Afghanistan. political. Kandahar). Pakistan and Iran Control the border areas (Helmand. from Dishu in Helmand to Shorabak Dominant tribe in Shorabak district Strong ties to Nushki in Baluchistan. cannot be ruled Warrior tribe (Narcotics) smuggling Helmand Ishaqzai Panjpai Durrani Kandahar • • • • Population Traditionally marginalized. weapons and fuel smuggling Insurgency Politically marginalized Independent. • • • • • • Kandahar Shorabak (98%). Helmand Dishu (10% Nimroz Chahar Burja (3%) • • 62 . Pakistan.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Tribes Confederation Province Border Districts Arghistan Helmand Khanishin (5%) Khanishin (30%) Dishu (32%) Maruf (8%) Arghistan • • Determinants of power Political links with Popalzai in the South Wealth generated through smuggling Cluster tasks (remits). which accounts for about 1. live now in the Mukhtar camp area of Lashkar Gah in Helmand. Table 4. The marginalisation and growing frustration of the Kuchis has provided ample recruitment ground for the insurgency and drug and weapons smuggling networks.4 provides an overview of the Kuchi in Southern Afghanistan. the long drought and subsequent death of many animals has severely disrupted the livelihood of local Kuchi communities.2% of the total Kuchi population. Kharotee.4. especially figures in Table 4. and Nasar dominate the areas between Zabul and Kandahar.000 Kuchi in Nimroz. where. according to our interviews. draws on the National Multi Sectoral Assessment on Kuchi Report by the Government of Afghanistan. Kuchis in the South.4 The Kuchi of Southern Afghanistan Province Nimroz Tribes Baluch Migratory patterns There are about 30. mainly from the Ishaqzai tribe. education and development services. Among the non-Pashtuns. rely heavily on the smuggling of narcotics and weapons as well as trafficking in humans. with some also being from the Panjpai confederation. living in the border areas under harsh climatic conditions with limited agricultural potential. Both settled and nomadic Baluch communities. The Baluch Kuchis inhabit the Southern border area stretching from Chahar Burja in Nimroz to Helmand and Kandahar. the Kuchi (nomadic communities) deserve a separate discussion. The Kuchis are a politically and economically marginalized group. This has so far not materialized in any change in the status of local Kuchi communities.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t The Kuchi – Nomads of Afghanistan In addition to the sedentary tribes discussed so far. Table 4. and Kunduz were forced out by local warlords and non-Pashtun residents of those areas in post Taliban times (as a revenge of Taliban suppression). The local Kuchis have little interaction with local state authorities even though the Afghan Government created the Independent Directorate of Kuchi Affairs (IDKA) in 2006 through a Presidential decree. for example. the Baluch have large nomadic communities. Kakar. These Kuchis. All of these are short-range migratory. who also have large Kuchis populations. are also linked to the insurgency and narcotics trade mainly due to their marginalized status and lack of benefits from the state. 13 The Kuchi in Afghanistan are mainly Ghilzai Pashtuns. In addition. Among the Panjpai in the Southern cluster the Ishaqzai make up the largest Kuchi group in Helmand and Kandahar. for example. there is a perception that a great portion of international development aid is not tailored to the needs of the local communities. 2005 13 63 . thus the Kuchi does not change much during the This section. Sari Pul. Among the Ghilzai Kuchis the Taraki. rank among the least educated population with one of the lowest literacy rates and very poor access to health. Jowzjan. The Ishaqzai. Large populations of the Southern Kuchi tribes that were settled in the northern provinces of Faryab. especially in the South. Badghis. Kharotee Zabul Taraki. About 53. 17% shortrange migratory and 20% is settled. Spin Boldak. 51% long-range migratory and 48% is settled.9% of the total Kuchi population). Kuchis move from Ghazni through Atghar to Kandahar. Out of the 49 communities. The main reason for this non-migration is ‘loss of livestock’. All of these communities are in fact only partially migratory. Suliman Khail. The most important summer area for the short-range migratory Kuchi is Panjwai district of Kandahar province.000 Kuchi in Helmand during the winter season (accounting for about 3.3% of all Kuchi) stay in Kandahar during the winter. In the winter season. about 80% are considered short-range migratory and 20% long-range migratory. Taraki and Dautani Kuchis move from Ghazni through Shamulzayi to Pakistan in winter. Of this population. and Shorabak in Kandahar. Of these Kuchi. Dautani. Dautani. Helmand Baluch Kandahar Taraki.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Province Tribes Migratory patterns seasons There are about 95. Shamulzayi (Tokhi) 64 . and on average 30% of these households remain behind in their winter residency even during the summer. about 1% is considered short-range migratory.000 Kuchi stay in Zabul province during the winter.000 (or 3. Taraki and Dautani Kuchis move from Nawa district in Ghazni to Arghistan. 63% are considered long-range migratory. the initial stage in the pattern towards settlement. about 80. S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Table 4.5 Kuchi Migratory Patterns 65 . however. and also makes it exceedingly difficult to develop generic tribal policies. This emphasizes that it is difficult to treat tribes in the South of Afghanistan in a uniform manner. feudal systems that existed in the pre-war era (1979) have been taken over by commanders and religious personalities that emerged during the three decades of war. each tribe also deals with their own internal politics and problems that are often unrelated to external actors or tribes. alliances could shift quickly and create new frontlines literally over night. However. One could argue that tribal actors have learned to never put all of their eggs into one basket. Many Afghan tribes had to survive in insecure and changing environments for long periods of time and as a result have learned how to always keep a “back door” open. In addition to latent tensions and open conflict between tribes. this fragmentation has not been uniform for all tribes. Balancing power is an important game for many actors in the South. who may have to foster (and shift) alliances with other individuals and tribes regardless of whether they like them or not. Tribal structures have been fragmented in the South over the past three decades of war and traditional decisionmaking institutions of the tribal system such as jirga and shuras are quite weak. Several Pashtun and Baluch tribes have managed to keep their tribal identity and solidarity. This.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t 5 Tribal Relations Chapter ribal relations in the Southern cluster are currently held in a precarious balance. Even though conflicts and fault lines between tribes exist. and tend to keep their options open thus becoming excellent political entrepreneurs. Under the mujahideen. with the reality being far more complex and the existence of many grey areas. During the jihad there were multiple alliances that were broken several times. One could describe it as a delicate inter-dependence among actors to stay in power. In addition. Conflicts may arise over the sharing of new (or old) resources. It would be wrong to assume that all tribes are necessarily unified. the picture is never black and white. Tribes in the South have been polarized in a struggle for control over power and resources – some tribes use the Government and others the insurgency to further their position. Alliances may be brokered T 66 . is not an issue exclusive to the South or Pashtun tribes. There are numerous latent conflicts with the potential to explode if the balance is disrupted. Thus. Therefore the Government usually becomes part of the game over power and resources with tribes trying to reap as much benefit as possible. are central to the Popalzai alliance currently in power. the Popalzai tribe in essence supports both the government as well as the insurgency. many of these pro- 67 . The Alizai. Due to the fact that tribesmen tend to rally behind their leaders. Nevertheless. Examples of “power games” in the South Popalzai: Even though the current president is a Popalzai. Barakzai – different survival strategies: • • In Nawa Barakzai (Helmand. were given many important posts in the current government as a reward. several leading commanders of the insurgency in Arghistan (Kandahar) are in fact Popalzai. In Maruf. it may not safeguard against inter-tribal conflicts.and low-level Alizai joined the Taliban. Power Shifts among Alizai sub-tribes in Baghran. Or one tribal leader engages in a personal conflict with another while at the same time brokering an alliance with yet a third. they managed to oust the insurgency. where they only constitute 50% of the population. This made the elite jihadi commanders important allies for the current government. Even though many mid. and co-exist with them. it is also interesting that power position of tribes can quickly shift through the loss of important leaders/strongmen or their displacement to another region. few of the elite Alizai jihadi commanders were integrated in their power structures. Conflicts and alliances may coexist and one sub-tribe may behave different than another. At the same time it can present a problem for the Afghan Government if an entire tribe chooses to join the insurgency. and Popalzai leaders also dominate the regional government in Kandahar. However. who in turn for helping to oust the Taliban. Governments are not viewed as permanent entities but as structures that will sooner or later collapse. The relationship between tribes and Government is also very complex. However. and especially networks of the Akhundzada family. not part of this survey). in the process of re-establishing their power base. alliances and conflict can be on a tribal level as well as individual level. even if tribal coherence could be a stabilising factor when it comes to fighting a common enemy (see Barakzai example). where the Barakzai constitute the (near) majority of the population. Power-holders may rise and fall depending on whom currently has the upper hand. they tried not to alienate the minority Alizai tribe (30%) who are strong in the insurgency there. A very similar process could be observed in Uruzgan and Zabul and with other major jihadi commanders from the Barakzai and Alkozai in other regions of Helmand and Kandahar.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t between two tribes in order to subdue another. differences or power struggles among individuals can also create bigger tribal differences. Musa Qala and Kajaki in Helmand (not border districts) The Alizai (Panjpai) are a good example of the complexity of tribal relations in the southern cluster. as the Alizai example (below) illustrates. Thus. as this would mean an immediate loss of state control in that area. Popalzai and Alkozai. these constellations of tribal relations are unequally distributed. In addition to numerous smaller conflicts (discussed later). We therefore have included this general discussion (even if some examples fall outside the border districts) in order to understand the larger context of the South. This tribal antagonism was accompanied by a take-over of power by the Durranis in Southern Afghanistan. presenting the most prominent conflict in Kandahar today. The Kandahari identity rapidly lost importance and the Durranis blamed the Ghilzais as the “true” Taliban of Southern Afghanistan. with Panjpai Durrani minorities in Helmand. In order to fully understand the Southern border districts it is necessary to look at the region as a whole. Thus only few of the districts fall exactly into the greater regional tribal politics. A very similar process occurred between the Durrani and Ghilzai confederation (discussed later). The tensions within the Zirak Durrani tribes. Nevertheless. and again when the Taliban was defeated. Shorabak is majority Bares. but also to gauge what may influence tribes and individual leaders in the border districts. This has lead to a marginalisation of the Ghilzai and Panjpai under the current regime. and Reg in Kandahar are mostly Baluch. It must be noted however. Ghilzai-Durrani fault line – historical context With the fall of the Taliban the latent tribal rivalry between the Durrani and Ghilzai confederations emerged again. 68 . especially against former collaborators of the Taliban. Power struggles within the Zirak Durrani While some of these conflicts are historic. there are three important tribal faultlines within the Southern cluster that are pertinent to understanding tribal relations and politics in the region: 1. At present there is no social justice between the Ghilzai and Durrani Pashtuns. Historical power struggle between Durrani and Ghilzai 3. these three greater conflicts do hold importance. The larger tribal rift between Ghilzai and Zirak Durrani is unlikely to be found within the administrative boundaries of the border districts. Some of them have consequently (re-)joined the current insurgency. such as Spin Boldak and Maruf fitting the Zirak vs. when a patchwork of commanders created enclaves or fiefdoms in their areas of influence. who fall outside the Pashtun confederations. many of the more latent fault-lines emerged when it came to the distribution of power in the South after the exit of the Communist government. Panjpai Durrani conflict. Conflict between Zirak Durrani (power holders) and Panjpai Durrani (marginalized) 2. The Ghilzai and Panjpai tribes dominated the Taliban regime and successfully removed the Zirak Durrani influence (traditional power holders) from Kandahar and the larger South. emerged during the jihad. Most problematic is that even the Ghilzai dominance over the private sector was lost to the Durrani tribes of the Barakzai. that in the southern border districts.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t government former jihadi commanders were quite heavy handed. for example. marginalizing them and other power holders. as for example Chahar Burja in Nimroz. Arghistan is mostly Zirak Durrani and Atghar and Shamulzayi in Zabul are Ghilzai dominated. not only for an understanding of the South. Dishu and Khanishin in Helmand. Furthermore. and the Coalition Forces and NATO (CF. The Durrani’s would like to blame all Ghilzai for the rise of the Taliban despite the Taliban also included Durrani leaders in their ranks. The latter made them a prime target during the Communist government (lead by Hotak Ghilzai leaders) for land confiscations. the Safavids appointed particular Pashtun tribes or clans to head tribal confederations and provided them with special privileges. In that time the oasis of Kandahar was a main transit point for the trade between India and the Middle East/Europe. As the Ghilzai tribes were strongly affiliated with the Taliban (with Mullah Omar being a Hotak Ghilzai). PRT). who served in the army of Nadir Shah. the Durrani confederation was in power over Herat and Farah. especially in Kandahar city. Complaints of this imbalance in access to power and resources have been filed with central Government. UNAMA.the annexation of the Pashtun tribal areas in Pakistan to Afghanistan . and 17 years later when he died. is possessed by Durrani khans. Nevertheless. the EU. The power over Kandahar shifted several times between the Mogul and Safavid Empire. The reasoning for this was due to fact that the royal family (Durranis) cared passionately the Pashtunistan question . Kandahar was situated in the border region of Safavid and Mogul influence. a backlash occurred during the present shift in power back to the Durrani tribes. the major backbone of the Islamic resistance. which is currently being infringed upon by Durrani tribes. The critical feature of this period of competition was the transformation of Southern Pashtun tribes into a vehicle of Safavid domination. currently feel sidelined and lack access to power and resources. the Ghilzais maintained their social and economic status. As a result the tribes of Popalzai and Barakzai of the Abdali (later Durrani) and the Hotak and Tokhi of the Ghilzai rose to prominence. favoured only Ghilzai in the top ranks of the mujahideen parties and neglected all Durrani initiatives. established an Empire stretching from Eastern Iran to Northern India. For the past three decades the Ghilzai have had a major share in the private sector (mainly trade). Ahmad Shah confiscated the land of the Ghilzai and gave it to his own tribesmen. Despite this. Since that time most land around Kandahar. Ahmad Shah Durrani (1724-1773) of the Popalzai. despite being roughly equal in size to the Durrani. particularly in terms of access to resource and power. but also in other parts of the South.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t The non-Durrani (especially Ghilzai) tribes.which Pakistan tried to diffuse by strengthening the Ghilzai. In the year 1709 Mirwais (Nika) Hotak took over Kandahar from the Safavids. His son Mahmud and his cousin Ashraf were not only able to maintain the power over Kandahar but to also capture the Safavid capital Isfahan and set an end to the Safavid Empire. In 1730 Nadir Shah destroyed the Ghilzai rule over Persia and established himself as the new Emperor. The power struggle between the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtun confederations dates back in history to the sixteenth and seventeenth century and is linked to the power struggle between the imperial powers of Safavids (Persians) and the Mogul Empires. with the Durrani holding the 69 . To consolidate their power over Western Afghanistan. While the Ghilzai were the tribal confederation in Kandahar during that time. The Ghilzai were forced to move further to the Northeast and scattered in the region between Kandahar and Kabul. Already both confederations were struggling for dominance in Kandahar. first through mujahideen and later the Taliban. The Afghanistan War was dominated to a certain extent by this Ghilzai-Durrani antagonism. the result has been a backlash against the Ghilzai. Pakistan. This has created a general feeling of resentment among them. as stated earlier. Zirak Durrani tribes control most of the reconstruction and development work (nearly 90%). are more united than the Durrani tribes. Even though Ghilzai and Baluch are also engaged in smuggling the narcotics trade is reported to be dominated by a few strong and prominent Durranis. ANP and other irregular forces. which is also referred to as Reform Shura of Kandahar. The Barakzai. o In response. especially the Barakzai. there is still a predominance of Durrani in politics. Achekzai and Popalzai are in control of private security companies. In terms of the three key determinants which serve as yardsticks to measure a tribe’s position in the political landscape (level of participation in the government. Alkozai. the Ghilzai tribes have created their own council in order to counterbalance the influence of the Durranis. The Durrani tribes are seen as well connected to the international forces present in the region and the Ghilzais feel that this link is being abused to stir the international forces against them.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t sceptre firmly in their hands and gate-keeping the Ghilzais out of important positions in politics and economy. the “underdog” at present. This is shifting. Even though they are not quite as marginalized as the Ghilzai Pashtun they nevertheless have also experienced exclusion (especially the Nurzai in Uruzgan) and therefore often feel closer to their Ghilzai “cousins” despite belonging to a different confederation. created by Zahar Gulalai. the Ghilzai tribes. • • • Overall however. There is an improper distribution of land especially in and around Kandahar city that has mostly been monopolized by the Durrani clans. Even though the central Government. This concentration of power among few stakeholders has decreased the legitimacy of the central Government and created resentment among other tribes resulting in a lack of willingness to work with the Government in fighting insurgencies. • • Zirak Durrani control most Government departments (and key political appointments) in Kandahar and in Uruzgan. While this Ghilzai shura has an official status with the provincial government. as the safest routes for drug trafficking at the moment are in the more unstable areas considered to be known for insurgent activity. are still mostly in the centre of the conflict. level of victimization by the government in terms of military and police operations. and level of support for the Taliban). The security sector is mostly made up by Zirak Durranis. arresting their members for alledgedly having links to insurgent (Taliban) forces. Popalzai and Alkozai) with only a few members of the Ghilzai. has made an attempt to balance out power politics in Kandahar among the different Pashtun tribes (as well as between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns). This manifests itself as follows: • The government administration and the provincial shura are under the influence of the Zirak Durranis (mainly Barakzai. it holds less power than the provincial shura. however. Popalzai and Alkozai. Commanders. o Among the non-Durranis only the Baluch got a sizable militia. even if not fully embedded in or challenging tribal structures. Panjpai and Zirak Durrani struggle over power and resources Even though the Panjpai are part of the Durrani confederation they were not equally included in post 2001 power politics by the dominant Zirak Durrani. for example. Panjpai 70 . with Zirak Durrani strongmen grabbing up most government posts (especially in Helmand. The conflict is therefore latent at the moment. while the Zirak Durrani currently dominates Government positions. the Panjpai. Nonetheless.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t tribes stand in the middle of a spectrum whose opposite ends are occupied by the Ghilzais and Zirak Durranis respectively. The relationship between the Achekzai and the Nurzai is quite complex. who generally supported the Taliban. This also forced large portions of the Achekzai tribe to seek exile in Pakistan. the Achekzai (Zirak) and Nurzai (Panjpai) are engaged in a long-standing conflict over power. with Zirak tribes only having a limited influence. When the Taliban took power the conflict between the Nurzai and Achekzai deteriorated further. the most important Achekzai-Fedayin leader at the time (the follower of the late Ismat Muslim). In addition to the Ghilzai Pashtuns the Panjpai were also major part of Taliban regime during the mid 1990s. mostly under Ismat Muslim’s Fedayin faction. The conflict between PDPA and Nurzai against the Achekzai became even more complex when Ghilzai jihadi commanders such as Hekmatyar (HiG-Kharoti) and Mawlawi Mahmad Nabi (Harakat-Andar) dually fought the Soviet supported PDPA and the Achekzai tribe under the leadership of Ismat Muslim. through their alliances with other groups such as the Baluch. He currently is the most important Achekzai tribal elder and allegedly has a good reputation. it has created a tendency among the Panjpai to once again support the insurgency and Neo-Taliban. As the Government is already weak (or non-existent) in most Southern border districts. The most recent renewal of the conflict started when the Nurzai joined the Taraki (Ghilzai) in the PDPA government and the Achekzai fought against the PDPA government. the Nurzai secretly still support the insurgency. mainly coming from Panjpai and Ghilzai confederations. which he still holds today. are currently very dominant in the non-governmental power structure in many of the Southern border districts. these marginalised tribes are actually in a power position at this moment. The presence of Coalition Forces is a further deterrent to open conflict. many Achekzai returned from Pakistan and joined the current Government. The Nurzai. Uruzgan and Kandahar). There are good individual business relations and both tribes have shares in the businesses in the Spin Boldak area. Thus. Already at that time the Taliban movement was representing the underdog or marginalized tribal groups of the South. The political war thus became a tribal war. After the collapse of the Taliban government. Historic power struggle between Zirak and Panjpai Durrani in the South: Case 1: Achekzai (Zirak) and Nurzai (Panjpai) in Spin Boldak (Kandahar) In Spin Boldak. both growing strong through links to insurgency and well as poppy production and smuggling. Abdul Raziq. providing an incentive to keep up the peace. mainly because they had even 71 . This is especially true for the Ishaqzai and Nurzai. allegedly used their power to hang Mansur. There is intermarriage between the tribes resulting in some important Nurzai being connected to powerful Zirak Durrani families. was given the position of Executive Officer of the Border police. At the moment there is relative peace between the tribes. Mansur’s nephew. As post-Taliban politics excluded many Panjpai sections and their leadership (in addition to also marginalising the Ghilzai and Baluch). Kandahar (Barakzai. Nawzad. they have been able to subdue larger tribal groups in northern Helmand through their alliance with the insurgency and their involvement in the narcotics trade. the Central Government transferred the Alkozai Chief of Police from Kandahar to Mazar-i-Sharif. This Chief of Police was then replaced by a Tajik (Ayub Salangi). They are concentrated as a majority in Kandahar. Alkozai and Barakzai. despite being a smaller tribal group. This is also the case in the current insurgency in Khanishin. power was distributed as follows: • Barakzai: control over the governorship and local Government ministries • Alkozai: control over the police • Popalzai: control over the district commissioners Later on. The Achekzai in contrast have traditionally (except during the jihad) been supporters of the Government. This has further added to their marginalized status. several Zirak Durrani tribes in Helmand The conflict is. They also have acquired prominence in the narcotics trade in Dishu (Helmand) as they populate large parts of border districts. The examples below illustrated the internal conflict amongst the Zirak Durrani. Sangin. replacing him with another Alkozai (Khan Muhammad) who was considered completely illiterate and unprofessional. The important power holders of the Zirak Durrani are mainly Popalzai. at the heart of it. between Ishaqzai and power-holders of the current Government in Helmand. Barakzai and Popalzai all attempted to obtain control of Kandahar. The loose and informal power sharing among the major Zirak Durrani tribes that emerged after the ousting of Taliban proved to be fragile. Popalzai) The rivalry within the Zirak broke out again with the fall of the Taliban. and in the northern part of Grishk. many of them have been kicked out of northern Afghanistan in the post. leaving the Alkozai without power in local Government. In addition. Thus. mostly over power and resources in Kandahar. have a strong religious base and support. removing the influence of the Barakzai 72 . They have large Kuchi sections and have suffered under the drought that has destroyed their livelihoods. The three groups felt that the spoils and power positions were unevenly distributed among them. the Barakzai Governor Gul Agha Sherzai was replaced by a non-Kandahari (Asadullah Khalid). Alkozai. They do.Taliban period by local warlords. Barakzai and Popalzai. involving the Alkozai.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t more power under the Taliban and hope that this could happen again. Traditionally. Intra-Zirak Durrani power struggle The Zirak Durrani power base is mainly in Kandahar province from where the neighbouring provinces of the Southern cluster are within its sphere of influence. Most recently. This changed in the former Taliban regime where they acquired some prominence in their power structure. but are also located in Helmand and Uruzgan. Case 2: Ishaqzai vs. the Ishaqzai have been weak in pro-Government structures. when the Alkozai. however. The Ishaqzai are historically considered to be a poor and marginalized tribe. Conflict over power and resources among Zirak Durrani tribes I. Initially. in the summer of 2005. disarmed the top commander of the Barakzai tribe (Mualim Mir Walay. In 2004. This leaves. Popalzai) In a situation similar to Kandahar. pushed the Governor of Helmand to appoint a Popalzai commander as the Chief of Police in Grishk. This did not help the latent conflict between the Barakzai and Popalzai as they Barakzai felt that the Popalzai had used their influence with central Government to weaken them in Helmand. a loose. a Popalzai strong man in Kandahar. II. however. The conflict remains far from resolved. a power struggle broke out among Zirak Durrani tribes in Helmand when the Taliban fell. Baluch and the Nurzai in northern Nimroz 2. In 2004 the UN. we have identified three other important conflicts in the Southern border districts. There are also some Zirak Durrani (Barakzai) living in Nimroz. Ishaqzai and some Alizai. mainly in the north of the province. the Popalzai with influence in local Government in Kandahar. The Taliban regime had supported the Pashtuns and encouraged their settlement. 73 . Ahmad Wali Karzai. in the end. and one involving the government: 1. Commander of 93 Div) and his militias. which is perceived as unfair by the Barakzai and Alkozai. informal power-sharing arrangement evolved wherein the governorship and district administrative posts were given into the control of the Barakzai tribe. This changed. and has led to tensions among them. mainly Nurzai. Initially. the provincial capital was moved from Zaranj to Kash Rod which is a predominantly Pashtun territory.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t over local Government. heavy fighting took place in Grishk and dozens of fighters from both sides were killed. Subsequently. Mualim Mir Walay (a local Barakzai commander formerly affiliated with the Hizb-i Islami Hekmatyar faction) was supported by the ex-governors of Kandahar Gul Agha Sherzai and Yusuf Pashtun (both Barakzais). under the auspices of the DDR programme. Mualim Mir Walay is currently a Member of Parliament. The struggle was over power and resources in Lashkar Gah and particularly Grishk. Factional rivalry between Baluch sub-tribes 3. and the Popalzai soon felt that they also wanted part of political power in Helmand. the rest are Panjpai Pashtuns (15%). Helmand (Barakzai vs. both inter as well as intratribal. Conflicts involving opposition to Government structures Case 1: Power struggle between Baluch and Nurzai in Nimroz Nimroz is the only province in the South where Baluch are also strong in the state administration of the province. Tokhi and Naser conflict (both Ghilzai) in Shamulzai (Zabul) 4. This is mainly linked to their population size as Baluch make up 85% of the population in Nimroz. Other tribal conflicts In addition to tribal relations situated in these major tribal fault lines. In addition. Mullah Abdulai was the Taliban district governor (Ishaqzai) and Mullah Alim the Chief of Police (Baluch). supported the PDPA Government as the Government (and Soviet Union). When the Taliban regime in Kabul collapsed the Bares and Baluch held a big gathering created a committee of three hundred elders. Case 2: Old factional rivalries between Baluch sub-tribes in Reg/Shorabak The tribal system within the Baluch is quite strong and there are few fault-lines among the various sub-tribes of Baluch.000 jarebs in the Darwazegy area 74 . there was only a little fighting between the PDPA and the pro-mujahideen Baluch and Bares. The head of the Baluch tribe and current Minister of Tribal Affairs. Achekzai and Baluch from Pakistan (Chaghai. Since then. who currently dominate the Government positions in Zaranj. Chief of Police and Head of the National Security Directorate (all the same person) is a former PDPA supporter from the Mangal subtribe. When the PDPA regime collapsed the situation reversed. putting them in opposition to the Mangal and Mahmundzani. The Pashtuns from Khashrod therefore constantly demand drastic reform in the Government administration. The District Governor. in turn. they were not allowed to return during the Taliban regime. Allegedly it was not a proactive support and they did not help them solve problems with local commanders as done in other areas. They sent an envoy to the Taliban and threatened to fight them if they would not leave voluntarily. were sympathetic to their nationalist agenda in Pakistan. The Mangal and Mahmundsani sub-tribes returned to Reg during the second year of the current Government when the Taliban had been removed from power. Zahir Shah gave the Nasar tribe 5. who are strong in Baluch Nationalist politics. The Taliban movement and the Taliban government were mostly composed of Nurzai.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t In the post Taliban period the provincial capital was moved back to Zaranj. Ishaqzai. In Reg district the political power has apparently shifted back to the Mengal. • • Case 3: Land based conflict between Tokhi (Ghilzai) vs. most pro-mujahideen tribes fled to Panjpai in the Quetta district of Baluchistan. The heads of the two Government shuras in the district are from the Mangal sub-tribe as well. Mr. The Baluch and Bares tribes did not resist them. with the Mangal and Mahmundsani tribes having to flee Reg/Shorabak while the pro-mujahideen Baluch and Bares factions returned to the area. is allegedly an instigator in this conflict by employing mainly Baluch in the current Government administration in Nimroz (98%). As tribal solidarity is strong among the Nurzai they are getting support from the Nurzai of Helmand and Farah provinces. When the jihad against the PDPA government started the other Baluch sub-tribes and the Bares joined mujahideen factions. Naser (Ghilzai Kuchis) More than 30 years ago settled Shamulzai (Tokhi) and the Kuchi Nasar populated the Shamulzayi district. however. Brahovi. Dal Ban Din in Quetta district of Pakistan). other Baluch sub-tribes (allied with the Pashtun Bares) in Reg/Shorabak that emerged during the jihad. When the war turned more intense and the PDPA/Soviet regime started to bomb and destroy houses in the area. As the Mangal and Mahmundsani had supported the Khalq faction. This has led to feelings of resentment among the Nurzai Pashtuns against the Baluch. Allegedly. power has shifted back and forth between the two sides as illustrated below: • Both the Mangal and Mahmundzani. An exception to this unity is the rivalry between the Mangal and Mahmundsani sub-tribes vs. The claims during the jirga were as follows: The Nasar wanted all their land back. Several years later. an envoy of Nasar cooks and labourers came to Shamulzayi to set up a temporary housing space for the tribal elders soon to arrive. ANA. an armed group of Shamulzai under the command of Commandant Spin burned the Nasar belongings as they thought this was an act by the Naser to once again occupy their land. the Chief of District.200 Nasar militia troops came with support from Major Ashrab (Pakistan) to reclaim their land in Shamulzayi.000 jarebs which belonged to the Shamulzai. tribal elders from almost all over Zabul.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t that was then an uncultivated desert. The Shamulzai were afraid that there would be harassment at the border if Naser were to control it. The situation improved when weapon’s licences were given to Shamulzai militia men. 75 . heavy fighting between the two tribes broke out. totalling an area more than 31. initiated a jirga to resolve the land dispute. Reportedly. the Nasar were not satisfied with the 5. they had made investments in the land over the last thirty years. There was a battle which lasted seventeen days. but the Shamulzayi were only willing to give them the 5’000 jarebs that was initially granted to the Naser. Up to this day. During the Taliban Government the tribes were disarmed and the conflict became latent. Subsequently. In 2005 (possibly 2006) the Governor of Zabul. during the time of Dr. • The jirga was not able to resolve the conflict and in 2007 Nasar reportedly attacked police check points. the Nasar are alleged to organise hit and run attacks on Shamulzayi district from Pakistan. however did not have a good start. 1. the insurgency (which are allied with the Shamulzai) allegedly does not attack the police checkpoints in the border area since the border police protect the Shamulzai from the Nasar. Supposedly. and the Americans (the latter also to keep the parties from fighting each other). and for which land deeds as proof existed. Supposedly the Nasaran killed many Shamulzai people. Najibullah’s Government. Furthermore. Members of the jirga included the Governor of Zabul. During the jihad the Nasar left the area and went to Pakistan and the Shamulzai reclaimed the land abandoned by the Nasar.000 jarebs given to them and grabbed further land. The Shamulzai purportedly won the battle and the Nasaran returned across the border. Prior to the jirga. Fighting also took place in Pakistan as many Shamulzayi refugees had fled to Pakistan. such as the construction of deep wells. Both sides had issues with the others claims: o o The Nasar felt that their settlements would be encircled by Shamulzai settlements and thus allow an effective control by the latter. Delbar Jan Arman. • The jirga. At the same time. the moment the common enemy vanishes.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t Case 4: Conflicts involving Opposition to Government Structures: Baluch (narcotics mafia/insurgency) vs. Poplazai (government actors) in Southern Helmand Dishu and Khanishin districts are the gateway for opium smugglers that involve most of the Baluch tribes. When the insurgents confronted the Popalzai elders living in the district the latter claimed that Haji Saher and his supporters were out of their control. After attacks by insurgents/Baluch led by Mullah Zaher Baluch. the continued struggle between the insurgency and ANA/ISAF/NATO in Southern Afghanistan has proven to be somewhat “distractive” for many tribes. However. the internal struggle over power and resources re-emerges. Haji Saher from the Popalzai tribe was appointed as anti-narcotics Chief of the Province in 2006 and young Popalzai were recruited to support him. respectively. the conflict continues. and in May-June and October 2005 almost ten and 17 policemen were killed. An opposition toward either the insurgency (or foreign) actors could prove unifying. between the tribes. The Popalzai who had supported Haji Saher retreated from the area to Lashkar Gah. 76 . Haji Saher’s brother Haji Daud is now the Antinarcotics Chief trying to complete this job. A similar situation could be observed when the different mujahideen factions fought the Communist government and when the Northern Alliance fought the Taliban. but Baluch tribe members attacked them several times. The Lashkar Gah power holders are currently trying to put a ground presence in the border districts in order to gain a share in the illegal income derived from drug trafficking/smuggling. and in form of a conclusion. Last but not least. as history suggest. The Baluch do not want to see the Government return as this could mean that they would loose a portion of their share in the local war economy. In 2004/2005 the Helmand Governor and Provincial Chief of Police appointed their own people as District Commissioner and District Chief of Police in the two districts. At least for a short time they may be to busy to engage in inter or intra-tribal disputes. even if just for a short time. Even though Haji Saher was killed in a car accident and Mullah Zaher during a bombardment. the Government presence ended. security. economy and research. we would like to emphasize a few guiding principles: • There needs to be an understanding that without a serious reform within the Afghan Government at the national. Combating conflict and insurgency in the Southern border districts cannot happen in isolation. a viable and superior Government alternative to insurgency needs to be offered and faith in good governance by the state needs to be rebuilt. Disentangling the symbiotic relationship between smuggling networks and the insurgency alone presents a major challenge and the central/provincial Government is in dire need of support if stability in the Southern cluster is to be achieved. Prior to the individual recommendations made in the areas of politics. At present. and humans). any local efforts to fight the insurgency needs to be cobbled with addressing the existing leadership and training cells in Pakistan. The weakness of traditional leadership needs to be acknowledged at the same time as understanding that the tribe as a social unit is still of great importance among many tribes in the Southern border district. In other words. and not just in the military area. regional and sub-regional level that addresses issues of corruption and lack of good governance. extensive smuggling networks (drugs. Traditional leadership without military background T he recommendations put forth here should be considered suggestions that are in no way conclusive when it comes to dealing with the current situation in the Southern border districts. individual action in the border districts of the Southern Cluster will not prove effective. weapons. The lucrative narcotics business. • • 77 . growing and diversifying insurgency and local tribal rifts combined with bad governance and power struggles among elites have produced a highly problematic situation.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t 6 Recommendations Chapter The South at large needs more support and attention by the international community. They are based on a rapid and exploratory assessment and in many areas additional research is needed. The role of Pakistan in fuelling the conflict in the Southern border districts needs to be understood. the Afghan Government and the international actors who support it are up against tbe extremely poor track record of Government officials in the Southern border districts. Even though the insurgency has local support (or is able to recruit) locally. o Reconciliation mechanisms should be considered between marginalised communities and the Afghan Government (this should also include the Ghilzai and Kuchi). The supply as well as demand side of the drug economy needs to be considered. can only re-gain influence in their tribes in the absence of insecurity and a threat from insurgency. Achekzai. Dishu and Khanishin in Helmand). • As tribal structures have been fragmented in the South there is a necessity to introduce reconciliation mechanisms that halt a further drifting apart among many of the tribes and continued inter and intra-tribal violence. as their strong leadership structures and control of the border areas present a big stabilisation potential. The marginalisation of particular unified tribes. o This means paying special attention to marginalized groups such as Kuchis and Baluch. however. o • Existing Government in the border districts is often considered to be non-representative of the local communities. • 78 . The local drug economy cannot be seen in isolation from an international narcotics mafia that benefits from the situation in Afghanistan. needs to be reversed. IDLG should come up with a strategy on improving the appointment of Government positions at a district level. Tokhi. Those Governments that do exist are often seen as corrupt and a compromise between the central state and local strongmen and their militias or insurgents. • Given the relative poverty in the Southern border districts any kind of action needs to have a long-term commitment that comes with a sufficient level of financial and political support from international actors.g. and Ishaqzai areas along the border have seen very little state influence. • Politics and Security • State presence in almost all the border districts studied here is either extremely weak or non-existent (e. o More creative matching of traditional community structures with formal Government bodies should be explored as a way to achieve a representation in local governance. o Improving this situation requires a combination of selecting capable and non-corrupt Government officials.. but also to Panjpai tribes such as the Ishaqzai and Nurzai. In particular. Hotak. Measures should be taken to improve a representative Government that reflects the real balance of power among local tribal structures. building the capacity of local Government structures and initiating confidence building measure with isolated and marginalised tribal communities. with Spin Boldak in Kandahar having the best local Government. o The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) within the Office of the President should have a policy and strategy that aims at working with the political leadership in the border districts. such as the Baluch. Nasar.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t and local capacities for peace. the Baluch. especially those that could be considered as « war criminals. Pakistan via Kandahar (especially Spin Boldak. As noted. Afghanistan is currently linked to regional (international) markets in Iran via Nimroz (and Herat) and Southern Helmand (such as the Baramcha market). has become one of the internal main labour markets during the poppy harvest season. Nevertheless. especially those with skills from Nangarhar. • • Economy The South cluster. presents a paradoxical situation. attracting labourers from everywhere. They need to be very clear about their rules of engagement and whom they work with. The Afghan economy largely depends on both the legal and illegal trade flowing across its porous borders to and from neighbouring countries (mostly Pakistan and Iran). One can even argue that it is because of the difficult livelihood situation in the Southern border districts that trade (both legal and illegal) plays such a crucial role in the South. but also Baramcha in Helmand and smaller markets in Zabul). and Zabul and Central Asian markets in the North via an elaborate network of traders and smugglers. Zabul should be considered as a strong focus of political (and security) action as it is an important cross-road for insurgents. The lucrative poppy trade was started to compensate for a weak agricultural sector and has now added to the economic wealth of the South. and especially the border districts. the South. including the range of measures highlighted so far. International military needs to be very careful to not increase civilian casualties during its fight against the insurgency as this only provides further support to the insurgency. Thus. but the terrain is difficult and water and livelihood opportunities are scarce. for example. Too much credibility of the international military actors has been destroyed due to striking alliances with « dubious » individuals. Helmand. Border districts especially are more connected to the neighbouring countries’ markets situated close to the border in Baluchistan province (Quetta and Zhob) in Pakistan and Zabul region of Iran. into security arrangements should be explored. especially the border districts. On the other hand. especially roads and communication networks. » o Coordination between Coalition Forces and ISAF/NATO as well as both entities with ANA and ANP in combating insurgency is essential. The importance of the Baramcha market in Helmand for the smuggling of drugs and weapons (and also humans) and its impact on the regional security situation needs further assessment. On the one hand. poppy eradication without the provision of clear alternatives will prove futile and only hurt local farmers. Similarly there is access to the ports of Karachi and Gawadr (Baluchistan) as upcoming markets that will further impact on the economy of Afghanistan and the surrounding region. such as the Baluch. weapons and narcotics trade. especially as the ANP has been heavily critised by local communities. there are huge landowners. are an important strategic economic region. A specific plan for engaging local communities in Zabul should be developed. The Helmand and Kandahar border is largely isolated from 79 . infrastructure at large remains very poor in these districts.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t o • The possibility to engage strong border tribes. pushing more and more locals either to migrate abroad or engage in opium cultivation. pomegranates. This could be a joint strategy with alternative livelihoods. due to corruption and a monopoly of local strongmen. In light of the above. o A good example is the introduction of cotton during the presidency of Daud Khan in the mid 1970’s in Helmand province. o More market research should be conducted on how to make the Afghan market stronger and market local goods better so that they are competitive with those coming from abroad. The business sector at large in the South has good access to rural markets but formalised legal channels and the grading of agricultural produce needs to be improved.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t the Afghan Government and the international community’s attention. and to a lesser extent in Europe and America. Grishk and Herat. food items. o o Smaller sector-specific business association such as medicine. • • Water shortage is a major problem in most of the Southern border districts. especially in the area of trade. farmers are disappointed with growing cotton. the economic potential in the South. At present the Afghan economy is dominated by goods imported from Iran and Pakistan. Subsidisation schemes for lower yielding crops (such as it often happens in Europe) should also be explored.E. • 80 . the main route of business between Persia and the Indian subcontinent passed through the cities of Kandahar. This holds promise as the business communities in the South has major shares in Quetta. which the Baluch and Pashtun tribes have historically exploited. and fruit merchants should be strengthened. Karachi. Even historically. Alternative livelihoods and staged mechanisms need to be explored to move farmers away from opium cultivation. spices and vegetables need to be further developed. legalisation of opium and taxing exports and ways to impact on the price structure to make the business less lucrative). automobiles. and melons). U. There is room for the development of more efficient ways of retaining and channelling water. • Private sector development is needed to bolster and boost legal economy and trade as currently it is overshadowed by the war economy. This « living at the edge of the Afghan empire » has essentially opened the door for smuggling networks to dominate the scene. • Ways to de-criminalise opium cultivation need to be explored (such as legal uses for opium.A. is big. Lahore. The region’s economy can build on an old and well established business community and extensive trade networks. o Cross-border business associations among local and regional traders exist but could be strengthened. Investments in water infrastructure such as reservoirs and channels (for example in Shorabak. o Well established sectors such as Afghan fruits (grapes. Reg) should be a priority as it could increase agricultural outcome. Of course this needs to be cobbled with alternative livelihoods developments as otherwise it may increase opium cultivation further. almonds. Currently. however. including cross-border relations among Pashtun tribes. and Day Kundi could also greatly benefit from these economic linkages. Maruf. • • • 81 . Maruf. The other districts. Spin Boldak is currently the second most important port of entry of goods from Pakistan. • • Research Much of what has been proposed. Studies on how to improve private sector development. Arghistan.. Reg. Ghor. of course. are more oriented to Pakistan either because of a lack of infrastructure (Maruf) or tribal ties (Reg. and Arghistan. Arghistan already has historical trade relations with Spin Boldak. The historical tribal conflict between Nurzai and Achekzai has already affected the businesses in the major market.S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t o The development of cool storage facilities for local fruits and vegetables is essential in order to break dependency on Pakistan’s market that currently provides this service for Afghan produce. Research on alternative livelihoods to opium cultivation and development of methods for a staged shift to a legal economy. These supplies through Spin Boldak need to be secured and developed. Focusing on Spin Boldak is ideal for other reasons we well. Here we would like to highlight those we consider absolutely necessary • • Case study on Spin Boldak and how it can be made into a regional market centre that includes Shorabak.g. however. Development of a Business Directory for the South. Pursuing this idea means including the surrounding districts (e. Reg and Atghar) into a regional development plan. Improvement of services and facilities along formal border crossing will divert more traffic towards such routes (away from informal and illegal ones) especially those linked to commerce. So far we have identified the need for research both in political and economic areas. These districts need to be “tied” to the economic gravity centre that is Spin Boldak. Shorabak and Reg through paved roads with Spin Boldak should intensify trade relations between these districts and can present a stabilizing effect on the region as people benefiting from trade are often less likely to engage in armed conflict in order to protect their business interests. Thus any development should try to use economic incentives to settle the NurzaiAchekzai conflict. Provinces such as Uruzgan. Bamayan. Investment in connecting Maruf. Case study on the Baluch and their role in the political economy of the South. The improvement of such strategic economic areas or zones can open up the isolated areas of the South for internal Afghan markets. should be based on more extensive research prior to engagement. Development of appropriate infrastructure fostering trade relations between the five border districts in Kandahar will be a key necessity. refugees. This could also include research in the development of local markets and how to make water usage more efficient. and daily commuters. Shorabak. Shorabak). • Incentives and development of border districts needs to take into account the strong cross-border orientations. S o u t h e r n C l u s t e r R e p o r t • • • • Identification of resource and land disputes that can be mediated with the support of IDLG. Understanding of transnational engagement of Afghans. Research on the causes of displacement in the South (both political and also due to lack of livelihoods) and the special protection challenges for those displaced by violence. • 82 . Case study on Zabul in order to identify entry points to break the stronghold of the insurgency and smuggling networks. the migration-development nexus and the importance of remittances. PRTs and MOI and Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs. Case study on the border district in Nimroz and their relationship with Iran.
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