The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain

7KH5ROHRI,UDQLQWKH)DLOHG&RXSRI7KH,)/%LQ%DKUDLQ Hasan Tariq Alhasan The Middle East Journal, Volume 65, Number 4, Autumn 2011, pp. 603-617 (Article) 3XEOLVKHGE\0LGGOH(DVW,QVWLWXWH DOI: 10.1353/mej.2011.0137 For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mej/summary/v065/65.4.alhasan.html Access provided by Tel Aviv University (24 Nov 2014 05:25 GMT) © Middle East Institute. This article is for personal research only and may not be copied or distributed in any form without the permission of The Middle East Journal. The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain Hasan Tariq Alhasan In December 1981, a group baptized al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li Tahrir al-Bahrayn [The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain] unsuccessfully attempted to carry out a coup d’état in Bahrain. The group published newsletters and books in which it described its attempts to overthrow the Al Khalifa ruling family and install Iranian-style Islamic rule instead. These documents provide evidence for the group’s involvement with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and of the support the Iranian regime provided for their activities against the Bahraini government. Between revolutionary propaganda on one hand and official government statements on the other, it has often been a difficult task to discern the role that the Islamic regime in Iran played in the political unrest that swept Bahrain between 1978 and 1996. While the official position of the Iranian government was to deny any intervention in or meddling with Bahrain’s internal affairs, numerous statements issued by important figures and high-ranking clerics in the Islamic Republic have pointed to the contrary. Such accusations have continued to the present day. A very recent example, wherein the former Iranian Speaker of Parliament and high-ranking adviser ‘Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri claimed that Bahrain was Iran’s “fourteenth province,” stirred a diplomatic crisis as a result.1 The aim of this article is to offer indicators of the extent of Iranian influence and intervention in Bahrain’s internal political affairs through the analysis of the publications of al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li Tahrir al-Bahrayn (the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, or IFLB), a now-defunct group which sought to topple the ruling Al Khalifa family and replace it with an Islamic regime similar to that of Iran.2 The Bahraini government accused the group of attempting to stage a coup d’état in 1981, and hinted that group members had been trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and received support from the Iranian regime.3 Analysis of the IFLB’s own sources offers the advantage of identifying the degree of Iranian intervention while hedging against the problem of the Bahraini government’s possible interest in exaggerating some aspects of Hasan Tariq Alhasan is a recipient of Bahrain’s Crown Prince’s International Scholarship Program. He has obtained an undergraduate degree in Political Science and a Master’s in Finance from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po) in Paris, France. Currently, he is pursuing a Master’s in International Political Economy at the London School of Economics, UK. His research interests include GCC-Iran relations, GCC labor markets, and the transformation of public bureaucracy in the GCC. Many thanks to the American Enterprise Institute’s Dr. Michael Rubin for his personal supervision of this article, originally written for his class, Understanding Contemporary Iran, taught at Johns Hopkins University. Many thanks to the Library of Congress as well for kindly providing the documents used in the research. 1. “Morocco Cuts Relations with Iran over Bahrain,” Reuters Africa, March 7, 2009, http://af.reuters. com/article/topNews/idAFJOE52601D20090307. 2. These sources and publications were gathered by the author at the Library of Congress. 3. David B. Ottaway, “Allegations of Iranian Plots Increase Gulf Concerns for Security,” The Washington Post, January 2, 1982, p. A10; Edward Cody, “Iranian-Backed Coup Bid in Bahrain Reverberates Throughout Persian Gulf,” The Washington Post, March 31, 1982, p. A14. MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL M Volume 65, No. 4, Autumn 2011 http://dx.doi.org/10.3751/65.4.15 604 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL the Iranian regime’s role. Putting the Iranian government’s recurrent denial aside, the truth can arguably be said to lie somewhere between the Bahraini government’s allegations and the IFLB’s propaganda on which this article attempts to shed some light. However, it is necessary to first give a brief presentation of the political context in Bahrain from the mid 1950s leading up to the failed coup of 1981. This will be followed by an introduction to the IFLB and its main figureheads, as well as a discussion of the events in which the group is accused of taking part. It would then be of interest to examine the five main areas in which the Iranian regime seems to play a role vis-à-vis the IFLB, namely that of ideology, leadership or direction, media coverage, logistics and support, and finally military training. The political situation in Bahrain The year 1954 marks the birth of a significant instance of organized political contestation in Bahrain that shaped the country’s political landscape for years to come. Following a series of protests led by taxi drivers after the government announcement of an obligatory insurance scheme, a group of intellectuals, notably ‘Abdel Rahman al-Baker, decided to act against the status quo and declare their intent to create a society representative of Bahraini laborers and workers of all ethnic and confessional categories. Benefitting from the zeal of Arab nationalism and socialism at the time, the society, baptized as the National Union Committee (NUC), was reportedly successful in recruiting about 14,000 Bahraini workers, and its candidates largely won the elections to the commission that was supposed to draft the first labor code.4 The government nonetheless was successful in suppressing the movement. First, the Bahraini leadership exploited the NUC’s failure to rally Shi‘a clerics to their cause and encouraged the latter to form a rival organization, the National Convention Committee (NCC), in 1955 in an attempt to compromise any chance the NUC had of forging a national consensus. Secondly, Bahrain, encouraged by the British, illegalized the NUC and in 1956 undertook a massive campaign of arrests and deportations of the movement’s figureheads.5 This, it seems, proved successful in ending the movement’s formal presence in the country. However, these measures backfired and forced opposition movements to reorganize themselves as underground and clandestine groups that were increasingly radicalized by the government’s measures against them. By the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, these groups consolidated their popular base thanks to the mood created by the ascendance of the Iraqi Ba‘th party to power and to the Iraqi and Iranian activists who came to Bahrain.6 In 1965, following the dismissal of hundreds of workers from the national oil company, Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), the clandestine groups launched what they called Intifada Maris [the March Uprising], crippling many sectors of the economy throughout the year. Discontent was, to a degree, motivated by the British colonial presence — protests and demonstrations significantly decreased after Britain’s announcement that it would end its presence in Bahrain. Between 1968 and 1972, the 4. Abdulhadi Khalaf, Contentious Politics in Bahrain: From Ethnic to National and Vice Versa (Sweden: University of Lund, 1998), http://www.hf.uib.no/smi/pao/khalaf.html. 5. Khalaf, Contentious Politics in Bahrain. 6. Khalaf, Contentious Politics in Bahrain. The iflb and the role of iran in the failed coup of 1981 M 605 government undertook significant efforts to create a national spirit and consensus, including the establishment of an army as well as its withdrawal from a project to create a federation of states, alongside Qatar and the emirates of the resultant United Arab Emirates, due to their refusal to adopt a system of proportional representation that would permit the participation of the people. The results of a UN survey in 1970 showing that the vast majority of the island’s inhabitants wished for Bahrain to become an independent state also helped to reinforce the mood. In a final attempt to stir antigovernment sentiment, several underground movements unified their efforts and launched a second Intifada Maris in 1972 that was quickly and effectively extinguished by the security forces. Conscious of the challenges facing them, the Bahraini leadership accelerated their efforts towards drafting the first constitution and establishing the first unicameral parliament elected by universal male suffrage in 1973. The experiment proved to be a failure, as the parliament refused to pass bills, such as the State Security Law, that the government saw as fundamental to national security. In addition, the regime believed that the parliament was determined to refuse the renewal of the contract permitting the operation of an American naval base. The late Amir Shaykh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa therefore dissolved parliament and suspended the constitution in 1975, only two years after its establishment. Introducing the IFLB In the meantime, many Shi‘a Islamist organizations were flourishing in the region, particularly in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.7 Among these was the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, whose existence was announced on January 27, 1976 (25th of Muharram 1396), although the Director of its Media Department, ‘Isa Marhoun, stated in an interview that “This announcement came many years after the actual creation of the Front for a number of reasons, as well as individual and contextual factors that prevented us from announcing the existence of the Front as soon as it was established.”8 The IFLB’s goals, according to Marhoun, can be divided between the immediate and the long-term. The immediate goals of the group were (1) the toppling of the Al Khalifa regime, (2) establishing a “free Islamic order,” (3) obtaining true independence for Bahrain, (4) achieving cultural and economic independence, (5) eradicating illiteracy and implementating mandatory education, and (6) the scientific and technological advancement of the country. Its long-term objectives revolved around three axes, namely: the development of the individual as one educated in Islam, embodying its morals, carrying its message, and being prepared to sacrifice himself in its defense; building the believing community through a vanguard capable of leading it to glory; and finally the erection of Islamic civilization which would be the end result of the Islamic Revolution. The figureheads of the IFLB included, first and foremost, Hojjat al-Islam Hadi 7. Falah al-Mdaires, “Shi‘ism and Political Protest in Bahrain,” Digest of Middle East Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 2002), p. 20, http://bahrain.wikia.com/wiki/Shi’ism_and_Political_Protest_in_Bahrain. 8. Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Dhu al-Qa‘ada 1405 (July– August 1985), p. 16. However, the IFLB celebrated its 11th anniversary on Muharram 25, 1407 (September 30, 1986) — 11 years after the announcement of its existence on Muharram 25, 1396 (January 27, 1976). 606 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL al-Modarresi.9 Born in Iraq into a family of prominent Shi‘a religious scholars in 1956– 1957 (1376), Modarresi came to Bahrain for asylum due to his fear of being persecuted by the Ba‘thist regime under Saddam Husayn.10 Following the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Hadi al-Modarresi began working along with his elder brother, Mohammad Taqi al-Modarresi, to export the Islamic Revolution to the Gulf.11 In Bahrain, he began what was described by the IFLB as underground activity to lead and bring about the revolution. In public, however, he continued to direct and educate the masses through his many lectures, books, and appearances.12 On August 27, 1979 (Shawwal 4, 1399) Bahraini security forces arrested Modarresi at his home, only to deport him shortly afterwards to the United Arab Emirates from where, according to the IFLB, he was to be sent to Iraq for execution.13 Modarresi was, however, not taken to Iraq and continued to lead antigovernment activity from Iran. The Bahraini government accused him of being behind the failed 1981 coup d’état attempt, an allegation to which he responded by stating, “It is an accusation that I do not deny, and an honor that I do not claim.”14 Other than Modarresi, other Shi‘a clerics have been known to occupy important positions in the IFLB, such as Shaykh Mohammad ‘Ali al-Ikri who was arrested on August 21, 1979 (Ramadan 28, 1399) by Bahraini authorities following his return from a visit to Iran,15 an event that subsequently sparked a series of demonstrations and arrests in Bahrain. Shaykh Jamal al-‘Usfur played an important role in this wave of protests, and was subsequently imprisoned in November 1979 (‘Ashura’ 1400) where he died six months later. Another important cleric, Shaykh ‘Abdul ‘Azim al-Muhtadi al-Bahrayni, joined the Hawza al-‘Ilmiyya (Shi‘a religious school) in Najaf in 1974 and escaped Iraq to Bahrain for fear of arrest in 1979. In November–December 1980 (Muharram 1401), however, ‘Abdul-‘Azim was arrested by Bahraini security forces and exiled to Iran shortly after, where he continued his revolutionary efforts against the government in Bahrain.16 Shaykh ‘Abbas al-Sha’ir, educated in “a religious school renowned for the 9. The title Hojjat al-Islam is granted to those who have completed their studies at a religious center (such as those in Najaf or Qom) but who have not yet been formally recognized as a mujtahid and are not capable of issuing their own religious decisions. 10. His father, Ayatollah Mohammad Kathim al-Modarresi, was a prominent member of the Hawza of Mashhad and Najaf. His grandfather is Ayatollah ‘Uzma Sayyid Mohammad Baqer al-Modarresi and his elder brother is Ayatollah ‘Uzma Sayyid Mohammad Taqi al-Modarresi. On his mother’s side, he belongs to the famous Shirazi family. His maternal grandfather is Ayatollah ‘Uzma Sayyid Mahdi al-Shirazi, and his uncles are Ayatollah ‘Uzma Sayyid Mohammad al-Shirazi and Ayatollah ‘Uzma Sayyid Sadiq al-Shirazi. From Modarresi’s official biography published on his website (Arabic version), http://www.modarresi.org/biography/index.html. 11. Laurence Louër, Chiisme et Politique au Moyen Orient: Iran, Irak, Liban, Monarchies du Golfe [Shi‘ism and Politics in the Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, the Gulf Monarchies] (Paris: Editions Autrement, 2008). 12. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Dhu al-Hijja 1403 (September–October 1983), p. 11. 13. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Dhu al-Hijja 1403, p. 12. 14. Interview with Modarresi by Al Shira’ magazine (Issue No. 5) quoted in: Rashid Hamadah, ‘Asifah fawq Miya al-Khalij: Qissat Awwal Inqilab ‘Askari fi al-Bahrayn 1981 [Storm over Gulf Waters: Stories of the First Military Coup in Bahrain 1981] (London: Al-Safa li-al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi‘, 1990), p. 248. 15. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn [The Journey of the Islamic Revolution in Bahrain] ([1980s?]), p. 87. 16. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Dhu al-Hijja 1403, p. 13. The iflb and the role of iran in the failed coup of 1981 M 607 authenticity of its thought and its revolutionary approach,”17 was another prominent figure in the movement who was also arrested in the month of July–August 1981 (Ramadan 1401) and spent a substantial amount of time in prison. The Failed 1981 Coup d’état: the IFLB Under the Spotlight In many ways, it was the failed 1981 coup d’état, which the government accused the IFLB of orchestrating, that brought the group into the spotlight. On December 13, 1981, the Bahraini Ministry of Interior announced the arrest of 73 individuals of various nationalities whom they accused of planning to overthrow the ruling family and install an Islamic republic similar to that in Iran. These individuals, the government claimed, had received training in Iran. Their plan was allegedly to attack the Dar al-Hukuma (the government offices) and take ministers as hostages, while simultaneously taking over the building of the national radio and television stations. All of this was to take place on December 16, Bahrain’s national day. Shortly after the arrests, the Bahraini government expelled a number of Iranian diplomats, including Hassan Shushtari Zadeh, Iran’s topranking diplomat in the country.18 The government, moreover, revealed the group’s possession of weapons and “accused Iran of providing the plotters, members of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, with equipment ranging from radios to Israeli-made Uzi submachine guns — and even fake Bahraini police uniforms whose buttons had ‘made in Iran’ stamped on the back.”19 The high court sentenced all 73 to jail; three of them received life sentences while the other 70 were given lighter jail terms.20 Ideological proximity The IFLB, on numerous accounts and occasions, declared its complete fidelity towards the “Universal Islamic Revolution under the leadership of Imam Khomeini.”21 In a conference held in Tehran on August 9–11, 1980 (Ramadan 27–29, 1400), the IFLB proclaimed four points central to its doctrine: 1. That Islam is our doctrine. Islam overthrew the Shahanshah empire and the Shah — policeman of the Gulf — himself whose military arsenal was made up of some of the most modern American and Israeli weapons available. Islam is therefore our true path to salvation. 2. That Imam Khomeini is the leader and axis around which our oppressed peoples should rally if they truly seek freedom, since Imam Khomeini is the summit of jihad and faith and the symbol of challenge and endurance. He is the hope of all the oppressed in the world. 3. That unity is the path to victory […] it is indispensable that all peoples collaborate and unite in the face of regimes and their clients. 17. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Dhu al-Hijja 1403, p. 13. 18. Ottaway, “Allegations of Iranian Plots Increase Gulf Concerns for Security.” 19. Cody, “Iranian-Backed Coup Bid in Bahrain Reverberates Throughout Persian Gulf.” 20. “73 Jailed in Bahrain Plot,” The Washington Post, May 23, 1982, p. A21 21. Document issued by the IFLB on the occasion of the second anniversary of Yom al-Quds [Jerusalem Day] on August 8, 1980 (1400), appearing in: IFLB, Kifah Sha‘b al-Bahrayn [The Struggle of the People of Bahrain] (1980), p. 213. 608 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 4. That the way to liberate Jerusalem should be neither eastern nor western. A word of advice to those who seek Jerusalem’s and others’ freedom: rid yourself of any dependence on the criminal West and the disbelieving East and hold fast to the example of the Iranian people’s slogans that embody independence (neither East nor West …).22 The IFLB also advocated the use of violent means to bring about its Islamic Revolution since, in its view, it was the only way in which Al Khalifa rule could be overturned and revolution brought about. In an interview with the magazine Risalat al-Husayn posted on Modarresi’s website, Modarresi explains that it is permissible, for the sake of resistance against oppression, to undertake violent confrontation against “the sword by the sword, [against] force by force, and [against] oppression and tyranny by means that the adversary understands […] even if this leads to bloodshed and killing of the believers.”23 It is equally noteworthy that Modarresi is recognized as having obtained the trust and wikala [delegated authority] to carry out matters in the name of Ayatollah ‘Uzma [Grand Ayatollah] Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah ‘Uzma al-Sayyid Mohammad Hussaini al-Shirazi, Ayatollah ‘Uzma al-Sayyid al-Mor’ishi al-Najafi, and Ayatollah ‘Uzma alSayyid ‘Abd al-A‘la al-Sabzawri,24 and is often identified by IFLB sources as the “representative of Imam Khomeini in Bahrain.”25 The IFLB also took the liberty of adopting some of the revolutionary slogans inspired by the Islamic Revolution, such as the famous “not Eastern, nor Western — Islamic Republican,” “our struggle, Hussaini; our leader, Khomeini,” and others. The group’s sources mention that, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Khomeini’s name was systematically and overtly integrated into slogans that were both chanted verbally and written on walls and banners.26 Leadership and direction Therefore, the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran is the precursor to the approach of the regime’s end in Bahrain. The people which lacked a coherent approach […] the people which lacked a committed and aware leadership, began fulfilling these factors through the guidance of Islam and under the banner of Imam Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Nation and of the oppressed, and under the leadership of the guided Islamic Front which stood out on the field and led the masses, launching the slogan “Allahu Akbar” that toppled the buried Shah and shook the throne of the Al Khalifa in Bahrain.27 The publications of the IFLB offer several indicators of the sort of leadership that prominent clerics of the Islamic Republic of Iran had over the group. Though these indicators are most often implicit and do not necessarily imply the existence of a direct relationship on the tactical or operational level, they point to a link that could be said to 22. IFLB, Kifah Sha‘b al-Bahrayn, pp. 212, 214. 23. Interview with the magazine Risalat al-Husayn [The Message of Husayn] posted on Modarresi’s website, http://www.modarresi.org/articles/articles_view_002.html. Risalat al-Husayn is a Kuwait-based magazine published during the beginning of the month of Muharram. 24. Rashid Hamadah, ‘Asifah fawq Miya al-Khalij, pp. 211–212. 25. IFLB, Kifah Sha‘b al-Bahrayn, p. 199. 26. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 91. 27. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 81. The iflb and the role of iran in the failed coup of 1981 M 609 have had an influence on the group’s strategy and orientation. First of all, IFLB sources point to a number of visits that their leading clerics paid to prominent figures in the Islamic Republic. The previously mentioned Shaykh Mohammad ‘Ali al-Ikri, for instance, was arrested upon his arrival in Bahrain from a “visit to Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution.”28 Modarresi, as already mentioned, was often described as, “the representative of Imam Khomeini in Bahrain.” Ayatollah Khomeini also had another representative in Bahrain, Hajj ‘Isa Shareefi (his title refers to his completion of the pilgrimage to Mecca), whose task was to collect the Shi‘a religious tax (the khums) on behalf of the Imam. Shareefi was also arrested by security forces.29 However, Shareefi’s representation of Khomeini was probably much less political than that of Modarresi, who was viewed as the link par excellence between Ayatollah Khomeini and the IFLB. Moreover, it is noteworthy that most clerics affiliated with the IFLB, including Modarresi and ‘Abdul ‘Azim, both of whom were exiled from Bahrain, ended up in Iran where, according to IFLB sources, they continued their revolutionary activities against the Bahraini government. The Iranian regime did more, however, than simply offer safe asylum to activists working against the Bahraini government. As IFLB sources testify, the Iranian regime allowed IFLB members to participate in the Iran-Iraq war on the Iranian front and provided some favorable media coverage for their activities (see Figures 1–4). Furthermore, Laurence Louër mentions that Hadi al-Modarresi and his elder brother Mohammad Taqi alModarresi worked in conjunction with elements within the Iranian regime such as Mehdi Hashemi, founder of the pasdaran (the armed body responsible for “guarding the Revolution”), to export the Islamic Revolution to the Gulf at least up until the mid 1980s.30 Furthermore, the IFLB on several occasions referred to a direct correlation between its activities and those of the pro-Khomeini public on one hand and statements or directions that Khomeini may have issued on the other. One of the earliest examples of this is the series of “demonstrations in support of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the protests that took place last year [August 17, 1979] in response to Imam Khomeini’s call wherein he declared the last Friday of the month of Ramadan as Jerusalem Day.”31 This was repeated the following year on August 8, 1980 (1400) when Imam Khomeini announced, “The Muslim peoples have to celebrate Jerusalem Day … your demonstrations and protests at the last Friday of the blessed month of Ramadan (Jerusalem Day) are the precursor to the expulsion of these corruptive rulers and to the end of their manipulation of the Islamic countries.”32 To this, the IFLB responded by issuing a statement urging the people of Bahrain to take to the streets to express their unequivocal support of the Islamic Revolution and Imam Khomeini, in addition to closing their shops, congregating in mosques, etc. Modarresi advocated using the ma’tams [also known as a husayniyya — a location for Shi‘a commemoration ceremonies, especially for the month of Muharram] and mosques as centers for spreading their Islamic Revolution.33 As he regretfully exclaimed, “A look at the 28. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 87. 29. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 58. 30. Louër, “Chiisme et Politique au Moyen Orient.” 31. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 86. 32. IFLB, Kifah Sha‘b al-Bahrayn, pp. 210–211. 33. Hadi al-Modarresi, “‘Andama Tatahawwal ‘Ashura’ ila Mashrou‘” [“When ‘Ashura’ Becomes a Plan”], Risalat ‘Ashura’ (newspaper), No. 2, Muharram 2, 1420 (April 18, 1999), http://www.modarresi.org/articles/articles_view_009.html. 610 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL reality of the ma’tam in our Shi‘a world today reveals clearly the degree to which the ma’tam is short of taking up its role as a religious-social-cultural establishment.” He lists a number of changes to place the ma’tam into this function, the most interesting of which are not very far from a partial takeover of the role of the state — such as the creation of a committee within the framework of the ma’tam aimed at improving living standards and directing graduates towards needed specializations, as well as offering academic scholarships for needy students. A striking resemblance can be seen between Modarresi’s thought and the IFLB’s frequently cited quotation, attributed to Imam Khomeini, wherein he describes places of worship as the “trenches of the revolution” and the husayniyat as the “fuel of the revolution.”34 Indeed, the ma’tams and places of worship did play an important role in the unrest reportedly stirred by the IFLB. “Khawaja mosque, Mo’min mosque, and the husayniyat of Madan and al-Gasaab are the places where most demonstrations that swept the streets of Manama were launched, and in Muharraq as well as the villages of Draaz, Bani Jamra, Damastaan, and Sitra, demonstrations would begin from mosques and husayniyat in order to express the Islamic character of the revolution.”35 Such politicization of Shi‘i places of worship was quite characteristic of the less quietist and less traditionalist version of Islam that Ayatollah Khomeini preached. In an attempt to explain the enthusiasm with which people often took to the streets and participated in demonstrations and riots, the IFLB explicitly mentions the “rightly guided leadership embodied by Imam Khomeini and the presence of an authentic and committed Islamic organization [that] gave the people faith in the inevitability of victory.”36 It is thus undeniable that the IFLB looked up to Imam Khomeini as a leader, though the extent to which this leader took an active role in leading the group and defining its orientation, whether personally or through intermediaries (particularly through Modarresi), is unclear. Media coverage No one can deny the fact that the most important element that contributed to the approach and speed of the Islamic Revolution’s victory in Iran is the media. Who knows how much longer Iran would have stayed under the rule of the Shah — who was served by the Zionist and global media which stood by him — if not for the displacement of Imam Khomeini to Paris and his direction of the people from there?!37 The media coverage and assistance that the Iranian regime provided for the IFLB was perhaps the most apparent, and the area in which Iran provided most support. As can be seen in Figure 1, Iran allowed the IFLB to set up media offices in the capital Tehran. The IFLB was also called upon to participate and “represent the people of Bahrain” in international Islamic conferences that were often organized in Iran, such as the Conference to Condemn American Interventions in the Affairs of the Islamic Republic and the Conference on the Liberation of Jerusalem. The IFLB was even allowed to set up exhibitions with pictures of “American and Israeli planes that carry the Star of David landing in Bahrain’s airport. They [i.e. visitors to the exhibitions] saw pictures illustrating the social 34. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 90. 35. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn. 36. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 98. 37. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 104. The iflb and the role of iran in the failed coup of 1981 M 611 injustice and poverty that many neighborhoods and villages go through in Bahrain. This is apart from pictures of past and present demonstrations and pictures of burnt houses and cars, in addition to the explosives that were used to set them on fire. Pictures of the corpse of the martyr Jameel al-Ali, bearing signs of brutal torture, were also displayed.”38 Furthermore, IFLB sources list the efforts to block the broadcast of the Iranian “Voice of the Islamic Republic” radio station to Bahrain by the Bahraini government as one of the latter’s repressive policies.39 Figure 1 illustrates that the Tehran-based “Voice of the Islamic Republic” did indeed broadcast “most of the songs of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain through radio and television at many times, since it receives wide acceptance from listeners thanks to the Islamic Revolutionary ideals that they contain.” IFLB publications also refer with regret to the banning of “even listening to a lecture by al-Modarresi on Radio Tehran”40 which most importantly indicates, alongside the above-mentioned references, that Iranian media outlets did broadcast IFLB propaganda and Modarresi’s lectures and talks. Iranian newspapers also provided press coverage for many of the demonstrations that IFLB activists organized in front of the Bahraini Embassy in Iran with a rather favorable tone. More importantly, however, Iranian press published a news item announcing that several IFLB members joined with the Iranian army to fight against the Iraqi Ba‘thist regime.41 These media references point to Iran’s support of IFLB activities through favorable coverage of their activities, as well as the spread of the group’s songs and propaganda material. Military training and involvement The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain did not suffice itself with [letters of support] but rather announced its preparedness to participate in the ongoing war on the Islamic Republic’s borders, calling upon other movements in the region to push their peoples towards participating in this war in order to accomplish the peoples’ Islamic unity in the face of the agent regimes in the region. The first batch of our prominent revolutionary mujahideen has already left for the Islamic Republic of Iran. There, five members of the front announced their allegiance to Islam, the Quran, and the great Imam Khomeini and set forth to participate in the battle against the Ba‘thist, mercenary, and Jordanian [allies of Iraq in this war] enemies of Islam and humanity who are armed with both Western and Eastern weapons alike.42 The above statement announced the participation of five members of the IFLB in the Iran-Iraq war against the Iraqi Ba‘thist regime.43 This declaration, however, was not the only indicator of involvement of the group’s members with the Iranian military. IFLB sources published a dossier on Husayn ‘Ali Mohammad Taher (also known as Abu Jihad) with pictures of him in army attire on the Iranian front. What is even more intriguing are the conditions in which Abu Jihad died. Abu Jihad did not die on the front against Iraqi forces as one might expect, but rather in his attempt to assassinate 38. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 105. 39. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 57. 40. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Dhu al-Hijja 1403, p. 12. 41. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, pp. 111–113 (Figure 2). 42. IFLB, Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 111. 43. Refer to Figure 3. 612 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL former officers of the Shahanshah regime and figures of the opposition to the Islamic Republic in one of the Arab countries. Abu Jihad and his comrades failed, however, as the bomb they had planted exploded earlier than scheduled, killing Abu Jihad and one of his comrades while injuring a third who was taken to the hospital.44 In an interview with the father of Isma‘il ‘Abbas Hassan, the first so-called Bahraini martyr against Saddam Husayn’s forces on the battlefield with Iran, the father makes explicit reference to the involvement of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, who came to his house in Iran (since both Isma‘il and his father were exiled from Bahrain) to inform him of his son’s death.45 IFLB sources also published an account of the so-called martyrdom of Shaykh Musa Ja‘far al-Babur and Shaykh Khalifa al-Haddad, both of whom were students at the Hawza al‘Ilmiyya in Qum. It comes as no surprise that a handful of Bahrainis travelled to the Hawza in Qum to receive their education. This, as well as the above-mentioned cases, present evidence of past incidents wherein Bahrainis who travelled to Iran for different reasons were hired to carry out assassinations in other countries, received training from the IRGC, or participated with the latter in its war against Ba‘thist Iraq. It is also interesting to note that, in the court statements of Mohammad Salman ‘Ali, the lawyer of Sayyid Ja‘far al-Sayyid Kathim al‘Alawi (one of the defendants accused of plotting against the government in 1981), he did not deny charges of his client having received training in Iran but rather said, “With regards to training in Iran, that is something simple and easily available not only to the defendant and the others but to a number of individuals, and it is something that is not denied in Iran.”46 Conclusion The failed 1981 coup d’état helped bring the IFLB under the spotlight. It was also one of the first instances when the Bahraini government publicly accused Iran of intervening in its internal affairs. The Bahraini government has long accused Iran of meddling with its affairs through the intermediary of the IFLB to which, Bahrain claims, it provided motivation, incentive, direction, equipment, and training. Many Bahraini opposition members and Iranian officials, however, dismiss this as nothing more than a pretext for the Bahraini government to suppress opposition. Between these two positions, the analysis of IFLB sources has allowed us to avoid the problems that the Bahraini and Iranian governments’ interests pose in attempting to find the truth about Iran’s intervention in Bahrain. This study has revealed a variety of factors, some of which can be seen as signs of Iranian intervention in the internal affairs of Bahrain: the adoption by the IFLB of the Islamic Revolutionary ideology, the proclamation of Khomeini as the leader, a number of ties that link the group’s figureheads to senior Shi‘a clerics in the Islamic Republic, a significant amount of prominent Iranian, often national, media coverage, and diffusion of IFLB activities and propaganda, and finally strong evidence pointing to various forms of involvement of IFLB members with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The series of arrests and deportations that the government carried out against IFLB leadership and members in the early 1980s weakened the group almost to the point of 44. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Safar 1406 (October–November 1985), p. 11. 45. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Shawwal 1405 (June–July 1985), p. 14. Refer to Figure 4. 46. Hamadah, ‘Asifah fawq Miya al-Khalij, p. 310. The iflb and the role of iran in the failed coup of 1981 M 613 virtual disappearance from the political scene. Nevertheless, the government accused other, newer groups of receiving support from Iran in order to stir unrest in the country. Such was the case of the Bahraini branch of Hizbullah (or Hizbullah-Bahrain) — whose existence as a distinct group is not beyond doubt — blamed in part for acts of vandalism against businesses and attacks directed against security forces during the 1990s. Today within the context of the Arab uprisings, the Bahraini as well as other GCC governments have continued to blame Iran for playing a role in stirring political unrest in Bahrain. Iran has done very little to refute those claims, however. It has, through its media arms such as the Iran-based al-Alam TV and Hizbullah’s al-Manar TV channels, shed much favorable light on revolutionary acts and acts of vengeance against the Al Khalifa ruling family.  The London and Karbala-based Shi‘i Ahlulbayt TV founded by Mahdi al-Modarresi, Hadi al-Modarresi’s son, broadcast Hadi himself encouraging demonstrators to carry out their revolution and glorifying acts of violence committed against the police, bringing back memories of his days as head of the IFLB. Reports have also linked some prominent opposition activists, like the London-based Dr. Sa‘id al-Shehabi, to the Iranian regime.47 Figures within the Iranian regime directly threatened the Bahraini government that Tehran would intervene unless it ceased repressing the protests at once. Iranian lawmaker Hossein Naqavi was quoted as saying, “Tehran will use all the power and potentials at its disposal to halt the oppression of the people of Bahrain.”48 In April, the British navy repelled a speedboat off the coast of Bahrain suspected to have come from Iran — possibly with explosives on board in an alleged suicide mission.49 Conservative Iranian cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Janati, chairman of the Guardian Council that supervises the conformity of legislation passed by parliament with the constitution as well as approves election candidates, went as far as to publicly call for Bahrain to be “conquered by Islam and the Muslims” during his Friday sermon on July 8, 2011.50 Both the Bahraini government and the Iranian regime could have some vested interest in exaggerating the part Iran plays in sparking unrest in Bahrain. Bahrain, on one hand, uses the Iranian threat as a scapegoat for its political problems while Iran, on the other hand, attempts to underscore its regional power and standing by championing the cause of the Bahraini opposition all while avoiding direct military confrontation. The case of the IFLB, offering the advantage of retrospect, suggests that accusations of Iranian meddling in Bahrain have not been completely false. The question remains, however, as to how exactly relations between the Iranian regime and Bahraini opposition groups have evolved within the wider context of Iranian foreign policy towards the GCC over the past 30 years and the extent to which they are in effect today. 47. Tom Harper, “Files Link Activist to Iran Regime,” London Evening Standard, August 30, 2011, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23982103-files-link-activist-to-iran-regime.do. 48. Gus Lubin, “Iran Warns it May Intervene in Bahrain,” Business Insider, March 17, 2011, http:// www.businessinsider.com/bahrain-thursday-march-17-2011-3. 49. Ian Drury, “Royal Navy Warship Opens Fire on Speedboat of Iranian ‘Suicide Bombers,’” Daily Mail, August 19, 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2027872/Royal-Navy-warship-opens-speedboat-Iranian-suicide-bombers.html. 50. “GCC Protests Iran Cleric’s Bahrain Comments,” AlArabiya.net, July 19, 2011, http://www. alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/19/158398.html. 614 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL Appendix Figure 1: Iran Allows IFLB to Set Up Media Offices in Tehran The iflb and the role of iran in the failed coup of 1981 M 615 Figure 2: Iranian Newspaper Coverage of IFLB Members Fighting Alongside Iran against Iraq 616 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL Figure 3: IFLB Announces that Five of its Members have Travelled to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pledging Allegiance to Khomeini to Fight against Iraq The iflb and the role of iran in the failed coup of 1981 M 617 Figure 4: Father of Isma‘il ‘Abbas Hassan Stating that the IRGC Soldier Came to Inform him of his Son’s Death