The Puzzle of Arctic Cooperation

The puzzle of Arctic cooperation: the role of selfimage and social culture in Arctic cooperationMaster Thesis in International and European Relations Author: Malin Frisk 29 October 2012 Department of Management and Engineering Division of Political Science, Master in International and European Relations Supervisor: Per Janson ABSTRACT The attention to the Arctic is increasing in international relations. There are fears raised by various commentators as regards a ‘race for the Arctic’, where climate change has revealed new opportunities for trade routes and resource development. In contrast to the Antarctic, the Arctic is frozen sea where the adjacent coastal waters are territories of states, with unsettled disputes over continental shelf delimitation as well as sea and land disputes. At the same time there is evidence that cooperation in the region are starting to expand and formalise in light of these developments, as are specific Arctic policies of states. The aim of this thesis is to analyze how characteristics of the Arctic policies of the eight Arctic states can influence cooperation in the region. The focus is on the use of language as to determine the characteristics based on self-image, the view of the Arctic and the image of other state actors in the region. The basis for characterising the relations rests on Alexander Wendt’s social cultures and a constructivist perspective. The analysis reveals that the images of the selves and others are ambiguous where some relations can be termed as more cooperative, whereas there are still uncertainties regarding others. This in extension gives a rather reserved view on the overall cooperation in the region. Key words: Arctic cooperation, Arctic policies, self-image, image of others, social cultures, constructivism Word count : 25 785 1 ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY A5 Arctic five, the five coastal states which signed the Ilulissat declaration, namely, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the USA The Arctic Council Arctic Environment Protection Strategy Barents Euro- Arctic Council Barents Euro-Arctic Region Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Exclusive economic zone European Union International Barents Secretariat AC AEPS BEAC BRC CLCS EEZ EU IBS Ilulissat declaration Declaration signed in Ilulissat, Greenland in 2008 as a proclamation of the commitment of the Arctic coastal states to solve disputes regarding the Arctic Ocean in accordance to international law. NATO NCM North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Nordic Council of Ministers, member states are the Nordic countries, namely Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden Northern Dimension (ND) A common policy between the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia with the objective to develop dialogue, strengthening stability and cooperation on economic issues and a sustainable development in Northern Europe. Geographically the ND stretches between the European Arctic and Sub-Arctic to the south of the Baltic Sea. SAR UNCLOS Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Agreement United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas 2 ..................... 8 2.......... 40 5...2 3.................... 46 5.............. 25 4......................................................................................... 35 5...................................1................. Theoretical points of departure .............. 68 5..................................................................... 27 5........... 56 5...8 Sweden .......................... 79 7....................2..........................................1.......................................... 33 5.....................3 Methodology and Method ....................................................... Arctic relations .....................an empirical background ...............3 The puzzle of Arctic cooperation ........................................................6 Norway............. Method and Material ............................................. Analytical discussion ............. Introduction ........................................................................... 4 1......................................................... Regimes in International cooperation .........3 Denmark/ Greenland ........................................................................ The Arctic as an international region.......................................5 Iceland ........... 20 Material.....7 Russia ....................................................................... Methodology..................................... Arctic state actors and their present Arctic Policies .............1.........1.1........1 Empirical analysis of the Arctic policies ..............1....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................2 1.......... Concluding remarks and further research...... 88 APPENDIX ................... 4 The missing pieces for a rational explanation to Arctic cooperation ............................................................. 10 The influence of norms... 20 3....................................................... 0 1..................................................................................................... 63 5..........................................................................Table of content The puzzle of Arctic cooperation: the role of self-image and social culture in Arctic cooperation ......................4 Finland ........... 86 Bibliography .......................................................................................... 51 5...................................................................................1 2..................2 Governing bodies and regimes ........................................................................................................................1..................... 97 Map of the Arctic .................................1 1.......................................................... 73 6....................................... 6 Thesis aim and research questions ....................................................................................................................................1................................1 3............... 33 5........................................................................... 23 4.................................................................................................. 97 3 .............................................................9 United States of America . self-image and social culture in international cooperation 13 3..... 10 2......................................... 23 Limitations ..................................................................... 25 4....................................................................................................................................2 Canada ..........................................................................1.......................................................... ).php/en/about/general-news-archive/421-senior-arctic-officials-met-instockholm 5 O Young Arctic politics. it does not mean that the Arctic is lawless. The Arctic Council. earlier embedded in the hostile Arctic environment. Arctic security in an age of climate change. In the midst of the climate change debate and the melting of Arctic icecaps. Cambridge University Press. University Press of New England.68 4 . Introduction 1. Stefansson Arctic Institute 3 Agreement on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue.org/arcticseaicenews/ 2 Arctic Human Development Report. p. 2004. . retrieved 10 April 2012 http://www.arctic-council.p. 190-213 6 G Flikke” Norway and the Arctic-between multilateral governance and geopolitics” in J Kraska (ed. retrieved 15 November 2011. which has mainly worked through a monitoring mandate with recommendations rather than decisions or strong agreements. http://arctic-council. http://nsidc. subject to collective action. Norway. namely Canada. the Kingdom of Denmark (through Greenland).5 and has even been referred to as a terra incognita. Akureyri. 2011 .npolar. Arctic Council. General News.1 The puzzle of Arctic cooperation This thesis will examine how Arctic states view the region. However it is also part of the Arctic states. Cooperation here refers to relations between states.pdf 4 Senior Arctic Officials met in Stockholm.conflict and cooperation in the circumpolar north. Iceland. retrieved 12 December 2011.no/Arctic Councilcms/export/sites/default/en/meetings/2011-nuukministerial/docs/Arctic_SAR_Agreement_EN_FINAL_for_signature_21-Apr-2011.1. In extension the study will analyze what implication these views can have in shaping cooperation.org/index. Hannover NH. Finland. The Arctic is a region often portrayed as an exotic inhospitable wilderness of vast icecaps. A more formalized cooperation is taking shape in the Arctic. It is still governed by regimes such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas 1 Arctic sea and ice news. Sweden and the USA. Such action can admittedly take many different forms and contain various issues. Arctic Council.2 such as access to resources and trade routes. got its first legally binding agreement on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) in April 20113 and a process has been started to establish a more permanent secretariat in Tromsø. 1992. the Russian Federation. National Snow and Ice Data Center. themselves as well as other actors. New York.4 The region has since the end of the Cold War lost its imminent strategic importance emphasized by Oran Young.6 Even though the Arctic cooperation been less prominent than cooperation in other regions of the world.1 not only problems but also opportunities arise. These as well environmental issues affect all states and require collective action to be solved. php?module=News&func=display&sid=77 8 S G Borgerson “Arctic Meltdown”. p198 10 R Tamnes.” Arctic security and Norway” in Arctic security in an age of climate change. There are several international organizations working within the Arctic.oceanlaw. Kraska J (ed. Foreign Affairs. Cambridge University Press.7 Both are proof that the littoral states publicly show a willingness to cooperate on matters like territorial disputes and soft security threats. many authors and state officials emphasize that these anxieties are highly exaggerated. J Kraska (ed.63-77 9 O Young. Greenland. Moreover Arctic states are members of the EU. The Arctic states are not all members of the same organizations and the existing organizations range between dealing with isolated sub-regions to focusing on specific issues. p. 2008.(UNCLOS) and the Ilulissat declaration.).8 Though not neglected as a possible scenario in the Arctic. New York 2011. xxvi. p. The Ilulissat declaration affirms the intention of the five Arctic coastal states to collaborate regarding issues relating to the Arctic Ocean. limited governing frameworks and moreover a lack of leadership in the region by the USA. N Petersen “The Arctic challenge to Danish foreign and security policy” . “Foreword” in Arctic security in an age of climate change. New York 2011.org/index. Cambridge University Press.). Such organizations are a mix of civil society and intergovernmental organizations. none or both. allegiance to various authorities as well as strategies to be adhered to and norms to be followed depending on just this divided membership. A-40-year-old dispute have been settled between Norway and Russia.10 the Ilulissat declaration has been acknowledged and all states now have an official Arctic Strategy. such as search and rescue missions. Cambridge University Press. retrieved 15 November 2011.in Arctic security in an age of climate change.p. Kraska J (ed. Schram Stokke emphasizes that there are many Arctic institutions targeting similar or the same issues.61 5 .9 Borgerson’s article was published in 2008 and since then cooperative activities in the Arctic have increased. New York 2011 p. However there are skeptics regarding this type of cooperation. Further. NATO. unsolved border disputes. Hence there may be various questions sprung from these memberships. Kraska J (ed. still haunting national economies at the time of this thesis. He emphasizes what he sees to be a scramble for territory and resources. http://www. in particular regarding continental shelf delimitation. 87 no 2. Cambridge University Press. all Arctic states have been affected in different ways by the financial crisis of 2008.).). Vol. New York 2011. 27 – 29 May 2008. 3-4. p. One who paints a rather grim picture of the situation for cooperation in this region is Scott Borgerson. F Griffiths “Arctic security: the indirect approach” in Arctic security in an age of climate change. Further. and 7 Ilulissat declaration Arctic Ocean conference Ilulissat. conflict and cooperation in the circumpolar north. International Boundaries Research Unit. Routledge. 2007.Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North (1992). rather than what the various organizations do. p.uk/ibru 6 . p. to say the least.) International cooperation and Arctic governance. 1992.171 16 Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region. This study will focus on the whole of the Arctic. p.ac.) Cambridge University Press.13 Fact remains that there is still no treaty governing the Arctic region. 13 12 Young Arctic politics. as presented in their official policy documents. since the Arctic was long dominated by the Cold War dichotomy.184 15 A Worm “Arctic security. retrieved 12 December 2011. towards the region.15 Since the majority of the Arctic is in reality frozen ocean. Durham University. New York p.189 14 Ibid. In the book he predicted that the Arctic during the 1990s would become a testing ground for new ways of international cooperation. www.14 and according to some authors there is no willingness by the Arctic states for such or a similar treaty. Hannover NH. not just regions or specific issues within it.conflict and cooperation in the circumpolar north.. This due to an increased focus. Kraska J (ed. 2011. the Law of the seas (UNCLOS) might be the obvious governing source.11 The cooperation patterns are complex. Abingdon. But it is obvious that there is present cooperation in the region and increased activities will bid for cooperation in the future. twenty years have passed since the publication of Oran Young’s book Arctic Politics. The emphasis is on comprehensive cooperation in an arena where the appearance of cooperation may be conceived as particularly unlikely.190-213 13 O Young Arctic politics.12 1. still there are and has been enduring disputes for decades between Arctic states concerning territorial waters.such issues may also be targeted by other international bodies.durham. Cooperation is hence viewed through th e overall Arctic strategy of the region’s states.16 International Relations have long been dominated by a realist approach of national interest and international cooperation has often been researched in the setting of established 11 O Stokke Schram “Examining the consequences of Arctic institutions” in O Stokke Schram & G Hønneland (eds.regime effectiveness and northern region building . in contrast to the long standing treaty of the Antarctic. by particularly the rim states. University Press of New England. where the language of the policy is central.2 The missing pieces for a rational explanation to Arctic cooperation At the time of writing this thesis. p. Young saw increasing activities in the Arctic in need of coordinated action and innovative political thinking and effective leadership.a Greenlandic perspective” in Arctic security in an age of climate change. Keohane claims that: “Cooperation remains scarce relative to discord” 17 and cooperation is hence in this view an extraordinarily occurrence rather than an obvious consequence of the anarchy embodying the international arena. with other states. Hence there are always winners and losers. Princeton University Press.71 19 K E Jørgensen International Relations Theory.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049. 50-51 21 Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle . p.organizations such as EU or the UN. Princeton.a new introduction.S. Here. Blackwell Publishers Inc. Palgrave Macmillan p.pdf 7 . p. Geological Survey. where a purely rationalist approach falls short of such explanations. U. London. who has the largest territory in the Arctic. Still they do so. 1984. USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049. Oxford . p. After hegemony-cooperation and discord in the world political economy. The Arctic cooperation puzzle needs a different approach as to why cooperation occurs and how it can be characterized. and claim that the challenges of environmental and economic issues cannot be solved individually and therefore requires cooperation.. economic or politically normative. 17 R Keohane. The main problem with this explanation is that regardless what the motives may be for cooperation in the Arctic. with a particular focus on the Arctic identity and self-image of the individual states. A pure realist rationalist approach to cooperation would mean that the most powerful Arctic state(s). Another explanation might turn to the interdependent character of the issues as hand. in the sense of having a large part of the territorial land and resources in the region. pubs.20 One example of a winner here could be Russia.19 In the rationalist tradition there is a notion of conflicting interests within international relations.21 Russia may not have much to gain from cooperating in the Arctic. Power. 2004. with a focus on how national interest is formed. this puzzle will be viewed through the lens of constructivism.78 20 Ibid. where battles fought can be military.18 would not be willing to give up sovereignty and hence not cooperate on matters concerning governance of these resources.usgs. This leads us to look deeper into how state or national interests are formed in the region. and has the vast majority of natural resources. retrieved 12 December 2011.5 18 J Scott. states are not identical and neither are their interests and reasons for cooperation. in particular natural gas. 2010. The point of departure is that self-image and identity will shape norms and a state’s view of itself and others in international cooperation. For others this may instead result in an improved prospect for agriculture and farming and can rather be seen as opportunities than as threats.3 Thesis aim and research questions The Arctic as a case of international cooperation is chosen because it has long been neglected in the international arena and as a region has spurred due to climatic changes and the attention paid to climate change in the international debate.22 however this thesis will focus more in depth on the role of self-image and identity than on material content of the policies or strategies of the Arctic state s’ policies. Consequences of climate change may range from increased shipping due to melting ice caps. both in geographical as well as political terms. the aim of this thesis is to analyze what role identity and self-image play in furthering or maintaining international cooperation and cooperative behavior in the Arctic.1. From primarily focusing on environmental assessments the Arctic Council is moving to a more formalized cooperation with emerging binding agreements in a region where national governance may seem a more obvious rationale than international cooperation.is/images/stories/Hveragerdi/Arctic_strategies_7th_draft_New_20120428. It will in part be a descriptive thesis in characterizing the self-images. Since the Arctic states are diverse.pdf 8 . much research in the international relations sphere has dealt with the Arctic in a geopolitical framework. The Arctic cooperation is interesting further since it has seen a rapid development in recent years.Inventory and Comparative Study. resource exploitation or environmental degradation which might have negative impacts on flora and fauna as well as indigenous peoples and cultures. as is the development of the relations between the actors here. retrieved 22 May 2012. Arctic Strategies and Policies. The future impacts that cooperation might have for international relations and for the inhabitants of the Arctic are therefore interesting. identities and cooperation seen in the region. Given the intensified interest in the Arctic. http://www. April 2012. A recent comparative study of Arctic policies was made by Lassi Heininen. The aim here is to take a different approach based on constructivism and self image rather than material interests. based on a notion that states operate in a social context in international relations.nrf. it is interesting to look at international cooperation in this region. Even though the interest in the Arctic has risen in recent years. The initial influence for this is Alexander 22 L Heininen . p. where the finding are subject to the author’s interpretations of the policies.Wendt’s statement: “anarchy is what states make of it”23 which will be extended here to the phrasing Arctic cooperation is what states make of it. 424-425 24 Young Arctic politics. The intention is not to explain in a positivist way the reality of the Arctic cooperation. even though running the risk of inflicting on state sovereignty.190–213 9 . rather the thesis aims to give a better understanding of how self-image and images of other actors can have influence on foreign policy and in extension international cooperation in the Arctic. pp. 2 (Spring. emphasized by Oran Young.conflict and cooperation in the circumpolar north. other actors and the self? How can these characteristics influence cooperation in the Arctic as an international region? 23 A Wendt. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics” International Organization. No. Vol. My research questions are as follows:   What characterize the policies of Arctic states. 46. Given its strategically military importance during the cold war. there is reason to believe that cooperation in the region is driven by a will to achieve stable and consistent cooperation. 391-425. in terms of defining the region.24 the prospect for increased trade and resource utilization. p. 1992). built to achieve common preferred results. Schram Stokke & Hønneland. Westview Press.. states must have influence to cooperate.140. Farnham . A S Alexandroff (ed. 29 whereas Caporaso claims that 25 M Zürn. 2008.25 With this view effectiveness and legitimacy of the cooperation and the interdependence of the two is crucial. such as Zürn. 295-320: 295. Waterloo.99. Ashgate. Boulder 1989. Tirman J (eds. Newman p.2.R Keohane International institutions and state power. like Stein common interests and values is however only a first step towards a common action. A crisis in Global institutions-multilateralism and international security. Still there is agreement that for this to be achievable cooperation needs to rest on common interests and values. and Hegemony”. For some.) p. ”Assessing State Preferences and Explaining Institutional Choice: The Case of Intra-German Trade ” International Studies Quarterly. p. p. international order and structural change. 146-147 10 .1 Regimes in International cooperation The thesis will not primarily concern the effectiveness or legitimacy of regimes. p. Thakur R.possibilities for effective multilateralism . a weakly confederal world. Newman and Stein.28 Resources to enforce compliance commonly imply that there are means to punish non-compliance to common rules and norms.16.56 27 Ibid. O Schram Stokke p. Wilfrid Laurier University Press . On this note Keohane stresses the importance of legitimacy in the sense of inclusion of relevant actors and determination of the cooperative form. in order for states to dare to commit to cooperation. Newman E. p. in Can the world be governed. Theoretical points of departure This chapter will deal with two subcategories of theory. 41. 1997.2008. 142 29 R Keohane. Abingdon 2007. though aware that these issues can be relevant in Arctic cooperation and it might be necessary to consider criteria for legitimacy and effectiveness while researching the significance of norms and identity for cooperation.55-56 26 Stein p.A Stein “Incentive compatibility and Global governance.26 Ends and means are equally important for a functional cooperation to survive political change within the concerned states. “The contingent legitimacy of multilateralism “ in Multilateralism under challenge?-power. Following this will be a subchapter on the impact of norms on self-image and identity and the relevance of culture for international cooperation. The background on regimes theories are here used to put cooperation in its present context. Firstly there will be an introduction to the research on regimes and their relevance for cooperation. which claims that these must have a character which encourages compliance to sustain cooperation.existential multilateralism. A.).57.58-64 28 H Breitmeier The legitimacy of International Regimes. Cooperation is according to various authors.136. Ontario. Routledge.essays in international relations theory. E Newman. 2. p. 140.27 The importance of common and shared principles on values and rules is highlighted by for example Beritmeier and Newman. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”. Minneapolis. Cornell University Press. 410 37 Schram Stokke & Hønneland: 167. Martha & K Sikkink.97-119 34 Ibid.36 This may be done on an issue basis to create assurance that national interest is not infringed upon. 1998 . Vol. 52. University of Minnesota Press cop. However as Kahler highlight. 166 11 .): Institutions for the earth. According to Schram Stokke the Arctic Council has the potential for this due to its cognitive niche rather than a normative one by “influencing actors´ awareness about certain problems and how they are affected by them. the inability of the former superpowers to agree (in the light of differing national interest based on historical relations) can be an underlying problem of today’s cooperation .15. 1995. in the Arctic case.p. such rationality can also be commonly beneficial if it socializes states into the international community32.38 30 J A Caporaso “International Relations Theory” in Multilateralism matters. p.37 where national interests may be deemed important. G J Ruggie (ed. p. Constructing national interests : the United States and the Cuban missile crisis . International organizations can also be seen as coalition builders. M A Levy .35 Given that both these powers are part of the Arctic cooperation and given their different identity and self-image and historical relations there might be difficulties to find common values and for them to ident ify as part of a common “we” in the Arctic. With the approach that national interest is socially constructed and may change depending on the view of the surrounding world 33.the theory and praxis of an institutional form.sources of effective international environmental protection: MIT Press. where states and other actors can push for preferred strategies and hence influence state interests in a bureaucratic way. R Keohane (eds.the theory and praxis of an institutional form.).. chapter 2 31 Ibid. But being part of a group or community can also mean that this group grows stronger in the auspices of a common threat. No.31 Even though cooperation can be a rational act in these terms. p. p. 35 M Kahler “Multilateralism with small and large numbers” in Multilateralism matters.P M Haas . p. 1993. non-arctic actors impinging on the Arctic sphere. Columbia University Press.321 36 M Barnett & M Finnemore. G J Ruggie (ed. 887-917. Ithaca & London. 1999. New York 1993.) Columbia University Press.inclusion or gaining a common identity can be a reward in itself for states 30 and therefore cooperation can be an end in itself. Rules for the world-international organizations in global politics. New York. the possibility of enhanced cooperation can also change depending on the view of the other members of the cooperative forum34. p. 4. p. p..902 33 Weldes Jutta. or their knowledge about ways in which problems can be mitigated ”. 56 32 M Finnemore. 2004. 85 38 Ibid... Cambridge Massachusetts. International Organization. 162-3. 409 41 Barnett & Finnemore.40 This can be done by orienting action and create a social reality 41 as well as to facilitate a shift of interests and concerns42 based on common knowledge. p. With this in mind. the following chapter will look at the role norms can have in the self-image of states and how this may influence cooperative behavior. 22 12 . 39 40 Finnemore & Sikkink p.There is scholarly evidence that institutions and international organizations can create new patterns of politics through norm building 39 and facilitate agreements through issue specific concerns rather than typical national realist conflicts. hence socializing states into cooperation. p.399.891 Levy et al. Schram Stokke & Hønneland p.6 42 Levy et al. p. Cambridge 1999. 312 44 45 A Wendt. 912 48 P J Katzenstein .5 49 P J Katzenstein Peter J. The influence of norms. Cambridge University Press.346 46 Ibid. p. p. p. it is appropriate to start by defining what norms are.249 47 Finnemore & Sikkink.. p.293-316. 44 The self-image and identity of a nation and its relations with other states and nations will ultimately affect cooperation. p.47 Katzenstein defines norms as “ collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity” and “can have constitutive effects ”. I Vertzberger The world in their minds. Certainly the definition will depend on the purpose of analyzing norms and here the ontological references of the scholar matter. R Jepperson. 49 43 Y Y. “Alternative Perspectives on National Security” in The culture of national security. University Press. 346. Finnemore & Sikkink p. V Shannon “Norms are what states make of them: the political psychology of norm violation”. Stanford 1990.2. since cooperation means to as Vertzberger phrase it.) Columbia University Press .p. Stanford.48 Norms can regulate behavior as well as be constitutive of actor identity and regulate behavior. p.norms and identity in world politics.54. I share Wendt’s definition of the anarchical international society.46 To understand and be able to analyze what role norms may play for self-image in international cooperation. 44. One way of doing so is to apply political psychology which emphasizes the role of leaders and their perceptions of reality in shaping a nation’s self -image and identity. while choosing their actions. International studies quarterly 2000 vol. 1996. grounded in the ideas about the self and the other. p. self-image and social culture in international cooperation Applying a constructivist view in international cooperation is appropriate to determine how the actors within the cooperation identify and relate to themselves and others.891 13 . not purely material. New York.2.43 Another with less focus on the individuals is the importance of social structures or cultures as defined by Wendt. A Wendt and P J Katzenstein (eds.308. Social Theory of International Politics. p. This chapter give an introduction to the application and views that here is assumed to create and shape self-image and identity in the Arctic context and will be used as a background to put the Arctic policies in context.information processing. chapter 6 Vertzberger. in the sense of lacking a central authority and his argument that structure should be used in social terms. in the sense that states take each other into consideration. “operate within a social context” 45 which Wendt claims is also true for states. cognition and perception in foreign strategy decision making. 56 Hence socialization can help re-shape images of the self and the other.p.57 57 Shannon. 634-664.311. p. “Toward a theory of international norms -some conceptual and measurement issues” The journal of conflict resolution. since such images are not static. that what is 50 Finnemore & Sikkink p. and how it perceive itself and others is constructed through the culture to which it is part.52 Further such perceptions are historically bound in the sense that judgments are made based on prior experiences and beliefs53 and the longer misconceptions about other actors stay uncorrected the more difficult they are to change. 348-362 53 Ibid. or both. whereas institutions emphasize the way in which behavioral rules are structured together and interrelate”. 891 52 Vertzberger.Decisions can be either influenced by rational behavior in the self-centric sense..348. or by social constraints like norms. 1996.). p. International Organization. p. Y Lapid Y & F Kratochwil F (eds.p.635 14 . 347 55 Wendt. 36 No 4. Social Theory of International Politics. 299 54 Vertzberger.952 51 Finnemore & Sikkink p. Even though I claim that the self-image has psychological context it should be apparent that that the way a state “thinks”. G Goertz & P F Diehl. p. pp. regardless of whoever is seen as the other. Shannon p. 914. Vol. will shape our judgment of other actors regardless of the accuracy of this information. 1992. 52 No 4 1998.” Identity and structural change in International Politics” in The return of culture and identity in IR theory. p. Lynne Rienner Publishers. J G March G & J P Olsen “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”.54 This is something that is also constituting Wendt’s argument but he focuses the state in describing this relationship.51 Political psychology scholars claims that the information individuals have. This will influence policies and actions. p.251 56 A Wendt. since the roles in cooperation are there and present regardless who fills the roles within cooperation. correct or incorrect. p.50 Finnemore and Sikkink differ between norms and institutions and claim that they can be distinguished by “aggregation: the norm definition isolates single standards of behavior. it can help create a unity or a “we”. Boulder Colorado.55 Given this reasoning the Cold War dichotomy can have a negative impact on Arctic cooperation but it may well be that the social context of cooperation changes an actors’ self-image and identity in as well as how one identifies with cooperative partners..57 This is a matter of fundamental national interest in classic IR theory framing. Some authors claim that power and rationality play a part in norm adherence or violation. vol.943-969. Decisions one make in a given situation.910. not on individuals. shape ones present and future perception of the other. hence it may not be rational to violate norms if there are repercussions for doing so. p. M Staisch.58 However this reasoning does not give an explanation to how such interests are formed. Finnemore and Sikkink claims that norms are subject to the influence of norm entrepreneurs. which lobby states and other groups in the international society to adopt certain norms and values. p.thought of as norm coherence may be driven by self-interest. in the Arctic case such critical states could be for example Russia because of its geopolitical influence. There is therefore a need to look beneath this and investigate what influences such interests. p. 892. others are likely to follow.63 Another factor influencing norms are international organizations. p. and there is evidence that if many states in a region adopt new norms. 1986).66 With this in mind.60 This reasoning is further applicable to the Arctic strategies. 4 (December.1105 61 Ibid. p..64 bureaucrats and officials can also be norm entrepreneurs.896 64 V Rittberger.90-92. but still adhering to its rules in the Arctic by complying with it in terms of customary law. 1095-1111.646 63 Finnemore and Sikkink p. International Organization. 639 62 Finnemore & Sikkink. norms and socialization can still lead to compliance with the underlying norms. pp. 2010. as well as individual states. Vol. 902-903 60 R Axelrod. 80. “Law. Palgrave Macmillan. p. Finnemore and Sikkink write of critical states which are those that are crucial to adhere to the norm and without which the goal of the norm cannot be achieved. 637 Finnemore & Sikkink.Polity. Using this reasoning one can claim that the working groups of the Arctic Council and Senior Arctic Officials as well as permanent participants can influence Arctic cooperation by their mandates. Politics and policies. p. p. Regardless of whether an actor signs and ratifies treaties. Barnett & Finnemore .251-281. the evolution of norms is often shaped and determined by the powerful groups in a society. “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms”. p.61 But this can also change over time. 899-901 65 B Baker. Basingstoke 2006. p 271-272 66 Finnemore & Sikkink. B Zangl . American University International Law Review. their structures and bureaucratic setting.65 Moreover some states can be claimed to be more relevant than others for the adoption of norms. 901 15 .p. p. No. the effects of which depending on available platforms for furthering norms. science and the continental shelf: the Russian federation and the promise of Arctic cooperation”. since norms are dynamic 62 not static in a social context. One such case is the USA not ratifying the UNCLOS for example. The American Political Science Review. One explanation is that compliance occurs for reasons relating to identities as members of an international society. Goertz and Diehl. Can we see an indication of willingness to be part of this specific group of Arctic cooperative states? According to the reasoning of Goertz and Diehl. high stakes and mere geographical space in the Arctic.59 According to Axelrod this is due to a “psychological need to be part of a group” . the USA due to 58 59 Goertz and Diehl. 25 No 2. Vol. 70 The Hobbesian social structure is one of enmity. By the reasoning above. p. The term culture in this thesis is inspired by Wendt’s definition and categorization into cultures in the anarchy of International Relations as Hobbesian (characterized by enmity and force).69 where cultures have their own representations of the self toward the other. Whether the culture is one of conflict or cooperation does not matter since a war against all is as much a cultural form as collective security. p. a parallel can be drawn with Wendt’s theory about international relations as resting on a culture of the social groups of states. 67 68 Wendt. kill or be killed. p.267 72 Ibid.68 In this thesis these categories will be applied to the culture of the relations in the Arctic.67 where only the Hobbesian structure can be classified as a strictly self-help system. The state can use the knowledge of the enemy’s capabilities to predict its behavior.276 74 Ibid. shared knowledge about the relations and get taken for granted.258 71 Ibid.. chapter 6 and p. p. p...72 It is a competitive culture due to the attributed intentions of the other but enmity can serve a purpose or value in itself to bolster a group’s self -esteem by mobilizing a “we” and “them” dynamic.310-311 70 Ibid.. 250 Ibid. Social Theory of International Politics . Cultural practices are formed by the shared ideas. p. This according to Wendt will be a self-fulfilling prophecy since the beliefs will generate actions that confirm the beliefs.262-263 73 Ibid. An enemy in turn is responded to in terms of enmity. Lockean (characterized by rivalry and selfinterest) and Kantian (characterized by friendship and the legitimacy of norms)..73 With this logic there should be a tendency towards empire building. whether enemy images are justified or not..71 This means that the other has no recognized right to exist and violence between the self and the other is limited exclusively in a lack of military capability or external constraint. The self has to be mirrored in the other’s enmity. or the normative influence of EU member states.264-265 16 .its major influence in International politics in general. survival of the fittest and a concentration of power to a few large entities.247 69 Ibid. since the culture is based on a worst case scenario.. while recognizing that the image of the self also has a strong connotation to the domestic sphere. The main focus of this study is international relations.74 This is not seen in international relations today. p. The 75 76 77 78 Ibid. Norms can be upheld due to self-interest.80 Though adherence to norms for this reason is not excluded.81 In the rivalry culture. p. 283 82 Ibid. which leads states refrain from conquering or dominate others..288 81 Ibid. According to Wendt states will make assumptions about the other rather based on the system than the knowledge about the other as an actor... However. This could explain the survival and sovereignty of weak states. whereas an alliance is temporary and can be found also in cultures constituted by rivalry.281 79 Ibid. p. p. p.violence and team play as the norm.In the Lockean culture the actors are rivals..79 This situation is upheld because it serves another purpose and is a strategy rather than an interest.82 The Kantian culture is an idealist one with non.284 83 Ibid. not necessarily because they see the norm as an end in itself.262-263 Ibid. From this will follow that the system gets a logic of its own.298 85 Ibid.282 80 Ibid. p.limiting due to other’s right to exist.300-301 17 ..280 Ibid. Furthermore collective security is neither time nor threat specific and military capabilities are not a threat within the culture rather an asset to all..76 Self-restraint may be either out of self-interest or a perceived legitimacy of norms.. p.84 The actors within this culture expect each other to adhere to solving disputes by non-violence and collaborate if one actor is threatened by a third party. 83 Its trait is friendship which is difficult to combine with a rationalist view since it does not assume that relations are solely built on self-interest and utility maximizing. Sovereignty is recognized as a right. p... p.. p.297 84 Ibid.. since friendships are expected to last indefinitely regardless of disagreement. p.. These prerequisites must be filled for the culture to be termed friendship 85 and the actors’ help each other even though there is no immediate return. disputes can still be settled by force and violence 75 but this violence will be self. p. The weak are protected by the system.298–301 86 Ibid.86 According to Wendt this friendship “need not spill over into other issue areas ”. However friends differ from allies. states will survive not for material reasons but for social ones since others let them survive.279 Ibid. p.77 The right of sovereignty is conferred by others through social capacities78 which can result in a status quo approach towards each other’s sovereignty because threats are not existential. In this way the cultures will be used here in analyzing Arctic cooperation. Actors are further capable to have several identities at once.299-300 Ibid. there are no obvious reasons why they cannot be applicable also to other types of cooperation.90 Although Wendt’s cultures are based on security cooperation. p. p.continuation of friendship is embedded in the shared knowledge of peaceful intentions and a behavior of solving disagreements by negotiation or arbitration not violence. It is only when the highest degree of internalization is achieved that states identify with each other and an identification that generate collective interests. This can limit the analytical use of the cultures. This however does not exclude the possibility that Arctic relations cannot have security characteristics and cooperate on security. within the group of actors. Also threats to existence of political systems may be seen as a threat of survival and considered a national interest. 304 89 Ibid.. This thesis does not reject the notion or role of national interests but national interest have to resonate with self-image Also important to remember is that identification and 87 88 Ibid. Further threats should not be limited to physical threats in a military sense. norms can be merely a strategy to obtain benefits for the self. Both in Lockean and Kantian cultures the cost of violating norms is taken into calculation and depending on the degree of internalization of the norms in the Kantian culture.. Admittedly Wendt does not make explicit whether security must be the basis for a culture.89 a willingness to do sacrifices for the sake of the other.. or to quote Wendt “ multiple group identification”. This does not exclude that actors act differently towards states that is not part of the culture.88 However here the actors still acts as friends when security is threatened with the expectation that this pattern is indefinite. Hence rivalry regarding resources will also be placed within a Lockean culture.. Identification with the other is rarely total and does not exclude egoism which may result in free-riding arguments and burden sharing which if left unresolved can lead to undermine the collective identity. which in turn means that international interests become part of the national interest.87 Take note that the behavior here and the adherence to the norms or culture is the shared knowledge of the internal relations. p.305 90 Ibid. 306 18 . p. In this thesis cultures will be used in its entirety even on topics which are not solely security related. perceptions varies by both issue and other 91 but that states learn about appropriate behavior from other states in cooperation. the socialization of cooperation is further interesting to study and the Arctic strategies ought to give indications as to how states see each other in the Arctic setting. being part of a group. 309 19 . the importance of the Arctic may lessen in its broader foreign relations. norms are reflections of the self-image and identity of the actor. If. p. since the view one have of oneself and others will guide the actions one take or the norms one keep in relations to others. p. its resources and inhabitants in the self-image of the state. 302-303 Shannon. p. there is a strong Arctic identity for the state and its sense of self. 92 These perceptions can be said to be guided by both domestic and international norms. Shannon. this region might be more relevant in terms of international goals and policies for such a state.52. Since Arctic cooperation is a diverse group of states with varying relations. p. contributing to the perception both of self and others and rests on the assumption that states have the need for social approval. If there is neglect for the region. on the other hand. where the distributions of ideas are social structures and shared ideas become this structure or cultures. To conclude the reasoning in this chapter. 91 92 Wendt “Identity and structural change in International Politics ”. Social Theory of International Politics. The relationship between the actors is what gives the international system its meaning. What role the region plays for the self-image of the state is likely to determine the importance of the Arctic in the states’ international relations and foreign policy. 93 Applying these points of departure to the policies will bring a greater understanding to the Arctic cooperation. 301 93 Wendt. 321-323. The empirical data presented is based on the content of the policies and quotes used as empery are selected on the basis that they refer to a general language of the policy.94 Others in this thesis refer to actors such as states. not to the theoretical concept of discourse analysis.metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig text. and organizations that are not phrased by the state actor in question. Discourse in this thesis refers to the communicative language found in texts.1 Methodology and Method In order to answer the research questions above and analyze the influence of identity and selfimage in Arctic cooperation.) Textens mening och makt. Method and Material 3. The quotes cited represent the images of the aforementioned and are subject to interpretation. The thesis will be a qualitative study of the Arctic strategies with a focus on the Arctic identities of states. By this token the thesis will intend a content analysis. In order to structure the analysis. 2005. to be part of the self. The interpretation of the quotes is subjective in the sense that they are chosen on the basis that the author of this thesis believes that these quotes show the language and images of the particular state. or framing of others. The textual analysis is made by studying the policy documents and the language with a focus on the framing of the Arctic as part of the national identity of the Arctic states. one that identifies what topics are brought to the fore in the policies focusing on national interests and self-image and a second part centring on how these topics are spoken of. Studentlitteratur. as well as the image of. From this a discourse ought to be able to be traced. the Arctic strategies will be studied. These strategies or policies are textual documents published by government ministries of the respective Arctic states. p. Focus will be on tracing the communicative language of the Arctic within the national policies and in extension compare them to the other policies in order to find common and different views of the region and the identity and self-image as well as the image of the other Arctic states. Methodology. Others can therefore be enemies. other actors and cooperation. it will be divided into two parts. as regards the Arctic.och diskursanalys. the self. The intention is not to explain in 94 G Bergström & K Boréus (eds. with the purpose of looking at the specific discourse of the Arctic in the mentioned strategies.3. friends or insignificant others. which in turn can be claimed to constitute a culture in the Arctic cooperation. Lund . 327-328 20 . rivals. and the actors’ selfimage in the same. the frame and context the text is situated in as well as what is excluded or included in the text. rather the thesis aims to give a better understanding of how self-image and images of other actors can have influence on foreign policy and in extension international cooperation in the Arctic.97 Studying the discourse of the states identity with the Arctic is used here in order to look at how the framing helps shape the “ reality” of 95 96 Ibid. Another image relevant here is that of cooperation which can be constituted by the example of international organizations. but rather an in depth case study of identity through foreign policy in a narrow context of a specific region. much material in the policies are redundant and not used in the analysis and empirical data here. The study of Arctic strategies aims at clarifying the content and visual identity in the strategies. This case shall not be seen as subject for generalization. conclusions can be drawn as to what the main relations are in the Arctic context and make a prediction of what consequences these can have for the cooperation in the region. there is suffice material regarding details on how projects and problems will be tackled also on a domestic level. the self and others. it is assumed that the state actors involved has a particular relation to the region which will determine how and in what terms the actors relate to cooperation here and its relations with other actors. P Esaiasson.95 From this. 323-324. this thesis will also look at the discourse of the Arctic “ space” in relation to identity and how they see their own roles and the role of other actors in the region. 210-226 Ibid. L Wängnerud. Nordstedts Juridik.. M Gilljam. 329 97 Ibid. p..a positivist way the reality of the Arctic cooperation. in terms of specific words used. Apart from the relations and images of others and the self. not constructing it.. bilateral or multilateral cooperation in the Arctic.210-214 21 .96 The discourse will then be used to analyze what implications this has for the prospects of Arctic cooperation. but as mentioned this study is not issue specific hence. but rather the framing and language concerning the Arctic. Metodpraktikan-konsten att studera samhälle. p. Stockholm 2012 . The analysis of the documents will be open in the sense that there will be no preconditions or search for quantifiable data. H Oscarsson . Given that the case of international cooperation has a focus on the Arctic. The focus will be on the language used in the strategies and foremost to describe the discourse. individ och marknad . Since the policies are documents concerning the Arctic in general and not cooperation in particular. p. p. Care will be taken to ask questions such as how the text can be characterized and what assumptions it makes. The identity or self-image in relation to the Arctic region cannot be assumed to be the same for all states and may vary depending on different points of recognition and circumstances specific to the individual states. The character of cooperation will be evaluated on how the states refer to themselves. which may be multiple. The framing of the policies or strategies is likely to differ depending on who is aimed to be the receiver. Self-image or identity can hence be seen in this context as statements or utterances where there is an unintended visibility of ideology in the sense that things are obvious or preconceived by the authors or dispatcher of the policy. The operationalization of constructivist theory is admittedly not done with ease. 98 Ibid.. the Arctic and the other actors involved in the region. enemies. Utterances of self-image or identity must be separated from what can be termed as branding or disguised or intended threats. the link to identity in cooperation is not far-fetched. Therefore will likely have traces aimed at both the own people (the self). From this the following assumptions can be made:   The norms.Arctic relations. The actors involved in cooperation are no strangers to each other and have historical relationships with one another in a variety of settings and will from these prior relations form their views of others. rivals and friends.98 with a point of departure that the language is important in shaping relationships.  The cooperation in the Arctic is inherently dependent on trust and commitment between the actors involved. p.305 22 . values and priorities embodied in the strategies or policies are derived from the self-image of the individual states involved in the cooperation. Given these variations in the image of a nation in Arctic terms. The above assumptions will be evaluated by analyzing the language used and the issues brought to light in the Arctic context within the different policies. but the base of this thesis is the assumption that the relationships and thereby the cooperation in the Arctic will depend on the self-image and the image of other actors. 2 Material The strategies are used in this thesis as the main material for examining the values and self-images and images of others as perceived by the Arctic states. made an overview in 2007 of the Northern Dimensions.3. Moreover it is probable that specific norms would be in focus in interviews would be made. Geopolitics. and the policies of selected Arctic states. if in any type of analysis. the minds and thoughts of an individual representative of a state cannot be known. The Arctic strategies can tell us how the individual states see this region both in a domestic setting but also in how it is portrayed in international terms. “The Importance of Northern Dimension Foreign Policies in the Geop olitics of the Circumpolar North”. 2007 23 . hence it cannot be known the true intention of the states. I still find it useful to use the English versions to get a general validity and reliability in my material. 12:133–165. and the content has been “validated” this way. 3. The official Arctic strategies might give at hand only that what the states want to present in an international setting. such as for example interviews with government officials or bureaucrats in the Arctic Council working groups. what part the actor’ s believe they play and how they perceive Arctic cooperation. Heininen and Nicol. It cannot be excluded that a different result would follow had a different type of method been used. however in this type of study. One limitation to the presented Arctic strategies is a lack of previous comprehensive strategies for comparable purposes in time.3 Limitations The culture of cooperation can be analyzed in more depth. written originally in the native tongue of the authors and then in most cases translated into primarily English. as would be the case studying other stakeholders in the Arctic. The Russian strategy is only available in English as a translation in an online journal. Nicol Heather. but well a comparison as to the present differences between the 99 Heininen Lassi. in terms of its influence by self-image and identity by not investigating specific norms as examples of how cooperation is functional or not. They serve as a source of Arctic identification and domestic relation with the region. Aware of the linguistic difficulty that comes with the various languages used in the individual Arctic strategies. Hence a historical comparison cannot be made. But the content of the same has been compared by a Russian speaker for my purpose with the Russian original version. 99 Since then some states have revised their policies and many of the states were not included in the study. 100 A E Nilsson “A Changing Arctic Climate – science and policy in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment”. Such access and insights in the Arctic political sphere however demands a different scope and timeframe than this thesis can provide. This thesis will be limited to the cooperation of the individual states rather than international organizations. regarding different as well as overlapping issue areas and geographical spaces. retrieved 14 March 2012. or as defined by Norway ‘The High North’. but studying those and how they contribute to the Arctic cooperation is a question for an entirely different and additional paper.kb. This timeframe spans between 2006 and 2011 and the documents analyzed will be limited in the sense that they are all foreign policy or strategy documents with a clear focus on the Arctic region. Moreover the focus in this thesis will be on state actors. the culture and role of images in international cooperation is the problem discussed.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-8517 24 . Aware that other methods can indicate a differing discourse. hence there is no room to analyze all possible issues or norms that might play a role in the Arctic cooperation. All Arctic states have their own policies at the same time as the EU has a Northern Dimension and an Arctic policy in the making. The focus lies not on cooperation on particular issues. 2007 http://urn. norms and interests than the state actors. will be used so in this thesis as well. A deeper analysis has proven fruitful in other studies. but rather on the “culture” of cooperation as depending on norms and self-image. not on other stakeholders in Arctic.Arctic identity and self-image of the states in question. Here. Further this thesis is limited to a time frame that stretches from the first published Arctic strategy since the increased focus of climate change and its effect on the Arctic on the international agenda. the limited availability of access to officials and bureaucrats for this purpose excludes them in this thesis. The phrases Arctic and the High North is used interchangeably in the literature on the region and for simplicity. such as for example Annika E Nilsson’s work on the relation between strategy and science for the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 100. It is likely that these stakeholders have different self-images. Linköping University Electronic Press. conflict and cooperation in the circumpolar north. Nicol 2007: 137. This study will be made of cooperation in an arena where the appearance of cooperation may be conceived as particularly unlikely since the Arctic was long dominated by the Cold War dichotomy. international law or the strategic importance of the Arctic during the cold war. the Arctic or High North are two concepts that are used interchangeably in the literature on the region.g.102 Keskitalo claims in her research on region building in the Arctic. the forerunner to the Arctic Council is clear evidence of the environmental focus and a rather “soft” cooperation . John Wiley & Sons: Chichester (1996).190-213 105 N Petersen p. London) Routledge:.103 The formation of the Arctic Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS).150.the construction of an International Region. Despite the challenges.H. presenting a background to Arctic relations as well as a short presentation of the organizations and regimes governing the region.175-177 104 Young Arctic politics.1. 4. (2004 Akureyri) Stefansson Arctic Institute 102 Heininen and. Arctic relations .105 On the other hand the acts or language of state representatives gives a different picture. cooperation between the Arctic states remains pragmatic and low-key and produces solid 101 For further reading see e. The Arctic as an international region The following chapter is dedicated to an introduction to the Arctic arena. Carl Bildt said at the meeting of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region in Stockholm on 14 February 2012 that: "In many ways we are facing tremendous challenges in the Arctic. Borgerson p.C. Swedish Foreign Minister.104 and where some spectators still claim that there is cause for concern and possibly even anxiety of conflict and war due to what has been termed “the race for the North pole” by media and certain scholars. Chaturvedi Sanjay: The polar regions – A political Geography. 157 103 Keskitalo E. environmental issues.an empirical background The literature on the Arctic deals to great extents with the situation of indigenous peoples.4. (2004.63-77 25 . p. Young: 1992.101 According to Heininen and Nicol. definitions are based on geography and nature. Arctic Human Development Report. that the Arctic has been artificially constructed by the environmental aspects of the region and that there is a lack of common regional identity amongst its inhabitants. Negotiating the Arctic. 109 and excluding the non littoral states and neglecting concerns of the permanent participants in the Arctic Council.).results.108 This according to the same. Kraska J (ed. Kraska J (ed.gov. Cambridge University Press.106 It has further been highlighted that the region is strongly dependent on developments in the rest of the world. According to Young there has been a trend of the Arctic five to “enhance their ability to dominate Arctic policy ”.105 108 O Young “foreword” Arctic security in an age of climate change. 26 . This is a great success in a world where not all multilateral organizations are working as well as we would hope" .). India.110 106 Swedish Foreign Minister..107 If norms have a role to play in international cooperation and depending on what that role might be.se/sb/d/15777/a/186366 107 K Zysk “Military Aspects of Russia’s Arctic Policy: Hard Power and Natural resources”. Young stresses in the foreword to Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change. Stockholm 14 February 2012. Cambridge University Press (2011) New York: xxii 109 Ibid.sweden. Singapore as well as the EU.. has resulted in renewed interest in the region as regards influence and this mainly due to the enforced position of the A5 rather than the A8 constellation. xxiv 110 Ibid. that recent changes in the Arctic have caused changes that “ tightens the link between global forces and regional processes”. influence and shape also the Arctic cooperation. other relations in the world will indeed contribute. http://www. retrieved 23 February 2012. due to what Young claims to be a stronger focus on the Arctic Ocean in regional affairs. relating this to the increased interests from other non-arctic actors’ in Arctic issues. New York 2011 p. South Korea.in Arctic security in an age of climate change. Carl Bildt speech from meeting of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region. Japan. such as China. The Arctic Council is a high level forum founded on the initiative of Canada in 1996 through the Ottawa declaration.arctic-council. between which the chairmanship rotates biannually.arcticcouncil. The bodies brought up here are listed in alphabetical order and not by the weight or power of influence and is further not an exhaustive list of cooperative forums in the Arctic. Their mandate is given by the Arctic Council ministers. retrieved 3 October 2012 http://www.org/index. with a separate chair and management board of representatives from national governmental agencies and the permanent participants. 116 The working groups are mainly research oriented and there is only one legally binding 111 112 O Schram Stokke . http://www.org/index. but did not come into its full being until 1998.114 Further it has permanent participants consisting of various indigenous groups.php/en/about. retrieved 3 October 2012 http://www.org/index.org/index. The BEAR and the AC are examples of what Young termed ‘innovative political thinking’ and includes civil society groups for indigenous peoples.112 It is also the only organization that includes all the Arctic states as full members.php/en/about-us/permanentparticipants 116 Working groups of the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council has a forerunner in the AEPS (Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy) an initiative of the government of Finland in 1989 113 and consists of the eight Arctic states. p.php/en/about-us/working-groups 27 . can influence their behavior and norm-building transcending into other forums for Arctic affairs.php/en/aboutus/members 115 Permanent Participants to the Arctic Council. Membership might be influenced by and influence the norms and values of the forums as well as impact on issues dealt with in such constellations.org/index. as consulting groups for the Arctic Council agenda and in the BEAR having a representative in the regional council and the regional committee as full members.115 It works primarily through six working groups supported by a secretariat.arctic-council.php/en/about-us/history 114 Arctic Council members retrieved 3 October 2012 http://www.arcticcouncil. retrieved 3 October 2012 http://www.arctic-council.4. What the actors do and how they act in different forums and with whom. 5-6 About the Arctic Council. 113 Arctic Council History.111 Even though they do not act as full members they still have a voice in the region they inhabit.2 Governing bodies and regimes There is a variety of international organizations active in the Arctic with a diverse focus and varied relationships. retrieved 3 October 2012. Barents Euro Arctic Council. The focus is on closer contact among the people of the 13 counties in the Barents region. Iceland.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Introduction. works on an intergovernmental level (BEAC) and on an interregional level (BRC).agreement in the AC. the aim and hope of a stable and secure region.php/en/about-us/working-groups 119 Keskitalo E.no/Arctic Councilcms/export/sites/default/en/meetings/2011-nuukministerial/docs/Arctic_SAR_Agreement_EN_FINAL_for_signature_21-Apr-2011. which can explain why the remaining members have the same right to consensus as the rim states. 91 120 121 122 Schram Stokke “International Institutions and Arctic governance” in Schram Stokke & Hønneland p.H. this he explains being due to. Barents Euro Arctic Council The Barents Euro-Arctic Region which was initiated in 1993.beac. But the chair of the BEAC rotates biannually between Finland. which can attend working group meetings and participate in specific projects as can invite guest or experts.org/index. Russia. The overall objective is sustainable development. Russia and Sweden. 117 the ACs first a step in the direction to a more formal There are several states and organizations with observer status to the Council.iw3 28 . Norway. retrieved 18 September 2012.120 Stokke highlights that western participant states contributes financially a “disproportionate share of the costs of the Arctic collaborative endeavors”. Finland.165 Ibid. referring to the variety of representatives which according to him participate more than as experts and observers. 117 SAR agreement 2011.the construction of an International Region. organization. However “All decisions of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies are by consensus of the eight Arctic Member States”. retrieved 3 October 2012 http://arctic-council. 122 Its members are Denmark.arcticcouncil. p. London. 2004.pdf 118 Working Groups of the Arctic Council retrieved 3 October 2012http://www. the SAR. Norway.. Sweden and the European Commission.119 Schram Stokke emphasizes that what makes the Arctic Council special is what Stokke calls “participatory heterogeneity”. it is not impossible that there will be a special sub-council dealing with oceanic related issues.C. still as with other issues there is a risk that this would be subordinate to the already established bodies under for example The Law of the Sea. http://www. Routledge. Negotiating the Arctic. according to Keskitalo.npolar. Introduction .118 The AC gives priority to states before nongovernmental groups even though such are permanent participants. In the future though if the council has a broader mandate. The premise of the Barents cooperation is one of long term political stability and aims to reduce tension within the region.121 Issues range much broader than the high seas. The main argument for an Arctic policy is the EU’s commitment to environmental protection and the fight against climate change but the there is also a focus on opportunities of new transport lanes and the exploitation of natural resources.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Introduction.iw3 125 Barents Euro Arctic Council .iw3 124 Barents Euro Arctic Council .europa. Introduction.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Introduction. with the purpose of making the cooperation more coherent and effective.beac. It impacts through being a large receiver of exports economic activities from the Arctic. from the Northern Dimension to the on-going process of formalising an Arctic policy.htm 29 . Denmark and Finland are members of the EU 126. Maritime Affairs. Further there is since 2008 an International Barents Secretariat (IBS) in Kirkenes.beac. The EU states that it has “an important role to play in supporting this successful cooperation and in helping to meet the challenges that now confront the region” . BEAC cooperates with the NCM and the EU’ s Northern Dimension.iw3 . At least one parliamentarian conference is held within a chairmanship period. 126 European Union Member states retrieved 18 September 2012 http://europa. retrieved 18 September 2012 http://www. The latest document on the forthcoming EU policy on the Arctic states state it wants to develop its Arctic policy in cooperation with its Arctic member states as well as neighbours and other 123 Barents Euro Arctic Council .124 Issues that are dealt with vary with examples such as rescue services. 127 The European Union contributes a substantial amount of financial aid to developing “the economic. Introduction . retrieved 18 September 2012 http://www. Out of the Arctic states Sweden.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Introduction.123 Indigenous peoples in the region have an advisory role in both levels of cooperation and a special working group considers indigenous issues. social and environmental potential of the Arctic regions of the EU and neighbouring areas” as well as research.implemented mainly by cross-border projects.htm 127 The European Union official webpage. customs. retrieved 18 September 2012 http://www.125 The European Union is increasingly more engaged in the Arctic region. Norway. culture and social health issues. not only through the common market but also of other Arctic states and discusses Arctic issues in the accession talks with Iceland.eu/abouteu/countries/index_en.beac. Sea basin strategy: Arctic Ocean. . Introduction. retrieved 18 September 2012 http://ec.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/sea_basins/arctic_ocean/index_en. infrastructure. http://www. These are narrated in terms of border insecurities and ownership disputes when it comes to natural resources. Through the Commission. Issues are delegated through committees of senior officials 128 The European Union official webpage.htm 130 NATO newsroom. there are concerns in NATO as to the endurance of the current state of cooperation. retrieved 18 September 2012 http://ec. EU has applied to become a permanent observer to the AC as a compliment to the engagement through BEAC and the Northern Dimension. 5 of them are Arctic states: Canada.129 However NATO is not responding to a specific threat but rather a change and how to adapt to possible changing circumstances in the region.Arctic states. Further according to the official webpage.htm?selectedLocale=en 131 About the Nordic Council of Ministers. and the United States. Maritime Affairs.128 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) There are not many specific entries to be found about the Arctic on the official webpage of NATO. and not a specific body focusing on the area and even though there are only 28 members of NATO. and the organization admit that this can have security implications in the region.130 Nordic Council of Ministers The Nordic Council of Ministers (NMC) is the forum for Nordic governmental cooperation.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/sea_basins/arctic_ocean/index_en. search and rescue and serving as a discussion forum as well as “ utilizing the opportunities inherent to the NATO-Russia Council” . NATO discusses security prospects in the High North.131 There is an annual rotation of chairmanship between the five Nordic Countries. retrieved 3 October 2012 http://www.europa. Arctic policy . retrieved 3 October 2010. http://www. with a new program for every chairmanship period.nato. Denmark. where each country have one vote. Founded in 1971.htm 129 NATO review 2009: The Arctic: too hot to ignore? Paul King. where Prime Ministers have the overall responsibility.int/docu/review/2009/0901/EN/index. There is however a concern in NATO of the pace of melting ice in the Arctic.nato. Issues at the table for NATO are claimed to be more in line with relief operations. retrieved 3 October 2012. Iceland.int/cps/en/natolive/news_49745. Norway.org/en/nordic-councilof-ministers/the-nordic-council-of-ministers/about-the-nordic-council-of-ministers 30 . The Seminar on Security Prospects in the High North published 29 January 2009.norden. the NCM is structured in such a way that ministers for specific policy areas meet a few times a year with decision making based on unanimity. With the convention came a definition of territorial sea.nautical miles off shore) 136. a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. civil servants.norden. Prime Minister meetings are held every year and with additional meeting before EU summit meetings.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective. However the USA respects it as part of customary law. with the purpose to regulate and bring a stable order to all aspects of the resources of the sea and uses of the ocean.htm#Key provisions 31 . exclusive economic zones (200.made up of civil servants from t he different member states. http://www.norden. The purpose of the Nordic Council of Ministers is to take advantage of synergies and empower relatively small Nordic powers to make a stronger impact at both European and the global level. and the right to conduct scientific marine research by international law. 135 There are two bodies of the United Nations which are particularly relevant in the Arctic context relating to border disputes and management of the vast oceans in the region. Issues for the Nordic Council range from environment and climate to education/research and freedom of movement.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/the-nordic-council-of-ministers/member-countriesand-territories 135 Member states of the Nordic Council of Ministers retrieved 3 October 2012http://www.org/en/nordic-councilof-ministers/the-nordic-council-of-ministers/about-the-nordic-council-of-ministers 133 Member states of the Nordic Council of Ministers retrieved 3 October 2012. The UNCLOS has a tribunal (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea) with competence to settle ocean related disputes in conjunction with the 132 About the Nordic Council of Ministers. retrieved 3 October 2012http://www.norden.132 In addition to the Nordic states. The convention is a body of the UN in place since 1982.un.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/the-nordic-council-of-ministers/member-countriesand-territories 136 About 87 per cent of all known and estimated hydrocarbon reserves under the sea fall under some national jurisdiction.norden. They now have the same representation as the state members and decisions taken in the Council is binding also for the autonomous areas to the degree that they are compatible with the self-government decrees133. The Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a convention to which all Arctic states are parties but the USA. the Faeroe Islands and Åland have increased their representation and position in the Nordic Council of Ministers. entrepreneurs and journalists to study democracy and institutions in the Nordic Region”.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/the-nordic-council-of-ministers/member-countries-andterritories 134 Member states of the Nordic Council of Ministers retrieved 3 October 2012http://www. focuses on programs that “enable Russian p oliticians. retrieved 3 October 2012 http://www. 134 Further the cooperation between the NCM and Northwest Russia. Greenland. Historical perspective on the UNCLOS . 139 Further the CLCS provide scientific and technical advice.htm 140 About the Members of the Commission of the CLCS.140 137 Historical perspective on the UNCLOS .org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home. Limits established by a coastal state on the basis of these recommendations should be binding. within the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 137.138 The CLCS review the data presented by the state and recommendations.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.un.un.un.htm 139 About the CLCS. Disputes over issues covered by the convention are arbitrated by an 11member Seabed Disputes Chamber.application or interpretation of the Convention. http://www. Its recommendations and actions shall not judge on boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. retrieved 3 October 2012.htm#Members 32 . Compliance with the UNCLOS is today part of customary law but in order to contribute and have a say in the decisions made. The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf facilitates the implementation of the UNCLOS by establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond the EEZ where claims are made by a coastal state.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_members. retrieved 18 September http://www. retrieved 18 September 2012. elected by states who are parties to the UNLCOS with equitable geographical representation but serving in their capacities as experts. retrieved 18 September 2012.htm#Key provisions 138 About the CLCS.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home. http://www. The CLCS consist of twenty-one experts in the field of geology. party-ship is necessary. meaning this is a forum where the USA cannot influence the convention today and cannot make claims. but review whether or not the claims are reasonable in relation to the already established territory and adjacent sea.un. geophysics or hydrography. http://www. French and Inuit. namely the international society or other involved states one might gather. Firstly though there is a general discussion regarding to the Arctic policies. By this is here meant that they are created rather as a 33 . the USA and Russia have policies that are straight forward and written in strict administrative language. the Russian policy has no official English translation and the Canadian policy is published as one document but in three languages interchangeably. However the content that there are some policies that regardless of native language still aims at directing the policy to more than one type of receiver.5. To analyze the policies in English is a choice which in extent already selects to look at documents with a specific receiver. The exceptions are Norway. For example Sweden was the last and latest country to publish its Arctic policy and hence had the benefit to relate it to the policies of other states. The Ilulissat declaration can be claimed as a milestone in littoral state cooperation and hence the policies or strategies published before this declaration in 2008 did not have the information acquired that those publishing their policies after this declaration. The strategies and policies varies both in content and size and under which government ministry or page they are located. this presentation is made in alphabetical order. This may have relevance for the content presented by the different states. Arctic state actors and their present Arctic Policies This chapter will present other authors views on the role of the individual Arctic states as is complemented by the empirical findings from the Arctic policies. Iceland. the Arctic identity. The discourse of the Arctic as a region. which have one English and one Russian translation. while the other five Arctic states present their policy or strategy in a more ‘ commercial’ way. The Russian policy is not available in English other than unofficial translations but is still aimed at a larger scope of receivers than might be expected to have knowledge of the Russian language. English.1 Empirical analysis of the Arctic policies The Arctic policies have been presented in the recent 2000s ranging from 2006 to 2011. 5. for most non English native countries there are two versions one in the official language of the country and one in English. This situation is true for all events and circumstances surrounding foreign policy making and must be taken into consideration in the analysis. the image of other Arctic states as well as their view concerning Arctic cooperation will be traced. identifying what issues are brought to the fore in terms of national interests. Emphasis will be to compare the policies and their language in order to find common and different views of the region. and how are other actors and opportunities and challenges talked about? Are there traces of normative stances or is the language more rationalistic in its wording? In what context is the national interests framed? 34 . Questions which will be addressed while analysing are: How is the Arctic talked about? What terms are prominent. From traits of a social culture can be drawn. the self-image and the image of the other Arctic states. The analysis is structured into two parts. and images of the self and other actors and analysing how these topics are spoken of.booklet or brochure and has introductory chapters by government officials explaining the background to the documents and feature pictures of sunny skies over an exotic landscape and pictures featuring indigenous peoples. polar bears and dog sledges and beautiful landscapes. 193-194.141 This is agreed by Keskitalo who claims that the Arctic long has been in the Canadian focus. According to Huebert the state faces no true challenges to its sovereignty over maritime regions of its Arctic domain148. The first is larger in scope. p. according to Huebert.p. p. both in domestic policy and as part of the national identity...238 148 R Huebert p. English. p.143 Canada and has recently been anxious about the increased international interest in the region where interests may be diverging from those of Canada..).144 He further claims that Canada “seldom found it necessary to allocate significant resources to consolidate its policies. Cambridge University Press. 195 149 Ibid.. Kraska J (ed. Arctic sovereignty is according to Hubert linked to national security.5. New York 2011. The long document is written in.. p. 154 144 R Huebert – p.). 127 143 Ibid. both militarily and non-traditional security and has been an important issue in Canada’s international relations146.198 145 Ibid.2 Canada Background The Arctic has historically been a rather difficult region to access. Kraska J (ed. 146 Ibid. This made Canada one of few states which were able to position the Arctic and the north as truly valuable for Canada historically as a nation and for it to niche into a proper Arctic state.142 Despite Keskitalo’s claims that Canada is seen as having been a driving force in international region building in the Arctic. Lackenbauer further suggest that for Canada the case of the North West Passage has a special position and is seen as a part of Canada itself147.”145 For Canada. Summary of Canada’s Arctic policy: Canada has two policy documents regarding the Arctic. 2011. New York. including a lengthy foreword. the Northern Strategy and Statement on Canada’s Foreign po licy on the Arctic.198-199. The second is only an 141 R Huebert – “Canada and the newly emerging international Arctic security regime ” in Arctic security in an age of climate change. in Arctic security in an age of climate change.198 142 Keskitalo p. containing forty-eight pages.194.1. p. concerning both domestic and international issues. French and Inuit.226 35 .193-194. However according to Lackenbauer there seems to be a nationalist myth in Canada that the USA has the intention to abate its sovereignty149. Cambridge University Press. it was long left out of focus by the international community. 196. 198 147 W P Lackenbauer “Polar race or Polar saga -Canada and the circumpolar world”. This is accentuated largely with a focus on the environment and the rights of indigenous peoples. including for example health. defining its domain and advancing its knowledge in the Arctic. Governance of the northern regions is to be inclusive. Local authorities are to be involved and get to partake in decisions regarding the local and regional communities and increased funding and greater self governance of the territories. The claim that Canada positioned itself as a true Arctic state which emphasizes that the north is an integral part of itself is strengthened in the Arctic policy where 36 .eight pages long summary of the foreign policy in English. airspace and lands. However there is also a focus on facilitating the region as a source for resource extraction and the enabling of such resources to sustain and improve the lives of the people living in the Canadian Arctic. The long document has both a domestic and an international audience in mind. Canada will increase funding on research mainly on climate change and adaptation to a changing environment. Promoting social and economic development is to be done in order to make use of the Arctic resources and including the population in decision making which in extension will give the people of the north the opportunity to benefit from local or regional economic activities. This can be interpreted as its proclaimed roles as a steward The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy The Arctic is outlined in strong terms of sovereignty and in need of protection. Further the development of infrastructure in the Canadian north is highlighted. This includes increasing military capabilities in the Canadian waters. Protecting the Arctic environment: Here the fragility of the Arctic environment is brought to the fore and in order to protect the same. where wants to show that Canada is to be a model for local governance in the Arctic but at the same time has a strong focus on international governance of the region at large. The priority areas of the Canadian policy are: Exercising its sovereignty is to be done by maintaining a Canadian presence in the North. not least for the sake of Arctic inhabitants. such as mining. Both are written in the style of a booklet or brochure. particularly as regards resource management. not likely in enemy terms but well by rivals. Our Heritage. The North is a fundamental part of our heritage and our national identity.asp p.northernstrategy. and this inclines that other actors in the region could be the source of such threats. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians.northernstrategy. Our Heritage. This word is however never defined and it is rather difficult to grasp what the Canadian policy really mean with stewardship. retrieved 25 January 2012 http://www. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians. Our Future. but it might be related to its aim to advance its role “as a responsible Arctic nation ”152. Ottawa 2009. both indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. Ottawa 2009. Ottawa 2009. Such claims might indicate that there is a perceived threat to sovereignty or interests.153 This statement draw attention to the importance of sovereignty and the language exemplifies an apprehension about the developments in the region. The strong affiliation with the Canadian Arctic is reflected in the particular focus on the peoples of the north. Our Future. Our Future.northernstrategy.33 37 .8 152 Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North.the national identity as being grounded in the Canadian north is accentuated in multiple quotes of outspoken willingness to show this affiliation. 33 153 Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North. The following statement can be interpreted as a critique to these claims: 150 Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North. The image of others “…effective Canadian stewardship of our sovereign territory and the active promotion of Canadian interests internationally are more important than ever before ”.gc.northernstrategy. and it is vital to our future. Our Heritage.ca/index-eng. following are two examples of this: Canada is a northern nation.asp p. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians. retrieved 25 January 2012 http://www. Given this there are many indications in the language used that despite this apprehension the relations in the Arctic are good. Our Heritage.150 Few countries are more directly affected by changes in the Arctic – as Canada.gc.gc. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians.asp p. Our Future. retrieved 25 January 2012 http://www. Despite disagreements between Canada and other Arctic states and fears raised by commentators and the media that there is a race for the Arctic are untrue. Ottawa 2009. One word that is recurring in the Canadian policy is that of stewardship.asp (foreword) 151 Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North.151 Few other Arctic states use as strong language as Canada while speaking about their relation to the Arctic.ca/index-eng.ca/index-eng. retrieved 25 January 2012 http://www.gc.ca/index-eng. Canada is said to want to strengthen the Arctic 154 Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North. in order either to convince the international society that these disputes will not cause violence and that Canada is not violently inclined. Sweden.gc. Our Heritage.northernstrategy.155 Concerning Norway. Canada’s statement shows a willingness to solve disput es and verging on arrogance in language. Our Future.northernstrategy. In fact they have had no impact on Canada’s ability to work collaboratively and cooperatively with the United States. Ottawa 2009. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians.northernstrategy.ca/index-eng. This can be seen as evidence that there is a stronger connection between Canada and the other western states but also shows a willingness to include Russia in cooperation. 34 156 Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North. Denmark. The United States is claimed to “ an exceptionally valuable partner ”.ca/index-eng. retrieved 25 January 2012 http://www.33 38 . Our Future. overstated or purely irrelevant. Our Heritage. However Russia is left out in the context of shared interests but included in the phrasing “ will work closely with” 156 regarding Arctic issues in general. Denmark or other Arctic neighbours on issues of real significance and importance154. The view on cooperation: Regarding cooperation the Arctic Council is in focus and cooperation on Arctic issues rather than the Ilulissat declaration which shows that the Arctic agenda of Canada is broader than settling territorial boundaries and governing the oceans. Ottawa 2009. Statements like these and what it says about the Canadian view of disputes and how disputes are talked about in literature or the media is in a matter a response to contentions that Canada as well as other states would not be sophisticated enough to adhere to international law.asp p. where mentioning of Canada is scarce in comparison.gc. Our Heritage. Ottawa 2009. which is the context of this statement.13 155 Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North. retrieved 25 January 2012 http://www. This can be read as though Canada finds discussion of these issues as overrated.asp p. This can be viewed as another reflection of the importance of the Arctic peoples since the AC is one of few international forums where indigenous peoples included.asp p. Our Future. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians.gc.http://www. However the exceptional value of the US is not reflected in the Arctic policy of the USA.All of these disagreements are well managed and pose no sovereignty or defence challenges to Canada. with whom Canada share many common interests in the region.ca/index-eng. This type of language can easily aggravate other states. Finland and Iceland it is said that Canada also shares common interests. since it appears to mitigate the severity of disagreements on territorial claims. retrieved 25 January 2012. dynamic economic growth and trade. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians. Our Future.gc. 2010. resources and influence to respond effectively to emerging challenges affecting the Arctic and its inhabitants. 2010. rules -based region with clearly defined boundaries. retrieved 25 January 2012 http://www. retrieved 25 January 2012 http://www. 157 Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng.pdf 39 . both financially and in scope. vibrant Northern communities.157 And it is viewed as something more than a high level discussion forum. Affairs and International Trade Canada.gc. 36 159 Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy.northernstrategy.ca/index-eng.international. Ottawa 2009.Council.asp p. Our Heritage.158 Despite this importance given to the AC and the rather relaxed approach to resolution of disputes there are still statements in the policy which can be attributed a lack of trust in other actors but also in extension towards cooperation as such.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng. Canada’s vision for the Arctic is of a stable. retrieved 25 January 2012 http://www. Yet the statement may well be a visualisation of the faith in international law and the commitments made through the Ilulissat declaration.159 This vision or these goals contains an anxiety that this might not be the case in the future where it can be interpreted as though Canada sees the other states as threats to its sovereignty where international regulations are prerequisites for orderly cooperation in the region and respect for such is a key interest of Canada in order for it to pursue other policy goals. Affairs and International Trade Canada. namely The Arctic Council is an important venue for deepening global understanding of the Arctic and has played a key role in developing a co mmon agenda among Arctic states… We are committed to ensuring the Arctic Council has the necessary strength. and healthy and productive ecosystems.pdf 158 Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North. improve its possibility to self-sustaining economy. Denmark´s presence in the Arctic may well increase rather than diminish. However.). The document is a collective policy signed by representatives from Denmark. by focusing on utilizing mineral and possible hydrocarbon reserves instead. A Worm p. Cambridge University Press. The physical.164 According to Petersen the Greenlandic government has abandoned its protection of traditional income sources such as hunting and small scale fishing and aims instead for economic transformation.a Greenlandic perspective” in Arctic security in an age of climate change. 164 166 N Petersen p. including the off-shore seabed.5. rather than as now a high reliance on Danish financial grants. the USA and NATO. defense.148 163 Ibid. p.166 162 N Petersen p. foreign policy.161 Hence according to Petersen.158 40 . Cambridge University Press (2011) New York:147-148. Thule. 165 Even though the USA has a military air base in Greenland. sovereignty control are key responsibilities remaining under Danish control. if there is need for these competences. this base has not had an active defense since 1965. Summary of Denmark’s Arctic policy Denmark’s Arctic policy is a fifty eight long document in the style of a booklet with multiple pictures with both a preface and an introduction.162 Climate change with rising air temperature will benefit Greenland in the sense that it may expand the possibility for agriculture and in combination with possible oil and gas extraction.3 Denmark/ Greenland Background Denmark owes its presence in the Arctic mainly to Greenland a part of the Danish realm which since June 2009 has self-government status. 149 164 A Worm p. 167 165 N Petersen p. Kraska J (ed.166 161 N Petersen “The Arctic challenge to Danish foreign and security policy” in Arctic security in an age of climate change. human and political-diplomatic resources are not sufficient in Greenland if the Arctic indeed does become an important economic and political region in the future..160 The self-government has authority rights to Greenland’s underground riches. The objectives as 160 A Worm “Arctic security. New York 2011.). Kraska J (ed.1.166 still Greenland’s defense is managed under a military security umbrella of Denmark. Greenland and the Faeroe Islands. 163 According to Worm Greenland’s budget depends to around 57 percent and 30 percent of the GDP on financing through a block grant from Denmark. Other priorities that is brought up is the focus on peace and stability and international cooperation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. Even though there might be diverging views between the different parts of the realm the immediately effected will have strong influence on policies. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . and foremost Greenland.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. The Development of Greenland is high in the agenda and should be implemented while preserving the environment but at the same time by facilitating a self-sustaining growth through exploration of minerals. The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy The policy is published as a joint document by the three parts of the Kingdom of Denmark. Throughout the policy there is a strong focus on empowering the Arctic population rather than fulfilling specific foreign policy goals and given that Greenland’s population is to great extent indigenous this also transpires to inclusion of indigenous peoples in international forums.involving common interests relating to for example international agreements. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . The Kingdom will promote and protect indigenous peoples’ rights167 The Kingdom will actively contribute to the shaping of EU policies relevant to the Arctic and Arctic challenges. August 2011. the Faeroe Islands and Greenland. and regional and global issues. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. where both bilateral and multilateral cooperation are in focus. in forums where they are included in decision making but also that their views on issues concerning them will be 167 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. The following statements highlight the language used and the purpose of the Danish Arctic policy: A strategy for the Arctic region is first and foremost a strategy for a development that benefits the inhabitants of the Arctic. The document emphasizes that the policy goal is to include all parts of the realm in decisions relating to Arctic issues. August 2011. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk.presented in the policy are based on aiding the development of Greenland and maintaining the role of the Kingdom of Denmark as in the Arctic. Denmark’s Arctic policy is to a large extent focused on the parts of the realm which is located in the Arctic. namely Denmark. http://um. renewable energy and living resources.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. 52 41 . Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk. retrieved 9 April 2012. 51 168 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. and in this context seeks to ensure the Arctic peoples’ rights and interests168.ashx p. retrieved 9 April 2012. http://um.ashx p. ashx p.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk.ashx p. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. As seen above the peoples of the Arctic takes a prominent role in Denmark’s policy. http://um. The following statement enforces the image that relations between the actors are not one of trust .ashx p. The image of others Denmark recognises that the region must be characterised by peace and cooperation and that the A5 cooperation is close. retrieved 9 April 2012. August 2011.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. 21 42 . 10. 20 172 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen .dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. but at the same time the policy highlights the need to enforce the Kingdom’s sovereignty in light of increased activities in the region.171 These wordings show an uncertainty about the relationships in the Arctic. 169 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. retrieved 9 April 2012. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk. where cooperation is promoted but Denmark is not sure it can trust the other states. 11.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. August 2011. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . retrieved 9 April 2012. The Arctic can hence be seen as an arena for Denmark to enhance its strength also in international relations in general. 55 170 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. This statement however can be seen as a reflection of an eagerness for relations to be mirrored by existing relations of good neighbourliness or a lack of confidence in present cooperation with a stance that international regulation is needed.represented even in forums where the Arctic population does not have a seat at the table. http://um. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. implying that they see the possibility to do so: The Kingdom will reinforce confidence-building in cooperation with other Arctic states to maintain the Arctic as a region characterized by cooperation and good neighbourliness172. http://um. In this way Denmark identifies itself as an Arctic state through the interests of its Arctic peoples. http://um. 50 171 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk.ashx p. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . yet another prominent feature is that Denmark aims to strengthen the global role of the Kingdom in the Arctic169 and to play a key role in future cooperation 170 to be able to exercise its policy in international relations. August 2011. retrieved 9 April 2012. but that Denmark’s intentions are to strengthen the relations with other states. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. August 2011. August 2011.ashx p. 54 174 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020.15 175 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.10 176 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk. August 2011. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. and not showing the same unity between the Nordic countries. As mentioned in the Canadian policy there are disputes between the Arctic states. Denmark is more pragmatic but the content is closely related: Pending a permanent solution to the issue. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen .ashx p. retrieved 9 April 2012. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . http://um. August 2011.ashx p. Further the Danish policy emphasise that apart from other Arctic states is also intends to organise cooperation with other actors which are stakeholders with interests in the region 175. This might reflect an preconception about the relations with the other Nordic states. but its involvement must be on the terms of the Arctic population 176.ashx. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . http://um. retrieved 9 April 2012. the Kingdom also wants to further expand and develop cooperation with Russia. August 2011. as seen in the following quote: We will maintain close contact with Finland and Sweden on Arctic issues. the dispute will be handled professionally as would be expected between two neighbouring countries and close allies.174 This indicates no reason for distrust and that it is unfounded to think that these types of disputes will lead to violent conflicts.52 43 . Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. Regarding Denmark and Canada.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. the main dispute is over Hans Island. Rather other Arctic states are in focus even though mentioning the other Nordic states. In addition. This is also said about other external actors 173 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. as in the Finnish and Swedish policies. retrieved 9 April 2012. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk. There is an importance placed on the role of the EU as an actor in region.http://um. however close contact is not a phrasing which imply a close relationship. p.. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn.The relations with other Nordic countries is interestingly not made in the same strong terms. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk.. which has been increasingly engaged in international cooperation in the Arctic173. retrieved 9 April 2012. http://um. Canada spoke of disputes in rather nonchalant terms. http://um. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen .dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . retrieved 9 April 2012. http://um. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. http://um. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk. 13 183 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. retrieved 9 April 2012. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn.ashx p. August 2011. 54 178 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. Japan and South Korea 177. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. August 2011. retrieved 9 April 2012.ashx preface 182 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. Cooperation rests according to the policy on the following: Ensuring a stable peaceful and secure region characterized by dialogue. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . The Kingdom supports their respective wishes for observer status in the Arctic Council178 …the new actors will be integrated into the norms and values that the Kingdom and other coastal states in the Arctic Ocean believe should apply to the Arctic. August 2011. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk.183 177 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020.179 This indicates that the Kingdom sees itself and its relations with other Arctic states as a model for international cooperation and intends to socialize external actors into these norm patterns.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . 54 179 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. are seen as important in the Arctic context.ashx preface 181 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. retrieved 9 April 44 . http://um. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . http://um. negotiation and cooperation. August 2011. retrieved 9 April 2012. 55 180 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk. retrieved 9 April 2012. http://um.ashx p. retrieved 9 April 2012.where China. August 2011. August 2011. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk. The view on cooperation: Regarding cooperation the Danish strategy states the relevance of transparency 180 and understanding in Arctic cooperation 181 as well as the importance of legal frameworks 182. The Danish policy states that: It is encouraging that the three Northeast Asian countries are joining the consensus among the coastal states that the UNCLOS must be the central foundation for the legal regulation in the Arctic. Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk.ashx p. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen . August 2011.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. Avoiding the militarization of the Arctic, and actively helping to preserve the Arctic as a region characterized by trust, cooperation and mutually beneficial partnerships.184 This implies that Denmark wants to show that it has low military intentions and given that there has been no direct military tension since the Cold War, either this can reflect an anxiety that such tension will increase of just reaffirming Denmark’s own intentions. Denmark wants to retain the importance of the A5 185 constellation, but focuses, like Sweden and Iceland to increase the impact of the Arctic Council, which in contrast to many other organizations, have representation by indigenous peoples. The policy states in strong words its intention for the Arctic Council to be: …reinforced as the only relevant political organization that has all Arctic states and peoples as members.186 and Evolve from a decision shaping to a decision making organisation.187 Here again are traits of the Danish identification with the Arctic through its Greenlandic population, while referring to Arctic cooperation. Further this shows a strong faith in cooperation and that the region can be evolved and that cooperation on a broader mandate is possible and desired. 2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx, preface 184 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen , Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April 2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 10 185 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen , Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April 2012,.http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 52 186 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen , Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April 2012,http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 52 187 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen , Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April 2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 52 45 5.1.4 Finland Background According to Rob Huebert, Finland has been more involved in circumpolar affairs than for example Sweden, and before presenting its Arctic policy, Finland influenced cooperation mainly through policies of the EU and played an influential role in proposing the EU’s Northern Dimension 188. Finland’s geographic closeness to Russia has according to Keskitalo had a major impact on its foreign policy, also in the Arctic setting and the Nordic Council and has influenced Finland’s neutrality and the scope of its international actions189. Finland’s ability to act has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War and its policies has since focused on “nearing itself to the west” 190. Huebert further emphasizes Finland’s vulnerability in terms of its extended border to Russia which is also portrayed as the main reason for Finland’s unwillingness to join NATO 191. Summary of Finland’s Arctic policy The Finnish policy is written in strict administrative language and contains 56 pages starting by introducing the Arctic and reflections on other Arctic state policies. It concludes with proposals for action and funding for the policy. Further the policy includes two chapters concerning policy tools and the EU respectively. The main objectives of the Finnish policy are: Regarding the environment, Finland attempts to draw attention in international cooperation to the specifics of Arctic environmental issues and risks. The environment is to be attended through increased research and nuclear safety. Economic activities are highlighted in terms of Finnish know-how, where the opportunities for Finnish companies and Finnish experience in winter shipping is in focus. Further natural resources of the Arctic are put into a Finnish-European market and export perspective, where the closeness to Russia is in focus as an asset. Transport and infrastructure is seen in the perspective that there needs to an improvement in these areas in order to improve business activities and also regarding 188 189 R Huebert p. 206 Keskitalo p.59-61 190 Keskitalo p.61 191 R Huebert p. 206 46 harmonization of international regulations concerning safety and protection in the Arctic region. Indigenous peoples are framed through the perspective of inclusion and participation. The focus is both on the Finnish indigenous peoples Sámi as well as Finland’s role internationally in contributing to increase the rights of indigenous peoples in general. Objectives for the EU and Arctic policy tools focuses on enhancing the role of the Arctic Council, strengthen Finland’s representation in Russia and an improved role for the EU in the Arctic cooperation. The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy Finland’s Arctic policy focuses mainly on facilitation of opportunities in the Arctic region, where the Sámi people and Finnish industry takes precedence. Regarding the self-image the policy focuses to claiming its rights in the region, as demonstrated by the following statement: “As an Arctic country, Finland has a natural interest in Arctic affairs…seen as a whole, Finland is one of the northern most countries in the world” 192. This implies that this role has to be asserted and the statement can be seen as a manifestation of an attempt to convince other actors in the region of its role. The image of others and cooperation Regarding other actors, the other Arctic states are mainly mentioned in a Nordic context and even though Finland states its principal support for including other actors in the cooperation in the region this however has to benefit the cooperation on the terms of the states and the Arctic Council. Finland is open to new observers: “… provided that they are committed to acting towards achieving the Council’s goals.” 193 192 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications August 2010, retrieved 22 April 2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07} p. 8 193 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications, August 2010, retrieved 22 April 2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07} p. 38 47 finland. and admitting new observers ”. http://formin. shows that giving the Council a more prominent role can mitigate an exclusive club of A5 collaboration and secure the role of the non-coastal states.195 These statements are made in a context where Finland also promotes itself. Finland shares the anxiety related to the exclusive cooperation between the coastal states. with Iceland and Sweden. 30 195 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region. http://formin. retrieved 22 April 2012. retrieved 22 April 2012. This would in extension give greater weight to states such as Finland which are now excluded. not specifically Finland. where Finland sees itself as part of a group of states rather than a single unit. as in the case of the Ilulissat declaration as well as a way to exclude actors with differing interests. While referring to international relations there is often reference to what the Nordic countries have done.194 Among Arctic states.fi/public/download. they can be seen as a way to show that the Nordic countries are a coherent group of states with a common agenda.finland. 31 196 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region. where other actors play the role which can jeopardize stability and the coastal states are held responsible for this in the Finnish policy: 194 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region. The following quotes are examples of this: The Nordic countries recognise the right of indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making in matters pertaining to them. however. Further this is also proof of Keskitalo’s reference to Finland’s attempts to become closer to the West. in this case the other Nordic countries. http://formin. the Nordic countries voted for the adoption of the declaration. retrieved 22 April 2012.finland. Prime Minister’s Office Publications August 2010.fi/public/download. 38 48 . Prime Minister’s Office Publications August 2010. Prime Minister’s Office Publications August 2010. Further there seems to be a anxiety for increased tension in the Arctic.196 These statements when taken into account with the ones regarding the Arctic Council in the Swedish and Icelandic policies.This can be interpreted as a way to make sure Finland gets to be an important actor in the Council and not be excluded.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07} p.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07} p.fi/public/download. Testament to this are the following statements regarding the importance of the Arctic Council: “…strengthening the Arctic Council as the only cooperation structure in the Arctic region formed by the eight Arctic states.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07} p. fi/public/download. Even though Finland is an EU member. August 2010. retrieved 22 April 2012.fi/public/download.203 202 but rather in terms of an enabler to bring 197 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region. http://formin.finland. retrieved 22 April 2012.finland.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07} p. 41 202 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region. August 2010.fi/public/download.fi/public/download.fi/public/download. Its role s important however in the Finnish policy benefits to the Arctic states as seen below: Within its jurisdiction. http://formin. August 2010. August 2010. retrieved 22 April 2012. This is interesting since it has above been highlighted to play a large role in Finland’s foreign policy historically. http://formin. http://formin. Prime Minister’s Office Publications.finland. 45 49 . August 2010. retrieved 22 April 2012. http://formin.The coastal states have also stepped up their operating potential in the region 197 It is in Finland’s interest to maintain stability and continue cooperation in the region and to keep the security situation predictable198 In addition to the Nordic states Russia plays a role in the Finnish policy 199 but this mainly appears in the context of protecting the environment where the following is stated: Russia’s active participation in measures contributing to common goals is of special importance for Finland. Prime Minister’s Office Publications. Prime Minister’s Office Publications . Prime Minister’s Office Publications. Prime Minister’s Office Publications. 48 200 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region. retrieved 22 April 2012. August 2010.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07} p.201 This can be interpreted as an outreach to Russia as well as an acknowledgement of the willingness to include Russia and bring the neighbours closer together.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07} p. However Russia is more prominent in some other Arctic policies than in the Finnish one. http://formin. 10 199 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region.200 In the Barents region.fi/public/download. 14 201 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region.finland. the EU is spoken of in terms of an external actor. retrieved 22 April 2012.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07} p. 11 198 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region. Prime Minister’s Office Publications .aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07} p.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07} p. August 2010. Finland plans on strengthening its representation especially in Russia’s northern regions .finland. Prime Minister’s Office Publications. 9 203 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07} p. retrieved 22 April 2012.finland. http://formin. the EU can look after and support the member states interests as efficiently as possible when Arctic issues arise in various international organisations.finland. cooperation with Norway and Russia is important to Finland.fi/public/download. The language used implies that Arctic issues are under the mandate of the Arctic states and EU is there are a enabler to get the Arctic states a stronger voice in forums in which its own influence is not as strong as the EU unit. 50 . 205 However Iceland promoted itself as the natural center for future trade routes in the Arctic and has according to Ingimundarson shown a willingness to accommodate outside actors in the region.. but criticism has settled since the economic crisis hit Iceland which is also around the same time as these flights subsided. Cambridge University Press. and bordering the Arctic Ocean. 51 . Still it is investigating oil exploration possibilities in the Dragon Zone in Jan Mayen. 207 Ibid. but never violated Icelandic airspace.204 He further states that Iceland has been a firm opponent of what is perceived as the development of hegemony of the Arctic littoral states and has insisted on the relevance of the Arctic Council. These flights were however strongly criticized by Iceland. Iceland is claiming a stakeholder role in the Arctic due to its geographical location and historical rights.206 Until the fall of 2008 Russian bombers flew frequently near the Icelandic borders. p. p 176. 179-180 208 Ibid. but makes no territorial or resources based claims in the Arctic. It is hence not involved in any disputes with other Arctic states over jurisdiction or access to the same.). Iceland has no military services at its disposal since the USA closed its base at Keflavik in 2006..207 Russia offered Iceland a large loan after Iceland had been turned down emergency aid by its western allies. New York 2011.1. and hence according to Ingimundarson.175-176 206 Ibid. Iceland has a strategic location. Its exclusive economic zone extends to the Greenland Sea. Kraska J (ed. The Russian loan never became reality but criticism was raised both from Iceland towards its western allies for not aiding it in its financial difficulties and Iceland’s allies in the west criticized it for being too eager to accept Russian aid and accused Iceland of being anti western hinting that Iceland’s economic difficulties was used by Russia for strategic oil and gas purposes..5 Iceland Background Iceland is not a littoral state but it is the only Arctic state that is wholly surrounded by the North Atlantic.208 Iceland is a non-armed NATO country. 204 Valur Ingimundarson “Territorial discourses and identity politics: Iceland’s role in the Arctic” in Arctic security in an age of climate change.. p.5. which is part of its exclusive economic zone. including all eight states.175 205 Ibid. The principles cover Iceland’s position in the Arctic. where issues regarding fisheries are prominent. Two and a half pages contain the principles whereas the rest of the document is commentary to the principles.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policyapproved-by-Althingi. May 5 2011. However cooperation within other minor constellations are highlighted. economic and security related sense. the common definition of the Arctic and the concept of what constitutes a coastal state.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution principle 2 52 . The Arctic region should therefore be regarded as a single vast area in an ecological. but not in a narrow geographical sense with the Arctic Circle.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policyapproved-by-Althingi. where influence. political. May 5 2011. Icelandic influence is to be strengthened by promoting an extended definition of the Arctic. tree line or a temperature of 10 degrees centigrade in July as a reference point.Summary of Iceland’s Arctic policy Iceland’s Arctic policy is a resolution approved by Althingi. retrieved 8 April 2012 http://eng.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution. This is illustrated by the following statements: The Arctic should not be limited to a narrow geographical definition but rather be viewed as an extensive area when it comes to ecological. cooperation and resolution of disputes are prominent. political and security matters. Further emphasized is the need for increased knowledge and the protection of indigenous peoples rights. The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy Iceland’s policy is one which makes rather harsh proclamations and much of the language is filtered through alleged injustices not least in its exclusion of the Ilulissat declaration.utanrikisraduneyti.. The collaboration between all the Arctic states are emphasized and there is strong opposition to an extension of mandate for the A5 constellation. economic. 209 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy. strengthening of the Arctic Council and implementation of the UNCLOS. the Icelandic parliament.209 Iceland is geographically located by the Arctic Circle and is therefore within the Arctic. It is of vital importance that Iceland secures its position as a costal state among other coastal states in the region210. which is framed in a way that Iceland. stipulating twel ve principles for Iceland’s Arctic policy. principle 3 210 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy. The need to include external actors mainly through trade is stressed and so is the need to maintain security and stability in the region. The document is eleven pages long. as a small nation have an interest in promoting inclusion. retrieved 8 April 2012 http://eng. May 5 2011. Iceland uses rather inconsiderate language in its Arctic policy and might be accused of trying to shaming other Arctic states by positioning itself against others as a state of high normative stances. it can be asserted that solidarity between the eight Arctic states will be dissolved and the Arctic Council considerably weakened. May 5 2011.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution principle 1 213 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policyapproved-by-Althingi.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution principle 6 53 .pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution (general) 212 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy. Iceland continues this critical language throughout its policy where other actors are positioned against the normative stances of Iceland. This appears in the policy mainly towards the constellation of the five Arctic coastal states after the Ilulissat declaration: If consultation by the five states (A5). which would undermine the Arctic Council and other Arctic states.213 This critique against powerful countries might not be aimed towards other Nordic states.Iceland as well as other Arctic states seems to struggle with its status as an Arctic state and it may seem as though Iceland uses language to assure other actors as well as themselves that they are indeed part of the Arctic. Iceland is not regarded officially as a littoral state but seems to view itself as such: The image of others In common with Finland and Sweden one can read an anxiety of exclusion in Iceland’s view of other actors.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policyapproved-by-Althingi.211 Individual member states must be prevented from joining forces to exclude other member states from important decisions. democratic state with its small population as an example of an inclusive society where participation in decisionmaking is key.212 These statements indicate a lack of trust for other Arctic states in the regional cooperation.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policyapproved-by-Althingi.utanrikisraduneyti. retrieved 8 April 2012 . This following quote is an example: Experience shows that powerful countries have a tendency to overlook issues involving indigenous peoples and trivialise them. including Iceland. Such attitudes must be countered in partnership with indigenous peoples’ organisations under the auspices of the Arctic Council and through other international platforms where indigenous peoples ’ issues are discussed .utanrikisraduneyti. http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti. May 5 2011. where it sees itself as a model. retrieved 8 April 2012 http://eng. even though they are bigger than Iceland. they might not be considered as 211 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy. retrieved 8 April 2012 http://eng. develops into a formal platform for regional issues. utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policyapproved-by-Althingi. it cannot be ruled out that disputes arising from continental claims will compromise relations between the Arctic states. there is a fear and condemnation of such activities: Although there are few indicators that the Arctic will be an area of conflict in the near future. though on a different topic this normative stance appears again.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution principle 4 216 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policyapproved-by-Althingi.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policyapproved-by-Althingi.215 This may well be another example of a real or perceived anxiety of a small state with no military means at its disposal surrounded by the other actors who does. such as Russia. May 5 2011. retrieved 8 April 2012 http://eng. the cooperation in terms of the Arctic Council and it states that: The role of the Arctic Council as the most important forum for international cooperation on Arctic issues need to be enhanced.pdf to Parliamentary resolution principle 1 54 . The Icelandic policy stresses as seen above. May 5 2011. There is however little noticed paid to the Nordic states overall in the policy.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution (general) 215 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy. Canada and the United states have not ruled out taking unilateral action to protect their sovereign interests. retrieved 8 April 2012 http://eng. and though there has not yet been military conflicts in the region.214 Individual Arctic states.internationally powerful states. in which Iceland has a role to play. retrieved 8 April 2012 http://eng. Another interpretation could claim that Iceland threatens the A5 in the sense to be less cooperative on other issues in order to retaliate this exclusion. The view on cooperation This critical language emphasized in the section on Iceland’s image of other s give witness to a willingness to align within the original group of the Arctic Council. May 5 2011. Iceland is a small state and lacks any military means of retaliation.utanrikisraduneyti. This may interpreted either as anxiety of being left out in the cold when decision are made that might indeed affect other states in the region. Further. still the Arctic Council is the main cooperation forum on other issues and works on the principle of unanimity and hence even a small state can hinder cooperation and future legal agreements.utanrikisraduneyti.216 If the statements above are read rather in anxiety terms than as threats this anxiety in further highlighted by statements that there needs to be further cooperation within smaller 214 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy. Moreover it still promotes new constellations where it takes part in order to strengthen the position of smaller states and autonomous areas in Arctic cooperation.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution principle 5. retrieved 8 April 2012. and is critical towards constellations of powerful states in issues that might have an effect on Iceland. 217 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy. http://eng. May 5 2011. but where it has no say on such matters. Overall Iceland sees a need for cooperation in the Arctic region.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policyapproved-by-Althingi.utanrikisraduneyti. 9 55 .constellations of Arctic or Nordic states where Iceland promotes increased cooperation between the west Nordic countries. in order to reinforce the strength of smaller states in economic and political and security issues 217. 218 219 G Flikke p. A new dimension of Norwegian Foreign policy emphasizes sovereignty. Norway is dependent on the continuation of a European security regime and is a member of NATO.219 however in terms of its High North. It contains foreword. p.218. p.. military presence.61 223 Ibid. 70 Ibid.. Even though Norway is a stark proponent of multilateralism above self-help in international cooperation on other issues it is protecting the status quo in Arctic cooperation on legal and security and resist institutional advance in these areas according to the same. however since a 40 year old dispute regarding maritime delimitation on the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean... only the legal status of Svalbard remains to be settled. Norway has since 2003. framed it in terms of strategic interest.6 Norway Background According to Flikke.Norway’s position in most international conflicts is according to Flikke unique since it is often perceived as a non-stakeholder.66. The relations with Russia are highlighted in almost all parts of the strategy where the main objectives are defined in nine parts namely.222 However the legal status of Norwegian territorial waters surrounding Svalbard is contested not only by Russia.60 222 Ibid.220Tamnes further augment this image by claiming that Norway’s comparably strong economy ha s contributed to an increased presence both military and non-military in the Norwegian Arctic compared to other Arctic states. The Norwegian policy is seventy three pages long and published as a booklet.61-62 56 . 65 221 R Tamnes p.:73 220 Ibid.223 Summary of Norway’s High North policy The High North is defined as mainly the northern parts of Norway but the strategy extends to implicate the other Arctic states as well as Nordic and other regional cooperation. climate change and cooperation. summary and concluding with suggestions to follow up the High North strategy.221 Historically Norway and Russia has had a number of territorial disputes.5.1. is in focus as a source of knowledge regarding climate and environment as well as cultural values. People to people cooperation. health and cultural cooperation across borders. The management and utilization of marine resources. Business development and economic development for Norway in the High North. a well-functioning labor market and value creation is emphasized in order to maintain Norwegian settlements in the north. is highlighted as an opportunity to improve relations between the Arctic countries in terms of common standards and retaining population rate in the High North. the government intends to set high environmental standards for all activities in the High North. The environment. both for safety of shipping but also the preservation of the environment. sound fisheries policies is important for Norway. where in particular the preservation of the wilderness of Svalbard is stressed as along with cooperation on environment and nuclear safety with Russia. Further the rights of the Sámi are emphasized in trade and resource extraction and so is the need for common international standards regarding indigenous peoples. Issues relating to indigenous peoples.Knowledge generation and competence building. 57 . Where allocation means to research and research cooperation is in focus. Further Norway wants to be a leading nation concerning environmental policy. research and tourism in its High North. based on research and regulations. Petroleum activities are to be increased through opening up of new petroleum fields but with a focus on safekeeping the environment. where cross-border cooperation. Access to international fishing zones is emphasized as well as is the prevention of illegal fishing. Focus is on youth enablement. is phrased in terms of climate change and seizing opportunities and utilizing resources in the Arctic. where cooperation and increased surveillance are highlighted. This entails strengthening education. Maritime transport is important in terms of setting high safety standards. both in domestic and international terms. Further such increased developments are framed as important for sustainable social development and retaining Norway’s population in the north. The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy Arctic. retrieved 8 April 2012. 19 228 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy.html?id=448697 p. 224 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. 13 225 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy. The policy is claimed to be neither purely a domestic nor foreign policy but rather: It is a question of our ability to continue our tradition of responsible management of resources. The Norwegian-Russian cooperation in the high north has developed into an important channel for European dialogue. and this is something we will continue to build on. 224 It is characterised both by the own north and development of the same. http://www.regjeringen. rather than a far away wilderness.225 There is an obvious identification with the High North and it is seen as an integral part of Norway. the EU and with the other Arctic states. retrieved 8 April 2012. http://www.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. Svalbard is given much attention and focus lies on the Norwegian sovereignty in the archipelago by legality and in a peaceful manner. retrieved 8 April 2012. as well as by international relations. referring mainly to its own territory in the Arctic but as stated. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www. predictable exercise of sovereignty and close cooperation with our neighbours.regjeringen. 14 227 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy. Norway has been commended for its stewardship in the north.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. 227 As well as an orderly situation in the region as stated in the quote below: Although there are sometimes differences of opinion on certain legal questions and points of international law.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.regjeringen.html?id=448697 p. http://www. 5 (foreword) 226 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy. 16 58 . Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.html?id=448697 p.regjeringen. retrieved 8 April 2012.228 This statement shows the general language in the Norwegian policy that there is an orderly relationship in the Arctic at least in the view of Norway and there is a feeling that despite the differences of opinion Norway identifies as being a good representation for Arctic relations. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.regjeringen. this policy overlaps with both the Nordic cooperation. Norway’s policy is focused on what is termed as the High North.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.html?id=448697 p. 226 even though the High North policy also emphasize the importance of exercising sovereignty by retaining the presence of its armed forces in the North.html?id=448697 p. partners and allies. retrieved 8 April 2012. http://www. http://www. According to the policy the Arctic region has since the Cold War been dominated by a broad international cooperation 230 and further highlighting that: Even during the tension of the cold war. were faith in international cooperation might not be the dominant trait but rather some form of force.There is a language which inclines that Norway. This strong language can be interpreted as the language of a leading nation. ought to be considered a model as a responsible state The image of others Norway position itself against other states in the Arctic and the language inclines a disregard towards states which questions Norway’s legal rights to territorial waters. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. retrieved 8 April 2012. There is an overall strong focus on Norwegian-Russian relations. This is apparent in the following statement: We expect other actors to comply with national and international rules and regulations. and we will seek the support of our allies and partners to ensure that Norway is able to address the real challenges we are facing in the high North. 14 231 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy. retrieved 8 April 2012. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. since it is the only one who places expectations on other states. http://www.regjeringen. retrieved 8 April 2012.html?id=448697 p. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www. relations between the countries of the north were orderly and correct231 and Our relations with Russia form the central bilateral dimension of Norway’s High North policy . The High North is at the top of our foreign policy agenda.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. rather than simply committing itself to international law.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. Even so it shows the importance of the region and firmness towards other states. especially concerning Svalbard. 16 232 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy.229 This language is one which can be seen to be rather harsh coming from Norway.html?id=448697 p. Regarding international law Norway uses the strongest language amongst the states. In most chapters there is a special section on the implications and relations of the policy areas concerning Russia in particular. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.regjeringen. retrieved 8 April 2012.html?id=448697 p. http://www.232 229 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy.regjeringen. 17 230 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. 17 59 .html?id=448697 p. as a democratic state with significant territories in the High North and a widespread economic development. regjeringen. 18 60 . http://www.234 Russian membership of the WTO and subsequent membership of the OECD is important in order to create a transparent and predictable framework for economic activity.233 Heavy industry on the Kola Peninsula is still the most important source of pollution in eastern parts of Finnmark.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. There are even statements shaming Russia on issues such as the environment. 47 235 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy.235 After decades of authoritarian rule and isolationism.regjeringen. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.regjeringen. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. and the language used about this relationship is ambiguous given that the policy states the importance of cooperation with Russia to Norway in the High North. but at the same time there are obvious traces of suspicion towards Russia. http://www. Russia is now finding its place in the European cooperation between democratic states …It is however. still unclear how Russia will develop in a number of areas of interest to the surrounding world. It is admittedly the closest costal neighbour and has shared disputes with Russia for a long time.html?id=448697 p. retrieved 8 April 2012.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. and inputs from various sources in Russia are contributing to the high levels of environmentally hazardous substances in the High North.237 In these statements there is ambivalence. retrieved 8 April 2012. This applies particularly to key issues such as the rule of law. as well as questioning its intentions in the Arctic.html?id=448697 p. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.html?id=448697 p. 18 234 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy. 18 237 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy.regjeringen.html?id=448697 p. This centrality of Russia is to be seen only in the Norwegian policy.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. http://www. 71 236 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy. the principles of the rule of law and political right. since Russia is seen as an important partner at the same time as cooperation seems to be valid only on Norwegian terms.html?id=448697 p. However these statements might be directed as to set standards for cooperation as well as showing other recipients of the policy that Norway takes a firm normative stance towards Russia in this 233 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy.The focus on Russia is interesting even though it is a recurring theme in most other Arctic policies. retrieved 8 April 2012. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www. This is illustrated by the following quotes from the Norwegian policy: We can only ensure sustainable use of resources and sound environmental management in the Barents Sea with Russia’s engagement and Norwegian -Russian cooperation. retrieved 8 April 2012.regjeringen. retrieved 8 April 2012. http://www.236 We will maintain a candid dialogue with Russia and will be clear about Norway’s views on human rights. freedom of expression and human rights. 239 However the interests and specification of the allies and partners are not nearly as prominent as the role of Russia in the Arctic context. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However Russia is in a special position as cooperation partner in the High North. 32 240 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy. and there is not as strong focus on Nordic cooperation as in the policies of some other Nordic states. The government will seek to maintain our allies’ and partners’ interest in the north. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. retrieved 8 April 2012. including Japan. the US and Canada. Russia.html?id=448697 p.240 the Norwegian policy also highlight the importance of international and in particular regional cooperation. industrial and militarily presence in the High North.regjeringen. http://www. 238 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy. http://www.html?id=448697 p. The following statement can be seen as proof of this reasoning.regjeringen. retrieved 8 April 2012. India and China. Further it can be a tactic in the effort to socialize Russia into western norms and values and in this way bring the Arctic cooperation closer.238 This implies that Norway feels a responsibility towards other states. The Government also wishes to establish closer cooperation with other countries. and will encourage increased participation in military exercises and training in the region. There is an impression that the Arctic cooperation is not necessarily a closed forum for inaugurated members.regjeringen. In light of the focus on Russia and the domestic emphasis shows that bilateral cooperation is the main feature for Norway. Defence cooperation between Norway and Russia is also building mutual trust and increasing our capacity for joint problem solving.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.http://www.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-plansand-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. 63 61 . 20 239 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy. possibly even a “we” even though expressed in guardian terms which give the impression th at Norway is a leading nation regarding protection of the rights of all Arctic states.and key EU countries are some of our most important cooperation partners. retrieved 8 April 2012. be it on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.setting and avoid the risk of being accused of being anti western by others.html?id=448697 p. The view on cooperation Despite the focus on the Norwegian civil. And other actors than Russia are also raised in the Arctic policy where: The other Arctic Council member states-the Nordic countries. Remark: The absence of the Arctic Council and the A5 constellation in the Norwegian policy might be a consequence of the early publication date. The Norwegian policy was published in 2006. Admittedly there are more recent added documents to extend the Norwegian policy. and it is possible that including these might answer questions regarding the A5 and the Arctic Council and a more explicit view on cooperation. As discussed before the setting of the policies has an impact on the content. which is two years before the Ilulissat declaration and hence a positioning in relation to this is not possible. however this is evidence of the rapid developments in the region. 62 . 246 However Zysk states that “Above all the leadership seeks to ensure that Russia´s voice is heard when the rules of the game and the region´s future are defined ”. Russia may as claimed by Antrim to have more at stake in the Arctic than any other Arctic state.1.243 although an expanded role in the Arctic by NATO is still stated to be unacceptable.). 80-81 247 K Zysk p.5. Kraska J (ed. 121 244 K Zysk p. p.210 249 C L Antrim p. p.7 Russia Background Russia was the first of the Arctic states to submit its claims to the CLCS in 2001. 2011. be depended in many ways on the west 245 yet this harsh rhetoric is something to take note of since according to Geir Flikke.85-86 243 C L Antrim p. 88 63 . Russia sees international affairs not only as dominated by the west but by western institutions which has according to Flikke contributed to a change in its foreign policy away from a status quo and into a zero-sum game and interaction simply in terms of relative gains.247 Further Huebert claims that Russia’s po wer capabilities or at least its possibility to show off strength into the Arctic has increased in recent years 248 as the least developed country in the Arctic.249 Further.).250 Caitlyn Antrim explains this as being due to the fact that the Kremlin worldview is indeed different from that of most western 241 C L Antrim “The Russian Arctic in the Twenty-First century” in Arctic security in an age of climate change.241 Russia’s Arctic policy is seen by Zysk as having a great impact on the strategic atmosphere in the Arctic. New York. both because of Russia’s vast geographical scope an d the central role ascribed to region in Russian strategic thinking as well as in its defense policy. 2011.85-86. as highlighted by Caitlyn Antrim.137-138 250 K Zysk p.242 A previous harsh rhetoric has declined with the presidency of Medvedev according to Zysk and according to Antrim. Cambridge University Press.99 245 C L Antrim p.244 Russia may. however the claim was not accepted by the CLCS and additional information was needed. New York. Russia has according to Zysk been seen as “the wild card” in Arctic strategic calculations due to its increased military activity which coincided with an increased “rhetorical hostility toward the West”. Cambridge University Press . Kraska J (ed.140 246 G Flikke p.106 248 R Huebert p. Russia has stated that the Arctic is to be a region of cooperation and peace.120 242 K Zysk “Hard power and natural resources” in Arctic security in an age of climate change. Dmitri Medvedev cited by G Flikke p. to realise the interests Russia attempts to expand the Arctic resource base.79 64 . including military and coast guard security for exploration of resources with a long term perspective. local governments. limited commercial development. Main objectives and strategic priorities of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic. Further the interests are framed to be peace and cooperation. The printed document is 12 pages long divided into five sections each with a number of objectives.137. maintain and improve the military forces for mainly border protection. commercial and non-profits organizations as well as cooperation with foreign states and international organizations. Basic problems and means for the realization of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic. The sections are specified as follows: General Provisions define the Arctic Zone geographically within the Russian Federation and the special feature of the Arctic zone as extreme and vulnerable natural and climatic conditions.252 Summary of Russia’s Arctic policy The Arctic policy used here is a unofficial translation of the document posted on the governmental page of the Russian Federation and translated into Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and Beyond. 251 252 C L Antrim p. Main mechanisms for the realization of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic are to be realised through coordinated activities between federal agencies. safeguard the environment and develop and integrate the Northern Sea Route to improve national transport and communications.251 For president Medvedev the Arctic has been claimed to be of vital importance and announced it as the key source of economic revitalization for Russia. ensure to minimize environmental impacts of economic activity. National interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic are stated to be the utilization of resources to develop the social and economic development in Russia. Further the objectives are to improve regional and legal cooperation in the Arctic. developments in technology and scientific research. Cooperation will be under terms of international law and international commitments.states’. remote with low population density but as a rich resource base. are to ensure the territorial borders and confirm resource reserves and modernize and develop technological and infrastructural needs. the main aim seems to be protection and usage of its natural resources in order of: .perunconsulting. but neither this is termed in a harsh rhetoric. Another focus of the Russian Arctic policy is that of the aim to show the Russian position in the Arctic. http://www.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225 255 Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond. policy in the Arctic Main mechanisms for the realization of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic 11 (c). Rather the policy focuses on stating the Russian objectives for the region in a rather neutral language. and promote peace and stability in the Arctic region. Here there is a possibility that Russia wants to show its willingness to cooperate but also as various other Arctic states..The realization of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic will be made in three stages expanding international cooperation and formalizing the Federations outer borders as part of the first stage and increasing the zone’s competitiveness as the long term goal. Russia’s aim is phrased as follows: to strengthen Russia’s position in the Arctic.perunconsulting. The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy Even though there are references to the Arctic region in military terms..255 These statements show that Russia is aware that other states in the Arctic and in international arena might be hesitating as to Russia’s role and intentions in the Arctic.com/2010/11/25/russiasarctic-policy/#more-225 65 . http://www. Possibly the self image of Russia is based on its lack of international posture in the past few decades.256 253 Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and Beyond. Yet a goal for Russia is: to retain its role as the leading Arctic power 254 and according to the policy this aim will be achieved by: Mass media coverage of issues relating to Russia’s national interests in the Arctic.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225 254 Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond. in order to form a positive image of Russia. to prove that it has the right to the Arctic region. National Interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic: 4(a) retrieved 7 May 2012. retrieved 7 May 2012.perunconsulting. Main mechanisms for the realization of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic 10 (d) retrieved 7 May 2012. http://www. consolidate international security.allowing for the solution of problems of socio-economic development253 The Russian policy lacks the harsh rhetoric mentioned above. including the organization of exhibitions “round tables” devoted to the history of Arctic exploration by Russian explorers. One of the few such times is the reference to Spitsbergen (Svalbard) where the policy states that Russia wants to ensure: the mutually beneficial presence of Russia on the Spitsbergen Archipelago. The view on cooperation A notable absence in the Russian policy is that of military and security. there is no mentioning of the Norwegian presence in Spitsbergen. However it is interesting to note here since Russia is the only state which has such a specific strategy for the Arctic. than security. The Russian policy emphasises cooperation and peace which shows non-military intention and a wish to change the image of hostility. where it is mentioned. Main objectives and strategic priorities of the Russian Federation ‘s state policy in the Arctic 6 (B). Main mechanisms for the realization of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic 11 (c).perunconsulting.The image of others Most other Arctic states have some mentioning of Russia in their policies. yet it shows readiness to acknowledge the rights of other actors to their claim in the region as well as an intention to solve matters by common efforts. The main focus in the sphere of military security Russia aims to secure: defence and safekeeping of the state borders of the Russian Federation located in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation258 The main focus lies with economic development in the region and in terminology the safeguarding of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation has higher priority. This lack of focus may however be a consequence of the fact that the Russian Federation has a specific strategy for Security and Defence in the Arctic region.perunconsulting. http://www.257 Even so.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russiasarctic-policy/#more-225 66 . whilst other states have the region integrated in more general Security and Defence documents on a national level but even so taking it into regard in their overall Arctic policies. which give many answers to questions raised here about its relative absence. http://www. This might be in order to be able to 256 Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond . http://www.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225 258 Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond. in contrast the Russian Arctic policy has very few references to other particular state actors in the Arctic. retrieved 7 May 2012. retrieved 7 May 2012. it is directed in terms of education and border control. Main objectives and strategic priorities of the Russian Federation‘s state policy in the Arctic: 7 (F ) retrieved 7 May 2012.com/2010/11/25/russiasarctic-policy/#more-225 257 Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond. 259 Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond Main mechanisms for the realization of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic 11 (A) . This can also be interpreted so that issues to which there is no agreement.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russiasarctic-policy/#more-225 260 Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and Beyond. Even though cooperation seems to be based on the national interest of Russia there are signs of willingness to cooperate with other Arctic states. There is however. http://www.259 Implementation of active cooperation between the Russian Federation and Arctic states for the purposes of delimitation of maritime borders on the basis of international law and mutual agreements with consideration for the Russian Federation’s national interests.including the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Policy in the Arctic 7 (c) retrieved 7 May 2012.perunconsulting. Nevertheless it is an invitation to cooperate within the Arctic region. as well as cross border cooperation. including for the effective management of the natural resources of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.contribute.perunconsulting. Policy in the Arctic 6 (f). 7 (a) retrieved 7 May 2012.http://www. Main objectives and strategic priorities of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic. retrieved 7 May 2012. take a larger role in Arctic cooperation and get an international recognition for Russia’s role as an Arctic actor. http://www.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225 261 Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and Beyond. retrieved 7 May 2012.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225 262 Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond. which is highlighted through the following statements: An expansion of opportunities for international cooperation. throughout the Russian policy a strong reference to International treaties and agreements. good relations between Russia and Arctic states. as well as addressing the issues relating to the international legal basis for the outer borders of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation. on a bilateral basis and through regional organisations. Main mechanisms for the realization of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic 10 (a). should be left out of discussion in international cooperation.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225 67 .260 This shows a willingness to comply with the Ilulissat declaration and cooperate on matters on a mutual basis even though cooperation is mentioned in issue-specific terms and do not specifically emphasize a broader scope of cooperation.261 Strengthening. . scientific-technical and cultural programs.perunconsulting. http://www.262 This shows that there might be a lack of trust towards other Arctic states and a statement that Russia will only comply with agreements on its own terms. the implementation of joint economic. rather than differentiation of cultures.212 Keskitalo p. BEAC and the EU. Sweden is the Arctic state that has been least engaged in Arctic issues. and it does so in a way in a section of commentary regarding the other Arctic policies.145 Keskitalo p.265 Summary of Sweden’s Arctic policy Sweden has the advantage of being the latest and last of the Arctic states to produce an Arctic policy.5. The Swedish policy is published as a booklet with a summary and introduction.1.145-148 68 . since there is according to Keskitalo a larger integration with indigenous peoples and main issues are financial and the distance to governing centers. whereas culture is spoken of in consideration of preserving the traditional Sámi cultures in all states with a Sámi population. 263 264 265 R Huebert p. containing reasons for formalizing an Arctic policy. at least in terms of security.8 Sweden Background According to Huebert. Security is framed in a Nordic cooperation. Indigenous peoples are a small minority amongst the inhabitants of the north.264 The North/south divide in national terms are in all the Nordic states of a different nature than those of other Arctic states. Sweden can relate its policy in the frame of what other state policies have stated. Concerning economy the policy stresses the expertise of Swedish business as well as traditional Sámi trades. Climate and environment are highlighted as a hazard to the Swedish north. as all Nordic Countries according to Keskitalo does not refer to the north in international relations in the same way as other Arctic states but the northern mainland are referred to in a context of northern interstate cooperation and not connected to the Arctic as a concept. but has had a stronger engagement in circumpolar organizations such as the Nordic Council.263 Sweden. By this token. reflections on other state ’s policies and a definition of the region. EU and dependency terms. The policy is 50 pages long and is divided into three chapter as follows: Sweden and the Arctic is divided into subchapters explaining the Swedish ties with the Arctic where historical research and the contemporary competences of Swedish Arctic research is emphasized. 2011. Nordic cooperation. this role is not specified. with reference to Sweden’s prior lack of involvement in Arctic specific issues.gov. 13 267 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. whilst showing that there is more to be desired in terms of the US policy and its commitment to Arctic issues. http://www. Here Sweden intends to be driving force specifically in protecting the Arctic environment and indigenous peoples rights to exercise their cultures. 17 69 . http://www.sweden.269 266 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. retrieved 8 April 2012. Barents cooperation.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.gov.268 Even though claiming that it has an important role to play.267 The Sámi people form the link between Sweden and the Arctic. education and research and the human dimension. the A5 and Sámi cooperation. 2011. The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy Sweden’s Arctic policy relies heavily on its claim to be an Arctic state with numerous references to historical rights and scientific achievements.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. 2011. by which it is assert its right as an Arctic state266. The following statement gathers these claims: Sweden is an Arctic country with interests in the region and has an important role to play in both multilateral and bilateral discussions. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . The image of others What is apparent from the policy is that Sweden identifies with Finland.sweden. and can be seen as rather a statement to gain respect as an Arctic state. 7 (introduction). EU. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . 12. the UN. retrieved 8 April 2012.Objectives and implementation in Arctic cooperation are divided into the different levels of cooperation with subsections regarding the AC.sweden.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . The overall objective is to guarantee that the Arctic is spared from political tension.gov. Further Sweden wants to coordinate the actions and take advantage of synergies within these various forums. The opportunities presented due to climate change should be managed through a broad concept of security including human security and where sustainable development and cooperation are priorities. 7 (introduction) 268 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. http://www. retrieved 8 April 2012. where the AC is the main venue for Arctic cooperation. economic development. Swedish priorities are specified into climate and environment. 2011.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. 2011. retrieved 8 April 2012. http://www.gov.15 70 .Given the subtleness accredited to the US policy the statement below might seem as one of insecurity concerning the future situation in the Arctic. Ministry of Foreign Affairs .se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. 14.sweden.14 271 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. Ministry of Foreign Affairs .14-15 274 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . retrieved 8 April 2012. http://www.gov.gov. Ministry of Foreign Affairs .gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. The importance of Nordic cooperation in prominent in the Swedish policy and it further emphasizes its declaration of solidarity towards the other Nordic countries. Ministry of Foreign Affairs .gov. retrieved 8 April 2012. http://www. http://www.sweden. 2011.275 Also in other aspects than security it highlights the Nordic cooperation and these statements can reflect a wish to emphasise the good relations and allegiance between Sweden and other Nordic states in particular.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.sweden. section listing other Arctic state policies) 270 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region.15 275 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. http://www. http://www. 37 273 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. where an increased interdependence is in focus: Sweden’s security po licy position based on security in cooperation means that the security policies of the EU member states and Nordic countries will strongly influence Swedish security policy273 and becoming even more closely interwoven with the political priorities of the other Nordic countries274.10 (introduction.gov. 2011. retrieved 8 April 2012.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. 2011.sweden.sweden.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. 2011. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . However the policy shows a readiness to partake more in the future international security arena. The Nordic region is an important part in the Arctic and it is also important that there is a forum for discussion on how the Nordic countries can jointly contribute to its development276 269 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. 2011.sweden. being dependent on states which of one is not straightforward in its commitment: the overall security policy climate in the Arctic is very much dependent on the relationship between Russia and the United States270 However Sweden emphasise that security challenges are not necessarily of a military nature271 and also stresses that the Arctic is rather characterized by cooperation than of conflict272 Further Sweden is a “neutral” state and promotes the use of civil rather than military means to solve disputes.sweden. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . 23 272 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. retrieved 8 April 2012. retrieved 8 April 2012. retrieved 8 April 2012. http://www. retrieved 8 April 2012. Ministry of Foreign Affairs .se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.9 (introduction.22 71 .40 278 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. 2011.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.sweden.sweden.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . http://www.gov. retrieved 4 August 2012. 2011. retrieved 8 April 2012. http://www. 2011. section presenting other Arctic state policies) 279 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. 2011. The view on cooperation Sweden also highlights the need for enhanced cooperation in the Arctic in general. http://www. but “speaking” also on behalf of others may be a sign that cooperation and relations are strong in the Nordic relations and both Finland and Iceland do acknowledge this common concern in their respective policies. where it highlights that: Finland’s position as an Arctic country in the Nordic region is very similar to Sweden’s278 It is important for Finland. http://www.22 280 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. Ministry of Foreign Affairs .sweden.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.gov. 2011.Cooperation across national borders in the North also helps to maintain good relations in the High North 277 Here the Nordic Council takes prominence even though the role of the Arctic Council is also important.20 277 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. The following quote enhances this 276 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region.gov. with a focus on international law. which may indicate a lack of trust or a step in the direction of closer relationships between the Arctic states.sweden. retrieved 8 April 2012. Iceland and Sweden to be able to participate in decisionmaking in cases where they have legitimate interests and that the status of the Arctic Council is maintained279 As seen above Sweden shares with Iceland and Finland an anxiety of being ousted in cooperation by the A5 and expose a willingness to strengthen the Arctic Council for the reason that: An energised Arctic Council could reduce the need for the coastal states to drive forward issues in the Arctic Five format280 These statements can be seen as a way for Sweden to strengthen the validity of its own position. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . retrieved 8 April 2012.sweden. http://www.gov. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . Sweden shows the strongest identification with the Nordic states as concerning its policy in the Arctic. This indicate that the group of Nordic states are seen as the closest to friends in Swedish considerations and a group of ‘we’ within the Arctic which is possibly exclusive towards other Arctic states. retrieved 8 April 2012. retrieved 8 April 2012. 2011.282 It is in Sweden’s interest that new emerging activities are governed by common and robust regulatory frameworks and above all that they focus on environmental sustainability.283 An enhanced role for the EU in Arctic cooperation is highlighted 284 but the focus on cooperation in the Arctic is on the existing regional forums such as the Nordic Council and the Arctic Council and stress that the role of the Arctic Council should be strengthened and its mandate broadened. retrieved 8 April 2012. 19 72 .sweden. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . 2011. confidence-building measures and cooperation in line with international law form the starting point for Sweden’s appro ach to security concerning the Arctic.4 (summary) 284 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. 285 This can be seen in light of the image of others above and may be interpreted as apprehension that other states might not be as keen to cooperate in the region and this emphasis on regulation of the Arctic relations can further be seen generally in the Arctic policy.gov. 2011.gov. http://www.sweden. http://www.5 (summary). 2011. http://www.sweden. http://www.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . 281 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. a need to enhance confidence it the region. demonstrating an anxiety that there might already or in the future a possibility that conflict will increase.sweden. retrieved 8 April 2012. retrieved 8 April 2012.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. transparency. 2011.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . Further given that the Nordic states are all members of the Arctic Council and since it is governed through unanimity the strengthening of the same can be seen as an extension to the relations between the Nordic countries and as a wish to further the patterns of good cooperation in the Nordic Council to socialize other Arctic states into the same culture.sweden. Ministry of Foreign Affairs .se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. 18. Dialogue.19 283 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region.gov. 4 (summary). 20 285 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. http://www.uncertainty since it indicates despite the statement of cooperation.19 282 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region.281 Arctic cooperation is characterised by a low level of conflict and broad consensus. Ministry of Foreign Affairs . p.9 United States of America Background The USA is an Arctic state that has shown relatively little interest in the region. Strategy” in Arctic security in an age of climate change.1. Cambridge University Press .287 This lack of interest is concurred by Heininen and Nicol who highlights the disinclination of American policy makers to promote formal relationships in the region and a lack of willingness to take a broader perspective outside of issue specific cooperation. p.133–165. the least preferred partner in the Arctic by people in the Arctic in 2011. p. 259-262 292 Ibid. Geopolitics.292 Summary of the US Arctic policy The Arctic policy of the USA is presented as a presidential directive on national and homeland security. It is ten pages in scope and written as a memorandum for various secretaries. 2007. Hence the text is formal and divided into sections of 286 J Kraska “The New Arctic Geography and U. responsibility” in The return of culture and identity in IR theory. 12 . Y Lapid Y & Kratochwil F (eds.5.) (Boulder Colorado 1996) Lynne Rienner Publishers.150-151 289 D Campbell “Violent performances: identity. This is explained by Kraska as being due to the fact that the American people as well as the Congress views the Arctic as peripheral in contrast to more urgent domestic and foreign policy needs286 and he predicts that the aftermath to the financial crisis will contribute to sustain this stance towards the Arctic will remain for some time. p..288 Authors such as Campbell emphasizes that “the identity and role of the United States in the postwar world” can be understood as “a struggle over identity” that is not isolated to military threats but rather a moral one and an idea that the US was a key player and necessary actor in any international action289 and according to Flikke the Arctic is still sensitive to shifts in US-Russian relations.p.256-257 287 Ibid. 163 290 G Flikke p. sovereignty. p.).290 According to Kraska the only real national interest of the USA in the Arctic is that concerning freedom of navigation over which there are disputes in particular regarding the Northwest Passage and anxieties in the USA that if the freedom of navigation is infringed upon this can have consequences for the freedom of navigation globally291. USA was according to Kraska after China.S.. administrators and directors.256-258 288 L Heininen & H Nicol “The Importance of Northern Dimension Foreign Policies in the Geopolitics of the Circumpolar North”. 257-258 73 . Kraska J (ed.:69 291 J Kraska p. New York 2011 p. homeland and defense policies of the USA. Maritime transportation in the Arctic region. considers access to the Arctic Ocean and sharing of research platforms in the Arctic and the policy stresses better coordination with in particular Russia. International governance where the policy states that the AC should remain under its mandate and not be transformed into a formal international organization. USA further want to be a leader in Arctic research. Freedom of the seas is a prominent feature but the policy also encourage disputes to be resolved by peaceful means. background and policy. The background and policy are presented below: The background to the Arctic policy claims that the USA has an undeniable interests in the Arctic by the virtue of it being an Arctic nation and that the increased interest in Arctic resources. The promoting international scientific cooperation. However protection of the interests of the USA is key. The purpose refers to which directives this policy supersedes and will not be addressed here. which emphasize that the USA will operate independently or in conjunction with other states in military terms increasing its military capabilities and presence in the Arctic. is framed in terms of safety and environmentally sound commerce and the need for well functioning infrastructure by working through international established forums on the matter. but does not exclude other forums to be extended or new arrangements to be considered. 74 . Economic issues including energy will be developed with stake-holders but with concern for the environment and indigenous peoples and in cooperation with other Arctic states in extraction of resources. must alter the national-. Extended continental shelf and boundary issues are highlighted in terms of defining the areas to which the USA can claim sovereignty and take measure to resolve existing disputes with Canada and Russia. This regards in particular the UNCLOS which the policy encourages accession to. the visual change in climate and the work of the AC the region. The policy is divided in to: National security and Homeland security interests in the Arctic.purpose. Environmental protection and conservation of natural resources is according to the policy still in need of further research and efforts in this area should be increased in order to mitigate impacts on the Arctic environment.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25. Sovereignty and interest of a military and resource character has a strong emphasis.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25. retrieved 8 April 2012 http://www. The image of others The Arctic policy of the USA does not refer specifically to other actors in the region hence there is a lack of language to analyze to some extent.nsf. land and sea borders in the Arctic region 293 and to assert a more active and influential national presence to protect its Arctic interests and to project sea power throughout the region294 The policy concur that the freedom of the seas is stated to be a top national priority. as necessary.66.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.296 Such words gives the impression that there is an imminent threat to these interests.66. however the language of the American policy is one with a national focus.pdf 75 .66. This may be the case for all Arctic states.pdf 295 National security presidential directive/nspd. and it may be claimed to be directed mainly at a domestic audience. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd.nsf. http://www. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.nsf. National Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic region: B 3. On the other hand the exclusion of references to other actors can indicate that the USA misses the identification to the Arctic and 293 National security presidential directive/nspd. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd. National Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic region: B 6 a.66. The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy The Arctic policy of the USA is mainly centered on its own national interest. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd.25.pdf 294 National security presidential directive/nspd.25.25. National Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic region: B 5. rather than just a precaution for a possible scenario in the Arctic. retrieved 8 April 2012. One of the chronological top priorities is to: develop greater capabilities and capacity. to protect United States air.nsf.25. National Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic region: B 5. retrieved 8 April 2012 http://www.pdf 296 National security presidential directive/nspd.295 Preserving rights in the Arctic is seen as a prerequisite for the ability of the USA to maintain this right in other vital and strategic straits globally. retrieved 8 April 2012 http://www. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd.299 Cooperation in the US Arctic policy is discussed in terms of achieving national interests by “ coordination with the Russian Federation ”300 “consult with other Arctic nations” and “ facilitating access to ” the Arctic Ocean or natural resources.pdf 299 National security presidential directive/nspd.pdf 301 National security presidential directive/nspd. http://www. retrieved 8 April 2012.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25. National Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic region: B 6 e.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25. http://www. The policy is largely issue specific as regards cooperation but does not exclude international cooperation.its actors in this context that can be found in the policies of other Arctic states. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd.25.301 However it also sees “the value and effectiveness of 297 National security presidential directive/nspd. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd. http://www. International Governance C 2.66.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25. retrieved 8 April 2012. 298 referring to national security interests.pdf 300 National security presidential directive/nspd. National Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic region: B 1 .25.nsf. in fact it “encourages peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region”.pdf 76 . http://www.nsf.25.25.nsf. At the same time it point to the possibility that other actors are not necessarily viewed as peaceful regarding disputes in the region.66. 297 Admittedly this does not say much about the view of others specifically but it gives an indication that other actors are capable to solve disputes in a peaceful way.nsf. retrieved 8 April 2012. Promoting International Scientific Cooperation E 1. retrieved 8 April 2012. http://www. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd. Even though the policy highlights that cooperative institutions in the Arctic should be strengthened it is one of few Arctic states who wishes the Arctic Council to remain a highlevel forum under its current mandate and that it should not be granted to evolve “into a formal international organisation…with asserted contributions”. The view on cooperation The policy states that the USA is “ prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests ”.pdf 298 National security presidential directive/nspd.66.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25. Promoting International Scientific Cooperation E 1 retrieved 8 April 2012.66.66. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd.25. 66. not a will for coordinated policies and general cooperation. retrieved 8 April 2012.pdf 306 National security presidential directive/nspd.66. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd. including energy G 2. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25. 302 National security presidential directive/nspd.306 Again the cooperation is phrased in terms which imply cooperation out of necessity.66. http://www.pdf 77 .nsf.existing fora.305 This encouragement is however termed in the context of gaining access and to “have a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted”.nsf.304 In spite of this disregard for formalisation of the Arctic Council the Arctic policy encourages the senate in terms of accession on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.nsf. retrieved 8 April 2012.66. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.nsf.25. including energy G 3.pdf 304 National security presidential directive/nspd. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd.25.25. however in its full context it is clear that cooperation mechanisms are to be used only in event of mutual concerns. http://www. retrieved 8 April 2012. http://www.nsf. possible disputes or in order to pursue national interests that are subject to differing opinions in international relations.pdf 303 National security presidential directive/nspd.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25. retrieved 8 April 2012. International Governance C 4.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf 305 National security presidential directive/nspd. http://www.25. http://www.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25. International Governance C 4. 303 This may seem as a rather indistinct policy by the statements above. Economic issues. such as the Arctic Council”302 and emphasizes that it aims “to continuing to work closely with other Arctic nations”. Environmental protection and conservation of natural resources: H 6 e. Economic issues. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd. retrieved 8 April 2012.66.25. What this means in terms of the culture of the Arctic relations and the possibilities of cooperation will be analysed in the following chapter. This is peculiar given that the sole regulative body at present is the UNCLOS.General conclusions on patterns of the Arctic policies: There is a recurring notion that the Arctic needs to be regulated by international treaties. Further this expose a staggering faith in the power of international treaties as a base for cooperation. Yet focusing on security and the individual interests to bring security onto the agenda or having an opinion on the situation of Arctic security. No evidence can be seen that there are outspoken threats in the policies. Moreover some states are more inclined to speak in terms of common values and close cooperation than others and there are differences in the views of cooperative structures. However it also indicates that there is a trust that such agreements will be adhered to by the parties. hence one can read into this that there is a lack of comprehensive trust within the cooperation. Moreover all states are compellingly promoting their own interests in the region and show an inclination to represent their own interests and the way they deal with international relations to be the model way to go about Arctic affairs. sends a message to other actors that the self “come in peace” but also recognizes that there is a possibility that others might not. a sort of promotion of peace and stability as an order in the Arctic region. 78 . Further this can be seen as a way of trying to convince others that there should be no violence in the region. in the sense that relations needs treaties in order to be regulated. stability and cooperation. This does not exclude that states are unwilling to defend sovereignty with military means. and another recurring jargon is that the region is one of peace. retrieved 22 April 2012. Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. Our Heritage. http://formin. give the perception that USA has limited cooperation interests in 307 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region.sweden. in terms of defining the region. retrieved 9 April 2012. resting mainly on protection of border sovereignty and resources. Analytical discussion In this section there will be an extended analysis of the findings from the Arctic policies in relation to the theoretical background. What characterize the policies of Arctic states.finland.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians. retrieved 25 January 2012 http://www.utanrikisraduneyti. retrieved 8 April 2012. and indeed shows an Arctic identity in matters regarding regional issues. however this can be a consequence of the routine of referring to its north in terms not particularly as Arctic. retrieved 8 April 2012 http://eng. May 5 2011. Our Future.gov.309 Canada gives the image of a strong identification with the region with a focus on the peoples living in the north310.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policyapproved-by-Althingi. http://um. The analysis will be divided under the headings of my research questions.308 Denmark is a state which recognizes itself as an Arctic state even though this relies on parts of the realm which is gaining ever more independence from the central authority.pdf 309 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020.ca/index-eng. Sweden and Finland seems to have a lack of confidence as Arctic states307.gc. The analytical discussion and the conclusions drawn are subject to the authors’ own interpretations of the policies . http://www. Iceland is confident that it is an Arctic state while struggling to be recognised by others as a coastal state and wanting to bring forth an Arctic concept more suitable for its own self-image.northernstrategy.fi/public/download. by giving examples of why it is and should be a legitimate actor.6. The limited interests of the USA in the Arctic.asp 79 . Ottawa 2009. other actors and the self? It seems that some countries are still struggling to claim their role and right to be an actor in the Arctic. but Denmark is aware of the Kingdoms responsibilities regarding matters in forums where for example Greenland has no voice.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC834EA16C26D07}.ashx 310 Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North. This may reflect power relations in international relations in general since all states implies that there is to be an increased focus on the Arctic in the future.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 308 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy. This is a consequence of the constructivist stance taken in this thesis. html?id=448697 80 . Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finland and Iceland shows this in stronger terms relating to Arctic issues than do Denmark and Norway. however the anxiety lies in the possibility that there will be a broadened scope of the A5 cooperation leading to a neglect for other forums where the membership stretches further. http://www. . Iceland and Sweden share the image of the A5 as a group constituted to exclude them in important Arctic decisions. However they along with Denmark and Norway share to some extent common grounds in the Nordic cooperation and identifies themselves as a “we”. even though the USA frames this division in nationalistic terms.311 It is also an indication that the USA is the state which has the least identification with the Arctic and that the region has a very limited part in its self-image.25.regjeringen.the region. USA and to a lesser extent Russia are the states which are least inclined to use a language which indicates restricted cooperation whereas the Nordic states and Canada speaks in more debt about enhancing and broadening the scope of cooperation. http://www. Homeland security presidential directive/hspd. Hence there is a ‘we’ and ‘them’ division between the west and Russia. and the specific Arctic policy does not give at hand that it feels threatened or any signs of aggression.perunconsulting. All but Russia and the USA show willingness to strengthen the cooperation in terms that will 311 National security presidential directive/nspd.66.313 Finland. but all emphasise the importance to protect sovereignty and the need for security measures in the region. The Ilulissat declaration is welcomed however in the sense that common solutions and the adherence to international law is encouraged.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtionplans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north. http://www. retrieved 8 April 2012. implying that there is a fear that other actors might act in aggressive means regarding the protection of their sovereignty. 312 Norway takes an integrated approach to its High North. Russia is the actor which all the other states mention in sceptical terms but at the same time it is still seen as a vital actor to incorporate in Arctic issues .pdf 312 Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond. Russia identifies with the region in economic terms. The protectionism seen in the policy of the USA verges in a way to that of a state under threat. There is in none of the policies an outspoken willingness to completely stay outside of cooperation in all areas.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225 313 The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy.nsf. but where focus is mainly domestic and with strong references to Russia’s role in Arctic management. even though Sweden. retrieved 8 April 2012. The assumption that the region is driven by a will to achieve stable and consistent cooperation even though risking an infliction on state sovereignty is true to some extent.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25. retrieved 7 May 2012. In cooperation terms. or a victim. adhering to norms such as the value of cooperation for the sake of peace and stability. Admittedly the Arctic policies cannot reflect all shades in the relations. whereas it is also mentioned by Denmark and Norway. It might be rational to solve problems collectively but giving up sovereignty on issues which are subject to national interests is not. can to some extent be confirmed. such as the ‘ we’ sense in the Nordic policies as well as strengthening the scope of the Arctic Council. The fact that most states show willingness to cooperate and give precedence and funding to Arctic cooperation forums shows friendly intent and inclusive relations.ultimately limit the role of individual national interests. yet there is evidence that certain national interests coincides with the interests of others and hence pose relatively little threat to sovereignty. Further Norway places strong weight as do Finland on the involvement of Russia in the cooperation. Both Norway and Finland criticise Russia on a normative basis of human rights and environmental terms. still other actors are highlighted more and even though Denmark intends to strengthen the Arctic Council. This may reflect different things in the relationship between the Arctic countries. However sovereignty and national interests are still prominent in each of the policies. Canada for example shows that the USA is its most important partner in Arctic relations whereas the USA focuses mainly on itself and the own interests in the Arctic policy. however there are many traits to the individual policies which cannot be explained by rationality. 314 Wendt Social Theory of International Politics chapter 6 81 . which can contribute to future perceptions of the same in line with Wendt’s cultures314. This framing of cooperation can be seen to some extent in a rational way. the A5 is still an important forum. however the lack of acknowledgement of the relationships in the Arctic makes analysis of overall relations less transparent. The assumption that there might be stronger ties between certain countries and evidence of friendship relations. The situation is the same in the Nordic relations. at the same time Russia does not give any of the western countries particular weight in its Arctic policy. The Arctic policy of the USA might indeed be perceived as an unwillingness to cooperate and might reduce its chances to gain assurance from other states. yet they want to incorporate Russia into their own normative framework. Iceland and Finland are the states which focus the most on Nordic relations. where Sweden. which if given stronger mandate will take on issues that might infringe on national decision-making. however this relationship is more explicitly expressed by certain actors than others. whereas Russia’s seemingly straightforward intentions can contribute to stability in the region and assurance of peaceful resolution of disputes. Further there are no signs that the A5 constellation will be dissolved once the aim of the Ilulissat declaration is resolved.essays in international relations theory. 347 318 Wendt.319 If only common interests are present in a rational sense then there is little prospect for a satisfactory outcome and future cooperation. p.57 319 Breitmeier p. such as adherence to international agreements. “Alternative Perspectives on National Security” p. and an unwillingness by the USA to enhance the role of the Arctic Council.320 Presently there is a fear of exclusion by certain states in the Arctic cooperation. However many statements also indicate an active persuasion language in the sense of contributing in trying to change prior images accentuated by Wendt. the structure and organization of the Arctic Council has become more strongly asserted. Moreover even lacking the support of the USA. this is particularly true for the US policy. 146-147 82 . Vertzberger’s stance that decisions about others are historically bound317 can serve as an explanation to why other states are anxious about Russia. In particular the collective expectations for proper behaviour.56 320 Keohane. This illustrate s an attempt to socialize other actors into cooperation on friendly terms in the Arctic.136. through not least the permanent secretariat. For a functional cooperation on a long term basis inclusion of relevant actors and determination of cooperative form is equally important as highlighted by Keohane. as emphasized by Katzenstein 316 can be seen in the Arctic policies.” Identity and structural change in International Politics”. Cambridge University chapter 6 P J Katzenstein . mainly in terms of environment.99. p. “The contingent legitimacy of multilateralism p. which projects a strong stance on security.How can these characteristics influence cooperation in the Arctic as an international region? Norms can play a part. Newman p. namely as a result of the Ilulissat declaration. which might indicate that other actors than the USA. Part of the theoretical departure in this thesis is that enduring cooperation needs to rest on common interests and values as well as end and means of the same.315 Some norms are prominent in the Arctic polices and all states project their own norms. when influencing the images of states depending on how deep the culture is embedded within the relations. All these are influencing the possibility for cooperation and the norms of the individual states shine through in the language of the policies. Stein p. according to Wendt.5 317 Vertzberger. p.57. human rights and a faith in and importance of international agreements. Keohane International institutions and state power. 140-142.318 both regarding the own view of others as well as other’s view of the self. holds the position of being critical states in the sense which Finnemore 315 316 Wendt Social Theory of International Politics. Finnemore & Sikkink. human rights and environmental values. Flikke p. The outreach to Russia is important given the inclusion of the relevant actors in cooperation mentioned above. Concerning the Arctic cooperation in terms of Wendtian cultures. Even so. and hence we cannot put the whole cooperation culture in the Arctic within one of these categories. which here is interpreted as a step towards better inclusion and possibly acceptance for western values and in the long term this may be a way to socialize Russia into the norms and values of the other Arctic states if it is indeed included and socialized into gaining a common Arctic identity.321 As some authors mention above Russia sees international relations as dominated by the west and western institutions and viewing international relations in a different way than the west. even so not all see climate change as being a menace and the same is true for external actors impinging on the Arctic sphere. when looking at the group of Arctic states as a whole. it would be thoughtless to place all relations within the same culture.323 and then the Arctic Council could become a more prominent and stable form for overall. 901 Antrim p. 902-903 83 . p. This uncertainty in light of the theoretical departures would indicate that cooperation might fail in the future. yet it is unlike that western states will change their self-image regarding democracy. Rather there might be layers within these cultures where some are more dominant than other traits.” Identity and structural change in International Politics” p. simply want to have its voice heard in international relations.137. This however is something that is missing overall in the Arctic cooperation.57. This however does not exclude that other states may also be influenced by Russian values. Wendt . Russia seems to be striving to gain a friendlier image in Arctic relations. p. On the other hand reluctant states can be socialized into the view of the majority. p. hence there might be relationships between certain actors that fit in one culture whereas this is not true for all. 322 In the policies of mainly the Nordic states there are signs to invite Russia to take a more prominent part in cooperation.80-81.and Sikkink emphasize. however as it seems. 271-272. stronger influence in the region. The strong focus on international law or legal agreements can be an utterance to adhere and adapt to a larger 321 322 Finnemore & Sikkink. Hence a stronger unity is presently lacking. Presently the common threat to be seen in the Arctic policies is that of environmental degradation. As seen here there is not currently a cohesive picture of what constitute Arctic cooperation as a whole. The various states have different relations towards different actors. on western terms.106 323 Baker. Zysk p. these are not in terms of eliminating an enemy. in statements that the region should be one of peace and stability. Further some states claim that the military presence is due to protect resources and for search and rescue missions.282 84 . 325 even though there are statements that claims that states will protect sovereignty and interests. There are no straightforward Hobbesian traits in any of the policies and even though there are sections of proof for a “we” and ”them” language.. however it cannot simply be boiled down to a rhetoric of good intentions. this both regarding territory as well as resources. These interests can be seen as in need of protection rather in a sense of deter intrusion. there is no hostility towards the group as such in its 324 325 Wendt Social Theory of International Politics p. Norm abiding can be seen in the policies as a strategy to formalise stronger cooperation and stability in order to face the opportunities and human security threats in the region. however give at hand an anxiety or distrust amongst the Arctic states but not on the verge of enmity in Hobbesian terms. Hence military presence is for protection. Given this.262-263 Ibid. where the sense of rule of law is prominent and conflicts are not immediately resolved by violence.international society or a way to make sure that other actors which may act in a threatening way will not harm self or its interests. In terms of a Kantian culture there are traces to be found in particular for the relations between the Nordic states. The emphasis to include for example Russia in cooperation shows that perhaps a notion that Russia would be a threat if it is not included and including all actors in the region will eliminate the possibility for Hobbesian conditions. The Lockean traits are numerous in the Arctic policies. in terms of rivals for normative stances. This. Even though Iceland felt rejected by its fellow Nordic states during its difficulties in the financial crises. violence is condemned by all. this however may be seen as a typical rivalry trait. political influence and natural resources. p. since the recognition of sovereignty is not threatened. rather the we and them constellations show more Lockean traits. If there was a pure friendship relationship within Arctic cooperation there would be no need to state the obvious. The need to vocalise this in the policies shall not simply be seen as a anxiety of military violence in the region. not aggression. Nevertheless there is a build -up of military capabilities. a peaceful relationship. All states imply the willingness for a peaceful and stable region on the prerequisites that their own sovereignty is kept intact. But reinforcing character of the social cultures can strengthen cooperation324 where such is already initiated and this can in extension enforce stronger relations in the region. Arctic policy.. Rather it is a combination of Lockean and Kantian cultures. Rather it may strengthen international law adherence which could spill over onto different areas of international cooperation. science and which country is the best model for development. this may imply that it might be difficult for other states to gain access to be part of this exclusive group and this may hinder the development of an overall Kantian culture in the Arctic cooperation. the tone of sovereignty and military presence. Hence Arctic relations do not fully align with the friendship criteria. Given all this is safe to say that there is not one single culture represented in the Arctic cooperation. Since there is a Nordic cluster with historical and political ties. which will not implicate wider international conflicts or military involvement. But also in Norway’ s statement to aim to protect the interest of its allies and partners in the region. 326 Ibid. where relations can be seen as layered both between actors but also between the issues at hand. p. does not suggest that collaboration on threats from third parties in terms of non-arctic states. are not the most prominent. Since all states highlight the importance of negotiation and arbitration through international law. Solidarity is typical for a Kantian culture 326 and as seen this solidarity is only directed towards other Nordic states. There is evidence that the states in particular amongst the Nordic and EU states of what Wendt call multiple group identification. This trait is clearest in the Swedish policy where the unilateral solidarity is present. but neither is there a prominent we stance. with diverse allegiances to different constellations of cooperation but as seen above there are still strong interests which can be regarded as exclusively egoistic.298–301 85 . The relations in the Arctic are unlikely to develop into violent conflict based on the language in the policies studied. The friendship between the Nordic states is there and there in some Nordic states’ policy but a general ‘ we’ sense between them in not apparent in the Arctic policies. Further there is rivalry between the actors. Even though not purely in utility maximizing terms. even though most prominently this rivalry regards resources. International relations can be said to be dependent of regional relations. it might be suggested that there is a culture of friendship in the Arctic. The sense of exclusion is rather on a broader scope. However. If Arctic cooperation is managed in accordance with the policies there will be an orderly situation in the Arctic region. However the selfimages found in the language of the policies here indicate that these cultures are present with prospects to develop. This can be explanation to this ambiguity due to their respective influence on international relations. There are prominent layers of both Kantian and Lockean traits in the Arctic cooperation. This self-fulfilling prophecy is difficult to measure in this type of study since it needs a comparison through time and possibly in different forums. However there is a language in all policies which emphasize a will to cooperate in the region. this study does not intend to reveal a positivist truth and hence the above is merely one interpretation of the Arctic relations. In light of this there are prospects for a functional cooperation. There is not currently a cohesive picture of what constitute Arctic cooperative relations as a whole.7. No obvious Hobbesian characteristics are present. with rivalry elements. in terms of images. There are however signs of anxiety as to the development in the region in all policies. The reflections of different relations within the Arctic results in slightly ambiguous views of the overall cooperation in the region. 86 . as well as the formulations of cooperation in the Arctic. however there is an uncertainty as regards the implementation of these goals as in terms of collective action. There are individual policy goals of the states which often coincide. however cooperation. It is rather subject to different cultures which reflect the various relations and ties between the involved states. which bodes for good prospects of cooperation. This uncertainty could indicate that cooperation might fail in the future. As stated in the chapter on thesis aim. can mean a more stable and predictable situation in the Arctic given the background that being part of a social structure reinforces relations into self-fulfilling prophecies which could influence also other spheres of international relations. The Kantian traits are most prominent in terms of relations within the Nordic countries and overall Lockean traits can be found in terms of the emphasis of references to international agreements found in the policy documents. USA and Russia are the states which are least expressive as regards their relations to the Arctic and within Arctic cooperation. which seems to be in progress in the Arctic relations. Concluding remarks and further research The general conclusion of this thesis is that Arctic cooperation cannot with ease be sorted into one specific relations pattern. Moreover a will to socialize other actors into a cooperative and even friendly culture. Further as the EU policy on the Arctic is formalized the role and influence of the Arctic states on this policy and their contributions to the policy could shed a new light on the cooperation in the Arctic. in its various spheres. Other traits which was not possible to include in this thesis but might be of interest in the field is that of the discourse within the bureaucracy of the various cooperation forums working on Arctic issues. as well as the influence of norm entrepreneurs in Arctic relations.Relevant topics for further research could be a study on the developments over time of the perceptions of others and the self in the Arctic region. as well as the influence of other actors such as non-Arctic states and other stakeholders in the region. 87 . 1095-1111 Baker. Ithaca & London. Barents Euro Arctic Council. Vol. 2008. retrieved 18 September 2012. Stefansson Arctic Institute . No. 2010. Arctic Council website.) Textens mening och makt. 87 No 2. Kraska J (ed. http://www. 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English translation published: 25 November 2010.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225 Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на период до 2020 года и дальнейшую перспективу http://www.html the Arctic policy in Russian Published/approved by Dmitrij Medvedev 18 September 2008. http://www.pdf 96 .ru/documents/98.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.66.scrf.gov. shtml 97 .APPENDIX Map of the Arctic The map illustrates the Arctic Ocean with surrounding states. http://geology. Copyright: Brad Cole Geology.com.com/world/arctic-ocean-map.