The Impact of Political Marketing on Internal Party Democracy by Darren Lilleker

Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 58 No.3, 2005, 570–584 Advance Access Publication 7 July 2005 The Impact of Political Marketing on Internal Party Democracy BY DARREN G. LILLEKER THE introduction of marketing concepts and philosophy into political policy formulation and communication is increasingly seen as a core feature of party electoral strategy. Over the past four decades parties across Europe have brought in consultants to support their campaigning, conducted research to aid the design of communication and used techniques associated with branding when constructing symbolic representations of their party. Leaders’ style and image, key messages, party motifs, as well as the various modes of advertising, are all part of sophisticated marketing strategies more associated with producers of fast moving consumer goods than with political parties. Whilst some commentators argue that such developments are necessary in the face of an increasingly non-aligned, apolitical and consumerist electorate, it is also suggested that such strategies have negative implications for the future of politics in western liberal democracies. Critics of political marketing argue that it has replaced ideology with opportunism and downgraded the role of party members, exacerbating the crisis of support and legitimacy currently facing political parties. It is possible to argue that political marketing can offer benefits to the voters, by providing greater democratisation through constant market research. In nations where the party structure is weak, and democracy is not fully embedded, the design of party policy around voter groups’ needs and wants may underpin the development of democracy. However, within the majority of western democracies, where parties initially formed out of groups claiming to represent societal segments—such as the British Labour Party’s historical link with the trade union movement—the relationship between voters and parties is more complex. Parties are embedded within society; their names signify certain values, policies and beliefs. On the basis of this they have a broad range of supporters with differing levels of loyalty and attachment. There are paid-up members who act as advocates for the party and provide active support during elections campaigns; there are loyal supporters, who perform many of the same functions despite not holding formal membership; and, finally, there are weak supporters, whose loyalty is more fragile and who are more likely to adopt an economic model when determining their level of support. Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 58 No. 3 © The Author [2005]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government; all rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] doi: 10.1093/pa/gsi052 This model infers that voters make decisions about which party to support. Parties and members: working together for shared goals? There are a number of perspectives from which we can study the role and motivations of party members and the way in which parties could or should interact with their membership. With partisanship decreasing and fewer voters possessing lifetime attachments to one party or another. prospective parliamentary candidates from the 2001 General Election. The article looks at the nature of the parties’ internal relations. it is useful to explore the normative view of the relationship between parties and their members. Parties are increasingly attempting to develop strategies that target the same segment—floating voters—overlooking those who they would once have considered ‘their’ voters and who in turn saw the party as ‘theirs’. This apparent quantitative shift away from concern with ideology and belief in codes or creeds. whose support is critical for a party seeking to win power. This approach leads to a breakdown in the relationship between the party and its members and loyal supporters. and data gathered from a survey of voters during the 2004 local and European Parliament elections. as well as with sections of its weaker support. Brands divide the market between them. Importantly they will seek to understand ‘their’ customers and provide the goods and services they require. interviews with Conservative MPs. It then offers some general observations regarding the changing nature of parties and their internal relations as they appear to move towards an electoral professional model. including: focus groups with current and former Labour Party members from heartland Labour constituencies. First. the floating voter is seen as an important segment that needs strategic targeting through political marketing. The empirical data is drawn from a range of sources. These can be divided geographically or by socio-demographics. the major supermarkets will compete on the borders of their catchments for customers. towards a greater focus on which party would be the best managers has created a greater number of floating voters. and has been referred to in America as ‘pocket book voting’. Without developing a theoretical . while others will target poorer households. Such a strategy could have a profoundly negative effect on political parties as we know them.Political Marketing and Internal Party Democracy 571 The economic model of voting is said to prevail amongst the undecided or floating voter. and Conservative Association members from one solid Conservative stronghold. based upon a calculation of which party or candidate will provide them with the better standard of living and best respond to their individual needs and concerns. squeezing out competition and staking a claim on key segments. however. their implementation of political marketing techniques and the resultant attitudes of members and supporters. This article focuses on the effects of political marketing upon internal party democracy in the British Labour and Conservative Parties. ’ While there was no theoretical basis to this statement. argued: ‘Labour is for the little people in the nation. One working class Labour member. this rationale was central to this individual’s view of the party. deliver leaflets. While it is clear that people with environmental concerns will be more likely to join organisations such as Greenpeace. canvass voters and knock-up their supporters on election day: as such they are the lifeblood of a party. Friends of the Earth or the Green Party. The lack of state funding in the UK makes such members of great importance. A Conservative. and will develop a political programme that is designed to facilitate that society’s creation. The first key point is why people join political parties. it is less tangible why individuals join a mass political party.’ While neither of the above quotes should be taken as a statement of either party’s political identity (though they mirror to some extent the statements from many of the respective party leaders over the last forty or so years) they represent the motivational factors of two members and are indicative of why people join. he personally linked it to why he would always support Labour. Evidence suggests that local campaigning is increasingly important in generating support for a party and encouraging electoral turnout generally. we think those who invest deserve to get a return. They are the parties’ foot-soldiers. who joined the party in 1954. such as a mention of socialism. Collectively.572 Parliamentary Affairs analysis of parties’ internal relations. The belief in a common societal goal motivates people not just to join but to support campaigning activities. or any practical examples to explain what he meant in real terms. Parties such as Labour and the Conservatives do not exist to raise awareness of one particular cause or to defend a particular social group. organise and coordinate campaigning activities. prospering. others give a great deal of their time to trying to get ‘their’ parties elected. the parties are working to create a certain kind of society based on key values to which the membership subscribe. who joined the party in 1949 and remains a loyal member and supporter. Despite the power of business. it does what it can for people like me. Some give money.1 Especially in target . offered a similarly conceptual perspective when asked why she had joined and remained a staunch member: ‘We are for a strong nation based upon the power of the people to go about their lives. what members recognise is a shared social vision. they will run local offices. it defends the poor and downtrodden. building their families and homes and supporting them through hard work. The longevity of political parties in Britain suggests that they have developed clear identities associated with sets of social values that are shared by large numbers of the public. We don’t think we should do everything for those who won’t do for themselves. Their identities are perhaps best expressed in the words of long serving members from both parties. there are a number of important issues that need to be introduced to provide the context for the discussion. Joining a political organisation suggests a commitment to its values and programme. The models of political marketing developed by Bruce Newman and Jennifer Lees-Marshment suggest a linear top-down approach: the party leaders gather data from market intelligence. tends to shift power away from the local associations and members towards the central office. The removal of power from the mass membership is. These twin factors can cause grass roots members and party leaders to become more distant: for some members it can cause a complete breakdown of relations ending in divorce. door-to-door canvassing and general advocacy work is crucial to the success of a party at the polls. the activity of grass roots members in leaflet delivery. Market research showed that they could be tempted back if changes were made . most obvious in the case of the UK Labour Party from the 1990s onwards. a policy being advocated or the candidate or leader being promoted. which can leave ordinary members feeling alienated. as discussed further below. some will withdraw their support and membership. and filter this throughout the party to ensure a coherent campaign. campaign message or political outcome. Equally. those where there is a narrow margin between the two major competitors. Sometimes they will withhold their services because they disagree with the message on a leaflet. This section focuses on the reorientation of the balance of power necessitated for the implementation of political marketing strategies and discusses how this shapes the UK parties’ political programmes.Political Marketing and Internal Party Democracy 573 seats. perhaps. but also in the way that party leaders and strategists think. Members may not always exercise their power. and the potential for them to express themselves may well be limited. In the protracted review process which began in the mid 1980s. Nevertheless it is clear that power must be reoriented in the process of marketisation. develop a political strategy—including both policy and communication. Consequently. Decision-making becomes centralised within a leadership cadre. The party leaderships’ need for members gives those members power. If the party moves away from the core principles that motivate members to join and be active supporters. Labour’s strategy guru Philip Gould suggested that the party should reorient its political programme towards ‘Middle England’: an amorphous group that had abandoned Labour in favour of the Conservatives. The use of political marketing. however they remain a group that demands a say over the party’s direction. members are needed— though party leaders may sometimes wish they were not. associated strategies have the tendency to shift power away from core supporters and members towards the floating voter. Bringing the marketing in: changing the balance of power The introduction of a marketing philosophy to political behaviour necessitates changes not only in the way that parties develop policy or communicate messages.2 The role of market intelligence in the policy development process is fairly opaque because it is difficult to link directly the gathering of data to the production of a manifesto promise. is that it was rigidly controlled by the leadership. The problem for Labour’s leadership was that dissent did not go away. which had been drafted in 1918 and contained the commitment to the ultimate object of ‘common ownership of the means of production’. large sections of the existing membership were concerned about the reforms being enacted in the name of securing broader support. accepted at the April 1995 special party conference. while defecting MP Paul Marsden recorded stories of bullying by the whips for his opposing air strikes against Afghanistan. The economy and law and order were high priorities. in practice. The Conservatives’ open warfare over Britain’s position in the European Union lost the party. Importantly. In an effort to marginalize and minimise dissent over the rightward policy shift. particularly after the damaging debacle surrounding the UK’s 1992 withdrawal from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. and its leader. Though. in particular weakening its ties to the trade unions and abandoning of its policy of nationalisation. The newer version. In particular. much credibility. but at what cost?3 Labour MPs and candidates who do not support what is sometimes referred to as ‘The Blair Project’ express serious misgivings about the . Thus marketisation of the Labour Party removed the vestiges of democracy that many in the party saw as fundamental. was seen by critics as vague and marking a decisive break between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Labour. What they appeared to want was a party that descended from the Conservatives— although not the Conservatives as they were in the mid 1990s. What is significant about the redesign of the party. John Major. Despite an influx of new members. wanted politically. partly resulting in the invention of spin as Labour’s sleaze.574 Parliamentary Affairs to the party. were awarded celebrity status as they highlighted the ‘Stalinism’ within the party. such as the disbarred candidate for Leeds North East and Labour NEC constituency representative Liz Davies. Dissent was met by increasingly fierce briefing in the lobby by Labour’s ministers and press officers. Figures with little public status. and its subsequent mode of policy design. many expressed deep unease about the reform of clause IV of the Labour constitution. as were more traditional welfare policies that were identified as Labour’s strengths. some of whom were from within ‘New’ Labour’s target group. clause IV had exercised little influence over Labour policy since the 1940s—particularly when the party had been in government—its significance lay in its aspiration to create a socialist society. Market research was employed to uncover what it was that ‘Middle England’. enormous emphasis was placed on the need to secure victory at the polls after eighteen consecutive years of Conservative rule. research indicated that disunity was unattractive in a party. NEC members argued that they were marginalized in favour of the Blairite National Policy Forum. Labour’s story is perhaps a question of marketisation. the floating C1 or C2 voters. The Labour leadership team and their advisors created what some academics have described as a slightly adjusted version of Thatcherism. William Hague’s first task on becoming leader in 1997 was to attempt to follow the Spanish Conservative Prime Minister Aznar’s three steps to election victory: show the party who is boss. as power could not be wrested from the semi-autonomous associations around which the party is formed. However. Iain Duncan Smith. establish the party as a credible opposition. and unity between leaders and members around the future direction of the party. who had been elected to the Commons in 1997 but refused to stand again due to the ‘pressures’ placed upon her. the Conservative Party still seems unable to reach the second step. some candidates argued that the party seemed no longer interested in ‘conscience politics’. In the era of managerial politics. a former Labour colleague observed that it was unsurprising that ‘some people can’t take that pressure’. ideas may still underpin political decisions. and subsequently Major’s premiership. He was subsequently defeated at the 2001 election by an Independent candidate who campaigned solely on the hospital question. and position the party in the public perception as a credible opposition. However. the parliamentary party descended into disunity and was perceived by voters as lacking competence. a shift some find difficult to accept. Labour MP for Wyre Forest 1997–2001. Fellow candidates felt they could be similarly hindered in doing their job. Fellow party members suggested that her decision was chiefly due to the way in which she was treated by the whips after showing opposition to the reforms to benefits for single parents. ‘it is impossible to serve a constituency if the party ties your hands. This attitude means that decisions cannot be open for ideological debate. There is evidence that backbenchers have become increasingly militant and are often willing to oppose the party leadership in significant numbers. was maintained to a far greater extent than in the Labour Party. was reportedly not allowed to become involved in saving accident and emergency treatment at the local Kidderminster General Hospital. the chief obstacle to achieving that goal was the membership. The Conservative attempt to become market-oriented was less successful. In 2005. This observation was drawn from inferences made by prospective candidates . While Hague and his successor. but only if gathered from the market and not from an abstract set of ideals. A number of East Midlands MPs became increasingly disillusioned around the 2001 General Election following the party’s attitude to Tess Kingham. I’m glad I lost in this climate’.Political Marketing and Internal Party Democracy 575 way the party conducts politics. More tellingly. One unsuccessful candidate remarked. Following Paul Marsden’s defection to the Liberal Democrats. David Lock. this meant that internal democracy. both recognised the need to reposition the party in line with mainstream public opinion. towards the final years of Margaret Thatcher’s leadership. as well as being out of touch after eighteen years in power. focussing instead on ‘good management’. on the grounds that ‘it is not the government’s role to become involved in the decision-making of health authorities’. I felt like some kind of out of touch nutter on the doorsteps of [the constituency]. Rather. mainly due to the weaker party structures evident there. which seemed to be shared by many of the electorate. As one candidate recounted. As the 2001 election loomed. divisions between modernisers who were keen to make the party more socially liberal. Harking back to Alan Clark’s history of the party. and was enshrined in the principles of Hague’s intra-party reforms. However. These were not. but it becomes problematic when the members are unrepresentative of the broader electorate. the party was forced to focus on the few issues that united the fractious membership: Europe and Immigration. The trials around leadership selection in recent times have highlighted the wider internal battle over the party’s future course. Lees-Marshment’s analysis of the Labour Party showed that it failed to respond adequately to the internal market. consequently failed. highlighting the need to adjust the product or ‘offering’ in line with the expectations of the internal market. who struggled to match tactics designed to win votes with the demands of the associations that supported their candidature. such as Euroscepticism. A later study by Knuckey and Lees-Marshment found that George W Bush had to balance compassionate conservative policies against traditional Republican tenets to gain the nomination for candidature in 2000. in 1997. and later ‘Common-sense Conservatism’ in 1999. one candidate argued that while he believed the Conservatives should be simply about winning elections in the country. Many believed Hague was an asset.’ Iain Duncan-Smith fared little better in his attempt at blending together traditional policy stances. Internal democracy in the Conservative Party has remained strong. the leadership had followed a tactic of promising victory by using public opinion data collected through social research to bend the party to its will in . his local association were more concerned with securing power within the party. however. limited the party’s progress. who held entrenched conservative views. the issues of prime concern to voters. Newman’s studies of political marketing in the USA did not find the weakening of internal democracy and shifting of power to the centre to be a problem. This approach may be effective in maintaining an energetic and actively supportive membership. Attempts to reposition the party in the political centre ground. I had to bang on about keeping the pound and kicking out asylum seekers.4 In the British context. however. In a speech at the 1997 party conference Hague demonstrated that his main market was the internal one. despite electoral stagnation in recent years.576 Parliamentary Affairs at the 2001 General Election. through branding exercises such as ‘Fresh Conservatism’. with ‘Compassionate Conservatism’ promoted symbolically on the deprived Glasgow Easterhouse council estate. but argue that he was constrained by the party’s increasingly right wing membership and their power within the local associations. and traditionalists. ‘the voters were interested in public services. the retention of policies that are popular with members but less relevant to the floating voters in 2001 meant the party was unable to make a dent on Labour’s parliamentary majority. Whilst Labour delivered on this promise. which remains active. This approach meant that the party became subservient to the Blair cadre. not primarily as workers during election campaigns or as advocates of the party. election candidates and large sections of the membership. The British Election Study. Research into Labour members’ attitudes focused on three areas: their opinions of ‘New’ Labour and who the party represented. found . In the case of the Conservatives. this has contributed to electoral failure. how these opinions could be explained. a professionally marketed electoral machine is losing the party popularity among its base. if divergent. The dangers of political marketing: the case of New Labour The battle between internal and external opinion. while for Labour. Research in 2001 and 2003 among party members and loyalists within a safe Labour constituency tells a story of disconnection: a party and its activist base separated by strategy. Concerns were exacerbated as the high expectations held by these Labourites were not realised after the Blair government’s first term of office. if members feel the party has moved away from addressing their concerns to focus on a different group of voters. While it is recognised that party loyalty and alignment are diminishing. has been able to complete the tasks of implementing a political marketing strategy in a way that is able to satisfy key voter groups as well as loyal voters and members. undertaken prior to the 2001 General Election. who again was more the party choice than that of the electorate. Leadership changes designed to provide the party with potential electoral dividends consistently failed to have any effect on public perceptions of the party.Political Marketing and Internal Party Democracy 577 matters of policy and presentation. many members became disillusioned with the party’s record in office. despite disquiet among some backbenchers. therefore. these people are of great importance to the Labour Party. In the case of the Conservatives. Arguably. once the sheen of the election victory had worn off. The party has thus retained its identity and base. ‘New’ Labour’s strategy was to sell changes to the party’s image and programme to the membership with promises of victory. The failure to meet the expectations of the members could prove to be the Achilles Heel of Blair’s government. A discussion of Labour’s problems will demonstrate the dangers of adopting a marketing philosophy that focuses purely on the floating voter. Neither party. leading to Iain Duncan Smith’s replacement by Michael Howard. and whether they felt that they should have influence over the party’s political direction. is a problem for a party that wishes to develop a series of policies with broad electoral appeal. but rather as an indication of broader erosion of the party’s base. there are still voters who identify strongly with one party. since such activities are not particularly important in safe seats. 7% declared their intention to abstain from voting. . Those who took part in the focus groups said they felt that Labour cared no more for the less well off than would a Conservative government. and perhaps capturing the mood among many of the participants in the research. however. This was read as an attack on Labour’s heartland. However. and its adoption of political marketing. If this is a phenomenon associated with the political and electoral strategy of ‘New’ Labour. and particularly female members. and have perhaps temporarily disengaged from the party. In other words members felt that they had been left behind by the party and that Labour now focused on a new group of voters. ‘looking different’ at the national level or ‘not being like it used to be’. Some participants found this difficult to articulate. They argued that the party had appeared to be keen to help the people that the Conservatives had left behind. . and who would fit into the C2 and D demographic classifications. It seems that such respondents are unsure of what the Blair-led party stands for. It was these people that expected great things of a Labour government. While few Labour Party members in the focus groups expressed any understanding of the concept of political marketing.5% of the overall sample. 32. 44. we don’t have a party’. argued it was the policies that mattered. although it is likely that these voters predominate in safe Labour strongholds.578 Parliamentary Affairs Labour had the strongest level of identification. its like cutting off your roots. those people one participant described as ‘the victims of Thatcher’s pit closures and the destruction of the industry’. the first thing they did was attack those on benefits. it could indicate severe problems with the argument that such a strategy has long-term electoral dividends. describing the party as talking a ‘different language’. In 2001 there was a further notable statistic: of the strong Labour identifiers. That’s the real change. Those who selfreported being working class. These participants. Tellingly. looking at those who identify strongly as Labour there is a clear link with perceptions of social class and economic status. One participant captured this attitude well when she argued that ‘Labour is not for the people like us anymore. their perception of the changes that had taken place during the mid 1990s are contiguous with the adoption of a marketing orientation. are 62% more likely to be loyal Labour voters. one member presented his argument in terms of . that’s what they’ve done. taking that away meant the party didn’t believe in nothing anymore. although one longstanding member contextualised the change in the terms of reform of the symbolic clause IV: That’s socialism that is . Others took a more measured view. arguing that such rhetorical statements of principle did not fundamentally matter. When asked how or why the party had changed some participants could not offer answers. This is unsurprising given the political context of that particular electoral contest. Data does not state which types of seats these respondents lived in. There were a number of similar comments suggesting that. a company car and. The participants in later groups. it’s about the workers and looking after people like me. The driver was from the local party but there was also a young bloke from London. with a mortgage. However. or they used ‘the city’ as a catch-all term. in a double wage-earning family. but also from the types of voter they feel the party is now targeting. This was of an affluent individual. red flags. 40 declared that they had . calling each other comrade or any of that bullshit. importantly. They equally recognised that these voters were seeking different things from the party than them. recognised this as the sort of person that the party was courting. if we talked to them they said we would put them off. but this member no longer recognised Tony Blair as ‘Labour’: ‘the party is not about red roses. one group was dominated by a member who had taken part in Labour’s campaign in 1997. She was able to offer a different perspective of the party that was highly negative and reflective of the party’s strategy: We were taken by minibus to the private estates. but largely participants were illinformed about who it was they felt Labour represented—just ‘not them’. who could afford to ‘go private’ for health care. a feeling nicely encapsulated by one with the question ‘what bloody MP?’ They equally argued they were paid little respect by the party. ‘wealthy business folk in the South. when introduced to this hypothetical voter. given loads of leaflets and told to deliver them. the MP espoused familiar values. If not themselves then who is it that these loyal voters perceive the party to be representing? While possibly indicative of a perceived North–South divide.’ Many talked about ‘Tony’s cronies’ repeating a popular left-wing tabloid critique of the party. not only did the members feel a dislocation from the party. or the ‘rich’. but don’t talk to them just deliver the leaflets. The participants felt this was demonstrated in the lack of attention paid to their constituency. as one participant argued: ‘Well these sorts of people won’t want tax rises will they. ‘the professional lawyers that help themselves to whatever they want’. Some participants argued that Blair represented ‘big-city types who work the stock market’. But we were told these are the voters the party needs. had private pensions. the participants argued it was little wonder that the party no longer ‘stood for them’. they’re just out for themselves’. ‘security’. the consensus of opinion centred on the suburbanites of the London region. I think Blair is just for people like him and he is nothing like me’. Following the creation of this ‘straw voter’.Political Marketing and Internal Party Democracy 579 belief rather than symbolism. We did this Tory area that Blair won. The discussion that followed this description of the strategy resulted in the portrait of an average ‘New’ Labour voter. and were never approached in 2001 for their vote: out of 82 participants. He argued that the local party was the same. despite their long-time membership and loyalty. All this could simply be the complaints of those who hark back to a non-existent golden era when the Labour party was socialist. Labour will make a mistake and we’ll rise again. . these arguments are based on little substantive evidence. . more a perception among many members that they used to have some level of influence in the party which has since been eroded.05) quoted a number of 18–25 year olds with attitudes that echoed the comments of the Labour loyalists. The act of not voting. Conservatives argue that any threat to the party’s core would be heavily resisted. Contrast this with the comments of a local Labour Party chairman who. if we had one MP we would still stick to our guns’. a reaction to the lack of campaign as well as the perception that none of the parties offered a societal view shared by these voters. four years later we were saying it should be him not Hague with Thatcher’s hairdo on his head’. independent of the desire for election. one association chair stated ‘I don’t care . while they may not be attractive to the broader electorate. our values will be seen as right for the nation . something that is seen as a shift in behaviour by the Labour Party. when looking back at the reforms of the 1990s. their core values remain. it doesn’t seem to matter whom you vote for anymore’. A feature article in the Daily Telegraph (7. Those in the party hierarchy locally argued they had given up any power to ‘them who said they knew best’. While that may be the case. was argued to be a message. it looks after businesses . . Conservative members appear to see the reverse as the case. that in redefining the party’s values—what one participant called ‘making their values a bit vague so they don’t mean anything’—the party is perceived to have lost its ideological anchor.580 Parliamentary Affairs not voted (35 of whom claimed this was the first time they had abstained since they turned eighteen). As one local association member commented: The mood will turn. . argued ‘we were blinded by the need to get elected. Some presented personal reflections that emphasised the difference in party-member relations. it no longer does that. we agreed to Blair and all he stood for . and these individuals may well be deemed unrepresentative. similar sentiments can be found elsewhere. ‘The Labour Party used to be about serving the interests of the most vulnerable in society. as Blair stole them anyway the people will start to recognise that we are the right people to run the country as we actually have beliefs. The longest serving Labour . This statement suggests that political marketing has led to a devaluation of the Labour brand. . However. When discussing the fact that the party is ‘about electoral success’. .2. and it was described in terms of an action. But what does this have to do with a lack of democracy? Clear references were made to a lack of consultation with the members. . One 20-year-old Oxford University student asserted that. to ‘Blair and his cronies’ or ‘to the marketing bods that sold the party out’. and that their values may be outdated. . In other words they felt that they had an input whether this was real or not. others talked openly of ‘socialism’. that he was out-voted was immaterial. Conferences were described as ‘scripted pantomimes . no one reads it because we don’t see it making our lives better’. being ‘for the workers’ or ‘the working class party’ or ‘the trade unions’ party’. often near an election. they feel they are never consulted and are therefore disenfranchised. One member of the Labour Party argued ‘Blair was given his power by the members before the voters . that the meetings were ‘genuinely exciting’ and ‘we made decisions’. although in practical rather than ideological terms. but feels that it is also ignored under Blair’s Labour premiership. they argued. he doesn’t give a [damn] what people like me think. Blair does what his cronies tell him. despite the introduction of one member one vote at conferences. all flashy suits without price tags’. Members and loyal voters feel they awarded their party leader with the mandate for power. However.’ They feel they have no way of making their voice heard within the party. This is not the picture in every constituency. Labour should ensure that society is made more equal. The fact that they see everything focused at them as being promotional while at the same time largely irrelevant seems the root cause of the disengagement. and that if they do vent their opinion no one listens. Fundamentally. but he’s not using it right’. They now experience a different kind of communication. They equally recall that the local party meetings could discuss important policy decisions.Political Marketing and Internal Party Democracy 581 member informed his group that he recalled having input into the debates during the Gaitskell era and voted against adopting unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 1980s. but it is indicative of the Labour heartlands. when it happens at all: ‘every so often. . They are still loyal to the ‘idea’ of Labour and perhaps ‘Labourism’. They feel they are disadvantaged in society. However. like a department store window. and now within the party: ‘they ask the rich what they want and give it them and do [very little] for folk like us’. One member remembered a policy document on nationalisation being circulated among those associations that would be most affected. . he found that the important issues were not even tabled: ‘They do just what they want. some of it explained the economic circumstances. . attending conferences in the late 1990s. Some articulated this in terms of ‘helping the little people’. but they see their role as to reform the party and steer it towards a more traditional political trajectory. Hence their only recourse is to withdraw their active support. The loyalists talk as representatives of a part of society that feels left behind by Thatcherism. we get this stuff saying “aren’t we great” or “haven’t we done all these good things”. ‘the members aren’t asked to vote on anything serious’ so ‘why should we do anything for the party?’ Many Labour . and that party members could help them to decide how to achieve this ‘even without upsetting those who won’t pay more tax’. but it also asked for comments and alternatives. . in contrast to Conservative and Liberal Democrat members who appear keen to be active. traditional Labourites and a new more affluent type. A local Labour constituency party chairman argued there are two types of Labour member.582 Parliamentary Affairs constituency parties appear to have become deactivated. though one contributor with unknown political affiliation argued on a political web-log that this made ‘those in temporary employment at more risk of losing their jobs anyway’. This may not be sufficient. support for parents during the early stages of a child’s life. However. these were by far the minority. however. a number of initiatives have been undertaken by Labour aimed at engaging its members and the wider public. education. one academic study has suggested that such exercises have been more about public relations than genuine consultation. The former are the activists. While a few did argue war was normatively wrong for a Labour government. though this may not be true for the Muslim community. the foot soldiers. Questions such as ‘will it affect the economy by raising oil prices?’ or ‘will it increase the chances of a terror attack in the UK?’ predominated. many of whom work through employment agencies and so can be dismissed with little notice. our pledge card reflects that vision’. Focus groups held in early 2003. which abandoned Labour in the Leicester South and Brent North by-elections. old. in 2001 and 2003. The six pledges for the 2005 election focused on five issues: living standards. in line with broader public opinion. but the latter contribute funds whilst showing little enthusiasm for political involvement. The first perhaps serves a new type of Labour member. One prospective parliamentary candidate argued that the party ‘had to show they were doing the best for all elements of society. The problem is that the latter group prevail in the . and criticisms may well be forgotten as the feared negative consequences failed to materialise. and so for whom economic problems are the most serious. law and order and immigration. and supported the Tony Benn or George Galloway line. The future: mass parties or cadres? Since the focus groups were conducted. when fears of war were very real. However few commentators argue that Labour is making any real reconnection with its roots in a meaningful way. More broadly. it is still argued that the Labour Party under Blair is disconnected from its loyal supporters and members. a chasm further widened by the effect of the Iraq war. The main political move was the increase in the minimum wage. The reason for this individualistic emphasis is the level of insecurity among those voters who fear redundancy or lay-offs. for the core Labour voters. Some in the media argue that a number of sops have been offered to Labour’s heartlands in recent times.5 Therefore. one can imagine that much dissent would have disappeared once troops entered Iraq. showed that the greatest concern among Labour voters was the effect that the war would have on them personally. The underlying assumption for this is that Conservative members are representative of ‘ordinary’ people in society. Similarly the Daily Telegraph survey showed that the young believe none of the parties are representative of their societal view—and that in practice parties do ignore young voters since they are least likely to turnout. we just have to do it in different ways.05). Patrick Wintour. whilst expecting the product of that triumph to be more radical and socialist than proved to be the case. they have to understand that’. held on to power at the expense of short-term goals. we have to be more cautious and help them in a different political atmosphere. This problem is created partially by marketing. arguing that big tent politics is unravelling (Guardian. When asked about the former group. as some members hoped.2. undecided or floating voters. Marketing attempts to identify the market that an organisation requires to tap in order to achieve its goals: for all parties seeking to win power this is the disloyal. This strategy necessitates a reorientation of the party towards this type of voter and away from their core. there is little indication that they have gone through a process of rebranding. the Conservative’s consultant. in contrast. Labour achieved this during the 1990s when the membership acquiesced with reform of the party’s image and policies in the name of electoral victory. rather than appealing to the wallets of the median voter. Whatever the marketing strategy it is one that will maintain coherence internally and should motivate activists to support the party’s efforts. unlike Labour’s Philip Gould. but is also the reason for parties’ application of marketing techniques and philosophies. 23. Tellingly.6 The Conservative Party.2. is said to have shifted away from a purely member-oriented political strategy. without the heavy taxation. seems to be telling the party to reinforce its core values rather than reject them for some vague. For the 2005 campaign. its prime campaign message in 2005—‘Are you thinking what we are thinking?’—is said to be based around issues raised within the party by its ‘ordinary members’. indicates that the Conservatives’ traditional policies have become salient with the voters and. Toynbee warned the Labour party to focus on values. thus nothing will be done to upset this group. In fact.05). Nevertheless. Such a strategy may well pay off in the future. trust and support for the party is rising. the chairman argued: ‘we are still about helping those people. Both strategies will be problematic: the former will lose the party . The Conservative associations and members. If Labour loses ground it will be forced either to return to the heartland or to go onto a marketing offensive with the floating voter.Political Marketing and Internal Party Democracy 583 marginal seats. and this may not be far from the truth in 2005. The same seems to be the case for the loyal Labour voters and their traditional members: as they tend to live in safe seats it does not matter if they do not vote. This itself is probably the result of reading public opinion. Lynton Crosby. writing in the Guardian (25. The problem is that many members do not. watered down version. meanwhile. rather than a market. Pattie and R. 2 3 4 5 6 .584 Parliamentary Affairs ground with the median voter. J.shtml. Manchester University Press. ‘The Impact of Constituency Campaigning in the 2001 General Election’ in L. Lees-Marshment. Little. Bush and the Republican Party’ in D. this is what we do. the latter could erode its base completely. C. 1 Evidence for the importance of an active membership is presented in D.mori. J. Lilleker and J. 2001.J. Lees-Marshment.3. Bennie. Fisher and I. Political Marketing: A Comparative Perspective. and so allow its vote to rise and wane in line with political fashion and the successes and failures of opponents? This course of action was followed by the Conservatives on the assumption that. buy into it if you want’ and forget notions of appealing to the median voter? These are questions that many parties. Johnston ‘Local Battles in a National Landslide: Constituency Campaigning at the 2001 British General Election’. Should a party retain a strong brand identity. 1994. or for an insider’s view see P. Gould. Knuckey and J. Perhaps the most important in the British context is the need for members to be active foot-soldiers during election campaigns: if parties fail to motivate their members then they will be inactive and campaigns will have a reduced impact: this is because of the reliance that must be placed on central office resources and telephone canvassing despite the importance of human contact on the doorsteps. Wring. Sage. 2003. across numerous political systems. J.J. 2005. J. Tonge and P. Frank Cass. G.05: http://www. The most contested statement in political marketing literature is that a market orientation is a necessary step for a party seeking electoral success. British Elections and Parties Review 12: The 2001 General Election. there are clear dangers for British parties attempting to be market oriented. Manchester University Press. Denver. Palgrave. independent of its popularity at any one point in the electoral cycle. C. Hands. The Politics of Marketing the Labour Party. must address. Lees-Marshment (eds). established and most loyal section. Lilleker ‘Political Marketing in the UK: A Positive Start but an Uncertain Future’ in Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (eds). B. That is a problem Labour face: in courting a different type of voter they are alienating their traditional. The Unfinished Revolution: How the Modernisers Saved the Labour Party. Political Marketing and British Political Parties: The Party’s Just Begun. J. Political Geography. Rallings. Webb (eds). Lees-Marshment and D. oriented strategy? Should parties just state ‘this is what we stand for. it is clear that political marketing is not the panacea. Useful sources on the marketisation of the Labour Party are D.com/pubinfo/rmm/digging-up-islwyn-man. The Marketing of the President: Political Marketing as Campaign Strategy. As parties face a crisis of membership and allegiance.I. Could this indicate that internal democracy is needed to avoid such a problem and that as this is incompatible with the use of marketing then parties should look to a more sales. as their values increase in salience. While discussion can be had over the extent to which parties are market oriented and whether the various models have been applied fully and correctly. For further evidence of the importance of the core voter see R. 1998. Newman. Mortimore ‘Digging Up Islwyn Man’ 23. ibid. 2005. MacAllister. This is the issue at the core of discussions on the appropriateness of a marketing orientation for political parties. 2002. politics would move onto their territory and they would benefit in the polls. Brown and Co. ‘American Political Marketing: George W. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. .