The Evolution of Field Artillery Tactics, Technique, Amd Organization on the Western Front During the World War

Codo NO.6 4 SUBJBQTi VH3 HWItfTIOH OP ?W*D ARSILLERY T A 0 M 0 3 , ON THB \7230ERN PROKT IfURIlIG THB WOULD WAR. SIJJB1IOTED Hfj C a p t a i n Goorgc W. G r l n e r 9 Infantry* Fort Loavenworth, Kansas, 12 May, 1933. itatOFAWXRl FCH: Tho Direotor, Sooond Year Classt Tho Command and General btaff School, Fort Leavonworth, Kansas* ; i SUBJBOTt The Svolution of Field A r t i l l e r y T a c t i c s , Tochnique, and. Organization on the Western Front During the World war. ; I . PAPERS ACCOUPAKYIHG* X. A bibliography f o r t h i s study. II# XEB STUDY PRESENTED*- In presenting t h i s s t u l y i t i s the auihorta purpose t o point out the fundamental ideas governing the employment of I f i e l d a r t i l l e r y h e l d by the warring nations a t tho outbreak of h o s t i l - ! i t i o s in I9I£ anl to traoe during the suooessive periods of the war the i modification and evolutioir-e* those o r i g i n a l i d e a s . In eaoh case an e f f o r t w i l l be made to determine tho reason for the change of employ­ ment. Organization and technique are to be considered only . s o f a r as they lnfluenoe, or are influenced by t a c t i c s . Bio term " f i e l d a r t i l l e r y " i s construed to iiio?.tid& a l l a r t i l l e r y that was placed i n the field to engage terrestrial targets* I I I . HISTORICAL FACTS RULATIIW TO TIIE SUBJECT. I. The, Artillery Dootrlno at the Outbreak of the War. , a. ?ranoe. Tho French artillery in I914 was an auxiliary arm vhose exolueive mission was the support of the forward movoraont of the i n ­ fantry particularly by the delivery of fire upon the objectives os: tne attack prior to tho assault.(I}• The artillery wittiin the division was not oharge'l with ccunter'oattery, either as a primary or sacondary mission. (2). The effect of artillery fire upon a protected eiuamy was not appreciated, and French regulations of that period concludet HTo force an oneay to uncover himself he must bo attacked by infantry.Thos-e­ fore preparation by the artillery cannot be carried out independently j of lxrfa&Ory aotion. The avtillery no longer prepares attacks, i t supports r t h t3) The above b e l i e f s are natural complements of the exclusive theory of the swiftly moving o f f e n s i v e with rtiieh tho French an$r was a t that time thoroughly s a t u r a t e ! . ( 4 ) . A preparation would delay the uttaolc; heryy oalibero oapable of dealing o f f o o t i v e l y irt-th oneiqy s^oltor i would slow up the advance and delay tho forward movement of *ho infantry As a r e s u l t i t can be s t a t e d with a degree of oertainty that tlie French; did not f u l l y appreciate the value of f i r e powar.(6)» (1-222) (2-10) (41-209^ (53-21.30) (2-9) (42*217) (2-10} (5-661) (41-217) (5-661) (41-209) (64-31) (5-661) (63-262,263) (66-3) TMH SOLUTION LUST CE RETURNED FOR FET.UAt:; FILE DY f>:00 P.M.. ON THE DATE BUOT.U LIL: ?LS:A:- :'LACE YOUR HAKE on COV^R PAGS r,;iLii -ITUUIIKG FOR FILE B I T DO KOV PLACE YOO'R > SOLUTION VfHEN REQUESTING A REVIEW. r\ NAY 2 0 1^3 Cooperation with the infantry was enjoined. The latest regulations for the Maneuver of Field Artillery statedt "When the mission of a battalion i s to give particular support to a designated attack, i t s . ; commander £ets in touoh with the oomnander of the infantry unit vftiich i s to make the attack* That preliminary understanding between the executants is the foundation of liason. During the execution of the operation, the artillery oonrwvnder takes evory possible measure to maintain eoa­ munication with the infantry commander* She most certain means are» f i r s t , by sight, then liason agents and in certain oases by relays of signals*'(6). Ihe use of aviation as a means of ocsununi cation was not developed afc thip, time.(7). French pre-war regulations aro alient on tba subject of attacks against a fortified position* No one envisaged stabilisation as a probable disposition for an army imbued with the spirit c? maneuver, and as a consequence field fortification was not appreciated AS a subject worthy of general study* It was furthermore believed that once a soldier was entrenohed i t would be a difficult matter to get him to go forward again under fire* (8). b. Germany* Gorman pre-war regulations recognised the meeting engagement, the attack of a defensive position and the attack of n fortified position as different types of combat and provided for the artillery separate and dlstinot employment for each type* In the attatk in a meeting engagement It was the mission of ttie artillery to withhold i t s fire until the deployment of the infantry was oompleted, in order to facilitate the element of surprise; i*. the atteok of a defensive position regulations cautioned against hurried preliminary disposi­ tion* and provided that the infantry attack follow the preparation and in the,attack against a fortified position i t *as provided that the ; »infantry should advance "only tinder the protection of arvillery fire"* (9) The above dootrlne i n d i c e s * conclusively that the Germans placed a suaewhat greater importance upon fire power and evidences a more accurate appreciation of the value cf iire effect* Their regulations fuither stated:"To attack is to push the fire forward"-, and again:"The offensive consists in moving the fire toward the enemy"* In contrast with the dootrine of tho French, I t might be said that the Germans substituted methodical fire power in tho offensive for the Prenoh theory of speed in execution.(10) It i s a moot question whether the Gexmans had made a serious study of f i e l d fortification part of H the general trainiug of combatant branches. Their instructions stated; 12ie construction of trenches must never paralyse the desire for the irres is table advance* and above all must not k i l l the spirit of the offensive".(II)* The German Infantry constituted the prinolpal combat am, but to a somewhat lesser comparative degree than the preeminanoe asoribed to the French infantry* Countei oattery was roeogniMd as a secondary (6) (2-11) (63-242,243) (45-36) (7) (Ii3-2t6) (2-II) (63-267) (6) (1-227) (2-12) (18-5) (9) (2-19) (41-30) (63-30,31) (I0)(2-20) (26-210) (11-333) (10-467) (II) (5-660,979) (63-I8.IS) (63-21,31) (56-3) i (63-264.266) -2­ mission of the divisional artillery j but i t s primary miss ion was "to concentrate i t s crushing fire offoots on that position of tho hostile infantry line which i s to be assaulted". Corps artillery was prepared for systematic eountorbattery*(I2)* . So cooperate with the needs of the Infantry it'was provided that the artillery send forward officer* to signal baek the situation. Five simple flag slgnaln were provided, the most important being the one icdJeating the distance between tho infantry front line find the enomy so that the artillery could continue firing a* long as possible* (13). Aerial observation had been advanced farther by the Qemano then by the Allies toenusa the larger number of planes at their disposal afforded more ptttevlde in working with the artillery* (14)• c* England* The aa&lish doctrine lay between the French and the German views!* Like the French, mobility was emphasised to the detriment of fire power* Support ot the infantry attack was considered a desirable accessory rather than an absolute necessity* Oxe necessity of a coordinated artillery and Infantry fire plan was not appreciated*(15)* Sole reliance was placed in ground observation* P*A*T*V 19X4 stated! "To support an attack with success a battery oomtander oust be able to see Hie ground over which the encsy is advanelnfV(l4)* lhere was no agency chargeA wltfa systematic eounterbattery* n o poscibillty of the concealment of enemy guns was unappreciated* Heavy artillery was known as "Siege*1 artillery and i t s future use In mobile warfare was unforeseen* (17)* d* United States* In our service prior to 1914 the field artillery was oonsleV ered a supporting arm whose targets are those most dangerous to the infantry. The preparation *>rlor to the attacK wee recognised under certain conditions* flic ?£X4 Fiald Service Regulations aAaltted the possibility of the uue of heavy artillery ifl the field but restricted i t s use to cf fenslv* operations **vher* reconnalcfienoe of the .enesy position has been carefully plaratd", or to a defensive action "whert there has been time to deliberately select and strengthen a position1** In brief, heavy artillery «as to be used in the attack or defense of a fortified position* MIn a l l other eaees i t was to remain "well to the rear of oombat units> (I8)* 2* a* uaterlel* Prmoh crcy in 19X4 had a low-power*& rapid fire 75 m m gun which was the pride of their army and the sole weapon of i t s di­ visional and corps artillery* This light gun had a potential range of about 10,000 yards, but i t s sights and ourriage were constructed to permit of a au&dmvsn range of about 6,600 yards* In addition the French 12) 19) 14) 15) 16) 17) (16) 2-19) (26-210) (IG~467) (4X-30) (53-21,31) 2-19) (I-23I) (6>k>3) 30-219 j (2-25) (I&'tl) (29-95) (69-36?) 25-160) (63-260,261• 23-160,161) 23-160, I6X) (56-11) (63-361,262) (26*209-211) (66-3) emphasis on direct observation of fire farther limited the everyday unable range to about 5t000 yard* maxlmtoa* (19)» Tho German army had for years endeavored to perfect their 77 on field gun, bat i t s inferiority to the Freneh 75 in potential range (al­ though the former by means of the goniometer fired' aa naoh as 0,000 yards in Hie early stages of the war), in rate of fire and in accuracy was readily admitted* Bie 77 was superior only * n nobility and in the thleknesf of i t s shield* (20). Profiting by the lessons resulting frots the sueeetfsful use of h artillery in the past, and doubtlessly with a view to offsetting the ?reneh superiority in light gun, Germany during the administration of the late Chief of Staff von Sohlieffen had placed i n their artillery a quantity of heavy pieeei of curved trajectory, including howltsers of 15 sm, 21 em, and 28 em, as,well as a Krupp 42 em siege mortar* tttesie heavy pieces had been rendered mobile by meaus of non reeoll carriages* mechanical traction and caterpillar tfieela(&) Meantime the controlling French thought disregarded a minority o­ pinion and rested secure ivt the belief that in any field operation (visualised by them a* a swiftly moving offensive maneuver), the 76 could render heavy, less mobile artillery powerless* (22) b* Organisation* The above mentioned differences of thought are reflected in the i n i t i a l war organisations, which reveal Qtrjeny w possessing f, better balanced armament of varying calibersi (I) France*(23) (a) Division Artillery. Division X Light Artill**? Hegioect l Groupe I Groope 1 f droops I I r I I I Battery 4 guns 75 BI9* (19) (10) (UX) (28) \Sa) (X-284) (2A-«It,2l8) (16-72) (51-413,414) (65-256) (45-369)(68-318) (3-14) (5-661) (20-874) (7-1X29) (bI-4l5 t 4H,417) (58-1) (68-3x8) (X8-M0) (X-2X8-2S9) (47-40) (4IJI9) (X0-4A7) (6.46X) i (26-72) (X9-M) (25-71) 11-20,W) (68-22X). (66-3) (67-5) (65-36?) (X-t86) («-*«! (26-209,210) (26-7fl) (18-6) (4X-8X) (69-267) X-56.ttt.23X) (6*661) (18-10) (21-8QI) ( S M ) (XO-46?) I : 16-269) (41-80) (63-266,259) (b) Corps Artillery. Oorpe I Light Artillery Beglaent I 1 Qroup* I Group© I Group* r "T Qroupe Battery 75 an. l l / i 1 r 1 i i 4 gtBM (t) Any Artillery, pieeea of 9 M aucpr artillery consisted of e total XOB, X£0 and X64 iwu (dj Total ai>tilltry. *• see that th» P«nch division had thirty. six 75 sn gauss the oorpe artillery forty-«l#it 76 ma gctris, making a total vithin the eorpe of two divleion* of 120 gnus* 'Sxb total field artillery In Z9X4 ma about 4X48 pieoes, only 508 of ¥bioh wore ofj larger taliWr than 75 ran. U;) Great Britaia.(24). (a) Division Artillery. Division of 808 I Brigade Cvgiws J3 pr. I Brigade I Brigade I Brigade Battery 6 gunn 4.5 ln.how. f~T~\ r~l—! H—1\ (b) Oorps Artillery- rh I Battery 4 gone 60 pr. The British in ttie beginning had no corps artillery organisation, their entire strength being distributed within the (e) Total artillery. She British divielon was equipped with 76 gems, f i f t y four of whieh were IH pr, eighteen 4.5 inch howl t i e r s , end four 60 pr* Thin organisation would wake available to the oorpe of two divisions 152 gas*. To a Halted degree they had followed the lead of the Germans and had equipped their artillery with saae calibers larger than the 76. A total of 486 pleoes of a l l eallbers was i n i t i a l l y available to the Brltifh Scpe&itionary Foroo. (24) (23-161) (4^73) (B-66I) (10^67) (6-259) (63-255,258) -6­ (8) Qerraaior. (25) (a) Division artillery. Division Eeglicont Regiaent Abteiltmgen i _J Abtellungen Abte ltmgen Abteilungen Battery 6 guns 77 no* (b) Oorpa AriiUeiy. Corps Abteilungen • 7 r Battery 6 guns Battery 4 (tana 15 on how* (e) Any Artillory. In •nob arwy thara nas a variable noHb*i> of of a oaltbor of 21 en oi­ (d) foM W joncluda from taio above tiiat <H« O«xman diTioion * «as aq[aippod with a total of 72 pieaee, fifty-four o? «hl«& voi« 7? nn Rua»> and sleht««B 10B ran IvnltMtv* Avallablt to tha oorpi of two division* cas a total of 160 pl«o*a, sixteen of tihlth v&re 16 m howltstri* Approzimatol^ 2400 plaots of htavy artillory « u M oo & gon«?aa r48«rr«. A total ox 7420 plttoi of artillory M ly available to tho 0«naaa a n ^ in I9I4. (26) (I-4t) (I7-I) (5-661) (I0-46V) (6-259) (86-230) (4X-29.30) (57-2) (68-17) (53-21) (63-255,269,260) • Writer* disagree upon the orxspoiition of eorpt ariUlery. soae atai« that the Abtei^uflgen •onaiited of t«6 tatteki«i of 6 pleeeo •a*b| other* that It ^^nslttel of three batteries of 4 pleeef eaehi other* t U t e i t s e**voftltlMi Ik as nhsmu Apparently i t varied in different eorpe. (4) United States. (26). (a) Division Artillery. Division I Bilged* Begiment f Begtaent Battalion Be* Battallori Battalion I Battalion Battalion i r n Btta Battalion Battalion r / II li Battery' 4 guns ; 7o no» i m r I Brigade r 4 pieces IBS nn how* (b) Corps Artillery(4 divisions). f X Regiment I I Regiment r ^ i 1 fvattexy 4 gems 4.? inoh i i r r I Bttteiy 4 euna 155 ma. / ' i r Battalion TAttallon Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalion (o) Arny rosorve and 0E4 artillexy. The of IBS ton gtu«t and 5 iMd. In addition G Q H of railwv artillery. a n ^ reserve, oonsietlng of 5 oorpe, Id regiments regiments of light artillery(portee) w s anthor­ retained vnder i t s special ocmmond 42 battoi'lea This reserve was narer fully assembled. (d) Totol artillery. 2he U.S. division hod a total of ?2 pleoes, 24 of were 166 nn hotrltiers* The orgonie- extillery of the corpe (2€) (31-78) (27-7S) -7­ consisted of 48 guns, equally divided between calibers of 4*7 inch and X66 na. This organisation is based upon the experiences of the war to the date of our entranoe in I9I7V and represented the best thought of the Allies upon the subject* Die supply of these weapons for the American Expeditionary Forces was largely dependent upon purchase from the French. c* Technique* Artillery technique in 19X4 was elementary and limited in comparison with the highly developed and efficient methods of today* If we bear in mind that at tSie break of the war preparation for fire consisted of ranging by braotet on an objeot seen from an observation point which was normally xlthin sight of the gun, and that nap firing for the light field piece was the rare exception rathe? than the general rale, th«n i t w i l l be understood that In a etudy of the taotloal use of artillery some mention must be mda of i t s iereloy­ roent. (87) (27) (1-224) (48.56) (63-371) •8­ 2* The Initial Period of Maneuver. a* Tho Introduction of pioCOB of large calibor* When the German arny in 1914 began Its advanoe through Bel­ gium, the first reslstaneo was met at Liege* OIIB olty was protected by a sorles six main and six smollor forts of Brlalroont construction. iJbe larger forts wore underground structures of concrete and ware designed to resist six-lnoh r i f l e or eight-inch howitzer shells* Eaoh of the main forts was anued with two six-lnoh guns, four 4*7 inch and two eight-Inch mortars* Between this ring of forte ran a single Incom­ plete* infantry trench line* (28)* On August 4 the Germans began the bombardment of the forts with long range fire from their light field pieoes* Next day the Infantry attacked, but wore beaten off* Later In the day the Germans bombarded the forts with medium howitzer fire* Paring the night the infantry again attacked and filtered through the line of forts into the city* But the forts held out.(29)* In the meantime the Germans waited for their heavy pieoes to be brought up* Xhls being accomplished, on the I2th they began a bom­ bardment with 21 cm and 26 cm howitzers as well as a Krupp 42 em mortar, from positions so distant the Belgian guns could not roply. These shells buried themselves under the foundations of the oupolas and racked the entire structures* By the I6th the last of the forts was smashed, and the power and mobility of "siege1* artillery, when properly oq ipped for movement, was suddenly brought to the attention of the Allies.(30) France, especially, was shocked, h&ving placed much dependence in both the efficacy of her fortresses and In hor light guns* She con­ cluded without considering the advantage in resisting power enjoyed by her flrst-olass forts over the seoond-olass forts of Liege, that permanent fortifications had served their usefulness*. Aside from such a consideration, however, the emergency of the present situation as regards heavy artillery was sufficient to cause the removal of hor guns from the forts to the field* By tho end of 1914 about 400 had been rendered mobile* Unfortunately these were slow firer* and were not tho equal of like oalibars of German artillery*(31)* i b* Use of aviation to observe flro and increase tho range of artillery* the first engagements on French soil the German aviation j worked in llason with the artillery, both in importing targets to be engaged and in observing the effects of fire* This enabled the Invader's artillery to fire effectively at targets near the limit of the range of , the weapon, thereby offsetting initially any advantage enjoyed by the ; 75 over the 77* i b i s , combined with the presenoo of organit meditm j artillery In the German division, resulted in the French artillery being! at all times outranged* Counterbattery by German batteries vas executed j (28) (29 (30) (31) (3ft*264) (8-538) (35-19) 12-29'J) (32-262,264) (0-669) (5-477,,474.918) (8-538.639) (12-296) (3-24.25) (33*123) (36-44,45) (35-19) (2-21,33) (26-215) (18-5,12) (28-19) (33-123) (35-44) (32-262,263) (25-73) (67-9) (62-247) ! 1 (32-264) (67-8,9) (5-473,918) -9­ frequently troa such range ttiat the French oould not reply* Bxeae factors lead to the authorisation, on Hovember 27, 1914, of a group* of 165 ran, ISO ma or JOB ran guns for each corps*(32) o. Adoption of preparation by the French. Ihe Preneh fetish for speed In tot off«nalv» caused at tasks daring th« battles of the frontier to be launched without artillery support* This contributed to frequent failures and unnecessary losses* Aa instance of eueh an attaok i s that of the French ftlonlals on Aug­ ust 22, lAieh resulted so diaastreusly that a deep retirement vas net­ essitated* On August 24 the French high oomnand altered Its pre--war dootrine, and prescribed that "vrwy tlae a strong point i s to be taken, the attack must be prepared by the artillery** (33) (32) (33) (26-213) (3-17) (49-2S4t28?) (35-30) (2-26) (I-24I) (1.245) (16-10) (69-74) • flhft Period of tyllborata, IPrsnoh Warfare. a. Artlllory manafnoturlnf; the Gormans rotreated to tho Aisne after the Battle of tho i&rno and dug thomsolvov undor tho ground they introduced a fom of warfare in vfcioh their preponderance of high angle firo artillery as well as their probably better appreciation of field fortifications gave then a ,\eoided advantage* Die combination of wl*a, trenches, and machine c«&« proved too svrong for * e French and British inter try, lacking as they wore tho support of a superior artillery, tfio logioal result waa stabilisation. Both angland and Franco, therefore, took advantage of the luil in maneuver following the ftaoo to the Sea to initiate large artillory maaufaoturing proeraets//(74)* / All oanbataatA suffered an oaounition sh/'rfcage e&rly in the first year of the war* The i n i t i a l French war stoefe of 76 acvmsitlon (variously Btated between 1300 and I5C0 rptuxd/i per gun) had dioiu­ ished to about GOO rounds per eon at the conclusion of the Battle of the Marne* 'Jhe jvro-var provision ty the Brit'iffh of 18-potmdor eBinu­ nltlon approxiiriated that of the French* 3 » Gannons had initially provided only 600 rounds per (jun for the 77 rat, altyoutfi thilr pro* vision for tfr* heavy artillery was considerably more generous* In­ orcased anmrnitlon supply early beoaao and thereafter remained a natter of prime Importance* ttils increased ammunition demand required motorization of the anmanltion train and tfw plaoing of i t under division artillery control*(36)« b. Llni*"-! objective attaoks* During tho vdnter of 1914-16 Germany adopted a defensive a t t i ­ tude on the western front in order to f;ive major Attention to the eastern theater of war* In the defense, however, she worked oonstant­ ly toward strengthening the natural natures of tho ground and in deepening her positions* The Allied attitude was offensive, bnt the deficiency In both quantity and type of artillery materiel dictated limited objectives* Initially tnoso nttacks had local successes in view* The power of the enany artillery and the strength of his de­ fenses preoluded any other type of effort*(36)* o* Parthea offensive(February.»l»roh, 1915. In order to prevent the Germans from transferring additional troops to the oast France firot attempted a breakthrough in February, 1910, The attack on a three kilomoUor front followed a prei»aration " y tfio organio artillery reinforced by approximately 100 batteries* b Aftor the capture of the first obj actives, the artillery w&s brought forward and the rear lines bomb<\rd»d prior to a continuation of the effort* This latter attack broke down* Contributing artillery faotors were*. (34) (35) (36) (6-252) (23-162) (2-27,29 1 33,54) (I2-3C5) (16-12) (5-S6I)(64W56) (53-52) (48-56) (40-349) (10-466) (3Ev*47) (26-21 b) (50-295)' (50-219) (1-245) (2-28) (VX8) (I8-II-X4) (5-671) (10-467) i (36-144) (35-510) (41-32) (41-31) {6O19/ (72-378,379) (35>e4) : (28-l9 r 20) (2-31,34). -II­ (1) the narrowness of the front of attack, influenced by a lack Of additional artillery. (2) the laek of rapidity in the snoooesion of attacks, resulting in a loss of continuity of effort, due to the slo% achclonment of the artillery* (3) the failure of the artillery to crush the eneny artillery. (4) the lack of surprise caused by the lengthy preparation thor^it to be nocessary because of the shortage of rapid fire artillery* (37)• d. N*ove Chappelle(March, 1915). She British at Keuve Chappolle in iKvioh Lcto::pt9d a large scale operation with a view to penetrating the enemy frcn.t. 13ie la & sons of tho Perthes operations influenced the shortening of the preparetion to 55 minutos in an effort to gain surprise and the arrangement of the . i attacking troops in three wavos to correspond to; the three Hues of the enemy to.be occupied* In order to (allmlnate the loss of artillery fire i support result Ing. frow displacement soae of the long range artillery i was pushed v e i l forward* Some 300 guns of varying caliber ware as1 sembled for the effort, and the desire to gain destruction of the j enemy position and artillery lead to a narrowing of the frontage of \ attack to less thou a mile* Even thus narrow!, the artillery was unatle1 to inflict the desired destruction In the short preparation, and this failure was erroneously thought to bo the chief souse of the failure which resulted* Prior to the attaok, the aviation photographed the en­ emy positions. Initially the British gained surprise* During the attack the attaokers' artillery igtrod&oed for the first tine the curtain barrage designed to prevent eneny reinforoements from reaching their front lines*(38). e. Artois(12ay t l9l6}. a e next effort cf the French, at Artois, failed when i t ran into an oawny (lefeii&lve organisation which had been so deepened. that It constituted a fortified sone of sue cos wive positions* She effort resulted in a larger concentration of artillery permitting the widening of tha front of attack to seven miles* 'jhe cooperation of the aviation in the observation and adjustment of fire was facilitated by the a t ­ tachment of c squadron and a balloon to eaoh oorpt. Die adjustment of fire and registration was begun on the tlay preoed'.ng the cttaok, and the preparation was increased to about four iMmrsv in ordor to assure destraotion of the eneny positionu* Counterbattery was not on assigned mission of the artillery until after the launching nf the infantry attaok| and tiie failure to secure a reasonable degree of neutralisation va.3 a contributing factor to the fail-core of the attaotc* Another factor preventing suooess was the loss of surprise due to the long period of planning and preparation of the Beotor for the attack* (39)* (37) (38) (39) (2-37) (26.23) (42-1) (23-153) (2-37) (24-21i22|22-312) (2-41-43) (10-468) (59-21) (10-466) -12­ f« Introduction of tho non-toxlp »as shell by tho Germane. Vi In tho early sumaar the Ponaans introduced tho non-toxio gas shall, and at tho ond of Juno wado a limited objootlvo attaok at Bagatelle to tost its effectiveness and taotioal value. Tho shells woro placed between tho objective and the enemy reserves* 'Shelr use was a faotor in tho gaining of surprise and vrere soon thereafter utilized as a means of shortening tho preparation* (40). g. Allied offonsivo in Champagne and Artois(Sopton*Der,I9l5)« By fall the artillery situation wos improving, and .in Septo/nber the Allies attempted large results by undertaking simultaneous attack* in (harapaytio by the French IGrSh Arty end in Artols by the f British let Axtoyi the former stteok over u thirty-fivo kilctnetor frottt bolng reinforced by 900 gems of caliber lorgsr than the 75 mu, and the latter ovor a nine kilometer front boing reinforces by approximately 250 moiivan or heavy guns* For tho attacks those piooo% wore x«^Hed wnll forwsrd. She artillery asstaaed definite m.'.ssionaj (1) (2) (3) (4) 15) To destroy wire and their flanking defenses* To destroy the defenders* To raze t^nohes. To atop all alleys of ooaraunioptions, and to blind tho oneqy OP'a. Countorbattory for destruction before the attack and thereafter for neutralization. (41). Tho Ions continuqd preparations for the attacks v including the oonstrur>**'j of airplane hangars as wall aa artillery preparations, ro*oa*d«x the Allied intontions and provevtod anjr measure of surprise* Tho Gersaans withdrew thoir artillery on tho Chanpagiie front the day ; prior to the attack, thereby preventing oVfeotlve jounterbattory. Both , 1 attaokfi broka dowa boforo tho enoiny second position. Othei contributing causes of failure \rorc» (1) The inability of the artillery to pronptlji dlsplooo foi-wtird to positions fron v»Moh tho roar poa* ilons ocr.'.l.i bo att'vsked ydth (2) TIio vuioxpected strength of the nomoroue oiwc^ machine gunu. (3) The breakdown of oormuni oat Ions, especial ly botwoen tha inftintry and tho artillery, as soon a9 the attacks "*ero ."laujichetl. (43}• 'On tho O.efondors cide, i t appears thut l«io aurtoin oai-rage of tho British attaok at Keuve t'.iapelle was ocnvevtod by the Germans into a atrlotly dofonsive bai«rago and plao?d in front oi' tho defond« iiig riflenon. (43). (40) (^50) (10.468) (53-28) (35-89) (41) '(2-S:t52) (10-4fi3) (41-54) (42) (5-CC3) (2.54) (44-30/ (63.66) (43) (2-57) h. Improvements In toalvnique in trcnoh warfare* f? ttao period of stabilization their* grew tip an elaborate • system of intercommunication by telephone, signal lamps and Vory pistols, between the infantry and the supporting artillery and between the j battery and i t s oomraand post* The further development of aerial : observation and the use of wirt .ess as a means of oommunieation now ! nooessit^ceC1. the most careful measures for concealment and protection of batteries, rebulting in the universal use of camouflage or oasemated emplacements* Bio development of sound and flash ranging necessitated s t i l l further precautions in oonoealiroat. Kew range tables based upon prolonged experimental firing wart, prepared* Accurate mape were issued and upon these enemy positions were carefully located and narked* Daily .' Announcement was made of teraparature and wind oorreotlons* i t was be- ( cause of these improvements in technique, communication, oni moans of Information that the infantry, during the night as well as ths day, within a few moments could oall down the fire of the supporting a r t i l ­ lery. (44). 1. Improvements in materiel* The race for lnoreased range ii* a l l calibers went on oonour.rexit­ ly with t)ie race for production* Tactical considerations were the oon­ trolling faotora* £ie French altered the trail of their 7B to permit greater elevation and increased the range of that weapon to II 9 000 yards when using the streamline* shell* Sho Germans increased the r^nge of their 77 from about 5800 yards in 1914 by 500 yards by the adoption of a pointed fnr-j; and in 1916 they produced a new 77, In vfcloh by .lengthening the yunv/adding an upper carriage to increase the maximum olevation, they wore able with the streamline shell to obtain a rftivge of 11,700 yards*(45)* The use of the high explosive shell had gradually replaced that of shrav^iel, almost in universal use at the outbreak of the war* The larger bursting radius of the shrapnel, extremely effective in the open agaiiutt porsonnel, was almost entirely disoarded by nil combatants except the British, and partially disoarded by the latter, for the • following reasonst (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6, (7) (8) Difficulty /locating suitable targets* Tendency of fuse to detorloravj in long poriods of storage* Ineffectiveness agelnst armoured or proteoted targets, or wire* lllgh degree of training required of operating personnel. Greater moral offeot of high explosive* Difficulty of adjustment In irregular terrain* Slower manufacture in great quantity necessary* i Observation of fi*?e essential, rendering nlcfct firing lmpraotioable'»(45] (44) (45) (46) {48-57} (10-468) (46-73) (15-11,12) (T.6-II-I3) (14-80) (57-15) ! (I9-I6e,ie9) (52-441-44?) (5D-1B,20) (56-12) (53-38) (68-313) ; ) ( 6-119,252) (7-II29) (57-3) (63-38) (58-2) (71-363) (63-256M3.20! (38-135) (39-137) (36-400) (9-126} (6-252) (5-619,671) \ j (41-33) (22-163) (44-32) (56-7) (57-13) (69-607) -14­ j * Relation of the artillery to th* defense. ' Of the artillery, Ludendorff cays : "It has become the keysfcone of battle and the mainstay of the front." The protective barrage w&a a. dominant necessity* It was demanded by tho infantry on tho slightest fear of attack or Whenever tho enemy manifested any l i f e whatsoever* Tho Infantryman forgot how to use his r i f l e , and the war booarno for a time ono of artillery, ttiich was so disposed In depth as to give great protection. Iho following ohart illustrates tho typioal sector* Typo of artillery Yards from front line Light ortillery­ 0-3,000 close defense guns. Mission (I)To protect outpost zone, 12) Snipiag (3) Flanking units and j adyanood sootions. ' (I) To protect bi ttle zone) (2} To barrage front line trenches in case of '' attack. | (3) Forward oounterbattery!. (I) To proteot infantry in support zone j (2) Oounterbattery ; (31 Harassing fire. • (1) Annihilating fire (2) Barrage fire. Speolal missions.! 47;) 3,000-4,000 light artillery­ ualn positions* 4,000-6,000 Heavy artillery 6.000-8.000 Ovor 8.000 Heavy artillery Mobile artillery reserve Booauso of i t s rango, tho artlllory alone wa3 able to reaoh the | enemy In full force and to neutralize his operations while they wore in i preparation and boforo they were developed. In the event the enony j attacked, i t s great volume of.fire power frequently regained tho i n i t i a ­ tive for the defenders* When the enomy bombarded prior to the attack, the howitzers of the defending artillery executed counterbattory f i r e , ; while tho heavy guns shelled the billots and approaches in tho back , areas. V/hon the attacking in/entry com? out of their trenches the light i guns and howitzers v/ere charged with shopping the attack by a protective barrage on tho enecy front line trenoh. Tho silent batteries of tho ~j forward zone oponed fire wuen the smoko of the defensive barrage provided a measure of concealment for their gunc.(48). . i Considering the mission of tho artillery with rospect to i t s organic unit, tho mission of tho divisional artillery was the support of the ; infantry to a dopth of the effeotive rango of tho light guns; tho mission of the corps ar t i l lory was tho support of tKo divisions In line, and the' extension of tho zone of aotion of the divisional artillery in dopth, < (47) 148) (36-318,319,321) (6-252) (19-181) (66-2) (67-17) .15­ especially for oounterbatteryj and the i^ssion of the guns of .the arny artillery was to carry oat special Missions beyond the range of the oorpa or divisional artillery* In Addition to tho normal zone eaoh group had the mission of flanking adjacent seotors.(49)* k* Halation of tho artillery to the attack* In the attack tho artillery had likewise beoooo all-inportant. General retain i s orodlted with tho remark {"Artillery now conquers, the infantry oooupies*" It was the spirit of tho times that "battle was not waged with men against nawriel*" In 1916 Fooli saidi"Against an adversary who is perfectly protected, infantry has l-^st its offers aivo powor in tho .actual battle* Guns alone can destroy \he enen^'s defonaoB, upsot his organization, k i l l or annihilate thd defenders» and toaster his artillery.•* He i s reported to hove remarked that hia f i r s t question tfhon told to attack was not to ask how ouch infantry but how ouch artillery would ho have available* One result of thia growth of importance was tho formulation of detailed plans for each operation to be undertaken* Artillery oosnanders were created by all oombatants in each echelon above the brigade, and tho forcnila­ tion of tho nesossary plans necessitated a greatly enlar^d artillery staff organisation* In tho oase of tho Germans, these artilloly staffs wore not of a permanent nature as regards personnel* (50 )• (49| (60) (2-90) (57-17) (57-95) (69-604,605) (2-67) (6-663) (41-32) (36-319,321) (67-19) (61-14) (71-360,361) (10-460) (6-27,5) -16­ A. Mt Povlod of Attempted Broak-tftrou/di. fa a. Operations at Verdun, 1st phase (February Si-July 3I.X9X6)* She ascendency of the artillery influence approached i t s peek in the preparations for this operation. In which a penetration was planned* to to accomplished by materiel rather than men* Materiel was roliei upon to blast the way, aiaaihilate the defenders, and penult the infantry to exeoute a march and occupy the devastated Area without a fight* It i s established that oertaln infantry units on February 27. began the march with rifles slung* {M }• Sensing the probability of an attack in this are*, the French worked fovorJehly to deepen the forts, to strengthen the weak places, and to u t i l i s e the fortifications by making them a part of the schema of defense in the preparation of a fortified region, of great depth contiguous to tho forts themselves* Because of iho uncer­ tainty as to tho point of enemy attack, the French defense va« cm open chain Instead of a dosed ring or bend* (6$)* In preparing for tho attaok, the Germans made the most thorough preparations, assembled the greatest quantity yet masaedf fa\out 2,000 pieces, with approximately half heavier than the 77), and -fere careful not to reveal the location of the attack* xeans resorted to in retc?n^ ing this partial seorooy were the omission of the oonstruotiou of parallels of departure, the omission of registration, the movement of the inoomlrsr artillery into concealed positions in woods, the placing of the preparation over a front of 22 kilometers and attacking over 7, and by the reduction of the duration of the preparation from a aatter of days (as had been customary) to ono of ten hours* This reduction in length of tho preparation was made possible without loss of fire effect beoause of the assemblage of rapid fire weapons, the introduction of the phosgene shell and the continued us« of the non-toxio shell for the purpose of the neutralisation of those olements not destroyed* The emission of the registration was made possible by the adoption of tone fire in lieu of the precision *hoo*itv» of stabilisation, bio •preparations for the attack stressed eo*i.*erbattory and <uod* tho length of the preparation contingent vjpon the results of fire, to be determined at Intervals by rooonnaisaraice parties*(53)* During the preparation the French infantry sought ooverr the defending artillery rolatlvoly weak on the 21 of February delivered counterbattery. Vihen tho attackers a&vanoed, the infantry eoae out of their shelters to jive desperate battle, while the artillory s t i l l in aotlon placed i t s fire upon tho adveaoing lines* Outnumbered, the branch eventually f e l l back figitlng* This operation was repeated time and again throv hout the operation, the attackers on the 24 of February being on tro verge of a decisive suooess rtien the defenders wore a l l but annihilated*, but tiio orders for the advance called for a limited advance only, and both support and oomnrunication were prearr&ugad tc such a degree advantage could not readily be taken of the opportunity* In every other oase the wooker side in men and materiel ovoroamo tho deficiency by a superb spirit in whioh the "will to win" (51) (62) (53) (5-919) (35-57) (73-184) (2-73) (5-916) (35-52,55) (33-123) (2-73,74) (10-468) (35-57) (19-67) (63-68) -17­ tver flsa»d.(54)« The Initial front of the attaok was perceived to be a contributing faotor to the limited suooesf of (the attacks, and the German Grown Prince aftor making a personal appeal to the troops to "take Verdun, the heart of France", mado a new effort on a wider front on Marsh 6, aftor a longer preparation of about two days, Oils effort lacked that element, of surprise obtained in the initial attaok, and was stopped in front of Uort Horane.(BB). Suooessive efforts in April secured Mort Horaoe, and in June brought Thiaumont and Fleury under German control, but at this stage thoir attention was required on the Somme* During these latter attacks,' the French artillery had been augmented and often foroed the attackers j to form up in their trenches for the attaok under heavy concentrations ] of fire* And thus we have the beginning of counterpreparation fire as we know the term todty* (56)* i i The value of permanent fortifications had again been demonstrated. The prolonged bombardment by heavy artillery l e f t the turrets intact and the deep oonorete shelters had not only saved the lives of the defenders but had allowed that minimum amouri of rest so necossary for the prevention of oomplete exhaustion and shattered nerves* Modern forts themselves are helpless; but they strengthen the resistance of stout hearted defenders•(57)* b« The Somne Offensive(July I-Hovember 50,1916). The Frenoh and British on July I began a large scale offen­ sive over a front of attaok of 40 kilometers with a view to relieving the enemy pressure at Verdun. Zjoh attacking army concentrated a r t i l ­ lery in suoh mass as to give a density of approximately one piece (ex-| elusive of trench mortars) to each 15 yards of the front over which the attack was to be launched,, Although these attaoks were successful in removing enaay pressure At Verdun, s t i l l greater results would probably have been obtained had the lessons of Verdun been discerned* There was no surprise* Tbd Germans had learned as early as February of the impending attaok* The long preparation (on the Frenoh front this lasted for six days) would have prevented surprise had i t not already have been surrendered* Objectives were limited, as at Verdunand no preparations had been made to exploit suocesses*{68)* The initial attaoks presented for the first time on a l.\rge scale a new use for artillery, namely, the rolling barrage,, in an effort to give oioser support tc «he advancing infantry, thereby preventing enemy machine gunners from manning their weapons at the time the attacking infantry forms an effeoVive target* The rate of advanoe of the barrage, depending upon the' nature of the terrain end the likely resistance to tfe met, was at a rate of 100 motors iu from four to eight minutes, untU the objectives wore reached* Here i t booaroo for a time a standing barrage* (59)* (64) (55) (56) (67) (58) (59| (35-84) (32-261) (33.124) (2-79) (2-78) (5-919) (35-63,90) (73-196) (10-468) (35-66,66) (53-70) (74-565) (5-9180 (35-55) (59-6) (73-60) (2-80) (10-468) (35-72,74,77) (41-34) (24-25) (33-124) (64-71) (53-72,73) (2-80;88) (5-663) (59-40) (60-3) (63-73,82) (32-261,262} *I6­ Shis aystorn of Irregular concentrations and advances was complicated, and although efforts were olrapliiy i t , yet i t never beoflme e l a s t i c rHut effectiveness of the barrage uas later increased by various devioeai shortening the l i f t s , by raking f i r e , and by noans of plaolng an odvunood barrr^e of heavy artillery or ges oh^lls in front to deepen* ($d)i Sh« rolling barrage unquestionably markod a great adv&noe in ! infantry support, but the ideal was by no means realised* Advancing ' slowly, the enomy could see i t approaching in time to seek oover ' while i t paosel. The area of i t s action wus restricted and predetermine^ The extreme limit of i t s protection was hardly more than 5,000 me tors. In order to obtain the maximum benefit of i t s protection, tho infantry crust follow i t closely, and yot i f followed too closely ito fire was as dostruotlvo to the troops i t supported as the fire tf onemy a r t i l ­ lery* Abovo a l l , i t rigidified the advance of th*> infantry and su­ bordinated that advanoe to a prearranged friendly fire r&thor than to tho requirements of enomy resistance* (6l)» It i s significant that tho Allies olmg to precision fires during the Scene operation, and that the Germans attested this method of fire delivery by abandoning for future operations tho zone fires used at Verdun* Probably the compellis^ reasons for this decision wore tho great wastage of anvumitlon ana the excessive wear and tear on the guns involved in such use* (62). 2ho Some operation witnessed the introduction by the British of the tank, a weapon which was to influence artillery employment* But ho re tho use of the new weapon was insufficient to provide an as curate gauge > of that influence* (63)* o* Growth of goneral reserve and centralisation of artillery command* , Coinoldont with the employment of naval guns by tho Gormans, th*>; Fronoh inoluded in their artillery concentration for the Soroe buttles a norabor of railway naval guns, possessing great strategical mobility though a limited taotioal maneuverability. Initially these guns wore employed under isolated aocnand for harassing and long range intor­ dlotion f i r e s , but gradually wore dram into the genoral scheme of '­ fires for tho long range artillery* Other means of increasing the siBO and fire power of the genoral reserve of artillery -ms a slight reduct­ ion of organio division artlllery(the British reduced tho X8-pounde? artillery within the division from throe brigades to two), the adoption' of tho four gun batter} by tho British and Germans, and the continued tendency of all'combatants except tho Germans to centralize ooonand ! of the artillery in tho Chief of tiio higher headquarters, in order to facilitate the proper density of fire at tho place and time roquired, particularly for the aotlve battle* The German tondonoy to centralise command gave an increasing percenter of the artillery to the division< oontna.idor* (64)* d. She Verdun oporaticm oompl*tod(Au(;ust-DGoembGr, 1916). In tho latter part of 1916 the Fronoh by successful counter­ attacks '.Tested from tho onomy tho torrain previou3!*y lost to him in (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (57-21) (59-41) (60-13) (64-73) (76-15) (47-70) (59-42) (60-3-H) (64-77) (73~I9G,I97) (2-86) (1-349,350) (2-85) (5-664) (41-36) (53-75) (1-351) (36-399) (6-235,259) (10-468) (56*20) (57,2,10) (63-71) (26-237) (70-32) (71-359) (3-IB) -19­ this area. Initially thoM oounterftfiaoks were tttnspiouOuaXy aided by systematic awl eff eotlve oonntarov^ry from a j>owerful French artillery, operating under centrally d control. For the final attack on Docorabor 16, tho French shortened their preparation to four ; houre without loss cf suoeesa, althoutfi the objoctlvea were more distant than had boon assigned In tho Sonus attacks. This success v i s faoil- [ ltated by a curtain dogroe of taotisal surprlf* gained by at H-hour, at tho moment of launching tho infantry attack, a of artillory fire similar in volume to that used in the preparation. In the execution of now Infantry tootles now iutroducod, tho artillery p y g fires provided hoavy concentrations on stron* terrain features which the infantry pushed beyond and captured ty outflanking, t 0. Tho llivolle 0ffouolvo(9 April-I5 Hay, 1917). . For the Allied spring off endive in 1917 Gonoral Haig pieced hinsolf under tho oormand of Genera? Klvelle, and opened the oporation on April 9 by an attack ovor a twonty-four kilomoter front, with a View to tho ponotration of tho onony front by taking distant objootivoo without long halts, in crier to obsorb the onony reserves and finally, in conjunction with tho ;'ronoh attack, to turn in against tho German lir.os of oorxnu\icatioxu Within six days the attack had progrefls&d about olght kllomoterSf(66)« After a nine dc^ preparation tho French attacked on a forty kllomator front* She artillery donsity was tho greatest to date, having, exsluslve of tronch nortaro,, ono pioce enlaced for each 10,5 r- tors of front, i'ho offens5vo onoo acoln, howovor, lacked every olenient of se­ crecy, and was even, discussed prior to the attack by tho press of Franoe. Tho fJortmn plan was defensive, as in 1915. Several wooka before the British attack they withdrew to tho Hindonburg line and awaited the Allied attaoks to tost thoir now defensive taotlos, which were based upon elasticity and counterattack rather than rigidity, as formerly* The Gemans wore in every sonse ready, and met the French attackers with murderous fire and stopped thoir advanoe in front of the second position. (67). (66) (G6) (67) (35-93) (41-43) (53-01,83) (I-Mf) (2-102,103) (34-265) {35-105,117,119) (2-99) (1-405,466) (34-263) (36-4-59) 97,100) (1-485) (5-664) (53-94) (59-22) (53-95, -20­ 6. 2he Return to Limited Objective Attacks* a. Situation. The severe losses resulting from the Mlvelle offensive and the diB&stvoua effeot of those losses both in and out of the any prevented serious consideration of an early resumption of thvoffen­ sive with a view to a break-through* The efforts of the Allied for the remainder of the year were to be centered upon limited objective attacks thloh were, with a single exception, thoroughly prepared by the artillery with a view to destruction* (68). b, Hes8in©g(Juno,I9I7). The first of these larpe scale limited objeotlve attacks was at itossines, where on June 7 after an artillery preparation of , great intensity extending over a period of nore than a week the British ; penetrated on a fifteen kilometer front to a depth of several kilometers on schedule time* Doe to the excessive length of the preparation, there was no surprise, but the British preponderance of artillery was sufficient* W are interested in this study in the coordination . e of the machine gun barrage with that of the artillery. Oils resulted ta freeing a portion of the artillery for other missions.(69). o. Malmaison(Ootober, 1917}. The French reached the zenith of artillery density at val­ maison, Where they assembled I860 pieces of artillery, or an average of one pieoe for every six meters over the ten kilometer front of attack* After a slow preparation, designed for annihilation and da, struetlon, and lasting over six weeks, they gained with Blight infantry; losses the limited objeotives desired* Sixty tanks were used In this ; battle and were given the mission of extending and prolonging the j artillery aotion. On the eeoond day of the battle, the initial penetra-' tion was widened to about eighteen kilometers; but no plans had been ! made for exploitation* During the aotion the artillery laid down inten­ sive interdiction fires, and the enemy's flow of anuunition and food i was severely hampered* The operation is considered the masterpdeoe of the limited objective attacks in trench warfare involving destruction by artillery materiel* (70). d. Cambrai(November-December,1917). The British now perceived that the long preparation preceding these limited objective attacks rendered Impossible one essential element of any decisive attaok, namely, the element of surprise, in that the protracted duration of the bombardment gave the (68) (69) (70) (1-485) (2-106) (59-2) (61-16) (53-100) , (2-110) (48-57) (37-102) (10-411) (60-294,295) .(54~29-33)(64i»l30| (2-111,113) (37-105,106) (35-137) (43-56) (53-103) (£6-323) 1 -21­ enemy tine to bring forward the necessary reinforoementa of nan and materiel. (71). They lik»wise had formed theorlea regarding ,tht eapabilitiea of the tank. ihese theoriaa invited verification. Bi*rafor», on Hovember 20, at Cambral, the British launohed a limited objective attack with no, preparation ifcatever, assigning to tho tanka tha form&r artillery \ misaion of wire cutting* Surprise waa farther facilitated by the o- , mission of registration, even for the guna partielyatlng in the rolling barrage* Oils waa made possible by oawful calibration bade of tho lines. (72). Bic attack: was the f i r s t strategical surprise ainoe Heuve Chapelle in 1915* It was initially suooesaful beyond expectation, and although most of the ground gained waa later surrendered to the surprise German counterattack, the reverse resulted from a lack of receives rattier than faulty artillery or tank employment. The results of the use of tanks, aside from their moral effeot* waa chiefly the shorten­ ing of the artlllto:? preparation* Neutralisation Instead of dtairuot­ ion appeared in better light as the appropriate aim of the preparation, not only because i t aided surprise by the shortening of the preparation, but also beoause i t appeared sufficient to permit the subsequent j advance of the infantry* (73)* Although the advent of the tank relieved the artillery of certain of i t s missions, yet i t added to the artillery the task of i t s own protection by laying down timely oountorbattery as well as a smoke soreen for the tank's concealment* Bat our chief interest in the tank i s to note that i t s introduction l a s In response to tho ever present need for close infantry support and presaged another effort at close support yet to come in the form of accompanying artillery*p type of support fir3t attempted on a anall eoale by tho Germans in their coun­ terattack at Cambroi*(74)* (71) (72) (73) (74) (5-6?4) (35-136) (41-46) (59-16) (64-135) (63-103) (71-363) (2-II2J (10-466) (41-46) (23-164) (64-136) (63-104) (40-349) (2-112,114) (34-291) (37-11I) (41-48) (10-468) (2&-X6S)(63.xO6) (23-164) ; (59-64) (61-13) (40-355) (53-105,106) (37.203) -22­ 6, lfoft Break tflrouffi Accomplished and the peiturn to Maneuver* a* The Genaaa offenslve(Iiarch-Aprllf I9l8]» Tho Gorman offensive oommenolng Maroh 21 1 1918 furnished perhaps j the moat suooessful offensive taotios of tho war* Here success was largely predicated upon securing'strategical and taotloal surprise* Artillery factors which contributed to this surprioo we ret (1) Thorough instruction during the preceding winter in meanB to bo adopted, and publication to troops of measure! i to obtain seorooy* (2) Concentration of resorves veil book from the front whore their disoovery would not indioate the use to be mode of them. (3) Tho use of camouflage over a l l preparatory measures, including ammunition dumpo. (4) Severe restriction upon all forms of communications. (5) Confining artillery movement to tho hours of darkness, and taking advantage of the cover of woods during the day* (6) Limiting tho construction of now artillery positions to those which could bo concealed and dels;;ing the construction of thosa as long as possible* (7) Maintenance of normal traffio on roads daring &e day* (8) Restriction and supervision of circulation in the rear areaox the clearing of roads of troops and vehioles upon the approach of planes, the establishment of control posts, and the barring of a l l roods to motors five kilometers from the front* ' (9) Systematic reoonnalssanoe and increased activity oiror othor fronts^ extending as far to the rear as depots and railheads* (10) Deception of their own troops by rumors of enoray offensives in the sootor to be attacked, the withholding of information of the approaching attack from tho mass of the officers, and the keeping of m ips and orders under look and key well to tho rear* (Il)Roconnaissanco parties limited in size and ramber, and conducted by corapotont guides* (I2)Hellanco on technical preparation of fire data* (I3)'i3ie superimposing of the incoming artillery upon tho artillery already in the sector, and charging tho latter with the reconnaissance and selootion of positions, the Initial calculation of firing data, and the expansion of tho oonttunioation system* (I4)Bringing forward the mass of the artillery during the night be- . fore the attack, end to covered though otherwise unprotected po- j sitions* i (15 }lluf fling of wheels of animal drawn artillery vehiolos during tho i final move into position, in order to reduoo tho noise of traffic*; (16preparation over a front greater than that soleoted for attack, j thereby concealing until K-hour the exact front of advanoo* ; (I7)Extremo violence of artillery preparation mode possiblo by massing of guns(one piece to each II yards of front), coroontration of fire and maximum use of a l l oalibors, Including trench mortars* j (I8)Tho shO-'ttuing of tho preparation to 5|-hours, node possiblo by j charging tho proparatlon with neutralization only, and facilitating tho accomplishment of neutralization by an extensive uso of gas* (I9)Tho assigning of doop objectives to bo tc««m by tho infantry by a continuous progression without halts, to bo continuously oupporbod by groups of artillory attachod to tho Infantry and known as ; accompanying artillory*(75). : T (3-28,29,59-66) (75-11,17.47,48) (77-376,427,818,883) (42-2) (37.£05-209.227) (35-149) (01^5) (1-631)' -23­ In order to gain the extreme concentration of fire effect, the preparation WBS dividod into phases, varying in different sector* as to duration and amount of ammunition oxpondod denonding upon the nature of the positions and tho amount of encny artillery to be encountered* A typical phase division ie 5 1st Porlodi Cowitorbattery for about two hours, making full use of bluo and {preen oross oholls, vrith a ton minute hurrioane boiabardmont of tho infantry lines plaoed noar the middle of tho period* 2d-4th Foricdt Continuation of countorbattory for about ono and a hr.lf hours, with a gradual shifting of the infantry support battories to tho hostilo infantry positions* F>th-6th Period; Shifting of all tho artillery, oxoopt tho long range guns, to the infantry positions for about two and a half houra. 7th Period: A five minute period to adjust battories on their propor linos for tho attack* Ac this period tho artillery was divided into three groups, as follows: rolling barrage, crantorbattery, and accompanying guns* Until this period command was centralized, but a growing decentralization now contnonoes. (76)* ?ho barrage group was made as powerful as the diversity of artillery missions permitted, in order to provide both o deep and dense ahiold­ ing curtain of fire for the infantry. Lioson was to bo provided by means of planes and light signals, but tho heavy fogs prevailing during tho greater ytxri of tho offensive censed tho complete break­ down of infantry-arti 11 ory comunication except in the Eighteenth Arqy rtioro Colonel Bruchnrullor was artillery supervisor* In ordor to keop tho ortillory within firing rango, i t hod. been provided that displacement by ocholon comenoe at H plus 1^-hours* (77)• Tho greatest effort, however, to subordinate artillery fire to the infantry's immediate needs was tho oxtonslvo use of the acocn­ panying battorlos, two guns "oeing attaohed to and placed under the c or mend of each assault infantry battalion comander* 'Sioae gun? , wore so used because of tho nocessarily slow response of the artillory, vhen the noons of oorxmnication broko down during an advance. ITioir \ assigned missions wore: (1) Tho fire support of tho battalion against those olooonts holding up tho attack* (2) Anti-tank operations. (3) The protection of the flanks* (C) She repelling of counterattacks. (5) Qie general support of tho battalion after i t had passed beyond the range of tho rolling barrage* They wore pushed well forward and followed tho infantry lines closelyrf taking positions on create and firing point blank at targots located generally within 1000 meters* (78)* (76) (77) (78) (37-229) (76-18,47,48) (3-20) (1-632,633) (37-229) (75-48) (77-836, 371,372) (6-249) (37-229) (7S-46) (77-307,818.618,619) -24­ b* Development of portoo art i l l 017. 2ho Go man initial offensive was eventually brought to a halt vhon surprise was lost and after tho French had reinforoad the British* 1J10 experience rovoaled that the necessary artillery oould bo more assembled at tho throatonod point if that artillery moved by motor power. Horse drawn artillery proved slow in moving long distances* For this reason, as well as because of the increasing shortage in / horsos, portoo artillory organization, utilizing available truck oar- . riera, wv pushoi to tho limit of ax iilnbl«u transportation! B tho end ca y of tho war tho French alono had cowvertod thirty-four corpf light" artillery rogiments into portoe organizations. (79). / 0. Surprlso lost* Tho Chomin dos Daraos offensive, oonr.onelMg liny 27, wasraadopossible by a rapid and so ere t transfer of a powerful mans of artillory, enabling tfto Germans to rotain surprise and to offoct a rapid advance V Juno 3 to tho ?.!arne»{80)« Thoir rext thrust 6n Jtoio 9 at tlatz lacked tills ole/ant, hovwver, and failure resulted* And ocain, on July 15, their offensive in Champagne for the eon* reason not only failed but booauae of tho ounnilatlvo w-stace of strencth porr.wnentl5r lost the initiative for the Germans.(81)* d* Allied counteroffonsivo. The French Initiated tho Alliod countsroffenslve on July IO« Con­ tributing faotoro to surprise 1703 tho entire absence of any preparation on tho frait of tho IOtfi Arwy, while on tho 6th Amy front i t wis limited to a duration of l£ hours. (82). 2ho British ouiv^"5»-^ attack August 8 was ovon moro successful, and vras dolivowd without n prepiiration. Airplane cooperation with the artillory prior to the attack was so offeotive the British artillory through accurate countorbafctory was ablo to free their tanks from the dangers of onony artillery firo«{03). 1 i" Amorlcan attack at St. llihiol was successful with but partial 3.> surprise by virtue of an overwhelming superiority of mo: and natoriol. A short but intense preparation v/oo node possiblo by by tho massing of more than three thousand piooos cf all callbore that delivorod . over half a million rounds of ammunition during a few hours of firing* (34)J On Soptonbor 26 tho Arcorioans and tho French J.nitiatod an offon­ sivo which was to spread to tho other Alliod fronts, and to maintain prossuro without letup against a disintegrating foe. During this warfaro of rnovomont , chief artillery difficulties experienced woro: (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (10-468) (SS-dOI) (42-405) (1-504,637) (34-359) (59-23) (I-627-6C8) (37-267) (70-35) (81-40) (1-629,670) (34-376) (3-29-39) (34-380) (1-42) (35-171) (34-390,295) (40-355'y (35-178) (37-327) (82-65-70) (41-404) (79-23-42) -25­ (Z) Hooping the artillery, espooially the medium and heavy p well forward and maintaining an available admonition supply, (2) The maintonanoe of infantry-artillery coramnioatlon. (3) Koeying suitable targets under terrestrial observation or obtaining oonroleto oooperation from the air observation agencies* (4) Exaoting. the exorcise of the, .initiative required of the leaders ,, of the subordinate artiltesy unit P. in a warfare v£ rapidly 'shifting situations. \ ''•' , ,// Uarshal Fooh doubtlessly hud the above difficulties in mind when in X9I6 he said;"Bio infantry must roalize that i t possesses an annatsent which is strong eneu^i to enable i t to oxploit its first success, and to continuo ite. progress while overcoming local resistance with its otm rosourcos and without artillery firo. M (85). . e. Alliod experience with accompanying artillery. ISio Allies wade gonora'i. use of accompanying artillery, but with varying rosults. In the 82d. Division(U 3.) during the Jleuse Argonne offensive one such gun is roportod to have destroyed in a singlo day eight pill boxes which had at various tines boon used in holding up the infantry advanoe. The somo report mentioned the loss of twelve horses by a single platoon within a period of three days, during vhioh time tho platoon accomplished nothing toward the support of the infantry. In a post-war study of fourteen oasos appearing in tho Field Artillery Journal, i t nan found that in seven coses ruch employment was definitely unfruitful.(86). Exverionco establishod the follow!^ factors as being pertinent to tho divergent VIOTTS on tho use of accompanying artilleryt doctors favoring such use: (1) Favorable moral effoot on tho infantry. (2) Infantry vroapons, including tho 37 tin gun and tho tank, are at timost incapable of giving the necessary support-. (3i Past failures are largely attributable eitiior to ienoranoe on the part of the infantry oonmander or tc inexperience or lack of oggres­ sivonass on tho part of the artillery gun oenmander. These defi­ oioncos can be corrected by proper training* (4) Infantry-artillery nomnunio&tions break dorm in open war'are, in foloh oase accompanying artillery' constitutes the only means of ob­ taining accompanying fire. Factors indicating tho undesirabillty of such use: (1) Tho gun with its transportation offos-s tho enemy a target of such size and vulnerability that losses are lnooanensurate with the results obtained. (2) Tho limited tactical mobility of tho gun frequently renders slow, laborious manhandling necessary. (3) Lack of training of infantry officers as to or til lory capabilities and mode of aotion preoludes oorreot tactical handling. (4) maximum concentration of fire requires contrail cation of ootmand. (6) Bold and aggressive uso of OP's facilitates aoounpanying fire. Ac­ company ing I'iro has tho advantages of accompanying artillory without any of its disadvantageb.(07). (85) (86) (87) (I-423J (53-246) (57-22) (5-666) (80-650-662) (83-394) (84-1-19) (85-186} (76-22-25) (78-7) (80-646,647,662) (86-5P.6-52S) (87-J540-342) -E6­ IV- CONCLUSIONS OP U H AUTHOR* H I . Anolys^g* I oonolu&e that the teohnlool development o f a r t i l l e r y during the var resultod o l t h o r from a derand f o r {jraateft f i r o porar or booause of tho necessity of possessing a superior firo power at tho critical point; and that tho tactical ovolution of -artillery employment resulted from a desire to rendor the artillory continuously rospon­ sivo to tho changing noods o? tho infantry* Principal tactical and technioal developments con be sivnmarizod in tabular for-, as follows: i FIRK PCMSR t SUPERIOR AT OHITIGAL POIHT > CCIITINUO'JSIY HE- , SPONSIVS TO INFANTRY i Rapid firo euno i/iito-Incroasod numbor guns Inoroasod aimunition supply s Caterpillor Uobility-Tiactor drawn .Hallway Portee lias sine of cunfl Concentration of fire Co.Tmu»ioation~Y/ire Liosou Deionsivo barrace Haras cin£; fires Interdiction fires | WeiQht-LarG©r calibor ; i Rance-'ilevati on 3hpll modification Acourcvcy-Observod^Airplano Control-Genorul reserve Bcholonnwnt in depth I Balloon Artillory staffs Unobserved-Registration Ooncont rations (Map firingJAcourafa naps Prepara\;ion-.?or destruction Attack-F.olline barraeej For neutralization Ac company inf? j Ranfio tablao VJ C X Daily oorroctiom. Calibration Advanco by echelon i Dofiladcd positions Cajnouf lago Oaueinatod omplaoomonts Conservation-Sound and fl&dh Yeaclnc Countorhat to ry * • Howitzors L'ortars Hitfi oxploaivo shells lion toxio G*3 shells Toxio gas shells Smoke Porsiotont gas shells 2ho ne«d ^or fire power impelled tho oarly introduction of ho&vy artillery, of rapid fii\> artillory, ard tho utilisation''of a £jreatl^ increased nunber of videos with a corresponding increase in nmunition expenditure* To place thl.3 firo deep into enemy territory t K rango of >» a l l calibers, pj-tioularly licht artillory, was inoroasod by modifioa­ tiono of tho shell and mount* To locato tarcjets and plaoo this i'iro Limited decentralization \ -27­ ucyuratoly upon those t a i n t s tho airplane and tho balloon early became of groat aasistimoo to torrostrial observation* To mako possible unobservod firing at nltfit or during tho day vhon aerial observation was not available, or ground observation, because of the range, Impossible, there oame into general use a combination of toohnioal means for accurate mno shooting* Chief of those were registration upon entry of the gun in the sector, and tho propara­ ticr and distribution of acourato maps, range tables, and daily corrections* In tho lattor period of tho tar registration was d i s ­ pensed with by means of careful calibration back of tho lines* To oonserve this tin power and to prolong i t s l i f e , oanouflage. defi- i laded positions or caseraated emplacements beoemo of great importance,' countorbattory vras systematized, and sound and flash1 ranging was devoloped* To increase the effectiveness of fire under the varied conditions of combat encountered, the howitzer and the mortar i bocomo more important weapons, while in the realm of the projectile . high oacplosiv© became the shell of greatest u t i l i t y although entirely new types of gas and si oke shells were developed to i n f l i c t casual­ : t i e s , conceal movements, or facilitate neutralization* Tho absolute necessity for fire superiority at the point of tho oritical effort demanded artillery nobility, both tactical and strategical* Tuotioal mobility and a certain freedom of aotion after roaohir& tho battlefield was possessed by horse drawn artillery, and to a lesser degree by the tractor drawn and caterpillor typos* Bail'TOy and porteo artillery was introduced in the latter half of the * war to give strategical mobility and insure rapid concentration from distant fr6nts* To mako these types uvailable where and when ; needed they wore used to augment tho General Reserve of Artillery* » To make artillery t'ire superior at tho decisive point weapons wore massed to a density hitherto not dreamed of* 7/tter this was carried a ^ e p farther by owacontrating fire for brief pariods rather thcta..spreading i t out thinly over a larger area indefinitoly• Shis lattefjicai&anoy was & factor in Increasing the complexity of artillery planning, and larger staffs resulted. : ; • ; i j Daring trench warfp.ro the increase of power of tho defense, duo j to the oonstruotion of tranches in depth, wire, and tho increase of automatic weapons, particularly machino guns, rendered tho attacker's^ fire incapable of securing instantly tho superiority necessary for j a penetration* To overcome this d&fioionoy, the preparation beoame | a proreTii8ite* During the greator part of tho war i t was given the mission of destruction of tho enemy dafenses and matoriel, and was | consequently of a protracted duration. Eventually i t was peroeived that suoh a preparation dofeated i t s own object by affording the ' enemy tiaio to bring up his artillery and moot mass with mass* There* i forev the mission of the preparation was choreed to one r.f neutral- j ijsation, and by moans of en increasing density of fire and utilisation of appropriate omnunition, the preparation was shor toned to a i duration of a few hours only* fthon the broak-th>*ough «as accomplished, ! tho preparation was at times omitted altogether* Fire power, oven when uv&llablo in tho critical aroa, i s of l i t t l o valuo unless I t can be properly utilized und can bo made -28­ responsive to the needs of the troops for whoso support i t i s doliverod* During trench warfare, advantage was taken of the fixity of position! to perfect the moans of infantry-artillery communication* Wir*> ployed a major part in this contact. Coordination, of effort now boing possible, the defensive barrage for the protection! of the front line dements was but a raothod of cooperation, in order to insxiro support oven though the energy effeot a limited ponotration, guns were echeloned in frreat depth. Counterpreparation fires resulted logically from tho poriou of warfaro which lacked any deg^o of surprise of action and represent a move highly developed infantry support than oould be given by the passive defensive barrago* Har­ assing and interdiction fires r»>r*J3ent the artillerj' f s ansvjer to t the demand of the infantry for support before the enemy comes within olese range* In the attack, the nethod of artillery support initially took the form of concentrations during the advance. As the poror of tho defense increased, the difficulty of rushing machine gunners not silenced and frequently not covered by the fire concentrations re­ sulted in a demand for on artillery fire to move just ahead and in close support of the leading wave, in order that the enemy would not have time to recover from tho effects o£ the barrage before the leading ole&ionts were upon.him. Upon resumption of maneuver warfare in 1918 the rolling barrage lost much of i t s Importance because of tho look of trenchds and tho lessened density of weapons avail­ able to tho defense, as well as increased difficulty of onnunition supply for such artillery use faced by the attacker* The finely adjusted oommunioations of stabilised warfare broke dorm after the break-through—infantry-artillery communications went out and although the artillery displaced -.forward by ooholou yet i t hod much difficulty locating and keeping under observation suitable targets — and to compensate for this loss of responsive­ ness to tho infantry, a degree of decentralization of the artillery set in and aoootnpanying guns and batteries were attached to infantry units* ji This effort to give continuous and olostio support to tho infontzy failod to accomplish full results* Developments since 1918 nay have furnished u satisfactory solution of the probletnV* *aie future alone will determine whether this i s tho oase* until such tine that a per­ fected radio development gives a praotioal demonstration of i t s ability in actual war to maintain continuous and uninterrupted infantry-artillery'' communication, studios in our army uhould inoludes a. The advisability of a greater uso of airplanes by tho artillory for the observation, adjustment, and oontrol of firo. b* The production of a highly mobile artillery gun capable of move­ ment over rugged torraln and possessing the invulnerability to enemy fire neooasary to rondor i t suitable for olosely following tho infantry* Such a weapon would render the vory great sorvioe , of lessoning the paralysing effeot of a break-down in oocmunioatioiu* I thorotore finally oonolude that the taotloal evolution of tho onployracnt of field artillery on the wostom front during tho world -29­ war Has Invartatjly tho result of one aoaitwing na*At nomtty v TBS POS­ SESSION OP A PIRB POWEB SnOHOOOHHT USD COtinSVOttlX RBSPGD3IVB TO THE CHAHOIKa REQUIH3ffiKTD OP 1KB AS&GKXHa OH DEPSKDIHd STOOPS, AUD 3UPI5U0H TO me mane ks cm DBCISIVS POINT. -30­ 2* Lessons* (1) Heavy artillery should bo mobile artillery, and should bo plocel in the f i e l d . (2) Heavy artillery i s the ideal weapon for destruction. {3} A well balanced artillery of a l l oalibers, both guns and howitzers, i s a necessity for a modorn army* (4) Artillery methods and araamont must go hand in hand with and to a degree be dependent upon the advances of soience and invention. (5) Prolonged artillery preparation defeats Its own purpose by naming the enemy and giving Mm time to prepare for the at took to follow. (6) Artillery alone and independent of infantry ootion oonnot conquer , a v e i l organized defensive position* (7) The advance of the rolling barrage should be regulated in.aooordanoe with the ability of the infantry to push forward* (8) The rolling barrage of i t s e l f i s not a sufficiently elastic support fo*' tho infantry. Coramuniaatlons must render i t flexible during the advanoo* (9) Tho artillery preparation should not be charged with more than neutralization of the enemy* (10}TOienopposing forces ore adequately supplied with artillery, surprise of action i s essential to suoooss. (11) Massing of guns in an essential to a successful offensive opera­ tion. Guns cannot bo massed unless they are mobile* (12) Concentration of fire in order to sooure the value of sudden, violent, and surprise effoot;1B of primary importance. (13) Artillery must cooperate with infantry, tfiose support constitutes a major artillery mission. (14) Artillery is able to cooperate with infantry only when there i s a trustworthy (tomounloation and on offinion'o information service* (15) The artilleryman and the infantryman must have a definite knowledge ofj tho other am, i t s mode of aotion, i t s capabilities and i t s ' limitations* An intelligent understanding of the other man's Job ig the first essential of successful cooperation* (16) Cooperation will bo facilitated by oombinod training of tho Infantry-artillery tetvn in poace tirao, with espooial attention' to tho means of communication essential to continuous infantry support* (17) Artillery fire i s moasurod as much by the availability of -31­ fumnmitlon aa by tfce number of guns* Tha war taught us that "artillery's best reserve i s a large anmmition supply*" (18) Satisfactory taotical mobility for raaneuvtx'warfare was not obtained* (19) Artillery plans and methods mast be constantly revised* An unvarying and stereotyped plan, betrayer Bound, will eventually surrender surprise and contribute to failure* (20) Our artillery poaoo tine training should inolude the methods of artillory employment in 9v*xy fora of warfare with Ttiloh we may be faoei in the future* (21) Ihe artillery during the war successively held a position of an auxiliary am, the major ana, and a companion am* She Cao­ tios of ita most suooessful etuploymont indicates that i t s proper position i s that of a oompaniun am* V* RBCOOISKB&IIOHS*- Kone required* VI* C01ICUBEENCE3.- Hone required* Code No* 84* -32­ BIBUOGBAPHJf. Keys (4-25) - Ho. 4 text bo low, page 23. I . Herr, Frederie Georges, General, Fronoh kra^t "field Artillery; F u i , Present and Future". Field I r t i l l t r y Journal, U.S.Field A r t i l ­ lery Assooiatioa, Issues May-June, 192? to Vanfcary.J?ebrttary,l929, both Issues inclusive* Page referenees refer to Issues at follows* Pa. 2gg m Mfty-Juno,I927, 329-356-July-August,1927 «4-B03-Sept.-0et.,I927. 623-637-BOY*-Deo.fI927. 36-60-Jan.~?eb. f 1926* 280-302-Uay-Jmw, 1923. 5I9.553-Sept.-0et. t Z9t8. I3-2V-Jaa, .Feb., 1929. 2« Lueaa, Lieut* Ool(Oe»eral Staff List, Frenab Amy«"The eyolatioa of taotloal ideas in Franee and Oezmaay during the «&? of 1914-18•»• Translation by Major P.V.Kleffer, P.A.,1925. 3. Bruohnraller.Ooorg, Ool»,B>t.,Geraan An^t n 9ie Qenaan Artillery i n the Breai£-airou0i Battles of the World War", translated by ifaj. Wallaoe, F.A* and Lieut* H.D.Kehro, P.A. S.S.Hittler and son,Berlin, 4* Ghaobers Snsyolopaedia, Vol. I. J.B. Lippinoott Co..Philadelphia, Hew Sdltion* 5. Boeyolopaedia Brittanloa, Vol.XXXII, New Volumes,I2th Bd., cam- bridge Issuft, Knoyolopaedia Brittaaiea Oo», Ltd«, Londca. 6. Sneyelopaedia Brittaaiea, Vol. ZXZ, Nev Voltmes, I2th Sd. 7. aieyelepaedia Brittaniea,Yc?, XXZZ, Hew Volumes, I2th Ed. \\ 8. Sneyolopaedia Brit tunica, Vol. I l l , I3th Sditloni I926 f Encyclo­ paedia Brittaaiea, I n s . , London and B»v York. 9. Bioyolopaedia Brittaaiea, Vol. I , I4th Edition* I929| Encyolo­ paedia BrlttaaiM, i n e . , London avl Hew York. 10. Snoyolopaedia Brittanioa, Vol. I I , I4th Bdition. 11. aioyolopaedia Brittanloa, Vol. XII, I4th Sdition. 12. The Aoerloana; Amerioana Corporation, Vol. 28| New York, 1929. 13. New Amoriqana, Vol. 2; Hammond Press, W.B.Oonkey Oo., Chioago. 14. Field Artillery Notes No. I; W.D.Doo. 588; May, 1917. 16. Artillery Notes No. 9j W.D.Doo. 788; Apr.,1918. 16. General Notes on the Use of ArtlllerytW.D.Doe*696|NO7«aZ9X7« *7. Marx, Lieut* Col*,Gorman Army$ "Strongth, oomposltion and organJ*atio^ of modern artillery 1 ** Translation from "ttlssen and Wear**, Deo.. 1923. -33­ 18. Bouquerol, O M i n l , French Arayi "Reflections of an Artillery- • man*1. Translation mule at the General Servioe Schools of an article pub. llshed In the Revue Uilitaire Generalo, 1923* 19. Field ArtJlltry Journal, Vol. VIZ, 1917. ailtorial notes. 20* Sohwarte, M., Maj. Gen., Ret. f German Any; "War Lesson* in &canples Taken from the World War1** Translated in Uilltary I n t e l l i ­ gence Division, War Department, 1930. SI* Oullman, Prederis, General, Freneh Anqyi "Division Artillery", Field Artillery Journal, with page references a» follovst ps v 860-393, July-August,I951. 473-488, 3ept.-October,1931. 22* CfcaUeat, U.J.,Gonerfcl, French Amy; "Taoties and uaterlel1** Arny Ordnanee, Army Orlnaaoe Assoolatlon, lashiu^ton, with page refereaees aa followst ps. 169-164, N O T . - D M . , I 9 3 I 324-330, liar.^Ipr.,1932 83* Foster, H»rut Captain, R«A«tHQie Ztonua Silver iiedal Essay,i930-! X93IH. the Journal of the Royal Artillery, July, 1931. Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich. 24* Becke, A.P., late Uajor, R«F.A.;MIhe Ooaine of the Creeping Barf> rage", live Journal of the Rcyal Artillery, April, 1931. ! i 25* Notes on Infantry, Cavalry and Field Artillery, I9i7# Government Printing Of flee, Washington* (Personal oopy). ; 26. lleyer, Vlnoent, Llajor, P.A.;"Evolution of Field Artillery TaoMts Daring and as a Result of the World War1*; Field Artillery Journal.page j references as follows t ' ps. 209-224-Uar.-Apr., 1932. S2I-334^lay-June, 1932. 27. Pershlng, Jobn J, General | "Final Report"} Government printing Of­ fioe, 1920. | 28. "Frenoih Offioial Aooount of the War**| Abstraot In The Anoy j Quarterly, Vol. XXV, No. I(0ot.I932)i Willlan Clones and Sons, Ltd,Lon-; don* 29. Barrow,ft de 9, General, British Arqy; "The Soldierly Spirtt n i Qie Aray Quarterly, Vol. XX7, No. I. 30. "Qie War Uemories of Marshal. joffre"; Stwnary in Tho Amy Quarterly, Vol. X V No. 2. X* 31. Ay res, Leonard P, Col., U.S. Array j "The War with Gernaj^") Gov­ ernment Printing Offioe, r.914. 32. Shartle, S.G., Ool., CA.C"Forts and Fortresses", Infantry Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4 (July-Aug*, 1932) U.S.Infantry Association. 33. De Weerd, H.A.wTho Vorduc Ports"; coast Artillery journal. Vol. ; 76, No. 2* -34­ 34. Hindenburg, von, Field Marshal}?Out of M Li*e"i Cassell and co«, y London, 1920. ' 35* Mangin, General, French Arnr/jnHow the War aidei". Oyped trans­ lation by Miss Dorothy Hooks, G.S.S. 36* Ludendorff, von, Brieh, General; "Ludendorf^s O n Story"; Harper w and Bros*tH«w Yoxfe and London, 1919* Volume I* 37. Volume II of 36 above* 38* Rohno, H., Lieut* Gen., German Arnyt"Observed and Unobserved Art­ illery Fire"i Translated by Lt. W.L.Gibson, E.G.A.; journal of Royal j Artillery, Vol. 49, 1923. 39* Weitershausen, von, P., Col., German Array; "Observed and Unobserved Artillery Fire"* Translated ly Lt. ft.L.Gibsen, R.G.A.; Journal of Royal Artillery, Vol. 49, 1923. 40* Ironside, W*B*,Maj»Gen#, British' Awy, "Die Development of Mod­ em Weapons", journal of Royal Artillery, Vol. 49, 1923. 41* Allen, Goo* H,feh*D| Sins, W.S.,AdmiraljlicAndrewfj.W. fKaJ.Gen*| Wiloy,Edwin,Ph.Dj "Ehe Great War",' Vol* V; George BarriVs Sons. Philadelphia, 1921. 42* Coonent Sheet, UP 4, Series X, 0* and GS, 1932* 43* tflllou&iby, C.A.,ltaj, lnf«, Abstraot of articles "Tanks in the Battle of Ualmaison, Oot.,1917", in the Bevue d' Infanterie, Jan.,l93£» Review of Current Military Litorature, Vol* XI, No.44, O.and G.S., uar*i 1932. I 44* Lewin, B.O.,Col•,British ArnytHl8 pr. AsounitionN* journal of Royal Artillery, Vol. 1IX, Ko. I (Apr.,1932J. 45* De Pardieu, tlajor»"A Oritical study of German Taotios and of New Gennan RegulRtions* Translated ty Captain C.F.i.'ortin, U.S.Amy; U.S.Cavalry Association Presi, Fort Leavenworth, Kaaias* 46* Spanlding,•Oliver L:"Hotea on Field Artillery for Officers of a l l Arma"t 4th Edition; U.S.Cavalry Association, Fort Leavenworth. Kansas* . 47* Grundel, Ot"Attack and Defense"! Abstracted by ilajor A* Volluek Review of current Military Literature. C and G.3.,June, 1932* * 48* Brosse, General ,Fresoh Amy* "Frontages and zones of Action", • Rovue iJilitalre Pranoalse, Mar*, 1932, Abstracted by Uaj. O. Review of Current Military Literature, C*and G.3.S, June,1932* 49* Svioooho, Georgo H, Lieut*i"Pages from the Diary of a French Artilleryman^* Field Artillery Journal, Vol.VII, 1917, 50* Looke, H.E. ^laJor,?.A."Artillery in Surope"t FlelA Artillery Journal, Vol. VII, 1917. 51* Duvall. Maurice:"Comparison between the German i*77n and the French "75** Field Artillery Journal, Vol*VH,l9I7* A .M ? • *****, Oeo.H, Majort"Aocurate Shooting la Treneb. tfarfare"tField Artillery journal, vol* VII, 1917. i -35. 53,Bale,:, Lieutenant General, German Aray: "Development of Tactics, World Wax** Transleted by H&*ry Boll* General Service sohools Press, 1922. E4. "The Attack of the British 9th Corps at Uesslnes Ridge"* W.D. Doo* 658 t Oovemnent Printing Office, Y/ashlngtont 1917* 56* Field Artillery Notes No* 7* W.D.Doo* 654, Government printing Office. Washington, 1917. 56* Cork i l l , W.E», Captain, F.A.i"A Study of Development of Field Artillery ainoe the Napoleonic Ware to Determine the Fundamental prin­ ciples of i t s Bsployment"* Monograph 27, I.R., 0* and G*S*School,I932* 57, Schirmer, Colonel, German Army*"Artillery "• Translated lay Major Wa Bryden, F.A*, 1924* r* 58. Sohirmer, Colonel, German Arcqyt"Military Lessons in the Great War". Seme translator as Reference 57* 69* Roger, J.,Colonel, French Anapt "Artillery in the Offensive"* Translated toy Maj, J.S.Wood, F*A*# 1923, 60* Ro&er, J*,Colonel, French Amyt"The Hethods of Artillery Support of the Attack during the War". Translated ty MaJ* N.B.Behkopf, F.A* 61* Halgt Field Marshal Sir Douglas:"Features of the War". W.D.Doo. 952, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1919* 62* Aultaon, D.B., Brigadier Gonoral, n.3.AnqytMcounter\>attery \7orkH* Field Artillery Journal, Vol. IX, 1919* 63* Brooke, A.F*, Lieutenant Colonel, R.A.»MThe Evolution of Artil­ lery in the Great War". Journal of Royal Artillery, Vol* 51* 64. Broad, C.N.F.j"The Development of Artillery Taotios, 1914-18". Journal of Royal Artillery. Vol* 49* , 65* De Castelnau, Conraandant, French Arflyj"What the Germans Think of the French Artillery." Field Artillery Journal, vol* XV* 1925. Translated ty KaJ* F.T.Armstrong, F.A* 66. Malone, Paul B*, Colonel, Infantry, U.S.Arny^Infantry-Artillery*. Field Artillery Journal, Vol* X, 1920* 67. "An Artillory Study liado in the A. a. P." Field Artillery journal, Vol. X.I920* 66* "The German and Fronoh Artillery at tie Beginning of the war*" Field Artillery Journal, Vol.X,1920. 69* Le Gallais, General, French Are^t "Questions Affooting Artillery(*• Field Artillery Journal, Vol. X, 1920* 70* "Munaell L'artillorie lourde longue." journal of Royal Vol* 49,1923*Translated ty W. 71* Birch, Lieutenant General Sir Noel, British Anqyt "Artillory Dovolopmont in tho Great V/ar." Fiold Artillery journal, Vol*XI,I92l. -35­ 72. Wood, Liajor J . S . , F.A.i "Fronoh Artillory Dootrine." Piold Artillery Journal, July.*&usuflt,l932. c • 73. Faueeron, General, Frenoh Amy i "She Effects of Artillery Fire." Fiold Artlllory Journal, Karoh^pril and July-August, 1932. 74. Goubard, Chof D'esoadron D'Artillorioi"Defensive Baploymont of the Fronoh Artlllory In I9l8.":i!ranslated by Captain P.C.Ilarpor, F*A. Field Artillery Journal, Volume a * 19ZU 75. Y/ilbur, tf.IL, Hajor Infantry «"Bie Gorman Offensive of narch 21, 1918.M Connand and Gonoral Staff School, 1933. 76. Information Bullotin Ko. 65. Published o.t ?6rt D i l i , Oklahoma, "by direction of the Chief of Artillery* 1^34. Library of liajor J.S.Sloan. 77. Sumary of Information, 2d Section, Genoral Staff, GHQ, AKF. 78. Information Bulletin Ko. 8. Published at Fort 3111, Okl&homa, 1919, by direction of the GWef of ?l*ld*Artillory. 79. Infomatioii Bulletin Ho. 62. Published at Fort S i l l , Okla­ homa, 1923, by direction of the Chiof of Field Artlllory. 80. Kunt, r H.H a , 2d U o u t . F.A.:"Acoompanyin{j Artillery". Fiold Artillery Journal, llovombor-Dooombor, C 81. CordA, a, Lieut. Colonol, Fronoh Anny: "Evolution in Offonsiye "othods". Journal of Royal Artillery, Volume 49(1922). 82. "The German Catastropho of the 8th of AugO3t, 1918. Arny Quarterly, Volurao 25, October, 1932. 83. Information Bnllotin No. 5. Publiahod a t Fort S i l l , Oklahoma 1919, by direction of tho Chlof of FloId Artillory. 84. Confidential file{"Acoonpai^rln{j Artlllory". 2ho Infantry School, Fort 3onnine, W* 85. HoNair, L . J . , iiajor, F.A.j "Infantry Batteriep and Aooompanyine Guns." Field Artillory Journal, Volxane XI, 1921. 86. Burloeon, R.O. ,i:ajor,F.A. i"Sorae Observationa Concerning tho Use of Accompanying Batteries During the World War with somo personal Exporioncos." Fiold A r t i ^ e r y Journal, Volumo XI, I&2I. 87. Deems, C,Lieut.Ool, ,F.A.»"Sorao Footuros of tho Aooompaiwlng Gun."Field Artillory Journal, Volume XI, 1921. Kote« All of tho above reforenoes are to bo found in the l i b r a r y . 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