Situating the Mindanao Agenda in THE Radical Politics of president Duterte Christopher Ryan B. Maboloc
Ateneo de Davao University, Philippines
a b st r act : The rise to power of Rodrigo Duterte is perhaps one of the most astonishing political developments in our time. It is a radical revolution that is rooted in the language of dissent of the Bisaya. However, the critics of the president insist on the sociology of power as the real motive behind the man. Using Chantal Mouffe’s theory of modern democracy, it will be argued that Duterte’s radicalism is symptomatic of the political tensions in nation-states. Mouffe believes that the logic of identity in the modern state has disappeared. This approach to politics does not arise out of a consensus, but in the necessity of conflict and antagonism that characterizes the politics of nation-building in post-colonial Philippines. Drawing from the intent to pursue the Mindanao agenda, it is argued that critics misunderstand the nature of Duterte’s radical politics. k ey wor ds: Radical democracy, Rodrigo Duterte, Mindanao agenda, Grammar of dissent
Introduction This article seeks to critically examine the reality of radical politics in the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte. What makes Duterte a radical leader? Is he the paradigmatic persona who emerges at an important time in history to become a catalyst for genuine change or is he just another pragmatic politician? After a year in office, Duterte has created several firestorms in the political scene. Building a society requires dismantling old habits. But more importantly, it also concerns rectifying unjust systems and structures. Politicians are usually guided by patterns of patronage to maintain their firm grip on power. Money is at the heart of any populist agenda. But Duterte has succeeded in projecting himself as a progressive leader who is different from the others. The Filipino people, finally, are witnessing the unfolding of the revolution from the South in their political lives.
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This paper will explain the meaning of radical democracy and explicate why liberalism does not always fit the politics of nation-building. The task at hand is to sever democracy from moral homogeneity. Our intent is to appreciate the idea of radical democracy. The idea of radical politics tells us that there is no singular path to nation-building. Duterte’s hardline approach to the scourge of drugs has resulted in the ideological clashes between civil society and institutional powers. Such also makes manifest the moral divide and antagonism that now characterize contemporary Filipino society. Indeed, Duterte’s vitriolic language makes him a divisive public figure. The observation of his critics has merit. But change cannot happen overnight. Institutional reforms will take time. The president is setting the right tone by representing the Mindanao agenda. As a matter of fact, Duterte carries with him an inner quality that most of our politicians do not possess – political will. Expla ining R a dica l Democr acy Radical democracy, according to the French theorist Chantal Mouffe (1995, 178), is “the abandonment of the concept of a perfect consensus or of a harmonious collective will and the acceptance of the permanence of conflicts and antagonisms.” A perfect consensus can only exist among like-minded individuals. But Mouffe thinks that, “there is no longer a substantive idea of the good life on which rational persons could agree” (1995, 178). How radical is Duterte? As a politician, Duterte knows all too well that political discourse is different from moral discourse. The president understands that politics is not about negotiations and complete agreements, but power relations and the deployment or use of effective public persuasion. For instance, this can be observed in Duterte’s reliance on the communal sentiments of the Filipino people in pursuing the solutions to the country’s problems. However, the president’s critics usually frame their assaults on his progressive style of governance by employing liberal standards. By doing so, they misinterpret the meaning and value of his radical politics. Modern liberals, Mouffe says, offer that brand of political philosophy that is nothing more than a form of public morality that is meant to regulate 4
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the basic structure of society (1995, 187). But liberals have not been able to properly distinguish the political from the moral. They confuse and fail to make a distinction between morality and political discourse. The problem with this theoretical misappropriation is that the mode of reasoning in the public sphere has been reduced to that process of finding a common understanding on contentious matters, thus ignoring the reality of dissention that is essential to modern day political engagements. As a result, Mouffe is saying that conflicts, antagonism, and relations of power have disappeared in the public sphere (1995, 178). Liberal politics in the Rawlsian sense, she argues, is the exercise of rational deliberation that disregards the importance of superior political opinion (1995, 178). In contrast to Rawlsian liberalism, Mouffe believes that the radical nature of politics is about one defining feature – struggle (1995, 178). Echoing Carl Schmitt, she argues that all people fight against each other in the name of “justice, humanity, order, or peace” (1995, 178). Mouffe thinks that there will always be political tension on the meaning of justice and equality. She says that there will be disputes and disagreements in understanding the meaning of the good. The challenge, Mouffe asserts, is to find the set of values that strictly belongs to the political. Political values are not based on a private or individual morality as proposed by Kantian liberals. Rather, they must be defined on the basis of associative relations. The task at hand is to identify the political principles that determine for the people the true nature of their political community. For Mouffe, political principles cannot have any pre-defined or fixed meaning (Taylor 2010, 55). Politics in this respect is about the reality of a “we” versus “them” (Mouffe 1995, 189). Mouffe thinks that in order to have a “we,” society must also create a “them” that necessarily runs counter to one’s own interests and values. Indeed, the notion of an “identity” cannot be established without the reality of “difference.” Inclusion in this respect is always about the accommodation of what appears alien and impossible. For Mouffe, every positivity also carries with it a trace of negativity (1995, 189). The thing that we call unity is no more than the political ordering of power. Agreement and dialogue, in this sense, are but a convenient way of looking at the political. Politics is complex. It therefore cannot be hinged on pure rational discourse. It has 5
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emotive elements that drive people to make decisions that others might find adversarial but nonetheless necessary. Post-Marxist theorizing tells us that politics is the science that describes the meaning of every struggle. The political reflects how class interests come to be represented. For Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, the genuine “roots of authoritarian politics lie in this interweaving of science and politics” (2001, 59). In our present context, this can be seen in the interface between human rights and the ethical (Gaspar 2016). We can talk, for instance, of ruptures and mixed feelings, but nothing truly appears definitive when it comes to the surplus of meaning that one finds in the politics of Duterte. Mouffe suggests that people must find the type of unity that is articulated by political values. We can look for these values in the day to day struggle of Filipinos. While the life of a nation is rooted in the type of solidarity that is grounded in a common purpose, we also realize that the community is not just an aggrupation of individuals. People have distinct values that determine their political commitments. The politics of nation-states is characterized by local thinking. Political conduct in the state does not come from abstract rationalizations. The dynamic meaning of the common good is so constituted by the people’s sense of history. The conflict in Mindanao is a testament to this. Due to political exclusion, the Moro people have continued their struggle for recognition. Indeed, moralizing is not enough in order to deliver to people a sense of nationhood. It is the struggle for recognition that decides the meaning of justice and freedom in the community. The communal life includes a set of “diverse and competing languages that construe a range of political identities, modes of knowing our roles as citizens, and ways of visualizing what kind of political community we want to constitute” (Mouffe 1995, 190). Liber a lism and the Fa ilur e s of EDSA With the downfall of communist regimes, Francis Fukuyama has predicted that liberalism will be the ultimate form of government on earth. Encouraged by the success of representative democracy in the Western hemisphere, Fukuyama insists that the deliberative model is the right fit that other societies 6
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can emulate. Liberalism is grounded in the idea that persons are autonomous subjects. The freedoms of people define the meaning of their social and political relations. But the problem with liberalism is that it begins with a hypothetical contract. Society, however, cannot exist outside of history. People are influenced by communal contexts and the juxtaposition of the past and their future expectations. The Fukuyama (1992, xi) thesis relies on the homogenous understanding of the meaning of the good life. He believes that the ideal of liberal democracy cannot be improved on. The issue, however, is not theoretical. It is a question of practice. The US experiment on Iraq with regard to the model of government that the latter wanted to impose on the former is proof that the liberal approach to state-building does not always work. The regime of US President George W. Bush drove Saddam Hussein and the Baath party out of the bureaucracy and replaced the Iraqi government with mostly inexperienced civil servants. This proved to be disastrous and later on, as a result of the confusion, gave rise to the emergence of a ruthless terrorist organization—the Islamic State. The Philippines is not a stranger to political struggles. This can be traced to the regime of then President Ferdinand Marcos. The dictator did not only steal from the Filipino people, he also took their political soul by imposing a virulent culture that is fueled by constant fear and harassment. Thousands were incarcerated during the dark Martial Law years. Marcos was the epitome of the abuse of power. He transferred the ownership of vast industries to his friends and appropriated for himself and his wife the resources of the state. With cronyism at the top of his political order of things, Filipinos found themselves without hope nor a bright future to look forward to. Civil rights and religious movements prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution sealed the end to the repressive rule of the dictator. The assassination of Ninoy Aquino may have ignited the march of the Filipino people to reclaim democracy, but it was actually the persistent moral protest by many in Philippine society, especially the Catholic Church, that caused the eventual downfall of Marcos. Small movements in the peripheries of Philippine society finally found the ultimate expression of their dissent during the 1986 EDSA People Power that saw the widow of Ninoy took over the presidency after Marcos was deposed. 7
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But EDSA, however, was a failure. EDSA did not give to the Filipinos the power of the purse and the ability to determine for themselves their fate as a people. Cory, simply restored the old order and returned to the oligarchy the control of the economy. As a result, while the Marcos regime was characterized by stagnation and zero growth during the eighties, EDSA also did not secure for the Filipino people the equitable distribution of wealth. Instead of seeking debt relief from its foreign creditors, Cory recognized the country’s external obligations during the Marcos regime. In the years that followed, the Filipino people simply witnessed the emergence of a new breed of elitism in Philippine politics perpetuated by imperial Manila. EDSA, if truth be told, ignored the pleas of the people in Mindanao. The constant disquiet in Philippine society, the enduring Moro rebellion in the Philippine South, and the continuing struggle of the Filipino people, only suggest that the country is nothing but a weak state whose institutions are unable to deliver to the people the basic services that are needed in realizing a decent life. With this, the Filipino people do not trust that the solution will come from their elected leaders. Muslim Mindanao does not identify itself as part of the Philippine nation-state. Liberal politics in the country has produced the types of leaders who are driven by self-interests and elitist commitments. The frustrations of the Filipino people forced them to look for an alternative. Filipinos found this alternative in Rodrigo Duterte. The attributes of politicians do not define what elitism in politics is about. Rather, elitism can be described by looking into its effects on the poor. The rule-makers in the country do not dress like the people they represent. That in itself is a clear manifestation of the hypocrisy of the idea of democratic representation. But what is most revealing is the reality that the majority of Filipinos, especially those in Mindanao, have not really enjoyed the benefits of economic growth. The situation of people in the Bangsamoro is tragic. But the roots to this exclusion are historical. Renato Constantino (1974, 26) explains that throughout the whole Spanish occupation, the Muslims were not considered part of the developing society and was treated as foreign territory. The root of the problem is Ilustrado politics. History tells us how Ilustrado politicians have abused their power and wreaked havoc on the lives of the Filipino 8
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people. With the exception of Ramon Magsaysay, elite politics simply served the ruling few. Duterte has emerged as the voice from Mindanao who carries the prophetic assurance that change might soon come. The poor in Mindanao have been without a voice for the longest time. Ilustrado politicians have arbitrarily dictated the fate of the Filipino for many decades. Duterte changed all that by consolidating the sentiments of the Bisaya. The son of Mindanao is now at the center of everything political. Gr a mm a r of Dissent The notion of a grammar of dissent has been used in the past to express the opposition to religious doctrines. Dissent, or the act of protest, is the rejection of a dominant rationality. The concept of protest is an ideological tool. It is often identified with the anti-imperialist agenda. Dissent presents a kind of political radicalism. This type of radicalism is symbolic of the function of the political that Mouffe describes. It advances the attitude against cultural hegemony. Adele Webb (2017, 129) thinks that “language is always central to politics.” Duterte is often portrayed as anti-establishment. Webb (2017, 127) notes that Duterte’s cursing of Barrack Obama “only served to cement the president’s support.” To the rising class of many young professionals, Duterte is the crime buster who will keep the streets safe. The unsmiling Duterte, it can be noticed, is often angry in his speeches. It is not theatrics. Rather, the president is deliberately doing it to bring emphasis to the value of emotions in politics. Without this anger, it is difficult to show the passion for change. To express disgust against the enemies of the public is the manifestation of a struggle. Duterte’s hostile demeanor is meant to press an issue so that his listeners will pay serious attention. Language does not seek to denote situations. Rather, it is meant to bring import to what the speaker intends to say. When a person curses “Putang Ina,” it is farthest from his mind that another person is a son of a whore. Vicente Rafael (1992, 36), who is a staunch Duterte critic, explains that “words can refer only to other words, grammar can operate outside of the rules of rhetoric and meaning, and language can thus deviate rather than flow from the social order.” Rafael is vocal against Duterte to the 9
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point that he actually believes that the president is sowing the seeds of a new dictatorship. Duterte, he thinks, has that dystopian vision of society. Rafael says that the president wants to put everything into that rancorous narrative of crime and punishment. The character of the presidency, Rafael believes, is grounded in Duterte’s acrimonious ways of dealing with things. Let us examine the language of the Bisaya. We shall begin with something that is familiar—the term buot. The translation of the term in Tagalog is loob. For Fr. Dionisio Miranda (1989, 1), “loob” refers to the “spatial interior of the individual.” In Duterte’s grammar of dissent, “buot” manifests the appeal to communal contexts. The derivative phrase ayaw pagbuot expresses an individual’s sense of independence. It evokes the character of assertiveness, one that is important for the Bisaya from a political perspective due to the reality of Manila-centric politics. Sila ra ang magbuot, for example, is an expression of a form of political protest. It is not by coincidence that many of the critics of Duterte come from the capital. The feeling of most Filipinos in Mindanao is that the time has come for them. For this reason, to say “Bisaya na pod” engenders a strong sense of pride for a people who have always felt as having been dominated by Tagalogs. Indeed, the slogan “Bisaya na pod” is an assertion of the will of the Bisaya. It is at the same time an acute awareness of their situation. What is not known behind it, however, is the reality of a social divide that is rooted in cultural hegemony and political dominance. Duterte has succeeded in portraying a cruel picture of a country where the “have-nots” have been forced out into the margins. For the “masa” (masses) in the provinces, it has always been the Tagalogs who make the major decisions, thereby subjugating the “kabubut-on” or “will” of the Bisaya. In this sense, if and when the term “buot” is employed in political discourse, it becomes an overtly persuasive tool. Local politicians also invoke the concept of kabubut-on sa tawo or will of the people to emphasize the importance of winning the people’s mandate. It has become a rallying point for the masses in their struggle for political recognition. But perhaps, nothing was more powerful than the catchphrase or slogan, “Bisaya na pod.” It was effective in bringing an intended message because it 10
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expressed the sense of solidarity for the Bisaya-speaking Filipinos. It evoked the feeling of pride and the sentiment of displeasure on the part of Mindanaons with regard to Manila’s monopoly of political power. But demographics also helped Duterte’s candidacy. Many Bisaya-speaking Filipinos are in Luzon to earn a living. For them, the leader who will carry their burdens in life has finally come. “Bisaya na pod” meant that the time has come for Mindanao and Visayas to rise. But we have to be careful not to brand it as another type of regionalism. Duterte, who was born in Leyte, grew up in Mindanao. Duterte’s propaganda had exploited “Bisaya na Pod” to the hilt. The sense of solidarity among the Bisaya had a tremendous political effect that catapulted Duterte to the presidency. Duterte once used the slogan, utang kabubut-on dili kabayran (a debt of gratitude cannot be repaid). The phrase expresses a sense of gratitude. To be grateful means to acknowledge a sense of abundance. But this abundance is not about having something. It bespeaks of being and how one acknowledges the value of the other person. It makes politics a personal thing. Duterte, thus, has mastered how the Bisaya conceives of the world, a trait that his rivals during the 2016 elections failed to understand. To explain, we can look into one of Duterte’s long time slogan that he has used as mayor—“Ato ni, Bay.” The aspect of cultural solidarity is present in this catchphrase. For instance, ato is a derivative of kanato which means ours. The element of “belonging” appears clear in this respect. “Bay” is a Bisayan term used to address a friend or even a stranger. But the fact that it is used in calling someone with endearment, even if the same is a stranger, tells us that the Cebuano dialect is inclusive. Politically, this is important. “Ato ni, Bay” is the language of the masa and hence, it is indicative as to why millions of Filipinos have thrown their support behind Duterte. Incidentally, for the Cebuano-speaking Filipinos, the above claims also signal that it is time for someone who speaks their dialect to finally take the rein of national leadership. “Ato ni, Bay” as a three-word catchphrase captured, in essence, what the election was all about. On one hand, it reveals the point that politics has been dominated for the longest time by the ruling elites stationed in Manila. On the other, Cebuano-speaking Filipinos feel that they are now in a position to take full control through Duterte. The true power of the local dialect 11
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has been established in the above stipulations. Duterte’s propagandists saw and intelligently took advantage of it. The opponents of Duterte relied on clichés about peace, justice, and equality. But people know that such narratives do not work and seldom matter to the common tao. Pr agm atic or R a dica l? The country’s civil society and human rights advocates insist that the president must observe the rule of law in his war on drugs. But Duterte has defied their protests by expressing his disdain for due process. While this could have caused the popularity of any leader to slide in the midst of the criticisms, the former mayor found his trust ratings rise. Hence, we need to examine why. Social conflict is the starting point of the radical politics of Duterte. The reason may be found in our history as a people. For decades, as we have stated above, politics in the Philippines has been dictated by the agenda of the country’s ruling Ilustrado class. Ilustrados refer to the rich, well-educated politicians who control politics. They determine the course of politics in the country. In modern democracies, it is unexpected for a timid provincial politician to snatch power from the traditional ruling families. From a pragmatic end, there is no denying that Duterte is a seasoned politician. He is affiliated with the PDP-Laban Party. But Duterte is actually above any party affiliation. It is typical for a prominent politician to set up his own party that will serve as his umbrella organization in launching a national campaign. Duterte, however, did not have to depend on the PDP-Laban for his campaign. Rather, he drew his strength from the sentiments of millions of Filipinos who have felt shortchanged by the lackadaisical leadership of Benigno Aquino III. A pragmatic politician will simply align with the most powerful party and subscribe to the wishes of party financiers. Duterte, however, relied on his sense of understanding of what the Filipino people truly wanted. To realize his political goals, his strategists used social media to the fullest and took advantage of the emotions of a new generation—the millennials. Duterte is the phenomenon of a revolution from below. His cause is the passion not only of the poor; the president also represents the struggle of a 12
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generation that has remained anxious due to their uncertain future. Duterte’s brand of leadership liberates politics from the fetters of formal institutional discourses and linear dialogues. Duterte’s starting point is that there cannot be a good life if Filipinos do not take into their own hands the control of their lives. Filipinos are witnessing, in this regard, a new political upheaval in the country. Let us look into the opinions of political theorists that describe the first year of the Duterte presidency. Karl Gaspar (2016, 27) writes that “this juncture of our country’s contemporary history has placed many well-meaning Filipinos at a quandary; we are in a difficult situation that brings about perplexity, uncertainty, and insecurity.” Gaspar’s doubt is understandable. While the elite-versus-the-masses plot cannot be overused, the ardent desire of the Bisaya-speaking Filipino to be freed from the domination of Manila-centric governance necessitates a final reckoning due to the discomfort felt by millions. It cannot be denied, for example, that among the candidates for the presidency, only Duterte had successfully pursued the Mindanao agenda. In this respect, he was able to bring out the narrative of historical injustice that has been muted for a long time. Wataru Kusaka (2017, 64) posits the idea of Duterte as a social bandit. For Kusaka, Duterte campaigned under the platform of strict discipline anchored on a promise to eradicate drugs and crimes in six months. But for him, the background narrative in Duterte’s Dirty Harry-style can be found in the culture that defines modern day Filipino society. The president is the hero who is out there to end the bad elements of society. According to Kusaka, such “represented a cultural and moral backlash against the hypocritical elites in the center by those in the peripheries.” Duterte’s popularity and the people’s acceptance of his militant ways are the results of the desire to eradicate the menacing presence of thugs in Philippine society. Kusaka says that Duterte has “insisted that executing bad criminals in order to save the nation was justifiable from a moral standpoint, which is superior to the law.” Kusaka (2016) is right in suggesting that Duterte uses public security as the moral justification for his brutal methods against criminals. It cannot be denied that the public wants to walk safe out in the streets at night.
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Julio Teehankee (2016, 83) offers another angle. “The rise of Duterte,” Teehankee says, “repudiates the reformist-versus-populist dichotomy that has characterized post-Marcos politics by reviving the nationalist narrative prominent during the post-war Third Philippine Republic.” Duterte’s ascent to national prominence and ultimately, his victory in the presidential derby, are a consequence of the inability of the formal institutions of the country to solve the everyday problems of the Filipino. Duterte’s strong message resonated with the public who want order in society. The Filipino people knows that the criminal justice system in the country is slow. The people want action and they also demand results, no matter the cost. Duterte’s approach has had so much appeal if contrasted with the weak and inept leadership of Aquino. But for Teehankee, “the Duterte phenomenon is not a revolt of the poor; it is elitedriven. It is the angry protest of the wealthy, newly rich, well off, and the modestly successful new middle class” (2016, 73). Duterte employed two familiar narratives in selling his candidacy—he presented himself as a reluctant candidate, dressed like a probinsyano, and portrayed himself as an underdog—traits that Filipinos dearly love. But these did not hand him the election. Rather, it was the opportunism of the country’s elite, captured on various social media propaganda that caused the downfall of his political opponents. It can be recalled that in the months that preceded the 2016 elections, Duterte’s propagandists in social media had painted a picture of an Aquino administration that was wanting in political will. The Mamasapano incident, the slow Yolanda relief efforts, and the laglag bala issue, all sealed the collapse and defeat of the administration standard bearer. Indeed, the rise to power of Duterte was not even the former mayor’s own making. Teehankee (2016, 83) notes: The election of Rodrigo Duterte came on the heels of six years of high growth and political stability under the administration of President Aquino. However, Duterte’s phenomenal victory should be understood within the context of what the second Aquino administration has failed to do. Despite his personal popularity, which was due to his clean image and lack of personal political scandals, Aquino failed to institutionalize his straight path reformism…
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Nicole Curato (2016, 92) gives an interesting point. She says that the rise to power of Duterte is due to his ability to highlight the discontentment of the public. She avers that Duterte’s rule is founded on penal populism. Filipinos discriminate against drug addicts. Even petty criminals are labeled as salot ng lipunan (menace to society). The term salot is clearly pejorative. It connotes that a bad person must be exterminated. Hence, it is meant not only to exclude individuals, but it also condemns the individual who is judged as undesirable. The “salot ng lipunan” is the criminal who preys on innocent people, and as such, the people think that society needs to get rid of the same like some pest. Duterte, of course, did not implant this prejudice in the mind of the public. Filipinos know how dangerous the streets and dark alleys can be. Having someone to cleanse society of its ills is seen by many as perhaps the kind of radical change that is needed. In this way, the idea of protecting the virtuous against the wicked elements of society is the essence of penal populism. This is the consequence of what Jacques Derrida calls a constituted outside (Mouffe 1995, 189). Curato (2016, 100) explains: Duterte’s anti-drug crusade recognized the public’s latent anxiety and politicized a normalized issue. The populist logic of painting a “dangerous other” gained resonance among a public that already recognized the dangerous other, but did not have the confidence to name and shame the enemy, out of fear or obligation to maintain community cohesion. Penal populism draws its discursive power from its capacity to attribute blame to both offenders and the political establishment that perpetuate shared anxieties.
The Sociology of Pow er Duterte’s ascent to the presidency does not mean that all things will change in Philippine political culture. The sociology of power, his critics argue, is the real motive behind the man. What is the meaning of power in politics? The sociologist Max Weber maintains that power is about the ability to exert influence over the will of another. This power is not just about the capacity to control people. Weber tells us that power also shapes the dynamics of society. Social and political conflicts arise due to the inequality in the distribution of social goods. For instance, the elite in our society control the economy and the 15
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affairs of the state. With the rise of Duterte, political pundits are scampering to find how his radical dynamism will fit into the picture. The president has a type of charisma that is able to reach out to the sentiments of the majority. History tells us that a man gains power if he is able to exploit the failures of the past, or if he is able to take advantage of the present by affiliating with a popular personality. Aquino won the presidency after the passing of his mother. But though as president he showed a true sense of civility during his term, Aquino focused on rectifying the mistakes of the past by running after Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. He wasted most of his time as president blaming Arroyo. Curato says that “Duterte’s appeal lies in his promise to overcome the corrupt bureaucracy in the justice system and deliver peace and order in a swift and decisive manner” (2016, 100). In fact, there is one trait that clearly distinguishes Duterte from his predecessor. Aquino was indecisive to the point that he appeared insensitive whereas Duterte knows what is actually at stake. The refusal of Aquino to grant an additional 1,000 peso pension to Social Security System (SSS) retirees is a case in point. By highlighting the sad situation of the marginalized Filipino, including the exclusion of Muslim Mindanao, Duterte also sends the signal that he recognizes the need to end the age-old patronage system in the country. He mentioned Roberto Ongpin, for example, as an oligarch that he wants to destroy. Since then, Ongpin has divested his investments from online gaming, losing billions of pesos in the process. Duterte accused the oligarchy of reaping unjust profits at the expense of the people. The president knows all too well who controls the country. The former administration, in a way, has simply served the old order. The Filipino people, including a rising middle class, have all regressed from the inefficiency of the bureaucracy. Teehankee argues that “despite robust economic growth during the past six years of the Aquino presidency, the middle class suffered from a lack of public services, endured horrendous land and air traffic, feared the breakdown of peace and order, and silently witnessed their tax money being siphoned by corruption despite promises of improved governance” (2016, 83). Most politicians talk about policies and economic statistics. But Duterte is different. Duterte issues stern threats against those that he perceives to be 16
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the enemy of the state. The number of people he has threatened on national TV are aplenty, including oligarchs, taipans, and drug lords. Duterte’s way of doing things is unprecedented in Philippine political history. According to Teehankee, “Duterte’s victory in the polls is related to frustration and anger with the limits of the reformist agenda of the Aquino administration, but more generally with the good governance reformist regimes stretching back to Fidel Ramos and Corazon Aquino” (2016, 83). The recent case of Philippine Airlines (PAL) is illustrative. PAL, which has been using the Centennial Terminal for many years, owes the government seven billion pesos in debt. Upon knowing this, Duterte threatened to close the terminal. As a result, PAL immediately settled its past debts. A litigation would have dragged the issue for decades, costing the government millions in legal fees in the process. But the president made Lucio Tan pay. The Catholic Church is the president’s staunchest critic. For the Church, Duterte is killing the poor. The anti-narcotics campaign often involves operations in slum areas. Even the president admits that the majority of those who are into illegal drugs are poor. Given this, Duterte has to justify to the public his deadly war on drugs in a convincing manner. The support of the people for Duterte’s anti-drug campaign is due to the aspirations of the general public for public safety and security. This desire is rooted in the belief that order can be achieved by means of discipline. Past administrations did nothing or were inutile in terms of addressing these concerns of the Filipino people. Thus, Duterte has maintained his grip on power since “the desire for discipline transcended class cleavage because of the widely shared belief that exploitation of the law… by corrupt officials has almost made the public service system break down” (Kusaka 2016, 56). Duterte is viewed by many as the leader who is strong enough to institute the sweeping changes in a weak state like the Philippines. Politics is about the protection of interests. A good leader protects the interest of the public whereas a bad leader serves his own. The incentive of holding public office will always tempt a politician to maintain the position he holds. National politicians are often impersonal, formal, and policy-oriented as opposed to local politicians who can directly relate with the people. Local politics is about the sense of belongingness. But it is too early to judge Duterte. 17
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To his hard critics, Duterte mixed the strength of his character as a leader with a penal populism. However, his supporters will insist that he is the type of leader who has the means to confront what ails Philippine society. But of course, a lot still needs to be done. While the state bureaucracy needs to be reformed, critics maintain that the same cabals in Congress are in power. Sixteen million Filipinos chose Duterte to do the job of cleansing the nation of its problems. The public knows, however, that Duterte was elected into the highest office of the land in an overwhelming way precisely because the majority of Filipinos no longer believed in elite politics. It is a matter of fact that three decades after the EDSA Revolt, the promised decent living for millions of people still remains a pipe dream. The failures of EDSA gave the Filipino people the reason to choose a radical leader. Liberalism presents itself as the moral solution to our social and political problems (Mouffe 2009). Human coexistence, in this respect, is nothing but the homogenization of moral standards and protocols. The leader who does not abide by any moral ideal is branded as “illiberal.” For instance, an international human rights regime forces upon every society the procedures that must determine the meaning of the rule of law. The establishment of a just social order must conform to the norms that have been held in high esteem by the dominant rationality of the West. The idea is to search for someone noble who will do the heroic thing. Duterte, of course, defies protocols and refuses to follow outside impositions. Many of the sociological explanations about Duterte’s politics are no more than the surface of his actions, with no intent to reveal the history behind his attitude that breaks the barriers set in place by traditional statesmanship. Others even brand him as an original fascist (Bello 2017). While any person can criticize public officials, the truth is that the sociology of power is sometimes a question of whose interest one truly serves. The refusal of Duterte’s critics to recognize the wave of change in the country is due to their elitist attitude. Manila, including its best scholars, insists on defining the meaning of our political lives. But there is no perfect state nor can there a perfect type of leader. Politics, in this respect, is not really about finding those reasons that people can agree on. Rather, it also germinates in the desire of citizens to transform their society, even if the means are painful 18
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and unpopular. The focus should be on what kind of world it is that we as a people actually envision for our own children. Politics is about how we properly understand the meaning of power. The Minda nao Agenda An important factor in Duterte’s rise to power has been the fact that he succeeded in carrying the Mindanao agenda in the elections. Duterte has given voice to the face of the marginalized people of the South, especially the Bangsamoro. This is not to say that Duterte single-handedly opened the issue into the public consciousness. What we seek to emphasize is the fact that among the candidates for the highest office of the land, it was Duterte who must be credited for bringing into the table the decades-old troubles of the island. Latent structural injustices, embedded since the time of Spain, have resulted in the hegemonic divide in Philippine society. This has forced the Bangsamoro to take arms against the state and press the struggle for self-determination. But this is not just a political issue. It is a question of a continuing historical injustice. Muslim Filipinos feel that they have been deprived of their entitlement to the land that is Mindanao with the coming of the Christian settlers. Heidi Gloria (2014, 146) calls this the “Filipinization of Mindanao.” For many years, the ties of race between Christians and Muslims, due to the prejudices against the latter, are often replaced by suspicion and antipathy (Constantino 1974, 28). From a structural perspective, understanding the Bangsamoro problem means that we have to look into political positioning and analyze the cultural divide that have reinforced the latent and obvious subjugation of a people. While the conflict that the people find themselves in is ideological in nature, there is a need to rectify a cultural divide from unjust positional hierarchies and unfair rules that discriminate those in the margins. The clash of cultures is a matter of misunderstanding and the lack of tolerance for the difference in the identity of the people. It is a pathology that is bred from neglect and the indifference of a majority who have failed to recognize the value of a minority in state and nationbuilding. It is this aspect of domination that explains the dialectics of power. The historical injustice in the Bangsamoro is caused by the type of control and 19
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domination so instituted for elite Filipinos to follow. Ilustrado politicians, who benefited from the American regime, perpetuated the feudal order of the country in order to maintain their position in the state. Muslim Mindanao has delivered votes for the prominent national politicians. In turn, some Muslim leaders received concessions. This divisive type of politics, handed through colonial conquest, has also bred many political dynasties in the provinces who rule in perpetuity. The Bangsamoro has been largely ignored since the character of politics in post-colonial Philippines has been “an opportunity for enrichment… where local power holders controlled their resources with weapons and private armies” (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 190). There is a socio-political context out of which the narrative of domination and resistance are harshly interwoven. There is a reason why historical injustices breed contempt. But what society may have become, or how its leaders behave, can be traced to the kind of consciousness its history might have created. The deep wounds of the past do not easily heal. For some Muslims, the Filipino Christian majority do not have sympathy for them. To the Christian majority, there exists a feeling of latent mistrust. The basis for this type of mistrust can only be that ill feeling that people have against each other, given the experience of oppression that a nation has been subjected to. When the president promised autonomous rule to the Moro rebels, it manifests the strong will of the national leadership to finally offer a lasting solution to a decades old regional rebellion in the South. Duterte recognizes that rebels are fighting for an authentic cause. The president thinks that dying for an ideology is acceptable. It is in this sense that his model of leadership cannot be patterned after any other politician in the Western liberal tradition. Rather, his maverick attitude in the office is uncharacteristic of any public official in modern times. Whereas the presidency is expected to make the person, it is Duterte himself who is defining the presidency. This is the new, non-linear kind of radical leadership that instills fears in the minds of many, but also embraced as a bitter pill to swallow if the country is to rise from its systemic failures. Duterte’s kind of radicalism is grounded in some form of resurgent nationalism (Webb 2017, 136). Duterte is seen as that hero who is out there to continue the struggle of the Bangsamoro people, who while asking for selfdetermination, still have to depend on the vested interests of Manila politicians 20
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who have become the actual impediment to the prospect of real progress and development. This, if scholars follow the lead of Webb, is reminiscent of nationalist historians’ efforts to “claw back a Filipino dignity and political agency that was all but lost in colonial accounts” (2017, 136). Caroline Hau (2000, 280) understands the radical transformations happening in post-colonial Philippines as grounded in an “unfinished revolution” that was meant to “exorcise the ghosts of the past.” The Philippines, as a county, in this sense, is one that suffers from a colonial hangover, the people from the South are simply taking advantage of this opportune time. In this sense, Duterte symbolizes the never-ending protest against an empire. Webb says that “he embodies the scrutinized Filipino native subject of history, subordinated and looked down upon by the foreign outsider; in standing up to the people, he signifies the refusal to continue the indignity of the past” (2017, 139). This indignity is being suffered the most by Mindanao. While largely unconquered, the island remains at the receiving end in the country’s social and economic fragmentation. Duterte’s brand of politics, of course, borders on the symbiotic relationship between promise and perils. His kind of leadership is unprecedented but the revolutionary idea that he is willing to stake everything on the line for the sake of the country can also be perilous to our democracy. There are ramifications to a society’s desire to achieve an ideal order given that the enemies of the state can simply lurk around like a swirl of distraction. The good thing about the president is that he does not whisk away the antagonistic nature of politics. This is crucial when a people dream of realizing a decent life. Without the firm political will of Duterte, there is no way for Mindanao to overcome centuries-old biases that continue to impede its development. Gloria (2014, viii) is right in saying that “the Mindanao experience cannot be glossed over or dismissed as peripheral to the national interest.” The young Moro in the South is forced to think that he has no right to resent the comfortable life enjoyed by the affluent in the Philippine capital. The antagonism of the people in Mindanao is a consequence of their exclusion. It is a systemic problem that has deprived a sector in society the actual opportunity to become part of the decision-making processes in the state. Past governments have failed to safeguard the freedoms of the marginalized, including indigenous peoples. This 21
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disintegration in Philippine society has resulted in the persistent impoverishment of millions. Such is the by-product, it can be argued, of what is called a “patchwork state” (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 182). The Bangsamoro, for instance, thrives on a shadow economy, one that has given advantages to dynasts and local elites, but not to the Muslim (Lara 2015, 127). Amina Rasul (2007, 81) thinks that the real reason “people want peace is because they want food on their tables, they want jobs, they want justice, they want shelter and health care, and they want a decent life.” It is this kind of life of normalcy that the Muslim Filipino so desires. It is a way of life that is hidden from the view of the public due to the narrative of conflict that Mindanao is so unjustly characterized or labeled with. Conclusion First, political philosophy, in the mind of Mouffe, must not be confused with ethics. Politics is concerned about those values that determine for a society the meaning and purpose of their type of associative relations. Understanding our democracy from the viewpoint of morality misses the important aspect of decision making that is crucial in effecting change and reform. But this should not mean that we reject morality altogether. It only means that we have to make the proper distinctions. Indeed, it is argued that there cannot be a singular approach to state building and that the concept of a perfect consensus must be rejected. The same are mere utopian ideals that do not have any actual impact or influence in the politics of nation-building. The reality on the ground is that of social conflict, disagreement, and moral antagonism. Politics, in this respect, is a divisive enterprise. But the point is that we cannot really avoid it. Our private lives are intertwined by those decisions that also determine the course of our public lives. In this respect, we have to understand the role of the political in our lives. Second, politics as a science seeks to investigate an imperfect truth. But at the same time, it also frames the truth in Westernized categories that defeat the essence of every unfolding. One of such unfolding is the phenomenon of Duterte. For the longest time, presidents have brandished their agenda of reform and progress, but the same only benefited a few. The promise of reform 22
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perpetuated the unequal economic order in Philippine society. The explanation to Duterte’s ascent to power will point to the affective sentimentality of people. But critics will allege that Duterte’s persona as a public official actually makes manifest the transformation of the state into a tangible power. The argument that is presented here is not meant to challenge the idea of penal populism. It does not seek to deny the fact that in Philippine society, many are attempting to constitute an “other” who is seen as the enemy. This constituted other is the drug addict who is judged as that undesirable person who must be annihilated in order to protect good citizens. It is plausible to say that the state too has been used as an instrument in order to perpetuate the type of violence against human beings whose value as a person is objectified. But the problem is that the elite in Philippine society are actually using the same issue in order to hide a historical pathology that Filipinos must confront. The fact of the matter is that the remnants of an Ilustrado order are weaving the rich-versus-poor narrative as an anti-thesis to a new era in the political life of Filipinos. Third, Duterte’s surging popularity as a national leader is due to the fact that politics is all about the meaning of struggle. Understanding the more than fifty years of a bloody Moro struggle in the Philippine South is important. Manila has controlled the lives of Filipinos. EDSA ignored the Mindanao agenda. The fortunes are now reversed. The president is finally giving Mindanao a powerful voice. The political and economic divide in the country is rooted in the exclusion of a marginal sector of its population. Many Muslims, of course, resent their life situation and blame the injustice they suffer from the domination of the powersthat-be in the capital who have not in any way helped them transform their local political culture. National politicians know the existence of local elites in the Bangsamoro and took advantage of the same. As a matter of consequence, Muslim Filipinos have persisted in their struggle for autonomy. Duterte has opened the way for them to achieve their dreams. Gloria says that “the real misfortune lies in the misunderstanding of history… When the perspective of the past becomes the prerogative of the majority who can claim a more common experience” (Rasul 2007, 81). The linear approach to politics and nation-building will not work. Thus, the task ahead is to philosophically examine the meaning of Duterte’s rise to power as one of the most unique albeit controversial political unfolding in our time. 23
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Acknow ledgements This article is funded by the University Research Council of the Ateneo de Davao University under the Radical Democracy in the Time of Duterte Research Grant. The author wishes to thank Fr. Joel Tabora, SJ, university president and Dr. Lourdesita Sobrevega-Chan, chair of URC. Acknowledgments: The author thanks the participants in the two Focus Group Discussions: Dr. Zosimo Lee (UP), Bro. Karl Gaspar (SATMI), Dr. Jeffry Ocay (SU), Dr. Ruby Suazo (USC), Dr. Anderson Villa (ADDU), and Dr. Sherlito Sable (USEP). References Abinales, Patricio and Donna Amoroso. 2005. State and Society in the Philippines. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Bello, Walden. 2017. “Duterte: A Fascist Original.” In A Duterte Reader, ed. Nicole Curato. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Constantino, Renato. 1974. The Philippines: A Past Revisited. Manila: Tala Publications. Curato, Nicole. 2016. “Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duterte’s Rise to Power.” In Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, no. 3: 99-109. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Books. Gaspar, Karl. 2016. “The Interface of Social Ethics and Human Rights in the Philippines Today.” Social Ethics Society Journal of Applied Philosophy 2 no.1: 1-30. Gloria, Heidi. 2014. History from the South. Davao City: Research and Publication Office-Ateneo de Davao University. Hau, Caroline. 2000. Necessary Fictions: Philippine Literature and the Nation, 1946-1980. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press. Kusaka, Wataru. 2017. “Bandit Grabbed the State: Duterte’s Moral Politics.” In Philippine Sociological Review 65: 49-75. Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. 2001. Hegemony and Social Strategy. New York: Verso Books. Lara, Jr., Francisco. 2015. Insurgents, Clans, and States: Political Legitimacy and Resurgent Conflict in Muslim Mindanao. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press. Miranda, Dionisio. 1989. Loob - The Filipino Within. Manila: Divine Word Publication. Mouffe, Chantal. 1995. “Liberalism and Modern Democracy.” In Democracy and Possessive Individualism, ed. Joseph Carens. New York: SUNY Press. Mouffe, Chantal. 2009. “The Limits of John Rawls’ Pluralism.” In Theoria 56, no. 118: 1-14. Rafael, Vicente. 2003. Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Rasul, Amina. 2007. Broken Peace: Assessing the 1996 GRP-MILF Final Peace Agreement. Makati: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Taylor, Graham. 2010. “The End of the Nation State: The Disarticulation of Power and Identity.” In The New Political Sociology. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Teehankee, Julio. 2016. “Duterte’s Resurgent Nationalism in the Philippines: A Discursive Institutionalist Analysis.” In Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 3: 69-89. Webb, Adele. (2017). “Hide the Looking Glass: Duterte and the Legacy of American Imperialism.” In A Duterte Reader, ed. Nicole Curato. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. 24
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