Shared Memory Joel Candau

OUTLINES - CRITICAL PRACTICE S TUDIES• No. 2 • 2010 • (29-42) • http://www.outlines.dk Shared memory, odours and sociotransmitters or: "Save the interaction!" Joël Candau University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis. Laboratory of Anthropology and Sociology "Memory, Identity and Social Cognition" 98 Bd Edouard Herriot, F-06204 Nice Cedex 3 E- mail: [email protected] Abstract Collective memory, social memory, professional memory: although these notions are in current use when we name the shared (or assumed to be shared) representations of the past, they are very ambiguous. The point at issue is to show how memories can become common to some or to all members of a group. In this paper, I shall base my arguments on the simplest situation imaginable: The sharing of a memory of an olfactory experience by two individuals, namely one of my informants – a gravedigger – and myself. We can try to explain this shared olfactory memory, or the imagination of this sharing, by taking two facets into consideration. First of all, we must learn to take seriously those few seconds when a shared experience of the sensory world took shape between the anthropologist and his informant. Secondly, we must attempt to answer both of the following questions: what is the nature of this sharing? And what conditions make it possible? In the first part of this text, I examine the issue of the nature of sharing by weighing up its aspects as I consider protomemory, memory and metamemory. In the second part, I outline one of the essential conditions of sharing: the existence of what I call sociotransmitters. For the most part, my attention remains focused on that particular moment when the gravedigger said, “Smell this!”, and when what was at stake was to save the interaction. Memory can be defined as the discontinuous set of traces of the past (distant or recent) that we mobilize and reconfigure hic et nunc in order to project ourselves into a future (immediate or distant), by means of reasoning or imagination (Miller, 2007; Hassabis et al., 2007; Dudai and Carruthers, 2005). Because every trace implies some loss - it is incomplete in terms of what left the trace (Candau, 1998a & 2002) - memory is always made of things remembered and things forgotten. Although the study of the forms of shared forgetting (Connerton, 2008) is neglected (M. de Miguel, 2004), it is easier to or the belief in this sharing: i) by taking very seriously the few seconds when a truly shared experience of the material world seems to be forged between the anthropologist and his informant. just as they might be purely rhetorical with no empirical foundation at all. namely one of my informants and myself. the reference to the same shared memory does not guarantee the identity of the memory content. In short. 1995). if we can show that it can be shared although it is by definition very intimate. In the first part . it would be a mistake to underestimate the scientific implications of our testifying to the intersubjectivity of this sensory memory. the hypothesis of memory sharing in its most mundane aspects (socialized. 2 • 2010 http://www.human remains recovered after a body reduction: tattered clothes. like him. whereas that of a present phenomenon is less its presence than the way it is presentified. to be able to recognize that smell when I came across it again. Indeed.) that might account for actual shared memories. while I was conducting a survey on olfactory knowledge and know. or social/ familial/ national/ historical/ professional memory. “Smell this!”. I complied. For this reason. One may consider that this scenario is far too crude and will not help us to understand the nature of memories putatively shared on a wider scale. institutionalized) will gain credibility. He raised the lid of the container. ii) by trying to answer two questions: What is the nature of this sharing? Under what conditions is it possible? To answer these questions. I do not claim that doing so will enable me to overcome all the difficulties related to the hypothesis of the inter-subjectivity of the memory. Therefore.Candau • 30 establish their existence than the actual sharing of representations of the past.a sensory experience which would enable me to form an olfactory memory identical to his. 2005) of their memory in the face of the event in question . it is much safer to claim that individuals have in common the forgetting of an event – for this purpose. worm-eaten planks of coffins. In this latter case. directed me towards the containers in which he and his colleagues placed all non. or more exactly. quickly sniffed the contents and said. even when this inter-subjectivity only concerns two people. One can try to explain the sharing of this experience and of this olfactory memory. a gravedigger.or I believed I shared (I will come back to this point again) . In my opinion. etc. At that moment. I shall base my arguments on the simplest situation imaginable: The sharing of a memory of an olfactory experience by two individuals. shrouds. I shared with him . with all the limitations of the exercise: Bloch. the point at issue is to show how memories can become common to some or to all members of a group. for example.than to hypothesize that they share a memory.outlines. Indeed. the profound ontology of an absent phenomenon is prec isely its absence. write on a notebook or record on a magnetic medium the way in which a person tries to verbalize her/his own. however. the concept of “shared memory” does not go without saying. who worked for a local funeral services company. I have imagined or made use of some conceptual tools. Though data on individual memories can be gathered relatively easily (the researcher can. etc.CRITICAL PRACTICE S TUDIES • No. One day in Nice. After smelling those remains. one only needs to note the emptiness.how (Candau. I was supposed. the hypothesis of a shared memory is an inference expressed through metaphors (collective memory. 2000). My goal is more modest: it is simply to be able to face these difficulties and to not pretend that they do not exist.dk OUTLINES . the silence (Garcia. outlines. which is the cognitive representation of the odorant. which can be purely sensory or emotional (Proust syndrome: Chu and Downes. have roughly the same physiological tools to perceive. 2003. Then. both the gravedigger and I. which is made possible by synaptic plasticity: the molecular bases of this process of increase (or possibly collapse) of synaptic efficacy are now well known1 . etc. When this process is completed. the latter being moreover never really cognitively dissociated from the scent-bearing source. because several elements lead me to significantly qualify it. the odour. I address the question of the nature of sharing. What does this trace consist of? Very roughly. Odours & Sociotransmitters • 31 of this text. the stimulus (a certain amount of odorant molecules) is processed by the human brain along with contextual information. diet. 2009. protomemory and metamemory related dimensions. That stimulus is processed (recognition: Baccino et al.lead to the assumption of a possible sharing of an olfactory experience? How is a shared olfactory memory (possibly) constructed ? Let me begin with a very trivial observation: I can only suppose the existence of a shared olfactory memory if I am capable of smelling the odorant molecules that will cause the odour 2 . For the most part. OUTLINES . let us say a few words about the relatively consens ual model of olfactory memory.Shared Memory. my attention remains focused on that particular moment when the gravedigger said. 2010. much shorter than the first. for example. 2003a. p. the olfactory stimuli.. old olfactory traces that are closely related to the cultural environment (influence of socialization.CRITICAL PRACTICE S TUDIES • No. In the second part. 2004). Use this for the larger part of the article. categorization: Candau and Wathelet. olfactory and gustatory experiences and learning.THE NATURE OF MEMORY SHARING First. Once it has deposited itself on the olfactory epithelium in the upper part of our nostrils. one can describe it as a reinforced connection between a population of neurons. an anosmic anthropologist would have had no chance of memorizing and sharing this experience with the gravedigger. 2 • 2010 http://www.This is the normal text / body text (Times New Roman 12). in approximately the same way. 2000). cosmetic practices.).unique to an individual . “Smell this!”. This trace has the particularity of being persistent (Candau. I discuss what in my opinion is an essential condition of sharing: the existence of what I call sociotransmitters.) by using information that is already stored. is usually confounded with the odorant itself. In the natural language. I make this assumption almost reluctantly. etc.dk . Furthermore. 1 2 Long-term potentiation (increase of synaptic efficacy) and depression (decrease of synaptic efficacy) depend on the activation or receptor molecules such as NMDA or mGluR: see. 254. we have to assume that like all human beings (Schepherd. If s/he had been in my situation. the question that arises is: how does this irreducibly singular trace . the stimulus is encoded as a new olfactory trace into the long-term memory. Berthoz. I. 2001). denomination: Candau. focusing on its memory. if only because we did not grow up in the same environment. In addition to this. our own respective experiences (these different socialization processes) colour our olfactory experiences. Beyond this professional. is different to mine. to compare the sensations arising from his opening the container with the memory of past sensations he has experienced in his work. p. for reasons I cannot develop here.e. in the same family. There is here an olfactory culture (Candau.Candau • 32 Firstly. since infancy. 2004a) that is specific to a profession I am completely unfamiliar with. 1977. qualia is an inappropriate term because there is no qualitative aspect of consciousness. but sharing sensations is very uncertain since ultimately it is the qualia 4 that are supposed to be shared: subjective qualities of the sensation defined as the phenomenal experience of the thing . in that it refers to a thing in the world that is not “inter-subjectively observable” (Quine. etc.dk . 1974). as “what it is like to be” (Nagel. irreducible to one another. this shock is only a short moment of my life. more accurately. My memory aptitudes are also different from a professional point of view: in this particular register of death smells.unique because of the epigenetic and genetic uniqueness of each brain 3 . standing next to the container are two unique individuals . for example.. that the mental scenes that we construct when facing the same event . There is no evidence. young and old. forensic scientists or embalmers are. faced with the smells of dead people.as probably in all other worldly experiences . They are certainly so from a biographical point of view: my informant’s olfactory experience. to an intangible thing. 2 • 2010 http://www. men and women. I am not as familiar with it as gravediggers. mortuary employees. p.imposable. my olfactory experience is vastly differ ent from that of my informant. people from all backgrounds.are very different from those of the gravedigger.CRITICAL PRACTICE S TUDIES • No. the olfactory stimulus . In their different ways. a “superquale” so to speak. All these professionals are on a daily basis. in the same house.are perfectly super. 324). I think that the subjective event which we call an odour is a particular type of quale. OUTLINES . 175-176. qualia are considered largely incommunicable. This is an old philosophical topos. However.g.77). know how there is one major difference between the gravedigger and I.or. Because I am just passing through this world of death smells. and. His experience has enabled him. in the same school. sometimes in an advanced state of decomposition. According to Searle (1996. 2000. Indeed. If I carry on with the interpretation of the minor ethnographic scene I have described above. says a mortuary 3 4 « Every brain constructs the world in a slightly different way from any other because every brain is different »: Carter.outlines. “We have a lived experience of smells”. in many aspects. therefore. We are therefore justified in believing that the gravedigger’s olfactory experience and mine remain. all consciousness is quale (all mental states are subjective). If the discovery of the olfactory universe of the smells of death and of corpses can be a shock for the cultural anthropologist I am. almost technical. as Thomas Nagel puts it. p.or rather.the opening of the container and the release of odorant molecules . it is likely that my memory aptitudes in the field of olfaction . combined to this is a difficulty intrinsic to the register of sensations. these protomemory dispositions are at the origin of singular olfactory experiences which remain inaccessible to an anthropologist who is just “passing through”. 2003.CRITICAL PRACTICE S TUDIES • No. In my previous works (Candau. Yet. Candau. adds an embalmer. Odours & Sociotransmitters • 33 employee. Therefore. A memory is constructed and shared (generally. 510). All refer to this “mute experience of the world as a given which is produced by practical sense”. 2005. or in any case. possibly as a result of his professional habitus: it is as though in this environment saturated with “odours that mustn't be looked at”5 . ii)memory itself or high. “you get used to it after a while”. 1997. they are perceived as a given. here it doesn’t smell. “we do not see things the same way” considers a funeral assistant. As such. or the habitus and its performative aspect. 2000. An anthropologist is incapable of sharing this denial.outlines. p. as defined by Bourdieu. which is the best known memory aptitude and the one that is the most often taken into account in studies. 77-78). We are here in the presence of what I call protomemory behaviours. p. where corpses of adults were kept. 2 • 2010 http://www.Shared Memory. 86-87). p. 51-68. Thus. and said: “There are children here. without being verbalized) simply by being a member of the profession long enough. Among professionals who are confronted daily with the smells of death. the procedural memory specific.memory conceptualized by Bergson (1939. to a profession. a mortuary employee of the city of Nice suddenly lowered his voice. OUTLINES . and becomes “embodied knowledge” (Bourdieu.dk . the body hexis. my informant seems to “deny” the olfactory stimuli. and iii)metamemory. At that moment. 11-14. Well. Let me now discuss this concept of protomemory more specifically. A child “doesn’t smell” or else “s/he smells good”. it gives a high likelihood to the hypothesis of a shared memory. I include the ethos and all the knowledge and behaviours acquired during early socialization. 163). 5 These are the exact terms used by one of my informants: Candau & Jeanjean. p. this protomemory made of “whole systems of knowledge that automatically wake up at a given time” (Nicolas. constitute the knowledge and experience that are the most resistant and the best shared by members of a group or of a society. as a gravedigger told me. 2006. I proposed to address the question of memory-sharing by considering three dimensions or three levels of memory: i)protomemory. Protomemory activates the subject without him/her ever being conscious of it. the repetitive memory or habit. it doesn’t smell”. In summary. it were important that the odour of children be inherently “invisible”. This experience induced habituation is so powerful that these severe olfactory universes almost become commonplace. 1998b. p. p. p. to me the smell seemed as strong as the smell in other cold stores.level memory. 5). upon opening a cold store where a dozen children's corpses lay (mostly stillbirths or sudden deaths). and it prompts reactions and behaviours which are also considered as a given. Under the term protomemory. the “acceptable” behaviours memorized without noticing (Zonabend. or everything that concerns “ permanent embodied dispositions”. for example. 1979). odour considered unpleasant by adults (Soussignan and Schaal. on a permanent basis.. at least for the negative side of the hedonic space. Bensafi et al. Shah. s/he suffers an emotional shock. Indeed. 2004) – to overestimate the risk than to underestimate it. 192). 2005). Moninger.. the risk of overestimating the sharing is real but limited given the nature of the odorant.. Bensafi et al. 2003 . We manage. 1996 and 2001). we sniff more deeply when we image a pleasant odour (e. Although the connection we make between a stench and toxicity is not a direct causal link. OUTLINES . For these reasons. p. 2003.. as long as they remain unconscious. let us admit that the gravedigger and I felt roughly the same sensation when he raised the lid of the container. the so-called unpleasant odours are processed more quickly than any other 6 . 2003.g. Ben-Shahar. Moreover. and even in its darkest part. or at least less saturated with cultural representations than in the case of the corpses of newborn babies. Kline. These nuances notwithstanding.CRITICAL PRACTICE S TUDIES • No.dk . there is every reason to believe that there exist invariants in olfactory perception. in the shadows of our memory. 2003. In the field of taste. Neuro-anatomical. 2003. it is nonetheless real from the statistical standpoint (Holley. for instance. & Welsh. have no chance of generating a sense of sharing. or because they activate defence mechanisms that enable them to keep it far enough from consciousness or even to repress it. which her/his informants do not feel in the same way.Candau • 34 essentially I believe because at that particular moment (when the cold store is opened). 2001.g. in the case of hedonic judgement.. it is better to be overly sensitive to a bad odour than to ignore a foul smell that actually signals toxicity... 2001. chocolate) than when we imagine an unpleasant one (urine): Kosslyn. interoceptive or proprioceptive) which. 2 • 2010 http://www. Is this common physiological aptitude sufficient to give rise to and justify the feeling of a shared memory? Obviously not. This being the case.. which is closely related to smell via the retronasal way (Small et al. it is not unrealistic to think that the gravedigger and I. endowed with the same physiological ability to detect nauseating odours.outlines. 193 and 198) 7 . This might possibly be an adaptive phenomenon (Hamann. either because it is less intense (a phenomenon of habituation). with the resulting increase in the subject's heart beat rate (Bensafi et al. or emanate from toxic products as. Kosslyn. have collected and memorized in similar ways the odorant substances that are kept in the container. In our case. electro physiological and psycho-physiological data « argue for the existence of two separate subsystems in neural processing of pleasant and unpleasant odours » (Bensafi et al. First. 2009). emotionally and symbolically. 2003) inclined to discriminate these odours. countless messages (e. this requires that each of us be aware of his/her sensation. 2004). It is in our best interest to rapidly detect bad odours so that we can immediately get away from them in case they are toxic. putrid food (Prescott. it is preferable – as in many other domains of cognition (Sperber & Hirschfeld. p. we know that newborn babies react negatively to bitterness (Steiner. Without this 6 7 Furthermore. Researchers studying chemosensory sensitivity in newborn humans have observed that the latter make facial expressions of disgust when exposed to the odour of butyric acid. And we also have every reason to assume that our sense of smell is naturally (Anderson et al. 1999). This hypothesis is all the more plausible as those substances were relatively neutral. In this case. I cannot exclude that the odour that I smelled standing next to the container. writing or thinking that we share a memory . however. We often confuse the fact of saying. Odours & Sociotransmitters • 35 consciousness which. and then more and more complex mental scenes (Edelman and Tononi. and I shall limit myself to stressing the importance of this metarepresentational level8 of the feelings of sharing. an individual's own representation of her/his own memory (which may be a memory of the present or of the immediate past.outlines. written or thought reflects a real shared memory. more broadly.summon up when performing a task. and that I then memorized. metamemory is. this metarepresentational level is that of metamemory. might have first emerged from primordial emotions (Denton. which is the reason why the feeling of a shared memory is often illusive. during the evolutionary process.is himself aware that each of us is aware that the other is aware of his sensation. which leads me to claim that we have a common olfactory memory. In this case. this sharing can be real or imaginary.Shared Memory. that the consciousness of sharing does not necessarily have to refer to actual sharing in order to lead to this claim. each of us must be aware that: i) the other is aware of her/his sensatio n. to talk about it.CRITICAL PRACTICE S TUDIES • No. see Sperber. her/his knowledge of it. to think and talk about our mental states and. 2005) or from the ability of our brain to build. we confuse the discourse with what this discourse describes or is supposed to describe. Secondly. Indeed. I must be conscious of my conscience in order to be able.dk . just like the gravedigger. metamemory is an essential dimension of the sense of memory inter-subjectivity.like him – that we smelt the same smell.the sensory partner . I shall stop here. on the other hand. It would be wrong to underestimate the importance of this claim of metamemory in the socalled “collective memory” phenomena.with the idea that what is said. When one moves from the individual to the group. on the one hand. OUTLINES . Yet. the feeling of 8 About our ability in daily life. had nothing in common with the odour perceived and memorized by the gravedigger. It is because we are conscious of what we share. this confusion has an important social function: it reinforces. in the consciousness of individuals. Note. 2000a. The metamemory level is that of a reflective look on the memory process that an individual is able to – or thinks s/he can . This level also conditions the possibility of claiming a shared memory. In contrast to what I said above about the plausibility of sharing an unpleasant olfactory experience. possibly. there can be no shared mental representation. Thirdly and fourthly. first rough. 2 • 2010 http://www. ii) that this other .memories. although I firmly believed . what s/he says about it. to theorize about the mind and language . In short. experiences . 2004b). and speak about it. a skill which “signs” the identity of our species (Candau. though the claim of a shared memory is always based on the premise of sharing. as in the case of the scene of the container). that we are able to claim a shared memory. At the individual's level. so as not to fall into a pointless mise en abîme of truly mutual knowledge. 2000). social CCC and cultural CCC. Metaphorically. I call sociotransmitters (Candau. or professional. etc. Cohesion in a social world. claim almost unanimously that they share their olfactory experiences. has very powerful effects: it feeds the imaginary of the group members by helping them to think of themselves as a community. 2009) .. when the gravedigger and the anthropologist (me in this case) claim that they perceive and memorize the same odour. “we”.) upsets us. 2009) . for their part. or at least the belief in this sharing. etc.Candau • 36 a shared memory. I think”. Therefore. The efficiency of this strategy depends on the existence of sociotransmitters. and strongly performative. particularly in its memory forms.dk .that will or will not make the sharing of the perception and its memory possible. like any language. 2 • 2010 http://www. as happens in the context of a survey. which gives more authority to what is believed. SOCIOTRANSMITTERS. We do not just believe what we believe. p. 1995. 2004c) all the human productions and behaviours that help to establish a social or a cultural cognitive causal chain 9 between two minds. or family memory.this was discussed by Halbwachs in The Social Frameworks of Memory -. suggest the importance of this meta-discourse which. in fact. a point which I shall discuss briefly here. 147). Professionals who work daily in an unpleasant olfactory environment. CONDITIONS OF SHARING ONE OF THE We can define the singular moment when the gravedigger opened the container and prompted me to smell the content. Obviously. a cooperation strategy (Candau. “We all have almost the same sense of smell. Tomasello et al. To the subjective feeling of a shared memory is added the objective sharing of a discourse (a narrative actually) expressing the belief that this subjective feeling is based on a real shared memory. of whatever kind (even the “small world” the gravedigger and I form) does not only hang on the precarious thread of “shared illusions” (Dosse.at the heart of most human activities (Henrich & Henrich. “for us”. It also depends on what the members of one group say about this sharing. OUTLINES . the numerous occurrences of “us”. see Sperber. it plays a great part in shaping a world where the phenomenon of sharing ontologizes itself. 2007. we think and we also say that we believe it. either in the form of a claim . 2000b. or in the form of a lament when the loss of a supposedly shared memory (national. It is. this shared claim is much more likely to occur in cases where individuals live permanently in a common world than in cases when a world is only occasionally shared. what is remarkable is the shared expression of the belief in a shared experience and a shared memory. sociotransmitters between individuals perform the same function as 9 About the distinction between cognitive causal chains (CCC).CRITICAL PRACTICE S TUDIES • No. says a mortuary employee explicitly.outlines. In their discourses. as a strategy to promote the sharing both of an olfactory perception and of its memory. II. Odours & Sociotransmitters • 37 neurotransmitters 10 perform between neurons: they promote connections. exchange of glances. Finally. gloves. protective clothing. during the interaction between the gravedigger and I.Shared Memory. In both cases. at the aim is to save the social interaction between the gravedigger and I. body postures. metamemory. more generally. the illusion of sharing. and facilitate the tranmission of information between two neurons. photographs. especially because the relation people have with them 10 The neurotransmitters are amino acids or their derivatives that play in the synaptic space. to an interindividual (intersubjective) focalization of the recall or of the recognition of past events. they adjust any memorizing act to the collective conditions of its expression. on a daily basis. OUTLINES . As such. the vehicle used to transport non-human remains.dk . Sociotransmitters are therefore the vectors of social interactions and human cooperation or of the belief in the efficient nature of the latter. that is to say as a member of an institution that serves as a key to my field of survey. 2003). 2007) that we mobilize to maximize sharing. “an individual's ability to interact socially in an intelligent way” (Zuberbühler and Byrne. I encounter employees who have been authorized by their employer to share information with me. All these objects. At protomemory level.varies according to the three types of memory that I have distinguished above: protomemory. However. On this ground. of Anne Muxel’s research on instruments of transmission and of intergenerational memory (jewelry. 2003b) are obviously fundamental sociotransmitters. we continue to talk and to make use of words and emotions to try and strengthen the sharing of the experience and of the olfactory memory. which we talk about. toys. There is the container. there is a body language that facilitates the process of sensory and memory accordance: gestures. 2 • 2010 http://www. or more often tha n not. sociotransmitters are the effectors of shared memory: they contribute. there is the institutional framework: I was allowed into the gravedigger's workplace in my capacity as a scholar. that can also be defined as all cognitive and sensory aptitudes (Candau. touch and feel.) (Muxel. Then. emotions (when they are common) and language (Candau. family furniture. Many anthropological and sociological works provide detailed descriptions of these sociotransmitters (even if they are given a different name). of course. or of the vast literature that highlights the importance of language in socio-transmission.outlines. which my partner shows me. its contents and. 1996). Immediately afterwards. the environment's cultural objects (Julien and Rosselin. etc. We think.CRITICAL PRACTICE S TUDIES • No. memory. etc. Moreover. partake of the sharing of the experience that we both wish to achieve. 1979). 2008). several objects play an essential role in the socio-transmission. particularly when trying to build a shared memory (Bilhaut. 2005): the gravedigger’s tools. This whole mechanism serves social cognition that is to say. In the case of the olfactory experience putatively shared by the gravedigger and I. of Yvonne Verdier’s work on the women of Minot (Côte-d'Or). what are the sociotransmitters? First. for example. which “make the custom” (Verdier. which are indispensable for the cultural transmission and memory sharing. that cannot be reduced to the gravedigger's first injunction (“Smell this!”). 2006). and which I can see. this role. facial micro-expressions (Porter and Brinke. outlines. the most famous memory trigger is of course the Proustian madeleine (Proust.forgetting that these forms. is it not because. we share. of a professional group like the gravediggers . In doing so. we tend to dwell on primordial (and sometimes primary) forms of sharing . to make almost similar or similar experiences. p. to adjust to and synchronize with one another. Paradoxically. they contribute to the effects of narrative enlightenment or. of memory affordance (Gibson. p. which often undo the old ones. we can view sociotransmitters as a memory triggers: they induce memory inferences or fulfil the function of recall indices. For reasons which anthropology must explain.but also the history of a country. they give consistency to a shared memory imaginary. we actually share a way of being in the world. the belief in this sharing occurs easily.g. we firmly imagine that we are becoming alike? If memory intersubjectivity becomes possible.Candau • 38 leads them. we are often mistaken about the nature of this thing. Sharing is always a process and from this process develop new bonds of belonging. in a very concrete way. but under a form other than that we have imagined: while we believe in a shared memory. first and foremost. at the same time.the olfactory world and experiences of death professionals: day after day. One might talk. at the last level. in ordinary times. To come back to the ethnographic example. 2 • 2010 http://www. the territory. Only. 1987. In the olfactory register. to primary socialization and to education: practices that consist in identifying with our parents. with the group to which we belong. the belief in this shared memory and. or at least modify them. with these first two levels. they underpin the discourse on the characteristics of shared memory. 1979). which I use as the guiding thread of my argument. we share something with our partners. As Tarde pointed out (1993. making it real by the mere fact of believing in it. particularly under the influence of emotional expressions. Finally. A large part of the content of my interviews with death professionals belong to this memorial discourse. 78) “ We are not born alike. sociotransmitters are resources for metamemory. is it not because in our everyday social practices. we are here in the realm of what I called above .for lack of a better expression . the reality of sharing notwithstanding. more modestly. Conclusion Let me conclude with a remark of general anthropological significance. we feel that as a result.dk . sensations. and if we become alike. 57-59).). If we now consider the memory level. The intersubjective sharing of mundane experiences and of their memories is not a given. they are immersed in a particular environment made of objects. etc. various interactions. including our cooperative practices. the family romance.those related to birth. we become alike”. though robust. etc. by cooperating (as I did with the gravedigger). . are meant to be constantly transformed by our social practices. to share situations. etc.CRITICAL PRACTICE S TUDIES • No. How can we explain this paradox? It is possible that because we are often in situations of cooperation and cooperative behaviour (as I was with the gravedigger). the language. we routinely engage in practices that are based on the belief that this intersubjectivity exists. we save social interactions or we believe we save OUTLINES . they are its fuel : they promote verbalization (that of a group – e. J. Le monde alpin et rhodanien. Revista de antropología social. La cognition entre individu et société. Sharing an Olfactory Experience: The Impact of Oral Communication. traces partagées ? Socio-anthropologie. Farget. Pouliot. K.. J.. Paris: PUF. Bremner. M. 243-259. J.. 196–202. (2002). Candau. J. but by sharing this belief we partly save them. Candau. Glover.11. Zelano. R. H. …Soñar. C. Candau. E. J. 344. 2004d .. 12. Bloch. J. Scheer. J.outlines. Nature Neuroscience. 26. C. N. References Anderson. Olfactomotor activity during imagery mimics that during perception.. If this proposal has any truth value. Panitz. J. 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Bd Edouard Herriot.CRITICAL PRACTICE S TUDIES • No. K/ & Byrne. Tarde. (2004). Identity and Social Cognition" (E.E. E. 40–46.. Sperber. Human facial expressions in response to taste and smell stimulation. (1979). de (1993). Tel: +33. (2006). 2 • 2010 http://www. R. R786R790. F. (1979). 505-524. Steiner. Arts et Sciences Humaines.A.A. 3179). 13. Fax: +33.W. 154-155. Outils conceptuels pour une science naturelle de la société et de la culture. 257-295. About the author Joël Candau is an anthropologist at the University of Nice-Sophia and Director of the Laboratory of Anthropology and Sociology "Memory.) (2000b). Contact: U. Tomasello.R. la cuisinière. E.493. Zuberbühler. Une femme de mémoire en BasseNormandie. Social cognition. He has published a series of books about Memory in French and is currently interested in the Anthropology of the Senses. L’Homme.Candau • 42 Sperber. Paris: Kimé. Identité et Cognition sociale" (LASMIC. La laveuse. J. Skyrms. (Ed.F.fr. 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