Remedial Law Digests - CrimPro & Evidence - Recent Jurisprudence - Gesmundo

ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 79 of 256 Justice GesmundoRULE 48 RULE 49 RULE 50 RULE 51 RULE 52 RULE 53 RULE 54 RULE 55 RULE 56 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES 28. CALAWAG v. UP (2013) Rule 58 - 3 facts must be established before a writ of preliminary injunction may issue. First, there is a material and substantial invasion of a right. Second, the right is clear and unmistakable. Third, the issuance of the writ is necessary to prevent serious damage. Calawag and others were students in the Master of Science in Fisheries Biology program of UP Visayas. They sought the approval of their thesis proposals by Dean Baylon. Dean Baylon rejected their proposals. The students filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction before the RTC. RTC enjoined Dean Baylon to approve the thesis titles while the suit was pending. UP VIsayas went to CA via 65 and asked for a TRO. TRO was issued. Held: The students were not entitled to preliminary injunction. “To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, x x x the petitioners must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction [presents a fourth requirement: it] is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper (China Banking v. Co, Gateway Electronics v. Land Bank).” ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 80 of 256 Justice Gesmundo 29. Espia vs Baylon Espia et al filed a petition for mandamus against Dean Baylon to compel him to approved their thesis topics. They also applied for preliminary injunction which was granted by the RTC. To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, x x x the petitioners must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. It is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper. Petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right that needs the protection of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The dean has the discretion to approve or disapprove the composition of a thesis committee, and, hence, the petitioners had no right for an automatic approval and composition of their thesis committees. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS 3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL V. HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE, ET AL (SEPTEMBER 24, 2013) (RULE 63, DECLARATORY RELIEF) Private respondents filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the constitutionality of some of the provisions of the Human Security Act of 2007. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The RTC committed GADALEJ when it ruled that private respondents’ petition had met all the requisites for an action for declaratory relief. The following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: (1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. The fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements are absent in this case. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. By “ripening seeds” it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. There is no justiciable controversy here especially since allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. The private respondents also lack locus standi since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case, especially since this case concerns penal legislation. As to the fifth requisite, neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse remain highly-speculative and merely theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 26. VIVAS V. MONETARY BOARD (2013) Rule 65 Prohibition is a remedy against actions yet to be made. Direct filing of a petition to the Supreme Court unless no other court is capable of resolving the issue or the case involves exceptional circumstances. Vivas was a major stakeholder in EuroCredit Bank (formerly Rural Bank of Faire). After several examinations made by the Bangko Sentral, the Monetary Board issued a resolution to prohibit the Bank from engaging in business and to place its assets under receivership. Vivas filed a petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court. Held: Wrong remedy. The action assailed had already been made i.e. the Resolution had already been issued. Certiorari would have been proper but Vivas also failed to observe the heirarchy of courts principle. Besides, ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 81 of 256 Justice Gesmundo under Sec. 4, Rule 65, cases involving acts and omissions of a quasi-judicial agency must be filed before the CA. The Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency. 27. PNB v. ARCOBILLAS (2013) Rule 65 As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite of the filing of a petition for certiorari. In her capacity as PNB employee, Arcobillas erroneously credited around $5k to a client (should have credited P5k). PNB incurred losses and terminated her employment. Arcobillas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA ordered reinstatement and NLRC affirmed. Without filing an MR, PNB filed certiorari before CA. CA dismissed. An MR was filed by both parties and both were denied. Held: A Motion for Reconsideration is necessary before an aggrieved party can file a special civil action for certiorari. However, this rule admits of several exceptions as “(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a [M]otion for [R]econsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relied by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved (Abraham v. NLRC).” In this case, the existence of any one of the exceptions was not established. 31. SPS. SABITSANA VS MUERTEGUI This case is an action to quiet title which was caused by the fact that the lot was sold twice by the owner. It was contended that the RTC had no jurisdiction because the land was worth only Php 1,230 while the jurisdiction for all civil actions in the RTC was, at that time, at a minimum of 20,000/50,000. RTC has jurisdiction. It is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC. 97. EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB vs. CA (2010) “Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as a matter of right. The party who seeks to avail of it must strictly observe the rules laid down by law.” "EagleRidge Employees Union" (EREU) filed a petition for certification election. Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club opposed, ascribed misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud to EREU in connection with the adoption of its constitution and by-laws, the numerical composition of the Union (registration stated 30 members, while minutes showed only 26)(5 members wanted to be excluded from the union – which would reduce the membership below the mandatory minimum), and other discrepancies. DOLE and BLR found for Eagle Ridge, MR granted for EREU. Eagle Ridge went to CA but dismissed petition for certiorari. Main Issue: Whether there was fraud – NO, records failed to show any misrepresentation, false statement or fraud that would amount to cancellation of registration. REM Issue: Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require a “sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. Sec. 3, paragraphs 4 and 6 of Rule 46 pertinently provides: SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. — x x x x The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals x x x, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same x x x The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 82 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Evidently, the Rules require the petitioner, not his counsel, to sign under oath the requisite certification against non- forum shopping. Such certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance to the court that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues, and cause of action. The signature of Eagle Ridge’s counsel was without the requisite authority. It is, thus, clear that the counsel is not the proper person to sign the certification against forum shopping. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. Nevertheless, the Court will explore the merits of the instant case to obviate the inequity that might result from the outright denial of the petition. 110. DOMDOM VS. THIRD AND FIFTH DIVISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (FEBRUARY 24, 2010) (RULE 119; RULE 65 SECTION 4; MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME) That no mention is made in the amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike in the previous formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited Petitioner filled a motion for extension of time file a petition for certiorari, then subsequently filled the petition for certiorari beyond the period allowed in Section 4 of Rule 65. Supreme Court allowed the petition for the following reasons. That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike in the previous formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that “no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.” Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the Court’s sound discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits. 179. KLAVENESS MARITIME AGENCY, INC. and DENHOLM SHIP MANAGEMENT (HK), LTD., vs. JOSE MARIUS F. PALMOS and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents, (1994) “Prior motion for reconsideration is not indispensible for commencement of certiorari proceeding” Private respondents were employees of petitioner. They were hired as Able Seaman by a local manning agent. The manning contract stipulated a period of employment of twelve (12) months but they were repatriated to the Philippines from the Port of Santos, Brazil. As a result of their untimely repatriation, private respondents each filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, as well as non-payment and underpayment of wages with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA"). In response, petitioners Denholm and Klaveness jointly filed a complaint against Palmos and Sevilla for disciplinary action and reimbursement of repatriation expenses (POEA Case No. [M] 89-08-742). On motion of Klaveness and Denholm, the three (3) cases were consolidated. In time, the POEA rendered a decision in the three (3) consolidated cases before it, in favor of Palmos and Sevilla. The POEA's decision was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") on appeal by petitioners. Both the POEA and the NLRC held that petitioners companies had failed to discharge their burden of establishing the existence of a just or authorized cause for the dismissal of private respondents, who were accordingly considered as illegally dismissed and as entitled to an award of salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their contracts of employment as seamen and unpaid and underpaid salaries. Petitioner companies were held solidarily liable for the amount found to be due to Palmos and Sevilla. Upon the other hand, petitioners' complaint for disciplinary action and reimbursement of repatriation expenses was dismissed for lack of merit. In the present Petition for Certiorari, Denholm and Klaveness claim that the NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the evidence which petitioners had submitted to prove their case, and in failing to find that petitioners had terminated the services of Palmos and Sevilla for a just or authorized cause and with due process. The Supreme Court granted petitioners' prayer for a temporary restraining order enjoining the NLRC from executing its Decision, in order to prevent the present Petition becoming in effect moot and academic. Palmos and Sevilla ask the Court to dismiss the present Petition for having been prematurely filed, petitioners having failed to file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC before instituting the present Petition for Certiorari. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 83 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The Court does not agree. A prior motion for reconsideration is not indispensable for commencement of certiorari proceedings if the errors sought to be corrected in such proceedings had been duly heard and passed upon, or were similar to the issues already resolved by the tribunal or agency below. Accordingly, the Court has excused the non-filing of a motion for reconsideration when such a motion would be basically pro forma in nature and content, and where, as in the present Petition, the questions raised are essentially legal in nature. We do not consider that the present Petition was prematurely filed with this Court. OTHERS 2. SPOUSES SARMIENTO V. SPOUSES MAGSINO (OCTOBER 16, 2013) Courts will not decide issues which have become moot and academic, there being no more practical value/use. Spouses Magsino filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages with respect to a delivery of some properties before RTC Branch 93. RTC Branch 93 ruled in favor of the Magsinos. The Clerk of Court had issued a writ of execution against the properties, which were then in the possession of the Sarmientos. The levied properties were sold at a public auction and bought by the Magsinos. TCTs were issued in their favor. The Magsinos thereafter filed for the issuance of a writ of possession directing the sheriff to place them in actual physical possession of the properties. The Sarmientos opposed. The Magsinos were granted the writ by RTC Branch 93 and subsequently got physical possession of the properties. BUT prior to RTC Branch 93’s order, the Sarmiento’s had already filed a separate complaint for recovery of possession and ownership against the Magsinos before RTC Branch 31. The Magsinos opposed on the ground that the acts sought to be restrained was already fait accompli – there was nothing else to perform regarding the act sought to be restrained because the sheriff, upon the order of RTC Branch 93 had already placed the Magsinos in possession. RTC Branch 31 sided with the Sarmientos. The issue sought to be resolved by the SC in this case is W/N RTC Branch 31 interfered with the judgment and order of RTC Branch 96, a co-equal court, when it issued an order granting the preliminary injunction restraining respondent spouses from occupying the properties and ordering them to vacate the same, which in effect enjoined the enforcement of the writs of execution and possession issued by RTC Branch 93. Yet, pending resolution of this SC case, RTC Branch 31 had already decided the case in favor of the Sarmiento’s and ordered the the cancellation of the TCTs in favor of the Magsinos. Thus, the case has become moot and academic. It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved. And where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. The Court will refrain from expressing its opinion in a case where no practical relief may be granted in view of a supervening event. 15. MALVAR v. KRAFT FOODS, ET AL. (2013) Although the practice of law is not a business, an attorney is entitled to be properly compensated for the professional services rendered for the client, who is bound by her express agreement to duly compensate the attorney. Malvar was terminated by Kraft Foods amidst relatively spurious circumstances. Malvar filed a complaint with the NLRC, a battle she fought until she entered into a compromise settlement with the employer. After signing the compromise, she tried to terminate the case by withdrawing the appeal she took. However, before the Court could act on the withdrawal by Malvar, the Court was flabbergasted by a so-called Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights filed by a law firm (counsel of Malvar), praying that its contingent fees be paid in accordance to the firm’s contract with Malvar. It appeared that Malvar, to escape paying the firm, unceremoniously terminated the services of the firm. The SC held that the firm’s withdrawal from the case neither cancelled nor terminated the written agreement on the contingent attorney’s fees. Nor did the withdrawal constitute a waiver of the agreement. In ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 84 of 256 Justice Gesmundo the end, the Court granted the firm’s Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights as a measure of protecting the firm’s right to its stipulated professional fees that would be denied under the compromise agreement. Basically, the SC said that Malvar and Kraft Foods connived by settling behind the firm’s back to escape having to pay the firm’s contingent fees. 40) UP v. DIZON (2012) exception to the finality of judgments (post decision circumstance) UP contracted respondent Stern Builders Inc. for modification of the CAS Building in UPLB. When UP failed to pay due to COA disallowance, respondent filed a case against UP resulting in the decision to garnish public funds amounting to P16M. The RTC gave a favorable decision to respondent. UP failed to appeal within the 15-day period, but filed 7months thereafter arguing it only received the decision around that time. RTC Judge Dizon ordered the release of the funds. UP files for Certiorari assailing that the finality of the RTC decision can be challenged and that the fresh-period rule can be given retroactive application. The court granted the petition. As a general rule, once a decision has become final and executory, the prevailing party should not be deprived of reaping the fruits of victory. But an exception to this would be when circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision to render the execution unjust and inequitable. In the present case, SC rules that the non-acceptance of RTC to the appeal made by UP for the Nov 28 2001 decision was inequitable and was a clear violation to UP’s right to due process: The service of the denial for MR was defective since it was not given to the counsel of record, the OLS, but to Atty Nolasco of UPLB Legal. Only by May 31 2002 did OLS receive a copy The filing of the notice of appeal on Jun 3 was well within the reglementary period (as per the fresh-period rule) For equity, the fresh-period rule should and must apply in this case QED the finality of RTC decision is set aside The retroactive effect of a procedural law does not come within the legal conception of “retroactivity” or is not subject to the general rule prohibiting the retroactive operation of statutes (Sec4, NCC) rather, its retroactivity is already given since, by the nature of rules of procedure, no vested right is impinged in its application (Sec 2252, NCC) 66. NAVIA V. PARDICO (2012) Writ of Amparo To fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person. The relevant laws and rules for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo are: [1] Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which took effect on October 24, 2007.] SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis ours.) [2] Section 3(g), R.A. No. 9851, otherwise known as the Philippine Act On Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity, define and identify the elements which constitute enforced disappearance, which are: (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 85 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Navia, Bio and Busing, as security guards at the Asian Land security department, invite Ben and Bong, to their office because they received a report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post in said subdivision. Ben was missing after the incident; his wife, Virginia, filed a petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Malolos City. Petition of Writ of Amparo dismissed. Navia et al. are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. 100) IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FROM PAYMENT OF FILING/ DOCKET FEES (2010) “The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.” The National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks clarification from the Court on whether or not it is exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal bonds and supersedeas bonds. On December 6, 2005, NPC is exempt based on R.A. No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation). On October 27, 2009 their exemption was denied by P.D. No. 938 amending RA 6395 and Section 5(5), Art VIII of the Constitution. NPC is a national government-owned and controlled corporation (RA 9136). Section 22 of Rule 141 (Rules of Court) reads: “Sec. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local government units and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.” The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the power to promulgate these rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive. Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less the Executive. 138. QUASHA, ANCHETA, PENA, ET. AL. V. THE SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (2009) Quasha Law Office is the duly authorized counsel of LIRL. LIRL is a foreign corporation from Hong Kong and is licensed to operate a resort casino hotel in Subic Bay. Petitioner LIRL filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract, Specific Performance with Damages and Application for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72, docketed as Civil Case No. 219-0-2004, against PAGCOR and SBMA for amending the 19 March 1993 Agreement, notwithstanding the total absence of any consideration supporting petitioner LIRL’s additional obligations. The RTC ruled in favor of LIRL. PAGCOR filed a Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam with the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, in relation to the winding up of LIRL Companies Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance issued an Order appointing Kelvin Edward Flynn and Cosimo Borelli as the joint and several liquidator of LIRL, granting them the power to carry on and manage the business of petitioner LIRL, including its business in Subic, Philippines. Pursuant to such order, Flynn sent a letter to Picazo Law Office notifying it that its legal services as counsel for LIRL has been terminated and that petitioner Quasha Law Office is LIRL’s new counsel. The Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals refused to recognize Quasha Law Office, saying that because such order of the HK court is considered a foreign judgment, our courts should not take judicial notice thereof. Final orders of foreign tribunals could only be enforced in Philippine courts after appropriate proceedings are filed. W/N the HK court order was a foreign judgment? NO. No enforcement of a foreign judgment was involved in this case. LIRL’s appointed liquidators had been duly authorized to manage petitioner LIRL. The authority of the said liquidators extended to all of petitioner LIRL’s branches, wherever situated, the branch in the Philippines included. The ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 86 of 256 Justice Gesmundo act of terminating the legal services of private respondent Picazo Law Office and engaging in its place petitioner Quasha Law Office was a mere exercise of petitioner LIRL’s prerogative, through its appointed liquidators, which was an internal affair that required no prior recognition in a separate action. 178. PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON (2001) Private respondents, were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. Their foreign employer allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated and they were repatriated to the Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner with the following causes of action: 1. Illegal dismissal; 2. Payment of salary differentials; 3. Illegal deduction/withholding of salaries; 4. Illegal exactions/refund of placement fees; and 5. Contract substitution. The case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 85-05 0370. Under the rules of the POEA dated May 21, 1985, complaints involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including money claims, are adjudicated by the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office (hereinafter the "WAAO") thru the POEA Hearing Officers. On the other hand, complaints involving recruitment violations warranting suspension or cancellation of the license of recruiting agencies are cognizable by the POEA thru its Licensing and Recruitment Office (hereinafter the "LRO"). In the case at bench, the first two causes of action were in the nature of money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and were properly cognizable by the WAAO. The last two causes of action were in the nature of recruitment violations and may be investigated by the LRO. The third cause of action, illegal deduction/withholding of salary, is both a money claim and a violation of recruitment regulations and is thus under the investigatory jurisdiction of both the WAAO and the LRO. On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision which both the petitioner and private respondents felt aggrieved. Thus, petitioner and private respondents filed separate appeals from the August 31, 1988 POEA Decision to the NLRC. The NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials. These awards to private respondents were deleted by the NLRC considering that these were not raised in the complaint filed by private respondents. The NLRC likewise stated that there was nothing in the text of the decision which would justify the award.Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated October 25; 1989. Private respondents the decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari which was however dismissed outright for "insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questioned resolution. Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents' money claims, the POEA issued a separate Order dated August 29, 1988 resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents' complaint. In this Order, the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful deduction. Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari. ( Sabi ng petitioner, ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 87 of 256 Justice Gesmundo POEA cannot make me liable anymore sa illegal exaction because nadismiss na ung private respondents dati ng Supreme Court. Petitioner argues that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries considering that the Supreme Court itself has already absolved petitioner from this charge. Petitioner premises its argument on the fact that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC absolving it from private respondent de Mesa's claim for salary deduction has already attained finality by reason of the dismissal of private respondents' petition for certiorari of the said NLRC decision by the Supreme Court. Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents arising from employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims that petitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money claims of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's liability for said money claims is without prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separate Order." The NLRC Decision absolving petitioner from paying private respondent de Mesa's claim for salary deduction based its ruling on a finding that the said money claim was not raised in the complaint. While there may be questions regarding such finding of the NLRC, the finality of the said NLRC Decision prevents us from modifying or reviewing the same. But the fact that the claim for salary deduction was not raised by private respondents in their complaint will not bar the POEA from holding petitioner liable for illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for the suspension or cancellation of petitioner's license. Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative, may conduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of the license of any private placement agency on any of the grounds mentioned therein. As such, even without a written complaint from an aggrieved party, the POEA can initiate proceedings against an erring private placement agency and, if the result of its investigation so warrants, impose the corresponding administrative sanction thereof. Moreover, the POEA, in an investigation of an employer-employee relationship case, may still hold a respondent liable for administrative sanctions if, in the course of its investigation, violations of recruitment regulations are uncovered. It is thus clear that even if recruitment violations were not included in a complaint for money claims initiated by a private complainant, the POEA, under its rules, may still take cognizance of the same and impose administrative sanctions if the evidence so warrants. As such, the fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the payment of the money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewise absolved from the administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or withholding of private respondents' salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of salary. 182. REPUBLIC V. GINGOYON (2005) “Final decisions of the Court are to be followed even when Rules of Court allow for a different course of action.” The NAIA 3 project between the Government and PIATCO was nullified in an earlier case (Agan case). It was held that the Government must pay PIATCO for the construction of the airport before it can make use of the already finished facilities. The Government eventually filed for expropriation. The issue in this case is whether the Rules of Court of RA No. 8974 govern in the matter of determining the amount of initial payment and to whom this initial payment is to be given before the government can be entitled to a writ of possession.[1] Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with a government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value. While allowed under the rules, this deposit does not conform to the express order given by the Court in the Agan case which directed the government to pay the amount due to PIATCO before it can make use of the facilities. RA. 8974, which necessitates payment to the property owner is in conformity with the Agan decision. The Court ruled that ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 88 of 256 Justice Gesmundo RA 8974 should be applied instead of the Rules of Court because the latter contravenes an earlier final decision. [1] Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized government depositary the assessed value of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the Government make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 89 of 256 Justice Gesmundo CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GILBERT REYES WAGAS (2013) “Accused is entitled to presumption of innocence; failure of prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt amounts to an acquittal.” Wagas was charged and convicted by the trial court of estafa. Apparently, a certain businessman transacted with a man (allegedly Wagas) over the telephone for the release of certain goods. The businessman released the goods to a certain Cañada upon the release of a check, but the check bounced. The Prosecution established that the businessman had released the goods to Cañada because of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds. Now, the businessman went after the alleged person who defrauded him, the man on the telephone. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded the businessman by issuing the check. Therefore, the accused must be acquitted. BAUTISTA v. CUNETA- PANGILINAN (2012) 2 cases of libel was filed against the appellant. After presenting respondent on the witness stand, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence. Demurrer was granted so the case was dismissed. Trial court opined, among others, that since the prosecution did not submit its Comment/Opposition to the petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, the averments therein thus became unrebutted; that the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution failed to prove the participation of petitioners as conspirators of the crime charged. As a consequence, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit, with the attached Comment stating that during the pendency of the trial court's resolution on the petitioners' Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence, with the attached Demurrer to Evidence, the prosecution intended to file its Comment, by serving copies thereof, through registered mail, upon counsels for the petitioners, including the other accused, and the respondent; however, said Comment was not actually filed with the trial court due to oversight on the part of the staff of the State Prosecutor handling the case. Claiming that it was deprived of due process, the prosecution prayed that its Comment be admitted and that the same be treated as a reconsideration of the trial court's Order. RTC granted the prosecutions' Motion to Admit, with the attached Comment, and ruled that its Comment be admitted to form part of the court records. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the RTC Orders which granted petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the cases against them and which noted and admitted respondent's Comment to form part of the records of the case. The CA granted respondent's petition, thereby reversing and setting aside the RTC Order, but only insofar as it pertains to the grant of petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, and ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, granting the Demurrer to Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can no longer interpose an appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners contend that respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA should not have prospered, because the allegations therein, in effect, assailed the trial court's judgment, not its jurisdiction. In other words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in the nature of an error of judgment rendered, which was not correctible by a petition for certiorari with the CA.The petition is impressed with merit. At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and the view she is advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 90 of 256 Justice Gesmundo In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant. In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case. Consequently, the petition should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since the petition for certiorari filed in the CA was not at the instance of the OSG, the CA should have outrightly dismissed the same. Moreover, not only did the CA materially err in entertaining the petition, it should be stressed that the granting of petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence already amounted to a dismissal of the case on the merits and a review of the order granting the demurrer to evidence will place the accused in double jeopardy. Consequently, the Court disagrees with the CA’s ruling reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners. Under Section 23, 29 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court on Demurrer to Evidence, after the prosecution terminates the presentation of evidence and rests its case, the trial court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon the filing of a Demurrer to Evidence by the accused with or without leave of court. If the accused files a Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court and the same is denied, he may adduce evidence in his defense. However, if the Demurrer to Evidence is filed by the accused without prior leave of court and the same is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. Corollarily, after the prosecution rests its case, and the accused files a Demurrer to Evidence, the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the trial court finds that the prosecution evidence is not sufficient and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the merits of the case which is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed. Any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would, thus, violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. 2. PUA V. CITIBANK (2003) “Civil suits falling under the SRC are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts and hence, need not be first filed before the SEC, unlike criminal cases wherein the latter body exercises primary jurisdiction.” Pua filed a complaint with the RTC against Citibank for declaration of nullity of contract and damages. The circumstances of the case fell within the jurisdiction of the SEC. Citibank invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, while Pua maintained that the RTC has jurisdiction. RTC dismissed the case; CA affirmed the dismissal. On appeal to the SC, Pua reiterated their original position that the SRC itself provides that civil cases for damages arising from violations of the same law fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Countering, Citibank maintains that since the complaint would necessarily touch on the issue of whether or not the former violated certain provisions of the SRC, then the said complaint should have been first filed with the SEC which has the technical competence to resolve such dispute, invoking Baviera. Supreme Court held that while Baviera held that all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC, it should be construed as applicable only to criminal cases. The Court held that cases falling under the SRC, which pertain to civil liabilities arising from violations of the requirements for offers to sell or the sale of securities, as well as other civil suits shall be exclusively brought before the regional trial courts. Therefore, based on these considerations, it stands to reason that civil suits falling under the SRC are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts and hence, need not be first filed before the SEC, unlike criminal cases wherein the latter body exercises primary jurisdiction. 3/4. DISINI V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 1 ST DIVISION (2011) ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 91 of 256 Justice Gesmundo “The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close associates.” Ombudsman filed two informations with the Sandiganbayan charging Disini with corruption of public officials and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Disini moved to quash, but Sandiganbayan denied him. Sandiganbayan convicted him. On appeal, one of the grounds relied upon by Disini was that he is a private individual, and, hence, the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over him. Supreme Court ruled against Disini. The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close associates. That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in “the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship,” expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status. 5. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES V. SEC. PEREZ (2013) “The pendency of an administrative ease for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in the HLURB to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid Jots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of PD 957 on tile ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.” San Miguel Properties bought lands from BF Homes. Apparently, BF Homes withheld the release of the TCTs because of a dispute wherein it was alleged that the sales were entered into by a receiver who was not authorized to enter into the sales. San Miguel filed a complaint with the prosecutor. The prosecutor refused to file an information. SMP moved to reconsider, but the prosecutor still denied, holding that BF Homes could not be held liable for non- delivery of the TCTs without a definite ruling on the legality of the receiver. SMP appealed to the Supreme Court. Supreme Court held against San Miguel. The action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because the receiver did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of PD 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case. 6. SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF PANGASUGAN, BAYBAY, LEYTE V. EXPLORATION PERMIT APPLICATION OF PNOC (2013) “Under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.” PNOC applied for an exploration permit in Leyte with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau. The Sanggunian expressed deep concern for possible environmental damage, and subsequently filed a complaint praying for the denial of the permit application. The MGB Panel of Arbitrators (PA) dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but remanded the same to the Mining Environment and Safety Division of the Office of the Regional Director of MGB for appropriate action. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied. Aggrieved, ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 92 of 256 Justice Gesmundo petitioner appealed to the MAB. In a Decision, the MAB affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint, albeit on a different ground. While it ruled that the PA has jurisdiction over the complaint, the same is nevertheless dismissible for being premature. PNOC then subsequently filed a motion to declare the decision final and executory for failure of the Sanggunian to timely interpose a motion for reconsideration. MAB then issued an order declaring the finality of the earlier decision. Supreme Court ruled in favor of PNOC. The Sanggunian itself admits that it is assailing the MAB’s Order. However, it is well to emphasize that such Order merely declared the MAB’s earlier Decision final and executory for failure of petitioner to either move for reconsideration or appeal the same. It is well-settled that under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. This doctrine has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. 7. PUNZALAN V. PLATA (2013) “The conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor.” At the height of intoxication, a group led by Punzalan feuded with the Platas. In the end, Punzalan filed multiple charges against Plata and his friends; while Plata countered with even more charges against Punzalan and his cohorts. The City Prosecutor dismissed the charges against Punzalan for lack of sufficient bases. The dismissal reached the DOJ, which promptly ordered the filing of charges against Punzalan. Upon review, however, the DOJ changed its mind and ordered the dropping of charges. The Platas moved to reconsider, but they were denied. They went to the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary. The CA ruled in their favor, and ordered the DOJ to reinstate the filing of charges. Hence, this appeal. In essence, the petitioners argue that the determination of the existence of probable cause is lodged with the prosecutor, who assumes full discretion and control over the complaint. They insist that the DOJ committed no grave abuse of discretion when it issued Resolutions ordering the withdrawal of the informations. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, they contend that the courts should not interfere with the discretion of the prosecutor. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Punzalan; the DOJ should withdraw the informations. The well- established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. The prosecution of crimes lies with the executive department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that the laws of the land are faithfully executed. “A necessary component of this power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their violators.” Succinctly, the public prosecutor is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime and should be held for trial. In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse of discretion committed by the DOJ. 8. FELY Y YALONG V. PEOPLE (2013) The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non- compliance with such requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. Yalong was charged for the crime of violation of BP 22. The MTCC found Yalong guilty beyond reasonable doubt, finding that all the elements of the crime charged have been duly established. Yalong then filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied due course, A petition for relief and denial of appeal was subsequently filed but was also dismissed. Aggrieved Yalong filed a Petition for Certiorari with the RTC. The RTC also denied the latter petition. Finally, Yalong filed a petition for review before the CA. The petition for review was an improper appeal; Yalong should have filed a notice of appeal with the RTC instead of petition for review with the CA. While the ROC do not specifically state that the inappropriate filing of petition for review instead of a required notice of appeal is dismissible, Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the ROC nonetheless provides that appeals tot the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 93 of 256 Justice Gesmundo appeal with the latter court. Though as a general rule, rules of procedure must be strictly construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations. 9. MASAYUKI HASEGAWA V. LEILA GIRON (2013) The CA has the jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC on the ground of GADALEJ. The prosecutor’s findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts unless they are patently shown to have been made with GADALEJ. Respondent Giron filed a complaint affidavit for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal detention against petitioner. In a Resolution, the prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Respondent thus filed a petition for review before the DOJ but the same was denied. Thus, Giron filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The appellate court granted the petition. There was GADALEJ on the part of the investigating prosecutor. The prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. While discretion lies with the, she may not turn a blind eye to evidence upon a formidable evidence mounting to show the acts complained of. 10. ROMULO NERI V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2013) Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to the parties. This case arose from the botched Philippine-ZTE NBN Project. The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 criminal informations, first against Abalos (raffled to the 4 th Division) and the 2 nd against Petioner Neri (raffled to 5 th Division) for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) citing Sec 22, Rule 119 of the ROC moved for consolidation of the 2 cases. Consolidation here would be improper as it would force Neri to await the conclusion of testimonies against Abalos, however irrelevant or immaterial it is to his case. Joint trial is permissible “where the action arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.” The SC has previously held that the rights of an accused take precedence over minimizing the cost incidental to the resolution of controversies. 11. THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA V. ATTY. FRIA (2013) Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a trial judge may immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, but the same would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear. An Information was filed against respondent, Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City charging her the crime of Open Disobedience under Article 231 of the RPC. The MTC ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause as it found that the petioner’s failed to prove the existence of some of the elements of the crime alleged. The MR filed by the petioners were denied, thus it elevated the matter on certiorari. The RTC found no GADALEJ on the part of the MTC in dismissing the case. There is no GADALEJ. Once the Information is field with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish the probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause. Applying these to the case would lead to the conclusion that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal case for lack of probable cause. 12. LEE PUE LIONG V. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE (2013) Sec 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, defines an offended party as the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 94 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Petioner Liong is the president of Centillion Holdings Inc (CHI) which is part of the CKC Group of Companies. The CKC Group is involved in an intra-corporate dispute between the petitioner and respondent’s group. Petioner on behalf of CHI caused the filing of a verified petition for the issuance of an Owner’s Duplicate Copy of a certain certificate of title which is claimed to be owned by the corporation. Respondents however alleged that petioner committed perjury, as the latter in fact knew that the duplicate copy was with them. The MeTC denied petioner’s Omnibus Motion, which claimed that private prosecutor, cannot intervene for the prosecution of the perjury case, being that there is no allegation of damage to private interest. The statement of petioner regarding the certificate of title is injurious to respondent’s personal credibility and reputation. Furthermore, there is potential injury to the corporation that is likewise undeniable. Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected, The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the purpose of enforcing civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. This intervention is subject to the discretion and control of the public prosecutor, 13. DR. ROGER POSADAS V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2013) Under Sec 4 and 5 of the ROC, the requirement of notice of hearing is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement renders the motion defective. Petioner Posadas was appointed by the Board of Regents (BOR) of UP Diliman as Chancellor.During his term, the BOR established the Technology Management Center (TMC) under the direct supervision of the Office of the Chancellor. Dr. Posadas then submitted to the NEDA an Application for funding of his proposed project (TMC Project(. Later on, Dr. Posadas was appointed as project director of UP TMC and was hired as Consultant for the TMC Project. He was to receive honoraria (Php 30,000/month) and consultancy fees (Php 100,000), but the COA raised questioned on the legality of the said fees. As a result thereof, criminal cases were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan found petioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied due course for the reason that it has not been set for hearing as required by the rules, hence the motion is pro forma. Petioners committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing, his motion was properly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan. Thus no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Sandiganbayan when it denied due course to petioners’ motion for reconsideration. 14. JOSE V. SUAREZ (2013) “When a trial court is confronted to rule on ‘a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information’, it is its "bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion." Carolina claims that Purita went to her house because the latter needed cash for her business. Carolina gave Purita the cash she needed provided she would pay interest at 5% monthly. In exchange for the cash, Purita issued checks all dated April 27, 2004. However, the checks were dishonored upon presentment. Hence, the complaint for estafa. Purita, on the other hand, claims that her transactions with Carolina are civil in nature; they are mere loans and the checks were issued only to guarantee payment. She explained that due to serious liquidity problems in her hardware and construction business, she was constrained to borrow money from Carolina, a money lender, to fund the postdated checks she issued to creditors which had been maturing daily. Compelled to replenish her daily fund requirement, Purita was forced to accept Carolina’s exorbitant and iniquitous terms, initially at 1-2% interest a day until the same was increased to 5%. The setup was that whenever the loaned money is released, Purita would issue a number of checks dated on the next banking day equal to the amount of cash lent to her, plus the 5% daily interest inclusive of weekends and holidays until the checks are cleared. The Prosecutor initially found estafa. However, the DOJ found merit in Purita’s Petition for Review. It ruled that the transactions between Purita and Carolina do not constitute estafa and are merely contracts of loan because Carolina was not deceived into parting with her money. Held: RTC failed to make an independent evaluation of the merits of the case in determining probable cause when faced with a Motion to Withdraw Information. Likewise, in its March 10, 2006 Order reiterating its denial of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC merely stated that the 5% interest is a matter of defense. There was never any discussion as to how it reached such conclusion, or how the DOJ findings impacted on its ruling. And instead of confronting the reasons stated in the motion for the withdrawal of the Information, the RTC ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 95 of 256 Justice Gesmundo digressed and focused solely on what constitutes estafa involving bouncing checks. otably, the RTC in both Orders perfunctorily denied the motion to withdraw as it did not "(1) positively state that the evidence against Purita is sufficient to make out a case for estafa; (2) include a discussion on the merits of the case; (3) assess if the DOJ’s conclusion is supported by evidence; (4) look at the basis of the DOJ’s recommendation; (5) embody its assessment in the said Orders; and, (6) state the reasons in denying the motion to withdraw information." 38 Hence, it is plain from the said Orders that the RTC failed to perform its bounden-duty to make an independent evaluation of the merits of the case. The CA did not therefore err in declaring that such failure of the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. 39 COSCOLLUELA V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2013) “There is no complete resolution of a case under preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman approves the investigating officer’s recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to dismiss the complaint.." Acting on a letter-complaint from People’s Graftwatch regarding an anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount of P20,000,000.00, the Case Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report 7 dated April 16, 2002 which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares prepared a Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution), finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro recommended the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003. However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (came only on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB. Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing with the SB. Thus, the petitioners filed a motion to quash arguing, among others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted. Held: Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated. In the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. In this relation, the Court does not lend credence to the SB’s position that the conduct of preliminary investigation was terminated as early as March 27, 2003, or the time when Cañares prepared the Resolution recommending the filing of the Information. This is belied by Section 4, The above-cited provision readily reveals that there is no complete resolution of a case under preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman approves the investigating officer’s recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to dismiss the complaint. Therefore, in the case at bar, the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners were not terminated upon Cañares’ preparation of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information but rather, only at the time Casimiro finally approved the same for filing with the SB. In this regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May 21, 2009, or almost eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint. Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through the particulars of case but also to resolve the same within the proper length of time. Thus, barring any extraordinary complication, such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in the case or any event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal work activity – any of which have not been adequately proven by the prosecution in the case at bar – there appears to be no justifiable basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not have earlier resolved the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners. Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases since they were unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. Thus, it is undeniable that petitioners’ constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases had been violated. BACASMAS V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2013) “An information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) the name of all the accused; (b) the designation of the offense as given in the statute; (c) the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 96 of 256 Justice Gesmundo offense; (d) the name of the offended party; (e) the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and (f) the place where the offense was committed.." Petitioners here are involved in a scheme where they obtained cash advances from the city government of Cebu. COA created a team to investigate such government. It made a surprise check and found a shortage of almost P10 million. A case was filed in the Sandiganbayan and the said court found that the information against the petitioners is sufficient. Hence, this petition. Held: Petition denied. An information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) the name of all the accused; (b) the designation of the offense as given in the statute; (c) the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (d) the name of the offended party; (e) the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and (f) the place where the offense was committed. The Sandiganbayan earlier held that the Information was sufficient in that it contained no inherent contradiction and properly charged an offense. We uphold its ruling for the following reasons: First, it is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was committed, except when it is a material ingredient thereof. Also, Cesa contends that Gonzales should have been included in the Information, because the latter incurred cash shortages and allegedly had unliquidated cash advances. 62 Cesa is wrong. The Information seeks to hold petitioners accountable for their actions, which allowed Gonzales to obtain cash advances, and paved the way for her to incur cash shortages, leading to a loss of over nine million pesos. Thus, the Information correctly excluded her because her alleged acts did not fall under the crime charged in the Information. Third and last, the Information sufficiently specified the offense that violated Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature and cause of the accusation against petitioners, 64 namely the violation of the aforementioned law. The use of the three phrases – "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "inexcusable negligence" - in the same Information does not mean that three distinct offenses were thereby charged but only implied that the offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes provided by the law. 65 In addition, there was no inconsistency in alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because the latter was not simple negligence. 20. OMBUDSMAN v. CHAVEZ (2013) The office of the Ombudsman has a clear legal interest in defending its right to have its judgment carried out. The Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding Respondents guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct with the penalty of dismissal from office. The Deputy Ombudsman issued an Order directing the Batangas State University-Board of Regents to enforce its Resolution. Respondents went to the RTC to ask for a preliminary injunction as their case was pending appeal before the CA. RTC denied. Respondents appealed to the CA. Ombudsman moved to intervene but the CA denied the motion. Ombudsman went to the Supreme Court via 45. Held: 45 was proper even if the decision assailed was merely an interlocutory order because it was patently erroneous (Equitable PCI v. Fernandez). The CA should have allowed the Ombudsman’s intervention because it is interested in the enforcement of its orders. In administrative cases, "An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal... A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course (Facura v. CA). 21. PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH DIVISION (2013) Courts should generally defer to the judgment of the prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be used as a witness only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119. Mercado and other DOF officers were investigated for allegedly issuing tax credit certificates to JAM Liner even if the latter was not qualified. Mercado applied for immunity as a state witness. The Ombudsman agreed. When the case was filed before the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman moved to discharge Mercado from the information. Sandiganbayan denied the motion. Ombudsman moved for reconsideration but was denied just the same. A petition for review on certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 97 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Held: The filing of a criminal action cannot render the Ombudsman unable to exercise its powers under RA 6770, one of which is to grant immunity. Under Section 17, Rule 119 the following are the requirements of for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness: (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. As the Sandiganbayan has acquired jurisdiction, it has the power to determine whether an accused may be discharged as a State witness. In this instance, the Court found that the testimony of the accused Mercado was necessary. 22. AMPATUAN v. DE LIMA (2013) The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act). Kenny Dalandag, one of the accused in the Ampatuan massacre applied for inclusion in the Witness Protection Program. The DOJ accepted the application. Meanwhile, Ampatuan and his co-accused were charged of multiple murder. Ampatuan filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC to have Dalandag included in the information. The petition was denied. A petition for review on certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court. Held: The prosecution of crimes is a function of the Executive Branch of government. It is the policy of the Judiciary not to interfere in preliminary investigations except when grave abuse of discretion has been committed. A participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness either pursuant to Sec. 17, Rule 119 or RA 6981. Under Rule 119 it is the court's discretion to discharge a co-accused to become a witness for the State provided the requisites under the same law are present. Under RA 6981, the person is admitted to the Witness Protection Program (determination of qualification made by DOJ) and the same operates as an acquittal and the witness cannot be included in the information unless he fails or refuses to satisfy. However, if the same witness happens to be charged as an accused, the public prosecutor shall move for his discharge upon presentation of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program. 23-26. ARROYO v. DOJ; ABALOS v. DE LIMA; MACAPAGAL-ARROYO v. COMLEC (2012) The Department of Justice exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the Commission on Elections to conduct preliminary investigations of all election offenses. By virtue of a Resolution and Joint Order, the COMELEC and the DOJ formed a Joint Panel to investigate electoral offenses committed in the 2004 and 2007 elections. Petitioners assail the validity of the formation of this panel and the promulgation of its rules to the effect that it has authority to conduct preliminary investigations. Held: The Court may determine the validity of the conduct of preliminary investigation even after informations have been filed or warrants of arrest have been issued. Direct resort to the Supreme Court is justified when the resolution of issues is of paramount importance, such as in this case. While the Rules of the Joint Panel are void for lack of publication, the power of DOJ to conduct preliminary investigations of election offenses is recognized under BP 881 as amended by RA 9369. In view of this, the Court said that preliminary investigations made by the Joint Panel shall be governed by Rule 112 and the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 41) SEC V. MENDOZA (2012) Quashal of a search warrant. A search warrant was issued covering documents and articles found in the respondents office. However, these seized items were not immediately turned over to the issuing court therefore violating Rule 126, Sec. 1. Therefore Mendoza et al. filed a petition for injunction to prevent these items from being admitted as evidence. The court held that although passed off as a petition for injunction, the action that Mendoza, et al. filed with the Muntinlupa RTC, the object of which is to prohibit the three agencies from using the items seized under the search warrant, is actually an action to suppress their use as evidence. It might be pointed out of course that ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 98 of 256 Justice Gesmundo since Mendoza, et al. were not parties to the issuance of the search warrant, they had no standing to question the same or seek the suppression of evidence taken under it. But the rules do not require Mendoza, et al. to be parties to the search warrant proceeding for them to be able to file a motion to suppress. It is not correct to say that only the parties to the application for search warrant can question its issuance or seek suppression of evidence seized under it. The proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant does not partake of an action where a party complains of a violation of his right by another. 42) PEOPLE V. ASILAN (2012) Sufficiency and failure to quash of an Information. Asilan was charged of murder, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, of a policeman while the latter was in the act of arresting another person. Asilan assails the insufficiency of the information and alleges that he is only liable for homicide. The Court ruled that the information was sufficient in accordance with Rule 110 Sec. 6 stating that information is sufficient if it contains the full name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date, and the place of the offense. Likewise Asilan failed to timely object to its insufficiency as per Rule 117 Sec. 9 provides as the Court also held that an Information which lacks essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent evidence presented therein (citing People v. Candaza) 43) PATULA V. PEOPLE (2012) Information, purpose etc. Patula was a saleswoman at Footlucker’s who allegedly failed to account for and by operation of a series of acts, misappropriated collections from various sales. Patula assails that the information failed to allege the falsification and that the Court erred in admitting evidence for Falsification whereas the information lacks an allegation for falsification. According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her customers, and later falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning such duplicates to her employer to show that the customers had paid less than the amounts actually reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed the falsification in order to conceal her misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the falsification was not an offense separate and distinct from the estafa charged against her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts of falsification as its means of establishing her misappropriation or conversion as an essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not infringed or denied to her. • Preliminary Investigation; Ombudsman Powers 44. JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES VS. HON. MA. MECEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, OMBUDSMAN, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, ET AL., G.R. NOS. 189161 & 189173, MARCH 21, 2012 Doctrine: 1. As a general rule, the Court does not interfere in the exercise by the office of the prosecutor or the Ombudsman of its investigative and prosecutorial powers. An exception is when there is a charge and sufficient proof to show grave abuse of discretion. 2. It is within the discretion of the Ombudsman to decide whether or not preliminary investigation should be conducted. Judge Angeles filed a criminal complaint against State Prosecutor Velasco for giving unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the accused in a criminal case for smuggling by failing to present a material witness, engaging in private practice by insisting on the reopening of child abuse cases against petitioner, and falsifying a public document to make it appear that a clarificatory hearing on child abuse Complaints was conducted. The Ombudsman ruled in favor of Velasco. SC held that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the Complaint against Velasco. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 99 of 256 Justice Gesmundo As a general rule, the Court does not interfere in the exercise by the office of the prosecutor or the Ombudsman of its investigative and prosecutorial powers. The plenary powers of the Ombudsman is virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. An exception is when there is a charge and sufficient proof to show grave abuse of discretion. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will uphold the findings of the Ombudsman. It is within the discretion of the Ombudsman to decide whether or not preliminary investigation should be conducted. The Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint outright without a preliminary investigation. State’s right to due process; demurrer to evidence 45. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), IMELDA R. MARCOS, JOSE CONRADO BENITEZ AND GILBERT C. DULAY, G.R. NOS. 153304-05, FEBRUARY 07, 2012 Doctrine: 1. As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. 2. The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to it day in court. Respondents were charged with malversation of public funds. After prosecution presented its evidence and rested its case, respondents filed separate motions to dismiss the criminal cases, by way of demurrers to evidence. The prosecution filed a Manifestation stating that it was not opposing the demurrers to evidence. The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence and acquitted respondents. SB found no evidence of misappropriation of the subject funds as based on the unreliability and incompleteness of the audit report. Petitioner argues that the SB committed grave abuse of discretion that resulted in a miscarriage of justice prejudicial to the State’s interest when it took the demurrers to evidence at face value instead of requiring the presentation of additional evidence, taking into consideration the huge amounts of public funds involved and the special prosecutor’s failure to oppose the demurrers to evidence. As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Notably, the proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on errors of judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a party’s due process rights. A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due process implies an invalid or otherwise void judgment. If either or both grounds are established, the judgment of acquittal is considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not have the effect of an acquittal. Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will not lie in such a case. The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to it day in court. Its right to be heard rests to a large extent on whether the public prosecutor undertook his duties in pursuing the criminal action for the punishment of the guilty. The prosecutor owes the State, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that the court’s mind may not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent may not suffer; and that the guilty may not escape unpunished. Here, the State was not denied due process in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the special prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present available evidence or that other evidence could be secured. There is also no grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan when it exercised restraint and did not require the presentation of additional evidence, given the clear weakness of the case at that point. Under the obtaining circumstances, the petitioner failed to show what and how additional available evidence could have helped and the paramount interest of justice sought to be achieved. It does not appear that pieces of evidence had been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or that these pieces of evidence are intended to correct evidence previously offered. More importantly, it does not appear that these contemplated additional pieces of evidence (which the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 100 of 256 Justice Gesmundo special prosecutor allegedly should have presented) were ever present and available. For instance, at no point in the records did the petitioner unequivocally state that it could present the three UL officers, Cueto, Jiao and Sison. The petitioner also failed to demonstrate its possession of or access to these documents (such as the final audit report) to support the prosecution’s charges – the proof that the State had been deprived of due process due to the special prosecutor’s alleged inaction. • Review of judgment of acquittal 46. ARNOLD M. YSIDORO VS. HON. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, ET AL., G.R. NO. 171513, FEBRUARY 6, 2012 PEOPLE VS. FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL., G.R. NO. 190963, FEBRUARY 6, 2012 (consolidated case) Doctrine: Generally, the Rules provide three (3) procedural remedies in order for a party to appeal a decision of a trial court in a criminal case before this Court. The first is by ordinary appeal under Section 3, Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The second is by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. And the third is by filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Each procedural remedy is unique and provides for a different mode of review. In addition, each procedural remedy may only be availed of depending on the nature of the judgment sought to be reviewed. Ysidoro, the Municipal Mayor of Leyte, was charged before the Sandiganbayan for withholding RATA and Productivity Pay from Nenita Doller. He filed an omnibus motion to quash the information and, in the alternative, for judicial determination of probable casuse. SB denied both. Trial on the merits in the case continued before the SB. The SB acquitted Ysidoro of the crime charged. Generally, the Rules provide three (3) procedural remedies in order for a party to appeal a decision of a trial court in a criminal case before this Court. The first is by ordinary appeal under Section 3, Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The second is by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. And the third is by filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Each procedural remedy is unique and provides for a different mode of review. In addition, each procedural remedy may only be availed of depending on the nature of the judgment sought to be reviewed. As applied to judgments rendered in criminal cases, unlike a review via a Rule 65 petition, only judgments of conviction can be reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition. However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and where the prosecution had been deprived of due process. The rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine and assess the evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value of the evidence. It does not include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence. A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not the question of whether the decision is legally correct. In other words, the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds. • Preliminary Investigation 48. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), REP. BY ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO VS. ANTONIO O. TOBIAS III, G.R. NO. 177780, JANUARY 25, 2012 Doctrine: A preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial. At a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 101 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Tobias opened a bank account for and in the name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat business. He applied for a loan from Metrobank. Metrobank appraised the property for collateral by asking him for a photocopy of the title and other documents. Metrobank approved the credit line. The Deed of real estate mortgage was annotated. Tobias defaulted on payment. The certificate of sale was issued in favor of Metrobank. No TCT was found in the registry vault of the Registry of Deeds. After investigation, the Prosecutor charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of public documents. The Secretary of Justice opined that Tobias had sufficiently established his good faith in purchasing the property. He said that it was Metrobank that had caused the annotation of the mortgage on the TCT, thereby creating an impression that the title had been existing in the Registry of Deeds at that time; that, accordingly, the presumption that the possessor of a falsified document was the author of the falsification did not apply because it was always subject to the qualification or reference as to the approximate time of the commission of the falsification. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. A preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial. At a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. There is no definitive standard by which probable cause is determined except to consider the attendant conditions; the existence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting the examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the clear dictates of reason. • Probation 49. ARNEL COLINARES VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 182748, DECEMBER 13, 2012 Doctrine: An accused has the right to undergo probation despite having appealed his case if the appellate court grants a lower penalty which now falls below six years imprisonment. Arnel was accused of striking someone with a stone on the head. He was charged with frustrated homicide. He invoked self-defense. RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for 2 years and 4 months of prision correctional, as minium to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. Arnel appealed to the CA. CA denied. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation because he already appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him of frustrated homicide. However, the SC found him guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide. Hence, the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of 4 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, Arnel was granted the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC. The SC gives two reasons: (1) If the SC allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of the case; (2) Since the RTC meted the wrong judgment, Arnel has the right to apply for probation under the corrected judgment imposed by the SC. The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege • Offer of Evidence 50. WESTMONT INVETSMENT vs AMOS FRANCIA (2011) On Offer of Evidence --- It is not enough that the documents are attached in the pleadings. To be considered as evidence, these documents must be formally offered in evidence. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 102 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. It bears stressing too that all the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings before the CA cannot be given any weight or evidentiary value for the sole reason that, as correctly observed by the CA, these documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial court. To consider them now would deny the other parties the right to examine and rebut them. “The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.” Objections to evidence are also raised only after the evidence has been formally offered. • Arrest 51. PEOPLE vs PPO1 TRESTIZA (2011) On Arrest --- Objection to warrantless arrest must be raised before plea; otherwise, objection is waived; Illegality arrest does not set aside judgment of conviction if there was sufficient evidence to hold accused guilty. Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused (through his warrantless arrest) must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. The accused in this case was arrested for two crimes : kidnapping with ransom and illegal possession of firearms. The illegal possession of firearms case was heard first and the accused fully participated therein. He could not now object to the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person by the court in the kidnapping with ransom case. Also, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. The fatal flaw of an invalid warrantless arrest becomes moot in view of a credible eyewitness account. • Ombudsman’s Grant of Immunity 52. QUARTO v SIMEON MARCELO (2011) On Ombudsman’s Grant of Immunity --- Ombudsman has authority to choose the individual to whom immunity may be granted. The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative. But while the legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity, the authority to implement is lodged elsewhere. The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a constituent part of the process and is essentially an executive function. The Ombudsman may properly exercise this authority. But if the Ombudsman arbitrarily chooses who will be granted immunity from prosecution, mandamus may lie. • Rule 117 Section 3 and Rule 10 53. JOEL GALZOTE vs JONATHAN BRIONES (2011) On Rule 110 – Pointers to see if criminal information is sufficient in form and substance (see below) On Rule 117 Sec 3 – The ground of co-conspirator being convicted of a lesser offense is not a ground for quashal. The ground used by the petitioner in his motion to quash (i.e., that his co- conspirator had been convicted of an offense lesser than the crime of robbery) is not among the exclusive grounds enumerated under Section 3, Rule 117 that warrant the quashal of criminal information. The designated purpose of a motion to quash is to assail the validity of the criminal information (or criminal complaint) for defects or defenses apparent on the face of the information. In this robbery case, the criminal information is sufficient in form and substance for it states: ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 103 of 256 Justice Gesmundo (a) the name of the petitioner as the accused; (b) the offense of robbery as the designated offense committed; (c) the manner on how the offense of robbery was committed and the petitioner’s participation were alleged with particularity; and (d) the date and the place of the commission of the robbery were also stated therein. A denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter’s ruling. A direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. Judge’s Own Determination on Whether Prima Facie Case Exists to Hold Respondent for Trial; Not to Rely on Prosecution Evaluation Only 54. CEREZO vs PEOPLE (2011) An order of the court which relied solely on the prosecution evaluation is VOID and without any legal effect. Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. In resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice which are only persuasive and not binding on courts. In this case, it is obvious from the Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to make his own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents. By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainant’s right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever. 55. PAULINO ASILO vs PEOPLE (2011) ‘Undue injury’ in graft law is actual injury proved by evidence. The elements of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) OR that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the other party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 104 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Causing undue injury to any party, including the government, could only mean actual injury or damage which must be established by evidence. In jurisprudence, “undue injury” is consistently interpreted as “actual.” Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law. 56. VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, IN REPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO T. COMENDADOR V. BOMBASI ET. AL., G.R. NO. 159059 (2011) “The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed. Hence, liability arising from sources other than such offense may still be enforced by filing a separate civil action.” Respondent Visitacion Bomabasi’s mother entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna allowing the former use and enjoyment of a parcel of land and a store situated in the public market. The contract provided that in case of modification of the public market, she and her heirs would be given preferential rights. During the subsistence of the contract, the respondent received a letter from the office of the Mayor, directing the demolition of the store as per a Sangguiniang Bayan Resolution, to give way to the construction of a new public market. The respondent replied, expressing willingness to vacate, as long as their store would be allowed to operate at the same spot in the new market. The reply was ignored, and the demolition ensued. Hence, respondent filed a civil case for damages against the municipality, its mayor, other responsible officers and the new occupants of the property. A criminal case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the mayor was later filed. The cases were consolidated, pursuant to P.D. 1606 which provides that where the civil action arising from an offense cognizable by the Sandiganbayan had been filed separately, and judgment therein is yet to be rendered, it shall be consolidated with the criminal case when such is thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned. Judgment was rendered against the mayor in the criminal case, and against the defendants in the civil case. The counsel for the mayor filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the death of the mayor during the pendency of the consolidated cases had totally extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the Motion insofar as the extinction of the criminal liability is concerned and denied the extinction of the civil liability. The civil liability of Mayor Comendador survives his death. The death of the accused pending his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict; in such cases, the action for recovery may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action. In this case, PD 1606, which considers a separate civil action corresponding to an offense cognizable by the Sandiganbayan abandoned upon failure to consolidate, does not apply. The complaint for damages filed by the Bombasis is based on the mayor’s violation of their right to due process, which is independent from any civil liability arising from the mayor’s violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 57. RICABLANCA V. JUDGE BARILLO, A.M. NO. MTJ-08-1710 (2011) “After conducting preliminary investigation on criminal cases, investigating judges have the duty to transmit the corresponding records to the provincial or city prosecutor for appropriate action.” Ricablanca, court stenographer of the MTC of Guihulngan, Negros Occidental, charged Judge Barillo, Acting Presiding Judge of the MTCC of Canloaon City, of Grave Judicial Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law. To support this charge, Ricablanca made several allegations, including archival of criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the RTC, among others. In his Comment, the Judge alleged that he was no longer the Presiding Judge of MTC Guihulngnan, but nevertheless gave a general denial of the charges against him. Upon investigation, it was found that Judge Barillo followed the procedure applicable to trial judges, when in truth, law and in fact, he was acting as an investigating judge, upon whom a different procedure was applicable. Judge Barillo followed the wrong procedure. As investigating judge charged with the responsibility of conducting preliminary investigations, he is governed by the rules on preliminary investigation under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which directs him to transmit the result of the investigation to the provincial or city prosecutor for appropriate action. This is different from the procedure under A.M No. 7- 92 applicable to trial judges, which provides for archiving of cases after the issuance of warrant. Judge ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 105 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Barillo’s orders prevented any further action to be taken on the cases with respect to which he conducted preliminary investigation by archiving their records in his court, rather than transmitting them to the proper prosecutor. Judge fined Php 30,000. • Impeachment Complaint; Sufficiency of Form and Substance 58. GUITIERREZ V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 193459 (2011) “As to form, the complaint or resolution must be verified; as to substance, there must be a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the Committee.” Within the same year, 2 impeachment complaints alleging betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution were filed against Ombudsman Merceditas Guitierrez. The first complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, by a group led by Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel before the opening of the first session of the 15 th Congress. The second complaint was filed on August 3, 2010, by a group led by Renato Reyes Jr. The two complaints were simultaneously referred to the Committee on Justice during the August 11, 2010 plenary session. Finding both complaints sufficient in form after hearing, a resolution to this effect was issued on September 1, 2010. Guitierrez asked for reconsideration of the said resolution with the Committee on Justice which refused to accept the motion for prematurity. Guitierrez was advised to wait for the notice for her to file answer. Meanwhile, both complaints were found to be sufficient in substance after hearing. Guitierrez was served notice to file answer. However, instead of doing so, Guitierrez filed this petition for certioarari and prohibitition, alleging violation of the due process clause and the one-year bar provision of the Constitution with respect to impeachment complaints. The petitioner was not deprived of due process during the determination of the sufficiency of the complaint, as the participation of the impeachable officer only begins upon filing of the answer, which naturally comes only after such determination. Further, the power to determine the sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is lodged with the House of Representatives. Pursuant to this power, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and substance in accordance with constitutional requirements. As to form, the complaint or resolution must be verified; as to substance, there must be a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the Committee. It is not within the power of the Court to look into such recital of facts, as doing so would require it to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense, which in turn, is already a judicial determination of a purely political question that must be left to the sound discretion of the legislature. As to petitioner’s invocation of the one-year bar provision, the SC ruled that there was no violation. What the Constitution prohibits is the initiation of more than one proceeding against the same official within one year. Complaint is different from proceeding. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candlewick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, multiple matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. In relation to the one-year bar provision, Guitierrez also argued that the Rules on Criminal Procedure must suppletorily apply and hence the “one offense, one complaint” rule must be followed. Thus, Guitierrez argued the charges of betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution cannot be heaped together. The SC rejected this contention, ruling that the Constitution itself allows indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment. • Appeal; Neypes 59. GO V. SUNBANUN, G.R. NO. 168240 (2011) “When a procedural rule is amended for the benefit of litigants for the furtherance of the administration of justice, it shall be retroactively applied to likewise favor actions then pending, as equity delights in equality.” ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 106 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The respondents filed a claim for damages against their lessees Aurora Go, her husband and their Employment Agency before the RTC of Cebu. The complaint alleged that because the Gos operated the ground floor portion of the respondents’ house as an office, the warranty of the respondents’ fire insurance policies were breached, since the policies only cover property classified as residential. Aurora primarily relied on her testimony as defense, and thus made arrangements for the taking of her deposition by the Philippine consulate in Hong Kong, where she worked. Her deposition, however, was taken after Aurora was already declared to have waived her right to present evidence, due to delay attributable to the consulate. The RTC held Aurora liable, disregarding her deposition. To make matters worse, the Court mistakenly sent the adverse judgment to her counsel’s old address, and so, an MR was filed only on the last day to file an appeal, on March 31, 2004. The MR was denied, and was received by Aurora’s camp on May 6, 2004, with only a day to file her appeal. Aurora sought a 15-day extension, as she was allegedly busy campaigning for the local elections. Thereafter, she filed her notice of appeal on May 11. The notice of appeal, however, was denied by the RTC. The CA denied Aurora’s petition for certiorari due to procedural defects including failure to explain why the petition was filed only by registered mail. Hence, this petition. The CA did not act in grave abuse of discretion in denying Aurora’s petition for certiorari. The reason given by Aurora is not a compelling and highly exceptional one, as hers was the duty to tend to her case despite her campaign. Be that as it may, the “fresh period rule” amendment as held in Neypes v. CA must be applied to her benefit. Under such rule, a litigant is given another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an appeal after receipt of the order of denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/new trial before the RTC. The denial of Aurora’s MR of the trial court’s January 26, 2004 decision was received by her former counsel on May 6, 2004. Sans her motion for extension to file a notice of appeal, with the fresh period rule under Neypes, she still has until May 21, 2004 to file her notice of appeal and thus, had timely filed her notice of appeal on May 11, 2004. 60. CONQUILLA V. JUDGE BERNARDO, A.M. NO. MTJ-091737 (2011) “Under Sec. 5, Rule 112, preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall be conducted by the prosecutor.” Conquilla filed an administrative complaint for usurpation of authority, grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law against Judge Bernardo, Presiding Judge of the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan. The complaint alleges that first level judges no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations pursuant to AM 05-08-26-SC, and thus, Judge Bernardo gravely erred when he conducted preliminary investigation and issued a warrant of arrest in connection with a direct assault charge filed against Conquilla. The Office of the Court Administrator found the Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be fined and warned. The conduct of preliminary investigation by respondent judge was in direct contravention of A.M. No. 05-8- 26-SC, amending Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by removing the conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level courts. Thus, under Section 2 of Rule 112, only the following officers are authorized to conduct preliminary investigations: (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (c) Other officers as may be authorized by law. Considering that this is respondent judge’s third offense, the second of which was also for gross ignorance of the law, the Judge was suspended for 6 months without pay. • Fresh Period Rule; Right to Appeal 61. HON. TATAD V. PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 170979 (2011) “The fresh period rule applies to criminal cases.” Judith Yu was charged with Estafa before the RTC of QC, and was convicted as charged. 14 days later, Yu filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging the discovery of material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime. The MNT was denied. Thus, Yu filed a notice of appeal invoking the Neypes decision on the “fresh period rule”. Judge Tatad of the RTC denied the motion, holding that Neypes is inapplicable to criminal cases. The fresh period rule applies. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 39 of BP 129 governing ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 107 of 256 Justice Gesmundo appeals makes no distinction, and makes the rule applicable in all cases. Moreover, the modes of appeal to the CA and to the SC for both criminal and civil cases are the same. Thus, there exists no cogent reason why the period to appeal should be treated differently. To strictly interpret the “fresh period rule” in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case – a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. 62-64. LUMANOG V. PEOPLE, FORTUNA V. PEOPLE, PEOPLE V. FORTUNA Y ABUDO (2011) Rule 121 To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown that the evidence was “newly discovered” pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below. Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify reopening of the trial and/or vacating the judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw that may have initially attended the outofcourt identification of the accused, the same was cured when all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial. 65. VILLENA V. PEOPLE (2011) Rule 113 While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice of appeal and that the trial court thereupon loses jurisdiction over the case, this principle presupposes that the party filing the notice of appeal could validly avail of the remedy of appeal and had not lost standing in court. In this case, petitioners have lost their standing in court by their unjustified failure to appear during the trial and, more importantly, during the promulgation of judgment of conviction, and to surrender to the jurisdiction of the RTC. The accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the judgment — (a) the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules allow the accused to regain his standing in court in order to avail of these remedies by: (a) his surrender, and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies, stating therein the reasons for his absence, within 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment. This Court has invariably ruled that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. 66. PEOPLE V. DEQUINA (2011) Rule 113 Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, who had the first hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of their testimony, we have no reason to disregard the findings of the lower court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 108 of 256 Justice Gesmundo jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances: a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Accused-appellants did not raise any protest when they, together with their bags containing marijuana, were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. In People v. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174 (1994), we ruled that: When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. x x x. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. 67. PEOPLE V. UYBOCO (2011) Rule 113 Time and again, this court has invariably viewed the defense of frameup with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted. As a rule, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, which had a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial, as in this case, cannot render a valid and just decision, since the latter can very well rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his decision. There are two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase “within the area of his immediate control” means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested. 68. PEOPLE V. NG YIK BUN (2011) Rule 113, Section 5 – valid warrantless arrests – “A settled exception to the right guaranteed in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The provision refers to arrest in flagrante delicto.” ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 109 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Ng Yik Bun and 5 other Chinese nationals were charged with violating Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The police received information from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment of contraband. The police officers were able to observe the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters. They saw that the men were loading bags containing a white substance into a white van. They asked one of the men what were contained in those bags and he replied that it was shabu. The police officers confiscated the bags and arrested the 6 men. The accused allege that the police arrested them even without a valid warrant of arrest. And since there was no warrant, the search subsequently made on them was illegal and therefore, the seizure of any evidence as a result of that search is inadmissible as evidence. In the instant case, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. The arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that the accused were loading and transporting contraband, more so when one of them, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to their leader. Thus, the arrest of the accused is valid. In People v. Alunday, it was held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. The accused were committing the offense of possessing shabu and were in the act of loading them in a white van when the police officers arrested them. The crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers. And it was also held that the accused are deemed to have waived their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea. On the issue that no notice of hearing for the identification of the shabu were made upon one of the accused and his counsel, the Court held that the accused waived his right to be present at that hearing. He and his counsel should have brought that issue in the trial, not at the late stage on appeal. 69. PEOPLE V. JANJALANI (2011) Rule 116, SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — “When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.” Several members of the Abu Sayyaf Group were charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder due to the bombing of an RRCG bus on Valentine’s day of 2005. For the multiple murder charge, the accused Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty. However, for the multiple frustrated murder charge, the both of them pled not guilty. The trial court asked Baharan and Trinidad whether they were amenable to change their “not guilty” pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled “guilty” to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency. The defense counsel explained to the accused the consequences of the plea. So a re- arraignment was conducted. When the information was read to them, they pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder. The issue is whether the trial court erred in accepting the plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of its consequences. In People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that “all trial judges … must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.” Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court regarding a searching inquiry. Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory. Nevertheless, considering the circumstances, the Court held that it is unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the “searching inquiry” in this instance. Prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt – one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Remanding the case for ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 110 of 256 Justice Gesmundo re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration. 70. PEOPLE V. OLIVE RUBIO MAMARIL (2010) Rule 126, Section 6 – “If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.” The police officers implemented a search warrant against the accused Mamaril in her residence. Upon searching the house, the police found a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which was subsequently discovered as shabu. Thus, Mamaril was charged with violating the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accused contends that the issued search warrant was not based on probable cause since SPO4 Gotidoc, the applicant of the search warrant, did not testify on facts personally known to him but simply relied on stories that the accused was peddling illegal drugs. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. On the other hand, probable cause means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Contrary to the allegation of the accused, the Court is convinced that the search warrant was based on a probable cause. SPO4 Gotidoc stated in his direct testimony that surveillance was conducted prior to the application for a search warrant. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid with great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. The accused failed to present substantial rebuttal evidence to defeat the presumption of regularity of duty of the issuing judge. 71. BRIG. GEN. (RET.) RAMISCAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2010) Rule 116; arraignment; Speedy Trial Act – “Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later. Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last Section 7 of RA 8493 mean the same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when the accused appears before the court.” Ramiscal and several others were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found probable cause and filed informations with the Sandiganbayan. The accused filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombusdman’s findings. The Ombudsman for the Military recommended that Ramiscal’s name should be dropped from the informations. But after a review by a panel of prosecutors, it was decided that the original recommendation should be denied. The Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of Ramiscal while he filed his second motion for reconsideration. Ramiscal filed a motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of the second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. But the Sandiganbayan still proceeded with the arraignment. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information. The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Ramsical failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 111 of 256 Justice Gesmundo in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493. In connection with the second motion for reconsideration, under Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, Ramiscal can no longer file another motion for reconsideration questioning yet again the same finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation. 72. BONIFACIO, ET AL. V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149 (2010) Venue; criminal action – “The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.” The Yuchengco family filed a criminal complaint for 13 counts of libel against several persons who allegedly made derogatory remarks and false statements against them on an internet website. The Information read that the injurious and defamatory article on the website was first published and accessed by the complainant in Makati City. Petitioners moved to quash the Information because it failed to vest jurisdiction upon the court for failure to allege that the libelous articles were “printed and first published” in Makati and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases. The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article “was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City.” In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication. If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. For the Court to hold that the Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed. 73. TY-DE ZUZUARREGUI V. HON. VILLAROSA (2010) Rule 111, Section 7, suspension by reason of prejudicial question – “For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.” Verification and certification of non-forum shopping, erroneously signed, subsequent compliance – “A certification against forum shopping signed by counsel is a defective certification that is equivalent to non- compliance with the requirement and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. However, there are instances when compliance with the rule are treated with relative liberality, especially when there are circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified.” Rosemary Ty-Rakeshi filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of her mother’s estate. Petitioner Krizia Ty-De Zuzuarregui initially opposed this petition but they eventually reached an amicable settlement and entered into a compromise agreement which was approved by the RTC. The other siblings of Rosemary filed a ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 112 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Petition to Annul Judgment Approving Compromise Agreement, since being the children of the decedent, they are also entitled to inherit. While the action was pending, one of the siblings Fannie, filed a complaint for falsification and perjury against Rosemary and Krizia, alleging that they falsely stated in the pleadings that they are the only heirs of the decedent. Rosemary and Krizia filed a motion to suspend the preliminary investigation on the ground of a pending prejudicial question before the CA as to whether Peter, Catherine, and Fannie are legal heirs of the decedent. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity “that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,” the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. The case pending before the CA is principally for the determination of the validity of the compromise agreement wherein the other siblings of Rosemary presented evidence that they are also heirs of the decedent. On the other hand, the criminal case involve the determination of whether Krizia and Rosemary committed falsification of public documents in executing pleadings containing untruthful statements that they were the only legal heirs. It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal cases for falsification of public documents. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that they are not biological children of the decedent, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases. On the issue of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping signed by the counsel instead of the petitioners, the Court has ruled that substantial compliance may be accepted. In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, while a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification, the verification, signed by petitioner’s counsel in said case, is substantial compliance inasmuch as it served the purpose of the Rules of informing the Court of the pendency of another action or proceeding involving the same issues. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the party need not sign the verification; a party’s representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. 74. DE GUZMAN vs. GONZALEZ (2010) [Ombudsman; Determination of Probable Cause] - “A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect.” De Guzman was indicted for malversation of public funds. After reinvestigation, Prosecutor Bayag Jr. recommended the dismissal of the case. Upon review, Graft Investigation Officer II Agbada recommended to proceed with the prosecution of the case. Gonzales, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon approved the recommendation of Agbada. De Guzman argues that there was no sufficient evidence to establish probable cause since the COA audit was deemed not complete in view of the non-accomplishment of the certification of cashbook examination. Held: A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In disapproving the recommendation of Prosecutor Bayag, Jr. and adopting instead that of Agbada, respondent Gonzalez as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon was merely exercising his power and discharging his duty as mandated by the Constitution and by laws. It is discretionary upon him whether or not he would rely mainly on the findings of fact of Prosecutor Bayag, Jr. or make his own findings of fact. Thus, given this vast power and authority, he can conduct a preliminary investigation with or without the report from COA. The findings in the COA report or the finality or lack of finality of such report is irrelevant to the investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman in its determination of probable cause. The discretion to determine whether a case should be filed or not lies with the Ombudsman. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is shown, judicial review is uncalled for as a policy of non- interference by the courts in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated powers. 75. PEOPLE VS. DE GUZMAN (2010) ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 113 of 256 Justice Gesmundo “As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.” De Guzman was found guilty of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. On appeal with the SC, he argues that the police officers did not comply with the provisions of RA 9165 with respect to the marking and inventory of the seized items; and that the unbroken chain of custody of the evidence was not established. Held: Acquitted. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. The fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. The chain of custody requirement performs this function. As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard, because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable (such as in the case of narcotic substances), when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness, or in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination, and even substitution and exchange. Hence, in authenticating narcotic substances, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects that are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails establishing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness, if only to make it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. Accordingly, the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the seized items has been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is enough to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused. A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. 76. JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. (2010) [Rule 114, Bail Pending Appeal; Matter of Right or Discretion] - “If the trial court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years then bail pending appeal is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under 3 rd par. of Sec. 5 of Rule 114 is present, then bail shall be denied.” Leviste was convicted by the RTC for the crime of homicide and was imposed a penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal. He filed an application for admission to bail pending appeal. CA denied. In the SC, Leviste argues that the CA erred in denying his application. His theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than 6 years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the 3 rd par. of Sec. 5 of Rule 114 are absent, bail must automatically be granted to an appellant pending appeal. Held: CA is correct. Under Sec. 5 of Rule 114, the availability of bail pending appeal to an accused who is convicted by the trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment may be summarized as follows: a. If the RTC imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years, and not one of the circumstances stated in 3 rd par. of Sec. 5 of Rule 114 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion; b. If the RTC imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years, and any of the circumstances stated in 3 rd par. of Sec. 5 of Rule 114 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 114 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Thus, an application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in 3 rd par. of Sec. 5 of Rule 114 are absent. In such a case, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the 3 rd par. of Sec. 5 of Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; and on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail. 77. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR M. DOCUMENTO (2010) [Rule 116, Arraignment and Plea; Conduct of Searching Inquiry] - “Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained.” Documento was charged with 2 counts of Rape. Upon arraignment, he pled guilty. During trial, he testified that he pled guilty only because the prosecutor convinced him to do so. RTC convicted him of both counts of Rape. On appeal, he alleges that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and his full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. Held: Indeed, Documento was not fully apprised of the consequences of his guilty plea. The trial court should have informed him that his plea of guilt would not affect or reduce the imposable penalty, given that death is a single indivisible penalty not affected by any mitigating circumstance. Moreover, the trial court judge failed to inform him of his right to adduce evidence despite the guilty plea. With the trial court’s failure to comply with the guidelines, appellant’s guilty plea is deemed improvidently made and thus rendered inefficacious. This does not mean, however, that the case should be remanded to the trial court. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained. 78. DEL ROSARIO v. DONATO (2010) [Cause of action; Sufficiency of a Complaint; Elements] - “The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff alleges in it, the court can render judgment granting him the judicial assistance he seeks. And judgment would be right only if the facts he alleges constitute a cause of action that consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiff’s legal right in the matter; (2) the defendant’s corresponding obligation to honor or respect such right; and (3) the defendant’s subsequent violation of the right. Absent any of these, the complaint would have failed to state a cause of action.” Armed with a search warrant, Gonzaga and other NBI agents proceeded to search a house owned by Del Rosario on suspicion that such house is used to store fake Marlboro cigarettes. Their search yielded no such items. Petitioner filed a complaint for P50 million in damages against respondents NBI agents. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. RTC denied the motion. Held: The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff alleges in it, the court can render judgment granting him the judicial assistance he seeks. And judgment would be right only if the facts he alleges constitute a cause of action that consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiff’s legal right in the matter; (2) the defendant’s corresponding obligation to honor or respect such right; and (3) the defendant’s subsequent violation of the right. Absent any of these, the complaint would have failed to state a cause of action. Essentially, all that the Del Rosarios allege is that respondents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant against them, evidenced by the fact that their search yielded no fake Marlboro cigarettes. But a judicially ordered search that fails to yield the described illicit article does not of itself render the court’s order “unlawful.” The Del Rosarios did not allege that respondents violated their right by fabricating testimonies to convince the court to issue the search warrant. Their allegation that the NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant is a mere conclusion of law. While a motion to dismiss assumes as true the facts alleged in the complaint, such admission does not extend to conclusions of law. Statements of mere conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action. 79. PEOPLE v. PAGKALINAWAN (2010) [Chain of custody; Sec. 21 of RA 9165; Substantial compliance] - “The failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with Sec. 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal. It does not render appellant’s arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 115 of 256 Justice Gesmundo value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.” Pagkalinawan was convicted of violation of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On appeal, he argues that the prosecution failed to show compliance with Sec. 21 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules regarding the custody and disposition of the evidence against him. Held: Sec. 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides: “x x x The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. x x x” Thus, the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with Sec. 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal. It does not render appellant’s arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Here, there was substantial compliance with the law and the integrity of the drugs seized from appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case was shown not to have been broken. The factual milieu of the case reveals that after PO1 Memoracion seized and confiscated the dangerous drugs, as well as the marked money, appellant was immediately arrested and brought to the police station for investigation, where the sachets of suspected shabu were marked appropriately. Immediately thereafter, the confiscated substance was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination to determine the presence of any dangerous drug. Therefore, it is evidently clear that there was an unbroken chain in the custody of the illicit drug purchased from Pagkalinawan. 80. PEOPLE V. SUAN (2010), G.R. NO. 184546 Chain of Custody; Corpus Delicti; Authentication of Evidence The elements necessary to show that the crime had indeed been committed are proof that the illicit transaction took place coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug. … The identity of the narcotic substance must therefore be established beyond reasonable doubt. … when the Certificate of Inventory was prepared by P02 Labasano, the item allegedly seized from the appellant bore no markings. However, in the Request for Laboratory Examination/Urine Test prepared by the Provincial Chief of Police, the item being subjected for laboratory examination was already referred to as Exhibit A. Next, in the Memorandum of the Regional Chief of PNP, the item that was referred to the Forensic Chemist already had other markings. From the foregoing, there is already doubt as to the identity of the substance being subjected for laboratory examination. At this time, we are no longer sure whether the item allegedly seized by PO2 Labasano from the appellant was the same item referred to by the Provincial Chief and then the Regional Chief of PNP to the Forensic Chemist for laboratory examination. Worse, in the Certificate of Inventory prepared by PO2 Labasano, the Memorandum prepared by the Provincial Chief, and the transmittal letter prepared by the Regional Chief, the substance supposedly weighed 0.01 gram. However, in the Chemistry Report No. D-500-2003[25] prepared by Forensic Chemist Carvajal, the substance was indicated as weighing 0.1 gram. It is lamentable that the trial court and even the appellate court overlooked the significance of the absence of this glaring detail in the records of the case but instead focused their deliberation on the warrantless arrest of appellant in arriving at their conclusions. Not only did the prosecution fail to identify the substance that was allegedly seized from the appellant; it also failed to establish that the chain of custody of the substance was unbroken. The testimonies of PO2 Labasano are contradictory. At first [during direct], he testified that the substance recovered from the appellant was delivered to the crime laboratory but he did not know who received the same. On cross-examination, however, he claimed that ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 116 of 256 Justice Gesmundo the substance was delivered to their team leader, SPO2 Cañonero. Notably, the prosecution failed to put on the witness stand SPO2 Cañonero or the person from the crime laboratory who allegedly received the substance. Consequently, there was a break in the chain of custody because no mention is made as regards what happened to the substance from the time SPO2 Cañonero received it to the time the transmittal letter was prepared by Police Chief Inspector Jesus Atchico Rebua addressed to the Provincial Chief of Police, Lanao del Norte requesting for laboratory examination/urine test. … [Furthermore,] [t]he Forensic Chemist did not testify at all as to the identity of the person from whom she received the specimen for examination. … Verily, there is a break in the chain of custody of the seized substance. The standard operating procedure on the seizure and custody of the drug as mandated in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations was not complied with. … appellant acquitted because the prosecution miserably failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly seized from him. In addition, we find that there was a break in the chain of custody thereby casting doubt on the integrity and evidentiary value of the substance allegedly seized from the appellant. 81 - TAN V. GUE (2010), G.R. NO. 174570 Rule 113, Search Warrant; Determination of Probable Cause; Rule 126, Sec. 6. [A] search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant’s personal knowledge and his or her witnesses. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the search warrant for a case filed for robbery against respondents. Later, the information for robbery for which the search warrant was issued was withdrawn. In granting the motion to withdraw the Information, the RTC took into consideration the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90368 dated August 29, 2006, which affirmed the findings of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Secretary of Justice that the elements of Robbery, i.e., unlawful taking with intent to gain, with force and intimidation, were absent. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration wherein respondents informed [the Supreme] Court, albeit belatedly, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted their motion for the withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-241375. As such, respondents prayed that the decision be reconsidered and set aside and that the quashal of the subject search warrants be rendered moot and academic on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case. In his comment [p]etitioner alleges that he [] filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the same incidents and that should the Information for Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants [for the will be used as evidence therein. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense … Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant’s personal knowledge and his or her witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated from the same incident. Moreover, considering that [] there was no probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery absent the essential element of unlawful taking, which is likewise an essential element for the crime of Qualified Theft, all offenses which are necessarily included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be filed, much more, prosper. 82. APARIS Y SANTOS V. PEOPLE (2010), G.R. NO. 169195 Rule 110, Sec. 15 - place where action is to be instituted [I]t is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This case arose from a buy-bust operation for the sale of P100,000 worth of shabu. One of the defenses of the petitioner was lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, alleging that the offense occurred in Manila. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 117 of 256 Justice Gesmundo In the instant case, the Information clearly alleged that the crime was committed in Makati. The allegation in the Information was sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Moreover, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA and the RTC that the defense failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate its allegation that the place where the buy-bust operation took place was within the territorial jurisdiction of Manila and not of Makati. 83. CRUZ V. SB (2010), G.R. NO. 174599-609 Rule 112; Res Judicata, Conclusiveness of judgment or auger action pendent The res judicata rule bars the re-litigation of facts or issues that have once been settled by a court of law upon a final judgment on the merits. Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court establishes two rules: (a) a judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars the parties and their privies from bringing a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before either the same or any other tribunal; and (b) any right, fact or matter directly adjudged or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court that renders judgment on the merits is conclusively settled and cannot be litigated again between the parties and their privies, regardless of whether the claims, purposes or subject matters of the two suits are the same. The first is commonly referred to as “bar by former judgment”; the second as “conclusiveness of judgment.” It is the second that is relevant to this case. Conclusiveness of judgment or auter action pendent ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot be raised anew in any future case involving the same parties although for a different cause of action. Where the rule applies, there must be identity of issues but not necessarily identity in causes of action. In 2001, acting on reports of irregularities, respondent Special Presidential Task Force 156 (Task Force) investigated the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center (the One-Stop Center) of the Department of Finance (DOF). The Task Force found that certain officials of the One-Stop Center had been issuing tax credit certificates (TCCs) to entities that did not earn them through tax overpayments. Diamond Knitting Corporation (DKC) is allegedly one of those entities, as the DOF’s One-Stop Center issued to it TCCs totaling P131,205,391.00 from 1994 to 1997. DKC in turn sold a number of these TCCs to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) with the approval of the One-Stop Center. Pilipinas Shell then used these TCCs to pay off its excise tax obligations to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Believing that petitioner Pacifico R. Cruz, the General Manager of Pilipinas Shell’s Treasury and Taxation Department, was a party to the fraud, … the Ombudsman … caused the filing of informations for violations of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against petitioner Cruz and the others with him. Meanwhile, this Court rendered judgment in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. CIR. [It that case,] [t]his Court nullified the [BIR] assessment, finding that Pilipinas Shell was a transferee in good faith and for value and may thus not be unjustly prejudiced by the transferor’s fraud committed in procuring the transfer of those TCCs. Cruz filed a manifestation invoking the Court’s ruling in the above tax case as res judicata with respect to his alleged criminal liabilities relating to the subject TCCs. The main issue in this case is whether or not Cruz, Pilipinas Shell’s Treasury head, connived with the officials of the One-Stop Center and others in unlawfully giving, through manifest partiality and bad faith, unwarranted benefits to DKC by processing and approving such transfers to Pilipinas Shell, knowing that DKC, the transferee, had been a dormant company. This Court resolved substantially the same issue in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. There, the Court categorically found that Pilipinas Shell, represented in its acquisition of the TCCs in question by petitioner Cruz, was a transferee in good faith and for value of those TCCs. This means that neither Pilipinas Shell nor Cruz was a party to the fraudulent issuance and transfer of the TCCs. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 118 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The parties in the tax case and in the criminal cases are substantially the same. Although it was respondent Task Force that investigated the irregularities in the issuance and transfers of the TCCs, the ultimate complainant in the criminal case—the party that suffered the injury—was the government, represented by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The latter also represented the government in the tax case against Pilipinas Shell. Petitioner Cruz, on the other hand, represented Pilipinas Shell in all the transactions in question. In short, the parties in the tax case and in the criminal cases represent substantially identical interests. The principle of res judicata through conclusiveness of judgment applies to bar the criminal actions against Cruz. 84. HEIRS OF BURGOS V. CA (2010), G.R. NO. 169711 Rule 112; Prelimenary [W]hen the trial court acquits the accused or dismisses the case on the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal action and appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability. … the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of conviction. The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by final judgment. … In a criminal action … the parties are the People of the Philippines and the accused. … only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court. [See §35 of the Administrative Code.] This case is about the legal standing of the offended parties in a criminal case to seek, in their personal capacities and without the Solicitor General’s intervention, reversal of the trial court’s order granting bail to the accused on the ground of absence of strong evidence of guilt. In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, this Court allowed the offended party to challenge before it the trial court’s order granting bail. But in that case, the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting bail without conducting any hearing at all. Thus, to disallow the appeal on the basis of lack of intervention of the OSG would “leave the private complainant without any recourse to rectify the public injustice.” It is not the case here. The trial court took time to hear the parade of witnesses that the prosecution presented before reaching the conclusion that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong. Petition denied. 85. SORIANO V. PEOPLE (2010), G.R. NO. 162336 Rule 112, Preliminary Investigation; Rule 117, Motion to Quash Rule 112: [The] affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public, then there was substantial compliance with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Rule 117: [T]he Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari. [T]he Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), transmitted a letter to Jovencito Zuño, Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The letter attached as annexes five affidavits, which would allegedly serve as bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents against, inter alia, petitioner herein Hilario P. Soriano. These five affidavits, along with other documents, stated that spouses Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of P8 million with the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM), but had never applied for nor received such loan; that it was petitioner, who was then president of RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and received the proceeds of the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 119 of 256 Justice Gesmundo loan; and that the P8 million loan had never been authorized by RBSM's Board of Directors and no report thereof had ever been submitted to the Department of Rural Banks, Supervision and Examination Sector of the BSP. The letter of the OSI, which was not subscribed under oath, ended with a request that a preliminary investigation be conducted and the corresponding criminal charges be filed against petitioner at his last known address. Acting on the letter-request and its annexes, State Prosecutor Albert R. Fonacier proceeded with the preliminary investigation. He issued a subpoena with the witnesses’ affidavits and supporting documents attached, and required petitioner to file his counter-affidavit. In due course, the investigating officer issued a Resolution finding probable cause and correspondingly filed two separate informations against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner moved to quash these informations. [The relevant issues are: (1) Whether the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653; and (2) Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy against an Order denying a Motion to Quash?] The Court held: (1) … after a close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ, that these were not intended to be the complaint, as envisioned under the Rules. They did not contain averments of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of any offense. The letters merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the affidavits of people who had personal knowledge of the acts of petitioner. We ruled that these affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public, then there was substantial compliance with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. (2) The proper procedure [to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information] is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash[;] and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Anent the contention that there was no authority from the BSP Governor or the Monetary Board to file a criminal case against Soriano, we held that the requirements of Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653 did not apply because the BSP did not institute the complaint but merely transmitted the affidavits of the complainants to the DOJ. We further held that since the offenses for which Soriano was charged were public crimes, authority holds that it can be initiated by “any competent person” with personal knowledge of the acts committed by the offender. Thus, the witnesses who executed the affidavits clearly fell within the purview of “any competent person” who may institute the complaint for a public crime. 86. TAMARGO VS AWINGAN. (JANUARY 19, 2010, RULE 112.) When confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the ground of lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion. It may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved from the pain of going through a full blown court case. Atty. Tamargo and his daughter, Gail, were shot and killed in Binondo, Manila. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit stating that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of Geron’s affidavit, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against Columna and three John Does. However, due to the submission of Columna’s letter and affidavit, the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 120 of 256 Justice Gesmundo prosecutor found conflicting statements in Columna’s affidavits and therefore the prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the DOJ. The DOJ Secretary directed the withdrawal of the information. The RTC judge denied the motion to withdraw the information. It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the ground of lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion. It may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. When, at the outset, the evidence offered during the preliminary investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper so that the system would be spared from the unnecessary expense of such useless and expensive litigation. The rule is all the more significant here since respondent Licerio Antiporda remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Daguna. Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was only to satisfy herself whether there was probable cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial as co-conspirators. Given that she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause against respondents, her orders denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against them were issued with grave abuse of discretion. 87. PEOPLE VS TUNIACO (JANUARY 19, 2010. RULE 122-APPEAL) The appeal by one or more of several accused cannot affect those who did not appeal, except if the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to them. This case did not really delve on the topic it was assigned under. The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman with murder before the RTC. In this case the accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide and was only ordered by the trial court to pay P50,000 to the heirs of the victim. The Court notes that, when it modified the award of civil damages to the heirs of Cortez, the CA made both accused Aleman and Datulayta, jointly and severally liable, for the damages as modified. But the appeal by one or more of several accused cannot affect those who did not appeal, except if the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to them.14 Here accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide and the trial court ordered him to pay only P50,000.00 in civil indemnity to the heirs of Cortez. The CA erred in expanding that liability when he did not appeal from his conviction. 88. LEE VS KBC BANK (JAN. 15, 2010, RULE 112). A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution’s evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. In fine, the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information, trial court is not bound by the resolution of the Secretary of Justice but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial and should embody such assessment in the order disposing the motion. Midas Diversified Export Corporation (MDEC) obtained a $1,400,000 loan from KBC Bank. Lee, assistant treasurer and director of MDEC, executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC’s rights over Confirmed Purchase Order No. MTC-548 to KBC Bank. MDEC also obtained another loan ($65k). Lim, treasurer and assistant secretary of MDEC, executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC’s rights over Confirmed Purchase Order Nos MTC-548 and WC-128 to KBC Bank. MDEC was considered in default in paying the $65,000 loan. On 17 March 1998, KBC Bank sent a letter to Otto Versand verifying the validity of Confirmed Purchase Order WC-128. On 19 March 1998, Otto Versand sent a facsimile message to KBC Bank stating that (1) it did not issue the purchase orders, (2) it did not order or receive the items covered by the purchase orders, and (3) it would not pay MDEC any ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 121 of 256 Justice Gesmundo amount. Accordingly, two informations for estafa against Lee and Lim were filed with the RTC. Lee and Lim claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the admissibility of the facsimile message is a matter best ventilated in a full-blown trial. Lee and Lim also claim that the CA erred when it ruled that RTC judge failed to make his own evaluation and merely relied on DOJ Secretary’s recommendation that there was no probable cause. The Court is not impressed. Whether the facsimile message is admissible in evidence and whether the element of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are matters best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not in the preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution’sevidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. In fine, the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. The Court also found that the RTC Judge failed to make his own evaluation in granting the motion to withdraw the informations. Judge Dumayas’ failure to make his own evaluation of the merits of the case violates KBC Bank’s right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 89. ONG VS GENIO (DEC. 23, 2009, RULE 110, SECTION 5- WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTIONS, APPEAL) Only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the CA. While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf, as when there is a denial of due process, this exceptional circumstance does not obtain in the instant case. Ong (petitioner) filed a criminal complaint against respondent Jose Casim Genio (respondent) for Robbery which was dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Makati. The RTC of Makati dismissed the case due to the absence of the elements of intent to gain and also dismissed the information in its entirety for lack of probable cause. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the CA. The OSG filed its Comment, taking the stand of respondent that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines filed before the CA or the Supreme Court. The OSG submitted that, for being fatally defective, the said Petition should be dismissed insofar as the criminal aspect was concerned, without prejudice to the right of petitioner to pursue the civil aspect of the case. The Court agreed. The OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Likewise, the Solicitor General shall represent the Government in this Court and the CA in all criminal proceedings. While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf, as when there is a denial of due process, this exceptional circumstance does not obtain in the instant case. In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. 90. PEOPLE VS TAN (DEC. 9, 2009, RULE 112) Probable cause assumes the existence of facts that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a crime has been committed and that it was likely committed by the person sought to be arrested; The test for issuing a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. A trial, unlike preliminary investigations, could yield more evidence favorable to either side after the interrogations of the witnesses either on direct examination or on cross-examination. After investigation of the prosecution, the above respondents became suspects in the commission of parricide and two murders; their father, their step-mother and step sister. Respondents Archie and Jan-Jan’s defense is alibi. They claimed that they were away when the crimes took place at the house. Based on Dr. Lebaquin’s forensic computation, however, the victims probably died at about midnight, more or less. The two were still at home when the killings happened. The City Prosecutor’s Office filed separate informations for two murders and parricide against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan before the RTC of Iloilo. The CA held that Judge Justalero gravely abused his discretion when he made a finding that there is probable cause to warrant the arrest of Archie and Jan-Jan. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 122 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The Court disagrees. Probable cause assumes the existence of facts that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a crime has been committed and that it was likely committed by the person sought to be arrested. It requires neither absolute certainty nor clear and convincing evidence of guilt. The test for issuing a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as the evidence shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court has sufficient ground to issue a warrant for his arrest. Here, admittedly, the evidence against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan is merely circumstantial. A trial, unlike preliminary investigations, could yield more evidence favorable to either side after the interrogations of the witnesses either on direct examination or on cross-examination. What is important is that there is some rational basis for going ahead with judicial inquiry into the case. This Court does not subscribe to the CA’s position that the prosecution had nothing to go on with. 91. DELA CRUZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (DEC. 9, 2009. RULE 112) The preventive suspension of the accused under Section 13 of RA No. 3019 is mandatory upon a finding that the information is valid. The instant criminal complaint arose from the construction and/or renovation project involving several multi- purpose halls located in various barangays in the City of Tarlac. Upon post audit, the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) issued Notices of Disallowance on the ground that what were actually constructed and/or renovated were barangay chapels in violation of the Constitution. The Office of the Chief Legal Counsel recommended that the corresponding information be filed against the aforesaid local officials because there is probable cause to hold them liable for violation of the anti-graft law. Acting favorably thereon, the Ombudsman issued an Order directing the Office of the Special Prosecutor to file the necessary information with the Sandiganbayan. The accused filed separate motions to quash the information and/or to dismiss the case. It is mandatory for the court to immediately issue the suspension order upon a proper determination of the validity of the information. The court possesses no discretion to determine whether a preventive suspension is necessary to forestall the possibility that the accused may use his office to intimidate witnesses, or frustrate his prosecution, or continue committing malfeasance. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both. 92. BIENVENIDO DINO, ET. AL VS. PABLO OLIVAREZ, RULE 112 Rule 112 (in relation to Election offenses; Comelec has jurisdiction) Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Section 265. Prosecution.—The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. Facts: Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo Olivarez. Based on the finding of probable cause, two informations were filed before the RTC on 29 September 2004. Respondent filed before the law department of COMELEC an appeal and argued that the pendency of the appeal before the COMELEC should prevent the filing of the Informations before the RTC as there could be no final finding of probable cause until the COMELEC had resolved the appeal. Moreover, he argued that the charges made against him were groundless. COMELEC directed the prosecutor to transmit or elevate the entire records of the case and to suspend further implementation until final resolution of the said appeal before the COMELEC en banc. The respondent filed “Opposition to the Admission of the Amended Informations,” arguing that no resolution was issued to explain the changes therein, particularly the deletion of paragraph k, Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code . Moreover, he averred that the city prosecutor was no longer empowered to amend the informations, since the COMELEC had already directed it to transmit the entire records of the case and suspend the hearing of the cases ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 123 of 256 Justice Gesmundo before the RTC until the resolution of the appeal before the COMELEC en banc. Respondent filed certiorari under Rule 65 and assailed the actions of the RTC. ISSUE: (1) whether or not the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque had acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it filed the Amended Informations, and whether Judge Madrona had acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he admitted the said Amended Informations and denied the respondent’s motion to quash; and Held/Ratio: There is no dispute that the COMELEC is empowered to investigate and prosecute election offenses, and that the Chief State Prosecutor, the provincial prosecutors and city prosecutors, acting on its behalf, must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority. Be that as it may, this Court finds that the public prosecutors, in filing the Amended Informations, did not exceed the authority delegated by the COMELEC. It simply reads: “In this connection, you are hereby directed to transmit the entire records of the case to the Law Department, Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila by the fastest means available. You are further directed to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until final resolution of said appeal by the Comelec En Banc.” The filing of the Amended Informations was not made in defiance of these instructions by the COMELEC; rather it was an act necessitated by the developments of the case. Respondent filed a Motion to Quash on 11 October 2004 on the ground that more than one offense was charged therein. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides: Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. x x x. (Emphasis provided.) Since the Rules of Court provided for a remedy that would avert the dismissal of the complaints on the ground that more than one offense was charged, the public prosecutor filed the Amended Informations. The instructions of the COMELEC, in the letter dated 11 October 2004, were clearly intended to allow sufficient time to reconsider the merit of the Joint Resolution, not to have the public prosecutor abandon the prosecution of the case and negligently allow its dismissal by not filing the Amended Informations, thus, leaving the COMELEC in a quandary should it later dismiss the appeal before it. 93. FEDERICO MIGUEL OLBES VS. HON. DANILO A. BUEMIO (2009) Rule 119; Rule 110; Sec. 8; Rule 115, Sec. 1 In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of "speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Facts: Olbes was indicted for Grave Coercion. Then the petitioner posted bail and was released. The judge denied the petitioner’s motion to defer his arraignment and proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment. The pre trial was set to October 23, 2003. At the pre-trial the petitioner failed to appear which prompted the trial court to issue a warrant for his arrest. However, it was later recalled on discovery that neither the petitioner nor his counsel was notified of the said pre- trial. Before the rescheduled pre-trial, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to a speedy trial under RA8493. He argued that "considering that [he] was not - without any fault on his part - brought to trial within 80 days from the date he was arraigned, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 119, Section 9 8 in relation to Rule 119, Section 6 of the Rules." The trial court through Judge Buemio denied the MTD holding that the petitioner played a big part in the delay of the case and that technical rules of procedure were meant to secure and not override substantial justice. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 124 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Then, petitioner challenged respondent’s orders via certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. Issue: W/N IN AFFIRMING THE MTC-MANILA JUDGE’S RULING THAT COMPLIANCEWITH RULE 119, SECTION 9 OF THE RULES IS NOT MANDATORY. THE RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT THAT CANNOT BE DISREGARDED. Held/Ratio: The court is not impressed with the petition. As to the time limit within which trial must commence after arraignment, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states: Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit.-- Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116 and the preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days. In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation. To the Court, the reasons for the postponements and delays attendant to the present case reflected above are not unreasonable. While the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of the resetting of the pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by oversight or simple negligence which, standing alone, does not prove fatal to the prosecution’s case. 94. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO DALISAY Y DESTRESA Rule 111; Rule 110, Sec. 8 Sec. 8. Designation of the offense Facts: The victim was a 16 year old female, who stayed with her mother’s live-in partner, appellant Dalisay in a rented room in Quezon City. On July 10, 2003, bent on satisfying his lust, appellant raped the victim.The victim ran away from home and visited her aunt who was nearby and narrated the unfortunate incident. They then reported the matter to the authorities, who lost no time in apprehending appellant. Consequently, an Information for rape in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 was filed, pertinently reading: That on or about the 10 th day of July 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, with lewd design[,] with force and intimidation[,] did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [name withheld], his stepdaughter[,] 16 years old, a minor[,] against her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party. CONTRARY TO LAW. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered the April 11, 2007 Decision convicting appellant of qualified rape but imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua in light of the passage of R.A. No. 9346. The RTC further ordered appellant to pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. On review, the appellate court affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court. The CA convicted the accused not of qualified rape but of simple rape, and disposed of the case. Issue: W/N exemplary damages should be awarded The Court, therefore, finds appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape. While it has been proven that appellant was the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim and the child was a ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 125 of 256 Justice Gesmundo minor at the time of the incident, the Court cannot convict appellant of qualified rape because the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the information. To recall, the information here erroneously alleged that appellant was the stepfather of the victim. Proven during the trial, however, was that appellant was not married to the victim’s mother, but was only the common-law spouse of the latter. Following settled jurisprudence,[27] appellant is liable only of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua. GENERAL RULE: With the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages.[30] Pertinent are the following sections of Rule 110: Sec. 8. Designation of the offense.—The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. Sec. 9. Cause of accusation.—The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. EXCEPTION: Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. In this case, finding that appellant, the father figure of the victim, has shown such an outrageous conduct in sexually abusing his ward, a minor at that, the Court sustains the award of exemplary damages to discourage and deter such aberrant behavior. However, the same is increased to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 95. OMBUDSMAN VS. HEIRS OF MARGARITA VDA. DE VENTURA (2009) Improvident plea; Conduct of Searching Inquiry (case has no relation to the topic) Facts: Respondents filed with the Office of Ombudsman a complaint for falsification of public documents and violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Grafr and Corrupt Practices Act) against Zenaida Palacio and Sps. Darang. The court dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. Thus, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the Court of Appeals, which was also denied. Issue: W/N the Court of Appeals has no Jurisdiction to review the findings of probable cause by the OMB. Held/ Ratio: The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases. It is settled that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Since the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, its ruling on the same is void. The question that arises next is what remedy should an aggrieved party avail of to assail the Ombudsman’s finding of the existence or lack of probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases. In Estrada v. Desierto, the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 126 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Court emphasized that parties seeking to question the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, may file an original action for certiorari with this Court, not with the CA, when it is believed that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents originally filed a petition for certiorari before this Court but the same was referred to the CA. It, thus, behooves this Court to now look into whether the Ombudsman indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the charge of Falsification of Public Documents and provisionally dismissing the charge of Violation of Section 3, par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against Zenaida H. Palacio and spouses Edilberto and Celerina Darang. A close examination of the records will reveal that the Ombudsman acted properly in dismissing the charge for falsification of public documents because herein respondents utterly failed to identify the supposedly falsified documents and submit certified true copies thereof. In fact, respondents admitted in their petition for certiorari, originally filed with this Court but referred to the CA, that they had not yet submitted documents in support of the charge for falsification of documents as they intended to present the same in a formal preliminary investigation, which they expected to be conducted by the Ombudsman.[13] However, it has long been acknowledged that in administrative proceedings, even those before the Ombudsman, a formal hearing is not required and cases may be submitted for resolution based only on affidavits, supporting documents and pleadings. Such procedure has been held to be sufficient compliance with the requirements of procedural due process as all that is needed is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[14] In this case, records show that respondents had been afforded such opportunities. As to the provisional dismissal of the charge for Violation of Section 3 par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, the Court likewise finds no reason to overturn the ruling of the Ombudsman. Nevertheless, the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not absolute. However, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman’s findings by this Court. 97. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARTURO F. DUCA Rule 124; Appeal Duca and his mother were charged of the crime of falsification of public documents. Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded ‘not guilty’. Then trial on the merits ensued. The case was ruled Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that she had no participation in the execution as she was in Manila at that time. On the other hand, Arturo testified that the signature atop the name Aldrin Duca was his. However, he intersposed the defense that he was duly authorized by the latter to procure the said tax declaration. On April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto rendered a decision finding the accused guilty. Dissatisfied with the decision, Arturo Duca appealed. The RTC of Dagupan affirmed the lower court’s decision. Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review. On November 23, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision acquitting Duca of the crime charged and reversing the RTC decision. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: W/N PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND HAD ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED PRIVATE RESPONDENT ARTURO F. DUCA’S APPEAL WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD THEREON. Held/Ratio: ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 127 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts. However, when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or this Court, it is the Solicitor General who must represent the People of the Philippines not the fiscal. 12 Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given the opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The records show that the CA failed to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment on Duca’s petition. Pertinently, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al. 16 ruled as follows: When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA. Further, the CA should have been guided by the following provisions of Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court: Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the adverse party, in this case, the People of the Philippines through the OSG. Respondent failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City. The service of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The respondent’s failure to have a copy of his petition served on the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. However, the CA, instead of dismissing respondent’s petition, proceeded to resolve the petition and even acquitted respondent without the Solicitor General’s comment. We, thus, find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed decision. 97. LIEZL CO VS. HAROLD LIM Y GO Rule 117, Sec. 3, 8- Consent of the Accused Rule, 117 Sec. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception. – An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3 (g) and (i) of this Rule. In the case at bar, the requisites of double jeopardy was not met. Thus, there is no bar in filing another prosecution. Facts: City Prosecutor recommended the prosecution of Lim for the violation of Anti-Fencing Law. Lim moved for the reinvestigation of his case. The reinvestigation of the case against Lim was conducted together with the preliminary investigation of Go, his co-accused. On 16 January 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Department of Justice, Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, issued a Resolution 16 reversing the Review Resolution and directed the prosecutor to withdraw forthwith the informations. On 27 January 2004, Assistant Prosecutor Yvonne G. Corpuz filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations seeking the dismissal of the cases filed against respondents pursuant to the Resolution of the Acting Secretary of the Department of Justice. The RTC dismissed the case after considering the respective stands of the defense as well as the records of the case. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which sought the reversal of the resolution of the Sec. of Justice. Issue: ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 128 of 256 Justice Gesmundo BY THE PRESENT APPEAL BY CERTIORARI, ARE THE RIGHTS OF THE TWO (2) ACCUSED AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATED, CONSIDERING THAT THEY EXPRESSLY MOVED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST THEM? WAS THE ORDER OF THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC45-MANILA DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASES NO. 01-197839 AND 03-213403 FOR THE SOLE REASON THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ORDERED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CORRESPONDING INFORMATIONS, AND WITHOUT MAKING AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF EVIDENCE, VALID? Held/Ratio: The petition is meritorious. Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of its duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor, which the court may order the latter to produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor. The failure of the trial court judge to independently evaluate and assess the merits of the case against the accused violates the complainant’s right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Withdraw Informations anew. In dismissing the criminal cases against the respondents, the RTC in Section 21, Article III of the Constitution prescribes the rule against double jeopardy: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. The following requisites must be complied with for double jeopardy to set in: (1) there is a valid complaint of information; (2) the complaint should be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) the accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. The Order dated 11 February 2004 of the RTC categorically stated that the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the cases against the respondents. Verily, respondents, through counsel, had given their express consent to the termination of the case on 11 February 2004. Therefore, the fourth requisite, which necessitates the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case without his or her approval, was not met. Undoubtedly, the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable to this case. 98. NIEVA MANEBO V. SPO1 ACOSTA (2009) Rule 112, Section 1 “A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. It is a means of determining which person or persons may be reasonably charged with the crime.” The victim and the witness were seated beside each other on a sofa watching TV when suddenly a man with a companion, both with short firearms shot the victim several times on the head and body causing her death. An information for murder was filed with the RTC agains the two men. However, years later, the DOJ Secretary reversed the resolution finding probable cause against the two men on the basis that the witness executed an affidavit only after more than 4 months after the incident. Additionally, the description given by the witness was different than that of the accused. Pursuant to the reversal of the resolution, the prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw the Information. The current petitioner (sister of the victim) filed the present petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA to which the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The SC held that there exists a probable cause. The DOJ committed a manifest error in finding no probable cause to charge respondents with the crime of murder. The witness’ delayed testimony should not be taken against her, as such reaction is ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 129 of 256 Justice Gesmundo within the bounds of expected human behavior. Notably, the police report stated that during the conduct of the investigation, the witness was shocked after the incident and could not possibly interviewed. Initial reluctance to volunteer information regarding a crime due to fear of reprisal is common enough that it has been judicially declared as not affecting a witness’ credibility. 99. GO V. BSP (2009) Rule 117, Sec. 4 – amendment of complaint or information – “An Information may be defective because the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the dismissal of the case will not necessarily follow. The Rules specifically require that the prosecution should be given a chance to correct the defect; the court can order the dismissal only upon the prosecution’s failure to do so.” An Information was filed against Go for violation of the Banking Law. Go filed a motion to quash on the ground that the Information failed to state that the amount he borrowed exceeds the limit set by law, thus, the acts charged did not constitute an offense. The RTC granted such motion and denied the MR. The failure of the RTC to provide the opportunity constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power that was correctly addressed by the CA through the certiorari petition. The Rules of Court allow amendment of insufficient Information. 100. SPS. MARIMLA V. PEOPLE (2009) Rule 126; Sec. 2; Exception; Search Warrants in Special Criminal cases by the RTC’s of Manila and Quezon City - “The guidelines in AM No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in AM No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in a special criminal cases by the RTC of Manila and QC shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the ROC.” Executive Judge Guarina issued a search warrant for a house located in Angeles City. Several drugs were seized by virtue of the warrant and a case was filed against the petitioners. The petitioners filed a MTQ Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally seized on the basis that the application of the search warrant was filed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the alleged crime was committed. AM No. 99-10-09 authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF. The petitioner’s contention that the NBI Head himself must personally endorse such application for warrant is unmeritorious. Nothing in AM 99-10-09 prohibits the heads of PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application of warrant to their assistant heads. 101. & 102. GARCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2009) Forfeiture vs. Plunder, Sec. 20/Sec. 7, Rule 14; Rule 111, Sec. 1; Rule 117, Sec. 3 – Motion to Quash - “A forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder absorbs the forfeiture case.” To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the amount of 143 M that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia and his family had allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic through the OMB filed with the SB a petition for forfeiture of those properties (Forfeiture I). It was followed by the filing of another forfeiture case to recover funds and properties amounting to 202 M (Forfeiture II). Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged Garcia and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder). The plunder charge, as the parties’ pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties identified in both forfeiture cases. The forfeiture cases and the plunder case have separate causes of action, the former is civil in nature while the latter is criminal. RA 7080 did not repeal RA 1379. “The requirements for substituted service are: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service, the sheriff must indicate in the return that several attempts for personal service of at least 3 times on at least 2 different dates, (2) specific details in the return, and (3) effected on a person of suitable age and discretion.” Summons on Forfeiture I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. Substituted service of summons for both cases were made on the family of MG Carlos Garcia for his family also at the PNP Detention Center. Substituted services of summons to his family were invalid for being irregular and defective. There must be impossibility of prompt personal service which is not present in this case. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 130 of 256 Justice Gesmundo 104) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LUIS PLAZA Y BUCALON; G.R. NO. 176933, (OCT 2, 2009) (Rule 114, Bail) In this murder case, respondent with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser stating that the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, however, the evidence is only points to crime of homicide. Because of this, the defense filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond contending that the accused could now be released on bail since it is already a matter of right (homicide is not punishable by reclusion perpetua unlike murder) Summary hearing to determine if accused is entitled to bail is no longer necessary. The Supreme Court held that holding a summary hearing merely to determine whether the respondent was entitled to bail is no longer necessary. The evidence in chief to be studied was already presented and it is only sufficient to convict the accused of homicide (in which bail is a matter of right,) 105) CABADOR V PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 186001, (2009) (Rule 119) a motion to dismiss filed on the basis that the accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated is not a demurrer to evidence. After the public prosecutor asked for 3 extensions of time, accused Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case invoking his right to a speedy trial. In addition, he claimed that trial court could not consider any evidence against him that had not been formally offered. The RTC, however, treated this motion to dismiss as demurrer to evidence (in filing of demurrer, accused waives to right to present evidence.) The Supreme Court held that Cabador filed a motion to dismiss following the criteria in Enojas case (1) allegations made - in the motion, Cabador pointed that prosecution’s repeated extension of time to file formal offer only prolongs the case; he also invoked his right to speedy trial (2) stage of the proceeding in which it was filed – filed even before the formal offer of exhibit by prosecution was decided on; the prosecution has not yet rested its case (3) primary objective of the party filing = Cabador consistently invoked that his right to speedy trial being violated. 106) SPS. SIMON YAP AND GUEVERRA V FIRST E-BANK CORP GR 169889 (2009) Rule 110 Section 1 (b) Rule 111 of ROC and Circular 57-97 both provide that the criminal action for violation of BP22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action (i.e. collection suit.) No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. Yap obtained a loan from PDCP and as security, his parents executed a 3 rd party mortgage. Yap also delivered 6 post dated checks to PDCP. The checks bounced and so PDCP filed a complaint for violation of Bouncing Checks law. After this it again filed an application for the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. The parents filed a TRO and damages to stop the foreclosure alleging that in filing the BP 22 cases, the bank has already waived its right to foreclose. A creditor has 3 alternative remedies if the debtor refuses to pay his debt: (1) collection suit, (2) foreclosure of mortgage property; (3) sue the debtor for violation of BP22 (if the checks bounced) and under Circular 57-97 choosing one alternative bars the other. The Supreme Court held that though the Rules of Court and Circular 57-97 imposed such procedure, such can’t be applied to the case at hand because the BP22 cases were filed before the circular is said to have been in effect. Thus, the foreclosure and collection suit were not barred even if a suit for BP22 had been filed earlier. (107) FIRAZA V PEOPLE G.R. 179319 (2009) (Rule 110, Sec 6, -sufficiency of complaint or information) The allegation in a complaint or information determine what offense is charged, The alleged acts or omissions complained need not be in exact terms of the statute determining the offense. It can just be in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense being charged. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 131 of 256 Justice Gesmundo In a criminal complaint against Firaza, he was charged with “unauthorized carrying of licensed firearm outside residence” where it further stated that he wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess the said pistol, entered the residence with expired license or permit to carry outside residence. Firaza appealed stating that the Compalint already charged him with “illegal possession of firearms” thus he can not be convicted of carrying firearms outside of residence. The Supreme Court held that based from the complaint the words used to indicate or described the offense charged are clear. They are sufficient. 108) CHUA V ANG, ET AL G.R. 156164 (2009) (Rule 112) Sps Chua filed a complaint-affidavit before the city prosecutor accusing the developer in violation of PD 957 for failure to construct and deliver the contracted condominium unit. The jurisdiction of the city prosecutor over this case was questioned by the respondent stating that the case should be brought before the HLURB. The City prosecutor then dismissed the complaint for being premature. The Supreme Court held that nothing in PD 957 vest the HLURB with jurisdiction to impose criminal penalties. The authority of the HLRUB is to impose the administrative fines. The City prosecutor also acted in grave abuse of discretion when he immediately dismissed the complaint for prematurity. He should have made a determination of the probable cause. 109) VALEROSO V CA, G.R. 164815 (2009) (Rule 126, Sec 13 – Search incident to lawful arrest; plain view) Plain view doctrine is only applied where police officer who is not searching for evidence against the accused still inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Valeroso charged with Illegal Possession of firearm and ammunition filed an appeal alleging that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated. He was arrested by virtue of warrant of arrest for kidnapping with ransom. During his arrest, officers found the subject firearms and ammunition after ransacking the locked cabinet. Those recovered were then used to charge him of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The Supreme Court held that in this case, the search was made illegally and in violation of Valeros’s right against unresasonable search and seizure. Thus, the evidence obtained in violation will be inadmissible. Warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest in this case. Lawful arrest only allows seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons which are on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The warrantless search in this case, can’t also be justified under the plain view doctrine. This is only applied if the police officer who is not searching for evidence against the accused still inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. In Valeroso’s case, the police got hold of the weapons after ransacking the room and cabinet. 110. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RIVERA, G.R. NO. 177741 (2009) – CHAIN OF CUSTODY Non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act) is not necessarily fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, what is important being the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Willie Rivera was apprehended by the police authorities through a buy-bust operation for allegedly selling shabu. The RTC found him guilty; the CA affirmed. Rivera contends that his warrantless arrest was not justified. However, records do not show that he raised any question on the legality of his arrest before he was arraigned or in his petition for bail. By submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court and presenting in his evidence, he voluntarily waived his constitutional protection against illegal arrest. Furthermore, the buy-bust operation was coordinated with the PDEA. After the sachets of shabu were confiscated from Rivera and PO3 Salisa marked them, a spot report was submitted to the PDEA detailing the items seized from appellant and the procedure undertaken. While PO3 Salisa’s testimony did not indicate if he made a list of the sachets as well as the buy-bust money in the presence of Rivera or if photographs thereof were taken, the defense did not propound questions suggesting doubt as to the integrity of the sachets. The Court in People v. Pringas held that: Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non- ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 132 of 256 Justice Gesmundo compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Rivera, as in Pringas, has not questioned at any stage of the case the custody and disposition of the items taken from him. 111. JUDGE FELIMON ABELITA III V. P/SUPT. GERMAN B. DORIA, ET AL, G.R. NO. 170672 (2009) Rule 113; Warrantless Arrest; Requisites; “Personal Knowledge of Facts”; immediate commission; Rule 126, Sec. 13 – search incident to lawful arrest; plain view 1. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion; A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 2. Plain View Doctrine; Requisites. —Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. Petitioner (Judge Abelita) alleged that he and his wife were on their way home when the respondents (Doria, Ramirez), accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers, requested them to proceed to the PNP headquarters. He alleged that when he parked his car in front of their house, Ramirez grabbed him, forcibly took his car keys, barged into the vehicle and conducted a warrantless search. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun and an unlicensed .45 caliber pistol allegedly found inside the vehicle. Respondents’ Version: Doria alleged having received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by Ramirez to investigate. Ramirez reported that a certain William Sia is wounded while petitioner and his wife just left the place of the incident. Doria looked for the petitioner and when he found him, he informed him about the incident and requested him to go to the PNP headquarters. However, the latter suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence. The police officers eventually caught up with the petitioner. They saw a gun in the front seat and a shotgun at the back of his car. The Court held that the warrantless arrest and seizure of firearms were valid. For a warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. On the other hand, the plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 112. VALENZUELA V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 149988 (2009) Rule 115, Sec. 1 – rights of the accused at the trial, right to be informed Right to be Informed; Pleadings and Practice; Aggravating Circumstances; The words “aggravating/qualifying,” “qualifying,” “qualified by,” “aggravating,” or “aggravated by” need not be expressly stated, so long as the particular attendant circumstances are specified in the information One evening, Gregorio and Rogelio left the dela Cruz residence and headed for home after their “drinking spree” with Pepito dela Cruz. While they were walking along the barangay road and were near the Valenzuelas’ residence/sari-sari store, the petitioner and his brother Hermie suddenly appeared from behind them. The ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 133 of 256 Justice Gesmundo petitioner held the shoulders of Gregorio while Hermie stabbed Gregorio twice at the left side of his back. Immediately thereafter, Hermie ran to the direction of the Valenzuelas’ house some 10 meters away. After the stabbing, Gregorio was brought to the clinic of one Dr. Casipit. The wounds were found not to be fatal. Ramie Valenzuela (Petitioner) and his brother, Hermie however were charged with frustrated murder. The RTC convicted petitioner with frustrated murder (Hermie was at large). The petitioner appealed to the CA. The appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision; it held that the crime committed was attempted murder since the wounds inflicted were not fatal. The petitioner, in his Reply, finds the appreciation of abuse of superior strength to be erroneous, as the Information charging him with the crime of frustrated murder did not allege this circumstance with particularity as a qualifying circumstance. The petitioner therefore posits that this circumstance, even if proven, must be considered a generic aggravating circumstance. The Court ruled that there was no merit in the petitioner's contention in light of its ruling in People v. Aquino, wherein it was held that the words “aggravating/qualifying,” “qualifying,” “qualified by,” “aggravating,” or “aggravated by” need not be expressly stated, so long as the particular attendant circumstances are specified in the Information. Furthermore, both the RTC and the CA erred in concluding that there was abuse of superior strength as the prosecution failed to present evidence to show a relative disparity in age, size, strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants, one of them armed with a knife, attacked the victim. 113. RODRIGUEZ V. PONFERRADA, G.R. NO. 155531-34 (2005) Rule 1, Sec. 1 – institution of criminal and civil actions What Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court prohibits is the reservation to file the corresponding civil action; The fact that the Rules do not allow the reservations of civil action in BP 22 cases cannot deprive the private complainant of the right to protect her interests in the criminal action for estafa—in promulgating the Rules, the Supreme Court did not intend to leave the offended parties without any remedy to protect their interests in estafa cases The QC Prosecutor’s Office found probable cause to charge Rodriguez with Estafa and BP 22. During the hearing for estafa, Respondent Judge Ponferranda noted the Formal Entry of Appearance of Atty. Solomon as Private Prosecutor (in order to pursue the civil liability against petitioner), but this was opposed by Rodriguez. Petitioner, through counsel, contends that the private prosecutor is barred from appearing before the RTC as his appearance is limited to the civil aspect which must be presented and asserted in B.P. 22 cases pending before the MTC of Quezon City. The Court held that an offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so, or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of these instances, the private complainant’s interest in the case disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor.None of these exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the estafa suit. Furthermore, institution of the civil actions with the estafa cases and the inclusion of another set of civil actions with the BP 22 cases are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check. 114. SONNY ROMERO Y DOMINGUEZ V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 167546 (2009) Rule 120, Sec. 2 – contents of the judgment The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 134 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The JC Liner driven by petitioner Sonny Romero and the Apego Taxi 4 driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision. This resulted to the death of 6 persons and two sustained serious injuries. Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the MTC of Camarines Sur. MTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged but was held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims a sum of money. Petitioner appealed to the RTC, then to the CA. The rule is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Furthermore, in this case it was held that courts can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages in the same case. It is not even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted. In this case, while petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by preponderance of evidence. In other words, the failure of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable. 115. SORIANO V. OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 160772 (2009) 1. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. 2. Preliminary Investigation; Conducting a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining whether there exists probable cause to prosecute a person for the commission of a crime, including the determination of whether to conclude, reopen, or dismiss the criminal complaint subject of the preliminary investigation, is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the provincial or city prosecutor. Petitioner filed an affidavit-complaint against Mely S. Palad, a bank examiner of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, for Falsification of Public Documents and Use of Falsified Document punishable under Article 172 of the RPC. Acting on the complaint, Asst. City Prosecutor Balasbas issued a Resolution recommending that Palad be charged in court with Falsification of Public Documents and that the charge of Use of Falsified Document be dropped for lack of merit. Said resolution was forwarded to 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Dimagiba who recommended the filing of the information. Palad filed a Motion to Re-Open Case on the ground that she was not given a copy of the subpoena or any notice regarding the complaint filed against her. Eventually, the case was re-opened. This prompted petitioner to file with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Balasbas for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner alleged that in the reopening of the case, Palad received an unwarranted advantage or preference, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, causing undue injury to petitioner. In a Resolution, Graft Investigation Officer Rico of the Office of the Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint for want of sufficient basis. This was approved by Ombudsman Marcelo. The general rule has been that the courts will not interfere with the discretion of the prosecutor or the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his investigative power, to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. The Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, in this case, although Balasbas initially recommended the filing of a criminal case against Palad, this recommendation was still subject to the approval of his superiors, Dimagiba and the City Prosecutor. Balasbas, as investigating prosecutor, had no power or control over the final disposition of Palad’s motion to reopen the case. Conducting a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining whether there exists probable cause to prosecute a person for the commission of a crime, including the determination of whether to conclude, reopen or dismiss the criminal complaint subject of the preliminary investigation, is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the provincial or city prosecutor. PEOPLE V. TARUC ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 135 of 256 Justice Gesmundo A convicted individual who escapes prison is deemed to have waived his right to appeal by not submitting to the court’s jurisdiction within 15 days from the notice of the judgment against him. Rule 124: Judgment On 2002, Francisco escaped prison while being on trial for the murder of one Emelito Sualog. While still at large, the RTC of Bataan convicted Francisco Taruc on the said charge. On a mandatory review by the Court Appeals, Taruc’s counsel through the PAO filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appelant’s Brief (Taruc still being at large). The Court of Appeals dismissed the appea. The PAO then appealed the case to the SC. The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against him. While at large, he cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court. PEOPLE V. CANARES An Information is deemed sufficient if it states: (1) name of the accused; (2) designation of the offense given by the statute; (3) the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (4) the name of the offended party; (5) the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and (6) the place where the offense was committed. Sec. 6, Rule 110 – Sufficiency of complaint or information The trial court and the CA convicted Canares with rape on the basis of an Information that stated that the victim was 9 years old and was raped about 10 times by Canares from 1992 to 1995. Canares now alleges that he should be acquitted since the statement of “1992 to 1995” is very broad. The Supreme Court held that the date is not material to the crime of rape. The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the woman under any circumstances provided by law. The statement of “1992 to 1995” sufficiently informed the accused of the crimes charged since all the elements of the crime was stated in the Information. HERRERA AND MARIANO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET. AL. The accused shall have the right to confront and cross-examine the witness against him according the Sec. 1(f) of Rule 115. Sec 1(f), Rule 115 – Rights of the accused at the trial; right to confrontation The Pat. Herrera and Mariano along with the other accused were all members of the Paranque Police Station. They are charged with the murder of Go and Shi Shu Yang. On the night of the murder, they were accused were spotted by a witness Winterhalter shooting both the victims causing their deaths. The accused submits that they were not given the opportunity to extensively cross-examine the prosecution’s witness. The Court held that the accused’s counsel has conducted an extensive cross-examination of prosecution witness Winterhalter on the scheduled dates of hearing. Therefore, they cannot belatedly claim that they were deprived of the said opportunity and, thus, anchor their theory on the procedural infirmities in the proceedings. MAIQUE V. HON. PATAG An Information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over the case because there is a defect in the Information. Five Informations for libel were filed against Maique in the RTC of Iloilo City. These were quashed for lack of jurisdiction since the Informations failed to allege that Aragona (private respondent) held office in Iloilo City or that they were published or printed in Iloilo City. Five Informations were then again filed and signed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Maranon. Maique challenges the Informations that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion since the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office had no authority to file the same. The authority lies with the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office. The authority to sign and file the new Informations is properly lodged with the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office. The Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office was clearly bereft of authority to file the new Informations against the petitioner. 116. ANITA CHENG V. SPS. WILLIAM SY AND TESSIE SY (2009) ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 136 of 256 Justice Gesmundo One can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the criminal cases, the court made an exception and reinstated the case for the civil liablitiy of the accused. Cheng filed 2 estafa cases, and a charge for violating BP 22 against Spouses Sy for drawing a check against a closed account for the payment of their loan from Cheng. RTC dismissed the estafa cases for the prosecution’s failure to prove the elements of the crime. The order of dismissal of one of the estafa cases made no declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy. On the other hand, the order of dismissal of the other estafa case stated "Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is purely ‘civil,’ not criminal in nature.". MeTC also dismissed the BP 22 case for failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order also did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused respondents. Cheng filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money with damages based on the same loaned amount ofP600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111. Cheng filed an MR which the court denied. Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal issue – Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 57- 97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the respondents was based on the failure of the prosecution to identify both the accused? Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be left without a remedy to recover from the Spouses. Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, Cheng’s recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule. 117. RE: REQUEST OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO I. RAZON FOR AUTHORITY TO DELEGATE THE ENDORSEMENT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT (2009) Executive Regional Trial Court Judges have required that the applications for search warrants need to be endorsed personally by the PNP Chief otherwise the application would not be acted upon as stated in Section 12, Chapter V of the Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges. SC granted then PNP Chief Razon’s requested that he be allowed to delegate the endorsement of the application for search warrant to the Director of the Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management. The subsequent PNP Chief, Versoza, asked for a clarification on the matter as to whether the policy was to apply only during Razon’s term or if it may be continued by Versoza. Sec. 12, Chapter V of the Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties, as embodied in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, as approved by the Court in its Resolution of 27 January 2004, is hereby AMENDED to read as follows: SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. – The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 137 of 256 Justice Gesmundo the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti- Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court. The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their respective duly authorized officials and shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. The Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall keep a special docket book listing names of Judges to whom the applications are assigned, the details of the applications and the results of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued. This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 118. SORIANO & ILAGAN V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 159517-18 (2009) Rule 110, Sec. 13; Rule 117, Sec. 3 - motion to quash Soriano, then President of Rural Bank of San Miguel, was charged with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial document on separate informations, for allegedly securing fictitious loans. Ilagan, then General Manager of the same bank was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial document for the same fictitious loans. Soriano and Ilagan filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that: (i) more than one (1) offense is charged; and (ii) the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information under Section 3(e), Rule 117. The Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense. Section 13 of Rule 110 clearly states: Duplicity of Offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense. In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with more than one information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. Loney v. People upheld the filing of multiple charges against the accused: a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense." In People v. Doriquez, SC held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the same" — if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. On the question whether the facts in the information do not charge an offense, the fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a), Rule 117, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 138 of 256 Justice Gesmundo SC held that there is no justification for the quashal of the Information filed against Soriano and Ilagan. 119. DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. V. JANIOLA AND HON. FAMINI G.R. NO. 186861 (2009) Rule 111, Sec. 5 Prejudicial Question An information for violating B.P. 22 was filed against Janiola, as instituted by the complaint-affidavit filed by Dreamwork against Janiola. After 2 years, Janiola and her husband filed a civil case against Dreamwork for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement. Janiola file for Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question. According to Janiola the civil case on rescission of the construction agreement must be first decided prior to the BP 22 criminal case. Sec. 7 of Rule 111 provides: SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. The fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. The agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. 120. PEOPLE V. NUÑEZ G.R. NO. 177148 (2009) - RULE 126, SEC. 3 Nuñez was charged and convicted for the possession of drugs. He assails the validity of the search warrant as it did not indicate his exact address but only the barangay and street of his residence. He maintains that none of the occupants witnessed the search as they were all kept in the living room. Section 3, Rule 126 provides: SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property: (a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities. In the case at bar, Search Warrant No. 42 specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement which would repel such inference. Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted. Certainly, the lady’s wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 139 of 256 Justice Gesmundo tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in appellant’s residence they believed were "proceeds of the crime" or "means of committing the offense." The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. Court affirmed the conviction and modified the decision ordering that the official custodian of the objects taken during the search which are not otherwise regulated drugs or drug paraphernalia, is ordered to return them to Nuñez. 121. DIÑO AND COMPARATIVO V. OLIVAREZ G.R. NO. 170447 (2009) Jurisdiction; election cases. A public prosecutor exceeded the authority delegated to him by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to prosecute election-related cases when he filed amended informations in court against the respondent Pablo Olivares even after he had been directed by the Legal Department of the COMELEC to suspend the implementation of his joint resolution (which found that the respondent should be indicted) but before his delegated authority had been revoked by the COMELEC en banc. The Constitution, particularly Article IX, Section 20,empowers the COMELEC to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election cases. Furthermore, under Section 265 of the OEC, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct the preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the OEC and to prosecute the same. Under Section 265 of the OEC, the COMELEC may avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the continuing delegation of authority to other prosecuting arms of the government,which authority, however, may be revoked or withdrawn at anytime by the COMELEC in the proper exercise of its judgment. Section 10 of the same Rule 34 gives the COMELEC the power to motu proprio revise, modify and reverse the resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors.Clearly, the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same. However, such authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime by the COMELEC either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good or where it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the COMELEC, provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of the resolutions, directives or orders of the COMELEC in relation to election cases where it had been deputized to investigate and prosecute by the COMELEC. As mere deputies, provincial and city prosecutors acting on behalf of the COMELEC must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority. 122. GUASCH V. DELA CRUZ (2009) Rule 120 Sec. 2. However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure.Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby. A case was filed for estafa against respondent. The trial court then issued an Order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the case and acquitting the accused. Thereafter, filed a Motion to Amend to include a finding of civil liability of petitioner but failed to file this within the reglementary period of 15 days because all postal offices in Metro Manila were allegedly ordered closed in the afternoon due to the rally staged on Ayala Avenue. This motion was denied. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 140 of 256 Justice Gesmundo As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure.Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby. PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ (2013) Rule 122, Sec. 11(a) - “An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.” PO2 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Vadez were tried and convicted for three counts of murder in the RTC. CA upheld the conviction. Both of them appealed to the SC but Edwin Valdez withdrew from the appeal. The SC downgraded the ruling finding Eduardo VAldez guilty of 3 counts of homicide instead of 3 counts of murder. Edwin filed with the SC Administrator an application of the judgment in favor of Eduardo Valdez insofar as it shall be favorable to him (Edwin), despite his withdrawal of appeal. Held: Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against the victims, warranting their equal liability under the principle of conspiracy. The benefits of this provision extended to all the accused, regardless of whether they appealed or not. 123/125. VLUDEZ II V. CA (2009) Rule 112; Rule 113, Sec. 1 Pending resolution of a Petition for Review filed with the Secretary of Justice; Suspension of Proceedings including implementation of Warrant of Arrest. The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause is exclusive. Thus the consequent implementation of the warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the SoJ as to the finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. A complaint for the alleged murder of Galvez and his driver was filed against Dela Cruz et al. Likewise, a complaint for murder against Viudez II was filed by the widow of the victim. Upon finding of probable cause to indict the petitioner and others for the crime of murder, the investigating state prosecutor filed 2 informations of murder with the RTC of Malolos, which then issued warrants of arrest the same day. The petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings and to Suspend the Implementation of the Warrant of Arrest pursuant to Section 96 of DOJ circular 70, the implementation of the warrant of arrest against petitioner should be suspended and/or recalled pending resolution of the said petition for review. The RTC denied petitioner's motion stating that there was no way for it to recall the warrant of arrest in the absence of any compelling reason and that jurisdiction overhead the person has not been acquired yet. Hence petitioner has no personality to file any pleading in court relative to the case until he was arrested or voluntarily surrendered himself to the court. The task if the presiding judge when the information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or nonexistence for the arrest of the accused. The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause is exclusive. Thus the consequent implementation of the warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the SoJ as to the finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge. Nowhere in the said provision ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 141 of 256 Justice Gesmundo does it state that the court must hold the proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion of the court whether or not to suspend the proceedings or the implementation of the warrant of arrest, upon the motion of the appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains unhindered. This is in consonance with the earlier ruling of this court that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests of the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it 124. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DE GRANO (2009) Rule 120 the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice. Facts: An Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed against Joven, Armado and Estanislao, together with their co-accused Leonides, Domingo, and Leonardo, who were at-large. The respondents applied and were granted bail. At the promulgation of judgment, the respondents, except for Estanislao, did not appear and a judgment of conviction was then rendered against them. Subsequently, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. Such motion was granted. Petitioner then sought recourse before the CA, via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, from an Order of the trial court drastically modifying its earlier findings convicting the respondents of the crime of murder, by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the convictions of their co-accused from murder to homicide; this, notwithstanding that all the accused, except Estanislao Lacaba, failed to personally appear at the promulgation of the Decision despite due notice thereof. The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint MR with respect to the respondents who were at large. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal. However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error when it entertained the Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction over his person. Consequently, the RTC’s ruling downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against double jeopardy applies. 126. BRIONES V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ( 2009) Rule 115, Sec. 1 rights oft he accused at trial FACTS: A criminal information was filed against Briones for crime of robbery. Briones allegedly took the service firearm of S/G Gual while the latter approached the group where the former is involved in a mauling. S/G Gual positively identified Briones. RTC found Briones guilty of the crime of simple theft (Art. 309 Par. 3 of RPC) after giving weight to prosecutions positive testimony as against the defenses of denial and alibi. On his appeal, he raised the issue of self-defense. The Court of Appeals found Briones guilty of robbery under Article 293 in relation to par.5 of Art. 294 of RPC, and not of theft. Whether or not a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence. No. The for new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted. In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were not established. 134. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DANTE TAN (2010) ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 142 of 256 Justice Gesmundo A Panel of Prosecutors of the DOJ, filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan in the RTC. The cases pertained to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares and the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the SEC a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares. At the crux of the controversy was the issue of whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante Tan’s right to speedy trial. In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. For a period of almost two years and eight months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence. The question was whether there was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. In the case at hand, the delay in the trial of the case was due to the complexity of the case. Furthermore, this delay was done with the implied consent of the petitioner as he agreed that the cases be tried separately. The Court held that double jeopardy had not attached, considering that the dismissal on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial was without basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was no reason to support the initial order of dismissal. Although it was true that in an unbroken line of cases, the Court had held that dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute was equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense, it stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. Double jeopardy did not apply to this case, considering that there was no violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial. • RULE 111 135. JAIME U. GOSIACO VS. LETICIA CHING, ET. AL. (2009) Petitioner invested with ASB by way of loan. In exchange, ASB through its manager issued DBS two checks. Upon maturity of the ASB checks, petitioner deposited the two checks. However, upon presentment, the checks were dishonored and payments were refused because of a stop payment order and for insufficiency of funds. The question before the court is whether or not a corporation may be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case. No. Nowhere in B.P. Blg. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may be impleaded as an accused or defendant in the prosecution for violations of that law, even in the litigation of the civil aspect thereof. Nonetheless, the substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable obligations against a debtor- corporation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure. Technically, nothing in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action against the juridical person on whose behalf the check was issued. What the rules prohibit is the reservation of a separate civil action against the natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22, including such corporate officer who had signed the bounced check. Let us pursue this point further. B.P. Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on the signatory of the check which is distinct from the civil liability of the corporation for the amount represented from the check. The civil liability attaching to the signatory arises from the wrongful act of signing the check despite the insufficiency of funds in the account, while the civil liability attaching to the corporation is itself the very obligation covered by the check or the consideration for its execution. Yet these civil liabilities are mistaken to be indistinct. The confusion is traceable to the singularity of the amount of each. If we conclude, as we should, that under the current Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action that is impliedly instituted in the B.P. Blg. 22 action is only the civil liability of the signatory, and not that of the corporation itself, the distinctness of the cause of action against the signatory and that against the corporation is rendered beyond dispute. It follows that the actions involving these liabilities should be adjudged according to their respective standards and merits. In the B.P. Blg. 22 case, what the trial court should determine whether or not the signatory had signed the check with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit in the bank account, while in the civil case the trial court should ascertain whether or not the obligation itself is valid and demandable. The litigation of ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 143 of 256 Justice Gesmundo both questions could, in theory, proceed independently and simultaneously without being ultimately conclusive on one or the other. RULE 117 136. MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA Y ABDUL, ET. AL VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET. AL. (2009) Petitioners alleged that while they were cruising on board a vehicle, a Sedan bumped their vehicle; that when they were kidnapped and held for ransom; Information was filed. Subsequently, the accused moved for the quashal of the Information on the ground that “the officer who filed the Information has no authority do so. The trial court denied the motion to quash on the ground that under the ruling in People v. Mapalao an accused who is at large is not entitled to bail or other relief. The issue before the court is whether or not the accused policemen can seek any relief (via a motion to quash the information) from the trial court when they had not been arrested yet. People v. Mapalao, does not squarely apply to the present case. In Mapalao, the accused escaped while the trial of the case was on-going thus the accused cannot seek relief from the court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no standing in court, whereas here, the accused have not been served the warrant of arrest and have not been arraigned. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash which requires that the accused should be under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no authority to do so. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. However, while the accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. At any rate, the accused’s motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority of the filing officer, would have never prospered, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government thus, prior approval by the Ombudsman is not required for the investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the accused policemen. RULE 125 NEYPES 137. CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR. VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET. AL. (2009) A certain “Juan dela Cruz” wrote a letter to then Ombudsman seeking the investigation of certain accounts of PNB. The letter was treated as a complaint lodged with the Office of the Ombudsman. Probable cause was found. Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that there was newly discovered evidence. In his Amended Motion for New Trial, petitioner included the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the judgment of conviction, claiming that there was no concrete evidence presented by the prosecution that petitioner endorsed Arancillo’s check except for the unauthorized admission by the counsel for the accused. The amended motion for new trial was denied, Sandiganbayan made an Entry of Judgment which thus, became final and executory upon the lapse of the appeal period. The issue before the court is whether or not Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course petitioner’s motion for new trial. This Court disagrees. Petitioner had already availed of a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by Sandiganbayan. His next remedy is set forth under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which provides that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, Court allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court to be counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. Without an appeal, the judgment becomes final upon expiration of the period and execution should necessarily follow. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to avail of the said remedy within the 15-day period and, instead, filed a motion for new trial. The petitioner cannot be allowed to resort to another remedy as a substitute for an appeal. Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that its Decision ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 144 of 256 Justice Gesmundo became final and executory upon the lapse of the appeal period. Petitioner’s procedural misstep of filing a motion for new trial did not produce any legal effect and, therefore, did not operate to suspend the enforcement of his sentence. RULE 112 Preliminary Investigation; Determination of Probable Cause; Judicial Review of the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice 138. APRIL JOY ASETRE, ET. AL. VS. JUNEL ASETRE, ET. AL. (2009)- Hanz Asetre was found dead. The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause against April, his wife, Hanz’s first cousins, and Benjie Ebcas. Thus, the prosecutor recommended that murder charges be filed against Ebcas and the Gamboas and a parricide charge filed against April. Subsequently, the four accused asked the DOJ for a review of the prosecutor’s findings. Acting Secretary Gutierrez absolved petitioners and reversed the investigating prosecutor’s resolution because she did not find sufficient evidence to sustain the theory of the prosecution of “conspiracy to commit murder.” Accordingly, Secretary Gutierrez directed the prosecutor to withdraw the information against petitioners. Pursuant to the ruling, the prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information, which was granted by the RTC. The trial court also recalled the warrant of arrest issued against the accused, and later denied private respondents’ motion for reconsideration. The DOJ denied the Asetre siblings’ motion for reconsideration of the Secretary’s Order Thereafter, respondent Asetres filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the DOJ Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Resolution despite the circumstantial evidence against petitioners. The Secretary of Justice committed no grave abuse of discretion. Based on the totality of the evidence presented by both parties, it is clear that there is a dearth of proof to hold petitioners for trial. Furthermore, the Secretary is empowered to order or perform the very acts questioned in this case A preliminary investigation falls under the authority of the state prosecutor who is given by law the power to direct and control criminal actions. He is, however, subject to the control of the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice, upon petition by a proper party, can reverse his subordinates’ (provincial or city prosecutors and their assistants’) resolutions finding probable cause against suspects of crimes. It is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals decision may then be appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari. RULE 120; Sec 7; Judgment 139. ROSARIO T. DE VERA VS. GEREN A. DE VERA (2009) Petitioner Rosario accused her spouse Geren and Josephine of Bigamy. Geren pleaded “Guilty.” However, in a Motion he prayed that he be allowed to withdraw his plea in the meantime in order to prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The motion was opposed by petitioner. She posited that since the case was ready for promulgation, Geren’s motion should no longer be entertained. RTC granted Geren’s motion and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in the determination of the penalty to be imposed. Petitioner moved for the partial reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied. For failure to obtain favorable action from the RTC, petitioner instituted a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. However, she failed to persuade the CA which rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC. In filing her motion for reconsideration before the RTC and her petition for certiorari before the CA, petitioner sought the modification of the court’s judgment of conviction against Geren, because of the allegedly mistaken application of the mitigating circumstance of “voluntary surrender.” The eventual relief prayed for is the increase in the penalty imposed on Geren. Is this action of petitioner procedurally tenable? No. In judgments of conviction, errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the accused consents thereto; or he, himself, moves for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision. Obviously, the requisite consent of the accused is intended to protect him from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties, which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked. This is a protection against double jeopardy. However, we reiterate the rule that review is allowed only in apparently void judgments where there is a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The aggrieved parties, in such cases, must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 145 of 256 Justice Gesmundo 140-141.) ESTINO VS. PEOPLE G.R. NOS. 164009-11 (2009) AND PESCADERA VS. PEOPLE (2009) (CONSOLIDATED CASE) Rule 121; Motion for New Trial Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment, and although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that the accused were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary. Petitioner Estino was elected Vice-Governor of Sulu along with Gov. Abdusakur Tan. Later on, they were issued a status quo order in G.R. No. 133676, suspending the effects of the proclamation of Gov. Tan and ordering Vice- Gov. Estino to assume the position of Governor until further orders. Thus, Estino acted as Governor of Sulu from July 27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999 when this Court lifted the suspension order against Gov. Tan. Ernesto G. Pescadera, on the other hand, was Provincial Treasurer of Sulu during Estino’s stint as Acting Governor. Pursuant to Commission on, a special audit team was created upon the request of the Provincial Government of Sulu. An audit of the disbursement vouchers and payrolls for the period starting July 27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999 was then conducted by COA State Auditor II Mona U. Balabaran and her team. The COA Special Audit Report stated that there were anomalies in the payment of salary differentials, allowances, and benefits, among others. The Ombudsman then filed three informations against petitioners. Petitioners pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged in the informations. Petitioners were charged with violation of RA 3019, Sec. 3(e) by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial which were denied in the Sandiganbayan Resolution. SC remanded. We resolve to grant petitioners a chance to prove their innocence by remanding the case to the Sandiganbayan for a new trial of Criminal Case No. 26192. Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary. In their Supplemental Motion and/or Motion for New Trial, they stressed that they no longer presented the evidence of payment of RATA because Balabaran testified that the subject of the charge was the nonpayment of benefits under the 1999 budget, without mention of the RATA nor the 1998 reenacted budget. It seems that they were misled during trial. They were precluded from presenting pieces of evidence that may prove actual payment of the RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget because the 142.) METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. VS. GONZALES G.R. NO. 180165 ( 2009) Preliminary Investigation To determine the existence of probable cause, there is need to conduct preliminary investigation. Petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Visaland and private respondents Gonzales and co. with the Office of the City Prosecutor. In their Counter-Affidavit, private respondents denied having entered into trust receipt transactions with petitioner. Instead, private respondents claimed that the contract entered into by the parties was a Contract of Loan According to private respondents, petitioner made them sign documents bearing fine prints without apprising them of the real nature of the transaction involved. Private respondents came to know of the trust receipt transaction only after they were served a copy of the Affidavit- Complaint of the petitioner.After the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor found that no probable cause existed and dismissed the Information.While the City Prosecutor was not persuaded by the defense proffered by private respondents that no trust receipt transaction existed, it nonetheless, dismissed the case for lack of evidence that prior demand was made by petitioner. The City Prosecutor underscored that for a charge of estafa with grave abuse of confidence to prosper, previous demand is an indispensable requisite. Accordingly, 23 separate Informations for estafa were filed before the RTC against private respondents. In the interim, private respondents appealed the investigating prosecutor’s Resolution to the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice ruled there was no probable cause. CA affirmed. Hence this petition. SC granted the petition. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 146 of 256 Justice Gesmundo To determine the existence of probable cause, there is need to conduct preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering which person or persons may be reasonably charged with a crime. The conduct of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public prosecutor’s function unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his findings. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must have been so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. In the present case, the abuse of discretion is patent in the act of the Secretary of Justice holding that the contractual relationship forged by the parties was a simple loan, for in so doing, the Secretary of Justice assumed the function of the trial judge of calibrating the evidence on record, done only after a full-blown trial on the merits. The fact of existence or non-existence of a trust receipt transaction is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of which can best be passed upon after trial on the merits, for it is virtually impossible to ascertain the real nature of the transaction involved based solely on the self-serving allegations contained in the opposing parties’ pleadings. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice is not in a competent position to pass judgment on substantive matters. The bases of a party’s accusation and defenses are better ventilated at the trial proper than at the preliminary investigation. 143.) PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA G.R. NOS. 164368-69. ( 2009) Rule 117, Rule 119; Rule 115 , Sec 1. –rights of the accused at the trial The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. An Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias was likewise filed against Estrada for representing himself as “Jose Velarde” in several transactions in order to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he acquired during his tenure as President of the Philippines. Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of the warrant of the arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued. A Special division of the Sandiganbayan was made to hear, try and decide the charges of plunder against Estrada. At the trial, the petitioners presented evidence to prove the allegations of plunder, illegal use of alias and perjury. After the petitoner rested in all three cases, the respondent moved to be allowed to file a demurrer of evidence in these cases. In its joint resolution, the Sandiganbayan only granted respondent leave to file demurrers in illegal use of alias and perjury. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the petitioner failed to present evidence that prove that Estrada committed the offense. Petitoner argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended information. Hence this petition. Petition denied. At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature—the right of Estrada to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Under the provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this constitutional right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense in the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.As to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, and for the court to pronounce judgment. The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 147 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.In short, the allegations in the complaint or information, as written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused—the primary reader of and the party directly affected by the complaint or information—of the charge/s laid. 144.) PEOPLE V. ABELLO G.R. NO. 151952. (2009) Rule 110 , Sec 6; Rule 115, Sec 1 – rights of accused at the trial, right to be informed A variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. Appellant Abello was accused of raping and twice sexually abusing AAA. Abello interposed the defense of denial. In all the instances, Abello claimed that he merely stepped on the victim at the sala on his way to his room after retiring home. The RTC found Abello guilty under the three Informations. The CA affirmed Abello’s conviction on appeal but modified the penalties imposed. AAA’s testimony covers the commission of the sexual assault through the insertion of Abello’s male organ into her mouth; AAA also consistently identified Abello as the perpetrator of the sexual assault. These statements satisfy the first and second elements of the rape. Her testimony that she was roused from sleep with Abello’s male organ inserted in her mouth, goes into the third element of the crime.In this respect, we observe that both the RTC and the CA failed to notice the variance between the allegations in the Information for rape and that proven at the trial on the mode of committing the offense. The Information alleges "force and intimidation" as the mode of commission, while AAA testified during the trial that she was asleep at the time it happened and only awoke to find Abello’s male organ inside her mouth. This variance is not fatal to Abello’s conviction for rape by sexual assault. In People v. Corpuz, we ruled that a variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. In the present case, Abello did not object to the presentation of evidence showing that the crime charged was committed in a different manner than what was stated in the Information. Thus, the variance is not a bar to Abello’s conviction of the crime charged in the Information. 145. ) GUY VS. PEOPLE G.R. NOS. 167088-90. ( 2009) Sufficiency of information; allegations; matters of evidence and facts The specific acts of the accused do not have to be described in detail in the information, as it is enough that the offense be described with sufficient particularity to make sure the accused fully understand what he is being charged with—the particularity must be such that a person of ordinary intelligence immediately knows what the charge is. Petitioners were charged in three separate Informations with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the construction of three (3) infrastructure projects in Barangay 36, namely: an elevated path walk, a basketball court and a day care center. The Ombudsman Prosecutor filed the corresponding information for the offenses with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan decided the case against petitioners. Petitioners filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the decision. The Sandiganbayan denied all their motions.Petitioners maintain that the Sandiganbayan had not acquired jurisdiction over them because the three informations failed to state the specific actual allegations that would indicate the connection between the discharge of their official duties and the commission of the offenses charged; or alternatively, assuming that the Sandiganbayan had actually acquired jurisdiction, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, as well as the existence of conspiracy. SC denied the petition. Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the specific acts of the accused do not have to be described in detail in the information, as it is enough that the offense be described with sufficient particularity to make sure the accused fully understand what he is being charged with. The particularity must be such that a person of ordinary intelligence immediately knows what the charge is. Moreover, reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices. It is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 148 of 256 Justice Gesmundo necessary to be stated in order to render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. The particular acts of the accused which pertain to “matters of evidence,” such as how accused city officials prepared the inspection reports despite the absence of a project plan or how the contractor was able to use substandard materials, do not have to be indicated in the information. 146) PEOPLE V. BEGINO 582 SCRA 189 (2009) Rule 115 Sec. 1 Circumstance which qualifies the crime should be alleged and proved beyond reasonable doubt like the crime itself. Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. Facts: The RTC found Grajo guilty beyond reasonable of the "crime of statutory rape aggravated by the fact that the victim is below eighteen (18) years old" and that the offender is the common law husband of BBB. The qualifying circumstance of common law husband was not alleged in the information. Could Grajo be held liable for the qualified crime? Held: No, since the qualifying circumstance of "common law spouse" was not alleged in the Information for rape against appellant, he could not be convicted of rape in the qualified form as he was not properly informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. In a criminal prosecution, it is a fundamental rule that every element of the crime charged must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. Therefore he is only guilty of statutory rape. 147) MAGO V. FERMO 582 SCRA 1 (2009) Rule 112 Sec. 4 Personal examination of the complainant in a criminal case and his witness/es under Sec. 4 Rule 112 Facts: Judge delegated the examination of the complainant to stenoegrapher. Is he guilty of gross ignorance of the law? Held: Yes, Then, as now, a personal examination of the complainant in a criminal case and his witness/es was required. Thus, under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court before its amendment, the "investigating fiscal" was required to "certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses . . . “ By respondent’s delegation of the examination of the sheriff-complainant in the grave threats case to the stenographer, and worse, by allowing the witnesses to "read/study the [written] question[s]" to be propounded to them and to "write their answers [thereto]" upon respondent’s justification that the scheme was for the convenience of the stenographers, respondent betrayed her lack of knowledge of procedure, thereby contributing to the erosion of public confidence in the judicial system. 148) People v. Dumlao 580 SCRA 409 (2009) Rule 117, Rule 119 Sec. 23, Rule 120 Sec. 6 Facts: Dumlao was charged with violation of the anti graft and corrupt practices act. The information was filed in the Sandiganbayan. After pretrial Dumlao filed a motion to quash of the ground that the facts charged does not constitute an offense. The Sandiganbayan considered the evidences presented in pretrial and held that there is no cause of action, and dismissed the case. Should the case have been dismissed? Held: No, From the reasoning given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it dismissed the case because of insufficiency of evidence. Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash (Section 3, Rule 117). Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case. (Section 23, Rule 119, Demurrer to Evidence) In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 149 of 256 Justice Gesmundo prosecution’s right to due process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accused’s culpability. 149) ALBERT V. SANDIGANBAYAN 580 SCRA 279 (2009) Rule 110 Sec. 4 The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. Facts: After arraignment the Sandiganbayan allowed the amendment of the information changing "gross neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence". Whether this is a substantial amendment and whether this should be allowed. Held: The amendment should be allowed. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended.26 On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime. In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase "gross neglect of duty" from the Information. Although this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same is allowable even after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused.28 As a replacement, "gross inexcusable negligence" would be included in the Information as a modality in the commission of the offense. This Court believes that the same constitutes an amendment only in form. 150) PEOPLE V. CANARES (2009) Rule 110 Sec. 6 An information, is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when the date of commission is a material element of the offense. The offense may thus be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Facts: The prosecution alleged in the information the date and time of the rape as "sometime between the year 1992 to 1995". Is the information defective? Held: No, An information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. Section 11 of the same Rule also provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when the date of commission is a material element of the offense. The offense may thus be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. At the minimum, an indictment must contain all the essential elements of the offense charged to enable the accused to properly meet the charge and duly prepare for his defense. 151) FRANSISCO V. PEOPLE (2009) Rule 110, Sec 2, 5 A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. Facts: Bankard filed a complaint against Fransisco charging him with estaffa. Fransiscos defense bankard is not an offended party. Is the defense meritorious? ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 150 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Held: No, even assuming for the sake of argument that Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa were the proper offended parties in this case, petitioner Francisco is mistaken in his assertion that it was essential for either Solidbank Mastercard or AIG Visa to have filed the complaint for estafa. Except in cases that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, namely adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness, a complaint filed by the offended party is not necessary for the institution of a criminal action. The Information filed by the prosecutor with the proper court is sufficient. A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. The participation of the private offended party is not essential to the prosecution of crimes, except in the crimes stated above, or in the prosecution of the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action.11 A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor need not be filed by the "offended party" but may be filed by any competent person, unless the offense subject thereof cannot be prosecuted de oficio. 152. PEOPLE v. TARUC (2009) “A convicted individual who escapes prison is deemed to have waived his right to appeal by not submitting to the court’s jurisdiction within 15 days from the notice of the judgment against him. Rule 124: Judgment” On 2002, Francisco escaped prison while being on trial for the murder of one Emelito Sualog. While still at large, the RTC of Bataan convicted Francisco Taruc on the said charge. On a mandatory review by the Court Appeals, Taruc’s counsel through the PAO filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appelant’s Brief (Taruc still being at large). The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The PAO then appealed the case to the SC. The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against him. While at large, he cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court. 153. PEOPLE v. CANARES (2009) “An Information is deemed sufficient if it states: (1) name of the accused; (2) designation of the offense given by the statute; (3) the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (4) the name of the offended party; (5) the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and (6) the place where the offense was committed. Sec. 6, Rule 110 – Sufficiency of complaint or information” The trial court and the CA convicted Canares with rape on the basis of an Information that stated that the victim was 9 years old and was raped about 10 times by Canares from 1992 to 1995. Canares now alleges that he should be acquitted since the statement of “1992 to 1995” is very broad. The Supreme Court held that the date is not material to the crime of rape. The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the woman under any circumstances provided by law. The statement of “1992 to 1995” sufficiently informed the accused of the crimes charged since all the elements of the crime was stated in the Information. 154. HERRERA AND MARIANO v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET. AL. (2009) “The accused shall have the right to confront and cross-examine the witness against him according the Sec. 1(f) of Rule 115. Sec 1(f), Rule 115 – Rights of the accused at the trial; right to confrontation” The Pat. Herrera and Mariano along with the other accused were all members of the Paranque Police Station. They are charged with the murder of Go and Shi Shu Yang. On the night of the murder, they were accused were spotted by a witness Winterhalter shooting both the victims causing their deaths. The accused submits that they were not given the opportunity to extensively cross-examine the prosecution’s witness. The Court held that the accused’s counsel has conducted an extensive cross-examination of prosecution witness Winterhalter on the scheduled dates of hearing. Therefore, they cannot belatedly claim that they were deprived of the said opportunity and, thus, anchor their theory on the procedural infirmities in the proceedings. 155. MAIQUE v. HON. PATAG (2009) ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 151 of 256 Justice Gesmundo “An Information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over the case because there is a defect in the Information.” Five Informations for libel were filed against Maique in the RTC of Iloilo City. These were quashed for lack of jurisdiction since the Informations failed to allege that Aragona (private respondent) held office in Iloilo City or that they were published or printed in Iloilo City. Five Informations were then again filed and signed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Maranon. Maique challenges the Informations that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion since the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office had no authority to file the same. The authority lies with the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office. The authority to sign and file the new Informations is properly lodged with the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office. The Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office was clearly bereft of authority to file the new Informations against the petitioner. 158. ILUSORIO v BILDNER, G.R. 173935-98 (2008) “action for perjury to be instituted and tried where the deliberate making of an untruthful statement upon any material matter was made.” Petitions for the issuance of new owners duplicate of TCT copies allegedly lost were filed in the RTCs of Tagaytay and Makati (over TCTs issued by the Register of Deeds in those areas, respectively). 4 Informations for perjury were filed in the Pasig MeTC, with, as basis, the contents of the original petitions filed in the Tagaytay and Makati RTCs. The perjury cases should be filed in Tagaytay and Makati, respectively. It is in these areas where a) the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and b) where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance/materiality in deciding the issue of w/n new owner’s duplicate copies of the TCTs may issue. It is immaterial where the affidavit was notarized (in Pasig), so long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit “swore to” and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point in issue in the judicial proceeding. 159. PEOPLE v BOHOL, G.R. No. 178198 (2008) “The testimony of a person originally charged as a co-conspirator is credible evidence against an accused.” A criminal case for murder was filed against Accused with Robin as Co-Conspirator. Charges were dropped aginst Robin and he later became a State Witness. Robin’s testimony is credible. Where the culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the CA affirming those of the TC, duly supported by sufficient and convincing evidence, must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, and are not to be disturbed on appeal. The only exception is when certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. Also, the fact that Robin was charged as a co-conspirator before he was discharged as a state witness does not disqualify him as a witness or discredit his testimony. While his testimony should be taken with caution, Robin’s statement was corroborated by the testimony of his wife, who happens to be accused’s sister. There is also no evidence of ill motive. 160. PEOPLE v LOPIT, G.R. No. 177742 (2008) “three duties of the court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered” The accused in 3 cases for Rape against his daughter changed his plea of not guilty to guilty to one in the lower court. He did so because he was told that the penalty would be reduced and only because he lacked money to fight the case/s. Held: The lower court should not have allowed the change of plea. Under Sec. 3 Rule 116, the lower court should have taken measures to see to it that the accused really and freely comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea. It must explain to the accused that the penalty imposable for the crime attended by the qualifying circumstances of minority and filiation, as alleged in the Information, is death, whether or not he pleads guilty and regardless of the presence of other mitigating circumstances. However, the trial court’s failure to do so will not necessarily result in the accused’s acquittal. The evidence for the prosecution, independently of the accused’s plea of guilty, adequately established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as charged in the Informations. The testimony of the victim was sufficient to convict. Duty of Court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered: a) searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused’s full comprehension of the consequences thereof, b) require the prosecution to present evidence to prove guilt of accused and precise degree of culpability, and c) ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and to allow him to do so if he desires. 161. PEOPLE v PUIG, G.R. No. 173654-765 (2008) ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 152 of 256 Justice Gesmundo “in light of jurisprudence, no need to refer to banks as owner in case of qualified theft” In a case for qualified theft, the Information contained allegations that the employees acted with grave abuse of confidence, to the damage and prejudice of the Bank, although it did not particularly refer to it as owner of the money deposits. Held: It is firmly established in jurisprudence: a) the nature of possession by the Bank of the money deposits therein (i.e. Banks, where moneys are deposited, are considered owners thereof); b) the duties being performed by its employees who have custody of the money or have come into possession of it (they enjoy the confidence imposed on them by their employer). Thus, allegations in the Information that such employees acted with grave abuse of confidence, to the damage and prejudice of the Bank, without particularly referring to it (bank) as owner of the money deposits, are sufficient to make out a case of Qualified Theft. 162. CONCEPCION VDA. DE MANGUERA v RISOS, G.R. No. 152643 (2008) “Conditional examination of a prosecution witness to be taken only before the court where the case is pending.” Concepcion, a prosecution witness, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. The opposing party contends that Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure apply (depositions Pending Action, Rules on Civil Procedure) and not Sec. 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Sec. 15, Rule 119 applies. The conditional examination must be made before the court where the case is pending. The accused must also be notified, so he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. The manner of examination is the same as an examination during trial, which is through question and answer. This is unlike the examination of a defense witness which, under Sec. 13 Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken “before a judge…member of the Bar in good standing as designated or …inferior court designated therein.” PEOPLE v. BAUN y MERCADO, G.R. No. 167503 (2008) “guidelines for the court in conducting a searching inquiry / when conviction is based on evidence proving the commission of the crime” This is a case for 4 counts of rape where a plea was changed to guilty. The court established GUIDELINES IN CONDUCTING A SEARCHING INQUIRY: (1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge’s intimidating robes. (2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. (3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty. (4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment. (5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process. (6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter. (7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 153 of 256 Justice Gesmundo However, in this case, the convictions should not be set aside despite the improvident plea of guilt because other evidence was presented establishing guilt. As a rule, convictions in capital offenses must be set aside if based on improvident pleas of guilt when such improvident plea is the sole basis of the judgment. However, where the TC receives evidence to determine precisely w/n the accused has erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvident or not) loses legal significance, for the reason that the conviction is based on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged. 164.) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RUDY BUDUHAN Y BULLA, G.R. NO. 178196 (2008) “Rule 124 Sec 13c: Certification or appeal of case to the SC- In cases where the CA imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the SC by notice of appeal filed with the CA.” Information was filed against the Respondents before the RTC for the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide. RTC found respondents guilty of the charges. Buduhans found guilty of the the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide with respect to deceased Erese; sentenced both to suffer Reclusion Perpetua. They were also found guilty of Homicide with respect to victim Almeron and sentenced to Reclusion Temporal max. CA modified ruling as to award given by the RTC. Pursuant to Rule 124, Sec 13c of the Rules of Crimpro, the judgment of the CA may be appealed to the SC by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the CA. 165.) WINSTON MENDOZAAND FE MICLAT VS. FERNANDO ALARMA, G.R. NO. 151970 (2008) – “Rule 114 Sec21 Forfeiture of Bail.” Alarma spouses are owners of a hectare of land in Zambales. The land was posted as a property bond for the provisional liberty of a certain Mayo, charged with illegal possession of firearms. When Mayo failed to appear in court, the trial court ordered his arrest and confiscation of his bail bond. It also directed the bondsmen to produce within a period of 30days the person of the accused and to show cause why judgment should not be entered against the bail bond. However, without a judgment being rendered against the bondsmen, the RTC issued a writ of execution against the land in an order. The land was eventually sold at public auction. Alarma Spouses filed a complaint for recovery of property claiming the nullity of the entire proceedings relating to the property bond. Court ruled in favor of the Alarma Spouses. Rule 114 Sec21 of Crimpro provides “If the accused fails to appear in person as required his bail shall be declared to be forfeited and the bondsmen given 30 days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail.” Judgment cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so. In this case, the RTC gave the bondsmen 30 days to produce the accused or a reasonable explanation for their non- production. However, 2 years had passed from that time and still no judgment had been rendered against the bondsmen for the amount of bail. Instead, an order of execution was issued and the property was put up for sale and awarded to the highest bidders. This shows that there was a failure of due process of the law. The execution was issued, not on a judgment, because there was none, but simply and solely on the declaration of forfeiture. 166.) JUANITO CHAN Y LIM A.K.A. ZHANG ZHENTING VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. NO. 147065 (2008) “Probable cause and authority of the court to grant bail in cases involving capital offenses” Chief of the PAOCTF Lacson referred to the State Prosecutor for appropriate action the evidence collected by the task force during a buy-bust operation against Juanito Chan, a Chinese citizen. Through a confidential informant, the PAOCTF was able to apprehend Chan while selling 1kg of shabu. Chan requested for a preliminary investigation. After PI, State Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information against the petitioner. The Prosecutor did not give credence to Chan’s unsubstantiated claim of frameup and extortion. Eventually information was filed in the RTC of QC. Chan filed a petition for review with the Justice Secretary which was denied. Filed MRs and petitions with the SOJ and CA, all either denied or dismissed. Filed Certiorari in the SC claiming that PI was void for being violative of his right to due process. Chan claimed that he should have been afforded the right to be heard by an impartial authority. He contends that the State Prosecutor could not have been objective and impartial in conducting the PI because the latter was a member of the PAOCTF. He also claimed that the SOJ ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 154 of 256 Justice Gesmundo committed grave abuse of discretion when he affirmed the Prosecutor’s finding of probable cause. He reiterated also his claim of extortion. SC ruled against petitioner. Although the findings of the SOJ are not absolute, the Court generally adheres to the policy of non-interference in the conduct of PI particularly when it’s supported by facts. Also, the SOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the finding of probable cause by the Prosecutor. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. The allegation that the State Prosecutor was not impartial in conducting the preliminary investigation is merely speculative — a bare allegation unworthy of credence. Such accusation is worthless in light of our finding that there is, indeed, probable cause against petitioner. 167.) JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (4 TH DIVISION), G.R. NOS. 163972-77 (2008) “Rule 116 Sec2: Plea of guilty to a lesser offense” Daan and Kuizon were charged for three counts of malversation of public funds which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for a given period making it appear that some laborers work on the construction of the new municipal hall building in Bato, Leyte. They were also charged with falsification of public document by a public officer or employee. In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of “not guilty” and substitute the same with a plea of “guilty”, provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. If this proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of “not guilty” to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of “guilty”, but to a lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private individual. On the other hand in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of “not guilty” thereto with a plea of “guilty”, but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts. Prosecution found plea bargaining acceptable because it will strengthen the latter’s cases. Sandiganbayan denied. Petitioner filed certiorari in SC. Plea bargaining is authorized under Rule 116 Sec 2. The basic requisites is that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. However the use of the word may in Sec2 denotes and exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. In this case, the court ruled that the same standards applied by the Sandiganbayan in the case of People vs. Estrada (wherein the offense concerns public funds worth 25M) should be afforded the accused. The lesser offenses of Falsification of public individuals and failure to render account by accountable officer are necessarily included in the crimes of falsification of public documents and malversation of public funds respectively. Also, accused has already restituted the amount involved in the case and it does not appear that he took advantage of his official position in the commission of the crime. 168.) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REP BY THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC) VS. HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., G.R. NO. 174629 (2008) “Anti-Money Laundering Act” After the Agan vs. PIATCO ruling, a series of investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of the AMLC. The OSG wrote the AMLC requesting AMLC’s assistance in obtaining more evidence to completely reveal the financial trail of corruption surrounding the NAIA 3 Project. The CIS conducted an intelligence database search on the financial transactions of individuals involved in the award. AMLC issued a resolution authorizing its executive director to sign and verify an application to inquire into deposits and investments of Alvarez, et.al and to authorize the AMLC secretariat to conduct and inquiry once RTC grants application. RTC allowed the ex parte application. Alvarez argued that there is nothing in the AMLA authorizing the AMLC to seek authority to inquire into bank accounts ex parte. Court grants claim of Alvarez. Although AMLA authorized the AMLC to avail of a bank inquiry order without need of a pre-existing case, it does not follow that such order may be availed of ex parte (Sec 11 of AMLA). Court receiving application cannot simply take the AMLC’s word that probable cause exists that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity. Also supposed analogy between search warrant and a bank inquiry is unconvincing. The Constitution and the ROC prescribe particular requirements attaching to search warrant that are not imposed by the AMLA with respect to ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 155 of 256 Justice Gesmundo bank inquiry orders. A bank inquiry order is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of persons or property. 169.) MIGUEL E. COLORADO VS. JUDGE RICARDO M. AGAPITO, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, LAUR, NUEVA ECIJA, A.M. No. MTJ-0601658 (2007) “Rule 113 Sec 6: Arrest” Colorado is the accused in a criminal case for Grave Slander and Grave threats. He claims that on the date that the two cases were file, Judge Agapito immediately issued two warrants for his arrest. He was arrested on a Friday and languished in the municipal jail for two days and two nights. He was apparently arrested due to his non-appearance in court but he claims that although he previously received an envelope from the court, it does not contain anything. It was appears that the content was supposedly the notice of hearing. He now claims Grave abuse of authority on the part of Judge Agapito for the issuance of a warrant of arrest on a Friday to ensure complainants’ incarceration for two days. Nowhere in the rules or in our jurisprudence can we find that warrant of arrest issued on a Friday is prohibited. Complainant faults respondent for having been arrested on a Friday but Respondent cannot be held administratively liable for this particular matter. Rule 113 Sec 6 of Crimpro provides that arrest me made on any day at any time of the day or night. It is of no moment that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent on a Friday, because it is clear that the arrest may be made on any day regardless of what day the warrant of arrest was issued. Also, a person arrested on a Friday is not without recourse—he could post bail for his temporary liberty in view of SC Circular no. 95-96 providing for a skeletal force on a Saturday from 8am to 1pm primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters. 170. LIGAYA V. SANTOS, EDNA CORTEZ ET AL VS. JUDGE ROLANDO G. HOW (2007) “A judge cannot prevent the defense from presenting rebuttal evidence during the determination of guilt in bail hearings” Petitioners filed an admin case against Judge How because he prevented the presentation of rebuttal evidence of petitioners during the determination of whether evidence of guilt is strong during the bail hearings; instead he ruled solely on the evidence submitted by the opposing party. Respondent, in effect, deprived the accused with their right to present rebuttal evidence which to our mind is a clear violation of their right to due process and equal protection of the law. Dictates of fair play should have at least reminded respondent to inquire first of the nature of the evidence proposed to be presented, determine whether or not it will be essential for the purpose of ascertaining entitlement to bail, before discarding any evidence outright. This is in keeping with procedural due process, given established rules and jurisprudence on bail. 171. SALVADOR M. PEREZ, ET AL. VS. HON SIMEON V. MARCELO (2006) “Filing Amended Informations directly to the Sandiganbayan without the approval of the Ombudsman is a violation of procedural due process” Deputy Ombudsman of Luzon filed charges in violation of the Local Gov’t Code against Pangasinan Mayor Perez and Municipal Treasurer Apostol. Petitioners apparently bought computers paid too much for computers than what was stated as the regular market price. The Special Prosecs filed Informations which were directed to be withdrawn by the Ombudsman but were later amended. MR was denied since the powers of the prosecs to amend Informations do not need approval of the Ombudsman because there was no arraignment yet. The Ombudsman would be severely hampered from exercising his power of control if we are to allow the Special Prosecutor to authorize the filing of informations to the Sandiganbayan in the first instance. This is because while the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the informations may not be dismissed, without the approval of the said court. 172. BENJAMIN “KOKOY” ROMUALDEZ VS. HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO ET AL. (2006) “Absence of the accused from the Phils does not toll the prescriptive period in the prosecution of crimes” Several Informations were filed against Kokoy Romualdez for violation of RA 3019. Ombudsman revived such cases even after they were dismissed by the Sandiganbayan on the grounds of prescription. Ombudsman argues that ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 156 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Kokoy’s absence from the Phils tolls the period of prescription hence such crimes have not yet prescribed. Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91. Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted “when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.” However, there is no such proceeding instituted against the petitioner to warrant the tolling of the prescriptive periods of the offenses charged against him. The crimes have already prescribed. 173. JOSE C. MIRANDA, ET AL. VS. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO (2006) “Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest does not require jurisdiction over the person of the accused nor custody over the body of the accused.” A couple of police officers were named as perpetrators to the crime of murder. All were convicted except for Maderal who was later arrested; he subsequently named others as masterminds to the crime (herein petitioners). Presiding judge issued warrants of arrest to petitioners who filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, the judge noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion. 174. MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ VS. HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, ETC. ET AL. (2005) “The private prosecutor may intervene in the proceedings of the estafa case for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of checks which are also the subject of a BP 22 case.” Probable cause was attributed to petitioner making the city prosecutor to file two separate informations against her: one for violation of BP 22 and another for estafa (one in MTC and in RTC). Private prosecutor entered her appearance. An offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of these instances, the private complainant’s interest in the case disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. None of these exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the estafa suit. 175. MELBAROSE R. SASOT ET. AL. VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL. (2005) “A special civil action of Certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.” An information was filed against Sasot for possible violation of Art. 189 of the RPC on unfair competition. Sasot filed for motion to quash the information on the grounds that there was no offense as the NBA Properties Inc. is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines and could therefore have no standing to sue. Sasot’s Motion to Quash Information was denied by RTC and CA, hence this certiorari. Petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterate the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case such that immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari. 176. BRIG. GEN. CUSTODIO, ET AL. V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2005) “Before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 157 of 256 Justice Gesmundo at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.” This is the case of the double murder of Sen. Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman. In 1985, the Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused. However, the proceedings were later found by the SC to be a sham trial. The proceedings were nullified and a re-trial was ordered. In 1990, the Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty of murder. The judgment became final after the Court denied a petition for review of the Sandiganbayan decidion for failure to show reversible error as well as a subsequent MR. In 2004, petitioners requiested the Independent Forensic Group of the Univ. of the Philippines to make a review of the forensic evidence. The petitioners now want to present the findings to the Court and ask the Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and holding a third trial. One of the grounds invoked was the existence of newly discovered evidence that were not available during the second trial, specifically A) Independent forensic evidence uncovering the false forensic claims that led to the unjust conviction of the petitioners-movants and B) A key defense eyewitness to the actual killing of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. Petitioners submit that the review by the forensic group of the physical evidence constitutes newly discovered evidence which would entitle them to a new trial under Rule 121. Under the Rules, a person convicted of a crime may avail of the remedy of new trial before the judgment of conviction becomes final. Petitioners anchor their motion on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Courts are generally reluctant in granting motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence for it is presumed that the moving party has had ample opportunity to prepare his case carefully and to secure all the necessary evidence before the trial. Such motions are treated with great caution due to the danger of perjury and the manifest injustice of allowing a party to allege that which may be the consequence of his own neglect to defeat an adverse judgment. Hence, the moving party is often required to rebut a presumption that the judgment is correct and that there has been a lack of due diligence, and to establish other facts essential to warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered. The petitioners’ purported evidence does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that would justify the re- opening of the case and the holding of a third trial. The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as petitioners failed to show that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical evidence during the trial of the double murder case. It appears from their report that the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial evidence proferred during the trial, but made their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence. These materials were available to the parties during the trial and there was nothing that prevented the petitioners from using them at the time to support their theory. Petitioners, in their present motion, failed to present any new forensic evidence that could not have been obtained by the defense at the time of the trial even with the exercise of due diligence. If they really wanted to seek and offer the opinion of other forensic experts at the time regarding the physical evidence gathered at the scene of the crime, there was ample opportunity for them to do so before the case was finally submitted and decided. The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense during the trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules. The same is true with the statement of the alleged eyewitness, SPO4 Cantimbuhan. His narration merely corroborates the testimonies of other defense witnesses during the trial. IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (DETAINED AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA CITY) REYNALDO DE VILLA V, THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS Rule 121 – “A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 158 of 256 Justice Gesmundo merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment.” Reynaldo was accused of raping his niece, Aileen Mendoza, 12 years old. It was Aileen’s pregnancy, discovered by her mother a few months after the rape, that prompted the filing of charges. De Villa’s defenses were sickness and that the old age of 67 rendered him incapable of erection, that Mendozas bear a grudge against him and that he was in San Luis, Laguna at time of crime (alibi). RTC found de Villa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape and sentenced him to death. The case was elevated to SC for automatic review. SC affirmed RTC decision. SC found that the date of birth of Aileen’s child, Leahlyn, was medically consistent with time of rape. Three years after the SC Decision, June de Villa, son of accused, prays for the Dir. of New Bilibid to justify the basis of imprisonment (habeas corpus) and for a new trial. He alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim’s child, Leahlyn. June was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner’s case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. A writ of habeas corpus is proper when an individual is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. However, the writ cannot be sought to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction. A motion for new trial is available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds. Petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly “newly-discovered evidence”, i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape. The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition has long attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002. A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, the evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. June’s claim that he was “unaware” of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner’s counsel. It is a settled rule that a party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect. A client is bound by the acts of his counsel, including the latter’s mistakes and negligence. Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal because the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. 179. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DEL CASTILLO (2004) Rule 126, Sec. 8 – “It is only in the absence of the lawful occupants of a house, room, or premises or any member of his family that two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality may be called.” Under the authority of a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of shabu and its paraphernalias in the house of the appellant, police went to the subject house, entered the house, saw the appellant and served the warrant on her. The appellant and the residents of the house were asked to stay and sit down in the sala while the police were searching the property. They found shabu and paraphernalia, listed the inventory and asked appellant to sign the same. The inventory was given to one of the tanods present during the search. The manner in which the search was conducted failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Sec. 8, Rule 126 which provides that “No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.” It is only in the absence of the lawful occupants that two witnesses residing the same locality may be called. While appellant and other occupants ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 159 of 256 Justice Gesmundo were present during the search, they were not allowed to actually witness the search of the premises as they were asked to stay in the sala. They should have been the ones who accompanied the police, not the tanods. 180. PEOPLE V. HUANG ZHEN HUA AND JOGY LEE (2004) Rule 112, Sec. 7 – “Probable cause exists for the warrantless detention and arrest of one at the premises being searched when the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reliable and trustworthy information are sufficient to themselves warrant a reasonable belief of a cautious person that an offense has been or is being committed.” The police received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan, Henry Lao and appellants Huang Zhen Hua and Jogy Lee were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. They conducted surveillance and were able to verify that Lao and appellant Lee were living together as husband and wife in a condominium in Makati and a condominium in Paranaque. The police secured a search warrant and went to the condominium in Makati. No persons were present but they found shabu and paraphernalia, plus tools for the production of fake credit cards. Subsequently, Chan and Lao were killed in a shoot-out that happened between them and the police. The police went to the condominium in Paranaque where the appellants were.They found shabu and paraphernalia. The police brought the appellants to Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) headquarters and they were detained. The police officers executed an affidavit of arrest. The appellants were charges of violation of RA 6425. The RTC convicted both. (Huang Zhen Hua was acquitted because he had only been here for 4 days, no shabu was found in his person or his room and there was no evidence of possession.) Lee contends that there was no probable cause for her arrest as her mere presence in the condominium does not render her liable for the shabu found. The OSG contends that there was probable cause because an informant had tipped off the arresting officers that Lee was a member of a syndicate dealing with illegal drus, and that she handled the accounts of Lao and Chan. Although the appellant Lee was not one of the accused named in the search warrants, such fact did not proscribe the policemen from arresting and charging her of violation of RA 6425. There was probable cause for her warrantless arrest independent of that found by the judge who issued the search warrants. Probable cause exists for the warrantless detention and arrest of one at the premises being searched when the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reliable and trustworthy information are sufficient to themselves warrant a reasonable belief of a cautious person that an offense has been or is being committed. In Draper v. United States, it was held that informations from a reliable informant, corroborated by the police officer’s observations as to the accuracy of the description of the accused, and of his presence at a particular place, is sufficient to establish probable cause. In this case, the police officers received reliable information and verified, after surveillance, that appellant Lee and Lao were living together as husband and wife in the condominium unit and that appellant Lee handled the accounting of the payments and proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of Lao. Indeed, the policemen found that the appellant occupied the bedroom and slept in the same bed used by Lao. The appellant took her clothes from the same cabinet where Anciro, Jr. found the subject shabu and paraphernalia. The appellant had been living in the same condominium unit with Lao since October 1, 1996 until her arrest on October 25, 1996. Along with Lao, the appellant thus had joint control and possession of the bedroom, as well as of the articles, paraphernalia, and the shabu found therein. Such facts and circumstances are sufficient on which to base a reasonable belief that the appellant had joint possession of the regulated drugs found in the bedroom along with Lao, her live- in partner. For the purpose of prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, possession can be constructive and need not be exclusive, but may be joint. 181. PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND ALBA (2004) “To quash means to annul, vacate or overthrow. The absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ground for the quashal of the Information but is a ground for the dismissal of the case. If the court finds that there is no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, it may dismiss the case.” Pablan filed a Graft case against City Administrator Alba and the Chairman of Iglesia Evangelica Metodista En Las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF) Cruz with the Ombudsman. Pablan is the owner of a lot where IEMELIF encroached when improvements on their structure were made. The construction was done without the necessary building permit. The Assistant Building Official ordered the demolition of the structure. The order became final and executory for failure of IEMELIF to appeal to the DPWH. IEMELIF wrote a letter to Alba that said order not be ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 160 of 256 Justice Gesmundo enforced pending appeal. The letter was dated Nov. 5, 1998 but the Memo ordering the recall of the demolition order was dated Nov. 4, 1998 (a day before the receipt of the letter). Pablan objected but Alba refused. The Building Official was not able to effect the demolition. Abla alleged that he was acting under the authority delegated to him by Mayor Mathay and the guidelines implementing the Memo stating that no demolition shall be allowed pending appeal. The Graft Investigator found probable cause and recommended the filing of the information for violation of RA 3019, which the Ombudsman approved. Alba filed a Motion for Leave to Order Reinvestigation and/or Quash Information, which he later on converted to a Motion for Reconsideration. The SB granted the motion to quash and acquitted Alba saying that there was no probable cause. It based it findings on the Memo of Mayor Mathay. The SB acted with grave abuse of discretion when it quashed the information. The Memorandum of Mayor Mathay had already been amended by Memorandum No. 4, which states that the authority to act on violations of the Building Code no longer rested on the City Administrator by on the City Engineer. Moreover, the Memorandum of Mathay was contrary to the National Building Code, which states that the Secretary of DPWG has jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of building officials involving non-issuance, suspension or revocation of building permits. His decision is final subject only to review by the President. When the Omnibus Motion was converted into a Motion for Reconsideration, he, in effect, withdrew his motion to quash. The required reinvestigation was conducted to ascertain if there was probable cause for the filing of the information. There was no motion to quash the information pending resolution by the SB. Alba had already been arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and posted bail. The SB had already acquired jurisdiction. The SB should have set the pre-trial instead of quashing the information and even acquitting Alba. The arraignment and posting of bail bond proscribed the SB from dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. To quash means to annul, vacate or overthrow. The absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ground for the quashal of the Information but is a ground for the dismissal of the case. If the court finds that there is no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, it may dismiss the case. The dismissal of the case is without prejudice to the refiling thereof unless barred by prescription. In Section 6, Rule 112, the trial court is mandated to immediately dismiss the case upon finding that no probable cause exists to issue a warrant of arrest, and after having evaluated the resolution of the prosecutor and the supporting evidence. By quashing the Information on the premise of lack of probable cause instead of merely dismissing the case, the SB acted in violation of case law and, thus, acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the dismissal of a case is different from the acquittal of the accused. Except in a dismissal of the case based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case will not result in the acquittal of the said accused. 194. PEOPLE vs GALLEGO (2003) The accused must raise the matter of the validity of his arrest before arraignment, otherwise he is barred from doing so during trial and on appeal. Case law has it that findings of facts of the trial court, especially if affirmed by the appellate court, are given great respect if not conclusive effect by the Supreme Court unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. Having had the unique advantage of observing and monitoring at close range the demeanor and conduct of witnesses as they testify, the trial court is in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimony. Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of witnesses to get involved in criminal cases are sufficient explanations for a witness’ delay in reporting a crime to the authorities. Experience dictates that precisely because of the startling acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can recall with a high degree of reliability the identities of the criminals and how at any given time the crime has been committed by them. 195. PEOPLE vs LAIPTAJE (2003) ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 161 of 256 Justice Gesmundo 1. Waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 2. Aggravating or qualifying circumstance must be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. 3. Warrantless search of a moving vehicle is allowed only when it is NOT practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle carrying the prohibited drugs can be quickly moved out of the area or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. This exception in no way gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. • Rule 126 Sec 13 – Search Incidental to Lawful Arrest; Stop and Frisk 196. PEOPLE vs CHUA (2003) In in flagrante delicto arrests, the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. We distinguish the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. • Rule 114 Section 2- Condition of Bail; Requirements 197. SERAPIO vs SANDIGANBAYAN (2003) The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. When bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be “authorized” under the circumstances. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 162 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Court finds no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial. As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. An accused may file a Motion to quash the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. • Rule 126 Section 13 – Plain View 198. PEOPLE vs ESTRELLA (2003) Without the knowledge that a suspect had committed or was actually committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers, there could be no search incident to a lawful arrest. The scope of the search in one incident to lawful arrest should be limited to the area within which the person to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can destroy. The prevailing rule is that the arresting officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon the latter’s person—that which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may provide the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case. The purpose of the exception is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person being arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. A search of an entire hut exceeds the bounds of that which may be considered to be incident to a lawful arrest. • Rule 126 Section 13 – Search Incidental to Lawful Arrest; Airports 199. PEOPLE vs CANTON (2002) In an airport checkpoint search on the person of the passenger that yielded shabu, what may apply is “arrest in flagrante delicto” more than “search incidental to a lawful arrest.” In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. Prior to the strip search in the ladies’ room, the airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSAN’s body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being committed. It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. The search conducted on SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline substances. Such warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. Her subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto. 200. PEOPLE V. QUE MING KHA, (2002) Rule 126 Section 13, (Search Incident to Lawful Arrest, Evidence in Plain View) Doctrine: Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 163 of 256 Justice Gesmundo search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. Digest: Go and Que were arrested and convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act because they were caught in possession of Shabu. They alleged that the search was invalid because it was not made with a warrant. The Supreme Court held that the search was not illegal because the facts show that while the van was traversing Don Antonio Avenue in Quezon City, it accidentally hit a seven-year old ambulant vendor. The van stopped and the owner got off to bring the boy to the hospital. A police officer who witnessed the accident approached the van to apprehend the driver for reckless imprudence. As he stood near the van, he saw through the lightly tinted window of the van several sacks placed at the back of the van. One of the sacks was open, revealing several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance which the police suspected to be shabu. Clearly, the prohibited substance was within the plain view of the police officer who was in a position to be near the van at the time. 201. MERCIALES V. CA (2002) Not under anything in the Syllabus but the case may be under Rule 119, section 17 – discharge of an accused to be a state witness Doctrine: Presentation of evidence is expressly required by the rules for discharging an accused to be a state witness. The accused are not only the ones who are entitled to criminal due process, the victim is also entitled to due process. Digest: A charge of rape was filed against several accused men. During the trial, the prosecutor filed a motion for discharge of one of the accused to be a state witness. However, the prosecutor did not present evidence for the discharge arguing that no other evidence need be presented because said accused was already admitted in the Witness Protection Program. The judge denied the motion to discharge said accused. The prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. No TRO was issued. The judge required the presentation of other evidence in support of the charge of rape but the prosecutor declined to present evidence invoking the pending certiorari case. The defendants moved for a demurrer. The judge acquitted the defendants. The mother of the accused filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. CA denied. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor in this case was guilty of serious nonfeasance by not presenting evidence first as to the discharge of the accused to be a state witness (as required by the Rules) and by refusing to present evidence in support of the rape. The Judge was also guilty of nonfeasance for allowing the prosecutor to refuse to present evidence even though it was obvious that the evidence presented are insufficient to support a conclusion. In criminal proceedings, not only the defendants are entitled to due process, but also the victim. In this case, she was denied the opportunity to be heard. 202. PEOPLE V. ASPIRAS (2002) Rule 126, Section 13 (Search incidental to lawful arrest, plain view) Doctrine: While it is true that the police officers had prior justification for intrusion, permitting a warrantless seizure of any piece of evidence incriminating an accused, nonetheless, applying the “plain view doctrine,” such must be limited to those evidence that the police officer came across inadvertently. Digest: Accused was arrested during a buy-bust operation where he was caught selling marijuana in flagrante delicto. During trial, the prosecution wanted to presented several bricks of marijuana as evidence. These bricks of marijuana were found inside the house of the accused after he ran inside the same when he was about to be arrested. However, upon testifying, the police officer said that he found the marijuana under the table and inside a plastic bag. The SC held that the evidence was inadmissible because it was not proven that the marijuana bricks were inadvertently found by the police officer in plain view. Moreover, the prosecution failed to show whether or not the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 164 of 256 Justice Gesmundo plastic bag was transparent that would prove beyond reasonable doubt that the “plain view” of such plastic bag would readily disclose that its contents are marijuana. 203. RUDY CABALLES V. CA, (2002) Rule 126 – Sec 13 search incidental to lawful arrest – motor vehicle Doctrine: Probable cause is still important in search of moving vehicles. One form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order 22 and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search. Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection;and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area. Physical intrusion of a part of the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment (US v. Pierre). Digest: Caballes was convicted of theft of conductor wires owned by the NAPOCOR. He alleges that he cannot be convicted because the discovery of the crime was on the basis of an illegal search and seizure. The facts provide that Caballes was driving a jeepney covered by “kakawati” leaves which police officers found unusual. Thus the police officer flagged him down and discovered that there were stolen goods under the wires. The SC held that this is not a valid search and seizure because the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of the vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check. Moreover, the Court held that the fact that the vehicle was covered by kakawati leaves and looked unusual cannot be considered probable cause. 204. PUBLIC UTILITIES DEPARTMENT OF OLONGAPO VS. DOJ SECRETARY GUINGONA (2001) Doctrine: Certiorari will not lie to compel the respondent Secretary of Justice to file a case if he thinks the evidence does not warrant it. Digest: Petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent Tiu for theft of electricity and violation of a city ordinance. Upon preliminary investigation, the prosecutor found no sufficient basis for the complaint and dismissed the same. On appeal, Acting Secretary of Justice Demetria said there was basis for theft of electricity. DOJ Sec Guingona reconsidered and reversed and issued a resolution dismissing the complaint. Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari. The SC held that the holding of a preliminary investigation is a function of the Executive Department and not of the Judiciary. The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free a respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed upon in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent officer designated by law for that purpose. Secondly, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges. The decision whether or not to dismiss the complaint against private respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 165 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice may be reviewed by the court. However, the court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the Congress or of the President when they did not act in grave abuse of discretion. 206. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARMANDO COMPACION Y SURPOSA(2001) (RULE 126, SEC 13- search incidental to lawful arrest, consented search)- “A search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of the constitutional provision. However, there are several instances when the law recognizes exceptions.” Armando Compacion was charged for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 where allegedly he planted, cultivated or cultured 2 full grown Marijuana plants in his backyard. After a surveillance was conducted on the residence of the accused the team tried to get a search warrant a day before the arrest from 2 Judges but failed on both, because it was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 1 st one and for the 2 nd one they arrived at the house of the judge when office hours was already over. Nevertheless, they proceeded to the residence of the accused early morning the next day (1:30 am). They knocked on the gate which accused opened and from there the stories of both sides differed. Prosecution said upon entering the premises the police immediately asked about growing the plant the accused said yes they have it for his wife suffering from migraine. The accused on the other hand says that upon opening the gate the officers entered his house, did not ask permission to conduct a search, and when they said that he has Marijuana plants in the backyard he said that he did not know they were such and all he knows is that they have medicinal plants. The Court held that YES, the trial court erred in convicting the accused. A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Evidence secured thereby, i.e., the “fruits” of the search and seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority prior to the conduct of a search and seizure admits certain exceptions, such as when the owner of the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search; when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; when it involves a “stop and frisk” situation; when the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances. In these instances, a search may be validly made even without a warrant. In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls under any of the above-mentioned cases. Consequently, accused-appellant’s right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The accused did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either expressly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused in allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. His implied acquiescence, if any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, herein accused-appellant’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. 207. VICENTE DEL ROSARIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2001) (RULE 126, search and seizure)- “Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant—searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. The seizure of ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 166 of 256 Justice Gesmundo evidence in ‘plain view’ applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.” Vicente Del Rosario was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms by the RTC. The facts as found by the CA are that the police received a report that del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without necessary licenses and that upon inquiry to the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division a certification was issued stating that del Rosario is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. And with this, a search warrant was issued to enable P/Sr. Insp. Adique’s team to search del Rosario’s house. The search yielded a caliber .45 psitol with 5 magazines found at the master’s bedroom, 5 magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and 2 radios found in the room of del Rosario’s daughter and a caliber .22 revolver with 8 pieces of live ammunition found in the kitchen. Del Rosario contends that he had a license for the .45 pistol and that the other items seized were merely planted by the police, and that the manner in which the search was carried out was illegal since the search warrant was issued in violation of the Constitution and consequently the evidence is inadmissible. The Court held that YES, the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of said constitutional provision. The requisites for a search warrant’s validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial “fruit of a poisonous tree.” In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner’s house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the seizure was illegal. 208. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO SALAGUIT(2001) (RULE 126, SEC 6)- “In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure; there is no presumption of regularity.” Roberto Salanguit was found guilty for the violation of RA 6425 for the possession of shabu. Prosecution established that Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in RTC Cavite to search Salanguit’s residence in Novaliches, QC and presented SPO1 Badua as a poseur –buyer who was able to buy shabu and said that the sale took place in Salanguit’s room with the shabu taken from a cabinet. The warrant was issued by Judge Espanol. The accused assails the validity of the warrant issued stating that there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia, the warrant was issued for more than 1 specific offense and that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity. The Court held that YES, the warrant was properly issued being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The warrant authorized seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia” where probable cause of existence of shabu was presented. Although SPO1 Badua’s testimony did not mention anything about drug paraphernalia, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for seizure of such does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would only be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia but valid as to the seizure of shabu. On the issue that the warrant was issued for more than 1 specific offense because use/possession of shabu and of drug paraphernalia are under different provisions, it was held that only one warrant was necessaru to cover the violations under the various provisions of the same law. And lastly, on the issue of the specificity of the description of the place to be searched, it is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 167 of 256 Justice Gesmundo 209. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY TING UY (2002) (RULE 126, SEC 13- search incidental to lawful arrest)- “There are exceptions to searches and seizures without a warrant. In lawful arrests in the course of a buy-bust operation, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the accused but also in the permissible area within his reach.” Jerry Ting Uy, was found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A Chinses-Filipino police informant told the police officers in the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District that Ting Uy was engaged in illegal drug activities in Sta. Cruz Manila. The informant was asked to contact Ting Uy and to negotiate with him for the purchase of shabu and after this, the police planned a buy-bust operation for the entrapment of Ting Uy. After obtaining the shabu PO3 Chico introduced himself as a police officer and immediately arrested Ting Uy. The marked money was retrieved and inspection of the car was made where more plastic bags containing suspected shabu were found. The Court held that YES, the shabu seized from him is admissible as evidence. The Constitution generally proscribes searches and seizures without judicial warrant. Any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is not absolute, however. Searches and seizures may be made without warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) the search was incident to a lawful arrest; (2) the search is of a moving motor vehicle; (3) the search concerns violation of customs laws; (4) the seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Undoubtedly, Ting Uy was lawfully arrested, caught as he was in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers. In lawful arrests in the course of a buy-bust operation, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the accused but also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him the means of committing violence or of escaping. 210. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEILA JOHNSON (2000) (RULE 126, SEC 13- search incidental to lawful arrest, airports)- “Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation in privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable; such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.” Leila Johnson was found guilty by the Pasay RTC for the violation of Sec 16 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Defendant was to board a flight going to the US. The lady frisker Ramirez at the departure area was tasked to frisk departing passengers, employees and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods and explosives. When defendant was frisked, something hard has felt on the abdominal area, upon inquiry she explained that she needed to wear panty girdles. Upon Ramirez’ superior’s instruction, defendant was brought to the women’s room for inspection and here, 3 packs of shabu were found under the girdle which was confiscated. According to the defendant what happened was that she was at the last boarding gate when she was approached by 3 officers, was handcuffed and brought to the women’s room and was subjected to a body search but nothing was found on her person. Later on she was taken in an office where white packages were thrown on the table and she was asked to admit that the packages were hers. The Court held that NO, the constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant as it was an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search. The shabu was seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport and was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. There is little question that such searches are reasonable given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Travelers are notified through airport PA systems, signs and notices in airline tickets that they are subject to search and if prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. 211. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA and VALENTINO ORTIZ (2000) (RULE 126, SEC 9- time of making search)- “The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime, though, as an exception, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, may be made when ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 168 of 256 Justice Gesmundo the application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched. Absent an abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night where so allowed is not improper. The court takes judicial notice that 7:30 PM in a suburban subdivision in Metro Manila is an hour at which residents are still up-and-about.” The PNP-CISC conducted surveillance of suspected drug pushing activities at the Regine Condominium, Makati where one of their targets was Valentino Ortiz. Upon alighting his jeep, it was seen that he had a suspiciously bulging pants pocket and so the police officers accosted him and were able to retrieve a .25 caliber pistol, one magazine and 7 rounds of live ammunition. The search of his vehicle yielded a cellophane packet of shabu. The PNP-CISC applied for a search warrant against Ortiz for the violation of PD 1866 and to support the application, depositions of 2 officers were given stating their personal knowledge that Ortiz was keeping in his residence in Better Living Subdivision Paranaque, some unlicensed firearms. The application was granted the same day with the warrant commanding he officers to make an immediate search at any reasonable hour of the day or night of the house/s, closed receptacles and premises above described and seize and take possession the personal property subject of the offense described. PNP-CISC-Special Investigation Group team with a representative of the MTC judge and a barangay security officer went to Ortiz’ residence at 7:30 PM of the same day to search the premises and such resulted to seizure of unlicensed firearms and ammunition. The Court held that YES, the search was valid. The rule on issuance of a search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the time within which the warrant may be served subject to the statutory requirement fixing the maximum time for the execution of a warrant. The court found that the judge who issued the warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night. It was also held that 7:30 PM is a reasonable time for executing a search warrant in the metropolis. In this case there was no showing that the search that began at 7:30 PM caused an abrupt intrusion upon sleeping residents in the dark or that it caused Ortiz’ family such prejudice as to make the execution of the warrant a voidable act. The exact time of the execution of a warrant should be left to the discretion of the law enforcement officers. FRANK UY ET. AL. V. BIR G. R. NO. 129651 (2000) “Search warrants to be issued only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge through examination of complainant or any of his witnesses on facts personally known to them” Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish Packing Corporation, executed an affidavit essentially alleging that Unifish and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities in violation of the NIRC, mainly that they sold bulks of products (canned sardines and oil) without issuing receipts. The BIR applied for and was granted search warrants. Agents of the BIR and the PNP searched the premises of Unifish and seized, among other things, records and documents, for which a return was duly made. The BIR then filed a case before the DOJ. Unifish filed and motions to quash the search warrants and an MR, both denied, and the subsequent petition for certiorari was also dismissed by the CA, which questioned the validity of the search warrants due to inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched and the objects to be seized and the existence of probable cause. Rule 126 Sections 3 & 4 provide that search warrants must be issued if there exists probable cause, which must be determined after the judge personally examines under oath the complainant and any of his witnesses on facts personally known to them. In this case, the search warrants were issued based on the deposition of 2 witnesses: Labaria from the BIR, which was ruled as hearsay; and Abos, who in fact had personal knowledge obtained during his employment in Unifish, as former Operating Chief he had access to company records. In his deposition he detailed the schemes employed in the evasion of taxes and the description of the places where the evidence was located. Thus, there was sufficient basis for the issuance of said warrants. PEOPLE v. ABE VALDEZ Y DELA CRUZ G. R. NO. 129296 (2000) “Warrantless search and seizure are valid only if incident to (AFTER) a lawful arrest, not before.” Witnesses for the prosecution claimed that an informant tipped them about marijuana cultivation allegedly owned by Abe, for which they formed a team to inspect said premises and were instructed to uproot the plants and arrest the cultivator. They proceeded to the place with the informer and supposedly found Abe in his hut and when asked whose were the plants clearly growing near his hut, admitted they were his. The team of police officers took photos of Abe with the uprooted plants and was arrested thereafter. Abe as sole witness for the defense, claimed that he ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 169 of 256 Justice Gesmundo was intimidated into admitting ownership of the plants, posing beside the plants and being arrested. He contends that there was unlawful search since there was not warrant, to which the Sol. Gen. answered that there was no search made, but that the plants were in plain view AND since they were growing on an unfenced lot, are not private therefore no search warrant needed, thus a valid warrantless search. He was found guilty by the Trial Court hence this automatic review. Court ruled that the police had the opportunity to secure a search warrant but chose not to. Also, the “plain view doctrine” only applies where the police is NOT searching for evidence against the accused, and came across said evidence inadvertently. Finally, the police testified that they first located the marijuana plants before arresting Abe. Thus, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search. Rule 126 Section 13 provides that warrantless search for things which may constitute proof in the commission of an offense may be made ONLY AFTER a lawful arrest. SOLAR ET. AL. V. HON. ROLANDO HOW ETC. ET. AL. G. R. NO. 140863 (2000) “Suspension of the arraignment of the accused is within the sound discretion of the court.” The Paranaque City Prosecutor filed an Information for estafa against Ma. Fe Barreiro, which was set for hearing, but arraignment was deferred numerous times (suspended) pending the appeal taken by Barreiro to the Secretary of Justice. Solar claims the suspension of the arraignment was too long, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act and Rule 116 Section 12 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. First, the Secretary of Justice is given by law the power of control and supervision over his subordinates in spite of an information already filed in court. Second, the court is tasked to independently evaluate the merits of the case and is not bound by the Secretary’s recommendation and may either agree or disagree therewith. Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in complete control of the case and any disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion. Third, the Speedy Trial Act which provides that arraignment should be held 30 days after the information is filed admits of several exceptions, which the case at bar comes under. Finally, the circumstances mentioned in Section 12 Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are not exclusive, as jurisprudence has repeatedly held. PEOPLE v. JULIAN ESCANO, et. al. G. R. NO. 129756-58 (2000) “Checkpoints are valid when warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists and is limited to a visual search.” Prosecution version: A checkpoint was set up at the corner of Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. and SLEX pursuant to a COMELEC gun ban, where they stopped a car containing Usana, Escano, and Lopez. They saw a long firearm on the lap of Usana, and the rest were searched and a .45 caliber firearm was also yielded. In the trunk was found a bag carrying hashish which was owned by Escano. The statements of the accused differed from each other, and so the court found the prosecution’s version more credible. Thus they were convicted. The appeal questioned the admission of the bag in evidence for being seized without a search warrant, and how the checkpoint was conducted and that it should have been announced. Court ruled checkpoints are valid if warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in the least intrusive way, limited to a visual search. For as long as the vehicle is not searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, it is not violative of a person’s right against unreasonable searches. In this case, the checkpoint was pursuant to a COMELEC gun ban. If announces, it would forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. (Accused other than Escano were acquitted because the hashish and the car belonged to Escano, and no connection can be made to Usana and Lopez.) PEOPLE v. WEBB G. R. NO. 132577 (1999) “Introduction of evidence that would not have persuasive effect on the case may be disallowed by the court in its sound discretion.” Hubert Webb sought the taking of depositions of five people in America before the Philippine diplomatic agents thereat, claiming it was indispensable in proving his innocence. The trial court denied his motion, as well as the subsequent MR, both denials were set aside by the Court of Appeals. The CA stated that the purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully available for justice, and that even though the basis of Webb’s motion to take deposition is a mode of discovery and found in the Rules of Civil Procedure, the four divisions of the Rules of Court should be construed as a whole, for the division is merely for expediency, not exclusivity. SC ruled otherwise. The depositions sought to be taken would be superfluous, or corroborative at best, as there are ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 170 of 256 Justice Gesmundo numerous pieces of evidence which would prove the same thing the depositions seek to prove, and will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record. COJUANGCO v. SANDIGANBAYAN G. R. NO. 134307 (1998) “An arrest warrant should issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge.” A case was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General before the PCGG against Cojuangco for alleged violation R. A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, but the proceedings thereat were nullified and were ordered transferred to the Office of the Ombudsman. After it was decided that no prejudicial question exists, a criminal case was filed with the Sandiganbayan. Pursuant thereto, the Sandiganbayan issued an arrest warrant for Cojuangco, on the basis of two pieces of documents: a resolution by a panel of investigators and a memorandum by the Prosecutor. The court ruled that Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally determining the existence of probable cause, for the two documents were the product of somebody else’s determination. (However, since he posted bail and sought other affirmative relief, he was considered to have invoked and voluntarily submitted himself under the court’s jurisdiction.) “Once the information has already been filed with the court, any disposition of the case rests in the discretion of the court.” The Office of the Prosecutor issued a memorandum recommending the dismissal of the case in the absence of probable cause, which Cojuangco invokes as binding on the court, saying it was an integral part of the preliminary investigation which should take precedence. The court ruled that although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the prosecution, he cannot impose his opinion on the court, for the latter is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it, and so the resolution of the aforesaid recommendation now lies within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court. “Right to speedy disposition of the case is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.” Cojuangco filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss based on the finding of the Office of the Special Prosecutor that no probable cause exists. It has been more than three years after the filing of the Information, one and a half after the manifestation of lack of probable cause. The court ruled that the Sandiganbayan exercised inexcusable delay, since all pertinent pleadings required by it were all submitted already; and it was ordered to resolve the case on the merits. 218. PEOPLE VS. CUENO G.R. No. 128277 (1998) “In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect but also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping.” Cueno was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. He was accused of selling marijuana, a prohibited drug, to a poseur buyer. Cueno was questioning the legality of the search made in his house. The arrest of Cueno was made in the course of a buy-bust operation, thus, in flagrante delicto. A buy-bust operation - a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law - is far variant from an ordinary arrest. 219. DIMATULAC vs. VILLON G.R. No. 127107 (1998) “There is a right to appeal to the DOJ from a resolution of a Provincial Prosecutor. Sec. 4 of Rule 12 states that “If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for the dismissal of the complaint or information.” The proper party referred to is either the offended party or the accused. An appeal to the DOJ is an invocation of the Secretary’s power of control over prosecutors. The secretary of Justice has the power or authority to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for review or ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 171 of 256 Justice Gesmundo appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. *this is a procedural case 220. MANALILI vs. CA G.R. No. 113447 (1997) “When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses -- like “stop-and-frisk” -- which are graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen’s constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.” The police saw Alain in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. When Alain tried to avoid the policemen, they approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. They asked Alain if he could see what he had in his hands. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. Petitioner assails the search. Search is legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Sec. 5(a) Rule 113. Search was valid because it is akin to a stop-and-frisk. In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. 221. VASQUEZ vs. HOBILLA-ALINIO G.R. No. 118813-14 (1997) “Under Sec. 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, it is clear that failure of the prosecution to furnish copy of the resolution to private respondents is not one of the grounds to quash an information.” Odelmo appeared before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman and filed a complaint for murder. The Ombudsman concluded that there was probable cause. It recommended the filing of an Information for double murder. However, upon review of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) it found that 2 separate crimes of murder were committed but the commission was not in relation to the performance of the respondents. The OSP recommended the filing of 2 separate informations. The respondents filed a motion to quash the informations because the Office of the Ombudsman failed to furnish the private respondents with a copy of the resolution depriving them of their right to move for reconsideration or to elevate the matter to a higher office. x x x x the failure to furnish the respondent with a copy of an adverse resolution pursuant to Section 6 x x x does not affect the validity of an information thereafter filed even if a copy of the resolution upon which the information is based was not served upon the respondent. 222. TABUENA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No 103507 (1997) “Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised this as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for us to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not.” In a Presidential Memorandum, Marcos commanded Tabuena as General Manager of the MIAA to pay PNCC, the sum of 55M. Tabuena withdrew the sum and delivered them to Marcos’ private secretary. Tabuena did not follow the normal procedures in withdrawal and delivery of the money. Tabuena claims that he was only complying with the direct order of Marcos so he acted on good faith. The Court itself raises the contention that the case involves a violation of the accused’s right to due process in the sense that it was obvious that the Sandiganbayan was overzealous in its attempt to convict parties involved – as seen in the volume of questions asked, and the manner the same were posed (cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation). But what appears to be a more compelling reason for their acquittal is the violation of the accused’s basic constitutional right to due process. “Respect for the Constitution”, to borrow once again Mr. Justice Cruz’s words, “is more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused.” Sandiganbayan was obviously biased, denying Tabuena and parties involves the requirement of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. As a consequence of such violation of due process, the order of Sandiganbayan was found void. Note that this defense was not raised by Tabuena. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 172 of 256 Justice Gesmundo SOCRATES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 253 SCRA 773(1996) Rule 110, sufficiency of information Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these are matters of defense; Informations need only state ultimate facts. It is not the technical name given by the fiscal appearing in the title of the Information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information; Where an offense can be committed in many different modes, and the offense is alleged in one or more modes, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed through any one of the modes provided that is be such as to constitute the substantive offense. All persons who appear responsible shall be charged in the information, and those against whom no sufficient evidence of guilt exists are not required to be included; but, failure of the fiscal to include other public officials who appear responsible for the offense charged as co-accused in the information shall not vitiate the validity of the information filed. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy.” The failure to include a co-accused is not covered by the exception; hence, the same is deemed waived. Where the government prosecutor unreasonably refuses to file an information or to include a person as an accused therein despite the fact that the evidence clearly warrants such action, the offended party has the following remedies: (1) in case of grave abuse of discretion, he may file an action for mandamus to compel the prosecutor to file such information; (2) he may lodge a new complaint against the offenders before the Ombudsman and have a new examination conducted as required by law; (3) he may institute administrative charges against the erring prosecutor, or a criminal complaint under Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code, or a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code; (4) he may secure the appointment of another prosecutor; or (5) he may institute another criminal action if no double jeopardy is involved. Neither will the absence of a preliminary investigation, assuming that it is necessary to conduct a new one, affect the validity of the information filed against petitioner. Absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the criminal information or render it defective. Dismissal of the case is not the remedy. It is not a ground for the quashal of a complaint or information. The proper course is for the Sandiganbayan to pause the proceedings upon such information and to remand the case to the office of the Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation, if the accused actually makes out a case justifying such relief. An order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. It cannot be the subject of appeal until the judgment or a final order is rendered. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to enter a plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. Under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. Upon a proper determination of the validity of the information it becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue the suspension order; Court has no discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused on the pretext that an order denying the motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts. PADERANGA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 247 SCRA 741 (1995) Rule 114, Bail. Bail’s main purpose is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and still secure his appearance at the trial. As bail is intended to obtain or secure one’s provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. A person is considered to be in the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 173 of 256 Justice Gesmundo custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. Even if petitioner filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest, he may, however, under the peculiar circumstances which attended the filing of the bail application, because he was then confined in the hospital, for purposes of the hearing thereof, he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, with the exceptions where the accused is charged with capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus under the general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail. When bail is a matter of judicial discretion, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due process. If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court’s order in respect of the motion or petition is void. At the hearing, the accused can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. When, eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if objected, for these represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires. PEOPLE VS. BALINGAN, 241 SCRA 277 (1995) Rule 126, Search and Seizure. The search and seizure in the case at bench happened in a moving, public vehicle. The Court approved a warrantless search done on a taxicab which yielded the illegal drug commonly known as shabu. The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Baguio INP Narcotics Intelligence Division received an information that Balingan was going to transport marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their surveillance operations revealed that Balingan, whose movements had been previously monitored by the Narcotics Division, boarded a Dangwa bus bound for Manila carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag. When the moving public bus was stopped, her bag, upon inspection, yielded marijuana. Under those circumstances, the warrantless search of appellant's bag was not illegal. PEOPLE VS. DE GRACIA, 233 SCRA 716 (1994) Search and Seizure. The military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. Under the foregoing circumstances, the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 174 of 256 Justice Gesmundo was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. When the crime is punished by a special law, intent to commit the crime is not necessary as it is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law; Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act, distinguished. Ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition since what the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or subjection of the thing to one’s control and management. TORRALBA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 230 SCRA 33 (1994) Preliminary investigation. The right to such preliminary investigation, nevertheless, is still an indispensable element of our criminal justice system that may not be treated lightly, let alone ignored. A member of the Provincial board filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against Petitioner and other persons for conspiring in overpricing 2 cars purchased by the provincial government. The Ombudsman filed the information charging petitioner and other of violating the Anti-Graft law. Petitioners were not only effectively denied the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s final resolution but also deprived of their right to a full preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the information against them. The incomplete preliminary investigation in this case, however, does not warrant the quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate the proceedings already had. Neither is the court’s jurisdiction nor validity of an information adversely affected by deficiencies in the preliminary investigation. Instead, the Sandiganbayan is to hold in abeyance any further proceedings therein and to remand the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for the completion of the preliminary investigation, the outcome of which shall then be indorsed to Sandiganbayan for its appropriate action. 242. MANOLO FULE V. COURT OF APPEALS (1988) RULE 118, PRE-TRIAL AGREEMENTS Omission of the signatures of accused and counsel renders the stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence. The RTC and CA convicted petitioner for violation of BP 22 on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court not signed by the petitioner or his counsel. Rule 118, Sec. 4. Provides that Pre-trial agreements must be signed.—No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel.” By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. The use of the term “shall” further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt. 243. LEONOR FORMILLEZA V. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN 1 ST DIVISION (1988) As a general rule, a decision or final order of the Sandiganbayan can be elevated to the SC through a Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 where only questions of law may be raised. An exception to the general rule is when the findings of fact by the trial court overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner, a Personnel Supervisor of the National Irrigation Authority, was held liable for Indirect Bribery after allegedly refusing to act on the appointment papers of a certain Mrs. Mutia unless the former was paid some money. Petitioner then elevated the case to the SC through a Petition for Review claiming that conclusions reached ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 175 of 256 Justice Gesmundo by the Sandiganbayan are not supported by the evidence. The OSG in its Comment maintained that only question of law may be entertained by the SC. The argument that the judgment of conviction is not supported by the evidence raises a question of fact inasmuch as the resolution of the issue would require this Court to sort out and re-examine the evidence presented in the trial. Under Sec 7 of PD 1606 as amended, governing the procedure of cases from the Sandiganbayan raised to the SC, one way through which a decision or final order of the Sandiganbayan can be elevated to the Supreme Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 and, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised. The general rule admits exceptions, one of which is when the findings of fact made by the trial court overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. In the case, there are substantial facts and circumstances which appear to be favorable to the accused but which were not carefully considered by the Sandiganbayan. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the RPC is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. In the entrapment operation ensued, there were no photographs exhibiting the petitioner’s act of appropriating or keeping the money after it was handed to her and the presence of other witnesses and the same being done in a public place likewise belie the claim of bribery. 244. PEOPLE V. ROLANDO CAMAY (1987) Rule 116 3 things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the accused: 1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and 3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. The trial judge complied faithfully with this strict procedure and more. The records of this case show that after the extensive interviews conducted by the counsel de oficio with his client upon order of the trial Judge, the latter asked the accused a series of questions, fully informing him of the nature of the charge against him and the grave consequences thereof. Even after the accused had entered a plea of guilty and signed the Certificate of Arraignment, all the time with the assistance of counsel de oficio, still the trial court addressed three questions to the accused, whether or not he knew that his plea of guilty was for the crime of robbery with homicide; whether or not he understood the gravity of the penalty of death by electric chair for the offense to which he pleaded guilty; and whether or not, knowing the severity of the penalty, he still insisted on his plea of guilty. The trial court also ordered the prosecution to present its witnesses to prove the guilt of the accused in the presence of the accused and his counsel. After the prosecution made its formal offer of evidence, the accused was then asked to present his evidence, but, maintaining his plea of guilty, he and through his counsel de oficio, submitted the case for decision. 245. PEOPLE V. RUBEN BURGOS Y TITO (1986) Rule 126, Sec. 13 Rule 126, Sec. 13: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. However for this to apply in cases of valid warrantless arrests [When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it under Rule 113], an offense must have in fact been committed. Burgos was found guilty of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion based on confidential information of Masamlok, allegedly a man Burgos tried to recruit into the NPA. The police arrested him while he was plowing his field and searched his house where NPA related docs and a firearm was found. Burgos claims that his arrest was unlawful as it was done without valid warrant and that the subsequent search of his house invalid. The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC: a)When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; b)When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 176 of 256 Justice Gesmundo from one confinement to another and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 13: A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. The trial court erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any “subversive” act—he was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have in fact or actually have been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. 246. PEOPLE V. HON. UNION KAYANAN AND HON. AGANA ET AL. (1978) 1. An accused can confess guilt at any time even after arraigmment and after trial has begun, but the law is clear that he shall not thereby be entitled to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance. 2. A plea of guilty of a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused. The rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged. 3. When judgment was rendered in complete disregard of pertinent applicable rules and absence of any consideration whatsoever of public interest, the same is completely void and jeopardy could not have attached to it. A case for Murder qualified by treachery and/or evident premeditation was heard against accused Organo and 2 others before Branch III of Quezon Province. As the then presiding Judge was about to retire, proceedings were postponed but the prosecution had already rested its case and the defense was in the process of presenting evidence. Without the case being calendared for continuation or notification to any of the state prosecutors handling it, the case was continued before Branch IV before Judge Kayanan. After a new arraignment, the accused entered the plea of guilty to Homicide only without necessarily amending the Information and invoked the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and incomplete self-defense without objection on the part of Fiscal Florido. The accused was convicted of Homicide only. The State Prosecutors originally handling the case before Branch III sought reconsideration. A Supplemental MR was filed and heard before Judge Agana raising that the State Prosecutors were not notified of the hearing and that Fiscal Florido did not consent to the change of plea of the accused as provided for in Section 4 of Rule 118; that double jeopardy has not set in this case as the decision rendered is null and void, it having been irregularly and illegally promulgated in violation of Section 6 of Rule 118. For non-compliance with the applicable rules, whole proceeding in question is illegal is completely void, and, accordingly, jeopardy could not have attached to it. First, no explanation was given as to how a case in Branch Ill, one of murder to which special prosecutors have been specifically assigned by the secretary of Justice, already tried, with the prosecution already rested and the defense about to close, was called for a new arraignment in Branch IV without so much as even a verbal or informal notice, if not to the special prosecutors, at least to assistant provincial fiscal assigned to the case. Second, not even a formal amendment of the information to serve as basis for the plea of guilty to the lower offense of homicide was made. Third, accused was irregularly credited with mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and incomplete self-defense even without presentation of evidence. In addition, this was presented by counsel de oficio who, was appointed for arraignment purposes only. Lastly, the plea of guilty offered by the accused was not to the grave offense of murder charged in the information. 247.PEOPLE V. THE HON. JUDGE PEDRO C. NAVARRO (1975) Rule 119 Sec. 15&16 ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 177 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The rules of joint trials must be complied with. Several defendants charged with the same offense will be tried jointly while offenses founded on the same facts or for parts of a series of offenses may be tried jointly after a court order. Accused Catuday was charged with light threats and a year later while the 1 st case was pending, charged with frustrated theft before the same court. He was convicted of the 2 charges and appealed the same. Both cases were assigned to Branch XI. After several continuations and resetting/rescheduling of each case, the 2 cases were scheduled for hearing the same day. The Judge rendered one decision acquitting the accused of both charges and indicated in its dispositive portion that the cases were tried jointly. Prosecutors sought reconsideration for the light threats case but was denied because the judge claimed a joint hearing for the 2 criminal cases. There are specific rules on joint trial in criminal cases. First, "when two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried, jointly, unless the court in its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any defendant orders separate trial." (Trial of several accused: Sec. 16, Rule 119). As long as the condition therein is fulfilled, that is, two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, joint trial is automatic, without need of a court order. The rule is inapplicable here because there is only one defendant in the two cases. Second, "charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or which form or are part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character may, in the discretion of the court, be tried jointly." (Consolidation of trials of related offenses: Sec. 15, Rule 119). In contrast, this second rule clearly requires a court order for a joint trial, since the court has discretion whether or not to order the same. In this case, there was no court order for a joint trial. A joint trial is not called for in the two criminal cases. It is true that the accused in the two cases is only one person, but there are two different complainants: Henry Dioquino, in the threat charge, and Commonwealth Foods, Inc., in the theft case. Also, the charges are different. They do not even belong to the same class of crimes. Light threat is a crime against personal liberty and security; frustrated theft is a crime against property. So, we cannot say the charges are for offenses founded on the same facts or form or are part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character. Hence, the court had no power to try them jointly. ADDITIONAL CASES APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1. PEOPLE V. DELOS REYES (2012) The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. Imelda filed criminal complaints for rape against appellant. Appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, but before the prosecution could conclude the presentation of its evidence, he jumped bail. Consequently, he was tried in absentia. The RTC convicted appellant of two (2) counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty. In view of the penalty of death imposed upon him, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review. At the outset, the Court notes that these cases were elevated to Us on automatic review in view of the RTC’s imposition of the death penalty upon appellant. However, with the Court’s pronouncement in the 2004 case of People v. Mateo providing for and making mandatory the intermediate review by the CA of cases involving the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course of action would be to remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an intermediate review. After a judicious review of the records, however, the Court no longer sees the necessity of transferring these cases to the CA for intermediate review and instead, deems it more appropriate to dismiss the instant appeal. Records reveal that the appellant jumped bail during the proceedings before the RTC and was, in fact, tried and convicted in absentia. Thus, he has no right to pray for affirmative relief before the courts. Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail as in appellant’s case, or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief therefrom. Thus, even if the Court were to remand these cases ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 178 of 256 Justice Gesmundo to the CA for intermediate review, the CA would only be constrained to dismiss appellant’s appeal, as he is considered a fugitive from justice. (2)RODRIGUEZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2012) “The ‘fresh period rule’ is applicable in criminal cases.” The RTC convicted petitioner for Unfair Competition penalized under the IPC. After promulgation of the Decision convicting Rodriguez for unfair competition, he filed a MR before the RTC on the 15th or the last day of the reglementary period to appeal. 14 days after receipt of the RTC Order denying his MR, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal. Thus, the denial of his Notice of Appeal on the ground of its being filed out of time under Sec. 6, Rule 122, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner now asserts the applicability of the "fresh period rule" as laid down in Neypes v. Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether the “fresh period rule” should apply. Held. Yes. Petitioner seasonably filed his notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from the date of receipt of the RTC Order denying his motion for reconsideration.rÎ!ll The rationale of the "fresh period rule" is: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. It is, thus, now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant case, where the accused files from a judgment of conviction a motion for new trial or reconsideration which is denied by the trial court. The accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal. 2. ROLEX RODRIGUEZ Y OLAYRES V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED DOMECQ SPIRITS AND WINES, REPRESENTED BY ALLIED DOMECQ PHILS., INC., (2012) “It is now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant case, where the accused files from a judgment of conviction a motion for new trial or reconsideration which is denied by the trial court. The accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal.” Petitioner was convicted for unfair competition before the RTC. He filed an MR on the 15 th or the last day of the reglementary period to appeal. 14 days after receipt of the RTC order denying his MR, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal, which was likewise denied for being filed out of time. Petitioner asserts the applicability of the “fresh period rule” as laid down in Neypes v. CA. The SC ruled that the accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal. Verily, the application of the statutory privilege of appeal must not prejudice an accused who must be accorded the same statutory privilege as litigants in civil cases who are granted a fresh 15-day period within which to file an appeal from receipt of the denial of their motion for new trial or reconsideration. It is indeed absurd and incongruous that an appeal from a conviction in a criminal case is more stringent than those of civil cases. If the Court has accorded litigants in civil cases"under the spirit and rationale in Neypes"greater leeway in filing an appeal through the “fresh period rule,” with more reason that it should equally grant the same to criminal cases which involve the accused’s “sacrosanct right to liberty, which is protected by the Constitution, as no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” 4. PEOPLE VS. ROBELO 686 SCRA 417 ( 2012) Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Chain of Custody Rule; It should be noted that the alleged non- compliance with Section 21 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not raised before the trial court but only for the first time on appeal. This cannot be done. Police received information from an informant that a certain alias “Kalbo” (appellant) is involved in the sale of illegal drugs. Forthwith, the police organized a team to conduct a “buy-bust” operation to entrap appellant. After the operation, appellant and his companion Umali were arrested and brought to the precint where the investigator ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 179 of 256 Justice Gesmundo marked the seized items. The investigator then prepared the necessary documents.After qualitative examination, the forensic chemist found the items positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. Appellant was accordingly charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu in two separate Informations while Umali was indicted in another Information raffled to a different branch of the RTC. During arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded “not guilty” in the two cases. After the termination of the pre-trial, trial on the merits immediately ensued. After trial, the RTC rendered a verdict of conviction. CA affirmed. Hence this petition. SC denied the petition. SC: In his second assignment of error, appellant draws attention to the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 regarding the physical inventory and photocopy of the seized items. He asserts that this failure casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and the identity of the suspected shabu allegedly bought and confiscated from him. Appellant’s contention fails to convince us. It should be noted that the alleged non-compliance with Section 21 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not raised before the trial court but only for the first time on appeal. This cannot be done. In People v. Sta. Maria, People v. Hernandez, and People v. Lazaro, Jr.,among others, in which the very same issue was belatedly raised, we ruled: x x x Indeed the police officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence. “[N]on-compliance with Section 21 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is the ‘preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.’” The records reveal that at no instance did appellant hint a doubt on the integrity of the seized items. Undoubtedly, therefore, the suspected illegal drugs confiscated from appellant were the very same substance presented and identified in court. This Court, thus, upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the apprehending police officers. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 180 of 256 Justice Gesmundo EVIDENCE RULE 128 GENERAL PROVISIONS PEOPLE V. JOSE GALVEZ Y BLANCA, G.R. NO. 181827, FEB 2, 2011 “We have held that in our jurisprudence, falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence. It deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of universal application. Thus, the modern trend of jurisprudence is that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case.” Accused was charged with four counts of rape of his granddaughter. Accused was acquited of the first three, and convicted of the last, the rape committed on June 21, 2002. Accused-appellant claims that like the rest of the charges against him, the complaint under Criminal Case No. 3094-M-2002 should suffer the same fate. According to him, the discrepancy [which was one of the bases for the acquittal of the other rape cases] in AAA’s testimony on March 31, 2003 and that on February 2, 2004 as to whether she was raped before June 21, 2002 goes into her credibility and candor. We disagree … In the case at bar, the trial court, which found some portions of AAA’s testimony unconvincing, was nevertheless impressed by the following portion of the testimony of AAA concerning the events of June 21, 2002: [Omitted the transcript of direct examination. It essentially depicted a detailed testimony of the rape of June 21, 2002.] Conviction affirmed. LEE V. PEOPLE, GR NO. 192274 (2012) It is true that rules of procedure may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure for persuasive and weights reasons. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure, however, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Lee was a New Account Processor at Allied Bank. Allied Bank filed a case against him alleging that, on several occasions, he forged the signatures of responsible bank officers in several manager’s checks. During the course of the trial, he filed a Motion for Document and Handwriting Examination by the NBI. This Motion was denied. He filed an MR on the denial of his motion 2 days late. For Lee’s failure to comply with the Rules, his MR was denied. CA affirmed the denial. SC ruled that the RTC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying the subject motion. It is true that the rules of procedure may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure for persuasive and weights reason. In this case, however, Lee did not bother to offer any convincing reason for this Court to relax the rules and just plainly sought its liberal interpretation. 107. PEOPLE V. VINECARIO (2004) smell of Marijuana can be considered probable cause that will justify a warrantless search. Pursuant to the COMELEC gun ban, a check point was constituted. A motorcycle with three men sped past the police officers manning the checkpoint. The men were instructed to return to the check point. One of them was carrying a big bag. The three men acted suspiciously and passed their bag around. The police officers asked what was inside the bag and they said that it was just a mat. Suspecting that what was inside was a bomb, they opened the bag and saw a package wrapped in paper. They asked respondent to take out the paper. When the police officer touched the package one of the three men pulled it back and the paper was torn. The smell of marijuana wafted in the air. They were contesting the checkpoint and the search of their effects. Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 181 of 256 Justice Gesmundo probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 108. PEOPLE V. MAMARION (2003) General rule is that testimony of co-conspirator is insufficient to convict another co-conspirator. Exception: the testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and it contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. An information for Kidnapping was filed against Mamarion and several others. One of the accused, Gale, plead to a lesser of offense (Slight Illegal Detention) and was convicted. To convict Mamarion, the trial court relied on the testimony of Gale as direct evidence. It was corroborated by other testimonies. Mamarion et. Al, now assails the trial court’s giving full faith and credit to Gale’s testimony. As a general rule, the testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for the conviction of the accused unless other evidence supports such testimony. There is, however, an exception to said rule. The testimony of a co- conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and it contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. The Supreme Court upheld the RTC and its reason for giving credit to Gale’s testimony: The testimony of Amado Gale on how the conspiracy to kidnap Roberta Cokin was hatched and implemented resounds with all the earmarks of sincerity and truth. His testimony is rich with details of persons, time, places and things and portrays with vivid imagery the actionnd the happenings as he saw them. This is the kind of testimony that carries the hallmarks of honesty and truth. Testimonies which are unequivocal, forthright and replete with details are seals of self-authentication in their credibility. 109. BANTOLINO V. COCA-COLA (2003) administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of the ROC. The Labor Arbiter decided a case in favor of the employees. It relied primarily on the affidavit of the employees (which were not affirmed) and such employees were also not subjected to cross-examination. NLRC affirmed Labor Arbiter. CA reversed saying that cross-examination should have been conducted. According to the SC: “the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.” In Rase v. NLRC this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence. To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. 110. PEOPLE V. LAPITAJE (2003) Doctrine: The well-settled rule is that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great weight and respect, in the absence of any clear showing that some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied. Such as: ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 182 of 256 Justice Gesmundo After a painstaking review of the prosecution evidence, the Court found certain facts and circumstances of such great weight that the trial court overlooked and misappreciated or misapplied, as follows: 1. The trial court had erroneously given credence to the testimony of Lt. Col. Oarga who testified that he had seen four men running towards a waiting taxicab; and that the four who boarded the taxi were apprehended together with the driver. On this basis, the trial court hastily concluded that Wendel and Romy acted as lookouts while Arnold and Mario robbed Domingo’s house and that after the robbery, the four ran towards the waiting taxi. The other prosecution witnesses consistently and unequivocably belied the testimony of Lt. Col. Oarga. 2. The trial court miserably failed to consider that appellant Wendel had a physical disability. Wendel could not have ran together with the other robbers because he had an amputated leg and walked on crutches. 3. The firearm and live ammunitions allegedly found under the front seat of the taxi cannot be used as evidence against Wendel and Romy for they were taken as a result of an illegal search and seizure which will be discussed forthwith. Thus, Oarga’s testimony of the event leading to the arrest of appellants is not accurate and could not be a valid basis for the conviction Doctrine: Denial and Alibi should not automatically be disfavored. There are instances when denial and alibi are valid defenses especially if the prosecution’s evidence is weak. RULE 129 WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED MATTERS OF JUDICIAL NOTICE New Sun Valley Homeowners Association , Inc. v. Sangguniang Barangay (GR No. 156686, July 27, 2011) Rule 129, Section 1 The Homeowners Association of Sun Valley Subdivision brought prays that the Court issue an injunction against the opening some roads of the subdivision for public use. It wanted the Court to take “judicial knowledge that criminal activities such as robbery and kidnappings are becoming daily fares in Philippine society.” The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial knowledge are not found in Rule 129, Section 1 providing for mandatory judicial notice. Rico Rommel Atienza v. Board of Medicine and Editha Sioson (2011) “The rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary.” Due to her lumbar pains, Editha Sioson went to the Rizal Medical Center for check-up. Based on the laboratory tests, it was discovered that her left kidney is non-functioning. Thus, she underwent kidney operation. After a few months, her husband filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the Board of Medicine (BOM) against the doctorts who participated in the kidney operation. The negligence was alleged because the said doctors removed the right kidney of Sioson, instead of the non-functioning left kidney. In the proceedings before the BOM, Sioson offered 4 documents (x-rays) for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. The respondent doctors objected to the admission of such evidence. They argued that these documents are mere photocopies and not admissible based on the best evidence rule and that these are incompetent to prove their purpose. The Court ruled that the documents are admissible and stated the following reasons: First, the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM. Second, the fact sought to be established by the admission of Sioson’s exhibits, that her “kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time” of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 183 of 256 Justice Gesmundo established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary. Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, include the structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Sioson’s kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations. Third, the best evidence rule is inapplicable in this case. The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Sioson instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Sioson’s kidneys. The proper anatomical locations of Sioson’s kidneys at the time of her operation may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence. Judicial Admissions Judicial notice of foreign laws, law of nations and municipal ordinance EJ admissions; rule 129 sec. 4 26. REPUBLIC vs. DE GUZMAN (2011) Test to determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case is whether the Court can resolve the issue that was raised without having to review or evaluate the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it will be a question of fact. De Guzman is the owner of a PNP-accredited construction company, MGM. The PNP procured building materials from MGM and issued payment invoice for such. PNP alleged it already paid these obligations to MGM (De Guzman), which the latter disavows saying it was paid to a sister-company and for another project. De Guzman sued for sum of money. RTC and CA granted relief to De Guzman and ordered PNP to pay. PNP filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. SC Denied the petition and said that since the assertions and arguments advanced are those necessarily require the SC to re-evaluate the evidence. Since this is an appeal via certiorari, questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will only review them under the following recognized exceptions: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 27. JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS LUCAS (2011) The constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable in cases of a court order for blood test (DNA). Jesse filed a petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation in the RTC. The RTC ordered for the hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to file a petition for his opposition. Jesus filed an MR saying that the petition was not in due form and substance and saying that DNA testing cannot be had on basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as a father. SC held that there shall be preliminary showing a reasonable possibility of paternity should be made before a court can conditionally order a compulsory blood test in paternity cases. The petitioner should show evidence to establish prima facie the possibility of paternity. This is also in order to prevent harassment suits on the putative father. 28. PEOPLE vs. VILLARICO, et al. (2011) Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 184 of 256 Justice Gesmundo While in their home in Misamis Occidental, Haide was preparing dinner when suddenly Villaricos: Gilberto Sr (GS), Gilberto Jr (GJ), and Ricky and Jerry Ramentos stood near the kitchen and aiming their firearms at the door, Ricky and GJ on the left, and GS and Jerry on the right. Haide’s sister-in-law, Remedios, saw all of the assailants that upon seeing her, GJ pointed his gun at her and right after that she heard three gunshots. Francisco, the father of Haide, also heard the gunshots as he was coming out of the toilet. Lolita, mother of Haide, also heard the gunshots as she was in th sala. Then after this, Haide ran towards Remedios and saying that Berting (GJ) shot him. He died in the hospital. However, by the testimonial of one Peter Ponggos, in saying that being the tricycle driver who brought Haide to the hospital, he asked Haide who shot him. Haide apparently answered that there was only one assailant and he didn’t know who it was. SC ruled that the collective recollections of Remedios and Francisco were categorical enough and warranted no other logical inference than that the four accused killed Haide. The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting – uttered in theimmediate aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim – was a true part of the res gestae. The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42 : “Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae.” 135. People v Nilo Solayao (1996) “An admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker but not sufficient of itself to establish guilt. An extrajudicial admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged. When a negative is averred in a pleading or a plaintiff’s case depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is with the party averring the negative.” Accused Solayao was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition after he was caught with a 49 in. long “latong” (homemade firearm) wrapped in dried coconut leaves by the lone prosecutor witness SPO3 Nino who along with 2 CAFGU members was conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangay. They became suspicious of the accused who was wearing a camouflage uniform and his companions who were drunk and fled upon seeing the gov’t agents. Accused appealed. There are 2 elements that the prosecution must prove in crimes involving illegal possession of firearms: a) the existence of the subject firearm and b.) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license of permit to possess the same. The statement of the accused that he did not have a license to possess the “latong” upon being asked by SPO3 Nino does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the second element. It does not even establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the absence or lack of a license. The statement of the accused was an extrajudicial admission, not a judicial admission which when made in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case, does not require proof (Sec.4, Rule 129). Moreover, “when a negative is averred in a pleading or a plaintiff’s case depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is with the party averring the negative.” In this case, a certification from the Firearms an Explosives Unit of the PNP that accused was not a licensee of any kind of caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm. RULE 130 RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY • Requisites for admissibility of evidence POLLO V. CONSTANTINO-DAVID, G.R. NO. 181881 (2011) For evidence to be excluded for being obtained in violation of the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, there must be a reasonable expectation of privacy and the search must have been unreasonable. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 185 of 256 Justice Gesmundo On the basis of a letter informing the CSC Chairperson of misconduct on the part of certain CSC employees, Pollo's office computer was searched and files accessed were used as evidence to charge Pollo of misconduct. Pollo argued that the files were inadmissible as evidence, having been taken in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Held: The files were admissible as evidence. First, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy on Pollo's part because an Office Memorandum was issued on the CSC's Computer Use Policy. This document provides for a waiver of privacy in relation to files created and stored in office computers. Second, the search was reasonable seeing as how it was conducted to investigate government employees to ascertain whether there is work-related misconduct. Pollo was found guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, violation of RA 6713, and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service. RULE 130, SEC 32 Francisco v. Balaguer, et al. One cannot make evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the statements that he wishes to prove. Villanueva, the assistant manager of IBC 13 was dismissed from employment on he ground of loss of confidence for purportedly selling forged certificates of performance. Balanguer, the president of IBC 13 was quoted to have uncovered various anomalies during his tenure which led to the dismissal of an operations executive for selling forged certificates of performance. Villanueva urged Balaguer, et al to confirm or deny if he was the person alluded to in the news article as the operations executive of IBC 13. No reply from Balaguer, et al. Is the failure to reply to the letter constitutes as a valid admission by silence? No. One cannot prove his claim by placing the burden on the other party. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee v. EUGENIO CATAN (1992) There was a buy bust operation conducted against the accused. Soon after receiving the marijuana from accused, the poser buywers went out of the house and gave a pre-arranged signal to their companions who were waiting outside. The other team members rushed inside the house and arrested the accused. He, however, was able to pass the marked bills to a companion inside the house who was able to escape during the commotion that ensued. The marked bills were never recovered. Immediately thereafter, the NARCOM team conducted a search of the premises in the presence of barangay official, Jess Abundo, a certain Mrs. Catan, the house owner, and Appellant. The search yielded kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops. Appellant's assertion that he was illegally arrested and that the search of his premises was illegal is not well taken. Appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto in the act of selling and delivering marijuana to the poseur-buyers. His case therefore falls under the category of a valid warrantless arrest (Sec. 5, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). The subsequent search of his house which immediately followed yielding other incriminating evidence, and which became the basis of his conviction for possession of a prohibited drug, was a search contemporaneously made and as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest in the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made. That is a recognized exception to the general rule that any search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The inclusion of the seized items, therefore, as evidence for the prosecution, was in conformity with the provision on lawful searches. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MOISES MASPIL, JR. y WAYWAY and SALCEDO BAGKING y ALTAKI (1990) According to Jerry Valeroso, Sgt. Amador Ablang and Sgt. Florentino Baillo, all members of the First Narcotics Regional Unit of the Narcotics Command stationed in Baguio City, (See also Exhibit "I") on October 30, 1986, they established a checkpoint in front of the Municipal Hall at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, which is along the Halsema Highway, to check on vehicles proceeding to Baguio City because their Commanding Officer, Maj. Basilio Cablayan had been earlier tipped off by some confidential informers that the herein accused Maspil and Basking would be transporting a large volume of marijuana to Baguio City. The informers went along with the operatives to Sayangan. At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, the operatives intercepted a Sarao type jeep driven by Maspil with Bagking as his companion. Upon inspection, the jeep was found loaded with two (2) plastic sacks , one ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 186 of 256 Justice Gesmundo (1) jute sackm and three (3) big round tin cans which, when opened contained several bundles of suspected dried marijuana leaves. Maspil and Basking were arrested and the suspected marijuana leaves were confiscated. The accused admitted that the marijuana dried leaves were indeed confiscated from the jeep being then driven by Maspil with Bagking as his helper. However, they claimed that the prohibited drugs belonged to two of their passengers who loaded them in the jeep as paying cargo for Baguio City without the accused knowing that they were marijuana. Issue is whether or not the marijuana allegedly seized from them was a product of an unlawful search without a warrant. SC says NO. The search is valid. This case involves a search incident to a lawful arrest which is one of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant. This exception is embodied in Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides: Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. and Rule 113, Section 5 (11) which state: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This case falls squarely within the exceptions. The appellants were caught in flagrante delicto since they were transporting the prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest. A crime was actually being committed. UNCHUAN vs. LOZADA (2009), G.R. NO. 172671, RULE 130 “A party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, to account for the alteration;” “Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced” Facts: Two sisters (Anita and Peregrina), based in the USA, were registered owners of two lots in Cebu. They sold the lots to their nephew, Antonio JP Lozada under a Deed of Sale. Their brother, Dr. Antonio Lozada (Dr. Lozada) agreed to advance the purchase price of US$367,000 for Antonio, his nephew. The Deed of Sale was later notarized and authenticated at the Philippine Consul’s Office and new TCTs were issued in the name of Antonio Lozada. Pending registration of the deed, Marissa R. Unchuan caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the lots. Marissa claimed that Anita donated an undivided share in the lots to her under an unregistered Deed of Donation. Marissa filed an action to declare the Deed of Sale void and to cancel the new TCTs. At the trial, respondents presented a notarized and duly authenticated sworn statement, and a videotape where Anita denied having donated land in favor of Marissa. RTC held that Antonio J.P. Lozada is the absolute owner of the lots. On motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order declaring the Deed of Sale void. HELD: 1. A closer examination of the Deed of Donation further reveals that the number 7 in 1987 and Series of 1987 were merely superimposed. This was confirmed by petitioner’s nephew Richard Unchuan who testified that he saw petitioner’s husband write 7 over 1983 to make it appear that the deed was notarized in 1987. Moreover, a Certification from Clerk of Court of the Notarial Records Division disclosed that the Deed of Donation purportedly identified in Book No. 4, Document No. 48, and Page No. 35 Series of 1987 was not reported and filed with said office. Pertinent to this, the Rules require a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, to account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall, as in this case, not be admissible in evidence. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 187 of 256 Justice Gesmundo 2. The sworn statement of Anita was hearsay because she did not appear in court to affirm her averments therein. Yet, our rules of exclusion do not cover admissions of a party; the videotaped statement of Anita appears to belong to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that “the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declaration against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declaration against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. Thus, a man’s acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. However, as a further qualification, object evidence, such as the videotape in this case, must be authenticated by a special testimony showing that it was a faithful reproduction. Lacking this, we are constrained to exclude as evidence the videotaped statement of Anita. Even so, petitioner’s failed to prove any right to the lands subject of this case. ELENITA C. FAJARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2011) “Requisites for Plain View Doctrine: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.”; “Presumption of Innocence; Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, and the rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law.” Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio were charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866, before the RTC for conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, permit or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control two (2) receivers, two (2) pieces short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search conducted in the house of Fajardo. The CA held that the search warrant was void and resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioner’s residence were declared inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside the house of petitioner before the warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant to the plain view doctrine. The Court ruled that the receivers were seized in plain view, hence, admissible. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent. The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery was indubitably inadvertent. Moreover, petitioner’s apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed from the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such assumption into concrete evidence. • Relevance of evidence and collateral matters CATACUTAN V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 175991 (2011) Rejection of evidence irrelevant to the case is not a denial of due process. Promotion papers of private complainants were sent to Catacutan in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the Surigao del Norte School for Arts and Trades. Catacutan refused to implement the promotions made by the Commission on Higher Education. Private complainants filed a complaint against Catacutan for violation of RA 3019 with the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 188 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Ombudsman. RTC convicted Catacutan. Catacutan appealed to Sandiganbayan and argued that he was denied due process because a CA decision finding no fault in Catacutan's refusal to implement promotions in an administrative case was rejected as evidence. Held: Catacutan was not denied due process. The RTC was justified in rejecting the evidence because the CA decision was irrelevant. A decision in an administrative case bears no influence in a criminal case even if there is identity of parties and issues. • Multiple admissibility • Conditional admissibility • Curative admissibility • Direct and circumstantial evidence PEOPLE V. JERWIN QUINTAL Y BEO ET AL. G.R. NO. 184170, FEB 2, 2011 “There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and where her testimony passes the test of credibility the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. A dangerous precedent as it may seem, there is however a guideline provided also by jurisprudence in scrutinizing the testimony of the victim, namely: (a) while an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.” The accused, along with three others, was charged and convicted for the rape of AAA. In the main, appellant- accused assails the credibility of AAA’s testimony. SC agrees. First, AAA testified that she does not personally know Jerwin and Felipe. However, when the two allegedly invited her to go with them to a party, she readily accepted the invitation and in fact, went with them. Moreover, AAA was seen playing cards with Jerwin and his group in the wake, as testified by Maria, Felipe, Jerwin and Federico. Second, AAA recounted that the nipa hut where she was brought by the accused was very dark. And yet, AAA readily identified Vicente and Larry inside the hut, as two of those who raped her. Incidentally, it was unclear how AAA was able to identify Vicente and Larry because she was never asked, not by the prosecution nor the defense, on how she came to know the two accused. Third, the medical certificate only contained one finding, that there was a “round-the-clock abrasion in the labia minora.” This is not at all conclusive nor corroborative to support the charge of rape. Fourth, AAA’s belated reporting of the rape incident has relevance in this case, especially when it appears that she really had no intention at all to inform her mother, not until the latter actually asked her why she was walking in an unusual manner. Fifth, BBB allegedly went to the Barangay Kagawad and the Tanod, who happens to be her cousin, to report the rape incidents. However, when Fernando and Eddie testified, they claimed that they were initially informed by BBB about a marriage proposal by Jerwin’s parents. It was only during the meeting that they learned about the alleged rape. Sixth, to fuel further suspicion as to whether a rape incident actually transpired, BBB [the mother] never bothered to ask AAA about the whole incident. She accepted AAA’s testimony hook, line and sinker. Seventh, in an unusual twist, records show that AAA was seen visiting Jerwin in jail for at least six (6) times. These incidents are documented in a logbook presented in court by the defense and which was not refuted by the prosecution.The combination of all these circumstances are more than sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to whether first, rape was actually committed and second, whether the accused were the perpetrators. Accused acquitted. • Positive and negative evidence • Competent and credible evidence A. OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 189 of 256 Justice Gesmundo • 1. Nature of Object evidence • 2. Requisites for admissibility • 3. Categories of Object evidence • 4. Demonstrative evidence • 5. View of an object or scene • 6. Chain of Custody in relation to DDA 39.) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RUIZ GARCIA Y RUIZ, G.R. NO. 173480 (2009) “Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. R.A 9165 Art. II Sec 21 provides that the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.” Ruiz was formally charged and pleaded not guilty to a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Prosecution presented a single witness, PO1 Garcia who was the poseur-buyer in the legitimate buy-bust operation. Ruiz sold Marijuana to Garcia during the buy-bust operation. Ruiz now claims the he was a victim of a police frame-up and extortion. Also Ruiz claims the there was a failure to comply with Sec. 21 of RA 9165 or the chain of custody rule on seized drugs. Other than the markings made by P01 Garcia and the police investigator, no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under the circumstances required by RA 9165 and its implementing rules. We observe that while there was testimony with respect to the markings of the seized items at the police station, no mention whatsoever was made on whether the marking had been done in the presence of Ruiz or his representatives. There was likewise no mention that any representative from the media and the DOJ, or any elected official had been present during this inventory, or that any of these people had been required to sign the copies of the inventory. Ruiz acquitted. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALDRIN BERDADERA Y ARMAMENTO (2010) “‘non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said items’” Appellant was accused of selling and shabu. RTC found him guilty. CA affirmed. The appellant now contends that the prosecution failed to prove that the alleged buy-bust operation complied with Section 21 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules since the police authorities neither inventoried nor photographed the seized drugs and marked money in his presence or that of his counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice. The appeal is unmeritorious. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal. Indeed, the implementing rules that ‘non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said items’. Notably, the defense did not raise this issue during trial. Be that as it may, we explained that what is of vital importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Thus, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 190 of 256 Justice Gesmundo testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. Here, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses convincingly show that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal substance was properly preserved. The appellant in this case has the burden to show that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits of public officers and a presumption that public officers properly discharge their duties.. The appellant was unable to discharge such burden. 56. PEOPLE VS. CAPUNO (2011) “Evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant.” “Non-compliance with the express requirements under the DDA justified where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and, thereafter, explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.” “Chain of custody is defined as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation to court for destruction.” “Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the markings as reference.” The accused was arrested after an entrapment operation. The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states: “The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.” This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in handling the evidence. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in the presence of the appellant or her counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and an elective official. The prosecution failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen seized from appellant. 51. PEOPLE V. RUFINO VICENTE, JR. y CRUZ (2011) “Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.” This is a typical buy-bust operation where the accused is saying that the buy-bust team failed to present a pre- operation report and photographs of the seized items and that there is an uncertainty as to the identity of the illegal drugs seized. However the court ruled that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Absent any indication that the police officers were ill- motivated in testifying against the accused, full credence should be given to their testimonies. Also, non- compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 191 of 256 Justice Gesmundo evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 58. PEOPLE VS. AURE (2011) “What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.” “The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.” Aure was arrested after a buy-bust operation. No irregularity is found in this case. The poseur-buyer positively identified accused as the sellers of shabu. The shabu was confiscated and marked with initials “CAA” and was subsequently taken to the crime laboratory for examination, where it was confirmed that the substance was shabu. 65. PEOPLE v. WEBB, ET. AL. G.R. No. 176864 (2010) - Chain of Custody Due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Webb was convicted for rape with homicide in relation to the Vizconde massacre. SC issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case. Webb filed an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process. Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test. For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime. Nevertheless, Webb, et. al. were acquitted. The Court further held, in our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth. 66. PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ Y ANGELES, ET. AL. G.R. 191366 (2010) - Chain of Custody Martinez et. al. were convicted by the trial court for the use and possession of dangerous drugs (shabu). The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Doria coming out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Dizon, and Rezin Martinez in a room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police. In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil. They were arrested and the said items were seized. The Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are 1] that the evidence against the accused are inadmissible; and 2] that granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly established. The arrest did not fall within the valid warrantless arrests and since the items were seized incidental of the arrest, the seizure of the items are also invalid. Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the accused would still be in order for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the chain of custody requirement in dangerous drugs cases. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 192 of 256 Justice Gesmundo As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that there were irregularities in the same. First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. After seizure and confiscation of the subject items, no physical inventory was conducted in the presence of the accused, or their representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official. Thus, no inventory was prepared, signed, and provided to the accused in the manner required by law. Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v. Sanchez is instructive on the requirement of marking, to wit: What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. It should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. x x x Thereafter, the seized items shall be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag unless the type and quantity of the seized items require a different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or container shall accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the chain of custody. Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the courts below gives rise to more uncertainty. Instead of being prepared on the day of the seizure of the items, it was prepared only three days after. More important, the receipt did not even indicate exactly what items were confiscated and their quantity. These are basic information that a confiscation receipt should provide. The only information contained in the Confiscation Receipt was the fact of arrest of the accused and the general description of the subject items as "the sachet of suspected Shabu paraphernallas were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory." The receipt is made even more dubious by the police officer’s admission in his testimony that he did not personally prepare the Confiscation Receipt and he did not know exactly who did so. Fourth, according to the Certification issued by the Dagupan Police Station, the subject items were indorsed by PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty Investigator SPO1 Urbano for proper disposition. These were later turned over by SPO3 Esteban to P/Insp. Maranion. There is, however, no showing of how and when the subject items were transferred from SPO1 Urbano to SPO3 Esteban. Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of custody. No witness testified on how the subject items were kept after they were tested prior to their presentation in court. In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the prosecution’s position that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly preserved. The two documents specifically relied on by the CA, the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination, have been shown to be grossly insufficient in proving the identity of the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential before the accused can be found guilty. 67. E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC., ET. AL. v. SHEN DAR ELECTRICITY & MACHINERY CO. G.R. No. 184850 (2010) - Admissibility E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. (EYIS) is a domestic corporation that bought and imported air compressors from Shen Dar, a Taiwan-based corporation. Both companies claim to have the right to register the trademark "VESPA" for air compressors. Both have Certificate of Registrations (COR) for the same. IPO cancelled the Certificate of Registration under Shen Dar’s name. Shen Dar challenges the propriety of such cancellation on the ground that there was no petition for cancellation . Qasi-judicial and administrative bodies are not bound by technical rules of procedure. Such principle, however, is tempered by fundamental evidentiary rules, including due process. Thus, we ruled in Aya-ay, Sr. v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp.: ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 193 of 256 Justice Gesmundo That administrative quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases does not mean that the basic rules on proving allegations should be entirely dispensed with. A party alleging a critical fact must still support his allegation with substantial evidence. Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due process. x x x The liberality of procedure in administrative actions is subject to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process. As this Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the provision for flexibility in administrative procedure "does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative value." More specifically, as held in Uichico v. NLRC: It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. This was later reiterated in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumapis: While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have probative value. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, even though technical rules of evidence are not strictly complied with before the LA and the NLRC, their decision must be based on evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial. The fact that no petition for cancellation was filed against the COR issued to Shen Dar does not preclude the cancellation of Shen Dar’s COR. It must be emphasized that, during the hearing for the cancellation of EYIS’ COR before the BLA, Shen Dar tried to establish that it, not EYIS, was the true owner of the mark "VESPA" and, thus, entitled to have it registered. Shen Dar had more than sufficient opportunity to present its evidence and argue its case, and it did. It was given its day in court and its right to due process was respected. The IPO Director General’s disregard of the procedure for the cancellation of a registered mark was a valid exercise of his discretion. 113. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABDUL MACALABA(2003) (Plain view) “Under the ‘plain view’ doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. The seizure must comply with the following requirements: (a) a prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.” Abdul Macalaba was charged with violations of PD 1866, Art 186 of the RPC and of the Dangerous Drugs Act. According to the testimony of SPO1 Pandez, a PNP member of the Laguna Criminal Investigation Detection Group (CIDG), Major R’ Win Pagkalinawan ordered the search of Abdul, alias “Boy Muslim,” based on a verified information that the latter was driving a carnapped Mitsubishi olive green car and was a drugpusher in San Pedro, Laguna. Two teams were formed for the search. They went to his apartment but Abdul was not there, subsequently, they spotted the similar car while on traffic. They approached the car and asked that the light be turned on and that the certificate of registration be shown. When the light was already on, SPO1 Pandez saw a black Norinco .45 caliber gun inside an open black clutch/belt bag placed on the right side of the driver’s seat near the gear. He asked for the supporting papers of the gun, apart from the car’s certificate of registration, but Abdul failed to show them any. When the zipper of the clutch/belt bag was opened the CIDG saw 4 sachets of what appeared to be shabu and a plastic bag which contained fake bills, a list of names of persons and ammunitions for the gun. The Court held that YES, the search was valid. It is obvious from Section 2 of the Bill of Rights that reasonable searches and seizures are not proscribed. The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute and the established exceptions are: search of moving vehicles, seizure in plain view, customs search, waiver or consented search, stop and frisk situation and search incidental to a lawful arrest. Another exception is a search made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is authorized under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235. The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless search and seizure conducted on, ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 194 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Abdul constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. The evidence clearly shows that on the basis of an intelligence information that a carnapped vehicle was driven by Abdul, who was also a suspect of drug pushing, the members of the CIDG were looking for the car. While Abdul was fumbling about in his clutch bag for the registration papers of the car, the CIDG agents saw the sachets of shabu and thus were in “plain view” of the law enforcers. The Court was convinced that all the elements of seizure in plain view existed in this case. 79. ) People vs. Rivera G.R. No. 177741. ( 2009) Chain of Custody Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground ther for, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Apellant was charged for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.” Apellant was caught selling drugs by the police through a buy bust operation. The buy-bust team brought appellant to the police station and carried the seized items to the laboratory for examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs and their weight. The laboratory reports confirmed that it was shabu. Court find the accused guilty. CA affirmed. Appellant questions the reliance by the lower courts on the prosecution evidence in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The buy bust operation in the present case was coordinated with the PDEA. After the sachets of shabu were confiscated from appellant and PO3 Salisa marked them, a spot report was submitted to the PDEA detailing the items seized from appellant and the procedure undertaken. P/Sr. Inspector Villaruel soon after issued a memorandum transmitting the sachets to, which were received at 3:55 P.M. by, the EPD-PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. While PO3 Salisa’s testimony did not indicate if he made a list of the sachets as well as the buy-bust money in the presence of appellant or if photographs thereof were taken, the defense did not propound questions suggesting doubt as to the integrity of the sachets. People v. Pringas teaches that non-compliance with Section 21 is not necessarily fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, what is important being the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items: “Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground ther for, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused Appellant, as in Pringas, has not questioned at any stage of the case the custody and disposition of the items taken from him. At all events, the Court appreciates no showing that the integrity of the seized items has been compromised. 3. Don Djowel Sales y Abalahin v People of the Phil. G.R. 191023 Feb.6, 2013 Doctrine: As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the presentation and admission of the seized prohibited drug as an exhibit be preceded by evidence to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This requirement is essential to obviate the possibility of substitution as well as to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements and custody of the seized prohibited item, from the accused, to the police, to the forensic laboratory for examination, and to its presentation in evidence in court. Ideally, the custodial chain would include testimony about every link in the chain or movements of the illegal drug, from the moment of seizure until it is finally adduced in evidence. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that a testimony about a perfect chain is almost always impossible to obtain. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 195 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The identity of the seized substance in dangerous drug cases is thus established by showing its chain of custody. Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defined the concept of "chain of custody" as follows: b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.] The rule on chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR) expressly demands the identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court. We have held, however, that the failure of the prosecution to show compliance with the procedural requirements provided in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR is not fatal and does not automatically render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. As long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, the guilt of the accused will not be affected Facts: Sales was on his way to Boracay with his girlfriend and his girlfriend’s family. Prior to departure, he was frisked in the old manila domestic airport by one of the aviation security (Soriano). When he was asked to empty his pockets, he obliged but refused to open his hands. Soriano struggled with petitioner as the latter was nervous and reluctant to show what he brought out from his pocket. Soriano then called the attention of his supervisor, PO1 Cherry Trota- Bartolome who was nearby. PO1 Trota-Bartolome approached petitioner and asked him to open his hands. Petitioner finally opened his right hand revealing two rolled paper sticks with dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops. Petitioner was told his Miranda rights then was taken into custody. Petitioner on the other hand belies these facts by claiming a frame-up. Succinctly, he was first frisked by two officers, a male and female. He yielded and showed them the contents of his pockets which were a pack of cigarettes and some cash amounting to 8k. He then proceeded to the washroom. Towards his way there, another man without identification approached him and frisked him a second time. He complies and showed him the same. Before he could finally get to the washroom, the man shouted back at him and told him these (two rolled paper sticks) dropped from his pocket. It was at this moment that the other officers approached him and told him he was being arrested. RTC: Convicted him and imposed sentence ranging from 12 years and one day as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and one day. CA: The body search conducted on petitioner is a valid warrantless search made pursuant to a routine airport security procedure allowed by law. It found no merit in petitioner’s theory of frame-up and extortion. On the issue of the integrity and probative value of the evidence used to convict petitioner, the CA held that there is no hiatus or confusion that the marijuana that was marked at the airport, then subjected to qualitative examination on the same day and eventually introduced as evidence against petitioner, is the same prohibited drug that was found in his custody and possession when he was apprehended at the pre-departure area of the airport in the morning of May 24, 2003. The CA also explained that while the "marijuana leaves" referred to by Soriano in his testimony was otherwise called by the public prosecutor and the Forensic Chemical Officer as "dried marijuana fruiting tops" in both the criminal information and the Laboratory Report, these do not refer to different items. Both marijuana leaves with fruiting tops were rolled in two papers which were actually found and seized from petitioner’s possession in the course of a routine security search and frisking. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 196 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Held/Ratio: No merit. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. In this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport security officers found in the person of petitioner the marijuana fruiting tops contained in rolled paper sticks during the final security check at the airports pre-departure area. Petitioner at first refused to show the contents of his short pants pocket to Soriano who became suspicious when his hand felt the "slightly bulging" item while frisking petitioner. In People v. Johnson, which also involved seizure of a dangerous drug from a passenger during a routine frisk at the airport, this Court ruled that such evidence obtained in a warrantless search was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures, thus: Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. Petitioner concedes that frisking passengers at the airport is a standard procedure but assails the conduct of Soriano and PO1 Trota-Bartolome in singling him out by making him stretch out his arms and empty his pockets. Petitioner believes such meticulous search was unnecessary because, as Soriano himself testified, there was no beep sound when petitioner walked past through the metal detector and hence nothing suspicious was indicated by that initial security check. He likewise mentioned the fact that he was carrying a bundle of money at that time, which he said was not accounted for. We find no irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who was asked to empty the contents of his pockets upon the friskers reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while frisking petitioners short pants was a prohibited or illegal substance. Such search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235. Said provision reads: SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. The search of the contents of petitioners short pants pockets being a valid search pursuant to routine airport security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana) seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence. Petitioner’s reluctance to show the contents of his short pants pocket after the friskers hand felt the rolled papers containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or material subject to confiscation by the said authorities. The trial and appellate courts correctly gave credence to the straightforward and candid testimonies of PO1 Trota- Bartolome and NUP Soriano on the frisking of petitioner at the pre-departure area, during which the two rolled papers containing dried marijuana fruiting tops were found in his possession, and on petitioners immediate arrest and investigation by police officers from the 2nd PCAS and PDEA teams stationed at the airport. As a matter of settled jurisprudence on illegal possession of drug cases, credence is usually accorded the narration of the incident by the apprehending police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 197 of 256 Justice Gesmundo 30) People vs. Coreche (2009) The prosecution fails to comply with the indispensable requirement of proving corpus delicti not only when it is missing [8] but also when there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs which raise doubts on the authenticity of the evidence presented in court. [ Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking [10] of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. The Presumption of Innocence Prevails Over the Presumption of Regular Performance of Official Duty Facts: Caber was charged with violation of the dangerous drug act, her defense is that there were gaps in the chain of custody. Held: the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt due to substantial gaps in the chain of custody, raising reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti. The records of this case show that the plastic sachets allegedly seized from appellant were indeed marked. However, there is nothing on record to show when and where this was done. Therefore the first gap was failure to mark at the arrest site. Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking[10] of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. The second gap if that after chemical examination it was not clear who took custody. 53. People vs. Mark Dela Rosa y Suello, G.R. No. 1815166, January 26, 2011 Chain of Custody; Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 916 Doctrine: Thus, the proviso stating that non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers Facts: Makati Anti Drug Abuse Council reported that appellant was involved in the illegal sale of Marijuana. On the basis thereof the team conducted a buy-bust operation. One of the team’s members Lowaton prepared a Pre-Operational Report/Coordination Sheet and sent the same to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). After appellant’s arrest, he was brought to the office of SAID-SOTF, Makati City. The three plastic sachets of marijuana that has been previously marked were photographed and sent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. The examination conducted on the aforesaid specimen, i.e., three plastic sachet of marijuana, yielded positive results to the tests for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug, as evidenced by a Physical Science Report No. D-659-06S. Also, after the completion of the buy-bust operation, an after operation report or the so-called “Spot Report” was prepared and sent to PDEA. As a last ditch effort, appellant claims that his arrest was tainted with irregularity as the seized items were not photographed in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, thus, an evident violation thereof. The said argument is baseless. Issue: W/N the illegal drugs should be admissible because there was a violation of the Chain of Custody Held/Ratio: There was no violation of Chain of Custody Rule. The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides: Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 198 of 256 Justice Gesmundo (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; [Emphasis supplied]. The aforesaid provision is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.: (a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non- compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]. The afore-quoted Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165, offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements. Indeed, the evident purpose of the procedure is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of or innocence of the accused. Thus, the proviso stating that non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. In the present case, the records and the transcribed stenographic notes clearly showed that the seized items from appellant were physically inventoried by PO3 Lowaton at the place where appellant was arrested and in his presence, as evidenced by an Acknowledgment Receipt dated 25 September 2006. Also, when appellant was brought to the office of SAID-SOTF, Makati City, the marked three plastic sachets of marijuana were photographed by the apprehending team before it was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, which examination yielded positive result to the tests for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug, as evidenced by a Physical Science Report No. D-659-06S. Even granting arguendo that the prosecution failed to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to the aforesaid guidelines, the same is not fatal and does not automatically render appellant's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as it would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. 54. People of the Philippines vs. Nene Quimanlon y Malaog, G.R. 191198, January 26, 2011 Chain of Custody Doctrine: , The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with Facts: ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 199 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The case refers to the information filed against Quiamlon for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of Republic Act 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. That the the said accuseddid, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, ZERO POINT TWELVE (0.12 gm.) of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride. When arraigned on August 25, 2005, accused Quiamanlon pleaded "not guilty" to the foregoing accusations against her. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Quiamanlon claims that the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation failed to observe the existing rules in the proper custody of the seized items, thereby casting doubt as to the identity and integrity of the sachets allegedly containing shabu presented as evidence by the prosecution. Issue: W/N THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED SHABU. Held/Ratio: Chain of Custody Established Relying on People v. Lim, 33 Quiamanlon insists that "any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia, should immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof." Indeed, in every prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation in evidence of the seized drug, as an integral part of the corpus delicti, is most material. 36 Thus, it is vital that the identity of the prohibited drug be proved with moral certainty. The fact that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same degree of certitude. 37 It is in this respect that the chain of custody requirement performs its function. It ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. 38 Contrary to Quiamanlon’s assertion, the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drugs was adequately established in the instant case. As determined by the CA: x x x Going by the records, after the seizure of the drugs from appellant’s possession, PO3 Villamor marked them with initials "JV", "JV1" and "JV2", then turned them over to PO3 Hernandez, the Duty Desk Officer assigned on that day at Camp Karingal. An Inventory Report was immediately prepared and subsequently, a laboratory examination of the seized items were conducted upon the request made by PS Gerardo Ratuita. The plastic sachets with the markings of "JV", "JV1" and "JV2", containing white crystalline substance when subjected to a qualitative examination by Forensic Analyst in the person of Engr. Leonard M. Jabonillo, yielded positive results, and turned out to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 39 1avvphi1 SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.—The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) An astute perusal of the above-quoted provision of the IRR of RA 9165 readily reveals that the custodial chain rule is not to be rigorously applied, provided "the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team." Thus, the supposed procedural infirmities alleged by Quiamanlon ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 200 of 256 Justice Gesmundo with regard to the custody, photographing, inventory, and marking of the seized items do not, in any manner, affect the prosecution of the instant case and do not render her arrest illegal or the items seized from her inadmissible. Moreover, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. 41 In this case. Failing to discharge such burden, there can be no doubt that the drugs seized from Quiamanlon were the same ones examined in the crime laboratory. Evidently, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs. 55. METRO BANK vs Spouses Miranda G.R. N0. 187917, Januray 19, 2011 Chain of Custody Rule Doctrine: While it may be true that the party alleging non-compliance with the requisite publication has the burden of proof, still negative allegations need not be proved even if essential to one’s cause of action or defense if they constitute a denial of the existence of a document the custody of which belongs to the other party. Facts: Respondents spouses Mirnda obtained a credit loan accommodation from petitioner Metro Bank. The intial loan amounted to 4,000,000 secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land in Isabela. Later on, upon respondent’s request the loan was increased to 5,000,000 thus, the real estate mortgage was amended also to increase the principal amount of loan to 5,000,000. Subsequently the spouses obtained additional loans in the amount of 1,000,000 also secured by a REM in Isabela. Respondents encountered difficulties in paying their loans. They requested for a longer period to settle their account and further requested for the restructuring of their loans, which requests Metrobank granted. Respondents then signed Promissory Notes both payable on February 24, 2002. On August 25, 2000, Metrobank sent respondents a demand letter to settle their overdue account of P8,512,380.15, inclusive of interest and penalties; otherwise, the bank would initiate “the necessary legal proceedings x x x, without further notice.” Respondents, however, failed to settle their account. Consequently, Metrobank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of the mortgaged properties on November 16, 2000. The Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Santiago City sold the mortgaged properties at public auction for the sum of P9,284,452.00 to Metrobank, as the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of Metrobank on November 27, 2000, which was registered with the Registry of Deeds on November 29, 2000. Claiming that the extrajudicial foreclosure was void, respondents filed a complaint for Nullification of the Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction with the RTC of Santiago City. They alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1079 and Act No. 3135, particularly the publication requirement. Issue: W/N the foreclosure proceedings should be annulled on the basis of the non-compliance with the publication requirement Held/Ratio: Apparently, Metrobank lost sight of our ruling in Spouses Pulido v. CA,[25] Sempio v. CA,[26] and, recently, in Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo,[27] viz.: While it may be true that the party alleging non-compliance with the requisite publication has the burden of proof, still negative allegations need not be proved even if essential to one’s cause of action or defense if they constitute a denial of the existence of a document the custody of which belongs to the other party. It would have been a simple matter for Metrobank to rebut the allegation of non-compliance by producing the required proof of publication. Yet, Metrobank opted not to rebut the allegation; it simply relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Unfortunately, Metrobank’s reliance on the presumption of regularity must fail because it did not present any proof of publication of the notice of sale. As held by this Court in Spouses Pulido v. Court of Appeals:[28] ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 201 of 256 Justice Gesmundo [P]etitioners' reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties falls in the face of a serious imputation on non-compliance. The presumption of compliance with official duty is rebutted by failure to present proof of posting. As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the records[30] of the foreclosure proceedings lacked any proof of publication. This explains why Metrobank could not present any proof of publication. We take this occasion to reiterate that the object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing bidders and preventing a sacrifice sale of the property. • 7. DNA Evidence B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE • 1. Best Evidence Rule 8. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MA. IMELDA “IMEE” R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, ET. AL. (2012) "Section 3 Rule 130 mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself" This is a case about an alleged portion of the Marcoses’ supposed ill-gotten wealth. A complain for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages was filed against Ferdinand E. Marcos, later substituted upon his death by respondents. To prove that the Marcos siblings participated in and/or benefitted from the acts of the Marcos couple, petitioners presented several affidavits, a letter, and a TSN taken during the hearing held before the PCGG. All of these documents were not authenticated by the persons who executed them. Petitioners failed to observe the best evidence rule. In this case, the documents were presented to prove its contents, therefore the original documents must be presented to comply with the best evidence rule. Petitioner did not give any reasonable justification why the originals were not presented. The fact that the documents presented were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigation does not make them per se public records 10. PEOPLE V. HARPON (2011) “In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused; in the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.” Arpon was charged and convicted by the trial court of several counts of rape of a minor. The prosecution presented the testimony of the child during trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Arpon insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give weight to the incredible testimony of AAA. He alleges that AAA could not state with consistency the exact date when she was first supposedly raped, as well as her age at that time. The accused-appellant also avers that AAA could not remember the dates of the other incidents of rape charged, all of which were allegedly described in a uniform manner. He also argued that the prosecution failed to establish the age of the child (the only evidence was the testimony of the child). Supreme Court denied the appeal. Contrary to the posturing of Arpon, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal. Further, the Court stated that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness’ deportment and manner of testifying. In the instant case, the Court have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and found no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that Arpon indeed committed the first incident of rape charged. Further, the Court declared that in the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 202 of 256 Justice Gesmundo 22. PEOPLE VS. FUNESTO (2011) 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. 6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. In a case for rape, the aggravating circumstance of minority was not appreciated by the Court because there was failure to show the true age of the victim. ANTONIO LEJANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2010) “Best Evidence Rule; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; While the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see—the practice when a party does not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original.”; “Official Documents; Passports; Webb’s passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued, and the entries in that passport are presumed true; The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s passport—they have the same evidentiary value—and, the officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify on them.” Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. The identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre. Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 203 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony. But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. After four years of arduous hearings, the trial court found all the accused guilty. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde. On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case. Unfortunately, the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case. This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process. With regard to the admissibility of Webb’s passport as evidence, CA rejected it since he did not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As CA Justice Tagle said in his dissent, the practice when a party does not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the parties and on the court. Moreover, the U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webb’s arrival in and departure from that country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary. Webb’s passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that passport are presumed true. The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record. OTHER RELEVANT DOCTRINES: CARPIO-MORALES, J., Concurring Opinion: Evidence; Witnesses; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence derived from the testimony of a witness who was under the influence of drugs during the incident to which he is testifying is indeed very unreliable. A testimony given four years after the occurrence of crime which gives minute details that even contradict tales earlier given is too incredible as to draw dubiety. VILLARAMA, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion: Presumption of Innocence; Evidence; The Supreme Court has consistently held that the rule on the trial court’s appreciation of evidence must bow to the superior rule that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 204 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Witnesses; It is axiomatic that a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. Alibi; We have held in a number of cases that alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. Witnesses; The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that in determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. Verily, it is only when the identification of the accused as the author of the crime charged is inconclusive or unreliable that alibi assumes importance. Presumption of Innocence; Words and Phrases; Definitely, “reasonable doubt” is not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is guilty, but such uncertainty that “a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence.” Judicial Notice; Philippine Passport Act of 1996 (R.A. No. 8239); The Court takes judicial notice of reported irregularities and tampering of passports in the years prior to the recent issuance by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of machine-readable passports—in fact, the proliferation of photo-substituted passports, fake immigration stamps, assumed identity and double passports, among others, have been cited as grounds to justify the necessity of amending the Philippine Passport Act of 1996. SERENO, J., Separate Concurring Opinion: Right of Access to Evidence; The accused’s right to access to evidence necessitates in the correlative duty of the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection of the evidence, and not to suppress or alter it Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing; If a negative Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) test result could not be considered as providing certainty that Webb did not commit the crime, would it not have at least cast a reasonable doubt that he committed it? YASUO IWASAWA V. FELISA GANGAN G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013 “ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. The presentment of the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution is not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.” Petitioner is a Japanese national who married a Filipina. After their marriage and during their cohabitation he found out that Respondent already had a previous marriage. He found out because Respondent suddenly became depressed and when he inquired why, she confessed that it was because her former husband died. Upon knowledge, Petitioner verified the existence of the previous marriage and the death of the former spouse by obtaining from the NSO the official record of the marriage certificate of Respondent’s first marriage as well as the death certificate of the former spouse. Petitioner thereafter filed for the nullification of his marriage to Respondent on the ground of bigamy. He presented the NSO documents together with their marriage certificate to prove the material facts of the offense. The RTC denied the complaint based on insufficiency of evidence. It held that Petitioner’s failure to present the testimony of the custodian of the records to authenticate the due execution and contents of the records presented, was fatal to its case. It explained that respondent cannot rely on his own conclusions since he had no knowledge of the facts contained in the former marriage certificate and the fact of death of the former spouse. The NSO documents fall under the ambit of Art. 410 if the Civil code and assumes a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No need to present the custodian. • 2. Secondary Evidence MALIKSI v. COMELEC (2013) “Ballot images in the CF cards, as well as the printouts of such images, are the functional equivalent of the official physical ballots filled up by the voters, and may be used in an election protest.” ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 205 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Maliksi and Saquilayan were mayorality candidates. Saquilayan was proclaimed the winner. Maliksi filed an election protest. Trial court ruled Maliksi garnered more votes. Saquilayan appealed to COMELEC. The COMELEC First Division, after inspecting the ballot boxes, ruled that it was apparent that the integrityof the ballots had been compromised. To determine the true will of the electorate, and since there was an allegation of ballot tampering, the COMELEC First Division examined the digital images of the contested ballots stored in the Compact Flash (CF) cards. Based on this, Saquilayan garnered more votes. The COMELEC First Division noted that Maliksi attached a photocopy of an official ballot to his election protest. The COMELEC First Division stated that unless one of the clustered precincts had a photocopying machine, it could only mean that an official ballot was taken out of the polling place to be photocopied, in violation of Section 30(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8786. COMELEC En Banc affirmed. The relevant issue here is whether the ballot images in the CF cards are mere secondary evidence that should only be used when the physical ballots are not available. SC held no. Ballot images in the CF cards, as well as the printouts of such images, are the functional equivalent of the official physical ballots filled up by the voters, and may be used in an election protest. In previous jurisprudence, SC held “the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369.” In short, both the ballot images in the CF cards and the printouts of such images have the same evidentiary value as the official physical ballots filled up by the voters. The ballot images, which are digital, are electronically generated and written in the CF cards when the ballots are fed into the PCOS machine. The ballot images are the counterparts produced by electronic recording which accurately reproduce the original, and thus are the equivalent of the original. Hence, the ballot images are not secondary evidence. The official physical ballots and the ballot images in the CF cards are both original documents. The ballot images in the CF cards have the same evidentiary weight as the official physical ballots. • 3. Parol Evidence Rule 40. VDA. DE OUANO v. REPUBLIC (2011) “Parol evidence rule does not apply to executed contracts. Parol evidence rule is waivable.” Under the rule on the Statute of Frauds, as expressed in Article 1403 of the Civil Code, a contract for the sale or acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable unless the same or some note of the contract be in writing and subscribed by the party charged. Subject to defined exceptions, evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or secondary evidence of its contents. MCIAA’s invocation of the Statute of Frauds is misplaced primarily because the statute applies only to executory and not to completed, executed, or partially consummated contracts. Then, the objection on the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the Statute of Frauds may be waived if not timely raised. HEIRS OF POLICRONIO URETA V. HEIRS OF LIBERATO URETA, G.R. NO. 165748/165930 (2011) The Parol Evidence Rule does not apply when the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties and the validity of the written agreement are put in issue. As a general rule, hearsay evidence is incompetent unless no timely objection was raised against it and there are corroborative pieces of evidence. Policronio and Liberato were sons of Alfonso, who owned several parcels of land in Aklan. During the lifetime of Alfonso, Deeds of Sale were executed in favor of Alfonso's children to escape inheritance tax liability. After Alfonso and Policronio died, the Heirs of Policronio brought a suit to court claiming under a Deed of Sale executed in favor of Policronio. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the Deeds of Sale were void for being simulated. The rulings were supported by the Deeds of Sale and testimony of Amparo, one of Alfonso's grandchildren present at the time of the execution of the instruments. Held: The RTC and CA properly admitted the evidence presented. First, no timely objections were made. Second, as regards the Parol Evidence Rule, the case falls under the exceptions as the answer to the complaint clearly put in issue the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties and the validity of the written agreement. Third, hearsay evidence of Amparo was reasonable considered because it was corroborated by the other Deeds of Sale and other instruments. (The basis of the ruling on hearsay was Top-Weld Manufacturing v. ECED.) 52. JOEY MARQUEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2009) – “hearsay vs incompetent evidence” ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 206 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Joey Marquez was accused of entering into grossly disadvantageous transactions (walis tingting purchases) without complying with COA rules and regulations. Joey Marquez claims that the evidence of the prosecution which included a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Paranaque City was different from the walis tingting used by street sweepers and that such receipts are hearsay evidence. The Court ruled that not all of the contents of the audit team’s report constituted hearsay since Ms. Bermuda (audit team by COA) could very well testify thereon since the conclusions were reached by her and her team. The report which she identified and testified on was made by the Special Audit Team she herself headed. The disbursement vouchers, purchase orders, purchase requests and other documents constituting the supporting papers of the team’s report were public documents requested from the City Auditor of Parañaque and from the accused Mayor Marquez. Such documents were submitted to the Special Audit Team for the specific purpose of reviewing them. However, these conclusions were based on incompetent evidence which failed to show the actual price of the walis tingting purchased by Joey Marquez during the time of the audited transaction. 41. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v. Ricardo L. Inocian, et al. (2011) “The objection on the admissibility of evidence on the basis of Statue of Frauds may be waived if not timely raised.” The MCIAA pursued a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. It negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around the airport. The owners agreed to sell their lands and they claimed that the government assured them that they could repurchase their lands should the expansion project not push through or once the airport closes its operations. The court then decreed the expropriation of the lands. However, the Lahug Airport ceased operations and the expropriated lots were not used for the expansion of such airport. Thus, the former owners of the lots demanded that they should be allowed by the government to exercise their promised right to repurchase. The MCIAA argued that the assurance to the owners regarding the right to repurchase was only verbal and is barred by the Statute of Fruads. The issue is whether parol evidence may be admissible to prove the claim of the lot owners. The Court ruled that such evidence is admissible and that MCIAA’s invocation of the Statute of Frauds is misplaced. The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory and not to completed, executed or partially consummated contracts. In the case at bar, there can be no serious objection to the proposition that the agreement package between the government and the private lot owners was already partially performed by the government through the acquisition of the lots for the expansion of the Lahug airport. And since the purpose for the taking of the properties was not pursued, the lot owners can, in an action to compel MCIAA to make good its oral undertaking to allow repurchase, adduce parol evidence to prove the transaction. At any rate, the objection on the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the Statute of Frauds may be waived if not timely raised. Records tend to support the conclusion that MCIAA did not object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove its commitment to allow the former owners to repurchase their respective properties upon the occurrence of certain events. G&M PHILIPPINES v. CRUZ, G.R. 140495, April 15, 2005 G&M recruited Cruz as trailer driver for its foreign principal, Salim Al Yami Est., for a period of two years, and with a stipulated monthly salary of US$625. Cruz alleged that when he arrived in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, he was made to sign an employment contract in blank and his salary was reduced to SR604.00. Seven months into employment, his employer deported him because he filed a complaint against the company for sub-human working conditions, non-payment of wages and overtime pay, salary deduction and change of employer. He filed with the Labor Arbiter an Affidavit/Complaint against G&M for illegal dismissal, underpayment and non-payment of wages, and refund of transportation expenses. G&M contends that Cruz abandoned his job when he joined an illegal strike and refused to report for work, constituting a breach of his employment contract and a valid cause for termination of employment. The Labor Arbiter found merit in G&M’s claim but nevertheless granted Cruz claim for underpayment of wages and two months unpaid salary. G&M filed a petition for certiorari questioning whether or not there is evidence on record to support the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that Cruz is entitled to the payment of salary differential and unpaid wages. The SC ruled that it is already a well- entrenched rule, especially in labor cases, that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, like the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), are accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. Particularly when passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals, they are binding and conclusive upon the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 207 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Supreme Court and will not normally be disturbed. The Court finds no reason in this case to depart from such doctrine. IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA, G.R. 158802, November 17, 2004 Aileen Mendoza, 12, was raped by her uncle, Reynaldo de Villa in her home in Pasig. Her pregnancy prompted the filing of charges by her parents against de Villa. De Villa’s defenses were a.) sickness and old age of 67 rendered him incapable of erection; b.) The Mendozas bear a grudge against him; c.) At the time of the alleged rape, he was in his hometown of San Luis, Laguna. RTC ruled that de Villa was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape and was sentenced to death. Case was automatically elevated to SC for automatic review due to penalty imposed. SC affirmed RTC decision. June, son of accused, filed MRs praying for DNA tests to be conducted. DNA tests showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired the latter. June thus filed petition for writ of habeas corpus for his father. W/N writ of habeas corpus a proper remedy in the instant case.No. The writ of habeas corpus is proper remedy when an individual is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. However, it cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction. It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of conviction due to said lack of jurisdiction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through habeas corpus. • 4. Interpretation Of Documents 104. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HUANG ZHEN HUA AND JOGY LEE (2004) Rule 130 Section 16 Interpreters. The Rules of Court does not require the trial court to provide the appellant with an interpreter throughout the trial—an interpreter is required only if the witness on the stand testifies in a language other than in English or is a deaf-mute; The appellant may procure the services of an interpreter at her own expense. The records show that a Cantonese interpreter attended the trial and interpreted her testimony. The Rules of Court does not require the trial court to provide the appellant with an interpreter throughout the trial. An interpreter is required only if the witness on the stand testifies in a language other than in English or is a deafmute. The appellant may procure the services of an interpreter at her own expense. C. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE • 1. Qualification of Witnesses AFP- Retirement and Separation Benefits System vs. Republic G.R. No. 188956 (2013) “No need for authorization to be a witness.” There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. Such omission can be considered as a failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting such witness. All that the Rules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided therein. Lenido Lumanog, et al. v. People of the Philippines (2011) “It is settled that contradictions between the contents of an affiant’s affidavit and his testimony in the witness stand do not always militate against the witness’ credibility.” The accused Lumanog, Santos, Fortuna and de Jesus were convicted of the crime of murder. They seek for the reversal of their conviction on the ground that the testimony in court of the sole witness, Security Guard Freddie Alejo, was not credible and should have not been given much weight. They allege that the witness’ testimony in court was inconsistent with the first affidavit of such witness. The court ruled that it is settled that contradictions between the contents of an affiant’s affidavit and his testimony in the witness stand do not always militate against the witness’ credibility. This is so because affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate. In his first affidavit, Alejo mentioned only four suspects but in his testimony, he said that there were six suspects. The discrepancy is explained by the fact that Alejo merely gave an answer to a question which was asked of him during the investigation as to those persons whom he saw actually shoot the victim. He replied that there were four armed men who suddenly fired shots at the victim. Clearly, it was not a fatal ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 208 of 256 Justice Gesmundo omission on the part of Alejo not to include in his first affidavit the two other suspects who were acting as lookouts. During his testimony in court, Alejo was able to fully recount the details and state that there were two men walking back and forth before the shooting. Thus, he then stated that there are actually six suspects. CESAR FORTUNA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2011) & PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPO2 CESAR FORTUNA y ABUDO (2011) “It is settled that contradictions between the contents of an affiant’s affidavit and his testimony in the witness stand do not always militate against the witness’ credibility. This is so because affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate.” “Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below.” Petitioner was convicted of the crime of murder and seeks a reversal assailing the testimony of the lone eyewitness security guard Alejo regarding the identification of the accused. The accused strongly assail the weight and credence accorded to the identification of the accused by the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution, security guard Freddie Alejo. It was pointed out, among others, that: (1) in his statement given to the police investigators immediately after the incident, Alejo mentioned only four suspects, contrary to his subsequent testimony in court; it was impossible for him not to mention the two men he had seen walking back and forth before the shooting; (2) Alejo accepted financial support and benefits from the Abadilla family which could have colored his testimony against the accused; (3) his in-court identification of the six accused is questionable and unreliable considering that it referred to them only by numbers and he had given prior description of only two suspects; and (4) the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court to confirm Alejo’s observations was likewise unreliable because it was made at a time when a material condition is significantly altered, i.e., it was held from 10:00 a.m. onwards whereas the incident occurred between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. when the glare of the morning sun directly hits the guard post where Alejo was stationed. 1 st issue: Whether the testimony of the eyewitness security guard Alejo was inconsistent. Held: No. While it is true that Alejo mentioned only four and not six suspects in his sworn statement, this did not impair his testimony as an eyewitness. Alejo was simply responding to specific questions as to what he had witnessed during the shooting incident. It was not a fatal omission on the part of Alejo not to include in his first affidavit the two other suspects who were acting as lookouts. During his testimony in court, Alejo was able to fully recount the details and state that there were two men walking back and forth before the shooting. It is settled that contradictions between the contents of an affiant’s affidavit and his testimony in the witness stand do not always militate against the witness’ credibility. This is so because affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate. 2 nd issue: Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence to support the defense argument that there was no positive identification of the killers. Held : Not admissible. To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown that the evidence was "newly discovered" pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below. Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify re- opening of the trial and/or vacating the judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw that may have initially attended the out-of-court identification of the accused, the same was cured when all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EFREN PEÑONES, OSCAR PEÑONES, FROILAN PEÑONES, and ANDRES PEÑONES (1991) The appellants were convicted of murder by the lower courts. They are now presenting evidence of the fact of their voluntary surrender to the barangay official as newly discovered evidence for the motion for new trial. Issue now is ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 209 of 256 Justice Gesmundo whether this is sufficient. The Supreme Court says No, and that it is obvious that the evidence the testimony of the barangay official to whom Efren Peñones had supposedly surrendered—cannot in any sense be considered newly discovered. It was known to the appellants during the trial. Much less may it be considered of so substantial a character as would "change the judgment." For even if it be conceded that Efren Peñones had indeed given himself up to that barangay official, this circumstance would not alter the outcome one bit. Uy vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36(2000). Credibility of witness(?) The CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although, to its credit, it did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that the case could have been decided without these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed them essential to the resolution of the case, it could have asked for the records from the RTC. Third, in a similar case, we held that the submission of a document together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the submission of a certified true copy of “material portions of the record as are referred to [in the petition], and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto” along with the petition. So should it be in this case, especially considering that it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be defeated. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are: (1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description of “the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized.” The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. Thus, in Castro vs. Pabalan, where the search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court “admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation.” In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1 therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the premises to be searched is, is not a defect that would spell the warrant’s invalidation in this case. People vs. Uy, 327 SCRA 335(2000). Credibility of Witness A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted for the purpose of trapping and capturing law-breakers in the execution of their criminal plan; it is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has consistently proved itself to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, and unless there is a clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserved full faith and credit. As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses, especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed. The failure to present the informer did not diminish the integrity of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. Informers are almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Their testimony or identity may be dispensed with since his or her narration would be merely corroborative, as in this case, when the poseur-buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug. As against the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 210 of 256 Justice Gesmundo positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that they caught RAMON in a buy-bust operation, supported by other evidence such as the packets of shabu sold by and seized from him, RAMON’s negative testimony must necessarily fail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially when it comes from the mouth of credible witness. It may at once be noted that neither RAMON nor his counsel made express admission that the contents of the plastic bags to “be marked” as Exhibits “D,” “D-l,” “D-2,” “D-3,” “D-4,” and “E” contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. That RAMON agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Bravo may not be considered an admission of the findings of Bravo on the contents of the plastic bag. Strictly, from the tenor of the aforequoted portion of the Joint Order, it is clear that RAMON and his counsel merely agreed to the marking of the exhibits, and the clause “thereby dispensing with the testimony of forensic Chemist Loreto E. Bravo” must be understood in that context. As to the reports of Forensic Chemist Bravo, it must be stressed that as an NBI Forensic Chemist, Bravo is a public officer, and his report carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function and duty. Besides, by virtue of Section 44, Rule 130, entries in official records made in the performance of office duty, as in the case of the reports of Bravo, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. We are also aware that “the test conducted for the presence of ‘shabu’ (infrared test) is a relatively simple test which can be performed by an average or regular chemistry graduate” and where “there is no evidence. . . to show that the positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (‘shabu’) are erroneous . . . coupled with the undisputed presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, said results” may “adequately establish” that the specimens submitted were indeed shabu. People vs. Cueno, 298 SCRA 621(1998). Credibility of Witness. Accused-appellant assails the credibility of the police officers who have given testimony in the criminal cases. Unless compelling reasons are shown otherwise, this Court, not being a trier of facts itself, rely in good part on the assessment and evaluation by the trial court of the evidence, particularly the attestations of witnesses, presented to it. The Court will not generally interfere with the findings of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of the witnesses; it is the latter court, not the appellate tribunal, which has the opportunity to see and hear first hand the bringing up to it during trial of testimonial evidence. Here, once again, the Court sees no reason to doubt and disturb the findings thereon of the trial court. The inconsistencies pointed out by accused-appellant, at best to his cause, pertain only to collateral matters and really not that relevant to the case against him. Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) vs. Barron, 297 SCRA 376(1998). Credibility of Witness. In an effort to escape criminal liability, the respondent judge shifts the burden on the NBI by raising the defense of frame-up. Frame-up as a defense has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can just easily be concocted but is quite difficult to prove. And the defense of frame-up must be proved by clear and convincing evidence because it is of the same category as alibi. In the case at bar, the respondent judge failed to present any convincing evidence to substantiate his claim. He advances the theory that the NBI had carefully mapped out a frame-up operation against him as a retaliatory measure for all those cases which the NBI had filed and for which he (Judge Barron) caused the dismissal thereof. This cannot be given credence. There is no evidence on record that the NBI harboured a personal grudge against the respondent judge. Clearly, what transpired was an entrapment and not a frame-up as claimed by the respondent. Entrapment has received judicial sanction as long as it is carried out with due regard to Constitutional and legal safeguards. Furthermore, there is no scintilla of evidence that the manner by which the NBI agents conducted the operation was tainted with illegality. This Court has held in the case of Mallari vs. Court of Appeals that “Absent strong and convincing proof to the contrary, this Court is bound by the presumption that the arresting officers were aware of the legal mandates in effecting an arrest and strictly complied with the same.” The respondent judge insinuates that the search conducted on his car was illegal. We do not think so. Where the arrest of the accused was lawful, having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is no need for a warrant for the seizure of the fruit of the crime as well as for the body search upon him, the same being incidental to a lawful arrest. There being a lawful arrest upon the person of the respondent judge, the NBI agents were authorized to conduct a warrantless search. In People vs. De Lara, we held: “A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made.” The means employed and the manner by which the entrapment operation was conducted is assailed by the respondent judge. The reliance of the NBI agents on the signal given by Crear was appropriate. It was the manner by which Crear ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 211 of 256 Justice Gesmundo would convey to the agents that the marked money was already in possession of the respondent judge. The arresting officers could not place themselves in a conspicuous position where they could easily be seen by the respondent judge as the said transaction was supposedly between Crear and Judge Barron only. It must be noted that ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. Entrapment is not a bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker. All told, a judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. The conduct of respondent judge shows that he can be influenced by monetary considerations. His act of demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant constitutes serious misconduct in office. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct, no matter how nominal the amount involved on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice quickly, which erodes the respect for law and the courts. Atty. Tuldague v. Judge Pardo (AM No. RTJ-05-1962) Petitioners allege that Pardo committed corruption and violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. In an earlier criminal case, Judge Pardo allegedly asked 6,000 pesos from the defendant in exchange for a favorable decision on his application for probation. Pardo allegedly had other transactions with the defendant to further expedite the case. In an earlier land registration case, Pardo also allegedly got money to speedy release of a copy of a petition. Pardo denied all the allegations that he received money in exchange for favorable decisions in cases and claimed that Tuldague filed this complaint to get back at him. Petitioners also accused Calpatura, the legal researcher of the RTC, as an accomplice of Pardo. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) released a report, finding Pardo liable for violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct. As to the other allegations, the OCA claimed that there insufficient evidence and recommended the dismissal of the case. Held: The SC adopted the findings of the OCA and fined Judge Pardo for violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The SC said that the petitioners had the burden of proving the allegations against Pardo. Yet, as the OCA found, the petitioners did not have direct knowledge of their charges and merely relied on their witnesses to testify on the alleged wrongful acts of Pardo. To determine the credibility and probative weight of the testimony of a witness, such testimony must be considered in its entirety and not in truncated parts. To determine which contradicting statements of a witness are to prevail as to the truth, the other evidence received must be considered. On the charge of corruption, complainants only presented Rosendo to testify that he gave P6,000.00 to Judge Pardo in the latter’s house. He alleged that he likewise gave P3,000.00 to Calpatura, through Dominador. However, Rosendo’s statements remain uncorroborated as he did not present Alonzo, who allegedly saw him give the money to Judge Pardo. On the other hand, Judge Pardo presented Fr. Lazo, who testified that he did not see Rosendo give money to Judge Pardo in his house. Calpatura likewise presented Dominador, who testified that Rosendo never gave him money. Rosendo’s testimony also contains material inconsistencies, which gravely affected his credibility. It is well to note that when a serious and inexplicable discrepancy is present between a previously executed sworn statement of a witness and his testimonial declarations with respect to one’s participation in a serious imputation such as bribery, such discrepancy raises grave doubt on the veracity of the witness’ account. In addition, the Court held that the glaring discrepancy in the date of the commission of the alleged corrupt act and his failure to correct the discrepancy despite given a chance, negatively affected his credibility. 111. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BINAD SY CHUA (2003) “The rule that a trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal is not a hard and fast rule.” Police officers received a report that Sy Chua was about to deliver drugs at Thunder Inn Hotel in Angeles City and that he also distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in the area. A team of operatives were formed and ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 212 of 256 Justice Gesmundo when they saw Sy Chua alight his car in front of the hotel carrying a Zest-O juice box, they immediately accosted him. A small transparent plastic bag with crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. And the body search yielded 20 pcs. Of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from the left back pocket. Peeking into the box, the police saw it contained a crystalline substance. All of these were confiscated and Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and Illegal Possession of ammunitions. The test showed that the substance is shabu. The Court held that Sy Chua should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. The only exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact of circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case. In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of weight and substance that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which casts doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty and indemnity imposed by the trial court. A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusion of the trial court. It confused the two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto) and of a “stop-and-frisk.” In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant. Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant and searching his person. Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to them hours before accused-appellant’s arrest was not a product of an “on-the-spot” tip which may excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest. Furthermore, there are doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the very same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the initial field test where the items seized were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of Angeles City. The items were therefore not marked at the place where they were taken. In People v. Casimiro, the court struck down with disbelief the reliability of the identity of the confiscated items since they were not marked at the place where they were seized. 114. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CAMILO SORIANO (2002) “In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony, as and when sufficiently credible, given by the rape victim. Lust is no respecter of place and time.” The case is about the alleged rape committed by Soriano to his own 11-year old daughter, Maricel. A cramped space in a house designed to accommodate lodgers in Baguio was home to the Soriano children. Due to the small quarters, two of Leonora’s children from her previous marriage slept in the kitchen, one under the table and the other beside it, while Leonora, Camilo and their four children, including Maricel, used the lone 4x5-meter bedroom. The couple slept on the lower portion of a double-decked bed while their children stayed on the upper deck. When Leonora came back from La Union to collect the proceeds of her sales of cosmetic and underwear items, her son reported to her “Mama, papa is raping Maricel and we saw it.” She then confronted her daughter about it who confirmed and explained that Soriano warned her not to tell anybody or he would kill them all. The Court held that the spontaneity with which Maricel detailed the incidents, the tears she has shed at the stand while recounting her experience, and her consistency almost throughout her account dispel insinuations of a rehearsed testimony. Her testimony, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her recent non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm her claim that she has truly been raped by her own father. In criminal cases of this nature, the only evidence that can really be offered to establish the guilt of the accused, more often than not, is the testimony of the complainant herself. Appellant calls our attention of the small space of the family room and the constant presence of the members of the family that would make ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 213 of 256 Justice Gesmundo the commission of the crime most unlikely. Time and again it has been said that lust is no respecter of place and time. Indeed, it would seem that a pervert can give vent to bestial impulses without much thought to decency. • 2. Testimonial Privilege 32) Pentagon Steel Corp. v. CA (2009) Statements and/or agreements made at conciliation proceedings are privileged and cannot be used as evidence. Offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by the parties making them. Facts: A filed a case for illegal dismissal against PS Corp, it reached the CA the CA affirmed the NLRCs decision that there was illegal dismissal. The Corp is questioning the CA’s consideration of the proceedings that transpired during the mandatory preliminary conference of the case, were there was an offer of compromise. Held: The CA should not have considered the mandatory preliminary conference, Article 233 of the Labor Code states that “[i]nformation and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged communication and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission. Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken up at conciliation proceedings conducted by them.” Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by the parties making them. (remember this is a labor case not a criminal case). Josielene Lara Chan vs. Johnny T. Chan (2013) "Hospital records can be covered by the doctor-patient privilege" In a case for annulment based on psychological incapacity, the wife wanted the court to issue a subpoena duces tecum for the production and submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband. The Court denied the subpoena because considering that the offer of evidence is made at the trial, the wife will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. Even if the subpoena is treated as a motion for production of documents, the scope of production of documents is limited to those not privileged. In this case, to allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him— would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent. • 3. Admissions and Confessions PEOPLE vs. REYES (2009), G.R. No. 178300 Extrajudicial Confession, when admissible in evidence; defense of frame up – “The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused.” / “The defense of frame-up become less plausible when they are corroborated only by relatives and friends because of perceived partiality.” FACTS: Reyes, Amaldo, and Flores were charged with kidnapping for ransom with homicide. Accused Amaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force and identified his co-accused. Appellants claim that their written extrajudicial confessions should be inadmissible as they were taken without counsel. ISSUE: W/N extrajudicial statements of the accused are admissible. HELD: Yes. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 214 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The prosecution sufficiently established that the extra-judicial confessions of Arnaldo and Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and Flores. The extrajudicial confessions of Arnaldo and Flores are replete with details on the manner in which the kidnapping was committed, thereby ruling out the possibility that these were involuntarily made. Their extrajudicial confessions clearly state how appellants and their cohorts planned the kidnapping as well as the sequence of events before, during and after its occurrence. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused. Although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused (as for instance, the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the co- conspirator). While the alibis of Reyes and Flores and the defense of frame-up of Arnaldo were corroborated on some points by the testimonies of some of their relatives/friends. Alibi and the defense of frame-up become less plausible when they are corroborated only by relatives and friends because of perceived partiality. In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. 21. PEOPLE VS. BOKINGO (2011) An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co- conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. In a case for murder, an extrajudicial confession made by one of the accused during preliminary investigation was used as evidence. However, the court held the confession to be inadmissible because it was made without assistance of counsel. The same extrajudicial confession cannot be used against the other accused because conspiracy was not clearly shown. 46. SPS. LUIGI GUANIO AND ANNA GUANIO VS. MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. (2011) “Statements which are not estoppels nor judicial admissions have no quality of conclusiveness, and an opponent whose admissions have been offered against him may offer any evidence which serves as an explanation for his former assertion of what he now denies as a fact.” Sps. Guanio filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages against Makati Shangri-La citing various occurrences during their wedding reception that constitute as a breach of the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract between them. The RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Guanio, citing the letter of Krister Svensson, the hotel’s Executive Assistant Manager, which stated: “…we have disappointed you in all means… we feel as strongly as you do that the services you received were unacceptable and definitely not up to our standards… we have fallen short of your expectations.” The CA reversed the decision. Held: The letter is not an admission. It is not uncommon in the hotel industry to receive comments, criticisms or feedback on the service it delivers. It is also customary for hotel management to try to smooth ruffled feathers to preserve goodwill among its clientele. Statements which are not estoppels nor judicial admissions have no quality of conclusiveness, and an opponent whose admissions have been offered against him may offer any evidence which serves as an explanation for his former assertion of what he now denies as a fact. According to the hotel’s catering director, “being in the service industry, it is a practice that we apologize if there is any inconvenience, so the purpose for apologizing is mainly to show empathy ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 215 of 256 Justice Gesmundo and to ensure the client that we are hearing them out and that we will do a better investigation and it is not in any way that we are admitting any fault.” The SC deems this explanation sufficient to overcome any presumption of admission of breach that Svensson’s letter might have conveyed. 40.) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENATO ESPANOL, G.R. NO. 175603 (2009) “Rule 130 Sec. 27: In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.” Renato Espanol was charged with killing his wife, Gloria. At about 2am several people heard gunshots at Pantal Road, Dagupan City. A man wearing a dark-colored long sleeved shirt driving a yellow tricycle was seen speeding from the place of commission. Thereafter, Renato arrived at the place where his wife was killed; he shouted that it’s his wife but stepped across the dead body and saluted the police investigator right after. He then went to get his brother-in-law (Mateo) to inform the latter of the death of his sister. They rode a yellow tricycle owned by Mateo. Mateo noticed that the seats were wet. When Renato was asked about the wet seats he did not answer. Renato refused to look at the body and preferred to stay outside during the autopsy. Disturbed by appellant's actuations, Felicidad (victim’s sister) asked the police to interrogate her brother-in-law. At the police station, Renato requested if he could talk privately with Felicidad. During their talk, appellant begged Felicidad's forgiveness and asked that he be spared from imprisonment.During the victim's wake in their house, appellant hardly looked at his wife's remains. He chose to remain secluded at the second floor. He repeatedly asked for Felicidad's forgiveness during the first night of the wake. At one point, Delfin, a nephew of the victim, approached appellant and asked why the latter killed his aunt. Appellant just kept silent. Court affirmed the guilt of the accused. The circumstances are proven facts. Appellant was also silent when his wife’s nephew asked him why he killed his wife. His silence on this accusation is deemed an admission under Rule 130, Sec. 32. Also, Renato’s act of pleading for Felicidad’s forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise, which in turn can be received as an implied admission of guilt under Rule 130, Sec. 27. RULE 130, SEC. 26 PEOPLE v. OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL (2011) "An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitter’s fault if the admission does not." Cristobal, a bank teller of Prudential Bank, allegedly stole $10,000 from Prudential Bank. Among six tellers, she was the only teller assigned to handle dollar deposits and withdrawals. She claimed that the money was withdrawn after the cut-off time. She eventually told the bank president, via a letter, that she gave the money to a person who was threatening her family. When the State rested its case against Cristobal, her counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence praying for dismissal. RTC denied the Demurrer and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis that her filing of demurrer to evidence without express leave of court had waived her right to present evidence. She was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Qualified Theft. CA and SC affirmed. Regarding Cristobal’s handwritten letter, she claimed that it was inadmissible for being an uncounselled extrajudicial confession and for not being executed under oath. However, the SC held that that the letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on it being executed with the assistance of counsel. On the contrary, it is a voluntary party submission under Section 26. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitter’s fault if the admission does not. By virtue of its being made by the party himself, an admission is competent primary evidence against the admitter. The letter was not a confession due to its not expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft. Under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt for the offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein. There was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she wrote the letter because she spontaneously made it while not under custodial investigation. Her insistence on the assistance of a counsel might be valid and better appreciated had she made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial investigation, or under coercion by the investigating authorities of the Government. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 216 of 256 Justice Gesmundo RULE 130, SEC 30. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KHADDAFY JANJALANI, ET. AL. (2011) “While it is true that statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.” Night of Valentine’s Day 2005, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two men (Baharan and Trinidad) running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in. According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men as they were acting suspiciously. As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. Abu Solaiman, spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentine’s Day “gift” for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave an exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the bombing incident. In another exclusive interview, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the Valentine’s day bombing. The accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. . Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held that “[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross- examine the declarant.” VIVIAN T. DABU, ETC. EDUARDO RODEN E. KAPUNAN, ETC. ET AL., A.M. NO. RTJ-00-1600, FEB 1, 2011 “failed to specifically deny under oath his participation in the anomalous cases or to challenge the genuineness of his signature appearing in the court records of the questioned cases enumerated by Dabu. Thus, following Section 8, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[7] this amounts to an admission…” The Court acts upon these two consolidated administrative cases against [1] Judge Kapunan; [2] stenographer (Cortez); [3] stenographer Galo; and [4] Legal Researcher (Tiongco), all of Branch 51, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga for falsification of court records. … From a mere examination of the signatures of Judge Kapunan on the questioned court records, it is clear that his signatures were not forged. As correctly pointed out by the complainant and the Investigating Justice, except for the abovementioned cases of Enal and Vitug, Judge Kapunan failed to specifically deny under oath his participation in the anomalous cases or to challenge the genuineness of his signature appearing in the court records of the questioned cases enumerated by Dabu. Thus, following Section 8, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[7] this amounts to an admission by Judge Kapunan that he indeed signed the questioned orders, decisions and court records.Judge Kapunan failed to offer any evidence to support his defense that his signatures therein were forged. The rule is that he who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a public document bears the responsibility of presenting evidence to that effect.[8] Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,[9] the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following manner: [1] by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted on or been charged; [2] by a comparison, made by a witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. At the very least, he should present corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he should present an expert witness.[10] As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 217 of 256 Justice Gesmundo of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.[11] This, unfortunately, Judge Kapunan failed to do. [Case against Judge Kapunan rendered moot and academic considering his death in 2001.] Respondents found guilty and ordered dismissed. • 4. Previous Conduct as Evidence RULE 130, SEC. 34 30 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. MARINA CUSTODIO (2011) "The general evidentiary rule is that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that one did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time. However, evidence of similar acts may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like" Custodio, bank teller of Metrobank, allegedly failed to account for funds (P600,000) entrusted to her. Custodio was supposedly caught bringing out a teller’s copy of journal print transactions with the related cash transfer slips. These bank records were confiscated from Custodio when they were discovered in her dress pocket during a body search. Other evidence raised by Metrobank include “leaving for lunch alone with an expandable shoulder bag” and eight wrappers of five-hundred peso bills bearing Custodio’s teller stamp it allegedly recovered. SC held these as inconclusive. The bag was not inspected by the security guards. As it were, the security guard saw nothing unusual or out of the ordinary, with respect to Custodio’s bags that would have aroused his suspicion and prompt him to inspect her belongings before she left. The stamped wrappers can easily be procured by stamping unmarked bill wrappers with tools and materials that are readily available to Metrobank. Moreover, the wrappers offered into evidence by Metrobank do not bear Custodio’s initials to prove that the bundles of money which these wrappers correspond to were in her care. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the discovery of these bill wrappers by Metrobank remain unclear. Despite the bank manager’s instructions and the bank employees’ efforts in conducting a thorough search for the missing cash bundles, neither the money nor the bill wrappers were found on the day of the cash shortage. The cash custodian who identified these bill wrappers did not explain how she came to discover them Metrobank also argued that Custodio’s prior involvement in a cash shortage is admissible as evidence to prove a scheme or habit on her part. The general evidentiary rule is that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that one did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time. However, evidence of similar acts may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like. Here, Custodio’s previous involvement is not conclusive proof. Although the previous cash shortage in Cubao could possibly shed light on the intent, scheme or habit of Custodio, that previous cash shortage is not sufficient to affirm a definitive finding of fact that she took the funds in the Laoag City branch. If the prior cash shortage in Cubao showed a reasonable intent or habit on the part of respondent, then there was no reason for Metrobank to continue to employ her, considering the degree of trust and confidence required of a bank teller. Nevertheless, Custodio continued to serve the bank even after the previous case. Her continued employment was an affirmation that she was still worthy of the bank’s trust, insofar as she was allowed to continue to handle sums of money in another branch. • 5. Testimonial Knowledge • 6. Exceptions To The Hearsay Rule 32. PEOPLE v DIGOL (2011) “Alibi weaker when corroborated by friends; Dying Declaration has 4 requisites.” In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must concur: first, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death; third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 218 of 256 Justice Gesmundo fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. Then, the Court gives less probative weight to a defense of alibi when it is corroborated by friends and relatives. One can easily fabricate an alibi and ask friends and relatives to corroborate it. When a defense witness is a relative of an accused whose defense is alibi, courts have more reason to view such testimony with skepticism. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARY LOUR OMICTIN Y SINGCO (2010) “Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a party’s testimony as a witness in court.” All four private complainants filed complaints against Omictin with the NBI for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa. Thus, the NBI prepared an entrapment operation to arrest Omictin. A case was subsequently file and she was found guilty of Estafa by the RTC. The CA, affirmed. Hence, we have this appeal. Omictin, maintains that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain facts, which, if considered, would lead to her acquittal. Omictin asserts in her brief that the testimony of Primo Guevarra undoubtedly shows that he was not the one who paid the accused- appellant. His testimony, to the effect that the check, issued by a certain Elisa Dotenes, was paid by the bank, clearly falls within the rules proscribing the admission of hearsay evidence. It bears stressing that the failure of the prosecution to present Elisa Dotenes renders the testimony of witness Guevarra as unsubstantiated and hearsay. In addition to this, Omictin asserts that Another prosecution witness, Mr. Anthony Ambrosio, testified that he gave the accused-appellant the amount of sixteen thousand (16,000.00) pesos, representing initial payment in consideration of the work abroad. It is borne on record however, that Anthony’s testimony was unsubstantiated by any proof that he made such payment, i.e., receipts. Surely, mere allegation, without proof, is not enough to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. These contentions are erroneous. The testimony of Ambrosio cannot be considered as self-serving evidence. Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a party’s testimony as a witness in court. Assayed against the foregoing standards, Ambrosio’s testimony is not self-serving and is admissible in evidence. We can hypothetically assume, as a second consideration, that the testimonies of Guevarra and Ambrosio are unsubstantiated and self- serving. Still, the unsubstantiated and self-serving nature of said testimonies would not carry the day for Omictin, since through her testimony, Omictin admitted and established the fact that she was paid by Guevarra the amount of PhP 40,000 and Ambrosio the amount of PhP 16,000. 9. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., v. RODELIO ALBERTO, ET. AL. (2012) "The presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not present in court as long as the requisites for entries in official records are present." An accident occurred in EDSA. Based on the police report issued by the on-the-spot investigator, the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side shortly before the vehicular accident. The Mitsubishi Galant was insured by Malayan. Malayan sued the respondents. The trial court ruled in favor of Malayan. CA reversed it stating that the police report was not authenticated since the police who made it was not presented in court to identify it. The issue now is whether the testimony of the police officer who made the police report is necessary. As held in the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, “hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.” There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule, among which are entries in official records. To constitute as an exception, the following requisites should be present: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally or through official information. Therefore the presentation of the police report itself is admissible even if the police investigator who prepared it was not present as long as the said requisites are present. However, in this case, what is not clear is whether the police investigator had sufficient ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 219 of 256 Justice Gesmundo personal knowledge of the facts contained in his report, thus the third requisite is lacking. Nonetheless, the police report is still admissible for failure of the respondents to timely object to the police report’s presentation. (17) ANNA LERMA PATULA VS PEOPLE (2012) “The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft ofpersonal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.” Anna was charged with estafa but was convicted of falsification and she is assailing her conviction on the ground that the judgment disregarded the rules on admission of evidene as the documentary evidence were all private documents, the due execution of which was not proved in accordance with Sec. 20 of Article 132. The Court agreed and ruled that since the witness presented by the prosecution had no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by Anna or remitted by Anna, it wasn’t the witness himself who prepared the exhibits presented in court but the witness based his testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by Anna. According to Sec. 36 of Rule 130, a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information. In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined. The rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same. 20. PEOPLE VS. OCHOA (2011) Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule. The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the exceptions is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer. In other words, official entries are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the officer or person who made them was presented and testified in court, since these entries are considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. In a case of illegal recruitment, Ochoa contends that Exhibit “A,” the POEA certification – which states that Ochoa, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment is inadmissible because it was without POEA certification. The Court held the Exhibit admissible because while the POEA certification was signed by Dir. Mateo of the POEA Licensing Branch and Dir. Mateo himself did not testify before the RTC, the prosecution still presented Cory, Dir. Mateo’s subordinate at the POEA Licensing Branch, to verify Dir. Mateo’s signature. 78. ) People vs. Lazaro G.R. No. 152364 (2010) Declarant Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; “Admissions against Interest” and “Declarations against Interest” ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 220 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Petitioners filed against respondents a Complaint for partition with the MTCC. Petitoners and the respondents are the descendants of the late Simeon C. Santos, who died intestate leaving a parcel of land. That in the desire of the children of Simeon C. Santos from whom the parcel of land originated as owner, his children, namely[:] Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, all surnamed Santos, consented that the parcel of land be titled in the name of Basilisa, the latter being the eldest and so Original Certificate of Title No. 20742 in the name of Basilisa Santos was obtained although it was agreed among them that it did not and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole and exclusive owner of this parcel of land, and as embodied in the Title obtained in the name of Basilisa Santos. That during the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro informed the former, who are sisters, that the transfer of the title covering the lot in the name of Basilisa Santos into the names of her children would erroneously imply that the lot is solely and exclusively owned by Basilisa Santos-Agustin’s children, but Basilisa Santos-Agustin replied [to] plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro not to worry because an affidavit was already executed by her recognizing and specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos, and her sister Alejandra Santos-Lazaro would each get one fourth (#) share of the lot.That plaintiffs now invoke the intervention of the court to partition the lot in accordance with the law on intestate succession. Petitioners contend that Basilisa’s sworn statement which recognizes her siblings’ share in the disputed property is a declaration against interest which is one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Petitioners argue that since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted in court without further proof of its due execution and authenticity; that the testimonies of Basilisa’s nurse and physician cannot qualify as clear and convincing evidence which could overthrow such notarized document; that the notary public cannot impugn the same document which he notarized for to do so would render notarized documents worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the public. Respondents then prayed that petitioners’ complaint be dismissed. In their Counterclaim, respondents asked the court to direct petitioners to pay reasonable compensation for the latter’s use of the disputed property, exemplary and moral damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. MTCC ruled in favor of the respondents. RTC and CA affirmed. Hence this petition. SC denied the petition. There is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents’ predecessor-in- interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter’s legal interest, the former’s sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly executed, should be considered as an admission against interest. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO LABAGADA Y ABIGANIO, ET. AL. (2010) Romeo Labagala, Alvin Labagala and Richard Allan Alejo were charged of the crime of robbery with homicide. They pleaded not guilty. The victim was brought to the hospital as she sustained a stab wound. Raul Torres Arceo, son of the victim testified that on the way to the hospital, he asked his mother who stabbed her. His mother told him that two malefactors entered their store and she was able to hit one of them with a bottle on the head. She also mentioned they took the money meant for payment of the lot beside their store. Upon arrival at Talon Hospital, Estrelita was declared dead on arrival. The RTC found all three accused guilty. In the instant appeal, the issue boils down to whether or not the guilt of accused-appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Yes. Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the appellant is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. Credence should be given to the dying declaration of the victim, Estrelita Fonte. As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence. In order that a dying declaration may be admissible as evidence, four requisites must concur, namely: that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; that the declarant is competent as a witness; and that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 221 of 256 Justice Gesmundo All the above requisites are present in this case. At the time she narrated how the malefactors robbed and stabbed her, Estrelita was conscious and lying on the lap of her son, with gaping wounds on her chest. The victim's statements also form part of the res gestae. For the admission of evidence as part of the res gestae, it is required that (a) the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence, (b) the statements forming part thereof were made before the declarant had the opportunity to contrive, and (c) the statements refer to the occurrence in question and its attending circumstances. RULE 130, SEC. 42 31 PEOPLE v. ROMY FALLONES y LABANA (2011) "Admissibility of the deceased rape’s victim’s spontaneous utterances during the time she was being sexually abused and immediately afterwards" Labana was charged with rape. He allegedly raped a retardate, Alice. She died while the trial was ongoing. Her sister Amalia testified that she heard her Alice crying out “Tama na, tama na!” She repeatedly knocked on the door until Labana opened it. Amalia sa Alice behind him. Alice held out a sanitary napkin and said that Labana gave it to her. Alice later told her what actually happened. SC held that prior to her death, Alice was able to positively identify as her assailant before the barangay officials and the police. Amalia, her sister, testified of her own personal knowledge. The SC considers as res gestae Amalia’s recital of what she heard Alice utter. Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation. For spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following must concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The admissibility of Alice’s spontaneous statements rests on the valid assumption that they were spoken under circumstances where there had been no chance to contrive. It is difficult to lie in an excited state and the impulsiveness of the expression is a guaranty of trustworthiness. Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. v. People of the Philippines (2012) “In order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible.” Jose Bahillo was a barangay tanod. Around 9:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, he went out of the house to go to the area assigned to him. Later during the night, his live-in partner Veronica Dacir, heard him shouting and calling her name. When she went outside, she saw blood at the back and the shorts of Bahillo. He then told her that he was held by Brucales, while Belbis stabbed him. He was hospitalized and was eventually discharged after a few days. The doctor advised Bahillo to return to the hospital after the prescribed medicines are consumed. But due to financial constraints, Bahillo was not able to return. He only went back to the hospital on January 7, 1998 because he was already complaining of pains in his lumbar region. He died on that same day due to multiple organ failure. The accused are assailing that the statements of the victim Bahillo made in the presence of Dacir right after being stabbed is not a dying declaration since the victim still lived for one month after the said dying declaration was made. The court ruled that the statement of the victim was not a dying declaration. The fact that the victim was stabbed on December 9, 1997 and died only on January 8, 1998 does not prove that the victim made the statement or declaration under the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending. The RTC and the CA should have admitted the statement made by the victim not as a dying declaration but as part of the res gestae. All that is required for ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 222 of 256 Justice Gesmundo the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he had time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending circumstances. RULE 130, SECTION 49 Edwin Tabao v. People of the Philippines (GR No. 187246, July 20, 2011) Rule 130, Section 49 on Expert Testimony This case involves a charge of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. A police officer was presented by the accused as an expert witness. The essence of the police officer’s testimony was that the accused petitioner’s car could not have bumped the victim because the latter’s body was not thrown in line with the car, but on its side. The Court did not give much weight to this testimony because the expert was not an eyewitness and his opinion was merely based on a traffic incident report prepared by another person. Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. The use of the word “may” signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. Allowing the testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound by the testimony of the expert witness. The testimony of an expert witness must be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or not to adopt depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts and the applicable law. Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they may choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which deserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of discretion RULE 130 SECTION50 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EFREN CASTILLO (2010) “Mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court.” Facts: Efren Castillo was convicted of the crime of rape. The victim is a mental retardate. (Long facts; It basically showed how the accused used the victims’s mental retardation to coerce her in having sexual intercourse two times). The defense of Castillo was denial and alibi; he was working harvesting coconuts during the time alleged and that the house were the incident happened was already demolished (2 years ago). Castillo contends that the records are bereft of any evidence that would conclusively show that AAA was suffering from mental retardation. The mother of AAA’s declaration that AAA is a slow thinker does not sufficiently establish AAA's mental retardation. Further, the "expert witness qualification" of the prosecution's supposed expert witness is highly questionable because she had not acquired any doctorate degree in the field of psychology or psychiatry. More so, the psychological tests administered by her on AAA were inadequate to establish AAA's mental capacity. Issue: Castillo anchors his argument for acquittal on the alleged failure of the prosecution to establish AAA's mental retardation to make him guilty of rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 223 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Held: NO. In rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC states that for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that; (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she is under 12 years of age or is demented. The term "woman deprived of reason" includes one suffering from mental retardation. Clearly, carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter. In People v. Dalandas, citing People v. Dumanon, this Court held that mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court. Section 50, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence explicitly provides: SEC. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. - The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding- (c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. . . . The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person. Accordingly, it is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. Commonly, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness' own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion." • 7. Opinion Rule • 8. Character Evidence RULE 131 • Burden of Proof and Presumptions 31) CANEDA V. PEOPLE (2009) In a criminal case, the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to prove all the essential ingredients of the crime. The prosecution completes its case as soon as it has presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required elements. Facts: Caneda was charged with rape he invoked par. 1, Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) to exempt him from criminal liability considering that he was only 15 years old at the time the crime was committed. According to him he did not have to prove his age, since the prosecution has the burden of proving Caneda’s age under RA 9344. Held: Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence, refers to the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue in order to establish his or her claim or defense. In a criminal case, the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to prove all the essential ingredients of the crime. The prosecution completes its case as soon as it has presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required elements. At this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the defense to disprove what the prosecution has shown by evidence, or to prove by evidence the circumstances showing that the accused did not commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be held liable therefor. In the present case, the prosecution completed its evidence and had done everything that the law requires it to do. The burden of evidence has now shifted to the defense which now claims, by an affirmative defense, that the accused, even if guilty, should be exempt from criminal liability because of his age when he committed the crime. The defense, therefore, not the prosecution, has the burden of showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less when he committed ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 224 of 256 Justice Gesmundo the rape charged. This conclusion can also be reached by considering that minority and age are not elements of the crime of rape; the prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these circumstances. To impose the burden of proof on the prosecution would make minority and age integral elements of the crime when clearly they are not. If the prosecution has a burden related to age, this burden relates to proof of the age of the victim as a circumstance that qualifies the crime of rape. 105. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LITA AYANGAO (2004) “Alibi.” Alibi as a defense is inherently weak and for it to serve as basis for an acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. 106. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PRISCILLA DEL NORTE (2004) “Elements of Illegal Possession of Drugs.” The court has the duty to protect the accused where the evidence presented show “insufficient factual nexus” of her participation in the commission of the offense charged. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. • Conclusive Presumptions ERMITANO V. PAGLAS, G.R. NO. 174436, JAN. 23, 2013. “What a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply.” Petitioner Ermitano leased a house in lot in favor of Paglas. Subsequently, Paglas received information that Ermitano mortgaged the property in favor of a certain Yap, that it was foreclosed, and had already been purchased by Yap through an extra-judicial foreclosure sale. Later on, upon Yap’s offer, Paglas purchased the property. Meanwhile, Ermitano, believing that the sale was null and void, continued to demand rentals from Paglas. Because Paglas ignored the demands, Ermitano filed a case of unlawful detainer against the former. The MTC dismissed the case, and the RTC affirmed. The CA likewise affirmed. The basis of such rulings is the presumption of validity accorded to the conduct of the foreclosure sale. The SC affirms. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. As to Ermitano’s claim that Paglas is estopped from denying his right to collect rents as owner of the property based on the rule that “a tenant may not be permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them,” it is clear that what respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply. • Disputable Presumptions 41.) MANILA MINING CORPORATION VS. MIGUEL TAN AND MANILA MANDARIN MARKETING, G.R. NO. 171702, (2009) “Rule 131, Sec. 3e: Disputable Presumptions: That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.” Miguel Tan, doing business under the name and style of Manila Mandarin Marketing, was engaged in the business of selling electrical materials.Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) ordered and received various electrical materials from Tan valued at P2,347,880. MMC agreed to pay the purchase price within 30 days from delivery, or be charged ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 225 of 256 Justice Gesmundo interest of 18% per annum, and in case of suit to collect the same, to pay attorney's fees equal to 25% of the claim. MMC made partial payments in the amount of P464,636. But despite repeated demands, it failed to give the remaining balance of P1,883,244, which was covered by nine invoices. MMC offered as sole witness its accountant, Ibarrola. Ibarrola confirmed that it was standard office procedure for a supplier to present the original sales invoice and purchase order when claiming to be paid. He testified that the absence of stamp marks on the invoices and purchase orders negated receipt of said documents by MMC's representatives. On rebuttal, Tan presented Wally de los Santos, his sales representative in charge of MMC's account. De los Santos testified that he delivered the originals of the invoices and purchase orders to MMC's accounting department. As proof, he showed three customer's acknowledgment receipts. RTC ruled in favor of Tan. MMC filed an appeal. MMC questioned the probative value of the documentary evidence presented during trial. MMC claims that the unauthenticated photocopies of invoices and purchase orders did not satisfy the Best Evidence Rule, which requires the production of the original writing in court. It adds that by Tan's failure to yield the original documents, he was presumed to have suppressed evidence under Section 3(e), Rule 131. Petition lacks merit. The best evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing are directly in issue. Where the existence of the writing or its general purport is all that is in issue, secondary evidence may be introduced in proof. MMC did not deny the contents of the invoices and purchase orders. Its lone contention was that Tan did not submit the original copies to facilitate payment. But we are in agreement that the photocopies of the documents were admissible in evidence to prove the contract of sale between the parties. 68. RE: COMPLAINT OF THE CSC AGAINST CHULYAO (2010) It has been a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the duly accomplished form of the Civil Service is an official document of the Commission, which, by its very nature is considered in the same category as that of a public document, admissible in evidence without need of further proof. As an official document, the contents/entries therein made in the course of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. An administrative case was filed against respondent because it was alleged that her sister took the Civil Service exam in behalf of her. This was discovered when the result of the exam was utilized by respondent in her employment in the government service. When respondent filled up her personal data sheet and attached her photo thereon and eventually the picture in the personal data sheet was compared to the picture on the picture seat plan, it was only then that the impersonation was discovered, because the person appearing on the picture seat plan (her sister) was different from the person whose picture was attached to the personal data sheet. No sufficient proof was presented by respondent to overturn the evidence presented by the petitioner. 92. DELA RAMA VS. PAPA (2009) An improperly notarized document cannot be considered a public document and will not enjoy the presumption of its due execution and authenticity. The Dela Ramas (DLR) acquired a parcel of land in Laguna covered by a TCT. However, they later found out that such title was cancelled in favour of the Papas. DLR’s claimed that their signatures were forged in the deed of sale of the Papas and sought for the latter’s cancellation. Lower courts ruled in favour of the Papas claiming that DLR’s claim of forgery was unsubstantiated as well as upholding the presumption of regularity in public documents. The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. Respondent failed to confirm before the RTC that he had actually appeared before the notary public, a bare minimum requirement under Public Act No. 2103. Such defect will not ipso facto void the deed of sale. However, it eliminates the presumptions that are carried by notarized public documents and subject the deed of sale to a different level of scrutiny than that relied on by the Court of Appeals. 93. PEOPLE VS. MACATINGAG (2009) The burden to rebut the presumption of regularity in the discharge of duties in a chain of custody case falls upon the accused and such presumption will not be destroyed absent any strong prrof to the contrary. Macatingag was arrested for charged with a violation of the dangerous drugs act after a buy-bust operation instituted by the police. The sachet filled with a white substance which was obtained through the operation was later sent for testing and eventually identified as shabu. Macatingag pleaded not guilty and said alleged irregularity ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 226 of 256 Justice Gesmundo in the chain of custody rules in RA. 9165. Testimonies of witnesses convincingly state that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized item was properly preserved by the apprehending officers. It is thus evident that the identity of the material evidence has been properly preserved and established by the prosecution. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Macatingag in this case has the burden to show that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and a presumption that public officers properly discharge their duties. Macatingag failed to discharge such burden. 9. PEOPLE V. AMANSEC (2011) “Even though ideally, the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain; presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution.” Amansec was charged and convicted by the trial court of violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act for possession of meth. On appeal, Amansec argued that he should be acquitted because the informant was not presented in trial. Further, Amansec asserts that his conviction was incorrect because the evidence against him was obtained in violation of the procedure outlined in RA 9165. He claims that Section 21 of the aforesaid act was violated when the police officers who arrested him did not take his picture with the shabu they confiscated from him, and when they made no physical inventory of the shabu in his presence, or in the presence of his representative, the media, the department of justice, or any elected public official. Amansec avers that his presumption of innocence prevails over the presumption that the police officers performed their duty in a regular manner. Supreme Court ruled against Amansec. First, the Court has, time and again, held that the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. Second, even though ideally, the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. Thus, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under RA 9165, this will not render Amansec’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible in evidence. It has been consistently held that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, because the same will be utilized in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused. 94. REPUBLIC VS. PHILIPPINES VS. LUCIA M. GOMEZ, G.R. NO. 189021, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, Public documents Doctrine: Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. Facts: Lot No. 2872 was alleged to have been originally possessed by Gabriel Gomez. In 1936, his nephew Emilio Gomez, who was the father of respondent herein, bought the lot in a public auction and declared it under the name of the heirs of Gabriel Gomez. In 1945, the lot was declared for taxation purposes and was issued Tax Declaration (TD) No. 2234. In 1955, Emilio declared part of Lot No. 2872 under his name. When he died in 1969, his surviving spouse and children allegedly took continuous possession and occupancy of the lot, for which they paid real property tax. On 29 December 1986, the lot was allegedly partitioned by Emilio’s heirs when they executed a Deed of Adjudication with Consolidation and Extrajudicial Partition, by which Lot No. 2872-I was allegedly partitioned to petitioner. Thus, on 15 December 1999, respondent filed an Application for registration of title with regard to her part. Meanwhile, herein petitioner filed its Opposition to the Application and alleges that hat neither the [respondent] nor [her] predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question, that the muniments of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payment/s ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 227 of 256 Justice Gesmundo (sic) receipts of [respondent] does (sic) not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of lands applied for; that the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant/s who have failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by P.D. No. 892. 3 From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on April 21, 1998. Issue: W/N the CA erred in ruling that respondent was able to sufficiently prove that the land was alienable and disposable; and that she had possessed the subject lot in the manner and for the duration required by law. Held/Ratio: The Petition is meritorious. The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows: (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein. Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19 (a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy…The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public documents. The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value. Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 228 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. RULE 132 • Presentation of Evidence 34. REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN (2011) “PCGG CASE; PRESENTATION OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.” In the furtherance of justice, the court may grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question; While it is true that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, prescribed an order of trial (Section 5, Rule 30), relaxation of the rule is permitted in sound discretion of the court. Public respondent seriously erred in denying the motion to reopen for presentation of additional evidence on the basis of the supposed “final and executory” ruling which denied admission of Exhibits “B” to “E” in the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by the petitioner. A. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V ROGELIO DOLORIDO Y ESTRADA (G.R. 191721, JANUARY 12, 2011) “the assessment of the credibility of witness and their testimonies is best undertaken by trial court because it can observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.” In this case, Rogelio was charged with the murder of Daniel Estose. Witness for the prosecution alleged that Rogelio wilfully, unlawfully attacked, assaulted the deceased twice with a bolo causing the latter to die. In the pre- trial, Rogelio admitted that he killed Estose during their physical altercation and invoked self-defense. Invoking “self-defense” - A person who invoke self-defense has the burden of proof of proving ALL the elements. The SC held that the elements must be: (1) unlawful aggression from the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent such aggression; (3) lack of sufficient provocation from the accused. Unlawful aggression is the most crucial element and must be proven by showing that there is an actual physical assault, or at least threat (offensive and strong) to inflict real imminent injury upon the accused. Plea of self defense cannot be unjustifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also extremely doubtful in itself. As to the testimony of the prosecution of the witnesses: “the assessment of the credibility of witness and their testimonies is best undertaken by trial court because it can observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.” This rule is even more binding an conclusive when affirmed by appellate court. Degree of Proof In criminal cases, the prosecution is not required to show the guilt of the accused with absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is demanded, or that degree of proof which to the unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. PEOPLE V. PORFERIO MASAGCA, JR., G.R. NO. 184922, FEB 23, 2011. “The trial court has the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence, including the demeanor of witnesses, and is in the best position to rule on their weight and credibility.” Accused was charged with 3 counts of rape committed against his daughter on 3 different occasions. Accused was convicted by the trial court. The CA affirmed. The SC affirms, with modification as to the amount of moral and exemplary damages. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be given great respect in the absence of any attendant ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 229 of 256 Justice Gesmundo grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided it is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. PEOPLE V. ALEX CONDES, G.R. NO. 187077, FEB. 23, 2011 “Conviction or acquittal in a rape case more often than not depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's testimony because, by the very nature of this crime, it is usually the victim alone who can testify as to its occurrence; When offended parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16 years of age, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the public humiliation to which they would be exposed by a court trial, if their accusation were not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.” Accused was charged and convicted of rape of his stepdaughter, giving credence to the latter’s testimony. The CA affirmed on the basis of the same testimony, rejecting the appellant’s defense of alibi. In essence, the accused claims that his stepdaughter merely concocted the accusation of rape out of hatred because she resented the hard discipline imposed by him and she feared that he would punish her once he would learn that she had a boyfriend and pregnant at that. The SC affirms. In the disposition and review of rape cases, the Court is guided by three settled principles: First, an accusation for rape can be made with facility and it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; Second, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and Third, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Corollary to the above principles is the rule that the credibility of the victim is always the single most important issue in the prosecution of a rape case. In this light, the trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve great respect as it has the advantage of observing the witness’ deportment and manner of testifying. B. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND TEODORO RANCES (1988) Sometime in March 1984, private respondent Teodoro Rances was engaged by petitioner Pascor as Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship Management Limited. Four (4) months later, and after having been transferred from one vessel to another four times for misbehaviour and inability to get along with officers and crew members of each of the vessels, the foreign principal terminated the services of private respondent Rances citing the latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement of others to insubordination. Petitioner Pascor filed a complaint against private respondent with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration tion (POEA) for acts unbecoming a marine officer and for, character assassination," which case was docketed as POEA Case No: M-84-09-848. Private respondent denied the charges set out in the complaint and by way of counterclaim demanded an amount of US$ 1,500.00 which a court in Dubai had, he contended, awarded in his favor against petitioner's foreign principal. On 10 October 1985, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, docketed as POEA Case No: M-85-10-0814 and entitled "Teodoro Rances v. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation." In this complaint, he sought to carry out and enforce the same award obtained by him in Dubai allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal which he had pleaded as a counterclaim in POEA Case No: M- 84-09-848. Private respondent claimed that be had filed an action in the Dubai court for US$ 9,364.89, which claim was compromised by the parties for US$ 5,500.00 plus "a return ticket to (private respondent's) country," with the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the claimant" US$ 1,500.00 'in case the wife of the claimant Rantes doesn't agree with the amount sent to [her] Private respondent further claimed that since his wife did not "agree with" the amount given to her as 'an allotment for the 3-month period (of April, May and June 1984), he was entitled to recover the additional US$ 1,500.00 "as mandated under the Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the decision of the Dubai Civil Court. As evidence of this foreign award, private respondent submitted what purports to be an "original copy (sic) of the decision" of the Dubai court written in Arabic script and language, With a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator and a copy of a transmittal letter dated 23 September 1984 signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for Philippines." Issue: whether or not the decision of the Dubai court is admissible SC said NO. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 230 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Held: Even assuming (arguendo, merely) that the POEA has jurisdiction to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, still respondent Rances cannot rely upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision was not properly proved before the POEA. The Dubai decision purports to be the written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country, and therefore a public writing under Section 20 (a) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Sections 25 and 26 of Rules 132 prescribe the manner of proving a public of official record of a foreign country in the following terms: Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied. if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate maybe be made by a secretary of embassy or litigation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a writing is attend for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (Emphasis supplied) In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, dated 23 September 1984, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25. There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in evidence of the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision is accompanied by a document which purports to be an English translation of that decision., but that translation is legally defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that documents written in a non- official language hke Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English or Spanish or Filipino. In Ahag v. Cabiling, 13 Mr. Justice Moreland elaborated on the need for a translation of a document written in a language other than an official language: ... Moreover, when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language other than Spanish, if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated into Spanish by the official interpreter of the court, or a translation should be agreed upon by the parties, and both original and translation sent to this court. In the case before us, there is an untranslated exhibit written in the Visayan language. In Teng Giok Yan v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, had occasion to stress the importance of having a translation made by the court interpreter who must, of course, be of recognized competence both in the language in which the document involved is written and in English. The Court said: [t]he trial court was certainly not bound by the translation given by the Chinese Embassy, specially in the absence of a delete assurance that said translation was correct and that it was made by the Embassy Adviser himself. On the other hand, the translation made by the court interpreter is official and reliable not only because of the recognized ability of said interpreter to translate Chinese characters into English, but also because said interpreter was under the direct supervision and control of the court. .... 16 In the instant case, there is no showing of who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision which respondent Rances submitted to the POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been made by an official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai Government. Neither the Identity of the translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and English languages has been shown. The English translation submitted by the respondent is not sworn to as an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 231 of 256 Justice Gesmundo 50. RE: EVALUATION OF THE REPORT AND INVENTORY SUBMITTED BY EXECUTIVE JUDGE ROGELIO C. GONZALES, RTC (2011) “The rule is that he who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a public document bears the responsibility of presenting evidence to that effect. Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. At the very least, he should present corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he should present an expert witness. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.” This is a complaint from an article written by Atty. Jurado against Judge Gonzales regarding improperly disposing of marriage annulment cases. The court consolidated this case with another admin case which included Judge Kapunan and Tiongco. Judge Kapunan claims that his signatures on certain cases were mere forgeries. He later on died of a heart attack and his heirs sought to dismiss this admin case against him. However, the Court ruled that, Judge Kapunan failed to offer any evidence to support his defense that his signatures therein were forged. The rule is that he who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a public document bears the responsibility of presenting evidence to that effect. Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following manner: [1] by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted on or been charged; [2] by a comparison, made by a witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. At the very least, he should present corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he should present an expert witness. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. This, unfortunately, Judge Kapunan failed to do. MANZANO V. GARCIA (2011) “The trial court may validly determine forgery from its own independent examination of the documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court can do without necessarily resorting to experts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimen of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones.” A certain parcel of land was under the name of respondent Garcia. The land was subject of a deed of pacto de retro sale allegedly executed by Garcia in favor of Manzano (predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manzano). Under the contract, Garcia purportedly reserved the right to repurchase the subject for the same price within 3 months from the date of the instrument. Manzano passed away and the property was adjudicated to his heirs by virtue of a deed of extrajudicial partition. Petitioner Manzano was named administrator. Garcia did not redeem the subject property within the 3-month period. Thus, petitioner Manzano instituted a petition for consolidation of ownership over the property. Garcia opposed the petition alleging that the document evidencing the sale was a forgery and further alleging that he and his wife were in the US on the date the contract was allegedly executed. The RTC ruled in favor of Manzano, but the decision was reversed and set aside by the CA. Manzano in assailing such reversal, echoes the claim of the trial court that Garcia should have presented an expert witness to prove the claim of forgery. Jurisprudence is replete with instances wherein the SC dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries. Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them, but resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensible to the examination or the comparison of handwritings. Moreover, the findings of handwriting experts are not binding upon courts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those currently existing ones. In the case at bar, the variance in the alleged signature of Garcia in the contract and in the evidence on record and in the verifications of the pleadings before this Court was enormous and obvious, such that this Court can readily conclude that the pacto de retro sale was in all likelihood made by someone who has not even seen the customary signature of Garcia. 4. SYED AZHAR ABBAS V. GLORIA GOO ABBAS G.R NO. 183896 OCT. 30, 2013 ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 232 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Facts: Syed Azhar, a Pakistani, sought the annulment of his marriage to Gloria Goo after the latter instituted a case of bigamy against the former. Syed bases his claim on the lack of a valid marriage license. Verily, he states that when they were married, he did not know that the ceremony happening in the residence of Gloria was a marriage ceremony. He was told that it was a ceremony necessary for his stay in the Philippines. He substantiated his claim by providing a certification from the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite that marriage license No. 9969967 which appears in their marriage certificate was issued not in the name of Syed Azhar Abbas ang Gloria F. Goo but for another couple named Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. Syed presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically. He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person. Gloria Goo on the other hand presented as witness Rev. Dauz (the solemnizing officer), Atty. Sanchez (the person who drafter the marriage contract and delegated to his secretary the procurement of a marriage license) and Mary Ann Ceriola (a witness in the ceremony). RTC: ruled in favour of Syed. CA: reversed arguing that Petitioner challenged the validity of his marriage belatedly and only after Respondent filed for a case of bigamy. It based its ruling on the finding that other evidence show the existence of a wedding ceremony, the signing of the marriage contract and the knowledge of the parties of such marriage taking place. It took into account the testimonies of Gloria’s witnesses and the photos presented that showed that a marriage indeed took place. ISSUE: w/n there was a valid marriage license. Held/Ratio: No. Marriage null and void. There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. RTC CORRECT. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held: The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 233 of 256 Justice Gesmundo maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document. In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The CA deduced that from the absence of the words “despite diligent search” in the certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value. To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply. Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, “The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.” No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office. It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from.The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value. It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed. In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case of Republic, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 234 of 256 Justice Gesmundo the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license. To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA: Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit “5-C” which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract. x x x x The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit “1”) dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. ASIAN TERMINALS V. PHILAM INSURANCE, G.R. NO. 181163/181262/181319 (2013) To prove a private document under Section 20, Rule 132, the testimony of a person who saw the document executed or written is sufficient. Nichimen Corporation sold 120 units of Nissan Pickup Truck bodies to Universal Motors. The goods were transported by Westwind Shipping and were unloaded onto the port of Manila by Asian Terminals. The shipment was insured with Philam under an all-risk marine policy. Upon inspection, it was found that the goods were damaged. Universal Motors declared a total loss. Philam paid Universal Motors' claim and sued Asian Terminals and Westwind Shipping for damages. Asian Terminals and Westwind Shipping argued that the Subrogation Receipt, the basis of Philam's suit, is inadmissible as hearsay because it was not authenticated by the person who executed it. Held: The Subrogation Receipt is admissible. Philam offered the testimony of its claims officer, Ongchangco, who testified that he personally delivered the check payment for the claims of Universal Motors and that the Subrogation Receipt was signed in his presence. This is sufficient. All that the Rules require to establish the authenticity of a document is the testimony of a person who saw the document executed or written. 16. DE GUZMAN v. TUMOLVA (2011) “It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon." De Guzman and co. contracted Tumlova to construct an orphanage for about P15 million in Silang, Cavite. Tumlova deviated from the plans in constructing the perimeter wall. When typhoon “Milenyo” came, it destroyed ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 235 of 256 Justice Gesmundo the wall and thus, De Guzman seeks Tumlova to rebuild the wall without cost. The CA ruled in favor of De Guzman but declared the grant of actual damages prayed for is improper. Held: The CA is correct. Unfortunately, De Guzman failed to adduce evidence to satisfactorily prove the amount of actual damage incurred. Contrary to her assertion, the handwritten calculation of reconstruction costs made by Engineer Santos and attached to his affidavit cannot be given any probative value because he never took the witness stand to affirm the veracity of his allegations in his affidavit and be cross-examined on them. In this regard, it is well to quote the ruling of the Court in the case of Tating v. Marcella, 13 to wit: There is no issue on the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. Neither is there any evidence presented to substantiate Engineer Santos’ computation of the reconstruction costs. For such computation to be considered, there must be some other relevant evidence to corroborate the same. 14 Thus, the CA was correct in disregarding the affidavit of Engineer Santos for being hearsay and in not giving probative weight to it. There being no tangible document or concrete evidence to support the award of actual damages, the same cannot be sustained. 94. GARCES VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2007) Evidence in criminal cases is not limited to the declarations made in open court; when a sworn statement is formally offered as evidence, it forms an integral part of the prosecution’s evidence which complements the statements made on the witness stand. Petitioners were charged with forcible abduction with rape by abducting one AAA with the help of one another. One Pacursa did the act while the others stood guard outside. They posted alibi as a defense. Moreover, petitioners state that AAA’s testimony on direct exam did not testify about her mouth being covered when she was pulled out from the barn. Complainant’s failure to testify during her direct examination that her mouth was covered by petitioner when she was pulled out of the barn does not preclude resort to her sworn statement to provide the missing details, since said sworn statement forms part of her testimony Evidence in criminal cases is not limited to the declarations made in open court; it includes all documents, affidavits or sworn statements of the witnesses, and other supporting evidence. C. OFFER AND OBJECTION [ADD’L CASE] SPS. AMBROSIO DECALENG, ET AL. VS. BISHOP OF THE MISSIONARY DISTRICT OF PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL. (2012) “When a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence.” The Philippine Episcopal Church-Episcopal Diocese of Northern Philippines (PEC-EDNP) filed a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria and accion publiciana against Ambrosio Decaleng and Fabian Lopez (petitioners) alleging to be the owner of 2 parcels of land in Sagada which they (petitioners) are illegally occupying. Sps. Decaleng assail the title of PEC-EDNP by insisting that (1) PEC-EDNP failed to present the original copies of Certificate of Title No. 1 and the Deed of Donation dated April 24, 1974 (to which documents PEC-EDNP bases its claim of ownership); and (2) Certificate of Title No. 1 does not exist based on the Certification of the Register of Deeds of the Mountain Province. Held: PEC-EDNP presented and marked the photocopies of Certificate of Title No. 1 and the Deed of Donation in the course of the testimony of Rev. Hakcholna before the RTC. Even though the defense counsel stated for the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 236 of 256 Justice Gesmundo record the defense’s position that Certificate of Title No. 1 is non-existent, he did not make any objection to the presentation and marking of the photocopies of Certificate of Title No. 1 and the Deed of Donation by PEC-EDNP, and even admitted that said photocopies appear to be faithful reproductions of the “purported” original documents. When a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier. The identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit. The owner’s duplicate certificate of Certificate of Title No. 1, which was submitted by PEC-EDNP before the RTC can be used in evidence before Philippine courts in the same way as the original certificates in the registration book. Sec. 47 of Act No. 496: “The original certificate in the registration book, any copy thereof duly certified … and also the owner’s duplicate certificate, shall be received as evidence in all the courts of the Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein…” Also, the ROD’s certification to the effect that Certificate of Title No. 1 does not appear in the record of registered titles does not necessarily mean that such certificate has never been issued. The mere fact that the ROD does not have the original of a certificate of title does not necessarily mean that such title never existed because the same could have been lost, stolen, or removed from where said title was kept. To show that no record of the original certificate of title in question existed requires a preponderance of proof. 69. PEOPLE V. VILLANUEVA (2010) The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. Appellant was convicted qualified rape both in the RTC and the CA. The victim is appellant’s daughter and is allegedly is a minor. During the trial, the prosecution presented their witness who identified the appellant as her rapist. Victim’s birth certificate proving she was under the age of 12 years old and the medical certificate were marked as Exhibit during the pre-trial but was not formally offer as evidence. The appellant contested that the documentary evidence used to convict him should not be subjected for the appreciation of the court. The Supreme Court agree with the appellant that both the medical certificate and birth certificate of AAA though marked as exhibits during the pre-trial should not have been considered by the trial court and the Court of Appeals because they are not formally offered in evidence. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected. However it must also be considered that appellant can still be convicted without a medical certificate. In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided that the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. The trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the documents not offered. 77.) PEOPLE VS. DOMADO G.R. NO. 172971 (2010) Objection. Objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal—when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection, and without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. The prosecution charged the appellants before the RTC with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants were caught transporting shabu through an entrapment operation set up by the police. Under custody, they claimed with the assistance of counsel, their right to preliminary investigation and voluntarily waived their rights under the provisions of Art 125 of the RPC. At the trial, the shabu was duly marked, subjected to examination and cross examination and offered as evidence. Appellant made no manifestation against the evidence offered. The RTC, in its decision, convicted the appellant of “transporting shabu (12 grams). CA affirmed. Hence this petition. Judgment affirmed. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 237 of 256 Justice Gesmundo A notable feature of this case is the careful handling the authorities undertook in ensuring that the rights of the accused were protected, from the moment of their warrantless arrest after they were caught in flagrante delicto in an entrapment operation, all the way up to the handling of the evidence at the trial level. This is evident from the exhibits that were all properly marked and offered as evidence without any objection from the accused. We point out the defense’s failure to contest the admissibility of the seized items as evidence during trial as this was the initial point in objecting to illegally seized evidence. At the trial, the seized shabu was duly marked, made the subject of examination and cross-examination, and eventually offered as evidence, yet at no instance did the appellant manifest or even hint that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their admissibility, integrity and evidentiary value In. People v. Hernandez, 589 SCRA 625 (2009), we held that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION V. FRANCIA (2011) “The offer of evidence is necessary because it its the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such documents is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.” Respondents filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages arising from their investment against petitioner. After the testimony of Amos Francia, the Franciaas filed their Formal Offer of Evidence. After all the exhibits of the Francias were admitted for the purposes they were offered, the Francias rested their case. Wincorp was not able to present any evidence for its defense before the trial court. All the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings before the CA cannot be given any weight or evidentiary value for the sole reason that these documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial court. To consider them now would deny the other parties the right to examine and rebut them. The Court cannot likewise disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA as to the evidence presented by the Francias. It is elementary that objection to evidence myst be made after evidence is formally offered. It appears that Wincorp was given ample opportunity to file its Comment/Objection to the formal offer of evidence of the Francias but it chose not to file any. RULE 133 • Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence • Circumstantial Evidence 57. JESALAVA VS. PEOPLE (2011) “Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt; In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden.” “In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.” The accused was charged with Murder and convicted by the lower court of Homicide. Different versions of fact were presented by prosecution and the defense. On appeal to the SC, he questions the conviction based on purely circumstantial evidence. The circumstantial evidence proved by the prosecution points unerringly to the accused as the person responsible for the death of the victim. The combination of the circumstances which comprised such evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to the accused and no other as the perpetrator. Petitioner’s mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence clearly establishing his culpability in the crime charged. It is well settled that the positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an accused. The evidence for the prosecution was found by both RTC and CA to be sufficient and credible, while petitioner’s defense of denial was weak, self-serving, speculative, and uncorroborated. PEOPLE V. ROMERO, G.R. NO. 181041, FEB. 23, 2011 ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 238 of 256 Justice Gesmundo “Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience.” Accused was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. He was convicted by the trial court. On appeal, the CA affirmed, holding that Joanna, the child who saw and testified that she had seen the accused stab the victim repeatedly, had positively identified the appellant as the assailant. It also gave weight to the physician’s finding that the victim had been sexually abused before she was killed. Further, the CA ruled that the pieces of evidence obtained at the appellant’s house were admissible. The SC affirms, with modification as to amount of exemplary damages. In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution for this crime is particularly difficult since the victim can no longer testify against the perpetrator. Thus, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances unavoidably leads to a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with one another, and the only rational hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom must be the guilt of the accused. In the present case, no one witnessed AAA being raped. Nonetheless, the following circumstances form a solid and unbroken chain of events that leads us to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had raped the victim. • Substantial Evidence GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION- INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION V. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION (GR NOS. 183122 & 183889, JUNE 15, 2011) Burden of Proof and Quantum of Evidence The main issue of the case is the validity of the deeds of waiver, release, and quitclaim executed by laborers over their benefits under the contested CBA. The Court held that “it is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.” Inasmuch as mere allegation is not evidence, the basic evidentiary rule is to the effect that the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving the same with such quantum of evidence required by law. In administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings like those conducted before the NLRC, the standard of proof is substantial evidence which is understood to be more than just a scintilla or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Since it does not mean just any evidence in the record of the case for, otherwise, no finding of fact would be wanting in basis, the test to be applied is whether a reasonable mind, after considering all the relevant evidence in the record of a case, would accept the findings of fact as adequate. LETICIA I. KUMMER V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2013) "Inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court and the statements in his sworn affidavit referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony" This is a criminal prosecution for homicide. Cuntapay and Malana gave testimonies about how the accused Mallo. Upon appeal in the CA it was contended that there were discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct testimonies. In their sworn statements, they alleged that after hearing two gunshots, Malana dived to the ground for cover and hear another shot louder than the first two. This was allegedly inconsistent with his testimony that he witnessed the actual shooting. There were four other inconsistencies cited. The Court has consistently held that inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court and the statements in his sworn affidavit referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch upon the commission of the crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these may be considered as badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove that their testimonies have not been rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for no person has perfect faculties of senses or recall. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 239 of 256 Justice Gesmundo 2. RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT AND INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CABARROGUIS QUIRINO. A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC Oct. 23, 2013 Facts: This case involves the consolidation of two other administrative cases. A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC is the investigative report containing the findings of the other two. The other two cases were: A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962 and A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2243. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962 (first case) was an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Tuldague (Tuldague), Clerk of court of Cabarroguis, Quezon and Atty. Alfredo Balajo, Jr. (Balajo ), 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the same RTC. They alleged that Judge Pardo was guilty of corruption for having asked for money and/or animals from litigants in exchange for a favourable decision. A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2243 (second case) was an administrative case filed by the same complainants in the first case but against Jaime Calpatura (Calpatura), Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge of the same RTC. They alleged that Calpatura acted in cahoots with judge Pardo. Aside from the monies and animals (2 goats allegedly for judge Pardo’s birthday in exchange for a favorable probation application, a deer in exchange for the speedy resolution of a criminal case and a cow in exchange for an endorsement as utility officer in the office of the clerk of court) involved, judge Pardo is also accused of asking one Lugeorge to to take out two (2) cans of coat master paint from the Hall of Justice to use for his house. Because of the seriousness of these accusations, the OCA conducted an investigation. This is this case: RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT AND INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CABARROGUIS QUIRINO. ISSUE: w/n Judge Pardo and Calpatura are guilty of violating corruption through demanding money or live animals in exchange for indorsing applicants for vacant positions and taking of court property against; Judge Pardo for violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Held: The Court adopted the findings of the OCA to wit: 1. The charge of corruption against respondents Judge Moises M. Pardo (now retired), formerly of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Cabarroguis, Quirino, and Jaime B. Calpatura, Legal Researcher of the said court, as well as the charges of demanding money or live animals in exchange for indorsing applicants for vacant positions and taking of court property against respondent Judge Pardo, be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence; 2. Judge Pardo be FINED in the amount of P20,000.00 for violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits; and 3. The matter regarding the judicial audit conducted in Branches 31 and 32 of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino be now considered CLOSED and TERMINATED, insofar as Judge Pardo is concerned. Ratio: Complainants bear burden of proving Substantial evidence In administrative proceedings, the complainants bear the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, bare allegations of misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity in the performance of judicial duty. Factors Affecting Credibility As the OCA observed, complainants did not have direct knowledge of their charges and merely relied on their witnesses to testify on the alleged wrongful acts of Judge Pardo. To determine the credibility and probative weight of the testimony of a witness, such testimony must be considered in its entirety and not in truncated parts. To determine which contradicting statements of a witness are to prevail as to the truth, the other evidence received must be considered. On the charge of corruption, complainants only presented Rosendo to testify that he gave P6,000.00 to Judge Pardo in the latter’s house. He alleged that he likewise gave P3,000.00 to Calpatura, through Dominador. However, ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 240 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Rosendo’s statements remain uncorroborated as he did not present Alonzo, who allegedly saw him give the money to Judge Pardo. On the other hand, Judge Pardo presented Fr. Lazo, who testified that he did not see Rosendo give money to Judge Pardo in his house. Calpatura likewise presented Dominador, who testified that Rosendo never gave him money. Rosendo’s testimony also contains material inconsistencies, which gravely affected his credibility. Contrary to Rosendo’s statement in his Affidavit that Calpatura sent an emissary to ask for P10,000.00, Rosendo testified on cross-examination that Calpatura sent him a text message, while Judge Pardo called him to ask for the money. In his Affidavit, Rosendo claimed that Calpatura only sent a text message on 28 March 2005, but on cross- examination, he stated that Calpatura also sent a text message on 28 February 2005. It is well to note that when a serious and inexplicable discrepancy is present between a previously executed sworn statement of a witness and his testimonial declarations with respect to one’s participation in a serious imputation such as bribery, such discrepancy raises grave doubt on the veracity of the witness’ account. On the charge that Judge Pardo demanded money or live animals to endorse applicants for vacant positions, Tuldague’s allegation remains unsubstantiated. Toribio, Kimayong, Calpito, and Garingan, from whom Judge Pardo allegedly asked for money and animals, were not presented. In Aldecoa-Delorino v. Abellanosa, the charges of abuse of authority, harassment and oppression were dismissed by the Court when the concerned employees did not submit their Affidavits or appear during the investigation of the administrative case. The Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation. A material inconsistency is likewise present in Lugeorge’s testimony when in his Affidavit, he stated that Judge Pardo ordered him to bring out two cans of paint from the RTC on 29 June 2002. On his cross-examination, however, Lugeorge testified that Judge Pardo’s order happened "before 29 June 2002." In Jabon v. Judge Usman, we held that the complainant’s glaring discrepancy in the date of the commission of the alleged corrupt act and his failure to correct the discrepancy despite given a chance, negatively affected his credibility. With the failure of complainants to substantiate their charges, the complaint against Judge Pardo should be dismissed for lack of merit. However, we find Judge Pardo liable for gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct for admitting he has a drinking spree with one of the litigants while the latter’s application for probation was pending in his sala. 7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ZAFRA MARAORAO Y MACABALANG (2012) "The Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the trial court when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case” This case is about a violation of Section 16, Article 3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The police officer testified that they received a reliable information that an undetermined amount of shabu will be delivered in Quiapo. In Quiapo, the police officers saw two men talking to each other. One ran when he noticed the policemen. There was a chase but the policemen failed to catch him. The man left behind dropped a bag and when one of the policemen picked it, he examined the bag and saw a transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. Maraorao was convicted in the trial court. The issue now is whether the trial court properly gave credence to the policeman’s testimony when there is a glaring discrepancy between his testimonies. As a general rule, the Supreme Court will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court. As an exception, the SC may review it when there is a showing that trial judge overlooked some facts that would have affected the case. The first testimony of the policeman was that the man who did not run was holding the bag, while in his second testimony it was the man who ran away who was holding the bag. In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused. In the case at bar, because of the discrepancy in the testimony, the prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that Maraorao was indeed in possession of shabu, and that he freely and consciously possessed the same 70. LUMANOG V. PEOPLE (2010) the testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 241 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of Abadilla. The principal witness for the prosecution was Alejo, a security guard where the ambush-slay happened. As a purported eyewitness, he testified on what he saw during the fateful day, including the faces of the accused. All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of police officers and denial of constitutional rights during custodial investigation. The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted before the trial court their respective positions and participation in the fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they committed the crime. In giving full credence to the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo, the trial judge took into account his proximity to the spot where the shooting occurred, his elevated position from his guardhouse, his opportunity to view frontally all the perpetrators for a brief time -- enough for him to remember their faces and his positive identification in the courtroom of appellants as the six (6) persons whom he saw acting together in the fatal shooting of Abadilla. The trial judge also found that Alejo did not waver in his detailed account of how the assailants shot Abadilla who was inside his car, the relative positions of the gunmen and lookouts, and his opportunity to look at them in the face. Alejo immediately gave his statement before the police authorities just hours after the incident took place. Appellants make much of a few inconsistencies in his statement and testimony, with respect to the number of assailants and his reaction when he was ordered to get down in his guard post. But such inconsistencies have already been explained by Alejo during cross- examination by correcting his earlier statement in using number four (4) to refer to those persons actually standing around the car and two (2) more persons as lookouts, and that he got nervous only when the second lookout shouted at him to get down, because the latter actually poked a gun at him. It is settled that affidavits, being ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from the credibility of witnesses. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, as testimonial evidence carries more weight than an affidavit. 8. REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN (4 TH DIVISION) (2011) “Where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence, the party’s right to introduce further evidence must be recognized.” PCGG filed a complaint with the Sandiganbayan against Marcos and his living cronies, alleging that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of ETPI, which shareholdings respondents Africa and Nieto held for themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they organized, beneficially for the Marcoses. In the proceedings, there was an important deposition (Bane Deposition) which was not as part of the offer of evidence. After the trial has ended, the PCGG found its mistake and filed a motion to try to reopen the case for the sole purpose of introducing further evidence. The Sandiganbayan refused, hence, this appeal. Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan erred. A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from introducing further evidence; but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other; or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence, the party’s right to introduce further evidence must be recognized. Further, at the time the PCGG moved to re-open its case, the respondents had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly omitted “through oversight.” The higher interest of substantial justice, of course, is another consideration that cannot be taken lightly. 43-45. LENIDO LUMANOG, ET AL. VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2011) “(a) Contradictions between the contents of an affiant’s affidavit and his testimony in the witness stand do not always militate against the witness’ credibility. This is so because affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate. (b) Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial court.” ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 242 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Accused Lumanog, Santos, Fortuna, and de Jesus filed an MR of the SC decision convicting them of the crime of murder. The accused assail the weight and credence accorded to their identification by the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution, security guard Freddie Alejo, that: (1) In his statement given to the police investigators immediately after the incident, Alejo mentioned only 4 suspects, contrary to his subsequent testimony in court that there were 6 suspects. Held: During the investigation, Alejo was not being asked about the persons who had participation or involvement in the crime, but only those who actually fired at the victim. Thus, it was not a fatal omission on the part of Alejo not to include the 2 other suspects who were acting as lookouts. Contradictions between the contents of an affiant’s affidavit and his testimony in the witness stand do not always militate against the witness’ credibility. This is so because affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate. (2) Alejo accepted financial support and benefits from the victim’s family; Held: Although Alejo and his family were sheltered and given financial support by the victim’s family, presumably out of gratitude and sympathy considering that Alejo lost his job after the incident, such fact alone does not constitute as sufficient basis to overcome Alejo’s credibility given that Alejo did not waver in his identification of the accused despite a grueling cross-examination by the defense lawyers. Alejo’s testimony was credible, categorical and straightforward. (3) His in-court identification of the six accused is questionable and unreliable considering that it referred to them only by numbers and he had given prior description of only two suspects; Held: There is nothing irregular in Alejo’s manner of testifying in court, initially referring to the accused by numbers, to indicate their relative positions as he remembered them, and the individual participation of each in the violent ambush. (4) The ocular inspection conducted by the trial court to confirm Alejo’s observations was unreliable because it was made at 10:00 a.m. onwards whereas the incident occurred between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. when the glare of the morning sun directly hits the guard post where Alejo was stationed. Held: Given that this issue is being raised for the first time, it is now too late for the accused to assail as irregular the ocular inspection which was done with the conformity and in the presence of their counsel. (5) Also, Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence (an affidavit by Jurado, a police officer) to support the defense argument that there was no positive identification of Abadilla’s killers. Held: To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown that the evidence was “newly discovered” pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial court. Fortuna failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from police officers or other persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. 136. PEOPLE V GAZMEN (1995) “The most honest witnesses may make mistakes but such innocent lapses do not necessarily impair their credibility; the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein. It is expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different persons may have different impressions or recollection of the same incident. These disparities do not necessarily impair against their credibility; as long as their separate versions are substantially similar or agree on the material points.” “Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses.” Accused Avelino Gazmen, with his father (who was later acquitted), was found guilty of arson. The facts show that the accused and his father had an altercation with the Macasaddus, with the latter running into the house of the victim, Galamay to hide from the former who had brought with them weapons. In an attempt to lure the Macasaddus out of the house, the accused poured gasoline on the roof and set it on fire. Accused appealed raising as errors the inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecution’s 2 witnesses, Galamay (victim) and Bautista. For ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 243 of 256 Justice Gesmundo instance, Bautista claimed that the accused’s father was armed with a gun while Galamay stated that he was only armed with a pipe and a stone. Moreover, Bautista claimed that the accused did not fire a single shot which is contradicted by Galamay who testified that the accused fired and hit the arm of one Juanito Macasaddu. The Court held that the alleged inconsistencies are not material to the offense of arson charged. Due to the distance of Bautista from Galamay’s house, it was not improbable for him to have a false impression of the weapon carried. It is expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different persons may have different impressions or recollection of the same incident. Nevertheless, the main substance of the testimony of Danilo Bautista that he saw the accused set fire to the house remains untouched and unaffected by the alleged inconsistency of his testimony. Moreover, accused was positively identified by both Galamay and Bautista as the culprit who set fire to the house hence his alibi that he accompanied his father to the hospital at the time of the commission of the crime cannot stand. “Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses.” 15. FREEMAN v. REYES (2011) “The dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence." Petitioner claims that the respondent used gross dishonesty in obtaining money from her, without rendering proper legal services, and appropriating the proceeds of the insurance policies of her deceased husband. On January 19, 2001, complainant filed a Motion Submitting the Instant Case for Immediate Resolution with Comments on Respondent's Answer, alleging, among others, that upon seeing the letter 23 dated March 9, 1999 of the Coroner's Court, respondent began to show interest and volunteered to arrange for the insurance claims; that no acceptance fee was agreed upon between the parties, as the amounts earlier mentioned represented the legal fees and expenses to be incurred attendant to the London trip; that the parties verbally agreed to a 20% contingent fee out of the total amount to be recovered; that she obtained the visas with the assistance of a travel consultant recommended by respondent; that upon return from abroad, respondent never informed her about the arrangements with the insurance companies in London that remittances would be made directly to the respondent's personal account at Far East Bank; that the reason why respondent went to London was primarily to attend the International Law Conference, not solely for her insurance claims, which explained why the receipt for the P50,000.00, which she gave, bore the letterhead of Broadway Travel, Inc. (in the amount of P47,500.00) and that she merely made a handwritten marginal note regarding the receipt of the amount of P50,000.00; that with the use of an SPA [referring to the second SPA] in favor of the respondent, bearing her forged signature, the amount of £10,546.7 [should be £10,960.63], 24 or approximately equivalent to P700,000.00, was remitted to the personal bank account of respondent, but the same was never turned over to her, nor was she ever informed about it; and that she clarified that she never executed any SPA that would authorize respondent to receive any money or check due her, but that the only SPA [first SPA] she executed was for the purpose of representing her in court proceedings. Petitioner’s filed for estafa but it was dismissed. In the Report and Recommendation 31 dated August 28, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent to have betrayed the trust of complainant as her client, for being dishonest in her dealings and appropriating for herself the insurance proceeds intended for complainant. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that despite receipt of the approximate amount of P200,000.00, respondent failed to secure the visas for complainant and her son, and that through deceitful means, she was able to appropriate for herself the proceeds of the insurance policies of complainant's husband. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period allowed under the law, and that she be ordered to turn over to complainant the amounts she received from the London insurance companies. On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVI-2003-166, 32 adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with modification that respondent be disbarred. Held: The Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating Commissioner that complainant had sufficiently substantiated the charge of gross dishonesty against respondent, for having appropriated the insurance proceeds of the complainant's deceased husband, and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be disbarred. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 244 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 48 and 2, 49 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Applying the rule to the present case, the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. Respondent's defense that the criminal complaint for estafa against her was already dismissed is of no consequence. An administrative case can proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was committed. More so, in the present administrative case, wherein the ground for the dismissal of the criminal case was because the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to withdraw the information and, a fortiori, dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. 137. RASE ET AL. V NLRC (1994) POEA is not bound by the technical rues of procedure and evidence Sec 5, Rule 133 provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies (like the POEA) a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Petitioners are parents of Marilyn, a domestic helper who died of acute viral encephalitis in Saudi Arabia and are now claiming salary differential, death and burial benefits from POEA. Petitioners claim that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside POEA’s holding that G&M (recruiter) was liable. The POEA is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence. Under its Rules and Regulations in force at the time the petitioners filed their complaint (1989), adjudication proceedings before it were summary in nature and judgment may be rendered on the basis of position papers and memoranda. It was proper for POEA to admit the affidavit of Enciong, a co-worker in the same household with the victim Marilyn that her salary was increased from SR 150 to SR 350. The procedure it adopted strictly conformed with its Rules and Regulations. POEA resolved the petitioners’ complaint on the basis of the documentary evidence submitted by the parties which, insofar as the petitioners are concerned, included the assailed letter of Marilyn and the affidavit of Imelda Enciong. Thus, it was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and to be cross-examined by the counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the administrative proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence. “The argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC, where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.” 138. KLAVENESS MARITIME AGENCY V PALMOS, SEVILLA, AND NLRC (1994) In proceedings before the POEA and the NLRC the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in their full rigor. Palmos and Sevilla were hired as Seamen by Denholm Shipping through their local manning agent Klaveness for 12 months. They filed a case for illegal dismissal after they were repatriated for an altercation with their Chief Officer who alleged that that they returned drunk after their shore leave and assaulted him with a knife. Both POEA and NLRC held that they were dismissed without just or authorized cause. Upon certiorari, petitioners claimed that NLRC committed GAD in disregarding their evidence. The Court held that the issues raised by petitioners concerning the evidence submitted by them (e.g., an extract of the logbook of the vessel which contained the Captain’s report on the incident) and the objections to such evidentiary material articulated by the POEA and the NLRC, do not need prolonged analysis. We believe rather that it is the tenor and intrinsic worth of such material, along with that of the other pieces of evidence offered by petitioners and private respondents, that need to be examined, bearing constantly in mind that in proceedings before the POEA and the NLRC, the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in their full rigor. It was found that the proximate cause of the dismissal related not to the actual behavior of the 2 seamen, or to an actual threat to the internal peace and order of the vessel posed by such behavior. The dismissal of Palmos and Sevilla was based on the demand of the Chief Officer to the Captain to relieve the seamen or else lose him. That demand was not in itself a lawful or reasonable demand. The ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 245 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Labor Code does not, of course, require a formal trial-type proceeding before an erring employee may be dismissed. This is specially true in the case of a vessel on the ocean or in a foreign port. However, the minimum requirement of due process in termination proceedings consists of notice to the employees intended to be dismissed and the grant to them of an opportunity to present their own side. This was not fulfilled when they were dismissed summarily without being heard of their side of the incident. SIAO ABA V. ATTY. DE GUZMAN (2011) “Weight and sufficiency of evidence is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief for the party on the judge trying the case.” Complainants alleged that de Guzman persuaded them to file an illegal recruitment case against certain persons in exchange for money, in behalf of the other respondents. Because they refused to pursue the case, the respondents allegedly orchestrated the filing of fabricated charges for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa against them. Thus, they filed for disbarment cases agaisnt the respondents. In support of their allegaitions in the administrative complaint, they submitted the allegedly fabricated complaint, supporting documents, letter of De Guzman to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, De Guzman’s Affidivit of Clarification and other relevant documents. The Court ruled for the dismissisal of disbarment charges against Trinidad and Fornier and dismiss the liability of De Guzman. Rule 131 Sec 3(a) of the Rules of Court provides that a person is presumed innocent of crime or wrondoing. The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove all allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondents. Complainants were not able to discharge this burden as the documents they submitted were not authenticated and were apparently fabricated. Also, complainants did not not appear in the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint. RULE 133, §4 PEOPLE V. EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES Y OLANO; G.R. NO. 184926; APRIL 11, 2012 “Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the commission of a crime and the identity of the culprit.” Under review is the conviction of Edmundo Villaflores for rape with homicide based on circumstantial evidence. Villaflores now reiterates [before the SC] that the RTC and the CA gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide because the State did not discharge its burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged. In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide was established beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence. [The evidence, in essence, consisted of object evidence, police reports, an autopsy report, the testimony of the wife of the accused who saw in their house the sack which contained the rape victim, and testimonies of Aldrin and Jovie, friends who use shabu in his house, narrating that they saw the accused “umakay sa bata,” and heard “umiiyak ang batang babae at umuungol” from the house as they passed by, and saw the accused carrying a yellow sack towards the vacant house where the victim was found. ] “No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court specifies when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, viz: Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction affirmed. [Doctrines which may be omitted, but worth reproducing here. You may skip these parts. Composite crime v. compound or complex crime.] ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 246 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound crime under Article 48, supra, on the other hand. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be the subject of a separate information. [Two other doctrines, worth reproducing:] Indeed, during the floor deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act No. 8353, the legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape to refer to a killing that occurs immediately before or after, or during the commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as long as the killing is linked to the rape, became evident, viz: “…But the principal intent, Mr. President, is rape.” Under Article 266-A rape is always committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape, because a female of that age is deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge. Marita’s Certificate of Live Birth … her age to be only four years and eight months at the time of the commission of the crime. RULE 133, SECTION 4 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V CAPITLE, ET.AL (G.R. NO. 175330, JANUARY 12, 2011) Under Sec 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence: “circumstancial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: there is more than 1 circumstance; the fact from which inferences are derived are proven and the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.” This was the case of murder of Pasig City Brgy Chairman Pagalunan. He was gunned down by 4 men and more than a month after, 3 separate witnesses gave their statements identifying Nagares (who was apprehended by Police on account of conviction in a separate case for Frustrated Homicide) from the 4 pictures presented to him as one of the assailants. While under detention of the NBI, Nagares (Respondent) executed an extrajudicial confession to the killing of Brgy Chariman Pagalunan assisted by Atty Galang before Atty Dizon of the NBI. In his extrajudicial confession, he implicated the vicemayor, and 3 other men (including co-respondent Capitle) as cohorts in the killing. There are two issues regarding rules of evidence here. First, whether Nagares’ Extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence. Nagares’ assails its admissibility because it violates Sec 3, of Bill of Rights of Constitution as it was made under duress and was not assisted by an independent counsel during custodial investigation. The Supreme Court admitted the extra-judicial confession of Nagares because according to circumstances it was found that it was made voluntarily and there was no evidence of duress or violence on Nagares. He did not even file any criminal or admistrative complaint against the alleged maltreatment. There was no marks or bruises of violence on him. The presence of atty Galang also satisfied the requirement on present counsel. Second, based on circumstantial evidence, Capitle is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Under Sec 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence: “circumstancial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: there is more than 1 circumstance; the fact from which inferences are derived are proven and the combination of all circumstances is ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 247 of 256 Justice Gesmundo such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.” A combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way to leave no reasonable doubt to the guilt of accuse. RULE 133, SECTION 7 14. CAPIRAL V. ROBLES (2011) “When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions." On September 5, 2002, herein petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 on grounds that respondents' Complaint lacked cause of action or that the same is barred by prescription and laches. In their Opposition to herein petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, private respondents questioned the factual allegations of petitioner and contended that the property subject of the Complaint for Partition is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title having been duly registered under the Torrens System and as such may not be acquired by prescription. On February 21, 2003, the RTC issued an Order holding that it “finds it necessary to set first the subject motion for further hearing for the reception of evidence of the parties pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.” On August 12, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve 6 praying that an Order be issued by the RTC resolving petitioner's Motion to Dismiss but the RTC denied the same. Held: Petition denied. Petitioner contends that there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which requires a trial-type hearing for the resolution of a motion to dismiss. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, insofar as hearings on a motion to dismiss are concerned, Section 2, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court sanctions trial-type proceedings in the sense that the parties are allowed to present evidence and argue their respective positions before the court, thus: Sec. 2. Hearing of Motion. - At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the questions of law and their evidence on the questions of fact involved except those not available at that time. Should the case go to trial, the evidence presented during the hearing shall automatically be part of the evidence of the party presenting the same. In Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies v. Oriental Wood Processing Corporation, 11 this Court had occasion to rule that the issues raised in a motion to dismiss have to be determined in accordance with the evidence and facts presented, not on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations and that the courts could not afford to dismiss a litigant's complaint on the basis of half-baked conclusions with no evidence to show for it. In emphasizing the need for a formal hearing, this Court held that the demand for a clear factual finding to justify the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be dispensed with. In the present case, petitioner's ground in filing his Motion to Dismiss is that he has been openly, continuously and exclusively possessing the subject property in the concept of an owner for more than ten years and that he has explicitly repudiated his co-ownership of the subject property with his co-heirs. Evidence is quite obviously needed in this situation, for it is not to be expected that said ground, or any facts from which its existence may be inferred, will be found in the averments of the complaint. 17 When such a ground is asserted in a motion to dismiss, the general rule governing evidence on motions applies. 18 The rule is embodied in Section 7, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[w]hen a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions." However, in the present case, there was no affidavit or any other documentary evidence attached to petitioner's Motion to Dismiss as proof of the averments contained therein. Thus, the RTC is justified in directing the conduct of further hearings to ascertain petitioner's factual allegations in its motion. PEOPLE VS. DUMLAO (2009); G.R. NO. 168918 RULE 117 (Motion to Quash for Insufficiency of Evidence) – “Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case.” ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 248 of 256 Justice Gesmundo FACTS: Dumlao, et al were part of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS who supposedly approved a contract of lease-purchase with La’o, pa private person. They were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in the Sandignabayan. Dumlao filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He stated that the prosecution’s main thrust was the alleged approval by the GSIS Board of the Lease-Purchase Agreement. He argues that the Resolution was not in fact approved by the GSIS Board. There was no quorum of the board; thus there was no resolution approving the Agreement. The Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Dumlao and found that the minutes show that the Board failed to approve the Lease-Purchase Agreement. As evidenced by the Joint Stipulation, only 3 of the 7 members signed. It did not pass a resolution because a majority of 4 votes were required; thus, the SB held that the prosecution had no cause of action against Dumlao. ISSUE: W/N insufficiency of evidence is a ground for motion to quash. HELD: No. The resolution of the Sandiganbayan shows that it did consider the ground invoked by Dumlao (that the facts charged do not constitute an offense); otherwise, it could have denied respondent Dumlao’s motion. From the reasoning given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it dismissed the case because of insufficiency of evidence. Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case. Here, where the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against the accused for insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence, it violated the prosecution’s right to due process. Not only did the SB not consider the ground invoked by Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. 112. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ANTONIO C. ESTELLA (2003) “Courts do not rely on evidence that arouses mere suspicion or conjecture-to lead to conviction, evidence must do more than raise the mere possibility or even probability of guilt.” Antonio Estella was found guilty of violating Dangerous Drugs Act for the possession of dried marijuana. This was seized by virtue of a warrant issued by Judge Estrada of RTC of Zambales to search Estella’s residence. The trial court’s ruling was based on the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness, Intelligence and Investigation Officer SPO1 Buloron who was among the team that searched Estella’s house. Furthermore, it was the barangay captain of the place named in the warrant who led the team to the house thus Estella cannot deny that the owned it. The Court held that YES, the search was valid. The hut which the police searched where they found the marijuana is allegedly not the real residence of Estella. The only link that can be made between appellant and the subject hut is that it was bought by his brother Leonardo a.k.a. “Narding” Estella. OSG’s supposition that since it was being rented by the alleged live-in partner of appellant, it follows that he was also occupying it or was in full control of it cannot be sustained. In the first place, other than SPO1 Buloron’s uncorroborated testimony, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the person renting the hut was indeed the live-in partner of appellant—if he indeed had any. The attempt to make it appear that appellant occupied it, or that it was under his full control, is merely conjectural and speculative. We have often ruled that courts do not rely on evidence that arouses mere suspicion or conjecture. Furthermore, there were contradicting testimonies. Apart from the testimony of Barnachea—which contradicted rather than validated the story of SPO1 Buloron—no other evidence was presented to corroborate the latter’s narration of the events. Without any independent or corroborative proof, it has little or no probative value at all. In a criminal prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable, and in harmony with the usual course of human experience—not by mere conjecture or speculation. And lastly, search conducted was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been within appellant’s immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of that which may be considered to be incident to a lawful arrest. RULE 134 • Perpetuation of Testimony • No specific provision 95. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, ETC. VS. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR., ET. AL. (2007) ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 249 of 256 Justice Gesmundo “While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right under the Constitution. Besides this, the Philippines also recognizes the international treaties giving protection to human rights. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court." Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent" and conspiracy to defraud.DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. RTC issued an Order of Arrest and NBI agents arrested and detained him.Munoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. CA declared the Order of Arrest void. DOJ filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC. SC sustained the validity of the Order of Arrest. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent. Munoz filed, in the same case, a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself. It was then raffled off to Judge Olalia. Munoz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted. Hongkong filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied. Hongkong alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. In his comment on the petition, Munoz maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty. While the SC limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of the Court’s ruling is in order. The exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained. The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. Extradition has been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 250 of 256 Justice Gesmundo remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." 96. JEFFREY O. TORREDA VS. TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC., ET. AL. (2007) "The rule in labor cases is that the burden is on the employer to prove that the dismissal of an employee is for a just or valid cause. Evidence must be clear, convincing and free from any inference that the prerogative to dismiss an employee was abused and unjustly used by the employer to further any vindictive end." Torreda was employed by Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. as a finance assistant (on a probationary basis). He was employed on a regular basis as finance accountant under Sepulveda. Torreda failed to process several claims (separation claims and maternity and other benefit claims) before taking a leave of absence. In order to retrieve the payrolls and SSS files, Sepulveda, with prior approval of the head of the Finance and Accounting Dept., had the drawer of Torrefa forcibly opened by a staff member of the General Administration Section. It was opened in the presence of 3 other people. Torreda filed a complaint stating he discovered that P200 he kept in his drawer was missing. Torreda was dismissed because the complaint was without basis and merit. The ground given was Grave Slander. The Labor Arbited ruled Illegal Dismissal. The NLRC reversed, ratiocinating that the complainants committed the infraction of accusing his immediate superior of stealing and calling her a robber through email, without evidence and forwarding copies to the other officers of the company. It constituted serious miscondict, a just cause for dismissal. The rule in labor cases is that the burden is on the employer to prove that the dismissal of an employee is for a just or valid cause. Evidence must be clear, convincing and free from any inference that the prerogative to dismiss an employee was abused and unjustly used by the employer to further any vindictive end. In this case, respondent Toshiba adequately proved that petitioner was dismissed for just cause. There is abundant evidence on record showing that petitioner committed libel against his immediate superior, Sepulveda, an act constituting serious misconduct which warrants the dismissal from employment. Petitioner maliciously and publicly imputed on Sepulveda the crime of robbery of P200.00. Torreda knew that it was Delos Santos who opened his drawer and not Sepulveda. Thus, by his own admission, petitioner was well aware that the robbery charge against Sepulveda was a concoction, a mere fabrication with the sole purpose of retaliating against Sepulveda’s previous acts. The records show that Sepulveda was impelled to forcibly open petitioner’s drawer. She needed to retrieve the benefits applications of retirees and incumbent employees of respondent-corporation, which petitioner had failed to process for payment before his leave. The claimants sought to have their claims approved and released with dispatch. Before opening petitioner’s drawer, Sepulveda saw to it that she had Kobayashi’s approval. Delos Santos opened the drawer of petitioner in the presence of his co-employees in the Financial Section. Thereafter, the claims were processed and payments were effected. Thus, Sepulveda acted in good faith. Petitioner admitted that his charge of robbery/theft against Sepulveda was baseless, but claimed that he fabricated the charge because of his exasperation and anger at Sepulveda’s repeated acts of opening his drawer without prior permission while he was on leave; he also pointed out that Sepulveda looked into his personal files in his computer. In fine, by falsely ascribing a crime to Sepulveda, petitioner was merely retaliating against perceived misdeeds she had committed against him. However, the manner resorted to by petitioner of redressing the wrong committed by Sepulveda is a criminal act. As the adage goes, the end cannot justify the means used by petitioner. 97. LIGAYA V. SANTOS, ET. AL. VS. JUDGE ROLANDO G. HOW, ETC. (2007) "In line with the equal protection clause and the right to due process, the petitioner in bail proceedings has the right to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal." Santos, et al. filed an administrative complaint against Judge How for gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and serious misconduct. The complainants were detained without bail for criminal cases involving successive ambush incidents. The prosecution presented witnesses and the judge held that he would resolve the petition for bail on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. When the complainants manifested that they would present a witness, the judge branded the request “misplaced.” He rejected the request to make a tender of proof and declared the petition deemed submitted for resolution. The judge issued an order denying bail. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 251 of 256 Justice Gesmundo The grand of bail is discretionary. The prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong remains with the judge. This discretion may be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited of produced, a proper exercise of judicial discretion required that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. The petitioner in bail proceedings has the right to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. In refusing to allow the petitioners to present their witness, the respondent judge deprived the accused of the right to due process and equal protection. The dictates of fair play should have at least reminded the judge to inquire first of the nature of the evidence proposed to be presented, determine whether it will be essential for the purpose of ascertaining entitlement to bail, before discarding it outright. EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION / EVIDENCE 33. PEOPLE V LUCERO (2011) “Tangible evidence like a weapon that is obtained from an unconstitutional extrajudicial confession is also inadmissible” Accused-appellant was not informed of his rights, nor was there a waiver of said rights. Thus, the information elicited is inadmissible, and the evidence garnered as the result of that interrogation is also inadmissible. This parallels Aballe v. People, wherein the accused in that case was questioned without the presence of counsel, and later produced the weapon used in killing the victim, also making an extrajudicial confession admitting his guilt. In that particular case, it was held, “Together with the extrajudicial confession, the fatal weapon is but a fruit of a constitutionally infirmed interrogation and must consequently be disallowed.” SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA V. CALTEX (1966) “To constitute as an exception to the hearsay rule, the entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, should be based on personal knowledge of a person who witnessed the event and had given the information based on a duty to do so. ” A Caltex station blew up initiating a case for damages. The issue in the case is the admissibility of reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The report of Captain Tinio reproduced information given by a certain Benito Morales regarding the history of the gasoline station and what the chief of the fire department had told him on the same subject. Petitioners maintain, that the reports fall within the scope of section 35, Rule 123, which provides that "entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." To qualify their statements as "official information" acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record. 1 The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. SALMON, DEXTER & CO. VS. WIJANCO (1924) “Every officer has an implied duty or authority to prepare and deliver out to an applicant a certificate stating anything which has been done or observed by him or exists in his office by virtue of some authority or duty, and the certificate is admissible.” ” This case involved a contract for the sale of a tractor and a palay threshing machine. The issue regarding the contract is whether the threshing machine could thresh a particular quantity of palay (300 cavans of ordinary palay per day of ten hours' work). The issue before the SC is whether the certificate of the Director of the Bureau of Agriculture as to the average crop of palay produced in the municipality of Magalang in the 1920-1921 agricultural ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 252 of 256 Justice Gesmundo year, is admissible in evidence to determine the issue of the machine’s capacity. The statistics prepared by the Bureau of Agriculture is chiefly based on the quarterly reports of the municipal presidents made pursuant to section 2202 of the Administrative Code. Therefore, the certificate issued by the Director of Agriculture is admissible in evidence as an official document issued by a public officer authorized by law. MACTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT V. CA (1995) “Where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the moving cause of the written contract, or where the parol agreement forms part of the consideration of the written contract, and it appears that the written contract was executed on the faith of the parol contract or representation, such evidence is admissible, as an exception to the parole evidence rule.” This case is about the infamous expropriation proceedings regarding the Lahug airport in Mactan. Land of private parties was expropriated. However, the construction of the airport did not pus through. The landowners are now seeking reconveyance based on their written agreements which contain riders giving them the right to repurchase the questioned lots under certain circumstances. One of the landowners’, Inez’, written agreement did not contain this rider. The question now is whether parol evidence can be adduced to show that her written agreement should also have contained a rider like the others. Under the parol evidence rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties thereto . Where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the moving cause of the written contract, or where the parol agreement forms part of the consideration of the written contract, and it appears that the written contract was executed on the faith of the parol contract or representation, such evidence is admissible. In this case, the parol agreement that there is a right to repurchase is admissible in evidence. PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE LADIANA V. PEOPLE (2000) “The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from the accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel during a custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused during the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as evidence against the affiant.” This case involves a murder charge against Ladiana. During the conduction of the preliminary investigation, Ladiana executed a counter-affidavit which was later used by the Sandiganbayan as an extrajudicial confession. The case differentiated betweem admissions and confessions. The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the victim when the latter was attacking him. Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to the latter’s death -- but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him. ADDITIONAL CASES APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES 5) JIMENEZ VS. SORONGON (2012) The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in the SC. Facts: Unald Corp. filled a complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor, it charged Alamil et. al. with illegal recruitment(note this is a criminal offense). The RTC acquitted Alamil. Unlad Corp. elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65. CA dismissed Corp has no standing. ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 253 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Held: The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case. It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit."33 Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved.34 By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.35 When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.36 Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor."37 In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court (SC), the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 6. PEOPLE v. CONSULTA (2013) "[t]o secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof." Consulta, aka Manang, was caught in a buy-bust operation for shabu. An informant allegedly posed as a buyer for a buy bust operation. When the alleged drugs were put in the informants pocket, the police arrested Consulta. The RTC and the CA held that consulta was guilty beyond reasonable doubt for selling drugs. Consulta appealed claiming there were procedural lapses for her arrest and in obtaining the evidence presented against her. Held: Petition is impressed with merit. We held in People v. Hernandez 35 that "[t]o secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof." Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 provide the procedural guidelines that police officers must observe in the handling of seized illegal drugs in order to ensure the preservation of the identity and integrity thereof. In the present case, the above-mentioned procedures were not observed at all by the police officers. Both PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco clearly and categorically admitted during their respective cross-examinations that the five sachets of suspected shabu allegedly obtained from the buy-bust operation were not physically inventoried nor photographed in the presence of accused-appellant or her counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and an elective official. In fact, they stated that the buy-bust operation was actually conducted without the presence of the said representatives. 38 Although Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 contains a proviso in the last sentence thereof that may excuse the non-compliance with the required procedures, the same may be availed of only under justifiable grounds and as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved by the apprehending police officers. Here, we find that the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized were not shown to have been preserved. Contrarily, the records of the case bear out the glaring fact that the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was broken even at the very first link thereof. To recall, the testimonial evidence of the prosecution established that the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation was the confidential informant who tipped the police about the drug peddling activities of accused-appellant. Thus, it was the poseur-buyer who supposedly received the suspected illegal drugs from accused-appellant, which allegedly consisted of five plastic sachets of shabu. PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco did not participate at all in this transaction. They merely witnessed the exchange while they were seated inside a vehicle parked across the road eight to ten meters away from where accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer were situated. Even more damning was PO2 Dizon’s admission that he did not in fact see the ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 254 of 256 Justice Gesmundo item(s) handed by accused-appellant to the poseur-buyer. The police officers had no personal knowledge whether the alleged transaction between accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer indeed involved illegal drugs Nevertheless, granting for the sake of argument that there were indeed five sachets of suspected shabu sold to the poseur-buyer, there were still more broken links in the chain of custody. In this case, one broken link was that of the turnover of the seized items from the buy-bust team to the police investigator, SPO1 Doria. PO2 Dizon testified that after he placed the marking on the five sachets of suspected shabu, he turned them over to SPO1 Doria and the specimens were submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. 42 However, SPO1 Doria did not testify before the trial court so as to shed light on this matter. The Court finds this unfortunate as the prosecution even chose to dispense with his testimony. Still another broken link was that involving the transfer of the drug specimens from SPO1 Doria to the crime laboratory. P/Sr. Insp. Perez testified that the request for laboratory examination and drug specimens were first received by PO2 Bagaoisan, the Duty Desk Officer. The latter then called her to physically receive the same. 43 However, P/Sr. Insp. Perez stated that she did not actually see if it was SPO1 Doria who transmitted the specimens. She merely relied on the stamp of PO2 Bagaoisan. 44 Furthermore, PO2 Bagaoisan was not presented in court to prove that it was indeed SPO1 Doria who delivered the drug specimens to the crime laboratory. 8.EFREN ALMUETE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 179611, (2013) “Appeal in Criminal Cases: Rule 120, Sec. 6 allows the promulgation of judgment in absentia and gives the accused a period of 15 days from notice to him or his counsel within which to appeal; otherwise the decision becomes final.” Almuete, Ila and Lloren were charged before the RTC with violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 or the “Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines”. On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, Almuete’s counsel informed the RTC that Lloren was ill while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation. RTC found their absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its decision as scheduled. It ruled against the accused. The accused moved for reconsideration which was denied then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA granted the Petition and acquitted the accused. The defendants then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45. The Court reversed the acquittal of Almuete et. al and reinstated the RTC’s decision. The issue now is whether the petitioner can still file an appeal as a remedy. No. Petitioner’s right to appeal has prescribed. An acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed because the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion are correctible only by a writ of error. Thus, in filing a petition for certiorari instead of an appeal, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. Upon the trial court’s denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners had the right to appeal, by writ of error, from the decision on its merits on questions of facts and of law. The appeal of the petitioners in due course was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. In such appeal, the petitioners could question the findings of facts of the trial court, its conclusions based on the said findings, as well as the penalty imposed by the court. It bears stressing that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review and that the appellate court can reverse any errors of the trial court, whether assigned or unassigned, found in its judgment. However, instead of appealing the decision by writ of error, the respondents filed their petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision of the trial court on its merits. The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured beyond the sphere of its authority and arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari proceedings, the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible only by appeal by writ of error. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. Petitioner’s right to appeal has long prescribed. The decision is no longer open to an appeal. 9. CALLO-CLARIDAD VS. ESTEBAN (2013) The determination of probable cause to file a criminal complaint or information in court is exclusively within the competence of the Executive Department, through the Secretary of Justice. The courts cannot interfere in such determination, except upon a clear showing that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. One Chase Claridad was found dead in between two cars in Quezon City after he visited his girlfriend. One Phillip Esteban was last identified with the victim and was hence linked and charged with the crime of murder. The ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 255 of 256 Justice Gesmundo Secretary of Justice dismissed the complaint for lack of sufficiency of evidence. MR denied. Elevated to CA by petition for review under Rule 43. CA affirmed by dimissing the petition for review. Hence this petition. The filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 to review the Secretary of Justice’s resolution on the determination of probable cause was an improper remedy. Indeed, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Secretary of Justice. A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V FRANCISCO MANLANGIT (G.R. NO. 189806, JANUARY 12, 2011) In the matter of proving sale of illegal and dangerous drugs, it is necessary to show that the (a) transaction or sale actually took place AND (b) presentation in court of corpus delicti (body of the crime). The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) identity of buyer and seller, the object, and consideration; (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the lab up to the time it was offered in evidence. In the case, Manlangit was charged with using (Section 15, of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs act) and selling (Section 5, of CDDA) of shabu. Manlangit was approached by an informant asking for a shabu and after a few minutes the former took out from his house a sachet of white substance (shabu) upon payment Manlangit was apprehended by the police The Sachet was marked with FTM and sent to PNP crime lab. Manlangit denied that there was such buy-bust operation and claimed that the recovered shabu was not from him. Buy-bust operation: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment accepted as valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In such operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without being induced or prodded by another. If appropriately carried, it deserves judicial sanction. In the matter of proving sale of illegal and dangerous drugs, it is necessary to show that the (a) transaction or sale actually took place AND (b) presentation in court of corpus delicti (body of the crime). A) Transaction or sale actually took place The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) identity of buyer and seller, the object, and consideration; (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. B.) Chain of Custody of Seized drugs must be unbroken (section 21 of CDDA) The apprehending team with initial custody and control of drugs shall (immediately after seizure) physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused, a representative of the media and DOJ, and any elected public official. In the case of People v Rosialda however, SC clarified that non- compliance with these requirements shall not render the seizure void or invalid provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items are properly preserved. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the lab up to the time it was offered in evidence. (Demurrer to evidence under Crimpro but was classified under Evidence in additional assignment) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. NO. 153304-05, FEBRUARY 7, 2012) Under the ROC on Criminal Proceeding, the Sandiganbayan is not obliged to require the parties to present additional evidence when a demurrer to evidence is filed. Whether the Sandiganbayan will intervene in the course of the prosecution of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion. This case arose from 2 criminal information of malversation of public funds before the Sandiganbayan against Imelda Marcos, Benitez and Zagala (ministers of human settlement.) After the COA Auditor Cortez’ testimony, prosecution submitted its formal offer of evidence and rested its case. Then respondents filed separate motions to ALS 2014B — REM Digests Page 256 of 256 Justice Gesmundo dismiss the criminal cases, by way of demurrers to evidence. The prosecution then filed a Manifestation stating that it was not opposing the demurrers. The Sandiganbayan accepted the demurrers and acquitted the respondents for finding no evidence of misappropriation of subject funds. In this case the petitioners argued that Sandiganbayan committed GADALEJ (grave abuse of discretion…) when it took the demurrers to evidence at face value instead of requiring the presentation of additional evidence, taking into consideration the huge amount of public funds involved. The SC held that there is no GADALEJ when Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence. Under the ROC on Criminal Proceeding, the Sandiganbayan is not obliged to require the parties to present additional evidence when a demurrer to evidence is filed. Whether the Sandiganbayan will intervene in the course of the prosecution of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion. The court, in the exercise of its sound discretion may require or allow the prosecution to present additional evidence after a demurrer to evidence. This exercise however must be for good reasons and in paramount interest of justice. In this case, we cannot claim there is GADALEJ when Sandiganbayan did not require the presentation of additional evidence. !"#!$" &'( )*$+, NT Tabangao is a caigo vessel owneu by PN0C. It was sailing neai the coast of Ninuoio loaueu with baiiels of keiosene, gasoline, anu uiesel oil with a total value of 4u.4N. The vessel was suuuenly boaiueu by 7 fully aimeu piiates (accuseu in the case - Emilio Changco, Cecilio Changco, Tulin, Loyola, Infante, etc.). They uetaineu anu took contiol of the vessel. The name NT Tabangao anu the PN0C logo weie painteu ovei with black. Then it was painteu with the name ualilee. The ship ciew was foiceu to sail to Singapoie. In Singapoie, the ship was awaiting anothei vessel that uiu not aiiive. Insteau, the ship went back to Batangas, Philippines anu iemaineu at sea. Bays latei, it went back to Singapoie. This time, anothei vessel calleu the Navi Piiue anchoieu besiue it. Anothei accuseu, Cheong San Biong, supeiviseu the Navi's ciew anu ieceiveu the caigo on boaiu NT Tabangao¡ualilee. Aftei the tiansfei of goous weie completeu, NT Tabangao¡ualilee went back to the Philippines anu the oiiginal ciew membeis weie ieleaseu by the piiates in batches. The ciew was oiueieu not to tell authoiities of what happeneu. The chief engineei of the ciew, howevei, iepoiteu the inciuent to the coast guaiu. Afteiwaius, a seiies of aiiests weie effecteu in uiffeient places. An infoimation chaiging the accuseu with qualifieu piiacy oi violation of the PB SS2 - Piiacy in the Philippine Wateis - was fileu against the accuseu. The tiial couit convicteu them. (EvIBENCE RELATEB) -. /0'1 /23.. 4567 67. 635/0 81936:' ;5<=5<2 67/6 /889'.=> /??.00/<6': =.;.<'. 1; =.<5/0 5' <16 '9??136.= @A /<A 7/3= .&5=.<8. @96 67.53 @/3. 6.'65B1<A( C3./6.3 4.5276 5' 25&.< 61 67. 8/6.21358/0 5=.<65;58/651< 1; 67. /889'.= @A 67. ?31'.89651< 456<.''.' 67/< 61 67. /889'.=:' ?0/5< =.<5/0 1; ?/36585?/651< 5< 67. 81BB5''51< 1; 67. 835B.. D05@5 5' ;9<=/B.<6/00A /<= 5<7.3.<60A / 4./E =.;.<'.F B987 B13. '1 47.< 9<81331@13/6.= @A 167.3 456<.''.' 81<'5=.35<2 67/6 56 5' ./'A 61 ;/@358/6. /<= 81<8186F /<= =5;;58906 61 =5'?31&.( D889'.=>/??.00/<6 B9'6 /==98. 80./3 /<= 81<&5<85<2 .&5=.<8. that it was ?7A'58/00A 5B?1''5@0. foi him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only faileu to uo this, he was likewise unable to piove that he was in his place of woik on the uates afoiestateu. +6 5' =18635</0 67/6 67. 635/0 81936:' .&/09/651< 1; 67. 83.=5@5056A 1; / 6.'65B1<A 5' /8813=.= 67. 7527.'6 3.'?.86F ;13 635/0 81936' 7/&. /< 9<63/BB.0.= 1??1369<56A 61 1@'.3&. =53.860A 67. =.B./<13 1; 456<.''.' /<=F 679'F 61 =.6.3B5<. 47.67.3 / 8.36/5< 456<.'' 5' 6.005<2 67. 63967( !.1?0. &'( G/<501 H/69@52 A I1351 Banilo Catubig was chaigeu with the ciime of iape. Piosecution eviuence showeu that on Novembei 27, 1997, at aiounu 4:uu o'clock in the afteinoon, 12-yeai olu Bannilyn Catubig anu hei foui youngei siblings weie watching television in the sala of theii house. When Bannilyn's fathei, Banilo Catubig, aiiiveu, the lattei tolu Bannilyn's sibling to go to hei aunt's house which is just locateu neaiby. Theieaftei, Banilo tolu Bannilyn to go insiue the ioom anu to lie uown on the beu. Aftei Bannilyn hau complieu, Banilo iemoveu Bannilyn's shoits anu panty. Banilo, aftei iemoving his biief anu t-shiit, laiu on top of Bannilyn anu succeeueu in inseiting his penis to hei vagina. Bannilyn uiu not iesist because she is afiaiu hei fathei who beat anu iapeu hei in the past. Bowevei, Bannilyn's aunt who got suspicious of what Banilo was uoing to Bannilyn, infoimeu the lattei's mothei. Thus, when confionteu by hei mothei, Bannilyn was foiceu to ieveal that she was inueeu iapeu by hei fathei. Contiaiily, Banilo uenieu the accusation against him. Be claimeu that the iape chaige was biought about because of the ill will between him anu his wife anu uaughtei Bannilyn, following a quaiiel. Thus, the tiial couit convicteu Banilo of the ciime chaigeu anu the penalty of ueath was imposeu upon him. Bence, this automatic ieview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}ose }ueigo, a constiuction woikei of B. N. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floois fiom the Renaissance Towei, Pasig City to his ueath. Be was ciusheu to ueath when the platfoim he was then on boaiuanu peifoiming woik, fell. Anu the falling of the platfoim was uue to the iemoval oi getting loose of the pin which was meiely inseiteu to the connecting points of the chain block anu platfoim but without a safety lock. }ose }uego's wiuow, Naiia, fileu in the Regional Tiial Couit (RTC) of Pasig a complaint foi uamages against the ueceaseu's employei, B.N. Consunji, Inc. Petitionei maintains that the police iepoit iepiouuceu above is heaisay anu, theiefoie, inaumissible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he Rules of Couit pioviue that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his peisonal knowleuge, that is, which aie ueiiveu fiom his peiception. A witness, theiefoie, may not testify as what he meiely leaineu fiom otheis eithei because he was tolu oi ieau oi heaiu the same. Such testimony is consiueieu heaisay anu may not be ieceiveu as pioof of the tiuth of what he has leaineu. This is known as the heaisay iule. Beaisay is not limiteu to oial testimony oi statements; the geneial iule that excluues heaisay as eviuence applies to wiitten, as well as oial statements. The theoiy of the heaisay iule is that the many possible ueficiencies, suppiessions, souices of eiioi anu untiustwoithiness, which lie unueineath the baie untesteu asseition of a witness, may be best biought to light anu exposeu by the test of cioss- examiantion. The heaisay iule, theiefoie, excluues eviuence that cannot be testeu by cioss-examination. The Rules of Couit allow seveial exceptions to the iule, among which aie entiies in official iecoius. Section 44, Rule 1Su pioviues: Entiies in official iecoius maue in the peifoimance of his uuty maue in the peifoimance of his uuty by a public officei of the Philippines, oi by a peison in the peifoimance of a uuty specially enjoineu by law aie !"#$% '%(#) eviuence of the facts theiein stateu. In !"#$%&' )* &+, -., /&+*)0 123$+,4' 56%,' )* &+,, this Couit, citing the woik of Chief }ustice Noian, enumeiateu the iequisites foi aumissibility unuei the above iule: (a) that the entiy was maue by a public officei oi by anothei peison specially enjoineu by law to uo so; (b) that it was maue by the public officei in the peifoimance of his uuties, oi by such othei peison in the peifoimance of a uuty specially enjoineu by law; anu (c) that the public officei oi othei peison hau sufficient knowleuge of the facts by him stateu, which must have been acquiieu by him peisonally oi thiough official infoimation. !"#!$" &'( )#*")+# ,-$-./01+ Si. Insp. Aguilai applieu foi a waiiant in the RTC to seaich the iesiuence of accuseu- appellant Robeit Salanguit y Ko. Be piesenteu as his witness SP01 Eumunu Bauua, who testifieu that as a poseui-buyei, he was able to puichase 2.12 giams of shabu fiom accuseu-appellant. The sale took place in accuseu-appellant's ioom, anu Bauua saw that the shabu was taken by accuseu-appellant fiom a cabinet insiue his ioom. The application was gianteu, anu a seaich waiiant was latei issueu. The police opeiatives knockeu on accuseu-appellant's uooi, but nobouy openeu it. They heaiu people insiue the house, appaiently panicking. The police opeiatives then foiceu the uooi open anu enteieu the house. Aftei showing the seaich waiiant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Coites anu his gioup staiteu seaiching the house. They founu 12 small heat-sealeu tianspaient plastic bags containing a white ciystalline substance, a papei clip box also containing a white ciystalline substance, anu two biicks of uiieu leaves, which appeaieu to be maiijuana wiappeu in newspiint having a total weight of appioximately 1,2SS giams. A ieceipt of the items seizeu was piepaieu, but the accuseu-appellant iefuseu to sign it. They uiun't finu uiug paiapheinalia. Aftei the seaich, the police opeiatives took accuseu-appellant with them to Station 1u, EBSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they hau seizeu. 1,,0"2 3456457 87 986 645 '5:7;4 <:77:96 <:' &:=>?( Belu: voiu waiiant but uiugs founu still aumissible. The fact that theie was no piobable cause to suppoit the application foi the seizuie of uiug paiapheinalia uoes not waiiant the conclusion that the seaich waiiant is voiu. This fact woulu be mateiial only if uiug paiapheinalia was in fact seizeu by the police. +45 @:;6 >' 64:6 9895 <:' 6:A59 BC &>76D5 8@ 645 '5:7;4 <:77:96 >''D5?( 1@ :6 :==E 64575@875E 645 '5:7;4 <:77:96 >' &8>? 89=C >9'8@:7 :' >6 :D6487>F5? 645 !"#$%&" () *&%+ ,-&-,."&/-0#-1 2%3 #3 #! 4-0#* -! 3( 3." !"#$%&" () 5"3.-5,."3-5#/" .6*&(7.0(&#*" -! 3( 8.#7. "4#*"/7" 8-! ,&"!"/3"* !.(8#/+ ,&(2-20" 7-%!" -! 3( #3! "9#!3"/7": It woulu be a uiastic iemeuy inueeu if a waiiant, which was issueu on piobable cause anu paiticulaily uesciibing the items to be seizeu on the basis theieof, is to be invaliuateu in toto because the juuge eiieu in authoiizing a seaich foi othei items not suppoiteu by the eviuence. Accoiuingly, we holu that the fiist pait of the seaich waiiant, authoiizing the seaich of accuseu-appellant's house foi an unueteimineu quantity of shabu, is valiu, even though the seconu pait, with iespect to the seaich foi uiug paiapheinalia, is not. Accuseu-appellant contenus that the waiiant was issueu foi moie than one specific offense because possession oi use of methamphetamine hyuiochloiiue anu possession of uiug paiapheinalia aie punisheu unuei two uiffeient piovisions of R.A. No. 642S. The Bangeious Biugs Act of 1972 is a special law that ueals specifically with uangeious uiugs which aie subsumeu into "piohibiteu" anu "iegulateu" uiugs anu uefines anu penalizes categoiies of offenses which aie closely ielateu oi which belong to the same class oi species. Accoiuingly, one (1) seaich waiiant may thus be valiuly issueu foi the saiu violations of the Bangeious Biugs Act.