PS3086 Subject Guide

Democracy and democratisationG. Philip PS3086, 2790086 2011 Undergraduate study in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences This subject guide is for a 300 course offered as part of the University of London International Programmes in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences. This is equivalent to Level 6 within the Framework for Higher Education Qualifications in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (FHEQ). For more information about the University of London International Programmes undergraduate study in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences, see: www.londoninternational.ac.uk This guide was prepared for the University of London International Programmes by: G. Philip, Professor of Comparative and Latin American Politics, London School of Economics and Political Science. This is one of a series of subject guides published by the University. We regret that due to pressure of work the author is unable to enter into any correspondence relating to, or arising from, the guide. If you have any comments on this subject guide, favourable or unfavourable, please use the form at the back of this guide. University of London International Programmes Publications Office Stewart House 32 Russell Square London WC1B 5DN United Kingdom Website: www.londoninternational.ac.uk Published by: University of London © University of London 2007 Reprinted with minor revisions 2011 The University of London asserts copyright over all material in this subject guide except where otherwise indicated. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced in any form, or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher. We make every effort to contact copyright holders. If you think we have inadvertently used your copyright material, please let us know. Contents Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 Aims ............................................................................................................................. 1 Learning outcomes ........................................................................................................ 1 Syllabus......................................................................................................................... 1 Reading and preparation ............................................................................................... 2 Online study resources ................................................................................................... 5 Structure of the subject guide ........................................................................................ 6 Reading time ................................................................................................................. 7 The examination ............................................................................................................ 7 Chapter 1: Defining and conceptualising democracy ............................................. 9 Aims of the chapter ....................................................................................................... 9 Learning outcomes ........................................................................................................ 9 Essential reading ........................................................................................................... 9 Further reading ........................................................................................................... 10 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 10 Democracy as participation .......................................................................................... 11 Democracy as competition ........................................................................................... 16 Democracy as balance ................................................................................................. 19 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 24 A reminder of your learning outcomes.......................................................................... 24 Sample examination questions ..................................................................................... 24 Chapter 2: Democracy and the state ................................................................... 25 Aims of the chapter ..................................................................................................... 25 Learning outcomes ...................................................................................................... 25 Essential reading ........................................................................................................ 25 Further reading............................................................................................................ 25 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 26 Limited and façade democracy ..................................................................................... 27 Democracy in biased states .......................................................................................... 29 Illiberal democracy ....................................................................................................... 30 Delegative democracy .................................................................................................. 31 The notion of democratic consolidation ........................................................................ 32 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 34 A reminder of your learning outcomes.......................................................................... 34 Sample examination questions ..................................................................................... 34 Chapter 3: Non-democratic systems and the transition to democracy ................ 35 Aims of the chapter ..................................................................................................... 35 Learning outcomes ...................................................................................................... 35 Essential reading ........................................................................................................ 35 Further reading............................................................................................................ 35 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 36 Colonial rule and the collapse of empires ..................................................................... 37 Political consequences of imperial control and decolonisation prior to 1990 .................. 38 Negative legacies of colonialism .................................................................................. 39 Other forms of non-democratic organisation ................................................................ 41 i 86 Democracy and democratisation Transitions to democracy.............................................................................................. 45 A reminder of your learning outcomes.......................................................................... 45 Sample examination questions ..................................................................................... 45 Chapter 4: General theories of democratisation .................................................. 47 Aims of the chapter ..................................................................................................... 47 Learning outcomes ...................................................................................................... 47 Essential reading ......................................................................................................... 47 Further reading............................................................................................................ 48 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 48 Modernisation theory and its critics .............................................................................. 49 Managing social and political change .......................................................................... 55 Social class and comparative historical sociology .......................................................... 55 Democracy as ideas and culture: Fukuyama and Huntington ......................................... 63 A reminder of your learning outcomes.......................................................................... 65 Sample examination questions ..................................................................................... 66 Chapter 5: Threats to democracy, democratic breakdown and the prevention of democratic breakdown .................................................................................... 67 Aims of the chapter ..................................................................................................... 67 Learning outcomes ...................................................................................................... 67 Essential reading ......................................................................................................... 67 Further reading............................................................................................................ 67 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 68 Democratic breakdown: cases and near misses............................................................. 69 General explanations .................................................................................................. 72 Developmental dictatorship? ....................................................................................... 74 Economic progress in wealthy countries ....................................................................... 75 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 77 A reminder of your learning outcomes.......................................................................... 77 Sample examination questions ..................................................................................... 77 Appendix: Sample examination paper ................................................................. 79 ii Conceptualising democracy. In this course we will consider various aspects of the conditions of democracy. Paths to democracy. Transitions to democracy. Conditions of democracy and its maintenance. You should be able to: • explain how democracy actually works in real world conditions • explain how democracy relates to the non-elective institutions of the state • discuss different ways in which democracy can work badly • outline the essential arguments of comparative historical sociologists of democratisation. and whether democratic systems run any serious risk of breakdown. Delegative democracy. The concept of democratic legitimacy and the functioning of liberal democracy in advanced capitalist societies. Learning outcomes By the end of this course. the processes of democratisation. and the breakdown of democratic regimes. Democratic consolidation. such as Moore and Rueschemeyer • explain how some forms of non-democracy can make the transition to democracy • assess theories of democratic breakdown in relatively poor countries and arguments for developmental dictatorship • discuss why democracy has survived in wealthy countries. Comparative historical studies. illiberal democracy and biased states. and how far actual systems conform to democratic principles • the main explanations of why political systems have moved from nondemocracy to democracy • whether or not democracy is a stable political system. Forms of non-democracy and transitional paths towards democratisation.Introduction Introduction Aims In our study of democracy and democratisation we have three main aims. Process of democratisation. General criteria for democracy and particular forms of semi-democracy. you should be able to discuss critically a range of issues relating to democratisation. 114 Democratic politics and the State or 130 Introduction to modern political thought must be passed before this course may be attempted. Syllabus If taken as part of a BSc degree. These are to consider: • how democracy is defined and understood. 1 . but you do not need to master it all – you only need to know enough facts to be able to illustrate and understand general ideas. Democracy and its Critics. The amount of potentially relevant factual material is virtually infinite. Mass society theories and theories of class conflict. Listed below are works described as Essential reading. 2006. It may be better for you to take a limited part of the syllabus. and study that very thoroughly. The End of History and the Last Man. Remind yourself when reading complex works that this subject is mainly designed to explain concepts. Reading and preparation The reading required for this course is quite wide and extensive. some of the works that you do need to read are long and complex. but if you are careful to cover Chapter 1 of this subject guide – which really is essential – together with its associated reading. than to range widely but superficially across a very broad area. reprint edition) [ISBN 9780743284554].A. The fact that you have an hour in which to answer each examination question indicates that the Examiners will be looking for a certain amount of depth from each candidate rather than a wide range of knowledge. A range of countries will be examined in relation to these themes from Europe. 1991. R. re-issue edition) [ISBN 9780300049381]. It may be a good idea to test yourself before the examination by writing a one-hour answer to one or more of the sample questions. (London: Penguin.86 Democracy and democratisation Democratic breakdown and reconstruction. If you are keen to read more on your selected topics than the works listed here. It should be reasonably clear to you whether you have written a good answer or not. (New Haven: Yale University Press. You also will want to consider the Sample examination paper. Essential reading Books Dahl. and you cannot hope to read them all. Democratic reconstruction and its problems. You will need to prepare more than three topics. Moreover. along with the material covered in one other chapter. F. The main thing is to get a sense of the arguments presented rather than trying to follow every detail. 2 . Reading advice A very large number of works cover different aspects of democracy and democratisation. In your examination. These relate mainly to authors whose arguments are specifically discussed in the text. The history of democratisation. It goes well beyond this subject guide. which is given in the Appendix to this subject guide. in order to get a sense of what is likely to come up. Democracy and war. Modernisation theory and later criticisms. These should supplement the essential texts and give a fuller basis for those topics that you choose to concentrate on in detail. Asia and Latin America. democratic breakdown and democratic reconstruction extends across virtually the whole world and backwards through centuries. use the bibliographies of the listed works to find additional material. you will have to answer three questions from a choice of 12. Fukuyama. Other works are listed as Further reading. that should be enough. pp. G. 1994) [ISBN 0803977891]. 1996) [ISBN 9780801851582]. 1983) [ISBN 9780801825224]. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. and A. 2000) [ISBN 0312227558]. Q. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. 1992) [ISBN 9781856191470].Introduction Galbraith. ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’. Capitalism. E.K. Detailed reading references in this subject guide refer to the editions of the set textbooks listed above. Democracy and Democratisation. Rueschemeyer.nd. and Post-Communist Europe. S93. pp. 2002) [ISBN 9780199253289]. (ed. paper or online resource. 1967. 3 . You will need to support your learning by reading as widely as possible and by thinking about how these principles apply in the real world. (London: Penguin. A. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 11(5) 2004. Huntington. S. Journal of Democracy. You can use a more recent edition of any of the books. Stephens Capitalist Development and Democracy.22–43. South America. To help you read extensively.55 69. Socialism and Democracy. S. Lipset. O’Donnell. Other useful texts for this course include: Books Anderson. 72(3) 1993. D. pp. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Whitehead. Journals Carsten. Linz. F. Further reading Please note that as long as you read the Essential reading you are then free to read around the subject area in any text. Schmitter ‘Liberalization. Available online at www. Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory. (ed. use the detailed chapter and section headings and the index to identify relevant readings. Also check the virtual learning environment (VLE) regularly for updated guidance on readings. 2003) [ISBN 9780521423359] Chapters 1 and 2. Foreign Affairs. Brooker. J. Democratization. 1978) fifth edition [ISBN 9780043350324] Chapters 21 and 22. Political Man: the Social Bases of politics.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/ WPS/172.. 1992) [ISBN 9780226731445]. (London: Heinemann. and Philippe C. Beetham. transition and consolidation: measuring the components of democratization’. Przeworski. This is available via the publisher’s website.2249.P. (London: Palgrave Macmillan.5990. New editions of one or more of these textbooks may have been published by the time you study this course. pp. 5(1) 1994. P. Stephens and J. (London: Sinclair-Stevenson. 76(6) 1997. B. (London: Routledge. Foreign Affairs. Government and Politics. Democratization: Theory and Experience. J. Moore.) Defining and Measuring Democracy. reprint edition 1993) [ISBN 9780807050736]. (London: Sage. you have free access to the VLE and University of London Online Library (see below). Stepan Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. D. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.pdf Zakaria. ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’.) Religion. ‘Delegative Democracy’. Schumpeter. 2006) [ISBN 0415355370]. L. (London: Allen and Unwin.M. J. J. The Culture of Contentment. D. Mann. 1993) [ISBN 052144585X]. Crystal. and D. Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil. Austin (eds) Democracy and Cultural Diversity. 1996) second edition [ISBN 0801853052]. K. and F. Leftwich. 2001) [ISBN 0333802500]. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Huntington. et al. Whitehead. (New York: Simon and Schuster. (eds) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Rousseau. Malden. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Group. (Oxford: Oxford University Press with the Hansard Society. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Skocpol. (Berkeley: University Presses of California. 1992) [ISBN 0521394163]. G.P. G.. 2000) [ISBN 0719552435]. Vanhanen. Handelman. Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and Prospects for Democracy: Latin America. Philip. Di Palma. D. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Cambridge: Polity. F. (ed. Plattner The Global Resurgence of Democracy. H. M. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. States of Development. revised 2005) [ISBN 0199243751]. J. Hagopian. D. 1997) [ISBN 041514406X or 0521297249]. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. and M.) Towards Sustainable Democracy in the Third World. (London: Routledge. Prospects for Democracy: a Study of 172 Countries. P. M. (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. Diamond. MA: Polity. Moran (eds) Democracy and Democratization. S. Diamond. M. reprint edition) [ISBN 0520072146]. The Clash of Civilizations. 2006) [ISBN 0143037498]. (ed. The Failure of Political Reform in Venezuela. Tessler (eds) Democracy and its Limits: Lessons from Asia. T. O’Neill. Sources of Social Power: Volume 2.86 Democracy and democratisation 4 Bull. UK. T. This is available via the publisher’s website. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. J. 1998) [ISBN 1859848982]. 2002. L. J. The Social Contract. (ed. IN: University of Notre Dame Press. New York: Routledge. Models of Democracy. Latin America. and the Middle East. To Craft Democracies: an Essay in Democratic Transition. 2003) [ISBN 0745627601]. Held. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2001) [ISBN 0801868424]. 1996) [ISBN 0684811642]. J. Huntington. G. Newell (eds) Corruption in Contemporary Politics. G. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 2003) [ISBN 0333802985]. and M. Lieven. (London: Penguin. S. and M. The Rise of Classes and Nation States 1760–1914. (London: Verso. (London/ Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 1984) [ISBN 0521229286]. (London: John Murray. Democracy in Latin America: Surviving Conflict and Crisis? (Cambridge. Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2000) [ISBN 0754613461].P. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Parry. 1993) [ISBN 0806125160]. G. 1999) [ISBN 0268008914]. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1997) [ISBN 0801857953]. Haynes. Buxton. and P. The Dynamics of Democratisation. Plattner (eds) The Global Divergence of Democracies. Engels The Communist Manifesto: a Modern Edition. Schmitter and L. Gill. (Cambridge. O’Donnell. Institutions. 2000) [ISBN 0333801970]. 2006) third edition [ISBN 9780804754729]. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. Marx. updated edition) [ISBN 0521466350]. 1986) [ISBN 0801826829]. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.J. L.) Vision and Method in Historical Sociology. 1993) [ISBN 0415090504]. 1990. and M. D. 2000) [ISBN 0199290008].) The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. . 1996) [ISBN 0521032881]. North. (Notre Dame. (London. D. Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Columbia and Princeton. 1999) [ISBN 0745608426]. 1995. A. Diamond. support@ london. ‘Democracy and State Bias in Latin America: Lessons from Mexico. the sessions from previous years’ Study Weekends have been recorded and made available. pp. Online study resources In addition to the subject guide and the Essential reading. pp. Online Library and your fully functional University of London email account. including the VLE and the Online Library. please email uolia. where appropriate.ac.ac. Foreign Affairs. 27(4) 1992. The VLE provides a range of resources for EMFSS courses: • Self-testing activities: Doing these allows you to test your own understanding of subject material. • Videos: There are recorded academic introductions to the subject. ‘Liberalism and Democracy’. for some courses. which was emailed to the address that you gave on your application form. it is crucial that you take advantage of the study resources that are available online for this course. seek support from your peers. • Feedback forms. Government & Opposition. Philip.londoninternational.454–69. the Online Library and your University of London email account via the Student Portal at: http://my. • A student discussion forum: This is an open space for you to discuss interests and experiences.uk You should have received your login details for the Student Portal with your official offer. Some of these resources are available for certain courses only. Venezuela and Peru’. G. • Study skills: Expert advice on preparing for examinations and developing your digital literacy skills. 6(4) 1999. The VLE The VLE. ‘The Venezuelan Coup Attempt of February 1992’. audio-visual tutorials and conclusions. Plattner. It forms an important part of your study experience with the University of London and you should access it regularly. including updated reading lists and references.Introduction Journals Philip. 77(2) 1998. you will automatically have been granted access to the VLE. • Past examination papers and Examiners’ commentaries: These provide advice on how each examination question might best be answered. has been designed to enhance your learning experience. You can access the VLE. pp. providing additional support and a sense of community. but we are expanding our provision all the time and you should check the VLE regularly for updates. Democratization. • Recorded lectures: For some courses. • Electronic study materials: The printed materials that you receive from the University of London are available to download. 5 . which complements this subject guide. If you forget your login details at any point.uk quoting your student number. M. You have probably already logged in to the Student Portal in order to register! As soon as you registered. G. interviews and debates and.74–92. work collaboratively to solve problems and discuss subject material.171–80. and Huntington (1996). These include systems defined by O’Donnell (1994) as ‘delegative democracies’ and Philip’s work on biased states (1999). It also includes systems defined by Zakaria’s (1997) work as ‘illiberal democracies’. it discusses the possibility that democracy in wealthy countries may face different prospects and problems than democracy in poor countries. who believes that democracy reflects a universal human aspiration. try removing any punctuation from the title. who is a classic modernisation theorist. To access the majority of resources via the Online Library you will either need to use your University of London Student Portal login details. the work of Linz and Stepan (1996) is discussed and. their study of democratic consolidation. It considers one case of democratic breakdown (Chile in 1973) and one case in which democracy might have broken down but did not (Venezuela in the 1990s) and tries to relate these outcomes to theories. The notion of consolidation allows us to evaluate the working of democracy according to different criteria. Chapter 4 looks at general attempts to theorise the development of democracy. please see the online help pages: www.shl. question marks and colons.external. which is mostly considered to relate to some Asian countries.86 Democracy and democratisation Making use of the Online Library The Online Library contains a huge array of journal articles and other resources to help you read widely and extensively.php Structure of the subject guide The first chapter in this subject guide seeks to explain how democracy can be defined and understood. particularly Moore (1967) and Rueschemeyer (1992). or you will be required to register and use an Athens login: http://tinyurl. It also considers economic theories that appear to argue in favour of the greater developmental efficiency of authoritarian government. It does not deal in very great detail with the internal characteristics of non-democratic systems. Chapter 3 deals with non-democratic systems and transitions to democracy. In doing so. in particular. It takes three different approaches to defining. The third part deals with a clash between Fukuyama (1992).lon. The first part deals with Lipset (1983). If you are having trouble finding an article listed in a reading list. who has written about democratisation from a similar standpoint. it does discuss how far the different internal characteristics of different kinds of nondemocracies either facilitate or impede democratic transition. 6 .uk/summon/about. and Vanhanen (1997). who is much more of a cultural relativist. The second part deals with historical sociologists who look at class-based theories of political change. However. it discusses the works of six major authors.ac. For further advice. understanding and theorising democracy and considers each in turn. Chapter 2 looks at systems that have some of the characteristics of a democracy but which contain significant shortcomings from the viewpoint of democratic purists. Chapter 5 has to do with threats and alternatives to democracy. Finally. Finally.com/ollathens The easiest way to locate relevant content and journal articles in the Online Library is to use the Summon search engine. such as single quotation marks. You can probably afford to spend at least one quarter of the examination period preparing. 7 . there is no substitute for engaging with concepts. Another way of expressing this is that we normally recommend that if you study one course over an academic year. In the Appendix. It is important not to embark on an answer until you are sure that you know what you are going to say. no matter how much you may know about detailed political arrangements. If you are familiar with your own political system. Because of this we strongly advise you to always check both the current Regulations for relevant information about the examination. even though there are some case studies mentioned in particular chapters. Reading time If you can find the readings without too many problems. It is a good idea. you need to do a minimum of seven hours of study per week. or have read about the political systems and recent history of other countries. you should be able to cover enough of the subject to be able to answer three examination questions. and the VLE where you should be advised of any forthcoming changes. Since all answers are all given equal marks. Please note that this is the absolute minimum and we would never recommend that you only prepare for the minimum number of questions required on the examination paper! If you have already taken 82 Comparative politics (although this is not a prerequisite). You should also carefully check the rubric/instructions on the paper you actually sit and follow those instructions. then you should consider this familiarity with particular cases to be an advantage. then you may need to do a little less reading. Please note that subject guides may be used for several years. The subject guide offers a summary of quite a lot of reading matter. it is important to spend virtually equal amounts of time on each question. and deals with quite a number of different topics. It will take longer if you read more slowly or with difficulty. when the examination actually begins.Introduction At the end of each chapter. then in roughly 25 full days. It is intended to raise questions rather than close off discussion by offering answers too readily. You should therefore not begin an answer until you know how you intend to conclude it. There will be a three-hour examination. However. Remember. and have no difficulty reading English. You will be expected to answer three questions out of 12. It is an introduction to the literature and not a substitute for it. you will find a Sample examination paper for further practice. it is important to check the VLE for: • up-to-date information on examination and assessment arrangements for this course • where available. past examination papers and Examiners’ commentaries for the course which give advice on how each question might best be answered. you will find a list of Learning outcomes and some Sample examination questions to help you with your revision. The examination Important: the information and advice given here are based on the examination structure used at the time this guide was written. allowing one hour per question. to spend a reasonable period of time making absolutely sure that you understand the questions and preparing your answers in outline. It also deals largely with comparative and theoretical issues. which should enable you to explore a selected set of topics with some degree of depth. 86 Democracy and democratisation Notes 8 . 1996) [ISBN 9780801851582]. re-issue edition) [ISBN 9780300049381]. Capitalism. and having completed the Essential reading and activities. Socialism and Democracy. At the end of the chapter you should be able to explain. and Post-Communist Europe.Chapter 1: Defining and conceptualising democracy Chapter 1: Defining and conceptualising democracy Aims of the chapter This chapter considers three different ways of explaining how democracy works and how it differs from other forms of government: • the first of these is that democracy has to do with voting and popular participation • the second is that democracy has to do with free. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Essential reading Dahl. 9 . J. South America. 1978) fifth edition [ISBN 9780043350324] Chapters 21 and 22. and A. Each of these approaches is set out and then criticised. you should be able to: • list. describe and compare the main theoretical approaches to understanding democracy • describe the main criticisms of each of these approaches • outline and discuss the main ethical principles that lie behind democracy as a system of government • outline the ways in which the relationship between majoritarian government and individual rights has been understood • analyse the role of activists in democratic politics • explain why the notion of contestation is crucial to our understanding of how democracy works • explain why liberal democracy is inherently a rather complex system of government. Democracy and its Critics. (London: Allen and Unwin. Stepan Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe. fair and competitive elections • the third is that democracy is essentially a system of checks and balances. R. (New Haven: Yale University Press.A. the advantages and disadvantages of all three approaches to democracy. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter. Linz. at least in outline. Schumpeter. 1991. J. Rousseau. 2003) [ISBN 052142335X] Chapters 1 and 2. Virtually every wealthy. D. and M. such as Greece in 1967. although democracies have been overthrown in quite sophisticated political societies. lasting for seven and 16 years. This transformation has given some encouragement to those who believe that democracy is the best form of government and would like to see it extended further. (Notre Dame. though certainly not unknown. Many of these questions are discussed in subsequent chapters of this subject guide. it has led to a significant increase in the number of democratic systems. (London: Penguin. the United Kingdom and Bulgaria really have much in common just because they are democracies? • Or are they still divided by more than unites them? 10 . These are essentially questions about democracy itself: • On the basis of ideas about individual freedom and human rights – does democracy have to be liberal? • How can we understand and theorise liberal democracy? • How democratic is liberal democracy? • How liberal is it? • How stable is it? How far political systems can usefully be compared just because they are democracies is also a valid question. 1994) [ISBN 0803977891]. No First World country has suffered from democratic breakdown since 1945. Chile in 1973 and Pakistan in 1999.J. 2006.86 Democracy and democratisation Further reading Beetham. 2006) [ISBN 0143037498]. Eastern Europe. It does. Introduction The post-1945 period has seen a very great extension of democratic government. c1999) [ISBN 0268008914]. however. (London: Sage. Models of Democracy. The End of History and the Last Man. reprint edition) [ISBN 0743284550]. J. 2006) third edition [ISBN 9780804754729]. however. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. D. Tessler (eds) Democracy and its limits: Lessons from Asia. Latin America. Handelman. the military governments that replaced democracy did not prove infinitely durable. industrialised country is now a democracy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A high proportion of poorer countries in Asia. H. (ed. cases of democratic breakdown. Held. we consider in general terms some of the questions that we need to ask about particular situations. Przeworski. F. IN: University of Notre Dame Press. By the same token. and the Middle East. respectively. In this chapter. For example: • Do the political systems of Bolivia. although some clearly are not. raise a number of questions. The Social Contract. Fukuyama. (Cambridge: Polity. Africa and Latin America are also democracies. A.) Defining and Measuring Democracy. have been proportionately fewer since 1945 than they were during the 1920s and 1930s. Both of these countries are now democracies once again. In the first two cases. (London: Penguin. While the downfall of Soviet Communism has not democratised the entire world. even if his views were actually rather complex and somewhat misrepresented on some occasions. as was the case in Athens. It may be difficult to describe as a democracy a system in which slavery existed and in which women did not vote. Rousseau is forever associated with the idea that a good political system allows its citizens the freedom to participate in political life. It is an important dimension of human experience that we should seek to participate in choosing the rules and the people that govern us. What many people saw as valuable about the Athenian system.Chapter 1: Defining and conceptualising democracy There are many approaches to and theories of democracy. democracy as balance. was the assembly where all full citizens were encouraged to attend. In his work. Fukuyama (1992). the idea of civic equality has lain at the heart of all significant demands for political change – even if some movements. like Communism. It is also important for our society that we should exert some important influence on the decisionmaking process in our capacity as independent-minded individuals with personal viewpoints. Since the French Revolution. participate and vote. political participation is a good thing. following the German philosopher Hegel. Ultimately. even in France it helped to create modern democratic ideology – along with the War of American Independence (the principles of which are discussed later in this chapter). Democracy as participation The first major theorist of democracy in the modern world was the eighteenth-century French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau believed that people were free only when they were actually voting to choose their leaders or actively discussing proposed legislative changes. recently put forward the view that the radical democratic ideas of the French Revolution moved the argument for political equality from the religious to the secular dimension. democracy as participation 2. and their relationship to politics is direct and explicit. Dahl (1989) specifically outlines and defends participatory democracy against a number of competing arguments. Participationists seek to replicate in the modern world the virtues of the political system invented in Athens in classical times. because it is an expression of human desire and social need for civic equality. however. Political participation is good for us. We need to consider such a viewpoint because the notion of participation must be central to our understanding of what democracy is. Central to this approach is the argument in favour of participatory democracy. The most influential present-day exponent of the ‘participationist’ view of democracy is Robert Dahl. have been mistaken and subject to perversion when in power. from this standpoint. democracy as competition 3. How far his views were understood and how far they were misrepresented by later authors presents a complex question. Although the French Revolution did not put an end to despotism. Rousseau is still a controversial figure in the history of political thought. 11 . both as individuals and as a society. can be and should be. The essential argument is psychological. but the ruling ideas that lie behind them can be summarised under three headings: 1. The notion of democracy as being about participation plus equality reached its clearest and most extreme expression during the French Revolution. Secular democratic ideas are more universal in their appeal than ideas about human equality in the sight of God. However. but it is much better for all concerned if there is a general culture of agreement. This is necessary because. or in what we have in the bank. society is in danger of dividing more and more into the rich and powerful on one side and everybody else on the other. However. Legitimacy and governability A related and more recently elaborated argument in favour of the view that the key to democratic politics is participation has to do with legitimacy and governability (Beetham. and this is more likely if they have an opportunity to make the rules themselves. 12 . We live in a complex and sophisticated world. This is mainly because most people can understand adultery. This common concern needs to be given institutional expression if it is to remain vibrant. 1991). people have to do things that they do not much like doing.86 Democracy and democratisation Civic equality means the notion that we are all capable of understanding and debating issues that concern the general good. The state is obviously able to use force to make people comply with the law. and so on. It is important to distinguish here between the conservative argument that democracy is mainly about legitimation – in other words. Unless we keep activating some formal concept of equality. Decision-makers need to have a reasonable amount of knowledge so they can make good decisions. We are not all equal at our place of work. The objection is not really about narrowly defined expertise – because all political systems need to rely on experts to some extent – it is rather that the democratic need to express political arguments in ways that will influence ordinary people lowers the level of public debate. such as paying taxes. Voting and (in some countries) jury service are very important here. We would not go to a gardener to be operated on if a doctor of medicine was available instead. obeying the speed limit for driving cars. what unites us is (or should be) a common concern for the general good. in any successful society. It could be argued that the effect of too much popular participation is that democratic political systems pay too much attention to presidential adultery and not enough to foreign policy. so the argument goes. Apathy This reason for criticising participationist theories relates to differential knowledge. but only a few understand foreign policy. We might ask ourselves whether we want to live in a world in which a porter or a gardener has as much influence on political outcomes as a diplomat or a scientist. Both viewpoints conclude that participation is a kind of public good. about giving the appearance of self-government to people so that they obey authority more willingly – and the radical argument that democracy allows popular notions of morality to discipline the rulers. Critics of the participationist theory of democracy Participationist arguments for democracy have been criticised on three main grounds: • apathy • intolerance • logistics. The current phrase used in the UK to express this is ‘dumbing down’. This is much more likely when people are able to challenge and possibly change the law through appropriate participatory channels. People will accept authority more easily if they see it as rightful. The problem here. then misplaced emphasis of this kind can make it very dangerous. just as members of legislative assemblies are expected to. overall. Some may find it interesting and enjoyable to do this. Party machines sometimes play an active part in persuading people to go to polling stations. people need to have not only the ability but also the inclination to learn. such as Schumpeter. Critics. largely because they were not sufficiently focused on the main threat. then it is statistically inconceivable that the way in which you or I might vote will make any difference to the outcome. however. Majority participation in most democracies is limited to voting in national elections. However. and there need be no problem with democratic states having professional bodies of experts to give detailed expression to the democratic will. A voter may be a family man with a job or a working mother with a young family who does not want to spend time mastering the complex details of. Most people vote because they want to make some kind of statement of principle or to participate in what is seen as a social process of some significance. economic policy in order to decide how to cast a vote. Neither is necessarily a good idea. All that might be needed for effective popular participation is a willingness to understand the main issues and relate them to general principles. but ordinary people may not want to learn the details of every public policy. the democracies made a very poor job of standing up to Hitler. A supporter of participation could try to counter this argument by saying that a lot of general knowledge – albeit not the most detailed and specialist knowledge – could be acquired by interested voters. and perhaps even at local elections. In order to acquire knowledge. but still do not know much about policy issues (Schumpeter. Voting in general elections. for example. All kinds of government have to rely on specialist advisers. General legislative bodies do not need to set interest rates or draft precise legislation. This is not true of very specialised knowledge. can be seen as a kind of civic ritual. this observation does not get rid of the problem. although turnout in local elections is at very low levels and non-voting has increased alarmingly in the USA and the UK. explains why people should learn about policy issues in detail. however. In fact the ‘why bother?’ argument becomes much stronger in the context of active or informed participation on policy issues. say that. is that the nature of the democratic process ensures that nonexpert individuals can have only the most minimal impact on the choice of government. 13 . but monarchies and aristocracies do not have this either. most people do vote at major national elections when given the chance. If 20 million people vote at the next election. just about every other form of active participation is limited to minorities. So why bother to vote at all? In many present-day democracies. A voter’s time is not free. though.Chapter 1: Defining and conceptualising democracy If the world is indeed a dangerous place. 1978). Media coverage of election campaigns is very high and also helps to bring out the vote. most people either do not participate much in politics and do not know much about policy issues (by the standards of a professional politician at least) or else they do participate in politics. The only realistic incentive that a democracy can give to people to learn about policy is a chance to change it. for example. In Europe in the 1930s. None of this. The theoretical idea that voters may not want to involve themselves in mastering the details of complex issues is reinforced by empirical findings. The problem here is that participation involves more than deciding and voting. beneficial for democracy. All citizens would have to have the corresponding duty to listen to all others: if this were too drastic a rule. deliberating and debating. often argued reluctantly by people who generally sympathise with the idea of greater participation. and it is reasonable to suppose that this one per cent would soon cease to command the full attention of the other 99 per cent. Most of us accept that people have individual rights that should not be violated by pure majoritarianism. Minority rights can be violated by an excessive emphasis on majority rights. Popular participation is not the same as mob rule. Even so. they have been misled rather than corrupted. but they do put limits on what can be expressed or decided democratically. for people to be able to present arguments to other people in the hope of making them listen. they were encouraged by antidemocratic or politically manipulative elites. once a year. Logistics A third problem with participation. Majority opinion does not necessarily reflect respect for personal freedom or a respect for individual rights. on any subject. there has been less mob rule in reality than may have appeared in theory. 14 .86 Democracy and democratisation Intolerance A second argument against democracy as participation is that it gives too much attention to what majorities think and not enough to individual or minority rights. and critics do not necessarily accept that one will lead to the other. Suppose that every adult citizen had the right to address his or her fellow citizens for two minutes only. however. However. but some authors have expressed the fear that one might lead to the other. most democratic systems in the First World try to protect minority and individual rights through some kind of constitutional provision. The rights of neighbours and foreigners should be considered – most of us understand why it would be undesirable for the popular majority of a large and powerful country to vote to go out and conquer a smaller and less powerful neighbour.800 citizens would get to speak. For this reason. Usually. then only around one per cent of the population would be able to enjoy their two-minute speech. It should also involve listening. It is impossibly difficult in a large community. They do not prevent or limit the amount of popular participation. on the whole. The media – even the correspondence columns of newspapers – have space for only a tiny amount of possible communications. when crowds or popular masses have put on a show of intolerance. allowing no breaks for eating. If this went on for an entire year. Majorities have discriminated against minorities on the grounds of religion or ethnic background. most people in the democratic world live in countries whose electorates are well over 20 million. Such provisions are generally accepted to be. an alliance of irresponsible or antidemocratic elites and manipulable masses can be very damaging. So even if this drastic experiment in participation were possible. 30 citizens could speak every hour and 720 every day. is practicality. Dahl (1989) makes the point very clearly. even though he is a completely different person. sleeping or anything else. then 262. then there could be at least one television channel given over purely to individual speech-making. There is a memorable scene in Shakespeare’s play Julius Caesar when the mob kills a poet called Cinna because he has the same name as a conspirator. At that rate. As Rousseau would have put it. In historical fact. Opponents see them as giving too much power to possibly ignorant people. the direct effect of democratic participation is mediated by the fact that there are legal and representative aspects to democracy as well. A genuine difference in emphasis as to how much weight to give to referendums as instruments of policy exists between different democratic political systems. although the historical importance of participationist ideas and arguments should not be ignored. only a minority want the state to prevent abortion by law. A generation later. of course. Participatory democracy. some states of the USA occasionally and the UK hardly at all. there are many reasons why an uninhibited form of direct democracy would not be feasible and might not be desirable.Chapter 1: Defining and conceptualising democracy Referendums as expression of the need to participate Realistically. computer technology means that popular voting has never been easier to organise from a purely technical point of view and there have been arguments that referendums should be used more often to take advantage of this fact. Participants – like jurors in a courtroom – should listen and perhaps ask questions: they should inform themselves of the main issues and then make a decision. because many women will refuse to vote for a candidate who openly opposes abortion. Much the same was true in the USA. was originally intended to mean more than voting. although universal suffrage is. Today. it is evident that strong arguments are in favour of (and against) each type of system. feasible. however. Opponents of referendums also fear that too much direct voting can make it easy for opponents of change to block desirable innovations. public opinion has accepted such changes. In fact. the Irish people once voted by referendum to prevent any change in their divorce laws and only narrowly reversed this decision in 1995. however. In practice. Supporters of referendums see them as an important antidote to the inevitable elitism of professional politicians and organised interests. Since different countries have adopted different attitudes to referendums. with one’s mind made up by a slogan or a reflex. Overall. It has been widely observed that public opinion tends to be rather conservative (in the sense of disliking change) and systems for referendums have been more effective in blocking change than promoting it. the opposite had become true. even when this has been unpopular. In the late 1960s. The Swiss have remained outside the European Union and have played little part in foreign affairs: they also gave women the vote much later than most other countries. the California electorate has at times voted to restrict public spending according to a formula (proposition 13) and to make life far tougher for undocumented migrants from abroad (proposition 187). For example. is a much poorer form of participation. In the USA. these are ‘right-wing’ decisions. Broadly speaking. The abortion issue is very delicate for conservative Americans. although the actual decision was made by the Supreme Court rather than the legislature. 15 . To vote in semi-ignorance. For example. when abortion was legalised in the UK in the 1960s. Switzerland uses them frequently. it was clear that Parliament was voting for a change that was not supported by most people. later on. the existence of societies with very large numbers of people makes full-scale participatory democracy impossible. There have often been cases where legislative majorities have introduced change. conservative Americans (who opposed abortion) hoped that the issue would prove seriously damaging to liberal Americans (who supported the legalisation allowing abortion). However. Nor. although democracy was important. is that Schumpeter could find a strong defence of democracy even though he started from so negative a position. Schumpeter also argued that. For many ambitious elite figures. many people who today prefer democracy do so because of a belief in freedom and the rights of the individual. The most famous exponent of this argument was the Austrian political philosopher and economist Joseph Schumpeter (1978). His main argument is that elections discipline elites. What is interesting. Whether a political system is democratic is not at all the same question of whether we like it. such as their livelihoods and their families. Schumpeter believed. argued Schumpeter. it was not the only public good.86 Democracy and democratisation Activity List the different ways in which Robert Dahl (1989) defends his theory of democracy against its critics. because they believe that democracy is the best means of securing freedom and rights. Under extreme political circumstances. many people during the past century – including intellectuals – have at times supported antidemocratic parties or movements such as fascism and communism. that democracy should not be theorised in too idealistic a way. people would be more likely to be guided by an innate sense of right and wrong than by any doctrine of the democratic mandate. Anybody who wants to be head of government must first win an election. His view of the characteristics of ordinary people is much more pessimistic than that of Rousseau or Dahl. however. Power is less likely to corrupt people who have only a limited tenure on it. They are pro-democracy. For example. Such arguments are pessimistic. they mainly participate in politics by expressing attitudes rather than reflecting quietly on issues. Democracy as competition Another important theoretical approach to democracy defines it by the existence of free and fair elections and electoral competition. they might change their minds about democracy itself. Even quite intelligent people are capable of casting their votes without much thought to the consequences. Criticisms of Schumpeter Schumpeter’s arguments have been criticised as being too negative and restrictive on a number of grounds: • the role of activists • democracy and law • democracy and collective interest. Because few people believe that their vote does make a real difference. Schumpeter believed that it was wrong to idealise either democracy or the folk wisdom of the people. people either supported or opposed Hitler on moral grounds: a few people who opposed him nevertheless believed that he should be supported because he was democratically elected. 16 . If they were persuaded otherwise. At the opposite extreme. In order to win the game. the pursuit of power is actually a bit of a game. Schumpeter was writing a few years after the German electorate had voted in sufficient numbers to allow Adolf Hitler to take power. People devote their main care. therefore. attention and skill to areas of their life where it would make a real difference. though. a party leader cannot afford to be too arrogant because he or she might well lose the next election. Furthermore. a democratic leader must appeal to ordinary people. of course. should democracy be based on an overly optimistic view of people’s wisdom. argued Schumpeter. Activists are people – not generally personally ambitious – who wish to use democratic action to bring about (or sometimes prevent) change. Furthermore. Activists involved in interest group activity are not usually the very poor. children or even animals. trade unions). If we only have elites competing for the vote and voters acting in semiignorance. An additional problem is the way in which activist politics tends to turn itself into just another form of political organisation. One only has to compare the state of the physical environments in the former Soviet Union – where this kind of activism was ruthlessly suppressed – with that of Western Europe – where environmentalist groups have been very active for years – for the point to be very clear. it was argued. Business and labour interest groups are entirely legitimate. For some (though by no means all) salaried officials. as a nuisance. often initiates the slow process of changing the way in which non-activists think about particular issues. plural groups create an additional dimension to political life that is valuable and positive. like parties. Conservative critics see activists as misguided and. Pluralism was an important strand in post-1945 US political science. In today’s wealthy democracies. however. though. they are often supporters of environmental causes and sometimes of the rights of minorities. Activism. we lose an important aspect of democracy – the ability of people who do not want to be professional politicians to take some active interest in how they are governed and to bring issues to the attention of the public as a whole. In fact. democratic politics is much more than party politics. At times. Pluralists such as Dahl (1989) have generally been less interested in political parties than in organised groups. Interest groups. some interest group activity has more to do with helping a selected group make extra money than with seeking a better world. Amnesty International) and those that represent them at their place of work (e.Chapter 1: Defining and conceptualising democracy The role of activists It may be true that not everybody who participates in politics does so intelligently. business interests often operate even under authoritarian governments. including voluntary organisations that people join in order to express a view (e. subsequent scholarship has shown some of these pluralist arguments to be somewhat optimistic. The politics of organised groups. may quickly acquire a salaried bureaucracy. Furthermore. which may come to see itself as simply doing an ordinary job. They tend to be from a relatively well-educated minority of the population and are often quite unrepresentative of the population as a whole. but one cannot really see them as deepening democracy. Early pluralist scholars argued that anybody could be an activist and that organised group politics were a way of extending the effectiveness of democracy. In general. interest group politics are just another means of earning a living. Unfortunately.g. 17 . that is true – they are motivated by impractical ideas and support experimental changes that do not work well. could bring ordinary people into contact with governmental decision-making on a day-to-day basis. to some extent reacting against the view that democracy is essentially an auction for votes. It was not the case that citizen participation was restricted to one vote every four or five years.g. but intelligent participation is the hallmark of a democracy. not infrequently. There can be no doubt that such people have succeeded in changing the political agenda in a variety of ways. Little competition for votes exists across religious boundaries. or Ulster Unionist. the rule of law can discipline some of the excesses of political competition. Of course. although there is some. democratic leaders have to appeal to people who think of themselves as members of collectives. valuable as a corrective. It is surprising that Schumpeter. Some of his scepticism about the intelligence commonly shown by the general public is. many people define their participation in public life in terms of a collectively formed identity – such as social class. Of course. at least. for example. no legal system is necessarily proof against a really determined despot. However. The existence of intermediate groups prevents society from polarising between the leaders and the led. there are ‘loyalist’ voters who have always voted Labour. it may be objected that loyalist votes do not determine electoral outcomes. and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein have been mainly Catholic. Nevertheless. Overall. religious belief or regional origin. however. his theory of democracy as competition oversimplifies and limits too much. who was a very strong supporter of capitalism and the US way of life. Activity List the criticisms that Schumpeter makes of what he calls the classical theory of democracy. 18 . the number of genuine activists – although relatively small in terms of society as a whole – is much greater than the number of professional politicians or people in public office. For example. in Northern Ireland. Democratic systems somehow still have to be made to work in societies where competition is blocked by strongly held collective identities. the Ulster Unionist Party has. Republican. Democracy and law Liberals would be critical of Schumpeter on another point – that it may be possible to restrict the effect of any excesses and injustices caused by mistaken popular decisions by putting some constitutional and judicial restrictions on democratic politics. but swing votes do. Schumpeter starts from the notion that people participate in the political process as individuals. for many years. It is their activism itself that makes them atypical. tend to see activists as forming a counter-elite rather than a representative body of the citizenry. Christian Democrat. been mainly Protestant. identified more with a conservative than pluralist viewpoint. in political cultures in which the legal process is generally respected. because they are determined by the political alternation necessary for democracy to work. Nevertheless. Some people do change their preferences between parties on the basis of promises made to themselves as individuals or as a result of dissatisfaction with the performance of incumbents. Democracy and collective interest Like many free-market economists. did not give this point more attention.86 Democracy and democratisation Some scholars. Schumpeter is right to point to electoral competition as an essential and valuable part of the democratic process. because such a despot can simply refuse to enforce the law. Yet in the real world. However. Burke’s argument attempts to reconcile representative government with the autonomy of the political class. The US Constitution was based on a rather similar idea. whereas Burke. Political institutions should therefore be devised both to express and to limit the popular will. although popular dictatorship was itself a threatening but possible form of government. normally ascribed to James Madison. His point is that elected representatives do not exist to do exactly what the voters want them to do. to manage difficulties effectively as may arise. They exist to provide knowledge and good judgment as well as to reflect any popular preference. Although Burke was by no means a democrat. his thinking has influenced the way in which one school of thought looks at democracy. if this is not possible. The task of a successful democracy is to make these coherent or.Chapter 1: Defining and conceptualising democracy Democracy as balance I would hazard the view that most political scientists today would define democracy mainly as a system of balances. the important difference between British and US thinking at that time is that. voting should be channelled through a complex set of institutions: • strong local government • separate legislative assemblies • separate elections for a president • a written constitution • powerful courts. To avoid any overpowering effect. It is not the job of a representative political system to give people what they want. Britain and the USA. much more emphasis was put on limiting the power of the state. in different ways. • The other is the US notion. 19 . eventually emerged as the foremost English critic of the French Revolution. The essential point is that democracy is generally a rather complex system that seeks to strike a set of balances between different sets of principles. Theories of constitutional balance were developed. but to make decisions based on striking a reasonable balance between what is popular. some to competition. in the case of the USA. originally a supporter of the American Revolution. Popular participation was desirable in so far as it made it harder for the state to exercise despotic power. in eighteenth-century France. what is morally desirable and what works in practice. Two particular ideas are of interest here: • The first is the notion of the English eighteenth-century philosopher Edmund Burke that a system of government based on elections should be representative. that different aspects of a democratic political system should provide checks and balances. Government was seen as a necessary evil. They would give some weight to participation. However. and some to the expression of collective aspirations within an overall context where individual rights are protected via the legal process. Madison is regarded as the key intellectual force behind the doctrines expressed in the US Constitution. 86 Democracy and democratisation For a system of checks and balances to work. an English politician and military leader. In England and France. Where this does not reliably happen. Finding themselves short of money. As part of the normal political process. Moreover. to organise a parliament in the later thirteenth century. The monarchical state was defeated in England in the 1640s. This desire met resistance in a number of ways. the monarchy was eventually restored (although in France it was subsequently re-abolished). they sought to impose taxation. on rare but decisive occasions. it is clear that the defeat of the principle of absolutism in the most economically advanced and most powerful countries of the world represented a victory for propertied interests. which are discussed in the next chapter. It is not easy to trace a clear line from medieval institutions such as Magna Carta in England and the early development of Parliament to the dramatic constitutional changes that took place in England. Although those in control of other parts of the state may be capable of preventing this. This subject guide does not have the space to give a detailed discussion of constitutional change in these countries since then. the USA and France between 1642 and 1815. but it needed money. In England in medieval times. in the USA in the 1780s and in France at the beginning of the 1790s. • Civil society was unwilling to pay taxes. This is not to say that the propertied interests that played a vital part in this transformation were wholly and unambiguously in favour of democracy (they were not). This view can be seen as expressing an antithesis between economic and political power. but the absolutist state was not. it is necessary for the institutional system to be popularly supported – in other words. where necessary. However. we may find ourselves dealing with imperfect forms of democracy. but rather that independently held property provided a base of social power. Prerequisites for balance: the defeat of absolutism It is important to note that much eighteenth-century thinking in the English-speaking world (following the example of John Locke a century earlier) was based on the notion that government needed to be limited and. • Eventually bargaining broke down and armed conflict resulted. opposed. The USA went further in the direction of democracy by abolishing the monarchy altogether and replacing it with a presidency. those who control one branch of government (or one part of the state) may be tempted to exceed their authority. • Parliament offered some scope for bargaining between civil society and the crown. However. challenge the authority of the state and initiate 20 . the task of maintaining the system becomes much easier if public opinion remains steadfastly in favour of the constitutional process. This could. the sources of tension between property and political power were rather similar: • The crown asserted its right to power. It was almost universally accepted in the eighteenth century that property conferred rights. these conflicts led to deliberate efforts to contain royal power through the signing of Magna Carta in 1215 and the effort of Simon de Montfort. property owners – whether merchants or nobility – wanted to protect what they had from the Crown. The monarchs themselves tended to engage in wars and inevitably found this to be an expensive pursuit. legitimate. The point still relevant today is that the issue of property versus taxation led to some very sophisticated thinking about political organisation and to the development of what are still some dominant intellectual ideas about how a political system should work. theories that premise democratic politics on the role of the individual rather than the collective. and the idea of democracy as a system of checks and balances was rather superseded in the mid-twentieth century. but it did come closer to describing how democracy worked in the mid-twentieth century in some European countries. income and property taxes would be reduced. Political parties would play the role of encouraging activists and attracting ordinary people into politics. if the right-wing parties won. the point of democracy is as much to limit state power and protect citizens against the abuse of government as it is to express the view of majorities or transform society. have come back into fashion. and on problem-solving rather than general political doctrines. for example. There are therefore. the past 50 years has seen a decline in religious observance in most industrialised countries and also a significant class dealignment. What makes a political society healthy or otherwise is whether individual citizens are content with the working of their public institutions. If the left-wing parties won. Surveys show that voters in industrialised countries have become more suspicious of government in the past 50 years and that people are less collectively minded and more interested in personal freedom. fewer politically motivated Catholics. so the argument went. but the essential model. 21 . 26).) The doctrine of the democratic mandate never came close to describing the conduct of politics in the USA. who are likely to vote for religious parties. Labour or Social Democratic parties tended to compete with Conservative or religious parties.Chapter 1: Defining and conceptualising democracy far-reaching political change. they would increase taxes on high incomes and property. The influence of this kind of thinking can be seen in major recent works by political scientists. For these reasons. These would represent their supporters in parliament and would legislate according to the desires of their supporters. left collectivist doctrines of democracy vulnerable to the accusation that they had no good way of limiting the possible abuse of power by elected governments. Checks and balances versus the doctrine of the democratic mandate Fashions change in political science. A range of other issues always complicated the actual process. certain kinds of political ideology and one or more political parties. irrespective of what they do. according to which parties reflected defined social interests. would use their vote to support the political party (or parties) of their choice. by the doctrine of the democratic mandate. democracy was essentially a means of empowering government to change society in accordance with the wishes of the majority. largely seemed to operate. From this viewpoint. as they do everywhere else. This majority. and fewer manual labourers with an obvious affinity for working-class politics. however. Furthermore. The end of the Cold War and the damage done to the credibility of socialist doctrines by the collapse of the of Soviet Union also led people to doubt that the best form of politics involved a clash between the advocates of rival ‘big ideas’ about politics. in Europe if not elsewhere. (There is a significant overlap between this idea and the pluralist idea of activist participation. The absence of a role for checks and balances in this kind of political game. such as Przeworski (1991. Class interests or political ideas would establish a natural affinity between certain kinds of voter. According to this. there is now almost universal agreement that democracy needs a strong constitutional system with powerful courts. One reason for the current ascendancy of ideas about democracy as balance has to do with the longevity of the US system and the considerable contemporary prestige of the USA. because the absence of any one of them makes us vulnerable to some form of bad government. participants in politics face lower costs or greater benefits by complying with the procedures of democratic process than by breaking them. Because of popular attachment to the system. For this to be possible. It is not at all true of most other countries that are now democracies. however. Some of the ideas of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment have been abandoned. The people are subject to both law and the ultimate authors of the law-making power. for example: • The fact that democracy is unavoidably complex. People today do not generally believe (as the authors of the US Constitution did) that we have inalienable ‘natural rights’ given to us by God. There is. where parliamentarianism did not severely limit the role of the monarchy until after the 1832 Great Reform Act. A good question is how far the US model can usefully be adapted to other democratic systems. however. For many observers. We believe instead that we have to work at creating and protecting our rights and that if this is not done then our political system will fail. too much else going on. Although the theory of democracy as involving a complex balance of different aspects is probably accepted by the majority of political scientists. more emphasis was put on holding free and fair elections. This may not matter to a well-educated and sophisticated elector. otherwise those in charge of such institutions may gain from behaving undemocratically and may be tempted to do so. an aggrieved individual is at least as likely to visit a lawyer as a parliamentary representative. These include. will not see much relationship between how they vote and what they get. Many people. Although many political scientists are wary of the US idea that the executive and legislative bodies should be elected separately. Less sophisticated 22 . just underway in Latin America and possibly just beginning in eastern Europe. when democratic transition was more or less complete in southern Europe. Democratically elected leaders are capable of acting very undemocratically at times. In many wealthy countries today. This is not really true in the UK. The complexity of democracy In the mid-1980s. however. democratic institutions need real popular backing. We need all of these things. Democracy is now seen as the embodiment of a set of principles including: • individual freedom • human rights • non-discrimination on the ground of religion. is still considered to be essential for a good political system. it also has weaknesses. inevitably. ethnicity or gender • opportunities for participation • an element of electoral competition. Now there is a general view that free-and-fair elections are not enough. The US political system is still recognisably the same that existed in 1800. The protection of rights.86 Democracy and democratisation Przeworski argues that democracy is in equilibrium when ‘all the relevant political forces find it best to continue to submit their interests and values’ to the uncertainties inherent in the democratic system. the important thing was to get elections held and then a country could be considered a democracy. or fatalistic. For much of the twentieth century. Democracy and capitalism It may be. 23 . It is widely accepted (perhaps more in Europe than in the USA) that very great disparities of wealth are potentially threatening to democracy as well as being socially undesirable and perhaps morally wrong. but concerns have been expressed. In most First World countries the press is constantly full of details about government policy failures in transport. however. First World countries. generations of socialist or social democratic politicians have sought to use democracy to turn the state into a materially equalising institution. Electoral turnout has tended to fall in recent years in both the USA and the UK. some politicians have tried to find ways of reinvigorating the political process. In other words. • Multiple criteria can make definitions of democracy very demanding. but today’s democrats do.Chapter 1: Defining and conceptualising democracy people may be ‘turned off’ politics altogether by the complex nature of the democratic process. if private ownership of property and capitalist relations of production have the effect of maintaining and even increasing inequality? Most eighteenth-century thinkers did not care very much about the genuine poor. and with the notion that state power is generally part of the problem rather than part of the solution. The result may be to create a more apathetic. left-wingers hoped. and conservatives feared. This certainly fits the spirit of the times. • The US version of democracy tends to be biased against strong government and (at least by implication) sympathetic to the role of markets. might create opportunities for populist politicians. This may not be a bad thing in wealthy. the idea was that the less-privileged majority in any society would use the powers of universal suffrage to elect redistributionist parties. It follows that the relationship between democracy and equality – like that between democracy and property – has become complex and problematic. as long as its underlying bias is recognised and the assumptions on which it is based continue to be accepted. The best may become an enemy to the good. It is too early to be sure that this is happening. This. What happens. education and so on. possibly by strengthening local government. As we saw earlier. however. It may not be so helpful. The idea – very widespread in the 1940s – that government could be used as an active instrument to achieve valuable social purposes has lost a lot of credibility. that the relationship between capitalism and democracy will turn out to be more problematic than eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers originally supposed. democracy was originally intended to give expression to notions of civic equality. As a result. Certainly the idea of democracy as balance is very congruent with the idea of limited government. in evaluating emerging democracies. that democracy would foment equality and reduce differentials based upon unequal incomes and ownership of property. It is understood that people will seek their main satisfactions in private life and that the economy works best if it is run essentially privately. We live in an age that is rather sceptical about the role of government. where constant thought needs to be given to how to upgrade the quality of the political process. For these reasons. where the holding of free-and-fair elections on a consistent basis may seem to be an achievement in itself. however. in turn. This approach is not problematic. agriculture. culture among the population at large. The general international trend in the past generation has been to emphasise individual rights in our understanding of democracy and de-emphasise (to some extent) participation. the abandonment of the idea that a strong.’ Discuss. if genuine economic or political crises developed.’ Discuss. ‘The notion of liberal democracy is inherently contradictory. is nothing like as good at getting anything done. ‘A democracy is a country that chooses its leaders through election. This is at least partly because a very balanced and sophisticated democratic system. you should be able to: • list. describe and compare the main theoretical approaches to understanding democracy • describe the main criticisms of each of these approaches • outline and discuss the main ethical principles that lie behind democracy as a system of government • outline the ways in which the relationship between majoritarian government and individual rights has been understood • analyse the role of activists in democratic politics • explain why the notion of contestation is crucial to our understanding of how democracy works • explain why liberal democracy is inherently a rather complex system of government. have to satisfy a whole series of conditions before they can truly be regarded as democracies. central government can resolve pressing social problems ensures that democracy offers at best only limited opportunities for redressing the inequalities of the marketplace. however. Conclusion Democracy is a complex system that is understood in ways that are increasingly demanding. Countries. we would have to think again about what we wanted from our democratic system. However. does contemporary. That is why democracy should make frequent use of referendums. Overall. 3.’ Discuss. so that political scientists are not able to define it purely as they please. ‘A system is more democratic if people can vote more often on issues which concern them. Moreover. 2. although good at preventing undesirable things from happening. Whether this will be the case in the future remains to be seen.86 Democracy and democratisation It did not turn out like this. Sample examination questions 1. or at least to point out inconsistencies when they occur. What they can do is to try to make our understanding coherent. To what extent. 4. the definition of democracy as embodying a balance of principles reflects the way in which most of us think of democracy. This is not a problem for people who believe that they can mostly organise their lives satisfactorily with only minimal help from the state. First World democracy allow ordinary voters to exert control over what their government does? 24 . Democracy is a word that has to be understood by ordinary people and also by practising politicians. A reminder of your learning outcomes By the end of this chapter and the relevant reading. if any. 2003) [ISBN 052142335X] Chapters 1 and 2. D. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Democracy in Latin America: Surviving Conflict and Crisis? (Cambridge. Available online at www. MA: Polity. ‘Delegative Democracy’. North.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/ WPS/172. pp.22–43. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. and A. you should have a good understanding of how political scientists have tried to conceptualise these different forms of semi-democracy and what their main characteristics are. J. It considers several variants of systems that do not fit easily into either category. Foreign Affairs 76(6) 1997. These include façade democracy. It then discusses the notion of democratic consolidation as a way of distinguishing semi-democracies from countries that are fully democratic. You should be able to: • identify and discuss when it is most difficult for elected political leaders to control the military • explain when democracy is most at risk from within the state itself • outline what illiberal democracy is • outline what delegative democracy is • explain what happens when a democratic state is biased in favour of incumbents • analyse the advantages and disadvantages of using a demanding standard of democratic consolidation. Przeworski. ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’. G. Learning outcomes By the end of the chapter and the associated reading. illiberal democracy and delegative democracy.) Towards Sustainable Democracy in the Third World. and Post-Communist Europe. J. G.Chapter 2: Democracy and the state Chapter 2: Democracy and the state Aims of the chapter This chapter looks at systems that are democratic in some ways and not democratic in others. Journal of Democracy 5(1) 1994. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 25 . pp. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Malden. Philip. Further reading Books Haynes. (London/ Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.pdf Zakaria. Institutions. Institutional Change and Economic Performance. UK. South America. A. Essential reading Books Linz. Journals O’Donnell. 1996) [ISBN 9780801851582]. (ed. F. Stepan Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe.55 69. 2003) [ISBN 0745627601]. 1992) [ISBN 0521394163].nd. 2001) [ISBN 0333802500]. state bias. or democracies that are imperfect in some ways but effective in others. The courts. Plattner.86 Democracy and democratisation Journals Philip. as we understand it. in turn. Some early political philosophers would not have recognised it as democracy at all.74–92. act as though they are above the law and may resort to illegal methods of media manipulation or campaign financing at election time. 3. Linz and Stepan (1996) and other authors such as Przeworski (1991) have introduced into the literature a broad notion of ‘democratic consolidation’. police. 1997). a problem exists with the internal logic of illiberal democracy. which need to be narrowed down somewhat. They are. the police and the judiciary – does fairly much as it sees fit. etc. We have already noted that the notion of human rights seems essential to our understanding of democracy today. Is there a dividing line that enables us to say that ‘A’ is a democracy but ‘B’ is not? More importantly still. 1. Introduction The previous chapter established that democracy. Illiberal democracies. In addition to this. but in which there are still serious problems in achieving all of the things we generally want from democracy. M. in which votes are honestly counted and individual freedoms mainly respected. We will look at the issue of democratic consolidation later in the chapter.171–80. Some overlap exists between illiberal and delegative democracy. in that both are likely to involve the abuse of rights by the forces of the state. in that illiberal systems can deny essential rights to opposition politicians and thereby limit democratic participation and competition. however. This is normally known as limited democracy. Delegative democracies. There is a difference of degree. is a fairly complex form of government. are subject to the will of powerful politicians. pp. 4. This can be used to separate systems in which elections are held but in which the democratic process is flawed from those that are democratic in the fullest sense. These. Democratization 6(4) 1999. ‘Democracy and State Bias in Latin America: lessons from Mexico. in which the government responds only to public opinion and neglects pluralist arrangements and institutions (O’Donnell. however: delegative democracy is more likely to be a response to crisis and something that is inherently transitional. Venezuela and Peru’. Moreover. 1999). This issue is especially relevant when we look at new democracies. Foreign Affairs 77(2) 1998. Limited democracies. in which elections are held freely but the government does not fully control the state.’ 2. is there a good way to understand and conceptualise a system that has some of the characteristics of democracy but not others? These are open-ended questions to which no definitive answer can be given. 1994). but where there is little respect for individual rights (Zakaria. Biased states. This chapter looks at some cases in which the minimum conditions of democracy have probably been met. but where the elected government tends to use the state for partisan advantage (Philip. pp. Non-consolidated democracy can refer to a wide range of situations. questions that can usefully be explored further. we look at four specific but different kinds of situation. The state – by which is meant principally the army. the 26 . but at the extreme its critics could regard it as ‘façade democracy. G. in which the government and state control each other and where effective government is possible. ‘Liberalism and Democracy’. In this chapter. that winning elections was one thing and governing quite another. was famous as an orator. people will be likely to see democracy as a meaningless game. There are several reasons why this is so: 1. His personal motto was ‘give me a balcony and I will govern’. In policy terms. to his cost. We will now look at each of category in turn. but it is not clear that we can regard a country as democratic merely because it is not currently run in an authoritarian way. For example. and the real power is in the hands of a dominant party or the military or an individual dictator. Example: South America Between 1945 and 1976 (or thereabouts). So-called democracies with powerless democratic leaders will have a problem of legitimation. because it cannot expect to survive the consequences of opposition from non-democrats. Non-democratic forces. democracy is no more than a façade. He won five presidential elections and was unable to complete a single term: the military always stepped in and overthrew him before the end. We call this an ‘anticipated reactions’ problem. It is. because most countries had military interventions and long periods of military dictatorship as well. however. In such cases. For example. but it does not go very far. If anybody dissatisfied with an election result or government can just call in the military. Democracy can only take hold in a society if it is taken seriously as a means of deciding who governs.Chapter 2: Democracy and the state abuse of rights under delegative systems is more likely to be the result of personalist arbitrariness than systematic state policy. the Ecuadorian politician. 4. Could South America be regarded as fully democratic? The answer is ‘not exactly’. A democratically elected government will not do certain things. The distinctions drawn in the literature between different forms of semidemocracy are possibly a little bit neater than real-life situations. however. We do. Limited and façade democracy Some political systems may appear superficially to be democratic without being democratic at all. 2. possibly including the military and the police. 3. and the literature sometimes overlaps categories. this creates a situation in which measures that might help with long-term democratic stabilisation are inhibited by the short-term needs of political survival. however. It is quite reasonable to treat authoritarian rule as nondemocratic. South America had many elected civilian governments. One might consider the outcome as being the ‘personalisation’ of the state. He found. It may be better to regard such systems as nondemocracies and to analyse them as authoritarian systems. need to be concerned with systems in which there is a genuine democratic element. Velasco Ibarra. will control ‘enclaves’ of society and will not be accountable for their actions via democratic means. but in which this is not strong enough for a country to be considered fully democratic. Could we say that these countries were democratic at some points and authoritarian at others? This may be true as far as it goes. it was sometimes politically impossible for elected governments to use the legal process against their authoritarian predecessors for corruption or the abuse 27 . a good idea to keep them apart for the purposes of clear discussion. however. Democracy and the state Moving from specific examples to consideration of more general points. serious insurgency or terrorism. There are ways in which the elected government should not control the state (for example. Democratic systems require a balanced relation between the democratic and non-democratic parts of the state. elected government still needs to be subject to the constraints of the law. the police. it should not be able to win exemption from prosecution for corruption). led conservatives to claim that the government was failing to uphold the law and to invite the military to step in. or else it may be able to place itself above the law. One of the reasons why the parliamentary republic in Weimar Germany failed to prevent the rise of Hitler in 1933 had to do with the lack of sympathy with democratic values on the part of the German state elite – judges. but also agreement and cooperation. but it did not help that the courts. or else it accepts certain restraints on its conduct of conflict. It is evident that the elected government must be able to govern. Situations do sometimes arise in which what we might call the permanent state – officials.86 Democracy and democratisation of power. In the end. It is often the case. but normally this is likely to be manageable. A lack of trust in the existing state induced some militant supporters of the government to bypass the constitution and to engage directly in property seizures and harassment of opponents. Either the state fights its enemies in an indiscriminate way. and Hitler served only a few months in prison in 1923. It needs to involve elements of command. The problem of securing a good relationship between the government and the state cannot just be a matter of command and control. Such a situation will always generate a certain amount of tension. we can see that limited democracy exists when the elected government does not control the state. however. Tensions within the state are especially likely to arise under conditions of war. Obviously. The realisation that senior ranks of the military were often above the law made it even harder for civilians to govern in the long run. judges and security forces – is out of favour with the elected government. Restrained warfare can be a tenable option if the aim is to bring the adversary into a negotiating situation. 28 . The problems that arise can also be more serious. in turn.) Democratic systems vary according to which positions are subject to election and which are not. (We saw in Chapter 1 that democracy involved a complex set of balances. This. Nazi street fighters enjoyed over-tolerant policing and leniency from the courts. The elected government must not have absolute power over the state. however. but there is always a non-elected aspect to the state. Similar problems occurred in the case of Allende’s Socialist government in Chile (1970–73). this enormously strengthened the Nazi party. It is of course true that the word ‘control’ is problematic. despite having been involved in an attempt to overthrow the democratic state by force. It is quite possible that this government would have encountered severe problems whatever the circumstances. the military and so on. police and military were completely out of sympathy with the elected government. the military accepted this invitation. The relation between the elected and non-elected part of the state needs to be constructive if democracy is to be successful. Some democracies elect their judges. Very few elect their generals. because such conditions are likely to create a security dilemma. however.Chapter 2: Democracy and the state that military officers. In biased states. When even genuine liberal democracies are involved in some kind of armed conflict. This situation is not uncommon and requires some further discussion. the state is the rule-enforcing body. however. senior policemen and others will resent the restraints that democracy puts on what they are allowed to do. and they may be tempted to break the rules. though. it may in fact be impossible for an elected government to intervene too much in what the forces of the state do. If one takes competitive elections with the vote honestly counted as the minimum definition of democracy. In liberal democratic systems. It may have to ignore past or present-day abuses. elections are routinely held and contested. Organisations may not want to observe the rules. the state behaves ‘organisationally’ as well as institutionally. They may prefer one political party or one political outcome above others. For most of this period. In football. Mexico was governed in the 1980s and 1990s by an economic technocracy. 29 . there were contested elections. As a result of winning power (when they do so). Organisations are collectives that seek to gain some advantage by playing according to the rules. sometimes the economic technocracy and sometimes the judiciary – do not necessarily have to respect formal procedures operated by impartial officials. Political parties and interest groups are organisations. There is a clear analogy here with sporting occasions – for example. State bodies operate the political process by enforcing the rules rather than by trying to determine the outcome. rules are occasionally broken and enforcement is occasionally mistaken. In the worst case. as in life. they still have to operate through the formal rules of impartial institutions rather than directly as they please. The team players (the organisation) seek to win the game. then Mexico was a democracy during the 1990s at any rate. the military becomes the effective arbiter of power. Institutions are enforced rules – some people would say valued and enforced rules. Democracy in biased states Moving further along the democratic spectrum. They intervene only when the rules are in dispute or where they have been broken. Most social scientists accept Douglass North’s way of defining institutions and organisations (1992). The referee and ultimately the governing council of football (the institution) interpret and enforce the rules. but they have to do so or else they will fail to achieve their objectives. is that different people have different roles. Example: Mexico By way of example. The people who run the top echelons of the state – elected politicians. When the security forces are in a position to make a credible threat to overthrow the state. Those who run the state may have interests of their own. such an outcome does not occur as often as it possibly should. the police. organisations can change the rules in ways that are of benefit to their members and supporters. They can act more or less as they wish. The technocracy was introduced into the political system by the power of the presidency. The key point. but the state is biased toward incumbents. the military. a football match. The liberal democratic solution to such occurrences is for those responsible for lawlessness to be arrested and brought to justice. and it was kept there by a system that allowed the outgoing president to select his successor. but they still have to operate through laws and formal procedures. in some political systems. or that the state simply enforced impersonal rules within which different organisations competed. Fujimori’s supporters in congress counteracted by voting to impeach Supreme Court judges opposed to Fujimori’s re-election. Zakaria questioned whether the introduction of universal suffrage before systems of individual rights were firmly established would lead to liberal democracy or whether majoritarian systems would actually stand in the way of the development of rights. the closure of congress was quite successful: • inflation fell • economic growth resumed • the main terrorist organisation – Sendero Luminoso – was largely defeated. despite the fact that the constitution approved by plebiscite in 1993 forbade him to do so. in April 1992. In policy terms. Public opinion generally approved of this – Fujimori’s popularity actually rose following the closure. but further allegations of bribery led the Peruvian Congress – which was also elected in 2000 – to vote Fujimori from office at the end of that year. Britain. Fujimori’s supporters in congress voted in a law that would allow him to run again. It seems that some Peruvian military officers who wanted to fight against terrorism without constitutional restraint approached Fujimori and suggested that they get together and overthrow the congress and existing judiciary. the ruling party that contested the elections – the Institutional Revolutionary Party (the PRI) – was very much dominated by the state itself. Instead. as we generally know it. • Peru had a problem with terrorism. but things become more complicated afterwards. • Fujimori did not enjoy a congressional majority. who ruled that Fujimori’s candidacy for re-election did not break the constitution. Fujimori appeared to win the 2000 elections. Illiberal democracy The term ‘illiberal democracy’ was developed in an article by Zakaria (1997). Fujimori agreed to this and. involves a mixture of majoritarianism and respect for individual rights. He argued also that many independently established consolidated democracies enforced systems of individual rights before they introduced universal suffrage. Fujimori wanted to run again in 2000. In the end. Activity Using the relevant reading. Example: Peru A further example can be taken from Peru under Fujimori in the 1990s. present some explanations as to why democracy in biased states does not break down altogether. He was able to do this in 1995. These were replaced with tame judges. the situation was that the referee was also a player. 30 . for example. The Peruvian Supreme Court declared this unconstitutional. was a liberal state (according to some definitions of the term) after 1689. He faced serious problems on a number of fronts: • Peru was suffering from economic decline and hyperinflation. Fujimori was elected to the presidency as an independent candidate. However. in which he made the point that democracy. Fujimori took advantage of the resulting increase in presidential popularity in order to run for re-election. closed congress by force. It would be impossible to argue seriously that the state was indifferent as to whether the PRI was elected or not. but only became fully democratic after 1918. The state and the PRI were so closely connected that it was hard to say where the PRI ended and the state began.86 Democracy and democratisation However. Empirically. Would illiberal democracy fit Schumpeter’s definition? Delegative democracy The term ‘delegative democracy’ was developed by Guillermo O’Donnell to cover some countries in Latin America (1994). Many such systems are to be found in Southeast Asia. one important reason why extreme 31 . which was described in the last chapter. This context is the system in which cultural values are rather authoritarian and not particularly responsive to the individualistic principles of equality before the law and competition for the popular vote. and Plattner’s critique is directly relevant (1998). not entirely clear that this is the case. notably those of Fujimori in Peru and Chavez in Venezuela. the phenomenon of extreme personalist rule. they have often faced overthrow by congress. Weber’s notion is based on earlier religious leaders who successfully appealed to large numbers of people. Although Zakaria’s concept of illiberal democracy may need some reformulation. some people would say that other examples in the region could also be found. which are common enough in non-democracies. is not unknown and is worth discussing further. Some people think of liberalism as having to do with impartiality. most countries are democracies. Certainly. Although O’Donnell principally had in mind the presidencies of Collor in Brazil and Menem in Argentina. personalist politicians do not usually win presidential elections in Latin America. A relation also exists between this idea and ‘cults of personality’. others think of it as having to do with freedom. It is. A relation exists between this idea and the Weberian notion of charismatic authority. Whether such systems are democratic in a deeper sense is disputable. though. while using a concept such as bias to describe state partiality (as seen in the previous sub-section). Plattner argues that liberal values can be institutionalised via the democratic process in cases where liberalism did not precede democracy. but it is not at all clear that they have institutionalised systems of state impartiality. Activity Consider illiberal democracy alongside Schumpeter’s definition of democracy. Some political systems can be broadly fair and impartial but quite intolerant as well. Zakaria can be criticised for using the concept of liberalism (or ‘illiberalism’) too widely.Chapter 2: Democracy and the state Zakaria’s argument has led to a considerable debate in academic literature. refers to countries that are indeed democratic and to elections that have been freely held and actively contested. Nor are countries that have been democratic for longer – such as Colombia and Venezuela – more successful at building liberal institutions than others. and where they have done so. It is certainly the case that a country can be governed according to a set of political values that are not individualist or liberal but indeed formally democratic. In Latin America. O’Donnell’s notion. However. The basic idea is that the system is run on the basis of extreme personalism. however. It might be best to call such systems illiberal. although not common even in Latin America. it does work reasonably well in at least one important real-world context. People vote for the president – delegative democracy is far more likely in presidential than in parliamentary systems – on the basis that they are voting for a pure leader figure who will solve all of the country’s pressing problems. as happened in Argentina under Menem. which is that: ‘democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular set of institutions becomes the only game in town’ (1991. In Latin America at the beginning of the 1990s. which is what happened in Peru under Fujimori and. does the experience and practice of democracy make it more likely that democracy will be strengthened? If it does. In civil society. there has to be freedom of association and communication. The notion of democratic consolidation We saw in the introductory chapter that liberal democracy is a complex form of government. Although some countries have indeed seen a strengthening of their democratic institutions after they democratised. Linz and Stepan discussed this point in their work on democratic consolidation (1996). in Venezuela under Chavez. In political society. We have already discussed some of these situations in this chapter. We should also ask whether there is a dynamic of democracy. There must be a rule of law and a spirit of constitutionalism. It is entirely likely that we will find systems that are democratic in some aspects and not in others. 4. Economic society has to be organised around respect for property rights. Essentially they define five arenas of democratic consolidation. 5.86 Democracy and democratisation personalists sometimes do win elections is the fact that democratic systems can fail in policy terms and this failure can produce political crisis. there has to be free and inclusive electoral contestation. Delegative democracy may well prove to have been an inherently transitional form of government. then limited. although the moment of extreme personalism is transitory. 32 . In other words. however. biased. and conditions must be in place to permit economic growth. illiberal and delegative democracies are likely to be transitional phenomena pending the deepening of democratic institutionalisation. and the methodology is reasonably clear. The end result may be that the system changes into some other form of semi-democracy. They start by defining democracy in a very demanding way. There does not seem to be much evidence of a general trend according to which nonconsolidated democracies are likely to become consolidated according to a set pattern. its political significance may be long-term. can sometimes reorganise the state so that. this has not been so in all cases. 3. 26). These conditions are rather demanding. Very personalistically minded presidents in the region have often been removed from power by congress. An individual cannot solve all of a society’s problems and will soon lose his (or her) authority if he (or she) tries to do so. The state apparatus has to be fun. or else he can make common cause with business leaders. Activity List O’Donnell’s main criteria for characterising delegative democracy. according to legal–rational (Weberian) bureaucratic principles. for example. 1. to some extent. there was a clear relationship between hyperinflation and extreme personalism. The significance may be that a personalist leader will make use of the military to help him govern. 2. and contrast with a simpler definition proposed by Prezworski. Their work is rich and complex. An individual leader. and it may well be that there is some lack of fit between what people believe to be the case and that is actually the case. if voters perceive their government as being economically unsuccessful. We can learn more about how democracy works in practice. It is likely that these attitudes will be rationally explicable in terms of the objective conditions facing the country. then we can specify what objective conditions are likely to orient public opinion in a given way. • We need to be able to analyse systems in which there are elections but where there also exists a threat to democracy from armed minorities. We may need to look for more complex kinds of explanation. For example. by learning about people’s attitudes towards it. such as Diamond (1999) also believe that we have a lot to learn about democracy by asking questions of ordinary people. however. Can we seriously say. but armed groups wanting some form of secession have attacked each country from within: • the Irish Republican Army (IRA) wants Northern Ireland to become part of a united Ireland • the Basque Separatist Movement (ETA) wants an independent Basque country. then it is entirely likely that the economic indicators will show this to be so. most people would regard the UK and Spain as democracies. then we will not be able to explain democratic legitimation purely in terms of objective conditions. the southern states of the USA were racially segregated and black Americans did not enjoy the full protection of the law. Linz and Stepan give considerable weight to voter attitudes towards democracy. this does seem to be a useful way of proceeding. We really cannot know whether democratic systems that today seem non-consolidated will in the future: • become consolidated • break down altogether 33 . It is also important that the notion of non-consolidated democracy does not become a theory of stages. For years. although it is a view that has been advanced. to say that the USA was not a democracy during this period. Their work uses extensive survey data and seeks to evaluate answers to questions such as: • Are people convinced that democracy is the best form of government? • Do they have confidence in their own democratic institutions? Other authors. particularly in places where democracy is a relatively new form of government. that the rule of law did not operate in these cases? There are some advantages in having a demanding definition of democracy: • We saw in the last chapter that democracy is inherently a complex form of government. always some irrationality in politics. If such a lack of fit exists. If that is the case. In practice. It would be an extreme view. Some European democracies have also been run in very corrupt ways. For example. There is.Chapter 2: Democracy and the state The problem with any very demanding definition is that only a few political systems can meet it. In principle. however. however. • We also need to be able to analyse systems in which elections are routinely held and contested but in which there is not much confidence in the judicial system and in which it would be optimistic to speak of a rule of law. • We do need to break down the concept into some of its component parts in order to see how they fit together in different ways and at different times. but the dynamics of democratisation or non-democratisation in some respects remain obscure. have the merit of putting forward characterisations that work both at a conceptual level and as descriptions of one or more real-world political systems. A reminder of your learning outcomes By the end of the chapter and the associated reading. 3. There are limits to our possible knowledge of these things. Not only is democracy a complex category in itself. ‘“Delegative democracy” is just a sophisticated name for presidentialist personalism. are there for supposing that nonconsolidated democracies are likely to become more consolidated over time? 4. according to the rather demanding criteria set out at the end of Chapter 1. There are other possible ways of discussing imperfectly democratic systems – an enormous amount of literature exists on the subject. Activity Explain how each of the Linz and Stepan arenas of democratic consolidation interconnect to form an overall picture of a consolidated democracy. and fresh ideas will no doubt be put forward in the future. The authors considered here do not have a monopoly on these characterisations. What good reasons. Those authors considered here do. however. Sample examination questions 1. You should be able to: • identify and discuss when it is most difficult for elected political leaders to control the military • explain when democracy is most at risk from within the state itself • outline what illiberal democracy is • outline what delegative democracy is • explain what happens when a democratic state is biased in favour of incumbents • analyse the advantages and disadvantages of using a demanding standard of democratic consolidation. What is state bias? What impact does it have on democracy? 34 . What is ‘illiberal democracy’? What are the reasons for supposing it to be a potentially durable form of government? 2.’ Discuss. you should have a good understanding of how political scientists have tried to conceptualise these different forms of semi-democracy and what their main characteristics are. if any. Conclusion This chapter has considered some of the ways in which scholars have tried to conceptualise and categorise political systems that were at least minimally democratic (having free and contested elections) but not completely so.86 Democracy and democratisation • remain non-consolidated • consolidate in some ways and de-consolidate in others. 1996) [ISBN 0521032881]. you should be able to: • explain the main problems and difficulties that are likely to be associated with democratising each system of government discussed in this chapter (empire. P. Huntington. (London: Palgrave Macmillan. Gill.Chapter 3: Non-democratic systems and the transition to democracy Chapter 3: Non-democratic systems and the transition to democracy Aims of the chapter This chapter looks at the relation between different kinds of non-democracy and different kinds of transition to democracy. We will give an account of some of the ways in which each of these systems has been transformed into democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory. S. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. J. J. 1995) updated edition [ISBN 0521466350]. 2000) [ISBN 0333801970]. 1993) [ISBN 0806125160]. 35 .P. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. monarchy. (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. and having completed the Essential reading and activities. D. G. 1990. (London: John Murray. 2000) [ISBN 0312227558]. The Dynamics of Democratisation. To Craft Democracies: an Essay in Democratic Transition.) Towards Sustainable Democracy in the Third World. 2003) [ISBN 9780521423359] Chapters 1 and 2. Government and Politics. Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. (Berkeley: University Presses of California. (Cambridge. Columbia and Princeton. Haynes. G. Lieven. 2000) [ISBN 0719552435]. Hagopian. Further reading Brooker. military government and dominant party rule) • explain how transition could happen in different kinds of non-democratic political system. The types of non-democracy discussed in the chapter are: • imperial and colonial rule • monarchy • military government • dominant party government. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. 2001) [ISBN 0333802500]. This is available via the publisher’s website. Crystal. (ed. Di Palma. Essential reading Przeworski. Empire: the Russian Empire and its Rivals. Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (London/ Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. A. reprint edition) [ISBN 0520072146]. F. though not all. and not democracy. important to qualify the notion of ‘waves’ in one respect. and the following year the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco died. In the 1930s. Introduction During the past 20 years. the majority of Latin American countries changed from non-democracies to democracies. Huntington’s (1991) notion that there have been three waves of democratisation has generally been accepted as empirically useful. Essentially this chapter is an empirical discussion of how democratisation took place in the recent and more distant past. Latin America has suffered several waves of democratic breakdown. many observers believed that fascism or communism. The second wave consisted of countries that democratised after the defeat of fascism in 1945. It suggests that the way in which societies became democratic (or not) depended significantly on the way in which they were organised prior to democratisation. It is. Schmitter and L. the countries of eastern Europe also rejected communism and adopted democracy. By the middle of the 1990s. when a failed coup attempt brought about the destruction of the Soviet Union as a unit. From the late 1980s. The first wave of countries essentially adopted democratic principles in the nineteenth century. many countries that were formally nondemocracies have become democracies. By 1980. the most important of which took place in the 1930s. The list includes: • (the then) West Germany • Italy • Japan • Austria. P. would be the wave of the future. Many. In the past. 1960s and early 1970s. 1986) [ISBN 0801826829]. G. To adapt Huntington’s phraseology. During the next decade. in some regions of the world there were almost as many cases of democratic breakdown as of democratisation. What is significant for this discussion is that there has been much less democratic breakdown since 1980 than there was following earlier ‘waves’ of democratisation. The third wave began in 1974 with the overthrow of the authoritarian government of Portugal. They included: • the USA • Switzerland • France • Britain. of its component parts became democracies. The process culminated in mid-1991. many parliamentary systems were set up at the end of the First World War and the majority of these broke down in the 1920s or early 1930s. however. In continental Europe. Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and Prospects for Democracy: Latin America. Many African countries also adopted democracy in the 1980s or early 1990s. waves sometimes pulled away from the shore as well as moving towards it. which examines some theories of why democratisation occurred. The military government in Greece also fell in 1974.86 Democracy and democratisation O’Donnell. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. This chapter should be read in conjunction with the next chapter.. well over 50 countries that 36 . these three southern European countries had all become democracies. as we saw in the last chapter. Ex-colonial countries have not invariably adopted democratic systems of government. have failed to do so. Some countries nevertheless did suffer from democratic breakdown. Nevertheless. The mere fact that democracy has proved as durable as it has over quite long periods of time is significant. Unfortunately. In 1918. which today is the main alternative to parliamentarianism. Attempts were made to set up democratic parliamentary systems in most of these new states. progress towards democracy has slowed down since the mid1990s. India and Ireland are positive examples – but there are negative examples as well. A military coup took place in Pakistan in 1999. A generation later. As we shall see in more detail in the next chapter. the criterion of democratic consolidation is demanding. However. It is also clear that some important parts of the world – China and much of the Middle East – did not participate in the most recent democratising wave. the success of many former Latin American colonies of Spain and Portugal in securing independence also brought into existence new states and new constitutional systems – although constitutional development was much less successful in Latin America than in the USA. we cannot really speak of any major reversal of the most recent wave of democratisation. Nonetheless. It is true that some new democracies do not seem to be particularly secure and that only some of the countries that have democratised since 1974 can be regarded as democratically consolidated. the collapse of the Austro–Hungarian Empire also brought a number of new states into existence. the extent of democratisation has surprised scholars. the history of decolonisation has seen major changes in the way in which very large numbers of people have been governed. such as Pakistan. Colonial rule and the collapse of empires An important force behind political change has been the decline. The defeat of the British Empire in the War of American Independence had particularly important consequences for the history of democracy worldwide. some modernisation theories did not expect the spread of democracy across Africa and Latin America to be sustained. very few systems of this kind have truly consolidated institutionally in the long run. Even so. that were settled principally from Europe. Former British colonies have often done so – the USA. such as Argentina. Nevertheless. The USA pioneered the presidential system of government. This process has sometimes created entirely new countries – new countries that need new political systems. One way of trying to understand the magnitude of this transformation is to consider how different forms of non-democracies have evolved into democracies or. on occasion. even in countries. Former Spanish colonies did not immediately develop democratic institutions. collapse of empires. Most of these were in the Third World. This approach will be considered in the rest of this chapter. but virtually 37 .Chapter 3: Non-democratic systems and the transition to democracy were not democracies at the beginning of 1974 had become democracies. Most Latin American countries adopted hybrid systems that include: • presidentialism • continental European systems of administrative law • a tradition of rule by decree. and so far the vast majority of these democratic transitions have not been reversed. or in some cases. and serious problems were seen with the electoral process in Zimbabwe in 2002. it was generally accepted and sometimes seized. policy of decolonisation.86 Democracy and democratisation all of them failed. but at least some countries adopted and retained democratic systems. but this was by no means the only outcome. at times on the basis of full-scale integration into the imperial country. The consequences of earlier forms of imperial control and decolonisation in various parts of the world depended upon (among other things): • the character of the imperial society • the extent to which there was settlement from the metropolitan country • the historical epoch in which the colonising and decolonising took place. This was done with varying degrees of success in different parts of the world. which wanted to find an acceptable means of getting rid of a colony eager to stay in the empire – the Falkland Islands are one example and Gibraltar another. falling victim to authoritarian forms of politics by the 1930s. if not always voluntary. however. in the sense that subjects of the empire wished to remain so. Sometimes. In some cases. and sometimes not even then. On the other hand. Political consequences of imperial control and decolonisation prior to 1990 The effect of imperial collapse upon democratisation was therefore rather mixed. The political results of independence were mixed. After the Second World War. the European empires pursued a consistent. In other cases. We can identify four possible ways in which decolonisation interacted with democratisation: • continuity and democratisation 38 . willing ex-colonies have proved to be more a source of embarrassment than satisfaction to the colonial power. In some cases. the colonial power sought to reduce the cost of direct administration. India famously adopted a democratic parliamentary system in the late 1940s. Indigenous populations in much of the Americas were either totally wiped out or greatly reduced in number. When the opportunity for independence presented itself. either by allowing some precolonial patterns of authority to survive or by developing and transmitting new institutions. In some very important cases. Of course. while some other countries. in the sense that the French Guyanese vote in French elections and the Falkland Islanders elect a council of their own. indigenous peoples in Martinique and French Guyana are content to remain part of France. Many were then occupied or controlled by the Nazis during 1941– 45. It is clear that democratisation did spread after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. This kind of government is not inevitably non-democratic. only became democracies in the 1980s ‘wave’. but much less clear that the collapse of previous empires had so general an effect. Far more often. the impact of colonial rule was utterly destructive. the Falklands are populated by British settlers rather than indigenous people. the end of empire led to democratisation. the imperial power was unable to persuade former colonies to remain as colonies. In some cases re-democratisation followed the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 and in others it followed the collapse of Communism in the 1980s. though. European colonial powers were able to legitimate their rule. notably in Africa. but such cases are extremely few. Vietnam and Algeria became independent from France when France was a democracy. Continuity and non-democratisation In some cases. Britain retained good relations with India after independence in 1947. but they did not democratise themselves. Continuity and democratisation In some cases. One of the legacies of colonialism was that centralised states and national borders were organised over territories that had not previously known them or that had experienced quite different boundaries at earlier times. but did not democratise when it did so. When Soviet rule collapsed in Eastern Europe after 1989. it retained a monarchical system of government. independent countries adopted democratic institutions from their former colonial powers (which were themselves democracies). the independent country threw off the control of a nondemocracy. Discontinuity and democratisation The category most relevant to the issue of democratic transition occurred where the collapse of a non-democratic empire led to the adoption of democracy in the newly independent countries. although the past decade has seen significant amounts of re-democratisation in the region. Nevertheless. which became known as Belize upon independence in 1981. though this was not necessarily decisive. A form of colonial rule that was doubly non-democratic (both because colonialism is not inherently democratic and because the colonial power was not a democracy) then gave way to a non-democratic but local form of post-colonial rule. They did so partly in reaction to the unpopular Communist system imposed upon them earlier. Discontinuity and non-democratisation In some cases. most of the countries of eastern Europe adopted democratic systems of government. Borders that once seemed artificial often remained intact after the ending of colonial rule and tensions often resulted from a poor ‘fit’ between the externally imposed national 39 . newly independent countries seemed likely to adopt democratic parliamentary systems similar to those existing in their former colonial powers. partly out of a genuine preference for democracy and partly because the new states enjoyed the support of the USA and the European Union. Negative legacies of colonialism Sometimes the impact of colonialism created problems that made it hard for post-colonial countries to become stable democracies. and India adopted and maintained a parliamentary system based on the British model. The same was also true of British Honduras.Chapter 3: Non-democratic systems and the transition to democracy • continuity and non-democratisation • discontinuity and democratisation • discontinuity and non-democratisation. but in the end did not do so. the bitterly fought independence movement in Ireland did not preclude Ireland from adopting parliamentary institutions after 1922. Such cases are illustrations of transition to democracy via imperial collapse. It sometimes mattered that independence was granted and accepted on relatively good terms. The monarchy was not overthrown until 1889. and Brazil did not really establish a democratic form of government until the 1980s. When Brazil became independent from Portugal in the 1820s. This pattern of abortive democracy is common in Africa. Sometimes a clear-cut secession is possible and may appear to resolve the issue (for example. though. The relative importance of this linkage for democracy has varied from case to case and is never preponderant. although abundant survey evidence shows that most people within the region prefer democracy. In Latin America. the former Soviet Union no longer tried to do so. At the very least. Because empires were coercive.86 Democracy and democratisation borders and the original allegiances of indigenous peoples. international influence has played a part in discouraging dictatorship. and this fact needs to be taken into account as well. although they do not often make any successful claim to legitimacy in their own terms. the international community is much less supportive of nondemocracy in the Third World than was once the case. At other times. quite significant amounts of aid have been made conditional on democratisation. Several countries in eastern Europe that would probably have adopted democracy if left to themselves could then do so. therefore. These conflicts did not absolutely prevent subsequent democratisation but they did make it more difficult. Although Soviet rule over eastern Europe loosened considerably after 1986. In southern and eastern Europe. the Czech Republic and Slovakia agreed to separate in 1991). however. but from the late 1980s. however. clear-cut solutions are less easy to find and serious armed conflict may develop. at times. and there have been many failures as well as successes. The downfall of such empires has led. 1. It is often a matter of contingency whether or not this happens. to an upsurge in conflict between different ethnic or religious groups as each tried to consolidate its own territorial claims. Consequences of the breaking-up of the former Soviet Union in 1991 The central event in the third wave of democratisation was the fall of the former Soviet Union. 40 . In the African case. do at times develop institutions that can be transmitted successfully to colonies and kept on after independence. the seminal event here was the breaking up of the former Soviet Union after a failed military coup attempt in 1991. too. by saying that empires. is that attempts by the USA and to some extent Europe to export democracy to various parts of the world have been influential. Whether the influence exerted today by the USA over Latin America and by some European countries over parts of Africa can be considered imperial is controversial. The Soviet Union had supported communist rule in eastern Europe and invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 in order to preserve communism in the region. they sometimes imposed a single form of rule on ethnically or religiously divided territories. Such membership is advantageous on many grounds. Examples include: • the former republics of Yugoslavia in the 1990s • Ireland after 1922 • India/Pakistan after 1947. the decline of empires – although an opportunity for democratic transition – can also be a time of very great disorder and conflict. For this reason. This had three important consequences. One might conclude this discussion. countries that could sustain democratic institutions over the long term could enjoy the prospect of membership of the European Union. International bodies do have to work through local agents if they are to succeed and most Africans do prefer democracy. What is clear. Communist parties in non-communist countries needed to rethink their ideologies and strategies. and the King of Thailand exerts real. Monarchy A number of countries are monarchies today. Other forms of non-democratic organisation We now turn to countries that have made the transition to democracy without major changes in their basic identity or international relations. but it probably plays a modest part in the overall process of legitimating state power. because it is not directly relevant to democratisation. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates of the Persian Gulf are still run on monarchical principles. The appeal of ‘Prime Minister and country’ may be somewhat less. in particular. in practice. including the former Soviet Union. the concept of monarchy might fit perfectly into Weber’s belief that some political systems can be run on the basis of ‘traditional’ legitimation. no longer needed to do so. There are three fairly common forms of non-democratic rule in the world today: • monarchy • military government • rule via a dominant party system. There can be little doubt that the maintenance of a figurehead monarchy in parliamentary democracies relates to the aim of legitimating political authority among certain sections of the population. Similarly. It would be far too much to claim that the monarchy in the UK legitimates the political system as a whole. Nepal. Some of those who had supported military rule in Latin America because they believed that this was the only way of suppressing communism had to re-evaluate their positions. but this will not be discussed in great detail here. Activity List the most important European Empires. The USA. became a global advocate of democratisation and this is also true of the European Union. which had previously backed non-democratic rulers in parts of the Third World because they were anti-communist and likely to suppress communism. At first sight. but for many it is in name only. Monarchists in the UK would almost certainly win a referendum on the question of whether the UK should become a republic. power in his country. We might want to make a further distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian rule. 41 . in the sense that the monarch is a figurehead for what is. This was also true of anti-communists. Trace out which of their ex-colonies became democracies immediately after independence and which did not. the USA and some European governments. Soldiers in the UK are asked to risk their lives for ‘Queen and country’. The decline and eventual disintegration of the former Soviet Union changed the nature of politics in other parts of the world. parliamentary government. A number of newly independent republics that had formerly been part of the Soviet Union (though not all of them) subsequently adopted democratic systems of government.Chapter 3: Non-democratic systems and the transition to democracy 2. 3. though not absolute. though. monarchs have been opposed to democratisation and have either prevented it from happening or else have fallen from power under pressure from forces demanding change. Although there were some anxious moments. 1990).86 Democracy and democratisation In countries where the monarch actually does rule. to some degree. contrived and deliberately designed to maintain stability. is a more complex form of government than it may at first seem. The objective of all of this from the viewpoint of the rulers is not so much to build political institutions as to avoid the need for them. Military government Military rule. The deliberate arbitrariness and unpredictability of a system that depends upon individual decision-making creates some degree of insecurity within civil society. oil money is recycled through these societies as a result of essentially personalist decisions made by the ruling families. Most observers have attributed the survival of the Saudi and Gulf monarchies less to the legitimation produced by traditional values than to the neo-patrimonial allocation of resources in oil-rich countries (see Crystal. Commonly. Often. however. however. This is. the Shah was overthrown by religious fundamentalists. it is true that the whole purpose of military rule is to block democratic government. At other times. Military officers may be more willing to hand over power to civilians if they think that the new arrangement may only be temporary. and the question of how military rule can give way to democratic government is complex. As a result. Another Middle Eastern monarchy – that of Reza Shah II in Iran – could scarcely be seen as traditional at all. The most spectacular recent case was the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979. be too simple to adopt an uncritical definition of traditionalism. any expectation that the military is handing back power temporarily will have to be changed at a later date. The money clearly alleviates social discontent. by the same token. people who need access to public money are less likely to try to organise themselves in order to demand their rights or oppose the government. it would. Of course. Some significant exceptions to this rule do exist. Sometimes this may occur because of the will of the monarch. who did not believe that he was traditional enough. Many officers who 42 . In 1979. although family networks remain. like monarchy. It may indeed appear coercive and repressive. Monarchical systems can. Such a system can remain a surprisingly popular form of government as long as the monarch does not seek to undermine the principles of the constitution. if democracy is to survive. a military withdrawal from power occurs on the implicit basis that it could be cancelled or reversed later on. Traditionalism usually is. although this partially explains its undoing. it is likely that democratic prospects are enhanced when the monarch supports democratic transition rather than opposes it. what happened in Latin America in the early 1980s. undertake the transition to democracy. When this happens. it is likely that the country will retain a constitutional monarchy. Sometimes the military itself initiates democratisation. Since it is hard to think of a smooth and sustained transition to democracy that has also involved the overthrow of a monarchy. In other words. This may happen because military rulers have got into difficulties and seek some form of extrication. A notable example of this occurred in Spain after 1975 when King Juan Carlos made a determined attempt to ensure that his country adopted democratic principles. to a degree. After all it might be said that the whole point of military rule is to introduce policies and forms of governance different from those the people would choose if they could. in the end the transition to democracy was a clear success. Chapter 3: Non-democratic systems and the transition to democracy were involved in handing back power to elected civilians did so in the belief that this was just another phase in a cycle of military and civilian rule. Only in retrospect did the transfer appear definite. What needs to be explained, therefore, is less the original decision to hand power back than the inability or unwillingness of the military to organise fresh intervention. The changed international environment may be an important part of the explanation for this. Another possible pattern of transition occurs when the military seeks to move from a position of outright dictatorship to a position in which they still rule, but in which they do so in a more indirect and therefore theoretically more constitutional way. Sometimes, a move from open dictatorship to semi-dictatorship has appeared to work. General Pinochet in Chile twice won plebiscites – in 1978 and 1980. In the longer run, however, semi-dictatorship is an unstable form of government. By attempting to sustain it, military rulers have often put themselves in positions where they had to give up power altogether. When General Pinochet lost the 1988 plebiscite (his third), he was forced to give up power altogether. By the same token, military officers sometimes prefer one civilian political party to another and they may try to organise democratic transition in such a way as to help their friends. If the military government is unpopular, however, people may vote for a candidate who is seen as the most anti-military of all of those available. Another reason for the military allowing a transition to democracy is that it sometimes sees no further point in continuing to govern. Military officers are not necessarily anti-democrats in principle – they may have genuine institutional concerns. One reason the military sometimes distrusts democracy has to do with the concept of hierarchy, which is central to the military itself. The military organisation is based on hierarchy, discipline and obedience, not on participation or activism. To that extent, it can be threatened by civil commotion and political militancy. After a period of time, however, it may come to feel that society has changed and the danger has passed. After 1975 the Spanish military was mostly prepared to believe that the circumstances prevailing at the time of the 1936–39 Civil War no longer existed. The decline of communism in the 1980s also persuaded some military officers in South America that they had less to fear from democracy. A less stable way by which military governments have sometimes tried to adapt to democracy was for officers to make the transition into civilian politics. It is not impossible for officers who have already taken power to organise some kind of political party, provided that they are willing to accept a transition from military to civilian life. Colonel Peron played an important part in the Argentine military coup of 1943, but thereafter behaved much as any civilian politician. Although Peron himself was eventually overthrown by the military in 1955, Peronism was (and is) a successful political movement. Similarly, the Mexican Revolutionary Party was created by successful revolutionary generals willing to operate through a party organisation. Today, the party is wholly civilian. In ex-military or semimilitary governments in the Middle East, the instrument of government is a ruling party rather than the military. However, these transitions, real though they were, did not for the most part lead quickly to stable democracy. Finally, the military may simply be defeated and become unable to maintain itself in power. In this situation, however, political change will not necessarily lead to democracy. In Cuba, the military dictator Batista was overthrown by Fidel Castro in 1959, and in Nicaragua, the military dictator Somoza was overthrown by the Sandinistas in 1979. Neither of these dictatorships was typical of the region – they were much more 43 86 Democracy and democratisation personalistic than the majority. However, this does not alter the fact that they were overthrown by force. Nicaragua, after a flirtation with communism, eventually evolved in the direction of democracy; Cuba remains authoritarian. In other cases, political change has been precipitated by defeat by an external force. The Argentine military government fell in 1982–83 following a military defeat by the UK, and democracy returned to Panama after the USA invaded and deposed General Noriega in 1989. Activity List the main real-world cases that involved democratisation of monarchical systems and the democratisation of military governments. Dominant party government The idea of government by an all-controlling party largely stems from Lenin’s organisation of the Russian Bolsheviks. Lenin set up a Revolutionary party, not in order to compete for power in a democratic system, but rather to seize power from an autocracy. His idea was to create a strongly disciplined elite party composed of professional revolutionaries – a so-called vanguard party. This would, in turn, control a range of other organisations either openly or through clandestinity. Lenin did not bring about the overthrow of the Tsarist monarchy. He did not expect this to happen, and played little part in it. What he did do was take advantage of the power vacuum that followed the defeat of the Tsar in order to organise the seizure of power. The Bolsheviks were then able to take control of the whole of the Soviet Union and govern until the entire system collapsed at the end of the 1980s. The idea of a vanguard party was hugely influential in other parts of the world. However, the communist parties in China, Cuba and Yugoslavia differed from the Bolsheviks in that they were originally, in large part, military organisations as well as political ones. Mao, Tito and Castro actually took power by force from pre-existing dictatorships. The military aspect of government in these countries was correspondingly greater than that in the former Soviet Union. We have already noted that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Essentially, it was torn apart by internal conflicts between would-be modernisers and traditionalists who wanted to retain the Soviet Empire at all costs. Meanwhile, some of the modernisers had become alienated from the Communist Party and wanted a new kind of political system altogether. Most dominant party systems, however, are run in a very disciplined way by people who understand that internal disunity is likely to have very serious consequences, which is what happened in the former Soviet Union. Of the world’s remaining non-democracies, the most important are based on dominant party systems run by autocratic leaders. Can Leninist vanguard systems adapt to democratic circumstances? Evidence shows that they can, even though they may not particularly want democracy. The Mexican PRI had many of the characteristics of a dominant party system, although it was able to adapt to democratisation. The same was also true for the former ruling party in Taiwan. Both of these parties were able to retain an essential degree of unity, while moving from being authoritarian parties to parties willing to engage in democratic contestation. Both eventually lost power via the popular vote, but neither disintegrated completely. Both parties continue to play an active part in democratic politics. 44 Chapter 3: Non-democratic systems and the transition to democracy Transitions to democracy It is difficult to theorise about democratic transition on the basis of logical deduction about the strengths and weaknesses of non-democratic forms of rule – so many different possibilities exist. Moreover, subjective factors – such as whether particular individuals prefer democracy or distrust it – may matter as much as objective conditions. Attempts have been made to discuss democratic transition in more general terms, however. • A first influential approach is based on ideas about class power and state power. • A second approach is based on ideas of economic change and assumes that democratisation is associated with economic progress. This kind of approach – known as modernisation theory – is also discussed in the next chapter. It is important to note, however, that a number of quite poor countries have democratised since 1985, and that this is something that modernisation theory on its own would have failed to predict. • A third approach refuses to consider general ideas and puts a lot of emphasis on the detail of individual cases (see di Palma, 1990). If 50 countries have democratised in the past 15 years, there are likely to be 50 different combinations of factors responsible. This approach is valuable as a corrective, and it reminds us that democratisation is something that has to be brought about by political practitioners: it does not just happen by itself. Yet, if there were no general influences, one would expect democratisation to be something of a random process. In point of fact, democratisation has generally occurred in waves rather than as a set of random events. We do need, therefore, to consider changes in international politics. These are not the only relevant factors, but they clearly matter and they are capable of being analysed in reasonably general terms. A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: • explain the main problems and difficulties that are likely to be associated with democratising each system of government discussed in this chapter (empire, monarchy, military government and dominant party rule) • explain how transition could happen in different kinds of non-democratic political system. Sample examination questions 1. Under what circumstances are empires most likely to be able to transmit effective political institutions? 2. ‘Whether or not monarchies can democratise rather depends on the monarch.’ Discuss. 3. What are the main problems that arise when military regimes try to control the handing over of power to their preferred democratic candidates? 4. ‘Dominant party systems are authentic political institutions, but they do not always survive democratisation.’ Discuss. 45 86 Democracy and democratisation Notes 46 ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’. By the end of this chapter and the relevant reading. S. (London: Heinemann. 2006. The End of History and the Last Man. (London: Penguin. 1992) [ISBN 9780226731445]. Foreign Affairs. Lipset.Chapter 4: General theories of democratisation Chapter 4: General theories of democratisation Aims of the chapter The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the works of six different authors. Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics. (London: Penguin..P. 47 .22–49. as being helpful to and negative for democratic transition • explain the main criticisms of both Moore’s and Rueschemeyer’s work • explain what Fukuyama intends us to understand as ‘the end of history’ • explain why Huntington is sceptical about the spread of democracy to the Middle East. Learning outcomes This chapter should give you a broad understanding of the way in which the works discussed provide theories for democratisation. reprint edition) [ISBN 9780743284554]. Moore. E. B. 1983) [ISBN 9780801825224]. reprint edition 1993) [ISBN 9780807050736]. Essential reading Fukuyama. 72(3) 1993. The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. The six are grouped into pairs to look at three different approaches to democratisation: • modernisation theory • comparative historical sociology based mainly on class factors • theories based on culture and ideology. S93. all of whom are associated with different theories relating to democratic transition. you should be able to: • explain what the central logic of each of the main arguments is • list the main principles of classic modernisation theory • outline the main points made by critics of classic modernisation theory • explain why some authors have believed that there is an affinity between modernisation and democratic government • describe and explain the main weaknesses of approaches that seek to explain political change primarily in social or economic terms • list and explain the main principles of Moore’s argument in respect of the social origins of democracy • discuss the key variables identified by Rueschemeyer et al. pp. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Huntington. F.M. Stephens Capitalist Development and Democracy. 1967. Stephens and J. Rueschemeyer. D. S. Introduction So far. Statistical approaches Another approach is statistical. 2002. but to supplement it. we have discussed how we define and understand democracy and how we understand cases of semi-democracy and democratic transition. and they may produce ideas that can subsequently be tested statistically. 1996) second edition [ISBN 0801853052]. They are also better at explaining anomalous or different outcomes. Historical approaches One approach is historical. Vanhanen. The Rise of Classes and Nation States 1760–1914. revised 2005) [ISBN 0199243751]. therefore. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. but not perfect. even if we suppose that the initial theory met all of the historical facts. G.) The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. We try to explain why democratisation occurred in particular cases.) Vision and Method in Historical Sociology. Mann. They are more powerful than statistical approaches in gaining insights into particular cases. It is not intended to replace the detailed study of particular cases. we try to generalise. The relevant conditions may have changed. The Dynamics of Democratisation. (London: Routledge. (ed. 48 . It is not at all clear that such theories can ever be completely successful. We try to find correlations that indicate what the countries in each of the different categories have in common. seeking to establish findings from carefully focused comparisons. The act of theorising about politics may possibly change the way in which we think about and act in politics – and this may itself change our behaviour and its consequences. 1993) [ISBN 052144585X]. T. it might not necessarily continue to do so in the future. A good place to start. M. Sources of Social Power: Volume 2. Whitehead. 1997) [ISBN 041514406X or 0521297249]. 2000) [ISBN 0333801970]. Statistical truth is a matter of probabilities. but these need not be a problem. not every country in the world is either wholly democratic or wholly undemocratic. Skocpol. Prospects for Democracy: a Study of 172 countries. D. We look at countries that are democracies and those that are not. This chapter looks at some rather ambitious theories that seek to explain why some countries are democracies and others are not. However. is by asking what the purpose of such theorising is and what we can hope to learn from it. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. As we saw in Chapter 2. Gill. A statistical relation has to be significant. There may well be exceptional cases. Plattner The Global Resurgence of Democracy. A statistical approach can indicate the strength of relations between certain selected variables and others. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.86 Democracy and democratisation Further reading Diamond. 1984) [ISBN 0521229286]. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. and M. we still come up against the limits of inductive reasoning. and they might also be better at asking nuanced questions. The Greek philosopher Heraclitus pointed out that ‘no man jumps into the same river twice’. (ed. If there are enough similarities. T. In other words. We look at the course of history to try to find key junctures in the evolution of democracy. L. Historical approaches (usually) look at a few cases in detail. (Basingstoke: Macmillan. They might tell us that these countries are likely to be democratically ruled in 50 years’ time if they achieve reasonable economic progress in the interim and if the world does not change radically during this period. of course. it was reasonable to suppose that poverty and non-democracy went together. They might tell us that democratic breakdown in First World countries is unlikely. very illuminating. Vanhanen (1987) helps explain the failure of Weimar democracy in Germany. In general. and there is no guarantee that even these conditions will be met. None of the authors whose work is considered below will help us to assess the likelihood of a military coup in Pakistan or Venezuela within the next six or 12 months. in fact. All we can say is that a statistical relation that seemed robust enough as recently as the mid-1980s may no longer work. For example. Where insights of this kind can be found. They establish intellectual connections – through statistical or historical means – that give us an extra dimension of understanding when considering particular cases. many 49 . It was prescient of Lipset in the first edition of his work. The world is in a constant process of change. they give us an additional dimension to understand the history of particular cases. and since Africa is on the whole a poor part of the world. however. 22 African countries were authoritatively counted as new democracies. In 1998. They do not provide us with answers. however. Occasionally. Modernisation theory and its critics If we look around. which was published in 1959 (second edition 1983). too. a theorist may produce a finding that surprises us and turns out to be true. by pointing out that power relationships were rather heavily concentrated within the country at that time. Nor. We will not get very much purchase on individual events. Canada and Oceania are reasonably satisfied with the way their systems operate. What do we hope to learn from general theories? Whether we find general theories of democracy useful or not depends on what we hope to learn from them. Much less of a statistical relation between affluence and democracy now exists. Theories of this kind provide good mental exercise as well. although this does not at all suggest that they became democratic at the same pace or without struggle and conflict. we have the same problem of inductive reasoning. we are likely to have a good idea that this is so by looking at opinion poll data telling us that most people in Europe. very few African democracies existed. however. as just noted. a good knowledge of history is helpful to students of political science. to make our understanding of particular cases more sophisticated than it otherwise might be. however. It may be. They do help. Although Germany in the aggregate was an advanced industrial country at that time.Chapter 4: General theories of democratisation Here. in 1985. Attempts to find a single big explanation that can cope in its entirety with so large a topic as democratisation are likely to fail. but we have no real means of knowing whether or not this will happen. This is not. moreover. there was not the greater diffusion of power resources within Germany that tends to be found in more materially advanced countries. that some of these African democracies will eventually break down. We also see a historical trend according to which countries that are now democracies tended to democratise as they became richer. does it imply that poor countries cannot be democracies. the USA. to claim that democratic breakdown in Europe was unlikely – some people had expressed fears over the political evolution of 1950s Europe. we see that most wealthy countries in the world are liberal democracies. however. The outdoor assembly may have been feasible in a small citystate. The question is not so much whether but why this is true. modernisation theory does have advantages. The US government. People become relatively contented with their life chances and are less likely to resort to anti-democratic means in order to change them. of course. became identified with a different position. unpredictable. It also helps that First World countries have. There is little doubt. The future is. various kinds of argument are run together. Much political argument takes place through the written word – in pre-televisual days. The key point is that. It does rather de-emphasise the importance of political culture and the historical specificity of each country. been conflicts in various parts of the world. but the relation between literacy and development is not perfect. This line of analysis has frequently been criticised as too optimistic and evolutionary. for the most part. Literacy Sometimes. the European empires were in decline and Soviet communism was seen by many as an alternative to European colonialism. High levels of literacy and a good educational system 50 . What helps it is a further phenomenon that has proved broadly true up until now – that the world’s most affluent societies typically suffer from less internal inequality and a greater diffusion of economic power than poorer societies. would lead to social change. 1983). but could not serve much of a purpose once a country’s population reached tens of millions. How could a voter be expected to assess a complex economic argument if he or she could not read? This theory is appealing. Nor can we be certain that democracy is necessarily the wave of the future. This enables a happy coincidence of view between authors who put most emphasis on limited internal inequality as a key condition of democracy – the case with Vanhanen (1997) and Rueschemeyer (1992) – and those who regard affluence itself as the most important factor. experienced fairly constant improvements in living standards since around 1950. however. At the end of the Second World War. for most of the past hundred years. One of these has to do with the role of literacy in democracy. by definition. almost all of it did. The ability of societies to enjoy the benefit of steady increases in real income may also be a factor making for democratic stability. the years since 1945 have seen an absence of major war. in turn. as in the case of Lipset’s work (1959. Finally. India is a good example of a country that has remained democratic since independence despite the existence of significant illiteracy. that. the written word becomes crucial in the communication of information. a definite relation could be established between affluence and democracy. once societies reach a certain size and sophistication. If we allow for the fact that we are dealing with a relatively simple explanation that does not seek to cover everything. It believed that independent countries would gradually increase their national wealth. which in turn would ultimately bring about both democracy and development. in contrast.86 Democracy and democratisation poor countries are democracies. Economic development and democracy The question of whether economic development leads to democracy was first raised in the USA. but it is likely that it would be powerfully negative. We cannot know for certain what effect nuclear warfare would have upon democratic stability. This. although there have. Better evidence shows that the relation works in the opposite direction. By the same token. From the beginning of time until the nineteenth century. discussed later in this chapter.Chapter 4: General theories of democratisation are regarded as crucial if countries are able to move from poverty to relative affluence. Britain was the first country to urbanise extensively. Even today. At the same time. the rate of social change increased radically from the development of the railways in the 1830s and 1840s. Where there have been major social upheavals – for example. Country dwellers might organise their political lives around particular collective demands – for example. It is now heavily urbanised. but found support in the countryside. an increasing proportion of the world’s population is to be found in urban areas. evidence from some poor countries shows that very poor people are not much interested in education because they need their children to bring in an income – however small – from a very early age. Well-attested historical examples certainly point to cases in which established power was challenged in the cities. It was only in the later part of the nineteenth century that the majority of the British population was urban based. Urbanisation Another factor that has been regarded as important for the development of democratic systems is urbanisation. By the same token. Moore (1967). The pattern of urbanisation has spread from First World countries to parts of the world that are still considered relatively less developed. Urban mobs are less likely to be deferential and more likely to be radical. Although the British Industrial Revolution dates from the beginning of the nineteenth century. It has been argued that urban voters communicate more with people like each other and less with people in different class situations. Most present-day first world societies only acquired urban majorities in the early part of the twentieth century. which might in turn encourage greater political activism. Since around 1800. 51 . Why should cities be associated with democracy? Modernisation theorists have argued that the urban voter is less deferential than the rural one. tend to find greater followings in rural than in urban areas. socialist and communist parties have almost always performed better in urban than in rural areas. wealthier societies can more easily spare the resources necessary to operate ambitious public education systems. urbanisation took place even later in the main countries of Europe and in the USA. the French and Russian revolutions – rural rebellion was an important part of the process. It is possible that the anonymity of urban life can allow somewhat greater personal independence. It might be more accurate to say that country dwellers are not natural social democrats in the way that the urban working class was once reputed to be. where they are strong. including – at a very fast rate – China. It is certainly true that established churches. to regard country dwellers everywhere as naturally conservative. Moreover. calls some of these assumptions into question. however. Urbanisation is now taking place across Africa and Asia. the greater possibilities for socialisation in urban areas might allow the urban poor to appreciate the distinctiveness of their situation rather than defining their interests in terms of a dominant value system. It would be a mistake. Latin America had a rural majority in the 1950s and reached the 50 per cent urbanisation rate some time during the 1960s. for the redistribution of land or for a particular form of national self-determination – that simply do not easily fit into the world’s views of urban social democrats. most of the world’s population was rural. Under these circumstances. through active contestation rather than through the slow diffusion of power via the increased complexity of society – although diffusion may change the odds attached to the outcome of particular conflicts. Ironically. this was not generally true of Latin America. when it is so transferred. On the Left. It is certainly true that there are European cases in which the power of money was used to ensure that monarchical or aristocratic rulers became more accountable to the people.the experience of significant economic setbacks. so-called dependency theory suggested that the developing countries would be unable to catch up with First World countries. Africa. Criticisms of modernisation theory Economic criticisms Left-wing and right-wing critics challenged some of the main premises of modernisation theory during the 1960s and 1970s. some of his opponents tried to organise a run on the banks.and may well be explained by . the Middle East. survey evidence from Latin America showed a considerable increase in disenchantment with democracy. This correlates with . With only a small number of exceptions. where these doubts were elaborated in their most sophisticated form. ‘To stop the Duke. When the Duke of Wellington tried to maintain the old semi-monarchical political system in the early 1830s against demands for reform. would be extended to a wider section of the population. the distribution of power would become broader. Modernisation theorists generally believe that the process of economic development would itself tend to diffuse power within a society and therefore undermine the position of ‘traditional’ elites. the world is now very clearly divided into a number of quite rich countries and a larger number of quite poor countries. it appeared as though dependency theory could be dismissed as empirically false. because they lacked sufficient economic power. has more recently shown how difficult it is for poor countries to catch up economically with rich countries. a traditional elite would find that it no longer held all the levers of power within its own society. Although a number of Asian economies have enjoyed a positive economic performance during the 1980s and 1990s. however. even without political change. Political power is generally transferred significantly. In Latin America. doubts were expressed as to whether modernisation was actually occurring in many parts of the world. eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union. with the result being that the middle classes and others would be better able to assert their right to political representation through democratic means. these doubts were being expressed at a time when many parts of the developing world – Latin America and East Asia in particular – were doing fairly well. which had seemed at one stage to refute dependency theory. go for gold’ was the slogan. While traditional dependency theory was too pessimistic about the economic prospects of poor countries. Yet the data. Between 1995 and 2001. This version of modernisation theory is rather bland. It is likely that many people in poor countries find the slowness of any improvement in their material conditions frustrating. By the early 1980s. modernisation theory may well have been too optimistic. 52 . As society became more sophisticated.86 Democracy and democratisation Diffusion of power A broader version of modernisation theory – one that features in the work of Vanhanen – suggests that democracy is associated with the diffusion of power. Control over resources. particularly financial resources. subsequently changed its foreign policy to support democracy. although there are exceptions. This was a powerful social force that acted mainly in favour of social democracy. only around one-quarter of the workforce is engaged in manufacturing. Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 were actually invaded because the then Soviet Union feared that they were about to abandon communism. and the USA had its own civil war between 1861 and 1865. It is also true that a tradition in European sociological thought. typically only a minority of the workforce is engaged in manufacturing production. are heavily dependent upon more powerful neighbours. related rapid social change to social breakdown (although Durkheim was not primarily a political theorist as such). but the link established by early twentieth-century sociology between mass production. In many cases. poverty and potential economic power can no longer be made (Rueschemeyer. It has been suggested that these stresses were themselves likely to make it very difficult to establish democratic institutions. Britain and some British Commonwealth countries. it can be observed that a number of countries underwent unsuccessful experiments in democracy before democratic government was finally installed. It is clearly the case that some countries. This certainly had a major impact on the subsequent democratisation of most of Central and South America. 1992). only a very few (the USA. The role of population growth plays an important part in the argument. A hundred years ago. the mark of a country experiencing successful socio-economic development was the existence of a large working class made up of manual labourers. in developing countries. For example. 53 . First World countries no longer have a large traditional working class – poor people certainly are present. Democracy failed (temporarily) in Germany. and Switzerland) have a record unbroken by some form of crisis or democratic breakdown. which prior to around 1977 often supported non-democratic regimes. by virtue of their geographical position. proletarianisation. Demographic criticisms Historically speaking. Poor and traditional societies have high birth rates and high death rates. The USA. the countries of eastern Europe between 1945 and the late 1980s had little choice but to adopt some form of communism because of the will of the then Soviet Union. International criticisms Democratisation also clearly relates to international factors. Of all the developed democracies. Today.Chapter 4: General theories of democratisation Social criticisms Critics of modernisation theory are also sceptical as to whether the ‘modernisation’ experience of First World countries could be replicated in socio-economic terms in a different world order. associated particularly with Emile Durkheim. Spain and Argentina in the 1930s and in Portugal and Italy during the 1920s. In most advanced economies. and some of this is actually quite well paid. It is almost a truism within conservative social thought that social transformation can be stressful. A quick look at the demographics of development might help here. Similarly. democratic breakdown occurred well after the serious beginnings of economic development. This may make it difficult for them to adopt autonomous political strategies unwelcome to them. the level of infant and child mortality is likely to fall sharply. and a disaffected peasantry can be a powerful catalyst to radical social change. This leads to discontent. Conservative social theorists have sometimes seen the city as a source of political alienation and disaffection. occurs higher up the social scale. adds to conflict over land tenure. A further consequence of a growing population. The parental generation will not immediately change its reproductive behaviour. at other times. The arguments evaluated The non-economic critics of modernisation theory do identify some potential opponents of democracy (such as Rueschemeyer. It will not be long before the younger generation itself reaches the age of parenthood. What they see as the ‘natural’ or ‘organic’ ties of rural life are replaced by a kind of rootlessness. 54 . Aggrieved peasants threatened by conflicts over land tenure. and radical political forces have often been able to recruit extensively from the student/bohemian sub-culture of young people who may be unable to break into the fully middle-class world. 1992). even though the rate of child mortality is falling. so the cost of raising children is relatively low: they are expected to start some form of work at the age of six or seven. Another consequence of a rising population is likely to be an accelerated drift to the cities. Thus.86 Democracy and democratisation Because infant and child mortality is very high. The Zapatista rising in Mexico in 1994 would be a good example of this kind of problem. and rising living standards. A very good recent example of such a political force is Peru’s communist Sendero Luminoso. even though the death rate may be decreasing and life expectancy rising. Potentially ambitious people who find that they do not fit easily into any particular social role. This expansion is not necessarily accompanied by better teaching or more money for facilities. Studies of anti-democratic political movements often find that they are disproportionately supported by people drawn from three different groups: 1. These factors are very responsive to changes in the level of income. however. When serious development begins. 2. and a disproportionately high young population then reinforces itself by producing further children. in the hope that some will survive to support them in their old age. therefore. the birth rate remains high. As development occurs and the size of the middle classes increases. The result is that students often fail to graduate or find that they have little to offer a potential employer upon graduation. parents tend to have many children. Population growth. they expand in order to take in more students. which may lead lonely or socially dissatisfied people to drift into politically extremist movements out of a desire to find solidarity and comradeship. 3. Rapid change may be a factor here. Some traditional families who find it difficult to accept the demand for greater social and civic equality coming from democracy. As a result. A rapidly growing population is socially disruptive. increasing the pressure on relatively fixed amounts of land. which was very active in the 1980s and early 1990s. so competition for university places becomes more intense. under political pressure. universities respond by adopting a conservative policy on admissions. The existence of extremist movements with popular appeal has been seen as one of the factors behind the breakdown of political institutions. a predominantly young population comes into being. Sometimes. There is little education. and how far subjective human consciousness matters ‘autonomously’. is limited. in which conservative modernisation theorists would surely have expected democracy to break down. maintain stable democracies. Ask how far modernisation theory arguments would have predicted them. a reasonable conclusion might be that modernisation theorists have raised interesting ideas. the former British colonies in the West Indies have made a successful transition from colonial rule to democratic government. The most influential practitioners of what we might call comparative historical sociology are Barrington Moore (1967) and Rueschemeyer. We considered the role of empires in transmitting institutions in Chapter 3. Yet if one accepts that ideas are influential in this way. in fact. the birth rate. India has a largely uninterrupted history of democracy since independence in 1947. Social class and comparative historical sociology As an alternative to rather broad analyses of socio-economic factors in making democracy possible. these authors share with those we have already considered the belief that democratisation can be understood in essentially structural terms. etc. was a poor country. Nevertheless. but that they leave a great deal unexplained. democracy has survived uninterrupted to the present day. Institutional factors may be responsible for this. is very important. Ireland. as a problem of political management. as was de Valera in Ireland. It is true that many cases of democratic stability in poor countries have occurred in former British colonies. although Costa Rica has a long history of democracy. therefore. in India. For example. Even though many former British colonies did not. it is possible that parliamentary systems are more robust against stress and pressure than presidential systems. 55 . to some extent. The question of how far political outcomes can be understood by observing general social processes (structural explanations). Consensual styles of politics and a reliance on pacts and alliances that cross narrow sectional lines are feasible ways of defusing the tensions inherent in certain kinds of social conflict. Modernisation theorists still need to ask themselves why democracy sometimes survives in poor countries and has extended recently into much of Africa and Latin America. Use the arguments of both Lipset and Vanhanen. Meanwhile. the explanatory power of structural factors such as urbanisation. The record of former Spanish colonies is much less good. In most cases. some writers have attempted far more detailed historical analyses of particular transitions to see what can be learned from them. We will consider it again in the next section. one might wish to argue that structural change brings about changes in values that themselves ultimately change the nature of politics. consider three cases of democratic breakdown or near breakdown.Chapter 4: General theories of democratisation Managing social and political change The challenge of social change could be regarded. Political institutions do not just occur – they have to be built and maintained – and the subjective role of individual political leaders is likely. The transfer of ideas may be important as well. However. Stephens and Stephens (1992). Activity In conjunction with the reading in this chapter and Chapter 5. to be as important as the outcome of social and economic processes. Ghandi and Nehru were clearly committed to the principle of democracy. however. after it became independent in 1922. Traditional nineteenth-century sociologists – whether radicals. • By the same token. Moore. when we consider the last two cases that Moore discusses: • Russia • Germany. takes the argument much further back in time. such as Marx. parliamentary system with an independent judiciary. this was still a time when most French people lived in rural areas. When the USA became independent from Britain. England was certainly not a democracy. The US Constitution. the dominant scholarly trends were taken up with attempts to explore the role of the emergent working class or industrial bourgeoisie as key catalysts for political change. After 1688. p. then the conclusion still holds. but it had a liberal.86 Democracy and democratisation Barrington Moore’s approach An important work of historical sociology – and a point of departure for many other works – was produced by Barrington Moore. Immediately.viii). we come across one important feature of Moore’s approach. even if we consider that the democratic history of France started with the beginning of the Third Republic in 1871. however. If one takes the story into the more recent past (as does Moore) and considers that democracy in the USA was only assured after the defeat of the South in the 1861–65 war and the abolition of slavery. or conservatives. In Moore’s own words. such as Durkheim – put the notion of industrialisation or urbanisation at the centre of their work. He argues. Although it is not possible to trace an unbroken constitutional line from the revolution to the present day. it is nevertheless clear that it created intellectual traditions of democratic republicanism that are alive today. Moreover. the French Revolution occurred at a time when France was predominantly a rural country. This is an interesting and fruitful observation. Problems do arise. 56 . his book: ‘endeavors to explain the varied political roles played by the landed upper classes and the peasantry in the transformation from agrarian societies…to modern industrial ones…it is an attempt to discover the range of historical conditions under which either or both of these rural groups have become important forces behind the emergence of Western parliamentary versions of democracy. and dictatorships of the right and left’ (1967. There can be no doubt that some of the seminal events in the history of at least some European and American countries came at a time when most of the population lived off the land: • The English Civil War and the so-called ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 occurred when England was mainly a rural country. it was predominantly a rural society. most Americans still lived in the countryside. For many years thereafter. with its famous first amendment – the Bill of Rights – was designed largely by Virginian landowners. famously. that the success or otherwise of transitions to democracy depends upon the character of agrarian capitalism. however. When these events took place. • The USA provides another example of the same point. however. is not a guide to German politics today. Its Nazi years were barely 20 years in the past. he would not have lost the war with Octavian and Rome would have remained a republic. The notorious and not very impressive ‘Cleopatra’s nose’ theory of history asserts that. The idea of an ‘origin’ is less demanding – although it is also less enlightening. When the bourgeoisie defines its interests in opposition to the land-owning class. Christianity could never have been adopted by the empire. then this should be something that can be specified independently and applied comparatively. The causal relationship need only be probabilistic – in other words. Mark Antony would not have fallen in love with her. it need not apply on absolutely every occasion. the main hypothesis to explain the different political evolution of these various countries has to do with the role of the bourgeoisie during the period when agriculture becomes commercialised. An author seeking to establish a causal relationship. however trivial. needs theory. had Cleopatra’s nose been longer. As a republic. Germany’s Nazi experience. hypothesis and statistics. the result is likely to be democracy. the former Soviet Union was still a socialist empire. Russia is a (somewhat precarious) democracy. that cannot be said to have had an impact upon another historical event. 57 . Today. Returning to Moore’s argument.Chapter 4: General theories of democratisation When Moore wrote his book in the mid-1960s. it might have been quite reasonable for Moore to categorise the history of both of these countries as non-democratic – but can the same observation still hold good today? It is certainly an important question to ask why Russia underwent a non-democratic revolution in 1917 and why democracy did not take hold in Germany before 1945. When it forms an alliance with them. although shorter-term factors such as the disastrous experience of both during the First World War also need to be considered. the result is non-democracy. and from today’s perspective the most important features of Russia and Germany may be seen to be the fall of communism and Nazism. it necessarily had some impact upon event B. An origin is not a cause. And the whole history of the world would be unimaginably different. although the two words mean something rather similar. Germany was. Rome would not have undergone the process of imperial expansion and decline that occurred after it became an empire. although it certainly affected millions of lives. Flaws are present in Moore’s historical analysis. It is true but trivial that because event A occurred before event B. and questions about his methods have not been fully resolved. respectively. but merely with sufficient frequency to establish that a definite tendency exists. Without this distraction. because of the emergence of labour-repressive forms of agriculture that prevent the opening up of politics. however. Under these circumstances. By the same token. There were no doubt historical roots to non-democracy in both countries. A critique of Moore’s approach Even Moore’s critics accept that he has produced an interesting and original piece of work. Moore entitled his work The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. divided between a communist East and a capitalist West. If one is to establish a cause–effect relation. in 1966. however. There is no historical event. History does not stand still. This protects them from the criticism levelled at Moore and. indeed. is an occupational hazard for historical sociologists. Moore. The work of Rueschemeyer. Yet. or that the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 represented any kind of defeat for the traditional landowner classes. Little in his analysis considers the role of the state. to some extent. mostly ignores factors that he does not wish to emphasise. Many attempts have been made to find correlations between democracy or democratisation and other variables. Rueschemeyer et al.86 Democracy and democratisation The point of the Cleopatra’s nose theory is that history can give rise. 58 . these are crucial elements in the evolution of early modern and. More complex structural theories: Rueschemeyer and others One of the key differences between the comparative historical sociology of the late 1980s and early 1990s and the earlier work of Barrington Moore is the greater statistical sophistication of the former. Lipset – namely. Stephens and Stephens seeks to combine some statistical analysis with historical sociology (1992). however. to almost any number of arbitrary ideas about causation. with virtually everything. How is one to choose between conflicting interpretations? One possible solution is to try to deal. Historical sociologists may choose to interpret the course of events in terms of: • economic factors • demographic factors • the role of nations and nationalism • the character of class conflict • the rise and decline of organised religion • the role of the state • the progress of medical science • or virtually anything else. as such. is flawed in places. that they are only really interested in the history of countries that today are rich. Many historians would dispute. The problem is that any scholar starting with a framework will be tempted to make the available facts fit that framework – whether or not they easily do so. like arbitrary explanations of causality. It must also be admitted that Moore’s history. The fact that both approaches are combined surely strengthens the work. in principle. including most of South and Central America as well as North America and Europe. Rueschemeyer and others also move away from single-factor explanations of complex historical change in favour of a more nuanced set of explanations. twentieth-century Europe. They also look at a different and wider range of cases. Professional historians try to take a very wide range of factors into account when attempting to explain events – sometimes they avoid explanation altogether. seek to explain democratisation in terms of three sets of variables: • class formation and alliances • international factors • the role of the domestic state. for example. the rise of empire and the effect of war. that there were neat class factors behind the English Civil War. in principle. Flawed history. First though. and one of the most influential. In other words. and the trade cycle would become increasingly virulent. where the middle class – whose role in European democratisation was more ambiguous – played a more important role. As this very brief synopsis of the authors’ conclusions might suggest. segregated workers within factories and took few measures to organise the workers either industrially or politically. although it was often in favour of forms of political liberalisation. This is because the main respect in which their treatment differs from that of Moore (and the modernisation writers discussed in the last chapter) is the importance that they give to this particular class. Marx argued that industrialisation would. 1998. The first. the work itself is complex and its methods are sophisticated. in principle one could find out. 3. who believed that the working class was a revolutionary class whose historical role was to overthrow capitalism. its location and its potential strength compared with other classes. In general terms. what it does and what its interests may be. The working class would try to improve its position within capitalism by reformist means but would fail. The working class was organised in such a way that it was inherently likely that it would acquire a class consciousness. but not so strong that it overpowered civil society as a whole. such as the small peasantry in France. in time. Increasingly frustrated. Marx believed that working-class consciousness would develop because the factory employers did not socialise with the workers (in the way that agrarian employers often did) but rather built separate workers’ housing. 1993): 1. the general role of class analysis is worth a brief discussion at this point. As for the role of the state. Marx explicitly characterised some other classes. there would also be increased inequality of income and wealth. Marx’s theory of class Let us start with the question of how one defines what a class is. Many comments might be made about it. As we have seen. while the bourgeoisie was not especially friendly to it either. discussions of working-class politics came from Karl Marx. by looking at the right kind of statistics. the size of the working class. Although there would be economic growth. Marx compared the peasant class to ‘potatoes in a sack’.Chapter 4: General theories of democratisation The authors conclude that the main agent of democratic change in Europe was the organised working class. 2. the landed upper class was the enemy of democracy. which rubbed up against each other but did not acquire a collective awareness of each other. He characterised the working class by its relationship to the means of production. His argument can be divided into three stages (Marx. it would then turn its attention to overthrowing the capitalist system itself. Mann. 59 . this needed to be strong enough to maintain domestic order and to act with a degree of internal autonomy. spread across much of the world and that this would bring about a very large increase in the absolute numbers and weight of the working class. but this discussion will focus particularly on the authors’ treatment of the working class. International factors were sometimes negative for democracy. but overall they had varying consequences. as unlikely to acquire consciousness because a peasant’s experience of work did not bring him (or her) much into contact with other peasants but rather into a world of superiors and (occasionally) subordinates. Marx believed that capitalism was incapable of significantly increasing the living standards of the working class. especially if the country was excessively dependent upon others. This was less of a factor in South and Central America. the ability of workers to enjoy limited increases in income introduced an element of choice into revolutionary working-class politics. This brings us to the question of class-consciousness. Although it might be claimed that there will always be a tendency for organisations to represent their own interests rather than the interests of their members. tended to offer a social as well as a purely political aspect. but they might just as easily want to reform the existing system. The number of middle-class occupations was also slowly increasing. • They might decide not to take an active interest in politics and live for their families or their sporting activities instead. A working-class party or a trade-union bureaucracy will not succeed for long without responding in some serious way to what the membership wants. He certainly underestimated. It was also the case that under some circumstances. such as parties and trade unions.86 Democracy and democratisation Criticisms of class-based interpretations The variability of capitalism Much has been said about all three of Marx’s assertions. there are influences in both directions. it is clear that the urban working class might adopt any of a variety of possible political positions. and it might be best to take them in reverse order. trade unions were able to increase the living standards of those working-class members who were able to join them. democratisation has enabled workers and their families to vote for political parties that were able to achieve power and use the tax system and public spending to bring about at least a limited redistribution of income in the direction of poorer people. Marx did not actually claim (as his critics have asserted) that the working class would undergo continuous drops in real living standards. There is not necessarily a connection between membership of a sector of society and social activism of any particular kind. Moreover. Since 1900. It might be countered that the working-class experience – which is one of social as well as occupational difference – was inherently socialising under conditions of industrial capitalism. Although it was true that social inequality remained great. however. Even by 1900. 60 . Should workers seek to improve their position within the system or should they seek to overthrow the system altogether? Some political revolutionaries sought to bring about the overthrow of capitalism by seeking positions of influence within workingclass movements. What creates class-consciousness? Why should workers identify themselves politically as members of the working class? There are many other ways in which they might define themselves: • They could be nationalists or members of a religious party. it was becoming clear that the living standards of the working classes in industrial countries were showing a slow but definite trend towards improvement. political organisations. the likelihood that – where successful – capitalism might deliver quite significant improvements in real wages. • They might have ambitions to upward mobility within the existing system. Even if one were to accept some of the premises of Marx’s original argument (and he was a perceptive critic of capitalism). They might want the overthrow of capitalism. but it is reasonable to suppose that it is an objective that accurately reflects the aspirations of most individual businesspeople. The limited spread of industrialisation Marx was more perceptive than many other writers of his generation about the spread and significance of industrialisation. and they point out that working-class people have voted for and otherwise supported a range of parties with a wide variety of policies and aspirations. be co-opted by authoritarian leaders. (1992) are fully aware of these difficulties. but how illuminating is it? The problem is that working-class politics. They do not deny that members of the working class have engaged in politics or that some organisations. this was still a process with limits. however.. this is indeed true. may have little to do with any objective definition of the working class. were able to move into the middle class. The USA never had as high a proportion of its population engaged in manufacturing as was the case in Europe. The political weight of such people has diminished largely in proportion to their diminished numbers. They do doubt. What matters. and here too there has been a sustained decline since the early part of the twentieth century. In other words. when considering why Mexico and Argentina have experienced difficult transitions to democracy. working-class interests are not always easy to define. is the nature of the political leadership that successfully attracts working-class support on a sustained basis. moreover. It is reasonable to suppose that the business class is primarily interested in making money – this is not necessarily an interest that will lead to class solidarity. these forms are – according to Rueschemeyer et al.Chapter 4: General theories of democratisation Nevertheless. – of key significance in the emergence of democracy. as defined by Rueschemeyer et al. or at least their children. Rueschemeyer et al. under certain circumstances. or to overthrow the existing system altogether? A critic of Marxist kinds of theory might reasonably express scepticism about whether working-class politics really exist. only a very few people are engaged in the blue-collar manufacturing jobs regarded as typical working-class work. however. For example. During the course of the twentieth century. they implicitly accept that there is no such thing as a clearcut definition of working-class interests. explain that working-class movements in these countries have been co-opted by leaderships whose own commitment to democratic principles is ambiguous at best. however. but is hardly economically so. forms of working-class politics that are conducive to democracy. whether any claim to ‘represent’ a class can be substantiated. 61 . In many Third World countries. One can observe. Many former workers. This argument is defensible. to show solidarity and advance collective class interests (assuming that these can be satisfactorily defined). to use working-class organisation to improve the position of the working class within the system. There is. At an empirical level. That is quite a different matter from the inherent outlook of the support itself. but it also constitutes an admission that the working class can. A trade-union official who lives in an expensive house and sends his children to a fee-paying school may be ‘socially’ working class. identify themselves as working class. Rueschemeyer’s treatment of class Rueschemeyer et al. They seek to overcome them by defining working-class politics in ‘social’ terms. according to critics. the relative share of the population involved in manual labour has consistently declined in Europe – at first gradually and then quite quickly. a danger of circularity in the explanation. But what is the corresponding working-class interest? Is it to achieve some financial success and so emerge from the working class. such as trade unions or parties. As noted above. do attempt to go beyond Europe. This is because some degree of autonomous law enforcement is necessary to persuade social forces to operate through institutions. This argument is probably true. if allowed to do so. to the history of the countries that he does not specifically analyse. suggest that there are two opposite extremes in state–society relations that are detrimental to democratic development. develop. Rueschemeyer et al. will be hard to find. under these circumstances. that the conclusion follows from the argument. then the state–government distinction. that the democracies in these countries are less firmly established. it is damaging to have a weak state completely penetrated by powerful social groups or business enterprises. which is necessary for peaceful political contestation to develop. these authors conclude in any case that the role of the working class in democratic transitions was much less in Latin America than in Europe. press for democratisation. if the state is seen as the private property of an individual ruler or elite group. Turkey is another country that is sometimes seen as having an overpowering state with regard to civil society. where the co-optation of civil society by a post-revolutionary state has allowed the maintenance of one-party rule until quite recently. They tend to conclude. are left with the observation that the working class is democratic when it is democratically led and that it can. Even if it were true that the working class played a major role in the transition to democracy in (say) nineteenth-century Britain. 1. It becomes even more modest when set beside these authors’ admission that working-class politics mattered far more to democratisation in Europe than it did in South or Central America. It would seem clear that. therefore. to put the matter differently. The role of the state The role of the state in democratisation is more complex. This has to do with historical specificity or. 62 . Some Central American countries are seen as cases in which an insufficiently autonomous state is an impediment to democratisation. effective and tightly run states are not necessarily the enemies of democracy if the state elite itself is clearly pro-democratic. whether there can be (or is) any general pattern to which most cases of democratisation can be expected to correspond. Rueschemeyer et al. It is logically possible that the different combination of forces that lay behind the stabilisation of democracy in South America (with a far stronger middle-class role) could turn out to be as effective in its own historical context as the very different combination in Europe. make a contribution to the establishment of democracy. Moore hardly discusses the issue at all. however. and a significant part of their work is taken up with a discussion of Latin America. At the other extreme. 2. the state can sometimes play an overpowering role and inhibit the development of plural groups within civil society that might. if at all. At one extreme. but it is very modest. Something of this kind seems to have happened in Mexico. A further question needs to be asked about the argument that Rueschemeyer et al. although Turkey (like Mexico) is now a democracy. It is not clear. Juan Peron won contested and fair presidential elections in Argentina in 1946 with the willing support of the leaders of organised labour. Rueschemeyer et al.86 Democracy and democratisation Nor was this just a matter of authoritarian control. On the other hand. then why should this also be true of the transition to democracy in Peru or Chile? Moore admits that his own argument does not translate very easily. but it has its adherents – Fukuyama is one of them. This is an ambitious approach. The nineteenth century saw the gradual sweeping away in Europe and the USA of systems of governance based on traditional forms of belief. Democracy has won the day. Some countries might have adopted democracy out of an over-optimistic view of its economic benefits. In this final part we look at theories of ideas and democracy. rather than aspire to collective achievement at the price of authoritarianism and hierarchy. but it has involved a battle for power as well.Chapter 4: General theories of democratisation Activity Read Rueschemeyer et al. such as fascism and forms of politics based on religious belief. 63 . One of the best-known writings of this kind is that of Fukuyama. Given the choice. and we will consider his work first. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the twentieth century saw the discrediting of socialism. and the second part with theories of social class and democracy. but they became secularised in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Critics have pointed out that non-enlightenment philosophies. He only means that the dominating ideological struggles that have given a kind of meaning to political conflict since the days of the French Revolution are largely over. These were once expressed in religious belief. Critics of Fukuyama Fukuyama’s argument has proved controversial. Ideas can be rooted in a political culture (a viewpoint that is clearly formulated by Huntington). Fukuyama and the end of history Some authors have indeed argued that the idea of democracy does have universal appeal. is that democracy appeals to core human values of which the most important are human equality and the right of self-expression. albeit incompatible ones. Democracy as ideas and culture: Fukuyama and Huntington The first part of this chapter was taken up with theories of economic progress and democracy. but they can also be posited as reflecting universal aspirations. were by no means absent in the twentieth century. (1992) carefully and list all of the countries in which the working class was regarded as the most important force making for democratisation. essentially. people would rather live in a mediocre society with nobody clearly better than they are. and they may turn to alternatives if it becomes clear that these benefits are not forthcoming. His argument. This criticism calls into question the idea that human history is governed by some ideational notion of rationality or abstract human preferences for one system of government over another. Fukuyama’s actual argument is somewhat more limited than this suggests. leaving democracy as the only major belief system that both emphasised equality and proved compatible with the efficient running of a modern state. Although ‘the end of history’ is an ambitious theme. Fukuyama’s critics have also pointed out that liberal capitalism may not necessarily be as successful an economic strategy in poorer countries as it has been in the USA. because it is the form of government best suited to the aspirations of ordinary human beings. He does not mean that nothing more will happen to human political life. Make another list of countries in which other factors were regarded as being more important. One cannot deny altogether that politics in the past century has involved a conflict of ideas. The most progressive ideas in the nineteenth century were democracy and socialism – both depended on notions of human equality. does not bear out all of Huntington’s judgments. or at least a reasonably high. It is true that the use of surveys to try to capture political culture in different countries has advanced considerably since Huntington’s own work was published. In some ways Huntington is rather cavalier in his treatment of what he calls civilisations. For this reason. some kinds of political culture are conducive to democracy. he does not explicitly present a theory of democracy in his work. commitment to democracy on the part of electorates in new democracies. but he does see it as relating to a particular kind of political culture. he does not use recent survey evidence to try to substantiate his arguments about civilisations. Beyond doubt. although in principle this does exist. democratic breakdown in established democracies has been rare. civilisation and culture: the work of Huntington Huntington’s discussion of democracy is far more sceptical. Ultimately. Public opinion can change over time or be manipulated by powerful elites. most Muslims do not want conflict with liberal democracies. He departs from a far more culturally specific viewpoint. He argues that the spread of democracy during the 1980s and 1990s to parts of the world that had not been democracies in the past relates more to perceptions that democracy had made the USA successful than to any intellectual conversion to the desirability of democracy as such. Despite the considerable spread of democracy since 1985. For example. the observation that democracy requires committed democrats is true. however. In fact. and it shows that such people do exist in the real world. Huntington may well be right to suppose that some systems of government that did not democratise during the 1980s or early 1990s are not necessarily going to become democratic soon. Fukuyama’s approach does have some advantages. according to Huntington. the most important is Islam. For example. It is also the case that cultural differences may lead to forms of political conflict that make a consensus on the desirability of spreading democracy across the globe more difficult to achieve. relatively few Germans in the 1930s were genuinely committed Nazis. then how useful is it to group these systems together into so-called civilisations? Huntington’s work is most valuable as a corrective to what may be seen as Fukuyama’s over-optimism. For example. which he defines as a civilisation. It is also clear that public opinion surveys do show a high. The preferences of public opinion are not necessarily conclusive evidence of how a country’s political system will develop. and only a handful of them have given way to overt systems of authoritarianism. while others are not – among the less suitable cultures. some countries have not adopted democracy and seem unlikely to do so in the near future. but they still ultimately went to war under a Nazi regime. It is clear that democratic values do have a genuine appeal to people. We may have to get used to the fact that the world still contains some influential non-democracies. Fukuyama is surely right to state that democracy is both an intellectually appealing and a popular form of government. many people genuinely see democracy as a desirable form of government. The 64 . Democratic breakdowns in countries that have become democratic since around 1975 have been comparatively few. Democracy. This does not mean that democracy can easily be introduced against the wishes of powerful non-democrats or anti-democrats. The data about public opinion that is now available.86 Democracy and democratisation In defence of Fukuyama Nevertheless. Yet if public opinion is not regarded as key evidence for the future orientations of political systems. however. because they see its characteristics as inherently attractive. We might regard these systems as new democracies. Cross-reference them to Vanhanen’s indicators of power resources. be rather too pessimistic about the prospects for new democracies. By the end of this chapter and the relevant reading. Consider which of the two notions – power resources or civilisations – best explains whether these countries are democracies or not. Japan and now perhaps Taiwan are obvious counter-examples. India.Chapter 4: General theories of democratisation more difficult international security situation following the events of 11 September 2001 may work against further democratisation. even though economic progress in democratic Third World countries has not been especially impressive. Germany did not become securely democratic until the defeat of Nazism. however. it is not at all clear that democracy is only feasible in Western or Christian societies. but works of this kind do raise serious issues and it is well worth them being written. Their purpose is mainly to raise awareness and encourage discussion rather than to present hard-and-fast rules about democracy. the US government strongly opposed the military coup in Pakistan in 1999. they cannot easily take on long-term institution shaping interests as well. To the extent that the interests of the Great Powers lie in pursuing short-term security imperatives. Activity List the most important countries within each of Huntington’s civilisations. all generalisations of this rather ambitious kind break down against the obstinacy of specific facts. Fukuyama seeks to draw general lessons from the ending of the Cold War. Huntington may. In the end. Both Fukuyama and Huntington raise very big issues. 65 . the US government found it necessary to drop its objection to military rule in Pakistan. A reminder of your learning outcomes This chapter should give you a broad understanding of the way in which the works discussed provide theories for democratisation. while Huntington is more concerned with the failure of the liberal democracies to transform the countries of the Middle East in the direction of greater democratisation or greater sympathy for the USA. Less reversal of democracy in Latin America and eastern Europe has occurred than pessimists expected. Indeed. you should be able to: • explain what the central logic of each of the main arguments is • list the main principles of classic modernisation theory • outline the main points made by critics of classic modernisation theory • explain why some authors have believed that there is an affinity between modernisation and democratic government • describe and explain the main weaknesses of approaches that seek to explain political change primarily in social or economic terms • list and explain the main principles of Moore’s argument in respect of the social origins of democracy • discuss the key variables identified by Rueschemeyer et al. as being helpful to and negative for democratic transition • explain the main criticisms of both Moore’s and Rueschemeyer’s work • explain what Fukuyama intends us to understand as ‘the end of history’ • explain why Huntington is sceptical about the spread of democracy to the Middle East. Furthermore. For example. but when anti-Taliban military operations began in October 2001. nor Russia until the downfall of communism. if any. ‘The spread of democracy to over 50 countries since the mid-1970s proves that Fukuyama is likely to be right about “the end of history”. ‘The principal weakness of Moore’s analysis is his class reductionism. What implications does Huntington’s theory of clashing civilisations have for the spread of democracy? 66 . What general lessons. 5. Does underdevelopment make it more difficult to sustain a democracy? If so. What happens to societies when they modernise? What are the political consequences likely to be? 2.’ Discuss. why has democracy sometimes survived in poor countries? 4.’ Discuss. have we to learn from the Rueschemeyer study of democratisation? 6.86 Democracy and democratisation Sample examination questions 1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of economic explanations for democratisation? 3. 7. you should be able to: • discuss the main explanations given by scholars for democratic breakdowns – when these have in fact occurred – and for the nonoccurrence of democratic breakdown in wealthy democracies • explain what the main theories of democratic breakdown are. L. 2000) [ISBN 0754613461]. Fukuyama. 2006. J. et al. E. 1997) [ISBN 0801857953]. although it was not so rare in the comparatively recent past. and how they relate to one or more specific examples • examine how far class factors can be said to have influenced antidemocratic right-wing interventions in countries such as Spain and Chile • explain why some people think that authoritarianism is more economically efficient than democracy • outline why democratic stability has so far remained the normal case in First World democracies. and P. Stephens Capitalist Development and Democracy. 1992) [ISBN 9780226731445]. The chapter then looks at the main reasons for the stability of democracy in wealthy countries.K. democratic breakdown and the prevention of democratic breakdown Chapter 5: Threats to democracy. especially in poor countries. (eds) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. (Chicago: University of Chicogo Press. The End of History and the Last Man. (London: Sinclair-Stevenson. 1992) [ISBN 9781856191470]. M. Buxton. Further reading Bull. It considers some empirical cases first and then looks at explanations to do with: • class conflict • international opposition to democracy • the argument that dictatorships can be more efficient than democracies. democratic breakdown and the prevention of democratic breakdown Aims of the chapter This chapter tries to explain why democratic breakdown is relatively rare today. Learning outcomes By the end of the chapter and the associated reading. Stephens and J.. (London: Penguin. J. Newell (eds) Corruption in Contemporary Politics. reprint edition) [ISBN 0743284550]. Rueschemeyer. Essential reading Galbraith. The Failure of Political Reform in Venezuela. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. F. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 67 .Chapter 5: Threats to democracy. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Group. D. 2003) [ISBN 0333802985]. The Culture of Contentment. Diamond. As with the readings discussed in the last chapter. when a considerable number of weak democracies were replaced with authoritarian or outright fascist systems. M. A number of military coups took place in South America. and there was a failed coup attempt in Spain as recently as 1981. Prospects for Democracy: a Study of 172 countries. An evident premise behind Fukuyama (1992) is that democracy should not break down once it has been properly established. such as Argentina and Chile. pp. in poorer Third World countries.) Towards Sustainable Democracy in the Third World. therefore. O’Neill. The first approach has to do with general theories. (ed. Relatively wealthy countries can face democratic crises.P. however. Government & Opposition. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. We should not look only at the defeat of democrats without considering the victory of non-democrats. does not help much when considering the possible futures of poor countries that have democratised since the 1970s. There were many examples of democratic breakdown in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. At various times in the past. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Huntington. 1999) [ISBN 0745608426]. Philip. It could possibly be argued that the most dangerous figures 68 . scholars have approached the question of democratic breakdown in two different ways. although France came close in and just after 1958. 2001) [ISBN 0333802500]. but this need not lead to democratic breakdown. T. The second approach is to look at the actual or possible appeal of non-democratic forms of government. why scholars have on the whole paid less attention to discussing democratic breakdown than they did a generation ago. but it has to be said that they have not yet been falsified. S. These theories seem fairly optimistic. (London/ Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Introduction We are no doubt fortunate that there has been no case of democratic breakdown in any First World democracy since 1945. G. though not invariably.86 Democracy and democratisation Haynes. This is no longer the case. without necessarily accepting any authoritarian ideology. ‘The Venezuelan Coup Attempt of February 1992’. A. 2. It does explain. Democracy also broke down in Greece in 1967. though. people might reject it on pragmatic grounds. J. even in the most politically sophisticated and economically developed countries of the region. fascism and communism appeared to many people – including some intellectuals in wealthy countries – to be attractive models. Today. In order to study democratic breakdown. of course. the appeal of potential alternatives to democracy – fundamentalist Islam and developmental dictatorship – is more limited. and several incidences of military involvement in Turkish politics have occurred since 1945.454–69. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1993) [ISBN 0806125160]. States of Development. 1. Austin (eds) Democracy and Cultural Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press with the Hansard Society. such as Pakistan and Zimbabwe. 2000) [ISBN 0199290008]. Democracy has also broken down more often. Leftwich. Vanhanen. 27(4) 1992. In places where democracy performs really badly. Vanhanen (1997) also claims that democracy is here to stay in countries whose index of power resources has passed a certain threshold. (London: Routledge. and D. This kind of theorising. we have to look further afield. 1997) [ISBN 041514406X or 0521297249]. however. It may be that the relative importance of these two aspects – democratic weakness and anti-democratic strength – varies between cases. Countries such as South Korea. The argument that authoritarianism is somehow best for economic efficiency will be discussed in a later part of this chapter. there are few democrats and many authoritarians. It was not so much that democracy failed. was ready for full membership of the European Community. At one end of the scale. Are there good arguments to the effect that democracy is not necessarily the most appropriate form of government under all circumstances? It is certainly true that from the viewpoint of economic growth some of the most successful governments of the twentieth century have been authoritarian. by the mid-1970s. Democracy has not so much failed as been insufficiently tried. This may be because elites prefer non-democracy due to their interest in pursuing goals that they might consider incompatible with democracy – such as rapid economic development. At the other. democracy seemed so unsuccessful and corrupt that it failed to generate any popular enthusiasm. today. there have been historical periods in which it was democracy that appeared to be in retreat. and the 1960s and early 1970s in respect of Latin America. Franco’s Spain developed from effectively being a Third World country to being a society that. but that it had not really been tried. have often been high. Many people would prefer to live in a country whose economic performance was no better than average. Vanhanen may be right to suppose that an unequal distribution of factors of power within a society may be negative for democracy when such cases arise. The 1920s and 1930s were the most evident period in respect of Europe. democracy proved vulnerable to replacement by authoritarian rule at two opposite extreme situations. Democratic breakdown: cases and near misses Although. For example. Pinochet took power in Chile when that country was in severe economic crisis. At the one extreme. The overthrow of the Weimar Republic in Germany in 1933 principally had to do with a general lack of support for democracy. but found lacking in practice because of its inability to resolve pressing problems. who may appear to be liberal democrats but are not. elites felt threatened and frightened by democracy and wanted to put a stop to it. At the other end of the scale. The discussion below looks at one of the 1990s cases – namely Venezuela – in some detail. but where they could feel safe and at peace. democracy appears to be in the ascendancy and nondemocracy in retreat. the Chilean coup of 1973 reflected a widespread (though by no means universally held) idea that democracy had failed in that country. An unfavourable international climate might also be an influence.Chapter 5: Threats to democracy. the Chilean economy was by far the most successful in Latin America. China and Taiwan made considerable material progress under authoritarian rule. They have the power to deceive people who might otherwise reject an openly anti-democratic politician. although these did not quite amount to democratic breakdown. democratic breakdown and the prevention of democratic breakdown for democracy are semi-democrats. Its opponents could then attack democracy for being not so much threatening as pointless. in terms of repression and inequality. Much the same could be said about the various populist experiments tried in Latin America in the 1990s. The social costs of these achievements. it may be that democracy might be preferred in principle. rather than any idea that it had not been sufficiently tried. 69 . During these periods. and when he left power 16 years later. the international price of copper fluctuated greatly (as it still does today). in 1970. Under these circumstances. one of the most overtly institutionalised democracies (Rueschemeyer. there was enough consistency in the electoral process to convince some observers that democracy in Chile was fully established. This is an obvious point of contrast. 70 . the process clearly introduces some dangers. but the Great Depression set in motion a series of developments that forced the military from power. The overthrow of President Allende in Chile in 1973 was the result of social polarisation following on from excessive social conflict. Salvador Allende won the Chilean presidential elections in 1970 as the Socialist candidate. 2. One trend was the expansion of political participation. This meant that only a minority – though a substantial one – could vote. policy failure and a general sense of futility. It might be that the demands of new electors. Women were not given the right to vote. Two more ominous trends lay below the surface. Copper was losing ground to aluminium in the world economy. however. The military dictatorship that replaced the Allende government was particularly brutal. the suffrage was extended to cover virtually everybody. there were regular elections and alternations in power – there were socialists in the Chilean government as early as 1939. This encouraged many Chileans. Of all the countries in Latin America. Allende himself never seems to have made up his mind between the two. Despite the banning of the Communist Party for a decade at the height of the Cold War. Although it is not necessarily ominous for the electorate to expand in an existing democratic context. or organisations that compete with each other for the popular vote. Six times as many Chileans voted in 1970 as in 1952. In retrospect. The coup attempts in Venezuela in 1992 (which failed narrowly) show that democracy can also be vulnerable to atrophy. During the 1950s and 1960s. Allende inherited a weak economy and mismanagement made it much worse. Economic decline and political tension then reinforced each other and set off a spiral of events that led to the intervention of the military in September 1973. Chile in 1973 The Chilean case is fairly well known. Chile had. and countries other than Chile were rapidly increasing their output of copper. observers of Chile in the 1950s were too complacent about what might happen as the franchise became less and less restricted. There had been a brief experiment with military rule in the late 1920s. The Venezuelan case also provides an example of a country in which democracy might have broken down but has so far narrowly survived. thus enabling his political enemies to portray him as a revolutionary. could damage existing institutional arrangements.86 Democracy and democratisation Good examples of each of these two extremes come from Latin America. He was the head of a four-party coalition within which there was considerable tension between the reformist and the revolutionary wings. and there was an illiteracy disqualification as well. to look for ever more radical solutions to their country’s problems. Chile was heavily dependent on copper exports and suffered for this dependency. The other key trend was the relative decline in the Chilean economy. 1. All of this engendered a politics of frustration. and many thousands of Chileans lost their lives in the resulting repression. The alternations in power of the 1930s and 1940s took place in a country with relatively few electors. From the early 1930s onwards. and their leaders. 1992). as the high expectations of Chileans in the postwar years were not met. During this period. Meanwhile. and needed to be financed. the price of oil held steady during the 1950s and 1960s. in some cases. Despite these advantages. Venezuela was dependent on oil revenues in precisely the same way that Chile was dependent on copper. By the end of the decade. 71 . local governors were appointed from the centre rather than being elected directly – this was also true of municipal authorities until 1969. He stood for president in 1998 and won. Additional problems had to do with the rather hierarchical. It then increased sharply during the 1970s before falling back with equal sharpness in the mid-1980s. The combination of an aloof political system and economic decline led to a very severe popular disillusionment with politics. Judicial power was also weak and often corrupt. However. Elections had been held consistently since 1958. The result of this was to create a classic. non-receptive and generally closed nature of the main democratic institutions themselves and with the rigid and ineffective nature of the public bureaucracy. The difficulty with the democratic institutions had partly to do with the electoral system. and Venezuela avoided the extension of military rule that happened across so much of the rest of the region in the 1960s and 1970s. but that paid little respect to due process. democratic breakdown and the prevention of democratic breakdown The near-miss in Venezuela The Venezuelan case was more ambiguous in the sense that there were two military coup attempts in 1992 which did not succeed. Hugo Chavez – was elected to the presidency with 56 per cent of the vote in December 1998. One of these flaws was economic. boom and slump effect in Venezuela. the slump to capital flight and misery. whereas copper prices have always fluctuated. although the coup failed. His victory. However. the party elites developed close relationships with business interests. President and congress were elected together and there were no mid-term elections. but most presidential candidates were simply nominated through internal party processes. The boom led to mismanagement and corruption. We now need to move away from discussion of particular situations to see what general factors can be taken into account when discussing the breakdown of democracy. even by US standards. the coup leader – Hugo Chavez – was later granted amnesty by the government.Chapter 5: Threats to democracy. As a result. He subsequently changed the entire national constitution in ways that were certainly popular. One of the parties occasionally experimented with a primary system. The political parties that ran the country were politically moderate and ready to negotiate with each other. did not fully stabilise the situation in the military. This has remained difficult since 1992 and still does so today. 2. This led. Whereas the process of selecting candidates was rather centralised. The Venezuelan case is important because many observers saw the country in the 1970s – like Chile a generation earlier – as a stable South American democracy. but very large. Election campaigns were extremely expensive. Business interests were also heavily involved in policy-making. Until 1989. the Venezuelan people had lost confidence in their politicians’ ability to manage the country’s affairs either honestly or competently. while certainly achieved by fully democratic means. There was contestation and alternation in power. the man who led the first coup attempt – Lt Col. to suspicions of corruption and also to a distancing between ordinary people and their political representatives. democracy in Venezuela was also seriously flawed in two ways: 1. Elections were held every five years. an opportunistic coup by a small group of relatively junior officers came close to success and was widely applauded. The new constitution was not generally accepted by Chavez’ opponents. thereby reinforcing the role of party machinery. Moreover. So why should the working class precipitate class confrontation when it has little prospect of victory and every likelihood of defeat? One possible answer is that what matters is the political leadership of the working class rather than its structural political characteristics as a class. Why should an employing class. Pinochet in Chile and Papadopoulos in Greece – were concerned above all with destroying challenges to the existing order from the left of the political spectrum. to the effect that the working class tends to be prodemocratic in its orientation. 72 . If this is broadly true. Twentieth-century revolutions also involved some kind of ‘vanguard’ political leadership. but this resulted in a Stalinist dictatorship. of them writing within the Marxist tradition – class conflict provides an important explanation for democratic breakdown (see Rueschemeyer. France or Scandinavia. always assuming that this is something that can actually be said to exist. Those who argue that class conflict is a primary factor in explaining democratic breakdown in general need also to explain why it has not had this effect in other parts of the world. Every successful revolution in history has involved a significant degree of involvement from rural forces and at least some from the urban middle class. When labour movements were in the hands of moderate politicians. All of these were overthrown by right-wingers. It is certainly true that some of the most notorious destroyers of democracy – Franco in Spain. such as the UK. the Bolshevik vanguard in the former Soviet Union did successfully make a revolution. Class conflict was certainly an important explanation of the coup in Chile. 1992). The second reason is political. We have already seen that capitalism does have the capacity to raise the living standards of ordinary people via the normal process of economic growth. we considered the arguments of Rueschemeyer et al.86 Democracy and democratisation General explanations Class conflict For a number of scholars – many. 1. this might have been a different matter. and no new revolutions (of this kind) in industrial countries are expected soon. When there was a significant communist or ‘ultra’ leadership. In the last chapter. faced with potentially militant workers. The number of Marxian working class-led revolutions currently stands at zero. By the same token. which exploited rather than represented its social supporters. not simply buy them off by offering pay increases or selective opportunities for promotion. however. the workers have almost invariably lost. It played no significant part in events in Venezuela. democracy was not in danger. Communist or other revolutionary forms of politics were influential in the political composition of the Weimar Republic in Germany. and is evidently not an essential ingredient in any threat to democracy. though not all. When class polarisation has occurred. The first reason is economic. however. and why should a working class not accept such inducements? 2. then why should class conflict lead to the overthrow of democracy? There are two compelling reasons why we would not expect working class assertiveness to lead to the collapse of democracy. the Popular Front in Spain and Popular Unity in Chile. and it played a significant – though probably secondary – part in his overthrow. Since the mid1980s the US preference for democratic governments within Latin America may well have warned off potential military coup leaders in particular countries. The US government actively sought to encourage opposition to Allende. the leader of the left wing of the Christian Democratic Party. Tomic’s radical Catholicism might. as a political movement. the key issue may be conflict rather than class. This was very much the case in Cuba with Castro. These factors can be observed. This factor may also have played a part in the stabilisation of democracy after the fall of the Colonels’ regime in Greece in 1974. International influences International issues were also important in the cases of Chile and Venezuela. however. In practice. In the past. The Marxism prevalent in Spain in the 1930s and in Chile in the 1960s was aggressively anti-clerical. how society is organised and how the most important social organisations are led. but they cannot be deduced from a country’s socio-economic characteristics. have been selfconsciously supportive of democracy. The Cold War was clearly an important influence in the Chilean case. a significant proportion of the world’s population (though a much diminished one by comparison with a century ago) cannot choose its government without some reference to the wishes of one or more powerful neighbour. It might also have been that hostility to a powerful neighbour built up to a point where a domestic dictator could achieve power and popularity by asserting the national identity of his country. but was about atheism as well. was by no means the only factor in democratic breakdown in countries where this has taken place. In point of fact. One important reason for the stabilisation of democracy in Spain after the death of Franco in 1975 was the desire of much of the Spanish elite to enter the European Community. Ideas about politics. It may also be that class conflict. however. international developments and pure contingencies matter as well. This led to hostile reactions from people who might not have been so threatened by the purely economic aspect of what the left-wing governments were proposing. International pressures in recent years. when on three separate occasions the US government publicly declared its opposition to a coup. In Venezuela. however. democratic breakdown and the prevention of democratic breakdown In other words. whose successful defiance of the USA played a key part in his consolidation of power. was not just about equality. have been more acceptable to moderate Chilean conservatives than Allende’s Marxist atheism. This depends upon how these differences are interpreted. the USA was opposed to a coup and made its opposition clear. This might sometimes have been because a powerful neighbour was simply opposed to democracy in a satellite country.Chapter 5: Threats to democracy. Comparative politics tends to operate on the assumption that most people live in a world of effectively independent countries. heavy international involvement was mostly negative from the point of view of democratic stability. We cannot safely deduce whether social differences in any particular society will lead to conflict. It is entirely possible that this was the case in respect of Venezuela during the 1990s. 73 . while important. the campaign on which Allende fought the 1970 elections in Chile was not significantly different from the campaign of Rodmiro Tomic. Additional reasons seem to have contributed to democratic breakdown in both Spain and Chile. The religious issue should not be ignored – Marxism. This was largely the case in eastern Europe until 1986. In Paraguay in 2001. without local democrats. those who agreed with the statement that ‘in certain circumstances an authoritarian government can be better than a democratic one’ rose from 11 per cent to 21 per cent. the percentage of Argentinians agreeing that ‘democracy is preferable to any other kind of government’ fell from 77 per cent in 1995 to 58 per cent in 2001. Will people become disillusioned with democracy if democratic governments perform poorly in policy terms? Disillusionment with democracy as a result of severe corruption and policy mismanagement did play a significant part in the near-breakdown of democracy in Venezuela during the 1990s. though his government was clearly a failure on far more important criteria. however. there does seem to be survey evidence that a failure to progress economically has led to growing distrust of democracy since the late 1990s. the performance of newly installed democratic governments in many regions of the world – in Africa. at best. Meanwhile. How well founded are these claims? 74 . According to a poll reported in the Economist (26 July 2001). look again at the work of Linz and Stepan on democratic consolidation (1996). at least). the former Soviet Union and Latin America – turned out to be disappointing (during the 1990s. however. History does not really record whether he succeeded. It is true that the big powers today are less likely to try to undermine democracy in Third World countries than they were during the days of the Cold War and are more likely. of secondary importance. 41 per cent of respondents clearly preferred democracy in 1995 – this had fallen to 30 per cent by 2001. that they are more likely to be able to achieve national progress and prosperity than democrats. even when they are favourable.86 Democracy and democratisation Efforts by the international community to press for democratisation are sometimes ambiguous in their effects. Those who preferred authoritarianism under certain circumstances also declined – but from 21 per cent to 18 per cent. Authoritarians do argue. From the economic viewpoint. How consolidated would you say that Venezuela was in 1992 and Chile in 1973? What have we to learn from the two experiences about democratic consolidation as a concept? Developmental dictatorship? Mussolini famously claimed that Italian Fascism would make the trains run on time. it would appear that the initial pressures for democratisation came from within. In Brazil. This response also indicated a swing of opinion against democracy. Democracy cannot survive. more people preferred dictatorship under certain circumstances to democracy under all circumstances. however. Policy failure Many theorists of democracy have tended to take it for granted that a country is likely to achieve material progress if it: • adopts liberal capitalism as an economic system • adopts democracy as a form of government • gives due weight to technocratic expertise in policy-making. in consequence. and international pressures are generally likely to be. to offer limited encouragement to democratising movements. and received international support only after it had already become effective to some extent in domestic terms. With respect to the majority of countries that democratised after 1980. Activity When you have specifically read about Chile and Venezuela. In Latin America more generally. It is reasonable to start with the idea that capitalist liberal democracy has. but rose in Chile. If democracy is bad for economic performance. which remained dictatorial until the end of that decade. In other words. Essentially. It is noteworthy that the amount of income saved by Latin Americans actually fell when the region democratised during the 1980s. if we turn our attention to the notion of why democracy has not broken down in First World countries that have adopted it. in terms of institutional shortcomings. after all. though. however. A democratic state can have effective institutions of economic policy-making that are autonomous of the political process – which is. where these exist. 75 . democracy has an economic aspect. it is not necessary to have a dictatorship. They are unlikely to do so by raising taxes. Money that is saved by whatever means. upon competition for the popular vote. In fact. In order to ‘de-politicise’ economic decision-making. This can either be voluntary or involuntary (in the sense that the saving is achieved through tax revenue. Some democracies have performed well in economic terms. others badly. all societies need to be able to achieve a certain level of savings and investment. no clear relation between democracy and economic performance exists. democratic breakdown and the prevention of democratic breakdown In order to achieve any economic growth. The First and Second World Wars – and also the Cold War – were won by the most powerful of the world’s democracies (which is not to deny that the former Soviet Union played a major part in the outcome of the Second World War). inflation. Some of this may be funded from abroad. What is needed is the right kind of public policy and the right kind of economic technocracy. Economic progress in wealthy countries Finally. cannot at the same time be consumed. how can the general economic success of wealthy democracies since 1950 be explained? It seems to make more sense to explain problems in new democracies. Politicians can hope to win elections by promising tax reductions. both privately or publicly. the situation with the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank in the USA. spending increases and general prosperity. but it should not be seen too much in economic terms. The same is true of authoritarian systems. As Leftwich (1999) pointed out. the appropriation of social security funds or other forms of fiscal coercion). but it also contains a number of weaknesses.Chapter 5: Threats to democracy. democracy may be associated with an excessive demand to consume. Moreover. for the most part. but the most important source of domestic investment is domestic saving. or it can lead to a squeezing out of investment. Democratic systems depend. One key point is that savings ratios in democracies are generally high enough to finance growth. we again come across a range of explanations emphasising somewhat different factors. been a reasonably successful form of government in terms of international conflict. This can lead to financial instability and high real interest rates. the most successful economic performers in the past generation have been a diverse set of countries that do not have very much in common. If one assumes (and this is a questionable but not absurd assumption) that the amount of investment determines growth most of all – rather than the quality or allocation of the investment – then countries that wish to grow rapidly need to find a lot of investment capital. This argument is plausible. some authoritarian governments have been as much driven by short-term considerations of political expediency as some democracies. cutting spending or reducing consumption. however. so that per capita income grows as rapidly as national income. First World countries tend to have stable. It is certainly true that some countries have adopted democratic forms of government only after achieving significant levels of economic growth. provisional justifications for particular authoritarianisms. Most people are gradually becoming better off materially. Doctrines based on human inequality evidently lack appeal within established democratic systems. it remains true that the world’s richest countries are almost all democracies. Bad economic results may often lead to a vote against the government of the day. but not generally to a reaction against democracy as a concept. 76 . Of all the major doctrines that are based on the notion of equality. This need not mean that every society in the world will eventually adopt democracy – there may always be limited. but it is still the case that the economic record of the wealthy democracies is reasonably good. populations. there are other reasons to understand why liberal democracy has remained stable. no longer intellectual rivals to democracy with sufficient appeal to encourage significant numbers of people within stable democracies to seek to replace their system with a different one. Although some capitalist authoritarian systems have proved economically successful. Furthermore. Nor is it clear that liberal democracy could survive if advanced capitalism went into severe and prolonged economic crisis.5 per cent per annum. reason for contentment with the status quo. The economic performance of First World liberal democracies (a category which now includes some Asian countries) was markedly superior to that of communist systems. The democracies are under no pressure to change their systems of government in order to achieve superior economic performance. Finally. there have only been three years since 1945 in which economic growth has been negative. and the improvement can be very noticeable over a generation. but that so far have not. In this sense. Sometimes. or in some cases slightly declining. Political stability in wealthy countries Threats to First World liberal democracy seem to consist mainly of events that might hypothetically take place. which has not by any means been the most successful First World country from an economic viewpoint. Economic growth in First World countries is entrenched in the sense that progress is expected virtually every year. but these are not usually so long-lasting that resentment against the system as a whole has time to accumulate. Fukuyama’s thesis may be valid. it seems implausible that democracy could be the loser in any coming battle of ideas. In the UK. but it still allowed national income to double in less than 30 years. liberal democracy has been the least unsuccessful in practice. No capitalist system (or any other kind of economy) operates without some difficulties. economic slowdowns and recessions occur. It is not clear that liberal democracy (or any form of government) could survive a fullscale nuclear conflict. but prophets of the ‘coming crisis of capitalism’ have been proved wrong so often that they are now largely discredited. This is not especially fast. therefore.86 Democracy and democratisation When we move from considering primarily military to primarily economic issues. There are. illegitimate government is indeed possible under certain circumstances. The average rate of growth over the past 40 years has been in the order of 2. There is. Sample examination questions 1. 2. such as Chile. A reminder of your learning outcomes By the end of the chapter and the associated reading. ‘Democracy is likely to be the normal form of government in the future. ‘Class factors. democracy does seem to have won the battle of ideas. Other issues are usually more important. especially in respect of semi-industrialised countries. though less so than it was.Chapter 5: Threats to democracy.’ Discuss. between 1945 and 1980 but has since become much rarer. then democratic breakdown remains a possibility. in genuinely poor countries such as Zimbabwe and Pakistan. on their own. or by class conflict due to frustration at the failure to achieve economic progress. Venezuela has come close to full-scale democratic breakdown at several points since 1992. positive economic change seems to have reinforced democracy where this has occurred. It is still common. It was relatively common in semi-industrialised countries. and can be expected to survive in the majority of the world’s democracies in the absence of severe crisis. with mixed evidence. It cannot be taken for granted that this situation will remain unchanged. you should be able to: • discuss the main explanations given by scholars for democratic breakdowns – when these have in fact occurred – and for the nonoccurrence of democratic breakdown in wealthy democracies • explain what the main theories of democratic breakdown are. 4. However. democratic breakdown and the prevention of democratic breakdown Conclusion Democratic breakdown has been unknown in First World democracies since 1945 (unless we count Greece in 1967 as First World). However. at least for the present. that authoritarianism is good for economic progress. the likelihood of democratic breakdown in genuinely First World democracies seems remote except in consequence of a genuinely catastrophic event such as nuclear war. by changes in international conditions that might reward non-democratic leaders. On the whole. do not cause the breakdown of democracy. It could be triggered by popular rejection of democracy due to policy failure. though it was relatively common in the 1920s and 1930s.’ Discuss. 77 . In some poor countries political elites still believe. What can the case of either Chile or Venezuela tell us about conditions under which democracy can break down? 3. and how they relate to one or more specific examples • examine how far class factors can be said to have influenced antidemocratic right-wing interventions in countries such as Spain and Chile • explain why some people think that authoritarianism is more economically efficient than democracy • outline why democratic stability has so far remained the normal case in First World democracies. Where it has not occurred (and is not occurring). What are the main problems facing newly created democracies? Discuss with respect to any one country of your choice. 86 Democracy and democratisation Notes 78 . 3.’ Discuss. Discuss. reasons are there for believing that we are at ‘the end of history’? 9. 1. Why has democratic breakdown been so rare in developed countries since 1945? 11. the role of class analysis in our understanding of the process of democratisation. All questions carry equal marks. What is democratic consolidation? How can we tell whether a democracy is consolidated or not? 10. ‘Referendums are inimical to representative democracy. ‘Pluralist theory suffers from unrealistic ideas about participation. with reference to any one historical sociologist. Discuss some of the complexities in the relation between capitalism and democracy. 4. 8. ‘Democracy is a set of electoral practices. 5. 6. and why? 2. What are the main reasons for believing that democracy is unlikely to be sustainable in poor countries? Are these good reasons? 7.’ ‘Democracy is a set of values. The format and structure of the examination may have changed since the publication of this subject guide. ‘Political competition is an essential but only a limited part of liberal democracy. What.’ Discuss. if any.’ Discuss with examples.’ Which of these statements do you prefer. Has the spread of democracy to many Third World countries since 1985 decisively undermined modernisation theory? END OF PAPER 79 . Candidates should answer THREE of the following TWELVE questions. ‘Right-wing reaction against democracy has more to do with nationalist or religious extremism than with class politics.Appendix: Sample examination paper Appendix: Sample examination paper Important note: This Sample examination paper reflects the examination and assessment arrangements for this course in the academic year 2010−2011. 12.’ Discuss. You can find the most recent examinations papers on the VLE where all changes to the format of the examination are posted. Time allowed: three hours. 86 Democracy and democratisation Notes 80 .