Pinatubo

FIRE and MUD ContentsThe Mount Pinatubo Disaster and the People of Central Luzon By Cynthia Banzon Bautista 1 Depatment of Sociology and Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. ABSTRACT The eruption of Mount Pinatubo and subsequent widespread and persistent lahars and flooding have taken a serious toll on the people of central Luzon. The most serious toll has been the displacement of more than 10,000 families (more than 50,000 persons) whose houses were destroyed and whose farmland or other source of livelihood was buried. Initially, the indigenous Ayta people were hardest hit, and many remain displaced from their livelihood and their cultural roots. Since the eruption, many lowlanders have also become evacuees, driven from their homes and land by lahars and floods. Evacuations and damage from the volcano have undermined preeruption social standing and community leadership. Psychological stress is high. Decisions about how to mitigate lahar hazard have provoked suspicions between neighboring communities. Decisions about how to organize resettlement areas have engendered lively debate and, among some, concern that well-intended humanitarian relief is becoming a substitute for self-sufficiency. Viable resettlement options are badly needed, in which provisions for livelihood and social stability are given even more attention than matters of housing and visible public infrastructure. Note to readers: Figures open in separate windows. To return to the text, close the figure's window or bring the text window to the front. INTRODUCTION Since its major eruptions of June 12-15, 1991, Mount Pinatubo has changed the landscape of central Luzon, uprooted thousands of residents from their homes and means of livelihood, and affected the agenda not only of the local, regional, and national governments but also of nongovernment organizations. This paper aims to provide an overview of the social and psychological impact of the volcanic eruption and some of the issues and problems of resettlement. METHODS The discussion is based on several sources: documents of the now-defunct Mount Pinatubo Task Force and the Mount Pinatubo Resettlement and Development Commission, which was created by law in September 1992 to replace the task force; unpublished reports of the regional government agencies, specifically the National Economic Development Authority, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Agrarian Reform, and the Department of Social Welfare and Development; relevant clippings of all major newspapers from June 1, 1991, to December 31, 1992; papers read in scientific conferences and various forums; findings of ongoing studies; and other published materials on the Mount Pinatubo disaster. Apart from written documents, the paper relies heavily on interviews with key informants in government and nongovernment institutions and discussions with victims in evacuation centers and resettlement sites. Some of the points in this overview first arose in a field-based multidisciplinary study of one municipality, Concepcion, Tarlac, which is located in the direct path of lahars (fig. 1) (C.B. Bautista, 1993). Our team of social scientists lived in the area for 3 months, from October to December 1991. The team's findings were later validated or qualified by key informants in other areas of central Luzon. In February 1992, a workshop involving researchers and key resource persons in the municipality was organized. A month later, some of the research findings were disseminated in a town assembly held on March 27, 1992. Figure 1. Locations of barangays, towns, cities, and provinces cited in this report. All of the barangays and smaller sitios that are shown in parentheses, except Poonbato, were destroyed by the eruption. Poonbato was destroyed by subsequent lahars. Some of the team members went to Concepcion at regular intervals thereafter-twice a month from April to July 1992, about once a week from August to September, and biweekly in October and November to follow up developments there. While data were updated in Concepcion, another small research project was organized from October to December 1992 to gather information on the disaster in central Luzon. Devastated villages, resettlement sites, and evacuation centers were visited. Interviews with respondents in government agencies and discussions with victims and their care-givers were conducted within this time period. 582 88. 1991).5 Pampanga 113. depending upon the specific hazard and their physical vulnerability to it.1 51.815 8. September 28.578 62.SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE MOUNT PINATUBO DISASTER The 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo and its muddy aftermath have affected hundreds of thousands of central Luzon's residents in varying degrees.9 6.000 of these took refuge in the Amoranto Stadium in Quezon City.935 373 3. this volume). disaster monitoring report. of whom about 3 percent were in formally organized evacuation camps (Department of Social Welfare and Development. The distribution of families and persons affected by ash fall (Pardo de Tavera. 1992.6 Angeles City 15.322 529. Table 1.688 7.1 8. the effects of the volcanic eruption are discussed separately from the effects of lahars and floods.640 52. A quarter of a million people remained displaced 1 week after the first major blasts.633 245. wet ash fall from 5 to 50 cm deep caused 189 deaths in areas near the volcano when roofs collapsed under its weight (Magboo and others. Victims of the 1991 Eruption Ash fall from Mount Pinatubo's eruptions in June 1991 affected about a million people.371 5. and about 30.2 Province/City Families Persons Percent of total 31. 13 municipal buildings. Though generally harmless in areas far from Mount Pinatubo. Ash fall also damaged public structures that housed social services.827 23. 18 public markets. 1992a). Ninety-eight hospitals and health centers.3 Tarlac 11.0 .770 61. half of whom were from the province of Pampanga (table 1) (Pardo de Tavera. unpub.2 Nueva Ecija 79 0.7 . 1992). Tens of thousands of central Luzon residents fled to Metro Manila.2 6. For purposes of accuracy in assessing the social and psychological impact of Mount Pinatubo on the population. 1992) Percent of total Bataan 7.0 Olongapo City 17. and 70 other government buildings were destroyed (Department of Public Works and Highways. Spence and others.2 Zambales 49.0 24.551 3. 1993). an indigenous tribe (Shimizu. Even Poonbato was not the last stop of the Aytas documented in the book. The volcano was not only the source of the Ayta's livelihood but also the abode of Apo Namalyari. Around 7. l991. 1991. and finally from 30 to 40 km. Zambales. a thin one augured a sparse yield (Lubos na Alyansa ng mga Katutubong Ayta ng Sambales (Negrito People's Alliance of Zambales. This was not the case. LAKAS. 1991). p. their God. the Ayta's evacuation from the volcano was especially disruptive and heart-rending.000 persons. From that book's account. As organized constituents of the Lubos na Alyansa ng mga Katutubong Ayta ng Sambales (LAKAS).to 20-km radius of the volcano. reached about 4.0 Of all persons affected.Total 215.000. means power. 32). from 20 to 30 km. New leaders and factions began to emerge as the tribes separated (Tadem and Bautista. Botolan. They lived by the volcano's rhythm.020. among the Aytas living on other parts of the volcano. caused panic-stricken Aytas from villages along the Zambales mountain slopes to flee their homes and converge in a village 12 km from the volcano's base. or 35.971 100. the number of evacuees in Poonbato. they were also in a better position to maintain their cultural and tribal bonds and to critically assess the options opened to them. By the third week of April.193 100. timing the planting and harvesting of their crops by the volume of steam rising continuously from a natural vent on the upper slope. the group was kept intact throughout the exodus. Those who ignored the first ominous signs on April 2 fled in waves within the next 2 weeks. 1989). The acronym of the federation. LAKAS). A vivid chronicle of their life and exodus is given in Eruption and Exodus (LAKAS. however. earth tremors and heavy steam from the volcano summit at 1600 on April 2.800 Ayta families. For these reasons. were forced to flee their homes (Task Force Pinatubo. the hardest hit were the Aytas. whose experience was documented. A relatively dense steam meant a good harvest. Mount Pinatubo's eruption scattered them to various evacuation centers and disrupted their political and administrative structure.0 1. They changed sites with each extension of the danger zone from a 10. The Ayta's economic and cultural life before the eruption was rooted in Mount Pinatubo. 1992). They hunted in the volcano's wooded slopes and fished in the rivers that drained it. and home to the spirits of their ancestors. Fortunately for the Poonbato Aytas. Some groups moved 9 times in 1991 before they found semipermanent relocation sites. . however. 1992). were alien to their preeruption existence. before secondary effects like lahars and floods were taken into account. Some health workers believed that the Aytas eschewed Western medicine in favor of their own. and throughout the ordeal of moving from one evacuation site to another. Malnutrition also contributed to high mortality among Ayta children (Surmieda and others. Thus. Evacuees suffered from extremely hot days and cold and damp nights in these tents. and diarrhea. In early August. There was no basic sanitation. bronchopneumonia. 1991). What was missing. They were evacuated earlier than any other group. 1992. who pioneered the literacy campaign among Aytas in Poonbato. the Sisters of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary. The tents provided only minimal shelter from the elements. the Aytas were the prime victims of the volcanic eruption itself. A study conducted by the Department of Health reveals that its immunization campaign did not reach all vulnerable children in the camps. was rapport between health workers and Ayta evacuees that was based on an understanding of the Ayta culture. Aside from getting more sick than their lowland counterparts in evacuation centers. and they longed to roam the mountains and hills again in communion with nature and their God (LAKAS. they were totally uprooted from their way of life. Cultural differences accounted for the spread of some of these diseases. were extremely difficult for Aytas. The measles outbreak is a case in point. with high population density and town plaza complexes. Even their resettlement sites. Aytas were also disoriented by the surroundings far from their upland homes. 1992). claim that Aytas generally know when to ask for Western medical help. The cultural gap between the Aytas and health workers prevented the latter from reaching Ayta children (Magpantay and others. the government set evacuation procedures in place before the major eruptions in June 1991.Anticipating the need for Aytas to vacate the slopes of Mount Pinatubo. As a consequence. Conditions in the evacuation sites. Surmieda and others. Victims of Lahars and Floods Areas Most Damaged . respiratory and gastro-intestinal ailments were common. They were unaccustomed to the sight of flatlands and plains. at least initially. the Department of Social Welfare and Development reported that 156 Ayta children had died in evacuation centers in Tarlac and Zambales from various diseases such as measles. However. symbolizes Pampanga's travails. By October 1992. Families from devastated sitios of relatively less affected barangays are not counted. and additional barangays (especially in Zambales) were also isolated by floods at this time. adjoining the Pinatubo area. Because preeruption river channels have been clogged by lahars. Even this high number is surely an underestimate.000 families. lahars and floods have devastated many more villages and towns.The major eruptions and the plight of the Aytas in evacuation centers dominated newspaper headlines in June 1991. as stored in the National Economic Development Authority Region III Geographic Information System data base). [List of barangays is based on interviews with key informants in the municipalities. most parts of 29 barangays (villages) had been buried by lahars to depths of several meters (table 2). Siltation of river channels (much by lahars) caused subsequent floods that submerged barangays in at least 18 municipalities (table 3). Since that time. cite the evacuation of residents of Hermosa from floodwaters of up to 5 to 7 feet (Philippine Daily Inquirer. Zambales. Newspaper accounts on the week of August 20. subsequent rainfall cannot drain away through those channels. one of the most severely affected of central Luzon's once bustling towns. In the province of Bataan. Porac. Lahar-devastated barangays that were virtually abandoned in October 1992. Table 2. August 20. As of October 1. Hermosa. Floods caused by silted waterways have added to the misery of central Luzon's lowland victims. 1992. 1992 was the year of floods. The number of affected families and persons are taken from the 1990 National . Half of Pampanga's abandoned barangays were in the municipality of Bacolor. and Orani experienced persistent floods in 1992. or about 53. Compared to 1991. so it floods adjoining lowlands. water from the September monsoon rains had not yet subsided in low-lying parts of these municipalities. the province that bore the brunt of lahars in the first 2 years. corroborated by newspaper accounts and field observations. The 29 severely affected barangays were home to almost 10.000 people (1990 National Statistical Office population estimates for these 29 barangays. listed by municipality and province. the municipalities of Dinalupihan. 1992). Eleven of these were in only one municipality--Botolan. because it counts only those in barangays within which most sitios (hamlets) were buried. Most of these families once lived in the densely populated barangays of Pampanga. Many of its residents have left. Six were in Tarlac and 12 in the densely populated province of Pampanga. 634 Bamban Malonzo 128 811 San Pedro 385 2.Statistics Office figures as stored in the data base of the National Economic Development Authority.220 Santa Rita 876 4.310 Tabun 430 2.970 Potrero 786 4.097 Owaog-Nebloc 34 168 Palis 79 328 .991 Mabalacat Cacutud 268 1.297 Santa Rita San Juan 302 1.463 San Martin 178 1.191 Porac Mitla 287 1. Region III GIS Project] Province Municipality Barangay Families Population Pampanga 6.471 6.388 Botolan Villar 230 1.615 Tarlac 1.771 Duat 300 1.832 10.718 Santa Barbara 507 2.840 Parulog 321 1.101 Dolores 1.885 Zambales 1.624 San Antonio 887 5.553 Moraza 112 569 Belbel 124 534 Burgos 145 669 Cabatuan 77 330 Malomboy 208 1.213 Bacolor Balas 308 1.785 San Jose Mitla 217 1.913 9.084 33.121 Poonbato 483 2.039 Bangcu 35 216 Concepcion Malupa 230 1. 1992 data are from the Department of Social Welfare and Development Region III Disaster Monitoring Report.939 persons. Table 3. September 28. fewer than 10 died from lahars during 1992 (1991 figures are from the Special Transition Report of Task Force Pinatubo. Sixteen deaths. 1992. Disaster Monitoring data. Whereas 100 of the 932 disaster-related deaths in 1991 were due to lahars.435 Comparative Effects of Lahars and Floods.400 families.259 families experienced floods in 1992. [All these municipalities were (and will continue to be) affected by clogging of river channels by lahars] Province Municipality Pampanga Minalin Guagua City of San Fernando Santo Tomas . or 159. unpub.Nacolcol Maquisquis Total 143 278 9. Although the number of casualties decreased. while 19.326 53. and include deaths from illness in evacuation camps. however.742) were victimized by the end of August in the second year (Department of Social Welfare and Development. Municipalities that were flooded. 1991 and 1992 Owing perhaps to the previous year's experience with lahars. suffered the effects of lahars or floods in the first year (Department of Social Welfare and Development. May 1992. or isolated by flooding.829 693 1. September 28.932 families were affected by lahars (table 4). 1992). there were very few deaths due to lahars and floods in 1992. were due to floods in 1992. Viewing the data by type of hazard reveals that 144. 1992). as of late August 1992 (shown by asterisk) or October 1. significantly more people were affected by lahars and floods in 1992 than in 1991. five times more families (164. A total of 33. 1992). as opposed to none in 1991. In contrast.191) and persons (802. The marked increase in the number of people affected was due primarily to massive lahar-induced floods in 1992. 1992 Floods. 1992] Percent of Families Affected Lahar and flood combined Lahar. Distribution of affected families. Data are current up through the lahars and floods which occurred around August 15. [The 1991 figures were taken from DSWD (1992a).400 Province .259 164. The 1992 data were taken from DSWD (1992b).191 33.932 144. 1992 1992 1991 Bataan 17 15 5 Bulacan 2 2 Nueva Ecija <1 <1 Pampanga 27 52 49 62 Tarlac 40 5 9 13 Zambales 33 24 25 20 Total 100 100 100 100 Number 19. listed by province and type of disaster.Macabebe Floridablanca Mexico Bacolor San Simon (*) Sasmuan (*) Porac (*) Zambales Cabangan San Marcelino Bataan Hermosa (*) Dinalupihan (*) Orani (*) Tarlac Bamban Concepcion Table 4. lahars and floods affected 5 national and 176 communal irrigation systems that serviced 483 km2 of farmlands and 25. additional houses were destroyed in Tarlac and Zambales. This observation also holds for agricultural lands inundated by floods. Mudflows also breached 58 km of river dikes. They were overwhelmingly rice based. 1992).476 farmers (Task Force Pinatubo. These data are principally for Pampanga. 1992). Of the former category. By province. The latter figure includes many whose lands were spared from either lahars or floods. only a slight shift occurred toward sugarcane (Department of Agriculture Region III.072 were seriously damaged in 1992. September 28. followed by Pampanga (41 percent of 618 km2) and Zambales (13 percent of 236 km2) (Department of Agriculture Region III. Environment Management Bureau. unpub. 54 percent were demolished by lahar and the rest by floods.140 houses were completely destroyed and 3. Tarlac. farmers in affected riceproducing areas had to rehabilitate their lands. 1992 Summary of Damage Report). Lahars inundated 15 km of roads. 85 percent of them were almost equally distributed between Pampanga and Tarlac. In 1992. 1992). and Zambales were affected by lahars in 1991. Tarlac. half of which were along the Pasig-Potrero River. Beyond their direct effects on agricultural lands. . In terms of the people associated with the land. data. however. unpub.540 farmers in Pampanga. In 1991. In 1992. a total of 11. and Zambales. 1992b. damaged 13 major bridges throughout the 1991-92 period. 1992). data.At least 3. Because floods induced by lahar deposition in river channels usually left a layer of mud in their wake. During this year. Lahars and floods affected as much as 42 percent of the total cropland of Pampanga. that ratio remained practically the same. A discussion of the effects of lahars and floods on people is not complete without mentioning damage to infrastructure and agricultural lands--damage that has profoundly affected livelihood and quality of life. a finding consistent with the drop in the area of croplands newly affected by lahars. the number of lahar-affected farmers declined by half. almost 9 out of 10 lahar-affected agricultural areas were planted to rice (Task Force Pinatubo. and threaten to affect another 10 bridges in the coming years (Department of Public Works and Highways. Tarlac had the highest percentage of its cropland damaged (52 percent of 841 km2). In addition. Among amortizing owners. and houses in these communities regardless of the wealth of the owner. The loss of land owned through land reform.Farmers in those areas covered with 7 to 15 cm of lahar were better off than their counterparts in places with more than 15 cm but less than 30 cm of mud. and those who farmed such land must look for alternate land or leave farming. especially in Pampanga and Tarlac. others amortizing owners. Residents who could not afford to go anywhere else were able to dig up housing materials." On the whole. the social distance among groups in places that have not yet been severely affected by the disaster has been bridged by a significant increase in communal activities that have cut across classes. residents who were relatively well-off lost so much that they found themselves in positions similar to those who were once their social inferiors. the population in these villages was divided into those with access to agricultural assets or opportunities for overseas employment and those without. while the land of those with thicker lahar had to be scraped. In some instances.or corn-producing lands. Some are leaseholders. Still other land was either buried beyond rehabilitation by lahar or sunk in emergent lakes. class distinctions have not been eradicated. It is in this sense that ordinary folks have referred to Mount Pinatubo as the "Leveller" or the "Equalizer. Although the basic social hierarchy has been maintained in those communities whose residents have remained intact in relocation sites. was a special blow to beneficiaries who have painstakingly paid in full and obtained legal ownership of their parcel of rice. Religious rituals such as prayer sessions and processions around villages and along the river channels have been the most visible activities in different parts of central . some new organizations of community life have emerged in relocation sites populated by residents hailing from different barangays. and furniture. Most of the affected farmers. albeit temporary in a geologic sense. the disaster mitigated an internal process of social differentiation. appliances. because many of those with financial resources managed to find new homes elsewhere. Prior to the calamity. those who have paid a significant amount of the cost of the land stood to feel the loss more than those who have defaulted on their payments. equipment. and still others are new owners who have fulfilled the state's requirement of land transfer. Some Social Effects of Lahars and Floods For the former residents of barangays devastated by lahars. Lahars buried agricultural lands. thus preserving at least some of their position in the village's social hierarchy. The land of farmers with 15 cm or less of lahar just needed to be plowed. were land reform beneficiaries. however. The provincial governor's mediation apparently led to the withdrawal of the suit on the same day. Residents of this municipality resisted the plan. While such an operation would .Luzon. The politics of lahar defenses also resulted in tension between neighboring communities. San Fernando's local officials were also caught in a dispute with those from Santa Rita. Pampanga. 1992). participation in activities to protect barangays from lahars (such as sandbagging) or to protest government decisions designating particular areas as catch basins have been documented. The latter's folks rejected the fortification efforts of the former because it will trap lahars in Bacolor (Daily Globe. is a case in point. As a consequence. although they are practiced most frequently during the rainy season. rumors were an outlet for the growing suspicion among neighboring barangays. cited ill will aroused by the differential impact of lahars on two sides of the river within that municipality. fearing that it would divert lahars to other parts of the town. September 25. In the summer of 1992. San Fernando officials were alleged to have asked the local court to stop residents of Santa Rita from putting up a sandbag dike. The explorations of the Disaster Coordinating Council to use the Candaba swamp as a catch basin for lahar was met by strong opposition from residents living in several municipalities in Pampanga. Those on the side that was spared were suspected of having breached the dike on the affected side. Pampanga's capital (Philippine Star. Sometimes. lest the dike divert lahars and floods into San Fernando. Municipalities were pitted against each other as attempts to protect one political territory were deemed to be at the expense of a neighbor. Key informants in one municipality. Philippine Daily Inquirer. verified by the author from key informants). the Department of Public Works and Highways planned to make a sediment-trapping "sabo" dam in Maskup along the Sacobia River to contain lahars that were expected to flow into some parts of Mabalacat. The sandbagging operation along the boundary of San Fernando and Bacolor. for instance. Pampanga. 1992. Apart from religious rituals. September 25. September 16. Some of those interviewed claim that a few residents threatened the contractors who were beginning to survey the area. Pampanga. The rituals have been conducted all year round. The national government was not the only target of protests from angry residents who perceived efforts to protect some localities to threaten their own. 1992. the plan was shelved. picked themselves up and begun to run blindly again. Everyone was terrified and shouting for help. especially in rural areas. There was pandemonium as they ran." . Many believed it to be the end of the world and all thought they would die then. as they were pushed aside or thrown unceremoniously on.have been impossible to achieve without the affected area knowing about it. the impression held sway. It swept along with it tree trunks and rocks so huge and heavy that it took five men to move them later on. they tripped or ran into each other.. A study of victims and service providers in Tarlac (Jimenez. Those who were caught in their houses only had enough time to rush up to their roofs. all the while shouting to their older children to run ahead.. fell. There were those who only had time to scoop in their infant children and run off. crying. they recalled. despite early warnings from the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS).. As such. were caught off guard.. The lahar was terrifyingly high and steaming hot. The fact that dike construction raised ill will reflects the extent to which lahar defense has become a highly politicized issue. (Few) had enough time and presence of mind to scoop up . which traumatized adults and children: But whether it came by day or night. All thought of immediate escape. the sound and sight of the lahar was enough to frighten the people into immediate escape. In their haste. families huddled together in fear and for comfort--awaiting their certain death. There. All spent the night terrified. they reported. belongings. calling on their God for help and deliverance.there was a mad rush to get on the trucks. accounts for much of the cynicism and suspicion with which efforts to defend human settlements are viewed. The women and children came off badly in this scramble.. Nothing in their individual and collective past prepared them for the disaster. 1993) vividly described the evacuation process.. many of the victims suffered from psychological problems even long after their initial evacuation. and praying to God for help and mercy . A political culture in which the powerful are able to get away with practically anything. People were screaming and crying as they ran.. Some Psychological Effects of Lahar and Floods A cursory review of the graffiti on walls of abandoned homes reveals the angry and plaintive expressions of victims who. Many of the psychological problems confronted by those who took flight from the perils of lahars and those who continue to live in natural catch basins could be attenuated by mass resettlement to areas that are not vulnerable to the disaster.900 km2 of land in the three provinces may be buried beneath 2 m of lahar debris.Jimenez (1993) also reported several symptoms of stress among the victims who evacuated to the centers. Some went into hysterical laughter. For those living along the potential corridors of lahars and floods. and Zambales. the Mount Pinatubo disaster has displaced tens of thousands of people in Tarlac. Unfortunately. Males tended to become more quiet and withdrawn than did the women. The study. Pampanga. prompted the commission to estimate that about 74. snags in the resettlement process and attachment to their original lands and homes have discouraged many would-be settlers from moving to resettlement areas. with families anxiously awaiting the warning to flee their homes. the monsoon season heralded sleepless nights. ISSUES OF RESETTLEMENT As noted earlier. which could only be traced to the trauma of Mount Pinatubo.S. A conservative estimate based only on the population of 29 most thoroughly buried barangays in 1992 is around 53. Even days later. irritability. The U. Some of Jimenez's respondents judged that the Mount Pinatubo disaster affected males and females differently. key informants reported incidents of residents who suffered from heart attacks. victims found it difficult to sleep and did not have much appetite for food. Upon arrival in the evacuation sites. and constant headaches among the resettlers. and spent time in all-male drinking sessions. many of the potential victims have chosen to remain in high-risk areas because they have no viable alternatives. Army Corps of Engineers Recovery Action Plan team projected in a briefing for the Mount Pinatubo Commission that about 1. which basically supports the PHIVOLCS projections. To the dismay of scientists who warn against remaining in danger zones. they trembled from cold and fear continuously. a figure that is bound to increase in 1993. service providers in a relatively well-established resettlement site for farmers in Zambales cited sudden bouts of crying. So intense was the stress that when the warning signals--church bells or successive gunshots-were raised. More than a year after their lives were uprooted. Symptoms of stress were not confined to those who left their homes.000 people.000 residents in the high risk areas could no longer be defended against lahar and might have to be evacuated by force (Mount Pinatubo . the Mount Pinatubo Task Force's logic dictates that they might as well fit into the Regional Spatial Development Strategy of central Luzon. While these calamities resulted in untold human misery. provided health and nutrition services. In addition. The Loob Bunga Resettlement Site in Zambales. and promoted livelihood projects. central . As such. for example. for instance. the state poured massive financial resources into the development of various resettlement projects. This strategy conceives Region III to be the transit lane between the resource-rich provinces of northern Luzon and the densely populated industrialized areas of Metro Manila. they also provided the occasion to plan the modern Tokyo. and development-oriented nongovernmental organizations in some of the state's resettlement sites also infused private resources into these efforts. Because of the scale of human displacement. various civic groups. At least 11 organizations extended food assistance. the technocrats hope to address victims' needs while maximizing the rare opportunity to use planning principles.5 billion (US $93 million) for evacuation and resettlement sites (Mercado and others. The logic underlying the technocratic perspective of the now-defunct Mount Pinatubo Task Force can be described as follows. as well as literacy and spring-water development projects. The concept for the physical layout of the envisioned towns drew from the sprouting subdivisions in Metro Manila and its suburbs. public markets. 1993). These people. developed from the ruins of the Great Kanto earthquake of 1923 and from the Second World War. resettlement requires technical planning based on the principles of scale and efficiency. and ideas about the practicality of grid road networks versus the current linear pattern in rural areas.Commission. In addition. this volume). Because the Pinatubo disaster dislocated tens of thousands of victims. stands out in terms of its private resources.000 dislocated victims. private relief agencies. Their idea is to put up settlements bigger than the usual barangays in order to economize on basic services like schools. because government will be building new towns anyway. The present Tokyo. and hospitals. From the perspective of a technocrat. Technocratic Top-Down Planning or Bottom-Up Participatory Approaches An ongoing controversy over the state's resettlement efforts boils down to differences in the basic approach to the problem of resettlement. Total expenditures during 1991 and 1992 were at least P2. the plaza complex found in most towns. The infrastructure and settlement patterns of some modern cities in the world were planned at critical junctures in their history. who were not victims during the 1991 and 1992 rainy seasons will add to the 53. these complexes have attracted much negative attention. Cemented roads and public buildings were put up before houses. Some critics are silent on the basic approach but object to aspects of the content or implementation of the program. . victims should participate actively in all stages of planning. In this approach. but they will be houses and a community in (and for) which the displaced families will work hard and succeed. Capas. Site development has been deemed too slow in the face of victims who have languished in evacuation centers for more than a year. modern public buildings clustered around a plaza. To make matters worse. the phasing of the project has also been questioned. Victims will make sure that projects will meet their needs. The second group of critics questions not only the content of the plans but also the spirit and process of planning imbedded in them. On the whole. Tarlac. The resulting houses and emergent communities may not conform aesthetically to the technocratic vision.Luzon will "serve as a catchment area for population and industry spill-over from the metropolis. other critics question the basic philosophy and the implementation of the plans. these criticisms do not question the plaza complex or even the construction of public buildings as long as these are done after housing and livelihood needs are met. so some who moved into the resettlement areas decided to leave and others hesitated to move in. productivity centers (large buildings intended for use as factories). and they will feel a pride of ownership. while maintaining its comparative advantage in agriculture in some places. millions of pesos had to be advanced by a cooperative headed by a private citizen to hasten the pace of its development. The first group of critics accepts the technocratic planning process but assails the state for its insensitivity to the plight of central Luzon's dislocated residents. The overall technocratic vision explains why new resettlement areas have gridded street systems. However. Apart from the speed. and uniform houses made of either hollow concrete blocks or nipa (a palm). the most developed of the sites." The plans also project the region in the role of "providing the requirements of the Northern Luzon provinces in terms of processing and manufacturing of goods and their eventual shipment to areas of destination" (Mount Pinatubo Task Force. The participation of would-be resettlers is crucial for practical and psychological reasons. livelihood development efforts were relegated to the background. Drawing from the principles of participatory development. 1991). these critics stress the importance of planning with and not for the affected people. In the case of O'Donnell. but the conceptualization of plans will have to be decentralized to the level of the communities involved. Case studies of resettlement sites by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Philippine Business for Social Progress. when collaborative decisions are reached. As such. NGO's also have problems of duplicated effort and lack of communication. it is the only institution that can mobilize all of the basic resources needed in resettlement work.Psychologically. It is easy enough to give lip service to community organizing. there are no mechanisms for carrying them out. The second implication is that community organizational efforts must be an integral part of the resettlement process. This means some of the basic parameters in terms of sites can be set at the national or regional level. There can be no uniform design or blueprint for resettlement sites. Anderson and Woodrow (1989) cautioned against too much stress on NGO coordination. power. For all the criticisms hurled against the state in the last 2 years. because it enhances the self confidence of individual victims and the community's collective confidence in being able to rebuild its life in the new site. Even under a centralized scheme. 1992). the process of participation is as important as the visible outcomes of collective decisionmaking. they raise . conferences on relief and rehabilitation have been haunted by a recurring complaint--that government agencies continue to function within their own turfs. Coordination with and among government agencies is necessary to speed up the process of resettlement. The criticisms emanating from proponents of participatory development have two implications for resettlement. Furthermore. Key informants claim that very little is done to coordinate services rendered. Coordination Meaningful and effective decentralized planning requires coordination with local and regional government agencies and NGO's. reveal that some NGO's that are committed in principle to participatory development encounter problems of finding enough good organizers. In their book based on the lessons learned from disasters in different parts of the world. the disaster-related programs have been far from integrated (Bonifacio. This is easier said than done. Only the state is in a position to officially allocate land from the public domain and negotiate with private owners. sanitation. Infrastructural works such as roads. Although they argue for coordination of services. but it is hard to find capable people who have internalized the spirit of participatory development. and schools are also better left with government. for instance. they may be insensitive to the incipient dependence developed in the victims who are unwittingly made to rely on external agents for their needs. only the people themselves can do that. to date. 1992). The original concept of the new resettlement towns assumed industrial development in the central Luzon region. by increasing their capacities and reducing their vulnerabilities. is not a sufficient gauge of development. Given the demands of ministering to the daily requirements of rehabilitation or resettlement. prevented investors from risking their fortunes in these . Many of those involved with redevelopment around Pinatubo realize the dependence they have inadvertently created in the course of their work. Who is in charge of coordination? Whose purpose does it serve? Is it intended to ease the work of NGO's and make logistical requirements run smoothly or is it to ensure the highest possible involvement of the victims in decisionmaking and planning? Long-Term Development versus Dependency Underlying the abovementioned questions is an argument for integrating disasterrelated work with long-term development goals. While they all agree that food for work programs will have to end. the uncertainty over the landscape of central Luzon in the next few years and the sluggish nature of overall Philippine economy has. then wellintentioned attempts to improve coordination will merely add to a host of other emergency efforts that defer long-term development to the future. The planners hoped that multinational and domestic investors would see the prospect of employing resettlers in the newly built productivity centers. they are prevented from focusing on rehabilitation by a lack of opportunities to sustain livelihood projects in the site. As their short-term emergency assignment becomes institutionalized in the field. In debates over models for development. NGO's operating in the Loob Bunga Resettlement site are themselves alarmed by the perpetuation of a culture of dependence and mendicancy among resettlers (Mondragon. external agents cannot ensure a people's well being. even the more development-oriented NGO's and committed government agents may fail to see how their humanitarian work can stifle the capacity of the victims to rise from the ashes.basic questions. However. all agree that the creation of economic and social structures. while necessary. Over the long run. If enhancing the capacities of victims and reducing their vulnerabilities is not kept in mind by development workers at every point of the rehabilitation and resettlement process. University of Amsterdam. and those who will be dislocated in the next several years. 1993) revealed that most respondents gave livelihood a higher priority than housing. but more than 200. and additional areas have lost their supply of irrigation water. The next several years will continue to bring untold misery to central Luzon. The fact that some displaced victims have returned to their old homes has led the NGO's in Zambales to seriously consider internal repatriation. University of the Philippines--Centre for Asian Studies. Of these. Naturally. . Supporters of repatriation point out that some of the victims who decided to stay put in their barangays at the height of the evacuations seem to have rebuilt their lives faster than anyone in the resettlement sites.centers. The task is urgent. some beyond immediate rehabilitation. The relative absence of income sources in the resettlement sites accounts for the refusal of would-be settlers to move to the new sites. Fewer than 1.000 people) were so severely buried or otherwise damaged that they have been virtually abandoned. and many others are still potential victims. lahars.000 lives have been lost. It also explains why some of those who moved in earlier have already left the sites. It may also be possible for some victims to evacuate to sites near their original barangays rather than to the resettlement areas. need resettlement options that provide livelihood and that facilitate psychosocial adjustments to the trauma of being uprooted. barangays that were home to 9. CONCLUSIONS The eruptions of 1991 and their muddy aftermath have taken an enormous toll on the people of central Luzon.800 families (53. because people in high-risk areas will agree to move away only if there are viable alternatives. Current victims of the Pinatubo disaster have not yet seen the end. Large areas of agricultural land have been covered.000 families and more than a million people have suffered some loss or dislocation as a result of ash fall. concerns about livelihood have slowed acceptance of resettlement. It may be possible for some to return to their old homes during the dry season and to go to the resettlement sites when the rains begin. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The paper condenses the findings of a multidisciplinary team under the sponsorship of the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy. or flooding. Respondents to a survey by the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP. Those who are presently dislocated. Rehabilitation. p. College of Agriculture. UNESCO Press. and Paris. Department of Foreign Affairs. Region III. Conference on Environment and Development. Building. in Bautista. 122 p.N. Pinatubo disaster: Quezon City. 1992. 29 p. 1992. DSWD and relief operations: Paper presented by the DSWD Secretary at the International Scientific Conference on Mt. 1989. 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