Tuesday, January 14: Chisholm, “The Problem of the Criterion” How are we to distinguish the real cases of knowledge fromwhat only seem to be cases of knowledge? Or how are we to decide in any particular case whether we have genuine items of knowledge? If there is a criterion of truth, then this criterion should satisfy three conditions: it should be internal, objective, and immediate. Methodists think that they have an answer to the question of “How are we to decide whether we know? What is the criterion of knowledge?” Particularists think that they have an answer to the question of “What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?” Sceptics think there cannot be an answer to either. Empiricist is a type of Methodism which states that if a belief is to be credible, it must bear certain relations to the believer‟s sensations. There are two objections to empiricism: 1) It is very broad and at the same time arbitrary. How can one begin with a broad generalization? 2) It seems to throw out not only the bad apples but the good ones as well Chisholm suggests particularism is the most reasonable (G. E. Moore‟s argument!) The senses should be regarded as innocent until there is some positive reason, on some particular occasion, for thinking that they are guilty. A proposition is evident for a person if it beyond reasonable doubt for that person and is such that his including it among the propositions upon which he bases his decisions is preferable to his not including it. It is acceptable if withholding it is not preferable to believing it. And a proposition if unacceptable if withholding it is preferable to believing it. A proposition is certain for a given subject at a given time if that proposition if evident to that subject and if there is no other proposition that is such that believing that other proposition is epistemically preferable for him to believing the given proposition. A man‟s being in a certain state is self-presenting to him at a given time provided only that (i) he is in that state at that time and (ii) it is necessarily true that if he is in that state at that time then it is evident to him that he is in that state at that time. A proposition is axiomatic for a given subject at a given time provided only that (i) the proposition is one that is necessarily true and (ii) it is also necessarily true that if the person then believes that proposition, the proposition is then evident to him. A proposition is a priori provided either that (i) it‟s axiomatic, (ii) it‟s entailed by something axiomatic. We could begin by considering the following two principles: M referring to memory, and P referring to perception: M) For any subject S, if it is evident to S that she seems to remember that a was F, then it is beyond reasonable doubt for S that a was F. P) For any subject S, if it is evident to S that she thinks she perceives that a is F, then it is evident to S that a is F. Thursday, January 16: Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, chapter 10 A knows P if, and only if: (i) (ii) (iii) The truth-condition is satisfied: p is true. The belief-condition is satisfied: A believes that p or A is certain that p, etc. The evidence-condition is satisfied: A has adequate evidence for p or A has good reasons for believing that p, etc. Among those who have accepted Kap -> Bap, we may distinguish between those who have held that knowledge entails certainty: Kap -> Cap, and those who denied this. These are the Strong and Weak assertions of the belief condition. Among those who have denied Kap -> Bap, we may distinguish between Weak and Strong denial. According to weak denial, knowledge does not entail the absence of belief. But according to the strong denial, knowing that p actually excludes believing it. Linguistic arguments have been used in support of strong denial. Armstrong rejects this by arguing that 1) certainty entail belief, 2) it is possible for A to be both certain that p is true and know it to be true. But if knowledge excludes belief, one of these two obvious assumptions must be given up. Armstrong rejects the strong assertion by arguing that a fumbling, unconfident examinee may not be sure that his answers are correct, but still be attributed knowledge. However, he thinks the paradoxical nature of the first-person sentences linking knowledge and certainty indicates that the strong assertion is groping for some truth about the nature of knowledge. In support of weak denial, one may bring up the case of the widow who knows her husband is dead but doesn‟t believe it. Armstrong changes the case in one important respec t: suppose the husband is actually alive. Then the woman doesn‟t know the he‟s dead. Then we will have to say that she believes he is dead. Suppose we interpret doesn‟t believe as Ba ~P, then in the original case we have Kap & Ba~P, so weak denial is not established. But if we interpret it as Bap, then we have Kap and Bap & Ba ~P, which is not a counterexample either. A French-Canadian gets the death of Queen Elizabeth right (1603). In case 2, he gets taught that it is 1630. In case 3, he becomes muddled and come to think it is 1603 for some reason. Armstrong argues that case 2 stands to ordinary false belief exactly as case 2 stands to ordinary knowledge. Case 2 and case 1 are simply the two ordinary cases trimmed down in identical fashion. Tuesday, January 21: Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, chapter 11 The trouble with the punter, it is plausible suggested, is that he lacks good reasons or sufficient evidence for his true belief. However, when the Evidence-condition is scrutinized more closely, all sorts of problems emerge: Condition 1: Suppose that p is true, A believes that p and A has evidence for „p‟, namely „q‟ . But it cannot be the case that A knows that p unless, as a matter of objective fact, „q‟ constitutes sufficient evidence to establish the truth of „p‟. Condition 2: Even if „q‟ is in fact sufficient evidence for the truth of „p‟, it may still be the case that A does not realize, or has not noticed, the relevance of his evidence „q‟ to „p‟. Condition 3: Even if the evidence actually operated in A‟s mind to support his belief that p, it still does not follow that A knows that p. Might not A be reasoning from „q‟ to „p‟ according to some false principle which in this particular case moves from a truth to a truth? It seems that we need to say that the principle of reasoning according to which A operates, when his belief that q operates in his mind to support his belief that p, is a true principle. Condition 4: It still does not follow that A knows that p. For although the principle of A‟s reas oning is true, may it not be that A accepts this principle on thoroughly bad grounds? It seems that we need to say that the principle is known by A to be true. Condition 5: Do we not require the further stipulation that A know that q is true? Two regresses, begin by discussing the regress generated by Condition 5. Armstrong thinks condition 5 fixes the Gettier problem. Gregory O‟Hair has attempt to classify all the philosophers‟ analysis or accounts of knowledge as different reactions to the threatened regress. Armstrong‟s object is to place the type of solution to the problem which he‟ll defend in a perspective of other attempted solutions. Gettier-type analysis must, of course, be excluded, because they do not allow the regress to even begin. But we have argued that they operate with too weak a form of the Evidencecondition. Different reactions to the regress: 1. We may begin by distinguishing between „sceptical‟ and „non-sceptical‟ reactions to the regress. An extreme form of the skeptical reaction would be to say that the infinite regress showed that the concept of knowledge involves a contradiction. A moderate view would be that the word „know‟, although it attributes true belief, attributes nothing further of an objective nature to the belief – no relation to the facts – except truth. Karl Popper suggested that the word „know‟ is not theoretically useful, and that all our beliefs should be treated as „hypotheses‟. In J. L Austin‟s well-known article „Other Minds‟ (1961), it is suggested that the special li nguistic function of the phrase „I know…‟ is to pledge the speaker‟s word, or give his authority, that the statement that follows is true. This also suggests a „sceptical‟ view of knowledge. But a non-sceptical solution to the problem posed by the infinite regress is to be preferred if it can be found. After all, there does appear to be a clear, objective, distinction between knowledge and the mere true belief (vide the optimistic punter). 2. The regress is infinite but virtuous. Such a view was held by C. S. Peirce. But this solution depends upon maintaining that, in order to know anything, we must know an infinite number of things. And so it might seem to be sufficiently refuted by pointing out that the mind of man is finite. However, this does not completely dispose of the suggestion. For instance, if we know a rule for generating an open set of formulae then, it can be argued, we have potential access to an infinite number of formulae. Similarly, it may be suggested we can know the infinite number of things. It can hardly be pretended, however, that this reaction has much plausibility. Like the „sceptical‟ solution, it is a desperate solution, to be considered only if all others are clearly seen to be unsatisfactory. 3. The regress is finite, but has no end. Suppose, then, that the regress is not virtuous. Then either it has no end, or it has an end. If it has no end, then at some point the reasons must come back upon their own tail. This may seem to involve vicious circularity. Bu perhaps it need not. This may be called the Coherence analysis of the concept of knowledge. There are problems here. First, if one took the Coherence view of truth also, then the notions of knowledge and truth might come into close logical connection. But if one accepted the sort of view of truth argued for, then truth and knowledge would be quite independent. Second, what criterion can be given to show that a circle of true beliefs is „sufficiently comprehensive‟? It is not easy to say. Thir d, might there not be a sufficiently comprehensive circle of true beliefs which was arrived at so irregularly and luckily that we would not want to call it knowledge? 4. The regress ends in self-evident truths. Once it is granted that there is an objective notion of knowledge; that the infinite regress of reasons is in some way vicious; and that the regress cannot be stopped by judicious circularity; then it must be granted that there is an objective notion of knowledge; that the infinite regress of reasons is in some way vicious; and that the regress cannot be stopped by judicious circularity; then it must be granted that, when A knows that p, then either this knowledge is non-inferential, or it is based on a finite set of reasons terminating in non-inferential knowledge. But what further restriction must be placed on true non-inferential beliefs to yield non-inferential knowledge? The classical answer is: non-inferential beliefs which are self-evident, indubitable or incorrigible. They will serve to stop the regress and act as the foundations of knowledge. However, I reject the whole notion of beliefs that it is logically impossible to be wrong about. I think the logically possibility of error is always present in any belief. In any case, it has been demonstrated that, even if there is such self-evident knowledge, it is completely insufficient in extent to serve as a foundation for all the things we ordinarily claim to know. 5. „Initial credibility‟ (fallible foundations). It might be maintained that certain classes of our noninferential beliefs have an intrinsic claim to credibility, even although error about them is a logical and even an empirical possibility. Suppose a belief is non-inferential, is „initially credible‟ and is also true. Might it not then be accounted a case of non-inferential knowledge? This involves certain difficulties. It is easy, for instance, to construct non-inferential memory beliefs which are true, but which we certainly would not call knowledge. Thus, a probe in my brain might produce the belief in me that I had an itch in my little finger three days ago. By sheer coincidence, this belief might be true. Some way of excluding such cases would have to be found. I myself am convinced that the only way to achieve such exclusions is to pass over into an „Externalist‟ theory. 6. „Externalist‟ theories. According to this, what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural relation which holds between the belief-state, Bap, and the situation which makes the belief true. Externalist theories may be divided into „Causal‟ and „Reliability‟ theories. 7. Causal theories: Bap is a case of Kap if „p‟ is true and the situation that makes „p‟ true is causally responsible for the existence of the belief-state Bap. Causal theories face two main types of difficulty. In the first place, even if we restrict ourselves to knowledge of particular matters of fact, not every case of knowledge is a case where the situation knows is causally responsible for the existence of the belief. For instance, we appear to have some knowledge of the future. Such cases can perhaps be dealt with by sophisticating the Causal analysis. In such a case, one could say, both the illness tomorrow and today‟s belief that I will be ill tomorrow have a common cause. In the second place, and much more seriously, cases can be envisaged where the situation that makes „p‟ true gives rise to Bap, but we would not want to say that A knew that p. Suppose, for instance, that A is in a hypersensitive and deranged state, so that almost any considerable sensory stimulus causes him to believe that there is a sound of a certain sort in his immediate environment. Now suppose that the sensory stimulus that produces the belief is a sound of just that sort in his immediate environment. I believe that such cases can be excluded by filling out the causal analysis with a reliability condition. But once this is done, I think it turns out that the causal part of the analysis becomes redundant. 8. Reliability theories. Knowledge is empirically reliable. Ramsey is the pioneer. The paper „Knowledge‟ combines elements of the causal and the reliability view. There followed John Watling‟s „Inference from the Known to the Unknown‟, which converted Armstrong to the reliability view. Since then there has been Brian Skyrms‟ “The explication of “A knows that p”‟ and Peter Unger‟s “An analysis of factual knowledge”, both of which appear to defend the reliability view. A more recent paper is Fred Dretske‟s “Conclusive Reasons”. It is considered for a moment by Plato in the Meno, only to be dropped immediately because of Socrates. Thursday, January 23: Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, chapter 12 There are uncontroversial cases of knowledge simpliciter, but not of non-inferential knowledge. There is a pessimistic and optimistic view. Armstrong believes in a moderate view. The question is empirical. Armstrong believes there should be a law-like connection between non-inferential beliefs and what makes them true. First proposal: (i) (ii) P is the case There is some specification of A such that, if any person is so specified, then, if they further believe that P, then P is the case. What are law-like connections? First, they are the sort of connections which can in principle be investigated by scientific method. Second, they yield counterfactual or, more generally, subjunctive conditions. Third, it is an ontological connection, not a subjective one. An objection due to Max Deutscher: if we specify some H that A has in a lot of complexity, we may attribute knowledge in cases where there isn‟t knowledge, like in the veridical hallucination case. So add (iii) H much be such that there is some real probability or at least possibility of the situation being repeated. Compare attempting to do P with believing that P. Compare the occurrence of P with the truth of P. Compare skill in doing P to having a law-like connection. Christopher Murphy and Ken Waller object that the condition H and the nature of the beliefs held should be nomically related. Also add (iv) it is not the case that Bap is the cause of p. Or rather, the relation of BxJy to Jy is that of a completely reliable sign. Tuesday, January 28: Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, chapter 13 Argues that if we do not demand absolute empirical reliability for our non-inferential beliefs, then the principle of conjunction of knowledge must be given up. Arthur Danto says that if we can be wrong about something, then we can‟t know it. But if can is taken to be empirical possibility, then this is straightforwardly true. One objection to this account is that it would be completely useless for testing knowledge. Thursday, January 30: Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, chapter 14 The suggested conditions for A‟s inferential knowledge that p becomes: (i) (ii) (iii) A believes that p A knows that q (non-inferentially) A‟s belief that q actually functions in A‟s mind as a conclusive reason for believing p (iv) A knows the truth of the general principle of his reasoning But now, alas, we are once more threatened by an infinite regress. The trouble lies within the fourth condition. It demands knowledge of the truth of a general proposition. It seems that, if our four conditions for inferential knowledge are to be accepted, we must allow that such knowledge always involves some non-inferential knowledge of general propositions. We can do so as follows: A knows that (x)(If Fx then Gx) if and only if: (i) (ii) A believes that. i.e. A is so disposed that if a believes F then this belief will both create (if necessary) and weakly causally sustain within A‟s mind the belief that G is true. If this disposition (this general belief) is manifested, then if A knows F then A knows G. Because of an objection by Christopher Murphy, add the demand of control of the corresponding beliefstate by things of the sort F and G. If just (i) doesn‟t hold, then we say that A is wired for knowledge. But now here‟s a problem: there is recursion once again! Solution: non-inferential knowledge and inferential knowledge, qua knowledge, are exactly the same. Gregory O‟hair as an objection: Tuesday, February 4: Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?” Thursday, February 6: BonJour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge" Tuesday, February 11: Goldman, "The Internalist Conception of Justification" Bonjour thinks there can be a recipe for justification. Goldman does not think there can be such a recipe. Thursday, February 13: Sosa, "The Raft and the Pyramid" Armstrong and Goldman are both foundationalists, in that they believe that what makes the beliefs in the bottom layer is how we get them, not what they are. Tuesday, February 18: Alston, "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology" Thursday, February 20: Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism” Tuesday, February 25: Alston, “An Internalist Externalism” Tuesday, March 4: Alston, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification” (parts 1 -4) Thursday, March 6: Alston, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification” (parts 5 -8) Tuesday, March 18: Kornblith, "How Internal Can You Get?" Thursday, March 20: Stroud, "Understanding Human Knowledge in General" Tuesday, March 25: Sosa, "Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue" Thursday, March 27: Foley, "What Am I to Believe?" Tuesday, April 1: Schmitt, "Epistemic Perspectivism" Thursday, April 3: Goldman, "Internalism Exposed" Tuesday, April 8: Conee and Feldman, "Internalism Defended" Thursday, April 10: John Greco, “Justification is not Internal” Tuesday, April 15: Richard Feldman, “Justification is Internal”