Osaka HSR Impact

March 18, 2018 | Author: Utkarsh Bahadur | Category: High Speed Rail, Rail Transport, Train Station, Transportation Engineering, Land Transport


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The Development Effects of High-Speed Rail Stations and Implications for CaliforniaBrian D. Sands Institute of Urban and Regional Development University of California at Berkeley Berkeley, CA 94720 CALIFORNIA HIGH SPEED RAIL SERIES WorkingPaper April 1993 UCTC No. 115 TheUniversity CaliforniaTransportation of Center University Californiaat Berkeley of PREFACE This is one of a series of reports now being published as the output of IURD’sstudy of the potential for a high-speed passenger train service in California. The present series includes twelve studies. This is the tenth of twelve studies, nine of which have already been published. We gratefully Transportation acknowledge the support provided by the United States Department of Department of Transportation [CALTRANS] through the and the California University of California Transportation Center. Of course, any errors of fact or interpretation shoukl be assigned to us and not to our sponsors. PETER HALL Principal Investigator CONTENTS Acknowledgements List of Tables and Figures Summary 1. Introduction 2. Japan and the Shinkansen 3. France and the TGV 4. Germany and the ICE 5. Implications for California References ii ~°° !11 iv 1 2 22 39 5O 56 I alone take responsibility for the views and mistakes contained herein. University of California at Berkeley. I would like to thank David Dowall for his reminders that the market is the ultimate determinate to development. I would especially like to thank Peter Hall.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study was prepared in cooperation with the California High-Speed Rail Project (CalSpeed) the Institute of Urban and Regional Development. especially Kaye Bock and Martha Conway. and all of the staff and students at DCRP IURDfor their help and and support. to experience first-hand European planning. such guidance and assistance simply camaot be repaid. I would also like to thank Steve Zimrick of the California Department of Transportation for his interest in this study and for accepting the many modifications which have occurred along the way. . I’d like to thank Dan Leavitt and Joel Tranter for their contributions in reviewing and edidng this paper. which is funded jointly by the California Department of Transportation and the University of California Transportation Center. and to maintain a semblance of contact with my wife in Germanyduring the last two years. this paper would not have been possible. He has also assisted me with trips abroad to gather information for this study and others. Finally. who enabled me to grow as a student and researcher under his tutelage. Without the guidance and support of many people. 5 2. 1981-1985 California Population by Region. 1980-2000 (000s) by LIST OF HGURES 8 9 9 10 12 52 54 5.LIST OF TABLES 2. 1980-2000(000s) California Employment Region.9 4.4 2.4 4.3 2.6 2.8 3.1 5.6 3.7 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.5 3.4 3.2 Shinkamen Network Population Changesat the Prefecture Level Gifu-HashimaShinkansen Station Location Gifu-Hashima Station Development Shin-Yokohama Station Location Shin-YokohamaStation Development Shin-Osaka Station Location Shin-Osaka Station Development TGV Network Lyon: Traditional City Center and Station Part-Dieu Nantes TGV Station and Surroundings Nantes TGV Station: Viewof North and South Sides Nantes TGV Station: Northern Side Nantes TGV Station: Southern Side SouthernSide of Station: Hotel/Office Building Lu Factory RedevelopmentSite Bank Office Building Complex ICE and IC Network Kassel-Wilhelmsh6heICE Station Location Kassel-Wilhelmsh6heICE Station and Environs DevelopmentComplexat West End of Station Development Along Wilhelmsh6heAllee West of Station Parcel Under Development Behind Station Califorrfia High-SpeedRail Network(Proposed) Major Economic Regions of Califomia 3 7 14 15 17 I8 20 21 23 26 3O 32 33 34 35 37 38 40 43 44 46 48 49 51 53 iii .1 4.3 3.5 Numberof Regions with Population Increase/Decrease.5 4.2 3.1 2. 1980-85 Populationof Cities with Stations and Neighboring Cities with Stations Changeof Population and Economic ~dices in Cities on Tokaido Line Employment Cities with Stations and NeighboringCities with Stations of Information Exchange Industries Employment Growth (%) in Regions with Population Increase.1 3.2 2.2 4.6 5.2 2.7 3.8 3.1 5.3 4. which is currently considering the use of high-speed rail in California. At the regional and urban levels. especially rail links to the local city center and public sector support ofdevelopmento The presence of these factors can help provide the formation ofsignificam development activity around stations catering to the information-exchange sector. business behavior. the development effects of high-speed rail stations are somewhatdifficult go discern and categorize° Nonetheless. the agency responsible for developing a high-speed raiI system in California must take an active role in station area developmentand coordinate its activities with local transportation agencies. concentrations of information-exchange sector employment and centers of higher education are associated with above-average employment and population growth rates. as weUas access to high-speed rail. and Germany. heavy and commuterrail. These include changes to the following: population and employment growth rates. . such as offices and hotels. This report studies the development effects of high-speed rail stations on behalf of the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). reveals similar effects and opportunities for value capture. Since high-speed rail is a relatively new technology and is in use in only a few countries. real estate values and activity. high-speed rail would reinforce existing population and employment patterns and future growth trends. In California. and increases in overall land value of approximately 20 percent. and station levels. reveals significant developmenteffects at the regional.and observation of stations in the latter two countries. the stimulation of retail activities in the area. ridership.SUMMARY High-speed rail is the most visible form of new technology accompanying and enhancing the transformation to an information-based economy. In order to fully exploit station development opportunities and ensure ridership. business and employment location. and residential location. A review of related rail systems. France. a review of the literature on its development effects in Japan. and is likely to have the greatest spatial development effects of any of these technologies. The development effects of high-speed rail stations are most clearly associated with a strong regional economyand good links with other transportation modes. urban. The primary effects analyzed are changes in the foUowing: business behavior. This effect can most easily be measured in terms of ridership and the development that occurs around high-speed rail stations. mayauthorize substantial funds for prelimifor value existing urban cores. In doing so. with emphasis on the last. What development effects are expected with the introduction of high-speed rail in California? What can be done to control or take advantage of them? The focus of this paper is on the developmenteffects of a high-speed rail system at the regional. and German ICE. urban. As opposed to fax machines or electronic mail networks. overall economicactivity. and is likely to have the greatest spatial development effects of any technology.1. and business and residential location. Questions This paper addresses the following sets of questions: 1. it also identifies advantage of development effects. high-speed rail provides clear evidence of the effect of new technologies at the local level. Methodology The first studies. and the state legislature nary studies and engineering. French TGV. This paper addresses those topics to be investigated in the preliminary studies concerning the development effects of highospeed rail and the possibilities capture. INTRODUCTION Conte. Other related effects of interest are changes in ridership. business behavior.xt High-speed rail is the most visible form of new technology accompanying the transformation to an informationobased economy. Closer analysis can reveal the effect of high-speed rail on for value capture. they The California Department of Transportation is currently examining the possible use of high-speed rail in California. and residential location. The . population and employment growth. set of questions is answered through a combination of literature review and case planning strategies that must be pursued in order to take The focus here is on the Japanese Shinkansen. Although the use of new technologies may reinforce will nevertheless also have wide-spread effects at the local level. real estate values. real estate values. and station levels. which are ubiquitous and difficult to measure. business and employmentlocation. and any public sector activity that affects development. What are the development effects of high-speed rail? What conditions are necessary for those effects? Are value increases created and can they be captured? 2. as well as revealing possibilities planning strategies necessary to influence the effects of high-speed and value capture efforts. Such analysis can also reveal those population and employment. and station level analysis that appears in subsequent sections. This paper merely sketches an outline of the kind of research that should be pursued in the future on one of the most dynamic influences on development in the 20th century. The line. The Shinkansen network is served by two types of train: stop at every station. the Italian and the Swedish X-2000. speeds of up to 1713 mph (275 kmh) on advanced steel-wheel-on-rail technology (Taniguchi. and what does exist is not particularly Shinkansen This section reviews the characteristics and its effects at the national level. the Tokaido Line. It sets the stage for the more in-depth regional. the long time period required before developmenteffects are discernible. in California. ETR-450. the French Train/~ Grande Vitesse (TGV). opened in 1964 between Tokyo and Osaka (Figure 2. there is on the topic. 2. which stop at selected stations. the GermanInterCity Express (ICE). The two limitations noted above indicate that this topic is ripe for in-depth. and Hikari Super Express trains. comprehensive. given attention has been paid to the developmenteffects of high-speed rail. Line (Omiya-Niiigata). The total Shinkansen network is currently more than 1. only a limited amount of literature ized or easily comparable.800 kin) in length and connects 56 stations.second set is answered by extrapolating past experience to the situation certain high-speed rail system characteristics Limitations To date. If high-speed rail is defined as those systems operating daily at speeds of 150 mph (240 kmh) or greater. there are currently five high-speed rail systems: the Japanese Shinkansen (SKS). miles (1. JAPAN AND THE SHINKANSEN System of the Shinkansen system. the difficulty rail. little and economic conditions. As such. its development history.100 but extensions to the system are under KodamaExpress trains. This is in directly attributing these effects to high-speed well-organ- largely due to the relative youth of high-speed rail systems. 1992: . Characteristics The Japanese Shinkansen (SKS) is the world’s longest-running first high-speed rail system.1). and thejoetsu consideration. Because of the limited available only the first three are analyzed here. which Reaching three other lines have opened: the Sanyo Line (Osaka-Hakata). Since then. and the apparent multitude of factors influencing development outcomes. the Tohoku Line (Omiya-Morioka). urban. and comparable research. information on development effects. !972 Mar. 1975 June23. 1982 March1985 Nov. I0. 15. 1964 Mar. 1982 March1985 0 100kin Source:: Taniguchi. 15. . 1.Figure 2-1 Shinkansen Network ® Open ® ® ® ® Oct. 1992. In 1956.000 kin) long. 1979: 13). Japan is one of the most densely populated countries in the world (Fischer Weltalmanach. 18-21). However. it carried 24 percent of national passenger and 23 percent of national freight rail traffic.000 trains per economic and planning powers at the national concerned about the in the construction of the Shinkansen Tokaido Line. while the latter and industrial was implemented in 1957 to infrastructure (Miyasawa. as the post-World War II economic recovery has subsided. and as economic concerns have been replaced 4 . it produces 60 percent of the national economic output. Long-Range Economic Piano The former was created in 1950 to coordinate land planning. respectively (Nishida. Both provided powerful national level and were influential 16-17). like the plans which followed them. In addition. provide adequate infrastructure.100 at-grade crossings on the existing line and the inability the existing line to handle the higher speeds of the Shinkansen (120 mph/200 kph vs. which contains only 16 percent of Japan’s land area. 95/160). in large metropolitan areas. 11. 1979: 14). were particularly increasing concentration of population and economic activity had created substantial disparities between those areas and more isolated areas. and two years later the decision was made to build the Shinkansen (literally trunk line") Tokaido Line. city on the line. as many as 290 Shinkansen trains may run per day on the Tokaido line alone. The speed with which the new line was constructed exemplified the strength of Japanese national planning as outlined in the Comprehensive National Land Development Act and the New and improve social welfare. it has seven of the ten cities with populations of one million or more.: began operations.600 miles (21.1 percent and 4. which and polluted The two plans. only six years later.800 sq kin) and a population of almost 123 million. In 1964. percent. with 28.1 the Shinkansen (as of 1979) supported by a conventional rail network 12.2-4. it created an increasingly stressful national urban environment.800 sq mi (377. as the economy and personal incomes have grown. place emphasis on the construction of transportation 1979: 262-265). The region from Tokyo to Kobe. 1990: 354). a commission was established to determine how to expand capa"new of Japanese narrow gauge. Although this concentration had substantial economic advantages. new alignment was chosen (ibid. commonlycalled the Tokaido region. By 1952. and operating at minimumfour-minute headways. the Tokaido Shinkansen and its annual passenger and freight rail growth rates average 1 percent higher than the national average of 6. day (Nishida. is the most important region in the country. the conventional rail line between Tokyo and Kobe (the Tokaido Line) was approaching capacity. for several reasons: it contains 34 percent of the national population. Background With an area of only 145. using standard gauge instead of the traditional Because of the 122 stations and 1. 1992: 5). 1992: 4). Mt. The f~rst Shinl~msen. reduced the travel between Tokyo and Osaka to four hours.246 million hours. and annual passenger kilometers increased from 11 miUion to 66 million (Taniguchi. with 23 percent diverted from airlines. Taniguchi. increu. "Erie majority of Shinkansen passengers travel 90-100 miles (150in the 45-60 miles (70-100 kin) range are becoming more common (Sanuld.sed from 31 million to 236 million. Macro. . . According to some students of the system.: tition with air at distances of up to 425 miles (700 kin) because of its more frequent service. 1979: 110-112). actual passenger traffic percent.by quality-of-life One indication concerns (ibid. On the Sanyo Line (Osaka-Hakata). in the first Shinkansen was estimated to have saved 2. today. greater reliability. The Shinkansen has proven to be particularly cost. especially the Tokaido core (Tokyo-Nagoya. out of the urban cores. 1979: 231). to new Shinkansen lines and complaints of this phenomenonis the resistance about noise on existing lines (Taniguchi. 1979: 235-237. has exceeded estimates by effective in compe55 percent from other rail lines. the trip takes less than 3 hours from 1965 to 1989. the equivalent of one year of standard working time for 1. By those standards. cherry blossoms.Effects The Shinkarisen was designed to supplement existing particularly from other rail lines and the airlines. Finally. the Shinkansen has also had an image effect. and 6 percent induced (Okabe. In addition. and temples (Sanuki. traveling trains ’traveling at a maximum speed of 125 mph (200 kmh).1991: 40. Kamada. and to reduce the time required to travel time between cities along its route. saving 21/2 hours over the previous best time. Urban and Regional Development and funcnot just one of The Shinkansen has had strong effects on Japanese regional and urban structure tions. Fuji. lower 111-114. Sanuki. 160 kin) per trip. though trips and increased safety (ibid.: 268-272).Osaka).22 million people (Sanuki. although these effects have not always been consistent. easier station access. 1979: 230). with at a maximum speed of 170 mph (275 kmh). such national planning powers have been scaled back. Taniguchi. Planning policy has been to disperse activities Considerable attention has been paid to the Shinkansen’s effect on the dispersion or concentration of population and economic activities.although it is not clear that the Shinkansen has helped bring about this goal. 1992: 18. further strengthening the image of Japan as a nation of precision and reliability. 1979: 55). it has been very successful. 1979: 234). 1992: 15). the (Amanoet al. intercity transportation modes. annual ridership 11 years of operation. there are few cases to may have been influenced by the manner in which the municipalities were aggregated into regions. of those regions with increased population. six with one or more Shinkansen stations compared and four without. examine. economic developanalysis on the of growth caused between population Nakamuraand Ueda (1989) went on to conduct discriminant in an attempt to explain the relationship This analysis revealed that the possibility After determining the existence of a relationship 33 regions with Shinkansen stations change and Shinkansen-related activities. and the results However. so the relationship the Shinkansen station ment. Their analysis population growth in 10 prefectures. 1989: 96). At this level. with the national average (Figure 2. and it is interesting there were more population decreases (16) than increases (13). increases (17) than decreases (10). there were more Finally. There are a few interesting more increased in population (19) than between the effect of the to note that in those For instance. there appears to be a high degree of correlation regions with an expressway but no station.2). and population. with the presence of an expressway enhancing the effect. it is unclear if was leading growth or growth was leading the Shinkansen. Also. between the Shinkansen. the data suggest that the Shinkansen station was the primary cause of population increases.1). then. Shinkansen station and the existence of an expressway. although none of the prefectures rates higher than the national average. the researchers broke down the ten prefectures least one of the following characteristics: into 735 municipalities. analysis on the municipalities by aggregating them into 104 "daily life regions. they found significant population increases in municipalities with at proximity to the prefecture capital or other regional centers. The analysis concluded that there were three principal conditions needed for growth in a region: a high incidence of"infor- . while in those regions with both a station and an expressway. and of those regions that had a Shinkansen station.Population Nakamuraand Ueda (1989) conducted a detailed analysis of the effect of the Joetsu and Tohoku Shinkansen Lines on regional population between 1975 and 1985." which were defined as the economicand daily life activity terri97) (Table 2. slightly more had the Shinkansen. without the Shinkansen had growth decreased (14). location of a Shinkansen station within the municipality or a neighboring municipality. by the Shinkansen could be predicted for a region with 90 percent accuracy. They categorized the prefectures on the basis of those with an expressway and those without. In order to improve the analysis. seems tenuous. The effect of an expressway was largely inconclusive at this level: only three of the six prefectures with a Shinkansen station had higher population growth than the national average. Nakamuraand Ueda (1989) conducted further tories of households within the municipalities (ibid.: results. and location of an expressway within the municipality or a neighboring municipality (Nakamura and Ueda. Ultimately. .. 1989. Vith expressvzy Vithout ezpres3vay Shinkznsen I National Tread ~ ( Populzt|on in "T5 = 100 ) AMASHI YAMACATA Source: Nakamuraand Ueda. ..Figure 2-2 Population Changes at the Prefecture Level 116~ 114 112 108 !06 lO:g 102 |00 ViLhout I10-108 106 104 I02 100 -. This supported by the ratio of 1:5. it it from elsewhere. commodity-producing industries of 65 (ibid. and a large population of citizens 100-101).Table 2. Tokaido Shinkansen on a number of cities Shirlkansen station to four neighboring cities tion growth between 1960 and 1985 (Table 2. most notably a large share of (manufacturing).1 Number of Regions with Population Increase/Decrease. As a result of the latter. They compared two cities with a without a Shinkansen station with regard to populathe higher Another pair of researchers.7 percent) versus neighboring cities (1. but they were not included.2). years after the introduction of the Tokaido Shinkansen. would have been more reveal- remains to be seen if the station actually caused growth or simply attracted . Amanoand Nakagawa (1990). This analysis indicates that during the with a Shinkansen station had However. It must be noted that the sample size is quite small and that the cities are not well matched in terms of size. 17 ~ 19 13 _3_ 16 Decrease 10 14 16 39 55 1980-85 marion exchange industries" (business services. banking services. examined the impact of the along the route. without a Shinkansen station. real estate). cities population growth rates 22 percent higher than cities also on the Tokaido Shinkansen line. ties for higher education (universities). 1989. Data on densities in the two city types and information on general economic trends in the cities ing. done by Hirota (1984) (Table 2°3). It also conover the age cluded that there were conditions that could limit regional growth. Brotchie (1991) includes an analysis of population growth in cities. Population Increase With Shinkansen Station With Expressway Without Expressway Total Without Shinkansen Station With Expressway Without Expressway Total Source: Nakamuraand Ueda.: and good accessibility sufficient opportuni- to a Shinkansen station.3 new residents between the city types. average annual population growth rates of cities with Shinkansen stations (1.3 percent) maysimply be a function of the former’s smaller base size. 2% 1.75 0.360 145.93 (A2) With Station 1.490 257. 9 .6% 1.10 12.025.2 58.2 with Stations with Stations Population of Cities and Neighboring Cities Year Shinkansen Station Total Neighboring 1 2 3 4 City 1 2 _ 1960 41.8% 1.34 1.4 47.881 74.50 20. 1991 (based on Hirota.58 8.78 0.81 6.404 107 251 292.0 Rate 1.6 40.956 43.2 52.7 35.90 13.55 8.97 0.609 182.22 1.37 (C2) A2/B2 1.70 13.388 411.3% Total Source:: Table Change of in 2.6 42.7% 1. (2) Industrial production in area.5% 1.531 Absolute 18.Table 2.600 159.4% 1.26 of O) Annual increase is the average of the ten years preceding and following the introduction the Shinkansen (1964).910 210.438 62~966 104.80 Pre-Shinkansen (B 1) Without Station 3.322 54.90 (C 1) A1/B1 0.88 9.563 Amano and Nakagawa.478 142. ~3) Construction in area.492 732.432 67.968 Chan~e Percent 44. 1984).984 304.39 13.20 14.404 102.80 14.4% 1. 1990. Source: Brotchie.3 Indices Population and Economic Cities on Tokaido Line (i) Annual Increase Index Population Retail Wholesale (2) Industrial (3) Construction Notes (AI) With Station 2.21 1.760 99.62 0. 1985 59.63 9.96 11.16 1.70 7.2 40. The period following introduction is lower overall because of national economic stagnation.48 8.64 10.743 1.01 Post-Shinkansen (B2) Without Station 1. 4 with Stations with Stations Employment of Cities and Neighboring Cities Year Shinkansen Station Total Neighboring 1 2 3 4 City 1 2 ~ 21.3 percent.2 39.277 78. the terminus Sanyo Line.3 . the number of hotels tively) and rooms doubled (from 20 and 2.4% 2.710 22. For example.676 68.404 74.015 26.3% 0. 1990. Similarly.48.320 respecin between 1972 and 1974.695 22. an increase of 52.er of new employees was 1:7.4 75.060 to 40 and 5.8% 1. 1985 25.751 150.3). the year before the Sanyo Line reached Hakata. 1991: 26).178 26.2 83. with Shinkansen stations of absolute although the ratio numb.9 3.166 120.8 percent without stations.825 Change Percent 22.1% 1.4 Rate 0. ShinAmnsen station level. construction.359 72.4 ~ 40. when the Sanyo line was completed.4~7 55. an increase and Hiroshima City had 7. the number of hotel guests increased Okayama. shares a station with Hakata.025 3. when the Shinkansen arrived certainly due in large part to the increased cities (Brotchie.2 (Table 2.000 in 1975.541 107.5 percent. of 93.3 annual employment growth rates percent for neighboring cities were 1. Fukuoka City. Hirota (1984) found that retail. industrial.8% 2. all increases in the number of tourists with Shinkansen stations prefectures. along it had seen large which from other For example. in Hakata.121 229. midway on the Sanyo line. had 7.3% Total Source: According to Brotchie modation sectors (1991). Table 2. from 170. Hirota (1984) reported strong growth in the food and accomof the along the Sanyo Shinkansen Line.5 million visitors.566 111.873 48. 10 .703 Amano and Nakagawa.4).2 million visitors.562 ~ 382. without a Shinkansen station similar results for cities At a more general Amano and Nakagawa (1990) noticed with regard to employment: average and 1.528 Absolute 4. than in cities and wholesale sectors were 16-34 percent higher in cities (Table 2.Employment and Economic Activity the growth rates with a In a study of the Tokaido Shinkansen Line.389 47.675 533. tourism in cities with Shinkansen stations: by 1975.4% 1.490 52.6% 1.000 in 1971 These growth rates were to 236. in only two cities with stations was there a rise in retail sales of more than 10 percent in the year following the 1975 opening of the Sanyo line (Okabe.: station 126-128). Although there were increases in retail and wholeAnother indication that the Shinkansen might not have been effective in directing activities was the trend in retail sale activity in cities with a Shinkansen station (Brotchie. Nakamuraand Ueda. those in cities without a Shinkansen After discerning an apparent but tenuous relationship and population growth along theJoetsu (1989) analyzed the relationship between the station and economic changes in regions that experiFirst. wholesale activities increasingly concentrated in the existing centers (Osaka.). In addi- tion. or both (2.: increased relative to the total average in regions with just a station (0. It should also be noted that effects similar to these were occurring along the Tokaido Line (Kamada. 1979: 47). ~he number of visitors staying overnight declined in some cities with Shinkansen stations.However. the growth of employees in "information exchange industries" increased significantly more in regions with a Shinkansen station and an expressway (22 percent) than in those with only expressway (7 percent) (Table 2. The fact that growth convincing. Furthermore. Hirota. In sum. Free- is stronger when both the Shinkansen and an expressway are present is especially ways (¢~pressways) have long been known for allowing population and employment to disperse . income growth increased significantly sen station (2. which experienced a decline of 9. it declined (-3. ". 1979).4 percent). decided to make only day trips (Okabe. Nakamuraand Ueda’s work (1989) provides evidence that the Shinkansen. just an expressway (1. it decreased percent) in regions with neither (ibid. or both (9. and wholesale activity. and Hiroshima City). ment of other shopping centers in the city (ibid. particularly station (ibid.: to the detribecame 125). while those in regions served by just an expressway increased 42 percent (ibid.4 percent). it did not necessarily induce newtourist activities.6 percent) in regions with neither (ibid. the number of employees in the retail sector enced population growth during the period 1981-85.rod Okabe. an expressway (6. the detriment of smaller wholesale centers. does not cause growth. tourists along the line without a Shinkansen station saw a decline in the as notably OnomuchiCity. In addition. between the presence ofa Shinkansen Nakamura and Ueda per capita and Tohoku Shinkansen lines. They noted four effects.5). what all of these figures seem to indicate is that although the Shinkansen might have directed existing tourist activities. Second. 1979: 123).: Third. 1991. even as it concentrates growth around locations with access to the transportation system. relative to the total average in regions with either a Shinkan99). like similar transportation systems. 1984.5 percent). 1979 116-118). 1989. Fourth. but allows it to disperse from existing centers. Fukuoka City.2 percent).0 percent.6 percent). some cities number of visitors. the highest land prices in the commercial area regions served by the Shinkansen increased 67 percent.8 percent). growth was concentrated in those shopping centers near the station. Station Development With the start line had 12 stations. AdvertisingServices R & D and Higher Education Polirlcal Institutes Other BankingServices Real Estate Agencies Total Source: Nakamuraand Ueda. a self-fulfiUing sub-centers. it concentrated this growth and growth indigenous to Not all growth occurred that way. The Shinkansen line to shift out of existing allowed the growth of population.Table 2. of operations between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka in 1964. to cause growth is probably derived from its routing. 12 63 21 11 28 28 _. the relative beyond that dispersed and attracted growth is uncertain. and therefore were excellent test cases for the impacts of the Shinkansen. Investigation.5 Information Exchange Industries Employ’men. and economic activities the sub-center around locations with access to the Shinkansen.~ 7 from existing centers (witness the suburbanization of the United States) and converge around locations with good freeway access (highway interchanges centers to sub-centers. and urban ring roads). taking place there. 1989. the Tokaido Shinkansen Three of these stations were completely new and located on the periphery of the city. developed: growth was dispersed from existing centers to to the sub-center by the growth some growth above and economies importance of such and indigenous growth in the region was attracted from other locations. in Regions with Population Increase. employment. created by the synergistic that form at locations where growth concentrates. Shinkansen & 42 125 27 20 57 27 21 22 Growth (Percent) 1981-85 Expressway Only(%) Business Services (Total) Information. there was certainly However. and were already served by intercity rail and local rail transit services. Since the system was apparently designed to serve regions experiencing or expected to experiprophesy. The following sections review Amano and Nakagawa’s 1990 findings of 12 . The Shinkansen’s apparent ability ence growth. At the same time. The other stations were located in the traditional center of the city. 57-58). transportation 13 . because the trip to the city center takes about 30 minutes by car and the trip (Figure 2. and toll There are a number of warehouses. stations have provided in light an excellent of planning Station opportunity for before-and-after of development. and Shin-Osaka. seems like a remote locaservice to the Two factors appear to be responsible for this impression. Shin-Yokohama. the to and from the station (Goto. in or near the In Hamamatsu. carrying levels of service 600. which also has a Shinkansen station peaked per day ovx~r 8. comparisons These three which stop at every Shinkansen station which provide on the line. predictions. which is and two rail operations in Japan. but it still First.000 persons per day in 1974 and has dropped down to about 7. the location of new development. lines not served directly other major intercity line stations. this finding is not surprising.000 trains each day. was located development was shifted within the city that the (Amano and Nakagawa. However. Given the scale For example. the Osaka station.3). arrived and departed and bordered two municipal More than 2. centers.000 persons since then (ibid. 1990: 48). express service Kodama and Hikari Shinkansen.: 55. 1986). particularly policies toward development and transportation Gifu-Hasbima The Gifu-Hashima station. and on development at existing and Station Locations development impacts in cities rail stations where Tokaido Shinkansen stations There were no significant were built of rail within existing intercity (Amano and Nakagawa. was intended to be a major gateway for intercity city. there has been relatively 2. located in a rice paddy about nine miles (15 km) from the travelers entering the by rail center . trains. New Station Locations were opened with the introduction The first station of the Shinkansen in 1964: Gifu- Three new stations Hashima. was at the convergence of the JNR Tokaido line (Osaka loop and Fukuchyama line). little development at the station restaurants. ridership requires just a stop in Nagoya.of the City of Gifu. Existing of the Shinkansen on population and employment. It seems clear without the introduction in those cities would have occurred of a Shinkansen station. Nagoya. by the Shinkansen.000 passengers and ridership. where a Shinkansen station existing center although station city center and attached to an existing toward the station development did affect station.4). With such high existing stations impact of the Shinkansen on development at such train was likely to be limited. Despite optimistic since it opened almost 30 years ago (Figure entertainment tion. and Kyoto. was served only by Kodama Shinkar~sen while the other two were served by both between major stations.the effect new stations. 1990: 48). system linkages. parking lots near the station. 1990.Figure 2-3 Gifu-Hashlma Shinkansen Station Location Gifu Urban Rail Line g JR Line Shinkansen Nagoya Source: Amanoand Nakagawa. 14 . . 1990..Figure 2-4 Gifu-Hashima Prior to Station Construction Station Development Present Situation ! 1." Source: Amano and Nakagawa. 15 . By 1990. JR Yokohama line was also boosted. These improvements supplementing the local Kodamao 52-53). The first attempt. The new line has had no effect because the existing service via Nagoya. 60). an underground municipal rai|way 27.000 per day for the next decade.: 57-58). 53).: would appear that poor planning is causing these development pressures they would probably be best served by Gifu-Hashima.city center has not been improved. some of the express Hikari Shinkansen began to stop at the station. only the north side has followed through with their plans. until 1982.000 in 1989.000 in 1974. has higher frequencies (ibid. apparently discouraging many developers 0bid. The role of planning in allowing and encouraging development at high-speed rail stations is illustrated by a comparison of the north and south sides of the station. This contrast points to the value of long-range planning before and after the introduction of high-speed rail stations (ibid. was not introduced 57-60). and after a peak of 15. however.: was built. and is connected by a JR branch rail line to the center of Yokohama (Figure 2. Three reasons are cited for the jump in ridership. Finally. in service made the Shin-Yokohamastation one of the main entrance points to the city. However. ridership only averaged about 10. Both sides were designated for the north side nowhas a modern road network and numer55). a new urban rail line. 48 of the 105 Hikari trains in Japan called on Shin-Yokohama daily (ibid. thus. One result is that residential commutersare using increasing amounts of the area around the station for parking. long-distance Shinkansen travelers can bypass Gifu-FIashima for Nagoya. The frequency of service on the existing to go elsewhere. development.: This problem is reinforced by the fact that both the express Hikari and the local Kodama trains stop at Nagoya.5).: heavy development of the area around the entrance of the station led to the formation of a new city 16 . ten years after the station opened.: center (ibid. unlike other cities of its size (100. although longer in distance and time.6). As a result. while only the local trains stop at Gifu-Hashima. Shin-Yokohama Station The Shin-Yokohama station is located about four miles (seven kin) north of the city center in area of undeveloped hills. the trip to the city center on the JR line was about 30 minutes because the low frequency of service and the need for a transfer en route. when linking the station to Yokohama’s city center and reducing journey times to 12 minutes. gains population and employment and seems to offer the promise of strong development pressures (ibid. giving the station the highest ridership increase of any Shinkansen station since the system’s introduction in 1964 (ibid.000). while the south side remains undeveloped (Figure 2.: 54). The second factor contributing to the sense of isolation at the station is the land speculation that has occurred. All this is occurring even as Hashima. ous new buildings. Second. First. but because of resistance from residents on the south side. Ridership jumped to 50-51. . 17 .. YokohamaCity Center Source:: Amano and Nakagawa.. 1990.Figure 2-5 Shin-Yokohama Shinkaxtsen Station Location Shinkansen Station Shinkansen Line Z d JR Branch Line ~~. Underground "_ Railway . Figure Shin-Yokohama Immediately After Station Construction 2-6 Development Station Station: Present Situation Source: Amano and Nakagawa. 18 . 1990. rates were consistently greater in areas with Shinkansen service than in those without. (universities). however.5 miles (six km) from the center of Osaka and was linked to it upon the opening of the Shinkansen by a JR line and an underground municipal railway (Figure 2. because the area is separated from the city by the River Yodo.8). developmentaround it was initially ment has been strong around the station. First. and primarily because of several planning strategies around the station.000 per day in 1975 and has since leveled off just under 10. as men- linkages to the city center were opened at the same time as Third. positively in Japan at the regional.000 passengers per day (ibid. were especially explanation seems more likely. and a large population of citizens over the age of 65. or is it constructed in regions that are already increasing and thus simply concentrates growth within those regions? The latter provide a definitive answer. .: Sutnmcary The Shinkansen has had strong development effects station levels.: 60-62). what remains unclear is the direction does the Shinkansen cause the increases in growth rates. This last observation lends further support to the theory that the Shinkansen has se~ed to shift growth. banking services. large-scale tioned above. not general growth. Although there was also increased growth in the and wholesale sectors. rates increases is clear. a large new town was developed at the terminus of the municipal 62-65). the Shinkansen’s correlation with population and employment growth population and employment growth Although rates vary between studies. developdevelopment projects were initiated Second. Ridership peaked at over 11. real estate). ment growth and development activity retail as well as the hotel and food service sectors. ment growth rates than those without direct Shinkansen service. excellent transportation the Shinkansen station. 2. In recent years. not induce it. Employstrong in the information exchange sector. urban.Shin-Osaka Station The Shin-Osaka station is located about 3. there is evidence that these were merely shifts within communities. Regions served by the Shinkansen generally have higher population and employThese higher growth rates are a high incidence of"information exchange industries" sufficient opportunities for higher education In addition. two factors expressway and the Shinkansen had an especially to a Shinkansen station.7). although detailed analysis of route planning policies and growth rates would be necessary to At the urban level. However. the combination of There are also (manufacstrong effect on growth rates. that seem to limit growth: a large share of commodity producing industries of causation: turing). railway north of the station (ibid. limited (Figure Although the station is near Osaka’s city center. associated with three factors: and good accessibility (business services. Figure 2-7 Sh/n-Osaka Shinkansen Statiotl Location ~ottrce: Amano and Nakagawa. 1990. 2o . Figure Skin-Osaka Immediately After Station Construction Station 2-8 Development Present Situation Source:: Amano and Nakagawa. 21 . 1990. was made by Nakaraura and Ueda (1989). Planning.and French-language literature. trains run at speeds of up to 186 mph (300 kml~). Cointel-PineU and Plassard. Pieda’s information is combined with as well as a site visit to Nantes.1. On the 436 miles (702 kin) of dedicated track. The network is a mix of high-speed dedicated track and upgraded track. At the newstations built on the fringes of existing communities. Paris and the Rhone.there have been definitive effects. Plassard. development effects of the TGV (Pieda. British Rail to compare the impacts of four alternative signs of its development a British firm retained on the 1992: Table 2. Economic and Development Consultants (Pieda). with farebox revenues more than covering its costs° 22 . Its analysis is based on the following sources: 1981. 1990. totaling 2. other English. while on the remainder the network trains run at a maximum 136 mph (220 kmh) (Hall et al. Le Monde. 1990. development was found to be highly dependent on the provision of good transportation links to the new station-.920 miles (4. The expansion of existing stations for Shinkansen service has had little or no effect on developmentaround the station. value capture is likely to be quite extensive.1). Streeter.. Bonnafous et al. and ridership is very high. The line connects the two strongest economic regions of France. TGV Southeast The TGVSoutheast (Paris-Lyon) has been in operation since 1981 and currently serves cities with non-stop or one-stop service to Paris (Figure 3. Since the introduction of the TGV. 1991). 3. 1987a. 1987b. 1988. However. 1990. Gac. 1989. FRANCE AND THE TGV TGV System The French Train ~ Grande Vitesse (TGV)has been in operation in France for more than ten years. Buisson. given the scale of Japanese rail operations. A review of the development effects of Japanese heavy and commuter rail confirms this supposition.especially rail transportation from the existing urban center --and on planning policies that encouraged development and resisted The only reference to land value increases speculation.702 kin) in length. who found that land prices in the commercial areas increased 67 percent whenserved by the Shinkansen.. There are currently two TGV lines: the TGV Southeast line (Paris-Lyon) and the TGV Atlantic line (Paris-Le Marts/Tours) (Figure 3. development has varied.1).Alps region. No information was found on value capture. 1989.At the station level. has conducted an extensive review and analysis of the literature Bernadet. of 1992: 24). 1986. high-speed rail routes linking the Channel Tunnel with London. 1987.High SpeedLine Line in ServJoe Being Electrified Source: Bormafous. Streeter. 23 . 1992.Figure 3-1 TGV Network TGV Southeast TGV Atlantic Brest Morlaix ieuc Rennes Quire Le Crol Le St Naza TGV-Nord Le ~ARIS-Montparnasse hAtellerttu|t La Ro Poitiers oulSme Bor Bayonn( Biarrltz Hendsye Libourne Agen Montauban Toulouse irbe8 =. the opposite appears to have occurred. but there were also new travel packages for users of the TGVo former was the result of an increase The while the latter was a function of increased promotion by 19). changes: there were fewer overnight stays. Centralization. 1991: 19). The TGV was only one factor considered by businesses in the decision to locate in a town or city. conducted only two to three years after the introduction of high-speed rail services and during a given better economic conditions (Pieda. tourism. centralization. While total business journeys increased 56 percent. 1991: 15).). and/or facilities of the company. Tourism underwent two contradictory in the number of same-day return trips. 1991: 18). and the Ministry of Transport (INRETSand OEST). After a brief review of the first impacts. and three business location and development (Pieda. Winter tourism apparently was not affected by the TGV (ibid. These assessments were so longer term impacts might be of greater magnitude.Since 1979.particularly the Paris market. assistance). Before the TGV Southeast began service.: Business Location and Development in the Rhone-Aips and Burgundy regions. several agencies have examined the socioeconomic impacts of the TGVSoutheast: the Laboratoire d’Economie des Transports (LET). areas along the line. proximity to the market. with emphasis on several specific examples. as companies attempt to expand into the international market. as Rhone-Mpscompanies-. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer (SNCFor French National Railways). the complete transportation site provinetwork (including road and rail links). DATAR (Regional Planning). and public sector assistance (site identification. Their focus has been on service industries. subjects. Services. 24 . those related to the trade of services jumped by 112 percent (Pieda. this fear may eventually be realized Surveys of managers assessing the [ink between the TGV and the location of businesses were conducted in ten cities regional economic depression. In fact. and no business relocated primarily because of TGV service. Other important factors included the profitability sion.have expanded into However. In addition. particularly to Paris has also been unsubstantiated. and displace those based in the Rhone-Alps region (around medium-sized firms-. it was feared that Paris-based service sector companies would expand their operations Lyon). the fear that Lyon-based service companies and head offices would relocate 0bid. and Tourism this section will conduct a more in-depth analysis of business location and development The largest increase in ridership after the introduction of high-speed rail services between Paris and Lyon was in business iourneys related to the sale or purchase of services. 2). Based on the previous observations.000 sq ft (175.702. there are four factors responsible for the strong growth: easy access to and from the station by foot. in the form of financing for construction and 21-22). had located near the isolated TGV station.Only three new stations opment. convenience for customers.000 sq m). trains (ibid. and is limited thereof mainly to advanced service downtown.000 sq m) to 2.1).2 percent. TGVAtlarttic Operations on the TGVAtlantic line between Paris and Le Mans were only begun in 1989 (Streeter. The town. the area around the TGV station is now the most sought-after location for office space in Lyon: it has almost 40 percent of the city’s total office space. located in a region undergoing economic restructuring the closure of local coal mines. a total increase of 43 percent and an annual increase of 5.. had hoped to capitalize on its access to Paris to stimulate industrial growth. for new development. only two firms. It also seems that muchof the new development is leased to firms that have simply relocated from the traditional firms. and Macon.: 21-22). in 1990. and the station’s (ibid. According to local property agents. was promoted as part of a standing policy by local authorities (Figure 3. six years after the TGV began service and reduced the travel time from Paris to 85 minutes. it seems that the impact of the TGV limited to a is relatively small area of Lyon near the station. were built along the TGV Southeast line: Lyon Part-Dieu. In the future..883. 1992: 6) (Figure 3. both marginal. not to newly formed or attracted has been the result of firms that require good access to Paris. The main reasons for the weak development impact of the TGVseem to be a general lack of demand poor road access and image extensive pre-TGV studies made along the route.: and high visibility of the firms from the TGV joint ventures between the public and private sector. so there are few studies about the line and few detectable develophowever. Of the three. From 1983 to 1990. The specifics of such financing is not given in the literature. Le economic develof their development are Part-Dieu Creusor. a steady flow of businessmen through the district. As a result. because of The town of Le Creusot provides an example of a new TGV station that has failed to stimulate development. development impacts will be better recorded because of of SNCFand ment impacts. it has been suggested that much of the economic activity redevelopment (ibid.. The three stations examined in detail below.: 20). and in 1990 it had 60 percent of the city’s planned office project. However. office space around the TGV station rose from 1. only Lyon Part-Dieu was the site of significant and the reasons for the success or failure Because development in Lyon’s traditional downtownis constrained by rivers.000 sq ft (251. Property development subsidiaries 25 . the isolated station location. Moreover. Figure 3-2 Lyon: Trad/tional City Center and Star/on Part-Dieupr \ Source: Lan Uide Lay. 26 . 1967. land prices doubled number of transactions from $82.06/sq h/year (FF580-1. part because of the TGV.000-10. 1991: 22-23).600 sq m) to the second-largest dairy company France. and 23).000 sq ft (22.000 sq ft (10.000/sq m) in four years.000 sq m) had already leased half of its space to an insurance company. Le Mans One year after the TGV Atlantic put Le Mans only 55 minutes from Paris. 27 . the price of property in the town had increased 35 percent and real estate exchanges had increased 22 percent.and Nantes indicate their apparent success.: Nantes This section details the development effects observed during a visit to Nantes. 1 However.local attthorities have taken an active role in promoting development near the TGV Atlantic sta- tions. not its main cause or even a critical element XPrices calculated using an exchangerate of $1 = 5. All of this activity has sparked fears that the town will becomea commuter suburb of Paris. and intensity. and 28. By the end of 1991.52 to $18. down from 2 hours 15 minutes. A new business park with 370 acres (150 hectare) was scheduled to open in September of 1991 and expected to include a European graphics industry research and training center. A new business center with 108.07 to $164. an additional European Institute the rest: 237.000 sq m) were to be provided.66 French Francs (NewYorkTimes.000 sq ft (2.but also because of a new highway linking it in 1996 with Belgium and of northern Europe.100/sq m/year) in three years. Prior to the TGVAtlantic connection to Nantes. (Pieda. with 350 trainees. A new The Institute chose Le Marts in technol[ogy center is also planned near the existing university and has already attracted the new of the Musical Profession. Vendome.14/sq ft (FF5. for those able to afford the monthly $357 (FF2. 1992). location.500 sq ft (2. the TGV viewed as is a catalyst to this development and economic activity.000) fare (ibid. General economic indicators are also very strong in Le Mans: the of raw land and building sites doubled in three years. located on the TGVAtlantic. an extensive study was conducted to create a baseline against which to examine the impacts of the TGV Atlantic over time. 21. Within three years. property values and rents. the City of Le Marts already had an active and diverse development program to promote the area around the station. Vendome Vendomewas an unknown village before the TGVAtlantic reduced its time to and from Paris to 42 minutes.000 sq m) to the local economic development agency for new industry. The study will allow changes in the following property and urban form factors to be tracked: economic activities by type. and apartment prices rose from $9. in January 1992. and preliminary studies of Le Marts. these spaces offer rents approximately 25 percent below the city-wide average of $9. 1992).000 (Audic. and finance. The Department. 28 .). All of the stations have been architecturally reflects updated with wave. 1990: 8). the TGV has had three types of effects on the city: qualifying. Although it is still conduct meaningful comparisons with the baseline. Start-up companies may qualify to begin operations in one of the (FF550-650/sq m/ 60 incubator spaces the city has at six locations throughout the city. In France it is second only to Toulouse in high-technology to Nantes are provided with assistance in locating as discussed below.000 in 1988 (Gac and Paumier. electronics.03-10. Nantes has an active economic development program that assists companies interested the station. specializing in food processing. The city had a population of 232. The image effect relates to the TGV’sstyle and service: sleek. having a substantial Background impact on development in Nantes. industries (Audio. 59 minutes.development programs and projects (Gac and Paumier. Nantes has u growing and diverse economy. 1992). companies.Nantes had never qualifying effect springs from the improved connection between Paris and Nantes: reduction of it for consideration by businesses This notion is especially important for international because the train itself cities it serves. Urban Effects According to Phillipe Audic (1992). smooth. is France’s seventh largest city and the political and economiccenter of the Pays-de-Loire region. the travel time between Nantes and Paris to two hours qualifies for location. or relocation. The opening of TGV Atlantic service in 1989 reduced rail travel times between Paris and Nantes from three hours to one hour. invigorating them with promise and vitality. as well as shared business services (ibid. In addition. while the greater metropolitan area had a population of 500.). 30 minutes. fast. and direct. in expanding or relocating existing and start-up Existing around companies and is actively involved in the redevelopment of land around the TGV station.66 sq it/year year). sites and with the planning process. and it will soon complete a 42 km ring road and expand its two existing tramlines (ibid. it has an "osmotic" effect on the Before the TGV. medical research. is a technical and commercialsuccess. materials research and manufacturing.and sail-Like detail work that the network’s connection to the Atlantic Ocean and its smooth modernity. too soon anecdotal evidence suggests that the TGV is Nantes. Automobile travel time is three hours. 1990:11). the Managing Director of the Nantes Development image. Nantes is currently served by three highways. expansion. 230 miles (380 km) from Paris on the northwestern coast of France. and exciting. They may also participate in redevelopment activities data processing. increased productivity. as many cities now do. The direct effects of the TGV the reduced travel time. However.This has an especially on the companies as their major or only source of income. not all of the TGV’seffects are beneficial. Other companies relocating from Paris include Sonye du Val d’Electricite.000 employees. which have come to rely which had been located in small towns in the countryside are beginning to relocate to cities served by the TGV. x~th 1. paralleling the Loire River. The a large insurance to maintain to Nantes considers the TGV vital companywith 100 employees that is relocating some five to six stories the somhwestof the station is a former manufacturing district 29 . former manufacturing districts. recently relocated its headquarters from Paris to Nantes. market from Paris. Arthur Anderson France had intended to local:e a regional office with 100 people in Nantes. stories in height. Similarly. The station is about ¼ mile (0.).5 km) from the city center. as a prime location for economic development. The railway runs through Nantes from east to west:. now dominated by offices. are Nantes. with some offices and ground floor retail.5 km) north of the river and almost connected to it by a canal (Canal St. despite the fact that construction of a new headquarters in Nantes cost the equiw-alent of two years’ rent in Paris. costs. about ¼ mile (0. a producer of writing instruments sold worldwide. but then realized it could serve the regional This is not the only reverse impact: some medium-sized French companies disruptive impact on the small towns.). companyconsidered only cities contact with Paris (ibid.3). Now it lower travel actively courts companies and takes steps to assist them in locating to Nantes. which is northwest of the station (Figure 3. Business Behavior Although it is still too early to test fully the impact of the TGV Atlantic on business location decisions. The WatermanCompany. Its manufacturing plant. Buildings here are four to five in height. To the north of the station is a residential district. SNCF attempting to counteract this is problem by improving service to towns that have rail service to cities served by the TGV (ibid. and the cumulative effects of the decision by businesses to locate in manufacturing company with 150 employees (with plans to add 50 more). To To the south and east appear to be that borders a mixed residential on the TGV network for relocation. and the companyhad indicated that it could conduct its sales and marketing activities transformer in Paris and beyond with the use of the TGV connections an electrical to Paris. was already in Nantes. Station Development Name’sTGV station is located in the heart of the city. guaranteed arrival. F~lix) running from the Loire to the western edge the statiion. preliminary information indicates that the TGV plays a large role in the decision of busi* nesses to locate in Nantes.advertised itself. 1990.Figure 3-3 Nantes TGV Station and Surroundings Center -. . °" Loire River ~ Source: Gac and Paumier. 30 . Stretching to the west of this is a long one-story structure that also contains passenger service functions and a large tqve-story parking garage (300 spaces) (Gac and Paumier. F6Iix Canal. There are numerous small hotels.and light manufacturing district.6 sq mi (1 sq km) (Figure 3. Redevelopmentof the Quartier Lu serves the following functions: it is part of a plan to focus the growth of services in the city’s center while not restricting encourages economic activity it to the immediate center. restaurants.7). The remainder of the with some ground-floor retail to serve local residents. ~here is also a large five-story parking structure to the west of the station’s north side (estimated . The Quartier Lu is just southwest of the train station. and an appraisal of the particular 31 .6).It is dominated by a large entrance hallway on the southcafes. The company has relocated to modern facilities in Nantes. it by lowering development costs.5). side of the road° As its architectural specifically design indicates. a world-wide manufacturer of cookies and cakes. redevelopment area is primarily residential. with a long two-story building housing SNCF office building to the east (Figure them and an underground passageway making it possible to reach the four platforms (Figure 3. and measures about 0. Redevelopment Redevelopment in the Quartier Lu (officially called the Quarrier Champ-de-Mars-Madeleine) in Nantes provides the most striking evidence to date of the development effects of the TGV Atlantic. 1992. it fosters the redevelopment of underutilized property. The noJrthern side is the city’s traditional various railway passenger functions and an eight-story 3. Stretching to the northwest is a one-story complex of restaurants and cafes. discussed in detail below.100 spaces). and some small offices and light manufacturing. with the tracks between train station. thus opening up the parcel for redevelopment. only 300 feet (900 m) across the St. The designated price is determined by a city-wide annual review of property exchanges and rents. 1990: 71). thereby creating a service center growth pole. 1991: 3-5). David. This side of the station is served by a main east-west road and tram line. and it increases and improves the supply of housing in the area (Audic. The station itseff This last area is the focus of major redevelopment efforts and is is divided into a northern and southern side. and a five-story hotel and office building with a ground floor restaurant and car rental offices (Figure 3.3). the southern side of the station is new and was built for the coming of the TGV. and small retail stores lining the northern west corner of the station that contains passenger service functions (Figure 3.4). The redevelopment area designation gives the city both the right of first refusal on all property for sale in the Quartier Lu and the right to designate the price at which it will buy the property. The western edge of the redevelopment area was formerly the main manufacturing plant for the Le Petite Beurre company (commonly called "Lu"). 32 .Figure 3-4 Nantes TGV Station: View of North and South Sides AMENAGEMENT LA NOUVELLE GARE SUD DE Source: Gac and PaumAer. 1990. Figure 3-5 Nantes TGVStation: Northern Side View R)oking east (standing slightly west of station) //// // / ./ / / View to west 33 . Figure 3-6 Nantes TGVStation: Viewof entrance (looking north) Southern Side View to east 34 . Figure Southern View of South Side Side of Station: 3-7 Hotel/Office Building View of west side 35 . About one-half of the site will be offices and a convention center/hotel complex.000 sq m). This process is used as a assembles and reconfigures the properties for more efficient property to developers at the price for which it was originally making it an indirect form of value capture. Newdevelopment in the redevelopment area as a whole is considered to be unsurpassed in the city because of its modernqualities and its proximity to both the TGV station and the city center. Summary The TGV has affected the behavior and location decisions of businesses and has had noticeable development effects around some stations. In addition. Total development costs are estimated at $53 (FF300) million.000 sq m) of built space in a mix of four.parcel’s value. tourism increased. rents are subject to a 20 percent premiumabove equivalent space in other These rents are not for a lack of development areas of the citymnewoffice space on the former Lu factory site already is leasing for $13.000 in the near future. F61ix Canal wiU provide a direct connection between the development and the TGV station. A new pedestrian bridge across the St.000 sq ft (55.and five-story buildings. and mediuma large amount of new housing development and subdivision of existing population of the area is scheduled to rise from 3. 36 . Construction ofa mLxed-usedevelopment is progressing rapidly on the 6. The development will have approximately 592. service sector business trips by rail more than doubled.000 sq m) of office space has been constructed annually in the Nantes greater metropolitan area. about percent of which is land costs.000 sq ft (10.7 hectare) site of the Lu factory. The city then resells the means to retain a larger degree of control over the planning and development of the property. though: since 1980. Introduction of the TGV Southeast (Paris-Lyon) had several discernible effects: total business trips by rail increased 50 percent. and more than half of it has been within the city boundaries (David.9516. 1991: 26). overnight hotel stays dropped.41/sq ft/year (FF850-1. If the landowner chooses not to sell the property to the city at the designated price. allows more intense lane1 use of bought. units (Audic.000 to 6.000/sq m/year) (ibid. with the remainder of the project to open sometime thereafter Another major project (Audio.. 1992. Nantes.). ancl improves the infrastructure As in most redevelopment plans. The convention center is scheduled to open in September 1992.9)° It opened in the fall of 199I. 1991: 127).000 people in a building complex of 108. the city use. in the redevelopment area is a bank and once building complex the serving the property. David. residential indicating 1992). employing 1. an average of 604.000 sq ft (57. the property cannot be sold to any other part). directly across the street from the convention center (Figure 3. and the rest wiU be residences (Figure 3.7-acre (2.8). the property. As a result. Figure Lu Factory Convention center (looking south) 3-8 Site Redevelopment Hotel~Office Complex (looking southwest) 37 . 38 . Other factors included the overall econetwork (roads and rail). No information on value capture was found in the literature. and perhaps Great Britain (Sands. some development effects are already detectable. nomic situation. The Netherlands. value capture was in effect on the redevelopment site near the station. Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB) plans maximumof 173 mph (280 kph) to make up for lost the end of the decade to double the number of miles over which high-speed operations are capableo It also plans to expand ICE operations to 10 or 11 lines. The InterCity Express (ICE) is part of an effort to relieve congested freeways and airports divertinG.043 kin) in length (Figure 4. Developmentwas inconsistent across station locations. when making business location decisions. 20 trains per between Hamburg and Munich at scheduled speeds up to 155 mph (250 kph). Unfortunately. 1991.it had east-west orientation. and expects to be operating at speeds of 186 mph (300 kmh) on least one of those new lines. Howecer. been used mainly to serve the north-south corridor that had been overburdened ever since the postWorld WarII division of the country had disrupted the rail lines’ traditional The introduction of the ICE presents an excellent opportunity to observe the effects of high-speed rail on development at the national to local levels. Although the TGV Atlantic (Paris-Le Mans) has only been in operation for three years.~d to produce a 20 percent rent premiumon space in the redevelopment area. Real estate prices and transactions have risen sharply and in Nantes the network is perceived as qualifying the city a number of large businesses out of Paris for the location of businesses. 23.B~dVY AND THE ICE but in Nantes. the next generation of ICE trains will operate on lines extending into Switzerland. is and the presence of the TGV has spurred a major redevelopment project near the station as well as heltx. France. GEI. Belgium. no formal studies 39 . and connected cities over a single north-south line 648 miles (1. intercity travelers. 17. around the station. 33). some form of ICE System The German InterCity traveled Express (ICE) began operating in June. in several communities with stations. with effects generally limited to the area but the level of development was determined by the overall economic strength of the communityand the presence of service sector firms requiring access to Paris.size information sector firms in hinterland areas used the TGV Southeast to enter Paris markets. Prior to the unification of the former East and West Germanys. With the integration of the European high-speed rail network. 20. with time. Nantes has attracted (although the TGV also used by Paris-based firms to serve customers in and around Nantes). the entire transportation access to the TGVSoutheast was just one of a and public sector assistance. several of which will run into the eastern portion of the country. 1992: 3. 4.1). number of factors cited in business relocation decisions. Figure 4-1 ICE and IC Network Source: Deutsche Bundesbahn <January1991). 4O . the Harmover-Wiirzburg section.. 2 (Deutsche within By ICE..000 residents were served by only two intercity trains per day. is here that the preliminary It development effects of high-speed rail are most readily observable. Of the 11 cities served by the ICE upon its introduction in June 1991. Given the level of resources necessary for the reconstruction crossonational comparisons. This section forms a new north-south axis in the Germanhigh-speed rail system. the station is expected to improve the ability of the city to attract industrial and service firms. No development effects are as . north-south line running through Hamburg-Bremen-DOsseldorfit was Although Kassel is located in the middle of German)-latitudinally. 1987). making the decision to locate an ICE station one for the Deutsche Bundesbahn. supplementing the traditional Frankfi~rt-Stuttgart. 76. 1992). in the center of the city (Nose: 134. by any other national agency of the former East (Lange. hours and 10 minutes from Hamburg. both of which called on the main train station located of Germanyin 1990.. located very close to the border of what was previously East Germanywhen the decision was madein the early 1970s to route the new line there. are expected to provide a strong development impulse near the station and in Kassel as a whole. It is also the first new station to be built in a German city since shortly after WWII. 1991: 24. possibly. 1V2 hours from Frankfurt. Klotz. The station was perceived as a great economicopportunity for the city.. With the reunification there a fortuitous integrated Kassel has again becomea centrally located city.yet ob. its 213. These times. 74. At that time. enabling it to be with the rest of Germanyand Europe via up to 100 hourly ICE and IC trains per day.have been initiated by the Deutsche Bundesbahn nor. 116).this is not entirely surprising. and 2 hours and 45 minutes from Stuttgart Bundesbahn. especially for Kasse|-Wilhelmsh6he The following sections detail the development effects observed during a site visit to the Kassel-Wilhelmsh6he ICE station in January 1992. 1987). this is the only completely newintercity train station. Background Kassel is located on Germany’s longest new high-speed line segment. Germany. the funding of its university and government agencies (Bergholter. and in addition to improve the image and. Specifically. and especially for Kassel. 41 . combined with the station’s centrality the city. apparently. 1991: 48.ervable at these stations. but it does seem to be a lost opportunity. Kassel-Wilhelmsh6he is now less than one hour from Hannover. Klotz. The remaining ICE stops are at long-established stations in the center of major urban centers. but also regional and local passengers. is it possible to control speculation and conversion around the station. Althoughthe city center station still receives local train service and someregional trains. However. and industrial research center. According to Bergholter. and the kiss-and-ride stops.3). I991: 24). Third. will not simply be left behind as development occurs around the new station. and retail space? The strong demarcation of growth and non-growth areas in city development plans is expected to help control this. and general plans and policies to improve the quality of life and standard of living in Kassel. seven bus stops. almost all available space in the city already had firm development plans at the time of his writing 0bid. The station is also thought to provide an opportunity to channel growth that is occurring in the western part of the city (Bergholter. The new station is located on WilhelmshCSheAUee. that facilitates transit. is it possible to build a multi-modal terminal that serves not only intercity passen gers. the design (Figure 4. Second. along with the of the inner-center and the integration of the university with the city’s growth plans. revitalization transfer between them and intra-urbar (Bergholter. 1991: 40-41). The city has three ongoing programs which it would like to couple with the new station: the upgrading of the university to a top scientific re-establishment of its role as city-center. its most distinctive feature is the large canopy that ex~ends out from the front of the station lobby to cover the four light-rail 15 taxi stands. is there a role for the old main train station in the city center? The city wants to strengthen regional transportation links to the city center and turn it into a regional service center 0bido: 26). and train. First. The city originally wanted the new intercity train station to be built underneath the existexpensive and the site ing station in the city center. on the design and layout of the facilities would have to answer Jn the affirmative.). one has to wonder if it and is connected to the KasseloWilhelmsh6he station via bus. These uncertainties pt can be narrowed down to three questions. hotel.2 miles (3. even in the face of high demandfor office. stop. Although temporary drop-off/pick-up automobile park- 42 .officials ceive it as both an opportunity and a threat. Located and bus trafi~c (Bergholter. The station itself has an innovative and distinct architectural on a bridge that crosses the railroad tracks. Because it area and a nearby large park to the west. Location and Design. 1991: 25)? Based one and that is compatible with the existing site characteristics and the observation of passengers using the station.2) (Klotz. though. a wide street running east-west and dating from the Baroque era.5 km) the west of the city center (Figure 4. streetcar. this soon proved to be prohibitively was shifted to a small local passenger and freight train station approximately 2. links the urban city center with a growing residential street carries high levels of automobile. tram. 1991: 24).Planning Although the cityviews the newstation as an excellent stimulus to the community. 43 .Figure Kassel-Wiiheln~h6he 4-2 ICE Station Location 0 1 2mi Source:: Klotz. 1991. Figure Kassel=W’xlhelmsh~he 4-3 and Environs ICE Station Souxce: Langer, 1991. 44 ing is allowed in front of the station, regular parking is located either behind the station, above the train platforms, or underground to the west. Tour bus parking is available to the east of the station. Transit and automobile passengers have no more than a flve-minute walk to the platlobby, and by forms. The platforms are reached by long ramps extending down from the station service is provided from the four platforms. Development Because the station has been in operation for less than one year, it is difficult development effects, around the station trial and, unfortunately, DBis not monitoring development activity (Lange, 1992). However, the Kassel Industrie to observe in the area stairs and elevators from the parking lot above the platforms. ICE, IC, regional, and local train und Handeslkammer (an indusand raw and trade organization simiLar to a chamber of commerce)reports that a general increase in service, hotel, residential, demandfor all types of space has taken place, including retail, space, to $13.38/sq ft/year land. Somespecific effects that have been noted are: a 20 percent increase in rents for area office (DM 240/sq n~ear); the construction of a new hotel near the station; which is expected to serve mainly service demandfor manufacturing uses in the area the development of a large parcel behind the station, industry firms requiring access to the ICE; and little 2 (Frei, 1992). A brief visit to the station and a cursory land use survey around it produced similar findings. The design of the station is innovative, highlighted by the architectural qualities and details, out of place which are effective at creating a sleek and polished image. DBsought this image for the ICE, in part as a signal to development in the area, although it does sometimes seem a little with the current developmentin the area. The station itself has the usual array of small retail shops, restaurants, and cafes catering to travelers, as well as information and ticketing facilities, and railway offices. In addition, it has a fairly large retail/drug store, estimated to be 5,000 sq ft (465 sq m). Attached to the west of the station by a covered walkwayis a large building containing several diverse uses (Figure 4.4). Towardsthe back on the ground floor is a grocery store estimated to be 4,000 sq ft (370 sq m). Abovethis are four stories of offices for a number of electronics, communications, financing, and business managementfirms, estimated at 21,000 sq ft (1,950 sq retail stores, m). Towards the front on the ground and second floors is a mix of cafes, restaurants, parallel to Wilhelmsh6heAllee for about 100 feet, then turns up a neighboring street, ground-.floor retail above. The remaining buildings on that street are strictly residential. and a hotel, with an estimated total of 30,000 sq ft (2,800 sq m)o The building continues along where it has stores and a mix of offices for lawyers, doctors, and business management 2Prices ~dculated using an exchange rate of $1= 1.66 GermanMarks(NewYork Times, 1992). 45 Figure Development Offices and Ground-Floor Retail Complex at Stores 4-4 West End of Station looking southwest) (behind station, Offices, Hotel, Restaurant, Cafes (in front of station looking west) t!!111 46 To the southwest of the station. and 28. Summary The Kassei-Wikhelmsh6he station provides an opportunity to observe the development station location. with one large exception. Several. The remaining property within a one-mile radius of the station is primarily residential. however. 47 . although the ICE has been operating effects of high-speed rail at a new intercity for less than a year. Continuing west from the station. It is a five-story building with 6.rail tracks running up the middle and wide sidewalks. to the west of the tracks.000 sq ft (2.to six-story buildings. Although partially occupied.800 sq m). Only one new building was noted within one-half kilometer west of innovative building (similar to the station) with ground-floor retail in the process and cafes. To the northeast of the station is a large government building that appears to be undergoing renovations. are several five-story buildings with ground-floor retail and offices above. hotel. estimated at a total of 30. most of which are entirely retail or a mix of ground-floor retail and offices (Figure 4. in late 1992 it was still being painted and finished internally. Needless to development of such a large piece of property will have a substantial effect on the local property market and business location.6). an architecturally with residences above. and retail space around the station has significantly for increased (as evidenced by a 20 percent rent increase for retail space). is the large parcel (approximately 500 ft [150 m] wide and 2. and a large parcel bordering the station is being developed and is expected to serve information/service sector firms requiring access to the ICE. It is the clearest evidence to date that the ICE station has had an effect on development in the area. Demand office. the question of the ICE’s impact on the existing city center remains unanswered. Across from the station.Wilhelmsh6heAlice itself is a four-lane street with light. A completely new building is under construction directly across f~’om the station. and there is no available information on value capture. Most of these uses appear to be uses. to the east of the tracks.500 ft [760 m] long) that Frei (19’92) referred to as being under development for offices (Figure 4. and two to three storys of what appeared to be residences above.500 sq ft (2. have ground-floor retail continuation of existing the station.5). it is bordered by four. bordering the parking above the train platforms. However. It is bordered another building with a similar mix of uses.640 sq m) of office space.900 sq ft (640 sq m) of ground-floor retail space. Figure 4-5 Development (Looking west) Along Wilhelmsh6he AUee West of Station (Looking east toward station) 48 . Figure 4-6 Parcel Under Development Behind Station (Looking south) 49 . these areas have a combined population of approximately 20. ing it difficult. 2:55.54 million). According to the Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy(1992). increases of approximately 20 percent each. The CalSpeed high-speed rail system is based on steel-wheel-on-rail trains capable of speeds up to 200 mph (322 kmh). Univer- The CalSpeed research group at the Institute sity of California at Berkeley. and Sacramento (1.4-2. San Jose. Anticipated Development Effects As a review of high-speed rail systems in Japan. the system would serve the next group of medium-size metropolitan areas. California will add an additional three million jobs and six million residents during the 1990s. Although the state will experience numerical growth.5 million).48 million).1).5.1). iigh-Speed Rail System of Urban and Regional Development. It would be able to achieve approximately the following express travel times from Los Angeles: Bakersfield. 2:30. In addition. According to the 1990 Census. Bakersfield (0. In fact. and San Francisco. to specify developmenteffects by location.5 million). number of general statements about the potential in California are possible. research and development.a development effects of a high-speed rail system However.. IMPLICATIONS FOR CALIFORNIA I. Stockton (0. 2:05. This system is designed primaxily to serve the Los Angeles Consolidated Metro Area and the San Francisco Bay Area (Figure 5.5 million. France. Fresno (0. production facilities. 1.has indicated. according to one theory. the state will probably be well on the way to recovery by the time operations begin. considering the amount of time necessary to plan and coninvestments at the scale of a high-speed rail struct such a system. in the preceding sections.: 3). including San Diego (2. The current recession will reduce all development effects. Fresno.5 million (Table 5. despite the fact that the recession is more severe in California than in the rest of the nation.67 million). prosperity and quality of life maysuffer if the state does not take action to increase investment by the public and private sectors in education. 1:20. Sacramento. from the regional to station highlighted The importance of the economy for development to occur has been repeatedly makwithout detailed analysis. has developed a detailed proposal for a high-speed rail system in California (Hall et al. However. those with populations of 0. and 50 . 0:50. infrastructure system may be required for economic recovery. and Germany. level. the development effects of high-speed rail are highly variable and depend on a range of factors. infrastructure (ibid. 1992). 51 . 1992..Figure California High-Speed 5-1 Network (Proposed) Rail | Source: Hall et al. 3% 1.7% 2.1 121.5% 3.2).0 Annual Growth Growth Rate 19801990198019902) 1990 2000~ 2000 1_9_9_Q 200. more slowly. with large competition station would probably be fierce between cities 3.9 5.589. 1991.901.0 1. the Sacramento and San Diego regions led the state and they wiLl do so again in the 1990s. 1_9_~o) Los Angeles Basin San Francisco Bay Area San Diego Region Sacramento Region Rest of State California 11.8 1.1 46.4% 2.6 38.218. been and will continue to be the fastest-growing economic regions similar to those identified The Center divides by the CalSpeed study (Figure 5.1 84.___0 17. population Actually.Table C~!ifo~Lia Pop1~lation 5. rail These trends decade.023. A high-speed rail system would increase average.8 3. this growth and channel it within regions to cities advantages in accessibility over their neighbors for a system would reinforce which would then have significant position to attract and be in a better high-speed rail growth.7 592.681.679.6 23.6% 2.8 608.0 255.166. The situation experienced by the San Joaquin Valley. but will still next decade.0 5. The information-related new basic jobs is the fastest-growing of the economy. in population growth rates. 2. absolute population although the "Rest of State" group as are below average job growth during the 1980s. the regions in the state.8 X. accounting for one million 52 . which dominates growth in the Bay Areas will grow gain during the The Los Angeles Basin and San Francisco account for 60 percent of the state’s for employment growth is similar.8 6.6 35.7% 2.6 2.2). and employment growth rates in the regions it serves above the statewide tinuing Study of the California according to the Center for the Conthat such a system would serve have the state into Economy (1992). employment growth in the major regions likely to continue into the following A high-speed with stations. Employment growth rates information-related sector will be highest and centers in those regions concentrations of economic activities sector of higher education.9 19900) 14. (2) Estimated by CCSCE.1 1980~2000 (000s) by Region.760.6% 1. followed closely "Rest of State" group (Table 5. Source: Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy.2 2.861.8% Note: O) Census data.423.498.0 3.2 6. In the 1980s.7 305.6 29.941.3 6. within a region.0% 2.179.0 125.2% 1.4% 1.197.7 72.0% 2. Once this point was recognized.099. This trend is expected to reverse spills out into the San Joaquin Valley.640.481.948.4 65.7 1.7 87. ARE MONTEREY’ SANLU|S 0t~l$PG KERN SAN BERNARDINO BARBAR~ LOS ANGELES RIVERSI£iE SAN D|EG0 iMPERIAL Source: Center for the ContinuingStudy of the California Economy..Figure 5-2 Major Economic Regions of California SISKWOU LOS ANGELES BASIN SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA SHASTA HUMBOLDT SAN DIEGO REGION SACRAMENTO REGION REST OF STATE ® TEHAMA SAN FRANCISCC SAN MATEO "CRUZ TUI. 1992. 53 . 1 44. 6.5 1. San Diego.748.9% 2. 1979-2000 (O00s) Growth Rate 198019901990 2000 2.9 Annual Growth 198019902000( 2) ~ 200__0 8.6 52.0 663.7% 2.6 14. and Sacramento. Ridership would be poor at stations without adequate transportation network connections.485. of these types of jobs will be found in the Los Angeles Basin and San Francisco Bay Area.6% 2. Employment Development by CCSCE. it would be possible to connect high-speed rail development around the stations. However.9% 1.5% 1. Land value premiums on the order of 20 percent might occur around stations adequate transportation agencies.7 2.2 310. and would wholesale sectors would be dispersed across the system.3% 2.8 million new basic jobs.7 147.574.7 142.2 3. specifically an urban rail link directly to the local city center. 4.6 35. The majority. retail.421.7 20. 1991: Peg 16).445. the San Frandsco Bay Area.0 17.038. this sector is expec- percent of total basic job growth in the state.6 55. These connections would likely increase ridership on both the local and high-speed rail networks and increase in the accommodation.2 C~llfornia Employment by Regfon. 1991. this effect will be mitigated somewhatby the dispersion of "back-office" information-related two regions to others where there are lower land and labor costs.449.6 10.2% 4.917.210.824.2% 2. thereby further reinforcing their economic advantages in these sectors.0% 1980( 1 ) Los Angeles San Francisco BayArea San Diego Region Sacramento Region Rest of State California Note: O) California (2) Estimated 1990( I ) 6.8% 2. California ted to provide approximately 0.073.8 3.932.2 22.9 716.174.1 63.6 2.6 2. However.4 912. over 90 percent of the new basic jobs in (Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy. infrastructure if were provided and development were supported by public to these systems. Given that systems already exist or are under construction in the Los Angeles Basin.8 1.2 462. Increases in employment and economic activity concentrate in cities with stations. regional activities activities out of these 54 .8 34.Table 5.6 1.2 307.4% 2.0 Dept.1% 3. 5. Source: Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy.5 5. approximately During the period 1989-2000. (exporting products/services outside of California) during the period 1979-89.732. which a high-speed rail system will generate. so that high-speed rail stations can be easily accessible and can allow passengers to transfer smoothly between modes. and the ability to enter into development agreements with local public agencies and private developers. 55 . This is especially true for local rail systems. 2. This can be clone by establishing a to development effects. in the process of developing such a system. This may require the provision of funding to assist making connections to high-speed rail stations. the State of California has little control over the regional scale population and employment growth effects purchase property for high-speed rail lines and stations. However. The state agency responsible for development of a state high-speed rail system must take an active role in developing the area around stations. improve the development that takes place around stations. and provide adequate staff and funding for such activities. Failure to do so will not only result in a loss of possible revenue to support the development of high-speed rail facilities. the ability to develop its property.Recommendations On the basis of the aforementioned anticipated recommendations are made. the state will have to This will give the state the opportunity to ensure adequate transportation linkages. The latter is especially critical for the long-term success of a high-speed rail system. For better or worse. These recommendations are made on the basis of the observed development effects high-speed rail and related rail systems. of local agencies in and capitalize on land value increases that the stations and related development generate. development authority within that agency and giving it three fundamental powers: the ability buy and sell property. This agency must also coordinate and facilitate development done by local public agencies and private developers. The state agency responsible for the development of a high-speed rail network must work cl[osely with local transportation authorities to guarantee that adequate road and transit connections are provided to high-speed rail stations. but a loss of ridership. two 1. Brotchie. Dejeon City. Bonnafous. M. SNCF). Etudes et Recherches. Long-Wave Rhythnm in Economic Development and PoliticaI Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.E. Jacques (International Affairs Department. Audic.. Berry.. __. 1987. 1981. 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