Chua vs Timan 19 11 2010 FACTS: Interest Rate – Usurious Rates – 12% Per Annum Interest Rate – Central BankCircular No. 905-82 – Legal Rate In February and March 1999 Chua loaned the Timans 6 loans amounting to P864k. The interest rate agreed upon was 7%. The Timans paid at that rate until September 1999. In October 1999, the % rate was reduced to 5%. In March 2000, the Timans offered to pay P764k. Chua did not accept payment as they wanted the full amount of P864k. The Timans then consigned with the court the amount of P864k. The RTC ruled that the 7% and the reduced rate of 5% stipulated rate is excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant (equivalent to 84% and 60% per annum rate). Chua averred that by virtue of CB Circular 905, the ceiling on interest rate has been removed hence the 5-7% rate is valid and in the first place, Timan agreed to it. ISSUE: Whether or not the rate is valid. HELD: No. As has been ruled by the Supreme Court in a multitude of cases, interest rates of 3% and higher are already excessive. The rate should then be reduced to 12% per annum or 1% per month. The Usury Law has been rendered ineffective by the said CB Circular but it has not repealed the law, it merely suspended it. Note that only laws can repeal laws, not circulars. While C.B. Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively removed the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular could possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. Jesus B. Ruiz, petitioner, vs. Encarnacion Ucol & the Court of Appeals, respondents. August 7, 1987 FACTS: The laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge against defendant-appellee Encarnacion Ucol. Ucol, in her answer, alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by respondent’s husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks that Atty. Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges.When the administrative case was dismissed, the petitioner filed his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer. The lower court acquitted Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court as to the civil liability of the accused made no pronouncement. Instead of appealing, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded. Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, the appellate court certified the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred by the criminal case of libel. RULING: The contentions of the petitioner have no merit. Art. 33 of the Civil Code, independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit for the recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the injured party. The civil liability arising from the crime charged may still be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. The Supreme Court did not find any defamatory imputation, which causes dishonor, or discredit to the complainant. She was the victim of an unprovoked, unjustified and libelous attack against her honor, honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to self-defense, which she did in heranswer, to protect her honesty and integrity and the very job upon which her family depend for their livelihood. YANEZA vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 149322 November 28, 2008 Facts: Yaneza is the owner of a parcel of land in San Juan, Baras, Rizal. De Jesus is the owner of a lot which is adjacent to Yaneza’s lot. De Jesus’ lot has no access to the nearest road except through a road which they constructed over a portion of Yaneza’s lot. Yaneza informed De Jesus that he is the owner of Lot 2730-A and that he does not agree with the use of the portion of his lot as an access road because it will affect the configuration of his property. As an option, petitioner offered to sell to the respondents the entire property. De Jesus did not agree, so Yaneza agreed to a perpetual easement of right of way (4 meters wide) and stating that he will prepare the necessary document to facilitate the transaction for a consideration of P20K. De Jesus found out that it covered only 175 sq m, not 280 sq m. There was renegotiation and, for an additional consideration of P40K, Yaneza agreed to sell the entire 280 sq m. De Jesus constructed a road that is wider than that which was provided in the contract. He constructed a road three meters wider than what was agreed upon in the deed of sale. Yaneza initially allowed them peaceful possession and use of the area even when he started constructing his house adjacent to the access road. Later, a serious misunderstanding took place between Yaneza and respondents’ caretaker, Benjamin Manzano, because Manzano refused to allow Yaneza to tap water and electricity from the respondents’ property. Petitioner allegedly retaliated and constructed a fence along the access road, which could not allow trucks to pass through. Yaneza is now praying for the rescission of the contract for easement of right of way. Issue: WON Yaneza may validly rescind the contract of for easement of right of way? NO Held: The construction of the road beyond the stipulated area does not constitute a breach of contract. Breach of contract implies a failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise or undertaking that forms part of the contract. Although the contract specifically stated the area covered by the sale, it did not contain a promise by the respondents that they will only occupy such area. Albeit apparently wrong, petitioner’s cause of action should not have been based on the contract of sale. Rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach but only for a substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement. It must be a breach of faith that destroys or violates the reciprocity between the parties. Besides, the original agreement had already been superseded or novated by a new contract, an oral one, covering an increased area of 280 sq m. An additional P40K was paid to the Yaneza which covered the entire 280-sq m area were the access road was laid. The new contract of sale between the parties is valid despite it not being evidenced by any writing. LASAM VS. SMITH 45 PHIL 657 FACTS: The defendant was the owner of a public garage in the town of San Fernando, La Union, and engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire from one point to another in the Province of La Union and the surrounding provinces. Defendant undertook to convey the plaintiffs from San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in a Ford That is not a caso fortuito. Bueno. 137909. thus. according to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs. In the present case. December 11. that by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry the plaintiffs safely and securely to their destination. the chauffeur allowed his assistant. when. defects developed in the steering gear so as to make accurate steering impossible. Bueno held no driver’s license. The automobile was overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down under it. the failure of respondents to pay the balance of the purchase price within ten years from the execution of the Deed did not amount to a substantial breach. Petitioners obtained a permit from the city building official before the construction of its building. Second. WON the Kasulatan was a contract to sell? NO 2. however. CA affirmed but reduced damages. What is visual to the eye through is not always reflective of the real cause behind. in establishing the culpability of petitioner. but after having reached the town of San Juan.R. The complaint was filed about a year and a half after and alleges that the accident was due to defects in the automobile as well as to the incompetence and negligence of the chauffeur. The stipulations of the contract constitute the law between the parties. In a contract of sale. courts have no alternative but to enforce them as agreed upon and written. nor a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period. Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. Eulalio Mistica died sometime in Oct. In the Kasulatan.R. the remedy of an unpaid seller is either specific performance or rescission. SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE vs. or of his employees. Issue: 1. Issue: WON the damage of the PR’s house resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school building’s roof ripped off was due to fortuitous event? NO Held: Private respondents. and after zigzagging for a distance of about half kilometer. therefore the defendant was liable in damages. Petitioner claims that she is entitled to rescind the Contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. Joaquina. were inevitable. She also suffered nervous breakdown from which she has not fully recovered at the time of trial. Meycauayan. First. 3. the accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. Private respondent alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable. Rescission. vendee shall pay an interest of 12% per annum. No. among which was a compound fracture of one of the bones in her left wrist. CA G. It is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions which could have been foreseen. articles 1101-1107 of the Civil Code. provided the vendee paid 12 percent interest. As the term imparts. however. merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. DE MISTICA vs. WON the contract is in the nature of a potestative obligation? NO Held: 1. with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability. An ocular inspection of the destroyed building was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official. The Kasulatan does not allow the it to be converted to a potestative obligation. As far as the record shows. Buffeted by very strong winds. but his wife. Lasam escaped with a few contusions and a dislocated rib. thus showing that she was not exactly blameless for the lapse of the ten-year period. that the cause of action rests on the defendant’s breach of the contract of carriage and that. A portion thereof was leased to respondent Naguiat. the car left the road and went down a steep embankment. 2. the roof of Southeastern College’s building was partly ripped off and blown away. VDA. A deed of sale is considered absolute in nature when there is neither a stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is reserved to the seller until the full payment of the price. Mr. 1998 Facts: On October 11. forcing them to stay temporarily in others’ houses. powerful typhoon “Saling” hit Metro Manila. respondent gave a downpayment of P2K & made another partial payment of P1K & thereafter failed to make any payments. the fact that they already made partial payment thereof only shows that the parties intended to be bound by the Kasulatan. NAGUIAT G. The fourth floor of subject school building was declared as a “structural hazard. In case non payment. and not article 1903. some extraordinary circumstances independent of the will of the obligor. is an essential element of a caso fortuito. payment would have been made well within the agreed period. are applicable. The trial court held. On leaving San Fernando. Consequently. P 18k – to be paid within 10yrs.” As will be seen. mtrs. Bulacan. which reads: “No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which. even if foreseen. the right to rescind an obligation is predicated on the violation of the reciprocity between parties. received serious injuries. It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant’s legal liability is the contract of carriage. it was stipulated that payment could be made even after ten years from the execution of the Contract. brought about by a breach of faith by one of them. and that having failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was due to causes mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil Code. 126389 July 10. consequently. In the present case. Having obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy is prima facie . Petitioner never made any demand for the balance of the purchase price.” Lower court awarded damages. ISSUE: Is the trial court correct in its findings that the breach of contract was not due to a fortuitous event? RULING: Yes. Mistica entered into a contract to sell with respondent over a portion of lot containing an area of 200 sq. The agreement was reduced to writing in a document entitled “Kasulatan sa Pagbibilihan” P 20k – as the total purchase: P 2k – upon signing. this element is lacking. 1986. to drive the car. but had some experience in driving. 2003 Facts: Eulalio Mistica is the owner of a parcel of land located at Malhacan. No.automobile.The Kasulatan was clearly a Contract of Sale. WON petitioner is entitled to rescind the contract? NO 3. The court further found that the breach of contact was not due to fortuitous events and that. The car functioned well until after the crossing of the Abra River in Tagudin. Pursuant to said agreement. Petitioner even refused the payment tendered by respondents during her husband’s funeral. because respondents committed a substantial breach when they did not pay the balance of the purchase price within the ten-year period. landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents Dimaano’s house. nowhere is it stated in the Deed that payment of the purchase price is dependent upon whether respondents want to pay it or not. Had she accepted the tender. the automobile was operated by a licensed chauffeur. is allowed only where the breach is substantial and fundamental to the fulfillment of the obligation. 1989. January 29. The Contract to Buy provides that Anama shall purchase the property of a certain amount and shall pay to the PSBank. Reversing the trial court. Level A of the GSA. The bank could validly sell the property to the spouses Co. 128609. GR. But later. The trial court denied the respondent’s motion. COURT OF APPEALS. Anama was able to pay the first and second installments. Held: 1) A compromise once approved by final orders of the court has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. Both parties executed a compromise agreement and jointly filed in court a motion for judgment based on the compromise agreement. respondent filed a motion for execution to enforce its claim. Cancellation of TCT. This was either (1) to rescind the contract outright and forfeit all amounts paid by the petitioner. Anama then filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale. 2004 Facts: The property was previously owned by Douglas Anama’s parents. ALLEGRO RESOURCES 575 SCRA 310 (Art. Douglas and the PSBank entered into an agreement denominated as a Contract to Buy whereby the bank agreed to sell to Douglas the said land with all the improvements thereon. After petitioner repeatedly failed to pay the third installment. One of the sub-lessees was Edsel Liga (Liga). the right of the bank to sell the property being unequivocal. it also provides that (1) Anama shall apply with the bank for a loan.evidence of the regular and proper construction of subject school building. or in the extension granted. the failure of which is not a breach but simply an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. ANAMA VS. who mortgaged it to Philippine Savings Bank and later was foreclosed. and that a delay was not substantial compliance therewith. the Bank chose to exercise the first option. The contract provides the Bank two options in the event that petitioner fails to pay any of the installments. 2) Whether or not delay by one party on a compromise justifies execution. the . no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. Petitioner was even willing to present its maintenance supervisor to attest to the extent of such regular inspection but private respondents agreed to dispense with his testimony and simply stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice president’s narration. prevented the obligation for the Bank to pass title of the property to Anama. It subsequently authorized the use of the entire fourth floor of the same building. all amounts paid are forfeited in favor of PSBank. Anama was then advised to vacate the property despite his opposition to the rescission of the Contract to Buy. The Contract to Buy is actually a contract to sell whereby the vendor reserves ownership of the property and is not to pass until full payment. After submission of its progress billings to the petitioner. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition. the latter having the option either to demand full payment of total price or to rescind the contract. When part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted by typhoon Saling. however. he failed to pay the third installment when it became due. Respondent made the necessary repair and waterproofing. It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. (2) should the petitioner fail to comply with any of the terms of contract. Respondent objected to the rescission made by the petitioner and reiterated its claims. For petitioner’s failure to pay within the period stipulated. LIGA vs. his failure to pay on the date stipulated. the city engineer gave the go-signal for such repairs without any deviation from the original design. in whose favor TCT was issued. If subject school building’s roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses. Since ownership of the subject property was not pass to petitioner until fill payment of the purchase price. or (2) to demand the satisfaction of the contract and insist on the full payment of the total price. Petitioner’s explanation is clearly a gratuitous assertion that borders callousness. The failure to pay on the date stipulated was clearly a violation of the Agreement. ET AL. No. PSBank was entitled to rescind the Contract to Buy. non-fulfillment of the terms of the compromise justified execution. a decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory. La Paz constructed the Greenhills Shopping Arcade and divided it into several stalls and subleased them to other people. 147349. Thus. Held: Since Anama failed to pay the third installment. respondent received partial payments. It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto. The Court a quo rendered judgment approving the compromise agreement. Petitioner filed a comment and attributed the delays to its being a government agency. Such agreement has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. and Specific Performance with Damages. No.” Petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon “Saling” was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents’ house. Meanwhile petitioner unilaterally rescinded the contract on the ground that respondent failed to complete the project within the agreed completion date. to respondent ALA. Issues: 1) Whether or not decision based on compromise agreement is final and executory. Petitioner presented its vice president for finance and administration who testified that an annual maintenance inspection and repair of subject school building were regularly undertaken. Judges therefore have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce it. the proceeds of which answer for the balance of the purchase price. There were several transactions between them to settle the amount due. Progress billing remained unpaid despite repeated demands by the respondent. These only prove that subject building suffers from no structural defect. the bank executed an Affidavit of Cancellation rescinding the contract. obviously. and forfeited the payments made by Anama which were applied as rentals of the use of the property. Besides. The trial court directed the parties to proceed to arbitration. it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than “Saling. who obtained the leasehold right to Unit No. Issue: Whether the rescission of the Contract to Buy was valid. 2004 Facts: The contract for the structural repair and waterproofing of the IPT and ICT building of the NAIA airport was awarded. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. The bank sold the property to spouses Co. 2. as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules. 26. Limited Partnership entered into a lease agreement with La Paz Investment & Realty Corporation wherein the former leased to the latter its parcel of land located in San Juan. Hence. after a public bidding. ALA INDUSTRIES CORPORATION G. February 13. It is the height of absurdity for petitioner to attribute to a fortuitous event its delayed payment. the CA ordered it to issue a writ of execution to enforce respondent’s claim. 1159) Facts: Ortigas & Company. The appellate court ratiocinated that a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement was immediately executory. As the lease expired.R. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision in the main arguing that the 10. G. Allegro did not aver in its complaint that it was acting as Ortigas’s legal representative and seeking the back rentals due Ortigas. In deciding the case. it was then unregistered land. among others. WON Liga should pay to Ortigas back rentals covering the period 1 January 2001 to 31 August 2001? NO 2. the highest tribunal enunciated that it is incumbent upon petitioner to present special. Liga had failed to pay her rentals for the subleased property. ISSUE: The pivotal issue in the case at bar is whether or not the sale is actually a sale con pacto de retro or with right of repurchase. As the new lessee. The SC. Thus. It is basic that no relief can be extended in a judgment to a stranger or one who is not a party to a case. strong and convincing reasons to obtain the nod of approval by the Court. it appears that petitioners thought it otherwise. Liga also gave P40K as one month advance rental and another P40K as one month security deposit as provided in the agreement. The case reached the Supreme Court and it ruled that since the petitioners bought the property when it was still unregistered land.” Having delivered possession over the leased property to Liga. WON Liga should pay to Allegro back rentals in the amount of P40K a month starting from 1 September 2001 until such time as she vacates the leased property? YES 3. Attorney’s fees and costs of litigation are awarded in instances where “the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid. or to proceed contrary thereto.stallholders made several attempts to have their leasehold rights extended. the latter shall prevail over the former. Liga failed to pay the subsequent due rent. thus. Allegro had already performed its obligation under the lease agreement. that the former is selling their house and lot under pacto de retro. It is fundamental that a contract is the law between the parties. February 18. However. whether as plaintiff or otherwise. They agreed to sell their house and lot at a price of only P 15. Level A to Liga. that is. 159578. (3) There is no allegation or prayer in the complaint that Allegro was seeking the collection of the back rentals due Ortigas. and if the words of the contract appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties. The contention of petitioners has done more harm than good to their cause.00. Law and jurisprudence support the award of attorney’s fees and costs of suit in favor of Allegro. just and demandable claim. the owner of the property may prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage. in which case the period to file the action must have been within four years from discovery of the fraud.000. Despite repeated demands from Allegro. The evidence of the case proved that the sale is a sale with right of repurchase and not an unconditional. Allegro offered to sublease Unit No. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. respondents instituted a case for reformation of instrument or rescission of contract and damages. 26. July 10. Due to failure of petitioners to reconsider the sale as one with right of repurchase.000.00 with the intention of repurchasing the same within one year. petitioners questioned the appellate court’s decision on the ground that said court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in not considering a ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Luctan v. as well as the back rentals from January to August 2001 due Ortigas. No. She also agreed to pay the back rentals due Ortigas. They received the summons only in 1991.R. In 1991. In the case at bar.year prescriptive period for filing an action for reconveyance applies only if the action is based on an implied trust but not in this case where the respondents action was based on fraud. 142596. Al. (2) Allegro cannot justify the award as a legal representative by virtue of a provision in its lease agreement with Ortigas.R. COURT OF APPEALS G. They entered into a lease agreement dubbed Rental Information in which Liga agreed to pay rental of P40K monthly. the defense of having purchased the land in good faith is unavailing. Likewise. Liga should have exercised fairness and good judgment in dealing with Allegro by religiously paying the agreed monthly rental of P40. It turned out that Maxima Divison misrepresented herself as the owner of the land. holding that respondents are victims of misrepresentation. It is a general principle of law that no one may be permitted to change his mind or disavow and go back upon his own acts. SC reiterated that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years for the date of the issuance of the certificate of title . No. Issues: 1. On this score alone. Rogelia and Adelino Daclag vs. This is evident from the receipt issued by respondents and which was received by petitioners stating. On this petition under Rule 45. or has decided it in a way not in accord with the law or jurisprudence or that the court a quo has deviated from the normal judicial proceedings as to call for judicial supervision. the stipulation in the Deed of Absolute Sale that respondents have agreed to unconditionally sell their lots to petitioners must give way to the true intent of the parties – that the sale is subject to the right of repurchase in favor of private respondents. WON Liga should pay to Allegro the amount of P20K as attorney’s fees and the costs of suit? YES Held: (1) Ortigas is not a party to this case. The Supreme Court further ruled that even when a document appears on its face to be a sale. ordered the petitioners to pay the respondents their share in the produce of the land from the time they were deprived of possession thereof in 1984. When Daclag purchased the land from Maxima Divison. allegedly they bought the property in pursuance of a Deed of Absolute Sale. 2009 FACTS: A land was registered in the name of Rogelia Daclag in 1984. The Court cannot countenance the obstinate refusal of Liga to pay P40K a month to Allegro since she had already acquiesced to pay such rental rate when she signed the Rental Information. Adela Macahilig et. TIU vs. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Court of Appeals. The petition has failed to convince the Court that the appellate court has ruled on a question of substance not previously decided by the Court. the court is constrained to disregard this action as wanting in substance or importance. Elino Macahilig. respondents Macahilig filed a complaint for reconveyance. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. to the prejudice of the other party. Court of Appeals (266 SCRA 663) that. the literal meaning of the stipulations would be controlling. A scrutiny of the aforequoted grounds in support of the instance petition reveals that petitioner has fallen short of the standards set by the rules of procedure and jurisprudence. They also contend that as possessors in good faith they are entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted under Article 544. the Deed of Definite Sale was declared as an equitable mortgage. “the meeting of the minds in a contract speaks of the intent of the parties in entering into the contract reflecting the subject respecting the subject matter and the consideration thereof. irrevocable and complete conveyance of the subject house and lot. 2006 FACTS: Private respondents entered into a contract of sale with petitioner spouses. it is settled that if the terms of the contract clearly express the intention of the contracting parties. Allegro Resources became the new lessee. a physician based in Cebu.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4. 8042. Since it was a difficult birth. OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. without any existing valid governmental purpose. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate. leave pay and other bonuses. the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1.200. unless there is evidence that he performed work during those periods. Court of Appeals.00 per month. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal. specifically the adoption of the subject clause. 1906. v. G.A. v.) N o . No.A. the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. in which salary is understood as the basic wage. provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers. illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.00 Issue: 1. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.) No. 8042. 13. On March 19. the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum. . leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. series 1996. and Marlow Navigation Co.182. equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract. The subject clause being unconstitutional. DOLE Department Order No. The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process. Ltd.382. however. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract? H el d: 1. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.23. 1998. and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest days and holidays. prior to R. Records show that petitioners received the summons on August 5. 167614.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1. plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term. in addition to the US$4. pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R. No. (respondents) under a POEAapproved Contract of Employment. 1991. However. 8042. SERRANO v. Their daughter-inlaw was about to give birth & they requested him to render medical assistance. LAURON (Mutual Support) Facts: Oct. upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April. and not just for a period of three months? 2. consisting of monetary benefits. 2 . it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts. No. a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits of the thing only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted. whichever is less. computed at the monthly rate of US$2.x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just. reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. was called to the house of Marcelo Lauron & Juana Abella (defendants) in San Nicolas.A. In sum. Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims.But with the enactment of R. He also removed the afterbirth. 1999.. The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that. he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract.200. Inc. whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment. No.00. to wit: Sec. for it deprives him of property. exclusive of overtime. March 24. valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract. 2009 Facts: Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services. petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May. 8042.(Caro v. Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause. but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment.400. whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No.Money Claims.)Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract. 1998. they should therefore be liable to pay the respondents the 10 cavans of palay only from that date. August 5. nighttime – Arturo Pelayo. Inc. thus their good faith ceased on the day they received the summons. Applying the subject clause. The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10. OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. but at the time of his repatriation on May 26. Thus. the date of his departure. there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award. 33. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term. For seafarers like petitioner.23 more or a total of US$25. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC.00. Inc. Republic Act (R. in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged. . 1998 up to March 19. whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight hours. & MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO. INC. Under Article 544 of the Civil Code.A. Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services. he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. The wordsa la ries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property. 10. By the foregoing definition alone. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal. respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. petitioners good faith having ceased only on the day they received the summons.. 180 SCRA 401) SC granted partial reconsideration with respect to the liability of the petitioners for the fruits. Case Digest on PELAYO vs. 1991 and not from 1984. OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. he had to perform a surgery to remove the fetus using forceps.R. Likewise.590. Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19. petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA. Hence.)Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award.000. Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. He finished all of these until the following morning.400. he is entitled to US$21. petitioner contends that. Article 528 provides that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court inTriple Integrated Services. he sold the lights to the 52 original films to RBS. 147410. there was no basis for ABS’ demand that a contract was entered into between them. CA affirmed. defendants refused to pay said amount. provided that such right shall be exercised by ABS from the actual offer in writing. perfection or consummation. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties (2) object certain which is the subject of the contract (3) cause of the obligation. Also. it is the husband’s obligation to pay Pelayo and not the defendants. a contract is produced. HELD: NO. through this agreement. unconditional. Such failure to comply with the condition imposed for the perfection of the contract resulted in the failure of the contract. Held: There was indeed no acceptance of the offer by Asset Builders. No. allegedly signifying his intent to send a counter proposal. Asset Builders Corporation submitted a bid proposal secured by bid bonds valid for 60 days. February 5. Concio when it rejected the offer. Perfection occurs when they agree upon the essential elements thereof. LTD. when del Rosario met with Lopez at the Tamarind Grill. there was no acceptance. then. CA [301 SCRA 572 (Jan 21 1999)] Power of the Board of Directors Delegation to Executive Committee Facts: In 1990. The Instruction to Bidders prepared by Insular Life expressly required a formal acceptance and a period within which such acceptance was to be made known to the winner. signed by Lopez and given to del Rosario. CC) The party bound to give support should therefore be liable for all the expenses including the fees of the physician. The Defendants alleged that their daughter-in-law died in consequence of the childbirth. In the case at bar. 2004 Facts: Insular Life Insurance Company. such acceptance is not sufficient to generate consent because any modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls the offer. Held: NO. After hearing.R. That the 1990 Agreement with the right of first refusal was already exercised by Ms. What transcribed at that meeting was subject to conflicting versions. A qualified acceptance. The agreement between Lopez and del Rosario was subject to Viva BoD approval. consideration. Neither did it execute any construction agreement. Asset Builders bound and obliged itself to enter into a contract with Insular Life within 10 days from the notice of the award. this petition for certiorari with SC. But ABS. . through its counter proposal sent to Viva. In 1992. VS. RATIO: Rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is among the mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. INSURANCE LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY.00 + costs along with other relief that may be deemed proper. It informed Insular Life that it will not proceed with the project.He visited the patient several times the following day. or one that involves a new proposal. through VP Concio. Lopez claims that it had not fully exercised its right of first refusal over 24 films since it only chose 10. A contract is a meeting of minds between 2 persons whereby one binds himself to give something or to render some service to another for a consideration. with good and sufficient securities. This rejection was embodied in a letter. ABS filed before RTC a complaint for specific performance with prayer for TRO against RBS and Viva. ABS CBN and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby Viva gave ABS CBN an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. RTC rendered its decision in favor of RBS and Viva contending that there was no meeting of minds on the price and terms of the offer. Hence. actually made a counter offer. Without any good reason. ABS CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. del Rosario denied the existence of the napkin in which Lopez wrote something. ABS however. did not accept the list since she could only tick off 10 films. Viva again approached ABS with a list consisting of 52 original films where Viva proposed to sell these airing rights for P60M. Said agreement contained a stipulation that ABS shall have the right of first refusal to the next 24 Viva films for TV telecast. Asset Builders project. it must be plain. and that this was put in writing in a napkin. Issue: Whether or not there was a perfected contract between Lopez and del Rosario. The defendants are not under any obligation to pay the fees claimed (An obligation according to CC Art. However. and since this was rejected by the board. There are three distinct stages of a contractpreparation or negotiation. contracts. Viva’s Vic del Rosario and ABS’ general manager Eugenio Lopez III met at the Tamarind Grill to discuss this package proposal. (Arts. he and del Rosario agreed that ABS was granted exclusive film rights to 14 films for P36M. The last stage is the consummation where they fulfill the terms agreed upon culminating in the extinguishment of the contract. The offer must be certain. that their son & daughterin-law lived independently & her giving birth in their house was only accidental. CFI: Defendants absolved due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish right of action. and that Lopez refused said offer.00. and without variance of any sort from the proposal. 1089 is created by law. The husband would still be liable even if his parents were the one who called & requested for Pelayo’s assistance. Negotiation begins when the prospective contracting parties manifest their interest in the contract and ends at the moment of their agreement. Thus. Limited invited companies to participate in the bidding of the proposed Insular Life building. When the counter proposal arrived. 142 & 143. and insisted that what he and Lopez discussed was Viva’s film package of the 52 original films for P60M stated above. ASSET BUILDERS CORPORATION G. the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the offer. & by illicit acts & omissions or by those in which any kind of fault/negligence occurs. constitutes a counter offer and is a rejection of the original offer. when something is desired which is not exactly what is proposed in the offer. Once there is concurrence between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject matter. There was no contract between Pelayo & the defendants thus they can’t be compelled to pay him. and terms of payment. the package of 52 films was Viva’s offer to enter into a new Exhibition Agreement. quasicontracts. The project was awarded to the Asset Builders and a notice to proceed with the construction was sent by Insular Life to the former. Just & equitable value for the services he rendered: P500. He insists that SC give credence to his testimony that he and del Rosario discussed the airing of the remaining 14 films under the right of first refusal agreement in Tamarind Grill where there was a contract written in the alleged napkin. unequivocal. Hence. Under its proposal form. CFI judgment affirmed. RTC issued the TRO enjoining the airing of the films subject of controversy. Contracts that are consensual in nature are perfected upon mere meeting of the minds. To convert the offer into a contract. Issue: Whether or not there is a perfected contract between Insular Life and Asset Builders. Clearly. They prayed that they be absolved. which is established. hence. Thus he filed a case praying for a judgment in his favor against defendants for the sum of P500.). Thus. According to Lopez. and such 1990 Agreement was an entirely new contract other than the 1992 alleged agreement at the Tamarind Grill. ISSUE: WON the defendants are bound to pay the bill for the services Pelayo has rendered. Viva’s BoD rejected it. Viva offered ABS a list of 36 films from which ABS may exercise its right of first refusal. On the other hand. Consequently. The courts shall reduce equitably liquidated damages. the board may delegate such powers to either an executive committee or officials or contracted managers. Banga. These were evidenced by several promissory notes agreeing to an interest rate of 5. Hence. Interest can no be charged as lender and borrower may agree upon. MCTC ruled for Elvira. share and participation in the land in favor of Elvira and her husband. this acceptance did not bind Viva since there was no proof whatsoever that del Rosario had specific authority to do so. unless otherwise provided by said law.000. In June 1986. RTC declared that the promissory notes were genuine. share. Gonzales filed with the RTC of Bulacan a complaint for collection of the full amount of the loan. SC held that the stipulated rate of interest at 5. 905 has expressly removed the interest ceilings prescribed by the Usury Law and that said law is now legally inexistent. Issue: Whether or not the interest rate stipulated upon was valid. it could not consider the rate “usurious” because CB Circular No. Elvira and her husband. On maturity. the Usury Law has been rendered ineffective. 3) if the acceptance is made in a separate instrument. SC ruled that the affidavit executed by Esperanza wherein she renounced. and accordingly. which must be in the same deed of donation or in a separate public instrument. ABS’ right of first refusal had already been exercised when Ms.. In this case. interest and participation in the subject property in favor of Elvira and Ray is in fact a donation. respondents with the help of hired persons. Thus. However.000 loan was excessive. it should have complied with the requirements of Article 749 of the Civil Code. Spouses Martin and Lourdes Maglunob and Romeo Salido. No. Neither was there notice of acceptance given to the donor. The stipulation is void. The delegation. the latter must specially authorize them to do so. the acceptance of the donation was not made by Elvira either in the same affidavit or in a separate public instrument. Medel failed to pay their indebtedness. contrary to morals. February 18. the general rules of agency ad to the binding effects of their acts would apply.5% per month on the P500. whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. Assuming arguendo that del Rosario did enter into a contract with Lopez at Tamarind Grill. therefore the donation is void. However. Esperenza executed an affidavit in which she renounced her rights. then no contract could have been executed. the Court ruled that title to immovable does not pass from the donor to the done by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. SC ordered that the interest of 12% per annum and additional 1% a month penalty charge as liquidated damages reasonable. OCT was issued in her name by the DAR. The contention of Lopez that their meeting in Tamarind Grill was a continuation of their right of first refusal agreement over the remaining 14 films is untenable. Elvira argued that both RTC and CA erred in declaring the affidavit of Esperanza void because it is a valid and binding proof of transfer of ownership of the subject property as it was coupled with actual delivery. In Sumipat vs. entered the property and built a wall behind and in front of Elvira’s house. Only a law can repeal another law. who is is grandaunt of respondents Martin Maglunob and Romeo Salido. 2009 FACTS: Elvira Arangote acquired the subject parcel of land from Esperanza Maglunob. share and participation over the property in favor of Elvira suffered from legal infirmities. Held: NO. RTC applied the legal rate of interest for loan of money. there was no meeting of the minds between del Rosario and Lopez. A simple donation of real property to be valid: 1) must be made in a public instrument. G. and hence. goods or credit of 12% per annum. A CB Circular cannot repeal a law. Elvira Arangote vs. SC held that the interest of 5. . the interest charged by Gonzales on the loans was unconscionable. corporate powers. the donor must be notified in authentic form and the same must be noted in both instruments. stipulated upon by the parties in the promissory note was unconscionable.The acceptance should be unqualified. Ray constructed a house on the land in 1989 and in 1993. such as the power to enter into contracts. RTC reversed MCTC and declared respondents lawful owners of the land together with the other heirs of Martin I. except for the executive committee. CA reversed the ruling of the RTC holding that the Usury Law had become legally inexistent. Elvira and Ray sued respondents for quieting of title and declaration of ownership. Respondents averred that they were co-owners of the land with Esperanza who allegedly inherited the land from Martin 1 together with Tomas and Inocencia (Martin 2’s and Romeo’s predecessor in interest).5% per month with additional service charge of 2% per annum. must be for specific purposes. Before SC.5% per month. this petition for review on certiorari. Elvira went to the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC decision. It appears that the land was not exclusive property of Esperanza but also of the other heirs of Martin I whom she represented in the partition agreement. Hence. are exercised by the BoD.R. Concio wrote to Viva choosing only 10 out of the 36 films offered by del Rosario. relinquished and waived all her rights. or 66% per annum. The affidavit executed by Esperanza relinquishing her rights. 178906. Hence. if not against the law. When Viva’s BoD rejected the counter proposal. 2) it must be accepted. Under the Corporation Code. For such officers to be deemed fully clothed by the corporation to exercise a power of the Board. Nevertheless. CA [299 SCRA 481 (Nov 27 1998)] Usury Law Facts: Medel obtained several loans from Gonzales totalling P500. They argued that Esperanza could not have validly waived her rights in favor of Elvira and Ray. it ruled that although the Usury Law had been repealed. however. and penalty charge of 1% per month. That del Rosario did not have the authority to accept ABS’ counter offer was best evidenced by his submission of the counter proposal to Viva’s BoD for the latter’s approval. By virtue of this circular. Delegation to officers makes the latter agents of the corporation. Medel vs. CB Circular 905 did not repeal nor in any way amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latter’s effectivity. It already refused the 26 films. In any event. However.