O'Nora O'Neill, A Simplified Account of Kant's Ethics

- f tP. 26- z (_ l.4jJ 1-o T"l-u. t.., -4 "{ E -14.... have sonorous names. One is called the Onora 0 '.Veil! Formula of Universal Law; another is the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends. The one A .Simplified Account on which I shall concentrate is known as the Formula of the End in Itself To understand why of Kant's Ethics Kant thinks that these picturesquely named principles are equivalent to one another takes quite a lot of close and detailed analvsis of Onom 0 '.\"rill tmche.1 philosophy at thr [ 'nn·rmty Kant's philosophv. I shall a\oid this and mn- of EHex in Colrhrstn, England. She 1s the author of Acting on Principle and, most rrrentlv. Faces of centrate on showing the implications of this Hunger. version of the Categorical Imperative. 0 'Xei!l intnprets and explains thr formulation of the Categonral Imperative railed the Formula of THE FORMULA OF THE END IN thr End 111 ltsrlf, and thm compares the Kantwn ITSELF and utilita6an moral theones on thr 1•alur of human Kant states the Formula of the End in Itself as life. follows: Act 111 such a way that _)'Oil a!v.'ays treat humanity. Kant's moral theory has acquired the reputa- u•hether in your own person or 111 the pnson of any tion of being forbiddingly difficult to under- other, llfl'el' simply as a mmns but ah<'O\'S at the same stand and, once understood, excessively de- l1mr as an end. 1 manding in its requirements. I don't believe that this reputation has been wholly earned, To understand this we need to know what it and I am going to try to undermine it_ ... I is to treat a person as a means or as an end. shall try to reduce some of the difficul- According to Kant, each of our acts reflects-\ ties ... _ Finally, I shall compare Kantian and one or more maxuns. The maxim of the act is ' utilitarian approaches and assess their the principle on which one sees oneself as strengths and weaknesses. acting. A maxim expresses a person's policy, The main method by which I propose to or if he or she has no settled policy, the prin- avoid some of the difficulties of Kant's moral ciple underlying the particular intention or theon is by explaining only one part of the decision on which he or she acts. Thus, a theorv. This does not seem to me to be an person who decides 'This year I'll give I 0 r· irresponsible approach in this case. One of the things that makes Kant's moral theory percent of my income to famine relief' has as/ f;r: a maxim the principle of tithing his or her [tru' !:' hard to understand is that he gives a number income for famine relief the dif- . of diflerent versions of the principle that he calls the Supreme Principle of :\!orality, and ference between intentions and maxims is of these diflcrent versions don't look at all like little importance, for given am intention, we U.t. I, t"Oil.,..t"cll\iSIIot one another. Thev also don't look at all like can formulate the corresponding maxim by the utilitarians' Greatest Happiness Principle. deleting references to particular times,_ f.,-,IA.C•f/f..t ' But the Kantian principle is supposed to play places, and persons. In what follows I shall I a similar role in arguments about what to do. take the terms 'maxim· and 'intention' as equivalent. ! Kant calls his Supreme Principle the Cate- gorical hnperatir•e; its various \·ersions also Whenever we act intentionally, we have at i least one maxim and can, if we reflect, state I what it is. (There is of course room for self- "A Simplified Account of Kant's Ethics," bv Onora deception here-"l'm onlv keeping the wolf f 0'!\eill from .\lattrr.' of Lifr and Dmth, ed. Tom Regan, 19R6. McGraw-Hill Publishing Com pam. Reprinted by from the door" we mav claim as we wolf i permission. down enough to keep ourselves overweight, 26 Contemporary .\!oral Problen/5 II • - ' "' • • And since the person the particular others who are deceived or co- \dlO is deceived doesn't knO\\. In Kant's view. as things rather than as ends in them- I promising depends on deceiving the person selves. enough to feed some. and the debtor. But in this tor's intention is to coerce. according· were. and whether it does bet. as it we propose to do is right or wrong. im. stan. \\"e just have to check that the act we false promising wrong. without whom I could not lav my hands on coercing them. it is this that makes ble acts. and so cannot haYe the consent of I intend to do what he or she was promising. Kant does not say that to which he or she in principle cannot con- there is am·thing wrong about using some." (Of course the out. \ \ 11·hat the p_rc. promise as a prop or a thing and not as a ter at increasing happiness than other availa. or To use someone as a merP means is to involve by making a false promise or a fraudulent them in a scheme of action to wlzirh they rould . since the scheme requires that he or she one as a means. that it will treat other means is by deceiving them. the debtor. a prop or a tool-a mere means-in to Kant. very well that some offers and demands couched in that form are coercive. after all. those others (for consent precludes both de- one would. Kant would say that \ the creditor's scheme. Eth1ml Theones 27 . our acts are to whom the promise is made about what not only wrong but unjust: such acts wrong one's real maxim is. cannot consent to his or her part in in the transaction. had been no promise made. who cannot trulv consent to this .or. By getting some- persons as ends in themselves. he or she can't in principle consent to one else who hasn't enough food. Successful false means. acts that are done on max. or by giving a USING PERSONS AS MERE MEANS I misleading account of what one is about. if possible. If one knew that the promisor did not others. contract. Evidentlv we have to do so \ doesn't know what is going on. one involves another in something not in principle ronsent. \ in anv cooperative scheme of action. person. For ward form of such transactions may look like \' example. but we know another with every intention of breaking it. \Yhen we act on such maxims. If we act on such maxims. one person may make a promise to ordinary commercial dealings. each party consents to her or his part \ coerced. and. He coerces \ prop to be manipulated. then he uses the debtor as a mere means. that real max. sent. more to the point. if case.) his or her part in the proposed scheme of \\'hen we wanl to v•ork out whether an act· action. then the credi- means to earn his or her living. To make the example though they use one another as means. not accept or rely on the promise. ims that require deception or coercion of h is. If a rich or powerful person threatens a debtor with bankruptcy unless he \ \ the cash: the teller in turn uses me as a or she joins in some scheme. one involved in a business scheme or a crimi- nal activity on false pretenses. Each more specific: If a moneylender in an Indian \ 1 village threatens not to renew a vital loan \ person assumes that the other has maxims of his or her own and is not just a thing or a unless he is given the debtor's land. The person who is deceived is. A person who not at bow much misery or happiness the act promises falsely treats the acceptor of the is likeh to produce. are \\Tong. we should look at our maxims and the false promisor's scheme. It would be as though there ception and coercion).'sJ \ But there are other situations where one I person uses another in a way to which the "offer he can't refuse. ba\·e in mind will not use anvone as a mere Qf!e standard way of using others as mere means. we treat others as mere \ . erced.misor's intention (maxim) real. If I d(lrd way of using others as mere means is by cash a check I use the teller as a means.) \l If the promise is accepted. they do not use one another as mne means. then the person to whom it was given must be ignorant of In Kant's view. I other could not in principle consent. One can usually tell whether one's maxims. Every action. To treat someone as an end in means. plete if in addition their life plans have in the It may seem a great limitation of Kantian 28 Contemporary A/oral Problems I . at the maxims of agents. owing to'""'ractc 6f d:rta:'" often lacks precis. But beyond that. the act is permissible. that do not claim to discover whether acts whose one respect each as a rational person with his maxims they don't know fully are just. They or her own maxims. use them as ends in themselves in the fullest if omitting the act would use another as mere possible wav. pare all available acts and see which has the ties. asse'S'Ses actions by looking tion which of their t:"nds we foster. Kantians one not use him or her as mere means. we cannot seek THE LIMITS OF KANTIAN ETHICS: INTENTIONS AND RESULTS # everything that others want. Kant's theory him or herself requires in the first place that has less scope than utilitarianism. It follows that be. Yet. They consider onlv the propos- used some other or others as mere means.(. However. (! V\. ulate them but that foster some of their plans and activities. still we fail to means. whether There is then quite a sharp distinction be. als for action that occur to them and check But there are also cases where. To act any person or institution. of course. Beneficent acts try to achieve what others want. scope. or the consumer movement. e. even adopt maxims that not merely do not manip. when its impact on human happiness is thor- oughly obscure. we have best effects. l cause it would be unjust to do so. I will act would use others as mere means. THEMSELVES In making surf' that they meet all the de- Duties of justice are. acts in order of merit. Justice requires furmauon IS ava1table about all the conse- I that we act on no maxims that use others as quences of the act. the theory offers therefore to intend to achieve some of the more precision than utilitarianism when data things that those others aim at with their are scarce.. Kantian ethics has a more though it is a matter for judgment and discre. Some max. but. can be assessed tween the requirements of justice and of be. Kantian ethics differs from utilitarian ethics sometimes incompatible. though we do that these proposals use no other as mere not use others as mere means. If I want to make others happy. ed scope. the most important of our du. Kantians will claim that ing decision-making procedures. When we fail in these duties. If they do not. the women's movement. Beneficence requires that we act on some maxims that foster others' ends. provided only that in- neficence in Kantian ethics. by utilitarian methods. and that their duty is com.. They cannot rank beneficently is to seek others' happiness. It can do notfimg to assess patterns of debate as they tn· to compare total outcomes actiOn that reflect no intention or policy. and. in Kant's view (as in mands of justice. their acts is unjust. Kantians do not try to com- many others').i_on. such as the thev have done nothing wrong if none of student movement. both in its scope and in the precision with neficence has to be selective. Kantians individuals' acts. of different choices. the act is obligatory. which it guides action. hut there are some acts dent unions) have decision-making prot:e- whose obligatorincss utilitarians may need to dures.lr can only assess I\ ims no doubt ought not to be fostered be. of a person or of an agency. to which Kantians are hence it cannot assess the acts of groups lack- stringentlv bound. The theory has unlimited '\ f (c. their wants are too numerous and diverse. TREATING PERSONS AS ENDS IN circumstances been reasonablv beneficent. but it can I l\ are not committed to working interminably be extended to that through a list of lldppiness-producing and (like corporations and governments ana-Stu- miserv-reducing acts. one may be reluctant to judge others' acts or poli- mav also seek to foster others' plans and cies that cannot be regarded as the maxim of maxims bv sharing some of their ends. mere means. the the sake of greater happiness in other lives. words do not express their true intentions._ 1 . In utilitarian thought. it is not possible to say thor. And. If we peer through rational or autonomous creature should be tht' blur. ICS: neither celibacy nor contraception but still Utilitarian moral theory has then a rather insist "we never meant to have (more) chil. any other way. while other interventions are a matter of in- its the "intentions" of a couple who practict:. greed and selfishness of the profit motive or for ending of misery in that life.hL· does nothing unjust. can be produced. sults and correspondingly. Nobody cred. justice.. proce.. If some traditional arguments in favor of capitalism are right.means to the production of happiness . conscious humans are (along with 1 with likelv) in such cases. and one life may be taken for ful results in the long run. the conse. Therefore. This capacity and its exercise are of such tps lack.-r. no one vement. ooking Provided this intention-the agent's real in- assess tention-uses no other as mere means. life for the sake of others' happiness by not . we see that the utilitarian view is treated as mere means for the enjoyment or Kantian that IiYes may indeed be sacrificed for the even the happiness of another. he or KANT AND RESPECT FOR most at !'. ian arguments even when they the com.ere good intentions sometimes lead to bad re. We may in Ethical Theories 29 .. by and doing so by f. But it is sessed predictable results of what they do. or even produce . implications of the theory. that (if thev are not amazingly ignorant) their consciousness that is of value. paradoxical view of the value of human life. ate results of our action to be. Where people's ex. Conscientious Kan." Conception is likely (and known to be Living. There is nothing wrong with conscientious Kantians have to do is to make using another as a mere means provided that . It might seem that all are not willing. ble. intentions reflect what we expect the immedi. For we cannot just claim that our justice and beneficence is not sharply made even intentions are good and do what we will.tne distinction between Jne's the rule. then he or she Kantians reach different conclusions about ies that is sometimes beneficent. the means have caused. bad intentions persons are not ends 1n themselves. taking into account the misery .. Their sometimes do no harm.ffers helping (e. If Hardin 2 is right. e. Our within utilitarianism. the good intentions . that triaging is a matter of not benefiting. poli.g. other sentient beings) necessary for the exis- 1ether pressed intentions ignore the normal and tence of everything utilitarians value. Nor is m of have produced unparalleled prosperity for there any deep difference between ending a rank many.. policy. and that they sometimes intend happier result than could have been achieved eck to foster other's ends. ble for people to test their proposals by Kant. Because. angels or apes) are the bearers of rational_ terns of prt'hensiYe causal knowledge that life. It is therefore possi.. ethics that it concentrates on intentions to sake of a greater good even when the persons the neglect of results. utilitarianism requires. best results may require certain lives to be imited The Formula of the End in Itself applies to lost-by whatever means-for the sake of the n lacks the intentions on which one acts-not to total happiness and absence of misery that estrict. humans (and conceiVably other beings. human life.. Hence.g. tians can work out whether they will be doing value that they ought not to be sacrificed for h as the \Hong by some act even though it blurs the anything of lesser value. we infer not their being alive but the state of their hat in. But such discrepancies between inten- data tions and results are the exception and not harming. If some of his or her PERSONS tt it can mtentions foster others' ends. Humans are able to choose and to plan. Human life has therefore a high though de- lOSe rivative value.. Human life is valuable because tnd stu.• tans of those who feed the starving lead to dread. ethics dren.he sure that theY never intend to use others as the end for which the person is so used is a •OS- mere means. as we all know.special moral status derives from their being ·ory good. some prettified version that one may avow. II one's life plan remains in make the right calculations.] 30 Contrmporan . Utilitari- must sacrifice comforts or liberties and even ans value ha iness and the absence or re- lives to rear "the fabric of felicity" for their duction of miserv. Such sacrifice us as mere means. Utilitarians do not deny these (if conscientious) to devote one's life to possibilities. . analogous dilemmas have aris- It is conceivable that a society of Kantians. diverted for others' benefit. Further. On the other doubt.·hen modern mere means. and even of lives. because they may since the Kantians would be strictly bound maximize the number of survivors. human happiness demands the sacrifice of flected in their intentions. some benefit. medicine makes this possible? Should life be ness or with fewer persons alive than would preserved without hope of consciousness? some societies of complying utilitarians. Second.' 2 . will be able to discern the acts they should successively do in order to improve the world's balance of happiness over unhappi. though the imprecision of our achieving the best possible balance of happi- knowledge of consequences often somehow ness over miscTv. It into joining.Kant's view justifiably-even nobh-risk or ble. 2. famine.. for the we follow our own maxim and nobody uses sake of a greater happiness. But they will not cause harms And sometimes the answer will be that that they can foresee without this being re. we can discover two sharph contrast- Or it might turn out that some generations ing views of the value of human life. be used to onlv to justice. ever it will increase the total of human happi- piness. For Should triage policies. nobody will have been made an instru- end are often unclear. Endnotes ness. determine who should be left to starve? ing be quite selective in their beneficence and Should population growth be fostered wher- fail to maximize either survival rates or hap.. it mav at times require the sacri- sacrifice our lives for others. it is dauntingly long. Should life all of whom took pains to use no other as be preserved at the cost of pain . lives. For in doing so thev would fail may be necessary to sacrifice some lives for to treat us as rational beings. including the sacrifice of unwilling lives. for most utilitarians. would end up with less happi. it makes UTI LIT ARIANISM AND RESPECT no difference if the unwilling sacrifices in- FOR LIFE volve acts of injustice to those whose lives are to be lost. has increased.] This task is not one for the faint-hearted. this will he because the means to this hand. for example. It might. who they happiness is not reduced? All these questions know that their foresight is limited and that can be fitted into utilitarian frameworks and they may cause some harm or fail to cause answered if we have the relevant information. thev . Ed..ant-Ed. But whenever the ment of others' survival or happiness in the causal tendenCY of acts is clear. or their hard- actions towards those who do or may suffer eamed income. utilitarians society of complying Kantians.\!oral Problem.. As a Ut!Itarian one oug t successors. I. For in doing so fice of happiness. [See the end of the reading from 1\. indeed intermina. or even to achieve as much of either ness-or on some views so long as average as a strenuous group of utilitarians. prove neces- From the dif1ering implications that Kantian sary for maximal happiness that some per- and utilitarian moral theories have for our sons have their allotted rations.·ould use the sake of others. means of ending and pres en ing human life selves. en in many areas for utilitarians. they might without wrongdo. As our control over the us as mere means and not as ends in our. But no others may use may be morally required not onh when the either our lives or our bodies for a scheme person whose happiness or even whose life is that they han· either coerced or deceived us at stake volunteers to make the sacrifice. [See the reading bv Garett Hardin in Chapter S- First. then it is wrong to int1'1fere with them. for exam- n of our and arlo 01/ the idm of pohtiral equality.omehow and due process. person is not valuable because it is not ration- :1 life tice and beneficence. As O'Neill explains it. S. Thev base their claim that he other THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS our law deserves respect. Bentham thought that the idea of moral rights was . Dworkin on all sides that they do. gers or people in other countries? Whv or whv IS ples. Covernment respect the moral and political Some philosophers. how does Kantian ethics agree with this or not? ld life differ from utilitarian 3. do somethmg. Cambridge. ll. utili- :>dern tarianism or Kant's thcon' \\'hv? ufe be . Ed] Rqwimed bv permission of the publishers from Takmg 'nonsense on stilts'. has its most natural \ives are Rights Seriously . including Je that the right that those who break the law be ifice of Ronald Dworkin is Univenity Professor ofJurispm. It seems accepted md even protect other rights). to imph that the life of a fetus or a comatose the (!)Distinguish between the requirements of jus. punished? It is not surprising that these ques- 1willing dence. what is in\'olved in us.m instru. I l" o1l. Which theory is more acceptable to vou. Law's Empire.people have a right to appeals to co-operation or a common goal me per. \\'hY is this wrong? not? It @on O'Neill's interpretation. and Professor of Law. how does one 2. But that view has never 1\>. reject the rights of its citizens? Or does the Govern.from which our 1·eading is taken. He is the author of A Matter rights. ""'"'\' by Ronald Dworkin. Do vou ans- 4.. The language of rights now dominates politi. idea that citizens have rights apart from what the law happens to give them. This notion of rights. are pointless. This seems ples. Does the tarian svstems deserve the same loyalty. fly in happi- verage Ronald Dworkin the face of these rights? Do the minorities whose rights have been violated have the 1estions ks and Taking Rights Seriously right to violate the law in return? Or does the nation. The concept of t makes Xew }·ark ['mversity. rests on the Kantian idf'a of treating pf'ople yers and politicians take it as a point of pride ny these <t•lth dtgnity as members of the moral community.. ness? may :sed to ltarve? wher- ment's foreign policy. 1978 by Ronald been part of our orthodox political theory. life is valuable because it is rational. ple. ::-ir hard. or its race policy. The debate does not include the issue of benefit.rhr. Does Kantian ethics require us to help stran- ing someone as a mere means? Give some exam. al-it im·olves no choosing or planning. if {J.!I\. Review Questions Discussion Questions {!)According to O'Neill. individual rights of free speech. tions are now prominent. Oxford L'mversity. ].: . and e neces. at least in pan. that fact. On Dworkin's virw. and particularly the concept of rights ICeS Jn.© 1977.ird \ 'niversit\ Press. Conventional law- for their brhe<•rs.. then it 1s wrongfor the gov!'1-rtment to interfere with whether citizens have some moral rights '1erations the evmsr of this n·ght (unless this is necessary to against their Government. for treat people as ends in themselves? Gi\'e exam. . of course. . and Taking against the Government. that our legal system recognizes. for they would not claim that totali- in the cal debate in the United States. silent majority itself have rights. of Principle. use when a political society is divided. if citi:ens have a right to free speech.m · and politicians of both parties appeal to the Ethical Theones 31 . Kant's view is that a . equality. on . Mass.apter 5. For example. According to O'Neill. 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