This article was downloaded by: [Copenhagen University Library] On: 06 March 2014, At: 06:44 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK The International Journal of Human Rights Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjhr20 Nuclearism, human rights and constructions of security (part 2) Ken Booth a a Professor of International Politics , University of Wales , Aberystwyth Published online: 19 Oct 2007. To cite this article: Ken Booth (1999) Nuclearism, human rights and constructions of security (part 2), The International Journal of Human Rights, 3:3, 44-61, DOI: 10.1080/13642989908406828 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642989908406828 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-andconditions LONDON . Aberystwyth. despite their ostensible marginalisation through the 1990s. NUCLEAR RITES AND HUMAN RIGHTS Some nuclear idealists hubristically described the theorising that took place between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s (mainly in the United States) as the 'golden age' of nuclear thinking. It was argued that at the core of the problem of creating the conditions for future regional and global security is a clash of cultures: between that of nuclearism on the one side and human rights on the other.Nuclearism. as is human rights as a necessary condition for its achievement and consolidation. Part Two explores these differing approaches in more depth. Vol. committed to giving momentum to a new global policy aimed at eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. It is proposed that the British government initiate a project. No. Professor of International Politics. SANE 2000. As time passed. The article concludes by looking at the space one particularly significant international actor (Britain) has in terms of moving international politics from a literally MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) condition to a SANE (Security After Nuclear Elimination) world. nuclear deterrence had became a dogma.3. The International Journal of Human Rights.1 Even at the time there were profound sceptics of this view. No. University of Wales. Part 1 of this article was published in The International Journal of Human Rights.2. Vol. such a project could have a decisive effect on the construction of regional and global security as a result of progressive institution-building and law-creation. The institutionalising of the concept of 'security community' is suggested as a promising building block in that process.3 (Autumn 1999) pp. but during the later phases of the Cold War it became apparent to a growing body of opinion that all that glittered was not gold.44-61 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS. alternative ways of thinking were silenced as far as possible Ken Booth. as a step towards the discussion of the role of political community in the normalisation of security practices that offer greater hope than in the past of delivering the conditions of sustainable peace. it became increasingly common to describe nuclear deterrence theory as a theology. Human Rights and Constructions of Security (Part 2) Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 KEN BOOTH Part One of this article discussed the continuing threat of nuclear weapons.3. Nuclearism had its sacred texts and high priests. The reasons for this were compelling. proclaimed as true by its exponents. it is even more valid today. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY: PART 2 45 by indoctrination. legitimise practices that might well result in self-execution as well: this is the meaning of MAD. but it was a strategy that was increasingly out of its time and Clausewitzian logic. not a continuation of politics. As a result. and that this 'culture' transcends changes in policy. What unites these three examples (human sacrifice to gods. now regard human sacrifice to forgotten gods. The nuclear rites described above attended what was ostensibly a military strategy. the Clausewitzian philosophy of war and the Westphalian states system. If security is to be constructed on a .Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 NUCLEAR1SM. In the era of nuclear plenty a historic disjunction occurred between the ends governments sought and their nuclear means. static thinking and technological idealism. and probably earlier.2 In such circumstances. unlike those of the liturgists of primitive gods or the triumphalists of imperialism. the primitive nuclear rites of international society in the second half of the twentieth century will come to be regarded by future societies with all the incomprehension and horror that we.3) In its post-Cold War manifestation the culture of nuclearism has been dominated by complacency. Nuclear theology can be explained as the highest technological expression of the strategic culture associated with the 350-year international world defined by the ideas and practices of Machiavellian ethics. For over 50 years there has been a significant gap between the genocidal implications of a 'war' involving numerous nuclear weapons and the actual stakes likely to be at the root of the conflict. masculinist. this strategic culture is also ethnocentric. a nuclear war involving two states possessing extensive arsenals and nuclear war-fighting doctrines would be a negation of Clausewitz. not a politics to be contested. socialisation. What separates them is that the rites of the nuclear priesthood. In the light of this. If this was true in the Cold War.veritable nuclear rites.have traditional sets of attitudes and behaviour with respect to the threat and use of force. ('Strategic culture' is the idea that particular groups . which at least could be portrayed as a global struggle between two irreconcilable systems. critics were cast as heretics or the 'useful idiots' of the communist devil. government and even historical era. it is predictable that within the time-scale of several hundred years. or the genocide of first peoples in the name of colonialism. forms and acts . contemporary strategy was dominated by a distinctive set of prescriptions. and Strategic Studies in general and nuclear deterrence theory in particular was believed to be a faith to be embraced. and nuclear deterrence) is the legitimation of practices of execution in one form or another in the name of elite values. loyalty tests and exclusion. colonial genocide. and determined by the materially most powerful. with similar critical distance.especially states and nations . despite words on the parts of the leaders of these countries purporting to indicate a commitment to radical nuclear disarmament. That US/UK attitudes and behaviour with respect to nuclear weapons should be regarded in terms of 'nuclearism' . It is difficult. for example. those seeking to soften Westphalia's roughest edges. in the advocacy of civil society. target-seeking. Nuclearism remains much more deeply embedded in the mindsets and policies of the leading military powers than does the culture of human rights. The key point is the underlying commitment to nuclear weapons and strategies across the Cold War/post-Cold War divide. The nuclear disarmament that has taken place in the 1990s has not required any shifts in the nuclearist strategic culture or statist conceptions of 'security'. in the 1990s the nuclear reductions carried out by the major powers have sought the same goal . and in the popular imagination.that seeking human security5 and not simply the security of states or regimes . Human rights are intrinsic to any policy attempting to construct security in ways that promise to deliver sustainable peace because there cannot be global security unless there is justice and there cannot be justice without a vibrant human rights culture. to see any marked changes in the mindsets of their nuclear establishments through the 1990s.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 46 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS more long-lasting foundation.but this time by agreed decreases. In this light. it was not part of the more comprehensive approach to security proposed by global civil society. Some illustrations were given in Part One of this article of continuities in warhead and missile production. This is where human rights come to centre stage in the discussion of security. As was argued at the start of Part One.stability . the nuclear disarmament that was carried out by governments in the 1990s4 was tinkering rather than a major assault on Cold War nuclearism. one building upon and expanding those humanising forces that grew within the hegemony of Westphalia (for example. One of the central claims of this article is that the progress of civilisation can be measured by the relative weight accorded to each of these cultures around the desks of policy-makers. In the Cold War. and doctrinal development. in the conference halls of diplomacy. such as the development of the laws of war). though there have been significant reductions in warheads. then an alternative culture must be deployed. especially one on which there is a real prospect of a sustainable peace developing. comprehensive security .is shown by the continuities across the Cold War/post-Cold War divide. or those seeking to reduce social conflict (such as the delegitimisation of racism).must embrace . arms control policies had often sought to make deterrence more 'stable' by allowing agreed increases.a strategic culture rather than simply a military strategy . there are no better ideas presently on the table than those of 'security communities' and 'cosmopolitan democracy'. If a government is found wanting in this area . HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY: PART 2 47 universal human rights. the feasible and the desirable. First. resting as it does on the belief that human nature is malleable.6 They bring together. The potential historic function of a global human rights culture is nothing short of the invention of a more peaceful and loving humanity. In terms of developing the practices of global governance appropriate for the promotion of comprehensive security. Nuclearism was defined in terms of dependence in three key areas.7 In terms of world politics. the only dependable route to security is through policies of deterrence/balance of power/statism and so on. The culture of nuclearism assumes a fixed notion of human nature and a fatalism about human possibilities. rest on a particular theory of human nature. Nuclearism in its nature is antithetical to key elements of this goal. Given this classical realist view of the selfish/evil/power-seeking/mistrustful essence of all humans. The ways in which the culture of nuclearism is antithetical to human rights can be examined in relation to the definition proposed by Lifton and Falk and used in the introductory paragraph of Part One. as it marginalises the idea of common security in favour of common insecurity. that political groups learn Clausewitzian war as opposed to having . and hence nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantors of independence. and the extension through changing attitudes and behaviour of political and moral commitments. there is a strong case for arguing that the external policies of every government should be read subject to a footnote detailing its statements and record with respect to the eradication of nuclear weapons. exchanges the belief in the potential of common humanity with the primacy of the politics of states. like all theories of international relations. what this means is steady progress in the eradication of all forms of direct and structural violence. A strategy to promote the latter must therefore be central to the project of global security.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 NUCLEARISM. The human rights culture has very different assumptions and priorities for action. In this era of standard-setting and accountability. the more power one has the better. 'psychologically': All constructions of security. in approachable distance. though many vexing questions obviously remain to be answered both in theory and practice.and the statements of The International Court and the Canberra Commission quoted in Part One sets a standard for them then it is postponing dealing with the most fundamental human rights question of all: the global right to life. and clearly. and in place of a strategy seeking coexistence through community relies indefinitely on coexistence through the strategy of mutual genocidal threat. and the emancipatory philosophy and strategies that are at the heart of the thinking of those seeking to construct a global human rights culture. Such characteristics as these are antithetical to the concern for the individual. With respect to the Genocide Convention. cannot be imputed to nuclear strategies. industrialised. What was earlier described as structural nuclearism is one manifestation of this. Furthermore. the argument is made that human rights exist as positive law. a strategy and a goal in terms of cultivating a vocabulary. The nuclearist paradigm has been under challenge in various ways since the mid-1980s. and that an environment of human rights is one of the ways by which our biological selves can be constructed into better human beings. nuclear policies demand both policy-making secrecy and the cultivation of cultures willing in some circumstances to carry out genocidal threats. that human rights apply in armed conflicts. The record of the past 50 years. the supporters of nuclear strategies additionally argue that the 'intent' to destroy particular groups. 'politically': The culture of nuclearism is characterised by the politics of statism and the status quo. . that is the idea that the Western powers need nuclear weapons until the end of time because Saddams cannot be disinvented. the democratic assumptions. Second. 'militarily': Pro-nuclear advocates argue that human rights obligations were not intended to cover nuclear weapons and that in any case such obligations do not prevail in times of armed conflict. in whole or in part. In summary. politically and militarily. and that the intent to commit genocide can be inferred from the predictable consequences of carrying out nuclear threats. and globalised age.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 48 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS inherited the behaviour as an instinct.psychologically. that the Convention prohibits the systematic killing of members of certain groups and nuclear weapons would in certain cases be used to this end. practices and forms of global governance which give some hope of inventing social humans out of physical humans in this dislocating. The counters given to such arguments by those who believe that nuclear deterrence in its nature is antithetical to human rights obligations are lengthy and more complex than space allows. Human rights policies provide global civil society with a litmus test. that human rights prohibit the arbitrary deprivation of life while the use of nuclear weapons necessarily leads to the arbitrary deprivation of life. Third. that the Genocide Convention applies in times of peace and war.8 The culture of nuclearism is therefore fundamentally posed against the culture of human rights . but its replacement by a firmly embedded global human rights culture and meaningful 'cosmopolitan democracy' is by no means guaranteed. because its outcome will help determine whether security on all levels is enhanced on a global scale in the decades to come. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY: PART 2 49 since the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. for example. If. Security begins with threat(s). This penultimate section examines some practicalities relating to the construction of security in ways that start to move away from the traps of the past.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 NUCLEARISM. into more existential threats to identity (cultural imperialism).and so it is intimately related to emancipation. Security in the context of world politics consists of people(s) being or feeling free of threats that challenge their existence in some fundamental way. and hence determine how they must live in order to survive. nuclearism in its nature is antithetical to the theory and practice of human rights. and if a human rights culture is essential for that progress in global justice that must be part of any comprehensive notion of security. strategies. Only those who are secure have the time. are broad.9 In the presence of so many human wrongs it is not surprising that one of the themes of Amnesty's publicity through the 50th anniversary year of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has been to describe the UDHR as 'the world's best kept secret'. interpenetrating contemporary culture as well as policy-making in other issue areas. or can we construct a global community of security communities? POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SECURITY One of the implications of the general argument so far has been the inadequacy of compartmentalising nuclear issues . but its essence is choice . then the significance of this clash of cultures is evident. It is part of the central problematic of the post-Cold War world. forcing us to ask fundamental questions about global politics. and attempts to control such weapons simply in terms of 'defence' policy. through structural political and economic forms of oppression (slavery). and the opportunity to choose the danger entailed in. One of the paradoxical implications of this. as the annual reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch testify. by their intrusive character. has often been appalling. addressing both long-term goals and short-term pragmatics. Formula One . The fundamental questions that they raise require concrete answers.questions relating to nuclear policies. for example. Will we live in a community of fate or a community of emancipation? Will we continue to replicate nuclear insecurity communities. the material resources. as argued above. Nuclear matters. These threats range from direct bodily violence from other humans (war). is that being secure allows a person to choose danger. and deep. security is an instrumental concept or condition.the belief that 'community' can have real purchase in political practices at all levels. and ultimately globally. So. continents. and in terms of world politics security is not simply synonymous with peace. that peace is not simply synonymous with security was evident from the high degree of insecurity felt in Britain during the increasingly uneasy peace of the late 1930s.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 50 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS car racing or round-the-world yacht racing. military power. materially and existentially). The central point for the present argument is that peace which is other than a mere absence of war . which governments and opinion-groups of all types employ when they want to elevate the pursuit of their own interests and projects to a higher level of legitimacy). at the heart of the broader and deeper conception of security is the idea of political community12 .13 It can easily be debased (as in the phrase 'international community'. it is another to develop them in practical political ways. This is evident from the fact that a significant degree of security was felt within the United States during the final stages of the Second World War: by this point everybody knew that the US homeland was safe and that its core values would be triumphant. and the preservation of the status quo) can only deliver what Boulding defined as 'unstable peace'. One historic example of imagining. It is often used also as a political bromide . is a difficult. the construction of comprehensive security . albeit 'warmly persuasive' term. In other words. a negative peace resting only on the threat of force. of course. and increasingly in others. 'Community'. from the most geographically local to sub-continents.usually called 'positive' as opposed to 'negative' peace . The greater one's insecurity (bodily. Kenneth Boulding called this 'stable peace'.'11 It is one thing to talk about such matters in the abstract. it gives people(s) the opportunity to develop peace as a sustainable political (and cultural) practice. In this light traditional thinking about security (focusing on the state. in relation to the present discussion. discussed in Part One. constructing. which he defined as 'a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved. It is a state of being (subjective or objective) that gives people as individuals or groups the opportunity to try to achieve other things. and then practising security in ways that have actually delivered stable peace is evident in the development of Western European integration. In particular.creates space for the growth of sustainable peaceful practices. In this case. Equally.moving towards freedom from threats at all levels .10 Security is not therefore synonymous with the absence of danger at the individual level. the greater is one's everyday life determined.depends upon the prioritising and predictability of peaceful practices. but they do not deter a growing body of opinion from regarding the construction of community . the integration of Western Europe is the model for the idea: it shows there can be 'politics among nations'. in which state interaction is not organised around the threat and use of military force. Military strategy has been superseded in favour of a commitment to harmonise interests. while ethical communitarians contest the idea of universalism in human rights and cosmopolitanism in identity. compromise differences and reap mutual rewards.16 while in a condition of stable peace. He identified several distinctive characteristics in a security community. shared interests and identity. These points all serve as useful warnings against sloppy thinking about community as a political panacea. Communication for Deutsch was the essence of the construction of community. Security is constructed through community. The characteristics are: mutual compatibility of values. International relations between the former war-like tribes of Western Europe (and now beyond this core) take place.as central to the project of global governance. A security community was originally defined by Karl Deutsch and his co-workers as a group of people who had become 'integrated' in the sense of having developed a 'sense of community'. In other words. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY: PART 2 51 (as in the phrase 'national community'. strong economic ties . and it is these that must be constructed in the promotion of security and community in other world regions. Some analysts do not think community is an idea that travels well: traditional realists consider that political community can extend no further than the boundaries of sovereign states. to borrow the title of Morgenthau's account of the classic conflictual world. but in a context which is no longer determined by the deployment of armies.with its centripetal dynamics of multi-faceted interaction. an imperial euphemism employed by a dominant nation in a multi-national state). the construction of 'security communities' best conveys the philosophy of security underlying this article and gives most empirical reality to Boulding's hope of 'stable peace'." Even more so than when Deutsch and his co-workers developed the concept in the 1950s.14 Expressed in concrete form. not deterrence.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 NUCLEARISM. and the spread of moral and political obligation . navies and air forces against each other. with a shared belief that common problems 'must and can' be resolved by 'peaceful change' and by having the appropriate 'institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough' to bring this about. and between Western Europe and other developing or actual security communities. international politics are not fated to be an everlasting game played by Napoleons and Hitlers: a condition of stable peace is both conceivable and possible. This has been the condition of Western Europe since the late 1940s. the idea of a human rights culture rests on a conception of common humanity. however. It has been argued that nuclearism is antithetical to the spread of the practices of stable peace. and cultural transactions. First. as opposed simply to the arithmetic of military power. The latter. Comprehensive global security cannot be constructed on the foundations of nuclear deterrence. it is part of an approach to the construction of security in which the negotiation of justice is paramount. for we live in a multicultural as well as a multi-state world. routine processes. Second. mutual responsiveness. and . that of continental or sub-continental regions. Subsequent thinkers about security communities. or traditional insecurities and dynamics would simply be transferred from the level of states to a higher level. developing or developed security communities should not become nuclearised super-states. multi-faceted social. an important set of processes in developing towards such a goal would be generated by the synergy between the institutionalising of nuclear abolition and the construction of security communities. on the other hand. and so movement towards this goal has to be relatively slow. have added refinements and empirical flesh to the original idea.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 52 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS and expectations of more. a growing degree of institutionalised relationships. The former does not mean some false universalism. the idea of human rights is integral to the cultivation of key elements in contemporary political communitybuilding. as was argued above and in Part One. For present purposes. decision-making structures. lest the situation deteriorate even further than was discussed in Part One. therefore. Clearly. though in practice its flourishing is confronted by great obstacles. and mutual predictablity of behaviour. In direct contrast. two considerations should be clear from the definition of a security community. nuclear targeting is incompatible with the growth of a global network of mutually responsive security communities. notably Adler and Barnett. The defining test of whether a proper 'sense of community' had been established is whether the units target each other with their military power. political. must be pursued with some urgency. especially for example in relation to the promotion of shared values and mutual responsiveness (the role of the European Court of Human Rights has been of great significance in the ideals and practices of European community-building). Mutual targeting based on deterrent threats of ultimate violence is not compatible with community-building at any level of world politics. however. Furthermore. The very commitments. the global dimension of security community building requires sustained policies aiming to achieve both a universal human rights culture and a nuclear weapons-free world (NWFW). characterised by only one conception of how people(s) can behave. Above all. If governments actively pursued their rhetorical commitment to nuclear elimination over several decades. and progress towards an international community worth its name. Here we see an empirical case contrasting the 'community' approach to regional security and the 'deterrent' approach advocated by . both regionally and globally. such institutionalisation with a purpose might come to match at the global level the progression of the regional dynamic in Western Europe that led to the sequence: Coal and Steel Community/Common Market/ European Community/European Union. and contexts can be changed. if that level could be achieved. to institute a common currency in Western Europe when the Treaty of Rome was signed. there would by necessity be different strategic axioms and common sense. confidence-building. if it did prove possible for states to negotiate down to the last one hundred warheads or so. and habits of co-operation could positively interact in ways that would change the whole context in which the decision to move to the final abolition of nuclear weapons could take place. states would have moved from the Coal and Steel Community to Maastricht. by analogy. 40 years later it was. as in life in general. The final step. However. In terms of the analogy with the EU. Today. At that point nuclearism would be in terminal decline. several key governments seem only able to believe that nuclear disarmament can safely go as low as a few thousand warheads. not the enormous one it seems to be today. The elimination of nuclear weapons and the construction of mutual security would be mutually reinforcing projects. However. because of what some governments and their supporters believe these weapons represent in terms of sovereignty. symbolism and security. common decision-making structures. The significance of these arguments in favour of a community approach can be illustrated by a comparison between South America and South Asia in terms of positive and negative synergy between nuclear posturing and the prospect of regimes of co-operation and peaceful practices.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 NUCLEARISM. with no more than a hundred warheads or less. then moving down to a situation of true minimum deterrence. the elimination of the last nuclear devices. It was not feasible. In international relations. we would then be in a quite different nuclear world than the one we inhabit at present. for example. might then be easily conceivable. new transparency and trust. would appear a relatively small step after sustained community-building. Getting rid of these last few might not seem feasible. Interdependence. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY: PART 2 53 networks of interest necessary to carrying out the elimination of the most destructive weapons ever devised would in themselves be a powerful motor for community-building. what is defined as 'necessary' and what is deemed to be 'possible' is context-dependent. achieving greater transparency in policy actions and declarations. learned that their existing national security policies were proving counter-productive. Not least of the lessons to be derived from this experience is the important reminder that states can learn how to develop co-operative security practices out of what might appear to be intractably hostile relationships. and is defined by. in terms of the pragmatics of improving dialogue. suggests that the co-operative practices associated with building regional security regimes such as NWFZs can play a significant part in achieving a move from potential adversary status to that of potential community-partners. It shows that in the construction of regional security landscapes. those around them. and other parts of the world. and that for security to be sustainable. This occurred in South America in the 1980s. Through a growing understanding of each other's legitimate security concerns.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 54 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS traditional national security managers and their academic comforters. But what made the difference was the increasing awareness of the costs and risks of attempting to construct security on the basis of the unilateral pursuit of the 'national interest'. the key states in the region. There were various propitious circumstances in South America: historical. Sceptics and critics. there is now a considerable body of useful experience to help operationalise fine words about community-building. why not those in South Asia? From South America. of course. Those on the other hand who want to see a role model in this case must of course guard against carefree generalisation. it had to take a decisively co-operative turn. socio-cultural. which looked for a period as though their regional ambitions would take a nuclear and confrontational form. geographical and political. At the minimum. when a transformation took place in the insecurity landscape. we can confidently say that the denuclearisation of inter-state relations in South America is a very suggestive case.17 An analysis of the evolution of the Argentine-Brazil relationship. Argentina and Brazil. There are always special regional circumstances working either towards or against closer association. developing security guarantees. will immediately point to South America in the 1980s as a special case. but a common feature of successful community-building is the realisation by elites that their own country's security is inextricably linked to. If states in a potential nuclear confrontation in South America could learn such security common-sense. from the tensions and suspicions of the earlier period through a rapprochement leading eventually to the embracing of non-nuclear norms. and bringing about the inter-meshing of global norms and regional practices. though. initiating and reciprocating confidence-building measures and the implementation of non-offensive defence postures. the synergy between military postures and political outcomes . . If progress is to be made.another special case .18 Britain is a particularly interesting case. After all. But the Low Salience Nuclear (LSN) world of the marginalisers has proved victim to their own complacency. and committed anti-nuclear state has its own space in terms of advancing the project of eliminating nuclear weapons. the Western European security community grew out of a historic cockpit of war. These cases. but they do offer political encouragement and useful lessons for those who seek to construct a more secure global environment. nor are they necessarily destined to become so . This concluding section will briefly concentrate on Britain. purposeful agents are essential. where stable peace is now more of a regional reality than ever before . potential nuclear power. while the developing security community in South America is growing out of a historic cockpit of militarism and authoritarianism. though each nuclear power.though obviously they are not at the same stage. The ostentatious nuclearisation of Indo-Pakistani relations in 1998 was final confirmation of the view of the critics of LSN that zero nuclear weapons is the most rational goal. if we are to avoid a backwards race into nuclear history.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 NUCLEARISM.again forces us to ask: who are the real realists when it comes to building security? Is it those traditionalist governments and their supporters. Something must therefore be done. the TP2000 campaigners in Britain calling for nuclear elimination. who continue to answer tomorrow's questions with yesterday's answers? Or is it the demonstrators in Ramallah calling for greater justice in the Middle East. as a nuclear power of conservative leanings. however: it is both a serious problem. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY: PART 2 55 can be positive as well as negative.is also suggestive. and that pessimism is not always justified. and those rare governments that will listen to arguments in favour of pursuing policies committed justice and comprehensive security. Western European integration . Neither the case of Western Europe or South America guarantee that similar outcomes can be replicated elsewhere. that broader rather than narrower ways of dealing with security (avoiding compartmentalising defence policy issues from security issues) can be successful. and quickly. There was a unanimous desire that nuclear deterrence would never again be the eyeball-to-eyeball pre-occupation of the era of Strangelove. trapped in regressive mindsets. and who will then try to put these ideas into operation with determination and consistency? FROM A MAD TO A SANE WORLD? One persistent theme of this article has been the disappointed hopes that attended the end of the Cold War with respect to nuclear weapons. the marginalisation to some degree of nuclear deterrence. but it is close to the United States. if a British government decided to take a lead in nuclear disarmament it has the weaponry and scientific expertise to help develop the most sophisticated inspection systems using its own capabilities as a test-bed. a history of opposition to nuclear weapons. The former includes the possibility of building upon some of the positive developments of the 1990s. the halting of the plans of North Korea and Iraq. as ever. and throughout . These include: progress in some nuclear arms control forums (the NPT. There has been very low interest in nuclear matters: this silence was deafening in the 1997 general election campaign. and certainly no government would today be contemplating developing nuclear weapons from scratch if it did not already possess them (furthermore. finally. But first New Labour needs a new idea. of their nuclear 'inheritance'. it could be influential. and to establish a set of standards by which it can be judged. The prospects for serious progress in nuclear disarmament. the CTBT. notably South Africa (following the earlier reversal by Argentina and Brazil). the relinquishing by several former Soviet republics. and the strong and growing support from experts for a NWFW (including experts in the United States. are made up of both positive and negative considerations. and START). nuclear diplomacy and nuclear strategies in the national security policies of the major nuclear powers. have a rhetorical commitment to global nuclear disarmament. its 'ethical' foreign policy and commitment to be a force for good in the world implies a determination to be active. Britain has the freedom of being very secure from the threat of territorial aggression. to prioritise human rights.19 For these reasons the British government might not be totally resistant to being pressed to act. which will remain the key state in shaping what happens in this issue-area). the difficulties facing Britain as an independent nuclear power will grow if the United Kingdom dissolves as a sovereign state in the next 10-20 years). now independent states. There are several reasons for making the latter claim: Labour does.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 56 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS but it is also a potentially pivotal agent. Nuclear amnesia is evident at the level of public opinion. at least. and supporters and MPs who have strong anti-nuclear credentials. British public life in the 1990s offers another catalogue of the regressive attitudes towards nuclear disarmament mentioned in Part One. the establishment of NWFZs in Africa and Southeast Asia. Britain does not have the constraints of being a superpower. On the negative side. the reversal in the nuclear policies of a number of states. and if it did. at this point it looks most unlikely that any future British government would seek to purchase another generation of 'independent' nuclear weapons. complacency was exposed in the misleadingly entitled Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1998. while the SDR trundled away. Robin Cook. which contains many individuals with strong anti-nuclear credentials in the past. Ethic cleansing has been evident in the way the government. which reviewed everything except the most important strategic questions.the hard questions surrounding NATO expansion/enlargement. Significantly. relations with the United States. has ignored talking about nuclear issues unless really pressed (which has been very rarely). in public debate.20 Typically. Rare and partial exceptions were mentioned earlier.and indeed defence . grasped their military roles during the 1998 Gulf crises.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 NUCLEARISM. there has been contrary evidence in some (though certainly not all) sections of British civil society.seen as an area of potential electoral weakness . saw the implications of Britain's nuclear deterrent posture as a central issue to discuss in relation to the ethical foreign policy they announced just after the election in 1997. the nuclear issue was compartmentalised from other issues of foreign and security . HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY: PART 2 57 the decade there has been a general lack of attention in the press.important to a degree. but in fact postponing nuclear disarmament indefinitely by moving at the speed of the slowest ship in the convoy. neither the Foreign Secretary. worrying about issues such as the future of the Territorial Army .21 The SDR in effect was final proof that New Labour had normalised old thinking on the British bomb. nor the FCO in general. but not the pinnacle of twenty-first century strategic issues . and on TV and radio. former Royal Navy Commander and Soviet specialist Michael MccGwire. Britain contains several of the experts who have contributed powerfully to anti-nuclear arguments. the future of Trident.22 If the thinking of New Labour and of old Whitehall has generally revealed the regressive side of the 1990s Western nuclear mindset. and the dangers of WMD in general were skirted around. At the official level. Intellectually as well as politically. Tony Blair. and his key ministers. former Chief of the Defence Staff Field Marshal Sir Michael Carver.but also part of an embracing of the well-established British tactic of claiming to want to reach harbour. The shift to 'multilateralism' proved not only to be a tactic to remove the nuclear issue from the defence debate preceding the 1997 general election . and nuclear .policy. Complacency could be seen in the apparently easy manner in which some former Labour radicals in Opposition became socialised into attitudes about defence that sounded remarkably like their predecessors. Prominent among these have been Nobel Prize winner (1995) Joseph Rotblat. The embracing of traditionalist approaches to military/security questions on the part of New Labour seemed confirmed by the evident enthusiasm with which the Prime Minister. Britain is certainly not the only state that could initiate such a move. not in isolation but as a leader among a community of nations'. and it is in line with the highest aspirations of the Labour government. What is critical in this respect is the generation of the positive synergy discussed in Part One between denuclearisation and confidence-building within a comprehensive notion of security. If the context can be changed. but for the reasons suggested at the start of this section. One immediate step the British government could take.23 Furthermore. therefore. If the LSN framework is not to disintegrate completely over the next ten years.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 58 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS physicist Frank Barnaby. the tradition of conscientious and international law-based direct action has been kept alive by the TP2000 campaign. let alone an 'international community'.25 The idea is that the British government would make as the centre-piece of its security policy. words are less convincing than ever on the part of the existing nuclear powers. they do not presently constitute anything approaching a sufficiently powerful critical mass to disturb New Labour's priorities . and there is still time to do something. which would help to reinvigorate the process discussed throughout this article. there are some advantages in Britain doing it. so can what is thought to be conceivable. if Tony Blair was genuine when he said he wanted 'to define Britain's place in the world. the nuclear powers must act in a much more persuasive way to show that they are committed to the strategic rationality of the abolition of nuclear weapons. at the very outset of the twenty-first century. before nuclear 'realism' reinvents itself in even more dangerous forms than on the Indian sub-continent. . How can we talk of 'international society'. there should be a meeting of heads of government from as many countries as possible. they must be backed up by persuasive actions. might be called SANE 2000. when the hardest currency of all in their inter-relationships consists of genocidal threats? As early as possible in January 2000 therefore. but they are not utterly bleak. to make a commitment to work in a systematic way towards the elimination of these weapons: this would truly be a millennium project worth its name. a dramatic and public commitment to eliminate the WMD which deform politics among nations and one day will perhaps destroy significant portions of them. But at this stage. The prospects for purposeful action by the New Labour government on nuclear disarmament are not encouraging.of which taking a lead in global nuclear disarmament has not been one.24 Although the opinions represented by such individuals and groups as those just mentioned are of significance in any serious discussion about the future of British nuclear policy. can never entirely flourish. It was argued at the opening of Part One of this article that global nuclear war is the possibility that could cancel out all other human possibilities. at the start of the new century. and between rethinking security common-sense and founding new forms of global governance. In such ways it would be a way of kickstarting the institutions and processes that would help create positive synergy between weapons control and confidence-building. A culture embodied in the universal idea of the rights of the individual. provoked by the Nazi Holocaust.26 The crucial requirement at this juncture is to start moving forward in a comprehensive way.Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 NUCLEARISM. The aim of SANE2000 would be to make a highly visible. only a half century on. and its language and symbolism would seek to contribute to the delegitimising of the MAD mindset. alongside national security postures planning a nuclear Holocaust. in which the elimination of weapons of mass destruction must be central. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY: PART 2 59 At present. different sequencing steps. will always be threatened as long as nuclearism is politically significant. but also the written one in the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. it would set out a preliminary blueprint and timetable. and are locked in contestation. The nuclear age and the age of human rights were born almost simultaneously. between the institutionalising of radical disarmament and the strengthening of a lawgoverned international community. to the achievement of nuclear elimination.history's 'Great Escape'. however. but this time possibly in even less fortuitous historical circumstances than those that developed during the Cold War . there are many possible plans on the table suggesting how such a commitment might then proceed: with longer or shorter timetables. is that the construction of a global human rights culture. the nuclear Haves must attempt to persuade the Have-nots and especially the Might-gets that they are really serious about their commitments to nuclear disarmament . The subsequent theme of the article has been that the deconstruction of nuclearism is both functional and necessary for the construction of comprehensive security. It is too early. The predictable consequence of today's so-called international community failing to construct such a global security strategy.and not just the verbal ones. and reinvent living globally. If we are to avoid further shock-waves on the lines of the May 1998 India/Pakistan explosions. to know which will eventually triumph. will be to reproduce yet another international insecurity community. and more or less flexibility. symbolic and formal commitment. It would be a commitment to which governments could be held accountable. . What is certain. which it was claimed earlier is the possibility that could open up all other human possibilities. The concept of 'human security' is increasing rapidly in usage. 9. Kenneth Boulding. See also Our Global Neighborhood. No. and Michael MccGwire for sharing ideas on these issues for over 30 years. 'Condition(s) of Peace'. 11. 8.5. 2. pp. 1998).). 7. Raymond Williams. Globalization. 6. 'Deterrence: The Problem not the Solution'. Jacobsen (ed.65-6. 1999). 1957) p.24 (Special Issue). King's College. Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The Report of The Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press.167. presented at the Council For Arms Control & Just Defence Annual Seminar. Cosmopolitan Democracy. M. 1995). p. Vol.l. Human Security & the African Experience (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Hans J. Re-imagining Political Community Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press. (eds). 14.55-70. 16. International Affairs. On Cold War superpower strategic cultures see Carl G. 13. 1999) pp. 11 issues annually). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf. 1997. NJ: Princeton University Press. 1970).25.62. forthcoming). et al.). See the detailed record in Arms Control Reporter (Cambridge MA: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. For a variety of critical perspectives see 'Forum on The Transformation of Political Community'. Keywords. Community and Emancipation. Vol.139-75. Vol. A major contribution to such accumulating literature is Andrew Linklater. Wheeler. Community is one of the central organising concepts in the theoretical and empirical chapters in Ken Booth (ed. Karl Deutsch. Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The Inadequacy of Arguments Presented to the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinions' (unpublished paper. Review of International Studies.l. See. 1998). Weller. . Review of International Studies. 5. Theories of Peace and Security (London: Macmillan. An Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press. The latest significant contribution to thinking about security communities is Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds). 1998). An early contribution to the idea of 'cosmopolitan democracy' is Daniele Archibugi and David Held. The Transformation of Political Community. the UNDP Human Development Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ethical Foundations of the PostWestphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press. See The Amnesty International UK Annual Review. Security. 4. 12.60 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I want to thank Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler for comments on an earlier draft. 1994). (eds). 15. 1979) p. Winter 1985-86. 1976) pp. Emanuel Adler. See John Garnett (ed. Morgenthau. This is the general theme of Ken Booth. January 1999. December 1998. pp. 'Three Tyrannies' in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. 16 February 1998. 1978). 'Introduction'. Amnesty International Annual Report. 1995).13. A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London: Fontana. Political Community and the North Atlantic Alliance (Princeton.. No.31-70. One of the most original contributions to this debate was Michael MccGwire. London.). Stable Peace (Austin TX: University of Texas Press. See Daniele Archibugi. 10. for example. Critical Security Studies and Global Politics (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 NOTES 1. 1990). 3. Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan. 'Achieving a Sustainable Peace'. David Held and Martin Kohler (eds). and Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin. See notes 54 and 60. and Human Rights Watch Annual Report. December 1997) provides a stark contrast to the SDR. Nuclear Weapons: Britain's Role in the Transition from a MAD to a SANE World (London: ISIS. 18.37. Parts II and III contain some useful ideas. Occasional Paper No.841-3. Theories and Policies (London: Croom Helm. Cm 3999 (London: TSO.l) and William Walker. Special ISIS Report on the Future of UK Nuclear Weapons. International Affairs..' The Guardian. No. The Case for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons Now (London: Granta Books. The Next Steps (London: ISIS. inter alia.. 1. 25. et al. September 1997. Jonathan Schell. Arms Control and Disarmament Policy. in Booth. see the related The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays (London: TSO. Security. 'Labour's Strategic Defence Review'. The TP2000 campaign can be followed in the newsletter.74. and Michael Foot. pp. 1998). and on its website at http://www/gn/apc. 23. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY: PART 2 61 Downloaded by [Copenhagen University Library] at 06:44 06 March 2014 17. The Strategic Defence Review. The Gift of Time. October 1998. Wheeler and Tim Dunne. Vol. Tri-Denting It Handbook. 'Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy'. 'Community versus Deterrence: Approaches to Security and Non-Proliferation in Latin America and South Asia'. . Fissile Materials. 25 December 1998. I Presume (London: Gollancz. in John Baylis. 'Crisis management'. Special Report on the Future of UK Nuclear Weapons. pp. Stimson Center. see Nicholas J.org/tp2000/. Arms Control and Disarmament Policy. Vol. No.4. During the December 1998 crisis. 'A World Worth Fighting For'. together with further references. the demeanour of those who spoke for the government was such that it brought back memories of the US diplomat a generation ago who talked of enjoying and being elated by crises. See Angie Zelter. July 1997.3). 20. British Perspectives on the Future of Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC: The Henry L. 21.2).NUCLEARISM. Fissile Materials. THES. January 1998) p. No. Contemporary Strategy. 24.152. 29 August 1998. Speed the Plough . Fissile Materials. See also Malcolm Chalmers. See Phil Williams. No. 26. British Nuclear Weapons Policy. Special ISIS Report on the Future of UK Nuclear Weapons. Arms Control and Disarmament Policy. 22. The argument below relies heavily upon Simon Davies. Britain's Policies on Fissile Materials: The Next Steps (London: ISIS. On SDR and Trident see Colin McInnes.4. Community and Emancipation (note 12). May 1997. 1998). 1998). 1998). On the latter point. 19. The first version of some of the arguments below were published in Ken Booth. The campaign's operational manual. 1975) p. Dr Strangelove. See. Quoted in Rebecca Johnson. Dorothy Zinberg.74. 'Peace in Chains. Ibid... International Affairs.847-70. An Open Guide to Trident Ploughshares 2000 (Norwich: TP2000. No. October 1998.