Notes on Hegel s Shorter Logic Introduction [T]hought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing the necessity of itsfacts, of demonstrating the existence of its objects, as well as their nature and qualities (3). Thought first appears in the guise of its opposite, feeling.: [T]he strictly human and thought-induced phenomena of consciousness do not originally appear in the form of a thought, but as a feeling, a perception, or mental image all of which aspects must be distinguished from the form of thought proper (4). Feeling is the opposite of thought, but it is still thought. Some miss this, Hegel tells us, and associate thought only with what Hegel calls after-thought, reflective thinking, which has to deal with thoughts as thoughts, and bring them into consciousness (4). But this a moment of thinking; feeling is also a moment of thinking. Hegel says of law, religion, and morality, for instance, that thinking is present therein under the guise of feeling, faith, or generalized image (5). [P]hilosophy should understand that its content is no other than actuality, that core of truth which, originally produced and producing itself within the precincts of the mental life, has become the world, the inward and outward world, of consciousness . [I]t may be held the highest and final aim of philosophic science to bring about, through the ascertainment of this harmony, a reconciliation of the selfconscious reason with the reason which is in the world actuality (8). in other words, with by our profounder mind and our intimate self-consciousness (11). and this form is. The object of philosophy is an actuality of which those objects. social regulations and conditions. reflection. by this stimulus. reflective spirit began in Greece and came back with Luther (10) The moment of truth of experience: The principle of Experience carries with it the unspeakably important condition that. Philosophy begins by . or. Through this state of antagonism to the phenomena of sense its first satisfaction is found in itself. else. including under that name both our immediate consciousness and the inductions from it. Necessity (11). as it were. [I]n point of form the subjective reason desires a further satisfaction than empirical knowledge gives. in the Idea of the universal essence of these phenomena: an Idea (the Absolute. Awakened. accordingly. we must be in contact with it. or God) which may be more or less abstract (16). We must be in touch with out subject-matter.The object of philosophy is the Idea: and the Idea is not so impotent as merely to have a right to exist without actually existing. above the senses and inferences from the senses into its own unadulterated element. thought is vitally characterized by raising itself above the natural state of mind. in the widest sense of the term. Philosophy negates experience: Its point of departure is Experience. in more exact terms. or. that we must find the fact united and combined with the certainty of our own selves. whether it be by means of our external senses. at first a stand-aloof and negative attitude towards the point from which it started. are only the superficial outside (10). and by assuming. in order to accept and believe any fact. as the thought of sheer lack of . that empirical is an epithet applicable only to the form of scientific exposition. Sheer lack of determination is the same as nothing. towards the Idea but this involves abstraction. which mirrors the philosophic notion (22). but. is nothing. and each is a necessary member of the organization (20). while intuitive sagacity has arranged what are mere phenomena. in itself.negating experience towards the universal. however. The whole of philosophy in this way resembles a circle of circles. physics (quantum physics?). Doctrine of Being Being. The Idea appears in each single circle. In such a case the contrasts between the varied and numerous phenomena brought together serve to eliminate the external and accidental circumstances of their conditions. according to the essential sequence of the notion. The thought of being yields the thought of sheer lack of determination. and history their due: It may happen. at the same time. Guided by such an intuition. the whole is constituted by the system of these peculiar phases. Hegel gives empirical. nothing is being. At the same time. nothing. At the same time. experimental physics will present the rational science of Nature as history will present the science of human of human affairs and actions in an external picture. and the universal thus comes clearly into view. however. specific being with specific qualities. See: The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters. and that what is should pass into not-being. . And (2) since the result is the abolition of the contradiction. Being (133-134). without the category of determinate being. Being is nothing. it also is Being. Becoming is the name for the passing-into-each-other of being and nothing. but Being with negation or determinateness: it is Becoming expressly put in the form of one of its elements. and that what is should pass into not-being. In the explanation of becoming above. in which we get rid of the immediacy in these determinations. It is clear that becoming needs determinate being because becoming makes so little sense without it. For becoming is just this: that what is not should be. it comes in the shape of a simple unity with itself: that is to say. The passing-into-each-other of being and nothing that is. viz. For becoming is inconceivable if there is not something that becomes. Determinate being is the what in this sentence. I said: becoming is just this: that what is not should be. Slavoj Zizek.determination. The utter restlessness of becoming is inconceivable. nothing is being. becoming is utter restlessness. and their contradiction vanishes in their mutual connection the unity in which they are only constituent elements. is being. One might consider Schelling s account of God s creation of the world. Being Determinate is (1) the unity of Being and Nothing. Being and nothing collapse into unity. the latter must vanish also. and vice versa. How is quality the determinate mode immediate and identical with Being ? A something is what it is in virtue of its quality. is no longer immediately identical with Being. except opposed to quality rather than determinate being] which is involved in it but distinguished from it. although a mode of Being. as determinateness which is. I think it is the same as determinate negation. Until one knows what something is not. Determinate being is identical with its negation because determination is negation: determination means saying at once what something is and what it is not. as contrasted with the Negation [Hegel bolds this. which dies out in itself. The result of this process however is not an empty Nothing. is Reality (135). when it consumes its material.Thus Becoming stands before us in utter restlessness unable however to maintain itself in this abstract restlessness: for since Being and Nothing vanish in Becoming(and that is the very notion of Becoming). and such unmediated character is Quality (134). I see little use for . but little is said about it. but Being identical with the negation what we call Being Determinate (being then and there):the primary import of which evidently is that it has become (134). but a mode indifferent and external to it. Reality is mentioned. Quality may be described as the determinate mode immediate and identical with Being as distinguished from Quantity which. Becoming is as it were a fire. one does not know what something is. and losing its quality it ceases to be what it is (134). Determinate Being is Being with a character or mode which simply is. Quality. we get in this way what is called Reality (135). the death of the thing is ultimately part of its life through this negative relation. It is the limit of the somewhat that is. Life is nothing other than the constant effort to push away death. The somewhat s qualities are determined by the qualities it does not possess. is being-by-self. being through another which is not the somewhat. The foundation of all determination is negation (135). its possession of certain qualities is simply the non-possession of the opposite of those qualities. The limit of a . Another quote: If we go on to consider determinate Being as a determinateness which is. Determinate being is identical with determinate negation because determination means establishing the difference between (the) being and not-being (of a somewhat).the category of reality. The difference between determinate being and determinate negation the difference which determines determinate being and determinate negation is a limit. Quality is thus being-for-another that is. without regard for the otherness that determines them. But being-for-self is a category introduced later in the Doctrine of Being. Hegel by hypertext has being-for-self written instead. or whether being-by-self is a different category than being-for-self. of the determinate being. I am not sure whether this is its introduction. Determinate being internalizes negation with determinate negation insofar as the negation of a thing is part of its structure. maintains a relationship with itself. by negating death. This may be a typo. The simple inherence of the qualities in the somewhat. this negative relation is ultimately a negative self-relation because life. so that finitude and variability [alterability] appertain to its being (136). It seems that finitude means undergoing alteration upon meeting the other. and this is because death is inherent to life as the latter s other. Yet death changes life. that is. to be limited is to be finite. All determinate beings change upon meeting the other. it is finite. The relationship to the other is for determinate beings determined by their determinate being. Thus. which. secondly alterable. Thus. firstly finite. A living thing dies. it is a Limit. its other. as the negation that belongs to the somewhat. is determinate negation. to be a determinate being is to be limited. its negation. and therefore of the somewhat as the somewhat that it is. All things with limits. Change is internal to the somewhat because change implies negation negation of some parts of the somewhat. In Being (determinate there and then). Somewhat is by its quality. Hence the otherness is not something indifferent and outside it. and therefore all determinate beings. A somewhat s negation is inside it. life does not subsist in death. a Barrier. the determinateness is one with Being. yet at the same time. but a function proper to it (136). that is. by the limit that establishes the difference between a thing s being and its not-being. that is. Hegel pairs finitude with alterability. are finite. . Concerning alterability. by their determinate being.somewhat s being is its not-being. Hegel has simply this to say: that any change that happens to the somewhat is not external to it but internal to it. when explicitly made a negation. Plato says: God made the world out of the nature of the one and the other : having brought these together. This suggests that life and death are originally out-of-sync. death. and change is only the manifestation of what it implicitly is. and wich forces it out of its own bounds. and quietly abiding within its own limits: thought we also know. it is finite. and this is because death is inherent to life as the latter s other. it is true. that everything finite (such as existence) is subject to change. The change life undergoes when meeting its other. being implicitly the other of itself. which. but. its limit. This makes sense: it would only be possible for a . Thus. simply because as living they bear in themselves the germ of death (136-137). life does not subsist in death. Alteration thus exhibits the inherent contradiction which originally attaches to determinate being. does not meet the nature of the other as if it had no affinity to it. its other. it may know unconsciously that death is its own other. its negation. the realization of which is not a consequence of its own nature. when it establishes a relationship to death as its other. might be understood in a different way than just the death of the living thing. It might be understood as being-towards-death: life changes when it realizes that death is its other. even though they are each other s others. I said above: A living thing dies. he formed from them a third. The living die. Yet death changes life. In these words we have in general terms a statement of the nature of the finite. thus undergoes alteration. To materialized conception existence stands in the character of something solely positive. Life may not know consciously. But the fact is. Such changeableness in existence is to the superficial eye a mere possibility. mutability lies in the notion of existence. which is of the nature of the one and the other. as something. What. the ought that cannot be followed through with. for if a thing were explicitly its other than there would be a simple immediacy. this other is itself somewhat. The implicit nature of the relationship between a thing and its other is crucial. But this is impossible because every finite thing leads onto another finite thing. if their meeting were only implicit. Something becomes an other. It contains this something else.somewhat to meet its other if they had not already met. lather. Since it would be impossible to go through every finite thing to every other finite thing. [T]his infinite only expresses the ought-to-be . then. Rinse. this infinite is the bad infinite. and so on ad infinitum (137). and its relationship to the other is a negative self-relation. But the something is what it is by virtue of not being something else. therefore it likewise becomes an other. This infinite is an empty idea. this process can only be done with finite things. For reasons explained above. even though that would be absurd. There is a something. as Hegel said above ( change is only the manifestation of what implicitly is ). inside itself. What is this other that is inside the something and which makes the something what it is by virtue of the something not being the other? This other is itself a somewhat. is infinite? One might suggest that infinite is the going-through of this process with every finite thing. this infinite marks an ought: one ought to be able to go through every finite thing. is this infinite. this infinite would be a mere ideal the idea of going through every finite thing. its other. an ideal. but one cannot the idea of doing that. and no change would be possible. forever. Thus. or spurious infinite. repeat. What we now in point of fact have before us. since both have one and the same attribute. The progression to infinity never gets further than a statement of the contradiction involved in the finite. the infinite. and its own self as its own other then the infinite manifests (in the finite). and the necessity that each determinate being is the determinate being it is. to be an other. Infinity and being-for-self are related this lets us see the importance of immanence to Hegel s thought.elimination of the finite. . is the genuine Infinity. it becomes the other of the other. To be thus self related in the passage. the hard fact that the finite is finite. Thus essentially relative to another. When the finite accepts its finitude. We get at the category of the infinite when the finite is understood as containing the infinite within it. but as negation of the negation. The infinite is the necessity of the finite. Or. and in the other. and that the other generally comes to be an other. God is (in) the world. as necessary. viz. when the something regards it other as its own self. is restored again: it is now Beingfor-self (138-139). its limit. that it is somewhat as well as somewhat else (137(. that is. Behind the finite is the infinite. viz. Thus Being. under a negative aspect: what is altered is the other. is that somewhat comes to be an other. somewhat is virtually an other against it: and since what is passed into is quite the same as what passes over. as its own self. when the finite is understood as an essential part of the Absolute that is. it follows that something in its passage into other only joins with itself. but a substantial element. the infinite of understanding [bad. But with the absent point (of . what is the same. wearing otherness like clothing. This ideality of the finite is the chief maxim of philosophy. These qualities are other than it. This unit. which is coordinated with the finite. Similarly. from other to other. there is an absent point (of negativity?) that has qualities attach to itself. then others all the time interacting with qualities in general as if they were other than it. no whole truth. alteration does not involve moving from self to other. to be. But the truth of the finite is rather its ideality. and thus even finitude in the first instance is in the category of reality. Being-there-and-then. and for that reason every genuine philosophy is idealism (140). the One. Being-for-self emerges when the somewhat is no longer regarded as a conglomerate of qualities but as an absent point (of negativity? does subjectivity emerge here?) that has attached to it certain qualities. as reference to itself. Thus is otherness overcoming. as reality. In Being-for-self enters the category of Ideality. it is only by virtue of taking on these qualities. In this way is being-for-self the negation of the negation. is immediacy. Because all quality is other. any specific quality shift away from a given quality shift that is. It is a shift from self to self. So.Being-for-self is the persistence of being-self in becoming-other. is itself only one of two finites. then other qualities. and as reference of the negative to itself. being without distinction in itself. spurious infinite]. as in the first instance apprehended in its being or affirmation. thus excludes the other from itself (141). or. yet accepting this as necessary in order for it. Being-for-self. the absent point. is a self-subsistent. We should rather recognize in it the speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere either-or of understanding (142). out of one there is Many. When this fact. (2) to keep. Thus. this suggests that there are many ones that the relating one might relate to ones different from the one it is related to. Self-relation already suggests that the self is more than one: the one relates to the one. The one is the one by virtue of its relating to one rather than to many. Defining sublation: We mean by it (1) to clear away. The one becomes the one by relating to itself rather than to the many. [T]he One forms the presupposition of the Many: and in the thought of the One is implied that it explicitly make itself Many (142). The relating one is necessarily different from the related one. which gives to the same word a positive and negative meaning. a law or a regulation is set aside. The one relates to itself. The relating one relates to the related one. we say. but the relating one must be different from the related one. we have arrived at the category of the One. and gives no ground for reproaching language as a cause of confusion. implicit in the category of being-for-self. But this contains the admission that in-itself the one is the many. be the . since the one would. without its self-relation. But the many are all ones themselves. or preserve: in which sense we use it when we say: something is well put by. another thing that seems self-sufficient.negativity) there is another immediacy. must distinguish itself from the others. This double usage of language. in order to relate to itself. or annul: thus. stable. is not an accident. is recognized. The one. excluding otherness. but explicitly put as superseded or indifferent (145). Because all of the ones are repelling. repulsion can be seen to be. it repels itself away from itself because in itself it is the many. but is rather an absent point (of negativity) or absent pointS (of negativity?). in repelling one another (and themselves). All of the ones. at the same time. But the many are all ones. attracted to this repulsion (but why? that is the question understanding repulsion as attraction allows us to ask better. They all repel. might be said to be attracted to something at the very least. they all are ones only through repulsion. or mode. . This is the defining feature of quantity: Quantity is pure being. where the mode or character is no longer taken as one with the being itself. which is at once selfrepulsion and repulsion of the many it is the repulsion of the many in the one. or at least differently). The one is the one by virtue of repulsion: it repels itself away from itself in order to relate to itself. With the one and the many we are now talking about being that is indifferent to its character.many. attraction. the one s self relation is mediated by repulsion.