I.Concept of Jura Regalia I. CONCEPT OF JURA REGALIA Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests Name: 1. Collado vs CA (G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002) FACTS: Petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land (“Lot”), situated in Antipolo Rizal. Attached to the application was a technical description, stating “this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.” The Solicitor General filed oppositions to the application. Petitioners (Edna Collado and her co-applicants) allege that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. They paid all real estate taxes and submitted evidence to prove that there have been 9 transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners for having presented sufficient evidence to establish registrable title over the property. ISSUE: (1) WON petitioners have registrable title over the Lot. NO. (2) Did petitioners acquire private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33? NO. HELD: (1) Petitioners concede that the Lot is inside the literal description of Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR). Their main claim over the Lot is that “all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the MWR are subject to private rights.” EO 33 (which established the MWR) has a saving clause that the reservations are “subject to existing private rights, if any there be.” Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state. Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows: "Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Page | 1 I. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands." Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State. Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource: The term "natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and recreational purposes." (2) An applicant must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that he has an interest to warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title (may have been derived from old Spanish grants or titles). In the case at bar, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession (at least 30 years). Assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners’ application. NOTES: 2. Republic vs Dela Rosa (160 SCRA 228, G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988) FACTS: The case is about a parcel of land whose ownership is disputed by four parties: the dela Rosas, Benguet Consolidated Inc (BCI), Atok Corp, and the Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD). In 1965, Jose de la Rosa on his and on his three children’s behalf, applied to register a parcel of land divided into 9 lots in Benguet. According to the children, they acquired the land by virtue of prescription. As evidence they produced tax declarations and realty tax receipts. Benguet Consolidated Inc (BCI) opposed their application, claiming that half the lots were covered by mineral claim sold to it in 1934. Since 1934, BCI had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner. As evidence BCI presented geological mappings, payment of taxes, and construction on the land. Atok Corp’s claim is similar to BCI, that a mineral claim covering the lots had been sold to it in 1931. Their evidence is similar to BCI: construction and tax payments. Page | 2 I. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests The BFD also objected, saying that the land was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve (CCFR) under Proc. No. 217, dated 1929. As it was forest land, it was not subject to alienation as stated in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In the end, the CA affirmed the BFD’s rights on the surface of the land, while reaffirming the rights to the underground to both BCI and Atok. In other words, the CA ruled that the surface was to be agricultural on the surface, and mineral underneath. ISSUE: Who has the best claim over the land? BCI and Atok Corp WON land can be agricultural and mineral at the same time. NO HELD: BCI and Atok have vested rights over the land. The Court found that the mineral claims sold to both BCI and Atok have been perfected prior to the approval of the 1935 Constitution. The court had earlier declared the legal effects of a valid mineral claim: it segregates the area from the public domain and confers to the locator the beneficial ownership pf the claim. As of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties of BCI and Atok. Even if the land was included in the CCFR, it did not impair the rights vested in both mining companies. The claim of the dela Rosas were utterly disregarded for weak evidence, and even so, they could not have acquired the land through prescription as the same had already been converted to mineral land. Land cannot be half agri and half mineral. The SC said the classification of land must be categorical. In this case, while the land was intiailly classified as forest land, it ceased to be so and became completely mineral when the mining claims were perfected. Even if the surface was being tilled, it is still to be considered mineral land. Jura regalia. The SC discussed jura regalia in Sections 3-6 of Commonwealth Act No. 137. The Regalian doctrine is intended for the benefit of the State, and not of private persons. Example, if a person is the owner of agricultural land and minerals are discovered underneath, his ownership pf the land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the minerals without the permission of the State, to which the minerals belong. To further expound, once minerals are discovered in the land, the State can discontinue the surface tilling so as to not impede the mining undertaken therein. POLICY: The classification of land must be categorical, it cannot be half and half. The perfection of mining claims convert land to mineral land even if they were previously classified as forest land. NOTES: 3. Carino vs Insular Government ( 212 U.S. 449 February 23, 1909) FACTS: Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the province of Benguet, applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the crown. ISSUE: WoN Carino owns the land. – YES. HELD: (The US Supreme Court decided the case through Mr. Justice Holmes.) Page | 3 G. that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly Carino was entitled by the Spanish laws. Spanish conditions had been fulfilled. Page | 4 . the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership. The province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the SG. and had not continued for such a length of time and under such circumstances as to give rise to the understanding that the occupants were owners at that date. Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. No. In other words. he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. irrespective of any royal grant. and which would have made his title beyond question good. also. or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown. 1972) FACTS: Respondent. But it does not follow that. for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce. In the case at bar. as against foreign nations. the United States may assert. The older decrees and laws cited by the Carino’s counsel in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks. that. in his argument. acquired lawful title to the disputed lot located in Naga City pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application.R. characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. the United States asserts that Spain had such power. be proper and sufficient to say that when. at least. absolute power. It is true that Spain. Thus there is an existence of native title to land. embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown. and to issue patents to natives for not more than 16 hectares of public lands actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13.I. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of the island of Luzon. if not certain. as far back as testimony or memory goes. as Spain asserted. It is true. L-30389. in its earlier decrees. as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. December 27. sovereignty is absolute. BUT this section perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation was of land admitted to be public land. in the view of the United States. and never to have been public land. but not all. 1898. Aniano David. as against the inhabitants of the Philippines. it might. and that. it does not follow that. perhaps. in legal theory. It seems probable. NOTES: 4. Lee Hong Kok vs David (48 SCRA 372. it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain. It is true that the government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules and prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands where some. Page | 5 . The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. and ownership of land for taxation) The basis for the award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August 26. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title. the petitioners (Lee Hong Kok) did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. Their basis of ownership of the disputed lot was through accretion (process of growth or increase). can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. 1959. the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496. express or implied. It is a well-settled rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant. It was cited in Cariño v. 1959. up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor. There is no legal justification for nullyfing the right of David to the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials. Private parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.I. RTC and Court of Appeals dismissed their complaint. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests An order of award and issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on June 18. ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. Petitioners sought the declaration of the Torrens Title of Aniano David as null and void. a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Hence. 510 was the issuance by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on October 21. from the government In Cabacug v. which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre (a register of property showing the extent. or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 1958. This covered Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters. Since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application. Insular Government that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown. represented by the Director of Lands. ISSUES: (1) WON petitioners (Lee Hong Kok) can question the validity of the Torrens Title of respondent. value. Only the Government. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent.YES HELD: Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of 5 years. .NO (2) WON David has original acquisition of title. Lao." This was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia which was adopted by the present Constitution. the case at bar. . The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. Insular Government" that "as to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress" They continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by state grant. over the parcels of land both situated in Mariveles. there is a presumption that unclassified lands are of public dominion. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests 18 It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. such sales patent was transferred to Coral Beach Development Corporation. hence the present petition. 50464. If the land is indeed a forest land. Imperium .I. which was dismissed. 2. Inc. Subsequently. HELD: The case is remanded. ISSUE: Were the sales patents validly issued? Cannot be determined unless the land’s classification is identified. The Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed before the CFI an action for reversion. Because of the Regalian doctrine. The Solicitor General then filed an appeal contending that the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering (in its decision to dismiss) the allegation that the subject lans were forest lands. On Imperium v. No. erred in finding the subject lots disposable and alienable lands of public domain under the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands. There must be a positive act from the government classifying a land into an agricultural land which is alienable. therefore.government authority possessed by the state appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty Dominium . In such capacity. it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources.capacity to own or acquire property.. 1990) FACTS: The Director of Lands issued sales patents in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods. Bataan . then it is not subject to alienation or disposition and the case is moot and academic. Dominium 1. except as limited by the Constitution. NOTES: Page | 6 . G.R. The CA set aside the decision of the CFI. including their disposition. The CFI . NOTES: 5. Sunbeam Convenience Food vs CA (181 SCRA 443. There is a need to rule on the classification of the land. In 1981. October 31. February 2. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title.920 sq. NOTES: 7. (1980) Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA parcels of land (464.I.R. Judge Sayo approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties. all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Leyte Sab-a Basin Development Authority (LSBDA) was created. The purpose of the Torrens Act is to establish the private character of lands. The compromise agreement was likewise stuck down as it included persons who have not substantially proven their ownership of the land. ISSUE: WON the compromise agreement executed over ownership of Lot 7454 is valid. LSBA integrated the private and government sector efforts for a planned development and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in the province of Leyte.m). The respondents claim that the SocGen had no authority as Lot 7454 is not public land. or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands. 2001) FACTS: Through PD No. Opposition (including the Bu of Lands and the Bu of Forest Devt) dragged the cases for 20 yrs until 1981. Republic vs Sayo (191 SCRA 71. alleging that since he was counsel for the Republic. tract of land known as Lot 7454. The SocGen then stepped in. as it was not a grant made during the Spanish regime or any other primary evidence of ownership.R. G. Likewise. and then apply to register it under the Torrens Act. Page | 7 . he should have been given notice or allowed to participate. dividing the land amongst themselves. No. Their primary evidence to support this was a photocopy of a certificate of the National Library dated 1932 that the property was registered under the Spanish system of land regsitration in the name on Don Liberato Bayaua. 129401. he may not rely on general statements. LOI 962 authorized LSBDA to acquire privately-owned lands restricted in the Leyte Industrial Development Estate through negotiated sales with the landowners. The parties then applied to register the lot under the Torrens system. 1990) FACTS: In 1961. the spouses Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez filed an original application to register a 33ha. which through tax declaration reflects Yap as the owner of said parcels. 625. the property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim. the parties cannot claim that the land is private. or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title. The land was part of Isabela but transferred to Nueva Vizcaya by virtue of RA 236. when the parties entered a compromise agreement. The certificate the respondents present to bolster their case cannot be considered title to property. L-60413. NO HELD: Under the Regalian Doctrine. No. Seville vs National Development Company (DAYHON) (G. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests 6. claim that they have acquired title over the property through acquisitive possession of said land for more than 30 years. the Court held that all the lands of the public domain belong to the State. Petitioners failed to consider the fact that LSBDA’s title was based on the Miscellaneous Sales Patent from the Bureau of Lands and not on the conveyance executed by Yap. petitioners and respondents were to discuss on the possibility of a compromise agreement on the disposal of said improvements The CA applying the regalian doctrine. To overcome this presumption. basing on the fact that the original certificate of title was in the name of LSBDA as transcribed in the Registration Book. and that all lands not appearing to be unequivocally owned privately are presumed to belong to the State.m) Bureau of Lands issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent in LSBDA’s favor. Consequently. no matter how long. To refute said allegation. ruling that: o No competent evidence was presented to prove that subject property is indeed private in character o Granting arguendo that such evidences can be provided. the property had been untitled o Petitioners are guilty of laches for their failure to apply for judicial confirmation of their title o Failure to present evidence of bad faith on the part of respondent LSBDA ISSUE: WON respondent LSBDA’ title is null and void? NO HELD: Petitioners argue that LSBDA’s title was void as Yap had no right over said property. respondents claim that failure of the petitioners to show that such land is alienable and disposable. The subject property was then leased to Philippine Smelting & Refining Corporation (PASAR). cannot ripen into ownership.. which led to the issuance of the new TCTs in NDC’s favor. possession of the land cannot ripen into ownership. cannot ripen into ownership o Even prior to the issuance of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent in LSBDA’s favor. Inc (LEPANTO). Granting arguendo that petitioners are correct in claiming that Yap’s ownership over the property is questionable. Because of which. petitioners. They. and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. however. Further. Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS). rentals and damages against herein respondents. failure to prove that such property is alienable. The RTC declared: o the deed of Sale executed by Yap as null and void o herein petitioner as owner of the subject real property of the present action and ordered NDC to segregate from the OCT the area of the subject property and convey it to petitioners o the respondents were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the rentals that were due in petitioner’s favor o with regard to the improvements introduced to the subject property. (1989) LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject property to National Development Council (NDC). The Court held that because of petitioners’ failure to establish that the land had been classified as alienable prior to the issuance of the title in favor of LSBDA. occupation in the concept of owner. Concept of Jura Regalia - - - Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests (1982) Appellant LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application before the Bureau of Lands covering the land obtained from Yap together with other lots acquired by LSBDA (aggregate area: 442. petitioners cannot claim that they have gained ownership through acquisitive prescription. evidence must be shown that the land sought to be registered remains inalienable. NOTES: Page | 8 .7508 sq. (1988) Herein respondent filed for a complaint for recovery of real property. reversed the decision of the RTC.I. however imputing the same to LBDA’s title is misplaced. Classification of public lands is. however. in an amended complaint. In the absence of such classification. 324198 over a parcel of land located in Ila. like mineral or timber lands which are public lands. Atienza also averred that the Director of Lands had given due course to free and homestead patent applications of claimants of the said lot. that he failed to present clear. is Atienza. the survey plans. Atienza maintained that the land in question was not within the unclassified public forest land and therefore alienable land of the public domain. and dismissed the cross-claim of the DBP. G. and the Rural Bank of Sariaya. 73974. In its decision. Republic vs ROD Quezon (244 SCRA 537. 1995) FACTS: Manuel G. thus. ISSUE: WON the land in question is part of the alienable and disposable public land. Atienza was awarded FP (free patent) No. Apart from his assertions before this Court. and ultimately." CA. Atienza failed to present proof that he or his predecessor-in-interest was one of the claimants who answered the petition filed by the then Attorney-General in the said cadastral proceedings.R. including that of Atienza's. the court acquitted the accused of the crime charged but. declared as null and void OCT (Original certificate of title) No. Finally. all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State. The DBP. and other documents pertinent to said applications. the task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands. the land "was already alienable and disposable public agricultural land. Atienza's claim is rooted in the decision of the Court of First Instance in the Cadastral Case which was not given much weight by the court a quo. In our jurisdiction. It appeared that some of the free patents. the Register of Deeds of Quezon. Thus. an area which had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court. Before the promulgation of said decision. and for good reasons.set aside the lower court's decision. Atienza claimed that the land in question was no longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application for free patent by the Bureau of Lands. Lower court rendered a decision with the categorical finding based on "solid evidence" that "the land in question was found definitely within the forest zone On appeal. Quezon an investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in connection with alleged land grabbing activities in Pagbilao. No. were fraudulently acquired. In his answer. the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. even granted him a loan with the subject property as collateral. finding that the land covered by the application for free patent of private respondent was within the forest zone." Since the subject land was a very small portion of Lot. He further alleged that he had been in possession of the land since the Japanese occupation. substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines as actual mortgagee of the subject parcel of land. positive and absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to support his claim. The records show. are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution. the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant who. the Solicitor General filed for the petitioner a complaint against Atienza. in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands. declared as valid and subsisting Atienza's OCT. The then Intermediate Appellate Court relied only on the arguments he raised since petitioner had not filed any brief. which was later dropped as defendant and. and arrived at the conclusion that "the litigated land is part of public land alienable and disposable for homestead and [F]ree Patent. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources). Forest lands. P-13840 in Atienza's name and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon to cancel the same. become private properties. NO HELD: Under the Regalian Doctrine. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests 8. cultivating it and introducing improvements thereon. Malicboy. in this case. after due and proper investigation and inspection of his title. Pagbilao. he stated that his acquittal in the criminal case proved that he committed no fraud in his application for free patent. A criminal complaint for falsification of public documents was filed in the CFI against Atienza and four other persons for allegedly falsifying their applications for free patent. Courts have no authority to do so. an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department through the Office of the President. Mar 31.I. Page | 9 . Ramon Ituralde obtained a 6k ha parcel of land in Basilan Province. like mineral timber lands which are public lands. As there was no award or grant to Ituralde of the land by free patent or other ways of acquisition. January 20. Ituralde. the State retains ownership over the land. P. become private properties. NOTES: Page | 10 . In Bornales v. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests The fact that Atienza acquired a title to the land is of no moment. Ituralde vs Falcasantos (301 SCRA 293. notwithstanding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system. the said land was no longer part of public domain. and hence. G. that is. HELD: The CA is their decision found that since 1951. and therefore. 1990 the trial court named Ituralde the owner and possessor of the land.D. inalienable. Intermediate Appellate Court. The parcel of land retained its public character and it therefore not susceptible to private ownership.I. 128017. ISSUE: WON the filing of the public land application in 1989 made the land alienable. 32. Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. NO. Falcasantos. In 1989 the Director of Lands allowed Ituralde to file a public land application for the subject property. No. POLICY: Forest land. 1529) is actual and extrinsic. meanwhile. claims that since the Director of Lands allowed him to file a public land application. In the absence of such classification from the State. "an intentional omission of fact required by law. The "fraud" contemplated by the law (Sec." which in the case at bench consisted in the failure of Atienza to state that the land sought to be registered still formed part of the unclassified forest lands. not capable of private appropriation and occupation. applied with the Bureau of Lands to grant him the same parcel of land under free patent. we ruled that the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means of fraud. are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution. there must be a positive act from the government. the subject parcel of land was classified as a Forest Reserve Area. the land remains unclassified public land. 1999) FACTS: In 1986. in his appeal to the SC. under the concept of jura regalia. NOTES: 9. The CA reversed this decision and set aside the trial court’s decision in Ituralde’s favor as the land was found to be forest land.R. The filing of the public land application is not such positive act. Instead. 1966. 1529. Republic vs Candy Makers (492 SCRA 722) FACTS: Candy Maker Inc. all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. a public land within its jurisdiction pursuant to Republic Act (R. inalienable and indisposable. 1529. The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) approved Resolution No.D.I. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests 10. having being acquired through purchase from its predecessors-in-interest. Thereafter. the LLDA filed its Opposition alleging that the lot subject of the application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake bed. providing that untitled shoreland areas may be leased subject to conditions enumerated therein. 1 of P. The MTC rendered judgment confirming title of the applicants over the real property. hence.) where the notice of hearing was published were not adduced in evidence. the petitioner contended that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the application for registration since the actual copies of the Official Gazette (O. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use. The Republic of the Philippines. The Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Antipolo City filed on his Report declaring that "[t]he land falls within the Alienable and Disposable Zone and that the property is the subject of a CENRO case. recommended the exclusion of Lot No. respondent applied before the MTC for the registration of its alleged title over the parcel of land under Presidential Decree (P. inherited the same from their parents. as amended. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. purchased a parcel of land of the Cainta-Taytay Cadastre located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.D. ISSUES: (1) WON the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State.50 meters. was then prepared and approved. about 900 meters away from the Laguna de Bay. CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. 14. 4850. HELD: The SC ruled that the property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land until July 18.D. and bounded on the southwest by the Manggahan Floodway. The applicant averred that Sec. A Subdivision Plan and a technical description for the property. 3138-A and Lot No. which divided the property into two lots: Lot No. Page | 11 . par.G. 4 of the same section should govern because the subject parcels of land are lands of private ownership.) No. and on the southeast by a legal easement. Under the Regalian doctrine. 1529 is inapplicable since it speaks of possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not operate against the State unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. it remains part of the inalienable public domain. in turn.A. who. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State. par. the applicant likewise failed to establish exclusive ownership over the subject property in the manner prescribed by law. On appeal. The presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong to the State. and if so (2) Whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove its ownership over the property under Section 14 of P. respondent failed to prove that it possesses registerable title over the property. Series of 1993. 113.) No. the LRA. On the other hand. 3138B. However. 1966. Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution governing the system of exploration. the certification of the CENRO in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources proved that the land in question is found to be within the alienable and disposable site. It is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the State. And Joel D. or production-sharing agreements. The application for the registration of the property in question is dismissed. open and notorious possession. NOTES: 11. joint venture. Miners vs Factoran (SY) (240 SCRA 100. Page | 12 .. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable. No longer is the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through “license.I. Factoran. violates the non-impairment of contract provision since the said orders pre-terminates existing mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements. as well as the recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources. investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. the administrative orders and ultimately the executive orders are unconstitutional because. 1945" (in PD 1529) lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State. Jr.) questioning the validity and constitutionality of the administrative orders issued by the respondents (Hon. Petitioner alleges that among others. ISSUE: WON the administrative orders are unconstitutional? NO. Muyco. or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration. 1995) FACTS: The instant case was filed by petitioner (Miners Association Of The Philippines. The rationale for the period "since time immemorial or since June 12. HELD: The adoption of the concept of jura regalia that all natural resources are owned by the State embodied in the 1935. concession or lease” under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In this case. The petition is Granted. However. Director Of Mines And Geosciences Bureau) which sprouted from the respective promulgation by the then president Aquino of Executive Orders for the implementation of the new 1987 constitution regarding mining applications and agreements and for guidelines during the transitory period. The respondent failed to adduce proof that its predecessors-ininterest had acquired registerable title over the property before July 18. ushered in the adoption of the constitutional policy of "full control and supervision by the State" in the exploration. Secretary Of Environment And Natural Resources. or administrative action. Until then. No. whether express or implied. but also for its security and national defense. development and utilization. the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant from the government. Fulgencio S. the applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim over the land. 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. not only for national economic development. Inc.R. an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order. development and utilization of the country’s natural resources. development and utilization of the country's natural resources. 98332 January 16. G. among others. The options open to the State are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production. and that the occupants or possessor claim an interest thereon only by virtue of their imperfect title as continuous. The change was introduced by Article XII. being coextensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest. and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all. and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law. or it may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration. the exploration. development. and utilization of minerals. the State assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration. Accordingly. Consonant therewith. Section 2 of the said Charter explicitly ordains that the exploration. may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering. in the exercise of its police power in this regard. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2. especially the underprivileged. Police Power. Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. petroleum. the exploration. development and utilization of natural resources under the new system mandated in Section 2. extends to all the vital public needs. joint venture. the State. or production-sharing agreements. The economic policy on the exploration. Article XII. is geared towards a more equitable distribution of opportunities. development and utilization of the country's natural resources are matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people. income. NOTES: Page | 13 . The exploration.I. or it may opt to enter into co-production. modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Executive Orders. development and utilization of the country's natural resources under Article XII. Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution could not be any clearer. a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people. and wealth. development and utilization of natural resources may be undertaken by means of direct act of the State. As enunciated in Article XII. based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. development and utilization of the natural resources of the country. 1987. development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. particularly minerals. Art XII: … “The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration. Article XII of the Constitution. As per Section 2. 1995.” Note: (based from dissenting opinions) Limitations under Sec 2 Article XII 1. and utilization of minerals. fisheries. flora and fauna. Among the natural resources which are excluded from these agreements are lands of the public domain. It should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion to attract foreign investments and expertise. 2. etc… Ultimately. as well as the different modes of mineral agreements for mining: (1) The State may directly undertake such activities. coal. the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.II. life-giving strokes. petroleum. Limitations II. development. forests or timbers. – Jan 204 decision)… ie all other natural resources shall not be alienated. petroleum. development.R. the natural resources that may be subject of the agreement are a limited class. development and utilization of natural resources. consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations. joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations. Natural Resources Limitations First Set_Case Digests Name: 1. and other mineral oils. 127882. development and utilization of minerals. Page | 14 . Specific limitations / restrictions in fourth paragraph of Sec 2 (power of president to enter into agreements with foreign corporations): First. In such agreements. for being violative of Section 2. This law “shall govern the exploration. waters. as well as secure for our people blessings of prosperity and peace. Ramos (445 SCRA 1. (2) The State may enter into co-production. 2004) FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued EO 2796 on July 25. Most notable of the exclusions are forests and timbers which are in all respects expressly limited to Filipinos. the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance. The Constitution should be read in broad. HELD: (At first Yes. G. ISSUE: Is RA 7942 unconstitutional? NO.” It contained provisions regarding FTAAs. La Bugal-b’laan v. preserved for the Filipinos. authorizing DENR Secretary to accept. allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. petroleum and other mineral oils. Ramos approved RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) on March 3. utilization and processing of all mineral resources (sec 15). President Fidel V. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth. by law. (4) For the large-scale exploration. No. wildlife. December 1. State retains legal ownership of all natural resources State shall have full control and supervision over the exploration. and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law. (3) Congress may. based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. the Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 7942 – Dec 2004 decision. 1987. JG Summit learned that PHI was exercising its rights to top their winning bid. which allowed private persons to enter into service contracts with foreign corporations. the gov’t and Kawasaki agreed to allow PHI (Kawasaki is a stockholder in PHI) to top the winning bid by 5%. assuring that economic decisions need not be made solely from an ivory tower. pertaining as it does to the political wisdom of a co-equal branch. and more so when taken together. 124293. The JVA also provided that neither party shall dispose of its interest in PHILSECO without granting the other party the right of first refusal under the same terms offered to third parties." In terms of real limitations. these agreements must be in accord with the general terms and conditions provided by law. Page | 15 . Sembawang and Jurong was declared the winners. Hence. the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and Kawasaki of Japan entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) to build a shipyard in Subic that would later become the PHILSECO. By 1987. where the consortium of JG Summit. 2005) FACTS: In 1977. The value of legislative input as a means of influencing policy should not be discounted. In 1986. Before the auction. the right of first refusal granted to Kawasaki when it had 40% shares in PHILSECO was contrary to the Constitution. JG Summit alleged that among others. January 31. Legislative work includes consultative processes with persons of diverse interests. with another provision. so that by 1989. JG Summit avers that PHILSECO is a shipyard and therefore a public utility. entails legislative intervention and affirmance in the exercise of this executive power. it is only the President who may enter into these agreements. Kawasaki only had 2. it could only be operated only by a corporation at least 60% of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens in accordance with Sec 10 Art 12 of the Constitution. PHI countered this with PD 666 which explicitly stated in Section 1 that shipyards were not public utilities. development and utilization of minerals. Limitations Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests Second. G. NOTES: 2. as it should. No. The auction was set in 1993. While it is the President who enters into these contracts. and such exercise of discretion. and other mineral oils.03B. the President is mandated to base the decision of entering into these agreements on "real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. he/she must act within such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by Congress through legislation. the NIDC’s interest in PHILSECO had been transferred to the National Government of the Philippines. They agreed to have a shareholding proportion of 60-40 respectively. The discretion as to whether or not to enter into these agreements is vested solely by the Constitution in the President. this condition has admittedly little effect. There is also the possible sanction of repudiation by the voters of legislators who prove insensate to the economic concerns of their constituents. Fifth.59% share. This is another pronounced change from the 1973 Constitution. and appealed at the CA. the amdinistration thought to sell the government’s shares in PHILSECO through to private entities as part of their privatization plan. generally deserves respect from the courts. JG Summit vs CA (450 SCRA 169. these agreements with foreign-owned corporations can only be entered into for only large-scale exploration. Fourth.R. Third. This proviso by itself. Policy initiatives grounded on particular economic ideologies may find enactment through legislation when approved by the necessary majorities in Congress. having bid P2. petroleum.II. No. Kawasaki.R. NOTES: 3. and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade. their livelihood. which was also repealed by EO 226. Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. the subsequent repeals of the law effectively erased PD 666 and restored the public utility character of shipyards even before the schedule for bidding was set. Limitations Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests ISSUE: WON shipyards are public utilities and whose ownership therefore should adhere to constitutional requirements. POLICY: No foreign owned company may own more than the constitutional limit of Philippine public utilities. as listed) of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan.) Thus. law A is not revived unless explicitly stated by C. The auction was awarded to JG Summit. The ordinance basically aims to effectively free the city sea waters from cyanide and other obnoxious substance while the Resolution aims to protect and preserve the existence of the remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to reinvigorate and regenerate themselves into vitality within the span of five (5) years Petitioners argue among others that the ordinances deprived them of due process of law. ISSUE: WoN the challenged ordinance. selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms. including shipyards. 110249. HELD: Subsequent laws repealed PD 666 Section 1. among others: declare as unconstitutional (a) an ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa (that ban the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City without the required permits/documents. (Recall StatCon rules on repeals: when law A is repealed by law B. in violation of Section 2.II. 1997) FACTS: Petitioners (they’re so many—i. through PHI cannot participate in purchasing PHILSECO’s shares. Art 12 applies. or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. Page | 16 . YES. Office Order and Resolution are unconstitutional – NO HELD: The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads: SEC. and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. possessing. Thus. Section 1 of PD 666 which declassifies shipyards as public utilities were repealed by the Investment Incentive Policy Act of 1983. as it would put them over and beyond the 40% limit of its shareholdings. x x x The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters. August 21. 2. natural persons who claim to be fishermen but are alleged marine merchants) file a petition to.e. G.) (b) the Office Order issued by the acting city mayor implementing said city ordinance. as PHILSECO is a public utility as provided by law. and (c) a resolution (that prohibit the catching. gathering. Tano vs Socrates (August 21. and exclusive economic zone. the 60% per centum Filipino requirement in Section 11. and law B is repealed by C. buying. 1997. territorial sea. Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide: Sec. In their petition. Besides. development. to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources. marine resources belong to the State. especially of local communities. As hereafter shown. lakes. develop. Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen. Anent Section 7 of Article XIII. Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms “subsistence” or “marginal” fishermen. while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. and lagoons. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen. as to their status. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research. and conserve such resources.II. and marketing assistance. Factoran such as “the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment”) Page | 17 . production. with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish. as well as cooperative fish farming. and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution. and other services. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. There is nothing in the Office order that is violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. and conservation. cooperative fish farming. both inland and offshore. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. but also for the generations to come. xxx Sec. petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is described as “a private association composed of Marine Merchants”. but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.” without any qualification. shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.. 7. The challenged ordinance and resolution unquestionably involve a valid exercise of police power. with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers. adequate financial.” Moreover. and lagoons. The State shall also protect. Limitations Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests The Congress may. their mandated protection. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. development and utilization . (SC also quoted its decision in Oposa vs. Article XII of the Constitution.” while the rest of the petitioners claim to be “fishermen. allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. and. imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow. petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim. What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. their “exploration. but of their protection. by law. bays. development. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources. bays. the ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only for the present generation. 2. lakes. they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2. it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources. however.. as “merchants. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine. by law. their average net income per month fell from a high of P4. FACTS: On December 11. chemical and biological properties of any water x x x as will or is likely to create or render such water x x x harmful.D. the government agency vested with jurisdiction over pollution-related cases." it alleged that "the pipeline greatly affected biogenically hard-structured communities such as coral reefs and led to stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea. CA reversed RTC decision. Respondents Efren Jalos.) 984 or the Pollution Control Law. as the pipeline’s operation has driven the fish population out of coastal waters. Jalos.D. (Shell) and the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service Contract 38 for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan. It ruled that the action was actually pollution-related. The pipeline spanned 504 kilometers and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea. detrimental or Page | 18 . ISSUE: WON the complaint is a pollution case that falls within the primary jurisdiction of the PAB. September 8. Under these statutes. as it is a "pollution case" under Republic Act (R.00 to only P573.II. it is unmistakable based on their allegations that Shell’s pipeline produced some kind of poison or emission that drove the fish away from the coastal areas.00.al. YES HELD: Although the complaint of Jalos. While the complaint did not specifically attribute to Shell any specific act of "pollution. and 75 other individuals (Jalos. whose pipeline operation has allegedly driven the fish away from coastal areas. as amended by Presidential Decree (P. et al does not use the word "pollution" in describing the cause of the alleged fish decline in the Mindoro Sea. Section 2(a) of P.848. the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and actions for related damages. et al) filed a complaint for damages against Shell before the RTC claiming that they were all subsistence fishermen from the Oriental Mindoro whose livelihood was adversely affected by the construction and operation of Shell’s natural gas pipeline. et al claimed that their fish catch became few after the construction of the pipeline. Shell Philippines v.A. inflicting loss of earnings among fishermen. Limitations Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests NOTES: 4." This constitutes "pollution" as defined by law. This entailed the construction and installation of a pipeline from Shell’s production platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas. Jalos et. As a result. 1990 petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B. It alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action. although denominated as one for damages. 984 defines "pollution" as "any alteration of the physical.R. Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint. (G.V. RTC dismissed the complaint. 2010) This case is about a question of jurisdiction over an action against a petroleum contractor. 179918. They now have to stay longer and farther out at sea to catch fish. Arnaldo Mijares. The complaint should thus be brought first before the PAB. Shell discovered natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its development of the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas Project.) 3931. No. Joven Campang. forests.D. Inevitably. NOTES: 5. in resolving Jalos. the proper tribunal must determine whether or not the operation of the pipeline adversely altered the coastal waters’ properties and negatively affected its life sustaining function. we should develop not only our lands. Respondents had an administrative recourse before filing their complaint with the regular courts. One of the bidders and herein petitioner is Manila Prince Hotel which assails the sale by invoking the Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution granting preference to qualified Filipinos regarding the right.D. they said. commercial. recreational or other legitimate purposes. Respondents complaint for damages against Shell is DISMISSED without prejudice to its refiling with the Pollution Adjudication Board or PAB. privileges. et al is caused by some kind of pollution emanating from Shell’s natural gas pipeline. agricultural. extent. Therefore. as amended by P. The power and expertise needed to determine such issue lies with the PAB. industrial. EO 192 (1987) transferred to the PAB the powers and functions of the National Pollution and Control Commission provided in R." In this regard. safety or welfare or which will adversely affect their utilization for domestic. and issue writs of execution to enforce its orders and decisions. It also refers to our intelligence in arts. or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution. severity. 51 % of the shares of Manila Hotel Corporation to Renong Berhad. "greatly affected" or altered the natural habitat of fish and affected the coastal waters’ natural function as fishing grounds. ISSUE: Is the 51 % shares of MHC considered a national patrimony as to warrant the application of the Filipino First Policy? YES HELD: The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. sciences and letters. magnitude. Page | 19 . The pipeline. and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. a Malaysian corporation. causes and effects" of water pollution. 984. et al’s claim for damages. impose penalties for violation of P. through public bidding.II. This was after GSIS refused petitioner’s proposal to match the winning bid. Limitations Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests injurious to public health. These empowered the PAB to "determine the location. mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people. Manila Prince vs GSIS (267 SCRA 408) FACTS: GSIS sold.A. Among its functions is to "serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparation. 3931. 984. the PAB has the power to conduct hearings." It is clear from this definition that the stress to marine life claimed by Jalos. II. as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources. NOTES: Page | 20 . When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony. but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Limitations Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests In its plain and ordinary meaning. The Filipino First Policy which has been decided as a self executing provision warrants application in the matter of the shares. MHC has been witness to several historical occassions of the country and is thus a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines. the term patrimony pertains to heritage. PDCI paid the purchase price of 10k. The constitutional prohibition cannot be applied retroactively to BDCI as its rights to the property had already vested. as some occupants entered the lot only after it had been awarded to BDCI. 1. BDCI was entitled to a sales patent. After an auction in 1953. In 1964. As BDCI paid the full purchase price before 17 Jan 1973. BDCI filed an ejectment suit against 40 of them. Article 13 of the 1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to purchase public agri lands not exceeding 1024 ha. Some occupants (herein petitioners) of the lot protested the sale. They contended that the adoption of the Constitution in 1973 was a supervening fact that effectively legally barred the execution of the lower court’s judgment. A corporation who has purchased land before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution has vested rights provided the payment was completed prior to the 1973 Consti’s effectivity. the trial court ordered the ejectment of the petitioners. of Lands to Biñan Devt Co. HELD: BDCI’s right to the land has already vested. L-46729. a 250ha lot in Davao City was awarded by the Dir. (BDCI). thereby classifying them as squatters. G. but were later ordered to vacate the lot. Recall vested right: it is some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and no longer open to doubt or controversy. NO.” ISSUE: WON the prohibition against private corporations in the 1973 Constitution would bar BDCI from asserting ownership over the land. NOTES: Page | 21 . Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. In 1961. The patent was issued more than 13 years later in 1975. ejecting some of the petitioners from the land purchased. November 19. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain III. and to the 1964 decision of the trial court.R. BDCI’s right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. Inc. Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying a private corporation from purchasing public lands) to a 1953 sales award made by the Bureau of Lands. Natural Resources CLASSIFICATIONS OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN First Set_Case Digests Name: Ayog vs Cusi (118 SCRA 492. after the 1973 Constitution took effect. for which a sales patent and Torrens title were issued in 1975. Legal effects of complying with Public Land Law. They invoked the constitutional prohibition that ‘no private corporation or association may hold alienable land of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand ha’s in area. Under Section 2. POLICY: Compliance with requirements of the Public Land Law segregated lands from the public domain.III. 1982) FACTS: This case is about the application of section 11. No. The ‘squatters’ again opposed the execution of the ejectment. In 1961. The Republic. the Iglesia ni Cristo acquired 2 parcels of land from Andres Perez in exchage for a lot that INC owned. The Republic appealed. the INC cannot use the Sec 48 of the Public Land Law to bolster its claim to registry as the benefits of the law applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons. NOTES: 3. June 29. In 1977. Article XIV of the Constitution that "no private coporation or associaiton may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed on a thousand hectares in area". belong to the public domain. Casto-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799.’ as in the Susi v Razon case. Iglesia (June 29. continuous. Republic v. * That prohibition is not found in the 1935 Constitution. filed with the CFI an application for the registration of the 2 lots. Page | 22 .’ This occupation is enough to rebut the presumption of land’s public character. POLICY: All lands not purchased from or granted by the Government belong to the public domain. either by pruchase or by grant. and it was inside an area certifies as alienable by the Bu of Forestry in 1927. through the Dir of Lands. 1982) FACTS: This case involves the prohibition in section 11. NO. On the public character of the lots: All lands that were not acquired from the Govt. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests 2. The lots sought to be registered are still public lands as they were not possessed by a Filipino ‘since time imemorial. and that INC and Perez have not been in open. L-49623. Meralco v. The trial court ruled in favor of the INC and ordered the registration of the two lots in the name of INC represented by Erano Manalo. for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. the INC was disqualified to hold alienable lands of public domain. Likewise. ISSUE: WON the INC may acquire lands of public domain. the INC a corporation sole duly existing under PHL laws.III. Both lots were already possessed by Perez since 1933. The lower Court’s decision was reversed and INC’s application dismissed. HELD: The INC may not hold or acquire lands of public domain. The exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time imemorial. as a corporation sole or a juridical person. exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12. is disqualified to acquire alienable lands of public domain precisely because of the constitutional prohibition. that the land was in fact public land not susceptible to private apporpriation. INC. opposed on the grounds that as INC was a private corporation. with the exception of a land occupied ‘since time immeorial. a land registration proceeding under Sec 48 of the Public Land Law presupposes that the land is public. The lands were not private lands. Likewise. 1945. It alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than 30 years and had a right to an imperfect title by virtue of Sec 48 Ch 8 of the Public Land Law. 1982) FACTS: In 1953. as between the State and the Meralco. The Meralco is a juridical person. Since 1927. the constitutional prohibition. Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed. as a private corporation. had become private land in the hands of the latter. is disqualified to hold alienable public lands and that the applicant and its predecessors-ininterest have not been in the open. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests The Manila Electric Company.Quirino Streets in the town of Tanay.III. the Meralco appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest Page | 23 . exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application the Province of rizal and the Municipality of Tanay filed a joint opposition to the application on the ground that one of the lots (Tanay cadastre). the said land is still public land. YES HELD: We hold that. as a juridical person. would be needed for the widening and improvement of Jose Abad Santos and E. not for itself. either by purchase or by grant. a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws. in its application filed in the CFI praying for the confirmation of its title to two lots located in Tanay. more than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens. as Filipino citizens. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). lower court rendered a decision dismissing the application because in its opinion the Meralco is not qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural persons can apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles to public land. the Solicitor General counters that the said land is not private land because the Meralco and its predecessors-in-interest have no composition title from the Spanish government nor possessory information title or any other means for the acquisition of public lands such as grants or patents ISSUE: WON the land in question is a public land. Meralco contends that the said land. "all lands that were not acquired from the Government. banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land. The Meralco further contends that it has invoke section 48(b) of the Public Land Law. after having been possessed in the concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years. belong to the public domain. In reply to these contentions. Rizal The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the grounds that the applicant. The trial court assumed that the land which it seeks to register is public land. could secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land. and. It is residential in character as distinguished from a strictly agricultural land. is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b). 5440. Because it is still public land and the Meralco. The land was possessed by Olimpia ramos before the Pacific war Ramos sold the land to the spouses Rafael Piguing and MInerva Inocencio Because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel post on the land. therefore. it has formed part of the alienable portion of the public domain. the Piguing spouses sold the lot to the Meralco The said land was included in the1968 cadastral survey made in Tanay by the Bureau of Lands and was divided into two lots so as to segregate the lot which would be used to widen the two street serving as the land's eastern and southern boundaries. continuous. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. but for the Piguing spouses who. is not applicable to the said land. and has since introduced more than 45m worth of improvements. which states that when a piece of alienable public land is possessed openly. the land ceases to be public land and becomes private property by virtue of legal fiction and without the need of judicial or other sanctions. Finally.’ ACME has since been in continuous. L-73002. It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title. remains public land. the lands were registered to ACME. a piece of land. Section 11. Such lands would not be covered by the Public Land Law if they were already private lands. according to the DL. ACME anchors its claim that RA 3872 grants absolute ownership of ancestal lands to the occupying non-Christian tribe.III. ISSUE: WON the title sold by the Infiels to ACME in 1962 can be registered in favor of ACME in 1981. over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed. For that same reason. adverse and public possession of the land since 1962. Article 14 of 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of public domain except in lease not exceeding 1k ha. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish. The proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" NOTES: 4. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests Meralco does not pretend that the Piguing spouses and their predecessor had been in possession of the land since time immemorial. lands over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed are governed by the Public Land Law. The Director of Lands. long after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Should these conditions be met pursuant to law. it is equivalent to a Government grant and should be entitled to certificate of title. the applicable law should be the 1973 Consti and not CA 141. Under CA 141. The registration would not convert the land from public to private. No.R. however state that the registration proceedings for the parcels of land were instituted only in 1981. regardless of whether the land is public domain. IAC (146 SCRA 509. That means that until the certificate of title is issued. but rather. 1986) FACTS: The case is a dispute over the registration of 5 parcels of land in Isabela. this Court applied section 45(b) of Act No. and who have allegedly been in possession of the land since ‘before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan. Director v. allegedly acquired in October 1962 by the private respondent ACME Plywood from their ancestors (the Infiels) who were members of the Dumagat tribe. Page | 24 . The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). merely confirm such conversion already affected by operation of law. HELD: The Infiels already had vested right to dispose the lands to ACME. The Court in this case recalled the Carino doctrine. it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. when the 1973 Consti was already in effect? YES. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section 48(b). Thus. Finally. we should not make any distinction or qualification. G. December 29. exclusively and undisputed for the period prescribed by law. 1272 to the Religious of the Virgin Mary in virtue of a deed of sale dated April 12. POLICY: The character of lands should be determined at the time of the institution of the registration proceedings.A. Herein petitioner. measuring 21 square meters. The CA. The cited rulings no longer control. 1273 was a road right of way granted to the City of Iligan. Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. v. and its possession and that of its predecessors was immemorial. Likewise.5791 hectares. for sixty (60) years. is that open. it averred that it had bought the lots from Victoria Ong de Ocsio and had been in possession as owner thereof for over four years. is disqualified to obtain title over public lands. by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. 1989) FACTS: The controversy at bar arose in connection with cadastral proceedings initiated by the Director of Lands. and a juridical person who thereafter acquires the same may have title thereto confirmed in its name.. then registration would not be possible. NO. it is disqualified to obtain judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which grants that right only to natural persons. ISSUE: WON the respondents.III. of two (2) parcels of land with specific boundaries comprehended in the cadastral proceeding: Lot No. A private corporation had purchased the land originally of the public domain from parties who had. Current doctrine. divided into 1.419 lots. CA (February 28. The Cadastral Court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents stating that the evidence satisfactorily established that Victoria Ong de Ocsio had in truth sold Lot No.C. alleged that she was the owner. in relation to Section 11. the court held that the fact that the proceedings had been instituted by said purchaser in its own name and not in the name of the transferors was "xx simply xx (an) accidental circumstance. In upholding its right to do so. If the lands were still public. and that as owner. being a religious corporation. NOTES: 5. she had been in possession of both lots for fifteen (15) years. and Lot No. If the lands were private by some legal reason (as in this case). on appeal. and Lot 1273 a road lot. ACME was not disqualified to make such an acquisition. continuous and exclusive possession of alienable public land for at least thirty (30) years in accordance with the Public Land Act ipso jure converts the land to private property. and that the Infiels’ disposition of the land to ACME in 1962 was well within their vested rights. 1956. 1272. Villanueva. affirmed the Cadastral court’s decision in toto. Victoria Ong de Ocsio. Citing Manila Electric Co. and her predecessors-in-interest. for the settlement and adjudication of title to a large tract of land measuring 261. in behalf of the Republic. CastroBartolome and Republic v. It had thereafter instituted proceedings for confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. HELD: As regards the issue of law raised by her. productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and Page | 25 . measuring 256 square meters. petitioner fares no better. Virtually the same state of facts obtained in said case that now obtain here. she asserts that as the private respondent is a religious corporation. first announced by the Court en banc in Director of Lands v. as the sale was made under the 1935 Constitution. In its answer. situated in the City of Iligan. then the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by corporations should not apply. Title to the same parcels of land was however claimed by the respondents. possessed and occupied it since time immemorial. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests The Court in this case said that the Carino doctrine was applicable as the Infiels’ claim to the land was not contested. De Ocsio v. I. Religious of the Virgin Mary. by purchase. III. no matter how long. NOTES: 6. the Republic of the Philippines filed with the CA an action to cancel the registration for the certificates of title therein are null and void alleging that at the tile of the filing of the land registration. the subject land was still classified as timberland. there was no evidence showing that the land has been reclassified as disposable or alienable. HELD Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed waived. Under the Regalian doctrine. C. and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. It cannot be presumed.. 18 years later. Virginia Ong de Ocsio and her predecessors-in-interest having possessed Lot No.. incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome such presumption. The classification of forest land. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner. earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect Page | 26 . and Republic v. under the precedents referred to. It calls for proof. confirmation of title thereto in the latter's name is. the same was timberland and formed part of the public domain. Furthermore. ISSUE: WON the republic is barred by prescription? NO.A.R. Pagkatipunan v. or any land for that matter. Manila Electric Co. hence inalienable and not subject to registration. it remains part of the inalienable public domain. cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. where the same question of law was raised. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. 129682. Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of Government. No. In the latter it was expressly held that the prohibitions in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions against acquisition or registration of lands by or in behalf of private corporations do not apply to public lands already converted to private ownership by natural persons under the provisions of the Public Land Act. evidence extant on record showed that at the time of filing of the application for land registration and issuance of the certificate of title over the disputed land in the name of petitioners. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed. March 21. entirely in order. there must be a positive act from the government. Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 1272 for the period and under the conditions prescribed by law for acquisition of ownership of disposable public land prior to the sale of the property to the Religious of the Virgin Mary. and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. In the present case. G. is descriptive of its legal nature or status. 2002) FACTS: Petitioners (Nestor Pagkatipunan and Rosalina Mañagas-Pagkatipunan) were able to register a parcel of land. Petitioner on the other hand raised the defenses of indefeasibility of title for it took the government 18 years to assail the validity of the certificate of title issued to them." The ruling was reaffirmed in two later cases. In the case at bar. Director of Lands v. all lands of the public domain belong to the State. CA (379 SCRA 621. He also declared the land for taxation purposes in his name. Thus. Gordula v. No. They. 1973. ISSUE: Did the CA err in annulling the Free Patent over the Lots? NO HELD: We start with the proposition that the sovereign people. however. 9 (Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve). 573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the reservation. Petitioners do not contest the nature of the land in the case at bar. NOTES: 7. 127296 January 22. Forest lands. Gordula sold the land to petitioner Celso V. We do not agree. and declared the Free Patents null and void. petitioner Edubigis Gordula filed with the Bureau of Lands.R. Jr. The facts show that petitioner Gordula. contend that Proclamation No. he sold the lots to petitioner Nora Ellen Estrellado. On November 1987. G. the Republic filed a Complaint for Annulment of Free Patent and Cancellation of titles. continuous.III. The subject parcel of land in this case is Parcel No. but most importantly. 3 years after the land was segregated as a forest reserve. being the selfreplenishing. petitioners failed to do so. These were primarily for use as watershed area. Meanwhile. 1969). regardless of their actual state. certain parcels of the public domain (11 parcels of forest reserves). an application for a Free Patent over the land. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests title. have untrammeled dominion over the forests on their native soil. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant. 1998) FACTS: President Marcos issued Proclamation 573 (June 26. the Republic conducted surveys in the area. he must prove that the land is alienable public land. Several years after. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed therein. CA (284 SCRA 617. His petition for Free Patent was approved. subject to private rights. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. The petitioner’s land was found to be located in the saddle area of the watershed recreation for hydro-electric reservoir. This was reversed by CA. He filed his application for free patent only in January. it is clear that the applicant must prove not only his open. and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. In the case at bar. They claim to have established their private rights to the subject land. Fernandez. more than three (3) years after the issuance of Page | 27 . need to be reserved and saved to promote the people's welfare. it is indispensable that there be a showing of the title from the state. they are outside the commerce of man. 573. and inconvertible into any character less than of inalienable public domain. By their very nature or by executive or statutory fiat. express or implied from the government. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry. for as long as the reservation subsists and is not revoked by a subsequent valid declassification. cultivation. unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form. represented by their lawfully constituted government. versatile and all-important natural resource that they are. withdrawing from sale and settlement and setting aside as permanent forest reserves. and a Transfer Certificate was issued by the Register of Deeds in Laguna. did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. The State contended that in failing to do so. Prior to that. the land was declared alienable only in 1965. improve. At that time.”Marcos also Page | 28 . 137887. Thus. through the Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (“CDCP”) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. RULING: In this case. the land. G. the de Guzmans failed to overcome the presumption that all lands are public domain belonging to the Republic. R. 28 February 2000) FACTS: Following a dispute involving conflicting claims of imperfect title. As early as 1938 the ancestors of de Guzman has been possessing the property. G. or more than the required 30 years required by law. could not have converted it to private property. having failed the requirements set forth by law. the land was released as agricultural (and therefore alienable) only in 1965. No. FACTS: MARCOS REGIME: 1973 – The government. no matter how lengthy. a parcel of land in Cavite was awarded and registered to the de Guzmans. including foreshore and submerged areas. POLICY: Any occupation on land prior to its declaration as alienable land cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year possession requirement. 133250.R. PEA was tasked “to reclaim land.III. acquire. and has been for 63 years. was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good. NOTES: 9. NO. as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve. Marcos issued PD 1084 creating PEA. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests Proclamation No.” and “to develop. No. stating that the de Guzmans did not submit proof of their fee simple title or possession in the manner and for the length of time required by law to justify the confirmation of an imperfect title. REPUBLIC vs De Guzman (326 SCRA 574. From the time of the land’s alienation and the de Guzman’s application for imperfect title. CHAVEZ. petitioner. Apparently. 1969. CHAVEZ vs PEA (384 SCRA 152. 573 in June. It was not registrable and any possession. 2002) FRANCISCO I. respondents. the land was classified as forest land incapable of private appropriation. the presumption that the land belongs to the State subsists. ISSUE: WON the awarding of the imperfect title to the de Guzmans by the CA was proper. 1977 – Pres. and should be disregarded. July 9. x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. their occupancy had only been for 26 years. The CA ruled in favor of de Guzman. vs. The State appealed this decision. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. The 37 years their ancestors spent tilling the land could not be counted as one cannot acquire forest land through prescription. NOTES: 8. xxx. 1085 and President Aquino’s issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service. is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. 59. HELD: (1) The Freedom Islands have become alienable and disposable because PD No.” This comprises 157. .” Page | 29 . The Freedom Islands.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3. In between these dates. Aquino issued special patent granting and transferring to PEA “the parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP containing a total area of 191. CA No.YES (2) WON AMARI. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into “alienable or disposable” lands of the public domain.” The Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of a certain portion of the freedom islands as well as the still submerged areas. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 ha. Under the Public Land Act (CA 141.” Further. which are reclaimed lands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. so that “All future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA.” Accordingly. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. open to disposition or concession to qualified parties. Pres FVR approved the JVA. CORY REGIME 1988 – Pres.” Hence TCTs were issued in the name of PEA covering what is called to be “Freedom Islands. can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367. ISSUES: (1) WON the freedom islands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. 1085.NO. of submerged areas surrounding these islands. the law provides that the government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are “officially delimited and classified.84 Ha. PD No. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests issued PD 1085 transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay” under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). a private corporation.59Ha. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution . x x x. Legal Basis: Commonwealth Act No. which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. 1996 – An investigation was made after Sen.” Among the conclusions in the investigation is that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands. reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain: Sec.III. The Amended JVA involves “the development of the Freedom Islands and further reclamation of about 250 hectares comprising of foreshore and submerged areas. as amended). to develop the Freedom Islands. filling. 1999 – The Amended JVA was signed. Maceda denounced that JVA is the “grandmother of all scams. 1981 – Marcos directed PEA to amend its contract with CDCP. a private corporation. PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly was made as basis for the ruling because this law continues to this day as the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands. Section the law also authorizes the President to “declare what lands are open to disposition or concession. or other means. The lands DISPOSABLE under this title shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging. RAMOS REGIME 1995 – PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (“JVA”) with AMARI. the PEA and AMARI were on negotiations to amend the JVA.” plus an option “granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x. foreshore and submerged areas “shall not be alienated. 58. then the actual issuance of patent by Cory was the executive act. x x x. So actually. and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. or other means. the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the “lands of the public domain. filling. CA No. THERE MUST BE A LAW OR PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. there was yet no classification and declaration that such areas are alienable or disposable. the PD issued by Marcos was in effect the law/proclamation. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Further. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands. fisheries. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that: “Section 2. and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. xxx Page | 30 . (d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes. homestead.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay because for one. Sec. these submerged areas are. (b) Foreshore. and other mineral oils. the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. (c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers. waters.III. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands.xx xxx Section 3. All lands of the public domain. which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. or grant. 56. under the Constitution. all forces of potential energy. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase.” As such. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests NOTE: You might get confused with this paragraph in the full text: Under Section 2. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares. (b).” forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Article XII of the1987 Constitution. wildlife. and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain. minerals. private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease. waters x x x and other natural resources” and consequently “owned by the State. “waters x x x owned by the State. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease for a period not exceeding twenty five years. Yung nasa paragraph na ‘to specific siya sa reclaimed lands. Legal Basis: Sections 2 and 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man. coal. (2) AMARI cannot acquire and own under the Amended JVA the 367. these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use. Until reclaimed from the sea. renewable for not more than twenty-five years. With the exception of agricultural lands. the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging.” unless they are classified as “agricultural lands” of the public domain. The lands comprised in classes (a). forests or timber. all other natural resources shall not be alienated. 141 Sec. petroleum. Moreover. and other natural resources are owned by the State. Thereafter. flora and fauna. 34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. The State always reserved these lands for some future public service. ownership of 77. The 157. May 6. such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Likewise. and the rest of the 592. petitioner. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain. are alienable lands of the public domain. 2003) FRANCISCO I. and further declare them no longer needed for public service. now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290. NOTES: 9. CHAVEZ. The 592.15 ha of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.-B Chavez vs PEA (403 SCRA 1. Still. the 592. respondents. Why Lease Only: Government reclaimed. 133250. a private corporation. PEA filed a motion for reconsideration from SC’s decision. No. R. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests SC’s SUMMARIZED CONCLUSIONS: 1. FACTS: Several motions were filed by Amari in connection with the Court’s decision on July 9. 2. such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2.III. Rationale: The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 ha. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have actually been reclaimed. which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. PEA MAY LEASE these lands to private corporations BUT MAY NOT SELL or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. 4. and only allowed the lease. G. the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable. of these lands to private parties. In their present state.156 ha of still submerged areas of Manila Bay. 2002. Page | 31 . The Amended JVA was declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO for being violative of the Constitution. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens. the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3. 3.84 ha of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands. foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. vs. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale. Thereafter. subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. All these motions were altogether opposed by petitioner Chavez.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Amari now claims that “assuming arguendo that PDs. AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA.YES HELD: The prevailing doctrine before. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests AMARI filed its motion to SC. MIRIAM S. NOTES: 10. 1907 until the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. foreshore land. 141. ELIAS S. Amari argues that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. IMPERIAL. In the instant case. by result of a cadastral proceeding. FELIZA S. No. and does not overrule. Sabi sa first case that the petition was a case of first impression. Amari is not precluded from recovering from PEA in the proper proceedings. being part of the sea. the Director of the Lands Management Bu requested to the OSG that the OCT issued in Imperial’s favor be cancelled and that the land covered by it be returned to the State. except by lease. a doctrine that has remained immutable since the Spanish Law on Waters of 1886. allegedly. covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. 1999) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the DIRECTOR. LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU. a public corporation. Since the adoption of the Regalian doctrine in this jurisdiction. IMPERIAL JR.. alienable lands of the public domain. on a quantum meruit basis. and EOs 525 and 654 are inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution. The other main reason is that submerged areas of Manila Bay. the sea and its foreshore areas have always been part of the public domain. (bale new doctrine ang nasa decision dun sa naunang Chavez case. and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of LEGASPI CITY. SALVADOR ALCAZAR. contending among others the SC Decision should be made to apply prospectively. LOLITA ALCAZAR. the Decision does not overrule existing law or doctrine.” Amari likewise asserts that a new doctrine of the Court cannot operate retroactively if it impairs vested rights. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. Clearly. vs. or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution. This is one of the two main reasons why the Decision annulled the Amended JVA. 1654 on May 18. Elias Imperial was issued a OCT over a parcel of land in Legazpi City. any existing judicial doctrine. statutory law never allowed foreshore lands reclaimed by the government to be sold to private corporations. respondents. 1084 and 1085. during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot hold. not retroactively to cover the Amended JVA. Despite the nullity of the Amended JVA.III. as it was. Even on the characterization of foreshore lands reclaimed by the government. Republic v. petitioner. FACTS: In 1917. Page | 32 .) ISSUE: WON the SC decision declaring the Amended JVA null and void should be upheld . February 11. reclaimed lands and submerged areas for nonagricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 130906. In 1994. whatever Amari may have incurred in implementing the Amended JVA prior to its declaration of nullity. And since the enactment of Act No. IMPERIAL. the Decision merely reiterates. The 1973 and 1987 Constitution enshrined and expanded the ban to include any alienable land of the public domain. FELIX S. The DENR conducted a survey and conceded that the land indeed had features of foreshore land. are inalienable and beyond the commerce of man. EANCRA CORPORATION. IMPERIAL. the limitation imposed by the Decision on these decrees and executive orders should only be applied prospectively from the finality of the Decision. Imperial (G.R. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3. This parcel of land was later subdivided to his family by way of numerous TCTs. however. The decision of the director of lands when approved by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. such land shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise as soon as the President upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. and case was dismissed on appeal because the OSG failed to file their briefings in the alloted time. however. The principle behind this ruling is that the subject has been exhaustively weighed and discussed and must therefore be given credit. as amended. cannot be the premise of any conclusive classification of the land involved. or in conflict with that of." The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government. The SC observed that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) regularly presents motions for extension of time to file pleadings. NOTES: Page | 33 . b. Legazpi City. This doctrine finds no application. Region V. Instead of contributing to the swift administration of justice as an instrumentality of the State. 141. shall declare that the same are not necessary for public services and are open to disposition. HELD: a. to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant's brief. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests Petitioner insists that the parcels of land in question are foreshore lands. now DENR.The plaintiff further contended that under Public Land Act No. Petitioner's appeal presents an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due course. Consequently. Procedural matters: OSG took extensions for granted but they must be allowed to present their briefs for public interest etc. contended that the cadastral proceedings in 1917 (and the subsequent Torrens registration) were binding even against the State. taking for granted the court's leniency in granting the same. On foreshore lands and role of LMB/DENR note. Imperial. and hence. specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau).III. However. The contradictory views of the Director of Lands and the DENR. During trial. Despite the numerous cases that need the OSG's time and attention. Deadlines must be respected and court warnings not taken lightly. the OSG contributes to needless delays in litigation. NOT SURE – the case was remanded to CA to determine WON the lands were foreshore. ISSUE: WON the land was foreshore land. the RTC failed to rule upon the character of the land. which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC. inalienable and incapable of registration. the need. the DENR Secretary. the certificates of title covering said land are void ab initio." It is also known as "a strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and. when the decision of the director of lands is revoked by. equal importance should be allotted to each and every case. therefore. quizzable: Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. on the true nature of the land. despite asking for numerous extensions. It was defined as "that part (of the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. 3911.00) Pesos. No. 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. 47 converting the area covered by EO 40 into the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park. obligated itself to convey title and possession over the Property. No. some 440. such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant. 15 parcels of land were registered in the name of Diego Palomo by the Court of First Instance. The difference in price is a staggering P140. 133250. Since the lands were made part of a reservation for provincial park purposes. the lands in question were not classified as alienable lands.16billion. President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No.200. Page | 34 . or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish crown.III. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests 11. The Palomos contended that they have been in possession of the subject lands and have introduced improvements thereon.894. On July 10. 1889.00) Pesos per square meter. PEA (G. G.Private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal concessions which were documented in various forms. However. 2003) FACTS: This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private entity 157.000 per square meter.R. 130906) FACTS: In 1913. they cannot be the valid subject of alienation NOTES: 12. November 11. 1954. Public Estates Authority (PEA). the lands. More importantly. CA (266 SCRA 392. Palomo v. 3912.578. (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26.200 per square meter. ISSUE: Were the Original Certificate of Titles issued to the petitioners valid? –NO HELD Before the Treaty of Paris in 1899. 40. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation. consisting of approximately One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (1. mineral. or a price of One Thousand Two Hundred (P1. In 1937. equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen years and more than three times the Marcos Swiss deposits that this Court forfeited in favor of the government." (2) Concession Especial or Special Grant.R.441) Square Meters for a total consideration of One Billion Eight Hundred Ninety Four Million One Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred (P1. they form part of the forest zone. 1950. Chavez v. whether agricultural. published reports place the market price of land near that area at that time at a high of P90. Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30.530 square meters of land in Albay were reserved for provincial park purposes by virtue of EO No. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.129. Diego Palomo donated these lands to his heirs Ignacio and Carmen Palomo. under the JVA. Of said area. The decision of the CFI relied upon by petitioners were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the Clerk of Court. Thus.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1.200. In their present state. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging. or other means. and (c) Mineral lands. ownership of 77.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain. The 157. The lands comprised in classes (a). as soon as the Governor-General. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. x x x. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 3. 2. which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Article XII of the Page | 35 . shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay.III.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands. 1. (b). now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA. are alienable lands of the public domain. on reclaimed lands. filling. 6. a private corporation. and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290. x x x. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public domain into x x x alienable or disposable" lands. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests ISSUE: WON stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands. the 592. 2874.34 110 hectares of the Freedom Islands. such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3. (d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified. such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2. (c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers. (b) Foreshore. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI. The 592. 111 4. 58. Section 7 of the Act empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession. (b) Timber. were as follows: "Sec. The salient provisions of Act No." (Emphasis supplied) Section 6 of Act No. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act. shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into – (a) Alienable or disposable. reclaimed or to be reclaimed.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. The Governor-General. 2874. Sec. 1919. violate the Constitution? – YES HELD: On November 29. subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. the Public Land Act. Sec. 56. Still. and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Thereafter. the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3.III. the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution. Clearly. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution." or whose "object is outside the commerce of men." are "inexistent and void from the beginning. Under 112 Article 1409 of the Civil Code. NOTES: Page | 36 . and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio. contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. MARIA LUISA PALACIOS. 2) substitutions. a Filipino national. Grandnephews Jorge and Roberto opposed the partition on these grounds: o Provisions of vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda with respect to the widow’s usufruct. an alien. while the other part shall go to his grandnephews (Jorge and Roberto. VDA. the fideicommissary can only be either a child or parent of the first heir—but in this case. legatees.IV. died with only his widow as his compulsory heir. 1982) TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ. Administratrix. Page | 37 . It includes. MARCELLE D. and to give her more than her legitime will run counter to the testator’s intention. who submitted an inventory of the estate. (Art 859 of the Civil Code) However. what they are averring is the fact that the wife is entitled 1/3 usufruct over the ‘free portion’. and which is more than what she us given under the will. albeit a real right. FACTS: Jose Ramirez. where 1 part will go to the widow. Ramirez vs Vda. The ‘other portion’ that will go to the grandnephews is charged 1/3 with the widow’s usufruct. as administratrix. Marcelle is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. the fideicomissary substitutions are declared by the Court as void because the substitutes are not relate to Wanda. who is the original heir. February 15. as valid because the dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of Ramirez’s estate. vs. JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ. Thus. favor is violative of the Constitution o The proposed partition is violative of the testator’s express will ISSUE: WON the partition is invalid as to: 1) the widow’s legitime. does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution. Art 863 of the Civil Code provides that fideicommissary substitution is valid provided that such substitution does not go beyond 1 degree from the original heir instituted. and in favor of Juan Pablo and Horacio with respect to Wanda’s usufruct are invalid o Fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid as the first heirs and second heirs or substitutes st are not related with the 1 degree o Grant of usufruct in Wanda’s. Substitutions The Court declared the vulgar substitution entered into by Wanda in favor of Juan Pablo and Horacio. among the respondents). oppositorsappellants. oppositors. DE RAMIREZ.. Furthermore. Transfer of Private Lands TRANSFER OF PRIVATE LANDS IV. 3) usufruct of Wanda HELD: Widow’s legitime The appellants do not question the legality of Marcelle being entitled to ½ of the estate in full ownership. Palacios. Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests Name: 1. petitioner-appellee. while the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of his companion (Wanda). (Art 856 and 867 of the Civil Code) Usufruct of Wanda The Court upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct. ET AL. The Court held that the lower court erred for Marcelle who is entitled to ½ of the estate as her legitime. However. De Ramirez (111 SCRA 704. the Court adds that there is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit usufruct to the substitutes. refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance. submitted a project of partition which provides that the property of the deceased is divided into 2 parts. Wanda is neither the parent nor child of the fideicommissaries (Juan Pablo and Horacio). The contract covered only a portion of the land. deceased. in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng.”Santos executed on NoV 15. at an additional monthly rental of P360. On NoV 18. 1958 she executed 2 other contracts. old. Wong also took care of the payment. Phil. vs. FACTS: Justina Santos and her sister Lorenza were the owners of a piece of land in Manila located on Rizal Avenue and opens into Florentino Torres street at the back and Katubusan street on one side. lawyers’ fees.. being at the time 90 yrs. 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned. including rentals from her property at the corner of Ongpin and Salazar streets and the rentals which Wong himself paid as lessee of a part of the Rizal Avenue property. 1957.620. 22. the monthly rental was P3.. deceased. she was left with no other relative to live with.000. However. On Sept. For his part Wong undertook to pay. In two wills executed on Aug 24 and 29. at a monthly installment of P1. 10 days later (NoV 25).IV. but in a codicil (a post-script) of a later date (NoV 4. defendant-appellant. plaintiff-appellant. 1967) PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property. Her only companions in the house were her 17 dogs and 8 maids Wong himself was the trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping. 1959) she appears to have a Page | 38 . in her behalf. December18. G. one extending the term of the lease to 99 yrs. an amount not exceeding P1. having a monthly rental of P2. L-17587. 1959. this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. and her household expenses. 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir. representing the estate of JUSTINIA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO. a contract of lease in favor of Wong. while Wong Heng. The lease was for 50 yrs. lived with his family in the restaurant..000. The sisters lived in one of the houses. funeral expenses.000 a month for the food of her dogs and the salaries of her maids. No. Then already well advanced in yrs. In it are two residential houses with entrance on Florentino Torres street and the Hen Wah Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue. imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in her household.120.800 a month and was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship. out of the rental due from him. vs Lui She (21 SCRA 52. On Dec. including the portion on which the house of Santos stood. LUI SHE. blind. covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. Banking Corp. and another fixing the term of the option at 50 yrs.R. although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement. and the usufruct to Wanda with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo and Horace NOTES: 2. “In grateful acknowledgement of the personal services of the Lessee to her. salaries of maids and security guard. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests Decision: ½: for his widow as her legitime ½: the free portion to Roberto & Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership. masses. payable within ten yrs. On Oct 28. the charge not to exceed P1. crippled and an invalid. written in Tagalog. a petition for which was then pending in the CFI of Rizal. a Chinese. The option. 21 she executed contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for P120. of taxes. she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong. the contract was amended so as to make it cover the entire property. 1308 CC. the cancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon beforehand is fulfillment. undue influence and abuse of confidence and trust of and (by) taking advantage of the helplessness of the plaintiff and were made to circumvent the constitutional prohibition prohibiting aliens from acquiring lands in the Philippines and also of the Philippine Naturalization Laws. thus making contract of lease void. 1256 [now art. Indeed. she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts. WON consent of Santos was valid. Such a stipulation. 1957 by force of art. NO. 777 CC. at the time. 1957. is absolutely simulated. Reasoning : It is claimed that the stipulation offends Art. WON the provision “lessee may at any time withdraw from the agreement” makes the contract invalid. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practiced by him. The stipulation in the contract does not violate Art. Petitioner’s arguments the contracts were obtained by Wong “through fraud.000 which he said she had delivered to him for safekeeping. because her consent was obtained through undue influence. was in custodia legis because the contract was obtained in violation of the fiduciary relations of parties. for it is considered as a resolutory condition to the contract. fraud and misrepresentation. HELD: 1. when she leased the property on NoV15.IV. inequitable conduct." As was held in Taylor v Uy Tiong Piao. WON the contracts are void for trying to circumvent Philippine laws against alienation of property to foreigners. contrary to Art. NO. But he denied having taken advantage of her trust in order to secure the execution of the contracts in question. 1308 CC which provides that "the contract must bind both contracting parties. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests change of heart. 5. 16468.000 had been deposited in a joint account which he had with one of her maids. its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them. another sum of P22. as can be readily seen. and because the lease contract. At any rate. the exercise of the option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have been the subject of agreement. permitting the cancellation of such contract. (PBC) and Lui She (the wife) respectively. Ownership of the property (that used to belong to her sister) transferred to Santos upon the death of the sister. ISSUES: 1. and both were replaced by Phil. Both parties appealed. Note: both Santos and Wong died while case was pending. misrepresentation. thus enabling her to bind such in contracts Reasoning: Santos became the owner of the entire property upon the death of her sister Lorenza on September 22.” lease contract should have been annulled with the 4 other contracts because it lacks mutuality. “art. Hence. WON contracts are void for being violative of fiduciary relationship. does not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of cancellation. like the other contracts. 3. 2. in addition to the sum of P3. 4. she did so already as owner thereof. this case would at most justify the fixing of a period but not the annulment of the contract. 2. Page | 39 . even if no term had been fixed in the agreement.” The right of the lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be said that the continuance of the lease depends upon his will. Lower court declared contracts null and void save for the lease contract executed Nov 15. because it included a portion which. 1308] CC in our opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a contract for personal service of a resolutory condition permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties. for where the contracting parties have agreed that such option shall exist. Banking Corp. Respondent’s arguments admitted he enjoyed her trust and confidence as proof of which he volunteered the information that. WON the property cannot be leased for being in custodio legis. NO. Reasoning: “The illicit purpose then becomes the illegal cause rendering the contracts void. shows a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of land of aliens. 1972) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and/or THE QUASHA. the Parity Amendment was to expire. However. SOLICITOR GENERAL petitioners. and along with it the rights acquired by US citizens. Reasoning: There is no merit in the claim that her consent to the lease contract. WILLIAM H. vs. development. According to Quasha the Amendment created exceptions to the prohibition of non-Filipinos to acquire Filipino land without hereditary succession. contracts are void. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests 3.IV.1646 is not violated for Wong was never an agent for Santos. the disposition. by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property. a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. Consent given by her voluntarily and on well-informed bases. Atty. until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. YES. but neither of them was presented as a witness.R. did not amount to an agency so as to bring the case within the prohibition of the law. thus making each contract void. To be sure. although admittedly close and confidential. jus utendi. The collection of contracts. 4. the lawyer could not make her change her mind. If this can be done. Republic vs Quasha (46 SCRA 160. the use. respondent. but also an option to buy. if an alien is given not only a lease of. The SocGen later contended that Quasha’s land constituted private agricultural land. The truth is that even after giving his client time to think the matter over. was given out of a mistaken sense of gratitude to Wong who. As it was with the lease contract so it was with the rest of the contracts – the consent of Santos was given freely and voluntarily. tomorrow. Yumol testified that she signed the lease contract in the presence of her close friend and her maid who was constantly by her side. the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal. this to last for 50 years. the next day. a piece of land. In 1974. then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Phil. as well as to the rest of the contracts in question. Any of them could have testified on the undue influence that Wong supposedly wielded over Santos. Art. with the result that Santos’ ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow concept. No. L-30299 August 17. Article XIII of the Constitution which prohibits the transfer of such lands to non-Filipinos Page | 40 . is valid. and so on. G. NOTES: 3. and allowed US citizens to participate in the disposition. The Parity Amendment was signed after the war in 1946. 5.” Taken singly. she was made to believe. YES. FACTS: William Quasha is an American who has owned a parcel of land in Makati since 1954. and that his acquisition violated Sec 5. Reasoning: The relationship of the parties. they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. utilization etc etc of Filipino lands. It is just as if today the possession is transferred. as shown by the testimonies of her lawyer. Quasha was worried that his rights to own his property would expire along with the Amendment. as well as the intentions of Santos. but considered collectively. had saved her and her sister from a fire that destroyed their house during the liberation of Manila. so is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. jus fruendi and jusabutendi). And yet this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within this pace of one year. as announced in Krivenko. is in grave peril. then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi. but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi) rights the sum total of which make up ownership. vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS. and the decision with what to do with Quasha’s property was deferred to Congress. he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. G. Krivenko. an alien. "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution. The SocGen also said that even if Quasha acquired the land validly. he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that.R. NO. Quasha cannot find refuge in the Parity Amendment as it itself has prescribed that its effects were to expire in 1974. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests except by hereditary succession. In section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. CITY OF MANILA. are classified into agricultural. from which Krivenko appealed to this Court. L-630. The CFI ruled in favor of Quasha. his rights to it would expire with the Parity Amendment. petitioner-appellant. The decision of the CFI was reversed. The term "public agricultural lands" in the same Act classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition. Krivenko vs ROD (79 Phil. HELD: The phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as including residential lands. ISSUE: WON Quasha should be allowed to retain ownership of his property by virtue of the Parity Amendment? NO. POLICY: The Parity Agreement did not allow US citizens to acquire land without hereditary succession. In May. all lands were effectively reserved for Filipinos. the exploitation. Inc. No. 2. KRIVENKO. 461. commercial. being an alien. respondent and appellee. NOTES: 4. 1945. the registration of which was interrupted by the war. Krivenko then brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila but the court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds. but it did not allow them to acquire or exploit private agricultural lands. November 15.IV. industrial and for other puposes. 141. into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for Page | 41 . bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate. The State appealed to the SC. declaring him to have the right to retain ownership over the land even if the Parity Amendment expires. residential. HELD: When the Republic of the Philippines was established in 1946. ISSUE: WON an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land. dev’t and utilization of lands of public domain and other natural resources of the PHL and the operation of public utilities The Parity Amendment merely reopened the aforementioned activities to US citizens. 1947) ALEXANDER A. FACTS: Alexander A. The SC looked at the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the drafters of the Parity Agreement and found that the parity secured for US citizens extended only in two matters: 1. therefore. Both sections must. No. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable in favor of Filipino citizens. 5. they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. acting in representation and in behalf of the latter and its trustees. lands that are residential. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if. shall not be aliented." and with respect to public agricultural lands." And the subject matter of both sections is the same. this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of the provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens. corporations. after all. their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens. L-6776. trustees and administrator are all Chinese citizens. or lands for other purposes.R. Ung Sui Si Temple (G. for religious purposes. vs. Undoubtedly. no private agricultural land will betransferred or assigned except to individuals. Respondent alleged that acquisition of the land in question. respondent-appellant. This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. in favor of the unregistered religious organization “Ung Siu Si Temple”. UNG SIU SI TEMPLE. and that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religion clause of our Constitution. founder. founder and deaconess of the Temple. Register of Deeds Rizal vs. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots. FACTS Jesus Dy. the registry of deeds refused to accept for record the deed of donation. Save in cases of hereditary succession. industrial. However. as above indicated. petitioner-appellee. Page | 42 . is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission. a Filipino citizen. the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. NOTES: 5. 1955) THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII. be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests agricultural puposes. the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. "natural resources. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. Which was upheld by the CFI. May 21. ISSUE: WON the deed of donation is valid? NO. is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution. namely. with the exception of public agricultural land. Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution. and it reads as follows: Sec. section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. commercial. of Chinese nationality. operating through three trustees all of Chinese nationality.IV. conveyed a parcel of residential land. it appearing from the record of the Consulta that UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a religious organization whose deaconess. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources First Set_Case Digests HELD: The provisions of Act No. we are by no means convinced (nor has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or worship. or that one may not worship the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in fee simple. since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.IV. restricting the acquisition of public agricultural lands and other natural resources to "corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens" (of the Philippines). and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock. As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution. in so far as incompatible therewith. the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens. In providing that – “Save in cases of hereditary succession.” The Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. NOTES: Page | 43 . 271 must be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted. Neither is there any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII. The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition. no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos. (RCAAD Inc. is qualified to own private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of the Constitution? YES HELD: Under the circumstances of the present case. RCAADI Inc. said that the totality of the Catholic Population of Davao would become the owner of the property bought to be registered. December 20. TRANSFER OF PRIVATE LANDS Natural Resources Second Set_Case Digests Name: Continuation… 6. That there are more than 80% of Filipino Citizens who are Roman Catholic in Davao as per the Bureau of Census’ records which signifies that the mentioned constitutional requirement has been fully satisfied. RCAAD Inc. This set-up. respondents say that a conglomeration of people cannot just be pointed out as the recipient beneficiaries of the Catholic Church. THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY. INC. or assets belonging to a Filipino Citizen. with Msgr. Clovis Thibault. vs. 1957) THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO. the petitioner is not considered the owner but rather a mere administrator. it is safe to state that even before the establishment of the Phil. the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commission (LRC). The Register of Deeds (ROD) Davao required the said corporation to submit an affidavit declaring that 60 per cent of the members thereof are Filipino Citizens for purposes of registration. as postulated under Sections 1 and 5 of Article 8 of the Constitution. the necessary power and qualification to purchase in its name private lands located in the territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry. encumber. as actual incumbent (or administrator). RCAAD inc.R. alleges that under the Corporation Law as well as the settled jurisprudence on the matter. yet he has control over the same. Transfer of Private Lands IV.). In the required affidavit. according to the petitioners. property. is a corporation sole organized in accordance with Philippine laws. ROD being doubtful as to the ‘registerability’ of the land. respondent averred that though the petitioner does not own the land. LRC rendered a resolution holding that the vendee RCAADI Inc. respondents. That the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church of the Constitution has no nationality and did not have in mind the religious corporation sole when they provided that 60% of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino Citizens.IV. Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every corporation sole (special form of corporation usually associated with clergy) then organized and registered had by express provision of law. Inc. a Filipino citizen and resident of Davao City. Thibault who is a Canadian Citizen. On the other hand. executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in Davao City in favour of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao. alienate. Subsequently. Also. FACTS: Mateo Rodis. petitioner is qualified to acquire private lands for the establishment and maintenance of places of worship. was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of conformity to the constitutional requirement of at least 60% of the capital. No. After proper hearing. the denial of registration of the subject property to ROD Davao. an action for mandamus before the SC is filed. falls short of trust. A corporation sole is created not only to administer church properties but also to hold and transmit the same to his successor in said office. L-8451. ISSUE: WON the petitioner RCAADI Inc. Page | 44 . That by acquiring private lands. A motion for reconsideration was filed but later denied. petitioner. Roman Catholic Administrator of Davao vs LRC (G.. With full power to administer. a Canadian national. 1459. That it is not owned by the Filipino Citizens but rather the only incumbent Msgr. and sell or dispose of thereby exercising all rights of ownership on the property. hence. the Corporation Law or Public Act No. Page | 45 . Subsequently. the aforementioned constitutional requirement is fully met and satisfied considering that the corporation sole in question (RCAAD Inc. De Barsobia vs Cuenco (113 SCRA 547. even if the question of nationality be considered. Cuenco was a naturalized citizen and therefore he is constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. NOTES: 7. Epifania has been in possession ever since except that land sold to Pacita. therefore. it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and since the question as to ownership is still undetermined. the LRC resolution which holds that the petitioner corporation sole is not qualified to acquire private land is hereby reversed. must be taken into consideration. if this constitutional provision were not intended for corporation sole. In the case at bar. the sale of the land in question by Epifania to Ong King Po is inexistent and void from the beginning because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Contitution. then a widow. In determining. With these. respondent. Sasosa Vda. petitioners. and not the nationality of the actual incumbent of the parish. G. Epifania. DE BARSOBIA and PACITA W. VALLAR. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources Second Set_Case Digests Thus. Epifania sold a ½ portion of the land in question to Pacita Vallar. 1982) EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. Corporation soles cannot be considered aliens because they have no nationality at all. Cuenco immediately took possession of the said property and harvested the fruits therefrom.) is composed of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos. With this. FACTS: Leocadia Balisado sold her coconut land located at Camiguin. vs. the litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. No. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. it is obvious that this could not be regulated or restricted by said provision. Giap. VICTORIANO T. Misamis Oriental in favor of spouses Patricio Barsobia and Epifania Sarsosa. there is no more basis for Epifania to recover the land as ruled in the case of Vasquez vs. the respondent herein. However. sold the subject property to a Chinese named Ong King Po. Po sold the land to Victoriano Cuenco. Petitioner claimed that it was not her intention to sell the land to Ong King Po and that she merely signed the document of sale to simply evidence her indebtedness to the latter. CUENCO. Respondent filed a forcible entry case against Epifania before the MTC. The ROD is ordered to register the deed of sale subject of the litigation. the nationality of the constituents of the diocese. in the case at bar. whether the constitutional provision requiring 60 % Filipino capital is applicable to corporations sole.IV. ISSUE: WON the contract of sale entered into by Ong King Po and Epifania is valid? HELD: Firstly. which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos.R. Epifania filed an appeal before Court of Appeals contending that the contract she and Po entered into is void ab intio. However. L-33048 April 16. 1970. Upon his death. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. No. this. was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. 8. as the putative heir of his adoptive father. for instance. the said propery was passed on to him and upon application for a title. Cuenco. 1989) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. vs. on January 7. In Sarsosa Vda. the Republic contested the approval by the court of the same reasoning that Chua Kim acquired the said land while he was still an alien. GUILLERMO GONZALVES. the ruling was as follows: . FACTS: The chief question presented in the appeal at bar concerns the validity of a conveyance of residential land to an alien prior to his acquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization. 23 implicity recognized Chua Kim's title to the lands in question. the conveyance were made before the 1935 Constitution went into effect. de Barsobia v. Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the lands thus purchased by him.IV. 1 He was the adopted son of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. that compromise agreement.1977. 74170. which were among those included in Land Registration Cases Numbered 405 and 14817 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province. Chua Kim's adopting parent. as a naturalized citizen. without protest whatever from any person. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources Second Set_Case Digests Also. That since the death of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. The Trial Court's description of the factual background is largely undisputed. Quezon. at a time when there was no prohibition against acquisition of private agricultural lands by aliens. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. taking his oath as such. she is barred by laches from asserting her claim to the litigated property. The case involved three (3) parcels of land. and his status as adopted son of Gregorio Reyes. who became a naturalized Filipino citizen. that were the factors that caused his involvement in Civil Case No. ISSUE: WON a naturalized Filipino may acquire a property during his status when he was not yet naturalized as a Filipino citizen. said Gregorio Reyes. The case principally concerns Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be. As already mentioned. 447 [1955]). 22 and his participation in the Compromise Agreement later executed by all parties. It was indeed Chua Kim's being in possession of the property in concept of owner. Epifania is considered to have slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. approved by judgment rendered on July 29. C-385 of the CFI at Calauag. i. petitioner. July 18. Chua Kim had been in continuous possession of the lands in concept of owner.R. YES HELD: It is a fact that the lands in dispute were properly and formally adjudicated by a competent Court to the Spouses Gaspar and to the Spouses Marquez in fee simple. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons (96 Phil. and that the latter had afterwards conveyed said lands to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. Pacita vallar is no liable to damages since she acted in good faith. Republic vs IAC (G. Respondent. at the instance of the original parties thereto. Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. ** respondents. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person.e. 113 SCRA 547.. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Plainly. These lands were acquired through simplee fee by the father of Chua Kim.. By this inaction and inexcusable neglect.. Page | 46 . the defect in the will should be deemed rectified by the subsequent transfer of the property to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital. which was a non-stock corporation organized in the United States by virtue of a charter granted by the state legislature of Massachussets. the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources Second Set_Case Digests . Our consistent ruling on this matter is that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a ctitizen. Documents have now made it clear that the United Church for Christ in the Philippines and not the United Church Board for World Ministries was the owner of the Hospital at the time of the execution of the win in 1966 and of the testator's death in 1970. as owner of BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL. G. FACTS: David Jacobson was an American citizen who had been a resident of the Philippines for more than thirty years and up to the time of his death in 1970. Judge Alejandro E.. PETITION GRANTED. which was incorporated under Philippine law in 1948. is to preserve the nation's land for future generations of Filipinos. ISSUE: WON the eventual transfer of ownership from the foreign owned company to the Filipino owned company cured the defect that prevented the transfer of the legacy. vs. 30 March 1988) UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTRIES. with a total area of about 445 hectares acquired by virtue of a sales patent issued to it in 11953. YES HELD: Even on the assumption that the foreign company was really the owner of the Hospital at the time of the effectivity of the will and that the devise was for that reason unenforceable. DELENA and MAURO GEMENTIZA as Co-Executors of the Testate Estate of DAVID. CA AFFIRMED. Sebastian disallowed the above-described legacy on the ground that it was in effect an alienation of private agricultural land in favor of a transferee which was not qualified under the Constitution of 1935.. Jacobson. respondents.R. L-34672.IV. that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. No. HON. NOTES: 9. He left a will in which he "devised and bequeathed" to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital 60% of his shares of stocks in the Tagdangua Plantation Co. if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands. SEBASTIAN. United Church vs Sebastian (159 SCRA 446. It is also not disputed that such ownership passed to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital itself upon its incorporation in 1970 when it thus became the proper party-in-interest to claim the property directly devised by Jacobson to it.petitioner. The finding was that the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was owned by the United Church Board for World Ministries (UCBWM) . This corporation was the registered owner of a tract of land in Pantuhan Davao del Norte.the herein petitioner. Inc. and MELENCIO B. The CFI of Davao del Norte. JUDGE ALEJANDRO E. PETITION DENIED. inc. as Presiding Judge of the CFI of Davao del Norte. as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case. Page | 47 . for P14. then Chinese citizen. 515. and duly authorized by its articles of incorporation to own. the contract of sale was null or void and may be annulled. G. based on a defect in the contract which invalidates it independently of such lesion or damages. 1955) SOCORRO VASQUEZ. parcel of land with a house in Tondo. on the ground that Li Seng Giap was an alien and incapable to own and hold title to lands under the Constitution. The SC ruled that in sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both vendor and vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party. on nullity of contracts. Vasquez vs Giap and Lee Seng Giap (96 Phil 447. that aim or Page | 48 . avail themselves of the incapacity of those with whom they contracted. Li Seng Giap sold and transferred to Li Seng Giap & Sons. ISSUE: WON the transfer to Li Seng Giap and subsequently to the corporation was valid? YES HELD: YES. with 96. It is an action for annulment under Chapter VI. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources Second Set_Case Digests NOTES: 10. if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands.IV. L-3676. a corporation with shareholdings owned by Chinese citizens. is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos. In the United States the rule is that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto the vendor divests himself of the title to such real estate and has no recourse against the vendee despite the latter's disability on account of alienage to hold title to such real estate and the vendee may hold it against the whole except as against the State. FACTS: In 1940. the vendor divests himself of the title to such real estate and is not permitted to sue for the annulment of his contract. In 1948. LI SENG GIAP and LI SENG GIAP & SONS. plaintiff-appellant. Vasquez filed an action to rescind the sale of said parcel together with improvements. The transfer was valid by virtue of Li Seng Giap’s subsequent naturalization and majority of the corporation being owned by Filipinos before the State commenced proceedings to escheat or forfeit subject property which was originally transferred to aliens. The Rule in the United States that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto. defendants-appellees. Title II. the parcel of land for P14. however. also became a Filipino corporation.R. Subsequently.67% of its stock owned by Filipinos. Manila. Li Seng Giap & Sons. Vasquez sold and transferred to Li Seng Giap.500. Inc. January 31. Inc. a 423 sq. as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case. Article 1302 of the old Civil Code provides that persons sui juris cannot. No. m.. However. Book II. is also the rule under the Civil Code. declared against the vendee who is incapable of holding title to the real estate sold and conveyed to him However. The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated upon any of the grounds provided for in Article 1291 of the old Civil Code and because the action of rescission involves lesion or damage and seeks to repair it. It is only the State that is entitled by proceedings in the nature of office found to have a forfeiture or escheat . Li Seng Giap was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen under Certificate of Naturalization No. Vasquez argues that if at the time of the conveyance of the real property the Li Seng Giap was incapable of holding title to such real estate. In 1941. if the State does not commence such proceedings and in the meantime the alien becomes naturalized citizen the State is deemed to have waived its right to escheat the real property and the title of the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or. vs. acquire or dispose of real properties.500. and his subsequent naturalization as a Filipino citizen cannot retroact to the date of the conveyance to make it lawful and valid. corporations. YU SIOK LIAN DAVID ONG and JIMMY ONG. December 20. a naturalized Filipino citizen. Po and petitioners refused. 1994) ONG CHING PO. Po and petitioners claim that in 1946. could not own real property in the Philippines.R. 113472-73. When Parian’s husband died in 1983. what is in dispute is not so much as to the validity of the evidences of sale and transfer. Po died in 1986. The sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English. vs. was an alien and it was agreed upon between Ong Ching Po and his brother.) FACTS: In 1947. The lot was only named under Parian as a subterfuge since Po. A photocopy of the Deed of Sale written in Chinese evidenced said sale. Assuming that the Chinese Deed of Sale was duly executed. SC cannot go along with the claim that Po merely used Parian as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an alien he was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources Second Set_Case Digests purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. As stated by petitioners themselves. SC AFFIRMED judgment appealed from. being valid that of the domestic corporation to which the parcel of land has been transferred. The title to the parcel of land of the vendee. Petitioner Ong Ching Po is the brother-in-law of Parian. no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals. must also be valid. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD PARIAN. respondents. Page | 49 . Po bought the lot from Ong Joi Jong. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Nos. To sustain such an outrageous contention would be giving a high premium to a violation of our nationalization laws. Po was primarily not qualified to acquire and hold public and private lands. Parian said that she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to Po when she and her husband settled in Iloilo. Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land in San Nicolas to respondent Parian. 96.67% (or more than 60%) of its capital stock being owned by Filipinos. Parian’s husband. still petitioners cannot claim ownership of the disputed lot by virtue thereof. petitioners. Section 5.IV. a Chinese. Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides that save in cases of hereditary succession. Ong Ching Po vs CA (239 SCRA 341. G. that the land be registered in Parian’s name in order to avoid legal complications and to facilitate registration and transfer and that the said title would be transferred by Soledad to Ong Ching Po or his successors-in-interest and that she would be holding the title in trust for him. but whether the documents are a deed of conveyance in favor of Parian or a resort to or executed as a subterfuge because the real buyer. she demanded the lot be vacated since she was going to sell it. Po. It was registered with the Register of Deeds in Manila and a TCT was issued in the name of Parian. The CA and RTC ruled in favor of Parian. being a Chinese citizen. ISSUE: WON there was a valid transfer from Ong Joi Jong to Parian? YES HELD: YES. However. NOTES: 11. A consolidated case was filed with petitioners filing an action for reconveyance and damages against Parian and Parian filing for quieting of title. There is no document showing the establishment of an express trust by Po as trustor and Parian as trustee.IV. no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals. SC found. tax declaration. As to the contention of Po that all the tax receipts. "No express trust concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parole evidence." Undaunted. Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. have been disqualified from acquiring public lands. whether individuals or corporations. that these acts." Parian never lived in the building constructed on said land because her family had settled in Iloilo. While an implied trust may be proved orally under Art 1457. Petition was DISMISSED. possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. It appears. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources Second Set_Case Digests Section 14. development and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of Parian and her husband. the same is null and void. Aliens. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain" The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition. even if true. equivocal or indefinite declarations (. petitioners claim that Parian admitted that she did not pay anything as consideration for the purported sale in her favor. Under the law. if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides that save in cases of hereditary succession. Po was a Chinese citizen. however. the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution. "when the sale is made through a public instrument. petitioners said that Parian implied in her deposition that it was her husband who paid for the property. no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals. they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. To remove the mantle of validity bestowed by law on said document. In the same breath. Under Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property. corporations. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that save in cases of hereditary succession. the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract. therefore. because such kind of evidence may be easily fabricated It cannot be made to rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose. The oral testimony to prove the existence of the express trust will not suffice. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain. NOTES: Page | 50 . It is not correct to say that Parian never took possession of the property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of the Chinese Deed of Sale has been established. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain. Section 7. as even a mere administrator or manager may lawfully perform them pursuant to his appointment or employment. On the other end of the legal spectrum. petitioners argue that if they cannot prove an express trust in writing. hence. that the sale was financed out of conjugal funds and that it was her husband who handled the transaction for the purchase of the property. exploitation. Chinese Deed of Sale and transfer certificate of title were in their possession. The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. they can prove an implied trust orally. Parian explained that she and her husband entrusted said lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo. rental receipts. therefore. it being contrary to law. corporations. are not necessarily reflective of dominion. The rental receipts were also in the name of her husband. the deed of sale executed by Ong Joi Jong in favor of Parian is a notarized document. Such transaction is a common practice in Filipino-family affairs. 1985. have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.R. Ederlina went to Germany to file a divorce however Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. whether individuals or corporations. respondent.IV. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation. for recovery of real and personal properties located in Quezon City and Manila. EDERLINA P. Alfred alleged. Lands of the public domain. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources Second Set_Case Digests 12. Applying the pari delicto doctrine. against Ederlina. to her own account with the same bank. Quezon City Trial Court decided in favor of Alfred but the Davao Trial Court is in favor of Ederlina . managed to transfer funds from their joint account in HSBC Hong Kong. the defendant is in the stronger position … it signifies that in such a situation. without his knowledge and consent. cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. declaration of ownership of real and personal properties. They lived separately. ISSUE: WON Alfred has the qualification to own land in the Philippines. The sale of the three parcels of land to the petitioner was null and void ab initio. they move to the Philippines and get married. The petitioner. CATITO. are null and void ab initio. may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands of the public domain. with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. corporations. Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which. the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution. July 11. In the meantime. the petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. the purchaser of the three parcels of land subject of the complaint was Ederlina. cannot be done directly. that Ederlina. a Filipina and a native of Bajada. Davao City. petitioner. which include private lands. the law is unyielding. Alfred filed a Complaint dated October 28. The court further stated that even if Alfred was the buyer of the properties. No. Alfred also filed a complaint against Ederlina with the Regional Trial Court.[3][51] Even if. sum of money. for specific performance. as claimed by the petitioner. 2003) ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL. the petitioner was precluded from recovering the properties from the respondent. inter alia. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. 1985. they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. They bought several properties in Manila and Davao using the money of Alfred. The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence. Where the wrong of one party equals that of the other. on November 7. Davao City. HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. it leaves the parties where it finds them. no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals. being a party to an illegal contract. Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code. because of public policy. FACTS: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. the sales in question were entered into by him as the real vendee. Aliens. Hence. Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides. is null and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. neither a court of equity nor a court of law will Page | 51 . Alfred and Ederlina’s relationship started deteriorating. Unknown to Alfred. CA affirmed the decision of Davao City Court. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law. 143958. Thereafter. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain. vs. Frenze vs Catito (G. he had no cause of action against Ederlina for the recovery of the same because as an alien. It produces no legal effect at all. she was married to Klaus Muller when she was in Germany. Section 14. he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines. hence. and damages. Sometime in 1983 he arrived in Sydney and met Ederlina Catito. as follows: Save in cases of hereditary succession. 1994. Rebuffed in the trial court and the Court of Appeals. On September 7. The rule is expressed in the maxims: EX DOLO MALO NON ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS NOTES: 13. Under the 1935 Constitution. 3389.* Presiding Judge. petitioners. On June 27. in 1948. Prescription never lies against the State. save in cases of hereditary succession. the Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title. Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of the subject land. The original vendee. Lee vs Republic (366 SCRA 524. HELD: The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936. Regional Trial Court. ALOVERA. On June 10. Petitioners alleged that they were the widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting. was disqualified to acquire the land in question. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY. Branch 17. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. COURT OF APPEALS. subject to other defenses. Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Regional Trial Court. a Chinese citizen. The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate the transaction. Roxas City. subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos.IV. FACTS: Sometime in March 1936. vs. a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. G. ISSUE: WON Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the Philippines. represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR. the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the sale because the parties were in pari delicto. during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Branch 17. Lee Liong. Roxas City. Lee Liong. Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. as hereafter set forth. Thus. the Regional Trial Court. October 3. commercial or industrial land. since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land. No. 128195. the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State. The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural land. for it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of the public or private domain. ordered the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of an approved plan and technical description. plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.R. situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street. who were the heirs of Lee Liong. HON. aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands. the former owners filed with the Court of First Instance. In this case. Roxas City. On the other hand. JUDGE JOSE D.* respondents. 2001) ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself. 1993. However. has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs Page | 52 . 1956. The Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources Second Set_Case Digests administer a remedy. Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers. a Chinese citizen. it is not barred from initiating such action. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY and THE HON. including residential. the owner of the lot. because of the doctrine of pari delicto. Metro Manila. 149615. its acquisition being a violation of Section 7. the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties purchased thereby.300. In this case. corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. On September 26. The couple lived in a house in Germany owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. drinking. o The part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner. Rizal at the cost of P528. RTC rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner and respondent and ordered the equal partition of the personal properties situated in the Philippines. petitioners herein. Page | 53 . “If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen. respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources Second Set_Case Digests and subsequently their heirs. however. Necessarily. 1994. G. The real property. Hence. Petitioner. and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. therefore. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2. the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.000. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property. It also considered petitioner’s ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under a Transfer Certificate of Title of the Register of Deeds of Marikina. 2006) IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER. properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. Respondent. the instant petition for review. inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein spouses. a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute. vs. there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land.00. Petitioners are Filipino citizens. Muller vs Muller (500 SCRA 65. CA modified RTC’s decision.” The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property. As regards the house.” Thus. no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals. belong exclusively to the petitioner. HELMUT MULLER. the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. No. August 29. the spouses eventually separated. NOTES: 14. Thus: o Pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code.R. By this time.000. and maltreatment. Article XII of the Constitution which provides that “save in cases of hereditary succession. Germany on September 22. 1989. FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg.IV. Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing. No.** respondents.R. and that equity demands that respondent should be reimbursed of his personal funds. Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely reimbursement. NOTES: 15. that the funds were given to petitioner in trust. December 30. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. took possession of the property. to Gaspar Marquez. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained. who became a naturalized Filipino citizen after taking his oath on Jan. vs. to spouses Benigno Manosca and Julia Daguison. 1946. 1977. HELD: Petitioner contends that respondent. petitioner. 1934 – Lot 549 was sold to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un as well. Thus. whether individuals or corporations. December 27. 2. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. G. However. Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. that respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition but circumvented the same. respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. 74170 July 18. Thus. These were respectively adjudicated in land registration cases with 2 persons: o Lots 1 and 2. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources Second Set_Case Digests ISSUE: WON respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property. and his adopted son Chua Kim (alias Uy Teng Be). control and disposition of the Antipolo property. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. and that respondent’s purpose for filing an action for separation of property is to obtain exclusive possession. Hence. GUILLERMO FACTS: This case involves 3 parcels of land (Lot 1. 7. 1989) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. GONZALVES.IV. Gergorio Reyes Uy Un died. The 3 parcels of land together with several others became a subject of a compromise agreement in a litigation. to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. 549). no decree of confirmation and registration was entered at the time. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession. the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondent’s part. it is likewise proscribed by law. being an alien. Further. To do so would lead to the circumvention of the law. married to Marcela Masaganda. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. o Lots 549. RP vs Gonzalves (175 SCRA 398. are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. in the instant case. that the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage to petitioner. is disqualified to own private lands in the Philippines. the Manosca Spouses. Page | 54 . Aliens. 1934 – Lots 1 and 2 were sold by the owners. it was stated that the opposition parties (Domingo Reyes. YES HELD: It is a fact that lands in dispute were properly and formally adjudicated by a competent Court to the Spouses Gaspar and the Spouses Marquez in fee simple. et al) waives any claims and transfers ownership over to Chua Kim. Such agreement was submitted to the Court with approved it. The RP. his asserted titles are null and void. XIII. Hence this present petition. or (2) by his and his successor’s omission to procure the registration of the property prior to the coming into effect of the Constitution. as the putative heir of his adoptive father. since that constitutional principle has no respective application. Plainly. At a time when there was no prohibition against acquisition of private agricultural lands by aliens.IV. the same granted his petition. 15. through the Solicitor General challenged the corrected of the Order and appealed before the CA. at a time when was disqualified to acquire ownership of land in the Philippines (Art. Sec. ISSUE: WON the conveyance of residential land to an alien prior to his acquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization is valid. Uy Un. Furthermore. 1934. The Republic’s theory is that the conveyances to Chua Kim were made while he was still an alien. NOTES: Page | 55 . Art. Chua Kim had been in continuous possession of the lands in concept of owner. Petition is DISMISSED.R. XIV. the conveyances were made before the 1935 Constitution went into effect. 1935 Constitution. without protest from any person. Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the lands thus purchased by him and his ownership was not at all affected either (1) by the principle subsequently enunciated in the 1935 Constitution that aliens were incapacitated to acquire lands in the country. since the death of G. Chua Kim’s adopting parent. CA affirmed the order of the CFI. and that the latter had afterwards conveyed said lands to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. Be as it may. Therefore. Sec. 14. Transfer of Private Lands Natural Resources Second Set_Case Digests In the compromise agreement. 27 and 30. Chua Kim then filed a petition for issuance of decree of confirmation and registration with the CFI. 1873 Constitution. the acquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine citizenship should foreclose any further debate regarding the title to the property in controversy. Lourdes Abustan. by deeds executed in due form on Dec. March 28. as a naturalized citizen. Yap ceded the major portion of Lot 327 in favor of his son Felix Yap. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources TRANSFER OF PRIVATE LANDS IV. HON. After nearly 15 years from execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. petitioners. FACTS: Maximino Rico executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 339 and a portion of Lot 327 in favor of petitioner Yap (who was then a Chinese national). therefore. GRAGEDA.R. No. He was issued a Certificate of Naturalization. which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos” But the factual set-up has changed. NOTES: Page | 56 . CFI considered Section 5. as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Albay and JOSE A. CFI declared the sale null and void because it was sold to a Chinese national. 1983) DONATO REYES YAP and MELITONA MARAVILLAS. Yap was admitted as Filipino citizen and allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. inspite the fact that Yap had been a naturalized Filipino citizen. Judgment of CFI is reversed. as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case. Subsequently. L-31606. is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos. Petitioner caused the registration of the instrument of sale and cancellation of original certificates of title. was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines" to be an absolute and unqualified prohibition and. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. who was also a Filipino citizen (Filipina mother. Third Set_Case Digests Name: Continuation… 16. EZEKIEL S. Respondent. Yap vs Grajeda (121 SCRA 244. Lourdes Rico (aunt and co-heir of respondent Jose) sold remaining portion of Lot 327 to the petitioner. Respondent Jose Rico is the eldest son of Maximino. Giap and Leng Seng Giap & Sons: . RICO. “there should be no question that the sale of the land in question… was inexistent and void from the beginning because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the Constitution.. vs. that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization Complaint is dismissed. G.IV. respondents. Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution that "no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals. naturalization of father). if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. ruled that a conveyance contrary to it would not be validated nor its void nature altered by the subsequent naturalization of the vendee. ISSUE: Was the sale null and void despite the fact that vendee had been a naturalized Filipino citizen? NO HELD: As stated in the case of Sarosa Vda de Bersabia. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. corporations.. Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. They allege that their parents acquired the subject parcel of land during their marriage.. now deceased. Jose sold the land in 1941 without their knowledge. The plaintiffs are heirs of Jose and Martina Godinez. ET AL. The heirs argue that no valid title or interest was conveyed to Navata over said property and so Navata had not acquired anything from said grantor since the TCT issued by the ROD in favor of the alien is null and void ab initio.. The Court discussed the rule applied in the U. been conveyed to a Filipino citizen qualified to own and possess it.S. January 27. the vendor divests himself of the title to such real estate and is not permitted to sue for the annulment Of his Contract. an alien. where the alien vendee later sold the property to a Filipino corporation.. vs. is also the rule under the Civil Code. Page | 57 . Navata (a Filipino). who is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming. . NAVATA. After the death of their mother Martina. It is only the State that is entitled by proceedings in the nature of office found to have a forfeiture or escheat declared against the vendee who is incapable of holding title to the real estate sold and conveyed to him. Li Seng Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons. defendants. FONG PAK LUEN ET AL. Sulu sold by their father. In the United States the rule is that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto the vendor divests himself of the title to such real estate and has no recourse against the vendee despite the latter's disability on account of alienage to hold title to such real estate and the vendee may hold it against the whole world except as against the State. TRINIDAD S. to the defendant Fong Pak Luen. to Fong Pak Luen.IV.. The rule in the United States that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto. the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional prescription was never intended to apply. avail themselves of the incapacity of those with whom they contracted. however. who conveyed and sold the parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad S. the State is deemed to have waived its right to escheat the real property and the title of the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to him. on the ground that the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests 17. The SC in that case dismissed the complaint to rescind the sale of real property to the defendant alien. (reference was made to the Krivenko vs.. who under the law are prohibited and disqualified to acquire real property. ISSUE: WON the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation of a constitutional prohibition may recover the property if it had. in the meantime. NO HELD: Trinidad Navata. HOWEVER. the titled owner of the property is declared the rightful owner by the Court. if the State does not commence such proceedings and in the meantime the alien becomes naturalized citizen. defendant-appellee..ROD case on the meaning of this consti provision) Nonetheless. Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. Godinez vs Pak Luen (120 SCRA 223. a Chinese citizen residing in Hongkong. . on the ground that the vendee was an alien and under the Constitution incapable to own and hold title to lands. Persons sui juris cannot.. 1983) VICENTE GODINEZ. was violative of Section 5. Fong Pak Luen executed a power of attorney in favor of his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming. L-36731. Later. also an alien. G. No. There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose to Fong Pak Luen. Article 1302 of the old Civil Code provides: . UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE The Court discussed its ruling in Vasquez v. plaintiffs-appellants. a Chinese citizen. FACTS: The plaintiffs filed this case to recover a parcel of land in Jolo.R.. beyond the 10 year period provided for by law. assigning. (1) questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances — between Helen and David Rey. March 12. Petitioners (“the Halilis”). Halili vs CA (83 SCRA 633. died sometime in 1968. leaving real properties in the Philippines. a naturalized Filipino citizen. In 1989. HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN. that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. vs. David Rey sold the aforesaid parcel of land to Emiliano Cataniag (Pinoy). In 1991. as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case. the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S. Consequently. is the 6. is to preserve the nation's land for future generations of Filipinos. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests So.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned by Filipinos. 1998) CELSO R. 113539. an action based upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. No. COURT OF APPEALS. filed a complaint before the RTC. including residential lands".695 sqm land in Sta. it does not necessarily follow that the appellants may be allowed to recover the property sold to an alien. The title to the parcel of land of the vendee. Page | 58 . G. HALILI and ARTHUR R. DAVID REY GUZMAN and EMILIANO CATANIAG. prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. 96. FACTS: Simeon de Guzman. respondents. David Rey Guzman. Insofar as the vendee is concerned.IV. This statement is a declaration of an imperative constitutional policy. Helen Meyers Guzman.R. HALILI. also urban lands. prescription is unavailing. Navata. that the right of action accrued in 1941 but the complaint was filed only in 1966. titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon. Discussion on prescription of actions (if Atty. both of whom are also American citizens. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional prescription was never intended to apply. 1621 of the Civil Code. and between the latter and Emiliano— and (2) claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art. She further alleged that under Article 1144 (1) of the Civil Code. if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but. Coronel would ask) Navata alleges that the cause of action of the heirs has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by Jose in 1941. transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights. Helen executed a deed of quitclaim. Maria Bulacan (which is now subject of the litigation). petitioners. an American citizen. Fong Pak Luen. conveyed the property to Fong Pak Luen as a result of which a title was issued to Fong Pak Luen. Among the said parcels of land. being valid that of the domestic corporation to which the parcel of land has been transferred. His forced heirs were his widow. The Court ruled here that under the Constitution “aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands. a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property. From the fact that prescription may not be used to defend a contract which the Constitution prohibits. must also be valid. who are owners of the adjoining lot. and his son. NOTES: 18. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY and THE HON.IV. Save in cases of hereditary succession. Pak Luen among others. BASIS: Cited jurisprudence such as: De Castro vs. Roxas city. transferred and conveyed to David Rey all her rights. Helen's waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien. CA affirmed. NOTES: 19. HON. respondents. The deed of quitclaim is therefore not valid. COURT OF APPEALS. the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. Section 7 of which provides: Sec.R. it held that the subject land was urban. 7. JUDGE JOSE D. Tan (which has similar facts to the present case). Sebastian. Page | 59 . that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos. Lee vs Director of Lands (366 SCRA 524. 128195 October 3. since the disputed land is now owned by a Filipino citizen (Emiliano). Roxas City. situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street. no private lands xxx qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Sarsosa vs. This is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen. the flaw in the original transaction is considered CURED and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. hence. ALOVERA. and not to subvert them. 3389. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY. if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen. the Dinglasans sold to Lee Liong. petitioners. since the disputed land is now owned by Cataniag. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. Nonetheless. United Church Board of Word Ministries vs. the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional provision — to keep our land in Filipino hands — has been served. vs. Cuenco. Branch 17. G. No. So. a Chinese citizen a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1. Article XII. RATIONALE FOR SUCH PRINCIPLE: If the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands. the sale to Catiniag was valid because according to jurisprudence. since the purpose of the waiver was simply to authorize David Rey to dispose of their properties in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Philippines. the Halilis had no reason to invoke their right of redemption under Art. Regional Trial Court. a Filipino citizen. The objective of the constitutional provision — to keep our land in Filipino hands — has been served. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests RTC dismissed the complaint and said that on the first issue. On the second issue. titles and interests over the property she had inherited from her husband — collided with the Constitution. 2001) ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE. represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR. Godinez vs. ISSUE: WON the sale to Emiliano Catiniag was valid. 1621 of the CC. .YES HELD: The SC ruled that Helen Guzman's deed of quitclaim — in which she assigned. FACTS: Sometime in 1936. Accordingly.631 square meters. as construed by the SC in the Krivenko case. Presiding Judge. designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. or other valid sources of the title to be reconstituted. In this case. Incidentally. “If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. Lee Liong. This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of reconstitution of title. as hereafter set forth. This time. A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is void. CA granted the petition and denied the MFR filed by the Lees. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests In 1948. The original vendee. including residential. although Page | 60 . subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. Another action was filed in the CFI by the same vendors Dinglasan but the same failed because of res judicata. a reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.” If anything. it did not validate the acquisition of Lee Liong of the subject land. Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit. subject to other defenses. Prescription never lies against the State. the proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support. it is not barred from initiating such action. In this case. In this case. As earlier mentioned. It was dismissed by the trial Court and the CA. reconstitution was based on the plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority. The Supreme Court also dismissed the same applying the principle of pari delicto. In 1993. it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate of title must be based on an owner’s duplicate. Thus. “In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party. Pacita Yu Lee and Elizabeth manuel Lee (heirs of Lee Liong) filed with the RTC a petition for reconstitution of the Lot 398 which was granted. since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land. ISSUE: Is the Solicitor General estopped from assailing the reconstitution after failing to object during the reconstitution proceedings before the trial Court despite due notice? NO HELD: Even if the Court did not initially annul the sale because of pari delicto. there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers. the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself. has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs.IV. the Solicitor General filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment conontending that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title. however. petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens.” Thus. because of the doctrine of pari delicto.. the effect is that they (sellers) are not anymore the proper party to assail the sale . a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute. the Dinglasans filed a an action for annulment of sale and recovery of land against the heirs of Lee Liong on the ground of the Constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural land. the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. commercial or industrial land. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. secondary evidence thereof. This time. 235 SCRA 567) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. RTC rendered a decision confirming the title of the Spouses. m. the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the RTC of San Pablo City. the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. NOTES: B. Thus.IV. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land. 185 1. Reconstitution was disallowed for lack of factual support. No. FACTS: On June 17. There is a need to adjudicate the facts of the subsequent transfer from Lee Liong to the heirs who are Filipino citizens. a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. On appeal. No. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA. On February 5. 1994. Republic filed an opposition to the decision of RTC. respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens. respondent spouses bought Lots. CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Page | 61 . At the time of the purchase. situated in San Pablo City. respondents. Republic vs CA (G. This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest. from one Cristeta Dazo Belen. August 24. continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land.77 sq. from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)? YES HELD: Since the spouses’ predecessor in interest has been in open. such possession ipso jure converts the same to private property (Recall ruling of Director of Lands v. 1987. depending on the evidence. as their residence with a total area of 91. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests petitioners are in possession of the land. the court may declare it public land. they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.R. however. before the issuance of the certificate of title. ISSUE: WON a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines. vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public. 108998. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. vs. for in the same proceeding. This time. Republic submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor.P. petitioner. IAC). 1978. to be used by him as his residence (BP 185). Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article. a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands. (Emphasis supplied) Section 8. 2. there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. in the case of urban land. to wit: Sec. Article XII of the Constitution. a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land. From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present. and as transferees of a private land. the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which. or one (1) hectare in case of rural land. In the case of married couples. 185 was passed into law. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land. said properties as discussed above were already private lands. 15. no other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Pursuant thereto. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15. consequently. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters. tacking in the process. the relevant provision of which provides: Sec. as vendees of a private land. Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads: Sec. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Batas Pambansa Blg. 1945 or since 1937. when added to those already owned by him. it is not significant Page | 57 . what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185. It is undisputed that private respondents. one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted. That if both shall avail of the same. But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Provided. to be used by him as his residence. the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed. shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized. In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes. the spouses were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof.000 sq.IV. In the case at bar. acquired vested rights thereon. 8. as the Batasang Pambansa may provide. subject to limitations provided by law.m. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions. they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8.. Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question. for use by him as his residence. continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. or one hectare in the case of rural land. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article. Thus. were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. if urban. corporations. ISSUES: (1) W/N the sale entered into between the petitioner and respondent is void? YES (2) W/N the petitioner can have the sale declared null and void? NO HELD: The Court held that the sale entered into between the petitioner and the respondent is void for the law governing such sale is the 1943 Constitution of the Philippines as the transaction was executed on 1944. Page | 58 . the plaintiff is barred from taking the present action under the principle of pari delicto. In the 1943 Constitution. Respondent. Because the approval of the Japanese authorities has not been obtained and because it is contrary to Art XIII of the Constitution. specifically Art VIII Sec 5. and that said sale and lease should be declared null and void. L-1411. GAW CHEE HUN. and that is included in the private or public agricultural lands that cannot be acquired by aliens as provided in the Constitution. the Court held that although the sale in question is null and void. September 29. Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots. the Court said that the petitioner cannot invoke the Constitution for the purpose of recovering the lands that they have voluntarily parted with because of their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution. Reliosa vs Gaw Chee Hun (93 Phil 827. In ruling so. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Furthermore. vs. thus in every respect valid and binding between the parties. he remained in possession of the property for the reason that as the vendee (Gaw Chee Hun) is a Chinese citizen. as he has already executed a deed of lease over the property thus recognizing the title of respondent-vendee to that property. NOTES: Remedies 1.IV. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. on the issue whether the petitioner can validly have the sale declared null and void. has to obtain first the approval of the Japanese Military Administration. their application for registration of title must perforce be approved. Defendant however contends that the sale referred to in the complaint is an absolute and unconditional. GR No. the vendor-petitioner instituted an action seeking the annulment of the sale and the lease covering the subject property. Thus. it provides that “no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals. Thus. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines." The Court further held that “private agricultural land” also includes residential lands. Gaw Chee Hun contends that petitioner Rellosa is guilty of estoppel. FACTS: Herein petitioner Dionisio Rellosa sold a parcel of land together with the house erected thereon to Gaw Chee Gun. 1953) DIONISIO RELLOSA. the Court held in the negative. they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8. Although vendor (Rellosa) has issued a contract of lease. said sale is considered void. However. Petitioner. and as transferees of a private land. and that no one was occupying the same. He claimed that he had been in actual possession of the land since 1963 and that he had introduced substantial improvements thereon. Originally. No. INC. 1999) FRANCISCO BAGUIO.IV. Republic vs CA (172 SCRA 1) Case is very difficult to find in the internet or in SCRA. On July 20. and opposed Michael’s miscellaneous sales application. an OCT in his favor was registered. 1992. ordering the reversion of the land to the public domain. Mali ata ang SCRA # na na-cite NOTES: 3. and declaring private respondent Michael the true and lawful occupant of the land. petitioner. Baguio started to demand payment of rentals from Michael. The trial court ruled that the false statements made by petitioner Baguio in his application for free patent had the effect of ipso facto canceling the free patent and the title of petitioner. Michael eventually applied for a miscellaneous sales application. in his capacity as HeirSuccessor of WILLIAM MICHAEL. the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests NOTES: 2. MICHAEL. Page | 59 . In 1978. and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance of such patent. and as President of MICHAEL SLIPWAYS. a free patent for the same land occupied by Michael was granted to Fransisco Baguio. the trial court rendered a decision canceling the free patent and the certificate of title of petitioner Baguio. By virtue of this patent. William Michael in turn protested the issuance by the Bureau of Lands of a free patent to petitioner. vs. HELD: Effect of patent: It is true that. Baguio. 119682 January 21.. Baguio vs Republic (301 SCRA 450. respondent. RICARDO T.. but he has since developed the area (even reclaiming land) and even started running a drydock business on the property. G. SR. once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued. ISSUE: Is Baguio entitled to the land? NO. in securing the free patent claimed that the land was agircultural and alienable. FACTS: Since 1963. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.R. Michael was only granted a lease. William Michael had been occupying and developeing a parcel foreshore land in Cebu. and COURT OF APPEALS. or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession. petitioner declared under oath that the land in question was an agricultural land not claimed or occupied by any other person. to obtain compulsory process from the courts. and any subsequent modification. These declarations constitute fraud and misrepresentation. The registration of a patent under the Torrens System merely confirms the registrant's title. VICENTE CASES and ANITA CRISOSTOMO. or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Land or his authorized delegates or agents. and on the basis of such presumption. No. and this is settled law. Indeed. petitioners. In every investigation made in accordance with this section. alteration. from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable. Urquiaga vs CA (301 SCRA 738. title or permit granted. The workers of the petitioner once entered one of the said lots and gathered Nipa palms therefrom. changing or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements. to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true. In his free patent application. Such action is not barred by prescription. 1999) TEODORO URQUIAGA and MARIA AGUIRRE. that he had continuously possessed and occupied it. Page | 60 . They acquired such land pursuant to a Sales Patent in 1969.R. Respondents called their attention regarding the intrusion but the latter allegedly assured them that such incident would not be repeated. they caused the subdivision of a land which resulted to the issuance of to Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). THE COURT OF APPEALS. respondent spouses. Petitioner is guilty of making false statements in his application for a free patent thus justifying the annulment of his title. or shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions. As already stated. It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands. 127833. and for the purpose of such investigation. title. and that he had introduced improvements thereon. an order of cancellation may issue without further proceedings. concealment.IV. if necessary. the State may still bring an action under §101 of Commonwealth Act No. It does not vest title where there is none because registration under this system is not a mode of acquiring ownership. NOTES: 4. January 22. the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the title by means of fraud. G. Public policy demands that one who obtains title to public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit therefrom. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests Remedy in case of fraud However. Later. respondents. or permit issued on the basis of such application. 141 for the reversion to the public domain of land which has been fraudulently granted to private individuals. the existence of bad faith. the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpuenas and subpoenas duces tecum and. and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering. the indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. FACTS: Vicente Cases and Anita Crisostomo. Dipolog City. fraud. are the registered owners of a parcel of land located in Sicayab. vs. even after the lapse of one year. Further remedies in Sec 91 of CA 141: The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession. or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith. HELD: Petitioners insist that respondents had no legal capacity to file the Complaint. NOTES: 5. there is no certainty that their applications Page | 61 . equity is invoked only when the plaintiff. ISSUE: WON the petitioners should be declared lawful owners? NO HELD: No. and damages before the RTC. Therefore. Even assuming that fraud attended the sales application. petitioners argue that respondents. ISSUE: WON the private respondents may be deemed the proper parties to initiate the present suit. this petition in SC. The Court is not persuaded that the circumstances of this case justify the exercise of equity jurisdiction that would allow a suit to be filed by one who is not a real party in interest. or that would obviously be violated if the action filed were to be dismissed for lack of standing. petitioners have no standing to question the validity of the respondents’ title. the petitioners’ contention that the subject land was possessed by their predecessors – in –interest since time immemorial is completely untenable. they are not and they do not even claim to be owners thereof. In other words. have no legal standing to institute the Complaint in the trial court. G. With this. on the basis of the action filed and the relief sought. has a clear right that he seeks to enforce. CA affirmed the decision of RTC with some modifications in the award of damages. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests However. Admitting that they are only applicants for sales patents on the land. 131277. because they were not the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patent thereon. That it is free from any private claim. Tankiko vs Cesar (302 SCRA 559. First. In fact. it is only the State which may institute reversion proceedings considering that it is a public land at the time of the sales application. 1999) FACTS: Respondents are applicants for sales patents of a public land. RTC declared lawful owners the respondent spouses. We agree with petitioners. In the present case. respondents have no clear enforceable right. recovery of possession. hence. that their parents owned and possessed the said piece of land since time immemorial and that the respondents ascribed actual fraud in its acquisition. respondents applied for the quieting of title. SC affirmed the decision of CA. Hence. since their claim over the land in question is merely inchoate and uncertain.IV. They question the issuance of an OCT in favor of the petitioners contending that they are the actual occupants of the said land and had been paying the taxes religiously. February 2. not being the real parties in interest. open to disposition according to law. petitioner’s workers entered the said premises on several occasions this time claiming that the property is owned by Urquiaga. Petitioners appealed before the CA. Therefore.R. No. the original subject lot has been declared a public land and was owned by the Commonwealth of the Philippines before a sales patent was awarded to the respondents. Evidence shows that during the Cadastral proceedings. NO. In 1992. Jude's Enterprises. Therefore. Second. supplement the law. from 40. Defendant St. Inc. G. NOTES: 6.” In fact. Jude’s Enterprises. Inc. ST. VIRGINIA DELA FUENTE and LUCY MADAYA.421 square meters. Spouses DOMINGO CALAGUIAN and FELICIDAD CALAGUIAN. The Solicitor General filed an action for the annulment and cancellation of the certificate titles principally on the ground that said Certificates of Title were issued on the strength of [a] null and void subdivision plan which expanded the original area in the name of St.623 square meters to 42. Equity can only supplement the law. Equity cannot give them this privilege. the Court stressed that “[i]f the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest.. Republic vs CA (301 SCRA 366. 1999) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. respondents have no personality to file the suit. Inc.523 square meters to 42. Jude’s subdivided the lot under the subdivision plan and as a result thereof. only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land. Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the government may institute an action to recover ownership of a public land. This being the case. In the present dispute. Spouses CATALINO SANTOS and THELMA BARRERO SANTOS. Verily. it is evident that respondents are not the real parties in interest. it was later found to have expanded and enlarged from its original area of 40. respondents. which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may. No. Indeed. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such suit. and to defendant Lucy Madaya. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests would even be ruled upon favorably. St. equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. considering that some of the applications have been pending for more than ten years already. January 21. Subsequently. (Represented by the Acting Commissioner of Land Registration). Jude's Enterprises. “for all its conceded merits. petitioner.044 square meters or an increase of 1.R. it is daylight clear that the land is public in character and that it should revert to the State. This expansion or increase in area was confirmed by the land Registration Commission. not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon. is the registered owner of a parcel of land (with an area of 40. JUDE'S ENTERPRISES. sold some areas of its land to defendant Spouses Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto Santos. a final judgment may be invalidated if the real parties in interest are not included. defendant St. vs. not supplant it. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad de Jesus.044 square meters upon its subdivision. as often happens.IV. Because they admit that they are not the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon. FACTS: Defendant St. 116111. INC. The defendants interposed their defense that they acquired the lots in question in good faith from their former owner. and for value and that the titles issued to the said defendants Page | 62 . Inc. to defendant Sps. a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. 623 sq m) included in a subdivision plan located in Caloocan City. Equity is described as justice without legality. to defendant Virginia dela Fuente. COURT OF APPEALS. Jude’s Enterprises.” To grant respondents standing in the present case is to go against the express language of the law. ” CA: Affirmed the decision of the trial court.” In the case at bar. viz.421 square meters is without any basis in fact and in law.bought such “expanded” lots in good faith. that the subdivision plan submitted having been approved by the LRC. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests were rendered incontrovetible. to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. like all general rules. However. and subject to limitations x x x. the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens. YES.: “Estoppels against the public are little favored. HELD: The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or error of its officials or agents. which means “the failure or neglect. conclusive and indefeasible after one year from the date of the issuance of the titles by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. Spouses Calaguian. RTC: dismissed the complaint finding no fraud on the part of St. ISSUE: WON the government is estopped from questioning the approved subdivision plan which expanded the areas covered by the transfer certificates of title in question. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Jude’s when it submitted its subdivision plan to the LRC. Jude’s also answered that that the cause of action of plaintiff is barred by prior judgment. St. Dela Fuente and Madaya -. the government is now in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan. It is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to the innocent purchasers for value. this is also subject to exceptions. Jude’s titles in 1966 up to the filing of the Complaint in 1985). Jude. and the plaintiff's allegation that the area of the subdivision increased by 1. They should not be invoked except in rate and unusual circumstances. as it is tantamount to laches.IV. the other private respondents -. warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Its prolonged inaction strongly militates against its cause. Jude. Jude’s title and the approval of the subdivision plan. for nearly twenty years (starting from the issuance of St. It berated petitioner for bringing the suit only after nineteen (19) years had passed since the issuance of St. and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing. and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals. Nevertheless. NOTES: Page | 63 . for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. It also concluded that the government was already “in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan. relying on the clean certificates of St.Spouses Santos. which had no notice of any flaw in them either.” Significantly. it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. petitioner failed to correct and recover the alleged increase in the land area of St. demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. RA 9522 shortened one baseline. and damaging marine resources. RA 9522 is Constitutional As for the constitutionality of RA 9522. FACTS: In 1961. as “regimes of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of statues. assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two grounds: a.. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory and the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power in violation of Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution. It was ratified on February 27.R.IV. RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts.e. namely.A. Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522 to comply with the terms of (UNCLOS III) or the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. length and contour of baselines of archipelagic States and set the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties. Petitioners are professors of law. they don’t have locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petitioner alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative nor misuse of public funds. To comply with the requirements. No. No. not to delineate Philippine territory. Congress passed RA 3046. environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah. taxpayers and legislators. ISSUE: WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional? NO HELD: The petitioners have locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest. It is a multilateral treaty regulating. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security. law students and a legislator. sea-use rights over maritime zones (i. In addition. contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy. it is constitutional because it is a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zones and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. UNCLOS III prescribed the water-land ratio. The law followed the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (UNCLOS). They also question the locus standi of petitioners. 9522) 1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories. preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. July 16. undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security. 187167. petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. in their capacities as citizens. codifying the sovereign right of State parties over their territorial sea. b. although the breadth was left undetermined. Respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III. 2011) NATURE: Original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522 which adjusts the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories. the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the Page | 64 . in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. 1984. Magallona vs Ermita (G. In 2009. However. among others. It is the judiciary’s exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review. 1. the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests Archipelagic Baseline of the Philippines (R. petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. diminution of territory. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal: Sec 2. States acquire or conversely. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer: Article 48. and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. the contiguous zone. to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III.IV.000 square nautical miles of territorial waters. UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition. increased the Philippines’ total maritime space by 145. On the contrary. "weakens our territorial claim" over that area. lose territory through occupation. not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.216 square nautical miles. save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of baselines). the contiguous zone. contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines]. Further. and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG. Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris. and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III. Under traditional international law typology. the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. RA 9522. by optimizing the location of basepoints. assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose. the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]). The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): Page | 65 . as petitioners claim. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. On the other hand. The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046. but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago. – The breadth of the territorial sea. RA 9522 Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands Actually Increases the Country’s Total Maritime Space Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines. 2. as under RA 9522. enlargement or. either straight or contoured." prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests baselines]. accretion. Petitioners add that the KIG’s and Scarborough Shoal’s exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15. cession and prescription. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas. recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea. Under RA 3046. including overflight. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc. which RA 9522 did not repeal. of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. bed and subsoil. such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Page | 66 . the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines. took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations: “ What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. Section 2 of RA 5446. including the sea lanes. keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah: Section 2. – 1. described as archipelagic waters. Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regimes of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121" of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.” Hence. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal. Legal status of archipelagic waters. 4." The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate. situated in North Borneo. hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own. Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades. over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters. hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III. and the resources contained therein. as well as to their bed and subsoil.IV. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal. 4. UNCLOS III and RA 9522 Not Incompatible with the Constitution’s Delineation of Internal Waters As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522. or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. Statutory Claim Over Sabah Under RA 5446 Retained Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah. Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III. these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. and the resources contained therein. 3. 2." So sa loob ng ating baseline. UNCLOS III affirms: Article 49. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters. also known as Scarborough Shoal. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. the political branches of the Philippine government. does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary. RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones The prerogative of choosing to pass RA 9522 belongs to Congress. UNCLOS III. it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago. burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. Petition DISMISSED. now codified in UNCLOS III. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. consistent with the Constitution and our national interest. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided. The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas. placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty. expeditious international navigation. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III. may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. NOTES: Page | 67 . operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters. In the absence of municipal legislation.IV. subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise. the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. however. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests The fact of sovereignty. More importantly. the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. the right of innocent passage is a customary international law. allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. if not marginal. international law norms. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. In fact. the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community. preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III. Significantly. Moreover. as embodied in RA 9522. thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. Thus. UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. not to this Court. an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law. in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones. the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone. domestically. however. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first. and second. IV. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests IPRA (R.A. No. 8371) 1. Cruz vs Secretary (347 SCRA 128, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000) ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,respondents. FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners. ISSUE: WON IPRA law is unconstitutional. NO HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain – somehow against the regalian doctrine. NOTES: ( just in case sir will ask about ani :) Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution: “(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands; “(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples; “(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands; “(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains; “(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands; “(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and “(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.” Page | 68 IV. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners. In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. These provisions are: “(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands; “(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates; “(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples; “(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and “(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples.” Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that “the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination.” They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. NOTES: Mining Act (R.A. No. 7942) 1. Miners vs Factoran (240 SCRA 100, G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995) MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau, respondents. FACTS The instant case was filed by petitioner questioning the validity and constitutionality of the administrative orders issued by the respondents which sprouted from the respective promulgation by the then president Aquino of Executive Orders for the implementation of the new 1987 constitution regarding mining applications and agreements and for guidelines during the transitory period. The change was introduced by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution governing the system of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources. No longer is the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through “license, concession or lease” under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions allowed under the 1987 Constitution. Page | 69 IV. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests Petitioner alleges that among others, the administrative orders and ultimately the executive orders are unconstitutional because, among others, violates the non-impairment of contract provision since the said orders pre-terminates existing mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements. ISSUE WON the administrative orders are unconstitutional? NO. HELD: This argument is untenable. The adoption of the concept of jura regalia that all natural resources are owned by the State embodied in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, as well as the recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources, not only for national economic development, but also for its security and national defense, ushered in the adoption of the constitutional policy of "full control and supervision by the State" in the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources. The options open to the State are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture; or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization. Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, the State assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the country. Article XII, Section 2 of the said Charter explicitly ordains that the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Consonant therewith, the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may be undertaken by means of direct act of the State, or it may opt to enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or it may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. The economic policy on the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution could not be any clearer. As enunciated in Article XII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources under the new system mandated in Section 2, is geared towards a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. The economic policy on the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution could not be any clearer. As enunciated in Article XII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources under the new system mandated in Section 2, is geared towards a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. The exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources are matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Executive Orders. Police Power, being coextensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. NOTES: Page | 70 makes it possible for FTAA contracts to cede full control and management of mining enterprises over to fully foreign-owned corporations. utilization and processing of all mineral resources. then President Corazon C. On March 3. 7942. YES. (b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 95-23. 7942 and DAO No. 1996 which was adopted on December 20. has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.A. and the WMCP FTAA cede “beneficial ownership” of the mineral resources to the foreign contractor. as well as its Implementing Rules and Regulations. with weak review and audit powers. No. 7942 took effect. On August 15. No.IV. RULING (1): Petitioners charge that RA 7942. 1995.R. otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R. No. then DENR Secretary Victor O.387 hectares of land in South Cotabato. 1995. upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary. The DENR. which. Sultan Kudarat. This was later repealed by DAO No. They pray that the Court issue an order: (a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements. two newspapers of general circulation. then President Fidel V. December 1. development. The State does not supposedly act as the owner of the natural resources for and on behalf of the Filipino people. Shortly before the effectivity of R. development.A. 1995. 7942. 2004) FACTS: On July 25. 96-40. and (d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines.A. ISSUE (1):Whether RA 7942 and its Implementing Rules enable the government to exercise that degree of control sufficient to direct and regulate the conduct of affairs of individual enterprises and restrain undesirable activities. the President may execute with the foreign proponent. No. 127882. the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99. On April 9. or on March 30. 96-40." R. G. and utilization of minerals.) No.A. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations. 1987. 1995. and fixes their terms. counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R. Ramos approved R. No. No. Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. s. Inc. the implementing regulations. 1995. 1996. Page | 71 . Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements. s. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept. 1997. giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. Aquino issued Executive Order (E. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void. 30 days following its publication on March 10. however. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995) to "govern the exploration. it practically has little effective say in the decisions made by the enterprise. La Bugal-b’laan vs Ramos (445 SCRA 1. as unconstitutional. Petitioners then conclude that the law. illegal and null and void.O. On January 10. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests 2.A.A. R. however. (c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. with the result that the State is allegedly reduced to a passive regulator dependent on submitted plans and reports. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void. assignment/transfer and withdrawal. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. No. outlines the procedure for their filing and approval. consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration. They may act only as contractors of the State under an FTAA. utilization and processing thereof shall be under its full control and supervision. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests A careful scrutiny of the provisions of RA 7942 and its Implementing Rules belies petitioners’ claims. Section 3(aq). development.is unconstitutional. they also have to pay taxes. ISSUE (3): WON our mineral resources are given away for free by RA 7942. RULING (2): An objection has been expressed that Section 3(aq) of RA 7942 -. without yet being able to earn revenues to recoup any of its investments and expenditures. development and construction phases together add up to as many as eleven years. taking away mineral resources without paying anything. feasibility. the exploration. it will have to follow the government line if it wants to stay in the enterprise. The objection. RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of mining operations.which allows a foreign contractor to apply for and hold an exploration permit -. equipment and supplies. The contractors have to continually shell out funds for the Page | 72 . on the contrary. nowhere does it require the government to hold all exploration permits and similar authorizations. in permitting foreign-owned corporations to hold exploration permits. as the party directly undertaking exploitation of its natural resources. and other operating expenses. Hence. salaries of local labor and technical staff. is not well-founded. fuel. pre-feasibility. Paraphrasing the Constitution.” In other words. RULING (3): Foreign contractors do not just waltz into town one day and leave the next. and royalties. utilization and conservation through the combined efforts of the Government and private sector in order to enhance national growth in a way that effectively safeguards the environment and protects the rights of affected communities. NO. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral agreements with contractors. and the State. 4. It shall be the responsibility of the State to promote their rational exploration. While the Constitution mandates the State to exercise full control and supervision over the exploitation of mineral resources. the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get away with it.during the period of time that it is spending heavily on exploration works. In the meantime. however. The exploration permit serves a practical and legitimate purpose in that it protects the interests and preserves the rights of the exploration permit grantee (the would-be contractor) -. Such a possibility tends to discourage investors and contractors. 3 (aq) of RA 7942 is unconstitutional for allowing foreign-owned companies to hold the exploration permits.IV. All mineral resources in public and private lands within the territory and exclusive economic zone of the Republic of the Philippines are owned by the State. fees. Declaration of Policy. In fact. duties. development. They need to expend a great deal more of their funds for facilities. Minus this permit and the protection it affords. there is no prohibition at all against foreign or local corporations or contractors holding exploration permits. Section 4 of the statute clearly affirms the State’s control thus: “Sec.foreign or local -. is unconstitutional. Ineluctably then. must hold through the government all exploration permits and similar authorizations.” The aforequoted provision is substantively reiterated in Section 2 of DAO 96-40 as follows: “Sec. ISSUE (2): WON Sec. 2. Ownership of Mineral Resources. the exploration works and expenditures may end up benefiting only claim-jumpers. – Mineral resources are owned by the State and the exploration. “The State shall recognize and protect the rights of the indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands as provided for by the Constitution. NO. All told. The reasoning is that Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution does not allow foreign-owned corporations to undertake mining operations directly. for a period of not more than five years counted from the commencement of commercial production. they need to continue operating.IV. which leaves the Filipino people none the better for it. in order to do so. Rather. they have to disburse money to meet their various needs. In the meantime that the contractors are recouping costs. they recover or recoup their investments out of actual commercial production by not paying a portion of the basic government share corresponding to national taxes. Moreover. still. It must be noted that there can be no recovery without commencing actual commercial production. money is continually infused into the economy. along with the additional government share. before they can commence commercial production from which they would eventually derive revenues. Transfer of Private Lands + Other Topics Natural Resources Third Set_Case Digests duration of over a decade. that eventuality will happen only after they shall have first put out the cash and fueled the economy. in the process of recouping their investments and costs. since the foreign contractors are allowed to recover their investments and costs. the end result is that they practically get the minerals for free. In short. the foreign contractors do not actually pull out the money from the economy. The foregoing discussion should serve to rid us of the mistaken belief that. Granted that the contractors are allowed subsequently to recover their pre-operating expenses. All that money translates into a lot of “pump-priming” for the local economy. NOTES: Page | 73 .