Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe

Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe Later Medieval Europe Managing Editor Douglas Biggs Waldorf College Editorial Board Members Kelly DeVries Loyola College William Chester Jordan Princeton Iniversity Cynthia J. Neville Dalhousie University Kathryn L. Reyerson University of Minnesota VOLUME 1 Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe Essays in Honour of John H.A. Munro Edited by Lawrin Armstrong Ivana Elbl Martin M. Elbl LEIDEN • BOSTON 2007 On the cover: Seal of the port of Portsmouth, 13th c. (Actual wax seal impression: private collection (M.M. Elbl). © Photograph: M.M. Elbl.) Brill has done its best to establish rights to use of the materials printed herein. Should any other party feel that its rights have been infringed we would be glad to take up contact with them. This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISSN 1872–7875 ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15633-3 ISBN-10: 90-04-15633-X Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands x x J. H. A. MUNRO AT UNIVERSITY COLLEGE (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO) OCTOBER 2006 x x x x x x LIST OF FIGURES Changing Composition of the Exchequer Assignment (Household) ............................................................................ 219 Changing Composition of Assignments for Moradias of the Portuguese Royal Household ..................................... 230 Flanders and Adjacent Regions (Map) ................................. 317 Regional Groupings in Flanders and Its Environs (Map) ....................................................................................... 318 Places with Regulated Textile Industries by 1382, Castellany of Ypres and Environs ......................................... 323 Von Thünen Rings with an Interaction Model .................... 366 ......... 367 A Von Thünen System with Multiple Market Centres Price of Gold (1360=100): Mediterranean “Levantine” Ports .................................................................... 384 Price of Gold (1360=100): Northern Europe ...................... 385 Price of Gold (1360=100): The Western Mediterranean ........................................................................ 386 African Gold Trade, 1310-1370 (Map) African Gold Trade, 1445-1454 (Map) ................................. 388 ................................. 390 ............................ 395 ....................... 397 Price of Gold (1360=100): The Maghrib Price of Gold and Silver (1360=100): Egypt Bi-Metallic Ratios ................................................................... 398 ...................... 414 West-Central Sahara and the Maghrib (Map) The Tuat and Gurara (Map) ................................................. 422 ............. 443 Selected European Copper Mining Centers (Map) The Borromei Family (Selected Genealogy) ......................... 462 , 1438 . 229 Ships in Naval Service........... 336 ................................. 158 Tolls on Some Common Trade Goods Occurring in Lists of Public Works Tolls ......... 1254-1418 ........................................................................................................................................................................................ the Bordeaux Wine Trade................ 338 Fairs as Percentage of Regions’ Total Cases . 159 Revenues for Household Assignment (Exchequer) ........................... 116 Manresan Annual Tax Revenues.......................................................................................................... 1476-1505 ............. and Pilgrim Transport ............ 282 Estimated Coefficients of Multinomial Logit Number of Debt Recognitions per Year Regional Groups Cases by Region . 1325-1378 ..................... by Time Periods . 1254-1380 ................... 288 ..................................................... 218 Revenues Assigned to Pay the Moradias of the Portuguese Royal Household ......................................... 130 Tolls on Some Common Trade Goods Occurring in Local Toll Lists ................. 128 Known Extraordinary Payments Levied at Manresa............. 246 Percentage Distribution of Complementary Input Supply Clauses in Sample.......................................................... 337 ................ 127 Revenue from Some Specific Taxes in Manresa Nominal and Real Royal Income from Manresa.................................................................. 125 .......................................................... 96 Gold and Money Receipts of the Guinea House. 335 .....LIST OF TABLES Revenue-Generating Approaches ...................... .... ... ......Debts Payable at Fairs Debts Payable at Fairs Debts Payable at Fairs Debts Payable at Fairs Debts Payable at Fairs ...... ..... . ........... . x x . .. . FRANCESCO L. She specializes in the political culture in late medieval Europe and is currently working on a study comparing the development of the royal court in England and Portugal. from the University of Toronto and subsequently taught in Spain (Universidad Carlos III) and England (University of Leicester and Warwick University) before returning to his native Italy. and now teaches Medieval History at the University of Guelph in Canada.D. SUSANNAH HUMBLE FERREIRA received her Ph. and Chief Editor of the Portuguese Studies Review.D. University of Toronto. GALASSI was a student of John Munro both in undergraduate and graduate courses.. a lecturer in Economic History at the University of Ferrara. IVANA ELBL (Ph. and colonial military presence in the Maghrib. Trent University. His dissertation was entitled “The Catalan City of Manresa in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: A Political. JEFFREY FYNN-PAUL received his Ph. 1986) is Associate Professor of History.D. and a professional computer graphics artist and cartographer. Social..A. Trent University. credit.D.” His research focuses on structural aspects of Western Mediterranean society during the decades following the post-Black Death crisis. the Balearic Islands. MARTIN ELBL (M. a consultancy. He received his Ph. from the University of Toronto in 2005. He is currently an Associate Fellow of Warwick University. and the Technical Director of InMetrica srl. University of Toronto. and Economic History. His published work on medieval Provence includes studies of Jews. His research and publications focus on late medieval Italian and Iberian relations with North Africa. He currently works on a study of decision-making in the Datini Compagnia di Catalogna. as well as on Jewish history. Her research focuses on the societal dynamics of late medieval Portugal and on the early Portuguese overseas expansion. 1981) is an adjunct member of the Department of History. from Johns Hopkins University. .xviii CONTRIBUTORS JOHN DRENDEL received a doctorate in Medieval Studies from the University of Toronto in 1991 and now teaches at the Université du Québec à Montréal. He is currently editing a collection of articles for Brill devoted to the influence of Michael Postan upon French historiography. women and family. Managing Editor of the Portuguese Studies Review. with particular interest in gender. His most recent book. S. and the boundaries between pilgrimage and tourism. thesis supervisor. social theory. where he has also served two terms as Director of Medieval Studies.D.CONTRIBUTORS xix FRANCESCO GUIDI BRUSCOLI. Her academic areas of interest are agrarian and environmental history. urban-rural relations. is The Protestant Ethic Turns 100 (2005). is a specialist in European banking history of the late medieval and early modern periods. Distinguished Professor of Social Science and History at Fordham University. and the translator of Max Weber’s dissertation. JAMES MASSCHAELE is Associate Professor of History at Rutgers University in New Brunswick. The History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages (2003). He is the author of Schools of Asceticism: Ideology and Organization in Medieval Religious Communities (1998). He is the author of Peasants. University of London. from Indiana University and is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Vermont. and (with Walter Prevenier) From Reliable Sources (in German as Werkstatt des Historikers). and commerce. She is completing a book called Commerce Before Capitalism. CHARLOTTE MASEMANN teaches history at Carleton University in Ottawa. a ricercatore in Economic History at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Florence and Senior Research Fellow of the Department of History at Queen Mary. and material culture. The Marriage Exchange. LUTZ KAELBER received his Ph. MARYANNE KOWALESKI is Joseph Fitzpatrick.D. which received the 1999 Best Book award of the American Sociological Association’s Sociology of Religion section. where she also serves as Director of the Center for Medieval Studies. New York. urban society. towns and trade.J. and The Black- . His research interests include Weberian studies. as co-editor. Merchants. She specializes in the social and economic history of the Burgundian Netherlands. Her publications include Women Production and Patriarchy in Late Medieval Cities. Past & Present (2006). and women and family. where John Munro was her Ph. She is a recent graduate of the Centre for Medieval Studies at the University of Toronto. MARTHA HOWELL is the Miriam Champion Professor of History at Columbia University. and Markets: Inland Trade in Medieval England (1997) and his recent articles have appeared in Speculum (2002). New Jersey. Her publications include books and articles on maritime history.. comparative historical sociology. and on the history of the world economy during the twentieth century. 2007). shipbuilding and energy use from late antiquity through the eighteenth century. Great Britain and the United States. His most recent works deal with the history of brewing in medieval Europe and with Renaissance cartography.xx CONTRIBUTORS well Companion to the Middle Ages (forthcoming. He is currently writing a study of elements of regional cohesion in Germanic Europe in the late Middle Ages. He is currently writing a book on the medieval jury system. from the Middle Ages to the present. . in particular of the Low Countries. UNGER succeeded John Munro teaching medieval economic history at the University of British Columbia where he is a professor. His main research is focused on socio-economic and financial history of Europe. RICHARD W. HERMAN VAN DER WEE is Professor Emeritus and former holder of the Chair of Social and Economic History at the University of Leuven (Belgium). He is the author or editor of fifteen books and numerous major articles on medieval Flanders and comparative pre-modern urbanisation. specializing in the history of shipping. He has received fellowships from the American Council of Learned Societies and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. DAVID NICHOLAS is Kathryn and Calhoun Lemon Professor Emeritus of History at Clemson University. He is a member of the Royal Academy of Belgium and a foreign member of the Academies of the Netherlands. It is surprising to note how wide that field of work actually is and how many historians of different specializations it has brought together. the Netherlands and Belgium during the summer holidays to indulge in a methodical plundering of our archives in order to satisfy his constant hunger for research. this preface provides a formal framework within which to record. in this case. 1348-1478.PREFACE Herman Van der Wee Three—a magical number and. the number of unique reasons to accept with both hands the invitation to write a preface to the liber amicorum that is being offered to John H. Cloth and Gold: Bullionism in Anglo-Burgundian Commercial Relations. Secondly. to introduce this book. A. I can still see him. A visit to a colleague in the course of that year brought us into chance contact. it affords me the pleasure of introducing the reader to the various chapters constituting the book. My friendship with John Munro dates back to the beginning of the 1970s. on his arrival in Brussels. with the intention to add to the original data bank and to incorporate the analysis of the new data and its results into the upcoming volume. a fellow-traveller of long standing. At that time. he was preparing for publication his doctoral thesis Wool. very successfully defended in 1964 at Yale University. However strictly John held to the opening and closing times of archives—no minute could be lost—many evenings and weekends were kept free for cultural relaxation and get-togethers with friends. In the first place. Lastly. it serves as a vehicle to express the admiration for and appreciation of John Munro’s impressive academic oeuvre. whether they address themselves to Munro’s own academic field of work or to his broader academic interests. making a detour to . it is a privilege for me. the joys of many years of friendship. in an informal fashion. A sabbatical leave fellowship during the 1970-1971 academic year allowed John to resume his research in Belgian archives and libraries. thanks chiefly to John’s regular trips to England. For all these reasons. Munro to mark his retirement. and the acquaintance grew into a warm friendship. critical eye.2 HERMAN VAN DER WEE pick up concert programmes in the ‘Bozar’ (Palais des Beaux Arts). Cloth and Gold. music. He has always been prepared to share new ideas and theories. 1340-1478 was a milestone in the historiography of Anglo-Dutch relations during the Late Middle Ages. all the while reading and assessing everything with a sharp. as well as his own hypotheses and discoveries. The results were staggering and led the publisher Variorum to collect John’s most important article-length contributions in two publications: Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries. 1350-1500 and Textiles. Subsequent research prompted him to analyse this complex problem more deeply and. moreover. John extended his field of work in space. as a true academic. a quality that I have come to value more and more over the years. we have spent delightful summer hours at the seaside. In the area of monetary history. he sought an . a weekend with John was never complete without a musical event. the flow of absorbing academic discussion giving way to chin-wagging about what was close to our hearts—family. is no mean rival in his life to historical research. knows how to value a well-constructed piece of work. What for me has been the cement of such a long-lasting friendship is without doubt John’s generosity. The same generosity is to be found in his interest in other people’s work. he has been and is an interested and lively travelling companion along the sometimes lonely paths of late medieval and early modern history. to make considerable improvements to his initial hypotheses. indeed. In this. music. his approach was two-pronged: it was aimed not only at refining the monetary and financial analysis but also at deepening the research on the history of textiles. He is open to new approaches and. in time and in theme. without waiting for the success of any publication of his own. At the same time. in order to lose himself in music during the solitary after-work hours. In a word. He does so with great openness. In fact. Towns and Trade. friends. of course. More than once. the pleasure of being together and. The second reason for my pleasure at being asked to write this preface involves my admiration for John Munro’s impressive academic career. through contributions to various international journals. The struggle for Bullion in AngloBurgundian Trade. with anyone interested in them. The publication in 1973 of his PhD thesis under the new title of Wool. the impact of guilds and crafts. his analytical . and between North-Western Europe and the Mediterranean region. a constant in John Munro’s oeuvre. commercial or industrial? His conclusions produced important new insights into this episode in monetary history. The extension of the geographical horizon also involved commercial development. John Munro has become one of his generation’s most outstanding scholars in respect to the history and economy of the Low Countries in medieval and early modern times. His two crucial chapters in the recently published Cambridge History of Western Textiles—entitled respectively “Medieval Woollens: Textiles. 1000-1500”—not only represent the pinnacle of years-long research but are as farreaching in their effect (other things being equal) for the history of textiles as the invention of the flying shuttle for the development of the textile industry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. c. demographic. In consequence of this impressive academic activity. and the development of purchasing power and the standard of living. became more integrated into his research. He also analysed the industrial and commercial policies of both the central and local governments. the trade between the Netherlands and the Hanseatic towns. and his contribution to our profession has been immense. When discussing with him the writing of an article. including the attendant technological and technical advances in that sector. No topic of the social and economic history of those regions during those periods has escaped his eagle eye. by both land and sea. including the innovations of the early modern period. a book. he focussed on the development of modern financial techniques in North-Western Europe. with particular emphasis on the problem of usury. the history of prices and wages. c.PREFACE 3 explanation for the European depression of the Late Middle Ages: was its cause monetary. In consequence. I have always been amazed by his massive erudition. Textile Technology and Industrial Organisation. In financial history. he studied the development of the textile industry. Closely connected with this area of research was the analysis of the development of economic thought. 800-1500” and “Medieval Woollens: The Western European Woollen Industries and Their Struggles for International Markets. John Munro’s work also continued to maintain its central focus on the industrial history of the Netherlands. Employing an international. or the preparation of a colloquium or a conference paper. a chapter. comparative angle. Francesco Guidi Bruscoli and J. The combination of all these intellectual gifts enables him to fit all the pieces of a research puzzle together admirably.4 HERMAN VAN DER WEE power. Martin and Ivana Elbl. has also created a fully viable framework for historical explanation. John! Students and friends have indeed got down to work. For their part. reflect the broad range of academic interest—“passion” would be a better word—apparent in John’s publications. Lawrin Armstrong. Studies on the development of finance and credit. his writings have not only kept us wide awake. his understanding of the underlying context and his mastery of economic theory. Bolton present the results of their recent research on the Mediterranean region. insofar as a book can. He has not only constructed a huge data bank on social and economic life in medieval and early modern times. credit and finance during the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. Lutz Kaelber. Ian Blanchard. David Nicholas. but have also prompted us—his colleagues and students alike—to get down to work as well. the students looked to emphasize how fruitful his teaching and supervision have been in their university education and no less in their own research. The papers are now presented here in book form and. For their part. The contributions on institutional history by John Drendel and Francesco L. L. Kelly DeVries and . Jeffrey Fynn-Paul. they organized in March 2004 at the University of Toronto a colloquium under the title “Money. Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe: An International Workshop in Honour of John Munro. money. but. On the occasion of his retirement. the colloquium was a resounding success. Susannah Humble Ferreira and Martha Carlin. Thank you.” With their papers. as an outstanding historian and economist. the friends sought to demonstrate the extent of the inspiration they have drawn from John Munro’s academic oeuvre. The central theme running through the book is the business of trade. Mark Aloisio. Furthermore. and Richard Unger (having slipped across the Channel) those of his research on commercial activities in the Netherlands. Maryanne Kowaleski and James Masschaele those of their research in England. In respect of trade. Galassi are very much in line with John Munro’s own important research in this field. As could be expected. and—closely linked to this—studies on the problem of usury in economic thought are among the contributions of Martha Howell. the contribution of Charlotte Masemann on horticulture in Lübeck appears to fall outside the scope of reference. This liber amicorum now offered to John is therefore a deserved tribute to an unrivalled master. Unlike him. For him. Anglo-Dutch relations. especially with reference to England. a theme that has very much gripped John’s attention these last years and that has found expression in his most recent publications on prices and wages. but a point of departure for setting out viable hypotheses. but the research has clearly been placed against the background of the interplay between purchasing power and consumption. both authors focus particularly on the problem of Anglo-French relations. but to say that would indicate only a superficial reading of her study. The way in which this collection of academic contributions of the highest quality is presented is a clear reference to the remarkably wide field of research that John Munro has tilled during his academic career. It is true that she takes horticulture as her subject. for the depiction of a living society. in which the place and function of each actor are marshalled in the correct perspective. At first sight. although Anglo-Dutch relations were never far from centre-stage in that troubled period. in-depth research and a tenacious attachment to primary source material are not goals in themselves. teacher and faithful friend. their contributions hark back to one of the earliest themes of John Munro’s research. 12 March 2004 .PREFACE 5 Maryanne Kowaleski (again) study certain aspects of the Hundred Years War. detailed. x x . Provence and Italy. senior and mid-career historians. John Munro is perhaps best known for his research on late medieval trade and finance. Elbl The essays in this volume have been compiled in honour of Professor John H. peasant studies and economic ethics. The idea of a conference and Festschrift to honour John Munro was conceived separately by three of his formers students—Lawrin Armstrong. in many cases (in the spirit of Munro’s own work) based on archival sources or understudied texts. The essays reflect the wide range of John Munro’s own research interests and those of his colleagues and students: international. Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe” in Toronto on 12-14 March 2004. but also through his influence on several generations of doctoral candidates in Medieval Studies. at which seventeen of Munro’s colleagues and former students presented papers. During his thirty-five years in the Department of Economics and the Centre for Medieval Studies. Maryanne Kowaleski and Ivana Elbl—who joined forces in 2002. Our aim was also to assemble a cross-section of junior. as well as a mix of scholars trained in Toronto and elsewhere. Ivana Elbl. topics reflected in four of the seven . Munro on the occasion of his retirement from the University of Toronto in June 2003. Economics and History. All the papers embody fresh research. The conference organizers and editors sought to strike a geographical balance between the north—with an emphasis (in keeping with Munro’s own enduring focus) on the Low Countries.INTRODUCTION Lawrin Armstrong. John Munro had a profound impact on medieval and early-modern economic history not only through his extensive publications. A. Thirteen of these appear in the present volume. along with commercial ramifications in the Middle East. war economies. regional and local trade. his collaboration on several large-scale research projects and his participation in international colloquia and economic history associations. public finance. They convened an international workshop under the title “Money. Martin M. along with six further papers solicited by the editors. England and France—and the south: the Iberian peninsula. North and West Africa. Martha Carlin maps the complex retail market of thirteenth-century Paris. The Datini material is set in the context of an analytical synopsis of recent research on late medieval European copper mining. arguing that the high degree of market integration observed by historians in the sixteenth century was by no means an inevitable outcome. Mark Aloisio’s examination of the Sicilian-Maltese grain trade in the fifteenth century challenges the assumption that royal policies necessarily facilitated regional market integration. The paper includes. Martha Howell takes up and develops themes she has touched on in earlier studies in a paper on the shifting social functions and juridical definitions of property in the rapidly . ELBL. Richard Unger reviews the economic factors at play in the southern Low Countries during the fifteenth century. International commerce is the focus of three papers. Drawing on the rich resources of the Datini archive in Prato. I.8 L. with excursions across the Channel to England. Martin Elbl’s paper complements that of Blanchard with an exploration of the fourteenth-century trade in Venetian-supplied copper via the Balearics and the Sahara desert to the Western Sudan. in appendix. M. new critical editions and translations of selected key texts. David Nicholas and Richard Unger assess—or reassess—instances of market integration in high and late medieval Europe. Mark Aloisio. manifested most dramatically in the gold crisis of the early fifteenth century. Ian Blanchard considers the impact of changing trans-Saharan patterns of trade on Egyptian specie markets and ultimately on gold prices in western Europe. using didactic and dictaminal texts to showcase evidence related to trade. Three papers highlight local and regional economies. which ranges from the historical literature to geological and mineralogical studies. David Nicholas invokes the economic geographers’ concept of “central place” to sharpen our understanding of the function of thirteenthcentury Ypres as a credit market integrated into wider economic flows in Flanders. Francesco Guidi Bruscoli and J. northern France and at the Champagne fairs. ELBL thematic sections that follow. L. Bolton consider the role of Italian merchant banks in adjusting international trade balances in the mid-fifteenth century in a paper that outlines the initial results of their ambitious project to study and make accessible the records of the London and Bruges branches of the Borromei Bank in a digital format exploitable through software designed to manipulate ledgers and account books kept in the double-entry system. ARMSTRONG. Peasant studies as such have not been a major focus of Munro’s work. In an essay comparing the royal households of Henry VII of England and Manuel I of Portugal. invoking a biological analogy approach to the emulation. and transmission of institutional norms. broadly applicable theory of contract-clause adoption. in which warfare played such a key role.” and much of Munro’s research has focussed on the late medieval crisis. a problem hitherto largely ignored by traditional military history. “money is the sinews of war. Finally. Ivana Elbl offers a wide-ranging reassessment of Portuguese royal policy in West Africa that stresses continuity with earlier. Three essays take up this theme. drawing on a range of documentary and. The study develops a tentative. Susannah Humble Ferreira argues that the tendency to enlarge the royal household underpinned the fiscal reforms of both kings. but the two papers included here nevertheless reflect his methods and approach.INTRODUCTION 9 changing economic environment of late medieval Ghent. medieval models of revenue extraction and fiscal administration. Maryanne Kowaleski offers a positive assessment of the war’s impact on the economies of English port towns. archaeological evidence. James Masschaele focuses on surviving records of tolls and toll collection to develop a model for assessing the volume and nature of trade in thirteenth. mutation. more importantly. Ivana Elbl. Jeffrey Fynn-Paul’s close study of the relationship between demographic and fiscal crises in the late fourteenth-century Catalan city of Manresa proposes a model for interpreting similar phenomena in other European city-states dependent on funded public debt. Kelly DeVries examines the financing of the Hundred Years War and highlights the effects on military outcomes. Building on her pioneering research on medieval Exeter. According to a medieval cliché. Jeffrey Fynn-Paul and James Masschaele examine the relationship between public finance and broader economic and social trends. John Drendel brings economic criteria to bear on the question of the apparent revival of servile labour in late medieval Provence.and fourteenth-century England. One of Munro’s earliest publications revisited the “Weber thesis” and has proved prophetic of the current revival of Weber studies . Francesco Galassi takes a quantitative look at adaptations in Italian share-cropping contracts over a period of seven centuries. Charlotte Masemann creates a detailed profile of the market-garden economy of late medieval Lübeck. Elbl September 2006 . now McMaster University. in its execution. Martin Elbl typeset the volume. the Centre for Medieval Studies. and finalized the camera-ready copy for printing on the presses of the Koninklijke Brill NV. for her contribution to copy-editing the manuscript. the Departments of Economics and History (University of Toronto). Lawrin Armstrong. who here argues for the centrality of the usury prohibition in Weber’s account of the medieval economy. The editors and contributors offer the essays collected here as a fitting tribute to an inspiring teacher. ELBL exemplified by the work of Lutz Kaelber. of Jamie Smith. the Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies. We also wish to acknowledge the generous assistance of Andy Orchard and Rosemary Beattie of the Centre for Medieval Studies in planning the workshop. a doctoral candidate in the Department of History. University of Toronto. graduate students at the Centre for Medieval Studies. We are particularly grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and to the Department of Economics. formerly of Trent. I.10 L. and Elizabeth Archibald and Nicole Hamonic. Leiden. who underwrote the costs of preparing the manuscript for publication. M. Lawrin Armstrong’s paper takes up this theme by considering the vexed relationship between medieval canon law and moral theology expressed in two influential fourteenth-century treatises on usury by the jurist Giovanni d’Andrea and the ethicist Gerard of Siena. prepared the production versions of various maps. *** The editors and conference conveners wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. and the Department of History. Martin M. of several colleagues at the University of Toronto who moderated sessions. Trent University (Peterborough). Finally. ELBL. ARMSTRONG. and of Katherine Walker. friend and colleague. we wish to record our gratitude to Herman Van der Wee of the University of Leuven for his encouragement of and participation in the workshop and for his kindness in supplying an elegant preface to this book. the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (Toronto). for their liberal sponsorship of the workshop that gave rise to this volume. and a testimony to the continuing vitality of the field to which he has devoted his career. Ivana Elbl. Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Loren Brandt. and John Munro (area editors). xvi + 326. and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries.. Erik and John Munro. . A. Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries. Towns. Rainer Metz.” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire/Belgisch tijdschrift voor filologie en geschiedenis 44 (1966): 1137-59. Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Hampshire. Textiles. Munro. xvi + 312.. ca. Vol. Pp. and Brookfield. Maxine Berg. Louis Cain. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 355. Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Hampshire. Paul Lovejoy. Leuven: Leuven University Press. Wool. Jan de Vries. Studies in Social and Economic History. Maristella Botticini (assistant editor). Leuven: Leuven University Press. Eddy H. Articles in Scholarly Journals and Essays in Books and Collected Studies “Bruges and the Abortive Staple in English Cloth: An Incident in the Shift of Commerce from Bruges to Antwerp in the Late Fifteenth Century. 1988. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History. 1992. Coinage in the Low Countries (14th-18th Centuries). xii + 242. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. G. Cloth and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in AngloBurgundian Trade. 1994.. Aldershot. John H. MUNRO: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS Monographs and Books Munro. Pp. Aldershot. and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Ed. Van Cauwenberghe. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. Pp. Aerts. 1350-1500. 1990. Pp. Vol.. John. Franz Irisgler. and Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Aldershot. and Brookfield. 1340-1478. 292. reprinted in John Munro. A. 1994. and John Munro. I: AntwerpBruges-Brussels-Ghent. Munro. 1973. 19. 2003. New York: Oxford University Press. John. 124. Towns. Erik Buyst. by Joel Mokyr (editor in chief). in 5 vols. Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles. Pp. eds. and Brookfield. Textiles of the Low Countries in European Economic History. Textiles. Hampshire.JOHN H. . and numismatic topics in the correspondence of Erasmus. reprinted in John Munro. “Monetary Contraction and Industrial Change in the Late-Medieval Low Countries. David Herlihy. Aldershot. “Industrial Protectionism in Medieval Flanders: Urban or National?” In The Medieval City. I]. 1335-1500. A.D. “Wool-Price Schedules and the Qualities of English Wools in the Later Middle Ages. British Archeological Reports. 169-239. 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N4.economics.chass. 1300-1470: Did Money Really Matter?” JEL Classification: F4. N1. J5. E6. E5. N4. http://www. N4. READ PAPER/PDF [538 Kbytes] [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-03]. J5. F4. A.economics. Q1 READ PAPER/PDF [717 Kbytes].utoronto. L1. R4. http://www. N3. K2.” PDF [29. N4. and Real Incomes in Late. N3. J3.Medieval England and the Low Countries.chass.utoronto. Fifth to Eighteenth Centuries: The Limitations of Power.utoronto. J3. Technology. Monetary Changes. and Transaction Costs.” JEL Classification: F1.3 Mbytes].html “Flemish Woollens and German Commerce during the Later Middle Ages: Changing Trends in Cloth Prices and Markets. J5. J1. H3. http://www. N7. L6. K2.1290-1550. J2. J4. F2. Monetary Changes. http:// www. N7. E6. [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-04]. c. N6.html “Wage Stickiness. H2.utoronto. J1.ECIPA-MUNRO-00-05. N7. E4.ca/ecipa/ archive/UT. J6.html “Wool and Wool-Based Textiles in the West European Economy. H3. and Real Incomes in the Age of Erasmus: The Purchasing Power of Coins and of Building Craftsmen’s Wages in England and the Low Countries. N2. economics. [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-01-01]. [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-02].ca/ecipa/archive/UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-01-02. N6. J3. E5. G2. Warfare. N4.” JEL Classification: F1. 1200-1600. html “The Origins of the Modern Financial Revolution: Responses to Impediments from Church and State in Western Europe. READ PAPER/PDF [1581 Kbytes].ca/ecipa/archive/UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-01. N7. N3. L1.html “Figures 1-34: Wage Stickiness.html “Industrial Energy from Water-Mills in the European Economy. N6-7. J3. F3. . . 23-26 September 1977. in conjunction with the Annual Meeting of the Medieval Academy of America.” Paper delivered to the Colloquium on Medieval Textiles in the Mediterranean Basin. and again to the Social History Group of Ontario (Toronto) on 5 February 1978. at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Monetary Change.en Agrarische Geschiedenis of the Rijksuniversiteit Gent (Ghent. “Mint Outputs. “Depression and Culture in Fifteenth-Century Flanders and Brabant. North Carolina) on 18 November 1971. 32nd Annual Meeting. on 25 March 1971.. 7103 of the Centrum voor Economische Studiën). at the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies.D.” A revised version of “Mint Out- .” Paper delivered to the Comparative World History Workshop: Conference on Pre-Modern Monetary History. at the Royal Ontario Museum of Toronto.” Paper presented to the Conference on “The Dawn of Banking”. “Scarlets and the Economics of Sartorial Splendour in the Middle Ages. 1272-1663: A Study in Monetary Management and Popular Prejudice.” A revised version of “Scarlet and the High Cost of Dyeing in the Middle Ages. Belgium) on 12 March 1971 (and published by this institute in mimeographed form as Report No.C. Belgium). on 6 October 1973. 40-1. A précis of this paper has been published in Abstracts of Papers Delivered to the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Musicological Society (Chapel Hill and Durham. This paper was subsequently delivered also to the Seminarie voor Streeks. Mass.” Paper delivered to the Seminarie voor Middeleeuwse Geschiedenis of the Vrije Universiteit te Brussel (Brussels. on 5 December 1977. “Bullion Movements and Monetary Contraction in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. at Amherst. Los Angeles.” Paper delivered to the Midwest Medieval Conference. University of California.” delivered to the “Five Colleges Medieval Seminar” at the University of Massachusetts. on 11 May 1977. in November 1973. 1971). “La lutte bullioniste anglo-bourguignonne: sa contribution à la chute de l’industrie drapière de luxe et à l’essor des nouvelles draperies en Flandre et en Brabant. “The Coming of Spanish Wools to the Low Countries: An Industrial Transformation of the Fifteenth Century. 1235-1500 A.BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS 29 vain. at Duke University (Durham.” Paper delivered to the American Musicological Society. “Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange in England. 11th Annual Meeting. “Scarlets and the High Cost of Dyeing in the Middle Ages. 30 August-3 September 1977. and Economic Contraction in LateMedieval England and the Low Countries. University of Toronto. 1430-1480. Belgium) on 19 April 1971. Also delivered to the Economic History Workshop. N. “The Renaissance: Rediscovery and Exploration.” at the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association.” Paper delivered to the Theme C-7 section. Kalamazoo. Deflation.” A very considerably revised and expanded version of “Scarlets and the Economics of Sartorial Splendour in the Middle Ages. “The Late-Medieval Bullion Famine and Deflation in North-West Europe: A Critique of the Postan Thesis. “The Luxury Trades of the Silk Road: How Much Did Silks and Spices Really Cost?” Paper delivered to the Royal Ontario Museum Continuing Education Symposium “Silk Roads—China Ships. and Industrial Change in the Late Medieval Low Countries. on 13 May 1984.” of the 8th International Economic History Congress. Baltimore. Michigan.” on 10 September 1978. Maryland. and Monetary Change in Late-Medieval Brabant. 1334-1484.” delivered to the University of Toronto Economic History Workshop. Monetary Change.30 JOHN H.” Paper delivered to the Economic History Workshop. MUNRO puts. and Economic Contraction in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. “Inflation. 18 August 1982. on 20 October 1980. and Prices in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. University of British Columbia. University of Toronto. 1335-1500.” 19 November 1983.” Paper delivered to the Thirteenth Medieval Workshop.” Paper delivered to the Nineteenth International Congress of Medieval Studies. 5 December 1983. “Monetary Contraction.” delivered to University College Symposium Four. “Flemish Textile Production and the Changing Structure of Market De- . and the Big Problem of Petty Coinage in LateMedieval Flanders. at Western Michigan University.” Paper delivered to the “Third Oxford Symposium on Coinage and Monetary History: Coinage and Economic Development in the Low Countries. “Minting. on 16 January 1978. “The Medieval Scarlet and the Economics of Sartorial Splendour.” Paper delivered to the Workshop on “Medieval Monetary Problems: Bimetallism and Bullionism. “The Fullers’ Guild and Industrial Strife in the Low Countries.” 12 October 1983. on 21 January 1982. Depression. on “Minting and Monetary Circulation. A.” delivered to the University of Toronto Economic History Workshop. “Economic Depression and Culture in the Fifteenth-Century Low Countries. University of Toronto.” A much revised version of “Depression and Culture in FifteenthCentury Flanders and Brabant. Moneys-of-Account. “Mint Outputs. Money. 23 September 1982. Budapest. “Late Medieval Urban Institutions.” at the University of Toronto. 13401500. ” Public lecture delivered at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Louvain. 15001800.” Paper delivered to the Second International Conference on “The Production and Transfer of Precious Metals and Monetary Structures in Asia. “The Role of Petty Coinage in Monetary and Price Fluctuations in the Low Countries. Japan.” Paper presented to The Stockton Colloquium of 1985: “Production and Transfer of Precious Metals and Changes in the Monetary Structures of Latin America and Europe.” Paper presented to the 44th Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association. “The Nature of Price Changes in the Late-Medieval Economy: A Critique of the Postan Thesis. . and Prices in the Low Countries and England. and the Changing Qualities of English Wools in the Later Middle Ages.BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS 31 mand. 1270-1500.” Paper presented to the Ninth International Economic History Congress. and Europe. Illinois.” Public lecture delivered to the Universitaire Faculteiten SintIgnatius. on 9 June 1987. Universiteit Antwerpen (Antwerp. Department of History and Center for Medieval Studies (New Brunswick. 17 April 1985. at Western Michigan University. Michigan.” Paper presented to the 20th International Congress on Medieval Studies. 1450-1550. at Chicago.” Lecture-seminar given at Rutgers University. 1300-1500. Stockton. “Structural Changes in Late-Medieval Textile Manufacturing: The Flemish Responses to Market Adversities. 21-23 September 1984. in Bern. California. Belgium) on 5 November 1986.” at the University of the Pacific. New Jersey).” Public lecture sponsored by the Department of History. 10 May 1985. 16 April 1985. Mint Outputs. on 3 October 1985. Tokyo. Federal Republic of Germany. 26 August 1986. Department of History and Center for Medieval Studies (New Brunswick. Kalamazoo. 1334-1484. “The Behaviour of Wages During Deflation in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries.” Invited lecture given at Rutgers University. “Environment. New Jersey). “The Central European Silver Mining Boom. “Petty Coinage in the Economy of Late-Medieval Flanders: Some Social Considerations of Public Minting. Belgium) on 13 November 1986. Switzerland. America. 7 June 1985. Land Management. “Industrial Change in Textile Manufacturing in the Late Medieval Low Countries: Responses to Market Adversities.” at Keio University. “Wage Movements and Deflation in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. 15th to 19th Centuries. University of Trier. ” organized by the Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies and the Arizona State College of Business. A. University of Toronto. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Price. 1540. “Kredit im Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit. 1290-ca. Wissenschaft. sponsored by the Pasold Research Fund. and Wage Fluctuations during the Late-Medieval ‘Great Depression’: Did Money Matter?” Paper delivered to the Tenth International Economic History Congress. “The Flemish ‘New Draperies’: The Death and Resurrection of an Old Industry. “The New Draperies: The Death and Resurrection of an Old Flemish Industry. Senior Alumni Association. Towns.R. “Urban Regulation and Monopolistic Competition in the Textile Industries of the Late-Medieval Low Countries. Belgium. 21 August 1990. 13th to 16th Centuries. on 20 June 1989.” Paper presented to the conference “An Urban Context: Medieval and Modern Cities. Siena. at Leuven. ca. at the Certosa di Pontignano. Belgium. on 26 March 1988.” Paper presented to the Anglo-Low Countries Conference on the New Draperies.32 JOHN H. London. at Phoenix. England. Chester. 13th to 16th Centuries”]. at University College. on 14 April 1988. Session C. Arizona. Jugend und Kultur des Landes Schleswig-Holstein und die Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel.” Paper delivered to the Second SalzauKolloquium. “International and Local Banking in Medieval and Renaissance England. 1350: Economic Progress or Economic Crisis?” Paper delivered to the Historical Geography Research Group. [Revised and extended version of “The Flemish ‘New Draperies’: The Death and Resurrection of an Old Industry. University of Toronto. and Trade: Industrial Urbanization in the Low Countries. held at the Herrenhaus Salzau. Schleswig-Holstein. c. and the Workshop on Quantitative Economic History. “Industrial Transformations in the Northern Textile Trades. 1200-1600. held at Chester College.). “Oriental Spices and Their Costs in Medieval Cuisine: Luxuries or Necessities?” Lecture delivered to the Canadian Perspectives Committee. “On the Origins of Negotiability: Some Credit Innovations in AngloFlemish Trade.” at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. in Leuven. Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries.16: “The Economic Depression of the Renaissance Revisited.” Paper presented to the Economic History Workshop. 1360–c.” sponsored by Die Ministerin für Bildung.” Paper delivered to the Tenth Inter- . on 15 July 1989. “Monetary. 8 November 1988.” Paper delivered to the International School on the History of Banking and Finance (University of Siena-C. Third Anglo-American Seminar on the Medieval Economy and Society.N. on 24 October 1988. Italy. 23 April 1990. MUNRO “Textiles. Belgium.” Paper presented to the Economic History Workshop. “Maritime and Overland Trade in Textiles between the Low Countries and Italy. University of Illinois at Champagne-Urbana. Arizona. at the Westbury Hotel. Economic History Workshop.” Paper delivered to the 28th International Congress on Medieval Studies. at Western Michigan University. on 22 March 1991. Ontario. on 5 November 1990. at Western Michigan University.” Paper delivered to the Economic History Workshop. Department of Economics. “Monetary Policies. Ontario).” Paper delivered to the 38th Annual Convention of The Canadian Numismatic Association. Kalamazoo.” at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Towns.” Paper delivered to the Annual meeting of the Medieval Academy of America. Toronto. on 7 May 1992. Entrepreneurship. Session B-15: “Textiles of the Low Countries in European Economic History. on 23 August 1990. “The Belgian Archives. and Labour Strife in the LateMedieval Flemish Cloth Industry. at Western . and Trade: Urban Institutions in the Decline of the Medieval Flemish Woollens Industry.” Paper presented to the Convegno internazionale: “Banchi pubblici. on 8 April 1993. and Labour Strife in the LateMedieval Flemish Cloth Industry.BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS 33 national Economic History Congress. “Coinage Debasement as a Fiscal Policy: The Economics and Mechanics of Medieval Mint Manipulations. and Labor Strife in the Flemish Textile Industry. Michigan. Northwestern University. Kalamazoo. 1390-1435. “Monetary Fluctuations. Exchange Rates. banchi privati e monti di pietà nell’Europa preindustriale: amministrazione. “The International Law Merchant and the Origins of Negotiable Credit in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Michigan. “Textiles. on 2 April 1993.” held at the Università di Genova. 1353-1507.” Paper delivered to the 27th International Congress on Medieval Studies. 1991 Educational Forum. University of Toronto. “On the Origins of Negotiability: Credit Instruments and the Law Merchant in Anglo-Flemish Commerce. at the Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval Studies. University of Western Ontario (London. on 2 October 1990. at Evanston. Wage Fluctuations. on 23 November 1993. Genoa. 1390-1435. on 23 April 1993. Labour Economics Workshop. on 26 July 1991. tecniche operative. “Bimetallic Ratios.” Lecture delivered to the Centre for Medieval Studies. on 22 April 1993. Italy. 1350-1500. in Leuven. on 6 May 1993. 1200-1600: Which was the More Cost Effective?” Paper delivered to the 29th International Congress on Medieval Studies. Tucson. at the University of Arizona. Sources and Resources Committee. Economic History Workshop. e ruoli economici. University of Toronto. ca. Illinois. Revised version delivered to the Economic History Workshop. at the Burgkloster zu Lübeck.” Seminar paper delivered to the Graduate Students Workshop.” [64 pp. Harvard University. 1300-1800: Vergleichende konjunkturstatistische und wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Wirtschafts. on 6 May 1994. on 24 September 1994. 13 December 1997. 10-12 March 1997.34 JOHN H.” at the Università Bocconi. “The ‘Industrial Crisis’ of the English Textile Towns.” Paper delivered to the 11th International Economic History Congress.] Paper presented to the Seventh Annual Conference on ThirteenthCentury England. ca. Paper presented to the Hanseatic conference. at St. University of Leeds. MUNRO Michigan University (Kalamazoo. “English ‘Backwardness’ and Financial Innovations in Commerce with the Low Countries. Session 201 (“Trade and Transit Markets in Northwestern Europe. on 5 July 1994. John’s College. 1-4 September 1997. c.]. “Anglo-Flemish Competition in the International Cloth Trade. Thirteenth to Twentieth Centuries. Economics Department. Universiteit Antwerpen—Universiteit Faculteiten Sint-Ignatius te Antwerpen. and Infrastructure).] Paper presented to the Colloque Universiteit Gent—Universiteit Antwerpen (IUAP—Stedelijke Samenlevingen in de Laatmiddeleeuwse Nederlanden): “Internationale Handel in de Nederlanden (14de-16de eeuw: Kooplieden. “Wirtschaftliche Wechsellagen im hansischen Wirtschaftsraum. 14th to 16th centuries. Session B-3a. Oxford.Stickiness in the Late-Medieval European Economy.” Paper delivered to the Colloque d’Oxford. 1350-1550"). on 27 March 1997. 1330. “Real Wage Determination and the Problem of Nominal Wage. . “Urban Wage Structures in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries: Work-Time and Seasonal Wages. at St.” [58 pp. Organisatie en Infrastructure/International Trade in the Low Countries (14th-16th centuries): Merchants. Milan. University of Toronto. “The True Weights of the Marcs de Troyes in Late-Medieval France and Flanders: Evidence from Flemish Counterfeiting and Monetary Ordinances. Michigan). “Labour and Leisure in Historical Perspective.”at the Universiteit Antwerpen. Session 419: Medieval Arithmetic and Calculation. University of Durham. Massachusetts. ECO 4060Y. Organisation. Cambridge. on 13 September 1994. Aidan’s College. 11 December 1997.” Paper delivered to the First International Medieval Congress. 1388-1469. on 14 April 1995. [38 pp. 1290-c. 1340-1520: Endogenous and Exogenous Factors in the English ‘Victory’.” Lecture presented to the Department of History. “Flemish Woollens and Hanseatic Commerce during the Later Middle Ages: Changing Trends in Markets and Cloth Prices. A.und Handelsgeschichte im Spätmittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit. of the Centre Européen des Études Bourguignonnes. 1290-1550. 25 August 1998. 1330” above. “The Low Countries (Export Trade in Textiles with the Mediterranean Basin. Delivered to the Center for Early Modern History. 1290-c. Wage.und Handelsgeschichte im Spätmittelater und in der frühen Neuzeit.Medieval England and the Low Countries. 1300-1450. on 6 March 1998. 1500-1808.” at the Twelfth International Economic History Congress in Madrid.] Paper presented to the annual meeting of the Classical and Medieval Numismatics Society.” [29 pp. “Wage-Stickiness. France and England: Determining the Weight of the Marc de Troyes and the Tower Pound from the Economics of Counterfeiting.] A revised version of “The ‘Industrial Crisis’ of the English Textile Towns.] Paper presented to Session B.” [56 pp. 10th-17th Centuries. 1330.] Paper presented to the international conference on “New Trends in Late Medieval Studies. Denmark.” at The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters. in Copenhagen.] Paper presented to Session C. 1135-1820: A New View of ‘Long-Waves’. “The ‘Industrial Crisis’ of the English Textile Towns. c. “Determinanten der Entwicklung von Preisen. Monetary Changes. on 21 February 1998.” at Lübeck. at the Primrose Hotel. “Self-Selection of NineteenthCentury German Emigrants: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century Hesse- .” [32 pp. in Madrid. at the University of Minnesota (Minneapolis). “Monetary History in Global Perspective. c. and Real Incomes in Late. Germany. “Urban Demographic Stagnation in Early Modern Southwest Germany: A Computer Simulation. 1200-1600: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Comparative Advantages in Overland and Maritime Trade Routes. “Precious Metals and the Origins of the Price Revolution Reconsidered: The Conjuncture of Monetary and Real Forces in the European Inflation of the Early to Mid-Sixteenth Century.BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS 35 “Disputes About Mint Metrology in Late-Medieval Flanders.” [64 pp.6. 1388-1469. Commentator on three papers in 19th-century German Demography: Stephan Klasen (Munich). on 24 August 1999. and Monetary Movements in Western Europe.2: “Means of Communication. Löhnen unde des Geldes. 26 August 1998. 1290-c.” [39 pp. 1135-1820/The Chief Determinants of Price. Spread of Information and European and Mediterranean Commerce.” at the Twelfth International Economic History Congress.” [49 pp. on 30 July 1999. “Gender Bias in Mortality in a Comparative Perspective: Excess Female Mortality in Germany in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries.] A paper presented to the conference “Wirtschaftliche Wechsellagen im hansischen Wirtschaftsraum 1300-1800: Verleichende konjunkturstatistische und wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Wirtschafts.” Simone Wegge.” Terence McIntosh (North Carolina at Chapel Hill). Toronto. ” in Prato. “The Late Medieval Origins of the Modern Financial Revolution: Responses to Impediments from Church and State in Western Europe. 1501-1670: A Comparative Analysis.” Paper presented to the 61st Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association. University of Toronto.] Paper presented to the Annual Conference. at the Centre for International Studies. Revised version of the paper presented to the Economic History Workshop.” on the theme “Economia ed energia.” For the Seventh Anglo-American Seminar on the Medieval Economy and Society. Commentary on and Agenda for “Symposium: New Approaches to International Trade. the 32nd Settimana di Studio. Argentina. New Jersey): on 26 March 2001. University of Waterloo.” Paper presented to Session 16: “Wool: Products and Markets (XIIIth-XXth Centuries). and Prospects for ‘Profit Inflation’ in England. Warfare. and Spain. Pennsylvania. in Buenos Aires. Department of Economics. 1000-1500. Brabant. Argentina. Philadelphia. Monetary Changes. on 22 July 2002. secoli XIII-XVIII. and Textiles( [54 pp. 23-26 September 1999. held at Trinity College Dublin and the Royal Irish Academy. “Prices. Rutgers University (New Brunswick.” Paper presented to the 34th annual meeting of the Settimana di Studio.and Sixteenth-Century Low Countries: The Arrival of Spanish Merino Wools and the Expansion of the ‘Nouvelles Draperies’. in Dublin. A. Italy. Fifth to Eighteenth Centuries: the Limitations of Power.” of the XIIIth International Economic History Congress. on Finance and Economic Modernization. University of Toronto. on 13 October 2000. and Finance. “Wage Stickiness. on 26 July 2002. “Industrial Change in the Fifteenth. and Real Incomes in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “Francesco Datini da Prato. of the Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “Francesco Datini. MUNRO Cassel.” Papers presented at the First Conference on German Cliometrics. XVIth-XVIIIth Centuries. secoli XIII-XVIII. . 10 May 2000.” on “Fiere e mercati nella integrazione delle economie europee.” Paper presented to Session 15: “Global Monies and Price Histories. on 16 April 2002. at Loew’s Philadelphia Hotel. c. Paper presented to the Workshop in Money. on 26 October 2001. Department of Economics.” of the XIIIth International Economic History Congress. “Industrial Energy from Water-Mills in the European Economy. “The ‘New Institutional Economics’ and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Transaction Costs.” in Prato.] Paper presented to the Economic History and Labour Workshops. 13-16 July 2001. Department of Economics. History. 1300-1470: Did Money Really Matter?” [93 pp. Italy. Wages.36 JOHN H. in Buenos Aires. on 23 February 2001. ” Universiteit Antwerp. Ontario.” Paper presented to the conference on “Medieval Global Economies.” Prato. Germs. and Dowries in Florence. “‘Builders’ Wages in Southern England and the Southern Low Countries. on 17 April 2003. University of Toronto. “Social Norms. European Textiles. Secoli XIII-XVIII. and Venetian Trade with the Levant and Ottoman Empire. England. “Changing Patterns of Colours and Values of Woollen Textiles in the Southern Low Countries. 11 November 2005. 20 April 2006.” in Prato.” The University of Western Ontario.” Presented to the XXXXVIII (38th) Settimana di Studio.” Presented to the 68th Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association. Demographic Shocks. “South-German Silver. “Flemish Woollens and Hanseatic German Commerce During the Later Middle Ages: Changing Trends in Cloth Markets and Textile Values. “Real Wages and the ‘Malhusian Problem’ in Anwerp and South-Eastern England. Commentary on the paper of Maristella Botticini.” 5 May 2006.” Paper presented to the 12th International Medieval Congress. Population.” Westin Harbour Castle Hotel.” on the theme “Economia ed energia. “Bombs. 1346-1500: A Comparative Study of Trends in and Levels of Real Incomes. London. 10 October 2002. on the theme: “L’Edilizia prima della Rivoluzione Industriale. Department of Economics. Secoli XIII-XVIII. Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “Francesco Datini da Prato. 26-30 aprile 2004. 1720: A Non-mercantilist Approach to the Balance of Payments Problem. 17 September 2005.BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS 37 “Postan. and Prices in Late-Medieval England and Flanders. 1400-1700: A Regional Comparison of Levels and Trends in Real Wages for Building Craftsmen. on 30 April 2004. Toronto. on “War and Economic Growth. Ontario. secoli XIII-XVIII. 1250-1450. Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “Francesco Datini. in the Coach House Conference Room. 1290-1570. c. .” Paper presented to the Second Dutch-Flemish conference on “The Economy and Society of the Low Countries in the Pre-Industrial Period.” Paper presented to the the 36th annual meeting of the Settimana di Studio.” “Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico.” Session 4A. Peut-on comprendre les crises économiques de la fin du moyen âge sans le modèle malthusien? Montréal: Université de Québec à Montréal. Italy. on 12 July 2005 (to session 804: “Transforming Textiles”). “The Late-Medieval Origins of the Modern Financial Revolution: Overcoming Impediments from Church and State.” Paper presented to the Economic History Workshop. 1370 to c. 1300-1550: The Anti-Red Shift—to the Dark Side. and Invaders.” Paper presented to the Colloque de Montréal: Postan-Duby: Destin d’un paradigme. at Leeds. ” “Recasting the Phelps Brown-Hopkins Price-Index for the ‘Basket of Consumables’.38 JOHN H.” “The Mint Outputs and Monetary Statistics of the Low Countries.economics. 13341789. A. MUNRO Research Projects in Progress (for more detailed information see http://www.” “Cloth Prices in the Low Countries (1300-1570) for: Forschungsprojekt “Wirtschaftliche Wechsellagen im hansischen Wirtschaftsraum.” . 1300-1800. 1264-1700.utoronto/munro5/) “Wage Structures and Wage Movements in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries: 1260-1530. x MONEY AND ETHICS x . x x . Unless otherwise noted. in the Politics and the Ethics. A similar remark is commonly attributed to Brecht: “Bank robbery is the business of amateurs: the real professionals found a bank” (“Bankraub ist eine Unternehmung von Dilettanten. on the occasion of his retirement. but not to increase at interest. is usury. 1879.LAW. but which had originated as early as the fourth century B. (Constitutiones clementinae). ETHICS AND ECONOMY: GERARD OF SIENA AND GIOVANNI D’ANDREA ON USURY1 Lawrin Armstrong In the Threepenny Opera. and with the greatest reason. Corpus iuris civilis. as I have said. VI (Liber Sextus Decretalium Bonifacii VIII). which makes a gain out of money itself. in Ausgewählte Werke. 3 “There are two sorts of wealth-getting. translations are my own. which is a measure of value and medium of exchange.. which means the birth of money from money. 267. in the character of Mackie Messer. the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honourable. 1: Stücke 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. when Aristotle. mentor and colleague. not a source of value in itself. and my own research on the topic was inspired by his 1987-1988 graduate seminar on the “Dynamics of the European Economy.. Wahre Profis gründen eine Bank”). while that which consists in exchange is justly censured. 1872-1895). For money was intended to be used in exchange. 1959).. and Clem.. Corpus iuris canonici.3 Medieval ethicists and jurists were in agreement This paper is offered to John Munro. (Institutiones Iustiniani).und Verlagsanstalt. X (Decretales Gregorii IX). and not from the natural object of it. (Decretum Gratiani). Dig. (Leipzig: Tauchnitz. (Berlin: Weidmann. (Digesta Iustiniani). ed. 2 vols. The usury prohibition has long been of interest to Munro. repr. parturition.” An earlier version of the paper was presented at the panel on “Ethics and the Higher Learning” at the Renaissance Society of America Annual Meeting in Cambridge. April 2005. Reference is to the critical editions: Theodor Mommsen et al. The most hated sort. and a mode by which men gain from one another. 1997). one is a part of household management. Die Dreigroschenoper. asks. Graz: Akademische Druck. offspring]. 3 vols. And this term interest [tokos. Decretum Grat. Brecht. vol.C. and Emil Friedberg. “what’s robbing a bank compared to founding a bank?”2 He was expressing an ethical critique of usury that he probably knew via Marx’s Capital. eds. 2 “Was ist ein Einbruch in eine Bank gegen die Gründung einer Bank?” Bertolt Brecht. and I am grateful for the critical comments I received from colleagues there. is 1 . lit. 1350-1750. for it is unnatural. Act 9. The following legal abbreviations have been used in the notes: Inst. condemned profit on loans as an unnatural and asocial use of money. see Odd Langholm. The Church and Economic Activity in the Middle Ages (London and Toronto: Macmillan..4 I shall do so by applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2000): 351-70.1121b.1258a-b. ed. “The Controversy about Marx and Justice. Aristotle touches on usury in the Ethics in a discussion of liberality. For discussions of usury in the wider context of scholastic ideas about economic ethics.. “Bringing Marx to Justice: An Addendum and Rejoinder. which medieval and early modern theorists—including. and Norman Geras. The only comprehensive survey is John T. Ross in Basic Works of Aristotle. those who ply sordid trades. it should be noted. On the influence of the Aristotelian concept of justice on Marx. “Usury.10. see most recently Eric Kerridge. “The Medieval Schoolmen (1200-1400). see John Gilchrist.1984). 1200-1350. 1. 120. pimps and all such people. Politics 1.” Mediaeval Studies 1 (1939): 81-147 and 2 (1940): 1-22. 5: 183-5. The fundamental study of the canonical usury doctrine is T. Protestant reformers such as Luther and Melancthon—regarded as any profit on a loan of money or fungible goods.2. Jr. with documents in translation. 1974). Vol. Wherefore of all modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural. XIII and XIV Centuries). 4 There is an extensive literature on the usury prohibition. 179. Odd Langholm. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 29 (Leiden: Brill. 155-225. Brecht began studying Marx in 1926 and was familiar with Capital. Noonan. see Norman Geras. and those who lend small sums and at high rates.” Nichomachean Ethics. The objective of this paper is to consider the relationship between medieval ethics and law with regard to the problem of usury.42 LAWRIN ARMSTRONG with Aristotle and Marx: to profit from a money loan was a violation of the function of money and an offence against justice. Usury. McLaughlin.4. 4. and Lawrin Armstrong. Interest and the Reformation (Aldershot: Variorum. For brief overviews. trans. 1941). Brecht: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. and Odd Langholm.” New Left Review 1/195 (September-October 1992): 37-69. For a review of the controversy over the ethical content of Marx’s concept of justice. Money and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition. p. 1957). Value. MA: Harvard University Press. Ronald Hayman. W. trans. where he includes the usurer in the species of the miserly who “exceed in respect of taking by taking anything and from any source. Important recent studies of usury include Amleto Spicciani. 2003). For all those take more than they ought and from the wrong sources. 2002). 1990).” New Left Review 1/150 (March-April. P. 62-76. D. “The Teachings of the Canonists on Usury (XII. 1985): 47-85.1. “Marx and Justice. 1992). e. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House. 1969).” in Ancient .” in Joel Mokyr. The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cambridge.” Aristotle. 988. by the time he was working on the Threepenny Opera in 1928. ed. 1983). Volume 1 (Berlin: Dietz. On the Protestant reformers. Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History (New York: Oxford University Press. 1141. Marx cites the Politics passage in his discussion of merchant’s and usurer’s capital in Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. 2. Capitale e interesse tra mercatura e povertà nei teologi e canonisti dei secoli XIII-XV (Rome: Jouvence. The Aristotelian Analysis of Usury (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. see most recently James Daly.g. Benjamin Jowett in The Basic Works of Aristotle. 7 With the publication of the first version of Gratian’s and Medieval Economic Ideas and Concepts of Social Justice. 6 For a recent introduction to medieval canon law. Todd Lowry and Barry Gordon (Leiden: Brill. 12701348) in his Quaestiones mercuriales. “Moral theology” as the name of this discipline is an early modern usage. 1995). on the other. Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge. Before turning to the texts themselves. Berman. and the report and critique of Gerard’s quaestio by the influential fourteenth-century canonist Giovanni d’Andrea (c. Medieval Canon Law (London and New York: Longman. however. and London: Harvard University Press. In the Byzantine empire. In the west. 1998). 85-269. Joseph Goering’s discussion of the post-Gratianic penitential literature in “The Internal Forum and the Literature of Penance and Confession. Lydia G. and Manlio Bellomo. DC: Catholic University of America. however. pp. more precisely. for example. Die Entwicklung der Moraltheologie zur eigenständigen Disziplin (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet. and Diana Wood. 1983). 1970). from secular legal systems was peculiar to the medieval west. 7 A recent overview of the recovery and assimilation of Roman law in medi- . from theology and. 37-55. see Johann Theiner. there was no autonomous discipline of canon law. some preliminary observations on the relationship between law and ethics—or. see esp.5 The development of canon law as a system of positive law distinct. ETHICS AND ECONOMY 43 a review of two texts: the Question on Usury (Questio de usura) of the Augustinian friar and theologian Gerard of Siena († c. 1000-1800.LAW. church law was subsumed to imperial law. on the one hand. 1336). My comments in this paragraph are also inspired by the observations of Harold J. trans. 2002).” Traditio 59 (2004): 175-227. reflecting the union of secular and ecclesiastical authority in the emperor. on the medieval period. ed. The boundaries between law and theology were not always entirely clear with respect to ethical problems.6 In the early church. MA. the rise of universities and the recovery and systematic study of Justinian’s Roman law compilations created the conditions for the birth of systematic canon law. 5 Ethical and moral questions as they related to revelation were a branch of theology. Brundage. see James A. between law and theology—in medieval Europe are in order. Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Canon Law 4 (Washington. 1995). Cochrane. the expansive jurisdictional claims of the popes. ecclesiastical norms were deduced from scripture or articulated by councils of bishops. which historians of economic thought now consider the most influential formulation of the natural law argument against usury in late medieval Europe. see. Medieval Economic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 439-501. The Common Legal Past of Europe. S. On the relationship between theology. on the procedures for papal elections or the rules concerning benefices. 1956). Die Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des canonischen Rechts. but the fact that the subject matter of the canons was often identical to that of theology also created certain tensions of which intellectuals were acutely conscious. 38-103. for example. 3 vols. 8 On the successive recensions of the Decretum and dating. Johann Friedrich von Schulte. 1993). Henry of Susa (c.9 In his monumental Summa on the Decretals of Gregory IX. 5: cols.8 Canon law exercised a profound influence on the character and development of western Christianity. canon law quickly defined itself as a discipline and a body of norms distinct from theology. Graz: Akademische Druck. best known by his sobriquet “Hostiensis. ed. “Henricus de Segusio (Hostiensis). 2: 123-9. ed. Canonists and Texts. 2000) is the most important recent study of the emergence of canon law in twelfth-century Bologna and its relationship both to the revived Roman law and to theology. ed. see Gabriel Le Bras. penance or usury—moral theologians claimed a competence equal or superior to that of canonists. pars posterior. Popes. Anders Winroth. 195-204. 122-45. (Stuttgart: Enke. For biographical information. . but on the behavioral norms—for example.” was the most influential and creative canonist of the thirteenth century. Theology had little to say.” in Raoul Naz.44 LAWRIN ARMSTRONG magisterial textbook. around 1140. repr. the Decretum. Roman Law in European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fritz Schulz.” in Kenneth Pennington. 1953). which soon became the central text of the theology curriculum. One example will suffice to illustrate the tension between law and theology with regard to economic questions. published around 1253. the norms governing marriage. Susanne Lepsius for providing me with a copy of this article. Hermann Kantorowicz and Giuseppe Rabotti. 1200-1271). “Hostiensis. Faculté de Droit et Sciences Économiques de Grénoble (Paris: Éditions Montchrestien. 18751880. see Winroth.” in Études historiques à la mémoire de Noël Didier. the Sentences. 1999). The Making. 9 He was appointed cardinal bishop of Ostia in 1262 by Urban IV. 1211-28. “Théologie et Droit romain dans l’oeuvre d’Henri de Suse. and Kenneth Pennington. 1150-1550 (Aldershot: Variorum.und Verlagsanstalt. Roman law and canon law in Hostiensis’ thought. The Making of Gratian’s Decretum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1960). XVI: 1-12. Charles Lefebvre. The latter found its authoritative statement in Peter Lombard’s almost contemporary handbook. Studia Gratiana 10 (1968): 141-5. Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique (Paris: Letouzey et Ané. Hostiensis privileged Roman eval Europe can be found in Peter Stein. see Thomas Diplovatatius. Liber de claris iuris consultis. I am grateful to Dr.. contains a veritable digest of the Roman law of usury: how it was contracted. and attempting to reconcile Roman law with ecclesiastical authority on points where the two were clearly at variance. “Teachings. “Théologie et Droit romain. 1963). 1619). because according to both laws [canon and Roman] once prescription is complete he who prescribed is secure .LAW. for on account of worldly need the emperor could not entirely annul the burden of usury.. col. that he was not in violation of another’s right. after prescription. cit. 11 Summa aurea. however. “But what.. Charles Lefebvre.19 de usuris. for what reasons and at what rates of interest. 10 Le Bras. ETHICS AND ECONOMY 45 law concepts over ideas derived from theology in the analysis of canonical problems.5-7 (Venice. [the prescriber] becomes aware that he possesses the property of another. nn.. Theology and law.” Hostiensis asked. if somebody who has legitimately prescribed thinks that he sins mortally by retaining the thing prescribed. “Hostiensis. Prescription was a mode of acquiring ownership through an extended period of uncontested possession. noting (but generally minimizing) dissonances between Roman law on the one hand and canon law or theology on the other.7 (ed. X 5.10 Hostiensis’ discussion of usury. 12 “Hoc de iure humano. He devoted extensive portions of most titles of the Summa to Roman law definitions and distinctions. differed over the necessity of “good faith. 1615-19. Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo. the Hostiensis routinely chided theologians for applying rigid and abstract standards to economic problems. see McLaughlin. n. although he diminished it. for instance.. For a detailed discussion of juridical opinion on this point. repr. Therefore..” 1: 84-95.11 Acknowledging that such contracts were now disallowed by virtue of the canonical prohibition. X 5.” the prescriber’s honest belief. if. Nam propter mundi necessitatem non potuit imperator ex toto cassare obligationem usurarum. cols. .. even if mistaken. 1574. he nevertheless defended the (Christian) emperor Justinian’s approval of usury on the grounds of social necessity: “thus with respect to human law. while the masters of the canons commonly say the opposite.” 202-3. It seems to me that on this question the conscience of the theologians is too angelic .”12 Similarly. 1219-20.19 de usuris.” cols.” Summa. I do not consider him a theologian so much as a fraud.. say he learned for certain that the utensils he prescribed belonged to Martin: should he return them to Martin? The theologians say that he should . sed tamen minuit. . rubricella de praescriptione rerum immobilium..14 A similar tension may be observed in Giovanni d’Andrea’s adoption and critique of Gerard of Siena’s natural law case against usury. “Théologie et Droit romain. nam aliter .. the usurer was thereby absolved... But neither do I want to be so unfair as to comfort the theologians and drive people to desperation and lay snares for their souls . On Hostiensis’ privileging of conscience. col. Therefore it should be said and maintained that. quia completa praescriptione tutus est qui praescripsit secundum utrumque ius . and Charles Lefebvre. Hostiensis (and most other canonists). By contrast. X 5. Moral theology insisted that usurers make complete restitution of the sums extorted from their debtors. for otherwise he places himself at risk. Mihi videtur quod in hac quaestione conscientia theologorum est nimis angelica . 14 “Non scribo hoc in favorem usurariorum. sed nolo a rationabili recedere ut theologis faveam et in desperatiam inducam homines. 726).. urged discretion in exacting restitution.. Dicendum est igitur et tenendum quod precibus possit vel iussu iudicis sine pactione partium remissio fieri. puta audivit et pro certo quod haeres quas praescripsit erant Martini: numquid ipsas debet reddere Martino? Theologi dicunt quod sic . et sic dicam talem usurarium absolutum.. quia nec eis astrictus sum.46 LAWRIN ARMSTRONG for he fears what is above suspicion. igitur si quis credit peccare mortaliter retinendo rem praescriptam legitime.19 de usuris.. ... Si tamen eius conscientia ratificari non potest. col.” Summa.13 Restitution of usury was another point on which theologians and canonists differed.. he should obey it and return the thing.12 (ed. .. Of 13 12 “Sed quid si iam completa praescriptione conscientiam rei alienae incipiat habere. “I do not. if he cannot compose his conscience. 1634).. maintaining that if a debtor freely remitted part of the amount due to him by way of restitution.” Ephemerides iuris canonici 13 (1952): 319... ipsum non theologum iudico sed fraudulosum. X 2.” 201. n. write this in favour of usurers. reddat rem and sequatur conscientiam. provided there was no [prior] agreement between the parties.26 de praescriptionibus. Nevertheless. ac parem laqueum animarum . Magistri canonum communiter contradicunt. cit. “Aequitas canonica et Periculum animae dans la doctrine de l’Hostiensis. see Le Bras.” Summa.3 (ed. a usurer may ask or a court order that part of the amount owed in restitution be forgiven. cit.” he insisted. and I say that a usurer so forgiven is thereby absolved. for I owe them nothing. cum id timeat quod nulla suspicione est dignum. periculum non evadet.... n. 16 The Questio is a redaction of a public disputation Gerard presided over as a master of theology. which is mutable. fols.18 As Gerard himself put it. possibly patrician by birth. 2: 204-5. ETHICS AND ECONOMY 47 Gerard himself we know almost nothing. 1630). proemium. and Langholm. see Langholm. a Sienese. 2: 97). esp. 1925-1935). Tractatus de usuris et de praescriptionibus (Cesena. “Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters: Vertreter und Philosophisch-Theologische Lehre.15 He was. cod. La Bibliothèque Thomiste 21. probably in the first decade of the fourteenth century. according to some meta-legal standard. 209r). 19 “Talis namque actus ex natura rei contrariatur virtuti et ex natura rei ha- . MS 894. 165-93 (hereafter “Cesena”). 65r-66r.” Analecta Augustiniana 27 (1964): 208-9. is usury “by the nature of the thing itself wicked and bound up with malice. and Adolar Zumkeller. perhaps in the canon law faculty of Bologna. where he appears to have taught in the early to mid1330s. His commentary on the Sentences enjoyed great authority in the fifteenth century.17 The basic question Gerard posed in his disputation was this: is usury illicit because it is forbidden—that is. one of the two extant copies of the Questio de usura. Medieval Schools. Medieval Schools. Glorieux. Die Geschichte. Leipzig. I am currently preparing an edition of the Questio de usura for the Toronto Medieval Latin Texts series based on the other surviving copy. “Die Augustinerschule. After studies in Italy. P. Aristotelian Analysis. 18 Questio de usura. 2:97. 17 According to the cartulary of the University of Paris.19 15 For the scant details. simply because of positive law. Gerard disputed the problem in Paris (fol. Cesena. where he was admitted bachelor of the Sentences in 1325 and master of theology in 1329. I provide parallel references to the more readily accessible edition of Angelo Vancio. (Paris: Vrin. 625. that is to say. According to Rome. Gerard presided there as a regent master in 1330 (Glorieux.” 209. La littérature. Universitätsbibliothek. 549.LAW. La littérature quodlibétique. For reasons of convenience. who joined the Augustinian friars. see Schulte. 549-60. most likely in Paris in 1329 or 1330. For additional references. Biblioteca Angelica. he went to Paris. 16 Gerard’s status among fifteenth-century theologians of his order is attested by Zumkeller. Quotations of the Questio are from my forthcoming edition with folio references to the Leipzig manuscript (hereafter referred to as “Leipzig”). but for historians of economic thought it is his disputed question on usury that is of greatest interest. For an assessment of his place in the history of economic thought. and the evidence of this is that usury is permitted in Roman but not in canon law—or is it forbidden because it is illicit by nature. 2 vols.” illicit. 30-1 and 118-28. as his sobriquet suggests. Leipzig. though possibly somewhere in Italy. 165-8. see Langholm. 174. art. Jean Ribaillier. is neither diminished nor does it deteriorate” (“Ideo qui locat agrum vel do- . quodlibet 5. which most theorists interpreted as time. 111-8.24 However. lib. repr. 1891). Frankfurt am Main: Minerva. such as rental and lease agreements. art. The argument was adopted by Innocent IV in his analysis of credit and discount sales. such as houses or boats.” Questio de usura. proemium. 1980-1986). fol. 5: 528b..21 For example.88 c. Cesena. art. tractatus 48. Summa aurea. nos..2 (Frankfurt am Main. 24 (Louvain. Thirdly. repr. But money. so to speak. Cesena. ed. 2. 1646. 68r. it is illicit to charge for a money loan. 2. bet a Deo auertere et deordinare ac per consequens ex natura rei viciosus et malicia conuolutus. and Bonaventure († 1274). it was often argued by lawyers and theologians that usury was illicit because it involved the sale of the time that elapses from the granting of a loan until its repayment. 22 Decretum Grat.. 2.22 Gerard considered the argument frivolous (“ista racio . Commentaria. ad X 5. For theological opinion. For a discussion of the theological texts. D. Leipzig. omnino videtur friuola”) because the passage of time is a factor in many legitimately profitable contracts.11 palea Eiiciens. 3.88 c.” Questio de usura. 19. see Giles of Rome.11 palea Eiiciens condemned the usurer for selling “a thing given by God” (“ipse namque rem datam a Deo vendit”). For the text. see Langholm. Spicilegium Bonaventurianum. 20 “Assignare autem de hoc causam per quam euidencius demonstretur quod contractus usurarius habet ex natura rei viciositatem et maliciam conuolutam non puto omnino facile. Cesena.23 Or again. Since coins do not deteriorate in use. 4 vols. Bonaventurae. that is. which contrasts usury to rental: “He therefore who lets a field or a house is seen to relinquish his own use of it and to accept money and. like air and water.. Aristotelian Analysis. 176. 65r. a field or a house deteriorates through use. Leipzig. 3. Bonaventurae. 16-19. Gerard took the critique from his fellow Augustinian Giles of Rome († 1316). D. Leipzig. 173-6. Leipzig. cap. Langhom. cap. 23 Questio de usura. Time. 166. 67r-68v. fol. to exchange one profit for another. q. n. 1968).6. as Gerard astutely observed. fol. 2. when it is lent. rentable things. 338a. Cesena. 67v. fols. 517va. is common to all and therefore non-vendible. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva. Collationes de decem praeceptis. 2: 831. however. Quolibeta. “it is not altogether easy to assign a reason” for the latter proposition20 and the most striking feature of the Questio is its demolition or fundamental revision of all of the traditional arguments advanced against usury. 21 Questio de usura.48 LAWRIN ARMSTRONG In Gerard’s view.19. 1966). collatio 6. see William of Auxerre († 1229). Aristotelian Analysis. in Opera omnia (Quaracchi: Collegium S. q. fol. 1570. . 112. (Paris and Rome: Centre national de la recherche scientifique and Collegium S. 24 Canonical authority for the argument was provided by Decretum Grat. it was often maintained that a charge was only permitted in loans of things that deteriorate through use. since occupation of a house. non consumitur nec deterioratur. According to Roman jurists. Cesena. dubium 7. non sic autem est de aliis rebus.1.pr. oil or wine.pr. Buckland. art. veluti vino oleo frumento pecunia numerata aere argento auro. magis tendunt ad defectum. distinctio 37. n. 1963). see Langholm. that is.” 1: 98-102. it was unjust to charge him for the use of what had become his own property. 2. A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian. a loan of a fungible.. derived from the Roman law definition of a mutuum. whose use involved its consumption or destruction. for example. from the eighth century onwards. Pecunia autem fuerit mutuata. in a loan of a fungible. quae secundum quod magis et diutius eis utimur. nec ueterascit”).. quas res aut numerando aut metiendo aut pendendo in hoc damus. the church in the west repudiated such agreements on the authority mum. .: “Mutui autem obligatio in his rebus consistit.. and McLaughlin. 3. 125. by which the debtor promised an additional payment called usurae. lib. quae pondere numero mensurave constant. 68r. “Teachings.” See also the parallel definition at Dig. 26 Inst. Bonaventurae.” 25 “Ista racio. W. quia ita a me tibi datur. and the one usually adopted by canonists.2. On the restriction of usury to fungibles. see Noonan.3. nec minuitur. often improves its condition. Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum. ETHICS AND ECONOMY 49 rental charges are not really compensation for damage. 38-51.26 Specie—precious metal in a minted state—was considered a fungible because its use necessitated its alienation—its “consumption”—in exchange for other things. 12. fol. 28 W.14.. Unde etiam mutuum appellatum sit. 3: 836a: “Alia vero ratio est.” Questio de usura.” See also Dig.14. in Opera omnia (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Leipzig. a term which in Roman law had no negative connotations. 12.2.25 A more serious objection to usury. who was not required to repay the identical substance of the thing lent. rev. sed aliae eiusdem naturae et qualitatis reddantur. Aristotelian Analysis. 27 Inst. a thing like grain.1. 3. but simply its equivalent in terms of quantity and quality. 176. si quis bene considerat. 1887). et quodammodo quasi commutare uidetur cum lucro lucrum. 3. quia videmus quod domus illa de cuius usu accipimus pensionem vel fructum sepe melioratur per habitacionem. ut accipientium fiant et quandoque nobis non eaedam res.28 However.2. Peter Stein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 464. . quia pecunia. See also Bonaventure. ut ex meo tuum fiat. dum in usum vertitur. Because the debtor became the owner of the thing lent..LAW. est digna derisione. For a discussion.1. et pecuniam accipere. Tertio ager vel domus utendo ueterascit. ownership passed to the debtor. Scholastic Analysis. continues: “. 3rd ed. suum usum dare uidetur.27 Classical Roman law circumvented this purely conceptual problem by means of an additional contract termed stipulatio. 1. fols.” and it is this monetary value from which the usurer extracts his profit. quia remanet in suo dominio. 2. 67v. Et hoc ipsum videtur sufficere.35 was cited as an anti-usury tag in the decretal Consuluit (X 5. 30 “Hec autem racio. 2. Leipzig. de Propaganda Fide. not the substance of the coin or other fungible. tamen videtur valde dubia quia licet maior proposicio sit manifesta. et semper potest eam licite expetere. Cesena. in such things it is impossible to separate the thing and its use—as you can in the case of a rentable thing such as a house or a boat—therefore to grant the use of the thing is to grant its ownership. minor tamen videtur falsa. Aristotelian Analysis. art. 236-44. See Langholm’s observations. and Langholm. ownership of the lent thing continues to vest in the creditor “with respect to the identity and equivalence of the value. and he therefore sells the same thing twice or sells something that does not exist.19. in Opera omnia (Rome: S. however. 31 Summa theologiae. quamuis videatur valde pulchra et apparens. In Gerard’s view. The Church and Economic Activity.”31 It goes like this: the proper use of a fungible thing is its consumption. q. secundum quem modum ad eum pertinet. or at least in need of correction. 1897). 9: 155. Medieval Schools. secundum quem modum ad eum non pertinet nec potest eam repetere. 175-6. Cum enim dicitur quod fenerator exigit lucrum de re non sua. which is clearly unjust. quia ipse fenerator non exigit lucrum de pecunia quam mutuat in quantum talis substancie est. see Langholm. Lc 6. 174-5. sed exigit magis de ea in quantum tanti valoris est. quia debitor non tenetur restituere eandem pecuniam secundum substanciam. 558. 78. 75. Cesena. Gerard outlines the argument at Questio de usura. quamuis transseat in dominium debitoris quantum ad ydemptitatem substancie. this argument is “exceedingly elegant and clear” but fundamentally flawed because. The usurer.29 In Gerard’s view. fol. remanet tamen dicta pecunia in dominio feneratoris quantum ad idemptitatem et equalitatem valoris.10) of Urban III (1185-87). For a detailed discussion.” Questio de usura. wants to sell coin and its use separately. the analysis is “doubtful” (dubia).30 The most persuasive theological argument against usury was a variation of the ownership analysis proposed by Thomas Aquinas († 1274) and known to historians of economic thought as the “consumptibility argument. Aristotelian Analysis. where Jesus commanded his followers to “grant a loan without expecting anything in return” (“mutuum date nihil inde sperantes”). Leipzig. see Langholm. On this point. quia pecunia quam mutuat. . art.50 LAWRIN ARMSTRONG of Lc 6. potest dici immediate quod est falsum.35. 67v-68r. 2a 2ae. 62-3. C. although ownership of the substance indeed passes to the debtor. since it could be maintained that although the 29 Gilchrist. art. 81-9. Medieval Schools. specie) as well as natural (for example. 2. 33 For Aristotle. it is not because of any change in their intrinsic value expressed in 32 “Ista eciam racio videtur dubia quia posset aliquis dicere quod fenerator non vendit usum rei quam mutuat sine ipsa re. 68r.26.LAW. n. 176-82.”32 Nor. For a more complete discussion than that offered here. weight or number a fixed and determinate value that remains unchanged provided the measure. does it help to cite Aristotle’s view that it is unnatural that an artificial thing like a coin should give birth to another coin. “since in the same way as [the creditor] transfers the thing itself. Cesena. 68r. 68r-70r.”36 Fungibles—artificial (for example.35 He began with the Roman law definition of a fungible as something that can be “counted.33 Thus it might be said that “a house gives birth to a house” when a landlord uses his profits to buy another house with a view to letting it out. weight or number remains constant. transfert et ipsum usum et econverso. If such things appear to increase or decrease in value. Leipzig. 555-60. and therefore he does not separate the one from the other as the aforesaid reasoning supposes. and Langholm.” is very elegant. 176. 34 “Sed nec ista racio videtur valere propter duo. Medieval Schools. see above. et sic domus pareret domum. in a loan they are necessarily identical. 118-28. immo simul vendit utrumque. Leipzig. characterized by Langholm as a theory of the “self-valuation of fungibles. 2. quapropter non separat unum a reliquo sicud supposuit dicta racio. artificial things such as houses legitimately “give birth” or produce profit in the form of rent. ETHICS AND ECONOMY 51 use and ownership of a fungible are indeed logically separable. Primo quia usura committitur non solum in artificialibus sed eciam in naturalibus. et per consequens dicta racio non potest applicari tantum ad illa. measured or weighed. Langholm discusses the argument in Aristotelian Analysis. . 557. quia eo modo quo transfert ipsam rem. since natural things such as wine and oil can also be the subject of usurious loans.” Questio de usura. see Langholm. 2. 89-90. art. Furthermore. Cesena. fol. fols. Secundo quia videmus quod domus est quoddam artificiale et tamen usque ad certum tempus potest quis per unam domum lucrari aliam domum equiualentem. Gerard’s argument is contained in Questio de usura. Medieval Schools. 176. 36 See above.34 Gerard’s correction of both Thomas and the canonists. quia alienat a se non solum usum rei sed eciam ipsam rem quantum ad substanciam et ideo quantum ad hoc idem iudicium videtur de utroque. n. 35 The description is at Langholm. and vice versa. wine or oil)—he argues. fol. Aristotelian Analysis.3. Leipzig. Cesena.” Questio de usura. art. art. he also transfers its use. derive from their measure. utpote in vino et oleo et similibus. in Gerard’s opinion. By demanding more than the amount lent. the usurer therefore violates the intrinsic—the natural—value of a fungible determined and fixed by its nature or art in terms of number. fols.52 LAWRIN ARMSTRONG terms of number. Leipzig. Cesena. 39 See Langholm. but because of a fluctuation in the value of the things for which they may be exchanged. not a bushel and a half. 37 . such as time.. oleum et consimilia. quandoque ex condicionibus personarum. 2. in suo modo sic dico de alijs rebus que consueuerunt mensurari. a fungible is never worth more than itself. sicut vinum.38 For this reason they are not comparable to one another and cannot be the subject of a loan (mutuum).37 Thus. Natural and artificial nonfungibles—for example. they are necessarily sterile: “Idcirco ab intrinsico sue nature potest certitudinaliter cognosci eorum valor. do not affect the value of fungibles: in terms of number. vineyards. fol. Et sicud de rebus que consueuerunt ponderari. nec augentur nec minuuntur in suo valore quamdiu non distrahuntur in suo pondere. hoc non est propter aliquod augmentum vel minucionem valoris qui sit in eis sed per augmentum et minucionem nostre indigencie siue eciam propter augmentum vel minucionem in alijs rebus in quas commutantur. ita et in quibuscumque alijs rebus naturalibus que non ponderantur vel mensurantur. 177. ex quo possit earum valor pensari et certitudinaliter cognosci. for example for reasons of scarcity. non potest dici de rebus alijs naturalibus. Cesena.39 Because fungibles have a naturally determinate value in terms of number. quandoque ex tempore. Leipzig. immo est impossibile certitudinaliter cognoscere aliarum valorem. measure and weight. quia earum valor non potest pensari aliquo intrinseco ex necessitate sed ex diuersis causis extrinsecis et contingentibus. 558-9. ten florins are always worth ten florins. Contingent variables.” Questio de usura. 68r-v.. Et sicud dico in vinea vel in agro. goats or coin. be worth more in February than in September. weight and measure. but in terms of another substance. a bushel of wheat is always worth a bushel of wheat of the same quality. Medieval Schools. 2. Et si videantur augeri vel minui. condition and place. granum. it may. art. quandoque ex diuersis alijs circumstantijs que possunt multipliciter variari. 68v. ut verbi gratia. art. quecumque sint ille. 177-8.” Questio de usura. valor istius vinee vel valor istius agri quandoque pensatur ex loco. 38 “Hoc autem . by contrast. a bushel of wheat is always worth a bushel of wheat of the same quality. weight or measure. not twelve. measure or weight. Gerard maintained that this analysis also provides a correction to the canonistic argument from ownership. say. houses or horses—derive their value from external and contingent variables. nam alie res naturales non se habent in sua natura ad unum aliquod determinate. 2: 205-29. see Cyprian Rosen. 1581. Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique. “Dalle Quaestiones Mercuriales alla Novella in titulum de regulis iuris. fol. “Johannes Andreae and his Novella on the Decretals of Gregory IX: 40 . art. repr.” For the text of the quaestio. and O. we know a great deal about Giovanni. “Notes on an Earlier Version of the Quaestiones Mercuriales.” Questio de usura. Schulte. 2. “Jean d’André. Liber de claris iuris consultis.LAW.” Revista internazionale di diritto comune 3 (1992): 125-71.” in Naz. 229-39. Die Geschichte. to demand an increment in the form of interest represents a violation of the intrinsically sterile nature of a fungible. 69r. In contrast to Gerard.42 Born in Florentine “Quod autem contractus usurarius faciat rem non generantem fructum generare lucrum apparet quia presupponitur in precedenti processu quod res mutuabiles. Stephan Kuttner. 5 (1975): 103-14. In titulum de regulis iuris novella commentaria (Venice.s.40 Therefore. 89-92. 42 For biographical information. quia res que generat fructum semper excrescit in valore cum fructu. 4: “Peccatum non dimittitur. although ownership of the value of the sum lent indeed vests in the creditor (only ownership of the substance passes to the debtor). have assigned to them by nature or art a determinate value. see Diplovatatius. Stelling-Michaud. in quibus usura committitur. 6: cols. nisi restituatur ablatum. nam maioris valoris est quando est sub fructu quam quando est sine fructu. 62ra-66ra. and the reason for this is that his argument was paraphrased by Giovanni d’Andrea in a quaestio disputata of his own linked to a fragment of the title de regulis iuris in the Liber sextus that suggested the topic of usury: “Sin is not forgiven unless the thing stolen is restored.”41 Giovanni redacted the quaestio sometime between 1329-1330 and his death in the first visitation of the Black Death. The “commentary” is in fact a collection of questions Giovanni disputed on Wednesday afternoons during term and therefore known as the Quaestiones mercuriales. 41 VI de reg. ETHICS AND ECONOMY 53 That a usurious contract causes a thing that does not generate fruit to generate a profit is clear because it is assumed in the foregoing argument that lendable things. Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo. S. in which usury is committed. and as a result cannot increase in value and for the same reason cannot bear fruit. Cesena. On the collection. iur. n. Leipzig. for it is of greater value when it is in fruit than when it is not. for a thing that bears fruit always increases in value along with the fruit. see Johannes Andreae. Giovanni subsequently arranged them according to the chapters of de regulis iuris. 1963). habeant a natura vel ab arte sibi prestitutum determinatum valorem et per consequens non possunt in eo crescere et ex hoc ipso non possunt fructum generare. 179. Condorelli.” Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law. Gerard’s quaestio survives in only two manuscript copies. 550. Aristotelian Analysis. 556-7. Gerard incorrectly characterizes commodatum. 30-1. reproducing the Questio de usura almost verbatim. Noonan described it as the “Andrean argument” against usury. Scholastic Analysis. art. as recently as 1957. xvi. Peccatum. Similarly. 1990). 68v. Studi storici. There exists as yet no systematic study of the life and thought of this important jurist.” Archivum franciscanum historicum 46 (1953): 448-57. de usuris. quoted by Kuttner. n. fol. “Un trattato sulle usure e le restituzioni di Pietro Giovanni Olivi falsamente attribuito a Fr.43 Giovanni’s enormous prestige meant that Gerard’s argument came to be associated with the more famous canonist. Novella. Langholm. 44 Noonan.54 LAWRIN ARMSTRONG Tuscany around 1270 and educated in Bologna. These texts have been edited by Giacomo Todeschini. fol. but rather has an action for recovery of the sum lent: “Tu dic quod non bene advertit hic disputans.” 399.11 (ed. confining himself on the whole to inserting additional juristic allegations in support of Gerard’s points and to correcting inaccurate formulations of legal concepts. 63rb).45 Giovanni endorsed Gerard’s analysis. as a profitable contract: see Questio de usura. the gratuitous loan of a non-fungible thing. 46 For example. fol. friend of Petrarch and professor of canon law at Bologna. ad VI de reg.24. cit. The history of Gerard’s economic writings is additionally confused by the fact that the manuscript tradition sometimes also credited him with authorship of Pietro di Giovanni Olivi’s († 1298) treatises on usury and restitution. Peccatum.” Novella. non est dare quod creditor unus ex illis sit dominus. Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo. 4. fasc.46 Most subseAn Introduction. n. 67. in Stephan Kuttner. cit. ad VI de reg. Studies in the History of Medieval Canon Law (Aldershot: Variorum.11 (ed.44 It was the distinguished Norwegian economic historian Odd Langholm who corrected the attribution and established the importance of Gerard’s analysis for late medieval economic thought. Cesena. A counsellor of popes. 45 Langholm. 43 “Iuris canonici fons et tuba”. Medieval Schools. indeed. quia si debitor haberet unum scrinium nummorum. John T. 175. 125-6 (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo. and Giovanni’s comment.” The Jurist 24 (1964): 393-408. he was the most celebrated canonist of his day. iur. he left influential commentaries on the entire corpus of canon law and was posthumously dubbed “the fount and trumpet of canon law” by the civilian Baldus degli Ubaldi († 1400). 1980). Un trattato di economia politica francescana: il “De emptionibus et venditionibus. Leipzig. 63rb). Giovanni objected to Gerard’s use of the term “owner” (dominus) to describe the creditor: he owns neither the substance nor the value of the principal. 2. “Johannes Andreae. repr. iur. de restitutionibus” di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi. see Dionisio Pacetti. habet autem principalem actionem contra debitorem. n. 4. . Gerardo da Siena. 7. sed quod antea habeant certum et determinatum valorem durante pondere.13 (ed. that is. Peccatum. Usury and Public Debt in Early Renaissance Florence: Lorenzo Ridolfi on the ‘Monte Comune. 48 “Ego de plano concederem quod facilior est harum aestimatio et maxime tempore quo contrahitur restringendo ad illud. especially when concluding a contract. 2652. Giovanni—and later canonists echo him on this point—had an important reservation about the argument as it stood.” Tractatus de usuris. As applied “Sed quia hoc [that is. Giovanni declared that he did not understand why Gerard insisted that fungibles have a fixed and determinate value in such terms by nature: I would readily concede that the valuation of fungibles is simpler. 50 See the passage immediately preceding that just quoted.19. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. and this appears to be the burden of the qualifying “antea” (“beforehand”) in his comment. Giovanni seems to have objected to the proposition that the categories of number. ed. Peccatum.50 Nor. Giovanni Calderini refers his readers to Giovanni d’Andrea’s quaestio in a repetitio on X 5... 47 . n. 144.13 (ed.’ Texts and Studies 144 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. n. 283v-284r. 557.49 But the text of Giovanni’s quaestio indicates that he did not understand Gerard to be arguing that the value of fungibles cannot fluctuate in terms of other commodities.19 Naviganti. numero vel mensura. fol. iur.48 Langholm suggests that Giovanni misunderstood or simply rejected the argument. the latter described Gerard’s argument as both “useful and elegant. such as Giovanni Calderini († 1365) and Lorenzo Ridolfi († 1443). followed suit: indeed. ad VI de reg. n. paulisper in eo euagemur. did he reject the argument in general. fols. Medieval Schools. non alternandum in plus vel minus. q. ad VI de reg. While agreeing that the valuation of fungibles in terms of number. weight and measure was a convenience. Lawrin Armstrong. that usury is naturally vicious] utile et pulchrum videre est. but I do not understand why fungibles should have an inalterable fixed and determinate value beforehand provided the weight. lat. weight and measure derive from the nature of fungibles. see Vatican City. ETHICS AND ECONOMY 55 quent canonistic authorities on usury. Vat. he did not misunderstand the argument. clearly. pars 1. which reproduces Gerard’s observation about the price of fungibles in terms of other things (see above. cit. iur. fol. 49 Langholm.37). Novella. non capio.”47 Nevertheless. 4.LAW. 4. 63vb). number or measure remains constant. cit.” Novella. 2003). by restricting it to [a fixed and determinate measure]. 63vb). Gerard’s objective was to reformulate the Thomistic consumptibility argument in a form that rendered it unassailable by resolving an inconsistency that derived in part from Thomas’ over-faithful adherence to Aristotle’s remarks about artificial fungibles. In 1317 John XXII promulgated a decree of the Council of Vienne (1311-1312) which increased the penalties for notorious usurers and imposed excommunication on public authorities who tolerated their activities. is to direct human society towards the common good “in accordance with faith in God and in expectation of the future life.”51 Gerard of Siena’s sweeping critique of usury was very much in the spirit of the times. measure and weight: they are conventions agreed upon by human society.” Questio de usura. Giovanni’s critique went to the heart of Gerard’s question and transformed the terms of the debate. fols. It is precisely this point that Giovanni singled out. the remainder of Gerard’s argument holds good. art. 190. which is the realm of canon law. Cesena. 52 The decree Ex gravi (Clem. the value cannot fluctuate with respect to number. 5.. 71v-72r.5. 5. number. For a translation.56 LAWRIN ARMSTRONG to fungibles. Leipzig. whose function. which witnessed an intensification of the usury prohibition. He appealed to the supra-conventional and metalegal standard of nature as the ground for distinguishing between fungibles and non-fungibles.52 It would be a mistake to con51 “Ius vero canonicum intendit dirigere in bonum commune secundum quod congruit humane societati. For Giovanni. University of Chicago . they are the product of positive law. see John W. insisting on the conventional character of the definition. What does this appropriation and correction of a theologian’s argument by a jurist tell us about the relationship between law and ethics in the later Middle Ages? In a certain sense. there is nothing natural about number. measure and weight. In short.1) condemned the legitimation of usury as quasi-heretical and forbade the public licencing of usurers. With this caveat. the only definition of a fungible to which he had access was one that itself derived from law and convention. The value of a fungible is fixed by the contract—not by nature—and once the agreement has been concluded. Unfortunately. weight and measure are conventional constructs that have significance only in a contractual context and more specifically in the context of a loan. eds. Boyer and Julius Kirshner. que non solum viuit ciuiliter sed eciam regulariter secundum fidem in Deum tendendo et vitam aliam expectando. as Gerard himself asserts. . . On the contrary. indeed. ed.” in John A. “Teachings.. dicens se ad nundinas ire velle. dummodo nil fiat in fraudem usurarum et dictus mercator dicto modo non consueverit pecuniam tradere ad usuram. illud locum habet post moram debitoris.LAW. cit. most accepted Giovanni’s judgement on cessant gain and his endorsement of Gerard’s natural law argument against usury. “Usury. 54 “Quid si habens pecuniam volebat ad nundinas ire et merces emere. 1986). what modern economists call “opportunity cost”. Noonan. et ex contrario pararetur aperta via ad foenus. ETHICS AND ECONOMY 57 clude from Giovanni d’Andrea’s reservations about Gerard’s argument that lawyers were somehow more accommodating of usury than their theological colleagues. Verius videtur dictum Innocentii et quod dicitur de interesse.” Novella. ipse putat hunc contractum usurarium. Marino and Thomas Kuehn. Morrison (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. see McLaughlin. 115-28. n. Conscience and Public Debt: Angelo Corbinelli’s Testament of 1419. ut alio deferret vel tempore servaret propter lucrum. ocreis et calcaribus ad modum Foroiuliensium.54 Late medieval and Renaissance canonists were not. ad X 5. Medieval Europe. quod facturus erat verisimiliter ex pecunia. more “business-friendly” than theologians. ego indigens pecunia illam recipio. offerens me illam restituere cum lucro sperato in termino et loco? Dicit hic Innocentius quod licet quidam contrarium teneant. 4. 173-240. On the penalties for usury. “Teachings.53 In Giovanni’s view lucrum cessans “furnishes a highway to usury” and should therefore be rejected. lucrum cessans (cessant gain). Julius Kirshner and Karl F. 317. fol.55 The relationship between canon law and ethics in late medieval Europe is a subject that merits further study. Capitale e interesse. eds. 55 For a critique of some of the assumptions underlying the historiography. Giovanni d’Andrea was among the most severe critics of the so-called “extrinsic titles” to usury.19. see Lawrin Armstrong. staret enim usurarius paratus cum capello. vol. and Spicciani.” 1: 144-7. Gerard does not cite the decree in his quaestio.” 2: 1-22. most notably the title first proposed by Hostiensis according to which a merchant might claim compensation for legitimate opportunities to profit that he renounced by making a loan.. and trans. Hostiensis . 27-48. the existing scholarship on medieval economic ethics.. 2004). A Renaissance of Conflicts: Visions and Revisions of Law and Society in Italy and Spain (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies. see McLaughlin. si sibi liceret taliter stipulari sub colore lucri speranti aliquid ultra sortem.5 (ed. dicit quod tali mercatori obligatus sum ad interesse illius lucri. Scholastic Analysis.19. nec scit illum excusare. Although the two disciplines were clearly in accord about behavioral norms. namely. as the literature sometimes suggests. and this (admittedly narrow) case study suggest Readings in Western Civilization. 53 For discussions. 77vb). particularly on the usury prohibition. 58 LAWRIN ARMSTRONG that a fruitful area of research will prove to be the relationship between—and relative weight assigned by law and theology to— nature and convention. . Lawrin Armstrong. the anonymous reviewers for Max Weber Studies.” reflective of the dominance of purposive rationality in social relations. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 235. he notes that Weber had analyzed provisions against usury in a variety of settings and contexts. Relating his studies to Max Weber. xi. The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood. 2nd ed. Levin Goldschmidt.” or charity among kin. as he writes in the prologue to the second edition. and Sam Whimster for their comments and suggestions. While medieval historians and economists continue to debate what if any effect the Catholic church’s ban on taking interest on loans had on economic development.MAX WEBER AND USURY: IMPLICATIONS FOR HISTORICAL RESEARCH1 Lutz Kaelber Introduction Scholarly interest in usury varies widely across the disciplines. reproduced here with permission of the journal. to one of “universal otherhood.3 Yet Nelson provides no substantive discussion of Weber’s more intricate viewpoints. perhaps due to the fact.4 Since then few sociologists have acknowledged that Weber included references to the prohibition of contracting any increment above the principal of a loan in medieval Catholicism and in other An earlier version of this paper was published under the title “Max Weber on Usury and Medieval Capitalism: From The History of Commercial Partnerships to The Protestant Ethic. 4 Nelson. including while being a student of commercial law and history under the auspices of the acclaimed authority in the field. sociologists have abandoned the topic. 1969). Only Benjamin Nelson has afforded it a detailed analysis. The Idea. 3 Nelson.” in Max Weber Studies 4 (2004): 51-75. that his book had been fully formed before he came across Weber’s writings. The Idea. I would like to thank Nick Danigelis. 2 Benjamin Nelson. John Munro.2 Nelson reconstructs the history of religious attitudes toward usury in the Western world using the Weberian theme of a transformation from an ethic of “tribal brotherhood. 1 . over a variety of his writings. The second section addresses usury in the context of Weber’s Protestant Ethic essay published in 1904-1905 and subsequent rebuttals of his critics. Usury was not a peripheral topic in Weber’s writings. Fragmented and strewn. 5 . The topic emerged in Weber’s dissertation and gradually came to constitute a part of Weber’s inquiries into the salvation economy of medieval Christianity. N. Weber questioned the validity of Werner Sombart’s materialist interpretation of the role of ethics in economic development. The first section explores the emergence of Weber’s views in the context of his dissertation and first book.15. who found innovative ways to cope with the moral regulation of economic affairs and ultimately render them ineffective. these views nevertheless provide important insights. Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology (Princeton: Princeton University Press. which contains his most extensive discussion of the medieval prohibition of usury and its effects on economic development. Moreover.5 This paper addresses the development of Weber’s views on usury. his earlier approach. Solomon (Stanford: Stanford University Press. Paradoxes of Modernity. 343 n. 258 n. 226-7. and even fewer describe and analyze what these references entail and what they mean. Weber drew on his new explorations of the relationship between religion and the economy as well as his earlier studies on the German stock exchange to argue a point that was consistent with. Weber argued. 1996). but not identical to. who acknowledges that Weber “discusses usury quite a bit” without further analysis. trans. and Richard Swedberg.60 LUTZ KAELBER religions. in bits and pieces. Had religion been merely the reflection of material conditions in the transition from a feudal to a capitalist economy. 1998). Here. who notes that Weber considered the ban on usury a part of the traditionalist ethic of the pre-Reformation church that inhibited the emergence of modernity but does not explore the context of Weber’s argument and why Weber thought this to have been the case. Drawing parallels between medieval guild members and modern stockbrokers. It also addresses similarities and differences between Weber’s views and those held by contemporary scholars. many of whom saw the emergence of certain economic institutions such as commercial partnerships as a means of evading the Church’s ban—an argument Weber refuted. religious See Wolfgang Schluchter. Weber’s writings on the topic contain insights pertinent to recent scholarship.247. The content of Weber’s thought is discussed in three sections. 6 In a little-known and heretofore never discussed section. it contains a legal analysis of medieval partnerships. Published in 1889 and based on his dissertation. Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter (Stuttgart: Enke. Weber explores the topic to a greater extent than in any other writing and establishes the framework for later analyses. trans. see also L. The third section addresses Weber’s views on usury as they derived from his comparative studies on the world religions and Economy and Society. In The History of Commercial Partnerships. 1889). Weber responds to the argument that medieval partnerships were founded to circumvent canon law’s prohibition of usury. Max Weber. Rejecting new claims by Sombart and others that the medieval Catholic church’s ban on taking interest on loans was a boon rather than a bane for investing assets.” History of the Human Sciences 16 (2003): 27-56. While a discussion of the merit of Weber’s argument is beyond the purview of this paper.MAX WEBER AND USURY 61 authorities would not have expressed heightened concern regarding usury in times of economic expansion. MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Weber thematized the development of markets and the development of usury prohibitions as countervailing rationalizations of the religious sphere and the sphere of the economy. Kaelber. “Max Weber’s Dissertation. a loan of capital in return for the payment of 6 Max Weber. The Role of Usury in Economic Development and the Relative Autonomy of Law and the Economy: Weber’s Dissertation Weber discussed usury as early as in his first book. from an economic point of view. 2003). The History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages. He notes: Endemann argued that even loans that represented. Weber compared different religions’ usury provisions and demonstrated that their stringency did not correlate with economic development. which secular statutes adopted as well. the conclusion endeavors some thoughts on how Weber’s views may inform current scholarly debates concerning the historical role of the religious prohibition of interest on loans in Western history. Kaelber (Lanham. L. . according to the statutes of Pisa. the oldest area of large trade. The role played by the canonical prohibition was therefore not a small one. There is no evidence for that. But one cannot argue that the development of a new institution of law. rather than a subtle attempt to circumvent the prohibition of usury.... Therefore. happened due to this prohibition. or merely the further development of an existing institution. why the investment of capital took on the form of a share of the risk in exchange for a share of the profit.. even for the property of wards. the development of the forms of partnership. in need of capital. in Italy as well as in other places. it is a vast exaggeration to assume that capital invested in such a way had chosen this form of investment because there was no way for it to be invested in the form of an interest-bearing loan.. When the doctrine of usury—if one can agree that such existed— appeared on the economic scene. at that time these partnerships had already developed into their most advanced form in the Middle Ages. We know of similar attempts to construct the purchase of perpetual rent as a hidden interest-bearing loan secured by a mortgage. It also explains why forms of partnerships that economically resembled a loan still appear to have legally been constructed as partnerships with a fixed dividend. and that it fulfilled independent economic needs and not at all acted as a stopgap for the missing interest-bearing loan. there is evidence of the contrary . but this view has been abandoned. While we have also seen that the commenda and the societas maris were indeed used as forms of investment. explains why part of the risk was assumed by capitalists... had long been concluded. Almost all statutes addressed it . the repayment of a loan taken out for the purpose of funding the venture had to appear highly questionable. This. This institution corresponded to views prevalent in Mediterranean trade. This holds true even when capital available for investment later employed this institution—but not before it had come to fruition independently—as a substitute for the non-existent interest-bearing mortgage loan . In the case in which a maritime venture experienced a catastrophic loss. in fact. which could not perceive of the investment of capital for the purpose of an expedition overseas in any other terms than as a participation in it—that is. as sharing its risk as well. The analyses by Arnold and others have shown that the purchase of perpetual rent developed gradually out of renting real estate in towns. the latter of which nascent commerce..62 LUTZ KAELBER fixed interest were constructed in the form of a partnership. as Lastig has strongly argued against Endemann.. Changes in these views reflect the fact that risk became more calculable. This explains . The prohibition led to the end of some institutions such as the dare .. supplied willingly . as Weber shows for the city of Pisa. Weber. was very limited. See Weber.7 Weber makes four important arguments here. 136-7.” where an investor invested in a company operating out of a shop. These facts show clearly that the prohibition of usury did not give rise to the form of partnership. 111-4. First. who merely contributed his capital without further involvement and relied on a fixed dividend or rate of return (certum lucrum). more common types of partnerships. Zur Geschichte. and in the various forms of partnerships capital found ready investment opportunities. Investment loans were more important for economic development than consumption loans. and it later fell victim to this doctrine once it had fully taken hold. Zur Geschichte. 109-10. 122. Weber. 137-9. he argues. The prohibition of usury was therefore not entirely without teeth. whereas for the latter it led to the decline of the dare ad proficuum maris. For the former the prohibition of interest was indeed a constraining factor. 8 Weber. Even the proficuum maris. The History. a share in which could then be reasonably guaranteed. Weber. Weber. both on land and at sea. not creative. Its equivalent on land was the “dare ad proficuum de terra in bottega vel alio loco. which corresponds most poorly to the institution of a partnership but seems best suitable as a paradigm of Endemann’s theory. which was based on a capitalist’s willingness (literally) “to give for making profit on maritime voyages. it also served a restrictive. appears to have been fully developed before the doctrine of usury took hold. 145. it also made the partnership vulnerable to the accusation of usury and led to its ultimate demise. Its demise was not due to the way in which risk was distributed but happened because of the certum lucrum. I have made corrections or retranslated parts of them. The History. Zur Geschichte. Since in 7 In this and other passages taken from English translations of Weber’s writings. The History. The usury ban’s effect on those partnerships.8 While this arrangement took out the risk for the capitalist. and otherwise. some of which are buried in obscure language and references. when diminishing risks on commercial voyages to sea ports in the Mediterranean allowed for the calculation of an average profit. he does not advocate that usury laws were without impact. Weber’s second argument relates to the investment of capital in other. function. Weber distinguishes between loans for consumption and loans for investment purposes. .” That form of partnership developed in the later Middle Ages.MAX WEBER AND USURY 63 ad proficuum maris. 1988). the prohibition of usury simply did not apply to most of the commercial associations Weber explored. 12. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism of 1919-1920. 10 Weber’s History of Commercial Partnerships and his Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen über Allgemeine (“Theoretische”) Nationalökonomie (Outline to the Lectures on General [“Theoretical”] National Economy) of 1898 mention Endemann on several occasions (Max Weber.. 57 n. In 1874 and 1883. 17).9 it focused more on usury laws’ legal construction. It was not the first study that addressed usury. 3d ed. In doing so. Endemann’s tome was considered the major study of this sort at the time. 176 n.10 he takes issue with Endemann’s contention that medieval partnerships developed mainly as a means of circumventing increasingly stringent usury laws. which. Weber refers once more to Funk (whose name he misspells) and to Endemann’s studies that. with certain exceptions. . 2001).. he could legitimately reap a profit. M.” whom he mentions in the quoted passage. “Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus.64 LUTZ KAELBER most medieval partnerships a partner who provided capital incurred the risk of losing it and sometimes involved himself in carrying on business. Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen über Allgemeine (“Theoretische”) Nationalökonomie (Tübingen: Mohr. but compared to studies by Catholic theologians and authors such as Franz Xaver Funk’s. Arnold’s major study on the development of real property in German cities included census contracts (an annuity or perpetual rent). Kalberg (Los Angeles: Roxbury. Weber. was prohibited. “[are] today out of date in regard to detail yet still remain fundamental” (Max Weber.” in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I (Tübingen: Mohr. S. Zins und Wucher: Eine moraltheologische Abhandlung mit Berüchsichtigung des gegenwärtigen Standes der Kultur und der Staatswissenschaften (Tübingen: Laupp’sche Buchhandlung. according to him. Hence.32). 1990). Such a profit was seen as entirely different from taking interest on a loan. trans. but while Weber acknowledges Endemann’s contributions (as well as Funk’s). and economic relevance than on their ethical aspects. the legal scholar Wilhelm Endemann had published a massive two-volume study on the economic doctrines in Roman canon law. practical effects. Weber relies in part on the findings of a certain “Arnold. which did not emerge as a response to the prohibition of 9 Franz Xaver Funk. 1868). 16. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. The third argument concerns the timing of the emergence of stricter usury laws and the legal development of partnerships in the later Middle Ages. which is a reference to the scholar of Roman and German history Wilhelm Arnold. . It lacks a separate fund.” in Lexikon des Mittelalters (Munich: LexMa. “Kodifikation im 12. Pisa’s codified commercial customs dating back to as early as c. Weber supports many of Lastig’s views but he also goes beyond the latter’s studies by showing that changes in the legal arrangements of medieval commercial partnerships made them increasingly less similar to an interest-bearing loan or other such types of investments at the same time as the usury doctrine stiffened. 7: 736. buying and selling goods in his own name on the account of the principal. “Beiträge zur Geschichte des Handelsrechts. II. the unilateral and the bilateral commenda. Zur Geschichte des Eigentums in den deutschen Städten (Basel: Georg. In that arrangement.-J. on the other hand. a capitalist provided capital to an enterprise in which a managing partner carried out the business transactions. Classen. For a supportive assessment. see H. Recht und Schrift im Mittelalter (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke.MAX WEBER AND USURY 65 usury. 12 G. Lastig12 had launched an attack on Endemann’s thesis for not sufficiently distinguishing between different types of partnerships and misrepresenting how capital was invested in them. Weber argues that the unilateral commenda is therefore the medieval precursor to the modern form of commission agency. 14 As Weber points out. 1977). Of the two main forms of commendas he studied. 1861). Lastig. for an investor contributes capital but is not made liable to third parties by his partners’ actions. This institution of European . which is a constitutive element of the bilateral partnership. I. ed. 13 P. Lastig. “Rente.” in P. Arnold.” Zeitschrift für das Gesamte Handelsrecht 23 (1878): 138-78. 92. The managing partner did not partake in the risk and gradually developed into the capitalist’s agent. In the Constitutum usus.14 In a bilateral partnership. “Beiträge zur Geschichte des Handelsrechts. and his involvement in the partnership is not transparent to third parties.” Zeitschrift für das Gesamte Handelsrecht 24 (1879): 387-449. Rentenkauf. a se11 W. Gilomen. 311-7. and those of the scholar of law Gustav Lastig.11 Yet Weber’s main argument derives to a much larger extent from his own studies. on medieval partnerships. The risk is thus limited to the investor’s contribution. Weber considers the first one to be historically older. Classen. Jahrhundert: Die Constituta usus et legis von Pisa. Rentenmarkt.13 this form of partnership was known as dare ad portandum in compagniam. the equivalent in modern German commercial law is the “dormant partnership” (Stille Gesellschaft). 1995). In a pioneering analysis of documents in Italian archives. G. 1146-1154. 135. and with regard to the concomitant increase in the spheres’ relative autonomy. In the societas maris referred to in the Constitutum usus. 22-7. the legendary scholar of commercial law Levin Goldschmidt. when the doctrine of usury got its teeth. The History. This finding not only undercuts the argument that religious prohibitions affected these economic changes but also explains why Weber holds that. From a legal perspective the partnership’s capital is separate from the investors’ personal assets. Weber argues.” in Weber. see L. The History. While interdependencies are always empirically observable. derivative of associations of craftsmen and domestic traders. . where undisclosed or “silent” partners have unlimited personal liability in the absence of a limited partnership agreement.” The fourth argument contained in the passage is implicit but nevertheless important. who stressed such autonomy throughout his writings. whereas the traveling partner’s liability is unlimited. 108.66 LUTZ KAELBER dentary investor as well as a traveling partner each contribute capital and share the profits or losses.. Weber sees a differentiation of institutional spheres before modernity.15 Time is important in this analysis. which has joint and several liability. including those who stand in the Anglo-American legal tradition. Weber. “Max Weber’s Dissertation in the Context of His Early Life and Career. Zur Geschichte. the modern limited partnership had its root in the Pisan societas maris. His viewpoint is based on the supposition that both law and the economy in the Middle Ages had sufficient societal autonomy to proceed along their own trajectories and that developments in either sphere could simply be adduced by reference to another social sphere such as religion. for the shift away from unilateral partnerships and toward bilateral ones as a preferred form of investment was well underway before elaborations of canonical usury prohibitions began in the late twelfth century. See Weber. Goldschmidt also agreed substantively with civil law does not have an exact equivalent in common law countries. to partnerships in Florence. Kaelber. Thus. had long been concluded. “the development of the forms of partnership . he follows his academic teacher. their existence does not allow for the conclusion that one sphere depends on another or merely mirrors developments in the other.. 15 Weber also traces the modern general partnership. the sedentary partner’s legal liability is limited to his capital contribution. and partnership business is undertaken in a joint name. that of the firm. hence. Weber17 notes in the concluding chapter that the prohibition of usury “was more unsettling to theoreticians than to practitioners. and law’s and the economy’s relatively high degree of autonomy would affect his views when he revisited the topic as part of his Protestant Ethic studies fifteen years later. See K. M.. Goldschmidt made his first extensive comments on the topic in 1891. 16 . “Max Weber’s Writings on the Bourse: Puzzling Out a Forgotten Corpus. which he approached as a legal scholar.”18 Weber was thus first exposed to the issue of the prohibition of usury and its effects on economic development in his studies of the medieval urban Italian economy. 140-1. At most usury laws introduced additional restrictions to the market for credit.” Journal of Classical Sociology 1 (2001): 147-70). 151. The agreement between the two scholars extended beyond usury. Despite Weber’s vociferous remarks toward the Poles in his Freiburg inaugural address (see.g. Presumably relying on Weber’s Italian case studies. His arguments concerning the limited effect of religious restrictions on interest in Europe’s most advanced economy. 1891). for even canon law had provisions that permitted the taking of interest. Weber. He would not address the issue of usury in detail again until his two-part essay “The Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of CapitalL. Borchardt.” Max Weber Studies 2 (2002): 139-62. The History.16 Correspondingly. Usury and Medieval Religion: The “Protestant Ethic” Essays and Weber’s Rebuttals of Rachfahl After finishing his dissertation. J. not to mention more lenient secular laws.MAX WEBER AND USURY 67 Weber’s position. Zur Geschichte. 170. “Weber’s Inaugural Lecture and Its Place in His Sociology. it is likely that he had long before formed an opinion. Goldschmidt. Both were supportive of national liberalism and favored a limited intervention of the state in the economy. Goldschmidt stated that the prohibition of usury was not effective in throttling economic development. thus increasing rather than decreasing interest rates. Barbalet. L. Weyhe. Rejecting Endemann. 17 Weber. 1996). they had similar views on German politics and economic policy at the time. Universalgeschichte des Handelsrechts (Stuttgart: Enke. 18 It seems impossible to determine who influenced whom. Levin Goldschmidt: Ein Gelehrtenleben in Deutschland (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. e. However. Weber quickly moved on to other topics. which he may have expressed to Weber during the latter’s preparation of his dissertation. based on his own documentary analyses. The sources reveal that upon the death of wealthy people. at best. “Die protestantische Ethik und der ‘Geist’ des Kapitalismus. This was also the position of those directly concerned. I: Das Problem. as those concerned themselves saw it. 25. It was an insurance against the uncertainties concerning the afterlife and because.” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 20 (1904): 32-3. this represented a considerable accommodation of Catholic doctrine to the interests of the financial powers of the Italian cities . Weber portrays the Middle Ages as a time before the modern notion of a calling (Beruf) broke the Church’s “mold of medieval economic regulation.68 LUTZ KAELBER ism” in 1904-1905 and replies to his critic Felix Rachfahl in 1910. . rather than being hostile to. but on account of the constant danger of clashing with the Church’s ban on usury. and trans.” This mold he describes as follows: The phrase “Deo placere non potest” was used in relation to the activity of the merchant.. Weber’s approach broadens. considerable sums of money flowed into the coffers of the Church institutions as “conscience money.. [G]ain as an activity pursued as an end in itself was basically a “pudendum. Even skeptical persons not in sympathy with the Church tended to play safe and pay these sums in order to be reconciled with the Church just in case the worst came to the worst. C. economic activities in general. for which he adopts Werner Sombart’s term: the “spirit” of capitalism. after all (at least this rather lax view was widely held). A “moral” view like that of Benjamin Franklin would have been simply unthinkable. In his Protestant Ethic essay. P. But. Baehr and G. He is now concerned with the practical aspects of religious ethics.” which was tolerated solely because it had become an established institution. something morally neutral—tolerated. Wells (London: Penguin. 2002). It is here that the amoral and in part immoral character of their actions becomes clear. when compared to widely held antichrematistic views.” some of it even going back to former debtors as “usura” wrongfully taken from them. Their life’s work was.19 Weber sees heterodox religion in the Middle Ages as accommodating. Weber. and 19 M. specifically with the ways in which religion inhibited or contributed to the emergence of a modern capitalist ethos represented in modern vocational culture. outward conformity to the laws of the Church was sufficient to salvation. M. spiritually dubious. The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism and Other Writings. Weber. ed. Baehr and Wells. trans. From his analysis of the statutes of the Florentine Arte di Calimala. I.. Weber. for example.” In other words.. is that Weber refers to the prohibition of usury and the related restitution of wrongful gain to illustrate his point. did not simply ignore religious concerns regarding their activities but found ways to adapt to them and assuage lingering doubts. “Die protestantische Ethik. he notes: We can learn exactly how they used to come to terms with the ban on the taking of interest in. and that they do it in the manner most appropriate to the gift. in part through the corporate 20 Weber. The instructions that follow are also highly typical of the a-moral character of capital gains.. What is interesting in the passages above. Book I. the prestigious guild of merchants of imported wool. 63) to record all interest and profits as “gifts. . In the accompanying footnote. according to custom. in terms of the interest exacted for the past year.36. but no positive endorsement of methodically controlled acquisitive activity existed. Weber chooses the phrase “Homo mercator vix aut nunquam deo potest placere” (the merchant can hardly or never please God) in Gratian’s collection of church laws (c. for example. which could occur on a merchant’s deathbed. as well as. chapter 65 of the statute of the Arte di Calimala . Accommodation consisted of practices that allow remorseful transgressors to return to the bosom of the Church.1. In part this occurred through the aforementioned restitution. the immediately preceding injunction (chap. 51-2 n.” 33 n.MAX WEBER AND USURY 69 mercantile activities in specific. The Protestant Ethic. facing the issue of usury on an almost daily basis. however. International merchants. he comes to the same conclusion as he did about fifteen years earlier. : “The consuls must ensure that they make confession to those brethren [confessors] whom they judge most likely to pardon them.” Today’s stock exchange blacklisting of those who refuse to honor forward contracts by invoking the margin defense (Differenzeinwand) in court can be compared to the vilifying of those who went before an ecclesiastical court pleading exceptio usurariae pravitatis.20 Weber thus continues to draw on his dissertation to inform his assessment of commercial (and religious) medieval practices. service or reward received. the guild obtains indulgence for its members through official channels and through submission to the Church. 1140) as indicative of limitations on enterprise. which has escaped all existing English translations of Weber’s Protestant Ethic writings. Kalberg. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. “Einleitung” and “Editorischer Bericht. which are contractual transactions based solely on the exploitation of the difference between an initially agreed-upon price and the price set later by the market or exchange. n. Cf.23 M. Borchardt. trans. 220-1. the blacklisted traders are those “who take profits from differential rates” (Weber. 1189. Borchardt. they were not enforceable. and for Peter Baehr and Gordon Wells. stock market traders dealing among themselves could not invoke such a defense. the existing translations of the passage. 1978). rendering the contract unenforceable and thus the obligation non-binding. Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press. 507. The Protestant Ethic. 1893-1898. MWG I/5 (Tübingen: Mohr. Börsenwesen. 1040. and the Differenzeinwand.36). Börsenwesen. K. in cases Weber encountered during his studies on the stock exchange. were indeed blacklisted and thus faced marginalization. 1999). Weber. 28-31.35). Börsenwesen.” in Weber. 21 . The MWG edition of Weber’s writings on the stock exchange in 1894-189621 has made possible a better understanding of the origin of these words and their meaning. Weber. 22 K. Weber likens the defensive practices of medieval guilds to those of modern stockbrokers. 52. ed. 31). 225. trans.22 As Weber puts it. 204 n. for Stephen Kalberg. 23 Weber. Weber. Weber. see M. Economy and Society contains a better translation of a similar passage. At the end of the passage. 178 n. or “margin defense. Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1976). German civil law had traditionally not allowed forward or arbitrage contracts. the defense is analogous to medieval guilds’ strategies to vilify those invoking exceptio usurariae pravitatis. For Talcott Parsons. a defense based on the claim that one party’s contractual obligation derived from the other party’s depraved usury. Roth and C. S. T. 1044. these traders are those “who criticize orthodox procedures” and the exceptio usurariae pravitatis is a plea “for an exemption to the prohibition of usury” (Weber. The Protestant Ethic.” was the legal defense used against claims in court lest such speculative contracts be enforced. ed. and those who tried. Baehr and Wells. Börsenwesen: Schriften und Reden. However. trans. Economy and Society. and trans. G. Since such contracts constituted gambling or betting. traders who invoked the margin defense were “brokers who hold back the difference between top price and actual selling price” (M.70 LUTZ KAELBER practice of creative economic procedures that circumvented the prohibition of interest. Baehr and Wells.MAX WEBER AND USURY 71 In a different part of the essay. Weber. Economic Life in the Modern Age. “Introduction. but also strands of ascetic Protestantism continued to be concerned about the morality of taking interest. 1902). Weber argues. 1: 915. Therefore. 28 Weber. “Die protestantische Ethik. Der moderne Kapitalismus (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Stehr and R. He mainly addresses Sombart’s thesis in Der Moderne Kapitalismus (1902). 2001). Marx. referring to Rachfahl’s “peripheral points about church doctrine on ‘usury’ in the Middle Ages. 30. 26 K.13. Capital.1. trans. trans. Sombart was attuned to a Marxist-materialist interpretation of economic history early in his career. Sombart related to Karl Marx’s26 notion that feudal economic structures—rather than the existence of usury laws in itself—prevented assets generated through usurious practices from turning into industrial capital. Sombart argued that the medieval economy was craft-based and the ban on usury reflected its traditionalist ethic. not only did Luther remain a traditionalist on usury and other economic matters.24 Having written a splendid dissertation on the rural proletariat’s impoverishment and exploitation in the Roman campagna (1888) under the guidance of Gustav Schmoller. their relegation to marginal status in the early modern era could not account for the emergence of capitalism. Weber takes issue with those who argued that modern capitalism emerged because nascent capitalist entrepreneurs were finally able to shed the ballast of religious constraints on secular activities. Grundmann (New Brunswick: Transaction.27 The corollary of this position is that lifting the prohibition of interest signified a boost for the new modern capitalist spirit. an alleged desire on their part to engage freely in what previously would have been considered a usurious transaction is squarely at odds with the historical record. Sombart. Grundmann. and 45. ed. 25 N. Sombart. Weber is not convinced by Sombart’s thesis.” in W. Simply put. Stehr and R. Fowkes (New York: Vintage. 1: 184-7. a leader of the younger Historical School of political economy. because such restraints had not been a decisive factor in the Middle Ages. N.28 He affirms this view a few years later in his rebuttals to Felix Rachfahl’s arguments.25 In Der Moderne Kapitalismus.” 9 n. xiii-xv. 27 Sombart. Moreover. 46 n. 1977). I.” which for 24 W. The Protestant Ethic. Der moderne Kapitalismus. . B. trans. Weber. ed. Osterhammel. By 1910. including those that resulted in ethically questionable economic practices.35 and it rejected usury as a violation of the communitarian ethic of brotherhood. Kippenberg.31 This position not only reflects a shift in Weber’s work toward a sociology of medieval Catholicism32 but also echoes the views of Ernst Troeltsch. J. 1998). Harrington. Die protestantische Ethik. Die protestanische Ethik. 167. 2001). MWG I/22-5 (Tübingen: Mohr. G.. Schools of Asceticism: Ideology and Organization in Medieval Religious Communities (University Park. Mommsen and J. 341 n. D.72 LUTZ KAELBER economic development “are not at all decisive. 32 L. Weber. J. Graf. with M. II: Kritiken und Antikritiken. 112. Weber. 2001). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte: Nachlass. “Friendship between Experts: Notes on Weber and Troeltsch. trans. J. Harrington and M. 215-33. Shields (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press..11. 1987). necessitated the lowering of some standards (for the laity). The Protestant Ethic Debate: Max Webers’ Replies to His Critics. ed. 128.20.20. Wyon (New York: Macmillan. W. 5th ed.36 Such a process of universalizing ethical notions. Max Weber and His Contemporaries (London: Allen & Unwin. Weber. 129 n. 319-20. 1907-1910. The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. O. 35 Troeltsch. and alludes to modern Catholicism’s much more lenient dealings with those matters. Troeltsch. eds.30 mentions the Church’s dealings with usury along with confession as examples of the ways in which the Church was willing to accommodate but not approve of moral shortcomings. H. 1987). The Protestant Ethic Debate. 34 E. Chalcraft and A. 55-58. 29 .33 In articles later included in The Economic Teachings of the Christian Churches34 Troeltsch posited that the medieval Church affirmed its claim to “absolute universalism” through the establishment and enforcement of a unitary religious culture that bound all Christians together by a fellowship of love. [1912] 1956). Weber realized. 30 M. II. 377 n. A. Social Teaching. PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 73. 31 Weber. Winkelmann (Gütersloh: Mohn. 33 F. M. 36 Troeltsch. including accommodating economic practices to a certain extent while formally drawing sharp distinctions between ethical and unethical activities.” in W. ed. Teilband 2: Religiöse Gemeinschaften. with whom Weber formed a “friendship between experts” that led to much cross-fertilization in their work.”29 He traces the origins of the Church’s usury doctrine to a false reading of the Greek Vulgate translation of the Decretals. Kaelber. Social Teaching. Keller claimed inter alia that the Church’s ban on usury pertained only to emergency loans made in cases of sudden privation. Kalberg. In two separate publications. he40 maintained. that for the emergence of modern capitalism’s vocational ethic. 37 . Der Bourgeois: Zur Geistesgeschichte des modernen Wirtschaftsmenschen (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Luxus und Kapitalismus (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. the canonical prohibition of usury played no significant role. his writings on the economic ethics of the world religions. 27/The Protestant Ethic. Weber. and the sections on religious communities and secular and religious rulership in Economy and Society. medieval Catholicism is afforded a more prominent role. only in this context. Weber elaborated on Troeltsch’s views but also took on recent arguments by Franz Keller and Sombart. 38 F. as he underlines. usury had thereby become part of Weber’s reflections on the role of religion for economic development. Unternehmung und Mehrwert: Eine sozial-ethische Studie zur Geschäftsmoral (Paderborn: Schöningh. Keller38 and Sombart39 turned the existing paradigm concerning usury upside down. trans. Two new insertions concern the prohibition of interest. “Die protestantische Ethik. Sombart.” in Gesammelte Aufsätze. which is one of the longest. 24-8. Such a tightly confined prohibition of the taking of interest helped rather than hindered capitalist development. 168 n. because it cut short entrepreneurs’ ability to make a profit through illegitimate means and prevented the loss of capital stock of temporarily impoverished craftsmen and others in need. who would soon again be able to contribute to the economy.37 In the other insertion. 1915). Unternehmung. 40 Keller. 1912). 1913). In the revised Protestant Ethic. Usury in Comparative and Systematic Perspective: Weber’s Later Writings Several influences on Weber’s views are evident in the revised Protestant Ethic.MAX WEBER AND USURY 73 Troeltsch’s input. M. Keller M. In one Weber asserts the validity of his earlier remarks to Rachfahl.23. and The Quintessence of Capitalism: A Study of the History and Psychology of the Modern Business Man. and. trans. Weber responds to what can only be described as puzzling claims made by the Catholic theologian Franz Keller and by Sombart. Keller. Epstein (New York: Dutton. 39 W. 1913). 47 Weber. 1913). Epstein (London: Unwin. The Quintessence of Capitalism.2. 27 n. societas maris. commenda. Sombart. M. “Die protestantische. was not affected by religious prohibitions. Der Bourgeois. The Protestant Ethic. Weber. unlike interest. 57 n.43 war.. Der Bourgeois. Der Bourgeois. trans. [2] at the time when this happened the forms of purely business investment were not loans at a fixed interest rate but the foenus nauticum.32. Weber is as defensive as he had been against Rachfahl. 44 W. the fusion of adventure capitalism (for which he credits in part the European Jewry) with the modern bourgeois’ rational calculability. Sombart expanded on it in Der Bourgeois. Luxury and Capitalism. since profit.. 1913). 1913). of his larger studies. trans. 46 Sombart. Sombart. lastly. In his response in the Protestant Ethic. money had to seek more productive purposes and was thus invested in business. Sombart. Kalberg.41 perhaps influenced by Keller’s favorable treatment of Sombart’s previous work.25. yet other than by a few rigorous canonists they were not held to fall under the ban. 45 Sombart. and the dare ad proficuum de mari . W. He attributed an important role in the genesis of modern capitalism to the Jews.46 Like Keller. Sombart. [3] when investments at a fixed rate of interest and discounting became possible and common. Luxus und Kapitalismus (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Nevertheless. Krieg und Kapitalismus (Munich: Duncker & Humblot. MI: University of Michigan Press. 168 n. The Jews and Modern Capitalism. W. 43 W. 1911)... R. 42 41 .” in Gesammelte Aufsätze.”47 he affirms his earlier positions: The truth is that [1] the church began to reconsider the prohibition of interest only at a rather late time. Sombart. Sombart advanced an ever-increasing hodgepodge of explanations. 176 n. Seemingly intent on finding the capitalist spirit’s roots in anything but Weber’s Puritans. 314-22. trans. Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.74 LUTZ KAELBER made this argument in the space of a few pages and with barely a reference to historical documents.45 Sombart’s claim was as simple as Keller’s: by forgoing loans. Dittmar (Ann Arbor..42 trade in luxury goods. W. W. Sombart. 1967).44 and. they encountered discernable difficulties stemming from the Sombart. Calling Sombart’s publication “a book ‘with a thesis’ in the worst sense of this expression” and the “by far the weakest . Sombart furnished few references to literature supportive of this view. See L. Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus (Munich: Akademie der Wissenschaften. “parallels to the prohibition of interest are to be found in almost all religious ethics around the world. which was impersonal and hence not readily amenable to ethical control . [4] the canonists’ treatment of usury was purely formal-legalistic. nor was the Church’s rejection of interest in return for giving loans. and a result of. this passage succinctly depicts Weber’s views on usury shortly before his death. Weber. The Protestant Ethic. mostly diffusely held. 21.49 responsible for the investment of money in ethically less clouded forms of investments such as partnerships.32. Kalberg. on the other hand. 176 n. and without any such tendency to “protect capital” as Keller ascribed to them. Weber. Rather. trans. was determined by. Kalberg. who held that the Church had effectively given up on regulating interest rates in the late Middle Ages and accepted a ceiling on interest rates. his comparative studies of the economic ethics of the world religions. in so far as it can be ascertained at all.. In the conWeber. toward the growing power of capital. The Protestant Ethic.48 Convoluted in the original German. the Church’s attitude toward capitalism. .. “Die protestantische” in Gesammelte Aufsätze.32. Weber addressed the former in his comparative studies on the world religions and the latter in Economy and Society. as Weber notes in an earlier passage in the same note. Brentano. which led merchant guilds to adopt drastic defensive measures (blacklisting!). a traditional hostility. in its “modern” manifestation in form and spirit.. [5] lastly.”50 These views touch on two larger issues Weber raised in two main projects in the last decade of his life: the importance of external religious guidelines for secular action. the necessity for accommodation. 176 n. while firm.MAX WEBER AND USURY 75 prohibition of usury. The ban on usury does not rank among the chief reasons capitalism. 50 Weber. where he transcends the Protestant Ethic’s much more circumscribed theme of religious contributions to modern capitalism. “Die protestantische” in Gesammelte Aufsätze. 48 . Weber’s other major critic. 1916). 49 Cf. trans. Weber did not respond. 57-8 n. on the on hand. Weber’s statement regarding a prominent existence of usury rules in religious ethics is an implicit reference to.1. Lujo Brentano. 56 n. They had not changed significantly since his studies under Goldschmidt. did not develop in the Middle Ages. and the relationship between religion (as a societal order) and the economy. 56 M. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie III (Tübingen: Mohr. Elaborating on remarks made in his studies on agrarian history in 1908. due to their rationalism of “world adjustment. NJ: Transaction. 118. Weber. H. Berkeley: University of California Press. Weber. M. Weber. 235.und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Tübingen: Mohr. “Introduction.51 as did Indian Brahminism. Gerth (New York: Free Press. 1998). 1996). H. 159. and Domination. London: Verso. Ancient Judaism. 1964). Weber. Kippenberg. F. M. M. Economy and Society.” xxxiii-xxxix. and trans. Martindale (Glencoe. Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Hinduismus und Buddhismus: 1916-1920. and trans. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus und Taoismus: Schriften 1915-1920. Frank. MWG I/20 (Tübingen: Mohr. 354-5. The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism. H. IL: Free Press. Winckelmann. where he briefly touched on the issue of interest in Israel. 1967). Schmidt-Glintzer. ed. Weber. J. MWG I/19 (Tübingen: Mohr. M. Rationalism.55 Weber in his study on ancient Judaism traces religious provisions that allowed lending money at interest to strangers to the economic ethics of an oppressed people. 342-3. Schluchter. Weber. to mean that the taking of interest was allowed only from gentiles. H. see Stehr and Grundmann. H.56 However. for which Weber used the controversial concept of a “pariah people. . ed. Knight (New Brunswick. 279. M. 52 M. 54 M. 1952). 1958). and trans. 1989).52 whereas Confucianism and Taoism. 57 For discussion. Solomon. Weber. Gerth and D. trans. Schmidt-Glintzer. Wirtschaftsgeschichte: Abriss der universalen Sozial. 625. Weber. 1988). General Economic History. Weber does not go nearly as far as the increasingly anti-Semitic Sombart. 55 M. R. ed. N. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial. H. ed. H.”53 did not at all or only to a very limited extent. 357-58. 1989). The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism. 100. trans. who argued that Jews had a special propensity to trade and barter and by extracting profit from money lending contributed to the emergence of the adventure spirit Sombart associated with modern capitalism.und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. H. M. 142-3. 53 W. Religion. 435. 86. 90. I. ed. ed. Weber. 137. trans. Although voices existed which rejected this in-group versus out-group morality.76 LUTZ KAELBER text of those studies Weber notes that Islam scorned usury. Martindale (Glencoe.54 Judaism is more difficult to characterize. Relevant passages in the Torah were interpreted.57 In terms of prohibiting the 51 Weber. Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations. for both political and religious reasons.” ensured the continued existence of this morality. IL: Free Press. Weber. 85-116. the marginalization of Jews. 1981). 3rd ed. Gerth and D. Weber. 56. 268. ed. 1988). (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 232. The role of medieval Catholicism in this process was traditional. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press. Economy and Society. hence. 59 Weber. At best. Judaism is not the most permissive religion. or has seemed to place. 58 Weber. which every one of the great religious systems on its way has placed. H. 235. from other Jews in Judaism. The prohibition was not a decisive factor. and it is not a crucial issue: The core of the obstacle [to developing modern capitalism] did not lie in such particular difficulties [as bans on interest in money lending]. Weber addresses this issue on a more general level in the context of the relationship between the economy and other societal orders in Economy and Society. Gerth and C. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 1958). and trans. 60 Weber. H. The Religion of India. Yet they were externally imposed. ideas. ed. . Weber. and interests. Weber. Weber. they do not prevent the economic process from running its course. 460. Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus. 457. Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus. Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Hinduismus. it produced a “naïve affirmation of the world. ed. in the way of the modern economy. 115.MAX WEBER AND USURY 77 taking of interest. M. W. then areas influenced by Confucianism and Taoism should have been the first to usher in the modern rationalized economy. From Max Weber. A system of external religious prohibitions cultivated from the outside but not from the inside: it could not thoroughly penetrate economic actions with an inner value. Weber.”60 not ascetic Protestantism’s world mastery. 562.58 The taking of interest in return for a loan is thus only one of many prohibited or negatively stereotyped activities that could interpose obstacles to secular activities. from anyone in late medieval Christianity—none of these religions “developed” modern capitalism and introduced economic rationalization.59 This helps explain why in spite of variations in the prohibition of taking interest—none or little in Confucianism and Taoism. 348. Two chapters. for it did not provide psychological incentives for the pursuit of ethically tempered acquisitiveness. Kippenberg. both located in the older part. if it had been. unless accompanied by internal changes that redirected people’s motives. The Religion of China. 291. Weber makes clear. 112. The core of the obstruction was in the ‘spirit’ of the whole system. Weber. 194. ed. Kippenberg. J. “Max Webers ‘Herrschaftssoziologie’: Eine werkgeschichtliche Studie. Weber. 1-83.. 376-83. 1188-91.61 the other. 377-8. Hanke. J. Weber. Kippenberg. Economy and Society. This reflects a “principal struggle between an ethical and economic rationalization of the economy. Winckelmann.” it developed its strongest rejection of the countervailing ethics. 711.. ed. Weber stresses repeatedly that the systematization of religious ethics did not reflect material conditions and the unfolding of usury prohibitions is inconsistent with a materialist conception of history. 19-46.63 Weber notes that while Christianity from early on rejected ingroup versus out-group morality in its emphasis on what Troeltsch had called “absolute universalism. 2001). 65 Weber. One thematizes the relationship between secular and religious rulership. Kippenberg. eds. Mommsen. 5th. H. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 63 Weber.” in its opposition to interest when confronting the acceleration of economic growth in the twelfth century. 411-32. but see W. 377. 710-12. Winckelmann (Tübingen: Mohr. Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie: Studien zur Entstehung und Wirkung (Tübingen: Mohr.” in E. 61 . 584. on religious communities. Weber’s references to usury are similar and some passages virtually identical. 64 Weber. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. ed. rev. ed. Economy and Society. 1985). which is part of Weber’s sociology of domination. Weber. 62 Schluchter. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. he alludes to the same means of evading or circumventing E. Next to the notion of a “just price” (justum pretium) in economic transactions.” History and Theory 39 (2000): 364-83.” in Weber. G. 1189.”64 The Church attempted to come to grips with the amoral forces represented by the economy by means of a rationalization of the ethics that governed its hierocratic means. This took the form of elaborate casuistries by Canon scholars.62 Though the chapters’ foci differ. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. ed. Mommsen. 584. “Max Weber’s ‘Grand Sociology’: The Origins and Composition of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Soziologie. As he did originally in his dissertation.65 Moreover. ties his writings on the economy in its relationship to other societal orders to his comparative writings in the sociology of religion. Weber. those of the “market. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. J. Rationalism. Weber. 583-87. the dispensation of grace.78 LUTZ KAELBER concern usury. Kippenberg. ed. Hanke and W. Kippenberg. Economy and Society. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. ed. “Einleitung. usury was one of the foils against which they could construct a moral code of ethical behavior in the secular world vis-à-vis the impersonalization and “a-morality” brought about by the market place. The fact that Weber considered the religious proscription of usurious practices at most a detriment and at least a nuisance to pre-modern economic development certainly does not imply that a sociological exploration of usury provisions and their impact on actual practices is unwarranted—just as no one. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Winckelmann. Weber. its practices of penance. Weber considered the Church’s policies toward usury. 711. and increasingly became a mere impediment of commercial life. did not help bring forth modern capitalism. Weber. next to its doctrine of a just price. would want to argue that the analysis of Confucianism or Islam is unimportant merely because these religions. Schools of Asceticism. Kippenberg. ed. . 711. Had 66 Weber. and Modern Debates on the Role of Usury This analysis has shown that usury was not of marginal importance in Weber’s writings. The latter together with the elaboration of the system of penance and the establishment of ecclesiastical pawn lending institutions in the montes pietatis signify provisions by which the Church acquiesced to ethical conundrums resulting from economic action. Economy and Society. 381-3.. i. the blacklisting of guild members who go before ecclesiastical courts. 1190. 68 Kaelber. In fact.. 587. pushing it along the direction of a “moral declassement and obstacle to a rational business ethic. 382-3.68 to be a core element of medieval Christianity’s salvation economy.e. at least according to Weber.MAX WEBER AND USURY 79 the ban on taking interest as in the original Protestant Ethic.. ed. by way of analogy. the purchase of general indulgences.” Ultimately. ed. Kippenberg. the summary judgment is the same as it had been all along: the practical consequences of the Church’s ban on usury. 67 Weber. Weber. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.”67 Conclusion: Weber. and merchants’ testamentary gifts of conscience money and charitable endowments as posthumous restitution of usury. Medieval Catholicism. while “difficult to estimate. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. it was “nowhere really successful in cultivating the development of capitalism . Economy and Society.66 In all. and its system of a monastic supererogatory accumulation of merit. 118990. Weber. Winckelmann.” was that of being a burden on economic affairs. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. ed. 587. 46-55. Hübinger. While usury has not been a topic of interest for sociologists since Nelson. They do. Grundmann. one might reasonably argue. Rowan (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. without sufficient contextualization. and badly in need of revision in view of newer findings. Little. 74 Nelson.72 and literacy73 as crucial transformations toward more rationalized European societies even before the onset of the Italian Renaissance. Usury. Reason and Society in the Middle Ages. he would have addressed the inner workings of this salvation economy in his intended study on Christianity.69 Even though Weber may have intended his statements to constitute ideal-typical depictions.70 religious dissent. many of them appear too general. and relate advances toward a modern type of market economy to developments in spheres other than religion. 72 A. however. ed. 1994). 1978). one might get from Weber’s admittedly fragmented remarks. Kulturprotestantismus und Politik: Zum Verhältnis von Liberalismus und Protestantismus im wilhelminischen Deutschland (Tübingen: Mohr. The Idea. medievalists point to twelfth-century developments in the profit economy. would have played an important role in it. trans. rev. S. For example. An anonymous reviewer for Max Weber Studies took me 69 .74 it has received ample attention from medievalist econoG. 1985). (Oxford: Clarendon Press. The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press. do his views have any pertinence to recent scholarship? Current scholarship on medieval religion is less inclined to provide a broad characterization of a period spanning close to a millennium than Weber. 73 B. 1983). and perhaps even backwardness. 1994).71 reason. broadly support Weber’s (and Goldschmidt’s) notion of a relatively high degree of autonomy of the economic sphere from religious interference. whose views were steeped in contemporary presuppositions of Cultural Protestantism with its anti-Catholic and anti-Lutheran elements. Religious Movements in the Middle Ages. K. Given the time that has passed since Weber’s death. 70 L. however. Murray. Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 71 H. Stock.80 LUTZ KAELBER Weber been able to carry out the remaining studies on the economic ethics of the world religions. Such studies shatter the impression of a relative continuity in medieval culture. and with certainty extended his subsequent studies beyond those three scholars.” Explorations in Economic History 40 . as a prodigious reader.76 it is also inferior to task for claiming Nelson all too readily as a sociologist with the argument that Nelson was a trained medievalist and only later turned to social science (Parsons. Jr. for kindly supplying me with some of this information. Ekelund. the authors contend. and R. and Organization 5 (1989): 307-31. 76 See E. D. Tollison. R. Scheinkman. Freud. I wish to thank Dr. Their studies fall into three categories: (1) neo-classical economists’ attempts at addressing the impact on usury. Yet not only does this approach fit the historical development of the Church’s economic condition and its usury doctrines poorly. T. Bekar.. Donald Nielsen. et al. Economists have recently begun to address usury in the Middle Ages using neo-classical models. B. Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm (New York: Oxford University Press. Hébert. Reed and C.. It is true that Nelson received both his master’s (in 1933) and doctorate (in 1944) in medieval history. B. Jr. F. 75 R. C. Economics. G.75 proposed the following argument: leaders of the medieval Catholic church were no different from entrepreneurs heading economic firms in their attempts to become monopolistic suppliers of goods and services by establishing public policies that give them a comparative advantage over competitors. Such “rent-seeking behavior” can also be found. once a doctoral student of Nelson. However. “An Economic Model of the Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking. “Religious Prohibitions Against Usury.” Journal of Law and Economics 41 (1998): 1-36.” Journal of Law. designated to keep interest rates low and allowing the Church to borrow money more cheaply than in a competitive market environment. R..MAX WEBER AND USURY 81 mists and historians. and (3) a multifaceted controversy about Weber’s core question of how much the prohibition on taking interest on a loan impeded economic development. (2) comparative studies that have begun to expand Weber’s inquiries into other world religions and address Christian usury provisions in the light of other religions’ tenets and practices. L. Nelson undoubtedly explored materials beyond the more specialized range of medieval/Renaissance studies as early as while preparing his dissertation. Robert Ekelund et al. Glaeser and J. “Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws. while at the same time restricting competition under conditions in which the Church was herself a creditor. in the Church’s usury policies. Ekelund. 1996). The voluminous collection of Nelson’s papers housed at Columbia University’s Rare Book and Manuscript Library awaits exploration to shed more light on this topic. and Weber). Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus. scholars have studied Jewish vis-à-vis Christian lenders in the Middle Ages. S. 79 J. not less valuerational. . Weber. which may lead to sharper conflicts between these spheres. Weber showed. 1986). Lohlker. Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: Riba. 479-522. therefore deserves more recognition in these debates. and Islamic Banking (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. who prefaced his exploration of Christian usury doctrines with a study of usury provisions in Judaism. Rather than being a reflection of changing material conditions. 80 N.78 Since then. Shatzmiller. 323-59. 1993). as rationalizations in societal spheres develop according to their own logic and quite possibly in different directions.82 LUTZ KAELBER to Weber’s. and Medieval Society (Berkeley: University of California Press. A. 78 Nelson. Such policies may become more. to assume that when a hierocratic institution is embedded in a political and economic structure in which it can influence but not dominate public policies. It is more compelling. Gharar.77 Weber’s “political economy” model of usury policies. Shylock Reconsidered: Jews. Das islamische Recht im Wandel: Riba. From Max Weber. 1990). as some neo-classical economists want to have it—one might recall Sombart’s position outlined earlier in this paper—usury policies may thus be in sharper conflict with economic practices. The comparative aspect of Weber’s writings on usury has been taken up by an increasing number of studies that go beyond Christianity. appears to represent a step back from Weber’s studies and might benefit from drawing on some of Weber’s insights. Herman. Saleh. namely in its ethical doctrine toward those spheres. Moneylending. Medieval Usury and the Commercialization of Feudal Bonds (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.80 A truly comparative analysis of religious prohibitions against usury that (2003): 347-68. 1999). for it relies on the assumption that the Church’s policies were driven by the intent to bring about economic results rather than moral reform. xix-xxii. The Idea. Zins und Wucher in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart (Münster: Waxmann.79 and Islamic views toward usury in this and other periods. at least as currently applied to medieval ecclesiastical policy. R. One of the first scholars to engage in this line of work was Nelson. The neo-classical model. it will respond to a rationalization in politics and the economy that intrudes into its own sphere (as in the twelfth century) by a rationalization of its own. 77 Weber. which affords religion the ability to contribute autochthonous elements to such policies. and to the ways economic practice reflected them or reacted to it. Finally. Exchange. O. McLaughlin. P. 1992). Armstrong. P. there exists now a rich literature on how Canon lawyers and Church theologians defined and classified usurious practices. Teachings on Usury in Judaism.82 The variations in their views seem far too great to accord with the impression of a strong consistency one might get from reading Weber and his contemporaries. however. “The Teaching of the Canonists on Usury (XII. cessant gain. Menning. 1984).” Mediaeval Studies 1 (1939): 81-147. J. Princes. “The Teaching of the Canonists on Usury (XII. J. 1200-1350 (Leiden: Brill.” Mediaeval Studies 61 (1999): 1-44. Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth. and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition. T. Langholm. Armstrong. historians have paid much attention to the emergence of the usury doctrine in the Middle Ages and early modern era. 2000). including delayed repayment. W. 2003) for the religious accommodation of interest on communal public debt in Florence. 1957).MAX WEBER AND USURY 83 includes doctrines81 as well as their secular impact appears to be still in its infancy. and Islam (Lewiston. and exchange dealing83—is not refuted. The Aristotelian Analysis of Usury (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. actually or possibly legitimate forms of taking interest. Regarding the Church’s “accommodation” of business lending and public finance. Usury and Public Debt in Early Renaissance Florence: Lorenzo Ridolfi on the ‘Monte Comune’ (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. XIII and XIV Centuries). 1993) for the credit lending practices of the montes pietatis. 83 These are discussed in the aforementioned literature. Buckley. In regard to development of doctrine. Charity and State in Late Renaissance Italy: The Monte di Pietà of Florence (Ithaca. O. annuities. and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and His Circle (Princeton: Princeton University Press. as if such disputes were merely a reflection of the advent of modern capitalism on the 81 For example. see C. “The Politics of Usury in Trecento Florence: The Questio de Monte of Francesco da Empoli. that the ecclesiastical teachings did not simply become more “capital friendly” but rather more stringent on usurious loans—as distinguished from other. The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. This literature shows their teachings constituted no monolithic set of teachings but a sometimes discordant set of voices on a common theme. Masters.” Mediaeval Studies 2 (1940): 1-22. L. and L. NY: Cornell University Press. sharing of risk. 1970). Baldwin. NY: Mellen. 82 See especially T. L. Value. McLaughlin. Noonan. emergent loss or damages. T. Money. S. . Langholm. XIII and XIV Centuries). Nor is there evidence that disputes over usury simply ceased with the Reformation. Yet Weber’s overall argument. Their findings defy simple description. Christianity. 2004). A.84 On the contrary. “SSSR Presidential Address. While there is evidence of merchants so bothered by soteriological implications of their usurious activities that they paid considerable restitution on their deathbed. such disputes were played out with particular intensity in ascetic Protestant groupings. P. 88 B. 2003). “The Usurer and the Merchant Prince: Italian Businessmen and the Ecclesiastical Law of Restitution. 1984). 87 O.” in J.” in The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven. Jones. Conscience. Interest. 775-89. Valeri.” William and Mary Quarterly 54 (1997): 747-68. that the Church’s condemnation of usurious loans “did nothing to shackle the development of capitalism”89 and was “never a hindrance to the growth 84 N.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 43 (2004): 465-74. Armstrong.” Religion 22 (1992): 313-26. trans. “Usury. 1988). “The Usurer and Purgatory. L. F. Kuehn. and the Merchants of Medieval Genoa. and Public Debt: Angelo Corbinelli’s Testament of 1419. Restitution. and the Reformation (Aldershot: Ashgate. “Buying a Passport to Heaven: Usury. L.85 Moreover. 1979): 25. Kerridge. trans. . The still dominant view. 1989). L. 2004: Putting an End to Ancestor Worship. Le Goff. Your Money or Your Life. Marino and T.” Journal of Economic History 7 (Supplement) (1947): 104-22. historians have achieved no consensus on the extent to which usury doctrine influenced business practices and was a detriment to economic development. A Renaissance of Conflicts: Visions and Revisions of Law and Society in Italy and Spain (Toronto: Centre for Renaissance and Reformation Studies.87 But the crux of the matter is actual practice. A. Nelson. See J. 86 For example.88 which implies that Church doctrine had not deterred them from engaging in these activities in the first place. F. God and the Moneylenders: Usury and Law in Early Modern England (Oxford: Blackwell. “Restitution in Renaissance Florence. 85 M. 173-240. Rodney Stark.” in Studi in onore di Armando Sapori (Milan: Instituto Editoriale Cisalpino. Weber seems vindicated in rejecting simplistic assumptions about individuals or corporate entities as simply being rational utility-maximizing agents in religious markets86 who operate on the basis of strategic economic interests rather than longstanding normative concerns and ethical principles.84 LUTZ KAELBER super-structural plane. The Merchant in the Confessional: Trade and Price in the Pre-Reformation Penitential Handbooks (Leiden: Brill. Le Goff. Galassi. LeGoff describes the birth of purgatory as a way of allowing usurers to avoid eternal damnation. 1957). Usury. “Religious Discipline and the Market: Puritans and the Issue of Usury. Langholm. 2002). Edler de Roover. eds. CT: Yale University Press. Ranum (New York: Zone. 89 J. The Birth of Purgatory. E. J. Le Goff.. Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 70-4. Wucher. While it is true that Weber relied on a much narrower base of documents than economic historians have access to today. Lopez.” International History Review 25 (2003): 505-62. Kirshner. 181-205. C. F.” in J. “Wucher und Wirtschaft im Mittelalter. such a function could indeed be readily observed in those areas of commerce and finance.MAX WEBER AND USURY 85 of credit institutions. together with the exploration of its unintended consequences.” in The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven. 93 For example. Hunt and J. 91 J. 290-5.. Gilomen. 92 E.91 Since the prohibition applied to all loans but usury concerns could be circumvented much more readily in investment credit transactions.92 Moreover.” Historische Zeitschrift 250 (1990): 265-301. the petty pawnbrokers and small lenders of emergency loans for immediate consumptive needs were marginalized or forced out of the market if not legally protected by a charter or a license. M. or avoided altogether in investments in most forms of commercial partnerships. J. Gilomen. D. his approach to studying usury provisions as an important example of the ways in which religious ideas might shape and direct secular mateR. Munro. while larger lenders and companies were less likely to suffer the opprobrium of usury when engaging in credit-bearing transactions. Mueller. “The Dawn of Modern Banking. 1979). If anything. 2002). 90 . Many themes in these debates still resonate with Weber’s exploration. “The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution: Usury. 1200-1550 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 75-8.-J. will likely continue to fuel debates among historians about religion’s role in the emergence of modern capitalism. and Negotiablity. “Raymond de Roover on Scholastic Economic Thought. S. and Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Selected Studies of Raymond de Roover (Chicago: Chicago University Press. Rentes. Medieval Economic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. the ecclesiastical teachings were not equitably enforced. 1999).”90 has been tempered by the recognition. A History of Business in Medieval Europe. Banking. which ironically drove interest rates up instead of down. 1985). associated with the works of Raymond de Roover and others. see also H. 1974). Murray.93 The research on evasive practices engendered by the prohibition of usury. 32-33. C. 22. Money and Banking in Medieval and Renaissance Venice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. that the prohibition had a certain steering function in guiding banking away from loans and toward exchange transactions and annuities. CT: Yale University Press. Lane and R. Business. ed. Wood. Kirshner. he who doesn’t. Therefore it was an important topic. as an issue. ed. Weber thought.86 LUTZ KAELBER rial interests can still be considered relevant to these debates. Modern historians agree. 265.94 Usury.” in W. 1988).”95 94 Cf. Schluchter. 95 Gilomen. Max Webers Sicht des okzidentalen Christentums (Tübingen: Mohr. Reyerson. played a significant role in medieval religion’s moral economy and was an integral part of his sociology of religion and writings on the relationship between religion and the economy. faces penury. “Der Aufstieg des Bürgertums und die religiöse Vergemeinschaftung im mittelalterlichen Europa. L. it occupied institutions and sometimes posed stark ethical choices for individuals. . K. 410-36. and so did the fourteenth-century Italian Benvenuto de Rambaldis da Imola: “He who commits usury goes to hell.. Wucher. x TAXATION AND REVENUE x . x x . ” The American Historical Review 104 (1999): 25-32. The entrepreneurial role of the Portuguese Crown in the overseas expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is intricately woven into debates on the origins of modernity and the capitalist economy. in different ways. capitalist future. 1 . under the title “A evolução da política expansionista portuguesa na primeira metade de quatrocentos” (pp.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA: DECISIONS AND STRATEGIES OF THE PORTUGUESE CROWN Ivana Elbl Introduction In his recent AHA presidential address.2 Yet. both trends saw the overseas expansion and the role of the Portuguese state as a break with the past and a foretaste of a modern. Thomaz. The role of the Portuguese Crown in the economy of the early overseas expansion is thus deeply entangled in an ideological and Joseph C. the leading figure in the study of economic aspects of the Portuguese overseas expansion. in Portuguese.” Arquivos do Centro Cultural Português 26 (1989): 161-2. The foremost representative of the Braudelian school of economic historians in Portugal was Vitorino Magalhães Godinho. The article was reprinted. As Luís Felipe Thomaz has recently pointed out. The purpose of these debates is to discover the historical moments of change. which hailed the overseas expansion for its contribution to scientific discovery and the unfolding of human horizons. F. in L. which stressed a societal and structuralist approach and sought answers in economic and social processes. past historiography has created a double trap for those analysing the early Portuguese overseas expansion: the nineteenth-century tradition. Miller called for return to a humanist approach to history and to rigorous historicism. 1994). 2 Luís Felipe Thomaz. and the twentieth-century reaction to this heroizing approach. Miller. et l’Afrique au XVe siècle: Les débuts de l’expansion. 43-147). “Le Portugal. breaks with the old and the emergence of the new. “Presidential Address: History and Africa/Africa and History. De Ceuta a Timor (Lisbon: Difel.1 There are few areas where this approach can be more useful than in assessing the nature and roots of the early overseas expansion. Joseph C. Manuel Nunes Dias’ enduring concept of the “capitalismo monárquico português” (Portuguese state capitalism) constitutes only one reflection of the essential place the Portuguese overseas ventures have been assigned in the various theories and historical models of the emergence of capitalism. edited by James D. explored in great detail by Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada.”in Vitorino Magalhães Godinho. See in particular the section “A definição do capitalismo monárquico” (vol. F. The selection of articles in some of the recent collections. in particular his Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla (1252-1389) . “Finanças públicas e estrutura do Estado.3 Many modern historians perceived the overseas enterprise of the Portuguese Crown as a substantial innovation in commercial capitalism. For the period he covered. both of which have made a deep imprint on the historiography of the overseas enterprise of the Portuguese Crown. that the decisions and strategies that the Portuguese Crown had adopted in connection with its African enterprises were based on continuity with pre-existing practices and administrative methods. Mark A. 2 vols.: Ashgate) and David Armitage. such as Tracy.: Ashgate.” in Political Economy of Empires. Rather than following the flow of history from a deeper to a more recent past. it looks back into the past from a contemporary viewpoint. The late medieval Portuguese finances followed a pattern similar to those of Castile. 189216). 2.” in L. 5 For a seminal overview of the evolution of Portuguese state finances see Vitorino Magalhães Godinho. De Ceuta a Timor (Lisbon: Difel. Theories of Empire (Brookfield. the socio-economic and administrative history of the fifteenth and early sixteenth-century expansion has been somewhat neglected lately. 1-41. the basic precepts of the economic part of Nunes Dias’ interpretation are still generally accepted by contemporary leading scholars. Thomaz. 1991). this approach invites anachronistic and monist explanations. The Political Economy of Empires. however. Ensaios II sobre história de Portugal (Lisbon: Livraria Sá da Costa. “Expansão portuguesa e expansão europeia— Reflexões em torno da génese dos descobrimentos. The main criticisms of his theory focus on his neglect of ideological factors.90 IVANA ELBL epistemological modelling that is essentially presentist. Burkholder. While not without usefulness. Vt. “Evolution of Empire: The Portuguese in the Indian Ocean during the Sixteenth Century. Unlike the ideological aspects. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3 For an excellent and extensive summary of the historiography of the early Portuguese expansion and its perceived links to the emergence of capitalism see Luís Felipe Thomaz. 25-63. 301-2.4 It is easily overlooked. 1963-4). 4 Manuel Nunes Dias.5 rather than on innovation and change. 1998) illustrates this trend clearly by focussing on the later sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. ed. Administrators of Empire (Brookfield. See for example Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Luís Felipe Thomaz. 1994). Vt. O capitalismo monárquico português (1415-1549) (Coimbra: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra. ed. 1968).. which most monarchs of the period had to face. whether feudal or communal. whether they were generated by income from land holdings and rents. Late medieval states and other autonomous units. Vol. ed. see also A. especially those associated with war.. The resulting dissatisfaction among the noble elites constituted an explosive political issue. 1987). the Crown overseas ventures cannot be fully understood using the modern concepts of private or state enterprise. This decline affected both royal and noble revenues. in other words in the historical context which they were a part of. all of which contributed to a sharp demographic decline that did not begin to reverse itself until the second half of the fifteenth century. In other words. Portugal do renascimento à crise dinástica (Lisbon: Presença. José Mattoso. João José Alves Dias. A monárquia feudal (1096-1480) and Vol. For an extensive overview. wars and famines. The problem of growing costs was compounded by a crisis in revenues. 1999).n. were faced with growing expenditures. economic enterprises and ideologically motivated goals tended to be mutually supportive. 1200-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press.. 2. 177-199.” in Richard Bonney.6 (Madrid: Editorial Complutense. The revenues of a noble household. No alvoroço da modernidade (Lisbon: . proceeds from regalian rights. 1973). 1998). c. 1993) and La hacienda real de Castilla en el siglo XV (La Laguna: s. 3. at least in principle. ed. but require an appreciation of the economics of the noble household. The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe.. On the contrary. or customs and taxes sanctioned by tradition.. “Castile in the Middle Ages. There was no strict division between economic and non-economic projects. wealth was not a final objective. reflecting the triple scourge of epidemics. but a means through which the quest for power and honour could be satisfied. mostly social or political in nature. including that of the king. The Portuguese Crown found itself in the unenviable position of not only having to deal with its own fiscal problems but also to alleviate the social and political crises experienced by its most powerful subjects. H. História de Portugal.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 91 The Crown’s response to overseas economic opportunities were grounded in contemporary needs and attitudes. Portugal na crise dos séculos XIV e XV (Lisbon: Presença. with the royal household as its most complex form. were crucial but subordinate tools in fulfilling loftier goals. Like other late medieval noble enterprises. 6 For an excellent summary of these developments see the works of Luís Felipe Thomaz referred to above. de Oliveira Marques. ed. For a summary of his findings in English see Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada. . It offered a partial solution to a number of severe problems confronting the kingdom. and other sources of monetary income. the Portuguese Crown had the paramount claim to any tangible results of such ventures because they Estampa. . Thus. Henrique and Infante D. However. H. but because of the paramount political and legislative power it wielded. new lands. Royal Power and the African Enterprise It is important to realize that the Portuguese Crown became a dominant economic player in the early overseas expansion not necessarily because of its share in the enterprise. The extensive rights the Crown claimed over the early overseas enterprise were derived from the medieval notion of the king's sovereignty over his realm. ed. The Portuguese Crown based its policies concerning access to and trade with Africa and other non-Christian areas on these time-honoured principles. both in theory and in practice. 1993).92 IVANA ELBL The early overseas expansion represented a windfall for the Crown. such as Infante D. They also enhanced the Crown’s power and the means to implement its will by significantly enlarging its revenues through enlarging the royal fazenda (direct holdings). and through creating opportunities to implement new taxation. neither economic rationality nor revenue as such were the paramount factors in the Crown’s decision-making: the ultimate objectives were prestige and political power at home. de Oliveira Marques. and the King had the right to use them as he saw fit. In principle. The revertibility of fiefs and other holdings back to the Crown was one of the key precepts of feudal law. Pedro. A expansão quatrocentista (Lisbon: Estampa. 1998). In the Iberian context. customs fees. The king had the right to decide how the kingdom’s resources were to be used for the common good and to divide the available wealth among his followers. and A. all unassigned or newly acquired resources belonged to the Crown. The overseas ventures were a source of socially sanctioned opportunities. the formative experience and memory of the reconquista provided a vivid reinforcement to this fundamental idea. although the first overseas explorations in Africa were undertaken on the initiative of private persons. and new sources of income. 1415-1825 (New York: Knopf. the hard-pressed Pope Nicholas V yielded to the skilful diplomatic pressure of the Portuguese delegation and issued the bull Romanus Pontifex.. would show disrespect both for the Apostolic authority of the Pope and for the service rendered by Portugal to God. 401). Lisbon). 1147-1460 (Lisbon: Instituto para a Alta Cultura.7 Whoever should deprive the Crown of its well-deserved rewards. as a reward for its costly military effort against Islam. . 1. 401).9 An excerpt from the Bull stipulating these measures was to be posted on the doors of principal churches and announced to the public from the pulpit. to the exclusion of all other Christians. 1444). 1: 507-8 (doc. Gaveta 10. Subsequently. 1: 505-7 (doc. in the name of the king and in the “service of God and the King. Descobrimentos portugueses.8 Interloping south of the Cape Bojador. The revenues generated from the new terrritories were thus conceptualized as a redress for damages suffered and as a just reward for the Crown’s service to God. Descobrimentos portugueses. commercial. 401). Henrique.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 93 were carried out by sworn vassals of the king. were declared to be offences punishable by excommunication if the offender was an individual or by interdict in the case of corporate bodies. maço 5. or even organizing or ordering interloping expeditions. the Crown first justified its title to overseas dominium invoking the rights of first discovery by its subjects. vol. For a surviving printed copy of the public notice see AN/TT (Arquivos Nacionais—Torre do Tombo. directly or indirectly. The Portuguese Seaborne Empire. 8 Silva Marques. Documentos para a sua história. 9 Silva Marques. 505 (doc. On 8 January 1455. The Bull carefully spelled out the ecclesiastical prohibition against any military.” In the international arena. 10 Silva Marques. Boxer. 22. 1969). and fishing expeditions not authorized by the King of Portugal or D. Descobrimentos portugueses. No power or person was to deprive the beneficiaries of the bull of their just reward. 1: 507 (doc. ed. and also sent to major potentates within and outside of the Iberian peninsula. which declared that the Portuguese Crown was to hold dominium over the access to Africa south of Cape Bojador.10 The Romanus Pontifex did not content itself with relying only on the argument of a just reward but exploited the long-standing canon law principle that the Pope possessed the right to regulate contacts 7 João Martins da Silva Marques. however. Descobrimentos portugueses. a more powerful justificatory argument was developed. 401). 27. doc. See also Ch. Garcia. ed. 401). 13 J. this punishment was applied before the codification of the scales of interloping punishments in 1474. caught by Diogo Gomes off the Senegalese coast in 1460. unauthorized raiding in West Africa.. 1: 505 and 507 (doc. whereas others might seek only fast profit or even supply weapons or iron to the Infidels. the full implications of Bull provided the secular arm of the law with an avenue to invoke a spiritual offence ultimately punishable by burning at the stake. Violators of the royal decrees faced severe penalties. in order to maximize its revenue advantages. Descobrimentos portugueses. The justification was that the Pope could trust the above mentioned parties that their primary motive was to advance the interests of God. As viagens dos descobrimentos (Lisbon: Editorial Presença. Henrique. was publicly tortured on the wheel and burned in Lisbon.94 IVANA ELBL between Christians and non-Christians. In at least one known instance. All subsequent royal legislation stressed the Crown’s sole right to govern the modalities of contact with Africa. the Infante D. 46-7. Secular punishments could be very heavy. An interloper. to associate with Muslims and pagans as long as trade in prohibited goods was not involved. against papal prohibition. The Bull expressly permitted the king of Portugal. The bull itself only threatened offenders with excommunication but made it clear the church was willing to lift the spiritual penalty if they settled with the Crown. 12 11 . together with the gold he purchased in Africa and the swords he tried to sell.13 The 1474 decree became the first law regulating the West African trade to include a penal scale. Ship captains guilty Silva Marques. Silva Marques.12 Nevertheless. 1: 507 ( doc. 401). sometimes punishable by burning at the stake. just reward and authorization to associate with non-Christians. provided the Crown with a rock-solid base from which to regulate the African enterprise to its greatest advantage. Descobrimentos portugueses. and piracy against the legitimate traffic were all offenses punishable by death and loss of all property to the Crown. M. Direct or indirect participation in the West African trade. 1983).11 The two key arguments of the Romanus Pontifex. and persons authorized by them. contacts which could potentially result in spiritual pollution or corruption. with the Romanus Pontifex it became a capital crime. While in the 1440s interloping in West Africa was punishable only by confiscation of property. vol. 1200-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press.. Capital punishment applied to a greater number of offenses. ironically. “Introduction: The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe. 1461-1500 (Lisbon: Instituto da Alta Cultura. Smuggling or consent to smuggle and a host of other fraud charges called for various fines and in many cases for banishment. in the rest of Western Africa the Crown employed mostly indirect methods of revenue gathering.. however. ed. Descobrimentos portugueses. aimed at maximization of revenue benefits (fiscalism)16 and political objectives. 14 Silva Marques. both the practical difficulties the Crown experienced in enforcing its laws. 2a série (Lisbon: Agência Geral do Ultramar. the punishments had become even stiffer. 1958). 115). Anyone caught trading illicitly in Guinea in goods worth more than one mark of silver in local value was to be put to death. 4-5. However. Well into the first half of the sixteenth century. ed. although indirect exploitation of the overseas enterprise clearly constituted a less risky and labour-intensive mode of revenue generation. 1971). 154 (doc. and the legal strength of its proprietary claims. 1999). . 2: 79-92 (doc. Revenue-Generating Options The Crown had two basic strategic options to choose from in managing its business in Africa: direct or indirect participation. These options permitted numerous combinations. 1200-1815. smuggling of goods over the value of six marks of silver to Guinea. 16 For a concise definition of these concepts see Richard Bonney. The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 95 of false declaration or concealment of goods over one mark of silver in value were also to suffer capital punishment. 15 António Brásio.” in Richard Bonney. Unauthorized trading or raiding in Guinea and piracy against the legitimate traffic were still punishable by death and loss of property to the Crown. It habitually reserved for itself trade with gold-exporting regions (Arguim and the Gold Coast).15 The stiffening of the penal scale reflected. c. 28). Monumenta Missionaria Africana.14 By 1514. c. 3. decided by situational dynamics and policy oscillations (Table 1). So was. the Crown believed that direct involvement would generate more revenue. . it relied largely on regional and commodity monopolies. The decree forcefully reasserted the claim that the right to regulate contacts with Africa constituted a just reward for the royal services to God and Christianity and threatened transgressors with severe punishments. a wealthy Lisbon merchant.23 and in principle reaffirmed in 1514. Descobrimentos portugueses. 152). 26) and 7992 (doc. João de Barros. Descobrimentos portugueses. The decree of 31 August 1474 prohibited all unlicensed traffic south of the Cape Bojador and reserved the right to profit from the trade with Atlantic Africa to the Crown or its designates. 22 Silva Marques. 21 Silva Marques. 26) and 7992 (doc. 3: 153-4 (doc.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 97 favour of a more restricted policy. the Crown attempted fully to impose such an option only briefly. 25 Brásio. 3: 86 (doc. Hieronymus Münzer. 60). in 1469. 2a série.22 Its provisions were confirmed in 1481. 115). Descobrimentos portugueses. 23 Silva Marques. João assumed direct control over the African enterprise. 2: 71-3 (doc. 72. The King reserved to himself specific commodities. Afonso V leased. Monumenta Missionaria Africana. The ambiguities were resolved only in 1474 when the Crown Prince D. in 15181520.25 Until then.21 de facto violating the Gomes contract. 3: 220-2 (doc. The standing privileges of the Cape Verde Islanders notwithstanding. Descobrimentos portugueses. exclusive rights to the West African trade to Fernão Gomes.24 Although the assumption that a full monopoly was the most rewarding alternative formed the basic platform of the majority of the royal pronouncements on the early overseas ventures. Ásia de João de Barros. Primeira Decada (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda. 1988). 20 . 3: 129-30 (doc.20 The new Crown policy was far from consistent. D. Dos feitos que os Portugueses fizeram no descobrimento e conquista dos mares e terras do Oriente. Monumenta Missionaria Africana. eventually compelling Gomes to negotiate a separate lease allowing him to trade the spice. 2a série. 24 Brásio. claimed that the Portuguese King had a monopoly on every major Atlantic import and export commodity and that private parties were left to trade in parrots. a German humanist and diplomat writing in the early 1490s. 28). or on exclusive renewable contracts with private entrepreneurs. In 1470 the King reaffirmed the licence system. 2: 71-3 (doc. 28). monkeys and Silva Marques. whether partial royal monopolies or monopolistic arrangements with private parties. in particular malagueta (grains of paradise). 97). Chancelaria de D. 147). Even the Arguim trading station was leased out several times before 1521. Descobrimentos portugueses. 2: 71-3 (doc. and rhinoceros horns was reserved to the Crown from the very beginning of the trade. 2a série. 60).33 The severity of this decree was further blunted by the availability of special licences and contractual exemptions. 30 Silva Marques. or simply through the lack of enforcement. AN/TT. 96r. 72. 27 Viagens de Luís de Cadamosto e de Pedro da Sintra (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História. 2: 90 (doc. Monumenta Missionaria Africana. 2: 81 (doc. 35 Barros.32 However. AN/TT. 2a série. 32 Brásio. 155. and outlawed the export of such commodities to the Cape Verde Islands.” in Brásio. 9. Monumenta Missionaria Africana. maço 58. fol. Descobrimentos portugueses. Leis. 34 Brásio. Monumenta Missionaria Africana. The decree of 1470 claimed that trade in melegueta. 1948). 2: 90 (doc. maço 1. 29 AN/TT. Primeira Decada. and added brasil wood and precious stones to the list. 2a série. Monumenta Missionaria Africana. liv. civet cats. 144 and 185. 3: 86 (doc. Monumenta Missionaria Africana.26 The real picture was not so dismal. “Itinerarium. 2a série. a fortified trading station off the coast of Mauritania. Afonso V. 3: 214-5 (doc. 31). the Gold Coast and Arguim. 1: 244-5 (doc. only one commodity required a special additional licence: civet cats. which constituted an important link to the Saharan trade networks. because of their importance in the Gold Coast trade. 2a série. Thus Fernão Gomes’ contract demanded that he sell all his ivory to the Crown. 28). These provisions were later incorporated into the Ordenações Manuelinas 33 Brásio. red shells from the Canaries. 28).35 as opposed to disposing 26 Münzer.31 The penal code issued in June of 1514 proclaimed that private traders could deal only in merchandise and areas specified in the respective licence or contract.34 The Crown also used its legislative power to insert itself as a compulsory middleman. doc. 26). 28). 28 Silva Marques. . a source of valuable musk for perfume production. the same restrictions were placed on hanbels (voluminous Moroccan outer clothing)29 and conchas. parte I. 31 Brásio. Ásia.27 Certain key commodities were indeed reserved for the Crown. All other areas could be rented out or licences could be purchased for them. docs. other spices.28 In 1480. The Crown kept direct control above all over the main source of African gold.30 In March of 1514. the Crown summarily prohibited trade in all goods sold on the Gold Coast. Corpo Cronológico. 17-8.98 IVANA ELBL straw mats. Silva Marques. for example. 43. 2. 289).000 to 80 slaves per annum. 45 and 47).” Journal of African History 38 (1997): 52 and 69. 2: 139-50 (docs. smuggling. “The Volume of the Early Atlantic Slave Trade. in combination with the Crown’s repeated changes of policy. in particular those introduced in the early sixteenth century. In the early 1470s. 2a série. The São Tomé charters of 1485 and 1493 compelled the settlers to purchase all their manilhas (heavy brass or copper bracelets).36 These requirements significantly delayed the progress of São Tomé settlement and. 200) and 428-9 (doc.39 The law of 1518 reserved the Guinea trade for the Crown alone. 361). caused severe shocks both to the traffic itself and to its administration. from the Crown (whether in São Jorge da Mina or in Lisbon). 3: 207 (doc. the partial retraction of the Cape Verdian trading privileges and the imposition of the Gomes contract resulted not only in a sharp formal protest from the povo (third estate) in the 1473 Cortes but in near chaos.37 Measures such as these. tailed pepper. continued to have negative impact on the supply of slaves to São Jorge da Mina. Direct Crown Silva Marques. and piracy in Africa. 38 The hardening of punishments for interloping and smuggling in the law of 1474 demonstrates the Crown’s anxiety to master the situation. forcing the Crown to revoked the restrictions shortly after 1520. 40 See Ivana Elbl. forbidding them to buy slaves for export. lucrative market. the Upper Guinea slave trade declined from c. As a result. and slaves to the Crown agencies for a fixed price well below the market value. Monumenta Missionaria Africana. 14501521. Descobrimentos portugueses. 3: 587-8 (doc.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 99 of it on the open market. a well-established. a year later. 39 Brásio.38 In the late 1510s. because even those who would have normally purchased a license resorted to interloping. were based exclusively on the desire to maximize Crown profit by preventing competition from private participants and by monopolizing what appeared to be. Descobrimentos portugueses. an essential European export to West Africa. 36 . 115). Descobrimentos portugueses. the Crown almost destroyed the rapidly expanding slave trade with Upper Guinea by first requiring the Cape Verde Islanders to trade only in locally produced commodities and. 44. 37 Silva Marques. although they were significantly softened in 1500. 3: 153-4 (doc.40 These measures. under a given set of circumstances. They further ordered the settlers to sell all malagueta. 100 IVANA ELBL control was as a rule imposed on those commodities or in such regions and periods that happened to show remarkable growth or profit ratios. assumed a central. Dias Dinis. later. The death of Prince Henry in 1460 brought the dual control of the West African trade to an end. 14: 280 (doc. slow turnover. In the 1440s and early 1450s. In addition. João and D. 42 The name Casa de Guiné appears first in 1481. 217)). established already in 1455. the Crown relied on shipborne expeditions administered through the Casa da Ceuta. Arguim. However.41 The Lisbon office. not to mention a loss of enforcement capability. hard-to-control transaction costs. Despite its political power. and agency problems. Manuel hoped the Guinea House António J. but not exclusive role in administering the West African ventures. Casa de Guiné e Mina. The jealously maintained and enforced monopoly on the Gold Coast trade is a prime example of this approach. Since the 1480s. the name of the agency varied. Chancelaria de D. 53r-53v). 117). the most commonly used name of the agency was Casa da Mina e trautos de Guiné (see for example Silva Marques. The organizational structure of the royal West African enterprise emerged only gradually out of the general mechanism or the royal fazenda. João II. and the Crown came into possession of its first shore-based West African outpost. liv. These included daunting logistics. In some instances. In the 1460s the West African enterprise graduated to the status of a special subdivision of the royal estate. as fazenda de Guiné. Monumenta Henricina (Coimbra: Comissão Executive das Comemorações do V Centenário da Morte do Infante D. the term “nossos trautos de Guiné” or 41 . 3: 333-4 (doc. The older name trautos de Guiné that was in use since 1455 survived into the sixteenth century. 1. and became eventually known as the Guinea House (Casa de Guiné) or. fols. 1973). or to view profit in strictly economic terms.42 D. imperfect information. Problems of Direct Control The direct participation strategy frequently backfired because the Crown would overextend its resources and lose ability to act effectively. the Crown experienced problems faced by all large-scale medieval entrepreneurs engaged in complex ventures over large distances. Descobrimentos portugueses. Henrique. in a letter of quittance covering the period 1476-1481 (AN/TT. the Crown had to address far too many diverse concerns to give its overseas ventures the necessary and timely attention. and to make recommendations whether they should be rented out or administered directly by the Crown. 6-7. Regimento das Cazas das Indias e Mina (Coimbra: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra. the Feitoria das Ilhas. The problem was rendered worse by the fact that the overseas agencies were responsible not to the factor of the Guinea House but directly to the King. 11r and 114r). later. however. The resulting workload was overwhelming. also Indian trade. the central agency was beset with inefficiencies which led to serious bottlenecks and slowdowns in turnover. Arguim. Capitalismo monárquico português. After the opening of the sea route to India. . Both Houses still shared a single factor as chief executive responsible for all key decisions. The fluid and somewhat confusing nomenclature has led historians to believe that the central agency was effectively established in Lisbon only after 1481 (see for instance Nunes Dias. 2: 339 (doc.. despite orders to the contrary. though obviously referring to the same agency (see Silva Marques. Regimento. 222) and 348-9 (docs. such as the North African factories. so that his superiors. The Guinea House acted only as a logistic and clearance center.44 At the beginning of each year. the Casa dos Escravos. AN/TT. and São Jorge da Mina. but also for market research. 43 See Damião Peres. and by agencies located overseas. 44 Peres. 25-26. This was not the case: merchandise continued to be cleared through regional customs and tax-collecting agencies (alfândegas and almoxarifados). and the Arsenal (Armazém). Chancelaria de D. 1947). the Guinea House and the India House. The factor was responsible not only for its smooth operation and for enforcing royal instructions. superintendents of the royal fazenda could approve the list and orders could be placed. The Guinea House was complemented by three satellite metropolitan agencies. ed. Manuel was forced to reform the system in 1509 by dividing the agency into two separate Houses.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 101 would be able to handle both the Crown’s direct participation in the enterprise and the indirect revenues from it. Descobrimentos portugueses. It was his duty to collect up-to-date information on different trading regions in West Africa. D. fols. was only partial. he prepared a list of supplies and merchandise needed for the African and. Asian trade was added to the official mandate of the factor of the Guinea House. whose authorization was required in even the simplest matters.43 As a result. The reform. the vedores. six months ahead of the next trading cycle. In urgent “nossos trautos e resgates de Guiné” were used. João II. 231 and 232). 20. 2: 190-1). liv. maço 3. Corpo Cronológico. This was one of key problems characterizing the royal enterprise: by the time the goods arrived at their destination in Africa.48 Shortages of manilhas. 46 45 . because the supply ship failed to arrive. Regimento. cloths kept rotting unsold.45 The supply process was time-consuming and inevitably placed a lag of as much as two years between African demand and its satisfaction. The older textiles from previous shipments Peres. despite the king’s repeated and specific orders.000 manilhas in stock at all times. 14. The Crown was unable to provide adequate merchandise or facilities even to the gold-producing Mina factory. doc. Gaveta 15. The officials at São Jorge da Mina perennially complained about the poor state of the warehouses. and hurt the trade so much that the King ordered the Guinea House to keep 100. 6-7. maço 1. Material and transport were both available. 42. the low quality of the merchandise. In 1513 the factory was left completely deprived of suitable merchandise. 119 and maço 4. AN/TT. Crown agencies were unable to react flexibly to the African demand. doc. 8. the opportunities were often gone. 42.102 IVANA ELBL situations. the main focus of its entrepreneurial attention. Trade was brought to a standstill. doc. built together with the fortress in 1482. occurred several times during the early 1500s. Meanwhile. 47 AN/TT. one of the key Portuguese exports to the Gold Coast. and the damage that it usually sustained on its way from Portugal.47 In 1510. maço 4. and soon became unsaleable. but in 1503 the factor of Mina still lobbied the King to order the construction of a larger factory suitable for the proper storing and display of textiles. Gaveta 15. neither in terms of selection and quantity of the merchandise.49 with doubtful results. parte I. Corpo Cronológico. 49 Peres. maço 1. the Guinea House found itself unable to fill an order for painted hanbels and large basins desperately needed in Mina. doc. Regimento. parte I. See for example AN/TT. to the king’s great loss. were unsatisfactory from the very beginning. It was not a logistical problem. as the factor pointed out to the king. 48 AN/TT. nor in those of quality and logistical support. 14. doc. he could request an authorization to make interim purchases.46 The factory facilities. only a royal order was required. despite complaints and appeals to the King. The merchandise it was to carry remained to be ordered AN/TT. maço 2. 54 AN/TT. no. See also AN/TT. 888. maço 5. and the secretary of state who acted as the King’s representative.55 The factors faced chronic difficulties in securing transport to Portugal for the slaves they bought. Vaz informed the secretary that the small caravel servicing Arguim arrived in Lisbon with slaves and that it brought an urgent request for merchandise and food supplies. Gaveta 20.56 The extent of the problems faced by Arguim officials is well reflected in the 1515 exchange of letters between Estevão Vaz. AN/TT. or even enough casks to supply them with water. wheat rations decreased significantly both for the garrison and slaves. Gaveta 20. doc. was much worse off than Mina. 42. 53 AN/TT. thus further hurting the trade. the factor of the Guinea House.54 The supply of victuals was an even more nagging problem. Corpo Cronológico. because a large ship able to carry grain would take too long to get ready and would first have to be requisitioned. however. 55-59. 67 and maço 5. and about 700 hanbels were lost this way. when most of the trading took place. 56 AN/TT. doc. 42. Supply ships only arrived three or four times a year. Vaz urged the secretary to send the vessel back immediately with merchandise. 172r-177r. It proved impossible for months on end. In 1509. probably from the Arsenal. Núcleo Antigo. Gaveta 20. maço 13. AN/TT. 42. parte I. which was only of secondary importance to the Crown. subsequently. 42. the summer brought a period of hunger to the Arguim fort. and damaged the factory’s reputation. maço 5. Gaveta 20. no. doc. doc. 48. doc. doc. to make even a small vessel with emergency supplies ready to sail. Núcleo Antigo. Gaveta 20. maço 5.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 103 had to be placed in the second-hand cloth factory and sold off at a discount. 52 AN/TT. maço 5. en route to Portugal. 888. Each year. fos.50 The Arguim factory. 42. 55 In the summer. 51 50 . doc. fols. as an emergency measure. many slaves starved while awaiting embarkation and. in 1509 the factor of Arguim found himself unable for two years to get from Portugal a special order delivery of merchandise paid for with a large quantity of gold.51 Little effort was made to make attractive and fresh merchandise available during the first half of the year.53 To the amazement and indignation of the Berber merchants.52 Shortages of brass and mastic cost the Crown much gold in missed opportunities. 95. 28). A. C. for example. maço 50. 79. It took him eight year to clear his standing with the Crown. a return trip to Flanders took a couple of months. Corpo Cronológico. 22 (the record of the trial of a royal official. filled with accusations and counteraccusations). 40 (1979): 68-71. Brásio. The policy of micro-management and tight control over Crown employees and agents59 made it difficult to respond to the local demand and opportunities in a timely fashion. doc. 4 (complaints about the transfer of goods between royal pilots and the officials of São Jorge da Mina. H. Teixeira da Mota. Corpo Cronológico. Alan F. parte I. Manuel. parte II. 1959). 23-4. 72 (unauthorized trading during unloading).” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 1 (1959): 301-5. AN/TT. and an accounting system which was almost entirely geared towards inventory control. 2a série. “An Early Portuguese Trading Voyage to the Forcados River. Mauny. António Froes. 8-9.57 and even under the best of conditions. either directly or through administrative chicanery. Corpo Cronológico. Corpo Cronológico. 67. 11-15. 60 For examples of ships’ regimentos see A. 2: 89 (doc. Ryder. parte 58 . sér. received a 57 AN/TT. doc.” Boletim Cultural de Guiné Portuguesa 24 (1969): 562-7. 89-80. “Cartas de quitação del Rei D. Almeida sharply increased the supply of slaves to Arguim by fostering relations with mainland suppliers but ran into trouble because of disbursing unauthorized grain rations to feed the human merchandise. Teixeira da Mota and R. Tipografia Albano Tomas dos Anjos. 2a série. The elaborate security measures included ship and personal searches. 6-7. 28). B. “A viagem do navio ‘Santiago’ a Serra Leoa e Rio de S.61 Almada’s predecessor. Monumenta Missionaria Africana. maço 2. parte I. doc.58 It does not call for much imagination to picture how much time was required to process an order lacking urgency. 237). Regimento. 61 See Anselmo Braacamp Freire. Gonçalo de Fonseca. See also See for example Brásio. 2: 86-87 (doc. AN/TT. AN/TT. AN/TT. “Livre de l’armement du navire São Miguel de l’île de São Thomé au Benin (1522). See Peres. de Oliveira Marques. ending with a full audit of each ranking employee at the end of his turn of duty. maço 17. doc. Gaveta 20.60 On-the-spot initiative not only went mostly unrewarded but was often punished. Monumenta Missionária Africana. The conduct of trade was regulated by exceedingly detailed sets of binding instructions (regimentos) and price lists (taixas). Hansa e Portugal na Idade Media (Lisbon.104 IVANA ELBL from Flanders and other places abroad. 59 All Crown agencies laboured in an environment of suspicion and distrust. 26-9. as well as complicated control of access to money chests. as demonstrated in the misfortunes of Francisco de Almada. the royal factor in Arguim from 1508 to 1511.” Bulletin de l’IFAN.” Archivo Histórico Portuguez 2: 354 (doc. For documentary evidence pertaining to concrete situations see. maço 8. A. Domingos in 1526 (Livro de Armação). 642).” 8: 400-1 (doc. Regimento. The rest was deducted. maço 16. parte II. 62 Freire. The figures usually reflected the amount of taxes and customs that trade with those regions would yield in a particular year. together with the Crown goods without first consulting Lisbon and obtaining a proper clearance. because he sold some of the merchandise confiscated from a captured Genoese interloper. “Cartas.65 The Crown. parte I.64 The Crown was aware of its inability to compete with private participants on the open market. Corpo Cronológico. 94. 64 AN/TT. however ridiculous it may sound. but also to inspect the ledgers of private merchants newly returned from Africa in order to recommend which parts of the West African trade should remain open. but he died before the prize case was cleared. doc. 65 Peres.63 Because they were not on the Arguim price list (taixa). doc. 101). . that direct trade was easier to administer and potentially more profitable than collecting revenues from a multitude of participants. under the impression that if it took over directly a promising part of the trade it would be able to achieve four times I. Each year. the Crown would be presented with an estimate of the revenues expected to come from a particular sector of its overseas enterprise. and which should be reserved for the Crown. 8. 25-6. maço 12. The officials of the Guinea House were instructed not only to watch the royal market. Corpo Cronológico. as it did during the Joanine and Manueline period. doc. doc. as payment for the Crown’s mediation in selling the merchandise. Miguel Pardo. maço 27. As long as it believed.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 105 clearance of his accounts only in 1522. The commander of the ship that captured Pardo was theoretically entitled to a half of the cargo. 70 and maço 49. none of the Arguim officials would take the risk of touching them without explicit orders. it routinely resorted to legislation to preserve for itself access to trade in more profitable commodities or trade with more promising regions. fourteen years after his term had ended.62 Fonseca was reproached and Pardo’s best goods were left to rot in the warehouse until they were finally incorporated into the factory’s inventory several years later. and his heiress finally received only a half of the expected sum. which should be placed under an exclusive contract and for how much. 63 See the inventories from 1511 and 1514 (AN/TT. and to that section of the trade in general because they offered the Africans better terms than the Crown expeditions. The most obvious example was the attempted take-over of the flourishing slave trade on the Upper Guinea Coast in 1517-1522. In the course of the sixteenth century.000 réis (AN/TT. 45. or a share of imported African goods. 67 For a typical contract see AN/TT.69 D. liv. Theoretically. the leaseholders (trautadores) had an unlimited right to trade in the leased region. liv. Leasing and tax farming came to be definitely preferred over a system of individual licences. or to those in need of rewards for services rendered. Chancelaria de D. 97). often too dispersed to be managed effectively. liv. claiming that the Cape Verde settlers caused major damage to its proveito e serviço (profit and service) by competing vigorously. 132r). Afonso V. fol. however. 43. Descobrimentos portugueses. fos. 2a série. 44. Monumenta Missionaria Africana. The Crown. 30. to take partners. and eventually made all aspects of its African enterprise available to interested parties with enough capital to provide large sums up-front. 33. the Crown came to see leasing and contracting out as more advantageous that direct participation. and to issue licences to other traders in the name of the Crown.106 IVANA ELBL as much revenue. Afonso V.68 The Crown. prohibited most of the trade between the Cape Verde Islands and Upper Guinea. but this and similar instances tended to undermine private confidence in the safety of investing in West African ventures. 139-50 (docs. Chancelaria de D. and 47. often dealt severe blows both to the trade with West Africa and to its own revenues. For other payments in specie see below. 69 Silva Marques. seldom refrained from involvement in the leased-out areas and used general regulations limiting traffic in certain goods to extract extra payments. fols. The Crown promised not to send its ships to such areas. and the Crown was forced to reverse its policy before 1525. 3: 129 (doc.67 The leaseholders paid the Crown either a fixed annual fee. 46v-47r). Chancelaria de D. and not to licence access for other private traders. Afonso V. 68 The original 1474-1479 contract on the coast from Pedra de Galee to Cape Bojador called for one sixth of all imports (AN/TT. It was renegotiated in 1475 in favour of yearly payments of 28. Henrique initiated this type of policy when he rented out the Arguim trade to a group of entrepreneurs for ten years around Brásio.66 Revenues plummeted as a result. 33. 46v-47. 66 . 000 réis.74 despite the fact that in 1472 the Crown exempted him from all taxes except a sisa on the sales of malagueta.75 waived all standing regulations in favour of his privileges. but he still remained in control of the Arguim trade. Gomes’ general contract was terminated in 1474. Descobrimentos portugueses.77 Undeterred. The leaseholders were responsible for maintaining the fortress. 3: 129-30 (doc. Afonso V. raising the total rent to 300. Ásia. 3: 112-3 (doc. 71 70 .76 and had lent him a round ship to carry on the traffic in 1471. a prime slave freshly arrived from West African coast sold for 8.70 Arguim was still under lease in 1463. The calculation is 200. Descobrimentos portugueses. Chancelaria de D. Descobrimentos portugueses. however. AN/TT. the Crown renewed the contract in 1473. resident in Lagos. Descobrimentos portugueses.79 Bartolomeu Marchione. 3: 129 (doc. 74 Silva Marques. liv. probably for five more years. “Cartas. Chancelaria de D. 72 Barros.82 and most of the Viagens de Luís de Cadamosto. Afonso V.100. although it imposed an additional fee of 100. Chancelaria de D. 30. fol. for an annual fee of 200. 77 Silva Marques. 141r.000 réis. 75 Silva Marques. Chancelaria de D.80 held a lease on the Niger Delta (Rios dos Escravos) between1486 and 1495. 46v-47r. 82 In 1502-1503 the yearly rent was 800. 9. 33. liv. fols. 97). 96r. 78 Silva Marques. were stripped of their offices for mismanagement and replaced by a Lisbon treasurer. the entire Guinea trade was leased to Fernão Gomes for five years. In 1469. a Florentine merchant resident in Lisbon and a naturalized Portuguese subject. 76 AN/TT. liv.000 réis : 8. 33. 72.000 réis (Freire.71 These actions indicated that the Crown intended to pursue a similar approach in the near future. The fee was set at 1. fol. 83). In the subsequent years the lease on the Slave Rivers were much less than Marchione paid. “Cartas. 73 In this period. Primeira Decada.81 The size of the fee indicates that Marchione was entitled to trade not only in the Niger Delta but also in the rest of West Africa.000 réis = 25.72 The rent was relatively low considering that twenty-five slaves would have covered it.000 réis. when the royal collectors of revenue from Arguim. 68r. 3: 90-1 (doc.000 réis annually. liv. 404).THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 107 1455. Afonso V. 79 AN/TT.” 3: 477-8 (doc.000 réis on the malagueta trade. fol. 17. did not apply retroactively to the previous years. 81 Freire.” 2: 239-40 (doc. 97). 80 AN/TT. 65).78 The malagueta fee.73 Yet in 1473 Gomes still owed most of the rent. Afonso V. 220)). 000 réis (AN/TT.514. no. 89 AN/TT. 109 and 110). after almost forty years of direct Crown administration. payable in two instalments. 87 Freire. He paid regularly.297 represented several malagueta shipments. however. 30. John’s Day of 1514. 58r). for a period running from St. 85 Nunes Dias. La esclavitud en Valencia durante el reinado de los Reyes Católicos (1479-1516) (Valencia: Excmo. 217-471. 404). 88 Peres.91 Cantor and the Gambia River were leased to Mestre Felipe. was not selling very well in the early sixteenth century.400 réis.900 réis. 91 AN/TT. 968 réis. 247). 25-6. For the link with Cesare di Barchi see year 1497. a Jew.” 3: 477-8 (doc.” 2: 441 (doc. “Cartas. and as late as 1514 he still owed the Crown 36. Corpo Cronológico.000. parte II. for the staggering sum of 4. no.108 IVANA ELBL slaves that he imported to Portugal and sold to his associate. 155. It was also leased in 1525. have sold slaves from this part of West Africa in Mina. of which he paid 450. Only a very small fraction came from the Niger Delta. 50. but he proved unable to sell all the spices received from the Crown.000 réis. 105r.500 réis.85 In 1504-1505.000 in 1511. for 1. The payments were due after the arrival of the ships and after 83 Vicenta Cortés.87 Leasing became routine in the 1500s and 1510s. in June 1511 and January 1512. In 1512 Calliro Redolho leased the entire malagueta trade for two years for a more realistic annual sum of 1. John’s Day (June 24) of 1510 to St. 532.86 Malagueta. “Cartas. His original contract was for six years. Ayuntamiento. “Cartas.355 réis.83 Marchione could. Cesare de Barchi.89 The Senegal River zone was rented out in 15111512 for 393. 590. his payments to the Crown rose to 64. and when his contract was renewed he made an advance payment covering two-thirds of the total fee.” 2: 440-1 (doc. fol. 84 Freire. fol. and on the whole proved much more dependable than Fernão Gomes. 1: 360-1.050. Marchione made his payments to the almoxarife of the Slave House in Lisbon.” 1: 360-2 (docs. . “Cartas. Regimento. of which 16. 90 Freire. Núcleo Antigo. 297). 86 Freire. maço 58. in the 1490s. doc.88 Arguim was farmed out in 1515-l516. Núcleo Antigo. were Wolof. 1964). In 1507-1510 his activity expanded. but it was renewed for 1492-1495.640.84 Later on he invested heavily in voyages to India and in the spice trade.363.90 The amount due in 1511 was 195.158. O capitalismo monárquico português. one the most expensive spices in the late medieval period. 376.100 Forty years later.000 réis. fol. Núcleo Antigo. 532.98 Rio Primeiro.95 In 1510-1513 the lease dropped to about 540.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 109 allowing for expenditures. Freire.137 réis annually. the Portuguese Crown. the area between Gambia and Sierra Leone.” 3: 472-3 (doc. and this policy eventually came to cover those Lisbon agencies which dealt with revenue from West Africa. Of these.383.666 réis in 1511.102 92 Freire. was rented separately for 140. fol. allowed most of its tax and customs revenue to be farmed out. “Cartas. 44). in accordance with general European practice. “Cartas. 101 João Brandão. 1990). in 1552 the annual rate was only slightly higher. 112r. “Cartas. 98 Freire. 96 Freire.000 réis.” 3: 477-8 (doc. 220). Núcleo Antigo. the Slave House was particularly relevant because its head acted as receiver of most African regional and commodity rents.600 réis. 297). “Cartas. 297).94 Sierra Leone was leased prior to 1502 for 600. it rose to 1.” 2: 441 (doc.000 réis per year. or 3. Over this period.000 réis to another leaseholder.101 The Vintena House was farmed out in 1509-1510 for 3. and 1.99 Tax farming was probably less risky for the Crown than leasing. In 1509-1510 the Slave House was farmed out for 6. 370). “Cartas. or 1.100. were leased for three years. AN/TT. 97 Freire.” 2: 239 (doc. 94 Freire. 100 Freire. from 24 June 1509 to 24 June 1512.747 réis. 532. edited by José da Felicidade Alves (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte.” 1: 243 (doc.96 The Slave Rivers were leased in 1486-1495 for 1.812 réis yearly. 392). “Cartas.884.620 in 1512.” 2: 441 (doc. 108r.942. 59.000 réis annually. 93 Freire. “Cartas.000 réis.212. 102 Freire.” 2: 441 (doc. standing at 3. and before that for 640. 297). 195. 911.93 The annual lease amounted to 917. 297). 392). one of the past leaseholders. 404). AN/TT.” 3: 392 (doc. 220). east of the Lagos Lagoon.275 réis. António Fernandes. remained owing 84.000 réis yearly. . no.000 réis were paid in 15091510.400.97 and in 1502-1503 for 800.000 réis to Pero de Evora. and was based on extensive precedent.” 3: 472-3 ( doc.92 Guinea Rivers.” 2: 440-1 (doc. covered by a contract in favour of Joham de Lila and his partners. Grandeza e abastança de Lisboa em 1552. Throughout the late Middle Ages. and over the subsequent two years. no. 95 Freire.” 2: 239 (doc.191. 99 Freire. “Cartas. “Cartas.624 réis. “Cartas. “Cartas. 2: 41-5 (doc. no. parte II.109 The revenue of São Tomé was farmed out in 1509 to Diogo Fernandes Cabral.100.111 of which he paid 150. but it was still worth to Duarte Afonso and Duarte Bello.000 réis. “Cartas. “Cartas. Núcleo Antigo.” 10: 4 (doc. “Cartas. “Cartas. and Fogo for three years.110 IVANA ELBL The West African Islands represented a very attractive target for tax farmers. The revenues of Príncipe were farmed out in 1510-1514 to António Carneiro for 535. They undertook to pay 2. fols.113 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 AN/TT. Monumenta Missionaria Africana. and was farmed out for 1. the revenue increased again.103 This amounted to an annual rent of 700.” 2: 441 (doc. payable in slaves evaluated by the royal almoxarife. 58r.110 Joham de Fomseca continued farming the São Tomé revenues in 1511-1513. 100r. namely Santiago and Fogo. AN/TT. when the Crown’s repression of private trade reached its height. Núcleo Antigo. 90v. 532.000 réis during that period.104 In accordance with the provisions of the contract the amount. Freire. fol.500 réis. who held the contract until 1515.999 réis. 15). Maio. fol. some 70. this time to Jorge Nunez. and by the end of their contract they had paid the Crown 3.200. farming its vintena. Freire. and the sum increased to 900.” 2: 441 (doc. Freire.130 réis during an unspecified period ending in 1513.033. no. fol. .333 réis yearly. was later on further raised to 1. AN/TT. maço 8.800 réis.000 réis yearly in 1510.000 réis in 1511. Corpo Cronológico. 297). for a bulk payment of 535.112 The Ano Bom Island was a trading backwater. 764). 116r. “Cartas.” 3: 392 (doc. 590. Núcleo Antigo. AN/TT.500 réis. and in 1510 to Joham de Fomseca and António Carneiro for the sum of 388.108 In 1525. one third being delivered in advance as security. Núcleo Antigo. 104. 532. 297). 97r. Freire.105 António Rodrigues joined in partnership with Nicolão Rodriguez.130. 297). 370). Brásio.” 2: 440-1 (doc.000 réis.107 Graviel Rodriguez was the farmer in 1519-1521. no. when António Rodrigues farmed the revenue of Santiago. doc. The revenue of the Cape Verde Islands. was farmed out to Duarte Rodriguez Pinto and Pedro Francisco for three years in 1504. 532. no. AN/TT. Freire.106 The revenues were promptly farmed again. 2a série. ” International Journal of African Historical Studies 6 (1973): 456-7. under which the Crown supplied merchandise and Melo the necessary logistics in return for a share in the sales in Mina.Vogt.000 cruzados (39. argued in the 1473 Cortes that the Crown could derive as much as 100. 1469-1682 (Athens: University of Georgia Press). and instead of depending on the open market it signed a partnership agreement with Fernão de Melo. praised the Crown’s West African enterprise as a “remarkable coordination effort” (John L. Manuel’s administration tried to assure itself of a guaranteed supply in the early 1500s. binding him to supply Mina with slaves from Benin in return for two thirds of the price of each slave sold in Mina. . Melo. The shift in revenue-collecting strategy in favour of guaranteed income was a result of a continual reassessment of Crown options. who ignored it when they could not bypass it legally. Carneiro’s monopoly contract was an exception in this respect.115 contemporaries often criticized the Crown’s business decisions as ill thought-out or even irrational when it came to profit or income maximization. D. and a monopoly on the Niger Delta trade.000. however. which was not repeated when a slave supply contract was signed with Duarte Bello in 1519 and João de Odon in 1525. The Results While modern historians tend to be much more complimentary. This provision violated the privileges of the São Tomeans. in protest against the Gomes contract. and an example of ongoing adaptation of past lessons from the management of royal domains and other revenues to the conditions presented by far-flung overseas enterprises. Vogt. for example. 115 Vogt. The third estate (o povo). 72-73)). did not have a monopoly on the supply. The gradual move away from direct control of many of the African ventures reflects the hard lessons of the “capitalismo monárquico” (almost certainly a misnomer).000 réis) in revenues from the 114 John L. The Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast. São Tomé had been a slave supplier to Mina since it was populated in the 1490s. 1500-1540.114 The frequent changes in Crown policy and strategy reflect the difficulties presented by the logistical and administrative demands of a complex long-distance enterprise.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 111 In 1514 António Carneiro signed a four-year contract with the Crown. captain of São Tomé. “The Early São Thomé-Principe Slave Trade with Mina. 68.000 réis only three decades after its opening phase. since the Antiquity to modernity. L’impôt public et le prélèvement seigneurial. Monumenta Missionaria Africana.5% of the overall projected value of the trade.. eds. 3 vols (Paris: Comité pour l’Histoire Économique et Financiére de la France. just as the collection of various taxes. 2a série. 1986). Le Mené. in particular Bonney’s “Introduction” (1-17). 117 116 . Genèse de l’état moderne. Genet and M. For a general development of revenue administration in the West. the povo certainly seemed to have a point here. 1: doc. which this sum represented.117 It is important to realize that the Crown’s idea of “profit” was not necessarily based on accounting principles. the Cortes believed the trade worth at least 120. In contemporary usage the word proveito (“profit”) meant both “benefit” and “profit” in a bookkeeping sense.000. Prélèvement et redistribution (Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. panEuropean methods of reducing overhead and securing a guaranteed. farming out tax collection and contracting out regalian rights were time-sanctioned. 68. In the fifteenth century. fin XIIe-début XVIe siècle. tolls and dues did in the metropolitan area.-Ph. The Crown tended to voice only one kind of response to these and later protests by disgruntled subjects who pointed out that Crown policies were damaging to the latter’s own interests— invoking the royal prerogative to decide what was to the proveito (benefit/good) of the kingdom at large. and Albert Rigaudière. particularly chapters 4 and 5. Monumenta Missionaria Africana. Jean Kerhervé. see Carolyn Webber and Aaron Wildawsky. Given the fact that the Gomes contract came to only 300. L’impôt au Moyen Âge. The licencing system and customs network represented a considerable burden for the royal bureaucracy. even if it was lower that the potential overall revenue. Brásio. Like other medieval political bodies. also see Philippe Contamine.116 Since the Crown dues.118 It therefore does not come as a surprise that the Crown. J.000 réis annually.112 IVANA ELBL African trade if it was kept open. 2002). well beyond mere self-interest. eds. Brásio. 2a série. constituted 28. 1987). Thus transaction costs were one of the key considerations the Crown kept in mind in its continual reassessment of overseas revenue sources. A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World (New York: Simon and Schuster.. the Crown had to consider both non-economic goals and the costs of revenue generation. 1: doc. in other words invoking what amounted to executive privilege. 118 For a series of studies on medieval and sixteenth-century revenue collection methods and taxation strategies see the conceptually fundamental volume edited by Richard Bonney. fixed income. The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe. THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 113 like its European counterparts. AN/TT. The Crown’s accounting system was geared towards inventory and agent control. In essence. 67. Núcleo Antigo. In 1486-1493. “Cartas”.120 Freire. the Crown treated the African income the same way it treated its overall revenues: as a giant petty-cash box.119 In 1511. beyond a well-justified but useless notion that the revenue was considerable. no. the entire Crown share in the proceeds of the Atlantic slave trade went toward covering the enormous cost of building fortifications in Morocco. albeit at the price of potentially lowering the income. simplified bargaining. precisely the one that has often been characterized as a progressive feature. the rest being distributed as gifts and favours according to royal dispositions in the matter. rather than with the public in general. 532. 3: 396-7 (doc. The puzzling element in the early period of the Portuguese expansion is. see Ivana Elbl. 97r-121r. Some of the merchandise arriving from West Africa was not even put on the market. only one third of the slaves registered as received by the Slave House were actually sold. For the overall pattern. This approach increased predictability. was assigned to defray social payments to the nobility. 120 119 . fols. and thus lowered the Crown’s transactions costs. 380). focussed the eventual application of sanctions and deterrents. in particular Figure 1. namely the Crown’s insistence on direct participation in commercial operations as the preferred option. from which money and goods were drawn as needed. and Social Mobility in the Age of Vasco de Gama. in fact.” Portuguese Studies Review 6 (1997-98): 53-80. 190r. The revenue derived from regional leases and tax farms. “Overseas Expansion. showed a marked preference for dealing with a small number of large entrepreneurs. but distributed in the form of presents— thoroughly medieval and Renaissance —a form of largesse. similarly to some 80 per cent of overall Crown revenues. The King drew on the Guinea House randomly and haphazardly to cover purchases for the royal household or to transfer money to other administrative departments which stood in need of a cash injection. Nobility. not towards cost-benefit analysis or revenue-expense reconciliation. for example. One possible explanation may lie in the fact that its administrative and accounting practices left the Crown in no position to determine efficiently how much profit (proveito) it was in fact deriving from the West African enterprises. fols. such as his brother D. 176. Núcleo Antigo. and casamentos. fol. Descobrimentos portugueses.” the daughter and heir of King Henrique IV.” D. AN/TT. Afonso used overseas resources to offer boons to equally restless subjects. AN/TT.000 réis. 177-177v. 532. 3: 153-4. no. Núcleo Antigo. it must be stressed. no. João. yet such grants also became an expression of the Infante’s political power once the King had come of age. 115. Manuel’s consort Queen Maria. Afonso and D. Manuel. Afonso V’s minority.123 At the same time. Grants in the Atlantic Islands and in Africa were one of the ways in which the Regency sought to pacify the restless ambitions of Infante D. was rather alien to the actors involved in such processes at the time.114 IVANA ELBL The overseas expansion provided a valuable new source of rewards for powerful subjects or royal favourites. no. Manuel. the widow of King João II and sister of the reigning King D. no. who lost her bid for the throne of Castile to Isabel the Catholic in 1474 but because of her betrothal to King Afonso V continued to be the financial responsibility of Portugal. the African enterprise supported 45 per cent of the 4. the revenues from various West African regions were merged into the pipeline of royal social payments to the nobility: assentamentos. AN/TT. Núcleo Antigo. Henrique during D.125 121 122 123 124 125 Silva Marques. and thus constituted an important form of political and social capital.000 réis to which amounted the assentamento of Queen Lenor. After Henrique’s death. the full amount of the assentamento of D. 532. D. 532. 98r-121r. In 1474.460. fol. 532. the African enterprise came under the direct administration of the Crown Prince.122 In 1511. Fernando and the celebrated D.124 The revenues from trade in malagueta (grains of paradise) covered the assentamento of the “Excellente Senhora. Juana “La Beltraneja. Duarte de Meneses. D. 177v. doc. if not before. tenças. AN/TT. drew on revenues of the Casa da Mina. . becoming as inextricable a part of the system as the revenue from metropolitan fiscal districts. amounting to 2. In the 1510s.150. fols. and its profits were assigned toward the maintenance of his household. Núcleo Antigo. In this respect the Crown’s approach can be considered “economic” only if the concept is enlarged to include the application of formal economic thinking to social and ceremonial interaction— —something that. D.121 establishing thus a precedent for subsequent heirs presumptive. 000 réis of the Gomes contract look rather insignificant. fols. for example. However. “Evolution of Empire. 1r-118v. the potential of the trade was undeniable. 127 AN/TT. 1. The 1511 orçamento indicates that African revenues accounted for 17 per cent of the Crown’s expected income.000. Núcleo Antigo. pertaining to 1511 and 1525. 532.130 These figures suggest that Africa played an important role in the generation of royal revenues. but its share consistently Jorge Faro. 111r. Two of these orçamentos are available for the early sixteenth century. 316. the 300. Africa provided 16 per cent.000.000 réis. as Table 2 indicates. it is no surprise that the Crown was easily seduced into believing that its Guinea treasure chest was bottomless. no.129 In 1525. 126 . 130 AN/TT. the gross yearly revenues exceeded 13. João II. 82-5 and 225-9. 1r-98r. Both are incomplete but still comprehensive enough to be comparable.” 312. fols. but still formed the majority.168. not net income.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 115 The annual orçamentos (budget estimates) and the receipts of the Guinea House and its satellite agencies indicate that the West African enterprise contributed significantly to the royal income.000 réis.074. fols. had been deducted by the Crown. Yet it is important to realize that these figures represent gross receipts. Chancelaria de D. no. The orçamentos are more reliable when the estimates are based on leases and tax farms. 129 AN/TT. Receitas y despesas da Fazenda Real de 1384 a 1481 (subsídios documentais) (Lisbon: Instituto Nacional de Estatística.128 Since these raw figures were used for casting up the annual orçamentos. within two years of Prince D. Núcleo Antigo. the gross revenues of the Guinea House registered very rapid growth in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. India 14 per cent and the Azores 2 per cent (data for Madeira are missing).127 While nowhere near the 39. 1465). 590. because those represent actual net income. liv. In the 1473 orçamento. 128 For some of the problems of Portuguese revenue estimates in sixteenthcentury Asia see Subrahmanyam and Thomaz. rather than Crown receipts. the rest coming from domestic sources.126 In this context. 53r-53v. or the overhead.000 estimated by the 1473 Cortes.500 réis and in the 1477 one at 43. Moreover. João’s assumption of control over the African enterprise. domestic revenues declined to 68 per cent. the overall domestic revenue of the Crown was estimated at 52. None of the operating expenses. . From an administrative and strategic point of view the Crown handled this sector in the same manner as it did its metropolitan resources: as a means of attaining the short-term goals of solidifying and expanding its power under very difficult and turbulent conditions. just like the overseas enterprise in general. Conclusion The West African enterprise.” 13. both by limiting outsider access to African markets and by 131 Bonney. . an area that scholars have mostly neglected in their search for the roots of capitalist economy.THE KING’S BUSINESS IN AFRICA 117 lagged behind metropolitan sources. distorted the ability of African trading partners to sell and buy. “Introduction. It is essential to realize. The limitations characterizing the Portuguese royal enterprise in Africa.131 This system grew out of medieval seigneurial estate and revenue management. shows the importance of perception and impression: clearly. The emphasis placed on overseas income. and the temporary barriers to private participation that the Crown erected in an effort to manage its short-term revenues had serious impact on the volume and regional development of early European trade with Africa. However. rather than net income. at the expense of domestic revenues. It was the gross intake (see Table 2). The relative volume of trade with various African regions is frequently seen as a reflection of their supply capacity and of effective demand for European merchandise. The Crown’s strategies were thus satisficing—they did not necessarily aim at maximizing revenue. the overseas enterprise was perceived as the dynamic element. as formulated by Bonney and Ormrod. but rather at achieving an acceptable and sustainable cash flow and securing means to satisfy political and social strategies. that the policies and strategies of the Portuguese Crown. constituted a windfall addition to the existing (and limited) resources of the Portuguese Crown. as well as the inefficiencies of its various agencies. these strategies were deeply rooted in past practices and political choices (we might say that they were “path-dependent”) and can be best understood in the context of “domain state” fiscal system. that dazzled contemporaries and modern historians alike. however. 2 “The Development of Commerce between Europeans and Africans” (pp. Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World. and Trade in Western Africa.” 74-5. 1000-1630 (Boulder: Westview Press. chap. chaps. and George Brooks. Society. 133 For an elaboration of this argument see Elbl. Ecology. 1992).133 132 For comparison. 43-71). . 1400-1680 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. “The Volume of the Early Atlantic Slave Trade. 1993). Landlords and Strangers.118 IVANA ELBL making the Crown unable to conduct such trade efficiently. see John Thornton.132 It is particularly important to stress this in connection with the early Atlantic slave trade and the debate on the state of slave trade and slavery in the coastal regions of West Africa in the opening period of the European overseas expansion. 7-9. and wheat. only to have a wave of plague reduce the urban population by some significant amount during the repayment period. especially when it became clear that consumption taxes alone would not be enough to make the next round of interest payments. Since warfare was frequent and widespread in late fourteenth-century Europe. usually consumption taxes. wine. and especially the Catalan city of Manresa. but the principle deduced here can be applied to cities throughout Europe.CIVIC DEBT. would be available to pay interest on that debt. European war was funded almost entirely though deficit financing. which during these decades was often protracted and desperate. Since the taxes used to pay civic debts were often consumption taxes on such goods as meat. By the 1340s. CIVIC TAXES. the increased burden was felt most keenly by the poor. This is not to say that the middle and upper classes in many cities were not severely harried. and which demanded every surplus penny from combatants’ treasuries. the taxes which paid this debt had to be sustained at a constant rate. The case study will be Catalonia. urban householders throughout Europe were frequently in an untenable situation during the decades . especially since the price for failure on the battlefield was often a loss of sovereignty. debt and taxation.and long-term population loss on urban polities which had contracted fixed debt levels on the assumption that a steady level of urban taxes. Since civic debt simply had to be paid in order for the financial machinery of the state not to fail. it often happened that cities would contract a debt burden at the utmost limit of their citizens’ ability to pay. in a quadruple vise of depopulation. therefore. resulting in an increased tax burden per capita. war. To the mix must be added the effects of war. Squeezed. AND URBAN UNREST: A CATALAN KEY TO INTERPRETING THE LATE FOURTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPEAN CRISIS Jeffrey Fynn-Paul This paper describes a phenomenon that has not received its due share of attention from historians writing on the European crisis of the later fourteenth century: the effect of unforeseen short. when a long-term cycle of plagues was inaugurated by the Black Death. “The Vanishing Consulates of Catalonia. Although there had been experiments with systems of urban consellers in Catalonia during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. for Vic. meaning that until that very late date Manresa was both a feudal possession and outside of the main stream of Catalan urban development. Ramon Folc survived until 1274. Social. the pace of innovation in the smaller Catalan cities tended to lag behind Barcelona.” Speculum 74 (1999): 65-94. were slow to coalesce into what might be called a typical late-medieval form. and Venice between 1350 and 1400. the new King Pere II reorganized the Catalan administration system.” Speculum 54 (1979): 479-91. often by a period of decades.120 JEFFREY FYNN-PAUL between 1350 and 1400. The Development of Regular Tax Systems in the Catalan Cities.” PhD . “The Catalan City of Manresa: A Political. The persistent urban unrest which characterizes this period may often have arisen from precisely this combination of variables. It was not until 1274 that Barcelona received a definitive urban government of the type it would retain until the end of the ancien régime. In 1276. but as late as 1254 it was granted as a fief to Viscount Ramon Folc IV of Cardona for the duration of the viscount’s life.1 As might be expected. and also Paul Freedman. “Another Look at the Uprising of the Townsmen of Vic (1181-1183). Manresa and certain other towns now became the capitals of their own veguerias. both political and financial. “An Unsuccessful Attempt at Urban Organization in Twelfth-Century Catalonia. see Paul Freedman. it is necessary to describe the evolution and functions of these systems. however. and Economic History. 1285-1330 In order to understand the effects of urban tax and debt systems on late fourteenth-century Catalan cities. see Jeffrey Fynn-Paul. Manresa itself was a royal city by the late twelfth century. as it did in Manresa during the 1360s and 1370s. Florence.2 1 Philip Daileader. these were abandoned for somewhat mysterious reasons. 2 For the creation of the Manresan vegueria. The conclusion of this paper applies the theory derived from the Manresan evidence to some famous cases of urban unrest in Genoa. Catalan urban institutions.” Acta Medievalia 20-21 (2000): 177-86. which were large territorial administrative units similar in extent and function to English counties. 85-6. A third element of Jaume’s political policy was to purchase the town’s bailiwick from a noble family. The privilege was especially important to the city’s patricians because wine growing was a principal capital investment for them at this time.3 From 1315.4 Another royal privilege of 1311 granted Manresans the right to collect taxes from everyone who owned property within the territory of Manresa. (Barcelona: Rafael Dalmau. 5 Marc Torras. increasing its importance as a regional trade nexus. Throughout the fourteenth century. 8-10. Manresa owed a certain amount of money to the crown each year. 5: 658-60. few if any noblemen resided within Manresa’s city limits.CIVIC DEBT. El Llibre. the king granted Manresans a monopoly on intramural wine sales. in the same year Jaume also gave the Manresans permission to form a conciliar government.5 Also in this year. “De mercaders a terratinents. 70-1. for example. CIVIC TAXES 121 In 1291 King Jaume II ascended the throne. Exactly how much this Dissertation. no knights were elected to the office of consul.. In 1315. to increase revenue. King Jaume had made Manresa into a bourgeois city. to that of civitas (city). In 1311. More tangibly. and his farsighted policies. 3 Pere Català i Roca. This new monopoly represented a serious blow to the seigniors in the vicinity of Manresa. University of Toronto (2006). esp. Jaume’s political reforms were complemented by equally farreaching fiscal innovations. 4 Josep Fernandez Trabal found that wine growing was a principal investment of the Gironese patriciate in the years after 1300. Jaume elevated Manresa from the status of villa (town). 1967-1990). who had been exercising various forms of feudal dominance over the Manresan townspeople since the twelfth century. 1327). while the landowning patricians of the city were now in a position to charge a premium on their own vintages. implemented over the course of a long and pacific reign (d. Jaume added a second fair to the city’s calendar. ed. ed. 42-3. . See Fernandez. 6 Torras. El Llibre Verd de Manresa (Barcelona: Fundació Noguera. 1996). 88-9.” L’Avenç 94 (1986): 42-7. who lost their principal market..6 The principal aim of all this reform was. As part of the royal patrimony. did much to turn Manresa from a feudal market town into a thriving regional capital. Els castells catalans. of course. 6 vols. the de Manresas. The imposicion system can be seen as the culmination of Jaume II’s fiscal policy. grain. Aragon and Navarre. even though he did not live to see its full implementation. 1936): Appendices III-V.. and suggest that Jaume II had perhaps doubled Manresa’s real contribution to the Aragonese treasury. two years after Jaume’s death. Money. de la Roncière. such as Herlihy’s wheat prices. censal debts. By 1329. however. 10 Comparable systems had been fully developed in most Italian states by the late thirteenth century. 9 David Herlihy. Prices and Wages in Valencia. the index had fallen back to 125. 1967). MA: Harvard.8 One can only point to other European trends. went to the crown. shows that wheat prices ranged from an index figure of 125 in 1251-1275.9 The main reason for this sudden increase in urban tax revenue was another financial reform carried out under Jaume II. and the Valencia series does not commence until 1413 (Earl Hamilton. 1968). This in itself is an important distinction which is seldom discussed. it appears as though the crown’s income from extraordinary taxes was always earned at the expense of ordinary revenue. 213-60). spices. 8 The earliest data are from Earl Hamilton’s Navarre series. Since these imposicions also went to pay “extraordinary” taxes. it is probable that it was implemented by royal fiat in other Catalan cities at the same time. Charles M. His Aragon series has only fragmentary data prior to 1381. less the costs of urban administration. 1351-1500 (Cambridge. IL: Faber and Faber. in years when these were owed. Presumably. all of Manresa’s regular revenue from imposicions. It is impossible to say.7 It is known that in 1254. “Indirect Taxes or ‘Gabelles’ at Florence in the Fourteenth Century: The Evolution of Tariffs and Problems of Collection. whether real royal income from the city increased during this period. which was the creation of a system of indirect consumption taxes on such commodities as meat. and simple manufactured goods. Manresa was raising over two and a half times the 1254 figure. insofar as it enabled the cautious Jaume 7 The few bailiff generals’ books in the ACA which mention Manresa prior to 1380 give accounts of feudal rents. Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence (Evanston. and later.10 Because the development of an imposicion system happened simultaneously in Barcelona and Manresa. wine. The new system proved successful. to 170 in 1301-1325. the city had been worth about £450 per year to Jaume II’s grandfather. By 1326-1350. since there are as yet no price series for Iberia before 1350. These were known in Catalonia as imposicions. 123. but no indication of total annual payments to the crown. ed. Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia (New Haven: Yale. .” in Nicolai Rubenstein.122 JEFFREY FYNN-PAUL entailed at any given time has proven a very elusive figure. 152. the tax system entered into an evolutionary phase. however. the true development of this type of urban tax system dates only from this year. El naixement de la fiscalitat d’Estat a Catalunya (Vic: Estudis Universitaris. 91-2. remains to be discovered. the years between 1321 and 1329 can be seen as a further experi- Broussolle. after a quarter century of planning. 2000). grains.12 In the face of such irregularity. extraordinary royal levies were raised from the Catalan cities by means of direct impositions known as tallias. in which the sales of indirect taxes on staples were made only irregularly. Renda i fiscalitat en un ciutat medieval: Barcelona (segles XII-XIV) (Barcelona: Consejo superior de investigaciones scientíficas. However. and ships were sold in 1328 in order to raise money for the marriage of Alfons IV.15 By combining the narratives of Broussolle and Sanchez. 14 Manuel Sanchez.CIVIC DEBT. wine. taxes on meat. and how much revenue they provided. “Les impositions municipales de Barcelona de 1328 a 1462. From 1321. is the starting point for understanding the development of the imposicion system. Exactly what these dues entailed. 15 Marc Torras. 14. “Les impositions municipales. who in 1955 published a detailed study of Barcelona’s imposicions. 13 But now on Barcelona’s early rents see Pere Orti Gost. Between 1283 and 1329. according to Broussolle.11 For example. CIVIC TAXES 123 to launch a successful conquest of Sardinia between 1322 and 1326. 11 . 1998). the control of municipal taxes had passed firmly into the control of Barcelona’s consellers only in 1283. in 1329 no such taxes were sold. Late as it may seem.13 The work of Manuel Sanchez has now subdivided and nuanced the evolutionary period discerned by Broussolle. 1995). The work of Jean Broussolle.14 The first known references to imposicions date from only a few years before: they are referenced in 1314 in Barcelona. most Catalan cities began to raise sums for extraordinary taxes by selling imposicions. Broussolle believes that during this 1283-1329 period most of the ordinary revenue paid by Barcelona to the crown “came from other sources” (“consistant en d’autres impôts”). 12 Broussolle.” Estudios de Historia Moderna 5 (1955): 1-164. 1316 in Tortosa. by which he presumably meant older feudal dues.” 16. Els privilegis del “Llibre Verd” de Manresa (Manresa: Parcis Edicions Selectes. In fact. Broussolle discerned that through 1329 Barcelona’s tax system was not regularized. Sanchez notes that prior to 1321. or over six times the amount collected two years previously. Since the Black Death cut the population of Manresa by perhaps 30 to 50 per cent in 1348. when it surpassed £3. Whether this represents a shift from low to moderate taxes. however. and it is likely that this reorganization was imposed by the crown. From 1330. but were not yet accepted as annual and permanent.000. except during the Castilian war years of the 1360s and 70s. and it was often recorded in special books that were distinct from the records for the remainder of the taxes. it is very curious that revenue from imposicions did not change substantially between 1339 and 16 Because the meat tax was usually the single most valuable tax. From Table 1 it can be seen that between 1339 and 1418.124 JEFFREY FYNN-PAUL mental period. only four taxes were sold. is an open question. Manresan revenue from regular impositions hovered around £2. in 1330 twenty-four were sold. while from 1339 onward it stood closer to £2.000. the imposicions became ensconced as a cornerstone of Catalan urban finance.000. Records of meat taxes are therefore often left out of the accounts found in the Barcelona and Manresa council manuals. but in 1330 it collected £39. and Barcelona’s tax system was reorganized into the form that it would retain until the outbreak of civil war in 1462. in which the imposicions were heavily relied upon. When we consider the portrait of Barcelonese urban finances outlined above. especially from the point of view of the cities’ poor householders. The difference between the number and value of imposicions sold in 1328 and in 1330 is striking. The Manresan figures did not increase nearly as much as the Barcelona figures over the same period. a new royal campaign was launched against Genoa. Barcelona collected £6. . in 1330 or shortly thereafter. and 1339. when the next figures are available.000. and the number of taxes would remain close to this level thereafter. when the first figures become available. Manresan revenue from imposicions stood close to £1. In that year.16 In 1329. The probable explanation for this increase is that.332 in taxes in 1328. it is interesting to note that the revenue from Manresan imposicions shows a large increase between 1329.892. or from moderate to heavy taxes. but there was an increase of nearly 100 percent when a missing meat tax is added to the total. Whereas in 1328. and of 50 percent when this is left out. it was traditional to assign it to a separate purpose. Manresa’s taxes were reorganized along the same lines as Barcelona’s new system. d . censal . . . Universitat de Girona. Departament de Justicia. y finanzas en la Cataluña bajomedieval (Barcelona: Casa Milà i Fontanals. 1288-1384 (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya. initiate a long-standing conflict with Genoa. and Manuel Sánchez Martínez. It has been suggested that Jaume’s reforms left the Aragonese fiscal system better prepared to deal with the crown’s newly aggressive foreign policy. It can be observed from Table 4 that extraordinary taxation during this half century was so regular that it became. 1997). a further means of ordinary taxation. Estudios sobre renta. The new series of extraordinary levies that began during the 1320s was to last with very few breaks until Catalonia became fiscally exhausted in the mid 1370s. there were few. eds. 1995). 1993). 11-54. and although much has been made of the Corts’ intransigence. which reached a crescendo in the early 1350s. “Questie y subsidios en Cataluña durante el primer tercio del siglo XIV: el subsidio para la cruzada granadaina (1329-1334). CIVIC TAXES 129 royal levies had been a part of Catalan fiscality for centuries. the financial machine that was marshalled to finance the conquest of Sardinia has been christened “a new page in the history of royal and municipal finance” by Manuel Sánchez Martínez. in effect. Corts. See Manuel Sánchez Martínez and Pere Orti Gost. between the years of 1325 and 1378. since several subsidies levied after known sessions of the Corts remain unaccounted for. In fact. . Table 4 summarizes the known payments of over 2. in fact. The only check on the royal will regarding these taxes was that permission be granted by the Corts. fiscalidad. Another point to be noted is that Manresa’s portions of 26 Sánchez Martínez and his students have done much needed work on Catalan fiscality.000s that were owed by Manresa to the crown. a new wave of levies on the royal cities was begun in 1321-24. sessions that did not eventually produce a substantial levy. El naixement de la fiscalitat d’Estat a Catalunya: Segles XII-XIV (Girona. Manuel Sánchez Martínez. and a reorganization of the irregular tax system was another. This campaign would. but the known figures provide a sense of the high level and frequency of extraordinary taxes that were being raised from the Catalan cities during the middle decades of the fourteenth century.. if any.26 The reorganization of regular taxes was one branch of the royal initiative.CIVIC DEBT. parlaments i fiscalitat a Catalunya: els capitols del donatiu. The list is not complete. in preparation for Jaume II’s campaign against Sardinia. Manuel Sánchez Martínez. or that were raised by the city as the result of extraordinary demands made by the crown.” Cuadernos de historia econòmica de Cataluña 16 (1987). . . censal imposicions . 35 Munro. 129-34. 36 Sánchez Martínez. 13-26. The rente developed as early as the mid-13th century in Northern France and Flanders. where forced loans or prestanze were used alongside voluntary debt systems. et al. 2004). no hi ha cap any sense emissions de censals i violaris”). Christian Guilleré. speaks of the use of censals as a Catalan financial “system” from the 1360s. On these issues see John Munro. but. MA: Harvard Univ.36 In Catalonia.” 535. says that from 1350 “there was no year in which censals and violaris were not sold” (“A partir de 1350. since all were equally indebted to the crown by the acts of the Corts. from large towns to hamlets.CIVIC DEBT. Els privilegis. who were usually municipalities. The Catalan censal could also be sold on the market.34 Rates for both the censal and violari varied in response to the flux of the credit market.. This is because in the case of censals the principal did not legally have to be repaid except at the will of the issuing authority. Press. Girona Medieval. 147-62. “Medieval Origins. though. 1943). The censal-rente is a distinct instrument from that used in Northern Italy. El naixement. 1991). CT: David Brown. 37 Munro. “On the Dual Origins of Long-Term Urban Debt in Medieval Europe. received by an investor in return for his or her investment of a cash sum (usually substantial). the crown ensured that censals could always be redeemed by the issuing municipality. . eds. since it was to the king’s advantage for his cities to be less. did not appear in Catalonia-Aragon until nearly a century later. “The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution.” in Marc Boone. “Medieval Origins. This made censals all the more attractive to late medieval investors since they could be classified by canon lawyers as non-usurious..38 It should be noted that in this regard. issued their own censals.35 Royal municipalities of all sizes. rather than more.” 535. see Torras. the Catalans and the Italians consolidated their systems of loans on Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe (Cambridge. Urban Public Debts: Urban Government and the Market for Annuities in Western Europe (14th-18th Centuries) (Oakville.” and James Tracy. 50-1. It is likely that the smaller Catalan municipal entities began to sell their first censals at the same time as the larger ones. 191-9. CIVIC TAXES 133 A censal was a perpetual money annuity. as has been noted. in debt. 34 It should be noted that Spanish censal = French rente and Flemish rent. the Manresan council manuals suggest that this practice probably became widespread in the early 1360s.37 The first evidence for Manresan sales of violaris comes from the early 1340s. The censal was perpetual. The word rentier is derived from these terms. meaning that it could be transmitted to an heir at the death of the owner/recipient. only with the intervention of the issuing authorities. it seems. 38 For the appearance of the public debt in Manresa. l’etapa d’apogeu (1285-1360) (Girona: Ajuntament de Girona. In effect. and the cities forwarded these sums to the bankers.40 Later. that the imposicion system of consumption taxes was superseded by the system of public debt.” 515. the cities now pledged their regular revenue to a number of intermediate parties. the Catalan authorities realized that imposicion revenue could be used to pay censal interest. and it underpinned the newer censal system. after the imposicion system had been made regular and perpetual.39 That the plague occurred just after these major institutional reforms certainly meant.” 149-50. which paid at 15 per cent in the 1340s. a layer of middlemen was added. but the cities could also forward far larger lump sums to the Barcelona bankers. Sánchez has noted the speed with which the crown switched from financing its extraordinary levies through tallias and direct payments to financing these levies through the censal system. was that instead of paying the Barcelona bankers more or less directly. “Medieval Origins. this stream was being used to pay extraordinary taxes.41 Munro. The cities’ regular revenue now went to pay interest on the censals purchased by the investors. and the Florentines reorganized their loan system into the Monte Comune by 1345. had multiplied the cities’ effective short-term revenue nearly sevenfold. Sanchez suggests. the switch to the debt system. the Genoese consolidated their loan shares in 1340. the imposicion system was never replaced. The Venetians had developed a secondary market for their loan shares by 1320. Thus. 41 For interest rates on Catalan violaris and censals. insofar as the imposicion system was not replaced by the censal system. In fact. Rather it supplemented both the older loan method of paying extraordinary taxes. The main innovation represented by the censal system. however. Note that the old system of raising tallias (one-time exactions) was still used alongside the imposicion system. who purchased censals from the city for ready cash. Rather. “The Catalan City. see Fynn-Paul. in Catalonia at least. These investors paid lump sums to the cities. 40 39 . throughout the fourteenth century. that inexperience with managing the new system added to the calamity caused by the plague. In effect. as we have seen. Sanchez’ views on this point should be emended or at least reworded. the imposicion system formed a regular revenue stream that was not tied to outmoded feudal dues.134 JEFFREY FYNN-PAUL a similar time scale. then. By 1320. From 1353 through 1356. 1347-1381 It has been noted that a new age of conflict was initiated by the Catalans with their seizure of Sardinia in 1322-1326. by 1351 Pere III felt strong enough to ally with the Venetians against the Genoese. and Taxation in Manresa. in which the Venetians. But this was not terribly costly to the Catalan cities. alternately. and Greeks won a Pyrrhic victory over the Genoese. it is likely that the city made payments in those years as well. In any event. see Thomas Bisson. see Steven A. 220. . Epstein. Debt. The following year witnessed the famous showdown in the Bosporus. and this time. for the latter. ending their effective resistance for a time. Plague. and when the Black Death struck in 1348. the Genoese were utterly routed off the coast of Sardinia. In 1354 a third campaign was required in order for the Catalans to restore some semblance of order on Sardinia. The Medieval Crown of Aragon (Oxford: Clarendon. Warfare. it does not appear as though the Manresan treasury was in dire straits. in which the Genoese won a Pyrrhic victory over the allies. although due to lingering 42 For the former view. unprecedentedly large annual payments were made to the crown by Manresa. This expedition was led by King Pere III himself. The pressure on city governments to pay their interest on time was now much higher than it had been during the brief era of imposicions and extraordinary taxes. CIVIC TAXES 135 The danger of this system for the cities and for Catalonia at large was that a far larger network of creditors was now co-opted into the royal fisc. The principal Catalan conflict of the 1340s involved the successful annexation of Mallorca by the new king Pere III (1336-1387). The effects of unexpectedly difficult wars and unforeseeable catastrophic plagues on this newly emergent system will be detailed in the next section. Genoa and the Genoese (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. or. 1991).42 The Catalans and Genoese fought another major engagement in 1353. 1996). 109. Since the war began in 1351-1352. The financial effects of this Genoese-Sardinian war on Manresa can be ascertained from Table 4. It is therefore difficult to say that outstanding debts played an important role in civic finances during the immediate aftermath of the 1348 plague. Catalans. and it is likely that these were paid by the sale of censals and/or violaris.CIVIC DEBT. as Pedro I “The Cruel” of Castile (1350-1369) proved himself doggedly willing and able to annex portions of Aragon to his own crown.136 JEFFREY FYNN-PAUL bureaucratic confusion caused by the Black Death. each successive levy extracted from the Manresan fisc was like wringing the proverbial blood from a stone. was Barcelona. was Catalan-speaking.” 41-9. Despite recent rebellion and civil war in Castile. The king therefore ordered a general fortification of Catalonia in 1368. unfortunate. the town records for those years are disorganized and scanty. The capital of the confederation. and Majorca. Pere III soon realized that most of his cities were woefully under-fortified.43 But what might have been originally intended as a mere demonstration of Aragonese power soon turned into a defensive war for survival. from the early 1360s. Even then. Perhaps most dangerous of all was the fact that the French White Companies had gained a taste for Iberian campaigning during the war. after a decade of unrelenting subsidies. which lasted for over a decade. “The Catalan City. hostilities did not cease. which Pere III attempted to embellish in various ways. It should be noted that in the 1350s the “Crown of Aragon” consisted of the semi-autonomous states of Catalonia. and likewise the vast majority of the confederation’s wealth was concentrated in Catalan speaking areas. Table 4 shows the long and depressing list of extraordinary levies that were raised by the Manresans during these several decades of crisis. the Catalans were forced to fight a defensive war. Since a detailed history of Fynn-Paul. without a break. Aragon. The cities were to pay for their own walls. and presented tempting targets in the event of a mutiny. Note that most of the largest payments came during the 1350s. Valencia. It can be seen from Table 4 that the high annual expenses of the Sardinian war led directly. Enrique of Trastámara. into the hostilities of the Castilian war. since Enrique proved himself unwilling to yield concessions made to Aragon during the war. since about 90 per cent of the population of the Crown of Aragon. which I have argued was an extension of the Sardinian war and largely instigated by Pere III himself.44 As a result. until the final defeat of Pedro in 1369 by the Aragonese-supported pretender to the throne. and the timing was. to say the least. including its royal house. I take the liberty of using “Aragonese” and “Catalans” and near synonyms. Pedro quickly showed that Castile’s superior resources were more than a match for the Aragonese on land. when they had been enlisted on the side of Aragon. 44 43 . 11375. and these cycles did not abate much until the end of the fifteenth century. and 1375-1377.45 As this drama was unfolding. Catalonia would continue to experience serious outbreaks of plague in fifteen year cycles after 1348.6). Together with most of Europe.6. adding the threat of sudden death by contagion to the miseries of the Castilian invasion. Note: MC stands for the Manuales Concilii of the city of Manresa. just before the harvest. In April 1362 Manresa dedicated £60 (1. Yet this record is one of the most significant council entries of the fourteenth century. the Manresan councillors reported a dearth of wine. It may be summarized as follows: Because of the pestilence which recently ravaged the city. for no one trusted the companies after their infamous exploits in southern France. The year 1362 saw Pedro of Castile break a Vatican-arranged truce to attack the Aragonese frontier city of Calatayud.” MC 1362. The new plague lasted through the fall of 1362 and into the winter. They are unfoliated but entries are dated in chronological order and they have therefore been referenced by date. and because of the many payments which we must make to the king. it will suffice to focus on two periods.3. 47 MC 1363. this city 45 MC 1362. Barricades were set up at weak points in the city walls.25-1381.3.18-1373. Pere III had little choice but to enlist the French White Companies. AHCM/AM I-9 (1373.3.3. the Manresan consellers’ laconic record of the 1362 plague outbreak says nothing about its duration or severity.7. a situation which caused real alarm in Manresa. AHCM/AM I-8 (1365.281364. and the citizens’ desperate and laborious efforts to encircle themselves with defensible fortifications.46 This had not been done since the great famines of the 1330s.1. the menace of the White Companies. . indicating a poor vendimia in the previous year.10.4. a prolonged drought threatened to create the worst famine in a generation. oppressive taxes. In response. in which the vise of debt and plague squeezed Manresa with especial severity.200s) toward the purchase of grain.8.3).5.47 Weakened by famine.22). 1362-1363. 46 “Ad opus emendi frumentum. the Catalan populace began to succumb to a fresh wave of plague in the summer of 1362.CIVIC DEBT.30.10.9.18). CIVIC TAXES 137 this period would be beyond the purpose of the present work. In typical fashion. In July 1363. The citations relevant to this article are: Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Manresa AHCM/AM I-7 (1358. and AHCM/AM I-10 (1375. Catalan historiography has made much of a reference which calls this plague the mortaldat dels infants. Bridbury. despite the ravages of the Black Death. during the first half of the fourteenth century. These shall be free from all fogatges. MC 1363. Història de Catalunya (Barcelona: Edicions 62. Between 1348 and 1362. The city had been crowded. 1999). 26 (1973): 557-92. Therefore we proclaim that all those who are not natural to the city and who wish to stay in it for more than ten days must write their name in the book of the city. 49 48 . likewise they shall be free from all regular civic taxes (imposicions) for a period of ten years.. and even overpopulated from the vantage point of the lower classes.. their attitude changed dramatically. On the mortaldat dels infants. Bridbury argues. rather.50 As far as can be determined from the Manresan evidence.48 The first thing to be gleaned from this entry is that the plague of 1362-1363 hit the city with some severity. but it is clear that the Manresans also experienced it as a mortaldat dels menestrals (labourers). 2nd ser. however. “The Black Death.138 JEFFREY FYNN-PAUL stands in need of people who practise the mechanical arts. R. questias reyals. From 1363. Depopulation was now added to the list of enemies they faced.49 The Manresan councillors’ sentiment could not be a more fitting illustration of an analysis made by Anthony Bridbury regarding the effects of the first two waves of plague on the populace of England. ed. it had served only to alleviate the severe overcrowding experienced by most of the country through the first half of the fourteenth century. 3: 252. The year 1362 thus marks a very important psychological turning point in the mentality of Manresa’s citizens and government. and other occasional taxes. Henceforth they considered their city to be underpopulated.3. the Manresan councillors gave no indication that they felt the city’s population to be inadequate. After the plague of 1362.” Economic History Review. 50 A.5. see Carme Batlle. Bridbury argued that in England the plague of 1348 did not cause a severe labour shortage. “L’expansió baixmedieval [segles XIII-XV].” in Pierre Vilar. It was not until the plague of 1362. likewise it is our duty to attempt to populate the city by whatever means possible. Bridbury’s assessment also holds true in Catalonia. that the country began to experience an acute shortage of labour. the town councillors felt it necessary to foster policies that would increase the number of householders in the city. see Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de Aragón y de Valencia y Principado de Cataluña (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia. 2: 149-50. a fogatge.21. two from each quarter. even more important than the labour shortage caused by the plague was the shortage of taxpayers it created. or hearth tax. the plague of 1362 had wiped out a significant portion of the taxpaying households. On the same day that the consellers inaugurated their new immigration policy.54 In this difficult situation. and the city was now forced to sell 21. the debt burden remained to be shared amongst fewer survivors. after which time they would be personally responsible for paying a penalty of 500 gold morabatins.51 As though this were not burden enough. presumably at the Corts of Monzón in February 1363. Certainly this phenomenon was having an adverse effect on the Manresan economy.3. these may have been some of the very Frenchmen against whom the Manresans were so desperately fortifying themselves. As the population continued to shrink. the royal veguer and batlle imposed a deadline upon the tax collectors themselves. to their minds.52 In fact. Eight Manresan men. the eight members of the committee.53 In an effort to speed up the tax collection.000s worth of new censals to make a payment on the fogatge. who were probably mounted men-at-arms. For the equivalency in sous (1 morabatí = 9s). all of the city’s imposicions were sold for the upcoming four months. CIVIC TAXES 139 But the councillors’ own words show that. 54 The morabatí was derived from an old Arabic coin. For the fogatge at Monzón.5. had been declared.CIVIC DEBT. Not surprisingly. see MC 1372. This is mentioned at the Corts of Barcelona. While the city’s debt burden continued to grow. all of whom were well-to-do and well connected to city government.4. As a short-term expedient. they recorded that the treasurer had examined his books and determined that the city’s regular impositions were no longer sufficient to pay its censal annuities. claimed that they had not consented to this 51 MC 1363. on 6 April the consellers reported that the eight men were having some difficulty in collecting the money. 52 MC 1363. 53 MC 1363.6. Meanwhile.5. . and as a unit of account it was used in Catalonia throughout the middle ages for assessing judicial fines.26.3. or mercenaries. beginning 10 March 1364. 1896-1922). were appointed to collect a new tallia for the maintenance of this company. one month earlier the king had required the city to pay for the upkeep of a contingent of 25 clients. the entry breaks off at this point and nothing more was written on the matter. It is probable that some of this commission was destined to go to the guards who were appointed to help Bernat in his efforts. Bernat was to receive the very high rate of 3 sous per livre. . or 15 per cent. the Manresans could continue to raise additional funds. Not only were the lower classes becoming restive about sustaining such a high tax burden. The city remained in a state of quasi-revolt through the entire period. the city gave plenum posse to a new treasurer.57 The use of guards to enforce the payment of taxes was a novel step at Manresa. In this dispute may be seen one of the early foreshadowings of the state of affairs described in the royal privilege of 1380.56 Further signs of unrest were also evident in 1363. Civic officials were now inescapably sandwiched between the ire of their neighbours and the impatience of the powerful agents of the crown. The incident highlights important changes taking place in the tone of civic life.000s levy of 1365 was raised by the expedient of a “weekly tax. in which the councillors had complained that the city’s best men were avoiding public service. It is very interesting to learn that the town patricians claimed to have the right to consent to fines imposed upon them by the bailiff and veguer: This was clearly a challenge to the authority of the royal officials.4. of the money that he extracted from the citizens. After “maxing out” their regular revenue in 1362-1363. but this tactic would continue to be employed through the early 1370s. 269. and it is unfortunate that the results of this challenge cannot be known. Bernat de Area. In Manresa. MC 1363. El Llibre. since at this moment Pedro of Castile threatened their very sovereignty. the 28.6. who were admittedly acting in an extraordinary manner. who received authority to hear accounts from whomever he saw fit. but only at the cost of introducing novel modes of taxation.15. and so they paid up. but years of high taxation had created a situation in which it was becoming increasingly unpleasant to be a conseller or jurat. In the summer of that year. But they had no choice.140 JEFFREY FYNN-PAUL penalty and were therefore not bound to it.7. Torras. in addition to the authority to collect what was due to the city.55 Unfortunately.” Every Sunday one 55 56 57 MC 1363. Manresa’s jurats had admitted.26.9.000s over the next three years in order to complete their irrigation works known as the cequia. For the fortification of Vic in 1368. The city’s credit had reached its limit. MC 1368. and especially had become impoverished [because of him] . This was a Herculean effort: in August of 1375. In a unique passage from the Chronicle of Pere III.26.1 and MC 1367. “La fortification de Vich en 1368.8..4. when Pere III ordered Manresa and other cities of Catalonia to construct new fortifications. for the “daily tax” see MC 1368. the king specifically calls attention to his financial incapacity during the years 1375 and 1376. The 1368 order to fortify led to the imposition of another new tax.7. He notes that “Our house of Aragon had had great trouble and harm from King Don Enrique [of Castile].60 In 1375.. Tellingly. In addition to other levies. Only a month before. 60 Renewed efforts on the Manresan walls (picking up from the panicked efforts of 1362-1363) began in September 1368. was obeyed. I suspect from the nearly identical architecture that the walls of Montblanc and parts of Barcelona’s walls were also built in the same year. the “daily tax” about which little is said in the records.”62 MC 1365. albeit at the cost of six or seven more years of extraordinary expenses. in July.311 on the debt over the previous year. in inelegant Latin.19. the city voluntarily raised 51. 59 58 . after nearly thirty years of unrelenting hardship. N. interest rates on censals were at an all-time high.9. this order. see Eduard Junyent. the administrator Pere Nadal had rendered an account for his office of the “clavarius of the impositions assigned to pay censals.4.30. 2: 590. Chronicle (Toronto: Pontifical Institute. Hillgarth. which they viewed as their primary defence against famine.58 This weekly tax was collected between 1365 and 1367. Pere III. I have found payment records for the weekly tax between MC 1365. too. indicating that the order to fortify was probably widespread. another famine menaced the city. that they could find no one to purchase more censals from them—mutuo invenietur non potest. CIVIC TAXES 141 or more shillings were collected from each head of household according to their income level. trans.59 In 1368.. 1980). suggesting that the rest of the principality was in similar straits.” which showed that the city had paid £3.17 62 Mary and J.61 This is borne out by the narrative sources as well. 61 MC 1375.” Ausa 2 (1955-57): 347-56.CIVIC DEBT. Years of high censal payments combined with demographic decline was taking its toll on Manresa’s vitality. and unprecedented levels of coercion were required in order to collect them. They were.64 Nor did the Genoese situation improve over the next several decades. In Genoa.. the Genoese tax on salt had raised its price to twelve times what the state paid for it. on account of which this city is becoming depopulated. Florence. plures ipsius civitatis habitatores deseruit ipsam civitatem. largely at the expense of Genoa. Catalans and Genoese fought on. which between 1200 and 1500 gradually increased its maritime influence.” even though Catalonia played an equally important role in the conflict. as in Catalonia. a third major Mediterranean naval power. and Venice This analysis of the Catalan evidence is.63 Applications: Genoa. Utilizing vastly reduced navies. 219-21. It should be noted that Epstein follows a long Italianist tradition of describing the 1350-1355 war as “Genoa’s war with Venice.. and there are not enough people to pay the censals and other burdens by which the city is bound. In his account of the 1350-1355 Genoese-Catalan-Venetian war. MC 1377. consumption taxes were primarily used to pay interest on the debt. By the 1390s. Epstein reports. This is mentioned only because one of the purposes of this paper is to show how thoroughly the Catalans were integrated into the Mediterranean trade system by this time. As in Catalonia. and on its very viability as a socio-political entity. By 1380. also applicable to the experience of the Catalans’ archrival Genoa.1. consumption taxes were at revolutionary levels. fittingly. 63 . On 10 January 1377 this trend was analyzed by the councillors of Manresa in no uncertain terms: Many inhabitants of this city have deserted it. propter quod ipsam civitatis inhabitatibilis effici posset et non esset qui solveret censualia et alia onera ad que ipsam tenitur. Genoa and the Genoese.” 64 Epstein. in effect. and the Genoese debt had remained very high due to almost continuous warfare. the Venetians. Steven Epstein describes a situation in which the Mediterranean powers paradoxically began a new conflict just after their cities had been devastated by the worst plague in memory.10.142 JEFFREY FYNN-PAUL Nor did the crisis abate with the lessening of invasion fears after 1376. transferendo eorum domicilia aliundem. “. moving their homes elsewhere. with dire results for Genoa. 66 Epstein. we are now in a position to answer one further. Note again that in Genoa. Genoa and the Genoese. which was impossible to pay off in the short term. Likewise. at least for a brief time. Epstein. at the same time that householders continued to perish in significant and unforeseeable numbers. 234-6. it attempted to suspend all payments on the funded debt for a three month period. 76. 243. and why were unprecedented levels of coercion required in the collection of taxes? Much of the specific mechanism behind these factors.”65 Of course. and abolish the hated salt tax. CIVIC TAXES 143 “creditors were so vital to the continuing functioning of the state their goodwill naturally took precedence over common people needing bread. Herlihy estimated that between 1340 and 1404. firewood. debt shares were often assessed as involuntary “forced loans. The remaining householders had no choice but to pay off the debt which had been contracted in the name of a significantly larger populace.” in Il tumulto dei Ciompi: Un momento di storia fiorentina ed europea. 67 Herlihy.68 The Ciompi government of July and August of that year did manage to lower the tax rate in the Florentine contado by one third. one of first demands of the rebels was an abolition of the funded debt and a lowering of the gabelles that had paid its interest.” whereas in Catalonia censal holders were almost always voluntary investors. Florence. which we now recognize as a “classic” post-plague urban crisis. and population levels did not recover between major visitations. Genoa and the Genoese.66 Although Liguria is isolated from the rest of Italy.CIVIC DEBT. “Le riforme finanziarie nel tumulto dei Ciompi. such as that which occurred in 1385. must be the fact that the state had contracted a high debt burden. 100-1. and Tuscan comparisons must be taken with a grain of salt. 65 . and salt. years or even decades before. As is well known. Why did extravagant consumption taxes and state creditors become such an issue during these decades. 68 Roberto Barducci. and Venice.67 With the Manresan example at hand. Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia. question about the Genoese situation described above. 1981). Acts of the Congress of 1979 (Florence: Olschki. The Manresan example can also be applied to the famous case of the Florentine Ciompi revolt of 1378. Genoa also experienced recurring outbreaks of plague. Secondary markets for forced loan shares did open up to some degree in all three Italian republics however. Pistoia lost between two thirds and three quarters of its population. and very important. according to Mueller. Cohn.144 JEFFREY FYNN-PAUL Another related reform was the creation of a program for implementing a direct tax. Many defaulted and had their lands sold at auction. Jr. It is possible that through the 1370s. Between 1378 and 1381. at least. 1348-1434 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.70 In medium-sized cities such as Manresa. The Venetian debt system. and because Florence. at least for a time. 70 On the issue of emigration to the capital. Here Cohn quotes a document of 1402 in which the Florentines admit that their estimo had to be reassessed because war and plague had reduced the population of the mountains in particular. known as the War of Chioggia.71 In 1378. 1999).” in Rubinstein. Creating the Florentine State: Peasants and Rebellion. “The Medieval Origins. The Venetian debt system. the revolutionary government found that it could not function without maintaining interest payments on the debt. Florentine Studies. 84. 71 Munro. which alienated both the government’s lower and middle class supporters and the state’s wealthy creditors. never recovered from the blow it received during the Gene Brucker. for its part. began to show serious signs of trouble from 1363. the Florentines themselves were less acutely aware of the continuing effects of population decline on their debt system. like other metropoles. 69 . 338-44. however..” 515. the Venetians were forced to lend 41 percent of their assessed patrimonies to the state. and Brucker lays much of the blame for the regime’s failure on its vacillating debt policy. It is very notable from the point of view of the present discussion that Venice managed to pay the interest on its state debts regularly between 1262 and 1380. see Semuel K. This would have provided an illusion of continual demographic replenishment. But in the end. even slight losses in population would have been more obvious and more keenly felt by civic officials in need of funds. called an estimo. “The Ciompi Revolution. and only at this moment did it succumb to temporary insolvency. at the same moment that Florence became embroiled in its civil war. Venice became involved in a disastrous war with Genoa. when the government ceased to make any pretence of redeeming forced loan shares. was a focus of emigration. more than ever before. This could have occurred both because the nature of a large city is such that it is difficult to judge marginal population decreases.69 Part of why the Florentine situation became so dire by the 1370s might be ascribed to the mechanisms described above. . To spite his fellow townsmen. Like Black himself. however. the common clerk of the town of Ipswich. and they decided to convene the citizenry to draw up a new statement of the customs by which the town was governed. 1873). They began with a description of the extensive array of tolls Printed in Sir Travis Twiss.1 It naturally has much to say about local government and commercial regulation. 1883). The passages about the town’s tolls that are discussed in this paper are found on pp. 184-207. Initially. the leaders of the town sought to continue the routines of local government as if though nothing had happened. Upon learning of the indictment. Black fled from the town and was never heard from again.n. if any. Eventually. 239-43. they came to view the absence of a formal documentary basis for local government as a problem. Black somehow managed to gain possession of the town’s customary and a number of its foundation charters before his departure from the town. commonly referred to as the Ipswich Domesday Book.TOLL AND TRADE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND James Masschaele In the year 1272. The document they produced. In this account. There is nothing particularly unusual about the indictment of a public official in the period. but the erstwhile common clerk’s behavior upon learning of his indictment has few. but what is most surprising about the document is its lengthy account of procedures for collecting tolls. Henry Black. A good summary of the circumstances in which the text came to be written is given in Ninth Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission. these guarantors of Ipswich’s privileges and freedoms were never to be seen again. ed.. nor about Black’s decision to flee rather than face justice. part 1 (London: s.. Rolls Series no. is a fascinating account of the government and economy of a major English port in the later thirteenth century. was indicted as a notorious thief. 55 (London: Longman. 2: 1-207. The Black Book of the Admiralty. 1 . parallels. Ipswich’s leaders made a sustained effort to specify the distinctive features of the commodities liable to pay toll and the circumstances of their circulation as trade goods. Between these various accounts of the items traded and the rates of toll imposed in each market. cheese. and then followed up with a series of shorter descriptions of the tolls collected in eight separate markets specializing in cloth. This article will examine four issues related to the use of tolls in medieval England.TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 147 collected on the town’s quay. bread. They are. the compilers of the document entered brief notes summarizing unusual features of the markets: the toll on hemp. meat. Les Tarifs de Tonlieux. Like the documents Georges Despy described in his survey of medieval toll documents in France and Germany. and their study has been left largely in the hands of local historians and antiquarians. but the toll on hemp seed was paid in the cheese market. namely the relationship between tolls and the development of trade. 13-6. ranging from expansive descriptions like the one found in the Ipswich Domesday Book to simple lists with a small number of commodities and rates. These documents are a heterogeneous bunch. Though exceptionally detailed. the authors distinguished not only the different goods that were traded in that market but also their mode of transport and a host of incidental details about how goods might be processed or modified in the course of being sold. English lists often appear in ad hoc forms that defy easy generalization. Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental. fish. But their sheer number suggests that they are of more than local interest and deserving of more careful scrutiny than they have hitherto received. 1976). wool. 19 (Turnhout: Éditions Brepols. the account of toll collection in Ipswich represents a common documentary genre of the high and late Middle Ages. Within each account. for example. The second section provides some quantitative evidence for the revenues generated by tolls and relates the revenue figures to the rates of toll specified in extant toll lists.2 Perhaps because of their heterogeneity. and animals. in fact. a treasure trove of information about the conduct of trade in medieval England and they raise an important but curiously neglected issue for medieval commerce. 2 . The third Georges Despy. The first section summarizes the main types of toll levied in medieval England and sketches their chronological development. timber. economic historians have paid relatively little attention to them. appertained to the cloth market. Well over 50 lists of tolls collected in English towns and markets prior to 1350 can now be found in print and hundreds more exist in manuscript form. Types of Toll To make sense of the great variety in the form and structure of tolls and toll lists. Peasants. but in practice it is often difficult to determine which type is documented in a particular list. the two most important being toll collected on sales in a marketplace or fair and toll imposed on the passage of goods through a particular town or along a particular route. . it is helpful to divide them into two principal types.4 3 Throughtoll was sometimes levied on roads or bridges that were not associated with a specific town or market but it was far more commonly levied in places that had commercial facilities in which sales tolls were collected. Each type merits consideration on its own before any general assessment of the relationship between tolls and trade can be offered. The fourth and final section offers some thoughts on the overall impact of tolls in the period.148 JAMES MASSCHAELE section looks at the payers of toll and considers how different groups of payers were affected by royal grants of exemption from toll. one associated with the collection of local or customary tolls and the other with special tolls collected for a fixed period of time to finance public works projects. In theory these were two distinctive forms of taxation. Tolls on passage were sometimes denoted by the Middle English thurghtoll but the Latin word teloneum (with common variants teoloneum and theolonium) could be used to describe just about any toll. An appendix enumerating the many lists of tolls that have appeared in print can be found at the end of the article.3 In more descriptive accounts the circumstances of collection can sometimes be diagnosed from incidental details. The Ipswich account in the town’s Domesday Book is a good example of a document concerned with the collection of local or customary tolls. 4 Such disputes are discussed more fully in James Masschaele. The two types had different histories as well as significantly different roles to play in urban finance. Information of this sort is more likely to be found in court records dealing with disputes over exemptions from toll than in lists of toll rates. Such lists encompass several different kinds of toll. and it seems likely that municipal officials did not distinguish sharply between the two. but in general extant lists give frustratingly little detail about when and where tolls were assessed. nearly 30 towns had acquired a charter granting toll exemptions. 1042-1216 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. passim. but there is no question that tolls were levied in the period. since the vast majority of the exemption charters (25 of 30) date to the second half of the twelfth century.n. Sawyer.TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 149 Local tolls existed well before public works tolls came into being and they also predate by a considerable margin the earliest lists that have survived. 1977). Examples of both transit tolls and sales tolls can be found in the Anglo-Saxon world and may go back to the late Roman period. “Chipping and Market: A Lexicographical Investigation.umdl. 1959). Ballard.” in Cyril Fox and Bruce Dickens. 335-60.8 Over the course of the twelfth century. For the continent. particularly in the form of charters granting exemptions from toll. and also suggests that their development was particularly extensive in the period after 1150. 1904).]. Adolphus Ballard. 5 Ganshof. and many monasteries had done likewise. L.: Harvard Univ. F. By 1200. Domesday England (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull’alto Medioevo. H. Mass.v. 485-508. [s. The Early Cultures of North-West Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Darby.7 An undated eleventh-century list of the local tolls collected at Billingsgate in London points to the same conclusion. Press. 225-6. 1997). Press. the documentary evidence associated with toll collection becomes much richer. cxxxviii-cxlv. Sussex. The Early English Customs System (Cambridge. ed. Middle English Dictionary.” 9 A. 2nd ed. Evidence related to the actual functioning of tolls in the period is. 129-46.9 This body of evidence suggests that local tolls had become widespread by the end of the twelfth century. Harmer. Martin’s Press. Merchants. 7 H. 1998). 153-5. B. 6 F. 1918). electronic version (http://ets.5 Similarly detailed study has not been carried out for Anglo-Saxon England. “Tol. E.umich. Press. Gras. 73-5.6 Domesday Book contains numerous references to toll income and includes a rudimentary list of the tolls collected in Lewes. and Markets: Inland Trade in Medieval England (New York: St.edu/m/mec/). From Roman Britain to Norman England. 1950). “A propos du tonlieu à l’époque Carolingienne.. S.” in La Città nell’alto Medioevo. if not earlier. British Borough Charters. s. Ganshof has shown how Merovingian and then Carolingian kings sought to emulate late Roman practices with respect to toll and toll exemptions. P. 8 N. eds. 6 (Spoleto. as do the formulaic references to “toll and team” in Anglo-Saxon charters. 1913). .. C. (London: Routledge. a formula that goes back to the tenth century. The Domesday Boroughs (Oxford: Clarendon Press. Richard . 1278-1294 (Oxford: Clarendon Press. New Towns of the Middle Ages. 2nd ed. The volume of documentary evidence related to tolls increases dramatically in the thirteenth century. Town Plantation in England. 1963). But it is also likely that there were substantive changes in the role tolls played in urban finance and the economy as a whole. 1993). 10 Michael Clanchy. the relationship between the survival of sources and real economic change is difficult to disentangle. Similarly. (Oxford: Blackwell. Quo Warranto Proceedings in the Reign of Edward I. the twelfth-century evidence suggests that tolls were going through a phase of significant growth. 12 Maurice Beresford. Only two lists that can be securely dated to the twelfth century have surfaced to date. 11 Donald W. in fact. Sutherland. From Memory to Written Record. The “long” thirteenth century was a period characterized by the foundation of a plethora of new markets and towns.10 In this regard.12 It was. a royal inquest to establish how tolls were collected in a particular place. Both bear close resemblance to lists from later periods. 1967). and Gascony (New York: Lutterworth Press. one describing tolls collected in Newcastle in the reign of Henry I and the other detailing tolls collected in Cardiff in the second half of the century. the thirteenth century was a period in which local rights and privileges came in for close scrutiny. Even statements of toll rates and procedures that were not directly developed in response to a formal investigation may owe their existence to an awareness that the king looked more favorably on franchise holders with evidence in writing than on those who relied on longstanding tradition. each with the right to collect tolls on the transactions they facilitated. but it also suggests that they had yet to reach their mature form. but they enumerate fewer items of trade and their descriptions of commodities lack the precision and specificity of later examples. In general.11 The most common context in which lists of local tolls were recorded is. relatively meager. the increase in documentation may be due mainly to the nature of our source material rather than to any substantive change in the practice of toll collection. Wales. particularly rights and privileges that bore an association with royal authority. The thirteenth century is in general much better documented than the twelfth century and the insistence that longstanding practices and traditions be put in writing is one of its great hallmarks. especially after 1150.150 JAMES MASSCHAELE unfortunately. As is often the case. Tait. collected for the construction. A. Press. . 1996). 14 For a recent assessment of the period’s growth. (Manchester: Manchester Univ. 2nd ed. 1833-1844).. (London. The Commercialization of English Society. see John Langdon and James Masschaele. 1265-1350. Masschaele.TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 151 moreover. 15.. British Borough Charters. a period in which many of the larger towns acquired greater local control over their markets and tolls through the acquisition of royal charters granting self-government. consequently. 1923). involving a dramatic increase in the money supply. D. “Commercial Activity and Population Growth in Medieval England. but good accounts can be found in Hilary L. improvement. 2 vols.” Past & Present 190 (Feb. Record Commission.13 Most of these towns appear to have collected tolls before they acquired formal status as self-governing royal boroughs. or maintenance of city walls. British Borough Charters. a period in which toll collectors were well rewarded for their work and thus particularly interested in enhancing their rights. collected for the improvement of city streets. significant technological innovation. The earliest grant of this form of toll. The history of public works tolls also points to the thirteenth century as a period of significant growth. 1042-1216.. Merchants. Turner. “The Pattern of Trade in the North-East of England. Press. 2006): 35-81. Other common types included pavage. Perhaps most significantly of all. Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum in Turri Londinensi Asservati. 16 T. and pontage. Record Commission no. ed. and vastly increased commercial activity at both regional and international levels. in their dealings with the king many town leaders made a direct association between their right to collect local tolls and their duty to pay their annual farm.14 It was. 15 These grants have not been systematically studied in their own right. 1216-1307 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 1971) and Constance Fraser. and Markets.” Northern History 4 (1969): 44-66. was made in 1216..16 The Hereford charter provides few specifics about Britnell. Public works tolls constituted a special form of toll granted by the king to a town to allow it to raise money for a local construction project. Town Defences in England and Wales (London: J. Ballard and J. Hardy. to finance the construction of a town wall in Hereford. the “long” thirteenth century was a period of considerable economic growth. collected for the improvement of bridges. Baker. but their agreement to pay an annual farm to the king in return for their rights meant that toll revenues came to loom much larger in borough affairs. Peasants. eds.15 The most common type was murage. ed. 13 Ballard. Press. The English Royal Boroughs and Royal Administration 1130-1307 (Durham.: Duke Univ. Harvard University (1998). C. AD 1216-1225.152 JAMES MASSCHAELE how tolls were to be collected. Thesis. 238-9. 238-43. owed its existence to the activities of the toll collectors of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Over the course of the next century and a half. Turner. along with rates for seven different types of livestock. and it seems as though the overall economic contraction of the period meant that tolls were no longer a cost-effective means of generating revenue. 700-1300). Town Defences. Patent Rolls of the Reign of King Henry III. 224.17 It is difficult to determine from the wording of the grant whether the king intended to give the citizens of Hereford the right to impose a second set of tolls that mirrored the town’s local tolls or simply the right to retain revenue from the local tolls that had formerly flowed into royal coffers. What began as a matter of military necessity in the troubled period following the death of King John gradually developed into a routine act of government.18 By the standards of later grants. 104. one could rightly conclude that much of the infrastructure of English urban life in the Middle Ages. but the renewal sheds little additional light on the original grant.19 In the later fourteenth century public works tolls began to fall out of favor.000 grants of public works tolls. Early murage grants are discussed in Charles Young. . 18 Patent Rolls of the Reign of King Henry III.D. as towns moved towards direct taxation of local inhabitants as a preferable means of generating revenue for public works. 17 The grant was renewed in 1219. Investment at levels that characterized the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries was sustained in relatively few towns in the fifteenth century. 1: 267b. AD 1216-1225 (London: Mackie. 19 Alan Ralph Cooper. giving rates for loads of unspecified merchandise conveyed by ship.” Ph. 1961). the list of tolls established in this joint grant of 1220 is fairly rudimentary. “Obligation and Jurisdiction: Roads and Bridges in Medieval England (c. indeed. when Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth acquired the right to collect tolls to facilitate the construction of their walls. and for some time beyond. referring only to a collection of customary charges on loads of goods that were brought to the town. The first grant that specifically instituted new tolls occurred in 1220. 274. English kings made more than 1. packhorse and backpack. N. 1901). cart. however. and consequently their development in this period deserves particularly close scrutiny. 300. Rates and Annual Revenues Both local tolls and public works tolls were capable of generating significant revenues. Inspectors. Parliamentary Papers 1888.22 Markets in the small boroughs of Taunton and Frome in Somerset were valued at less than £3. 53. The dearth of information in Domesday Book about market and toll revenues in larger towns makes generalization difficult. 22 Darby. Indeed. Borough and Town. into the nineteenth century.20 But their internal development and their impact on trade were especially pronounced in the two centuries before the Black Death. and even the small market town of Leighton Buzzard in Bedfordshire accounted for market tolls of £7. Sussex. 20 . MA: Mediaeval Academy of America. 1933). Domesday England. and the borough markets of Okehampton (Devon) and Tewkesbury (Gloucestershire) were valued at less than £1.n.TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 153 The period from 1150 to 1350 can fairly be described as the heyday of toll collection in medieval England. Even the port of Pevensey. 21 Darby. with occasional additions of new trade commodities. 369-70. Already at the time of Domesday Book there are indications that tolls were well worth collecting: the tolls of Dover were said to be worth £22 in 1086. A Study of Urban Origins (Cambridge. but it seems likely that most towns would have envied Dover’s toll receipts in 1086. 369. Carl Stephenson. many towns Great Britain House of Commons. deal with relatively small amounts of money. although it is possible in the latter case that the entire revenue of the market was included. when we next have a substantial body of quantitative evidence. First Report of the Royal Commission on Market Rights and Tolls. Domesday England.. vol. Reports from Commissioners. 30 (London: s. and Others. accounted for toll revenues of only £4. vol. By the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Tolls certainly existed well before the expansion of the twelfth century and they continued to play a significant role in urban budgets for many centuries after 1350. which appears to have been thriving in 1086. 1889). 109. the system of local tolls fixed in place in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries persisted.21 Most of the Domesday entries referring to the value of markets and tolls. H. part 10 (London: s. 1921). trans. The Annalls of Ipswich. written a few years later. 68. Even some relatively modest towns brought in more than £20 per annum from their local tolls. for example. 26 London. Richardson (Ipswich: S. a jury stated that the tolls of the market and fair were worth £20.30 Municipal officials enjoyed similarly high revenues when they collected public works tolls. The National Archives. 25 London. a figure that helps to explain why the local Domesday Book. vol.24 An account of the town of Scarborough in 1316-1317 records toll receipts of £28. record incomes from tolls and market fees of £20 in 1271 and more than £27 in 1276. Colchester. 1: 3. 23 .25 An account for Grantham. a jury in Berwick in 1303 responded that they could be let at farm for £40 per annum. SC6/1248/8. ed. 1967). 4: Victoria History of the Counties of England (Oxford: Constable. 1891). Historical Manuscripts Commission Twelfth Report.]. New Towns of the Middle Ages (New York: Praeger. C.n. 4 vols.154 JAMES MASSCHAELE were enjoying remarkably healthy incomes from their tolls.27 When asked to report on the revenue that could be raised by leasing the town’s tolls. E101/506/22. gives such a lavish description of how the town collected its tolls. with the tolls and other perquisites of the fair bringing in roughly the same amount. Lincolnshire in 1324-1325 states that the tolls and tronage of the market were farmed for £25. 28 Gras. An investigation into the conduct of toll collectors in Bristol in 1340 found that £516 had been collected in the preceding twenty years.. 165. 420. The National Archives.23 In an inquisition post mortem in 1307 for the town of Chepstow.28 Still higher amounts are recorded in several bailiff’s accounts of the late thirteenth century: Northampton’s bailiffs accounted for about £44 in one year. ed. SC6/913/23. (Colchester: [s. 68. Isaac Herbert Jeayes. Baugh. 29 London. W. 1884).n. Beresford.29 Ipswich generated more than £69 by leasing out the revenues from its markets in 1287-1288.26 Even higher revenues accrued to larger towns. Monmouthshire. 66. Accounts for Oswestry. 30 Nathaniel Bacon. while Gloucester’s bailiffs reported more than £50 and Lincoln’s more than £75 in single years.. William H. 27 Court Rolls of the Borough of Colchester. 1989). The National Archives. leased its tolls for £35 per annum in 1310. for example. 24 M. Cowell. Shropshire. A History of Shropshire. E101/505/24. The National Archives. yielding an average yearly intake of G. London. Early English Customs System. . nearly managed to pay its entire farm from its toll receipts. The Great Roll. raising £120 from its murage grant in 1280. It is worth remembering. 33 J. Town Defences.37 It is also worth remembering that revenues like those itemized above could account for a significant portion of a town’s annual farm to the king. ed. Gouch. part 2 (Norwich: s. Sharpe. Bristol Town Duties (Bristol: J. 1918). actually took in more from leasing its market revenues in 1287-1288 than it paid to the king for its privileges. Ipswich. 3365/310. 1275-1498. 27-48. (London: J. Shrewsbury. The very fact that kings and local officials viewed tolls as the best way Henry Bush.. 11 vols. 35 Calendar of the Fine Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office. Gloucester’s farm was £60 per annum. 90-3. M.TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 155 approximately £26. ed. 1272-1307 (London: H. E.38 Gloucester. ed. Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Shropshire Record Office. 1989). 34 R.n. and £113 from three annual leases.33 London decided to lease its murage tolls in the early 1330s and earned £109. 1899-1912). for example.36 While Turner’s argument certainly has merit. £126. and Lynn. 37 Christopher Dyer. 32 31 .32 In Great Yarmouth. with an annual farm set at £40. 39 Cannon. Yarmouth. murage collectors brought in more than £66 in 1342-1343.. 252. that an annual income of £20 was held to be the threshold for knightly status in the period. 1828). 136. Letter Book E: 273-4. 132. Cannon. C. Tingey. 36 Turner. R. The Great Roll of the Pipe for the Twenty-Sixth Year of the Reign of King Henry the Third (New Haven: Yale Univ.31 Shrewsbury collected nearly £30 in murage in the politically troubled year of 1264-1265.” Original Papers Published Under the Direction of the Committee of the Norfolk and Norwich Archaeological Society. Stationery Office. 48. and that relatively few lords enjoyed annual incomes greater than £100. 1911). 38 Henry L. 1913).35 Walls and bridges were voracious consumers of capital and Hilary Turner has argued that the sums collected from tolls were often insufficient to fund the projects for which they were earmarked.34 Somewhat surprisingly. Calendar of Letter-Books Preserved Among the Archives of the Corporation of the City of London.M. the sums collected are nonetheless impressive when viewed in their own right. Newcastle was able to generate revenues comparable to those in London. 191.39 Other towns were not quite as fortunate but could still expect to requite between a third and a half of their annual farm from the sums collected in toll. Press. too. “The Grants of Murage to Norwich.. 18. Francis. Press. The editors of the Patent Rolls. Most surviving toll lists can facilitate analysis along these lines. Overall. But there are a number of differences between the lists that are worth noting.156 JAMES MASSCHAELE to pay for essential public facilities is a testament to their ability to generate revenue. for example. it is possible to calculate the percentage of the likely sales price that was owed as toll. are wont to give occasional incidental details about where and how tolls were exacted. but we have sufficient price data from other contemporary sources to establish a relationship between the actual value of the listed goods and the amount of toll each incurred. Using this method. though. lists of public works tolls give a more standardized and formulaic representation of English trade. local toll lists. in addition to enumerating the commodities on which toll was collected. to establish the proportional rate of taxation on trade. they also stipulate the precise payment that was due for a specific quantity of each good. In this respect local lists probably reflect more accurately the real circumstances of trade in the period. the printed form of many of the lists gives a misleading impression about their level of specificity. The best perspective on the sums generated by toll collection is. In the case of public works tolls. In this same vein. . local tolls are more likely to include entries dealing with small quantities of goods. Before offering such calculations. rates applied to goods carried on a man’s back are common in lists of local tolls but rare in lists of public works tolls. or. whereas lists of public works tolls convey little information beyond the commodities and rates. whereas in public works tolls it is ordinarily taxed by the quarter. it is necessary to describe more carefully the nature of the source material. while local toll lists tend to be more idiosyncratic and reflective of unique or unusual local circumstances. Local tolls tend to place greater emphasis on the modes of carriage used to transport particular commodities: grain. since. is often taxed by the cartload or packhorse load in local toll schedules. The lists ordinarily do not record the price of the enumerated goods. Carefully itemized individual statements of goods and rates characterize lists derived from both major types of tolls and the range of commodities and the units of measurement show considerable overlap. in other words. at least the longer and more detailed lists. gained by comparing annual receipts with the rates paid for specific commodities. on which the grants were recorded. however. Similarly. Subsequent columns record the toll demanded for the given standard unit of the good in a number of towns. because the earlier lists are much shorter than later lists and often much less precise. and also by the inclusion of specific ad valorem rates assessed on the value of merchandise that was not specifically mentioned in the list. Table 1 gives an overview of the rates on common trade goods documented in a selection of local toll lists. General rates for a cartload or a boatload of goods still occur sometimes. but then opted to save space in later calendars by omitting the lists of commodities and rates appended to grants made after 1232. continue to include entries denoting the recipients and general terms of these later grants. “Grants of murage. It may also have been based on the knowledge that the lists often repeated information provided in earlier lists. and occasionally with two or more standard units of trade. however. typically listing more than 100 separate goods. A summary of the basic information that can be extracted from extant toll lists is provided in Tables 1 and 2.” This is a subject that would repay more careful investigation. . those of the later thirteenth and fourteenth century are much more carefully itemized.TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 157 included in their standard calendars virtually the entire text of the grants made between 1220 and 1232. while Table 2 furnishes information about rates occurring in lists of public works tolls. see Fraser. each with a separate toll rate based on a standard unit of trade. The towns in the tables were selected partly because they have relatively extensive lists of rates and partly because 40 They did. the later lists are obviously better suited for calculating the relationship between commodity prices and toll rates. “Pattern of Trade in the North-East.40 Antiquarians and local record societies have published some of the later lists but the vast majority is accessible only by consulting the original manuscript sources. Including all of them would have significantly lengthened the published form of the calendars. The first column of each table records the type of good and the standard unit of measurement with which it appears in the lists. The lists of the early thirteenth century often provide statements of rates based on cartloads or boatloads of goods rather than precise quantities. For the purposes of the current analysis. but they were hemmed in by the extensive lists of specific commodities. Their decision to omit the lists of commodities appears to have been based partly on their sheer volume. This situation is unfortunate.” and Tingey. On the issue of repetition in the lists. 158 JAMES MASSCHAELE . . d. Even when different rates were charged they often bear a simple arithmetical relationship to the standard rate (typically half as much or twice as much as the standard rate). This may well have been an intentional policy on the part of royal administration to make the public works tolls more palatable to the people who had to pay them. and a common rate for a ton of wine was 4d. making direct comparison difficult and potentially misleading.” (for non-standard). the rates specified in local tolls lists tend to be somewhat higher than the rates in public works lists. but the relationship between a ton and a quarter of woad is uncertain. hides are typically listed by the dicker of ten in local lists but by the single hide in public works lists. it is relatively easy to convert the rates from one unit of measurement to the other.000 in local lists but by the thousand in public works lists. a feature that is particularly pronounced in the rates applied to wool and wine.” meaning that there is no data for that good. The goods in the tables were selected to represent different levels of commercial activity and also to reflect some of the more prominent commodities in circulation in the period. was 4d. grain should also have been included. Such uniformity might be expected in the case of the public works tolls. the lists show a surprising degree of uniformity in the assessment of rates: a common rate for wool. it is important to note that the units of measurement in Table 1 do not always correspond with the units in Table 2: herring is usually taxed by the last of 12. Several features of the tables call for comment.s. for example. In the case of herring and hides. perhaps a common rate associated with dues paid to the king in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It seems possible that local rates might have been based on some earlier commonality. On these grounds. Third. per sack. but it is more difficult to explain in the case of local tolls. In both tables. Goods that occur in a list but with an unusual unit of measurement are denoted by the abbreviation “n. First of all. which were centrally defined and organized. a common rate for the sale of a horse was 1d. While there is much to learn by comparing the lists with each other. goods that do not occur in a particular town’s list are indicated by the notation “n. the primary purpose of assembling the data in Tables 1 and . but grain tolls often appear in the lists in units of measurement that are not easily comparable.. Second.160 JAMES MASSCHAELE they reflect a variety of urban types and chronological periods. and woad is most often taxed by the ton in local lists but by the quarter in public works lists. 7 vols. in ways that cannot be accounted for with surviving data. ordinarily constituting less than one per cent of the average price of a commodity. (London: Stock. 42 Similar conclusions are presented in Hubert Hall. Comparing toll rates with average prices is indeed a useful way to assess the influence tolls might have had on trade. was £4 12s. The 1330s and 1340s constituted a period of unusually low wool prices. 1866-1902). Hallam. 2 vols. The Agrarian History of England and Wales (Cambridge: Clarendon Press. ed. 1: 73. “Prices and Wages. A History of Agriculture and Prices in England. in 8 (Oxford: Clarendon Press. and Henry Cobb. and Farmer’s data shows that for much of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries a toll of 4d.41 There are. The primary conclusion yielded by such an exercise is that toll rates were exceptionally low.TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 161 2 is to facilitate a comparison between toll rates and the actual value of the goods. James Thorold Rogers.. This can best be done using the price data assembled by David Farmer and James Thorold Rogers. consistent toll rate constituted a higher proportion of the average sales price of a given commodity in the early thirteenth century than in the early fourteenth century. 7d. Prices of goods also fluctuated significantly from one year to the next depending on weather conditions and the presence or absence of impediments to trade such as war.42 The average price of wool in Farmer’s index period of 1330-1347. H. per sack. Thus. 41 . 1961). sometimes much less. Prices tended to rise over the period as a whole. for example. many caveats that need to be offered when making calculations of this nature. the toll represents less than four-tenths of one per cent (0. lxv. the geography of production and trade could also exert an influence on the price structure.36 per cent) of the average price of wool in the 1330s and 1340s. David Farmer. 779-817. According to Tables 1 and 2.” in H. The Local Port Book of Southampton for 1439-40 (Southampton: The University. meaning that a standard. would have comprised well below three-tenths of one per cent of the value of the wool. But a general sense of the parameters within which tolls were collected is well worth having and can be calculated with some degree of confidence. but surviving data would have to be far more extensive to allow for exact calculations to be made. a common rate for the toll on a sack of wool was 4d. Finally.. A History of the CustomsRevenue in England. 1988). of course. 1885). 2 (1042-1350). ed. 162 JAMES MASSCHAELE Wool appears to have been treated relatively favorably by toll collectors, but low figures can also be calculated for some of the other goods found in Tables 1 and 2: the common toll of 4d. per ton of wine represented less than four-tenths of one per cent of the average selling price in the period; the toll of one farthing on 1,000 herrings amounted to less than three-tenths of one per cent of the average price of herrings.43 The toll on horses was one of the more onerous dues among the ones summarized in Tables 1 and 2. According to Farmer’s data, a toll of 1d. constituted just over eighttenths of one per cent of the average price of a general farm horse (an affer) in the 1330s and 1340s and exactly one-half of one per cent of the average price of a carthorse in the same period. Confidence in these calculations can be increased by comparing them with occasional entries in the lists that provide ad valorem rates or other information about the values of commodities occurring in the lists.44 The London murage grant of 1315, for example, stipulates a special toll of 1d. on horses worth 40s. or more, whereas the standard toll on horses in the list is one half-penny. It also stipulates that a toll of 1d. could be charged on all merchandise worth £1 or more not specifically mentioned in the list. Norwich’s murage grant similarly mentions special tolls on a few goods with stated values: a whole cloth worth £2 or more owed 1d.; a boat carrying ale, firewood, or turves worth £1 or more owed 1d.; anyone with a trussel of merchandise worth more than 10s. owed one half-penny. The Norwich list also notes that any merchandise worth 5s. or more and not named elsewhere in the list owed a farthing. Other lists suggest that an ad valorem rate of a farthing for every 5s. worth of goods was common; the attraction of using a rate based on the principle of a penny per pound of merchandise is obvious.45 Tolls set according to this rate amount to four-tenths of one per cent of the value of the goods, a figure that is strikingly similar to the ones that can The decennial average for wine in the 1330s calculated by Rogers (Rogers, History of Agriculture and Prices, 1: 641) was £4 12s. 9d.; the decennial average for 1,000 herrings in the same period was 9s. 3d. Rogers calculated wine prices per dozen gallons. I converted his price into a price per tun of 252 gallons. Wholesale prices per tun would, of course, have been lower, meaning that the proportion represented by toll would have been higher. 44 See the Appendix for the sources on which this paragraph is based. 45 E.g. Dublin murage tolls in 1308; Gloucester pavage tolls in 1332; Southampton local tolls in 1329. 43 TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 163 be calculated by comparing standard toll rates with prevailing commodity prices. An important exception to the general rule of low toll rates applied to traders who operated on a small scale. Part of the reason toll rates are so low in surviving lists is that the units of measurement were ordinarily quite large, meaning that the value of the goods on which toll was levied was correspondingly high. A sack of wool, for example, represented the clip of about 260 sheep. It was the common unit used in international trade conducted by wealthy merchants and is the most common unit to appear in surviving toll lists. But for the millions of peasant producers responsible for the bulk of England’s wool production, it represented commercial activity on a scale beyond their normal experience. At the local level, wool was typically traded in units of pounds and stones, and toll represented a higher share of the value of sales transactions. Extant toll lists have less information about the tolls imposed on this level of trade than on the trade conducted by wealthier merchants. Typically, they specify rates for the more humble branches of trade based on how goods were carried into the market rather than on precise units of measurement. But they do occasionally furnish more precise details about the treatment of local trade, enough to signal the likelihood that peasants and small scale traders had to pay higher proportional rates than did the merchants engaged in longerdistance trade. The extensive list in the Ipswich Domesday Book provides particularly good evidence for differential toll rates applied to smaller scale trade. Merchants who shipped a sack of wool from the quay could expect to pay 4d., but if they shipped a last of wool (equal to 12 sacks) they had to pay only 8d. In other words, they could ship twelve times the amount of wool and pay only twice the amount of toll. Those who sold wool in the wool market confronted a sliding scale depending on the mode of transport used: a cartload paid 2d.; a packhorse paid one half-penny and a person carrying a backpack of wool paid one farthing. These rates seem to be on a par with the rate charged per sack, if one accepts that a human was capable of carrying at least 23 pounds in a pack, or that a horse could be saddled with twice that amount. But a fourth rate also applied in the wool market: a farthing would be collected from anyone who sold wool worth 2.5d. This unusually precise rate probably represented the value of a single fleece of low to middling quality, the 164 JAMES MASSCHAELE kind of good that a peasant with a cottage and a few acres of land might occasionally bring for sale.46 As a simple ad valorem rate the toll amounts to ten per cent of the value of the wool. But it seems unlikely that many people would have been forced to pay such a steep rate. Since the farthing payment was the same for a single fleece as for an entire backpack, the rate dropped precipitously with each additional fleece sold. Thus, someone selling two fleeces would have paid approximately five per cent of the value of the wool in toll and someone with five fleeces would have paid less than two per cent. To reach the level at which the rate would have approximated that paid by merchants, an individual would have had to be able to sell the wool from a flock of about 15 sheep. Many peasants had flocks of this size and larger, but such peasants were generally among the better off members of a village.47 Regressive rates can also be found in the Ipswich tolls imposed on hides. The standard rate in Ipswich was 4d. for a dicker of ten hides, an unusually high rate by the standards of other towns. But the high rate per dicker melted away with increased volume, so that a merchant who shipped as many as 100 hides (a half-last) paid the same amount as someone who dealt in a single dicker. Conversely, the rate per unit was much higher on small transactions: an individual who sold a single hide had to pay one half-penny. Thus, someone who sold eight hides had to pay as much in toll as someone who carried 100 hides into the town. According to the data collected by Thorold Rogers for the early fourteenth century, a single unprocessed ox hide typically fetched a price of approximately 2s., while raw horse hides were worth about half as much.48 Prices varied significantly from one year to another and even between different sets of accounts in the same year, but the decennial averages calculated by Rogers suggest that a half-penny toll would have amounted to a bit more than two per cent of the value of a single oxhide and a bit more than four per cent of the value of a single horsehide. 46 A single fleece probably weighed a bit less than 1.5 lbs., and according to David Farmer’s data, would have sold for about 4d. in the 1330s and 1340s. On fleece weights see E. M. Carus-Wilson and O. Coleman, England’s Export Trade 1275-1547 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 13. 47 Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants, and Markets, 42-54. 48 Rogers, History of Agriculture and Prices, 2: 451. TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 165 The Payers of Toll Comparison between toll rates and commodity values reveals that the rates were extraordinarily low but also suggests that tolls may have affected different social groups in different ways. Any attempt to assess the relationship between tolls and trade clearly needs to take this social variability into account, and the best way to do so is to look at the practices of toll collection. Of particular importance is the issue of who actually paid the rates specified in the lists. Were the principal payers the wealthy merchants who traded goods such as cloth and wine in wholesale quantities over long distances, or were they mainly the humble peasants of a town’s rural hinterland who needed to sell a few pounds of wool in order to pay their rent? It has often been suggested that peasants inhabiting the hinterland of towns and prominent rural markets and other smaller scale traders inhabiting the market site were particularly prone to paying tolls, and that their payments accounted for the lion’s share of the income raised by toll collectors.49 This view is based mainly on indirect evidence derived from sources dealing with exemptions from toll, exemptions that were widespread in the period. Local merchants who were freemen of a town or members of the town’s merchant gild, for example, ordinarily traded without tolls in their own town. Merchants from other towns were also sometimes exempted from tolls, if their own town had a royal charter granting exemption. Larger monasteries were also common recipients of royal grants of exemption. Peasants and other petty traders in the town were, on the other hand, seldom endowed with such privileges. A few select groups of peasants were able to establish and enforce toll exemptions—principally tenants of royal demesne and, occasionally, the tenants of some ecclesiastical estates—but the vast majority of peasants and artisans had little choice but to pay the farthings and half-pennies demanded at the gates and in the marketplaces where they conducted their business. While there is little doubt that peasants and artisans were major contributors of tolls, their role as toll payers needs a great deal of 49 Gras, Early English Customs System, 26; K. M. E. Murray, ed., Register of Daniel Rough, Common Clerk of Romney 1353-1380, Kent Records 16 (Ashford: Records Branch [of the Kent Archaeological Society], 1945), xix; Maryanne Kowaleski, Local Markets and Regional Trade in Medieval Exeter (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995), 200-1. 166 JAMES MASSCHAELE qualification. For one thing, it is important to keep in mind that the term “peasant” is extraordinarily broad, ranging from small cottagers who might have only a single fleece to sell in any given year to wealthy virgate-holding tenants who were likely to have dozens of fleeces to sell at one time. For wealthier peasants—the ones most likely to be implicated in the commercial economy—the regressive scale found in some of the toll lists may not have caused much concern, certainly not as much as it would have for poorer peasants and artisans. Anyone in a position to take a full cartload of grain to market or to sell wool in units of stones rather than pounds would have enjoyed a toll rate closer to the one enjoyed by merchants than the one enjoyed by smallholders and artisans. The extent to which merchants managed to escape tolls because of their chartered exemptions also needs careful scrutiny. There is certainly a good deal of evidence to suggest that merchants were adamant about asserting their right to exemption and vigilant about protecting it, but there were limits to the exemptions. Indeed, anyone who reads the individual entries of a surviving toll list would be hard pressed to form the impression that the trade of merchants was not a major concern of the framers of such lists. Many goods occurring in the lists were clearly the commercial preserve of merchants rather than of peasants or artisans: dyestuffs, for example, or metals, or other imported goods. Equally revealing is the presence of so many entries dealing with wholesale quantities of goods: herring assessed by the thousand and almost as commonly by the last of 12,000; hides assessed by the dicker of ten and often by the last of 200; wooden boards (frequently imported from Ireland or the Baltic) assessed in units of 100 and only rarely in smaller amounts. Even farm commodities routinely occur in relatively large units. Rates for ten sheep, for example, are more common than rates for single sheep, and other common units of measurement in the lists include five flitches of pork, 2,000 onions, 100 rabbit skins, and a wey of cheese (336 lbs.). Such large units are particularly characteristic of lists of public works tolls, but local lists also devote a surprising amount of space to quantities that are clearly implicated in trade at a wholesale level. A desire to target foreign merchants explains at least some of this emphasis on imported goods and wholesale quantities. Foreigners accounted for a significant share of English trade throughout the Middle Ages and were particularly prominent in the thirteenth and TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 167 early fourteenth centuries when most of the surviving toll lists were written.50 From the perspective of an English toll collector, they were also ideally suited to pay toll: their status as toll payers was simple and straightforward, they were less likely to have corporate support to fend off demands for toll, and they had the ability to pay. It was not in anyone’s interest to abuse foreign traders by demanding excessive payments for the right to trade, but vigorous enforcement of dues that were either customary or sanctioned by the king was certainly well worth the effort, and probably accounts for a significant share of the figures for toll income given above. In 1303, however, the toll paying status of foreign merchants underwent drastic revision with the issue of the Carta Mercatoria, an edict designed to protect the interests of foreign merchants in return for their agreement to contribute to a new national customs duty.51 One of the key provisions of the document stipulated that foreigners were henceforth to be exempt from all levies of murage, pontage, and pavage throughout England. Exemption from the payment of local tolls was not included in the grant and appears not to have been claimed subsequently. This abrupt change in status with respect to public works tolls raises a perplexing problem, though. If foreign merchants were the only significant merchant group paying these tolls, one would expect to find a significant change in the nature of the toll lists drawn up after 1303, as well as a precipitous decline in the revenues yielded by public works tolls. Neither of these propositions finds much support in surviving documentation: the emphasis on mercantile exchange is every bit as prominent in later lists as in the earlier ones, and murage receipts remained healthy in the early fourteenth century, although the number of surviving accounts is too small to allow a categorical conclusion on this point. Another possibility worth considering is that English merchants were not quite as successful at evading tolls as the evidence regarding the enforcement of their privileges might suggest. Native merchants could be forced to pay toll in several different ways. First of 50 M. Prestwich, “Italian Merchants in Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth-Century England,” in The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1979); T. H. Lloyd, Alien Merchants in England in the High Middle Ages (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982); Joseph P. Huffman, Family, Commerce, and Religion in London and Cologne: Anglo-German Emigrants, c. 1000-c. 1300 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998). 51 Gras, Early English Customs System, 257-64. 168 JAMES MASSCHAELE all, royal exemptions were conditional rather than universal and toll collectors were able to ignore the exemption privileges of many of the merchants who passed through their town gates. They were entitled to do so because of a legal doctrine that placed great weight on the date on which an exemption was first granted, a doctrine that is sometimes referred to as “priority of seisin” or “priority of charter.”52 Grants of toll exempt status could not be applied retroactively, meaning that they were not valid in towns or markets that had a preexisting right to collect tolls. Thus, the merchants of Ipswich, who acquired their exemption in 1200, could expect to trade free of toll in King’s Lynn, which acquired its formal right to collect tolls when it became a borough in 1204, but not in Norwich, which could trace its collection rights back to its acquisition of its borough farm in 1194.53 According to the data assembled by Adolphus Ballard, dozens of towns acquired toll exemptions so late that their privileges would have been viable in very few of the major towns and rural markets of the kingdom. By the end of King John’s reign in 1216, for example, virtually all of the major towns in the kingdom and several hundred rural markets had established their right to collect toll, but the list of towns that lacked formal exemption privileges at that time includes such places as Coventry, Huntingdon, Leicester, and Worcester, along with many other smaller towns.54 Priority of seisin was, in fact, less straightforward than legal theory might suggest. First of all, rights and privileges could lapse through lack of use. If the first merchants to trade in a particular town did not insist on their rights, then other merchants from that town could not do so, even if their exemption charter predated the other town’s right to collect.55 Second, exemptions from toll were almost always conveyed by specific words in a formal charter, but the right to collect tolls was not always specifically mentioned in a royal act. Many of the older and larger towns in the kingdom had prescriptive Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants, and Markets, 111-16. Ballard, ed., British Borough Charters, 1: cxli, cxliii. 54 Ballard, ed., British Borough Charters, 1: cxxxviii-cxlvii; 2: xc-cii. On the degree of commercial development before 1216 see Langdon and Masschaele, “Commercial Activity and Population Growth,” 42-54. 55 George Woodbine, ed., Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England, trans. Samuel Thorne (Cambridge, MA: Bellknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), 2: 166-73. 53 52 TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 169 rights to collect tolls based on usage that went back to the AngloSaxon period. Some, but not all of these towns, also acquired the farm of their boroughs in specific royal acts, and the date on which they acquired the farm typically became the date used to determine priority of seisin vis-à-vis other towns who enjoyed chartered exemption rights. How priority of seisin would have been determined in places that never acquired a formal charter granting the farm of their borough—including some major commercial centers such as Bristol—is an open question. Ambiguities in the possession of collection rights might also explain cases in which towns agreed to compromise in toll disputes in which the issue of priority of seisin appears to have been clear-cut. In 1239, for example, the town of Southampton agreed to stop collecting tolls from the merchants of Marlborough, “notwithstanding that the charter of our [i.e. the king’s] men of Southampton is prior to that of our men of Marlborough.”56 The relevant charters for both towns are still extant, and they show that Southampton did indeed have the legal right to demand toll, since it acquired the farm of its borough in 1199 and Marlborough acquired its right of exemption in 1205.57 A second important limitation on the universality of exemption privileges applied in the case of public works tolls. In theory, the principle of priority of seisin should have meant that relatively few English merchants contributed to public works tolls, since the grants of such tolls typically postdated the acquisition of chartered exemptions: the vast majority of English towns had already secured exemption rights by the time kings began to make murage grants. But exemptions that originated as a means to deal with local tolls did not necessarily extend to public works tolls. The limited character of toll exemptions is well illustrated by King Henry III’s grant of exemption from murage to the inhabitants of Shrewsbury and Kings’ Lynn in the 1260s as a reward for their support during the Barons’ Ballard and Tait, eds., British Borough Charters, 2: 257-8. Ballard, ed., British Borough Charters, 1: cxliii, cxliv. In the fourteenth century, Southampton made a similar compromise with the merchants of Salisbury, agreeing to forego its priority of seisin in order to reach agreement about how the two towns would collect toll from each other’s merchants. P. Studer, ed., The Oak Book of Southampton, 2 vols., Publications of the Southampton Record Society, nos. 10 and 11 (Southampton: Southampton Record Society, 1910-11), 2: 1-17. 57 56 170 JAMES MASSCHAELE Revolt.58 Both towns had acquired general toll exemptions much earlier, Lynn in 1204 and Shrewsbury in 1227, but it is clear that the general exemptions had not extended to the most common form of public work toll.59 In the case of King’s Lynn, the newly acquired exemption from murage was valid only for five years; even the expansion of toll privileges was kept within strict limits. A similar process of enhancing and extending exemption privileges probably also helps to explain the subtle changes in language one commonly finds in royal confirmations of previously granted borough charters.60 Early urban charters usually specify that the town’s privileged members were henceforth to be free from teloneum, the generic Latin word for toll; later confirmations usually stipulate that the exemption covers murage, pavage, pontage (and sometimes other dues like stallage) as well as teloneum. A confirmation in 1348 of a charter originally granted to the town of Huntingdon in 1205, for example, states in the preamble that the burgesses “fear that they may be in future impeached touching liberties and customs which they have hitherto used under ... general words” and then goes on to enumerate various tolls and dues which were not specifically included in the 1205 charter.61 Uncertainty about the extent of exemption privileges conveyed in general grants is also manifest in an inquest into murage collection in Newcastle in 1281. In the course of the inquest, a jury noted that local merchants, who “should have paid murage on their merchandise ... in the same way as foreigners,” stopped doing so six months after collection had begun in the town.62 The Newcastle inquest is particularly interesting, because the jurors mentioned in Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, AD 1258-1266 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1910), 455-6; Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, AD 1266-1272 (London: H.M. Stationery Office 1913), 214. 59 Ballard, ed., British Borough Charters, 1: 188; 2: 255. 60 Calendar of Charter Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office (London: H.M. Stationery Office 1908), 3 (1300-1326), 9, 100, 217. Many more examples could be offered. 61 Calendar of the Charter Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office(London: H.M. Stationery Office 1916), 5 (1341-1417), 94-5. A similarly explicit confirmation was made in the same year for the town of Hedon (Calendar of the Charter Rolls, 5 (1341-1417), 88). 62 Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery) Preserved in the Public Record Office (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1916), 1: 366. 58 TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 171 passing that local merchants stopped contributing when they learned that merchants in Lincoln and York did not pay murage in their home towns.63 The Newcastle verdict suggests that the issue was still up in the air in the 1280s, long after the inauguration of public works tolls. It also implies that even on a merchant’s home turf, where privileges were most securely held, exemptions from toll were not necessarily ironclad. The third and final limit to the exemption rights of English merchants worth considering is simply that merchants did not always insist on the letter of the law.64 Fighting for recognition of privileges was usually an arduous affair that risked reprisals and protracted court battles. Towns frequently undertook the task of litigating on behalf of an individual who had been forced to pay toll in contravention of the town’s charter, and there is certainly no shortage of examples documenting their commitment to defending their chartered rights. But these manifestations of corporate vigilance and assertiveness in defense of toll exemptions have some curious features. Litigation sometimes recurs between two towns even after a royal court has issued a definitive ruling on their respective toll rights. Litigation also sometimes occurs long after commercial relationships had begun; in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries towns were still engaging in disputes related to priority of seisin and still invoking late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century charters when doing so. One can legitimately wonder if the lingering lack of certainty manifested in these types of litigation might have been caused by the willingness of individual merchants to pay a few pennies for the right to trade rather than to enter into a lengthy dispute by insisting on their formal privileges. A merchant of Norwich made just such a decision in 1286 and was fined for his behavior in his local court. The court entry notes that he paid toll in markets and fairs “of his own accord” and thus damaged the town’s liberties.65 The temptation simply to get on with one’s affairs must 63 It is interesting to note that both Lincoln and York were particularly turbulent in the 1280s and 1290s and that much of the turbulence had to do with what the king and the less privileged members of the town were wont to describe as oppressive abuses of their privileged status within their respective towns. 64 E. Lipson, The Economic History of England, 5th ed. (London: Black, 1929), 1: 257. 65 William Hudson, ed., Leet Jurisdiction in the City of Norwich during the 172 JAMES MASSCHAELE have been considerable, and giving in to the temptation must likewise have been common enough to obscure what in theory should have been clear and unassailable commercial privileges. Thus, while peasants in hinterland villages and petty urban traders who were neither full citizens nor gild members undoubtedly featured prominently among the payers of toll, they were by no means the only groups affected by the taxation of trade. The only statement that can be made with complete confidence on the matter is that the merchants who dominated gilds and town governments of the period ordinarily did not pay local tolls in their own town. (Had they not been exempt, the revenues cited above would have been significantly higher than they actually were, since local merchants were the most active commercial presence in every town’s market.) But when they traded in another town, or even when they traded in their own town while public works tolls were being collected, the situation became murkier. In these situations exemptions were often claimed and often even allowed; they were, however, neither universal nor infallible. Exemptions were an important element of the period’s commercial mix, but they were sufficiently circumscribed that merchants, even English merchants, frequently contended with demands for toll payments in the conduct of their business. The payment of toll was, in short, an issue that touched a relatively broad constituency. The Impact of Tolls on Trade The breadth of this constituency probably goes a good way toward explaining the sensitivity to tolls that can be found in the period. Medieval people were well aware that the level of toll rates could affect trade volumes and general prosperity. The founders of new markets, for example, sometimes encouraged traders to use their facilities by lowering or eliminating the tolls they were entitled to collect, applying an economic rationale that is strikingly similar to the reduced sales taxes offered in “urban enterprise zones” in many American cities today.66 The effectiveness of such a strategy can be XIIIth and XIVth Centuries, Selden Society, vol. 5 (London: B. Quaritch, 1892), 29-30. 66 Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants, and Markets, 68-9. TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 173 seen in a dispute over market rights in Lancashire: the abbot of Furness maintained that his market in Dalton was losing much of its trade because the holder of the market in Ulverston did not require traders to pay toll there, and the court accepted his argument and quashed the upstart market.67 In a similar vein, the towns of Cockermouth and Grimsby presented formal parliamentary petitions pleading for the king to shut down nearby commercial sites where trading occurred without the payment of toll, claiming that their towns were greatly impoverished by the loss of revenue.68 One has to allow for some hyperbole in these petitions, but the behavior they describe and the measures they take to deal with the problem suggest great sensitivity to the practices of toll collection. This sensitivity is harder to account for than might appear at first glance. Indeed, it is somewhat puzzling to contemplate the frequency of surviving toll disputes in light of the fact that toll rates were so low. Nobody likes to pay taxes and perhaps one need go no further than a general anti-tax sentiment to explain the sensitivity to tolls encountered in the period. But the vehemence and perseverance with which toll rights were contested suggests that something more than bellyaching about taxes was going on. The exaction of tolls— even tolls set at very low rates—was a serious matter, one that raised important economic issues for the parties involved. The import of these issues can best be studied by disentangling the different interests of collectors and payers. The economic interests of the collectors of tolls are probably the easiest to diagnose. They had a natural desire to maximize their income. This can be viewed as a byproduct of simple greed, although the wealthy merchants who controlled town governments also claimed to be acting in the interests of the community, since the proceeds from tolls were used to underwrite their town’s annual farm and to finance the building and repair of its walls, streets and bridges. Whatever the motivation, achieving maximum income from tolls required careful policy decisions. Raising rates was seldom an option because of the general unwillingness to accept modifications to custom, meaning that the central policy decisions revolved around 67 William Farrer and J. Brownbill, eds., The Victoria History of the County of Lancaster, 8 vols. (London: Constable, 1906-1914), 8: 350. 68 John Strachey et al., ed., Rotuli Parliamentorum; ut et Petitiones et Placita in Parliamento, Record Commission, 6 vols. (London: s.n., 1783), 1: 197, 412. 174 JAMES MASSCHAELE questions of who should be made to pay the customary rates and what sorts of transactions could be treated as subject to payments of toll. Even in these areas, though, toll collectors had to limit the scope of their ambitions. By the middle of the thirteenth century at the latest, commercial venues were so numerous that buyers and sellers were often able to choose where to conduct their business. If traders deemed a town’s toll collectors too aggressive or too arbitrary, they would vote with their feet and revenues would suffer as a result: medieval commerce was remarkably adept at relocating in response to relatively small marginal incentives. A loss of trade meant more than a loss of toll income; it could also mean a loss of rental income, a loss of spin-off business, and a dearth of provisions for the inhabitants of the town. Thus while maximizing current revenues was certainly a high priority, those vested with authority over tolls also paid heed to broader concerns about the economic health of their town. In these circumstances, the best toll policy was one that was vigorous but not overly zealous. Finding the right balance could not have been an easy thing to do. For local traders active in retail and small-scale trade, even relatively low rates of toll could have a significant impact on household income. The regressive rates found in many toll schedules suggest that the toll payments of smaller traders constituted a higher proportion of their market income than was true of wealthier merchants. But the real issue for people who sold goods in small amounts was probably the frequency with which they had to pay toll rather than the regressive character of the rate schedule. Those who purchased foodstuffs and other basic necessities were ordinarily exempt, but those who sold simple commodities often had to comply with demands for toll, depending on the item and the scale of the transaction. Many towns sold licenses to butchers, bakers, and other artisans in lieu of collecting tolls on every transaction—a policy most familiar from the routine fining of brewers and tapsters—but such licenses were seldom available outside the food trades. Nor were they ordinarily available to the peasants, victualers and petty traders who resided in the town’s hinterland. These extramural traders were, however, less dependent on a single market than were the artisans and retailers living inside the walls, and they may have seen their greater choice in marketing venue as preferable to the payment of a standard licensing fee. Wholesale merchants had the luxury of viewing tolls from the perspective of the profitability of their trading ventures rather than 2 vols. 1: 243-44. collected toll on all goods that passed through the town on the way to its port and even collected toll twice if the goods were not only brought into the town but sold there as well. AD 1292-1301 (London: H. 98 (London: Selden Society. The Eyre of Northamptonshire. for example. 70 1 69 . he was likely to pass through one or more towns vested with the right to collect murage or pontage. but it is possible to establish how often a merchant would have encountered demands for toll at any given time. xii. while hundreds of other towns and rural markets had the right to collect local tolls. they were hard to shirk and sufficiently widespread to make a real difference in a merchant’s bottom line. Drogheda. but public works tolls were another matter. 1329-30. but whose primary shipping depots were in the east. A. but towns took countermeasures by setting up collecting stations at crossroads situated many miles from the town. no fewer than 22 English towns were authorized to collect public works tolls. consequently. ed. Stationery Office.69 Merchants sometimes sought detours around towns as a way of reducing the number of tolls they had to pay. Dublin.TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 175 their immediate effect on household income.71 Merchants with good exemption privileges were probably able to avoid most local tolls. 71 The number of public works tolls in effect in 1300 has been calculated from entries in Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office. ed. Stationery Office. Further tolls were also likely to be due in the port from which the wool was shipped: Southampton.D..M. Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery) (London: H.. When carting his goods across the country. 1916). and Clonmel are not included. for example. a particularly important issue to address when assessing how tolls affected the overall health of Cobb. 1: 315-16. whose best sources of supply were in the west and north of England. for example.. M. One might sympathize. Selden Society vols. 97. with the plight of a wool merchant. Donald Sutherland. and several others that might endeavor to impose local tolls on the wool. but like smaller-scale local traders their primary concern was more the frequency with which tolls had to be paid than the absolute rate imposed in any single place. Local Port Book of Southampton. In the year 1300. passim.70 We do not have itemized business records to establish just how often toll was paid by any particular trader. 3-4 Edward III. 1981-82). 1895). The great proliferation of tolls that characterized the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is. 176 JAMES MASSCHAELE the commercial economy in the period. Indeed. for example. Public works tolls were. the relationship between royal policy and commercial development is more complex than such a trajectory might suggest. noting that “it would be too great a burden to people to have murage and pontage in the same place where there is quayage. For though the Crown was largely responsible for extending the use of tolls. & Co. It is worth noting in this regard that the terminal dates of surviving murage accounts indicate that towns adhered closely to the terms defined in their grants.”74 72 John Munro. Cloth. 74 Strachey. Gilbert. Wool. 73 Royal oversight is particularly well documented in the multiple murage grants obtained by Dublin. Rotuli Parliamentorum. In 1324. one might even see a continuum in royal interference in trade relations over the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. one could reasonably conclude that royal policy posed a considerable threat to the viability of commerce in the period. Many towns received extensions of their terms. and ultimately led in the fourteenth century to the system of staple ports and bullionism so well described by John Munro. 1171-1320. Edward II turned down an entreaty from the burgesses of Scarborough to add murage and pavage dues to those they were already collecting for the repair of the town’s quay. continued through the imposition of a national customs system under Edward I. 1: 423.72 But in the case of tolls. but their request for an extension was often accompanied by a scrutiny of what had been done with the earlier grant and sometimes even an assessment of the condition of the walls or streets earmarked for improvement. 1870). The policy of limiting their duration to a specified number of years points in the same direction. Green.73 At times.. J. carefully monitored to make sure that the money they produced actually went to the projects they were intended to fund. The Struggle for Bullion in AngloBurgundian Trade 1340-1478 (Brussels and Toronto: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles 1972). it was also committed to keeping them within reasonable limits. . at least. Rolls Series 53 (London: Longmans. This commitment can be seen in several ways. and Gold. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland A. the crown would even consider how a new set of tolls might affect the general level of tolls in a particular town or area. Since it was the English crown that introduced and expanded the use of public works tolls. T. ed.. one that began with the introduction of public works tolls in the 1210s.D. 75 Similar cases can be found throughout the thirteenth century and were common enough to lead King Edward I to include a clause dealing with toll rates in the First Statute of Westminster of 1275. however. 1: 34 (Statute of Westminster I. 1: 449-50.” and threatened to terminate the rights of any market-holder who charged rates that were deemed to be too high. Strahan. Curia Regis Rolls of the Reign of Richard I and John (London: H. Eyre and A. eds. 109-20. As early as 1201. T.78 The salient point. 76 Statutes of the Realm (London: G. Many similar examples of the crown’s willingness to regulate methods of toll collection and to intervene on behalf of those who paid toll could be offered.. Numerous enquiries related to the statute can be found in the Hundred Rolls of 1274 and the quo warranto pleas of the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Stationery Office. 160-61. reprint London: Dawson of Pall Mall.77 The town’s privileges were suspended as a result and reinstated only after the payment of a heavy fine and a promise to end the practice of collecting “excessive” rates. Flower. Strahan. 1922).76 In the statute. but on the whole their behavior was based C.1963). 1810. for example. and Markets. This is apparent in the care taken to define rates when making grants of public works tolls and also in the policy of setting those rates below the customary local rates charged in towns and markets. has many examples but is not exhaustive.. 75 . 77 W. is not simply that Angevin kings sometimes acted to protect the interests of toll payers. Illingworth and J.M. the crown made an effort to ensure that toll rates remained at low levels. Peasants. It also found more general expression in a broad supervision of toll collection practices throughout the kingdom as a whole.TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 177 In a similar vein. In 1330. a lengthy quo warranto investigation of commercial practices in Derby established that the town required people residing outside the county to pay rates that were twice as high as those paid by inhabitants of the county. a lawsuit was filed in the king’s court to challenge what the plaintiffs described as a change in toll rates collected in a local market. Eyre and A. contrary to the common custom of the realm. Record Commission (London: G. Toll collectors sometimes acted in ways that were arbitrary and capricious. 31). the king denounced those who collected “outrageous toll. 1818). it is rather that their commitment to action fostered an economic environment in which people by and large respected the rules of the game. ed. Merchants. Caley. Placita de Quo Warranto. c. 78 Masschaele. 178 JAMES MASSCHAELE on an ingrained acceptance of custom and routine rather than a willful flouting of rules. . They were prevented from doing so by an effective assertion of public authority. In the circumstances of medieval commerce. at least not in England. tolls had the potential to undermine people’s ability to make rational cost calculations in the conduct of trade. that was no mean feat. it must be added. since they were so widespread and so important to the bodies that collected them. the form of both public prosecution and private litigation suggests that people by and large accepted the existence of norms governing the rates that could be charged and the circumstances under which toll could be demanded. The crown was not capable of ensuring cost certainty for traders under its jurisdiction. they usually involved calculated actions undertaken to stretch rather than break conventional boundaries. Even when disputes arose over aggressive toll collection. In other words. In most economies. but it did manage to establish relatively narrow limits within which uncertainty fluctuated. Ultimately they did not play that role. And in the circumstances of the time. the regularity and predictability of the costs born in trade matter at least as much as the absolute level of those costs. (London: H. late eleventh cent. ed.TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 179 APPENDIX A Handlist of Medieval English Toll Lists Prior to AD 1350 in Published Sources A. C. 155-8. Ballard (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 24. in 4 (London: Longman. Liber Custumarum. 1859-62). The Anglo-Norman Customal of Exeter. Curia Regis Rolls of the Reigns of Richard I and John. Mass. The Early English Customs System (Cambridge. Schopp and R. ed. 1042-1216. 178. 1194-1242 Southwark. Riley. Stationery Office. (London: H. 1226-1377. S. Martin. Flower. Gras. 19231935). Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages no. 1100-1135 Cardiff. Lists of Customary Local Tolls Lewes. 1201 Torksey. 1086 Domesday-Book. Gras. 153-5. Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis: Liber Albus. 1911).: Harvard Univ. 1: 229-36. 1918). Abraham Farley. 1266 Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery) preserved in the Public Record Office. Press. Early English Customs System. 7 vols. 1240 Okehampton. T. J. 1: 449-50. Press. Green. 333-4. 1925). ed. M. The list is incomplete. 1916-1937). N. seu Liber Censualis Willelmi Primi Regis Angliae. Newcastle. W. T.M. Press. 1266 . and Roberts. 2 vols. 3 vols. B. 1228 Exeter. Brown. Stationery Office. British Borough Charters.. (London: s.. British Borough Charters. 3 vols. ed. ed. C. Surtees Society 117 (Durham: Published for the Society by Andrews and Co. The Percy Chartulary. 177-78. 1147-1183 Yaxley. 1783).n. T. 12. London. Easterling (Oxford: Oxford Univ. ed. 1: 103. M. H. 1913). Longmans. London. et Liber Horn. Ballard. 1: 26a. ed. A. c. c. Hornsea. The Making Of King's Lynn. (Norwich: Jarrold and Sons. C. 16. Caley. Veale. Placita de Quo Warranto. 32-5. M. Murray. 4 vols. William Boys. 2: 199-205. 2 (Appendix. E. Kent Records 16 (Ashford: Printed for the Records Branch [of the Kent Archaeological Society]. 1: 90. 1300 . ed. 19061910). 1871-76). M. 99-102. 1272 Winchester. Register of Daniel Rough. Record Commission. ed. vols. 1291 Bristol. 2 vols. 1300 Romney. Dorothy Owen. A History of the Town and Port of Fordwich (Canterbury: Cross and Jackman. J. K. Collection for an History of Sandwich (Canterbury: By Author. 18 (Bristol: Bristol Corporation. ed. 28-35. Rates applied only to trade with Southampton. 4: 90-1. Caley. 1300 Norwich. ed. c. 1927). Travis Twiss. Records of Social and Economic History. 2 vols. 1818). Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages no. Illingworth and J. 32-42. 1792). 2. Black Book of the Admiralty with an Appendix. 1: 106. E. William Hudson and John Tingey. c. c. 4. 1931-53). 1290 Ipswich. E. 55. 8. 1812-1818). The Great Red Book of Bristol. Furley (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Part 2): 184-207. The Ancient Usages of the City of Winchester. W. ed.180 Dartmouth. 1945). Press. 302. c. 1275 Huntingdon. 435-40. 1984). S. Woodruff. 1272 JAMES MASSCHAELE Rotuli Hundredorum temporibus Henrici III et Edwardi I in Turri Londinensi et in Curia Receptae Scacarii Westmonasterii Asservati. The Records of the City of Norwich. (London: Public Record Office. ed. 1300(?) Sandwich. ed. Bristol Record Society Publications. c. ante 1290 King's Lynn. new series 9 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 1286 Fordwich. W. Rotuli Hundredorum. (Dated on the basis of references to Jews). Record Commission (London: Eyre and Strahan. [1895]). (London. W. Illingworth and J. 1272-1307 Manchester. Rupert H. ed.n. Riley. Morris. Chester. Studer. 10 and 11 (Southampton: Record Society. Illingworth and Caley. Placita de Quo Warranto. Chetham Society vols. Placita de Quo Warranto. Illingworth and Caley. Placita de Quo Warranto. ed. 1340 Placita de Quo Warranto. Illingworth and Caley. 554-58. ed. 3 vols. 1329 Derby. Oak Book of Southampton. 160-1. 552.). B. 18-27. (Manchester: s. 1330 Placita de Quo Warranto. 2: 2-17. 1303 Ipswich. ed. John Harland. and 58. Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery) Preserved in the Public Record Office (London: Public Record Office. P. 1303 London. ed.. 1300 The Oak Book of Southampton. 1910-11). n. Publications of the Southampton Record Society nos. Public Works Tolls Note: The editors of the patent rolls included lists of tolls granted to finance public works in the volumes covering the years 1216-1225 and 1225-1232. Berwick... 146. but did not include the lists of commodities and rates appended to the grants. 164-7. Bakewell. Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis. 1330 Ipswich. of Manchester. 2: 421. 1: 223-9. ed. ed. 140. Early English Customs System. 53. 1330 Peterborough. 1330 Measham. 1321 Southampton. Gras. A number of these . Subsequent volumes calendared the grants of tolls. 553.d. 1330 Oundle. 159-63. Studer. Illingworth and Caley. ed. Illingworth and Caley. 56. Gras. Rates applied only to trade with Salisbury. c.TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 181 Southampton. ed.. Chester in the Plantagenet and Tudor Reigns (Chester: The Author. 2: 282-3. Early English Customs System. 2 vols. 1861-1862). 1320 Mamecestre: Being Chapters From the Early Recorded History . 1916). 1297 Dublin pavage. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland. Calendar of Letter Books. A. 1225-1232 (London: Public Record Office. Worcester. Worcester. Waterford. 1308 Dublin murage. 1172-1320. 218-21. 18991904). 1224 (445). 1232 (479). 53 (London: Longmans. 1232 (483). 1232 (477).182 JAMES MASSCHAELE later lists have. ed. Bristol. 189-90.D. Yorkshire. ed. however. 1224 (499). Francis. 1225 (508-9). 1284 Dublin murage. Bridgnorth. 1220 (238-9). Gloucester. Great Britain. Reginald Sharpe (London: E.D. ed. Shrewsbury. 270-3. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland.D. Drogheda Bridge. 1279 Calendar of Letter Books Preserved among the Archives of the Corporation of the City of London at the Guildhall. 1901): Shrewsbury. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland. Public Record Office. Sharpe. 1216-1225 (London: Public Record Office. 1226 (32). ed. Patent Rolls of the Reign of Henry III Preserved in the Public Record Office. 1295 Dublin murage. Gilbert. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland. 1225 (518). 1315 Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland. Public Record Office. 1224 (459). 308-12. I have summarized the material available in the early volumes of the printed calendar. Stafford. 1224 (433). 1227 (173-4). Letter Book E. been published in other venues. J. 1870). Dublin murage. ed. A.J. 1225 (555-6). 1903): York. Hereford. Gilbert. Gilbert. Northampton. 1228 (228). Great Britain. Rather than record each early list separately. 63-6. . Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages no. “Feria” bridge. ed. Hithe. Letter-Books A-F. Gilbert. 13021303 Dublin murage. 222-3. T. 1229 (253). London murage. Scarborough. ed. Lincoln. 1227 (116). 191-4. 1312 London murage. Hereford. 1227 (182). and then furnished individual entries for later lists. 1230 (343). Letter Book A. 194-5. Green & Co. A. Patent Rolls of the Reign of Henry III Preserved in the Public Record Office. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland. ed. Gilbert. Gilbert. H. 1315 Drogheda murage. Gilbert.TOLL AND TRADE IN ENGLAND 183 Peterborough pavage. A Charter of Edward the Third Confirming and Enlarging the Privileges of St. Jurica. E. ed. Fair Tolls St. 233-4. Calendar of the Records of the Corporation of Gloucester. Bellows. 39-40. Winchester. 1893). Bristol quayage. 1331 Peterborough pontage. Fisher and A. 1886).n. Fairs of Medieval England.Gutch. ed. Mellows. J. 413-17. 197. An Introductory Study. Stevenson (Gloucester: J. 1349 . Summarized in Moore. 1334 Gloucester murage. Giles Fair.. Bristol Town Duties (Bristol: J. Mellows. W. 1939). H. Peterborough Local Administration. Winchester. 1328 Peterborough Local Administration. ed. W. 1828). S. 1977). Studies and Texts 72 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. M. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. 50-2. 54-5. Bell. Henry Bush.. ed. 88-9. The Fairs of Medieval England. Ives. 197. ed. Documents in English Economic History (London: G. 233-4. 237-8. R. Northampton Record Society 9 (Northampton: s. 1345 Calendar of the Records of the Corporation of Gloucester. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland. 1334 Gloucester pavage. 1318 Newark pavage. England from 1000 to 1760. AD 1349 (Winchester: s. T. ed. Stevenson. 1985). 1252 Ellen Wedemeyer Moore.n. C. x x . x EXPENDITURE AND WAR x . x x . made such a study nearly impossible. Smith of the Royal Armouries. especially as it was not currency but currencies that these records report. This should be a matter of immense importance. was published in 2005. Smith and Kelly DeVries. co-written by Robert D. and I am sure that it will come as a relief to John that when. finally. This was followed by one of my first medieval historical “reality checks. strategy.CALCULATING PROFITS AND LOSSES DURING THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR: WHAT REALLY FORCED PHILIP THE GOOD FROM THE WAR? Kelly DeVries I first became concerned with war financing when I took Dr.” when in approaching John with a project concerning a data base of some 4.400 Burgundian gunpowder weapons dating from 1410 to 1477. it also lacked any comparative cost analysis of the gunpowder weapons of the four Valois dukes of Burgundy. and especially how such affected and effected military policy. 1363-1477 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press. and planning to make a comparative study of these costs. too. yet I am ashamed to admit that military historians have not paid enough attention to economic matters. I have still remained interested in the financing of warfare. From that conversation. in which some of the following is discussed and elaborated on. I was told. 2005). only three of those pages are devoted to war financing in general with an additional four pages devoted specifically to 1 Robert D.1 Nevertheless. . many listed with costs. I profited. and tactics. The fluctuation of such currency over this period. the reality of Burgundian monetarism was pointed out to me. which comes in at 1045 pages. The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy. In my Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology. His lengthy bibliography and the seminar discussion opened my mind to ways of looking at medieval warfare which I have profited from ever since. my study of Burgundian gunpowder weapons. John Munro’s seminar at the University of Toronto twenty years ago. The Hundred Years War: England and France at War 2 . although he discusses only “Taxation and Fiscal Institutions” and hides it in the middle of his section on “The Institutions of War. 262-5. 204). 2005). from either the English or French side. let alone from any of the other lands involved: Scotland. 3 Although several new studies of this conflict appeared in 2002. A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology (Leiden: Brill. it seems that we should know more about the military financing. Kelly DeVries. It was fought for a long period of time. F. Burgundy. 1297-1305 (Antwerp: N. V. with the seven hundred year anniversary of the battle of Courtrai (see Cumulative Bibliography Update. with Ypres and Courtrai in for a chunk. are more clearly identified. Portugal. Indeed. 1952)—now translated as The Battle of the Golden Spurs: Courtrai. 232-4).2 Perhaps for the earlier Middle Ages this is excusable. and the various Low Countries entities. most of his examples in this chapter come not from any king ruling during the war. was nearly impossible—Bruges paid for the majority of it. 4 Christopher Allmand. trans. 73. ed. over the reign of several kings and magnates. in eight pages. 1991). Of the prominent general studies of the war in any language. In this author’s opinion. this neglect can become quite Kelly DeVries. and especially the Hundred Years War. A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology Update 2004 (Leiden: Brill. the most complete studies of the 1302-1305 rebellion remain J. save Christopher Allmand’s The Hundred Years War. none. 11 July 1302. this has made little impact on the scholarship. anything more detailed was undetectable. published in 2005. and military actions. Allmand’s book does consider the subject. 398-402. adds only six more references (46. winners and losers. extant records are more numerous. Verbruggen’s De slag der guldensporen: Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van Vlaanderens vrijheidsoorlog.4 Sometimes. but from the reign of Philip the Fair. and not a single word is devoted to the financing of the fifteenth-century warfare. David Richard Ferguson (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press.” Furthermore. 2002)—and Vlaanderen naar de Guldensporenslag (Bruges: Westvlaamse Gidsenkring. the project I eventually attempted for John’s course. an update. as are the causes of these victories and defeats. there are no extant records that can be used to study the financing of William the Conqueror’s conquest of England. none of these discussed the financing of the rebellion. have the slightest discussion on the financing of the conflict. there were several lands involved. Still. Spain. Germany.188 KELLY DEVRIES financing in the Hundred Years War.3 But for the later Middle Ages. 2002). Standaard Boekhandel. I found that even trying to determine the financing behind the Flemish rebellion of 1302-1305. Burne. Hainaulter.5 Yet. 1937). W. The Crecy War: A Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny. 1974). 1977). neither details what forms of financing there were. probably in greater numbers than the English. 2003). Edouard Perroy. 1990). The Hundred Years War: The English in France. 1980). War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III. La guerre de cent ans (Paris: Fayard. 5 Jonathan Sumption. 3rd ed. 1978). The Hundred Years War. 1360 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. trans.6 (As one might guess from my criticism. Syntheses on the Hundred Years War that exclude any discussion on financing include Joseph Calmette and Eugène Déprez. despite the town being on the verge of defeat. 1337-1453 (New York: Atheneum. La guerre de cent ans (Paris: Editions Fernand Nathan. 199-216. Philippe Contamine. finally. The Agincourt War: A Military History of the Latter Part of the Hundred Years War from 1369 to 1453 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1955). 1951). The Hundred Years War (London: Routledge. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. with both determining the cause of Edward III’s failure at the siege of Tournai as the unwillingness of his Parliament to pay for the sustained siege. 1327-1360. 1300-c.” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 56 (1983): 102-13. and German allied forces were also involved. 1327-1360 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press. 1988). 338-70. . Alfred H. why such financing was solely in the hands of Parliament. 1991). Histoire du Moyen Age. La guerre de cent ans. La France et l’Angleterre en conflit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. B. and Clifford Rogers’ War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III. The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Alfred H. why Edward had not arranged his financing more completely before he left England. why England was paying for the siege alone when Flemish. 102-11. Desmond Seward. (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. my own study of the failure of the siege of Tournai has determined a different cause. Jonathan Sumption’s The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle. Jean Favier. 6 On the desire to return to combat by the end of 1341 see Michael Prestwich. the breaking apart of the southern Low Countries and German alliance. 1956). André Leguai. 2nd ed. “English Armies in the Early Stages of the Hundred Years War: A Scheme in 1341. it was well in hand by 1341 when Edward was prepared to make yet another assault on the continent.HUNDRED YEARS WAR 189 absurd. 2000). Burne. 7. In the last thirteen years two major studies on the first decade of the war have been published. Rogers. 1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brabantese. and. The Hundred Years War. why if his war financing was such a hardship in 1340. with the c. Robin Neillands. Wells (New York: Oxford University Press. and Clifford J. part 1. vol. and Anne Curry. ” in England in the Fifteenth Century: Collected Essays (London: Hambledon. and his “approaches. either chronological or geographical. 1340. Miskimin. and John Bell Henneman. 1972). 1976). état et société à la fin du moyen âge: Études sur les armées des rois de France. and M. Harry A. with few considering smaller instances of war financing and their effects on the fighting of the war.8 About France the opposite has been the case: there more studies have appeared considering smaller examples of war financing and their limited effects.” Past and Present 27 (1964): 34-53. . 139-50. “War.” Nottingham Medieval Studies 39 (1995): 70-105. M. 1984). None of the studies mentioned above have suggested any determination of military strategy or tactics. B. there are so many of them that I was recently able to combine several together to present a larger perspective on how the economic costs seem not to have mattered in determining the number of rebellions of the Southern Low Countries’ towns during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. McFarlane. except for an article by John Munro. so far have been more theoretical than substantive. 7 Kelly DeVries. Munro. Although most of these studies have been focused on smaller situations.190 KELLY DEVRIES defection of the Brabantese). 10 Philippe Contamine. Suffice it to say.7 I could go on. 13561370 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society. the Economy and Social Change: England and the Hundred Years War. among others. Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France: The Development of War Financing. that most scholars who have written about the English side have been interested in the subject of Hundred Year War financing as a “big picture. 1971) and Royal Taxation in Fourteenth-Century France: The Captivity and Ransom of John II.10 Interestingly. Postan. “An Economic Aspect of the Collapse of the AngloBurgundian Alliance. This brings me back to Dr. “La guerre de cent ans en France: une approche économique. 1981).” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 47 (1974): 125-49.” as he calls them.” which appeared in the English Historical Review in 1970 and which was extended later in his book. 9 See. “The Costs of the Hundred Years War. 1337-1494 (Paris: Mouton. See also Contamine’s Guerre. 1322-1356 (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1428-1442. the McFarlanes and Postans. “Contemporary Views of Edward III's Failure at the Siege of Tournai. Money and Power in FifteenthCentury France (New Haven: Yale University Press.” considering the war as a whole. scholars discussing the Hundred Years War from the Burgundian or Low Countries’ perspective have done a far better job of investigating the profits and losses of the Hundred Years War.9 Only Philippe Contamine has attempted to take a larger look at the “cost” of the Hundred Years War. 8 K. I agree with John. but that it was his abandonment of the French that meant the war would not be over quickly. Joan of Arc menaced them. to turn his military focus towards the Low Countries and the economic problems he has created for himself there by his Hundred Year War decisions in 1430-1436.” 11 . To the Burgundians. and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade. I discuss the military situation created in the forthcoming “The Effect on the Hundred Years War of Philip the Good’s Failures at Compiègne (1430) and Calais (1436). but. and also look at the issue a bit deeper. that first creates a negative economic divide between Burgundy and England. an incredibly difficult task considering that they were in control of the fortified bridgehead across the Loire. But I want to take it a step further. she had relieved the English siege of that town. It was Philip’s abandonment of the English that meant they would never win the war. Cloth. she was a military disaster. Almost anyone who knows even the most meager history of the Hundred Years War will know that 1430 was not the best year for the English.11 First. meaning that Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy does not simply abandon his English allies in 1435. after.HUNDRED YEARS WAR 191 Wool. The previous year a young peasant woman. But to the English. ironically born and raised in Burgundian territory. the like of which they had never seen before nor. Meung-sur-Loire. the Tourelles. to the two failed Burgundian sieges and their financing problems. and Beaugency—and had won While this article focuses on the economic woes created by Philip’s failures in these sieges. Now. appeared saying that she had received a mission from God to free occupied France from its English occupiers. Joan of Arc posed little problem. A month later. which increases his war financing problems. the agreed upon “turning point” of the Hundred Years War. I only wish to say that he suggests that economics had something to do with the break-up of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance in 1435. 1340-1478. after his failure at the siege of Calais in 1436. I will not attempt to summarize Munro’s article or book. one might add. Less than a week after she had arrived at Orléans. she removed the remaining English forces from their Loire strongholds—at Jargeau. a process which I see beginning with his failure at the siege of Compiègne in 1430. he also abandons the French. published two years later. instead it would last until 1453. 1841-1849). The reverses suffered by the English at the hands of Joan of Arc in that year were more significant than any in the last fifty years. despite staying in the town for several days before Joan of Arc’s 12 On the military life and leadership of Joan of Arc see Kelly DeVries. indicating how those lands currently held were to be apportioned and by whom governed. and Régine Pernoud and Marie-Véronique Clin. It is edited in part in Pierre Champion. Yet. A detailed and intricate military plan was agreed on. 1278. With this settlement. Joan of Arc. Then. shortly after. capturing towns along the way.14 Obviously.000.15 The Burgundian army then set out against its first objective. 1998). and translated in part in Vaughan. duke of Bedford. 30. ed. 15 This plan is in the Bibliothèque Nationale. 253-4. money was a more important incentive to the Burgundian duke than Joan of Arc’s or Charles VII’s prospect of peace or French unity. 139. like several ungarrisoned French towns.. did: money. 12-14. she led an army to Reims. no. after his coronation. Philip the Good. Bedford needed Philip and. 13 One extant letter is preserved in the Archives du Nord in Lille. Charles VII. 22-4. Compiègne. and what new military targets were to be undertaken. He needed to halt their progress before the English lost any more territory. J. D. So. I have used the translation found in Pernoud and Clin. 14 Richard Vaughan. when the Burgundian duke demanded payment in return for services. John. Adams (New York. 1999).13 What Joan of Arc and Charles VII did not offer Philip the Good. Procès de condamnation et de réhabilitation de Jeanne d’Arc dite la Pucelle. had joined with Charles VII after he had been crowned. Guillaume de Flavy: Captaine de Compiègne: Contribution à l’histoire de Jeanne d’Arc et à l’étude de la vie militaire et privée au XVe siècle (Paris: Honoré Champion. fols. Joan of Arc: A Military Leader (Stroud: Sutton Publishing. 1906).. where Charles the Dauphin was crowned King Charles VII of France. 67-8. . made entreaties for peace towards the Burgundians. 17. although he was still owed £100. 1970). the English leader was forced to ensure that the Burgundians would get it. indeed. It is edited in Jules Quicherat. Joan and. Compiègne.192 KELLY DEVRIES the battle of Patay.000.12 All during this time. 5: 1267. 5 vols. Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy (London: Longmans. trans. By the end of 1429. Bedford was desperate for Burgundian assistance. the English leader in France. Joan of Arc: Her Story. however. and rev. Philip the Good did: by the end of 1431 he had been paid £150. And. the Anglo-Burgundian alliance was once again in force. (Paris: Jules Renouard et Cie. See also DeVries. Joan of Arc. MS fr. one large and one small.16 Philip the Good may have thought that as Compiègne had gone over so easily to Charles. and almost all of it was directed at Compiègne. Renouard. ed. especially as he had. 111.HUNDRED YEARS WAR 193 attack on Paris.17 Philip had amassed a large army and an impressive artillery train. Chronique: Extraits relatifs à l’histoire de France. Récueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne. (Brussels: F. so quickly abandoned the town. L. Joan of Arc. 1898-1902). Compiègne was not going to abandon the French king. 166-70. 8 vols. rpt. 2: 53. L. They chose to remain French even though that meant that they would have to resist attempts to capture their town. However. L. 4: 418-9. Douet-d'Arcq. DeVries. 3: 319-23. 1973). and Antonio Morosini. Hardy. 153-4. Wiesbaden: Kraus Reprint Ltd. (Paris: Mme. and Claude Gaier. Dorez (Paris: Librairie Renouard. ed. arriving there before the Burgundians. Kervyn de Lettenhove. “La guerre de siège au temps de Jeanne d'Arc. 5 vols. Georges Chastellain.18 At this date. it seems.20 Extant artillery comptes for the Burgundian forces DeVries. 17 16 . innumerable couloverines. and ed.000 lbs. of gunpowder with the artillery train. 1863-66). The people of the town received news in March 1430 that Philip was planning to lay siege to Compiègne and decided that they would not surrender to him. and E. Charles retreated to his Loire River holdings following her failure to take Paris. and two “engins” among the besieging Burgundian army. 1857-1862). Œuvres. two veuglaires. 18 This is discussed more completely in Smith and DeVries. Chronique. Joan of Arc. L’industrie et le commerce des armes dans les anciennes principautés belges du XIIIème à la fin du XVème siècle (Paris: Société d’Edition “Les Belles Lettres”. Joan of Arc. 3: 362. 20 Philippe Contamine. Heussner. Contemporary chroniclers report the existence of at least five large bombards. The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Such bravery inspired Joan of Arc who felt that she had been held back from military engagements since the beginning of the year. J. abandoning Compiègne and the other towns in the region which had joined him. Enguerran Monstrelet. Eventually she joined the townspeople in the defense of their town. 169-70. C. it might just as easily leave him.19 other sources record the transportation of at least 17. there was perhaps no power with a stronger or more numerous gunpowder weaponry arsenal than the Burgundians. trans. 1864-91). W. ed. See also DeVries. 19 Jehan de Waurin.. The citizens of Compiègne began to stockpile supplies and weapons. P. 6 vols.” Dossiers d’archéologie 34 (May 1979): 16. felt that they could still achieve a victory. the town did not capitulate. These guns would prove very effective. “the great number of small engines. But this show of military technology did not intimidate either Joan of Arc or Guillaume de Flavy. 23 DeVries. the governor of Compiègne and leader of its defense effort. Not accustomed to stand behind walls in a defensive posture. 22 21 .194 KELLY DEVRIES have shown that these tallies are far too low. particularly. Joan of Arc was burned to death as a heretic in the market-place of Rouen. even against such a fortified location and even against Joan of Arc. but the Burgundian leaders. the defenders of Compiègne had their own gunpowder weaponry arsenal.000 livres tournois to Jean of Luxembourg. What she hoped to accomplish with this misguided tactic. and inhabitants.23 However. In fact. See also DeVries. Joan of Arc. Additionally. for it was unsuccessful and she was captured. especially Jean of Luxembourg. Enguerran Monstrelet describes a siege where the Burgundians built a large bastille or boulevard of earth. on 23 May 1430. called coulovrines. and the constant bombardment against the town. she decided to ride out of the town and strike into the Burgundian army. 176-82. A little more than a year after she had been captured. as reported by an anonymous eyewitness. it never did occur. Procès de condamnation. which were made of bronze and which fired lead balls. 1: 207-8). 49 n. the sum the English paid for her ransom. gates. the capture of Compiègne was quite another matter.22 Her capture proved to be worth 10. and they had prepared their defenses to use it by destroying any superfluous fortifications which might hinder gunfire. Despite the large number of gunpowder weapons which Philip the Good had at the siege. 176. a bow-shot from the town. no one has adequately explained. Guillaume de Flavy. The actual defeat of Joan was accomplished quite easily.21 This was not going to be a quick siege.10. These were aimed Quoted in Champion. with a small group of soldiers. The fortifications of the town were very strong.” He even boasted that these balls were able to penetrate the armor of a man-at-arms. Joan of Arc gave the best account of this at her trial (in Quicherat. in which they set up their gunpowder weapons. its walls. on 30 May 1431. whose men had captured her. Joan of Arc. All contemporary narrative sources record that the Burgundian guns were very powerful and very destructive. Récueil. with “one cannon mounted on the wall” killing ten or twelve besiegers. The joy of capturing Joan of Arc was soon forgotten. 3: 319-23. 25 Le livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne. and other artillery which were left in the hands of the French. who seem to have been well provided for. veuglaires. What actually happened is truly one of the biggest mysteries of the Hundred Years War. bridge. if this was the case. 3859. 2: 53. Suddenly. serpentines.” But. 24 . in Chroniques relatives à l'histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne (texts français). Récueil. Chronique. and boulevard of the town in many places.24 Still. Guillaume de Flavy continued to defend diligently the walls and the boulevard. because of the continuation of large stones which they fired. According to both Le livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne and Jean de Waurin. Chronique. Mines also were attempted and failed. and the plodding of the constant conflict must have worn on the soldiers. the brother of the governor. 1873). Surprisingly. and one gunshot even killed Louis de Flavy. 176. and really without an adequate explanation in any of the original sources. Chastellain. See also Waurin. cannons. Guillaume. mills. why did they leave with such speed that they abandoned “a very large number of large bombards. 3: 388-9. the Burgundian general at the siege. despite being encircled by hostile forces. and Morosini. Monstrelet claims that it was a decision made by Jean of Luxembourg. No contemporary source even mentions hunger being a problem inside the town. Œuvres. and “many other notables in their company.” The mills ceased to mill. little fatigue seems to have afflicted the besieged.25 Throughout the summer the siege of Compiègne went on. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels: M. the count of Hontiton.HUNDRED YEARS WAR 195 against Compiègne “which. their adversaries?” Monstrelet ends his account: Monstrelet. the besiegers were both fatigued and tormented by their inability to conquer the site. 3: 361-3. Hayez. See also Waurin. coulovrines. ed. thus missing a narrative topos so prevalent in accounts of other Hundred Year War sieges. 4: 390-91. On the other hand. the Burgundians abandoned the siege. the gunpowder weapons of the townspeople seemed to have been as effective as those of the Burgundians. disrupted and breached the gates. In fact they abandoned it so quickly that they left behind their numerous gunpowder artillery pieces which the inhabitants of Compiègne quickly captured and brought within the gates. Chronique.C. Sir Charles W. and other artillery which fell into the hands of the enemy. In a letter written 4 November 1430 by Philip to Henry VI. except for its relationship to the soon-to-be martyred Saint Joan. Chronique. 1924. 176. 24. Oman. A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages. 29 Champion. Le livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne. to the relationship between the Burgundians and the English. for example. Although Monstrelet reports that Jean of Luxembourg was condemned for his actions by Philip the Good. serpentines. L’art militaire et les armées au moyen-âge en Europe et dans le proche orient (Paris: Payot. 27 26 . whose reputation he was trying to rehabilitate from one who “gave up” Joan of Arc. The Agincourt War. veuglaires. I imagine that you and your councillors remember that it was at your urgent request that I took part in your French war. I Monstrelet. with its attendant loss of gunpowder artillery.196 KELLY DEVRIES “This artillery was the duke of Burgundy’s!”26 Jean de Waurin is equally confused and offers the same surprise at the abandoning of “a large quantity of large bombards. he clearly makes this known: Most redoubted lord. 1998). 1946). and Ferdinand Lot. 2 (London: Methuen. Guillaume de Flavy. Guillaume de Flavy. 42-58. the failure of the Burgundians to capture Compiègne. many do not even record the siege. rpt. especially.29 surprisingly. I recommend myself to you in all humility. vol. 30 See. Modern authors are equally befuddled at the Burgundian retreat. this can hardly be the sole or even the primary reason for such a quick withdrawal.31 the duke himself felt that blame for the military debacle should be laid firmly at the feet of the English. at whose behest the duke of Burgundy was undertaking the siege. Richard Vaughan suggests only that the Burgundians “were forced” to leave. Burne. 28 Vaughan. London: Greenhill Books. 4: 418-9. Yet. For my part. cannons.28 Pierre Champion praises the inhabitants of Compiègne and especially their governor and military leader. 162-82.”27 Still. Philip the Good.” The author of Le livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne professes that it was the defensive gunfire which “convinced them to retreat. was of enormous importance both to the next phase of the Hundred Years War and.30 and none mention the Burgundian financing problems that resulted from the defeat. 4: 419. 31 Monstrelet. these payments have not been kept up by you.. according to the agreement drawn up on your part with my people.. as appears in the recommendations drawn up on this and sent to Calais by our secretary Master Jehan Milet. for want of payment. in 3 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. ed. for they are in arrears to the tune of two months... and for the artillery. This letter is edited in Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France during the Reign of Henry VI. Stevenson. and especially that the said payment would be made without fail. both on account of the two months abovementioned. as well as the cost of the artillery. The same goes for the artillery. reprint Wiesbaden: Kraus Reprint Ltd. Moreover. Thus most redoubted lord. 1965). 33 32 . It is a fact that.. though this was contrary to the advice of my council and my own opinion.33 This was the sum agreed to by the duke of Bedford before the siege. I ask and entreat you most humbly to see that the said sums are paid over at once to my people at Calais who have been waiting there for this purpose for some time . and without payment of what is due to me.. as agreed.32 It was under the impression that this would be done on your part. it was at your request and command that I undertook the siege of Compiègne.. But. and myself.HUNDRED YEARS WAR 197 have so far accomplished everything that I agreed to and promised in the indenture made between . most redoubted lord. acting in your name. while my good cousin the earl of Huntingdon with his company ought to have remained with me before the said town of Compiègne . It is also true. according to him. as a result. The partial translation I am using comes from Vaughan.. 2 vols.. you ought to have paid me the sum of 19. I cannot continue these [military operations] without adequate provision in future from you .1: 156-64. 24-5. that. 2. most redoubted lord.000 saluts. to keep his forces in the field any longer . the cardinal of England [Henry Beaufort].. that I had my men stationed before Compiègne all the time. Likewise. For it had seemed to us better for me to advance towards Creil and Laon. Philip the Good. J. my good cousin of Huntingdon has been unable... My redoubted lord. for which I myself paid out over 40.500 francs of royal money each month for the expenses of my troops before Compiègne.... all my lands both in Burgundy and Picardy have been and are at war and in danger of destruction . for which Philip asked to be recompensed. This important coastal town had since 1347 been securely held in the hands of the English. perhaps never an entirely solid one during the reign of Philip the Good. most importantly.. whenever a leader needed to gather a large number of gunpowder artillery pieces. 1999). But neither she nor those in the latter work analyze the Congress from Philip’s position. never was paid. Nor. Philip the Good. XVe-XVIe siècles (Arras: Artois Presses Université. where Philip the Good led the Burgundians away from the alliance they had had since before the assassination of Philip’s father. John the Fearless. was irreparably damaged at Compiègne for a lack of promised financing. the costs of the artillery lost to the French. as the siege of Calais reI think that Joyceline Gledhill Dickinson (The Congress of Arras. and Christophe Leduc. as Joyceline Gledhill Dickinson and others have suggested. 98-107. Let me jump to 1436 and the siege of Calais. and plan to return later to it. as it was an attempt by the duke to bring the two sides together and their obstinacy which caused his reversal of previous policy. does Vaughan. I have attempted to do this briefly in my and Bob Smith’s The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy. in 1419. Arras et la diplomatie européenne. Its symbolism may even have outweighed its strategic significance. By the way. Instead.34 In 1436. Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy proved beyond any doubt that the Anglo-Burgundian alliance was at an end when he directed his largest army and artillery train yet assembled to attack Calais. although it appears that some of the promised funds were eventually paid. except to suggest that it was not so much a Burgundian treason against the French. 1955]) does an excellent job of examining the Congress of Arras from the Anglo-French perspectives. the siege of Calais was a resounding defeat for the Burgundians. Charles GiryDeloison.198 KELLY DEVRIES The Anglo-Burgundian relationship. I do not have the time to go into this in depth. Because of logistical problems. the English would surely have changed their strategic plans for the future of the Hundred Years War. There is of course much history in between the failed siege at Compiègne and that at Calais. with some correcting by the various essayists in Denis Clauzel. 34 . including. 1435: A Study in Medieval Diplomacy [Oxford: Clarendon Press. Had Philip successfully besieged Calais. following so closely on the heels of their diplomatic defeat at the Congress of Arras. the Congress of Arras. Philip began to formalize his plan in January 1436. in my view. ed. There were also four hundred ships. Philip the Good.” which sailed from the harbors of Sluys. P. Holland. a longer planning time was necessary. and 1 Iron Bombard from the Saint-Bertin Monastery in Saint-Omer (indicated in other documents to have been brought there as a central site) 1 Bronze Bombard chamber for the Bourgoinge from the Saint-Bertin Monastery 7 Gros Veuglaires taken from naval vessels 4 Iron and 1 other Gros Veuglaires from Saint-Bertin Monastery 2 Iron and 3 other Gros Veuglaires (no site mentioned) 2 Gros Veuglaires from Gravelines 1 Gros Veuglaire from Damp 17 Iron and 13 other Veuglaires from Sluys 23 Veuglaires from Bruges or Sluys 11 Veuglaires from Holland 35 This quote comes from a document written by an English spy (Archives départementales du Nord.HUNDRED YEARS WAR 199 quired. 1991). named Pruce and Bergiere. local armories. 75-80. especially from the counties of Flanders. and thus had to amass his gunpowder weapons from smaller. Université Charles de Gaulle Lille III. fol. one hundred bronze coulovrines. 203. In this case the Burgundians had no central artillery arsenal. B10401. 29) with a complete transcription in Vaughan. (Lille: Centre d'histoire de la région du Nord et de l'Europe du Nord-Ouest. and bombard gunstones weighing between 180 and 350 livres. and Artois. not including additional smaller vessels. “L'armée Bourguignonne au siège de Calais de 1436. Picardy. 36 Monique Sommé. Contamine et al. en Angleterre et en Bourgogne XIVe-XVe siècle.35 One convoy from Holland included a large veuglaire with eight removable chambers. ed. Biervliet. not to mention a large number of lances and crossbows.36 Notarial documents at the Archives de la Côte-d'Or record the following numbers and types of Burgundian gunpowder weapons at the siege of Calais: 3 2 3 2 2 Iron Gros Bombards and 3 other Gros Bombards from Holland Iron Bombards from Picardy Bronze Bombards from Burgundy Iron and 1 other Bombard from Abbeville Bronze Bombards. two crapadeaux with six chambers. and Rotterdam.” in Guerre et société en France. “stuffed with the most strong ordnance and all other materiel of war that any man had ever heard of. . Most of the guns used at the siege of Calais were supplied from the Low Countries. wagons.39 Jean de Waurin writes that the Philip the Good had “a large number of bombards. 39 Monstrelet. See also Le livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne. “L'armée Bourguignonne. Enguerran de Monstrelet describes the “large number of ribauds carrying canons and other large engins” to the siege. and Liber de virtutibus sui genitoris Philippi Burgundiae . Merkwaerdige gebeurtenissen vooral in Vlaenderen en Brabant van 1377 tot 1443.and medium-sized gunpowder weapons. and mantlets for the large. ed. masons carved stone cannonballs. See also Oliver van Dixmude. 38 Sommé.” 203. 4: 160. and large serpentines. Récueil. and 2 other Veuglaires from Abbeville 2 Iron Veuglaires from Avennes 2 Veuglaires from Bruges 23 Petit Veuglaires (no site mentioned) 2 Petit Veuglaires from Abbeville 4 Veuglaire Chambers from Sluys 23 Cannons or Veuglaires from Sluys 2 Petit Cannons from Abbeville 12 Iron Crapaudeaux (site not mentioned) 5 Iron Crapaudeaux from Gravelines 3 Iron Crapaudeaux from Abbeville 2 Petit Crapaudeaux (site not mentioned) 48 (or 52) Gros Coulovrines 200 Bronze Coulovrines 40 Iron Coulovrines 3 Other Coulovrines 2 Bronze Coulovrines a escappe37 It is also recorded that Burgundian and Low Countries’ carpenters made carts. J. J. 211. 5: 240. 1835). 1895). 150. cannons.”40 And Jean 37 See the documents preserved in Joseph Garnier. Lambin (Ypres: Lambin en Zoon. 40 Waurin.200 KELLY DEVRIES 14 Iron and 9 other Veuglaires (no site mentioned) 6 Iron Veuglaires from naval vessels 1 Veuglaire. and cannoneers purchased saltpeter and made gunpowder. Chronique. ribaudequins.38 The expense was enormous. The size and presence at Calais of this incredibly large gunpowder artillery train is commented on by all of the chroniclers who discuss the siege. named Anvers. 151-63. L’artillerie des ducs de Bourgogne d’après les documents conservés aux archives de la Côte-d’Or (Paris: Honoré Champion. As a whole they are impressed with what the duke of Burgundy was able to deliver to the walls of the English town. and. was an intense bombardment of the town. Mary. Ribawdes. ducis.41 This artillery force was so large. ed. ed. interestingly. boulevards and artillery towers around Calais and filled them with guns. 41 Jean Chartier. But. 1876). 3 vols. Shot many a full grete ston. the anonymous author of this poem describes the weapons which the duke had brought to Calais: With gonnes grete and ordinance. Day and night cannonballs fell on the walls and flew over them to land on the buildings inside. and marie mylde. the townspeople were preserved from the terror that these weapons delivered. it seems. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels: M. fortunately. roi de France. First. and others 26 horses each. . in Chroniques relatives à l'histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne (texts latins). Into the tovn in many apart. Chronique de Charles VII. Vallet de Viriville. With many a proude pavis. another 36 horses. Jannet. that began in earnest on 9 July 1436. that to utilize their numerous gunpowder weapons. Saint Barbara: Thanked be god. the patron saint of cannoneers. That theyme myght helpe and avance. the Burgundian army not only placed them at weak spots around the walls. Gailly paynted and stuffed wele. 1858). not including the large number of other various sized guns which accompanied those larger weapons. woman. Hayez. but also constructed their own earth-andwood artillery fortifications. The result of all of these gunpowder weapons at the siege of Calais. Then the cannoneers began to attack the town: Gonners began to shew thair art. 62-3. Was neuer better devyse. The most cinematic portrayal of this comes from a Middle English poem written at the time of the siege. They hurt neither man. preserved by God.HUNDRED YEARS WAR 201 Chartier notes that one of the Burgundian bombards was so large that it required 50 horses to pull it. 1: 242. (Paris: P. ne childe. armed with Iren and stele. even if.44 On the other hand. “‘The Siege of Calais’: A New Text. D. ed. when it came to the larger and better defended walls of Calais. 44 Monstrelet. Marck. This might be credited to the defensive gunpowder weapons which were inside the town which. Brie (London: K. They cowde noon other charme. 1959). 2: 578. Récueil. ms.42 Yet. All were written within a few months of the end of the siege. The fortifications of the nearby castle of Guines also held out during the siege. 5: 243.. See also Waurin. Bodleian Library. ed. However. they were incapable of breaching them. Digby ms. “Seynt Barbara!” than was the crie. 5: 245) confirms this. and a second in Oxford. despite their power and numbers. F.202 KELLY DEVRIES Houses thogh they did harme. 79. While the Burgundian forces were easily able to conquer smaller nearby fortifications. 245. Three more poems can be found in Rossell Hope Robbins. adding that while the cannonball did not kill the duke. 78-89. who has worked on these poems. New Zealand. as Monstrelet claims. or the Chronicles of England. Trench. one in London. with one Calaisien gunshot even piercing Philip the Good’s tent. Paul. these gunpowder weapons “strongly damaged” the walls of the town. Historical Poems of the XIVth and XVth Centuries (New York. Roger Nicholson. they note that neither the offensive nor defensive gunfire was effective. it did kill a trumpeter and three knights who were with him. Philip the Good. by placing their guns near the walls and battering them down. assures me that there are at least two more such poems as yet unedited. they originated in The Brut.. at least according to the English chronicle. . such as Oye. these Burgundian gunpowder weapons. Indeed. were not successful in breaching the walls or causing the town’s capitulation. the Liber de virtutibus sui genitoris Philippi Burgundiae ducis. and Balinghem. ed. Monstrelet (Chronique.43 However.” Publications of the Modern Language Association 67 (1952): 888-95. were very effective in the defense of the town. Lambeth Palace Library. of the Department of English. but without success. and Vaughan. The Brut. See also Olivier van Dixmude. The quotes which appear in the text above are found on pp. Whan stones in the tovn flye. 891-3. 1906-1908). W. 4: 175. 43 The Brut. The Brut. Trübner and Co. 2: 577-9. most contemporary chroniclers give no credit to the town’s defensive weapons in relieving the siege. 6. how effective can a bombardment lasting only fifteen days be? The military history of the fifteenth century showed 42 The version of this poem used is Ralph A. 63. Chronique. 102. Merkwaerdige. University of Auckland. Klinefelter. For fifteen days they fired on the town. 1545.. 2005). L.45 Yet. 46 See DeVries. on some occasions. it did little to change the situation. rivalry between two of the larger factions of Flemish troops. even when faced with the constant bombardment of gunpowder weapons. Once the Burgundian fleet arrived. and ever more frequently during the mid-fifteenth century. military leaders simply gave up when their combatants and artillery were unable to bring about a victory either from intimidation at the sight of the large number of gunpowder weapons facing a site or the increased fear of destruction after a few days of gunpowder weaponry bombardment. Indeed. strong fortifications generally took a very long time to be defeated. Before they arrived.s. “Hunger. Richard Vaughan raises other possibilities. such as those gained by Henry V in Normandy and Joan of Arc along the coronation route to Rheims. it seems that only when there was no desire to withstand a siege was there a quick capitulation. 12 (1991): 129-81. ed. Flemish Participation and the Flight of Philip VI: Contemporary Accounts of the Siege of Calais. 79. that it was extremely difficult for a blockade of any size to cut off all relieving maritime traffic to the stricken inhabitants.” in The Hundred Years War. to arrive at Calais at the same time as the army. On the problems of Edward III’s siege in 1346-1347 see Kelly DeVries. J. Joan of Arc. proving as Edward III had discovered in 1346-1347 when he conquered the town.47 In the meantime. Philip the Good. At all other times sieges either failed or dragged out until fatigue or privation on one side or the other brought about victory or defeat. raised largely among Flemish and Dutch coastal towns. had begun to affect the morale of the Burgundian troops. 152-4. if the inhabitants desired to withstand a siege. 1346-47. appearing only after fatigue and discouragement had begun to inflict their toll on the besieging troops.HUNDRED YEARS WAR 203 that. Unwittingly. and there was no evidence of distress among the besieged inhabitants. . English ships had sailed in and out of Calais. the Brugeois and Ghentenaars.” Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History n. 47 Vaughan. He cites the failure of the Burgundian fleet. Andrew Villalon and Donald Kagay (Leiden: Brill. Such can only be the reason for Charles VII’s unwillingness to pursue the attack of Paris after only one day in 142946 and perhaps may also be the reason why Philip the Good raised his siege of Calais after little more than two weeks in 1436. the Calaisiens 45 I investigate this more in “‘The Walls Come Tumbling Down’: The Myth of Fortification Vulnerability to Early Gunpowder Weapons. 79-80. 2: 582-4. ben Englisshmen þen ye. whiche falsly dothe malygne. The rest of the Burgundian army soon followed suit. The next morning.50 In these there is little doubt that the Flemings were to blame for the defeat: Remembres now. and as fear and rumors of other attacks spread throughout their camp. When ye laide seege to Caleis. 2: 581. 4: 186. 50 The Brut. that at the time also included Philip the Good. For Flemmynges come of Flemmed men ye shal wel vndirstand. On 26 July. they fled during the night. This defeat was met by jeers and mockery from the Ghentenaars.49 Whether the Flemings were to be blamed entirely for this military debacle is debatable. And comen of more gentill blode.48 The defeat was made even more serious by the abandonment of many of the Burgundian gunpowder weapons to hasten the retreat. with poems such as “The Englishman’s Mocking Song Against the Flemings” and “An English Ballad Against the Flemings” becoming so prevalent that they found their way into accounts of The Brut. they made a sortie from the Boulogne gate. Certainly the English felt so. See also Waurin. 2: 583-4. again by surprise. Record of Flaundrys.204 KELLY DEVRIES played on this rivalry. For more of reputacioun. 583. the Brugeois joined them. another group of English inhabitants of the town attacked a wooden artillery tower manned by Ghentenaar troops. surprising a unit of Brugeois troops. 4: 188-9) claims that the Flemings did take their best gunpowder weapons with them. The Brut indicates that the Brugeois tried to bury some of their guns in the sand in an effort to keep them from falling into English hands. It was now the Brugeois soldiers’ turn to respond with their own derision. 600-1. The Ghentenaars had reached their breaking point. ye wer right still to blame. For fflemed men & banshid men enhabit first youre land. Vaughan. On 28 July. 80. 51 The Brut. Philip the Good. of olde antiquitie. 49 48 . (“The Englishman’s Mocking Song Against the Flemings”)51 Vndyr a veyle of fals decepcioun. See also Vaughan. Récueil. Philip the Good. vpon youre owne shame. ye Flemmynges. but most seem simply to have been left behind. Jean de Waurin (Récueil. The Brut. the day after the Burgundian ships’ arrival at Calais. . regardless of the promises which they had that very day renewed. Moreover. together with the men from the castellany of Ghent. Because the spot where we and our people of Ghent were lodged was unsuitable for fighting a pitched battle when the enemy came. the Franc of Bruges their followers and some of our nobles in another place . and the Franc of Bruges. not content with this.” Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire de Belgique 115 (1950): 285-96.. they would await events. and at a time when we were expecting the enemy to arrive on the following Monday or Tuesday. . Ypres. on Saturday 28 July late at night. considering neither our honour nor their own. ed. although she mistakenly has Philip the Good sending the letter to his other brother-in-law. 81-2.. Hugh de Lannoy. The original is edited in Marie-Rose Thielmans. these people of Ghent.206 KELLY DEVRIES us in one place. In a letter to the duke written 10 September 1436. and the men of Bruges. which was said to be the best. having put the river [Aa] at Gravelines between themselves and the enemy. they departed that night.. Ypres. without listening to our requests or waiting for our advice. and placing those problems firmly in the Low Countries: A translation of this letter is found in Vaughan. abandoning what we had begun with the utmost chagrin. most suitable and most advantageous position to await the enemy in battle order. we were forced to depart and withdraw to Gravelines with the Flemings. “Une lettre missive inédite de Philippe le Bon concernant le siège de Calais... which is three leagues from Calais. we asked them to withdraw with us and the noblemen in our company to a certain place quite near their encampment . came to tell us that they had decided to decamp that night and to withdraw to a place near the town of Gravelines in Flanders. puts a more realistic spin on problems at Calais. Philip the Good. There.. who would willingly have stayed to carry out our wishes. and withdrew to the above-mentioned position near Gravelines. And at once.. 55 . Arthur de Richemont. while at the same time prophesying of future financial problems brought about by the defeat. they persuaded the men of Bruges. Nevertheless. to withdraw likewise.55 But Philip’s councillor. Since the contingent of noblemen we had with us was too small to do battle with the enemy .. and they agreed to do this . he blames the defeat at Calais on problems financing the siege.. Again. are in armed rebellion. indeed. it is possible that every wicked person will start plundering the rich.56 The original of this text is found in Kervyn de Lettenhove. 1999). and they will probably want to do this.” Bulletin de l’Académie Royale de Belgique 2nd ser. if Holland and Zeeland continue their trade with the English. If you need to raise finance in Brabant. If by chance they start pillaging and robbing. trans. there is much anxiety. On the other hand. I have used the translation found in Wim Blockmans and Walter Prevenier. will rebel in the hopes of getting similar treatment. 84. having got as far as talking in this way. and other lands of yours. you can imagine how much worse it is among the populace. 1369-1530. which have similar aspirations. sold. In this matter. or saddled with debts.HUNDRED YEARS WAR 207 You must have appreciated. the Flemings. This is a grave danger. ed. Moreover. according to reports. the English are planning to keep a large number of ships at sea in order to effect a commercial blockade of your land of Flanders. during the siege of Calais. I note that. nor are your domains. for such harm would result if that country were deprived for any length of time of its cloth industry and commerce. 14 (1862): 218-50. and it is to be feared that the war has only just begun. will probably make an alliance with the English. 56 . and it is very like that. your government. you have seen how agitated your Flemish subjects are. able to help you. which are mortgaged. if you pacify them by kindness and by accepting their demands. and involved in war on sea and land. some of them. Elizabeth Fackelman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Strange and bitter things have been said about yourself. If the truth be told. Edward Peters. And you appreciate how much it cost to send a fleet to sea to protect this commerce and resist the enemy. which could be very much to your prejudice and dishonor. what harm was done by the lack of finance. finding themselves without commerce. Covetousness exists among the well-off. if you punish and repress them. Holland. The Promised Lands: The Low Countries Under Burgundian Rule. it can only be with the consent and good will of the people. you have no territory whose populace is not hard pressed financially. it is to be feared that they will make disastrous alliances with your enemies. and your leading councillors. your enemies. other towns. Moreover. without their cloth industry. especially when they see that you are at war [with England] and that the Flemings seem likely to revolt against you at any moment.. “Programme d’un gouvernement constitutionnel en Belgique au XVe siècle. they will soon go further than mere talk. ” Journal of Medieval Military History 3 (2005): 176-83. war financing can also be blamed for the failure. Philip the Good. Gloucester burned several villages south of Dunkirk and around Ypres. and. They would rebel.” in Mélanges Paul Frédéricq (Brussels: H. It would not be long before the first paragraph of Lannoy’s letter would also be fulfilled: the larger towns of the southern Low Countries would seek their own means to ensure their economic wellbeing. found themselves in the ironic position of defending their countryside and towns from the very people on whom their livelihood chiefly depended. the irony of it all is that these were the people with whom Flanders had been allied for more than two centuries. led by their soldiers returning from Calais. 60 The military history of this siege can be found in Smith and DeVries. the previous year. The economic problems that directly followed the failed siege must also be considered. 245-58. 1904). duke of Gloucester. as a number of letters from the ducal court to the Ghentenaars and others in Flanders insisting that the Flemings must defend themselves suggest. John of Bedford. See also Jan Dumolyn. Already by the end of 1436. August 1436. Examples of the cost of this defense appears in Kelly De Vries. The English fleet also raided along the Flemish coast as far north as the Zwin estuary and the island of Cadzand before both army and navy returned to Calais. Taking advantage of the Burgundian confusion. Fris.58 Philip the Good and the Burgundian army would not be coming to their aid. far longer than they had been in Burgundian control. Humphrey.208 KELLY DEVRIES At the siege of Calais then. once again. 59 See V.57 This fulfilled in essence the last paragraph of Lannoy’s letter: the citizens of the southern Low Countries. the inhabitants of Bruges began an open rebellion against Philip the Good.60 It was the first of many Vaughan. led his own raid into western Flanders. who had succeeded to the leadership of the English troops in France after the death of his brother. Lamertin. 82-84. and who had arrived to take command at Calais only to see the flight of the besiegers. De Brugse opstand van 58 57 .59 One would expect to see a similarity throughout Flanders during these troubled times. The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy. with the Flemish town rivalries perhaps at fault. “Documents Gantois concernant la levée du siège de Calais en 1436. immediately after the Burgundian withdrawal. and the Flemings in particular on this occasion. “Provisions for the Ostend Militia on the Defense. For one thing. 2004). .” in The Medieval Crusade. financially. Vaughan. Although he frequently drifted into Crusading fantasies and other imaginative and unfulfilled military adventures. Susan Ridyard (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press. 157-70.G. Although he allowed some generals aligned with him to fight on the side of the French. “The Failure of Philip the Good to Fulfill His Crusade Promise of 1454. ed.. 86-92. Never again would he rely on someone else to pay for an engagement.HUNDRED YEARS WAR 209 Low Countries’ rebellions Philip the Good would be forced to face and put down. Philip the Good himself never returned to the Hundred Years War. or risk an enormous amount of expensive weapons on a single military endeavor. as he had with the English at Compiègne. nor did he allow the Burgundian army to be used en masse in any of Charles VII’s military conquest. and Blockmans and Prevenier.A. and his treasury. 1997). The Promised Lands. 1436-1438 (Courtrai-Heule: U. geographically. such as at Calais. 61 See Kelly DeVries. 98-99.61 from this time forward the duke’s focus was firmly placed on the southern Low Countries. Philip the Good. while the latter erected and expanded his Rosemary Horrox. Rebellion and the Financial Control of the Aristocracy 1485-1509.” Ph. more people came to live as dependents of the king than ever before. Provas da história genealogica. 3 Sean Cunningham. Provas da história genealogica da Casa Real portuguesa (Coimbra: Atlântida. 1947).THE COST OF MAJESTY: FINANCIAL REFORM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROYAL COURT IN PORTUGAL AND ENGLAND AT THE TURN OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY Susannah C. it is evident that during these reigns. It is true that household numbers had been on the rise in preceding reigns. 3: 217-224. at the turn of the sixteenth century.D. Despite the constant fluctuation in population.2 But the research of Sean Cunningham has shown that Henry VII doubled the number of dependants known as knights of the body as part of a strategy designed to increase his own political security. “The Establishment of the Tudor Regime: Henry VII.1 Similarly. 1 . records from the reign of the Portuguese king João II point to an escalation in the number of residents at court receiving stipends or moradias. The households of both Henry VII (1485-1509) and Manuel I (14951521) underwent a sizeable increase in both human and spatial terms. António Caetano de Sousa. Diss.4 In order to accommodate these growing numbers. attributable to location of the household and immediate political circumstances. 4 Caetano de Sousa. Lancaster University (1995). both Henry VII and Manuel I undertook a number of important building projects: the former king refurbishing and constructing large palaces along the River Thames. Humble Ferreira The changes brought to bear in the royal courts of England and Portugal.. 2 D. and Rosemary Horrox has made a convincing argument that Richard III of England (1483-1485) appointed many of his retainers to positions within the royal household. Richard III: A Study in Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.3 And the surviving records of Manuel I’s court indicate a similar trend occurring in Portugal. are strikingly similar. 1989). 3: 440-476. reveals a changing attitude toward the royal household and arguably marks a shift from a medieval household to a Renaissance-style court. M. 7 Geoffrey Elton. In revisiting the world of late medieval royal finance. the officers who handled the king’s money were individually responsible for sums in their possession. ed. No longer was presence at court restricted to essential personnel and a handful of grandes and no longer were household ordinances punctuated by legislation limiting their numbers. Henry VII and Manuel I were able to overcome substantial household debt and expand their royal courts. 3: 40. obsessed with economy. Thus as historian David Grummitt has noted. 1993). 1983).”7 Of course. the size of the royal households in both kingdoms began to outstrip the proscriptions that had limited their sizes in earlier centuries. the oftcited accounts of the treasury of the chamber record only the sums 5 For a comparison of the money spent by Henry VII on palaces as compared to Edward IV. The Royal Palaces of Tudor England (New Haven: Yale University Press. emerged the renaissance court devoted to appearances of opulence and majesty. the royal courts did not. . Also Simon Thurley. Given the imperfect separation between personal and professional identity. From the medieval royal household. see H. Information on Manuel I’s expenditure on building works can be found in Anselmo Braamcamp Freire.6 And by the turn of the sixteenth century. 20958. transformation was attributable to major changes in the financial administration of both the royal households and the kingdoms. a number of historians have cautioned against straightforward readings of exchequer and household accounts. and could not. have materialized from thin air.5 Such rapid expansion. in both England and Portugal. In Portugal. Research reflects that by securing a steady and reliable cash-flow into the coffers of the royal household. 19..” Archivo Histórico Portuguez 1-7 (1903-1909). Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. History of the King’s Works (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Colvin. 1963-1982). Manuel. 6 British Library (BL) Add. “Cartas de quitação del Rei D. new ordinances in 1516 allowed lower ranking servants to maintain wives and families. 2: 1024 and 4: 223. Évora and Lisbon. Such was the transformation that historian Sir Geoffrey Elton could glibly claim: “the Tudor court as a centre of social and political life springs suddenly into existence with the accession of Henry VIII.ROYAL COURT IN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL 211 domiciles in and around the important towns of Santarém. has muddied our understanding of court finance. Richardson’s Tudor Chamber Administration in 1952. many of whom held more than one office. But after the death of Sir Richard Croft in 1502. C. 10 W. 126. mantieiro of the royal household had to account for all the silver and goods that had been in his possession. Chancelarias de D. the attention given to the Treasury of the Chamber.212 SUSANNAH HUMBLE FERREIRA of money that passed through the hands of the Treasurer. Arquivos Nacionais/Torre do Tombo (AN/TT). 8 . in order to understand the operation of household administrative departments. as the kingdom’s primary financial department in the reign of Henry VII.11 The new office would have been more prestigious inasmuch as it gave Lovell an important position within the itinerant court. it was not the primary financial department at court: that place belonged to the Treasury of the Household. Since the publication of W. Chrimes. the wife and heirs of Estevão Pestana. 1972). liv. Chamber Finance and the New Monarchy: Some New Evidence. From 1485 until 1492. 11 S. 9 For example. These quittances show that a crown official had to account for all money in his possession—sometimes even from beyond the grave—and officials and their families were held accountable for sums as if they had been held as a personal loan. C. Tudor Chamber Administration (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. fol. Richardson. 118.9 Thus. Manuel. Lovell served as Treasurer of the Chamber. 1952). also occupying the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer. 29. John Heron and do not reflect a complete picture of the money controlled by the department as a whole. it becomes necessary to consider the personal relationships of administrative officials. Lovell was given the position of Treasurer of the Household in what was ostensibly a promotion. A clue to the veritable relationship between these two departments can be seen in relation to the career of Sir Thomas Lovell.8 This principle of private accountability is evident in the Portuguese quittance letters. or cartas das quitações that are made known to us through the royal chancery records.” Historical Research 179 (1999): 229-243. Henry VII (Berkeley: University of California Press. thereby offering him greater access to the king. B. “Henry VII.10 While the Treasury of the Chamber was undoubtedly the backbone of the financial machinery throughout much of the reign of Henry VII. But his new appointment also brought a closer social tie between the treasuries of the chamber and house- David Grummitt. 1959). 9. The Household of Edward IV The Black Book and the Ordinance . the official in charge of running all aspects of the household. 15. Presuming that the relationship of the two office-holders reflects the relationship of the two departments. it was the official known as the Cofferer who managed the daily expenses of the major household departments. 3. Although the head of this department was nominally the Lord Steward. the king’s subjects were undoubtedly affected when several hundred hungry mouths descended suddenly upon a village. 13. If the Cofferer did not have enough cash in hand to redeem tallies. 415/1. Household of Edward IV. who had previously been serving as Lovell’s deputy. 12 . 12. 414/2. 14 Myers. Extant Cofferer’s accounts reveal that while the responsibilities of this official changed somewhat over the course of the reign.12 Because these officers were of high social rank. of 1478 (Manchester: Manchester University Press. demanding food and accommodation. 416/1. Large households placed considerable strain on surrounding areas and. 13 Public Record Office (PRO) E 101 413/5. the two main figures in its operation were the Treasurer. 7.ROYAL COURT IN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL 213 hold insofar as the new Treasurer of the Chamber was John Heron. 9. and were often physically absent from the household. so that they might be redeemed by the various merchants and suppliers in the localities. It was financial constraint that limited the size of the royal household during the late middle ages. then local merchants and innkeepers would not be repaid. the smooth running of the royal household depended upon a regular supply of coin into the hands of the Cofferer. The traditional role of the treasury of the household. Myers. while house-to-house purveyance was a thing of the past. or counting house as it was sometimes called. the sergeants of the various departments were also supposed to deposit their tallies with the Cofferer. R. 144-7.13 According to the Black Book.14 For this reason. 13. 167. was to regulate the expenditure of the royal household. 6. 8. it would appear that the treasury of the chamber was working to facilitate the expenditure of the treasury of the household. he continued to disburse money to the purveyors of the major household departments for diet and supplies throughout the reign. Further A. 5. 12. who looked after all monetary assignments to the household and the Controller who kept a counter roll of expenses. to their great impoverishing. according to the Commons.”18 It had long been the expectation that English kings should “live of their own. Household of Edward IV. 63-75. seemingly its objective was not to underwrite the costs of expansion or enhancement. 18 J. 1767).500 to help to defray household expenses. cautioning that “the kyng wull haue his goodes dispended but not wasted.. 74. 17 Myers.15 The poor management of the treasury of the household during the reign of Henry VI (1422-1461). violence or theft. provoked a reaction from Parliament. 87. and in 1454.19 Upon his accession in 1461 Edward IV began to channel his private revenues into the treasury of the chamber in order to meet costs and tackle the debt of the royal household. 282-3. 6: 299. went unpaid and were forced to obtain food and lodging by whatever means necessary—bad credit. Parliament authorized an increase in the annual subsidy paid to the royal household. the Black Book attempted to limit the membership of the royal household. had encouraged the promulgations of an ordinance that attempted to limit its size. Although there is evidence of expansion by the end of his reign. which by 1449 were estimated at £24. Rotuli Parliamentorum. 20 David Loades. The treasury’s inability to meet household running costs.”17 In 1485.16 Although financial recovery was seen during the reign of Edward IV. as the crown faced civil war. Henry VI. Henry VI (New Haven: Yale University Press. who received wages in lieu of diet. 19 Wolffe. By the reign of Henry VI. .20 But his efforts were designed to get household finance on solid footing rather than to expand his household and Edward IV’s initial measure was to reduce household size.” meaning that they should finance their households with the profits of the lands that they had controlled as individuals. both the Black Book and Ordinance 15 Bertram Wolffe. but rather to alleviate the burden placed on the king’s subjects who had. 1986). eds. ut et Petitiones et Placita in Parliamento (London: s.. Strachey et al.. Household of Edward IV. the king was granted a meager allowance of £5. 301.000 per annum.214 SUSANNAH HUMBLE FERREIRA social unrest resulted if household servants. The Tudor Court (London: Batsford. it was realized that this expectation was unrealistic. “been grievously charged with continual taking of their goods and chattels for the expenses of his most honourable household whereof they have not been sufficiently contented nay paid.n. 16 Myers. 2001). 24 A description of the lands comprising the Duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster is provided by Colvin. Household of Edward IV. 22 21 .24 The matter might appear to be academic. 230. 12-3. Rotuli Parliamentorum.ROYAL COURT IN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL 215 of 1478 were preoccupied with economy. the income that had traditionally financed the royal household.000 and augmented this sum by £2.21 And in 1482. 23 Rotuli Parliamentorum. and was thus processed through the national treasury of the exchequer. Edward IV had been able to put his private revenues toward household expenditure and freely channeled these receipts through the Treasury of the Chamber. As heir to the Duke of York. he did not possess enough private property to help him meet the running costs of the government. Richard III was entitled to do the same with the lands he controlled as the Duke of Gloucester. but formed part of the patrimony of the crown. Thus they could only be made available to the king through Parliamentary assignment. 6: 299. However the bulk of the landed revenues available to Henry VII had been acquired through formal Acts of Attainder in Parliament. including revenues from the vast duchies of Cornwall and the Lancaster. Parliament increased the subsidy from £11. 6: 198-202. when Parliament agreed to raise the annual exchequer assignment to the treasury of the household to £11. The household assignment Myers. but the implicit differences between public and private wealth appeared to have had an effect on the way revenues were controlled. History of the King’s Works.000 to £14.000. it still fell short of the household running costs which the Black Book had estimated to be £14. Henry VII had an added disadvantage—unlike his Yorkist predecessors. Thus in 1485.000 appears to be a tacit acknowledgment of the differences between a king’s public and private wealth. 1: 470-6. Myers.000. By 1485.22 By the accession of Henry VII to the throne in 1485 it is clear that the crown was in financial trouble again.23 This increase of more than £5. The expansion of the household undertaken by Richard III was not accompanied by administrative changes that would sustain a larger household over the long term. Household of Edward IV.100 to pay for supplies in the royal wardrobe. if such changes had been on the horizon. then this king did not remain on the throne long enough to put them into play. was no longer controlled by the king as a private landholder. y Wes- . 21480.000 per annum stipulated by Parliament. the king could collect the equivalent amount of money from other sources of public revenue.30 Toward the end of the reign. Only knights and esquires of the body received their wages from the Treasury of the Chamber. 31 PRO E 101/413/4. from the Treasury of the Household. E101/414/9: E101/414/13. 1914-1916). A fragment of a document outlining household accounting procedure reveals that before 1493 the wages of most household servants: including sewers. 6: 433. 30 BL Add. E101/415/12. E101/413/7. messengers. carvers and cupbearers were paid directly from the exchequer. Thus. At this time other honorary servants such as sergeants-at-arms. E101/414/5. this document appears to predate the death of Thomas West who died in 1493. ushers. Given his inclusion as one of the members of the household. 1: 421. Accompanying such double dipping was a change in the way in which various expenses of the royal household were being paid for.31 Although this fact seems to suggest that the expenses of the treasury of the household did not increase. grooms. E101/416/1. the various accounts belonging to the Treasury of the Household reveal that the bulk of expenditure went towards diets while the Treasury of the Chamber came to underwrite other costs. by the end of the reign it is evident that nearly all servants received their wages from the Treasury of the Chamber.29 Yet according to the extant accounts of the Treasurer of the Chamber. pages and even servants of the chamber were paid by the Cofferer. John Heron. E101/413/5. the Coffer’s accounts mask a number Rotuli Parliamentorum. E101/413/12. such as the building expenses and entertainment.28 The substitution clause of 1489. such as customs revenues or tunnage and poundage. E101/414/2. E101/415/6.ROYAL COURT IN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL 217 1495. PRO E 101/416/11. E101/415/9. See Calendar of Patent Rolls (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. although the assignment from the exchequer might have appeared to have been reduced from 1489 onward. waiters. in actuality Henry VII was collecting on some of this income twice. The sum of money that the treasury of the household received from the Exchequer does not appear to have increased over the course of the reign. 29 28 . the amount received per annum was consistent with the £13. ensured that despite the fact that the revenues from these lands were actually going through the chamber. . . At the turn of the sixteenth century. Although the kingdom did not suffer the same damaging effects of a long-term dynastic struggle akin to the Wars of the Roses. once a department that handled the majority of crown expenses. Portugal presents itself as an interesting comparison to England. . The treasury of the household. whereas the treasury of the chamber received profits from crown lands. Moreover.000 in assignments from the exchequer and £12.000 from the chamber to meet the cost of tallies. Thus. 1955).000 per year after 1499: £13.000 per month was being used by Cope to redeem tallies brought to him by local merchants and suppliers and that Cope was personally liable for any of this money not accounted for.220 SUSANNAH HUMBLE FERREIRA Chamber to the Treasury of the Household. but to expand the size of his household.000 was to be granted to the Cofferer each month and “provided that if there are tallies that cannot be met” he would receive “allowances for the same. a devastating war with Castile (14751479) wreaked havoc on royal finances.”34 Thus it appears that £1. surplus cash from both departments came to be stored in the crown coffers in the Tower of London. the terms of this financial arrangement are laid out in a Close Letter of 1499 stating that £1. The diversity of payments listed in the accounts of the treasury of the chamber gives a false impression that the financial departments in operation during the reign were crude in their administration. And as Grummitt has shown. The exchequer of receipt channeled public monies such as customs revenues and tunnage and poundage. Afonso V (14331481) had granted lands and annuities at an unprecedented rate 34 Calendar of Close Rolls (London: Public Record Office. And it was the regular and reliable supply of money into this department that not only allowed Henry VII to achieve solvency and quell the complaints of the Commons. in effect the treasury of the household was receiving a total in excess of £25. 1: 322. The fact that Cope continued to receive this assignment until at least 1505 suggests that the Chamber assignment became an enduring arrangement. was streamlined into the department that merely financed the diet and supplies of the expanding royal household. However administrative changes undertaken during the reign of Henry VII offered treasury officials greater flexibility and reflect a marked effort to organize finances in such a way as to increase the flow of cash into the hands of the Cofferer. Couched in the terminology of an indenture. But until the turn of the sixteenth century the ability of the crown to fund the royal household from these revenues was limited. Manuel. ed. Ensaios II. immediate profits belonged to the Duchy of Viseu and were exempt from crown taxation. although the development of sugar plantations in the Atlantic islands contributed to metropolitan wealth and trade. Furthermore.ROYAL COURT IN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL 221 over the course of his long reign that further impoverished the crown.37 The complaints of these representatives reflected the frustrations of a populace burdened by crown debt and it is evident from the cartas das quitações that even as late 35 Vitorino Magalhães Godinho. Cortes de 1498 (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos. but only if the crown exercised restraint.35 Until the turn of the sixteenth century. was to play an important role in stimulating trade—the effects were not seen until the end of the reign. 363. 37 João José Alves Dias. Although his successor. representatives demanded that the king exercise moderation in household expenditure and in 1472-1473 it was explicitly requested that Afonso V reduce the size of the royal household.. 1978). 1990). his success was limited. 179.36 Representative assemblies expressed a willingness to provide for the royal household. 384. While the successive conquests of the North African captaincies might have been lucrative from the perspective of individual nobles. . begun in 1482. While the Portuguese crown was able to maintain the royal household on a system of credit. Cortes portuguesas: Reinado de D. 36 Armindo da Sousa. João II (1481-1495) worked hard to place the crown on surer financial footing. the Cortes entreated the king to keep a moderate household. the kings of Portugal were to enjoy additional income from the profits of the overseas expansion. 2002). As Cortes medievais portuguesas. the crown remained plagued by financial shortfall that placed limitations on the size of the royal household. 55. 1385-1490 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional. And although the construction of the important trading fort of São Jorge da Mina. Unlike the English crown. the defense of such places as Ceuta and Tangier drained crown resources. its repeated failure to meet costs outraged the Cortes. Even as late as 1498. Sobre história de Portugal (Lisbon: Sá da Costa. Lands confiscated from those nobles implicated in the conspiracies of 1483 and 1484 were soon granted out again and after 1489 the crown lost the valuable revenues from the Duchy of Viseu. In the session of 1459. . on the other hand. Exempt from this tax were gold. The efforts of the Manueline administration to reform local practices of revenue collection in the early years of the reign can therefore be seen as a conscious attempt by the king to increase his ability to finance the royal household. silver. 42 . but it can be surmised that war in the 1470s and the purges of the nobility that took place in the 1480s brought an added confusion to the networks of crown administration operating in the localities. colored cloth and imported textiles. rules and rates changed during successive reigns in the fifteenth century. João I and D. then interruptions in their collection would have had a direct impact on its operation. Para a história das Alfândegas em Portugal no início do século XVI (Lisbon: Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Manuel I inherited a kingdom rife with political faction. meat. cereals. Dicionário de história de Portugal (Lisbon: Iniciativas Editoriais. Very few exemptions were granted on the sisa. Given the volume of trade coming through Portuguese ports in the fifteenth century. 43 Once rated as a tenth of the balance of trade. his good luck has masked the concerted efforts put forth by his administration to instigate reform and increase revenues from domestic sources.43 The stumbling block was that the system of collection and delivery to the central coffers of the Casa dos Contos was inefficient.ROYAL COURT IN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL 223 nues was derived from the customary taxes of the sisa and the dizima.. It is often assumed that social and economic change occurring in Portugal in the early sixteenth century was attributable to the windfall of the Indian Ocean spice trade. Like Henry VII. See “Dizimas. Few records are left that can testify to the effect which the conflicts and confiscations had on revenue collection at a local level. 22-6. Afonso V to combat abuse. was levied on any merchant activity or sales and was most often paid at trade fairs on wine. horses and arms. and nobility and even royalty were obliged to pay this tax.42 The dizima. the yields from this tax should have been lucrative. 1979). 1983). The sisa. ed.” in Joel Serrão. Amendments to the dizimas were made during the reigns of D. which formed nearly three quarters of crown revenues in the fifteenth century. baked bread. was levied on all imports by sea and on goods coming through dry ports. If the profits of the sisa and the dizima were the main sources of cash feeding the coffers of the household. João Cordeiro Pereira. While extraordinary riches were indeed dumped in the lap of Manuel I (whose unabashed epithet was “the Fortunate”). 2: 326. While the reforms undertaken over the course of the reign might seem to demonstrate an altruistic interest in good government and civil harmony. ed.44 While much of this land was granted away in the decades to come. first published in 1514 but reissued in 1521. in 1516 the king and his ministers oversaw the reform of the financial administration of the entire kingdom. Also. Notable among these reforms were the Ordenações Manuelinas. (Lisbon: Editorial Presença. 45 João José Alves Dias. In 1496 the king sent a commission led by his chancellor Dr. Similar to the practice of Henry VII. the self-interest of the crown. to examine local charters in order to assess obligations of taxation and to perform a local survey establishing the lands held in feudal tenure. Portugal do Renascimento à Crise Dinástica. a number of reforms were put into effect. these added revenues gave him an initial cash injection as well as the ability to buy the support of various sections of the political elite at the time when he first took the throne. Manuel I was a much wealthier king. In addition. the reign witnessed the standardization of weights and measures and also the reissue of town charters. even before his proverbial ships came in. many of which had a perceptible impact on revenue collection. It remains that the administrative re- 44 Damião de Góis. Manuel I authorized commissions to investigate the condition of the administrative machinery. 1: 24. These enquiries would have provided information about the effectiveness of local administrative officials as well as up to date information about the rents and taxes owed by towns and independent landholders. Ostensibly they provided the background information that prompted the program of administrative reform enacted later in the reign. As heir to the Duchy of Viseu. they undoubtedly reflect.224 SUSANNAH HUMBLE FERREIRA Compared to his predecessor João II. 1949). 1998). obligations and procedures to be followed by crown agents and officials. Crónica de D. Both of these latter reforms would have had direct repercussions on revenue collection because they controlled prices and established concrete guidelines enabling crown agents to better enforce the payment of the sisa.45 During the reign. Manuel (Coimbra: University da Coimbra. Manuel I was able to draw upon lands and income worth more than twenty-eight million réis. . Rui Boto. They clearly articulated the duties. to a significant degree. known as the fazenda. 714. 47 Virginia Rau.000) to nearly a hundred million réis (£54.500 rs. what the crown was attempting to do was to speed up the process by which money made its way to the central coffers.) in 1496. the Contadores would have been summoned to Lisbon in order to render their accounts to the central authorities. Virginia Rau has argued that the Portuguese crown increased the efficiency of revenue connection by separating the departments of collection and audit. as mentioned. while the officials known as Almoxarifes.000). Every two years. . See “Finanças públicas e estrutura do estado. 3: 32-3. were responsible for conducting the audits. headed by the Vedores da Fazenda. or Receivers.700 rs.ROYAL COURT IN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL 225 forms put into effect had a perceived effect on domestic revenue.) in 1504. who had once performed these duties.). the Almoxarifes continued to administer and collect the sisa which. 1951). every other January. One of the provisions of the fazenda reforms was the regulation of the tax schedule so that both taxpayers and officials could thus anticipate the process of collection and get their accounts in order.” in Serrão.) in 1510. Contadores. A Casa dos Contos (Coimbra: Faculdade de Letras.000 rs. of the sisa could channel the profits to the central administration on a more regular basis. rising from sixty-six million réis (£38. the sisa could be assessed. where revenues went from £27 (47. who were burdened with the more cumbersome task of rent collection would be given more time to complete their duties. Thus. to £31 (54. Dicionário. remained one of the main sources of crown revenue. officials called Contadores were entrusted with the task of collecting rents and chasing down withheld payments. officials designated as Recebedores. Thus under the new system. But.46 It is important to recognize that the reforms of the fazenda were not enacted merely to impose an academic sense of order upon the network of financial administration.47 It appears that rather than legislating a strict division between officials of audit and collection. as Rau notes herself. Taken at the point of sale.000 rs. leveling out between 1516 and 1521 at £245 (430. collected and processed much more quickly than annual rents. evidenced by the claims of Vitorino Magalhães Godinho that crown revenues increased by fifty per cent between 1506 and 1518. Contadores collected money owed to the crown and conveyed the 46 The increase in revenues from the individual almoxarifados can be exemplified by Guarda. 62-7. to £65 (113. Casa dos Contos. the Algarve.48 By relieving the Almoxarife from the responsibility of collecting rents and by remitting the revenues from this source separately. . The changes undertaken at the level of the royal household were aimed at making the financial administration more flexible in order to channel the increased revenues directly into the hands of the Escrivão da Camara. the formal structure of the financial administration was altered in order to reflect the fact that the royal household was now drawing its income freely from the profits of the kingdom. Viseu and Guarda. Guimarães and Tôrre de 27. Since the household does not appear to have generated any significant source of revenue. Casa dos Contos. in 1504. accommodation for the king and his dependents was managed by local counting houses called aposentadorias. and the Contadores would then assemble their reports to present to the Vedores da Fazenda and their deputies in the late spring and summer. which 48 Rau. 1 June: Évora. 62-7. 49 Rau. Apart from reorganizing the financial administration of the kingdom. Porto. to act as a liaison between the national treasury known as the Casa dos Contos and the Escrivão da Camara. Santarém. it can be assumed that the primary purpose of this official was to communicate the financial needs of the royal household to the Casa dos Contos and to ensure that the necessary sums of money were brought into the coffers of the household. Balances were then to be settled by the middle of February. On On 1 July: contadores of Moncorvo. the new department was an amalgamation of the two and was called the Contos da Casa e Reino. Alenquer and Setúbal. Coimbra. and because the process of audit was undertaken by the Vedores da Fazenda. Beja. the crown greatly increased the efficiency of the system of revenue collection. At the turn of the sixteenth century. the king appointed a new official. Whereas beforehand the department that had regulated the expenses of the royal household had been termed the Contos do Rei and was separate from the Casa dos Contos. On 1 May: Contador Mor. Thus. known as the Provedor.49 The impact of this reorganization on the financial footing of the royal household becomes immediately apparent when one examines the way that the issue of lodging was handled.226 SUSANNAH HUMBLE FERREIRA amounts to the Almoxarife. changes to the system of household finance also increased the ability of the crown to access money in order to pay for the royal household. A decade later. Leiria. The failure of previous kings to meet these payments and the tendency of members of the court to abuse their privileges had roused an endless number of complaints in the Cortes. which had been filled at least until 1497. 44v. crown revenue agents came partially under the authority of the aposentadorias. 57. the position of Aposentador Mor. 23. seems to have been rendered obsolete and is not mentioned in the Ordenações Manuelinas. fol. 51 50 . the departments of the aposentadorias of the three cities—Santarém. Estremadura. AN/TT. liv. fol. liv. liv. this income contributed a sizeable forty million réis or £23. 128v. the road to financial recovery in the earlier part of the reign lay in its ability to access the increased revenues coming in from the almoxarifados. In 1506. João III. 12v.51 What these changes implied is that revenues. At the same time. But it cannot be denied that the great injection of wealth brought into the hands of the Portuguese crown from the profits of the emergent spice trade was to have a major impact on the development of the royal court. Chancelarias D. around the time when the gold trade had reached its peak. 17. 12. This official was responsible for ascertaining the numbers of people at court who were entitled to lodging through the royal household. came under the direct control of one of the Vedores da Fazenda. Lisbon and Évora—where the court was most frequently in residence. liv. liv. 7. fol.000 to crown revenues and profits from the spice trade were about the same—forty-four million réis or £25.ROYAL COURT IN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL 227 were supervised by a crown official known as the Aposentador Mor.50 Instead. the AN/TT. Leitura Nova. however. Manuel. and then worked with the local aposentadorias to requisition the appropriate number of beds. Chancelarias D. Santarém and Évora to rapidly pay off the debts that they had been accruing since 1477. Manuel. This shift undoubtedly allowed the aposentadorias of Lisbon.000. the crown was obliged to remunerate both innkeepers and private citizens for the lodging and food provided. 52 AN/TT. By 1513. Twelve years later. could be used to directly pay for the debts incurred by the aposentadorias. fol. fol. such as those derived from the sisa. 2. Although the king’s subjects were required by law to provide housing for the members of the court when it was in residence in their village or town. Chancelarias D.52 For the royal household. that were collected in these areas. 42.. 54 The royal court thus began to siphon off the wealth generated through overseas trade and diverted it in order to finance the royal household. 61. It can be no coincidence that the Casa da Índia e Guiné came to be located in the Ribeira Palace complex. more than half of these revenues derived from overseas sources and the majority came from the pepper trade. 1988). more than forty per cent of the money being taken to pay the living allowances of the fidalgos resident at court came from the kingdom. this opulent edifice on the main commercial square of the River Tagus replaced the castle of São Jorge as the residence of the royal court when it was housed in Lisbon.000.” 3: 33.228 SUSANNAH HUMBLE FERREIRA amount of revenue generated by the spice trade was close to one hundred million réis or £55. the amount being received from customs was about “Finanças públicas. money from the Casa da Índia e Guiné was more readily usable. Despite the fact that increased revenues were coming in from domestic sources.53 The vast quantities of cash. most of which comprised profits from sugar from Madeira. the crown established the joint Casa da Índia e Guiné in order to manage the profits from both the spice trade and gold trade. About twenty per cent of the income derived from customs subsidies while another twenty per cent came from foreign trade. In 1501. In 1498. spices and other moveable goods that tumbled into the harbour warehouses in the port of Lisbon presented a golden opportunity for the cash-strapped Portuguese royal household. If one examines the changes in the money used to pay the stipends or moradias of the kings dependents. Money from the almoxarifados and rents consisted of about only twenty per cent of the money received by the fazenda. Descrição da Cidade de Lisboa (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte. 54 53 . If the royal household had once suffered because of a dearth of cash or saleable goods. then the monetary surplus allowed household officials to redeem tallies and pay for necessary provisions from this department. either as receipts from the almoxarifados or other revenues associated with regular taxation. Just over ten years later. Begun in 1505. (later the Casa da Índia) becomes obvious. Damião de Góis. the relationship between the court and the Casa da Índia e Guiné. which had been part of the patrimony of the Duchy of Viseu that Manuel I was able to bring with him to the throne. ROYAL COURT IN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL 229 . . Developments in the financial administration of Portugal suggest that Manuel I had a similar priority of providing adequate and regular funding for the royal household. the construction of the Ribeira Palace. Even when Henry VII began to divert revenues from crown land. after 1499. But it was not enough for the king to merely generate income—he had to make sure that the monetary surplus was channeled directly into the central coffers.000 was guaranteed to the king by way of exchequer assignment which was ostensibly to be comprised of customs revenues and other public money coming from landed estates confiscated through acts of attainder. the financial departments of the kingdom were reorganized so that the Treasury of the Household paid only for the diet and supplies of the household—which required a steady influx of cash. The Manueline Reforms of 1516 allowed the Almoxarifes to streamline their process of revenue collection and to rapidly funnel the profits of the sisa into the central coffers.000 per month.ROYAL COURT IN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL 231 In general. The creation of the office of Provedor in 1504 allowed money to be carried freely between the counting house and the royal household and this link was formalized with the formation of the amalgamated department of the Contos da Casa e Reino. Finally. Even before the windfall of the India trade deluged the warehouses of Lisbon. the crown facilitated the financing of the royal household by making alterations in its personnel. The reform and standardization of urban charters or foros helped to regulate prices and thus normalize taxation. the Cofferer of the household received an additional £1. which jointly housed the king’s household and the Casa da . At least £13. and. substituting other revenues from the sources specified by Parliament. he continued to collect the full sum of the assignment. both public and private through the Treasury of the Chamber. Over the course of the reign. achieved during the reign. The replacement of the Aposentador Mor by one of the Vedores da Fazenda as the official in charge of organizing and paying for accommodation for the royal household epitomised the crown’s objective of properly funding the royal household and this move drastically reduced the red-tape involved in paying for lodgings. Henry VII increased revenues by ensuring that his receivers were both loyal and efficient and by exercising his prerogative in all cases where he stood to profit. in addition to the income received from the exchequer. also helped crown agents in this task. The standardization of weights and measures. nor were legal reforms and the standardization of weights and measures seen in both kingdoms for the benefit of the kings’ subjects alone and the self interest of the two monarchs is evident in the spoils raked in by their tax collectors. the monarchs of England and Portugal had faced great difficulty in paying the diets and wages of a household restricted in numbers— previous kings had difficulties achieving solvency. The ability of the kings to enlarge their households depended on their ability to channel money into the hands of the Treasurers of their household and many of the major reforms undertaken in these reigns were designed to do just this. Reforms affecting the financial administration in both England and Portugal at the turn of the sixteenth century were precipitated by the kings’ determination to expand the size of the royal household. This development may have been stimulated by a wish to keep up with expanding courts elsewhere in Europe as well as to extend and strengthen their political connections within their kingdoms.232 SUSANNAH HUMBLE FERREIRA Índia allowed the court to directly draw upon the revenue and saleable goods coming from India. let alone expansion. . The changes that rendered crown finance more efficient were not undertaken in a spirit of altruism. Yet in the century that preceded the reigns of Henry VII and Manuel I. ” Bulletin of the . R. M. “Le coût de la Guerre de Cent Ans en Angleterre. 3-13. Bridbury. Maddicott.” in Trade. R.1 The debate has since developed many strands. ed. McFarlane. “War. M. 1981). Harriss. Fisher. England in the Fifteenth Century: Collected Essays (London: Hambledon Press. L. 63-86. first published in Past and Present. McFarlane. Government. B. King. and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369 (Oxford: Clarendon Press. “The Hundred Years War: The English Navy: Shipping and Manpower. 2 A. B. and Social Change: England and the Hundred Years’ War. B. 1975). Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. M. 1. from A. W. see especially Edward Miller. W. 11-32. 1976). 27 (1964).” in War and Economic Development: Essays in Memory of David Joslin. For discussions of the impact of war taxation. 1st ser. 34-53. and see also. 49-62. and Economy in Pre-Industrial England: Essays Presented to F. See also a review of the debate in Philippe Contamine. J. 80-95.” Past and Present 22 (1962).” in Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. J. Sherborne. “War. 1294-1341 (Past and Present Supplement no. M.” in Essays on Medieval Agriculture. 1975). McFarlane a more positive assessment of the impact of the war on the English economy. with discussion on 13-18. and the English Economy in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries. J. 139-50. Sherborne. J. C. Oxford. “The Costs of the Hundred Years’ War. J. D. first published in Economic History Review. 163-75. “The Hundred Years’ War: Costs and Profits. AND CROWN PATRONAGE: THE IMPACT OF THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR ON THE PORT TOWNS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND Maryanne Kowaleski The debate on the economic costs and social consequences of the Hundred Years War has been part of most economic history syllabi since the 1960s when M.” Past and Present 37 (1967). Postan. M. Coleman and A. Parliament.2 Other scholars have focused on the costs and bene1 K. Bridbury’s argument that there was nothing special about the Hundred Years War in a society in which war was a constant factor. sociétés.WARFARE. R. “The Cost of English Warfare with France in the Later Fourteenth Century. the Economy. 12 (1942): 1-12. SHIPPING. John (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.” Annales: Économies. ed. 1973). M. 1975). Taxation. reprinted in K. H. The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown.. “Some Social Consequences of the Hundred Years’ War. no. G. civilisations 20 (1965): 788-91. Postan. Postan published a negative view and K. to conflicting analyses of the impact of rising war taxation. Sherborne. and the award of offices—to the aristocratic elite which led the war effort. . plunder. Ormrod. Norton.234 MARYANNE KOWALESKI fits—through ransom.” 64. A.” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial. H. Strayer. “A Business Partnership in War and Administration 1421-1445.4 This essay concentrates on an overlooked but crucial part of the debate by exploring how the Anglo-French conflicts affected the shipping available in British port towns. “The Domestic Response to the Hundred Years War.” in The Cambridge Urban History of Britain. 96-121. D. M. A. H. B. “The Investment of Sir John Fastolf’s Profits of War. ed. “The Fourteenth-Century French Raids on Hampshire and the Isle of Wight. 4 J. M. “The Crown and the English Economy. 5 See. 5th series.” in The Hundred Years War. Rodger. J. M.und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 88 (2001): 1-47. See also his “The ‘New Institutional Economics’ and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: The Textile Trades. Anne Curry and Michael Hughes (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer. ed. 121-43. 83-101. Udovitch (New Haven: Yale University Press. R. McFarlane. The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain 660-1649 (New York: W. 122-23. L. Herlihy. “Profit and Loss in the Hundred Years War: The Subcontracts of Sir John Strother. c. “Industrial Transformations in the North-West European Textile Trades. A. Campbell (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.” in The Medieval City. Ormrod. 91-116. Christopher Allmand. 1994). Miskimin.” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 58 (1985): 100-6. J.3 John Munro has made particularly valuable contributions to the debate by pointing out how the disruptive effects of warfare from the 1290s through 1340s contributed to an industrial transformation in the textile trades. The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. Warfare. Simon Walker.” Michael Hughes. Munro. ed. particularly during the fourteenth century. ed. K. 110-48. W. and Transaction Costs. C. Shipping and Manpower. 7 (1957): 91-116. 1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1988). 1983). N. 1374.5 no one has focused exclusively on port towns and few Institute of Historical Research 50 (1977): 135-50. coastal raids. Richmond. W. “English Navy. Kenneth Fowler (London: Macmillan. S. privateering. McFarlane. John Talbot and the War in France 1427-1453 (London: Humanities Press. 88-9.” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. 3 For example. “Port Towns: England and Wales 1300-1540. 269-92. M. and K. “War at Sea. Pollard. “The Costs and Profits of War: The Anglo-French Conflict of 1294-1303. 1971). Armies and Fortifications. 1991). Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War.” in Arms. Although historians have long noted the devastating impact on ports of naval impressments. 1300-c. 1290-1348. 1997). F. “Costs of the Hundred Years War. for example. Maryanne Kowaleski. ed. 149-83. A. B. 1340: Economic Progress or Economic Crisis?” in Before the Black Death. W. 1290-c.” English Historical Review 78 (1963): 290-316. 1977).” in Before the Black Death: Studies in the ‘Crisis’ of the Early Fourteenth Century. B. Postan.” in Arms. 68. and the disruption of maritime trade routes during the Hundred Years War. “Shipowners and Shipping in Medieval England. a view which has been promulgated by historians such as J.7 What I would like to suggest here. 1372-5. the value of ships probably outstripped all other forms of industrial investment in England during the middle ages. 7 Sherborne. AND CROWN PATRONAGE 235 have discussed shipping. SHIPPING. particularly in the western ports (those from Hampshire westwards. Palliser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. But the Cinque Ports were rarely able to fulfill this quota by the fourteenth century because of the silting of their ports and war-time interruptions of the maritime trade on which their D. who has argued—as part of the Past and Present debate between McFarlane and Postan—that coastal areas suffered from shouldering a greater proportion of the costs of war than inland regions. made the Crown increasingly open to their interests.WARFARE.” unpublished paper given at the 38th International Congress on Medieval Studies. “English Navy. One was to call on the Cinque Ports. “Ships and Mariners in Later Medieval England. moreover. MI. is that the picture is not as unrelievedly grim as naval and economic historians have claimed. around Devon.6 In focusing on shipping and port towns.” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 47 (1969): 17-29. patrol the coast.” Journal of British Studies 16 (1977): 1-17. they had three options. 6 Maryanne Kowaleski. 1: 469-70. Hewitt. 1966). and inclined to reward them with charters and other privileges. however. and up the coast to Cumbria). Shipping and Manpower. and Wales. 2000). Other historians who have emphasized the negative costs of the Hundred Years War to the maritime sector include: H. more likely to address their petitions. The entrepreneurial merchants. Kalamazoo. 473. The Organization of War Under Edward III 1338-62 (Manchester: Manchester University Press. and mariners of English port towns sometimes found ways to profit from the War. 2003. or engage the enemy at sea. and Timothy Runyan. although it represented the chief form of capital investment in port towns. as I have argued elsewhere. J. W.” see also his “The Battle of La Rochelle and the War at Sea. Sherborne. . M. a confederation of south-eastern port towns which owed 57 manned ships for two weeks of service a year in return for a number of privileges and tax exemptions. I want to query the uniformly negative view of the War’s impact on the maritime economy. Cornwall. Indeed. The essential contributions of the port towns to the war effort. When the English kings needed ships to transport troops and supplies. shipowners. forced to unload their goods before they reached their final destination.10 The third and most commonly used option was to impress mercantile shipping into naval service. “Ships and Mariners. showing their routes and work at each port. M. Runyan. For a similar sale to settle Edward III’s debts.9 These vessels. “The Keeping of the Seas during the Hundred Years War: 1422-1440. Safeguard. The Fourteenth Century 1307-1399 (Oxford: Clarendon Press. . 12 For example: McKisack. royal officials traveled from port town to port town to supervise their arrest. 9 Rodger. “The Naval Service of the Cinque Ports.8 A second option was for kings to build or purchase ships of their own. See also Rodger. 1935). 118. 244.12 Impressed ships could also be captured or destroyed and their crews held to ransom or killed. 11 Many of the accounts survive. Murray. In fact. May McKisack. an activity which became much more frequent and onerous for shipowners from the 1290s on. The Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports (Manchester: Manchester University Press. moreover. the superb fleet of some 40 ships that he had assembled was sold—on his order—to pay off his debts. Public Record Office [hereafter PRO] E101/40/21.236 MARYANNE KOWALESKI economies relied. 41/33. the king’s ships never represented more than 4 per cent of the fleets employed in the fourteenth-century naval campaigns. M. or with hurdles and gangways if they were to transport horses.” History 49 (1964): 285-7. for example. ed. 53/39. 1987). or diverted to another port to pick up goods or troops for a period of weeks or even months at a time. Timothy J. A. Fourteenth Century. were considered the kings’ personal property and could be sold or given away at any time. 1959). see Colin Richmond. Runyan (Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 118-25. although this alternative was rarely pursued because of its enormous cost. Hewitt. Organization. By the late 1340s the constant impressment of merchant vessels was provoking bitter complaints from port towns. The National Archives. N. Rodger. see Runyan. 206-16. for example.” English Historical Review 110 (1996): 636-51. 44-9. see.11 Ships could be impressed before their voyage was completed.” 9. Many of these cargo ships were cogs. To impress these merchant ships for naval duty. 77. E. “The Organization of Royal Fleets in Medieval England.” in Essays in Maritime History. 10 When Henry V died. Timothy J. who pointed out the unreasonable burdens that shipowners were expected to bear since they received no compensation for their ships when on naval service and also lost 8 K. Safeguard. 243. which had to be specially outfitted with sterncastles and topcastles for war-time service. 16 Town revenues 13 Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous [hereafter CIM].]. at considerable expense to the port towns. Ormrod. Ormrod.. R. (CD-ROM. “Ships and Mariners.” PROME. and an additional 54 in 1401..O.O.. 1937). See also Hewitt. 72. Rot.. III (London: H. Calendar of Patent Rolls [hereafter CPR] 1348-50 (London: H.M. Leicester: Scholarly Editions. 7 vols.13 The dissatisfaction port towns felt about these naval burdens was evident in the slowness with which many met the king’s orders for ships. ed. ordering six barges in 1354. Martin. “Parliament of February 1371. 2: 320. ed. items 133. (London. M. Organization. and by the mounting chorus of petitions from port towns and their residents regarding what they viewed as excessive and unfair burdens on their purse. n. Organization. 1783-1832). SHIPPING.. The barge provided by Southampton. Ormrod. Text and Translation. “Parliament of April 1376. item 50.15 The Crown was even able to shift the costs of purpose-built barges and balingers (oared vessels especially suited to war at sea because of their maneuverability) to port towns by instructing them to build ships for the navy on five different occasions from 1294 to 1401.WARFARE. 89. Shipping and Manpower. See also Sherborne. Calendar of Close Rolls [hereafter CCR] 1349-54 (London: H. 3: 66. for newly edited texts and translations... 2: 307. 1906). 16 In 1294 the Crown ordered 30 towns to provide a total of 20 large galleys or barges. for instance. that the cash-strapped Edward III increasingly resorted to this practice.. “Parliament of April 1379. “Parliament of November 1373. 2005) [hereafter PROME]. while London’s two barges cost the city over £580 in a five-month period. 128-34. cost the town £246. Parl. We know that at least eight of these vessels were constructed. they also acknowledge the Crown’s creative financing in transferring the costs of shipping. in outright disobedience by shipmasters who either ignored the ship call or left naval service prematurely to take on a commercial cargo. G.” Rodger. Although naval historians—many with the model of the modern navy foremost in their minds—have for years lamented the inefficiency and slow response time of the medieval naval system.” The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England. H. C. another 32 in 1377. vol.M. See below. AND CROWN PATRONAGE 237 out on the commercial freightage they could have earned. item 32. . 550-1. see W. W. 346. 345. crews.” PROME. and victualling to port towns.S.48. Rotuli Parliamentorum [hereafter Rot.M. 136. however.” (hereafter “Parliament of [ .. Parl. Hewitt. ed. Given-Wilson et al.14 From the Crown’s point of view. ed. item 29. the chief benefit of this reliance on mercantile shipping was its relatively low cost compared to what it would have to spend to build and maintain a permanent navy. at least 70 barges and balingers in 1373.S.” 164-66. Safeguard. This experiment was enough of a success.” PROME. 1905). 14 For example: CCR 1343-46. 448. 118-25. 83. no.M. ]).S. 77. “Navy.O. ed. 15 Runyan.. 14. used to bring back some 20. 17 Devon Record Office [hereafter D. 18 Kowaleski.” Mariners’ Mirror 35 (1949): 276-315.. 12941296.O. and Frederick Holbrooke (London. ed. for instance. Record Commission.” Mariners’ Mirror 14 (1928). in 6 [hereafter Foedera].000 tuns of wine a year to England in the first decade of the fourteenth century. Rodger. 3/ii. 238. 2 (1926): 142-96. Exeter City Archives. CCR 1399-1402. along with a smaller sum granted by the king from a tenth. but that amount fell to about 10. 473-5. War-time disruption of overseas trade routes was also costly. Foedera. 39. litterae. Veale (Oxford: Clarendon Press. The annual town accounts are in DRO. 19 Margery K.238 MARYANNE KOWALESKI were nowhere near enough to pay for these new ships. Enemy coastal raids became a particular danger during the Hundred Years War. the money came from a special rate assessed on the richer burgesses. In Exeter. . et cujuscumque generis acta publica inter reges Angliae . Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade. so port towns had to raise the money from their own citizens. Thomas Rymer. John Caley. 998-9. “English Galleys in 1295. 1971). 4th series. M. Exeter City Archives. for this and the following. targeting ports from Scarborough to Haverfordwest in Wales. C. Miscellaneous Roll 6..19 Shipowners also had to absorb the costs of armed convoy ships when they went to Gascony during J.16. The lucrative annual voyage to Bordeaux to fetch wine. 221. Adam Clarke. 220-41. in 1377. see above. a cost it only grudgingly met. 1816-69) 3 vols. A. Whitwell. for instance. port towns were forced to spend significant amounts to construct and maintain seaward defenses. the barge that Exeter built in 1374-75 cost over £200 at a time when the town revenues were in the neighborhood of only £100-£120 a year.” Archaeologia aeliana. comp. E.. R. Ian Friel. such as chains strung along harbor entrances. 17 [for the special rate] and mm.” Proceedings of the Dorset Natural History and Archaeological Society 108 (1986): 41-4. T.18 To counteract these threats. Nonetheless. 17a. n. And a few years later.].000 tuns a year by the end of the fourteenth century and even less by the mid-fifteenth century. ed. the town was ordered to provide yet another barge.17 The War also cost the port towns in other ways. For the financial difficulties faced by other towns ordered to build similar barges.1294.. Tinniswood. “Port Towns. J. 17. For barges that Exeter was ordered to build for the king. 10. “The Building of the Lyme Galley. and reinforced stone walls and towers. m. though Gascony was still in English hands. “English Galleys. “The ‘Newcastle’ Galley. 4: 28. James. Receiver’s Accounts. artillery fortifications. 107-16. conventiones. Safeguard. 1272-1377. 25-28 [for the building and repair accounts of the barge in 1374-75 and 1376-77]. Anderson.D.” 469.R. 41-3. see also CPR 1354-58. Hull. L.” Mariner’s Mirror 63 (1977): 138. Barbara Carpenter Turner. Maryanne Kowaleski. ed. Morgan and P. 1: 63. obviously enriched some merchants and shipowners. ed. 1983). “Piracy or Policy: The Crisis in the Channel. 37 (1959): 303-25.” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 49 (1976): 185-97. C. Maryanne Kowaleski. Page (London: Constable. 29 (1979): 63-77. no. J. and Scarborough which served as supply points during the Scottish wars. B. W. see M. the costs of ‘wafting’: protective convoys for the Yarmouth fishing fleets.” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. therefore.” International Journal of Maritime History. 1992). 1414.WARFARE. 15:2 (2003): 196-7.” in The New Maritime History of Devon. considers how the kings’ wars could also promote economic development and political empowerment. 5: 360-8. C.” in Collected Essays on Southampton. M. 269. 1912). “Southampton as a Naval Centre. 92-3.21 The picture painted here reflects the traditional. SHIPPING. 1926). 148-9. (London: Conway Press. . but I do not believe it tells the whole story. Ford. “Flanders and the Hundred Years War: The Quest for the Trêve Marchande. for example. 23 For this and the following. AND CROWN PATRONAGE 239 wartime. 22 Rosemary Horrox. H.” Archaeologia Aeliana. “Maritime History. accepted view of the impact of warfare on late medieval shipping and the port towns’ economies. Studies in the Wine Trade. 38. J. 1958). ed. “Keeping of the Seas. “The Medieval Ports and Trade of North-East Yorkshire. “The Port Towns of Fourteenth-Century Devon. War profiteering. 21 Richmond.” in The Victoria History of the County of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight.” in The Victoria History of the County of Kent. 1400-1403. by the fifteenth century. 25-6. The Black Prince’s Expedition of 1355-1357 (Manchester: Manchester University Press. “The Life and Death of John of Denton. 125-33. Duffy et al. 9-27. Page (London: Constable.22 Other ports prospered when they served as embarkation ports for naval fleets. Hewitt. Carr Laughton.1458. 36-8. I accept this picture too. Oppenheim. G. 1961). and. Fraser. Some of these opportunities have been acknowledged by scholars.” Stephen P. The remainder of the essay. ed. 4th series. 2: 247. “Maritime History. particularly those in northern ports such as Newcastle. M. The De La Poles of Hull (East Yorkshire Local History Society Series. W. Pistono. “The Commercialization of the Sea Fisheries in Medieval England and Wales. as when 25 English ships returning from Brittany with cargoes of salt were attacked and either captured or burnt by a Spanish fleet.20 Piracy and privateering also took their toll during the tumultuous war years. while Plymouth benefited from the more frequent expeditions to Brittany and Gascony. Bryan Waites. 5th series. especially when ships and their crews were forced to wait weeks until favorable winds or sufficient supplies arrived. J. The capture of Calais increased traffic through Sandwich.23 South20 James. Pederdy (Southampton: Southampton County Borough Council. 1002. 539-40. 566.. 1341. Ormrod. 1150. Their ability to articulate maritime needs also prompted in 1347 the first grant of tonnage and poundage. M. 1344. 1369. Indeed. W. 2 vols. are some of the other ways that the Hundred Years War altered the profile of port towns on the national stage. stimulated more recognition and appreciation of the contributions that shipowners. “Edward III: Parliament of January 1340. 469-70.. as well as passage of a tax to provide for the safety of the sea. 1422-1427 (Navy Records Society. shipmasters. 1374 and 1376—as many as forty to fifty ports were ordered to each send one to four experienced mariners or men knowledgeable about shipping to advise the King’s Council at Westminster on nautical matters.24 What has not been fully recognized.. 1342.” PROME. ed. for example. 3/ii.240 MARYANNE KOWALESKI ampton and Portsmouth became major naval bases. 24 Ian Friel. however. 11. 880-1. ed. 152. Foedera. 1826). 1995). The Navy of the Lancastrian Kings: Accounts and Inventories of William Soper. Ormrod. 1982). 25 CCR 1323-27. 1347. “Parliament of January 1340. in addition to channeling business to the merchants and shopkeepers who furnished naval supplies and victuals. items 5. 95. Parl. and mariners could make to strategic planning. going so far as to summon them to the so-called “Councils of Shipping” and “Naval Parliaments” in the mid and late fourteenth century. and their presence is reflected in agreements during the Parliament of 1340 to provide shipping to combat the French threat. A History of the Royal Navy.27 These specific calls to 39-47. (London: Richard Bentley. 108. 3/i. Introduction. homes to extensive shipbuilding enterprises for the royal fleet. 82-3. The shipbuilding that the king ordered so many ports to undertake also provided employment and training for a body of skilled shipwrights. Susan Rose. 27 Report on the Dignity of a Peer of the Realm (London. 26 Rot. See also Nicholas Harris Nicolas. 4. Shipbuilding and Technology in England 1200-1520 (London: British Museum Press.26 And on eight other occasions in the middle decades of the fourteenth century—in 1336. 39-67. v. 2: 74. 12. 526. 123. In 1326 the king’s admirals were ordered to bring two men from each port who were well informed about shipping to London to advise the king and his Council. 527. 1193. The kings’ growing reliance on shipping to carry out their territorial ambitions. 2: 107. Keeper of the King’s Ships. 124-5. 4: Appendix. 2/ii. customs duties levied to help . Part II. The Good Ship: Ships. 105-6. 1847). Safeguard. the Crown increasingly went out of its way to consult these shipping experts. and Rodger.” PROME.25 In 1339 shipmasters and mariners were issued writs to appear in Parliament. ” PROME. 1972). item 31. CCR 1296-1302. item 27. for instance. Ms. Chris Given-Wilson. “Parliament of October 1416. E101/48/15.” Handelingen der Maatschappij voor geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent. a sum closer to commercial freightage.. In 1301. AND CROWN PATRONAGE 241 include shipping experts in political deliberations at such a high level deserve more attention. Bryce Lyon. and in 1380 shipowners were finally granted regular compensation for the impressments of their ships. not least because of the influence they must have exerted in the flood of parliamentary petitions and decisions concerning shipping and the navy during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. fols. eds. 7966a.s. n. 212. The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell: 12 July to 27 May 1340 (Brussels: Palais des Académies. “Parliament of January 1380. In 1358. The growing political clout of the shipping industry is evident in the Crown’s more positive responses to shipowners’ grievances from the mid-fourteenth century on. PRO.. Rot.19.29 By at least 1338.WARFARE. 102-3. GivenWilson.28 Called “ton-tight”. See also Michael Prestwich. 130-31. Add.. 145. moreover. shipowners were receiving 1s a ton per month. An allowance for wear and tear on the masts of ships pressed into naval service was made available in 1378.” PROME. the rate for those joining the Gascon expedition was . item 47. it had been given to shipowners on an ad hoc basis from at least the late thirteenth century. the shipowner (who would have received the ton-tight payment) is also noted. in many cases. By the 1480s. 104. 3: 86. shipowners negotiated for a rate of 7s per ton. item 28. ed. “Parliament of March 1416. “The Infrastructure and Purpose of an English Medieval Fleet in the First Phase of the Hundred Years War (1338-1340). ton-tight was back to 3s 4d per ton for every three months of service by the reign of Henry V. knights and men-at-arms going overseas for wartime service had to pay shipowners to transport their horses.” PROME. Given-Wilson. War. Mary Lyon. from the late fourteenth century on. 30 Bryce Lyon.. 125. of recording the tonnage of each ship impressed for service.. 51 (1997): 73 n. The allowance fell to 2s per ton when the grant was renewed in 1385. Although 1380 was the first time that ton-tight was made a regular payment.30 Further concespay for the ships involved in the siege of Calais that year.. passim. ed. New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield. this compensation was paid at the rate of 3s 4d per ton for each three-month period of service. but it rose again in subsequent years and some form of monetary payment to shipowners became a regular feature of most naval impressments from this time forward. at the rate of 6s 8d per horse. Safeguard. “Parliament of October 1385. Given. Lucas.” PROME. 1983). British Library. 29 For example. 4: 79. see Rodger. Henry S. ed.Wilson.. Parl. 482-83. Parl. The regularity of ton-tight payments is also evident in the practice. Politics and Finance under Edward I (Totowa. SHIPPING. ed. 28 Rot. “Parliament of November 1380. R.” PROME.” PROME.. the latter petition prompted the king to sanction a procedure to deal with captured ships... GivenWilson. “Parliament of January 1489.” PROME. 120. the petitioners stated. 534-5. item 39. item 11. Organization.” PROME.. Marsden. 94. “Parliament of November 1390. ed. Given-Wilson. 3: 444. Foedera.” PROME. Horrox. is particularly noteworthy. idem. 3: 120. item 18.” PROME.” PROME. 5: 504. Curry. item 152. Ormrod.” PROME. item 73.32 These petitions not only prompted statute legislation. 26. ed..” PROME. A. 32 For this and the following. ed.” PROME.242 MARYANNE KOWALESKI sions included more substantial reimbursement for the war-time loss of impressed ships (although this did not always happen).31 Starting in 1381 there was also a big push to restrict the transport of English-owned imports and exports to English ships because the increased business. 278. item 35. shipmasters also appear as a noble (6s 8d) for two horses. Statutes of the Realm. and exempting ships from being forfeited as deodand when a mariner fell out and drowned. Given-Wilson. “Parliament of May 1413. item 107. item 50. G.. 34 Rot. eds.. 89. “Parliament of January 1442. Luders et al. 31 Hewitt. 4: 12. Ormrod.” 11-3. and explicit instructions reserving a portion of plunder taken at sea to shipowners. 492.. Given-Wilson. “Parliament of January 1377. 1810-28).” English Historical Review 24 (1909): 675-97. ed. “Parliament of November 1391. but also increased in scope as they continued into the reign of Henry VII. Parl. Given-Wilson. ed. item 153. item 133. would strengthen the merchant fleet on which the king relied for naval service.. 444. “Parliament of October 1435. 2: 345-6. The shipowners’ lobby was also probably behind parliamentary legislation forbidding confiscation of a ship when it carried uncustomed merchandise. “Parliament of April 1463. II. “Ships and Mariners. “Parliament of November 1381. R.. ed. see Rot. ed. “Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England. 11 vols. ed. items 18. Given-Wilson. ed. Parl..” PROME. item. “Parliament of October 1399.34 Lower down the social ladder.” PROME.. (London: Record Commission.. 412. 296. ed. item 33. Given-Wilson. item 107. Anne Curry. ed. 26. 372-3. 55. “Parliament of November 1439. which met with some initial success. ed. E. 52. 29.” PROME.. “Parliament of October 1399. see Rot. Horrox. 52-3. 3/i..” PROME. 33 The continual stream of petitions to outlaw deodand.. Curry..33 Other parliamentary petitions put forward by shipowners included release from responsibility for the misdeeds of their mariners (which could result in the forfeiture of the ship) and continual complaints about the misuse of safe-conducts by foreign shippers. 5: 27. Runyan. “Parliament of April 1376. “Parliament of November 1381. items 44. ed. 6: 437. . Parl.. note. ed..” PROME. “Parliament of November 1373. although the king would not promise to compensate them for all the ship’s equipment that might be damaged during naval service. 48/15. PRO. no.” PROME. 1296-1302. Safeguard. D. 37 (Florence: Le Monnier. Rot. CPR 1288-96. 2:. item 52. Richezza dal mare. including bonuses (called ‘regards’) of 6d per week which was added to their regular pay of 3d per day.” PROME. Ormrod. 19 Edward I-Henry VIII. Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi et in domo Capitulari Wesmonasteriensi asservati. 2: 287..37 The costs of strengthening seaward defenses were defrayed by murage grants. “Parliament of October 1378. port towns were also specifically exempted from subsidies and other taxes. Martin. 1: 138-42. 238-40. 123.38 To compensate for the cost of outfitting and victualling ships for naval service. see. PRO.35 Common mariners also reaped benefits. items 28. . 37 For example. Macpherson et al. 54/10. ed. serie 2. PRO. 40 Rot Parl. 55. ed.” PROME. items 38. began to group seaports together administratively so that they shared the expense of providing ships and men. 18141819). forthcoming). 44.WARFARE.36 Port towns also began to receive some relief from the burdensome costs of ship impressments. 1399-1402. 53/12. 2. ed. Turner. AND CROWN PATRONAGE 243 petitioners. 182. and Maryanne Kowaleski. 11-15 aprile 2005. in contrast. see Travers Twiss. Town Defences in England and Wales: An Architectural and Documentary Study AD 900-1500 (London: John Baker. SHIPPING. 41/33.. Prato.. Ricchezza del mare..40 In exchange for particularly meritorious 35 Rot. H. Istituto internazionale di storia economica F. 1970).. “Parliament of January 1348. “ PROME. 53/25. 52.” PROME. CCR 1377-81.39 By the 1370s. “Parliament of October 1377. 172. successfully protesting the delay of wages when pressed into naval service and the seizure of ships for minor customs infractions. item 26. 1: 211. were paid by the voyage. The Crown.. ed. towns that had built barges for the navy were allowed confirmation of their franchises free of charge. Ormrod. 29. for example. Martin. Mariners on trading vessels.. Ormrod. Parl.. Atti delle Settimane di studi e altri convegni. Datini. 51. See also Rodger. 7. for example. “Working at Sea: Maritime Recruitment and Remuneration in Medieval England. C47/2/63/2. C47/22/9135. CPR 1413-16. secc. Parl. XIII-XVIII: atti della “trentasettima Settimana di studi”. 42. item 59. 39.. 26. 1: 405. E101/40/36. ed. 1871). ed. 39 For example. 2 vols. 497-8. 54/4. while port towns were regularly being released from contributing to ‘land service’ by the early fourteenth century. G. “Parliament of January 1365. ed. m. 3: 17. 36 This bonus was recorded in naval accounts from 1387 through at least 1450. (London: Record Commission. Monumenta Juridica: The Black Book of the Admiralty (London: Rolls Series. 319-20. 38 Hilary L..” in Simonetta Cavaciocchi. 33. 57. items 20. Southtown. 32. Plymouth was also incorporated. 555-61.... see Rot. Watkin.. Plymouth City Charters 1439-1935: A Catalogue (Plymouth: Plymouth City Council.. 3: 662-3. Hugh R. 45 For this and the following. Welch. Plymouth.” PROME.. 1903-27). E. when it received a charter granting it self-government after a long struggle with the town’s manorial lord. and a charter of liberties—including the right to elect a mayor—in 1341 in consideration of “the great expense and loss they have suffered by reason of the war” and also for providing two large war ships with a double crew for the king. Dartmouth’s neighbor to the south.” PROME. 1341-1417. Rot. to help citizens guard against enemy incursions. 389.. Rot.. item 48. E159/172. Crispin Gill. Plympton Priory. 43 Statutes of the Realm. 1935). ed. 6 vols. 2: 68. “Parliament of April 1463. 5-16. Given-Wilson. ed. 82. 3-4. some seaports received entirely new privileges. 41 .”42 In 1393. The tin monopoly was annulled in 1391 as inconvenient for merchants.244 MARYANNE KOWALESKI service. was granted freedom from tolls throughout the realm in 1337. (London: H. and therewith has wrought great havoc on the king’s enemies. 5: 9.41 In 1390. 42 See for this and the following: CPR 1388-92. 37-9. Plymouth: A New History (Newton Abbot: David and Charles. 309-10. Calendar of Charter Rolls. Dartmouth was given a monopoly on the export of tin for three years because it “above other places in the realm has long been and still is strong in shipping. Hilary recorda. “Parliament of January 1390. 3: 120.” PROME. CPR 1461-67. 1327-41. as the town did in a successful petition against a corrupt royal customs official in 1396.M.” PROME. the first town in Devon to do so.O. 155.S.43 Nor did Plymouth hesitate to remind the king of its wartime services to him. Given-Wilson. 5. CPR 1461-67. 1962). also benefited from its naval contributions. “Parliament of November 1381. no. 3: 295-6.. ed. 338.” item 107. Parl. 18-22.. Dartmouth. ed. Dartmouth (Devonshire Association Parochial Histories of Devonshire. item 48. 338-9. 83-4. “Parliament of November 1411. 92-7.45 Not so long afterwards. ed. tiny Dartmouth was granted its own coroner and in 1463 the borough was allowed to absorb its suburb. See also C. 44 PRO.” no. item 40. Horrox. 18. Given-Wilson. being named in 1384 as one of the places where passports to depart the realm were available and in 1389 as one of two seaports sanctioned for the departure of pilgrims to Santiago de Compostella. Curry. “Parliament of November 1391. 5. 307. m. ed. 275..44 The culmination of Plymouth’s rewards came in 1439. Parl. “Parliament of November 1439. Given-Wilson. for example. 1966). Appendix. Parl. ed. ” 364-73. 65-7. a crucial trigger that helped to stimulate their shipping and maritime economies. n. dry docks. “Introduction. One reflection of this stimulus was the progressively larger share of shipping these western ports were able to provide. as well as the location of these harbors on the best shipping lanes to Gascony and Iberia. in its contributions to naval impressments.s. which lies at the mouth of the river leading up to the administrative capital of the Duchy.WARFARE. led by the Black Prince and closely linked to the Crown. AND CROWN PATRONAGE 245 The advantages that accrued to Dartmouth and Plymouth in the fourteenth century were due mostly to their naval contributions. where royal investment in shipbuilding and storehouses is well-known. Rose. Thus the Duchy of Cornwall. Maryanne Kowaleski. SHIPPING. Navy of the Lancastrian King. and repair facilities.47 Crown patronage of these western ports was. Indeed.. where English commercial and military interests were expanding at this time. 5-11. Dartmouth alone provided more ships for the war effort than any other single port in England. 46 .” The Haveners’ Accounts of the Earldom and Duchy of Cornwall. Lostwithiel. This vitality in the region’s shipping sector was evident.46 In 1337. and Southampton. Carpenter Turner. “Southampton as a Naval Centre. the Crown transferred its rights over these two strategic harbors to the newly-created Duchy of Cornwall. first of all. 2001). Shortly before the Hundred Years War began. which also controlled Fowey Water. ed. clearly encouraged the use of these ports as embarkation points for troops and supplies. Temple Patterson. Laughton. “Maritime History. a remarkable achievement when we consider that it ranked around For this and the following. which rose from just under 40 per cent of English ships at the beginning of the War to 54 per cent by the end of the War (Table 1). Other western ports also benefited from royal investment in the navy during the fifteenth century. Crown patronage. see Gill. the Crown had completed a process begun decades earlier to consolidate control over the two fine. 1976). 44. I argue. 1287-1356 (Devon and Cornwall Record Society..” 39-47. chief among them Portsmouth. where the Crown spent large sums on seawards fortification. vol. Portsmouth: A History (Bradford-on-Avon: Moonraker Press. 26-30. came to control three choice harbors on the southwestern coast. pilgrims. and wine fleets. but their ability to meet these obligations arose in large part from deliberate Crown patronage. deep harbors of Dartmouth Water and Sutton Pool in Plymouth. 72-5. Plymouth. 47 A. . . 145-64. Plymouth. 80. 221.48 There was a similar rise in the western ports’ visibility on the valuable wine route to Bordeaux. Gill. J. Safeguard.51 And the fact that more barges and balingers (oared sailing Foedera.S. 51-2. 49 Dorothy Burwash.16. and Plymouth all funded the building of new barges or the fortifying of old ships in response to the government’s needs. 46-7. ed.248 MARYANNE KOWALESKI 88th in total wealth in 1334 and its population in 1377 was only about 1200. 238-40. n. The Maritime Trade of the East Anglian Ports 1550-1590 (Oxford: Clarendon Press.. 114. 1988). English Merchant Shipping 1460-1540 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. The Crown’s recognition of the westwards expansion of shipping is also evident in the regional distribution of the orders it placed for the construction of barges and balingers for naval service. see Geoffrey V. where their share of British shipping rose from around 45 to 73 per cent between the early fourteenth and mid-fifteenth centuries. Note that probably fewer than eight of the 20 ordered in 1294 were built. 1385-89..49 How were the western ports able to increase so substantially their share of the nation’s shipping? The Crown’s constant need for ships. Valentine and Falconer at Southampton. 43-4. 181-2. 386.M.” Economic History Review. 1377-81. J. the western ports were capturing a larger share of overseas trade and competed more successfully against foreign carriers than did vessels of the eastern ports. See also Rodger. N. 17. 1354-8. mm. Dawes. however. 386. 474. 1947). Carpenter-Turner.O. 4: 28. Exeter. that the shipping and trade of the smaller ports of Norfolk and Suffolk fared better than the larger head ports of eastern England.. 50 From the 1350s through 1380s. C. fully half of the 54 orders were directed towards these ports. Part II. 55. Misc. only 24 per cent of the 21 barges ordered were from the western port towns. There is some evidence. 57. PRO E101/41/2. particularly its orders for port towns to construct barges at their own cost for naval service. Exeter City Archives. may well have stimulated shipbuilding in these counties. and probably none of those ordered in 1401 were ever constructed. in 1294. 150. 32-3. 13 (1961): 327-41. CPR 1350-4. 1931). And studies by Dorothy Burwash indicate that by the fifteenth century. PRO E101/555/8. 25-28 (work on the Exeter barge). 48 . B. CCR 1377-81.O. but by 1401. M.50 Devon’s reputation for shipbuilding was certainly well known. “English Merchant Shipping at the End of the Middle Ages: Some East Coast Evidence. Ships from the western ports were also responsible for almost 70 per cent of the late medieval pilgrim transports to St James of Compostela. Barbara W. 428. Williams. Scammel. D. see CPR 1350-54. 2nd series. Register of Edward the Black Prince (London: H. Roll 6. “The Building of the Gracedieu. 120. 51 PRO E101/555/8. 298.R. CCR 1399-1402. and above. Dartmouth. 40 (1954). W. SHIPPING. Local History Pamphlets. Grace Dieu. see PRO E122/40/21. Sherborne. “The Commercial Shipping of South-Western England in the Late 15th Century. Crayers usually carried three masts and set a bonnet on both fore and mainsails.WARFARE. spinace. each supplied with a yard. commercial freightage. including first and foremost. 54 On this point. another oared but also decked sailing vessel. a main. Sherborne. 1965). 112-5. Merchant Shipping. “English Barges and Balingers of the Late Fourteenth Century. with three masts. see PRO. also suggests that West Country shipping was sparked in part by Crown needs during the Hundred Years War. For two masts and other gear shipped from Dartmouth to Greenwich in 1396. the mercantile shipping capacity of the western ports. 107-8. Spinaces were oared and decked sailing vessels. 65.54 The passenger trade involved in pilgrim transport was capable of turning a tidy profit since the whole voyage took only three to four weeks and 1416-1420. 11 Cornishmen.” in A New Maritime History of Devon. 53 Burwash. 63 (1977): 109-14. a “musyn” and a “fukke”. There was also considerable shipbuilding in Southampton Water (above. 1600. it must be significant that three new types of boats—the crayer. especially Dartmouth. W. C47/2/49/14 (7 from Bristol. 83 (1997): 272-92. .53 Funding for these ships came from a variety of sources. for the names of West Country shipwrights who were fined for refusing to go to Southampton to work on the king’s ship. see also Wendy R. During the period of the Hundred Years War. 120-3. AND CROWN PATRONAGE 249 vessels whose speed and maneuverability made them particularly desirable during wartime) were active in western ports.” Mariner’s Mirror. swift ships (with hulls presumably carvel-built). as indicated both by the rise of the western ports’ share of the important carrying trade of Bordeaux wine and by their significantly greater profile in the transport of pilgrims to Compostela (Table 1).44) and Bristol. Merchant Shipping. 125-6. a small craft with comparatively elaborate sail. see J. n.” Mariner’s Mirror. suggesting a trend of innovation that may originally have been fostered a hundred years earlier. Ian Friel. 17. J. 190-200. Carvels were light. particularly those of Dartmouth and Plymouth was clearly growing relative to capacity in eastern ports. 74. and 22 from Devon). Childs. 52 Burwash. speedy and highly maneuverable vessels that may have been influenced by the Portuguese caravel—were also found in significantly greater numbers in the western than eastern ports in the late fifteenth century. 128-31.” Mariner’s Mirror. The mizen probably carried a lateen sail.52 Indeed. “Devon Shipping from the Middle Ages to c. and carvels. The Port of Bristol in the Middle Ages (Bristol Branch of the Historical Association. the Crown increasingly pursued a deliberate policy of licensing shipowners and shipmasters in the early fifteenth century to defend English interests by giving them free reign to attack enemy shipping. 78-106. 78.” 476-87. Maryanne Kowaleski. Privateer. view periods of rampant “piracy” as government policy to weaken the French.. Ford has argued. Plymouth and Fowey men for their effective harassment of foreign shipping in the English Channel.. “West Country Piracy: The School of English Seamen.” Kowaleski. Ford.” in Prejudice and Promise in Fifteenth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Charles Kingsford. while Ford and to some extent. Pistono. “Henry IV and the English Privateers. Stephen P. J. 58 George Warner. Pistono. Kingsford and others emphasize the Crown’s helplessness. ed. 53 (2000): 420-54. see CPR 1476-85. Libelle of Englyshe Polycye: A Poem on the Use of Sea- .58 55 The only recorded charge is in 1473.56 Substantial funding may have also come from the spoils of war via privateering and piracy. “The Expansion of the South-western Fisheries in Late Medieval England.” 56 Kowaleski. For this and the following. As C. 1925).” Economic History Review. “Henry IV and John Hawley. 57 E. “Commercial Shipping.55 The vigor of the carrying trade in the ports of Devon and Cornwall. The cost from Plymouth was probably slightly less since the voyage was shorter.250 MARYANNE KOWALESKI shipowners could earn about £30 for taking 80 passengers. 1399-1408.” English Historical Review 90 (1975): 322-30. a “low cost” solution to the king’s dilemma on how to fund a viable navy.” The point of disagreement usually revolves around the degree of control the government could exercise over lawlessness at sea. “Piracy or Policy. eastern. see also Childs. “Port Towns. specifically cited Dartmouth. Also significant as a spur to investment in shipping was the rising prosperity of West Country agriculture and the growth of overseas trade in the region (especially the profitable export of cloth and tin) over the course of the late middle ages—in contrast to the “depression” which hit so many areas of northern. which together accounted for almost one-half of all voyages to St James of Compostela from 1390 to 1484 and almost one-half of all wine voyages to England from Bordeaux by the mid fifteenth century is especially notable (Table 1). indicating a charge of 7s 6d per passenger.g. Stephen P. and southern England.” Transactions of the Devonshire Association 110 (1979): 145-63. “Port Towns of Fourteenth-Century Devon. Devon and Cornish men took such a leading role in privateering57 that the Libelle of Englyshe Polycye. Pistono. a 1436 tract arguing for the economic and political advantages that England could accrue by exercising control of the seas. 177-203. for a London ship of 320 tons taking 400 pilgrims for 225 marks (£150). 12.59 An even more notorious example is John Hawley of Dartmouth. 1386-1402. Mayor in 1346. however. admiral of the West. 22. CCR 1360-4. he was also personally involved in naval service. Dawes. in paying £500 cash up front to farm the customs of tonnage and poundage in the whole country. 87. and the relevant documents in Watkin. with two fellow burgesses. III. 111-12.. 4. threw its mariners into the sea and absconded with the ship and its rich cargo of wine and other goods. ed. Often thought to be the model for Chaucer’s Shipman. 59 CCR 1343-6. Smale was also accused of plundering a ship in Dartmouth harbor in 1343. “John Hawley of Dartmouth. Watkin. and several years later two of his ships were part of a private squadron of 13 vessels that pirated a Spanish ship. serving as mayor of Dartmouth fourteen times. CPR 1343-45. Gardiner. Pistono. n.s. 21. Exeter Port Customs Accounts.WARFARE. Dartmouth.. for instance.. 271. 121. and without the means to pay the crew or the costs of the squadron. 183.. holding various royal appointments in Devon. 141. C47/6/4. D. and acquiring immense amounts of real estate in the Southwest. 584-5. . 115. 150-1.60 Although accused of irregularities on many occasions. 106.” PRO. 1436 (Oxford: Clarendon Press. a Dartmouth merchant/shipowner active from the 1330s. SHIPPING. “ Mémoires de la société d’histoire et de l’archéologie de Bretagne. 27. Michael Jones. and in his capacity as lieutenant of Lord Guy de Brien. “Hawley. CPR 1358-61. Their effectiveness can also be seen in the petitions of their victims. 1926). 120. power. Dartmouth. 100-1. 64 (1987): 53-64 .R. who in 1379 was commissioned. both as a shipowner whose vessels were impressed for service. ed. Hawley’s activities made him tremendously wealthy. and piracy was William Smale. 1976). he had no difficulty. 1349/50-1360/1. see Dorothy A. privateering. ed. the carrying trade. CIM. to set out with a fleet of seven vessels against the King’s enemies for a period of one year. see Dorothy Gardiner.. 60 For this and the following. “Roches contre Hawley: la cour anglaise de chevalerie et un cas de piraterie à Brest. Hawley prospered as the owner of no fewer than 15 ships. they were diverted into piracy and profited from the capture of Flemish cargoes worth over £2000. AND CROWN PATRONAGE 251 An early example of the profitable merger of interests in naval service.O. A Calendar of Early Chancery Proceedings Relating to West Country Shipping 1388-1493 (Devon and Cornwall Record Society. on whose behalf he assembled fifteen Devon and Cornish ships (seven from Dartmouth) for the king in 1360. 2: 84. vol.” Transactions of the Devonshire Association 98 (1966): 173-205. A truce intervened. Register of the Black Prince. Safeguard. vol. 125-6. Redruth: Dyllansow Truran. 63 Kingsford. 65 John Keast. C. “The Turbulent Career of Sir Henry Bodrugan. 1992). 1327-1485 (London: Eyre & Spotiswoode. which led to a lively trade in prisoners in several West Country ports.64 And it was the ports where the shipping trade had developed most precociously—Fowey. 1941. 61 . see A.” in The Little Land of Cornwall (Gloucester. Appleby. that the vessels most often associated with piracy— carvels in particular. 523. 313. L. whose targets included a Genoese carrack off the coast of Portugal. Tudor Cornwall: Portrait of a Society (London. investors.61 In 1449. and under color of their county offices. Thomson. mm. because of their speed and maneuverability—were concentrated in the West Country ports. 24-33. carvels appear in the mid-fifteenth century. F.” in A New Maritime History of Devon. A. see also J. A.” 491. See also Rodger. 1990).65 From Poole comes the notorious Henry Pay.R. Merchant Shipping.63 It is surely no coincidence. 28d. Bodrugans.62 Prominent gentry from such West Country families as the Trevelyans. a privateering squadron led by Robert Wennington of Dartmouth captured over 100 ships in the Hanseatic salt fleet.” A. n. 75-6. see for example. and Poole in particular—that were at the forefront of the privateering and piracy that was so prevalent in the late medieval ports of western England. 7. Balingers and barges were associated with ports like Dartmouth from the fourteenth century on. From Fowey come Cornish privateerpirates such Mark and John Mixtow. vol. “Devon Privateering from Early Times to 1688.. 1987). whose Gardiner (West Country Shipping. “West Country Piracy. The Storey of Fowey (1950. as shipowners. 64 Burwash. “Port Towns. Arundells. Dartmouth. R. IV. xvi-xvii) cites evidence on this point.. but also barges and balingers. ed. see also Kowaleski. study of piracy 1450-1500 that found that 60% of known English pirates were barges or balingers.56 who cites a M. 1969). 1404/5. reprint Redruth: Dyllansow Truran. “West Country Piracy. L. Litt. 128-31. 1986. 120-3. cavalierly putting its crew ashore in Portugal destitute.O. 178-90. 259. and even the Courtenays (whose head was the earl of Devon) also collected the profits of piracy.” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 45 (1972): 233.252 MARYANNE KOWALESKI By the fifteenth century. English Historical Documents. moreover. D. Exeter Mayor’s Court Rolls. 90-2. CIM. 23d. J. and receivers of pirated goods. Rowse.” passim. John brought the ship and its rich cargo back to Fowey. Others profited from the ransoms they collected. Rowse. reprint Redruth: Dyllansow Truran. “The Courtenay Family in the Yorkist Period. the significant profits to be gained from privateering and plunder encouraged the emergence of a more organized and businesslike approach to these activities. and Kingsford. reprint. 62 For an account of the capture. Myers. 000 to 12. “Infrastructure. their crews were also entitled to a share of the profits.67 Although it would be foolish to deny the very real damage that shipping and port towns suffered during the Hundred Years War. 66 . The History of the Borough and County of the Town of Poole.” 68 Sherborne. when shipowners customarily received one-third.325 were mariners) in 370 ships. W.” 121. See also Sherborne. an incentive that must have drawn a wide variety of port-town residents into this shady but profitable maritime world. see Kowaleski. Safeguard.68 Edward III’s campaign to the Low Countries in 1338 included wage payments of almost £5.” Richmond. (Poole: Looker. “English Navy: Shipping and Manpower. Gardiner. shipmasters one-sixth. "The History of Belligerent Rights on the High Seas in the Fourteenth Century. SHIPPING. most of which were in service for just under one month.” Proceedings of the Dorset Natural History and Archaeological Society 61 (1939): 89-93. between 1368 and 1381. which reduced the royal share of captured cargoes and ships to virtually nothing by the fifteenth century. but the proceedings of inquisitions into H. “Working at Sea.69 In other words. in town defenses and quayside facilities. Brittany. and in the training and employment of a whole range of maritime workers. 1951). Kingsford. and the crews half of the spoils. 67 For the variety of occupational backgrounds practiced by the mariners aboard ships of John Hawley accused of piracy. 2 vols. Rodger. “Early Prize Jurisdiction. and Castile drew the attention of Spanish chroniclers.WARFARE.263 maritime workers (of whom 11. “West Country Piracy.” 82-3. the Mixtows. F.050.” 69 Lyon. or 23 per cent of the total spending on war. I hope this essay illustrates that it is worth considering the ways that the War stimulated investment in shipbuilding. for instance. 70 D.” 149. P. Smith. “Henry Pay: The Story of a Noted Poole Worthy. 127. the central government was transferring more money to port towns than it was taking away in the form of taxes. “Costs of English Warfare. Marsden. Matthews. naval costs accounted for over £246. from shipwrights and ropers to mariners and masters.” 66-7. Less quantifiable is the impact of the increasingly favorable distribution of prize money. and Pay as ship captains benefited most from these illegal and semi-legal activities at sea. AND CROWN PATRONAGE 253 raids on Flanders. A." Law Quarterly Review 48 (1932): 521-46. “Keeping of the Seas. Hawley.70 Few accounts survive of the legitimate distribution of these profits.66 Although Smale. We also need to consider the sheer amount of cash that the war effort siphoned to port towns. Normandy. 1: 178-82. 71 Nor must we forget the bigger picture here.. privateering. ed. because it was the navigational experience and entrepreneurial spirit formed by the naval. must be considered as a significant source of profit and investment. Early Chancery Proceedings. and piratical activities of late medieval English mariners that provided the “school for seamen” and training for Britain’s later voyages of exploration and colonization to the New World. see Gardiner. For examples of illegal profits made by Devon pirates and privateers.254 MARYANNE KOWALESKI illegal privateering or piracy suggest very large profits indeed. which given the notoriety of the West Country seamen for these activities. 71 . x LAND AND LABOUR x . x x . hereditary. who have recently discovered that serfdom survived in areas where they thought it to have been abolished in the course of the thirteenth century.” rather than being a declining artifact of an earlier age represented a revival of peasant servitude.univ-paris1. In the later Middle Ages. we encounter mentions of serfdom. as sources become more abundant. Monique Zerner suggests that this “bondage to land. La servitude dans les pays de la Méditerranée Occidentale chrétienne au XIIe siècle et au-delà: déclinante ou renouvelée? Mélanges de l’École Française de Rome 112 (2000).PEASANT SERVITUDE IN LATER MEDIEVAL PROVENCE: ARCHAISM OR INNOVATION? John Drendel Peasant servitude lasted only briefly as a generalized phenomenon in Provence. a victim of economic change and the pressures upon lordship created by the reconstruction of centralized authority in Provence. ed. “Le nouveau servage en Provence au XIe-XIIIe siècles: absence ou rareté?” Mélanges de l’École Française de Rome 112 (2000): 911-1007. Monastic sources attest to it widely for perhaps a century after 1050. the introduction to this volume by Monique Bourin and Paul Freedman is online at http://lamop. and shameful attachment to a lord embodied in dues..1 This reassessment comes in the context of a renewed interest in serfdom among French historians. Marc Bloch defined servitude as a personal. “‘Nouveaux servages’ de l’Europe médiane et septentrionale (XIIIe-XVIe siècles). 2 Monique Bourin. 6-8 février 2003. Histoire & Sociétés Rurales 19 (2003): 354-9. . characterized by tenures burdened with heavy charges and restrictions upon inheritance.” Conférence à Göttingen. and restric- 1 Monique Zerner. reviewed by Julien Demade. and if so. in particular an onerous form of lordship. localized in a swath of villages astride the highlands of Provence.fr/W3/Intro MEFRM2000. what was its relationship to the economic problems of the period? We should first clarify the vocabulary and language of serfdom.pdf.2 Did serfdom indeed rebound in Provence in the later Middle Ages. foremost of which were payment of a tallage and obligatory labor works or corvées. It fossilized in most areas into symbolic dues after 1200. Les sources de l’histoire économique et sociale du Moyen Âge: Provence.” in Marc Bloch. records of seigneurial administration are not numerous in any period. contribution à une étude des classes.4 The period between 950 and 1120 is documented by the monastic cartularies of the great Provençal abbeys. usually in the form of onerous fines. In what follows. while formariage imposed barriers. “L’Élaboration du grand cartulaire de Saint-Victor de Marseille. Montmajour and the episcopal cartulary of Apt.. Pons. leaving a hiatus of a century before the enquêtes of the Angevin counts. 217-46. Les Cartulaires. Laurent Morelle. alleutiers in French. 3 . 4 Georges Duby. I use the terms servitude. “Liberté et servitude personelle au Moyen Age. the lord inherited part or all of the real or movable goods of his serfs. and Michel Parisse. 1972-1974). Lérins.N. 1: 286-91. rather than by inheritance of a personal tie.3 Among the latter. the term “slave” refers to human chattels under Roman law. 121 du C. serfdom and bondage as synonyms referring to dependent status as Bloch defined it. beginning in 1252. eds. the term “real servitude” or “bondage to land” describes an onerous and degrading status in later medieval Provence not unlike serfdom.” in Olivier Guyotjeannin. Unlike the north of Europe. Robert-Henri Bautier and Janine Sornay. 1963). in theory a peasant who renounced his holdings no longer endured the servitudes they imposed.R. the most important limited the right to possess property and to marry. Victor of Marseille. and of dependents designated as servi in the period prior to 1000..S.258 JOHN DRENDEL tions upon personal freedom.D. ed. Comtat Venaissin. 5 Monique Zerner. against marriage among peasants of different lords.R. Savoie (Paris: CNRS. Dauphiné. St. Sources for the study of dependency in Provence are skewed towards the end of the Middle Ages. “freeholders” refers to peasants possessed of non-dependent allods. particulièrement en France. 1993). Actes de la Table Ronde Organisée par l’École Nationale des Chartes et le G. St. Most of these sources peter out before the middle of the twelfth century. 141-46. and notarial and communal records from the countryside allow us to pick up the thread again in the late thirteenth century. “Note sur les corvées dans les Alpes du sud en 1338. Études d’histoire du droit privé offertes à Pierre Petot (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence.5 The lacunae of documentation between Marc Bloch. but with an important difference. Mélanges Historiques (Paris: Sevpen.” in Pierre Petot.. Mémoires et Documents de l’École des Chartes (Paris: École des Chartes. This form of dependence was created by the land a peasant held. by virtue of mainmorte. 1959). Contribution à l’étude des structures dites féodales dans le Midi. 7 Jean-Pierre Poly. La Provence. The Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Aristocracy in Provence. the social landscape of Provence resembled late antiquity more than the region between the Loire and the Rhine. 88. legal distinctions among peasant were fewer. 1985). Geary. Collection “Études” (Paris: Bordas. These Provençal manors at least did not have the bipartite structure of estates in Northern Francia. the Bishop of Marseille’s enumeration of his lands and dependents mentions no freedmen or demesne slaves at all. The Rhône Basin at the Dawn of the Carolingian Age.7 In the eighth century. in 812/13. 92. rector of the Tarentais. 1952.9 Though some slaves probably worked the lands of the colonicae dominicatus. La Provence et la société féodale 879-1166. reflecting a simplified social structure. 8 Patrick J.”10 6 Georges Duby. 9 Poly. Recent historians of the early feudal period in Provence more or less follow this model. a roughly equal number of colons and slaves worked on tenures.PEASANT SERVITUDE IN PROVENCE 259 1150 and 1250 leave us in the dark concerning the period during which servitude withered. 10 Paul-Albert Février. but the records which survived in the period following 1250 describe its remnants and perhaps its sequels. 1976). 173-262. Provence did experience considerable domestic warfare and suffered incursions by Islamic raiders in the period 870-972 which may have contributed to breaking the “nexus between peasants and land. reprint Paris: Éditions de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. the economic and social status of these dependents improved. Beginning in the late tenth century.6 The disappearance of public jurisdiction allowed local lords to treat the bodies and lands of free peasants as no different from those of their slaves. “Review of Les Sarrasins dans le Haut Moyen-Âge . bequeathed in his will of 739 to the Abbey of the Novalesa. without assistance from the families of diverse status which held individual properties. 1988). George Duby’s influential thesis on the Mâconnais explained the manifestations of personal servitude as arising from the disappearance of the Roman notion of liberty and private land which the Carolingians sustained until the tenth century. La société aux XIe et XIIe siècles dans la région mâconnaise (Paris. colonicae. Servi cultivated the Provençal demesnes which Abbo.8 Less than a century later. despite the discrepancies between Provence and Burgundy. Although Paul-Albert Février believed the impact of the sarrazinades to be wildly exaggerated. 1965). in this period a group of peasant freeholders briefly emerged. and the emergence of a broad servitude. followed by those of the count in the 1040s.13 The result was a new social division between rusticus and caballarii. About 40 twelfthFrançais (Histoire et Archéologies) (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose. La Provence. 1990). beat down the free peasantry. Weinberger. “La transformation. 92. they are no longer objects. 134. termed miles after 1050. La croissance agricole du Haut Moyen Âge: Chronologie. “Sur la croissance agricole en Provence.” Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes (1966): 301-3. the ascendant warrior class of caballarii.” 10-12. Stephen Weinberger. but rather actors in the social landscape. 12 Weinberger. From castles held for the count.12 An opposing social force.260 JOHN DRENDEL Mentions of mancipia disappear in the latter half of the tenth century. La Provence. the miles exploited jurisdictional powers of public authority: justice.” in Centre Culturel Départemental de l’Abbaye de Flaran. Weinberger. Monique Zerner. Some rich peasants may have escaped upwards into the ranks of the warrior aristocracy but most fell under its domination.” Annales: Économies. Victor for this period. military service (cavalcata) and somewhat later the assistance (quista) owed by a vassal to his lord. but the end result was the disappearance of freeholding peasants.” 12-13.. ed. géographie. particularly through contracts of medium vestum which gave peasants the ownership of half the land they cleared after a period of five to seven years. 108. The decline of comital power led to the privatisation of Church lands in the late ninth century. 153-67. The language of sources refers to peasants with less pejorative language. finds within it scarce evidence of peasant servitude. Sociétés. 11 Poly. or built after 1040 on allodial lands. For Stephen Weinberger. the changing vocabulary was not wholly unfavorable towards the peasants who found their social role valorized. modalités. These were the pretexts for the imposition of arbitrary confiscations—malos usos and malas consuetudines— upon the peasantry. profiting from the reclamation of wasteland.”10-12.11 Indeed. and notably the freeholding peasants. “La transformation. Monique Zerner. 92 14 Poly. who has closely studied the cartulary of St.14 The characteristics of this servitude are disputed. Flaran (Auch: Centre culturel départemental de l’Abbaye de Flaran. 13 Poly. hospitality (alberga). La Provence. the distinction between free and unfree after 1040. “La transformation. Civilisations 45 (1990): 10. . “La transformation de la société paysanne en Provence médiévale. . Those who did so abandoned the lands and goods they held from their personal lord. 1969). the decline of millenial serfdom resulted from the decay of seigneurial prerogatives. In the first half of the thirteenth century. he abolished serfdom. in so doing. The Angevin counts of Provence continued this policy in the second half of the thirteenth century by granting “safeguard” (salvatoria) to serfs who left their lord.” Actes des Journées d’Histoire Régionale.23 The fading of servitude parallels the disappearance of traditional peasant census tenure in favor of the Roman law contract of emphyteusis. In the thirteenth century. La Provence. they 21 22 Poly. whenever the sisters of La Celle had the occasion to relet or renew a traditional censive holding. inspired by Italian influence and the renaissance of Roman law. the fragmentation of lordship weakened its holders in the face of competition from resurgent comital power. Aubenas.2.” 510 n. “Les consulats ruraux dans le ressort de l’Évêché de Nice (circa 1150-1326). Mouans Sartoux (1984): 361-96. Édouard Baratier. Enquêtes sur les droits et revenus de Charles Ie d’Anjou en Provence. “Le servage.262 JOHN DRENDEL Louis initiated a general movement towards the abolition of serfdom in the thirteenth century. La Provence. avec une étude sur le domaine comtal et les seigneuries de Provence au XIIIe siècle (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale. Raimund Berenger V used this tradition to weaken highland barons by creating consulates in the towns and villages of highland Provence where they did not exist. While such “coseigneuries” were generally managed through a single baile in the thirteenth century and later.21 The counts of Provence reconquered their ascendancy after the marriage between the count of Barcelona and the heiress of Forqualquier in 1094 brought to Provence a powerful and dynamic Catalan dynasty. Consular governments. . particularly in the highland regions where lords opposed comital power most fiercely. existed in villages of eastern Provence from at least 1064. 318-58. 155-9 Poly. 1252 et 1278.22 Raimund Berenger III and his heirs attacked strong lordship by undercutting its social domination. which suggests that the peasants’ relationship to land was already more powerful than personal bondage. a status which brought them under the lordship of the count. The allodialisation of seigneurial power in a region with a strong tradition of Roman law resulted in a collective possession of lordship shared among heirs equally in each generation. 74-5. 23 Jean-Paul Boyer and Alain Venturini. as we have seen. that the count tended to dissolve servitude in villages where he was a direct lord.25 These surveys.” Historical Reflections/Réflections Historiques 19 (1993): 249-66. Enquêtes. Many such acts survive from the thirteenth century. “The Institutions of Village Goverment in Later Medieval Provence and the Origins of the Council of Trets. These accords were paid for by converting onerous or shameful services into cash payments. These records show. the archbishop of Arles held all rights of justice in Salon. modeled upon Saint Louis’ administration of Languedoc. . which saw lords divide up seigneurial demesnes constituted during the eleventh century among free peasants and peasants soon to be free. This evolution was part of the global remodeling and concentration of habitat in Provence. 87-90. 75. n. But the counts were not successful in wresting all elements of public authority from the lay and ecclesiastical lords who wielded it. 1: 35-53. 178. John Drendel. save for justice over homicide. but more often they accorded franchises to entire villages. even in the highland regions north of the Var.2. shed new light upon the status of peasants in the second half of the thirteenth century. Robert-Henri Bautier and Janine Sornay. and permitting villagers to create permanent institutions of self-governance.PEASANT SERVITUDE IN PROVENCE 263 did so using the newer Roman law contract. Baratier edited the most important enquêtes from the thirteenth century. where baronial families like the Glandèves retained much land and power. in the inquest into comital rights conducted in 1252 and 1278. Still. Lords like the viscounts of Marseille limited the count’s jurisdiction in the Val of Trets to the east of Aix. even to the point of emulating the counts. Les sources de l’histoire économique et sociale du Moyen Âge. Baratier. south of Brignoles. Edouard Baratier found that the count had recovered comital domain over the lands of lay lords. a revived Roman law notariat.24 The Capetian dynasty of counts which succeeded the Catalans in 1246 launched a series of detailed enquêtes in the 1250s. Le monachisme. In some instances lords freed their own serfs individually. as we noted. 143. Enquêtes. the abbot of Lerins held all rights of justice in Cannes and its neighboring coast. and a general renaissance of written records. 26 Baratier.26 The servitude which emerges in the records of the later Middle Ages reflects the enduring power of seigneurial jurisdiction in some 24 25 L’Hermitte-Leclercq. but only a few of the many detailed enquêtes of the fourteenth and fifteenth centurys are available in print. were exempt from the count’s jurisdiction as well. the lands of the sisters of La Celle. ” Annales du Midi 69 (1957): 229-36. The enquêteurs called these dependents “men of the market quest” (homines de quista ad mercedem). Jan Stodolniak and Lidia Carminati-Nawrocka (Wroclaw: Académie Polonaise des Sciences.29 Baratier described the servitude of homines de quista and casamenti as comparable with the status of serfs in notarial registers from the Strong communities and a strong count reduced lordship to very little in the upper valley of the Vésubie after 1250. “Note sur la dépendance personnelle en Haute-Provence au XIVe siècle. In Reillanne. 129-134. Economie et société d’un bourg provençal au XIVe siècle: Reillanne en Haute Provence. 357-83. Aups were they distinguished from “free. 28 Baratier. the same arbitration conceded to the inhabitants the right to dispose of property by will. is a term which originated in the eleventh century as one of the malos usos. Danuta Poppe.264 JOHN DRENDEL (although by no means all) of the mountain valleys of highland Provence. Poly. inhabitants paid a seigneurial quista as well. This suggests how broad the quista was beforehand. 134. 1990). 72. the casamentum.” Cahiers du Centre d’Études des Sociétés Méditerranéennes 53 (1) (1966): 25-26. “Le servage.” 1004. homines de mercedem referred to men in Castellane whose annual tallage was a mark of dependence. Enquêtes. it continued in the thirteenth century to refer to both seigneurial and comital obligations. 102. Baratier. 29 Aubenas. Enquêtes. in the upper valleys of the Durance. Danuta Poppe. corvées and seigneurial quistas scattered across highland Provence from Forqualquier to the valleys north of Grasse. in 1341. “Saint-Christol. Poppe. Zerner. quistas which in the case of the Abbey of Saint-André were limited by arbitration in 1270 to five cases modeled upon those which circumscribed the quistas of the count. personal dependents of the count outnumbered free peasants in numerous villages. and Var rivers. “Saint-Christol à l’époque médiévale. Hommes et communautés du haut pays niçois médiéval.28 There is considerable evidence that homines de quista ad mercedem refers to a specific obligation owed by men by virtue of their subordinate status. The lords of the village of Saint Christol on the plateau of Forqualquier continued to levy quistas in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Other dependents bore servitude by virtue of their attachment to a specific type of tenure. Institut d’Histoire de la Culture Matérielle. La Provence. noting that only in one locality. La Vésubie (XIIIe-XVe siècles). 1980). Colette Samaran. Zerner argues that these men were not serfs. One can find remnants of mainmorte. Jean-Paul Boyer.” 78. Quista.27 In 1252. however.” 25-26. trans. Verdon. preface by Noël Coulet (Nice: Centre d’Études Médiévales de Nice. 27 . “Nouveau servage. Danuta Poppe.” According to Zerner “men of the quista” refers to the same comital obligation owed by all the counts subjects. ” 232. 34 Aubenas. Samaran. 32 Henri Falque-Vert. The maleservus had no other rights over the casamentum.” 78. could release himself from that same bondage by relinquishing his holding. “Le servage. “Note sur la dépendance. a coherent unit comprised of arable land. Caslani and casamenti alike owed their lord tallage in six customary cases. the free peasant who acquired a casamentum acquired a personal tie to the lord. “La famille et la terre: exploitations paysannes au sud du Léman à la fin du XIIIe siècle.32 The maleservus owed a heavy dues. 1997). Collection “La Pierre et l’Écrit” (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble. La vie montagnarde en Faucigny à la fin du Moyen Âge. Caslani in the village of Caussols had no more freedom to buy and sell their land than maleservi. in the absence of heirs.” 230-32.31 These obligations are very like those owed in this period by peasants in the Alps of Savoy and Dauphiné to the north. It is also similar to the bondage of peasants described in a comital inquest in the region of Puget-Theniers. and in theory. but elsewhere they appeared to possess land in emphyteusis. “Note sur la dépendance.PEASANT SERVITUDE IN PROVENCE 265 early fourteenth century studied by Colette Samaran.34 Although the language differs Samaran. the obligation to inhabit the village and use the lords oven and mill. Nicolas Carrier. where lords inherited the goods of many villagers. the holding could not be divided but only held undivided. Maleservi possessed a casamentum.” 229-36. Les hommes et la montagne en Dauphiné au XIIIe siècle. this form of servitude derived from the status of land and was not personal. 31 30 . 33 Samaran. Collection Logiques Historiques (Paris: L’Harmattan. The document from Puget-Theniers will be discussed below. If there was more than one direct heir. and corvées. “Note sur la dépendance. Économie et société. the burden of comital taxation. though in fact it was often relet to close relatives or other members of the village. up to 4 sesters and 3 quarters of grain after the harvest.33 It is comparable to the servitude of men known as maleservi in Castellane in 1341. vineyard and pasture held not in emphyteusis but by virtue of an act of homage.” Revue Historique 307 (2002): 891-937. whose goods were subject to mainmorte unless their children held the land undivided. dwellings and outbuildings. garden. fin XIIIe-début XVIe siècle. Fabrice Mouthon. 2001). the lord recovered the casamentum through mainmorte. For casamenti. other than to hold it and bequeath it to a direct heir.30 These acts reveal in much more detail than the comital records the subjection in the region of Grasse of two classes of men: caslani and maleservi. ” 144. whose close relationship I have explored elsewhere.” 1005-7.35 The distinction is neat. 1980). “Le crédit 36 35 . servage et glossateurs. but lords in the mountains used rights over land to capture economic resources from peasants beginning in the late twelfth century. much as English common law polarized the status of villani in opposition to free men. cited by André Gouron. and in particular by emphyteutic tenure.266 JOHN DRENDEL from place to place. as their jurisdictional rights decayed. The apparent rise of bondage to land may be a simple reflection of more abundant sources after 1250.36 Finally. but it conferred fundamental rights of possession incompatible with seigneurial restrictions on inheritance and alienation. XIe-XVe siècle.” Revue d’Histoire de Droit 56 (1978): 215-52. and that the broader impact of their interpretation of the law uniformly promoted the Roman law notion of liberty. evidence of personal servitude based upon jurisdictional rights prior to 1150. and not personal. albeit scanty. “Liberté. The consensual essence of Roman law contracts renders the legal system unusable in an unfree society. pointing out that civil law commentators had little interest in the status of peasants in the twelfth century. John Drendel. it never really had existed. precocious and widespread diffusion of Roman law and the notariat in the Provençal countryside widely promoted emphiteusis tenure and credit. Emphyteusis was a flexible contract adaptable to very different relations of power between peasants and lords. the idea that lords would use rights over property to limit the freedom of peasants and extract greater rent goes against the grain of an agrarian legal system dominated by Roman Law. “Nouveau servage. a dependent peasantry in Provence made no sense to lords moving towards salaried agricultural labor in the monetized economy of the early fourteenth century. Roger Aubenas. personal serfdom had not only disappeared from Provence. and the details as well.” Recueil des mémoires et travaux publié par la Société d’Histoire du droit et des institution des anciens pays de droit écrit (1980): 41-51. The rapid. the prevalent form of servitude in these highlands appears to have been real. The rise of bondage to land underlies the paradox of Zerner’s final conclusion. Moreover. 37 The question of the impact of Roman law upon freedom merits a separate discussion. as George Duby pointed out long ago. Duby.37 Zerner. Aubenas argued that the clarity of Roman law laminated a diversity of social statuses into a stark opposition between free and unfree. but Gouron disagrees. XVI-XXVI. “Note. and its fossilized remnants later. “Inconscience de juristes ou pédantisme malfaisant? Un chapitre d’histoire juridico-sociale. but it overlooks the clear. reprinted in La science du droit dans le Midi de la France au Moyen Âge (London: Variorum. and indeed sources do mention regional climatic crises and food shortages in dans les archives notariales en Basse-Provence au début du XIVe siècle. Notaires et crédit dans l’occident méditerranéen médiéval.P.. affected by the introduction of outside flocks onto common pastures.” in François Menant and Odile Redon. named the missing tax payers. La vie en Provence orientale aux XIVe et XVe siècles. 38 Archives Départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône. Collection de l’École Française de Rome (Rome: École Française de Rome. however. The investigation documents a dramatic population loss of one-third of the region’s population in the space of a dozen years.38 The Chamber of Accounts in Aix ordered local officers to investigate the missing foci or basic taxpaying unit in 25 villages and 4 small towns. La démographie. with the exception of a few villages. a drop affecting nearly every village. and his student Ilona Jonas studied it in a fine article which I have relied upon. eds. along with the original document.E. also in highland Provence. and their present residence. B354. Ilona Jonas. La pénétration du droit romain dans les Actes de la Pratique Provençale (11e-13e siècle). Marie Louise Carlin. introd.N. avec chiffres de comparaison pour le XVIIIe siècle. Démographie et Sociétés (Paris: S. if known. 39 Baratier. to write the following passages.V. speaking rather of “serious economic difficulties” which neither he nor his student Ilona Jonas explored. Edouard Baratier declined to invoke overpopulation. 80. This source has been interpreted as evidence of a Malthusian crisis in Provence.PEASANT SERVITUDE IN PROVENCE 267 The economic illogic of bondage to land for both lords and peasants in the fourteenth century emerges most clearly in a source from the later Middle Ages which has not been examined from this perspective.. . Édouard Baratier. La démographie provençale du XIIIe au XVIe siècle. 1969). 2004). The collapse in population is unequalled in any other region of Provence. described the time and cause of their departure.” Provence Historique 27 (1977): 59-80. “Note sur un recours de feux dans la baillie de Puget-Théniers en 1343. Édouard Baratier discovered this source. an enquête which the auditors of Provence’s central accounting office ordered into declining tax revenues in the mountain baillie of Puget-Theniers in the spring of 1343. 1967). 80.E. by Roger Aubenas (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. In each community the officers empaneled jurors who identified the hearths.39 The inhabitants of some villages decried poor weather and sterilitas as the fundamental causes of the region’s malaise. 1961). Paul-Louis Malaussena. 223-4. Bibliothèque d’histoire du droit et droit romain (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence. and above all. Yet no region of Provence outside of Puget-Theniers appears to have suffered social and economic dislocation on this scale as a result of food shortages.41 What is specific to Puget-Theniers. apart from the catastrophic loss of population. On a few occasions the term homo de casamento is expressly mentioned. peasants borrowing would have restricted what few precious movables they could pledge. Marie-Joseph Laurénaudie. . 41 John Drendel. “Les famines en Languedoc au XIVe et XVe siècles.268 JOHN DRENDEL Southern France in 1329-1330. a figure reflecting not the lack of legitimate offspring but rather their emigration. or debt. a prosperity brought down not by crop failure or overpopulation by rather by a crushing burden of war taxation.6 per cent were in the hands of heirs. while only 9. but in any case.” Annales du Midi 64 (1952): 23-35. climatic incidents. the transition from feudal tenure to emphyteusis gave peasants rights which accelerated the liquidity of land.” 72-4. Ravitaillement et alimentation en Provence aux XIVe et XVe siècles (Paris: Mouton. a market for credit. 80. in these highland villages.42 The enquête of 1343 is unclear concerning the specific nature of servitude in Puget-Theniers. the difference between the percentage of homes and properties sold (12 per cent) and recovered by creditors (16 per cent) as opposed to those claimed by the lord is convincing evidence of the servile incapacity of a substantial proportion the households to sell their goods. was the high population of dependent peasants: 24 per cent of 226 peasants hearths deserted by death escheated to the lord. but eloquent in its description of its economic impact. bequeath them to heirs or use them as collateral for loans. “Note sur un recours. 1331-1332. Villagers and the Count in Haute Provence: Marginality and Mediation. The nature of the tie between lord and peasant is expressed by the term “man of” (suus homo erat) or the remark that the goods escheated to the lord pro servicio. Whereas elsewhere in Provence. “Jews. my own study of a neighboring region suggests that highlands village sustained a relative degree of prosperity through the first four decades of the fourteenth century. Indeed it is difficult to understand how the lords themselves might 40 Louis Stouff. lack of freedom singularly restricted the ability of peasants to mobilize capital. Credit existed— the jurors specified many peasants who had lost their goods to creditors—but without the collateral of land. creating a land market. 42 Jonas. which harvest failures may well have provoked. 284. 1970). and 1339-1340.40 Other jurors fingered debt.” Provence Historique 49 (1999): 217-31. ( ) . C.1 argues that the multiplicity of stable equilibria leads to the establishment of competing selfreinforcing conventions. Increasing returns. “Spontaneous Order. 1990). emerge. 2 P.2 multiple stable equilibria lead to arbitrary or stochastic selection through “sensitive dependence” on small events (path dependence).. Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. eds. Change undeniably takes place. David. 68-90. 1990). which for want of a better term could be called the “QWERTY view” after David’s influential article. and it would take a D. “Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy. The Rise of the Western World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Conflict in Economics (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. on the one hand the “functionalist” view. No guarantee of efficiency or even reversibility exists.3 As always when worldviews differ.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 75 (2) (1985): 332-7. 1973). On the other side. Thomas. Institutions. Varoufakis and D. North.BARGAINING POWER AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: SEVEN CENTURIES OF ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS. Sugden. Galassi I A fundamental division lies at the heart of what has been called the New Institutional Economics (NIE). Young.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (4) (1989): 85-97. North and R. usually defined as the least costly ones. “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. R. Institutional choice and change occur as the most successful conventions. Creativity and Conflict.” in Y. Sugden. To stylize a complex debate. Francesco L. “Convention. put forth for example by North and Thomas or Sugden. 1 . C. R. network economies. who will find it advantageous to invest resources in protecting and enforcing existing institutions. R. 3 D.D.” Economic Journal 101 (4) (1991): 751-85. 821 TO 1517 A. or sheer uncertainty over the precise outcomes of alternative arrangements then generate rents or quasi rents for a subset of actors. proponents of either approach can point to a mismatch between the opposing model and everyday observation. Sugden. A. selection. albeit with checks and reversals.: MIT Press. 1993). Economics and Evolution (Cambridge: Polity Press. in that both approaches can deal with randomness or intentionality. Knight. Evolution and Economic Theory. 9 J. 10 M. the world is not a Panglossian equilibrium where all is at its best. the functionalist approach has more than a whiff of teleology or at the very least bears a strong resemblance to the smoothness of an Arrow-Debreu setting. Mass. at times on a macro scale.” Journal of Political Economy 58 (1950): 211-22. . S. Economic Evolution (London: Routledge. J. T. however. At the same time.ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS 271 particularly obdurate mind to deny that historically the broad thrust of institutional change has been towards increasing efficiency and reducing transaction costs. M.10 If transmission is unclear selection cannot be understood 4 J. The Nature of Selection (Cambridge. become a new norm? How does it “reproduce”? The biological analogy is both troublesome and insightful. But the insight into the tension running through the whole body of NIE-inspired literature may well be worth the small price of underscoring that distinction. Hannan and J. Alchian. “Uncertainty. 1992). 7 E.: Harvard University Press. Vromen. 8 For review see G. of the three constituent elements of evolution—mutation. Archer. 1989). and transmission—this last aspect remains the most troublesome for social science.5 To be more specific.4 The root of this division probably lies in the conceptual difficulty of modeling change in social relations. 1984). Sober. Freeman. as Knight pointed out. In fact. 1995). the disagreement does not ultimately hinge on the sources of social change.”6 so that it becomes necessary yet again to separate success from optimality. 6 A.7 If seen from the perspective of the numerous attempts to apply evolutionary thinking to economics. Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. determinism and free will. Hodgson. however it may have arisen. 5 M. Troublesome because it brings back Alchian’s concept of “fitness. Organizing Ecology (Cambridge. or any mixture of these. 1996). To detached inspection. Culture and Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The difficulty lies rather in the process of transmission: how does a mutation.8 the difficulty may be reduced to what Vromen9 has argued is the real puzzle in that exercise: arriving at a satisfactory specification of the transmission mechanism. Mass. C. Winter. To achieve this. 12 R. path-dependence debate involves specifying an agreed (set of) evolutionary mechanism(s). T. that is reproduce over long periods of 11 L. R.12 The unit of selection is. this makes economic evolution Lamarckian (transmission of acquired traits) rather than Darwinian (only genotypes are capable of replication. while a “routine” is not similarly identifiable. in an environment whose broad features are reasonably well known.11 One important proposal in this direction was put forth by Nelson and Winter. 1997). it should be possible to identify an institution and isolate within it a set of rules whose incidence in the population changes over time. . the individual “routine” used in any given economic process. If a basic (set of) unit(s) can be agreed upon. The Meme Machine (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.272 FRANCESCO L. and D. MA: Belknap. we need a well-defined population with a clearly identifiable set of characteristics.13 though fascinating is difficult to test and use analytically. As a first approximation. The suggestion that there are “units of culture” (memes). Since routines can be learned. A gene can be isolated as a unit of information within a biological organism. 13 R. Blackmore. first. The problem can therefore be put in these terms: reconciling the functionalist vs. 1976). 1996). The population needs to be. in their framework. North. S. G. then we could watch economic evolution in action and study the selection process. However. in that the units on which selective pressures act have to be identified before the process of selecting can be mapped. successful. Eggertsson. so that unsurprisingly the evolutionary analysis of institutions has been focusing on case studies. That in turn depends on defining what is being selected. GALASSI either. and change occurs through their differential survival rates). recognizing that to reach meaningful conclusions the time horizon might have to be longer than most studies of institutional change allow. Dawkins. 1982). The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press. whether consciously put in place or slowly arrived at by random walk or learning by doing. Nelson and S. if these routines are to be considered the economic equivalent of genes how they replicate is not clear. then. NIE does not have a general answer to this puzzle. We could then correlate these changes with potential transmission links. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge. J. Alston. IX. Osservazioni ad alcune carte amiatine del sec. “Livellario nomine. I. rent consisted of half of all output and the tenant agreed to live on the farm. . Mezzadria (sharecropping) pre-dated Leuprandus and lasted well into the post-1945 years. Evolution in Real Time (London: Vintage Books. tilled and untilled land” for which he agreed to pay the Abbey “omnia medietate..D.” Studi Senesi 1 (1906): 275-301. in fact.. Grant. beside the land and the house. and second. The Beak of the Finch. S. the earliest known sharecropping agreement in Italy and one of the earliest surviving farm contracts anywhere. Mezzadria classica toscana (Florence: Vallecchi. Mazzini. R. We need. 1881). in the nineteenth century. La Toscana Agricola. was simplicity itself: in a few lines. 1951). some fifty kilometres south-east of Siena (central Italy). J.] vines. Part 1: 463-466.000 years later. yet he probably would have had no trouble recognising as fundamentally the same agreement as his own a contract in use in Tuscany over 1. and was used in every part of country and 14 P.ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS 273 time. M.” Biological Journal of the Linnaean Society 25 (1985): 1-39. Leicht.14 On a much more modest level. a farmer named Leuprandus leased from the Abbey of San Salvatore a farm “with a house [. 1995). Variable inputs were supplied in somewhat different proportions. woods. Weiner. The agreement. in a village called Baiano. in this paper I propose to look at just one such population. but what had really changed by the late nineteenth century was the sheer number of stipulations that had been added to that basic agreement over time: the later contract consisted of 4 closely printed pages and 26 distinct clauses. Imberciadori. the Abbey agreed to supply oxen and half the seed while Leuprandus promised to live on the farm. 3.. in central Italy it accounted for over half (in some areas over 2/3) of all farm employment. At its zenith. II In early June 821 A.16 Then too.15 Leuprandus was illiterate. 78. Atti della Giunta per la Inchiesta Agraria e sulle condizioni della classe agricola (Rome: Forzani. something akin to Darwin’s Galápagos finches. streams and pasture.” half of all [products]. “Variation in the Size and Shape of Darwin’s Finches. 16 C. 15 P. changing yet reasonably stable (does not undergo such profound modifications that descendants cease altogether to resemble ancestors). In the remainder of the paper. “Medieval Agrarian Society in its Prime: Italy. This excludes emphyteosis or ad meliorandum agreements with share rents.18 As economic events go.” in T. I will look at changes brought over time to land rental contracts having the following characteristics: first. stagnation and decline. Byres. I will first briefly discuss the adoption and spreading of share contracts in Italy in the late Middle Ages. the transmission) is linked to the channels of communication. Sharecropping and Sharecroppers (London: Frank Cass. 19 For the present purposes. 1-18. “Historical Perspectives on Sharecropping. 1986). though in practice it almost always is.2 million hectares) was sharecropped. then will identify three clauses which appear quite early on in the centuries. 18 Istituto Centrale di Statistica (ISTAT). 189. it does not matter whether that share is ½. In effect I will treat the early contracts as an initial benchmark against which mutation can be measured.” in M. Sommario di statistiche storiche 1926-1985 (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato. “Historical Perspectives..” 21 P. From June 821 until January 1517 I can then track the geographic spread and frequency of these clauses through a sample of 832 sharecropping contracts. But success of what? What is the link between Leuprandus and the Italian farm census of 1961? Because it is the evolution of a contract that forms the focus of this inquiry. twelve per cent of all farmland in Italy (some 3. let us be very clear. rent is paid as a share of the product19 and second. GALASSI throughout the Mediterranean basin..20 share contracts became increasingly common in Italy from the thirteenth century onwards.274 FRANCESCO L. Jones. the land is already “improved” and constitutes a farm with a house for the tenant to live in. III Though already used in antiquity. following them through periods of demographic expansion. 17 .140 years after Leuprandus put his cross on that contract. 20 Byres.21 T. 1983).17 As recently as June 1961. eleven centuries can be considered longterm success. ed. The framework within which these changes can be understood is an agency problem. Byres. M. J. J. exactly 1. What the inquiry will show is that the spread of mutation to the original “benchmark package” (that is. J. but at a cost. “From Manor to Mezzadria. Since not all opportunistic choices would have been known at the time when the early contracts were designed. Rubinstein. Mealli. . J.: Northwestern University Press. J.” Rivista di Storia Economica 9 (1992): 77-94. S. Moral Hazard. Pudney. As techniques became more labor intensive the scope for opportunism by laborers increased. Florentine Studies (Evanston. “Tuscans and Their Farms: The Economics of Share Tenancy in Fifteenth Century Florence. The object of the game was to appropriate as much of the joint product as possible while limiting one’s own contribution to the competitive minimum. eds. Thus tenants sought to reduce their inputs into the proPostan and H. F. changing terms of trade altered the crop mix in favor of costly products with high sensitivity to proper care and handling. “The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing. 193-241. L. Ill. After the demographic crisis of the fourteenth century. Multiple performance margins and strong exogenous influences meant that room for discretion had to be built into the contract. Share contracts responded easily to this new situation by allowing landlords to concentrate costly resources on supervising invested capital while in effect leaving tenants to run the farm on a daily basis. Galassi. L. Botticini. “A Discrete Random-Effects Panel Data Model of Farm Tenures in Fifteenth Century Florence.. P. Galassi. who increasingly were urban dwellers engaged in trade or manufacturing.. and one way to reduce the problem was to introduce strong self-monitoring incentives. F. and F. The Cambridge Economic History of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jones. D.” Economica 65 (1998): 535-56.” Advances in Agricultural Economic History 1 (2000): 177-206. Supervision was difficult for landlords. Galassi.” in N. olive and fruit trees. “Moral Hazard and Assets Specifically in the Renaissance: The Economics of Sharecropping in 1427 Florence. L. it is possible to imagine landlords and tenants being engaged over the years in a repeated positive-sum game with learning. such as vines.22 The intensification of farming that resulted from rising population pressure in the late Middle Ages altered relative factor prices and encouraged the creation of exclusive property rights in land. which in turn gave renewed scope for opportunism.ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS 275 Recent quantitative studies show that their diffusion can be related to imperfect capital markets and incentive compatibility issues. 1964). or Capital Market Imperfections?” Explorations in Economic History 37 (2000): 241-57. I: 340-430. Ackerberg and M. The sharing rule went some way towards solving the monitoring problem. A. Habakkuk. as did the cost of careless or dishonest activity. 22 F. ed. 1968). would cheat rarely . GALASSI duction process. where I could often go. 90. Alberti. On 11 August 1255 a court in Lucca sentenced a sharecropper named Grispi to pay his landlord three pounds in damages for “not ploughing and sowing at the appropriate time as he had undertaken to do. they would seek to draw the largest possible benefit from the capital invested in the farm. Landlords. while landlords were constrained by monitoring costs and the tenants’ shadow reservation wage. Alberti. 26 A. seeing me often. L. one of the architects of the Italian Renaissance as well as a rich landowner. other players would adopt it. Luporini and Parigi have shown that limitations imposed on tenants’ activities are statically efficient in a multi-tasking framework. including dismissal.. Parigi. there was a probability that some player would find a new margin over which to capture some portion of the income streams. 210. B. B.26 The point is that the margins where either party could engage in opportunistic behavior were likely not at first fully known to either landlords or tenants. and possible sanctions.”24 Two centuries later.”25 In general.” Economica 63 (1996): 445-58. so 23 Note that neither incentive exists in contracts where one party acts as full residual claimant. . Mezzadria. 25 L.276 FRANCESCO L. At the same time. and be more diligent at their work. the game was still going on. both because labor creates disutility and because of Marshallian disincentives caused by the sharing rule.. wrote that “I would have my farm in a place . for instance. That is the explanation for the obligation the Abbey of San Salvatore imposed on Leuprandus to reside on the farm (limit his opportunities to undersupply labor) in the 821 contract. If the gambit produced a reward.23 Tenants were constrained by the probability of detection. and eventually measures to regulate or prohibit it would wind their way into the contract.. had the incentive to skimp on capital investment and force tenants to work as much as possible. “Multitask Sharecropping Contracts: The Italian Mezzadria. Ways of pruning vines. Over 400 years later.. Luporini and B. my emphasis. and take my exercise walking around it. Tenants and landlords were very well aware that they were engaged in this game. [1468] 1906). 24 Imberciadori. mostly labor. and the labourers. Della famiglia (Milan: Istituto Editoriale Italiano. Each time the game was played. of course. or putting it differently. But showing that change takes place is not evidence of evolution in the sense used in Section I. how to extract wine from a sealed barrel without leaving marks. something that benefitted the tenant. then it is reasonable to argue that the early contracts were signed by people who had not yet traveled far on that curve. The definition G. IV Contracts. even simple ones.ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS 277 as to maximize short-term output at the cost of the longevity of the plant. The next section discusses the design of the test. have a learning curve.” in Civiltà ed economia agricola in Toscana nei secc.27 In addition. cheating and monitoring. “Le paysan dans la nouvelle Toscane. and especially knowing what to monitor. C. 134-8. Bec. 29-52. XIII-XV: problemi della vita delle campagne nel tardo medioevo (Pistoia: Centro italiano di studi di storia e d’arte. If that is correct. L’Italia rurale nel Basso Medioevo (Rome: Laterza. Repeated interaction revealed this over time. There must be. Testing it is the next step. learning. in the earlier period of the contract’s life there may still have been a great deal of uncertainty about how to make the agreement work to one’s advantage. This is the general hypothesis of the paper. and the contract changed as a result. in other words. are multifaceted mutual commitments operating on several margins simultaneously. The “thieving sharecropper” was a stock character of Renaissance plays and stories. 1981). A reasonable approach to designing a test is to use the earliest contracts as a benchmark. What needs to be shown is that there is a line of transmission of these changes. and to track deviations from their set of clauses over time. 27 . probably had to be worked out over time. Like other activities. Cherubini. Another way of saying this is that characteristics acquired over time spread through the population. where tenants are often shown teaching one another how to hide grain already mown but not yet threshed. that changes in the set of clauses are directional and cumulative. but it was difficult to predict ex ante what form damage caused by neglect (a manifestation of opportunism) might take. 1984). In other words. careless handling of tools or livestock could affect the capital value of the landlord’s investment. or how to work away from the farm without the landlord finding out. the clauses whose presence is tracked must be clearly identifiable. It is the process of spreading that I am trying to follow. they cannot be those common catch-all clauses (e. forms the core of mezzadria. I will call clauses satisfying these criteria “nonreducible rules. then discusses the sample used and presents summary statistics of the contracts under consideration. tenants and landlords had to . all that matters is that c should at some point start to spread in the population. “the tenant promises to work well”) of little practical value. GALASSI I am employing. Rather the choice must be based on a priori considerations: if I am right that sharecropping was a way of introducing incentive compatibility. Any element detailing an obligation incurred by either party in addition to that basic core I will call a “clause.” Secondly. No priors exist as to when or where c began. the clauses must not be picked only because they are common in later contracts. That would vitiate the analysis. wherever and whenever it first appeared. the obvious ones to follow given the agency framework I am using. the constant linking Leuprandus to the second half of the twentieth century. To anticipate one possible objection. share-rent paid for an “improved” farm and tenant’s residence obligation. Besides committing labor on one side. However..g.” This section identifies a group of clauses to be tracked as they spread through the population. viz. First. and even if they do I have no way of knowing this. This means that they have to be reasonably simple clauses. in a sense.278 FRANCESCO L. increased its frequency in the population). the sample contracts are obviously unlikely to include the very first instance of clause c making its appearance. Because I cannot observe communication flows between actors. At the same time. To show that an evolutionary approach can yield insight into institutional changes. then the clauses that spread should be those that further constrain opportunistic behaviour. the chosen clauses must then be shown to have spread chronologically and/or geographically from their inception point. I have to rely on geographic or chronological proximity to argue that a solution found in one location spread (that is. and on the other land and fixed capital. Two basic issues need to be addressed to study mezzadria in an evolutionary framework. An econometric test is carried out in section V.. The non-reducible rules I propose to track are three and are also. so that there can be no question of one appearing in a modified form that may alter its effect on the contracting parties. stolen. No magic formula could protect everybody. or be leased out to work other farms. they had the incentive to use as much of the farm output as possible to feed their own livestock. of cattle worked too hard or not properly fed. while using scarce monitoring resources to ensure that they did not divert income streams from the farm to maintain their own capital beyond a certain point. If this reasoning is at least broadly correct. tools. Animals fattened on the farm’s output would be sold by the tenant to his sole benefit. but ultimately must have been decided by the land/labor ratio. Landlords may have preferred to shift the burden of supplying complementary inputs on their tenants. once other factors are taken into account. of tools broken. one reasonably stable solution was to force tenants to internalize as many of the costs of supplying complementary inputs as possible. If 28 Cherubini. but even aside from the latter’s ability to incur the cost this was a mixed blessing at best. or left in the fields. the supply of working capital was subject to bargaining between tenants and landlords. The outcome of the bargaining was affected by several unobservable variables.” With the advantage of hindsight. how can you really tell how much is being siphoned? In spite of such metering problems. the advantage of passing these costs on to tenants was that the range of necessary monitoring activities shrank. then I expect to find that sharecropping contracts over time increasingly came to include clauses that shifted onto the tenant the responsibility for the provision of complementary inputs. Tales of seed given for sowing but never put in the ground (as in Grispi’s case). The last part of this sentence is deliberately vague: finding the right tolerance for such “diversions” was not easy.ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS 279 agree on who would supply at least three other significant inputs: seed. At what point is the tenant siphoning rent? How expensive is it to stop him? Perhaps above all. Sharing inputs was resorted to.28 On the other hand. . tenants had no incentive to care for them. If the landlord supplied them. L’Italia. are common complaints for medieval and Renaissance landlords in Tuscany. if tenants supplied complementary inputs. however. but even so the agency problem remained acute for the landlord: one can imagine a tenant reporting that “your cow has died. 134-8. To be more specific. and livestock. and to sow what they wished. Il contratto. something that may indicate that the agreement had achieved a sort of canonical status. XIII-1348 (Florence: Olschki. Il contado di Firenze. GALASSI tenants could not easily find another farm. . and published over the past fifty years. The notary begins his text with religious formulae followed by date and location.280 FRANCESCO L. Lucca. and have been selected trying to maximize temporal continuity and geographic coverage. 1992). written between 821 and 1517 A. 325-80. 31 Piccinni. 1987). D. The time has come to focus more closely on the sample. Il contratto di mezzadria nella Toscana medievale. and becomes more so over time. 463-6.. have been collected from the notarial chartularies of the State Archives of Florence. If tenants were scarce. Demographic trends will matter to the test of the evolution of mezzadria. O. La Toscana. Mazzini. 1988). Il contado di Siena. yet it obviously represents only a minute fraction of all sharecropping contracts signed over these seven centuries. landlords would have to supply a greater proportion of complementary inputs and thereby shoulder the risk of incurring capital losses. the contracts of the “early” centuries constitute the case of an institution in full evolutionary adaptation. Piccinni. 30 Pinto and Pirillo. Il contratto di mezzadria nella Toscana medievale. Il contratto di mezzadria nella Toscana medievale. 1349-1518 (Florence: Olschki. G. Pirillo. Pinto and P. secolo XIII (Florence: Olschki. The discussion so far has mostly set the stage and presented in general terms what testing is to be carried out. Pisa and Arezzo. Mezzadria. G.D. so well known that there was little need to reproduce it. the sample is almost surprisingly large. for sampling criteria.30 The number of contracts extant in the archives drops off dramatically during the sixteenth century. just as the language tends to shift from Latin to Italian. Nenci. Il contado di Siena. landlords must have been able to force them to internalize more costs than tenants would have liked. The 832 contracts of the sample. The wording of the contracts is reasonably standardized.29 Given their great age (42 per cent of sample contracts predate 1300). sex. Muzzi and M. then identifies himself and the contracting parties and describes the purpose and duration of the 29 Imberciadori. Il contratto. Siena. This is indirectly confirmed by the strong similarity between the contracts dating from the late 1400s/early 1500s and the standard forms that came to be used in the nineteenth century.31 If so. The contracts relate in all cases to first-time agreements (renewal or termination were oral). we have over 800 observations of a well-defined institution scattered across the arc of some 700 years in a restricted geographic area where we have reasonably good information about other important historical events. if any. the periodization. There follows a description of the farm and its location. livestock and tools of direct interest to this analysis. We know something about the crop mix of the farm and the presence of animals and buildings/improvement works. the first column inevitably covers an abnormally long time period. Since very few contracts (hardly a dozen) survive from before 1199. though we know which political jurisdiction it came under. with details of the house or other buildings such as stables. Even considering that not all contract specifically list the three clauses I am trying to track (only about 500 do. The late 1340s marked a dramatic crisis all over Europe as the Black Death . the prohibition (usually) from seeking work off the farm.ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS 281 contract. received by the tenant to start work. the tenant’s residence obligation is the first mentioned. Above all. I have a clear question I can ask these data: do the non-reducible rules aimed at limiting discretion in an agency context spread chronologically and geographically in such a way as to suggest a learning process? Do these contracts evolve? Or are the changes non-directional? Table 1 reports some summary statistics relating to these clauses. We do not always know exactly where the actual farm was. lists of capital maintenance work to be carried out each year. For all contracts we know where landlords lived and where they signed the agreement with their new tenants. An inventory of stocks already on the farm is then added. followed by the details for the provision of seed. This is in fact a wealth of information. this is still a remarkable sample. More importantly. such as demographic trends. and the contracts end with the list of witnesses and the signatures (or marks) of all present. Almost invariably. depending on which clause). any additional payments owed for keeping fowls or other animals not directly covered by the contract. The other peculiarity may appear to be the division at 1347. First. There follow the clauses agreed upon by the parties. Fines are set against either party failing to live up to their commitments and at times arbitration procedures are outlined. and a list of loans. granaries and wine and oil making equipment. Some comments are in order. Other clauses include where the rent had to be paid (on the farm or at the landlord’s residence). . who had experience of contracting practices. By the fifteenth century livestock is almost always wholly supplied by landlords (fewer than one in forty or fifty supplied all livestock between 1200 and 1347). meant that the parties could hardly devote time and resources to working out in the necessary detail what clauses to impose on one another. does not per se constitute evidence of “evolution” in the sense discussed above. the notary. but probably did not actually have a fully formed mental picture of how to go about their goals. An evolutionary adaptation involves transmission. There is a hint in these data that at the peak of the demographic boom (early fourteenth century) tenants may have grown increasingly unable to meet the kind of capital commitment required of them: the proportion of tenants supplying all livestock (the most expensive working capital) in the first half of the 1300s is halved relative to the proportion in the previous century. The complexity of the tasks that had to be carried out. before the sixteenth century when the contract became so well established that it was seldom written down. Evidence of changing relative bargaining power. had already designed clauses aimed at obtaining the results they Sociales. The Malthusian limit was fast approaching. and seed is almost always shared (tenants supplied all seed in 50 per cent of contracts from 1200-1347). landlords increasingly had to commit complementary inputs to their farms and renounce gains accumulated since 1200. when that is the land/labor ratio was steadily falling. . Fortunately this was not necessary because they could hire a specialist. 1978). which is all the table shows. In the centuries of demographic expansion. Their contribution was rising. landlords and tenants were engaged in an ongoing search for the appropriate solution to the agency problems they faced. The mid-fourteenth century constitutes a structural break. in this case by learning. How can this learning process be modeled? My argument is that.ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS 283 These bare demographic facts fit easily with the trends in the clauses highlighted in the table. Thereafter. They knew what they wished to achieve in entering into the agreement. their contingent nature and the uncertainty inherent in any agreement where time consistency was a significant element and exogenous influences were strong. whether in the provision of livestock or of seed. the bargaining between landlords and tenants was being resolved against the latter. with the necessary modifications. and possibly modified. “Il collegio notarile di Siena. the notary worked on past practice and current concerns. “Craft Guilds. R. also the reassurance to the contracting parties that in using the agreement he designed they could expect that on average they would be no worse off than their reference group. it follows that modifications to the template were more likely to spread rapidly in the immediate geographic proximity of their inception. assessed. where individual non-reducible rules stored as part of the template were checked. in effect. he provided a reference point on current accepted practice.34 The template would then be adjusted as practice changed. 1985). For his part. In addition. that is. and it seems logical to see such organizations as information-sharing machines. or to put it differently sold a reduction in uncertainty. The process was self reinforcing in the sense that a modification to the template which found favor with the contracting parties would be used again and therefore would have a greater-than-average probability of being discussed within the corporation and consequently of spreading to other notaries and other contracts. like other trades. and could sell them a reasonably standardized commodity easily adjustable to suit their particular circumstances. The notary’s commodity was. Notaries were organized in guilds. GALASSI sought. The notary sold information.” in Il notariato nella civiltà toscana (Rome: Consiglio Nazionale del Notariato. only later “colonizing” more distant populations. as new solutions to old problems were devised. If that is at least a reasonable approximation of the process. 34 For examples see G. or as existing approaches were discarded.284 FRANCESCO L. 337-65. a kind of template in which the details of any given pair of landlords and tenants could be entered. Epstein. He can be modeled as storing a set of non-reducible rules for contracts of this sort. The selective pressures were at work in the mind of the notary. Apprenticeship and Technological Change in Pre-industrial Europe. The 33 S.” Journal of Economic History 58 (1998): 684-713. Catoni. . something of considerable value to both tenant and landlord who were thereby spared the trouble of analyzing to the end of their computational abilities each clause of the agreement.33 The basic template learned during the notary’s studies and apprenticeship would be continuously checked against current practice in conversation and professional contacts with other guild members. while Sl indicates that the livestock is shared. Then. Let P(cij=k) be the probability of clause cj being recorded in contract i. Likewise. I will then use superscript letters { l. S. for the supply of inputs by the landlord. P cij = Sk xi = 1 1 + exp(ßixi) and for tenant supplied inputs P cij = Tk xi = 0 The technique is sufficiently well known to require little discussion beyond pointing out that the ßs estimate the impact on P(cij) relative to the normalized probability of observing k supplied by the tenant. The framework is simple but useful . and tools. First. seed. and then discuss the variables used. so that for example Ls indicates the seed is supplied by the landlord. or by the tenant. for shared inputs.ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS 285 advantage of putting the issue in these terms (chronological and geographic proximity) is that I can derive some reasonably strong predictions and can then use the sample contracts to test them. in the changes undergone by sample contracts. I can write: P cij = Lk xi = exp(ßixi) 1 + exp(ßixi) for k = {l. V This section specifies and tests a multinomial logit model to detect directionality. S. t indicate livestock.s. t} to indicate under what arrangement complementary inputs are supplied. That is the task of the next section. L.t} where ß and x represent respectively vectors of coefficients and explanatory variables. and L. and therefore learning. Let l. s. T represent whether each of the complementary input is supplied by the landlords. shared. which is set to zero. s. I will specify the form the model takes. the probability of encountering clause c in contract i should rise with time elapsed since c is first encountered in the sample. having very few observations before 1200. the lower is P(ci=1). as there appears to be no reason to believe diffusion should be linear. so it is opportune to relate P(ci=1) to the time elapsed since c was last encountered in the sample. Specifically. and fall with the distance from the location where the first instance of c is recorded in the sample. Since the sample is not evenly spread over the 700 years it covers. I am using both the kilometers from the location where c is last recorded. It may also be questioned whether today’s roads are sufficiently close to the roads of the time to allow a modern kilometer count to approximate historical conditions. waves of diffusion. in other words. I said earlier that for evolutionary pressures to have been at work on the contract there has to be evidence of directional modifications. but the time taken traveling it is not. The discussion in IV above allows me to put some flesh on these bones. It is unrealistic to suggest that notaries referred back several centuries when modifying the template. GALASSI in the present context. Ignoring improvements in transportation technology.286 FRANCESCO L. and that the farther away were its last and first use. There should be. Both objections are valid. travel conditions change. It follows that what matters is the distance that the carriers of the template modifications. As for distance. and from where it is first recorded in the sample. and to do so accurately to the conditions of the time. except to note that the results reported below suggest that the distance variables seem to mirror reasonably well the cost of spreading information. Note that. If evolutionary pressures were at work as discussed above. Its role is to capture the geographic spread of a given clause. which should not significantly affect this sample. the higher was P(ci=1). and since demo- . and no real solution to them exists. However. both time (in years) and distance (in km) have been used in linear and quadratic form. The distance variable poses some conceptual problems. This distance is fixed in some ways (Siena and Florence are no farther apart today than they were in 1300). ceteris paribus. I can now turn to discussing the actual variables. the extremely long time period covered by the sample makes it necessary to qualify these priors. had to travel between one place and the next. I would expect that the more recent was the use of c. the notaries. first. the time squared elapsed since any given clause was last recorded and. On the other hand. each regression will include four chronological dummy variables. Overall. Table 2 reports the estimates (t statistics in round brackets. Finally. and even then only once at 5 per cent (in the other case. This is in a way not surprising: in spite of centuries of conflict between Siena and Florence. significance levels in square brackets []). and one for the slow recovery of the fifteenth century. one for the period before 1200 when population was growing but few contracts remain. whether or not a contract was signed in the territory of Florence appears to have had no effect on the probability of particular clauses being included. the lower was the probability of finding it again). second. (). Information evidently flowed easily across their contested boundaries. The only two variables that consistently fail to reach significance are. As for the latter. and was therefore omitted altogether from Table 2. the period dummies). one for the years of crisis (1348-1400). that is. the two city-states shared a language and a common cultural and legal heritage (Roman law). one for the period of demographic expansion when numerous contracts have survived (up to 1347). the variables measuring distance from the .ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS 287 graphic trends obviously had a significant impact on the clauses used in these contracts (Table 1). and are therefore not reported. suggesting that as more time passed since the last use of the clause. On balance. only the regressions using the supply of tools as the dependent variable failed all diagnostic tests. This was due to the very small number of contracts where tools are specifically mentioned (in all. the distance variables perform markedly better than the time elapsed variables (excluding. about two dozen for the 1200-1350 period and none before or after) which leaves virtually no degrees of freedom. The linear time variable is significant in only two of four cases. it has the “wrong” sign. The former actually worsens the performance of the estimates. the distance variables all have the “correct” sign (negative) and often are significant at remarkably high levels (1 and 2 per cent). On balance the results are almost surprisingly robust for a sample such as this. another dummy will attempt to capture the effects of political jurisdiction: Does it matter whether a contract was signed in Florentine territory. or in Sienese territory? Out of the three sets of clauses in Table 1. the political jurisdiction dummy. . . If the distance variables were insignificant. traveling costs rose so that diffusion was slowed down above a certain distance. the estimated coefficients for quadratic variables may indicate that beyond a certain point. once distance is taken out of the estimates. even if strongly significant at times. it appears that the diffusion follows a quadratic rather than linear form. In this sense.290 FRANCESCO L. and the logit is recalculated with all the time variables and the political jurisdiction dummy. The mutation introduced in the population was passed on to geographically proximate carriers. The time dummies. tell an interesting story. But it is the distance. Equally evident on balance is the reversal of the trend after the Black Death: the probability that the supply of seed and livestock would be shared or taken on entirely by the landlord rises after 1347. that is driving the parameters. The worsening of the tenants’ bargaining power during the centuries of demographic growth is quite visible in the negative coefficients relating the probability that complementary inputs would be supplied by landlords or shared to the period 1200 to 1347. In other cases (the probability that seed would be shared vs. In some cases. are rather “weak. But it is the significance of . notably the probability that landlords would supply livestock vs. not the political jurisdiction. quadratic distance variables. provided that traveling times and costs were linear in the distance traveled. that tenants would. In any event. that tenants would supply it) the coefficients suggest linearity. this kind of result would suggest that mutations had arisen in several distinct locations independently. if all distance variables are omitted from the estimate. GALASSI last recorded use of the clause (linear or squared) perform better than the distance from the location of first use. contracts signed in Florentine territory are less likely to include particular clauses. This is powerful evidence in favor of evolutionary spreading. What do the estimates suggest about the nature of this diffusion? The evidence is ambiguous. linearity in diffusion is to be expected. This is not surprising: since the earliest contracts are from Siena.” Their marginal effects tend to be in the order of fractions of percentage points. In some ways. which try to capture changing demographic trends. Interestingly. in a process that must resemble what I discussed in Part IV above. this latter is intuitively convincing: if modifications to the original template traveled with notaries. the latter is weakly significant (10 per cent) and negative in all cases. The story probably goes something like this. must have communicated with one another (even across political boundaries) to find solutions. . the carriers of the template. in some abstract sense.ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS 291 the distance parameter estimates that underscores that learning was in fact taking place. There was.. A landlord who had to supply tenants with seed in the early fifteenth century may have been. but so did access to information about how best to make use of changing circumstances. If the technical coefficients of production were not fixed. Rather. less clearly. no unique optimizing solution. In periods of stress. in other words. who in turn spoke to others farther away. time) matters to relative probabilities estimated by the logit.35 There was rather an area of possible outcomes. and this must be stressed. Any given solution spread 35 Knight. the notaries. The downside of the sharing rule was that both parties had an incentive to economize on their complementary inputs (= supply inputs only up to the point where their marginal product equaled their opportunity cost times the reciprocal of the rental share). that is in periods when one party was willing to give up some ground to gain access to an income stream.e. reason to believe that the changing relative contributions embodied in these clauses were not arrived at independently at different places and different times. which require that actors be interchangeable and rules continuous. There is. i. they spread: distance (and. worse off than his ancestor who had obtained it from his tenants 150 years earlier. who in turn repeated the process. no well-defined point of tangency among Edgeworthian contract curves. and over this area Tuscan landlords and tenants bargained to and fro for centuries. to identify successful mutations that would spread in the population. bargaining between the contracting parties would determine their respective contributions. Institutions. The contingent events of a given time period affected the outcomes of the bargaining processes. The mezzadria contract fulfilled the function of giving labor self-monitoring incentives in conditions where it was costly to solve agency problems through direct supervision. But above all what the logit strongly suggests is that there was in fact an evolutionary process at work here. but was still better off than not having tenants at all. They communicated with the most proximate colleagues. Whether they do or not is an . The approach taken here is that this is to be found in the simplest “non-reducible” rules. in that what players were ultimately bargaining for was the final output of land. Diffusion means learning: under certain stimuli. focusing on the clauses themselves makes the game in which landlords and tenants were engaged appear as zero-sum. and it would seem likely that in general members of the legal profession are likely to perform this function for a large number of institutions. In reality. But the issue here is whether the historical process is theoretically enlightening for researchers interested in institutional choice and change in general. In the current instance this has been identified in the “template” of the notaries. All that was happening was that the price one or the other player had to pay to have access to this output rose or fell depending on contingent events. the exact process of diffusion of contractual clauses in late medieval Tuscan agriculture may in itself be of interest to agrarian historians. In fact. GALASSI because it reduced uncertainty for increasing number of people who found existing arrangements unsatisfactory. more actors were interested in learning of new solutions. labor and capital.292 FRANCESCO L. It matters little to present purposes that one or the other party lost or gained something as a result of each mutation. And the process by which contingent events affected individuals was an evolutionary one: solutions worked out in one place spread. A notary who could satisfy many clients by introducing a “good” adaptation in the template would have additional clients beating a path to his door. this was a positive sum game. The second is to identify the means by which these non-reducible rules are stored and transmitted. The first is that modeling institutional change requires the identification of the exact unit of selection. thereby ensuring that the successful clause would spread further. In that sense the opportunity to follow change over 700 years is useful in that it may help define a research agenda for the analysis of institutional change. VI In the end. and would be copied by other notaries. and it is on that criterion alone that the contribution of this article rests. however. aggregates of which form institutions. an agenda that would seem to consist of three main items. If so. In this case. . and as a consequence of the second point. unless they were themselves landlords.ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS 293 empirical question which need not detain us here beyond stressing that transmission is not independent of the transmitter. and the distributional effects of passing the information on have to be modeled in any credible attempt to understand institutional choice and change as a general process. But those who store the information are not necessarily transmission neutral. this aspect has been neglected in that the notaries had no obvious interest in siding with one or the other party when drawing up the contract. Finally. understanding institutional choice and change involves understanding the incentives of the transmitters. however this does not seem to have affected the shift in contractual clauses against the interests of landowners after the demographic crisis of the fourteenth century. x x . x MARKET INTEGRATION x . x x . The Commercialisation of English Society. 121-73. Merchants and Markets: Inland Trade in Medieval England. 1980). the expansion of commercial activity. 10001500. 1996). Martin’s Press. Hatcher and M. H. 1997). lies nearby and is for the inhabitants as good as a granary. 35. Quintin D’Autun. in H. 1 . 2001). The Earliest Description of Malta (Lyons 1536) (Malta: DeBono Enterprises. Britnell. J. very fertile in all kinds of grain. the extent and effect of these changes at a regional or local level is less clear. Legal. Peasants. Aloisio “Malta is very fortunate for this one reason. whereby urban demand for foodstuffs stimulates specialization and higher levels of productivity in agriculture. R. with trans. For an exposition of the commercialist approach.2 This approach emphasizes the role of trade in promoting a greater division of labor in town and countryside. where otherwise they would die of hunger.”1 I The economy of medieval Europe is increasingly studied in the context of a “commercialist” or Smithian framework. institutional or social barriers represented transaction costs that could significantly limit the flow of trade or access to markets. 2 For instance. Insulae Melitae descriptio (Lyons 1536). J. 2nd. (Manchester: Manchester University Press. as well as more efficient distribution of resources. R. Towns perform a crucial role in these models. the kingdom of Sicily—of which the Maltese Islands formed part—was a politically J. In the fifteenth century. and the progressive integration and greater sophistication of regional market networks. Bailey. ed. Modelling the Middle Ages. 1150-1350 (New York: St. Yet while few would dispute the increased commercialization and sophistication of the late medieval economy generally. Masschaele. ed. Vella.A TEST CASE FOR REGIONAL MARKET INTEGRATION? THE GRAIN TRADE BETWEEN MALTA AND SICILY IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES Mark A. namely that Sicily. The History and Theory of England’s Economic Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press. “Lo stato e la vita economica. Cerdeña (Madrid: n. M. repr. ed. the grain trade was channeled through specially designated ports known as caricatori. S. Epstein. An Island for Itself: Economic Development and Social Change in Late Medieval Sicily (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. On the Mediterranean grain trade in the Middle Ages. 1986). 25-30 Aprile 1982. 1994). I. 1977). De Boüard.p. La Sardegna (Pisa-Cagliari: Pacini.” Annales d’Histoire Économique et Sociale 10 (1938): 483-501. in D. 1983). “Il commercio dei grani nella Sicilia del ‘500. “Un grand commerce médiéval: les céréales dans le bassin de la Méditerranée occidentale: Remarques et suggestions. 4 D. “Sul commercio del grano siciliano nel tardo Duecento. 1981).” Archivio storico per la Sicilia orientale 72 (1975): 7-40. 5-22. Since the reign of Frederick II. P. 1300-1450. Aspetti dei commercio dei cereali nei Paesi della Corona d’Aragona. Italy. Sicilian wheat was exported to cities in northern Italy (particularly Florence and Genoa). D. Wolff. Angevin and Aragonese rulers took an active interest in the commercial exploitation of this vital commodity. 2 vols. H. Abulafia. R. 165-187.298 MARK A. Palermo-Trapani-Erice. 147-74. I mercanti catalani e l’espansione della Corona d’Aragona nel secolo XV (Naples: L’Arte Tipografica Napoli. 1992).” in P. 1987). Tangheroni. France and Spain and occasionally even to north Africa..” VI Congreso de la Corona de Aragon. (Rome-Palermo: Bibliothéques des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome. “Problèmes de subsistance dans un état médiéval: le marché et les prix des céréales au royaume angevin de Sicile (1266-1282). vol. Federico II e il mondo mediterraneo (Palermo: Sellerio. Abulafia. Cancila. II The important role of Sicily in the grain trade of the medieval Mediterranean is well known. ALOISIO unified state with a relatively commercialized economy. Lettere e Arti. 1983). Bresc. Un monde méditerranéen: économie et societé en Sicile. Abulafia. The Two Italies: Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.. . M. Baroni e popolo nella Sicilia del grano (Palermo: Palumbo. Toubert and A. 1972). Abulafia. Aymard. 2 (Palermo: Accademia di Scienze. Paravicini.4 Sicily’s Norman.3 At one time or another. most of them located in the western half of the island where much of the 3 M. M. 1959). O. Del Treppo. D. It has recently been argued that during the late Middle Ages Sicily’s internal markets became progressively more integrated. fully aware of the substantial revenues that its export brought into their coffers. In the course of this paper I wish to discuss the extent of this economic integration by highlighting some obstacles that disrupted the trade in grain between Sicily and Malta during much of the fifteenth century. essay VII.” in La società mediterranea all’epoca del Vespro: XI Congresso della Corona d’Aragona. Sicily and the Mediterranean 1100-1400 (London: Variorum. in spite of these impressive figures. with the partial exception of Messina. as Epstein himself concedes.” Annali della Facoltà di Economia e Commercio dell’Università di Palermo 11 (1957): 217-52.000 salme was probably typical throughout the 1460s with a maximum of 90. estimates put grain exports at less than ten per cent of domestic output. 44. (Ricerche quattrocentesche) (Cosenza: Pellegrini Editore.10 It seems therefore that most of the grain produced in Sicily was consumed locally. 133. Baroni. in C.000 salme and perhaps around 40.000 salme were shipped out of Sicilian ports in 1407-1409 but this may have been an exceptional year.9 Nonetheless. Mediterraneo e Sicilia all’inizio dell’epoca moderna. 1977). did not apply in the case of a strategic and relatively scarce commodity such as grain. given their inability to rely on institutional privileges for economic and human resources. Un monde. had little direct control over their hinterland. Trasselli. Cancila. 127-8. Baroni. C. “Lo stato. S. Syracuse and Catania. Stephan Epstein believes that. 10 Epstein. 5 6 Abulafia. An Island for Itself.” Economic History Review 46 (3) (1993): 453-77.GRAIN TRADE BETWEEN MALTA AND SICILY 299 grain was grown. Cancila. 274. An Island for Itself. “Sull’esportazione dei cereali dalla Sicilia negli anni 1402-1407.000 salme in the 1490s. 20 reaches similar conclusions.” 165-87. “Town and Country: Economy and Institutions in Late Medieval Italy. R.000 salme in the following century (1 salma = 2. . Messina and to smaller centers such as Trapani.6 The island’s reputation as a major grain producer was indeed well-founded.5 Sicily produced at least three types of wheat by the sixteenth century but the hard variety (grano duro) was especially prized for its capacity to resist rot while remaining in storage for several years.000 to 30. 16. Sicily’s towns and cities were forced to obtain these resources on a competitive basis.8 An average of 50. Epstein. 7 Bresc.75 hl). repr. occasionally reaching a maximum share of fifteen per cent. An Island for Itself. Agrigento and Licata to the two main cities of Palermo. 8 Cancila. A system of land and (more importantly) sea transport linked the caricatori of Sciacca. where urban centers frequently obtained jurisdictional authority over the surrounding their contado and its resources. however.7 Some 122. 275. this state of affairs. Unlike northern Italy.000-100. Sicilian cities. Baroni. In the late thirteenth century annual export levels averaged 20.11 However. Trasselli. 11 Epstein. 331-70. 9 Epstein. Petino. Genoese and other foreign merchants. 1963). 107-8. Salvo. L’élite urbana a Messina tra Medio Evo e Età Moderna (Rome: Bibliopolis. Indications are. Politica e società nella Sicilia aragonese (Palermo: U. Manfredi.14 In fifteenth-century Messina. that Sicily’s domestic grain market remained quite fragmented throughout much of the fifteenth century. 1991).300 MARK A. This is hardly surprising given that.000 salme. the monarchy appears to have been unable or reluctant to consistently enforce institutional reforms favoring more open markets. For instance. 14 D. ALOISIO In 1392 Martin I of Aragon invaded Sicily in order to restore royal authority and put an end to years of wars and internal political instability. and reducing tolls on internal trade. The grain reserves of many cities were frequently low and any interruption in the supply chain could provoke considerable hardships for the inhabitants.16 V. The Rise of the Western World. one of the principal outlets for the export of grain in Sicily. in order to do so. 13 Epstein. Thomas. P. suggests that the interests of the local authorities were often in conflict with those who had grain for sale because the latter found it more profitable to sell their stocks to Catalan. the state often needed to act against powerful and entrenched local or sectional interests including monopoly rights of feudal lords and protectionist measures by individual cities. P. Governare un Regno. An Island for Itself.13 Among the latter measures was a decree passed in 1398 which stated that no tratte or trade permits were to be paid on grain exchanged intra regno and hence destined for internal consumption. 96. 1952). the grain trade was effectively controlled by local municipal officials who not only decided the price at which grain was to be sold in the city but frequently also owned the very estates from where that grain was bought. Corrao. 12 .000 salme while production averaged some 18. In this case at least. 30. Aspetti e momenti di politica granaria a Catania e in Sicilia nel Quattrocento (Catania: Università di Catania. 15 C. C. Giurati. D’Alessandro.000-15. Potere. 97-100. Catania’s annual grain requirements in the fifteenth century were in the region of 12. North and R. A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.12 The Aragonese monarchy also took steps to revive Sicily’s economy and promote inter-regional trade by establishing new fairs. 1995). Feudatari Mercanti. 1973). however. standardizing weights and measurements. società e istituzioni in Sicilia fra Trecento e Quattrocento (Naples: Liguori Editore.15 My own research based on the notarial archives of Sciacca. 16 A. 19 Some of the larger cities managed to either assure themselves of preferential access to grain stocks through special arrangements or by closing ports or even by interdicting grain destined for export.” in V. after the town’s giurati (municipal officials) had acted to prevent grain exports out of their port. I mercanti. often faced even greater difficulties. were increasingly forced into a harsh struggle to gain control over food supplies for their citizens. 3. 1980). Alfonso passed a series of measures promoting grain exports at the expense of domestic consumption requirements.. 17 .GRAIN TRADE BETWEEN MALTA AND SICILY 301 Moreover. Smaller communities. in the course of the fifteenth century. 744-7. both of which could be obtained by manipulating sales of grain. the soil is shallow and water generally scarce V. regime della terra e società rurale (secoli XI-XV). while engaged in military campaigns against Naples. in R. By then Martin had been succeeded by Alfonso V who intervened directly in the Italian grain markets. 19 Bresc. Sicily’s towns. Terra. 58-60. The surface is rocky in most places. Gozo and Comino. orig. 10 vols. III The Maltese islands.17 In 1404. faced with a growing population and rising grain prices. 3: 411-47. in 1433 the crown had given permission to two feudal lords to establish their own caricatori in the region thereby bypassing that of Agrigento. 18 Del Treppo. consisting of Malta. apparently with great zeal. The Aragonese king was at that moment desperately in need of funds and provisions. as grain exports increased. Romano. have a combined area of only about 316 square kilometers.18 In the 1430s. D’Alessandro. That assurance notwithstanding. such as the Maltese Islands. 357-9 and Chap. Un monde. ed. An example from Agrigento serves to emphasize this point. selling grain during periods of scarcity and high demand. Thus. D’Alessandro. “Paesaggio agrario. (Naples: Società editrice Storia di Napoli e della Sicilia. the desire on the part of the state to act in the interests of the urban masses and to implement long-term economic reforms often conflicted with more immediate political and fiscal concerns. publ. 1994). Martin I declared to those officials the monarchy’s intention to act in the interests of the island’s cities first and the merchants second. nobili e borghesi nella Sicilia medievale (Palermo: Sellerio. Storia della Sicilia. Medieval Malta.21 Given their geographical proximity. The Making of Christian Malta (Aldershot: Variorum. it was natural for the Maltese to look to Sicily. 1975). Buhagiar. A more accurate picture A. In the fifteenth century it was extensively utilized in Barcelona and also in Genoa and Montpellier. was widely exported and provided a valuable source of income through which Malta was able to pay for the growing necessity to purchase wheat from nearby Sicily. C. Wettinger. Luttrell. 2004). Sicilian wheat was of superior quality compared to that grown in Malta and was therefore always in demand. (Malta: Progress Press. For more recent overviews. 218. T. probably hovering around 10. Blouet. Malta (the largest of the three islands) managed to support a sizeable population throughout the late middle ages. with wheat. ed. Most other inhabitants were dispersed in rural settlements where they cultivated their own fields or worked on the larger private fiefs or royal estates.” in A. Cotton. 21 H. 1982). “Agriculture in Malta in the Late Middle Ages. to supply local needs.. both raw and in spun form.” in M. Iz-Zmien Nofsani Malti (Malta: Pubblikazzjonijiet Indipendenza.22 A number of instances are known in the fourteenth century when Malta actually exported grain to Sicily but even then these were probably unusual occurrences. Dalli. which guarded the island’s main harbor located in the south-east.. Nonetheless. rev. 2002). “Approaches to Medieval Malta. The Story of Malta. Medieval Malta. 132. Del Treppo provides several examples of Catalan merchants purchasing cotton in Malta. Bresc. The only sizeable concentrations of people on Malta were the town of Mdina with its suburb of Rabat in the center and the royal castle at Birgu. 2002). Maltese cotton is mentioned in Genoa in 1164: Abulafia. 22 G. a mere 60 km away. 13. repr. Luttrell. ALOISIO so that even today agriculture is heavily dependent on winter precipitation. 1-70. ed. and the fact that they both formed part of the same political order. Studies on Malta before the Knights (London: The British School at Rome. Proceedings of History Week 1981 (Malta: The Malta Historical Society. 20 . the need for Malta to import grain was probably not acute prior to the fifteenth century.” in Luttrell. B. ed. in A. T. The Two Italies.000 by the early fifteenth century. remains the best introduction to the island’s medieval history. Agriculture was the mainstay of the economy and the land was worked by a free peasantry.20 In spite of the harsh physical environment. The archipelago was incorporated into the Norman kingdom of Sicily in the late eleventh century and after 1282 became a peripheral outpost of the Crown of Aragon.302 MARK A. Luttrell. “The ‘Secrezia’ and the Royal Patrimony in Malta: 1240-1450. cumin and cotton being the principal crops. T. ed. Wettinger.. “Une croissance sélective: la population sicilienne aux XVIe-XVIIe siècles.” Melita Historica 5 (2) (1969): 80-106. Acta Iuratorum. 1480. Freller. or 5.”24 The Maltese historian Godfrey Wettinger argues that in this period it became increasingly necessary to supplement local production with regular imports. the authorities debated whether they should purchase 2.” Mélanges de la Casa de . In 1468. 26 Wettinger... Giambruno and L.23 In 1435 the Maltese claimed that grain shortages occurred every two to three years and were reducing the island to “great poverty.26 Given that one salma was equivalent to the yearly consumption for 1-1.” 14. § 772. 2002). which admittedly may have been an unusually harsh year. Alcamo-Malta (Palermo: Boccone del povero. “Li Buki di Rabatu: The Population of Rabat c. ed.5 individuals. possibly drawn up in response to the above-mentioned invasion scare.25 In critical moments the estimated need for grain could be higher still. probably on the order of 1000-2000 salme each year. Hospitaller Malta 1530-1798.000. 121-6. Fiorini. 1993). Melitensium Amor. as the island experienced a demographic upsurge that doubled the population to almost 20. Cortis. Genuardi. Festschrift in honour of Dun Gwann Azzopardi (Malta: Gutenberg Press. Wettinger. faced with the threat of a Turkish invasion. 1.27 Certainly the need to import grain pressed ever more urgently upon the Maltese authorities between the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. Mallia-Milanes. ed. “Agriculture in Malta.000 salme. 3..000.000 salme. L. eds. S. 28 G. Bugeja.” in V. “The Militia List of 1419-20: A New Starting Point for the Study of Malta’s Population. 24 S. Acta Iuratorum et Consilii Civitatis et Insulae Maltae (Palermo: Associazione di Studi Malta-Sicilia/Centro di Studi Filologici e Linguistici Siciliani. Aymard. 1993).GRAIN TRADE BETWEEN MALTA AND SICILY 303 of Malta’s grain requirements is possible for the fifteenth century for which more documentary material has survived. Studies on Early Modern Malta and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem (Malta: Mireva. A population list from 1480 for the community of Rabat. in G. T. indicated that its population of 317 households necessitated an additional 896 salme of grain. Comparable demographic growth patterns have been observed for Sicily in the later fifteenth century: M.000 by 153028 (at the time of the arrival of the knights 23 The main sources utilized here are the records of the Maltese municipal administration. 73-96.” in T. Fiorini. 1918). the municipal council ordered the purchase of 4. 409: “ki omni dui oy tri anni pati penuria di victuaglu per ki a quista chitati et insola fa misteri trahiri di Sichilia gran quantitati di frumenti. while in 1480. § 286. these figures represent significant amounts that must have imposed a considerable financial burden on the island’s limited resources. 27 S.” 25 Wettinger. “Malta in 1530. Capitoli inediti delle città demaniali di Sicilia approvati sino al 1458. 1-18. Malta and Gozo were importing about 9. Salvo.” in S.32 The precise extent to which personal interests impinged on the public responsibility of the universitas to provision its citizens with grain is difficult to assess. “Capitoli: The Voice of an Elite. Fiorini.30 The universitas of Malta was based at Mdina but its jurisdiction in fact extended beyond the limits of that town to include all the villages on the island. ed. Corrao. the task of ensuring that the population were adequately supplied with wheat was the responsibility of the local municipal council or universitas. The language used in the debates that took place during council meetings was often vague and the necessary prosopographical research that can identify relations among different families or groups has not yet been done. 37-46. For similar patterns of behavior within the universitas of Messina. 727. of whom only 42 had members who became jurati. 30 P. 29 Wettinger. Historical Essays Presented to Professor Godfrey Wettinger on his Seventieth Birthday (Malta: Malta University Press. The principal officials of the universitas were the captain. de Boccard. Karissime Gotifride. Fiorini. Xuereb. ed. . In addition to the procurement of grain. “Malta in 1530.31 From 1402 to 1457. 1999).. Proceedings of History Week 1992 (Malta: The Malta Historical Society. the universitas of Malta was effectively controlled by 68 families.000 salme of wheat annually.. “Assemblee municipali nella Sicilia tardomedievale: note sul caso maltese. Studies on the Maltese universitas and other universitates in Sicily have demonstrated that they tended to be dominated by a small group of families. By then. who often viewed public office as an opportunity to promote sectional or private interests. and the enforcement of price controls on foodstuffs. Giurati. 1994). Moreover.29 As in other towns and cities in Sicily. “Agriculture in Malta. that office was in fact monopolized by fourteen families whose members received 101 of 145 municipal appointments. 95-120. Roughly 16 per cent of debates and deliberations within the town council between 1450 and 1499 concerned matters relating to grain. 4: 303-27. 31 C. where a large section of the population lived. who were chosen locally and served for one year. However. Dalli. the farming out of indirect taxes (gabelle) on imported and exported goods.304 MARK A.” in P. 1968). and the jurati. ALOISIO of St John).” 14. the universitas oversaw the defense of the island. Un monde.” 111-98. 32 Bresc. who was appointed by the royal authorities. the proVelasquez (Paris: E. . “liberam et generalem potestatem administracionem et procuram pro emendo frumentum per universitatem et illud mictendo cum navigiis et si invenerit aliquem qui offeret fornire insolam frumento pro toto anno eciam ad granos duos ultra quod veniret ad expensas universitates quod habeat licenciam concordandi hoc prestito per eum juramento sollempni dum modo quod alii ferentes possent vendere . Most grain destined for Malta was apparently shipped from Terranova. like other Sicilian towns. all on Sicily’s southern coast. In that case. if found acceptable. including Licata and Syracuse. and the price at which it would be sold in Malta. Acta Iuratorum.33 In other instances. and these officials most likely functioned as intermediaries between sellers and buyers. 1 tarì = 20 grani. § 561. already delineated by Mario Del Treppo. the jurati discussed the offer and. § 219 (1462): council granted Fredericus Calabachi. If these examples represent a more widespread pattern of behavior among Maltese municipal authorities at the time they would have certainly represented a further disruption to the flow of trade in grain between the two islands. grani and denari (1 uncia = 30 tarì. tarì. Contemporary records indicate the involvement of Maltese and Sicilians in this trade but Catalan merchants were especially prominent. 34 Wettinger. The Maltese uncia was equivalent to around one-seventh of that of Sicily in the late fifteenth century. As in Sicily.GRAIN TRADE BETWEEN MALTA AND SICILY 305 posals put forward by some council members frequently appear to have specifically favored certain individuals at the expense of others. For instance. They also needed to decide how much grain to buy and at what price. communal officials often appointed a representative charged with its procurement. had consuls in various parts of Sicily where its merchants traded.. At other times. the money of account used in Malta and Gozo was the uncia.34 The Maltese universitas. whereby Catalans supplied cloth and agricultural products to Malta in 33 Wettinger. the Maltese authorities were approached directly by individuals or firms willing to bring grain to the island. gave permission for the deal to take place. This activity confirms a pattern. in March 1474 a number of merchants protested a decision by the universitas that prohibited the sale of grain for eight days with the exception of one merchant who a few days earlier had been allowed to sell a quantity of wheat at the high price of 21 tarì per salma. § 562.” . When it became necessary to import wheat to Malta. § 556. a fellow jurat. some jurati attempted to manipulate the selling price of imported grain to favor another merchant who was entrusted with its procurement (and who served periodically as a jurato). Acta Iuratorum. 1 grano = 6 denari). Licata and Syracuse. Capitoli.38 As the example of Malta demonstrates.40 35 Del Treppo. yet other requests to reconfirm this privilege recur in 1435 and 1450. 36 Epstein. ALOISIO exchange for Maltese raw and spun cotton. Capitoli. 141. This aim appeared to have been realized in 1398. An Island for Itself. Martin I exempted from export duties all commerce intra regno involving grain and foodstuffs traded by sea.37 It has been argued that Martin’s decree contributed to the formation of an integrated grain market in Sicily by opening the way for reduced incidences of shortages and more stable prices. alleging that they were being taxed at one-half tratta for each salma. The exchange of Catalan cloth and foodstuffs for Maltese grain by a Catalan merchant company in the 1450s and 1460s is difficult to explain: Del Treppo. I mercanti. however. that were levied on exports of grain fuori regno. but any trade privileges granted would have been lost from 1421 to 1428. 141-50. In practice things worked rather differently. commercial relations between Malta and Sicily should have been categorized as internal trade. I mercanti. royal privileges could lose much of their effect if they fell into disuse (as the Maltese claimed) or were not reconfirmed or firmly enforced. when Malta and Gozo were pawned to the Aragonese nobleman Gonsalvo Monroy and so were not part of the demesne. In fact. 172. An Island for Itself. 174-5. following the reincorporation of the islands into the demesne.39 Alfonso granted another exemption from payment of export licenses on grain and other victuals in 1432.” Melita Historica 7 (3) (1978): 265-83. 390. one of the most pressing concerns for the Maltese universitas in the early fifteenth century was to obtain from the royal officials a permanent exemption from payment of the tratte and other taxes on trade. and hence exempted from payment of licences. when shortly after the restoration of Aragonese power in Sicily. 37 Giambruno and Genuardi. among them that of Malta. 39 G. . 40 Giambruno and Genuardi.36 In 1416 however. 38 Epstein. 176. “The Pawning of Malta to Monroy.306 MARK A. It is not known whether Ferdinand acceded to the Maltese request. known as tratte. 166-7. the Maltese petitioned Ferdinand I to reconfirm that privilege. 376. Wettinger.35 As a territory that formed part of the kingdom of Sicily. That privilege was hitherto enjoyed only by the city of Messina but was now extended throughout the demesne which included most universitates. Fiorini. § 125 (1461).41 Small towns or isolated communities may have been especially vulnerable because they could not easily make their voice heard. 44 Del Amo García. § 216 (1462). 46 Del Amo García. Sciacca. 366-7. and Wettinger. S. ed. the Maltese continued to experience difficulties procuring grain.46 In difficult circumstances the universitas sometimes adopted harsh measures such as requiring those who held stocks of grain to sell it immediately. No. §279 (1468).45 In fact by 1515. Fiorini. in spite of an order from the viceroy. Malta appears to have been buying grain from several caricatori including Agrigento. Acta Iuratorum. particularly during the summer months when the weather was favorable to longer voyages. § 45. Acta Iuratorum. Acta Iuratorum. 371. J. § 101. Bresc. Miscellanea 33. § 101. Wettinger. and Wettinger. Archivum Cathedralis Melitae. Documents. Fiorini.” 42 41 . § 517. §215 (1462). 1405-1524. and Wettinger. § 314 (1468): “si faza la cherca di quilli ki hannu portatu frumentu et si l’annu portatu per usu so si pigla parti per vindiri a lu populu. and G. 1. either because of the intransigence or corruption of port officials who refused to honor toll exemptions or because towns in Sicily were unwilling to allow sales of grain for fear that they themselves might experience shortages.42 In 1483. In 1483 the port official of Licata asked the Maltese authorities not to buy all their grain from his city but to extend their search to other ports. § 96. and in 1507 Maltese who wished to buy grain from Terranova were allegedly being forced to pay bribes to customs officials or risk imprisonment. Capitoli.48 or to institute forced loans upon all or some members of the community with which the universi- Wettinger. § 927. Giambruno and Genuardi. § 84.43 Similar protests were made in 1513 and 1515 against other port authorities. 45 Del Amo García.47 to conduct searches to reveal hoarded supplies. Cathedral Museum.44 Times of scarcity only compounded the usual difficulties. Documents. 47 Wettinger. 43 Wettinger. Mazara.GRAIN TRADE BETWEEN MALTA AND SICILY 307 Even when trading privileges were in force. Licata. Some people made their own private arrangements to purchase grain in Sicily. 745. Documents of the Maltese Universitas. Documents. which perhaps explains why the capitoli (petitions) of the universitas of the island of Lipari contained complaints similar to those by the Maltese. the authorities in Licata refused to sell wheat to Malta. and Heraclea. 48 Wettinger. Del Amo García. Un monde. Fiorini. Mdina. Wettinger.. Documentary Sources of Maltese History (Malta: Malta University Press. 2001). On the cherca. § 73 (1456). Acta Iuratorum. Acta Iuratorum. Rather their object was to extend and protect the control of commercial activity . Modelling the Middle Ages. I believe that the evidence presented above confirms the view that economic intervention by the medieval state generally came in spurts and its effect was. they may have indeed contributed to a reduction of institutional constraints on trade and promoted regional specialization and greater market integration. at best. Acta Iuratorum. § 25 (undated).49 If the situation was deemed to be especially critical. §218 (1462) (forced loan of 1000 florins on “persuni facultusi”). but nonetheless important. § 547. I would like to remark on two implications which can be derived from this study.. §197 (1462).. Acta Iuratorum. Malta’s alienation from the demesne between 1421 and 1428—by no means a unique event among demesnal cities in the 49 Wettinger. this did not occur.308 MARK A. 50 Wettinger. When stategranted economic privileges were reasonably respected or enforced. First. 51 Hatcher and Bailey. it is admittedly notoriously difficult. for the profit of a few beneficiaries. the Maltese evidence shows that there were also several instances where. towns and urban elites were often more concerned with protecting their particular fiscal and commercial privileges than in reducing the cost of regional trade. unevenly distributed. and this inevitably restricted the scale of any reduction in the transaction costs of marketing for most producers.51 Second.50 IV In conclusion. As John Hatcher and Mark Bailey have recently noted: legal controls over trade in the Middle Ages were not intended to secure cheap and ready participation for as many as possible. . § 549. the universitas authorized the seizure of ships carrying grain to other destinations and confiscated their cargo. in practice. 168. I suggest that the extent to which urban demand in the late Middle Ages was responsible for opening commodity markets and lowering the costs of trade was in part limited by conflicts of interests within and among individual towns. However. Even in a relatively commercialized society like late medieval Sicily. to assess the effect of commercialization on a local level. § 548. ALOISIO tas could purchase grain (inpronti). .GRAIN TRADE BETWEEN MALTA AND SICILY 309 kingdom of Sicily—stands as a reminder that. the benefits of short term gains might outweigh long-term expectations. for the state. must remain an open question. He links the change also to the rise in transaction costs with the onset of wars in the 1290s. including 5. John H.505 debt recognitions. Its cloth was the most highly taxed of any Flemish textiles at the fairs of Provins. Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen. 1909-1913). Comptes de la ville d’Ypres de 1267 à 1329. when the 1 Elizabeth Chapin. the most precocious in record-keeping.3 Indeed. most questions concerning Ypres must remain open.1 The decline of the textile industry of Ypres in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is well known. 109. Before the war the city archivist.” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial. either as cause or effect. once the richest of Flanders. De Sagher. and Transaction Costs. 1937). 4 Guillaume Des Marez and E. 118. Warfare. Guillaume Des Marez.und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 88 (2001): 1-47.2 The extent to which the decline of the Champagne fairs was involved in the general decay of Ypres’ prosperity. 9 (Antwerp: Standaard. at 14-9. 115. . because the archives of the city. (Brussels: Commission Royale d’Histoire. Lille. Klasse der Letteren. 2 See particularly Hans Van Werveke. 3 John Munro has argued persuasively that the eclipse of the Champagne fairs was due to a decline in the production of light woollens that had been the most important element in their prosperity. “The ‘New Institutional Economics’ and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: the Textile Trades. no. and the city maintained its own houses for merchant lodging at Provins and Lagny. that were contracted before the échevins of the city from 1 October 1249 to 18 June 1291. and the most involved in trade at the interregional fairs. Les villes de foires de Champagne des origins au début du XIVe siècle (Paris: Honoré Champion. Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België. De omvang van de Ieperse lakenproductie in de veertiende eeuw. eds.. 2 vols. 96. published the city accounts from 1267 to 13294 and took extensive notes on the more than seven thousand chirographs. Ypres. Bruges. Munro. were destroyed in 1914.COMMERCIAL CREDIT AND CENTRAL PLACE FUNCTION IN THIRTEENTH-CENTURY YPRES David Nicholas Of the five great cities of Flanders (Ghent. the most industrial. Douai) in the late thirteenth century Ypres was the last to develop urban characteristics. 1947). . . . . . . . . . . . . Castellany of Ypres and Environs .w egulated Textile Industries by 1382. . . . . . gros tournois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . His emphasis is on the fall in transaction costs in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the rise of fairs in the Low Countries. 105-67. did not indicate a reliance on long distance trade or even intra-European trade that would be typical of the following two centuries. and Anke Greve. 2000).” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial. 1 . International Trade in the Low Countries (14th-16th Centuries) Merchants.THRESHOLDS FOR MARKET INTEGRATION IN THE LOW COUNTRIES AND ENGLAND IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY Richard W. 14th to 16th Centuries. More stable political conditions allowing a revival in overland trade to Germany and Italy along with expansion of shipping were the foundation for subsequent growth in industrial production and in commerce. Flanders. Some food production within town walls was to be a common feature of European cities into the nineteenth century. in extending the scope of their trade.. Infrastructure (Leuven: Garant. Southeastern England.1 But for much of the two centuries before 1500 it appears that the participation of the towns around the southern North Sea in exchange. A. Even more dramatically they were net consumers of food. and Holland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. and in integrating their markets with those of other towns changed little and perhaps even declined. Urban dwellers kept animals and had gardens. Organisation.und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 88 (1) (2001): 20-8. “The ‘New Institutional Economics’ and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: The Textile Trades. Munro.” in Peter Stabel. and Flanders were the most urbanized parts of northern Europe. Bruno Blondé. eds. Brabant. See also John H. “English ‘Backwardness’ and Financial Innovations in Commerce with the Low Countries. But for the principal source of nutrition of pre-modern See among other works by John H. Towns were net consumers of people: Death rates were higher than birth rates. virtually all sizeable fifteenth-century cities north of Italy could be found in the region. environmental and political circumstances. while showing signs of economic growth and a remarkable ability to adjust to changing demographic. which largely meant London. Unger England. With the exception of Paris. and Transaction Costs. A. Munro. Warfare. a process he said which became 2 Marie-Jeanne Tits-Dieuaide. The process gained momentum in that most densely populated region of northern Europe in the following century giving something of an impression of the inevitability of the process. The towns of southeastern England and the Low Countries did not rely extensively on grain shipped to them from afar and. That seeming anomaly is. La formation des prix céréaliers en Brabant et en Flandre au XVe siècle (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles. . It appears that. Within the Low Countries. 1975). UNGER people in northern Europe.350 RICHARD W. Towns were a force for promoting and generating trade and exchange. Scholars examining the grain markets of the region through a variety of statistical tests—that is Marie-Jeanne Tits-Dieuaide2—and the growth of the largest city in sixteenth century Europe—that is Herman Van der Wee—among others. surprisingly. in the fifteenth century there was a high and increasing degree of market integration. barley and oats. The size of towns around the southern North Sea and their need for food grains would suggest a need for trade. in fact. 270-5. trade in food grains was limited. consistent with theoretical expectations and with the constraints placed on them by the availability of land and by the prevailing technologies of agriculture. The towns could function and prosper on the basis of nearby supplies. Cities were sumps for food grains. The principal urban markets in northern Europe in the later Middle Ages showed low degrees of market integration with those at any considerable distance away. however. found evidence for the emergence in the fifteenth century of an integrated market or markets in Flanders and Brabant. from the countryside. especially in what was a clearly defined and relatively small region. that was not the case in the fifteenth century. sucking wheat and rye. a force for creating conditions conducive to an economy based on shipping and commerce. Despite the high degree of urbanization. bread. and especially the southern Low Countries. Few towns reached or surpassed a threshold which forced them to seek food grains from distant points. not even grain shipped from relatively nearby. According to Van der Wee urban markets in Brabant were moving toward integration already well before 1500. people in cities had to import the raw material. A standard test for market integration is whether prices tended to converge and to move together. Town and Countryside from the late Middle Ages to the 19th Centuries: Supply and Demand of Food (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers. forthcoming). Then more common it appears was the development of integration in relatively small regions which were themselves in turn connected commercially through new periodic regional fairs that emerged in the period. Brussels. and Economic Growth in Late Medieval Europe. “Regional Fairs. and government regulations worked to prevent exchange. and Louvain. Epstein. For the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it appears that integration was local and at most regional.4 Though price movements in the various markets were not always of the same magnitude at exactly the same time. eds. The grander pattern. The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. may be common in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries but by no means was that the only possible outcome in the fifteenth. the southern Low Countries had emerged by 1500..5 In the sixteenth century the same regions became even more integrated among themselves but only then with markets elsewhere in northern Europe. “Feeding Low Countries Towns: The Grain Trade in the Fifteenth Century. Unger. Despite the long term outcome. 5 For a summary of the discussion about Low Countries market integration and further statistical confirmation of a level of regional market integration see Richard W. “Maritime Transport and the Integration of Low Countries Grain Markets in the Late Middle Ages. 4 See Appendix 1. wheat and rye. 6 Stephan R. warfare. Cumula3 Herman Van der Wee. despite the eventual integration of markets throughout northwestern Europe. Data from towns in the Netherlands outside of Flanders and Brabant suggest that the process of integration was advanced by then but less so in places like Douai and Utrecht than in Antwerp.3 Both he and Tits-Dieuaide were convinced that a closely related and connected regional market for. This suggests slow movement toward integration and within limits.” in Piet Van Cruyningen and Erik Thoen. 1963).MARKET INTEGRATION 351 more pronounced over time. called globalization by later writers. Institutional Innovation. .” Economic History Review 47 (3) (1994): 459-482. Richard W. the charting of prices leaves a strong impression of the convergence of prices of the principal food grains. 1: 23-4. 31. Unger.” Revue Belge de Philolgie et d'Histoire 77 (2) (1999): 32958.6 Levels of transactions costs. the final economic result was not inevitable. at the very least. to be expected of two markets that are integrated. Because of the higher price wheat was better able to cover transport costs and so was more likely to be exchanged across markets. To test the degree to which consumers moved not to distant sources for the same food grain but shifted to different grains in their own market prevailing prices were compared inside single markets. If prices moved up and down together. Consumers preferred wheat almost invariably. There was a hierarchy of food grains in late medieval markets. The wealthy bought wheaten bread and the not so wealthy bought it when they . On balance and in the long term it is true that the forces for integration prevailed. Many of the towns of the region only infrequently searched outside of the lands nearby for sources of food grains. Wheat prices were higher per unit volume always. the level of integration with other urban markets was scant. That indicates that when a good grain was in short supply consumers turned to other grains in the same market. however. UNGER tive improvements in agricultural production.352 RICHARD W. that is either by weight or volume depending on the practice of the individual market. Data on potential food grain production indicate why towns could and did get by in many if not most years on what local farmers grew in the fields around the towns. Comparisons were made using the currency prevailing in that market. At many points in the fifteenth century and for many parts of the region. At the same time swings in production thanks to changing natural conditions and improvements in transportation had the opposite effect. worked to make small parts of the region self-sufficient. including diversification and intensification. The demand for wheat was more susceptible to changes in the income of consumers. Where levels of correlation were high that indicates that when a food grain was in short supply consumers turned to sources of the good in other markets. then price series from the two markets for the same good should be highly correlated. Measures of market integration indicate the limited degree of reliance on distant markets and the limited scope of integration in the region. Corrections were made for differences in and changes in the units of measure. thus avoiding problems created by the changing values of currencies. In the fifteenth century in England and the Low Countries correlations of prices of different food grains in the same market were even higher than correlations of prices between markets. Barley was not in the same class as wheat which was alone at the top of the grain hierarchy but barley was probably ahead of rye because of its use in quality beer. If no grains were traded then prices would have been determined solely by local conditions. Brill. 116-20. it was used extensively in brewing. that is if prices changed consumption levels changed little. If farmers and merchants and shippers preferred to trade wheat over other grains then wheat prices should have been more highly correlated with prices in other markets.” (Samuel Johnson. the only variation being small and “Oats. If wheat was. A fall in the price of wheat drew more consumers into the market for the good. The market for wheat should have been larger. It was not just the lexicographer Dr. Economy.. Technology and the State (Leiden: E. more integrated and integrated earlier than those for inferior grains like rye or oats. Rye was like oats and for both consumption was price inelastic. If neither wheat nor oats nor barley nor rye was exchanged under such conditions of autarky the price movement of all grains would have been much the same.MARKET INTEGRATION 353 could afford it. 7 . II).7 In the Middle Ages the grain was used as animal feed but was also used for bread. The expectation is that the price of a traded grain would have had a high correlation with prices in other markets and much less of a correlation with prices of other grains in the same market. 2001). such as wheat or more likely rye. Those grains were so necessary to the diet of the poor that people simply had to buy them even when prices are up sharply. porridge and. Strahan for J. That seems to have been especially true in England in the later Middle Ages. a luxury good then oats was at the other end of the spectrum. in the Low Countries especially. 1755). 8 See Richard W. It was an inferior good in that presumably a fall in price would have led to no increase in consumption as people used the income released by the lower cost of oats to buy something else. Samuel Johnson who thought oats were intended for horses. relatively.8 So people did eat oats but it came at the bottom of the list among choices. Unger. A dictionary of the English language: in which the words are deduced from their originals. the next grain up the ladder of preference from oats. and illustrated in their different significations by examples from the best writers: to which are prefixed a history of the language and an English grammar (London: W. J. but in Scotland supports the people. and P. A grain which in England is generally given to horses. Knapton etc. A History of Brewing in Holland 900-1900. Leiden. is among the highest and not the lowest. barley.354 RICHARD W. also beyond the region around the southern North Sea. For sites with surviving lengthy price series for the four principal food grains. It is almost as if any two grains were complementary goods. that is Antwerp. The results still prove to be similar no matter the grains. UNGER caused by differences in the characteristics of demand for the different food grains. the great export centre for Polish grain and in the sixteenth century and beyond a major supplier of food grains to the Low Countries. Using price series starting in the late fourteenth century and running down to 1600.800 (Table 1). no matter the sample size and no matter the location. Gdansk. where the lowest level of correlation would be expected given the position of the two grains at either end of the hierarchy of food grains. Going futher afield. 9 . For Utrecht there is only surviving data for three grains.9 What is more the relationship between oats and wheat. offers few observations. showed little difference between the performance of rye and wheat prices. To put it another way if grains were traded there should have been high correlation among the prices for the same grains in different markets and if grains were not traded then there should be high correlations for different grains in each local market. like left and right shoes. and southern England the coefficients of correlation are almost always above 0. oats and wheat. As well some extremely high wheat prices in the closing years of the Hundred Years War strongly affect reThe rye and oats prices from Antwerp are compared to wheat prices from nearby Lier. much higher than the norm for prices for the same grain among different markets (Table 2). but of course food grains were not complements. For some markets there are only two surviving price series (Table 3). if there is one thing that leaps out from an examination of the correlation of grain prices within markets it is the consistently high—indeed staggeringly high—levels of correlation. The relationship between oats and wheat shows the lowest level of correlation but the difference between it and other levels is small. The somewhat lower levels of correlation of barley and oats prices with rye prices in Leiden could easily be a result of the relatively smaller sample size. but correlation of prices was still high. that is well into the era of greater market integration in the sixteenth century. The Paris case. . . . . . . such as Antwerp (Lier) and Leiden (0. The towns may already have . There is the possibility that to some degree the common internal price movements were generated by government price fixing or at least price regulation.460) and Utrecht and Leiden (0. With the same grain price correlations between markets are still low compared to the price correlations between grains in a single market. Despite some deviations the statement would seem to be true of all grains in all places and at all times and not just in the Low Countries and southeast England but in northwestern Europe in general.498). Even the sample size does not seem to affect the result.004).451). Price movements for different grains in the late Middle Ages and the sixteenth century were highly correlated within markets. Oats prices in Antwerp and Leiden were weakly correlated (0. Between Brussels and Amsterdam the correlation of rye prices is actually negative (-. The hand of the civic government can be seen in the complete consistency of price movement over the years up to 1600.MARKET INTEGRATION 361 one market are compared to levels in other markets. The levels of correlation within markets are staggering. especially when compared with levels of correlation among markets. For a comparison of barley and rye prices the results are similar (Table 6). The data would seem to indicate much more exchange of food grains within markets than among markets. If that is the case then government legislation worked against market integration. Correlations within Leiden and Antwerp between the two grains were high while comparisons between markets show lower levels of correlation.600). admittedly for minute samples. for example between Antwerp and Louvain (0.471) or south England with Antwerp (Lier) (0. another indication that markets were moderately independent and did not rely on common sources of supply. Even with markets close to each other the correlations of the figures for barley and rye are strikingly low.427) as were wheat prices between Bruges and Brussels (0. The correlations in prices for the four principal food grains in Strasbourg are simply too high to be explained by autarky. Though towns in the Low Countries and especially in the northern Low Countries were less dirigiste than their German counterparts in the sixteenth century the legislation which first appeared in the fifteenth century may have had some bite which would help explain internally consistent prices (Table 7). For the same grain the correlations between markets are also low. kept the mechanism of prices from working to draw supplies from areas of surplus. . are uniform. The capital did reach an impressive 80. even if somewhat flexible. Both transport and production costs. Leopold. or in other words minimizes the number of sites of any economic activity. They began purely theoretically and then made attempts to adjust their theories to conform more closely to the reality they knew. demand is infinitely elastic at a given price. 2nd ed. and Amsterdam went through dramatic expansion.000 souls by around 1300 but cities of that size and larger in northern Europe were more a product of the sixteenth century when political centres like Paris. sites which provide services to the population. (Rostock: G. would appear at equal intervals. August Lösch. To make life simple they began by assuming a world that is a flat undifferentiated plain—and in this case two spellings of plane are correct which is the kind of thing that brings relief to students and anxiety to the writers of spell checkers for computer programs. such as that no firm makes abnormal profits and that society maximizes the degree to which firms agglomerate. For medieval England the study of the maximum size of towns has meant the study of London. however. and to his followers. H. In dealing with questions of sources of food big cities have been the most popular sites for investigation and not just because the material is easier to muster. on the size of those settlements. Ultimately it was food and fuel supplies that both theoretically and practically constrained the population of towns. B. and there is a single market centre. 12 . It turns out that the distribution of those centres of population will be theoretically arranged regularly in a pattern of equilateral hexagons. August Lösch. Johan von Thünen. There are additional limiting assumptions. London. Der isolierte Staat in Beziehung auf Landwirtschaft und Nationalökonomie. von Thünen. and so the effectiveness set restrictions. the German geographer Walter Christaller and the professor who refused a post under National Socialism. 1842-1850). to return to that school of German scholars who dealt in what they called the economics of location.MARKET INTEGRATION 363 of farmers in feeding towns had limits. With those assumptions then production would logically be distributed evenly and equally across the plain so then central places.12 J. To measure the restrictions created by the need to feed urban populations perhaps the simplest way is to return to the world of that early nineteenth-century Pomeranian rye farmer. By accepting variations in geography and so a lack of uniformity in production but. intuitively and also mathematically it is the best choice to describe regions of production for maximizing efficiency of supply. Since the hexagon is the closest to the circle in shape. 123-5. Complex Spatial Systems: The Modelling Foundations of Urban and Regional Analysis (Harlow. 1954). Wolfgang F. The plain is finite in extent and at some point reaches what is a much more undifferentiated surface. Lösch went further in trying to loosen the rather strict assumptions of the essential theory. trans. theoretically. That would depend he realized on the profits that farmers could generate. Von Thünen envisaged. In a sense Christaller was trying to make more general the specific case that von Thünen had described. Von Thünen himself tried to relax the obviously inaccurate assumption that the world is a flat undifferentiated plain. So if farmers were trying to maximize their incomes that led him to the question of why farmers picked the specific crops they chose to raise at different locations. Consumers paid for the cost of producing a crop and also for transport costs so at a certain distance away from a consumption centre it was no longer economic to grow one crop but became profitable to grow another. UNGER Von Thünen wanted to know the maximum rent a landlord could get from farmland. examined the geometry asking what would be the optimum shape of the zones of production. 109-20. 81-2. Stolper (New Haven: Yale University Press. starting with the same set of assumptions. 2000).13 In general just as waterways lower transport costs hills increase them. Christaller. 13 Alan G.364 RICHARD W. 135-8. There is no doubt that the circle was the most efficient choice but a series of circles around each centre of consumption would not fill up the entire plain. 51-4. He did consider what happened if for example a river ran through the plain. The critical factors for the choice of a crop were then production costs per unit of land and transport costs. thus creating a range of lower transport costs. that is the sea. more important. The hexagon turns out to be four-fifths as efficient as a circle for the purpose. . in transport costs the neat The Economics of Location. Essex: Pearson Education. square and hexagon. a series of circles around a point of consumption and within each zone described by those circles farmers producing one crop or type of crop. Wilson. The collection of polygons that would fulfill that necessary function of blanketing the plain are the triangle. offering great insights—rather in the manner of many economic concepts and theories which are accepted on such a basis without ever having a chance of representing reality in any detailed respect. 81-4. 15 Wilson. armed with more sophisticated mathematics and computers to do iterative calculations at high speed.MARKET INTEGRATION 365 pattern of hexagons becomes skewed. still the shape. theorists have added a dynamism to the static models of Lösch and his predecessors. However. They are highly flexible. . 93. Complex Spatial Systems.14 The smaller the area under consideration. is similar to the regular hexagon which satisfied Christaller. 16 Wilson. “Climate and Economy in Eighteenth Century Switzerland. The geometrical patterns around multiple centres are varied and show a great potential variety in land use (Figure 1). however. though the geometrical form takes on more of an elliptical shape the further away from the centre (Figure 2).. Complex Spatial Systems. 14 ..15 According to Wilson. the more likely the pattern of supply would conform to the theoretically anticipated pattern of regular hexagons. 146.. The resulting models are more complex with von Thünen’s world of rings reduced to a special highly restricted case. and allow for variations in geography. By accepting that geography could be different the theorists also accepted that production costs could vary because of soil type and weather conditions. and able to accommodate a wide variety of variables and so better able to deal with known circumstances. Christaller’s system is too rigid to have any chance of representing reality . In the second half of the twentieth century. the flows between them. it should be emphasised that the theory is an outstanding creation. Yet in dealing with a single centre and even incorporating an interaction-location paradigm.. at least in the first zone closest to the centre.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 10 (1978): 719-23. The resulting spatial interaction modelling can with some ease consider the reciprocal relationships of multiple centres of consumption.16 While the criticism of location theory as it emerged in the first half of the twentieth century is certainly well established and acknowlOn differences in agricultural output depending on differences in weather patterns see Christian Pfister. Essex: Pearson Education Ltd. 2000).366 RICHARD W. 83) .. Wilson. UNGER Figure 1 Von Thünen Rings with an Interaction Model (Alan G. Complex Spatial Systems: The Modelling Foundations of Urban and Regional Analysis (Harlow. MARKET INTEGRATION 367 Figure 2 A Von Thünen System with Multiple Market Centres (Alan G. Complex Spatial Systems: The Modelling Foundations of Urban and Regional Analysis (Harlow.. Wilson. 83) . Essex: Pearson Education Ltd. 2000). feed for animals.” The London Journal 16 (1) (1991): 11. UNGER edged as sound. food for the farmer’s family. 1989). 1200-1520 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. the net figure for marketable grain was between 160 and 220 litres per hectare. “London’s Grain Supply: Changes in Production. That assumes that the entire rural population was involved solely in production of food for market. and for tithes. to support a town dweller. If for every farmer in the countryside there was one dependent person who consumed rather 17 Christopher Dyer. Galloway. . then it took around two hectares of farmland. There was wide variation of course but something like 300 litres net per hectare for wheat and oats and 400 litres net for barley seem reasonable for late medieval England. and while the addition of dynamical locational analysis shows how exceptional were the cases described by earlier theorists. 1113. Another estimate for the early fourteenth century by James Galloway and Margaret Murphy puts the average marketable surplus at 360 litres per hectare for wheat. Galloway and Margaret Murphy. Distribution and Consumption during the Fourteenth Century.17 If per caput annual consumption of food grains was about 600 litres. an estimate which is not unreasonable and reflects neither a poor nor a prosperous standard of living. using figures generated by Christopher Dyer from the end of the thirteenth century. “Feeding the City: Medieval London and its Agrarian Hinterland. For the late Middle Ages. that is around the central place.000 litres per hectare for many food grains and after deductions for seed. the expectations which had their origins in the work of von Thünen can still serve as both a guide to patterns of production and land use. Each person who lives in the central place requires the labour of people producing food within the hexagon around the consumption centre. James A. and also as a basis for an understanding of the historical relationship between the agrarian countryside and the sites farmers supplied with food. more or less.368 RICHARD W. That in turn means that the amount of land it took to feed a town depended on how much land it took to feed a person. That was of course not true and became less true in the late fourteenth and fifteenth century with expansion in rural industry. The surplus created by the farmer will determine the land area required to support each resident of the central place.” Franco-British Studies 20 (1995): 27. with gross yields of around 1. James A. Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages Social Change in England c. They also esti18 James A. in regions near London. but in northern France.5 tonnes per annum it would have taken from 0. firewood was the logical source of home heat. 16501820. “The Energy Basis for Early Modern Growth. for the overwhelming majority of the population heat came from firewood. and that estimate probably is a high one. including industrial uses. and England the estimate is about four kilograms per day.20 Presumably the demand for firewood per caput was on the rise in late medieval England because of the spread of the use of the chimney.5 to 1. 2001).. and Margaret Murphy. 61. 1986). Firewood consumption varied with the climate. Four kilograms per day translates into about 1. 53. Production figures reported by Galloway. Derek Keene. Attempts to estimate the land area needed to supply people in towns with fuel are even more plagued by problems than the attempts to estimate the land area needed to supply food grains. “Fuelling the City Production and Distribution of Firewood and Fuel in London’s Region. Around 1300 coal cost four times as much in London as it did in Durham so even though coal had higher calorific value—more than double that of wood—other than for industrial uses. Early Modern Capitalism Economic and Social change in Europe. and Murphy from the woodlands supplying late medieval London suggest output of 2.19 One authority offers a figure for Sweden and Finland of eight kilograms of firewood per person per day as the consumption norm.MARKET INTEGRATION 369 than produced food then the land area needed to feed one urban dweller was around four hectares. 1400-1800 (London and New York: Routledge. Germany. Galloway.” Economic History Review 49 (3) (1996): 447-72. an estimate that is generous.” in Maarten Prak. Keene. 1290-1400. ed.0 hectares of managed woodland to produce that much firewood and so meet the needs of the average inhabitant of a town.5 tonnes annually and assuming a level of the average productivity of forests of between 0.25 tonnes per hectare. 19 On the management of English forests in general and over the long term see Oliver Rackham. the Netherlands. The History of the Countryside (London: Dent.18 Von Thünen expected that forested areas near cities would be retained and managed to produce heating supplies and that certainly did happen in southeast England. Firewood production varied with the character of the land and the level of organization and management in exploiting the land. at 448. 20 Paolo Malanima.75 and 1. though in some parts of England coal was known and used in the late Middle Ages. As to fuel. . 35 hectares to supply each Londoner.” 455-6.000 and only 18. that is two farm families of four each producing grain for the town dweller and two farm families producing grain for dependents in the countryside.21 So despite the extensive and directed work of Galloway. Original German edition published as Der unterirdische Wald (Munich: C. The estimate of 0. 55. Keene.5 hectares as the land requirement just to supply the 16. Assuming 16 rural people for each urbanite. 91-2. and that in an era when coal already was making a considerable contribution to the thermal energy needs of the capital. and Murphy an estimate of 0. still the errors in estimation do serve to some degree to counteract each other. 1982). H.8 tonnes.370 RICHARD W. At that pace and at the high rate of production they use it took an area of at least 0. Galloway. The goal is to produce a general rather than highly specific sense of land use and land requirements to supply town dwellers and so gain some sense of the threshold area required to sustain Rolf Peter Sieferle. but that figure errs to the low side.5 hectares as a per caput land requirement for firewood supplies is preferred.000 hectares in 1300 to meet the needs of the population of 80. Many factors make the figures suspect and the task of lending precision to the estimates for land requirements to sustain townspeople is far from complete. 21 .5 hectares then to meet the needs of a single town dweller. then to supply them would have taken eight hectares of woodland at 0. People in the countryside would have required firewood as well. “Fuelling. Beck. UNGER mated per caput wood consumption for the fourteenth century at 0. 66. Keene. The Subterranean Forest Energy Systems and the Industrial Revolution. and Murphy. The results may be wide of the mark. It would have taken an additional 0. An estimate of something on the order of eight hectares needed to supply enough wood for people in the countryside as well as a single person in town is probably not wide of the mark. The ratios employed for net grain production can and should be applied to estimating rates of firewood output by country dwellers for themselves and city dwellers. 2001). trans.35 hectares per Londoner seems low in general but especially because a contemporary in 1700 put the land area required to supply each town dweller with firewood at 0. At that level it took about 28. Michael Osmann (Cambridge: The White Horse Press. and presumably over time more research will sharpen accuracy.5 hectares.000 hectares in 1400 when the population was considerably reduced. If a distribution of production of food grains and firewood for the town of 1.22 That along with other indications of regular and consistent access to adequate heating fuel in the Low Countries and England suggests that most of the time most towns did not have trouble with their energy requirements.MARKET INTEGRATION 371 a late medieval town. For a city the size of Ghent or Bruges. London.000 square metres since 1 hectare = 10. The area. For London at its maximum late medieval population around 1300 of 80. For a town of 10. and Murphy. If it took four hectares of land in total to produce the food needed for a town dweller and eight hectares in total to produce the firewood.” 457.376 so L= 6. 23 22 . where L is the length of a side of the regular hexagon. that is around 40. “Fuelling. Because of the geometry that distance was not eighty times the distance for a Galloway.000 square metres then L = or almost 6. The shortest distance to any of the six sides of the notional hexagon from the centre would have been under six kilometres. 46.189.796 metres If A= 120. and the largest town in the region outside of Paris.771 metres or just under 12 kilometres as the width of the regular hexagon. The formula for the area of a regular hexagon is A = 3/2 × W2 where W is the smallest width of the hexagon.000 square meters then 240.000. an easy trip in a day on foot.23 It was a distance a farmer could walk in an hour with little difficulty. the length of a straight line from one side to the side directly opposite. had its fuel needs easily met by producers in the region.8 kilometres. and there was still a surplus for export.000 conformed to a pattern of regular hexagons—a limiting assumption though as indicated theoretically a reasonable first approximation—then the distance from one side of the hexagon to the other would have been about 12 kilometres.564.000/ 3 = W2 or W = 138. the length of the walk to the outer extremity of the idealized supply zone would have been just short of 43 kilometres.000 hectares. is also equal to 3 3/2 L2.000 or 120. No matter the efforts at estimation it appears that England’s largest urban centre in the late Middle Ages.000 the distance along the any of the six sides of the regular hexagon would have been about 21.064 or W = 11. A. for a notional town of 1.5 kilometres. the theoretical distance was just short of 61 kilometres. The shortest distance from the centre to any one of the sides would thus have been less than 6 kilometres.000.000 people—assuming that none of the people in the town did anything to produce any food or fuel for themselves—the total rural area required was 12. Keene.000.000.000. If A = 12. the second largest and possibly at some times the largest city in the region.” 11. But there is no way to diminish the impression that the land area required to supply a late medieval English town was small by almost any measure. A careful examination of sources of food for London. But even assuming that only half the land was productive for a town of 10. There are many exceptions which can and should be raised to the calculations. UNGER town of 1. There are many problems with the estimates.25 Even if the estimates to arrive at that conclusion are somewhat suspect and even if the final result is off by as much as 100% still the weight of the evidence strongly supports the impression that for most of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries most grain to feed towns came from close by and so did not have to brought from far afield.000 but only something more than five times the distance. “Feeding. that is except in unusual years. .000 hectares. indicates that virtually all the food needed. Unger.000 that would have increased the length of the side of the hexagon only to a bit more than 30 kilometres or a distance of a little more than 26 kilometres from the centre to the outer edge of the hexagon. an area in total about twice the size of the small county of Middlesex.” 329-58 at 330-2. and so excluding fuel. Such calculations depend on all the land within the notional polygon being productive and able to supply either food or fuel. again something that could have easily been covered in half a day by a farmer on foot and with some time to spare.372 RICHARD W. for example nearby on the Continent. but whether that is true or not the fact remains that food for the largest city in England came almost entirely from the southeast of England. The hexagon did not have to be large—in terms of distance that could be travelled even with the limited equipment and methods available—to meet the needs of the town in either the idealized world of the German location theorists or in the practical world of late medieval townsfolk. It may be that because of the nature of surviving documents research has missed some sources Londoners used for food. That being the case the maximum population of the town was 24 25 Galloway and Murphy. There are certainly errors. farmers in the coastal Low Countries could supply something on the order of twice as much grain as was needed to feed the existing urban population. “Feeding Low Coutries Towns.24 In around 1500. came from 100. Estimates of the land needed to produce food and fuel for towns are filled with problems but those pale in comparison to the difficulties with estimates of transport costs. “Fuelling. Eli Heckscher. For example. Odd data appear with singular observations never offering more than a glimpse at what it cost to move goods. and appears is the right word. Mendel Shapiro (London: George Allen and Unwin. even if overland. carrying firewood overland to London in the fourteenth century doubled prices over a distance of some sixteen kilometres but it still paid to bring firewood from as far away as twenty kilometres and even further if shipment was by water. 1955 [revised ed. Keene. probably did not present an economic barrier to town size. If the costs of transport went down it certainly made it easier to reach further afield for sources of food and fuel but since the area required to supply towns was as small as it was circumstances rarely required exploiting any gains that might be reaped from falling shipping costs.” 457-8. trans. It was not just the presence of food and fuel that mattered but the ability to deliver it to the town at a price which made it worthwhile for countryfolk to produce the goods and to transport them to a central place. F. The area needed to supply a town depended on transport costs. Mercantilism. The population threshold. Two factors seem to have been at work in the late Middle Ages which directly affected the ability of the countryside to get supplies to towns at prices that could sustain the settlements. First. it appears. for example 2: 80-9 .26 To move grain from the Baltic to the Low Countries in the fifteenth century was said to double the price so moving wheat over the few kilometres from producers to urban consumers.MARKET INTEGRATION 373 determined by the limits on the size of the hexagon and the optimal population was suggested by the size of the hexagon. and Murphy. the size of the town which would force reliance on distant supplies of food and fuel was very high because so much of what was needed by urban folk could be raised within a short distance from the town.]). Söderlund. If falling transport costs can make a valuable contribution to integrating markets and if in the fourteenth and fifteenth century the most obvious development in commerce was the emergence of regional grain markets 26 Galloway. Falling transport costs would have made it even easier to supply towns. by E. that over short distance by water transport costs went down in the period. ed. ” Journal of Historical Geography 19 (1) (1993): 1-11. Getting grain or wood to urban markets very often depended on proximity to a creek or rivulet which ultimately gave access to a major stream. Mercantilism (London: Allen & Unwin. Yet rivers.” John Langdon. 1997). “Maritime Transport. There town populations used political power to gain economic advantage.374 RICHARD W. The extent of controls over food supply and the marketing of food in towns expanded in the fifteenth century and became the model for monarchical governments in the sixteenth century. 29 Eli Heckscher. UNGER then perhaps it was not design improvements in the largest long distance traders that had the greatest impact on the organization of markets and town size but rather changes in smaller ships. James Masschaele. The presence of many river boats and the widespread use of river transport.28 only worked to make moving goods easier and so expand the potential area to supply towns. Peasants. set up rules and systems of taxation Unger. 1150-1350 (New York: St. Second. had a central role in inland transport in the late Middle Ages. the established practice of public authorities fighting wars or not stopping people from fighting each other. that is of seeking monopolistic advantages. 28 27 . The development of new and more efficient types of coastal and small sailing ships lowered costs. Martin’s Press. certainly hurt urbanization. especially in Tuscany but to a lesser extent in Lombardy. The amount of violence in late medieval northern Europe was limited. or at the very least to assure their necessary supplies. The failure to maintain order. Fears of forestalling and regrating. actions of governments had an effect on the area that might supply urban needs. vessels used in coastal and river transport.29 Those kings and queens in northern Europe followed patterns of legislation and regulation pioneered by urban governments in Italy. had generated legislation in English towns already in the thirteenth century. “Inland Water Transport in Medieval England.27 River boats are rarely a topic worthy of the time of historians or archeologists. [1935]). There is little that is grand about them and little reason to examine them when found or to preserve records of them. even some rather small and insignificant ones. sporadic and so the long term effects on optimal town size were less than the new practice of public authorities: regulating commerce. Merchants and Markets: Inland Trade in Medieval England. Italian towns. documented by Jim Masschaele and John Langdon. There is good reason to believe that improvements in transport technology did allow for the optimal size of towns to grow in the late 30 Stephan R. Epstein.000 range. It had the kind of political power and pull that typified powerful Italian towns. York. even in the absence of powerful monarchs. “The Towns.31 In the absence of powerful civic governments able to influence market forces and enjoying stable or falling transportation costs English towns in the late Middle Ages had greater flexibility in seeking their sources of food and fuel. In the Low Countries towns found themselves less able than their Italian counterparts to control the flow of goods from the countryside thanks to the power of counts and dukes and to the consolidation of the authority of the Dukes of Burgundy through much of the fifteenth century. Only four towns had populations between 10.000 to 10. as a result. Certainly no final answer is produced by the calculations. At least there is every indication that the answer to the question is probably something like “not very big” and certainly well short of the maximum. It also had relatively easy access to foodstuffs and other goods from not-far-distant productive regions overseas. “The Towns of England and Northern Italy in the Early Fourteenth Century. that is they had populations in the 2.000. It had access through a river network and through coastal trading to a highly productive agricultural region. In England around 1300 most towns were of medium and smaller size.” Economic History Review 46 (3) (1993): 456-69. Richard Britnell has shown that in England nothing like the Italian pattern of legislative control existed and. 32 Britnell. Their actions led to relatively large urban centres and inefficiencies that slowed recovery from the mid fourteenth century economic and demographic shock of the Black Death.MARKET INTEGRATION 375 which worked against subject towns and rural areas. London.32 The single giant. despite the fact that population densities overall were much the same. Winchester. such urban legislation was virtually impossible. .” Economic History Review 44 (1) (1991): 24-30. The four were Norwich.30 In kingdoms with powerful monarchies.” 22.000 and 80.000 and only one was over 80. 31 Richard Britnell. “Town and Country: Economy and Institutions in Late Medieval Italy. nothing like the size of Italian towns was achieved. was an anomaly in England. and Bristol. There is probably no exact answer to the question of what the optimal size was for a town in late medieval northern Europe. Towns could and did thrive in most years under most conditions without having to search far afield for essential supplies. that threshold was breached. was high. The constraints on urban growth were most likely reduced but for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it does not appear that towns chose to or needed to look to distant sources for basic goods. That did mean that even though local suppliers could meet needs there might well have been distant suppliers who had the ability to supplant them because the competitors some distance away enjoyed lower production costs. soil productivity and intensity of effort being the factors that led to some variation. That would have to wait for larger populations. that . UNGER Middle Ages. all of which became more prevalent in the region in the sixteenth century. even in the densely populated Low Countries and southeastern England. Over time the ability to draw on distant supplies might well have and probably did become easier. The regular pattern of hexagons was more likely to be disrupted by flows of goods with a different and varied pattern of supply emerging (See the example in figure 2). By the same token. The region that supplied the town might have an elongated shape with tentacles reaching some distance away but the total area remained more or less the same size. The price data combined with the theoretical framework laid down by von Thünen and his disciples and data on grain production per hectare confirms that intuitive expectation. Towns relied on suppliers nearby. if most markets got the overwhelming majority of their food almost all of the time from farmers within a very few kilometres of the towns then it does not appear that it was trade and market integration which yielded or pressed for specialization in agricultural production. Even if grain and firewood came from further away that did not mean that lands nearby could not meet urban needs. the point at which towns had to look some distance away for supplies. There was a threshold of size for settlements that set limits to how large the village or town or city could grow before it needed to look beyond the local area for essential supplies to sustain the population.376 RICHARD W. larger towns and greater concentration of economic activity. The threshold. Price data deployed to examine market integration conforms to the expectations of location theory and data for production and consumption of essential goods in the late Middle Ages. What is perhaps not intuitive is how high that threshold was and how infrequently. test the technical and economic limits of the world in which they lived.MARKET INTEGRATION 377 is with a few exceptions. either the optimal or the maximum size. It is another case it appears where people in the late Middle Ages did not. It seems that transportation costs did not act as a constraint on town size. contrary to the opinion of the last generation of economic historians. . The theory is simple enough and what is more a mass of published price data exists both from antiquarians and from the International Commission of Price History whose efforts began in the 1930s. 1928). UNGER APPENDIX I Measuring Market Integration: On the Theory of the Single Price.ca/unger/htm_files/new_ grain. The units remained the same over long periods of time.33 As markets became more integrated the prices in different places tend more and more to move up and down together. The goal was to decrease fraud and so increase confidence in the market among both buyers and sellers. Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan and Company. any difference being attributed to the cost of transporting the good between the two markets. in the end outweigh the difficulties. thus lowering prices in the original market to a level consistent with that in all the others. “Prix du blé et de l’avoine de 1329 à 1793. The theory of the single price is the basis for measuring market integration. By implication integrated markets should see increases and decreases in prices to the same degree. The advantages. Sources.history. European Commodity Prices 1260-1914.” http://www. The extent of trade will depend on those traders being informed about prices in the different markets. Limited. 270-3. 34 Robert Allen and Richard W. If two markets are integrated the same price should prevail in both with any difference attributable to differences in transport costs. the cost of transporting goods between and among markets. 35 For example. and the supply of goods available locally to each market. Monique Mestayer.htm. Correlations and Variations If markets are integrated the same price should prevail in them.ubc. “Allen-Unger Database. As prices rise in one traders should move goods from others in order to reap profits. The drive for gain among merchants is the force for price equalization and so for the distribution of benefits and burdens from changes in supply to all people within the scope of the integrated markets. however.35 In some instances the measure was not of Alfred Marshall.” Revue du Nord 45 (178) (1963): 163-4. 33 .34 In order to make comparisons among cities and to make comparisons over time all prices are standardized to the amount of silver needed to buy a litre of grain. Unger. Gauging the integration of European markets from the thirteenth through the sixteenth and even into the eighteenth century depends on the theory of the single price. For measures for grain volume towns were generally very strict about regulating the unit of transactions.378 RICHARD W. reports many series of grain price data for the period 1250-1914. There are serious problems with any such conversions. MARKET INTEGRATION 379 volume but of weight which makes conversion necessary. That is done assuming a specific gravity of late medieval grains of 0.8. The silver content of coins changed much more frequently than measures of weight or volume. Official changes at the mint typically do not reflect accurately the amount of silver in all the coins that exchanged in the market place. Old issues circulated frequently as did a variety of coins from other jurisdictions, new and old. There are other problems associated with the use of silver equivalents36 but the error introduced is more than tolerable in order to get the possibility of making comparisons. When dealing with the prices of grains in just one market tests for correlation often involve only the use of the prevailing currency, thus avoiding monetary problems, and correction is made only for differences in and changes in the units of measure To test for integration comparisons are made to see if price changes moved together, that is were the movements correlated, in two or more markets. Such tests can be made for long periods or the time period can be broken down to compare different segments of time. That was an approach taken by Wilhelm Abel, looking at price averages, and by his student, Walter Achilles, examining correlations.37 They did find differences over time and a long term trend toward integration. The gaps between prices in different markets should, in theory, have moved inexorably closer and closer together, the difference reduced by improving transport costs and the movement of goods among markets. Results, however, have not uniformly suggested that inexorable advance.38 Of course it could be that the serious data problems which plague the study of prices may be the cause for the mixed results, but inconsistent market integration remains a more plausible explanation. It may be that the internationalization of markets is what theory predicts and what historians presume existed but in fact the pattern of market development was more complex. Herman Van der Wee, The Growth, 115-122. Wilhelm Abel, Massenarmut und Hungerkrisen im vorinduustriellen Deutschland (Göttingen: Vendenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1972), 38-9, 47; Wilhelm Abel, Agricultural Fluctuations in Europe from the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Centuries, trans. Olive Ordish (London: Methuen and Company, Limited, 1980), 107-9; Walter Achilles, “Getreidepreise und Getreide- handelsbeziehungen europäischer Räume im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert,” PhD Dissertation, University of Göttingen (1957), 5-10, 33-4, 83-7, 114. 38 Richard W. Unger, “Maritime Transport and the Integration of Low Countries Grain Markets in the Late Middle Ages,” in Piet Van Cruyningen and Erik Thoen, eds., Town and Countryside from the late Middle Ages to the 19th Centuries: Supply and Demand of Food (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, forthcoming). 37 36 380 RICHARD W. UNGER APPENDIX 2 Sources for Price Data Amsterdam, Leiden and Utrecht: N. W. Posthumus, Inquiry into the History of Prices in Holland, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1946-1964). Antwerp and Lier: Herman Van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). Brussels and Louvain: Marie-Jeanne Tits-Dieuaide, La Formation des Prix Céréaliers en Brabant et en Flandre au XVe siècle (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1975). Bruges: Charles Verlinden and E. Scholliers, et al., Dokumenten voor de Geschiedenis van Prijzen en Lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant, 4 vols. (Bruges: De Tempel, 1959-1973), 2: 33-59. Douai: Monique Mestayer, “Prix du blé et de l'avoine de 1329 à 1793,” Revue du Nord 45, (178) (1963): 168-170. Southern England: James E. Thorold Rogers, A History of Agriculture and Prices in England From the Year after the Oxford Parliament (1259) to the Commencement of the Continental War (1793), Compiled Entirely from Original and Contemporaneous Records (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1882). Strasbourg: A. C. Hanauer, Études économiques sur l'Alsace ancienne et moderne, 2 vols. (Paris: A. Durand & Pedone-Lauriel, 1876-1878). x LONG-DISTANCE TRADE AND MARKETS x x x EGYPTIAN SPECIE MARKETS 387 I The long-term stability in gold prices, which characterised European specie markets during the mid-fourteenth century (1325-1375), rested upon the existence of a delicately balanced bi-metallic equilibrium within and between a series of autonomous specie markets. Each maintained the level and composition of its precious metal stock from independent, indigenous supply sources of silver and gold. The first of these, north of the Alps, possessed plentiful supplies of gold emanating from Hungarian mines.3 When this was exchanged against silver initially produced in England (Bere Ferrers, Devon) and Bohemia (Kutná Hora) during the years 1290-1345 and subsequently in Saxony (Freiberg-in-Meissen),4 a stable metallic ratio of 1:10-11.4 was established.5 Further south, two similar autonomous markets existed on the basis of an efficient inter-continental exchange network, facilitating the exchange of African gold for silver from Europe and Asia Minor. Driving directly northward from the Niger Bend across the deserts of the central Sahara, caravans carried gold each year to the refining and minting centres of al-Maghrib al-Aqsa, providing the base for an abundant local circulation of .é “heavy” single and double dinars. Further east, caravans travelling via either Wargla or Ghadames brought similar supplies to Egypt, for minting into those miscellaneous gold pieces that found currency in the lands of the Circassian Sultanate, the regions of the Muslim East, the Hijaz and the Yemen (Map 1).6 Two distinct zones—in the Mahgrib and Egypt—thus emerged, each with cheap and plentiful supplies of gold, which were juxtapositioned against equivalent areas Blanchard, Mining, Metallurgy and Minting, 3: Chap. 1, §2, 935. Blanchard, Mining, Metallurgy and Minting, 3: Chap. 1, §1, 927-34. 5 Blanchard, Mining, Metallurgy and Minting, 3: Chap. 1, §3b, 950-70. 6 Shihab al-Dín Abu ’l-Abbas Ahmad b. Yahya b. Fadl Allah al-‘Adawí é é é é é é . . é . é é al-‘Umarí, Masalik al-absar fí mamalik al-amsar, trans. and annot. Maurice é é .é .é Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 2 vols. (Paris: Bibliothèque des Géographes Arabes, é é 1927), 2, Bk. 10: 54; Shams al-Dín Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad al-Lawatí alé é é . Tanjí a.k.a Ibn Batttuta, Rihla or Tuhfat al-nuzzar fí ghara’ib al-amsar wa ‘aja’ib é é é é . .. é . . . ..é .é al-asfar, ed. and trans. C. Defrémery and B. R. Sanguinetti, 4 vols. (Paris: é Imprimerie Nationale, 1853-1858; reprinted Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Unié é é versity, 1994), 4: 376-82; Zakaríya ibn Muhammad al-Qazwíní, ‘Aja’ib alé é é . makhluqat wa ghara’ib al-mawjudat, in Yusuf Kamal, ed., Monumenta cartographica é é é é é Africae et Aegypti, 5 vols. in 16 books (Cairo-Leiden, 1926-1951), 1046. 4 3 8 Cartography: Ian Blanchard EGYPTIAN SPECIE MARKETS 389 of abundant silver, thereby encouraging an active interchange of the two metals. In the west the profitability of this exchange was such that for half a century trade in goods was subordinated to trade in specie. From 1325-1375 gold doblas (double dinars) regularly passed north bring forth a countervailing supply of European silver southward. In response to these flows a distinctive market structure evolved in the western—Tyrrhenian—basin of the Mediterranean, characterised by a long-term stability in gold prices and an “anticyclonic” distribution of the two metals between the continental littorals. Although relatively scarcer as one moved northward, gold was abundant to customers within a unitary market in which the African product reigned supreme. Nor was the situation significantly different within the eastern zone. Gold arriving in Egypt from alBilad al-Sudan was distributed after minting in a similar market strucé é é ture receiving small amounts of European silver and larger quantities from the mines of the Isaurian Taurus.7 Within the area spanned by European commercial networks there were thus three distinct and autonomous specie markets. Each of these had a similarly balanced stock of precious metals conforming to a common bi-metallic standard (1:9.4-10.9), and thus, whilst retaining their autonomous character, the markets were united into a homogeneous and unitary system. Unlike in the period 1135-1175, however, in 1336-1375 African gold no longer enjoyed a complete hegemony in the supply of this metal to specie markets within the area spanned by European commercial activity. Yet the existence of an efficient inter-continental trade network, facilitating the exchange of African gold for European or Middle Eastern silver supplies, still ensured bi-metallic exchange stability within and between at least two of the three autonomous specie markets. The unitary “European” system existed, moreover, on terms of bi-metallic parity with another one of similar character, which encompassed the lands bordering the Indian Ocean (Map 2).8 This “Asiatic” specie distribution system was also divided into a series of autonomous elements which, existing in conditions of bi-metallic 7 Ibn Batttuta, Tuhfat al-nuzzar, trans. H. A. R. Gibb, Travels in Asia and .. é . . ..é Africa (London: Hakluyt Society, Second Series, CXVII, 1929), 61-2 436-7. C. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey. A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History, c. 1071-1330 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1968), 160-1. 8 Blanchard, Mining, Metallurgy and Minting, 3: Chap. 7, §3a-1, 1275-89. EGYPTIAN SPECIE MARKETS 391 equilibrium, were conjoined within a unitary system. Here Chinese gold held pride of place, being distributed by Muslim and Chinese merchants through a commercial system that extended from the source of supply to Ormuz on the Persian Gulf and drew a countervailing flow of silver through three distinct points of access. In the west it was Iranian silver, from the Elburz (Reshteh-ye Alborz) mountains (Rayy and Damghan), traded through Ormuz, which laid é é the foundations of a bi-metallic system. Further to the east silver, drawn from the once mighty workings of the Pamir and Hindu Kush, passing through Cambay and Chittagong, played a similar role in the markets of the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. Autonomous yet united by a common bi-metallic standard these markets thus formed a single system, which co-existed with its “European” counterpart, bringing conditions of specie price stability and bi-metallic uniformity to a “world” trading network, divided by religion and politics, but united in its monetary mechanisms. II From about 1375, however, the first signs of disintegration began to appear in this monolithic edifice. Gold prices began to rise on European markets but not universally (Figures 1-3). Some regions remained able to acquire adequate supplies whilst others suffered acute shortages as the once universal market split into atomistic elements. The primary cause of these changes, as far as northern “European” specie markets were concerned, was rooted in the vicissitudes of indigenous gold production. Until the introduction of Afro-Asiatic techniques of separating gold from auriferous quartz by mercury amalgamation in the 1440s, this was largely confined to small-scale placer workings of European gold bearing gravel. Such placers, during the balmy days of overpopulation and low wages in the early fourteenth century, were thronged with workmen who sustained an annual output of about four tonnes of the yellow metal.9 From about the 1380s, however, a combination of labour shortages and resource 9 M. Malowist, “Problems of the Growth of the National Economy of Central-Eastern Europe in the Late Middle Ages,” Journal of European Economic History 3 (1974): 345. 10 From 1412 therefore. 1401/2. Nor was their contribution to specie markets unimportant. 10 . became tied to the fortunes of the silver industry and was most pronounced in the boom conditions—in 1391-1399.” in Hermann Kellenbenz. and until the end of the decade the pickings were rich. “Das Zusammenspiel oberdeutscher und Florentiner Geldleute bei der Finanzierung von König Ruprechts Italienfeldzug. Sozial. The Spleiss-Saigerhütten and Hammerwerke established at Neusohl produced some 2. secure in the purchase of Polish lead and with control over Hungarian copper supplies. von Stromer. “Nürnberger Unternehmer im Karpatenraum.u. thanks to its collaboration with the Venetian and Florentine agents of the Medici. 1412-1418 and 1435-1439— affecting that sector. Bericht über die 3. the Italians and Nürnbergers now profited from the boom years 14121418. 448-95.500 zentners of refined copper and some 8. and von Stromer. 143-8. 1350-1450 (Wiesbaden: F. Wirtschaftsgeschichte in Mannheim (Forschungen z. Jahrhunderts. Wirtschaftsgeschichte 16) (Stuttgart.000-2. In the event they lighted upon the exploitation of copper and lead ores containing auriferous silver. because of their low metallic content. Oberdeutsche Hochfinanz. causing producers to cast around for new sources of gold. as well as von Stromer. Arbeitstagung der Gesellschaft für Sozial. Falling copper and silver prices from 1399-1412. Steiner.500 zentners) sent to Nürnberg.000 tonnes of copper yielded some fifteen tonnes of silver and 140 kg of gold. Slovak gold production. 50-86. posed difficulties from which the first German house emerged victorious.u. ed.000 zentners of unrefined “black” copper. 1970).392 IAN BLANCHARD depletion caused production to fall to below three tonnes a year. Ein oberdeutsches Buntmetall-Oligopol 1396-1412. their exploitation was dependent on a new technology—the Saigerprozess—and a favourable conjuncture of primary metal (copper and silver) prices. which was exported to Venice together with an indeterminate amount (perhaps 2. Hungarian production from auriferous silver thus played a not insignificant role W. The 900-1. Thus during the 1390s the deposits of argentiferous copper of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Polish lead fields attracted the attention of two Nürnberg corporations—the Kammerer-Seiler and Flextorfer-Zenner—and the Genoese house of Gallici. 119-25.. 1971). Öffentliche Finanzen und privates Kapital im späten Mittelalter und in der ersten Hälfte des 19.” Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej 16 (4) (1968): 641-62.000-10. accordingly. however. Deposits of the former were found in Hungary to the north of Banská Bystrica (Neusohl) but. 5 tonnes annually. production fell from even this diminutive level.1 tonnes of silver and 108 kg of gold. 1325-1450 (metric tonnes) Date Date 1325-1375 1375-1400 1400-1425 1425-1450 Placer-lode gold (Hungary) 4. a 17. 11 “Und anfänglich bey König Mattyás auch Vladislai Zeiten ist keine Spleyss-Saygerhütten noch Hammer in Neusohl gewesen. Table 1 European Gold Production. Here the much higher gold content of the silver. 1964).” quoted from the “Memorial of the Fugger’s Factor at Neusohl.EGYPTIAN SPECIE MARKETS 393 in European gold supply during the crisis years of the early fifteenth century. As silver prices rose ever upwards.54 6. moreover. Established during the crisis of 1280-1320 the workings were neglected until the gold boom of 1418-1435 when production rose to 6.” printed in Peter Ratkoš. 1957).04 0. On the production of copper see Jozef Vlachovic.5 3.0 Totala (a) Total 4. storocí (Bratislava: Vydavatemstvo Slovenskej Akadémie Vied.06 Note: (a) Augmented until the late fourteenth century by African gold imports of about 2. Production thus moved counter-cyclically to that of Slovakia. 1525-1526 (Bratislava: Vydavatemstvo Slovenskej Akadémie Vied.04 0. the primary object of exploitation. .0 2. made it.94 3. amounting to as much as a sixth. however. at prevailing relative prices. Dokumenty k baníckemu povstaniu na Slovensku.7 Auriferous silver (Slovakia & Serbia) — 0.00 2. its contribution became ever greater. Slovenská med’ š v 16.9 3. 457. however. Serbia. with the other major source of European auriferous silver—the argenta indorata found in the lead ores of Novo Brdo. geseigert und geschmit.11 Yet whilst it made a contribution to the long-term stabilisation of European gold stocks it was an erratic one due to the primary role of silver and copper prices in determining production levels in plant using the new technology. sondern man hat den schwarzen Kupfer alsso aus den Land geführet und andersowo gespleissen. With the fall in gold prices after 1435. š 23.0-2. amounting to no more than sixty per cent of its former size in the early 1450s. Such was not the case. attaining at the beginning of the next boom in the early 1430s an annual output of about 400 kg.36 Gold quartz (Rhineland) — — — 2. This practice has been adopted by the writer of this essay. 3 vols.é on their writings.394 IAN BLANCHARD Together. During the critical years 1375-1425. §2b.3. 3: 782-6. 1896). Other factors were at work. These castles. ed. The History and Description of Africa. as “Sijilmassa. (London: Hakluyt Society.century (1385-1435) this resulted in the emergence of a completely new commercial network within which merchants avoided the dangers of desert transport and sought the greater security of the circumlocuitous way of the Sahel and the central highlands. continued for centuries thereafter to be referred to by both contemporaries and subsequent historians.k. however. A major restructuring of the transSaharan trade routes was underway. all of which were frequented by Jewish and Arab merchants. R. 3. Metallurgy and Minting. so gold prices rose. Tabuhasin and Mamun—within its territory. Caravans increasingly avoided the direct routes across the arid dune zones. During the next half. Brown. the Slovak and Serbian producers exploiting copper and lead ores containing auriferous silver made a small but growing contribution to European gold supply. therefore. however. They turned instead to the aqueous gravel at the foot of the Ahaggar and the Adrar des Iforas (Map 2). Mining. which were of far greater significance. trans. . who continued to grow rich “using great traffic into the lands of the negroes”. within the territory of the erstwhile town. their contribution was slight and as Hungarian placer production declined. who drew é é . table 3. was deflected to castles—Tenegent. . Commercial and minting activity. 3: Chap.” Al-Hasan b. As early as the 1390s basic structural changes may already be discerned in the transport network used by merchants.a Leo Africanus. whose inhabitants had been “very rich and had great traffic with the lands of the negroes” in the fourteenth century.12 Yet the decline in indigenous supplies was sufficient only to explain some one third of the price increase during the years 1375-1425. III Of primary importance amongst these non-indigenous influences was a fundamental restructuring in the patterns of trans-Saharan trade. 1030. XCII-XCIV. 12 Blanchard. where nomadic attacks13 and increasing difficulties in securing adequate water supplies rendered the transients’ life precarious. a. The town of Sijilmassa. Muhammad al-Wazzan al-Zayyatí . was totally razed in the 1430s. John Pory (1600). 13 Which destroyed the trade entrepôts of Gao in 1454 and Sijilmassa in 1432. 200 180 1. Marinid and Hafsid Mints . Mean. 2. . Marinid 160 EGYPTIAN SPECIE MARKETS 140 120 100 2 1400 1 1360 1380 1420 1440 395 Figure 4. Price of Gold (1360=100): The Maghrib . via Quseir or Suakin. Yet these movements in 1385-1390. Each rise in gold prices. via the Mahgrib and the coastal route to Alexandria. It passed from either East African sources. prices rose. after a brief dislocation from 1370-1394. Henceforth.396 IAN BLANCHARD The effect of these changes on the supply of gold to North African and Middle Eastern specie markets was dramatic. If route reorientation thus ensured intra-regional price stability within the Mahgrib. With the change in route alignment during the years 1375-1435. Within the Mahgrib supplies continued unabated and the price of gold (Figure 4) continued. such was not the case further east in Egypt. to fall to 1435 Yet this stability was achieved only by a basic restructuring of interMahgribi supply networks. from 1374. the Mahgrib and Asia Minor to Alexandria. or when this was disrupted. this was completely changed. Again this had resulted in a steady fall in the price of the yellow metal. The once active Marínid mints strung out é along the western routes of the mid-fourteenth century. Gold became relatively scarce in relation to both the unit of account and silver. or from the Niger Bend by the trans-Saharan . ceased minting entirely during the opening decade of the fifteenth century. however. resulted in an enhanced bi-metallic ratio. through natural wastage and a reversal of the specie flow. Egyptian markets experienced acute shortages. Silver flowed east and as gold stocks di- . Ghadames route. . lowering the bi-metallic ratio until gold imports ceased and the pattern was reversed. however. making it attractive to export gold from Europe. and particularly during the years 1385-1390 and 1399-1412 with little compensation provided by transhipments from the Maghrib. each gold boom led to a cessation of silver imports and as stocks diminished. 1399-1412 and 1418-1435 created a marked instability in the market. In their place a new network of Hafsid mints arose. Gold prices rose (Figure 5) and conditions prevailing in inter-continental exchanges were totally altered. rising gold prices attracted gold eastward by enhancing the bi-metallic ratio (Figure 6) relative to those prevailing in Europe. during the years 1395-1435. Cut off from trans-Saharan supplies. Given a lack of indigenous sources of silver. Here gold had regularly arrived in the mid-fourteenth century. strung out along the new routes which emerged . reflecting stock wastage without compensatory supply increase. after a brief period of debasement from 1373-1394 during which coins became more barbaric in design. as during the years 1348-1366. 1600 Gold 1200 Silver EGYPTIAN SPECIE MARKETS 800 400 100 1360 1380 1400 1420 1440 397 Figure 5. Price of Gold and Silver (1360=100): Egypt . Bi-Metallic Ratios .398 Venice 14 12 11 10 Genoa 9 Cairo IAN BLANCHARD 8 6 1360 1380 1400 1420 1440 Figure 6. which totally altered relations between the two trading blocks. a change centred on the years 1392-1412. Lütge. From 1375.15 Until that date the standard of the whole system was the silver dirham. stock wastage took its toll of the metal shuttling back and forth across the Mediterranean. The reason lay in the emergence of an acute crisis in the Egyptian monetary system. Strukturverwandlungen im ostdeutschen und osteuropäischen Fernhandel des 14.EGYPTIAN SPECIE MARKETS 399 minished its price increased . cycle followed cycle and in the absence of compensatory supply inputs.. Beck. the value of which fluctuated with market conditions and in 1392 exchanged at 20 silver dirhams per dinar or mithqal. each upward movement. 1392/3 marked the beginning of a phase of rising gold prices on the Egyptian markets. Numismatic Notes. 1399-1412 and 1418-1432—and silver—in 1374-1384. As already noted. 1413-1417 and 1431-1439—east to Alexandria. which alternatively channelled gold—in 1385-1390. 14-27. however. The years after 1375 thus saw the emergence of an extended market network. and copper.14 As precious metals shuttled back and forth across the Mediterranean in conditions of gradual stock depletion. the general upward trend being most pronounced in the northern extensions of the supply network. therefore.. first in gold and then silver. exchanged é 14 F. As both metals steadily increased in price. Each of the major ports of the northern Mediterranean formed a focus within which the impact of this specie trade was proportional to the size of its Levantine commerce. resulting in a gradual enhancement in specie price levels. each silver boom resulted in an abatement of gold price. . a much more fundamental change was taking place. drew the precious metal east and the depleting stocks raised prices on European markets. Each gold boom enhanced market prices. 15 Appendix. Section 1. Yet this rise brought forth no compensatory export of gold to Alexandria and European specie markets remained largely unaffected. exacerbated by the emergence of a direct gold trade from Central Europe to the Middle East across the steppes of Tartary. To the dirham was related gold. Jahrhunderts (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften—C. led to an abnormally rapid rise in prices. bis 16. Here disproportionate decreases in stocks. H. 1391-1399. 1964). 19 Popper. Egypt and Syria. 2: 396.” Economic History Review.1797). 68. 21 Al-Maqrízí.19 The result was obvious.6. Others were used in the manufacture of silver luxury articles 16 W. 1939). versa et illustrata (Rostock. M.” Numismatic Chronicle. as quoted by Popper. 43-4. P. Kitab al-nuqud al-qadímah al-islamíya. 68. 7th ser. 47.3-12. Bacharach. as quoted in J.25+ ritl per dirham) it was initially more profitable to take . A. é é é .1. 2 vols. wa’l-athar known . Anastase-Marie é é é é é é (Cairo. Popper. 17 Popper.4 respectively. highgrade dirhams disappeared into hoards or were sold in the bazaars like other precious wares.8 per cent. L.5 per cent). Taqí al-Dín Ahmad b. L. “Circassian Monetary Policy: Silver. 20 (1) (1967): 23-4 (Table 1). al-Mawa‘iz wa ’l-i‘tibar bi dhikr al-khitat.15.18 In the event.. al-Maqrízíya.”20 In these circumstances the canonical standard collapsed. that metal to the mint and receive silver (12. 67. physical punishment being threatened to those who disobeyed.21 Accordingly. caused great hardship. . As Maqrízí later described the situation prevailing é é during the years 1392-1395: “The Franks carried away the silver dirhams because of the increase in Egypt of the use of copper which they themselves had imported there. and J. 131. é é é Muhammad al-Maqrízí. Bacharach.” 268. 11 (1971): 267-8. shifted the bi-metallic ratio from 9. Systematic Notes to Ibn Taghrí Birdí’s Chronicles of Egypt. 1936). 1797). 1955-1957). which should have resulted in a reverse flow.3 to 14. . and Olav Gerhard Tychsen (Tuka).-Élie (Cairo. 20 Al-Maqrízí. éé as Khitat. Silvestre de Sacy (Paris: Imprimerie du Magasin Encyclopédique— Fuchs. The forcing of the exchange to this latter rate. L. ex codice Escorialensi cum variis duorum codicum Leidensium lectionibus et excerptis anecdotis nunc primum edita. “Circassian Monetary Policy. Egypt and Syria. 397. ed. quoted from the edition Traité des monnoies musulmanes. however. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 68. From 1392 to mid-1395 silver was exported and its price rose rapidly to a level incompatible with the official exchange. “Back to Gold—and Silver. ed. . therefore. University of California é é Publications in Semitic Philology 15-16. Dirhams were found being worn as ornaments. At the low prevailing price of copper (0.8 and in 1399 22.4. it was not to be. 2nd ser. 1382-1468 AD. .400 IAN BLANCHARD by tale at 24 coins of 4. Anastase-Marie de é é é é é é é St.16 In such circumstances the rise in gold prices to 26 1/2 dirhams in 1394 and 30 in 1399.25 grams per silver dirham.. 52. Egypt and Syria. Shudhur al-‘uqud fí dhikr al-nuqud. 18 A. 62. Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans. Watson.17 With Genoese and Venetian ratios of 10 and 11. ‘Alí al-Qa é é é édir b. Venetian exporters were offered potential profits of 7. Takieddin Al-Makrizii historia monetae arabicae. trad. 2:1. 1913-1920. 40. some 30 coins of two-thirds canonical standard being declared equivalent to 20 canonical dirhams and being exchanged against one dinar. half the standard of the canonical dirham) exchanging at a de facto rate of fifteen to one (or a bi-metallic ratio of 7:1). Parts é 1-7. M. prices rocketed upward. which had come to é é power under the new Sultan Faraj27 determined to defend gold and Al-Maqrízí/Sacy.23 With metal stocks doubly depleted by export (1392-1395) and hoarding. Traité des monnoies. 3: 467. The coinage accordingly deteriorated. allowing the restoration of the silver coinage at the price level of 1392.é . History of Egypt. 1382-1469. but only at the cost of a 20 per cent depletion of gold stocks. Numismatic Notes. Egypt and Syria. heavily worn coins displacing high-grade dinars in circulation.3:1. 27 Abu al-Maha é é é é é é é . 14. é é Popper. the administration of Yashbak al-Sha‘baní é é é with its financial ghuru Ibrahím ibn Ghurab.e. Section 2). Copper imports from 1392-1395 had prevented the alleviation of the crisis whilst exports of gold 1395-1399 had aggravated the situation.22 The effect was to demonetize the classical dirham. é 1964). Ibrahím.26 By 1399 a new equilibrium had been achieved between the two metals. University of California Publications in Semitic Philology 5-7. 6: 3). 22 (Berkeley: University of California Press. Egypt and Syria. ed. Egypt and Syria. 61. é é é é é é . William Popper.3. 56. 14 vols. thereby establishing a bi-metallic ratio of 9. which passed by the derogatory nomenclature dirham fulus é (copper dirham)—whose silver content reflected market prices. A. translation History 2: 2 (Arabic text Nujum. exchanging at a bi-metallic ratio of 11. (Cairo. 24 Ahmad b. é 22 23 . however. and between the Egyptian and Venetian currencies. 25 Popper. compensated only in 1398 by the first appearance of European gold from Genoa— florins which circulated at a discount in relation to the dinar in circulation (Appendix. reprinted Cairo: al-Mu‘assasa al-Misríya. 12. 1915-1960). In 1397/8 coins of only one third silver content comprised the major element of the circulating media (i. ‘Alí al-Qalqashandí. In its place debased coins came to dominate the circulating media. and trans. ésin Yusuf Ibn Taghrí-Birdí.25 Yet this stabilisation of silver was only achieved at the expense of the gold coinage. 45-7. That of silver resumed. ed. é . al-Nujum al-zahira fí muluk Misr . wa ’l-Qahira. At this point.24 In such circumstances the import of copper ceased. 1719. 26 Popper. Subh al-a‘sha fí sina‘at al-insha. .EGYPTIAN SPECIE MARKETS 401 such as saddles or vases. 31 the “copper dirhams” again at intrinsic value. reflected in a diminution of the intrinsic value of the dirham fulus. A standard of 30 canonical dirhams to one canonical dinar was affirmed. the regions of Syria. Egypt and Syria. As a result of this export and the process of natural wastage. Nujum/History of Egypt.e. to the point of becoming the current money and the most sought after in commercial transactions.11). it must suffice to say that as long as the firm hands of Ibn Ghurab and his é protégé al-Bírí were at the helm gold was successfully defended and é é the canonical standard reaffirmed. prices rose. With the raising of the bi-metallic ratio silver not only ceased to flow in but. The stability of gold. 1398-1409) in the principal towns of the world such as Cairo.” 27 (Table 2). 52.5).29 The debased gold and imported coins were set at intrinsic value: the dinar at 24-2530 and the ducat at 26 silver dirhams.32 The effect was dramatic. 1. was only achieved through the debilitation of silver. the Hidjaz.33 é é The use of the dinar ifrantí (ducat) became general in our commerce é in the 800s (i. which was more than sufficient to attract European gold and the actual coins in circulation were related to this standard. 6: 596. indeed. 33 Ibn Taghrí-Birdí/Popper. the Yeman. é 31 Popper. Nujum/History of Egypt. Watson. Popper. By 1403/4 the fractional curé rency of white metal was reduced to chaos. the principal lands of the Greeks.5 coins exchanging for one silver dirham. translation History 4: 30 é é é (Arabic text Nujum. Gold flooded in.28 establishing a bi-metallic ratio of 14:1. Egypt and Syria. which had been reduced to chaos.402 IAN BLANCHARD reform the monetary system. however. Egypt and Syria. Egypt and Syria. where the impact of the gold inflow was acutely felt. 53. 32 Popper. 30 Ibn Taghrí-Birdí/Popper. Looking back in 1425 on this period Ibn Taghrí-Birdí recorded. in exchange for the inflow of ducats it was exported. 6: 69. whilst at Alexandria. Coins of only one fifth the canonical standard were circulating in Cairo. Without following in detail the vicissitudes of the reform. the nor- Popper. 52. 47. Fostat. the regions of the Muslim East. é 29 28 . “Back to Gold. For the population the remedy was more disastrous than the disease. translation History 2: 51 é é é (Arabic text Nujum. Egypt and Syria. 2: 89 (6: 121. 121. 1403. From 1395. Nujum/History of Egypt. 0. (Cairo: Majlis al-A‘la li éní é é é ’l-Shu‘un al-Isla éyah. 6: 111).34 Nor was the other popular base of the monetary system—copper—immune.40 Within the year the old standard was Ibn Taghrí-Birdí/Popper. as quoted in J. replaced by é quarter-dirham weight (i.37 é The popular coinage was in chaos.EGYPTIAN SPECIE MARKETS 403 mal coins in circulation contained only half that amount of silver (Appendix. which continued to pass by tale. however. representing at Cairo a bi-metallic ratio of 9. translation History 2: 78 é é é (Arabic text Nujum. 3 vols. Inba’ al-ghumr bi anba’ al-‘umr. Whether this contributed to the fall of Yashbak is uncertain.25 grams) coins had disappeared. “Ciré émí cassian Monetary Policy.15). 69. 41/2 in . with the cessation of imports. translation History 2: 95 é é é 34 . é 39 Ibn Taghrí-Birdí/Popper.3:1. é é é 89 (Arabic text Nujum. Nujum/History of Egypt. which had characterised the sultanate of Faraj’s father. 4.38 In the first month of the new administration the coinage was called down to 100 dirham fulus accepted at é their intrinsic value per dinar.20). involving the merchant community in great losses and threatening the integrity of gold.39 This populism. Nujum/History of Egypt.36 In response to these changes and the rising price of silver. was continually lightened as small and worn coins displaced the heavier issues of an earlier age. Nujum/History of Egypt.” 271. Numismatic Notes. 6: 106. L.5). 35 Popper. because little arrived and merchants exported coin from the country”. causing great resentment amongst the population.74 grams) pieces. 1969-1972). 38 Ibn Taghrí-Birdí/Popper. 37 Popper. but the opposition party was clearly aware of the tensions in society and the period August 1404 to June 1405 saw a return to the populist policies. 6 in 1404 and 12 in 1412. translation History 2: 81-2 é é é (Arabic text Nujum.e.35 Prices rose from 4 dirhams per ritl in 1392 to 41/4 in 1397. Section 3). al-‘Asqala é. By 1403/4 the mithqal-weight (i.20). 69. translation History 2: 84. In September 1405 Yashbak and Ibn Ghurab once more came to power and the é primacy of gold was restored. soon came to an end. Egypt and Syria. 2: 45. é 40 Ibn Taghrí-Birdí/Popper. Egypt and Syria. the actual copper coinage. Bacharach. a new age began of “high” copper. 36 Popper. The flood of coins entering circulation of the years 1392-1395 came to an end with the de facto rise in silver prices already noted. 2: 84 (6: 115. which exchanged at 24 to the actual dirham fulus in circulation.e. 69. Ibn Hajar é .5. 6: 115. Section V). Egypt and Syria.42 there was a shift in the é. é é . é 44 Popper. 63-4. This change. 45 Popper. é 43 Popper. the Sultan on the é.44 The official rate. The system was once more reduced to chaos. Ibn Taghrí-Birdí/Popper. which steadily dwindled from 1392 (Appendix. Section 3). 42 At its introduction the nasirí dinar circulated at a discount of 10 dirhams é.43 é From the death of Ibn Ghurab and the fall of Yashbak. 49. Nujum/History of é é é Egypt.1). As the ten-percent coins thus continued to spread. was overshadowed in the new environment of the 1410s by problems arising from Egyptian monetary stock depletion. the coins being lightened from their standard of 3. as Maqrízí explained “by the alteration of é é é the nasirí and ifrantí by those who struck them. 46 Al-Maqrízí/Sacy. 54. é there was an increasing reluctance to acknowledge these changes by the new populist administration. European goods became increasingly un-competitive in relation to Levantine rivals as their relative price increased by 40-70 per cent (Arabic text Nujum. they gained ground. é in relation to the ducat (ifrantí). when Ibn Ghurab died. Egypt and Syria. 74. 59. 49. é 41 Popper. lowering the bi-metallic exchange within a restructured system to 11. translation History 2: 121. Numismatic Notes.20.41 Thereafter.55 grams to 2. 57. the de facto exchange rose to 264 in 1410 and 300 in 1412. month after month. Popper. 125 (Arabic text Nujum. é one part and the Venetians on the other. a complete alteration in the purchasing power of specie in terms of commodities within the two trading area. Egypt and Syria. fundamentally altering the nature of trade (Appendix. Section 4). Egypt and Syria. however.”46 Counterfeit and debased gold thus appeared in 1408. 173. Numismatic Notes.8). as a result of the diminution of Egyptian monetary stock. reflecting the deplorable state of precious metal stocks.404 IAN BLANCHARD re-established and the debilitation of silver continued apace as there was a gradual spread of the Alexandrine coins containing one-tenth silver (Appendix.94 grams. however. In recognition of the decline in the intrinsic value of the dirham fulus in circulation against the ducat é and newly introduced nasirí dinar. Traité des monnoies. The years 1392-1412 witnessed. 6: 131. however. é exchange rate from 150 in October 1405 to 250 in March 1406. Egypt and Syria.9: 1. was frozen at 25045 and the standard maintained. 6: 167. Reform following the death of Faraj once more established the primacy of silver. which had characterised the years 1374-1412. they had learnt to manage the monopoly effectively. Indeed as relative prices in Europe were enhanced by almost two-thirds the trade declined. Yet this could do little more than maintain a stable outflow of specie from the city. their position was weaker. oriental wares were correspondingly cheaper. They reacted by diversifying into unrestricted markets for commodities like cotton and potash (Table 3). 313 (Table XXIX). On the other hand. For Venice.47 Within two years. Where the Europeans operated in a competitive environment. Their first venture in 1412 was overly hasty. like the Karimí merchants (tujjar al-karim) in the spice trade. 1983). heavily tied to the spice trade. fluctuations in bi-metallic ratios merely placing a premium on one metal and then the other in the specie outflow. 48 Ashtor. Faced with a decline in specie returns for their goods. the trade could be highly profitable for.48 These changes both within the international situation and the Egyptian economy were to have profound effects on the European specie export trade and on those who participated in it. who with the é é é é encouragement of the Sultan were capable of a positive response. 47 E. the pattern of exchange of specie against specie. as in the market for consumables and raw materials. where they faced an organised group. their price increase from 60 to 220 dinars per sporta grotesquely overshot the mark and they were left with spices on their hands. the ability of the Karimí merchants to maintain the specie price of é é spices ensured that they gained no advantage from the new situation. now from 1412 was displaced by an exchange of specie against goods. one finds them buying up the country with alien gold and silver. however. Accordingly.5 tonnes of gold annually. Ashtor. however. maintaining domestic prices at about twenty per cent above the level of the 1390s. in free market conditions. equivalent to 1.EGYPTIAN SPECIE MARKETS 405 in the years after 1412. . Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 313 (Table XXIX). depended on the reaction of indigenous traders to the new market environment. How far European merchants benefited from this situation. Structurally there was a major displacement in the foci of the rapidly growing trade. the Karimí merchants simply restricted supplies of é é spices. Moreover. Trade in specie displaced trade in goods eastwards. Levant Trade. . always more committed to the bulk commodity trade. the volume of specie exports did not grow. which had lagged behind Venice in the boom of 1385-1390 and had been totally ousted from the final stages of the following boom by not having. with a bi-metallic ratio that constantly remained below that of Egypt. Bi-metallic equilibration between the two trading blocs allowed a resumption of commodity trades. it channelled specie east in return for a burgeoning volume of bulk commodities. Moreover. gave way to a rapid increase as the metal outflow grew without any compensatory reciprocal flow. . which had characterised gold prices in the period when metals had shuttled back and forth in conditions of gradual stock depletion.5 tonnes annually from 1425-1432. In contrast Genoa. Tapping a constantly widening market in Egypt their commodity export trade from there grew rapidly. and the increase in silver prices as a result of the mining crisis. engendering a corresponding import trade in specie from Europe. the specie outflow became the principal cause of the gold crisis during the years 1400-1432.EGYPTIAN SPECIE MARKETS 407 Tied to the spice trade. as a result of Egyptian monetary disorders. The Genoese market was transformed: the slow rise. A burgeoning gold export trade. took full advantage of the new market situation. Tapping specie supplies from the European heartland as well as Spain and the Mahgrib. a marketable product in the florin. Genoa had become the motor of Europe. during the years 1405-1412. denuded European gold stocks. increasing from about a third of a tonne net annually during the last quarter of the fourteenth century to 1. Eclipsing the effects of the mining crisis of 1375-1400.89 tonnes from 1400-1425 and perhaps as much as 4. each gold boom registered significantly in the market place. Its merchants. Only with the fall in gold prices. did the specie outflow come to end. and with a bi-metallic ratio hovering constantly just above that of Egypt to 1433 gold played little role in what outflow there was. now came to the fore. concomitant upon the establishment in the 1440s of mercury-amalgamation gold production in the Rhineland. . . Ashtor. “Études sur le système monétaire des Mamlouks circassiens. Sources: E. é (b) Related after mid-1416 to ducat-florin. . Popper. cont'd Gold Gold Canonical Nasirí é. Value of Gold.410 IAN BLANCHARD V. 74-5.69 (a) Related in this year and until 1416 to the dinar-mithqal. Egypt and Syria.” Israel Oriental Studies 6 (1976): 268-70 (Table 2). é Dinar Dinar M O March 1418 Sept 1418 Jan 1421 Jan 1422 Notes: Silver Silver Ducat M O Half-Mu’ayyadí é Dirham E V Bi-metallic Ratio 280 250230 230 240 260 220230 210 210 220 22 10 8.00 30 7 6. é. en route to the Western Sudan. west shore of Cabo de Tres Forcas [Cap de Trois Fourches].. Hunayn. upon his retirement. Monumenta Cartographica Vaticana.S. Alcudia (Khassaça. Almagià. The topic aims to honor John Munro’s place on the Scientific Committee of the Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F.. 1954 -).. and in many others. JOG NI30-03.. Planisferi. Portolani (as Alcudia). Bay (still known to World War II Mediterranean coastal pilots as Cala de Cazaza. in R. E. See e. The port is shown more or less correctly in many late medieval portulan charts (very well visible in BM MS Egerton 2803. also in the Fra Mauro map (c. mentor and a lasting source of inspiration. 1911)). all the way back to the Carignano planisphere (c. known to the Europeans as ..2 From Honein. also al-Qudia al-baida’ = the White Hill) is not . JOG NI30-02 (U. 1. . in . the well-known Tuscan merchant firm of Francesco di Marco Datini of Prato both watched and participated in the traffic of Venetian-supplied copper through the Balearic Islands to the Maghribi ports of Honein and Ghassassa.65 W): port formerly located northeast of modern Nemours. My ongoing research on the Datini firm owes much to the impetus of his graduate seminars and his numerous works.. 35. 2 Honein (Ar. particular. Edition 1-AMS.FROM VENICE TO THE TUAT: TRANS-SAHARAN COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DI MARCO DATINI OF PRATO1 Martin Malcolm Elbl From 1394 to 1410. Plate X of the Atlas of Portolan Charts. mod. L.é . commonly gazetteered as Honaïne. 1:250. Plates XIII-XV. North Africa. Datini” in Prato.g. The port was located in Ghassassa . Archivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF). lat. carte nautiche e affini dal secolo XIV al XVIII (Vatican: Città del Vaticano. Their indirect knowledge was mediated through contact with Majorcan Jewish merchants involved in the caravan 1 Offered to John Munro. Pending further discoveries in the Datini archive.000. in Honein Bay (Marsa Honaïne. Marsa de Sidi Lahsen. the metal then moved south to the oasis of Tuat.é .16 N. Tuat seems to have been the southernmost point in the Sahara with which Datini agents in Majorca were explicitly albeit indirectly familiar. ed. east of the prominent vertical cliffs of Punta Negri. Stevenson (New York. as Larcildia. between Cape Noé and Marsa Agla).. Army Corps of Engineers. é to be confused with Alcudia in Majorca. 1. at the mouth of Oued Honaïne. 1320). lon. 1450). Ghassassa. Iguesasen. 1944 –). ed. Metallurgy and Minting in the Middle Ages. “Egyptian Specie Markets and the International Gold Crisis of the Fifteenth Century. several of whom resided in or originated from Honein. At first a mere observer.” paper presented at the conference Slavery.” in the present publication.4 The Majorcan 3 R. University of Nottingham. Ian Blanchard. 3. the Majorca branch took its first serious plunge in the copper trade in 1398. c.” Universo (Florence). “The Medieval World of Islam: An Economic and Environmental Analysis. a period straddling Francesco Datini’s last illness. 4 Ian Blanchard. see G. The involvement gradually escalated to a complex set of transactions. 2001.”3 Given the dates (c. Far from a mere oddity. The Voyages of Cadamosto (London. some aspects of which remain as yet unpublished but circulate in digital manuscript. Part 3. R. Ian Blanchard. 1320-1520: A Study of Environmental Change and Commercial Adaptation. and the commodity (copper). however. Vol. even though accidental. upset the Majorcan copper market for many months and repercussions were felt from Valencia to Venice. 86. The arguments are also reflected in the third volume of Blanchard’s Mining. Undeterred. Leeds. H. “The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade. The venture’s disastrous outcome. 23 April 2005. Continuing Afro-European Supremacy (African Gold Production and the Second and Third European Silver Production Long Cycles) (Stuttgart: Steiner. 64 (5) (1984): 556-69. The substantive Datini evidence predates by some fifty years the notorious but far less richly contextualized voyage to the Tuat by the Genoese Antonio Malfante in 1447. Christian. Jewish. this extension of the firm’s conceptual map possessed direct relevance. the Majorca branch nonetheless maintained interest in exports of copper to Honein as late as August through September 1410.412 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL trade. and the firm’s legal dissolution. the geography (a Venice-MajorcaHonein-Tuat artery). 383-410. 2005). . still commonly cited as “the first Italian commercial venture in the Sahara. Rainero. “La prima iniziativa commerciale italiana nel Sahara: Antonio Malfante nel Tuat nel 1447. For Malfante’s letter from the Tuat. addressed to Giovanni Marione. 1390-1410). his death on 16 August. it is practically indispensable to set this trade flow in the context of Prof. and converso.” paper presented at the International Medieval Congress. Ian Blanchard’s recent cyclical intercontinental models of medieval trade in metals and other commodities. Freedom and Unfreedom in the Middle Ages. 1937). Crone. undertaken in 1407-1408 partly on behalf of the mother firm and its contacts and partly in conjunction with a diversified group of Balearic merchants. given the exposure of the Datini branch in Majorca to copper trade vicissitudes traceable as far as the Tuat. COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 413 copper trade is indeed of some relevance to supporting. adjusting or correcting (as the case might be) those portions of the models that cover the Western Mediterranean and the West-Central Sahara desert around 1400. among other. eliciting a countervailing southbound supply of European silver. Marínid mints in Morocco ceased operating in the first decade of the fifteenth century. Related mechanisms lying outside the scope of this paper contributed to a relative isolation of Egypt from African sources of gold. As Blanchard has argued.” 12. and the emergence “Base Metal Production and Trade: Lead. From the 1390s. . Blanchard has generally posited 1375 as the starting point of troubles in the distinctive Western Mediterranean market structure that since c. “Slave Trade. shifting away from the western Maghrib to focus more on Ifriqíya. and endured throughout the arid phase stretching from about 1420 to 1470. . while the Hafsid mints . however. . the latter’s lower temperatures and higher precipitation promoted prosperity among nomad populations. The latter swung to take advantage. The trail realignment was largely completed by 1435. particularly between the Tafilalt (Sijilmassa). acute shortages of gold on the Egyptian market. double dinars passed north “in exchange for European silver”.” 338.” 32-33. The 1375-1435 shift was accompanied by a “basic restructuring of inter-Maghrebian [precious metal] supply networks” reflecting changes in the flow of gold and thus presumably also other articles of trans-Saharan trade. “Medieval World of Islam. 1325 had arguably witnessed an adequate flow of gold in the form of double dinars (doblas) from the Maghrib to Europe.” 5 Blanchard. the Tuat. relative safety and stability along the desert margins. from where Hafsid . European maritime trade in the Western Mediterranean followed suit. and the use of trails crossing the West-Central Sahara through fairly difficult dune and sand sea (erg) regions. of “aqueous gravel at the foot of the Ahaggar and the Adrar des Iforas”5 (in this case the strip of Tanezruft routes from Tuat to the eastern Niger Bend). Tin and Copper. of Ifriqíya in the east rose to prominence. increasing aridity and the related upheavals among desert dwellers contributed to a major shift in trade routes. Around the same time the trans-Saharan caravans ceased to enjoy a roughly simultaneous benign climatic cycle. and Walata. “Egyptian Specie Markets. 414 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL . 1310-1370") and 2 (“Trans-Saharan Trade.6 Certain difficulties. or rejoin the Fez branch in the Atlas Mountains and invariably appear to follow the Tafilalt route.” unpublished draft.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 415 of alternating money-pump flows channelling respectively gold and silver from Europe and Asia Minor to Egypt. This is reflected in some of Blanchard’s trail maps.ac. 7 6 . The distinctiveness of the Maghribi regional economies and the intricacy of their role in Western Mediterranean commerce thus recede unduly into the background. in the middle.7 Wargla and “Sijilmassa” anchor the northern tips of the “X” throughout. the West-Central Saharan caravan traffic. esh. 1445-1454"). which seem to reduce West-Central Saharan trade dynamics to a see-saw between “Sijilmassa” in the west and Wargla in the east. Blanchard. Genoese and Provençal maritime trade is described as emulating in a somewhat mechanistic fashion the arid era rise of the easterly trails leading through the Tuat and other channels to Ifriqíya. specifically. gold. abstracting from the destruction of the walled city of Sijilmassa and from attendant changes in the role of the surrounding oasis of Tafilalt in the 1390s. Secondly. “Egyptian Specie Market. “Slave Trade. the Maghrib is all too often treated as an unproblematic trade membrane between Europe on the one hand and the Sahara and subSaharan Africa on the other hand.ed. 10-11. however. while Tlemcen. The result is a great “X” shape whose legs cross at the Tuat both in “old” trail system of 1310-1370 and in the “new” system of 1445-1454. The corresponding vagaries of the Egyptian monetary system—silver. even as a mere lieu de passage the Maghrib becomes a somewhat schematic doughnut in this rendering. Morocco and Ifriqíya namely hold the limelight. and copper—were partly reflected in the pattern of Egyptian copper imports. Firstly.” 338-43. at http://www. beset Blanchard’s macro-models with respect to Western Mediterranean and Maghribi commerce and.pdf. 8 Blanchard. Trade flows from Honein and Tlemcen are depicted as passing through Fez. “Egyptian Specie Markets. Catalan.” Maps 1 (“Trans-Saharan Trade. Correspondingly. almost vanishes were it not for mentions of the port of Honein. as is the Tlemcenian/Algerian Blanchard.uk/Courses_IB/Mid_Ages/alexandria.8 The middle band represented by the axis Balearics-Honein-Tuat is underplayed. The more direct Oued Guir-Oued Saoura trails are not featured. . and grain were the money-making staples of Balearic and partly also Valencian light shipping. David Abulafia. 11 Ch.11 9 J. however.10 The works of Charles-Emmanuel Dufourcq or Pierre Macaire did not go beyond restating the commonplace. Dufourcq.416 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL coast whose mundane but certainly not unimportant hides. He did not elaborate. Finally. by way of Majorca. L’Italie et le Maghreb. is rather more muted in this matter (Jehel. The book itself. the route Venice-Balearic Islands-Maghrib seems to have faded out of sight as a factor in the trans-Saharan trade. Dolors Pifarré Torres’ analysis of trade between Barcelona and Flanders. briefly alluded to Catalan imports of Flemish copper. avec certains minerais comme le cuivre. wax or wool. A Mediterranean . heavily drawing on Majorcan data. at http://www. Very much part of this “middle band” economy. qui constituent. Pierre Macaire. 1966). but without tracing any Maghrib trade links or touching on the Venetian strand of the copper traffic. L'Espagne catalane et le Maghrib aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles. Majorque et le commerce international (1400-1450 environ) (Lille: Atelier de reproductions de thèses (Univ. María Dolores López Pérez’s seminal study of exchanges between the Maghrib and the Crown of Aragon in the fourteenth century. 162). 2001) (signed Georges Jehel. “Il commercio nel Mediterraneo alla fine del sec. the vibrant Italian/ Majorcan trade in copper and other goods carried through the Tuat to the Western Sudan in the 1390s and early 1400s thus fills a virtual void in Blanchard’s phase of west-east route shift (1375-1435).-E.” Archivio Storico Italiano 113 (2) (1955): 177. suggesting that the sizeable quantities of copper on board the Venetian galleys westbound to Flanders in 1401 were perhaps partly routed to the Maghrib. 10 The promotional summary for Georges Jehel’s L’Italie et le Maghreb: conflits et échanges du VIIe au XVe siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.clio.fr). the first Catalan monograph to use the Datini material more extensively. kermes (dyer’s grain).. Heers. June 2002. and David Abulafia’s history of the Catalan kingdom of Majorca passed the Balearic copper trade under silence.9 Since then. of Lille III). however. or show that this metal indeed moved across the desert. l’essentiel des exportations du Maghreb vers l’Italie pour approvisionner une production artisanale et industrielle diversifiée en plein essor au XIVe siècle”). As early as 1955 Jacques Heers hinted at the relative importance of the Balearic copper trade. ignored copper among Balearic re-exports. De la bataille de Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) à l'avènement du sultan mérinide Aboul-Hasan (1331) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1986). further complicated matters by including copper among late medieval Maghribi exports to Italy (“. XIV e nei primi anni del XV. and a wide array of Maghribi skins. pelts. Moroccan gum sandarac. John H. M. 11: Scandinavian Languages to Textiles. Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. purple. 36-7 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons/MacMillan. Pasold Studies in Textile History No. Also J. s. Textiles. and Brookfield. Towns. reprinted in John Munro.v. Mediterranean Emporium. or scarlet. supposedly focussed mainly on wax and “to some degree” leather. 570-573. 1982-88 [1988]). Islamic. however. 1995)..g. La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb en el siglo XIV (1331-1410) (Barcelona: CSIC.” Dictionary of the Middle Ages. H. Carus-Wilson. El comerç internacional de Barcelona i el Mar del Nord (Bruges) a finals del segle XIV (Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat. cannot be used with confidence to map out Mallorca’s trading links”—a sensible if over-cautious position— Abulafia also suggested that the archive was of limited use for the study of the Maghrib trade. María Dolores López Pérez. Francesco Datini namely “showed rather little interest in North Africa. 2 (London: The Pasold Research Fund and Heinemann Educational Books. Hampshire. while expressing “strong interest” in African wares offered in Majorca. Cloth and Clothing in Medieval Europe: Essays in Memory of Professor E. Munro. Vol.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 417 The current gap in the literature is not.. A. David Abulafia’s Mediterranena Emporium unintendedly but pertinently exemplified the issue. 12 Abulafia.” The firm. Strayer et al. the West African spice malaguetta. and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. wool. superabundant as it is. “The Medieval Scarlet and the Economics of Sartorial Splendour.12 Unfortunately.. Munro. Ponting. 1994). a consequence of scanty data—enough is available to frame at least preliminary answers. “Scarlet. 13 vols.” in Negley B. rawhide and leather of varying grades and regional provenances. edited by Joseph R. 2002). and kermes (dyer’s grain)13 to “feather” alum. the Datini firm’s Compagnia di Catalogna was in fact extensively involved in Emporium.” as evidenced by a negligible exchange of letters between “north African localities and Datini agents in the Balearics. Harte and Kenneth G. this amounts to a severe misestimation of the Datini records. 13-70. See e. . Having argued that “the Datini evidence. 1994). in order to find pass-keys unlocking other archival leads and to build up a critical mass of cross-referenced evidence spanning the Western Mediterranean. 220-1. From Maghribi wax. ostrich feathers. Dolors Pifarré Torres. Institución Milá y Fontanals. It rather reflects a bottleneck in exploiting such massive sources as the Datini archive effectively. 1983). Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442 (Aldershot. A. 13 One of the substances used to dye fabrics in shades of deep red. The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. It is true that all the Datini transactions with North Africa were indirect. The same Compagnia supplied Balearic exporters with an array of European goods either retailed in the Maghrib or carried in part across the Sahara. 15 Giampiero Nigro. the extent of the Datini firm’s exposure to North African markets can prove difficult 14 Relevant elements can be traced back to the classic works of Federigo Melis. the year when the Compagnia di Catalogna finally emerged as a business entity from the awkward formative stage that saw the first implantation of a branch in Majorca. however. but the circumstances in which the local branch was set up. beads and paternosters. Eastern spices and lac. For the bulk of the latter’s most active and profitable years. at least obliquely.14 The recent publication (2003) of Giampiero Nigro’s two volumes of Datini and related letters from Majorca may begin to change perceptions in this matter. In particular. The bulky unpublished branch ledgers and associated account books. paper. Moreover. Il carteggio datiniano dall’isola (13871396). regrettable as it might be for historians. mirrors. of discrete Maghribi economic sectors. conducted through Majorcan or Valencian intermediaries. 1962). Olschki. both strands of the Datini material require careful matching with local sources—Balearic. did not reflect faint interest. including his fundamental Aspetti della vita economica medievale: studi nell’archivio Datini di Prato (Florence: L. based on both correspodence and ledgers) of the Datini wax. 2003). and for the intimately related evidence from sister branches in Valencia and Barcelona. chemicals and medicinal substances—and copper. eyeglasses. Valencian or both—to tease out their full significance. .15 The coverage. S. 3 vols. stops in 1396. it remains necessary to work with the original documents. The Datini archive should certainly not be underrated as a resource for the study of North African maritime commerce and. Yet the firm’s lack of direct contact with Maghribi clients. however. Mercanti in Maiorca. and the Balearic merchants’ protectionist tactics. (Florence: Le Monnier. 1396-1410. Finally. kermes.418 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL North African commerce. but new detailed studies (companion pieces to the present paper. from the point of view of timely publication. from cloth to petty metalware. Nigro focussed on the correspondence—quite wisely. malaguetta. are as crucial for interpreting the letters as the latter are for setting the bland transaction records in context. The third volume containing an interpretive essay and the index was still “in press” as of November 2005. and hide and skin trade through Majorca are only now on the verge of being published. The correct attribution is evident from the letters to which she refers. (the notation Datini Co. The first two predominated in the Majorcan market. Datini Co. Further p. 892. Majorca-Valencia. In the north. identifies here the so-called lettere di compagnia or “open” letters from one Datini branch to another. as Torres has shown. 1406. Virtually all the copper arriving in Majorca in the Datini years was shipped from Venice. Majorca-Barcelona.17 Venice supplied copper to the Western Mediterranean in three forms: loaf ingots (pani). Copper from the Low Countries did reach the key transshipment nexus in the Maghribi port of Honein. and rods (verghe). 18 ASP. Tuscan merchants in particular tended to balk at shipping copper from the Low Countries to the Mediterranean because they could not acquire it in Bruges on easy payment terms or through barter for other goods. 1409. There is no evidence thus far that the Balearics functioned as a crossroads of Venetian and Flemish supply strands.16 Moreover. frequently with direct involvement by Venetian firms or agents. plates (tavole. a quick sketch of Majorca’s copper market is in order. Barcelona. 1v.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 419 to assess without a close knowledge of the Balearic/Valencian merchant scene. . 17 Torres. tole. fol. Archivi di Famiglie e di Persone: Archivio Datini) 998 (number of Datini filza).18 No 16 ASP. 148. as opposed to letters exchanged among individuals within the firm. 23 Jul. D. It remains difficult to determine whether the Flemish copper sold in Honein tended to be virgin or part scrap—the firm of Diamante and Altobianco degli Alberti certainly signalled the availability of both at Bruges. Torres mistitled the Diamante and Altobianco degli Alberti partnership in Bruges as “els Diamante”. although not through Majorca. D. especially in the current absence of good indices to the Datini papers. lastre di rame). 437 below. 1v. 31 Jul. (Archivio di Stato di Prato. Before discussing the Datini role in the Balearic copper trade and the rather dramatic circumstances of the largest and so ill-starred copper deal orchestrated by the firm’s Majorca branch. the repetitious full business styles of originating and recipient branches will thus not be given).. Scattered prices for verghe are found in the Datini material but copper was rarely if ever delivered to Majorca in this form even though the Saharan caravans might have preferred rods. fol. as we shall see. Datini Co. copper was all too often cash business. but according to contemporary testimony North African buyers distinctly preferred Venetian copper. or strictly private and confidential correspondence. e. was still not quite pure and remained poorly malleable. 446-7 below. ottone). with the hallmarked Venetian ones fetching the higher price. 381-2. while marketable. 1936).20 Given the colour (molto vermiglio e rosso) and the price. verging on brass in colour. 20 Pegolotti. but despite its nice red hue the product. and only then were the ingots stamped with a producer’s hallmark. In Pegolotti’s time standard 19 Francesco Balducci Pegolotti. with the “Lamb” hallmark) occasionally topped the price range. sometimes conflated in the literature. although in the case of tin Pegolotti clearly stated that in his time (1320-1347) rods for re-export were made from ingots of Cornwall tin both in Majorca and in Venice. acknowledged and appreciated by merchants. MA: The Mediaeval Academy of America. ed. although Pegolotti stressed the difference. between this copper and brass properly speaking (“yellow copper”. yielded Garkupfer (refined copper) in the form of Rosettenkupfer. Allan Evans (Cambridge. Whether hallmarked (di bolla) or not. volatilize arsenic. . 381. but in fact distinct. the rame in tavole refined and made up into plates in Venice was put on the market in part as malleable Hammergarkupfer.19 The documents clearly show that the copper shipped to the Maghrib at the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries came largely in plates. The final Hammergarmachen involved one more smelting with charcoal. La pratica della mercatura. For discussion of possible provenance. it is likely that both types corresponded at the very least to Rosettenkupfer (using standard German smelting terminology) if not Hammergarkupfer (for the hallmarked ingots). The plates were rated good and “sweet” only if they “held up to the hammer” and bent without cracking or breaking. antimony and zinc. Somewhat cheaper were the unmarked small loaves of red rame dell’ene. The less frequent ingots quoted in Majorca as dell’angnolo (i. This was refined red copper in breadsized loaves.420 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL provision seems to have been made for turning plates into rods in Majorca in the Datini years. see pp. and tie other companion metals in slag. They fell into the category of rame di Papa or the rame della bolla di San Marco di Vinegia (whose general description is found in Pegolotti’s Pratica della Mercatura trade manual). Pratica. The primary refining of raw copper (Schwarzkupfer) in an open oven (Garherd) to reduce impurities. The product was yellowish. These were the last two steps of copper refining. 43 Majorcan pounds or 5. Brittle “sour” plates were undeniably on the market.4 and 8.73 kg/dm3 and the specific weight of beryllium copper can be as low as 8. It is tempting to interpret the “sour” plate as copper subjected to imperfect Hammergarmachen or none at all.. the most notable among them the bustling caravan station of Tamentit (Tamantít). 12. Wedged between the Tademaït Plateau and the Tidikelt in the east and the northern outliers of the long dunes of Erg Chech in the west. The specific weight of pure modern copper is 8. Libro grande bianco segn.68 m by 0. The oasis region of Tuat.8 for laminated and cast copper respectively.21 The Datini ledgers suggest an average plate weight of c. The port of Honein. and thus a thickness of c.5 braccia (0.é.5 Majorcan pounds = 2. Besides Tamentit.34 m).251 copper plates). 381. as already implied.93 kg/dm3 at 15 C. Casting brass and rolled and drawn brass vary between 8. falling to 8.968.6 kg/dm3 as a reasonable compromise in lieu of the unknown specific weight of the medieval copper sold in Majorca. and Pegolotti had explicitly urged testing batches for “sweetness”. Describing the Tuat in the later fourteenth century. while Ghassassa (Alcudia) . fol. The probable thickness has been calculated using the specific weight of 8. Ibn Khaldún spoke of some 200 qusur (for. 115r (27.04 kg. It provided a gateway to the so-called Tanezruft route and ultimately to the Niger Bend. Ibn Khaldún highlighted the micro-regions of Buda (in the north) and Reg- Pegolotti.9 and 8.é tified settlements). C (Majorca). 0. 22 21 . repeatedly mentioned in the letters.22 Whether the plates traded through Majorca were mostly “sweet” is not entirely clear from the Datini and Majorcan records. above all Fez. was a key entrepôt hub of the Majorcan/Venetian copper trade. 1016.25 cm— if indeed the other two dimensions remained roughly the same since Pegolotti’s time. the Tuat was a major source of food and water at the northern edge of the desolate reg (gravel desert) dominating the Tanezruft Basin.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 421 Venetian-made plates were sized 1 by 0. and mixed in to “pad” bundled lots. Pratica.1 kg/dm3. served as a secondary outlet geared towards Moroccan markets.. ASP. was a vital staging point south of the Grand Erg Occidental (Great Western Sand Sea) and the Gurara oasis group. The Datini letters leave no doubt that Honein was at this juncture a prominent head of trail serving the large annual caravans bound for the northern Saharan oases—and from there across the desert (even though the correspondence does not say much regarding the latter). D. 422 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL . 23 Buda. Camille Sabatier.. 1891). trans. north of Fenughil). Tamest. Inzegmir. é Confusingly enough.G. See e. Sabatier. . économique et militaire (Paris: Société d’éditions scientifiques. Les oasis du Touat-Gourara-Tidikelt en Algérie. al-islamíya bi-’l-Maghrib min Kitab al-’ibar.75 N. an extension of the Oued Saoura. not east to west: Buda. 234-5. Touat. Ibn Khaldun also referred to Buda as the é “westernmost” of Tuat’s micro-regions and to Tamentit as the “easternmost” one. The standard coordinates for Tamentit (often not shown on general maps). Gourara).M. 24 The standard definition of the Tuat refers to the stretch from Adrar and Reggane. 261). Sahara et Soudan.” Cahiers de l’ORSTOM. Villages désertés et structures agraires anciennes du Touat-Gourara (Sahara algérien) (Paris: A. lon. 0. Despite its title. the southernmost qusur of Reggane. 38-40 km/day). and then Tuat as such (Fenughil [Fenourhil]. Échallier. Touat. A caravan partially on foot would see this fall to some 32 km. 27. politique.25 Buda was simply the first cross-roads of trails from the Dar’a and the Tafilalt in the north-west (through the Kahal de Walí al-Dín ‘Abd al-Rahman Abu Zayd ibn Khaldun. as does J. “Survie et ordre social au Sahara. according to a broader topographic schema. are lat. B. Histoire des Berbères et des dynasties é é é musulmanes de l'Afrique septentrionale. from latitude 26 5' N to latitude 27 5' N. Zaglou (Tuat al-henna). but this is true only in a rather tenuous sense— the Tuat in fact stretches along a steep NNW to SSE line (Maps 1 and 2).24 The qusur of the larger Tuat were clustered in micro-regional groups . Timmi/Adrar. Note that the Oued Messaoud “vanished” in roughly the same place still in the nineteenth century (the dunes cut across it just south of Timadanine and Taourirt. For recent studies see Y. the former head of trail for caravans travelling to Mauritania’s Walata.28 W. Tidekelt. 23 . Série Sciences Humaines 29 (1) (1993): 121-38. or. and Reggane). 25 The “long day” is based on nineteenth-century estimates of the speed of a merchant caravan comprising only riders (c.-C. P. Touat. 196.é structuring the oasis region geographically and politically from north to south. There was not much real difference between a caravan station at Buda (north-west of mod. some 50 km or a long day’s march away. Kitab ta’ríkh al-duwal é é é é é é é . Guillermou. 3: 298. Adrar) and at Tamentit (south of Timmi.g. Casanova (Paris: Geuthner.” Erde 115 (1-2) (1984): 93-109 surveys some of the local medieval structures.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 423 gane (the southern outpost where the Oued Messaoud (Ghir-Saoura) “vanished among the sands”). 1925-1956) 1: 191. Gabriel’s “Zur vorzeitlichen Besiedlung Südalgeriens (Tanesrouft. The region is a string of discrete oasis nodes straddling the Greenwich meridian (0 longitude) down the east side of the Oued Messaoud (Oued Tuat) valley. 1972). new ed. MacGuckin De Slane. had reputedly yielded its é rank to Tamentit by Ibn Khaldun’s time.é Etude géographique. Tuat and Buda grande figure in a fifteenth-century Italian planisphere from the Vatican Galleries. and both Tamentit and Buda (ciutat de Buda) in the planisphere of Mecià de Villadestes (c. XIII. XV. Honein. By 1394. and in the atlas chart of the Genoese Battista Beccario (1426). Plates VIII. 1: Frontispice. La découverte de l'Afrique au moyen âge: cartographes et explorateurs. another 100 km to the south. Bernardo Bon) or leading copper suppliers such as the Contarini may have known at least as much as the Datini men. (Cairo: La Société Royale de Géographie d’Égypte. None the less. without any hint of need for explanation. Fonts per a l’estudi de la comunitat jueva de Mallorca.and fifteenthcentury Italians and Catalans. In the “Catalan Planisphere” of the Estense. 19251925).26 The Tuat was by no means unknown to fourteenth. at Timmi and Tamentit. Tamentit enjoyed at least a notional “defense in depth” advantage. would a caravan essentially have to commit to the Tanezruft route. as compared to the almost correct position in Dulcert and a fair approximation in Villadestes. and west intersected. Tamentit’s greater “safety” from Dar’a or Sus raiders was dubious. Buda in the Catalan Atlas of 1375 and in the “Catalan Planisphere” of the Biblioteca Nazionale in Naples (fifteenth century). 1413). Buda and a castrum de Tagenduhet (possibly Tamentit) appear in the Majorcan portolan of Angelino Dulcert27 (1339).g. Jewish merchants—Majorcan as well as Maghribi—played a significant role in the copper trade linking the Balearics. Catalonia Hebraica VI (Barcelona: PPU. de la Roncière. Only upon reaching Reggane. One can thus only assume that Tuat was equally familiar to Venetians involved more often and more routinely in the copper traffic. and from Figuig in the north. XI. 28 Ch.424 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL Tabelbala). Venetians resident in the Balearics (e. north. 2 vols. but in no way precluded striking out along south-westerly trails. 1330)). 2005). X. given that a raiding party mounted on mehari camels could cover up to 100 km/day when pushing the mounts. 495. Buda is considerably displaced.28 The importance of the oasis region appears to have been fairly well understood by those working for the Datini firm: from the very first mention in the Datini letters the tone is matter-of-fact. Mar. Majorcan Jews and post-1391 conversos were forcefully 26 Buda was exposed to nomad raids from the north-west in the sense of being located at the vulnerable northern tip of the Tuat. . Most routes from the east. 124 (doc. however. and Tuat. The latter was a little more defensible. 27 Also known as Dulcet (Eduard Pérez i Pons. in the “Catalan Planisphere” of Modena’s Biblioteca Estense (fifteenth century). . . and the Datini material adds only tantalizing glimpses.. that the article contains errors and should be used with caution). Subsequently. . the Jewish community of Tamentit was decimated (probably in 1492. The Datini firm. Muhammad al-Maghílí. and again in 1503). The isolated fourteenth-century tombstones with Hebrew inscriptions found at Buda (in Ghormali) and at Tamentit between 1903 and the 1950s moreover suggest a certain opulence.ã. W. from Bernat Tudela and Joan Toreyó to the notary and Maghrib trader Julià Fontcuberta and powerful players such the Pachs brothers and Antoni Quint. The structures of the trade on which this prosperity rested are poorly known. “A Contribution to the Biography of Shaikh Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd alKarim Ibn Muhammad (‘Umar) al-Maghili al-Tilimsani. who had first settled in the Tuat in 1477-1478 (see ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Abd-Allah Batran.29 Jewish and converso participation in the copper trade should by no means obscure. Tamentit has long been associated in both oral tradition and in historiography with a vibrant Jewish presence.” Journal of African History 14 (3) (1973): 381-94).” Journal of African History 4 (3) (1963): 323-4 (note. conveniently referenced in H. however. “The Problem of the Judaized Berbers. some of them from Majorcan lineages or from families with close ties to Majorca before 1391. during episodes of repression fomené éé ted by the scholar Muhammad b. were instrumental in warehousing the metal and arranging its transport to Tuat.. in part. even though they do not seem to have always travelled south with the caravans. Sheshet concerning Tuati affairs (incidentally confirming the importance of the Honein-Tuat link) are far too sketchy. the substantial and aggressive involvement by Majorca’s “old Christian” merchants of diverse financial stature. It is true that they focussed largely on one segment of the metal traffic—within the triangle MajorcaHonein-Ghassassa—which they deemed they could control at least . particularly between 1300 and 1492. Yet this was by no means exceptional. Honein Jews. Semah Duran (for instance concerning copper transported from Oran to the Tuat).) Hirschberg. Z. despite the hardship and disruption inflicted on the Majorcan Jewish community by the violent socio-political crisis of 1391 and the attendant assault on the aljama in Ciutat de Mallorca (mod. however. ‘Abd al-Karím b. Solomon b. Malfante reported that in 1447 Tuat trade was in the hands of local Jews. as well as the presence of reputable rabbis and halakha commentators. but that does not say much about the situation around 1400. (J. however. to 29 The responsa (takkanot) of Issac b. Palma). The exact division of labour between Honein and Tuat Jews remains nonetheless unclear. as are those of R.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 425 reasserting themselves in the Maghrib trade. Firstly.426 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL some extent on sufferance from the Majorcans. for now. ARM (Arxiu del Regne de Mallorca). with the most important shipment reaching the Balearics on board the cog of Giaconello de’ Falchi. correspondents such as Nofri di Bonaccorso or Antonio di Filippo Lorini and Co. fols. deliveries of copper to Majorca were chanelled mainly through the Venetian merchants Bernardo Bon and Polo di Giovanni. it is quite clear that outsiders had a certain mental image of the Datini firm’s “profile” and typical requirements and adjusted their reporting accordingly. Finally. The customs register in question carries a misleading attribution to 1386-1390. while a detached folded sheet inserted at the back provides a summary financial statement by the clavari for the year 1387. and ultimately to the Tuatis. was doing the same. The Balearic and Maghribi Jews who competed in the maritime triangle with the Majorcan “old Christians” and Italians projected their influence further south. The Datini letters and other sources suggest that prominent operators such as Ayon Susen rarely if at all travelled south of Honein. 6v-7r (the identification of the Majorcan registers’ “Polo de Venecia” with Polo di Giovanni remains tentative). the contents cover in fact the year 1390. In 1390. and Nofri was overtly paranoid about his fragile position of intermediary and local expert. 30 .30 Information for 1391-1393 is meagre. the flow of information was shaped by the contacts’ own business operations. were not prone to dabble in copper. RP (Patrimoni Reial/Real Patrimonio) 1998. while the economically depressed 1380s represent a void. gladly leaving the next stage to better informed and more entrenched locals. and in so far as it functioned as a supplier of copper it relied in turn on Venetian contacts and most often on Venetian ships. Muslims and Jews. 2v-3r. The reason is threefold. The Datini letters—those received from business contacts and arms-length agents prior to the arrival of Datini staff in the Balearics—fail to fill the gap. Secondly. owing to the paucity of Balearic trade records and to lack of research on Majorcan notarial registers predating the well-known fifteenth-century records of the notary Antoni Contestí. The first coherent glimpse of the Majorcan turn-of-the-century copper trade dates to 1390. to the Maghribi-northern Saharan segment— but once again within limits. the letters amply show that even the best contacts were politely coy about “trade secrets” in terms of specific local knowledge. The Datini firm was simply perceived as not being very much into raw metals. 33 E. Antonio di Flippo Lorini Co. To Datini Co. 32 ARM. Ambrogio Lorenzi to Datini Co. 7 (12) Oct.1 to 9. Nigro. The Tudela/Michele shipment on the latter galley amounted to 17 costals worth 115 l.31 An identical schedule was followed in 1395. however. up to 15 or 20 migliai grossi of copper plate (7. not the subsequently stamped archival page numbers).COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 427 The year 1394 saw the island market resupplied in copper for the most part by the outbound galleys of the regular Venetian Flanders line.g. Moceniga and Giustiniana on 16 April.M. Mercanti.33 It was not until two years after the Datini Compagnia di Catalogna branch structure had finally been set up in 1396. following its first awkward attempt to find a foothold in Majorca.M. RP 2002. at first handled brass and copper only on behalf of others. Lombarda. he strongly urged the mother company to order from Venice. the young Datini factor who arrived in the Balearics from Valencia on 16 March 1394. for which duty was paid by Messer Giacomino Arnuzzi were consigned by the Contarini merchant house and declared to be worth 440 l. In January 1399. 1394). Majorca-Valencia. The 31 bales of copper (aram) sheet on the Capitana. when copper and brass shipped from Venice partly on behalf of Alvise Contarini and partly consigned to the Majorcan Bernat Tudela and the Venetian Benedetto di Michele was delivered by the Flanders galleys Capitana. the 52 bales on the Lombarda were worth 840 l. 1395).).M. Cristofano di Bartolo Carocci.M. Ambrogio Lorenzi de’ Rocchi. The Giustiniana carried 8 costals of copper (coure) worth 115 l. through Zanobi di Tadeo Gaddi. which docked at Ciutat de Mallorca on Good Friday (17 April) and unloaded virtually nothing but a large quantity of copper.. Mercanti. 22 (29) Dec. 6r-6v (the folio numbers for this register are the original manuscript numbers. Ambrogio Lorenzi to Datini Co.5 metric tons) for resale to Majorcan Maghrib traders (“per la 31 Nigro. as reported by Antonio Lorini. Ambrogio Lorenzi to Datini Co.32 The Datini firm began to pay moderate attention to the transit of copper through the islands in 1394. 2: 994 (doc. and the Venetians Messer Antonio Contarini and Paoluccio di Maestro Paolo. 406. 607 (doc. 930 (doc.M. fols... 439. . (Majorcan pounds of account). 30 Oct. 642 (doc. that the firm developed a sustained and growing interest in the MajorcanMaghribi copper traffic. 25-28 April 1304. the 20 costals on the Moceniga were worth 100 l. was routinely quoting local copper prices in his business corespondence within the next half-year. who had assumed management of the Majorca branch in March 1396. however. such as Alberto degli Alberti of Bruges. 265.. 1394). 255. Lane and Reinhold C. Majorca-Valencia.428 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL Barberia”). Coins and Moneys of Account (Baltimore. In the meantime.. He waited anxiously for the galleys. 3r. 996. was nonetheless in short supply and deliveries from Venice. 1399. In October 1399 Cristofano still vainly advocated that the firm invest in some 200 to 300 centinai grossi of copper plate (9. D. and were trying to move much of it out to Valencia. 667. See Frederic C. Datini Co. and the 16 bales unloaded in May from the Verzona were snapped up at above market price. 22 Oct. Datini Co. 996. ASP. speculating on a rise in prices in case of war between Portugal and Castile rather than on sustained sales in the Maghrib. 134 (for the underlying Venetian pound). Italian Weights and Measures from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century (Philadelphia. Datini Co. 1. 1985). Bernardo Bon and the Contarini had saturated the Majorcan market with loaf ingot copper by May. D.7 kg). the renewed outbreak of the Portuguese-Castilian conflict was imminently expected to raise the price of loaf ingot copper. delayed by a quarrel between Venice and the Crown of Aragon over navigation laws..35 Stoldo di Lorenzo and Francesco Datini (the principals of the mother company in Prato/Florence) stubbornly held off into the spring of 1400. fol. however. fol. Majorca-Florence. MajorcaFlorence. The trading season’s main profits went to Datini competitors. fol. 667. Vol.3 metric tons). 27 Jan. in mid-June. fol. 1r. more suited for the latter market. ASP. 1981). 1399. ultimately intended for the firm’s main contact in Venice. Majorca-Valencia. ASP. Copper plate for the Maghrib was also in strong demand. Datini Co. The recommendation. D. Datini Co. 667. fols. preferred in the Iberian Peninsula. It was not until the following year (1401) that Cristofano finally managed to have 20 bales of plate shipped out to Majorca. 1399. were not expected until later in September.5 to 14. 2r. 5 Jun. however. 1399. and nearly half the batch consequently remained in his 34 ASP. 4 Sep. Mueller. Plate copper. 2r. The same applies to the centinai grossi mentioned next (1 centinaio grosso = 47. 35 ASP. Majorca-Florence.34 His insistence on delivery by the first available ship or failing that by the Flanders galleys (obviously those of the spring muda) fell. on deaf ears. was framed in Venetian units of measure and the corresponding conversion is used here (1 migliaio grosso = 477 kg). 360 and Ronald Edward Zupko. particularly Bastiano di Bartolo.. Money and Banking in Medieval and Renaissance Venice. He thus partly missed a window of opportunity for getting cargo on board the ship scheduled to connect with the caravans in Honein. 24 May 1399. . 1v.. D.. D. but did not receive his copper until much later. 1r. Datini Co. 12 Jan. 1v. 997. Majorca-Florence. Majorca-Valencia. 997. 1r-2v (fol. Datini Co. Majorca-Florence. D. and Cristofano suggested an over-ambitious scheme for shipping cloth. ASP. 2r. D. i . 1401. 1401.. plate and loaf ingots as well. 1401.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 429 stockroom. fol. Majorca-Valencia. D. Tuccio di Gennaio consigned with Cristofano another 30 quintals of copper re-routed from Valencia and brought in by way of Ibiza. 1r. Majorca-Florence. “blue and large as a middling nut. ASP. 17 Apr. By then copper plate for the caravans was a hot item. for to his suprised irritation he found himself locked out through tacit collusion among Majorcan merchants. 16 Jun. Unfortunately.. comfort. 668. 1r. Majorca-Florence. The Jewish traders who had initially been willing to buy up all that was left. 996.. 13 Jun. ASP. fol. fol. D. D.ã. D. 1r-1v. Cristofano di Bartolo to Luca del Sera.”37 36 ASP. Majorca-Valencia. 2v (“. Majorca-Valencia.. 1402. 997. D. 667. ASP. had been advised from Honein to hold off. 997. 1v. The pressure to come up with some strategy increased when. copper. Cristofano di Bartolo to Luca del Sera..36 The advancing autumn spawned its usual share of pipe dreams. almost too late. Ultimately the Balearic market went into hibernation until next March. fol. 11 Feb. 1401. 668. in the middle of the slack season. Cristofano di Bartolo to Luca del Sera. fol. 31 Jan... ASP. Datini Co. 1400. 26 May 1400. ASP. demand in Honein was stronger than ever before. Majorca-Valencia. 1402. 1402. 1r. 1401. 997. 28 Oct. such as are customarily brought by the Venetian galleys. fol. 1r1v. Majorca-Florence. fol. 37 ASP. D. fol. 668. D. Majorca-Valencia. 1402. Datini Co. Datini Co. 1400... ASP. To dispose of his remaining 36 bales of metal he then put his hopes in the Jewish merchants trading to Honein.000 pounds of copper plate). 668. 1v (recommending a shipment of 20. and a digression on how to save on customs by shipping goods to the Maghrib in Xipio’s name and to Majorca under the Datini merchant mark). 6 Oct. and the Valencia branch was only partially successful in finding takers for copper as late as October. and the Saharan trade buying pressure had spilled over even to such items as glass prayer beads... Datini Co. D. D. fol. September brought further complications both for him and for competitors. D. 2v contains the lengthy outline of the Jucef Xipio project. D. 667. ASP. the expected departure of the nave of Jaume Tudela for Ghassassa in January 1402 brought Cristofano no . fol. 12 Sep. ASP. and geared up for the next trading bout only in July. 28 Aug.. ASP. 997. 996. Datini Co. 1r. 17 Apr. Majorca-Valencia... fols. Cristofano di Bartolo to Luca del Sera. Datini Co. fols. ASP. 1v. fols. Majorca-Valencia. and other merchandise to the Maghrib with the help of the Valencian Muslim merchant Jucef Xipio. fol. 6 Apr. Datini Co. Datini Co. 1400. 1401. ASP. 15 Nov. MajorcaFlorence. D.. 1v. as he stressed. Datini Co. and drove a hard bargain when they finally agreed to buy 120 quintals. 40 ASP. 668. were already overcommitted on account of taking off his hands metal belonging to the Dandolo firm of Venice. ASP. 71r). fol. D. systematically reckon copper by a quintal of 100 pounds (see e.. ASP. 2r. and the firm’s internal usage is obviously the one to follow when converting relevant figures. Datini Co. 1403. D. Haim and Balaix held off even after having been rescued by an inflow of gold coin from the Maghrib. Cristofano was desperately trying to get Aion Haim and others interested. B (Majorca).38 In the summer of 1403 Cristofano was hard at work negotiating the potential sale of a sizeable shipment of copper sent out by the Contarini on board the Chopa. 38 ASP. Majorca-Florence. chome solglono portare le ghalee de’ Viniziani .430 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL Cristofano now dared to think bigger.39 That autumn’s bright point. MajorcaFlorence.. D. grossi chome una nuciola mezana. 1v. 1r.”). 1r. 1402. ASP. besides being short of cash. which collapsed in mid-October 1403. 23 Jul.3 metric tons) of copper at one go. and specifies that copper is sold by the “Barbary quintal” (cantaro barberesco) of 121 Majorcan pounds. 997. The Datini ledgers. given that his usual Jewish contacts (“gli amici”). to be unjustified. in the range of 500 quintals (20. D. 1403. fol. Majorca-Valencia. D. the quintal is here reckoned as 100 Majorcan pounds of 0. was the fact at least the leftovers of Contarini copper and the Dandolo tin remained unscathed and were successfully excavated from the ruins of the Datini house in Majorca. fol. 668. 1r. Majorca-Florence. 12 Jul.406 kg. Datini Co. however. 668. Libro grande bianco segn. Pegolotti does set the size of the Majorcan quintal (cantaro dells terra) at 104 Majorcan pounds. D. fol. 39 ASP. Cristofano di Bartolo to Luca del Sera. 1403. The talks were not going quite well. 6 Nov.. 1015. A massive flash flood of the Riera stream that wound down the centre of the late medieval Ciutat de Mallorca devastated the downtown business district.g.. making Cristofano rue having received another 16 quintals of Contarini metal through Piero Mattei in Ibiza.. 7 Jul. fol. Haim Susen and Balaix Feraig. Datini Co.40 By December the market remained soft and then virtually collapsed. 668. Between January and August 1404 he and paternostri di vetro azurini. 23 Jul. His expectations that it would take a year to see an improvement turned out.. Given the reference frame of the Datini letters and ledgers. however. fol. and the stacked metal ingots were one of the few things not carried away or destroyed by the muddy waters. 1403. . Majorca-Florence. Ultimately. six months after Niccolò replaced Cristofano as manager. and there was little sign of the boom about to start during the winter of 1405-1406. D. Over 22. D. Although there was no copper to be had in Majorca. Majorca-Florence. and ready to go before the expected departure of the last ship to Honein.000 pounds of copper plate (2. 42 ASP. had Niccolò soon in a panic. 997. 668. A (Majorca). 14 Jun. . ASP. ASP. Branch letters to Barcelona. 1405. Datini Co. Majorca-Valencia. and then Honein. fol. as well as to Joan Toreyó. set at around 29 July. and Samuel (probably Samuel Fazuati) on the Jewish side. 9 Jan. and Joan Toreyó and the money-changer Pere Barrera among the Christians.000 pounds of copper plate (8. and Ayon Susen. D. however.42 The subsequent magic-wand change. 3r. Even such mavericks as Ayon Susen were short of cash. He had sold third-party copper forward and by March 1406 penalties for non-delivery threatened. Cristofano di Bartolo to Luca del Sera. 1014. 1405. Majorca. Magalluf ben Allon. Majorca-Valencia. willing to buy only on merchant credit with payment due only after return from Honein. packed. Solomon Sorell. 154v-155r. accompanied by exclamations of pious hope that the metal would arrive with the Flanders-bound galleys. 780 pounds of Bernabò 41 ASP.44 metric tons) on behalf of Messer Antonio Contarini to a select group of dealers comprising Haim Susen. Libro grande bianco segn. Ayon took another 1. living on and off in Tenes (Algeria). 9 Apr.93 metric tons) belonging to the Florentine firm of Bernabò degli Agli went to Abraham Arquet. Measures were also taken to secure offshore lighters for unloading in case the galleys failed to tie up at the main quay because of current tensions over potential new duties. The nave of Rafael Ferrer brought more plate and loaf ingots from Venice. fol. through Pere Bassa. fols..COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 431 his chief factor Niccolò di Giovanni Mazzuoli successfully sold over 6. and Florence were peppered with reminders.414 pounds belonging to Francesco Datini and 227 pounds were consigned to Jaume Bonet in Valencia.41 The volatile nature of the copper trade nonetheless re-asserted itself by April 1405. D. June 1406 found Niccolò busy weighing copper with his large balance (romana) for his Jewish customers and for Joan Toreyó. 997. Finally. 1403. and the Valencia branch staked an interest in part of the shipment even though Niccolò favoured selling it in Majorca if the metal was weighed. the island’s Maghrib traders remained cautious. 2v. Valencia. Ayon Susen was a relative of Haim Susen. 70v-71r. ASP. D.44 Regardless of diverse economic troubles. Datini Co. and drove a hard bargain. His terms were for retied bundles.. 1r. 23 Jul. D. 1406.43 By the end of August. 4 May 1406. MajorcaBarcelona. 981. required time and put the onus on the payee. any time.. 891. 998. 44 ASP. fols. MajorcaValencia. but not necessarily in cash—one of the return commodities tended to be the scarlet dyestuff kermes. fol. fol. 998. 19 Jul. 1r-1v. ASP. 998. fol. 78v-79r. 1406. however. Magaluff ben Allon and Ayon Susen had virtually cornered the copper trade to Honein and the Datini firm. fols. Datini Co. including weak demand for cloth in the Maghrib. The bustle died down by mid-September and payments were now beginning to flow back from the Maghrib. Majorca-Valencia. The Majorca branch having been granted a “stay of execution” by the mother company. 1406. until the spring of 1407. B (Majorca). D. ASP. Libro grande bianco segn. ASP.. Majorca-Valencia.432 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL degli Agli’s loaf ingots from the Ferrer shipment were sold to Abraham Arquet and to the converso Maghrib traders Pere Pardo and Francesc Bellviure. however. 27 Oct. fols. 43 . Majorca-Barcelona. ASP. fol. 1r. that the Majorca branch would after all be liquidated and Niccolò transferred to Valencia.. 3v. 1015. D. Abraham Arquet.. 1406. had several thousand florins at stake with them. while another 200 quintals were earmarked for loading on board a galley armed by the prominent Majorcan merchant Nicholau de Pachs.. fol.. D. Some 150 ASP. moreover pressed the Majorcan branch for a binding arrangement to deliver copper on demand. Majorca-Valencia. Datini Co. Datini Co. fol. wrapped in fresh canvas. 998. Pere Bassa. D. not the debtor. D. 10 Jul. Datini Co. ASP. however. D. D. Niccolò tried to make up for profits lost during the months of uncertainty and betted heavily on copper. 31 Aug. Majorca-Valencia. This created a timing problem for Niccolò—the Datini firm was once again in the throes of serious reorganization and it appeared. Majorca-Valencia. 26 Mar. as well as Bastiano di Bartolo. who was attempting to carve out his own privileged niche. 1406. Datini Co. 1v. D. By mid-June he reported having disposed of around 500 quintals belonging to Francesco and to Ser Antonio di Lapaccio. 1r.. 1406.. Joan Toreyó. Selling the kermes. 1v. Niccolò began to feel uneasy. ASP. and delivered FOB to the hold of the outbound vessel. the copper market stubbornly picked up once again. 1r. 1406. Datini Co. ASP. 998. 21 Jun. with Francesco Datini’s blessing. Datini Co. 2v. 998. Datini Co. 1r. 998. fol. Majorca-Valencia. Majorca-Valencia. ASP. 23 Mar. Datini Co. 998.. 1406. D. 46 On behalf of another countryman. 1407. 15 Nov. 116v-117r). Tosinghi’s copper was worth 2.g. 1r. C (Majorca). fol.. aimed at unseating Jews and conversos from their current position of leadership in the copper trade. however. 29 Sep. and other traders. ASP. 25 Mar. not counting copper traded outside of the Datini circle and thus much more poorly documented. D. Niccolò sold just over 213 quintals of the 550 that Tosinghi had consigned with the branch on commission. D. 1406. net of expenses (ASP..M. D. 47 ASP. Majorca- . For allusions to the other issues. ASP. or 1. 114v-115r. 668. Niccolò begged the Valencia branch to explore all possibilities of selling copper there. 1v. D. 1408. Datini Co. 2d.48 45 Tosinghi and Antoni de Quint were also shipping out between them another R 2.968 1/2 lb was posted as sold for 2. fol.. ASP. 668.. net of expenses (ASP. 1r. D. 2d. 892.45 To hedge bets. 1016. 38v. Majorca-Valencia.622 l. 2/7 of which represented Tosinghi’s investment and the rest that of de Quint. the Venetian nave of Ser Marco de’ Benedetti had unloaded another 141 bales of copper plate and the local market showed signs of glut. 1d. 668. fol. were also spread among various Jewish. Libro grande bianco segn. Majorca-Florence. before the scheduled departure of the Pachs galley for Honein (toward the end of June). 10s. 1407. fol. Majorca-Florence. 998. 29 Sep. 998. on condition of making buyers agree not to resell in Majorca. 25 Mar. 1r. with Antonio di Lapaccio contributing a minor share.. Datini Co. 1016. Libro grande bianco segn. 998. Majorca-Barcelona. Majorca-Florence. Majorca-Valencia.. 16 Jun.M. 279 quintals belonging mostly to Francesco Datini. for that would further spoil the already saturated market. This is reported in letters outlining subsequent developments: ASP. fols. Datini Co. D. D. 15s. fol. D.794 l.. Datini Co. 48 ASP. The 200 quintals set aside were part of an untypical interlocking set of common ventures between Italian merchants and Majorca’s “old Christians” headed by the Pachs and by Antoni de Quint.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 433 quintals were expected to sell shortly. Niccolò di Giovanni Mazzuoli to Francesco Datini. Datini Co. D. Datini Co. 46 The whole Datini/Lapaccio batch weighing 27. 16s. fol.47 The metal ultimately put up by various participants. Further see ASP.. 1409. Giovanni Tosinghi. ASP. D.471 l. C (Majorca) fols. D. 1408. 998. 9d. The related losses are discussed for instance in ASP.006 l. 1r.M. 892. or 2. amounted to roughly 200. Majorca-Barcelona. By the end of September. including 500 quintals ventured by Nicholau de Pachs. Datini Co. on credit terms stretching into December. 31 Jul. Majorca-Valencia. 1408. Libro grande bianco segn.000 worth of copper. C (Majorca). 16 (18) Dec. 1s. D. fol. 1407. see e. 1016. 1v. fol. converso. ASP. 1r.000 Majorcan pounds or 82 metric tons of copper.. Barcelonese. The full extent of the disaster is impossible to specify—Niccolò’s comments indeed suggest that the caravan also carried. 1408. copper and other goods sent from Valencia.. lo mandavano [the copper] a Tuet. 141.50 Various merchants from Tlemcen. 1r.434 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL Then. 10 Apr 1408. for Francesco Datini and Antonio di Lapaccio. to Francesco Datini. the lower Moulouya River. the considerable delay with which the news broke and the lack of available detail leave some doubt about the location: either somewhere between Honein and Tuat. 892.622 l. the attackers may have been either traditional rivals of the dominant Ma‘qil nomad group that benefited from the passage of the caravans by virtue of controlling the space between Honein. the fact that reports of subsequent negoValencia. Datini Co.. Datini Co. however. alarming news reached the Balearics that a raiding party had attacked and robbed the Tuat caravan. or in the vicinity of the oasis region. ASP. and Tuat. Majorca-Barcelona. See Melis. On the one hand. Initial estimates of potential loss tallied up to 2. 1986). 49 ASP. Majorca-Barcelona.. Aspetti. and some 600 R. in saying that culprits were “una chonpagnia d’Arabi” Niccolò might have been unable to appreciate the difference between “Arab” and Tuareg. for instance. Fez. On the other hand. 25 Mar. (reials) for Giovanni Tosinghi. then two alternatives are perhaps worth considering. 1407.. D.000 to 12. The Majorcan reial (reale in the Datini ledgers) was worth on average 15 s. “Arabs” were indeed involved. given that an annual caravan to the Western Sudan could easily marshal 8. 51 ASP. and thus equivalent to the Florentine florin. 668. Datini Co. 892.. 16 (18) Dec. Datini Co. Secondly.000 camels and represented the confluence of diverse strands of commerce.49 Subsequent revised assessments dating to December 1408 showed that about half the copper was irretrievably lost. in January and February 1408. with the posibility that Tosinghi’s joint loss with Antoni de Quint might run as high as 2. may have supplied more metal to the affected Jewish and converso dealers.000 R. D. Handbook of Medieval Exchange (London: Royal Historical Society.M. What was the robbery’s Maghribi context? Firstly. Datini Co. or a disaffected splinter of the dominant group. . and other trade centers surely suffered losses as well. 50 ASP. D. fol. e una chonpagnia d’Ar(a)bi l’àno tutto rubato .51 If.”).. Majorca-Florence. fol. 1408. Majorca-Florence. 249 and Peter Spufford. 29 Sep. 25 Mar. Battista Campanaro. 1v. 1408 (“. 668. and at least one Genoese merchant active in Majorca. to Francesco Datini. D.. trans. and from there southward to sources of the Za. sultan of é é .COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 435 tiations for return of the cargo trickled in from varied points. 53 Ibn Khaldun. The ’Ubayd Allah controlled é é é by the later fourteenth century northern (summer) grounds reaching from the region of Tlemcen to Taurirt. to Oujda and the estuary of the Moulouya. Abí Yahyá in his attempt to seize . . Brunschvig.53 The Honein-Tuat caravan may well have fallen victim to a breakdown of peace at the intersection of the cross-cutting allegiances and closely adjacent nomadization corridors. the Kharaj.52 As for the first alternative. é . as far east as Collo and Annaba. 103-4. Des origines à la fin . the Tessala. sultan of Tunis. It is a moot point whether or not the Hakím were the Arab . for instance. 1895). Tlemcen. fraction who reportedly came to request Marínid help and who brought the emir back east with them. 1: 101. Fagnan. they collected tolls from traffic. E. du XVe siècle (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve. tended to recognize in the é é later fourteenth century the authority of Tlemcen. Their neighé é bours and standing rivals were the Banu ’Amr b. It is however equally plausible. Abu ‘Abd Allah had taken refuge at the court of é é é Fez. é Annaba and a rebel cousin of ‘Abd al-‘Azíz Abu Faris the Hafsid é é é . Abí Yahya. .. whereas the western Haddaj gravitated under Marínid influence. 200-201. Abí Sanuna . that the culprit was indeed the eastbound expedition é of Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad b. power in Ifriqíya in 1407-1408. . The eastern segment of the ’Ubayd Allah. and perhaps more so. Berbères. Certainly they and their shaykh Ahmad b. 120-2. none too stable during the fulsomely praised but conspicuously fragile reign of Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad I. A former governor of é é . Chronique des Almohades et des Hafsides attribuée à Zerkechi (Constantine: Adolphe Braham. While in their summer encampments in the tell. 214-5. were in the forefront of the rebellion against Abu Faris and were é é 52 R. 1940). La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafsides. together with his Marínid é é é support force. who é claimed as summer grounds the approaches to Oran. . given the specific timing. Zoghba. it is well known that Gurara and the Tuat formed part of the winter nomadization grounds of the Ma‘qil Arabs of the Dhu ’Ubayd Allah group. between Honein and Tlemcen. raises the possibility that the caravan was held to ransom by Arab partisans of the force sent from Morocco by the Marínid sultan Abú Sa‘íd ’Uthmán III to support the emir Abú ‘Abd Alláh Muhammad b. and the areas south of Tlemcen. 436 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL responsible for his initial defeat in late summer to early fall 1407 between al-Hamma and Nefzaoua.54 The Honein caravan may have in fact delayed its departure in a bid to avoid the Abu ‘Abd Allah’s é é eastbound forces, only to run into them all the same, or into their flanking Arab outriders. It would have been quite natural for part of the captured copper to be then carried east, with the advancing army, while negotiators sought a ransom that would have nicely rounded out Abu ‘Abd Allah’s war chest. This would acount rather é é tidily for news of the robbery spreading as late as January 1408, as well as for the fact that word of the stiff ransom of 10 double dinars a camel load arrived by way of Collo and Annaba around mid-May 1408.55 By 15 June 1408, as the rebellion was collapsing under Abu Faris’ é é counterattack, there was still hope that the metal would be ransomed by Jewish negotiators. The Majorcan copper market had nonetheless stalled, and the Datini branch feared that its Valencian counterpart would find itself in the same position, given that “all of it [the copper] goes by the same route” (i.e. through Honein).56 Abraham Arquet had lost all the copper purchased from the Datini firm and was temporarily penniless, and Niccolò begged the Florence mother company to arrange the sale of a batch of Arquet’s kermes in lieu of cash payment. Magaluff ben Allon anxiously waited for a ship to return from Oran, Honein and Mostaganem so that he could pay the Datini firm for the copper that originally formed part of the batch put up for sale on Francesco Datini’s own account. Niccolò’s pocket, incidentally, was just as empty and he proposed to draw bills of exchange on Barcelona to raise much needed cash.57 Finally, in December the worst possible news arrived from the Maghrib— although some of the metal had indeed been recovered, over a half was lost for good. Some 315 quintals (12.8 metric tons) of the Datini/Lapaccio copper had fortunately remained in Honein under the safeguard The exact dating of the rebellion’s last stages remain uncertain (14071409). Brunschvig, Berbérie, 214-5; Fagnan, Hafsides, 200-1; E. Fagnan, trans., Extraits inédits relatifs au Maghreb (Algiers, 1924), 297. 55 ASP, D. 998, Majorca-Valencia, Datini Co., 13 May 1408, fol. 1r. 56 ASP, D. 998, Majorca-Valencia, Datini Co., 15 Jun. 1408, fol. 1r; ASP, D. 998, Majorca-Valencia, Datini Co., 4 Sep. 1408, fol. 1r. 57 ASP, D. 892, Majorca-Barcelona, Datini Co., 20 Jun. 1408, fol. 1v; ASP, D. 892, Majorca-Barcelona, Datini Co., 12 Sep. 1408, fol. 1r. 54 COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 437 of Ayon Susen. So did some of Giovanni Tosinghi’s lot (whether also stored with Susen or not remains unclear). Another 60 quintals were rescued, but the ransom was more “than it was worth,” as Niccolò put it. The Jewish merchant who made the arrangements took the copper to the Tuat in person, but was not expected to do better than break even. The Majorca branch was moreover billed 78 R. for its share of customs and expenses. Another 1,256 doblas’ worth of copper was entrusted to a Honein Jew who forwarded the entire lot to the Tuat together with other remnants of merchandise, but this cargo was in its turn stolen, probably in November 1408. The unfortunate merchant was finally allowed to discount the lost shipment at 700 doblas (as opposed to over 1,300 original worth), pawning a house in Honein to raise 400 doblas and promising to pay the remaining 300 in nine months’ time.58 In Majorca the Jewish copper dealers closed ranks and made themselves inconspicuous, sold only for cash, and insisted on generous merchant credit when buying.59 In April-May 1409 caravan suppliers began to make deals again, but the market remained soft. Niccolò hoped that “those of the caravan (chanfila, i.e. Ar. qafila)” might ultimately buy some of the é metal left with Ayon Susen, but in vain. There was no demand for copper plate. Buyers might eventually be found, as Niccolò was informed, if the plates were made up into rods, but the expense sounded like throwing good money after bad. By 1410, however, things seemed back to normal. The late summer brought news that Tosinghi’s leftover copper was finally about to find a buyer, and Niccolò wrote in an upbeat tone to the Barcelona sister branch that he was on the verge of bartering another 150 quintals for merchandise. He also sought to bring over to Majorca 100 quintals of copper obtained by the Valencia branch at an advantageous price. His key letter from this period is dated 16 August 1410, the very day Francesco Datini died.60 58 59 ASP, D. 892, Majorca-Barcelona, Datini Co., 16 (18) Dec 1408, fol. 1v. ASP, D. 998, Majorca-Valencia, Datini Co., 28 Jan. 1409, fol. 1r. 60 ASP, D. 892, Majorca-Barcelona, Datini Co., 16 Aug. 1410, fol. 3r. See also ASP, D. 875, Florence-Barcelona, Luca del Sera to Datini Co., 23 Aug. 1410; ASP, D. 892, Majorca-Barcelona, Datini Co., 23 Sep. 1410, fol. 2r; ASP, D. 1110, Florence-Barcelona, Ser Lapo Mazzei to Datini Co., 24 Aug. 1410, in Melis, Aspetti, 76. For well-known general accounts of Francesco Datini’s death, burial, and bequests, see Melis, Aspetti, 75-7, and Iris Origo, The Merchant of 438 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL To set the Majorca-Honein-Tuat metal trade into a broader context, it will be useful to review here the main European sources of copper at the turn of the century. A clear answer regarding the Datini copper provenance, however, must await the outcome of attempts to backtrace through Venice individual west-bound metal shipments. Given the nature of the firm’s correspondence with Zanobi di Taddeo Gaddi and then with the executors of his commercial estate,61 unravelling the archival leads does not hold much promise of a quick and unequivocal identification of specific mines or even intermediate markets associated with individual batches of copper demonstrably shipped to the Balearics. The present discussion remains therefore confined to outlining plausible alternatives and screening out unlikely ones in the light of current research. The Datini records offer a few interesting although not unproblematic hints. Firstly, as already mentioned, Venetian copper was clearly favoured by Honein dealers supplying the southbound transSaharan caravans. The difficulty is that while copper of varied provenances passed through both markets, Flemish and Venetian, some of the sources were identical. This was particularly true for the socalled Polish copper, which came from the mines of Slovakia and Hungary. Barring differences imparted by final refining and plate production (impossible to ascertain from the data thus far associated with the Majorca route), the intrinsic characteristics of such sharedsource metal should not in principle have diverged so widely as to affect buyer behaviour in a systematic fashion. As in the case of earlier fourteenth-century Levant tin-buyers’ reputed preference for Venetian-made rods,62 the pattern may thus reflect nothing more than the assurance of quality implied in the Venetian product’s hallmark, without saying much about preferences for copper from any given primary source. Secondly, and somewhat more usefully, the prevalence of rame in tavole in the shipments makes it likely that the metal resembled Prato (Harmondsworth, G.B.: Peregrine Books, 1963; reprinted 1979), 341-6. 61 Zanobi died on 21 July 1400. The estate’s commissaria (with Antonio di Ser Bartolomeo and Lorenzo di Francesco di Vanni as executors and Domenico di Tommaso di Francesco della Vacca overseeing the Venetian office) carried on business on behalf of his minor male heirs (taken to Florence by their mother). For parallels between the business styles of commissaria and eredi di ... (“heirs of”), see Melis, Aspetti, 31 n.3. 62 Pegolotti, Pratica, 382. COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 439 the yellow-hue rame afinato e messo in tavole a Vinegia described by Pegolotti more than half a century earlier.63 The hue points to a natural copper-zinc alloy containing too little zinc to be rated by contemporaries as brass. This is not at all strange, for prior to c. 1740 pure metallic zinc was for the most part neither known nor available, and varieties of brass or bronze were commonly lumped together as “copper”.64 Thirdly, the risk of coming across shipments of “sour” plate may suggest relatively arsenic-rich batches. Arsenic, as is well known, imparts greater strength to copper at high temperatures (while also raising the annealing point from 190 C to around 550 C), but elevated arsenic (above 0.5 per cent) embrittles the metal. Relatively zinc-rich “copper” partly flawed through inclusion of appreciable traces of arsenic certainly readily evokes the copperarsenic-antimony fahlores exploited in various parts of Europe intermittenly ever since the Early Bronze Age. The literature relating to fahlores and their prehistoric and historic exploitation is substantial and growing and there is no need to review it here, but it might nonetheless be good to recall the ores’ basic typology. Fahlore (“pale ore” or gray copper ore, Agricola’s argentum rude album (1547)) represents one of the two key groups of gray copper sulphosalts, namely the tetrahedrite group. The second is the enargite group, much less relevant here. Fahlores range in composition between the tetrahedrite and tennantite types (darker steelgray tetrahedrite (Cu,Fe)3SbS3,25 or (Cu,Fe)3AsS3,25 and lighter grayblack metallic-lustre tennantite (Cu,Ag,Fe,Zn)12As4S13). Copper may be substituted in the ores, in widely varying proportions, by a range of metals, from Fe to Ag, Bi, Co, Hg, Ni, Pb, Zn, Ge, and Sn. Zinc, silver, arsenic and antimony, in particular, as well as bismuth, tend to carry over into any unrefined metal smelted from fahlore. Pegolotti, Pratica, 381. For the question of metallic zinc, see P. T. Craddock, Early Metal Mining and Production (London: Edinburgh University Press, 1995). There have been hints, however, of an unusually advanced production of zinc and of small zinc liturgical items in Bohemia in the thirteenth century. See Karel Nováæek, “Nerostné suroviny stpedovbkých Fech jako archeologický problém (bilance a perspektivy výzkumu se zambpením na výrobu a zpracování kovù),” Archeologické rozhledy 53 (2001): 279-309, and K. Charvátová, J. Valentová, and P. Charvát, “Sídlištb 13. století mezi Malínem a Novými Dvory, o. Kutná Hora,” Památky archeologické 76 (1985): 101-67. 64 63 440 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL From the point of view of metal source attribution, unfortunately, the difficulty with fahlores is threefold. Firstly, fahlores are very common among almost all hydrothermal sulphide ores (e.g. mesoand epithermal deposits), in sedimentary exhalative deposits, in polymetallic veins and skarns, in veins associated with S-type granites, and often also in copper porphyry deposits, while occurring as accessory minerals in volcanogenic sulphides. Recent research has also shown that despite their reputation for poor smelting (related to modern, not pre-modern processes) fahlores were smelted in Europe far earlier than previously thought. Secondly, the chemical composition of fahlore metal is not very indicative of provenance, as it depends on the actual smelting sequence, at least with respect to arsenic and antimony content. Lead isotope ratios are a better guide, but as late as 2005 these were lacking for some areas of interest, particularly Slovakia.65 Thirdly, as R. A. Ixer pointed out in a Bronze Age context, too much work yielding geochemical and isotope data has tended to focus on notable specimens (the “magpie school of provenancing”), not on mundane orebodies smelted in the past.66 For medieval fahlore research, the greatest bottleneck lies in a certain lack of informed comprehension between archive and laboratory. The following brief survey of European copper sources is necessarily quite sweeping, given the relative prominence in all the likely extraction areas of both fahlore bodies and related secondary mineral assemblages within the upper oxidised zones (gossans). To the best of my knowledge, however, no such compact overview is readily available, or at least none bridging the recent historical and geological literature.67 Whatever its limitations, the exercise may B. Höppner et al., “Prehistoric Copper Production in the Inn Valley (Austria), and the Earliest Copper in Central Europe,” Archaeometry 47 (2) (2005): 297, 306. For 2003 lead isotope data from the Erzgebirge and nearby areas, see E. Niederschlag et al., “Determination of Lead Isotope Ratios by Multiple Collector ICP–MS: A Case Study of Early Bronze Age Artefacts and their Possible Relation with Ore Deposits of the Erzgebirge,” Archaeometry 45 (2003): 61–100. 66 R. A. Ixer, “The Role of Ore Geology and Ores in the Archaeological Provenancing of Metals,” in S. M. M. Young et al., Metals in Antiquity. BAR International Series 792 (1999): 43-52; R. A. Ixer, “Copper-arsenic Ores and Bronze Age Mining and Metallurgy with Special Reference to the British Isles,” online study retrieved from http://www.goodprovenance.com. 67 Blanchard’s valuable Mining, Metallurgy and Minting, 3, Afro-European 65 COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 441 prove worthwhile, especially should it eventually help to spotlight otherwise inoccuous snippets of information in archival tracks concatenating from the Datini material, snippets that might permit the circle to be closed around the Venetian/Balearic trans-Saharan copper trade.68 Some of the relatively buyer-deprecated copper reaching Honein by way of Flanders in the Datini years clearly moved through Hanseatic channels (especially following the return of the Hanse Kontor to Bruges from Dordrecht in 1392, which ended the 13881392 Hanseatic boycott [Handelssperre] of Flanders). Two main supply streams merged here: Swedish and Slovak/Hungarian. The Swedish metal came, partly by way of Visby (on the island of Gotland), from Central Sweden’s massive copper sulphide deposits at Falun (Stora Kopparberget) between Lakes Runn, Varpan and St. Vällan.69 The Slovak/Hungarian metal came from areas and localities discussed further on, mainly via Kraków, the Wisla River valley (Thorn [Pol. Torux]), Lübeck and Danzig (Gdaxsk). The third source, if already worked around 1400, as tenuous indications of early smelting activity in nearby Allenbach may suggest, could have been the Hosenberg mines in the Hosenbachtal near Fischbach an der Nahe in the Hunsrück. Kupferkies and fahlore copper was easily shipped from here to the Low Countries through Cologne, Aachen, and Maastricht, at least after 1460.70 Supremacy, Part 3, “Base Metal Production,” unfortunately does not fill the gap as fully as might have been hoped for. 68 Recapitulating the orebodies in a joint historical and geological/mineralogical context may be also of some use for future metallographic and isotope work on African copper artefacts, apparently stalled as far as historical provenancing is concerned. See the “1994 Annual Report” of the Smithsonian Center for Materials Research and Education, Lead Isotope Program (at http://www.si.edu/scmre). 69 See e.g. Göran Dahlbäck, “Eisen und Kupfer, Butter und Lachs. Schwedische Produkte im hansischen Handel,” in Rolf Hammel-Kiesow, ed., Vergleichende Ansätze in der hansischen Geschichtsforschung, Hansische Studien 13 (Trier: Porta Alba Verlag, 2002), 163-74. For site analyses, soil chemistry, and brief historical overviews of Falun mining, see Elin Carlsson et al., “Historical Atmospheric Deposition in a Swedish Mining Area Traced by S Isotope Ratios in Soils,” Water, Air, and Soil Pollution 110 (1999): 103-18, and Jemt Anna Eriksson and Ulf Qvarfort, “Age Determination of the Falun Copper Mine by 14 C-datings and Palynology,” Geologiska Föreningen i Stockholm Förhandlingar 118 (1996): 43-7. 70 Hosenberg is not not far from Idar-Oberstein. The later fifteenth-century works are discussed in Rosemarie Homann et al., “Territoriale und bergbau- 442 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL Some copper, however, may also have been brought to Flanders from the Harz Mountains, the Erzgebirge (Saxon and Bohemian Ore Ranges) or from the Saxon Erzgebirgsvorland. In the Harz (a modest 90 by 30 km northernmost outcropping of the Variscan orogen), Rammelsberg near Goslar had long been supplying northwestern Europe with copper from massive syn-sedimentary polymetallic sulfide ore formations in the local Wissenbacher slates.71 Harz mining nonetheless suffered crippling setbacks in the midfourteenth century. Both in Goslar and in the Oberharz ore extraction came to a virtual standstill after 1360, partly owing to the exhaustion of the deep veins, as well as of smaller mineral bodies in the upper oxidation layer that did not require work to a depth greater than c. 20 m and therefore not much up-front investment. This was coupled with deforestation, rising labour costs aggravated by plague mortality, shaft flooding partly compounded by climate change, and investment bottlenecks reflecting old legal and institutional patterns. Yet it is less than clear, at present, how prolonged the mining complications really were. In particular, the extent and impact of the deforestation “energy crisis” would seem to have varied notably from region to region.72 liche Grenzziehungen auf dem Hosenberg bei Fischbach/Nahe 1473-1712,” Zeitschrift für Berg- und Hüttenwesen 9 (2003), Beiheft 4. For regional context, see e.g. H. Pohl, “Die Montanunternehmer im Rheinland vom 13.-18. Jahrhundert,” in Simonetta Cavaciocchi, ed., Miniere e metallurgia. Secoli XIIIXVIII. Diciottesima Settimana di Studi, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Datini” di Prato, 11-15 aprile 1986. Atti in CD-Rom (Prato: Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica, 1999). 71 A concise overview of the relevant geology is available in H. Kulke, “Der Harz (Norddeutschland): Geologisch-Lagerstättenkundlicher Überblick, Historische Baumaterialien (Natursteine, Gipsmörtel, Schlackensteine, Blei),” Mitteilungen der Österreischen Mineralogischen Gesellschaft 142 (1997): 43-84. K. Mohr, Geologie und Minerallagerstätten des Harzes, 2d ed. (Stuttgart: E. Schweizerbart, 1993), remains an essential reference work. The standard historical works include e.g. Gerhard Laub, “Zur Technologie der Kupfergewinnung aus Rammelsberger Erzen im Mittelalter,” Harz-Zeitschrift 32 (1980): 15-76; Franz Irsigler, “Über Harzmetalle, ihre Verarbeitung und Verbreitung im Mittelalter. Ein Überblick,” in C. Meckseper, ed., Stadt im Wandel. Kunst und Kultur des Bürgertums in Norddeutschland 1150-1650 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Edition Cantz, 1985), 3: 315-21; and C.-H. Hauptmeyer, “Bergbau und Hüttenwesen im Harz während des Mittelalters,” in K. H. Kaufbold, ed., Bergbau und Hüttenwesen im und am Harz (Hannover: Hahn, 1992), 11-20. 72 The established view of the mining crisis is outlined for instance in H. Steuer, “Bergbau auf Silber und Kupfer im Mittelalter,” in H. Steuer and U. Zimmermann, eds., Alter Bergbau in Deutschland. Sonderheft of Archäologie in 444 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL The evidence of flooding is more consistent, and there is little doubt that the Rathstiefster Stollen at Rammelsberg, for instance, could not handle peak waterflows by 1360. Moreover, known copper-rich reserves (mainly chalcopyrite, CuFeS2) in the 300 m deep Old Orebody seem to have been severely overexploited.73 In the Oberharz the Alte Mann silver/lead fields of the Clausthal-Zellerfeld area (former Celle), flourishing in the thirteenth century, were now abandoned. Those peripheral Oberharz smelting settlements that worked up Rammelsberg copper ore also declined, through a knock-on effect.74 Yet recent studies of metal traces from atmospheric deposition in the peats of the Sonnenberger Moor (Oberharz) suggest an intriguing cyclical spike of moderate importance in copper/silver processing, with a peak around 1400 (at peat layer depth c. -900 to -1,000 mm).75 A revival of activity at the turn of the century, promoted by the town of Goslar and the Welf overlords, thus appears likely. Small fahlore workings (albeit extracting mainly silver) were also active in the Mittel- and Unterharz, in the vicinity of Harzgerode Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1993; Sonderausgabe, Hamburg: Nikol Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000), 75-91. See also Christoph Bartels, Das Erzbergwerk Rammelsberg. Die Betriebsgeschichte 1924-1988 mit einem Abriß der älteren Bergbaugeschichte (Goslar: Preussag AG Metall, 1988), 15. For further aspects of the midfourteenth-century problems in the Oberharz, see Götz Alper, “Mittelalterliche Blei-/Silberverhüttung beim Johanneser Kurhaus, Clausthal-Zellerfeld (Harz),” Nachrichten aus Niedersachsens Urgeschichte 67 (1998): 87-134, and Götz Alper et al., “Johanneser Kurhaus.” Ein mittelalterlicher Blei-/Silbergewinnungsplatz bei Clausthal-Zellerfeld im Oberharz (Rahden [Westfalen]: Verlag Marie Leidorf, 2004). Revisionist approaches appear in Christoph Bartels, “Der Historische Bergbau und das Hüttenwesen im niedersächsischen Harz,” unpublished lecture, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum Bochum, 7 April 2005. For deforestation effects and charcoal supply, see e.g. M.-L. Hillebrecht, Die Relikte der Holzkohlewirtschaft als Indikatoren für Waldnutzung und Waldentwicklung. Untersuchungen an Beispielen aus Südniedersachsen (Göttingen: Goltze Druck, 1982). 73 For Rammelsberg’s two main orebodies, with clear diagrams, see D. Large and E. Walcher, “The Rammelsberg Massive Sulphide Cu-Zn-Pb-BaDeposit, Germany: An Example of Sediment-hosted, Massive Sulphide Mineralisation,” Mineralium Deposita 34 (1999): 522-38. 74 Alper, “Johanneser Kurhaus,” 94-7. 75 The deposits were studied by Burkhard Frenzel und Dr. Heike Kempter (Universität Hohenheim). The c. 1400 C.E. spike is much more modest than the one characterizing the periods 1150-1250 C.E. and c. 1500 C.E.. For methodology and caveats see Kempter’s Work Group webpage at http://www. rzuser. uni-heidelberg.de/~i12/emooremetall-index.htm, “Peat Bog Archives of Atmospheric Deposition—Ombrotrophic Peat Bogs as Archives.” COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 445 (Hagenrode) and Neudorf, although the meagre evidence is inconclusive regarding conditions around 1400. To the east and south-east of the Harz, copper had been mined since the thirteenth century from the stillwater sediments containing the black bituminous polymetallic marl slates (shales) (Kupferschiefer) of the Mansfeld basin and the Sangerhausen Revier. Hydrothermal processes whose exact geology is still debated had left behind mainly bornite (Buntkupferkies), chalcopyrite, Kupferglanz (Cu2S), and tennantite fahlore, encased between the Zechstein conglomerate base and the overtopping Zechsteinkalk. The main early focal area lay in the north-western corner of the Mansfeld field, at the Kupferberg near Hettstedt.76 Erzgebirge copper may also have found its way into ingot batches reaching Flanders and from there the Western Mediterranean. Copper was here a companion product of silver and lead extraction from post-Variscan hydrothermal vein-type ores occurring for instance in the Freiberg gray gneiss and yielding among other copper sulphides and arsenides in association with chalcopyrite. The midfourteenth century troubles afflicting the mining sector clearly did not spare the Saxon Erzgebirge (Saxon Ore Range). Just like in the Oberharz, smaller mining operations proved relatively more vulnerable. The single archaeologically best documented settlement thus far, Bleiberg on the Treppenhauer (above the Zschopau Valley near Sachsenberg, NE of Chemnitz), was permanently abandoned at this juncture.77 How long production remained in decline in the Erz76 For an overview see Dieter Beeger, Das Sächsische Erzgebirge: Geologie, Bergbau und Kultur (Vienna: Naturhistorisches Museum, 1988), and the Ostharz chapter in Gerd Seidel, ed., Geologie von Thüringen, 2nd updated ed. (Stuttgart: Schweitzerbart, 2003); further also J. Rentzsch et al., “Die laterale Verbreitung der Erzmineral-assoziationen im deutschen Kupferschiefer,” Zeitschrift der geologischen Wissenschaften 25 (1997): 1-6. For general estimates of total copper extraction at Mansfeld from c. 1200 to 1990, see G. Knitzschke, “Metall- und Produktionsbilanz für die Kupferschieferlagerstätte im südlichen Harzvorland,” in G. Jankowski, ed., Zur Geschichte des Mansfelder Kupferschiefer-Bergbaus (Clausthal-Zellerfeld: Gesellschaft Deutscher Metallhütten- und Bergleute, 1995), 270-84. 77 W. Schwabenicky, “Hochmittelalterliche Bergstädte im sächsischen Erzgebirge und Erzgebirgsvorland,” in Siedlungsforschung: Archäologie—Geschichte —Geographie 10 (1992): 195, 206-7; W. Schwabenicky, “Der mittelalterliche Silber- Blei- und Kupferbergbau im mittleren und westlichen Erzgebirge sowie Erzgebirgsvorland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Grabungsergebnisse vom Treppenhauer bei Sachsenburg,” Doctoral Dissertation (Berlin, 1992), 20, 22-3, 95; H. Douffet,, “Erzgebirgische Bergstädte,” in Dieter Dolgner, ed., Stadtbaukunst im Mittelalter, (Berlin: Verlag für Bauwesen, 1990), 182-4. 446 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 447 It is unfortunately difficult to establish, at this point, which copper types—“Polish” (i.e. Slovak), Swedish, Harzer, Erzgebirger, or eventually Hunsrücker—were most heavily traded in Bruges at any given juncture and in what proportion. Even tentative answers would help shed more light on the late fourteenth- and early fifteenthcentury trans-Saharan caravan trade’s predilection for “Venetian” as opposed to “Flemish” copper, but the issue must be left open for now. The problem is further compounded by the fact that linkages between less known mines and the commercial “catchment areas” of specific trade centers such as Bruges or Venice remain vague. This is true for instance for Bavaria’s Kupferberg in Oberfranken, near Kulmbach. Mining was probably in progress here by the 1320s, and in 1340 the works already suffered from severe flooding. The outlook possibly improved as early as 1364, but it is difficult to say whether copper from the relatively high-yield local ore travelled rather south or north-west, if indeed it possessed greater than regional importance. The detailed structure of the Venetian copper trade “catchment area” around 1400 remains correspondingly blurred. The closest regional sources lay in the upper Veneto, among the Belluno dolomite rocks, and in the Valle del Fersina (Trento, Ger. Fersental), where families of immigrant miners from the Tirol and Carinthia had settled already in the thirteenth century.80 The first securely documented copper mining operations in the Valle Imperina near Agordo (Parco Nazionale Dolomiti Bellunesi), however, date at best to the early 1400s, and given current evidence they are not very likely to have contributed much of the metal refined in Venice for shipping to the Western Mediterranean between 1390 and 1410.81 The orebodies of Austria’s Salzach Valley also do not seem a likely provenance.82 Copper, mainly from Kupferkies and fahlore, may have Salvatore Piatti, Palù-Palae: frammenti di storia (Palù del Fersina: Comune di Palù del Fersina, 1996), and Anthony R. Rowley, Fersental (Val Fersina bei Trient/Oberitalien): Untersuchung einer Sprachinselmundart (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1986). 81 Raffaello Vergani, “Technology and Organization of Labour in the Venetian Copper Industry (16th-18th Centuries),” Journal of European Economic History 14 (1) (1985): 173-86. 82 The relevant localities are Mühlbach am Hochkönig, Hüttau-Larzenbach (yielding Kupferkies and antimony-rich fahlore by the fourteenth century), Brenntalwald (securely documented only from 1425), and Kupferplatte (documented from 1447). 80 448 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL come to Venice, however, from the Austrian Walchen and the Ober Enns Valley of north-western Styria (between Öblarn and Schladming). Inferential data suggest local mining activity from c. 1230, although clear evidence relates only to 1432-1434.83 It is unfortunately a moot poin whether the term rame dell’ene in the Frescobaldi redaction of Pegolotti’s Pratica della mercatura refers to the Enns Valley or not. If it does, the Enns would have constituted the second highest quality source of Venetian red copper, at least up to c. 1350.84 The next most prominent nearby provenance likewise raises dating issues. The dolomite and limestone fahlore mineralizations of the Schwaz-Brixlegg area and adjacent orebodies (e.g. Falkenstein, Klein- and Großkogel) in the Unterinntal (some 40 km north-east of Innsbruck) appear to fit the mixed characteristics of the Venetian copper in tavole quite well. The local ores do contain significant concentrations of zinc. The smelting of secondary copper minerals in the host rock would have given a copper rich in arsenic and antimony, while metal with relatively low arsenic, antimony and sulphur (“sweet” copper) could have come from a mixture of fahlores and secondary copper minerals containing nickel.85 Such variation would not be suprising during early mining stages, before shafts and galleries were driven deeper. But although fahlores were worked extensively here during the Bronze Age, tradition cites only 1409 for the rediscovery of outcroppings, a year later than the commonly accepted date of the Schladminger Brief that became the basis of Tyrol’s mining law. According to the Schwazer Bergchronik, the Falkenstein veins were opened in 1420, attracting the first large wave Gerald Fuchs, “Montanarchäologische Untersuchungen in der Walchen bei Öblarn,” Report—ARGIS Archäologie Service (http://www.argis.at). See also Karl A. Redlich, “Die Walchen bei Öblarn. Ein Kiesbergbau im Ennsthal,” Berg- und Hüttenmännisches Jahrbuch 51 (1903): 1-62; Hans Jörg Köstler, “Neuzeitliches Montanwesen im Bezirk Liezen,” in Bergbau und Hüttenwesen im Bezirk Liezen (Steiermark). Kleine Schriften der Abteilung Schloß Trautenfels am Steiermärkischen Landesmuseum Joanneum (Trautenfels: Verein Schloß Trautenfels, 1993), 24, 69-75, 78; J. Wichner, “Kloster Admont und seine Beziehungen zum Bergbau und zum Hüttenbetrieb,” Berg- und Hüttenmännisches Jahrbuch 39 (1891): 111, 129-30, 135-6, 142-3, 146, 149, 153-4. For the mineralogy see Heinz J. Unger, “Der Schwefel- und Kupferkiesbergbau in der Walchen bei Öblarn im Ennstal,” Archiv für Lagerstättenforschung in den Ostalpen 7 (1968): 2-52. 84 Pegolotti, Pratica, 381. 85 Höppner, “Copper Production,” 301. 83 given that the 1764 edited text is dated “nach Christi Geburde dreyzehenhundert Jahr. but unfortunately many of the locations have been obliterated or made inaccessible in the giant rockslide of 1999. in this case perhaps distorted by the fact that the eyecatching element was silver. and the still viable old works in the Alte Zeche orebody were rediscovered in Schwaz only in 1426. und frühen 16. Margärethe Tag. of course poses challenges of its own. Such patterns typically serve to formalize in human memory more drawn-out processes. just a few years before the farm maid Gertrud Kandlerin drove out to pasture the legendary bull who by accident rooted up some silver ore. much older (prehistoric) mines are known to have existed at the top of the Schwaz deposits (Schwabboden and Eiblschrofen).Sb)4S13.” in Schwazer Silber—vergeudeter Reichtum? 1. not the much more mundane copper. then some of the copper refined by the makers of Venetian tavole di rame in the 1390s and early 1400s could indeed have been extracted from either the Schwaz dolomite primary ores (arsenical argentiferous tetrahedrite with a generic formula (Cu. On the other hand. or from other nearby rock formations contain- For background see Robert Krauß. Concerning the Brief. Jahrhunderts. 86 . the recorded Schwaz chronology fits all too closely a pattern of single-date eponymous “rediscovery” almost simultaneous with legislative ordering. The 1409 “find” is quite likely to have been preceded by a good few decades of prospecting and small-scale smelting in which copper would have been the most obvious product suited to cover the costs of searching for silver. Richter zu Slennig. 209-24. Internationales Bergbausymposium Schwaz 2002 (Schwaz: Berenkamp. “Rattenberger und Schwazer Schmelzen auf Silber und Kupfer vor und um 1500.Ag. 139-42. from the Brixlegg area Triassic limestone tennantite (with a generic formula (Cu.” Res Montanarum 30 (2003): 5-10. und in dem achtenden Jahr an Montag nach St.Ag)10Zn2(As.” in Schwazer Silber. Should this scenario prove correct. Inn Valley copper may well have traded in Venice at the end of the fourteenth century. “Der Schladminger Bergbrief. 2003).Fe. Saxony. and elsewhere.e. Zu den Verhüttungsverfahren nach Quellen des späten 15. Inn Valley copper thus enters into play too late to fit the Datini timeframe. Lothar Suhling. 1308 and not 1408 as commonly accepted. see Karl Stadlober. “Kupfer und Silber—ein verlorener Reichtum. Secondly.Zn)12As4S13). The Schladminger Bergbrief of Lienhart der Egkzlhaim.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 449 of miners from Bohemia.86 On the face of it.” i. 1:200. Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Miroslav Danis (Bratislava: Katedra vseobecných dejin š š FF UC.. and Martin Štefánik.” in R. Probszt.. The late fourteenth century Venetian link has been recently highlighted in depth by Martin Stefánik. see W.. ed.000 (sheet 33-45. Tasser and E. 1990).” Slovenská archivistika 39 (2004): 40-58. Further research into possible pre-1409 copper mining in the Inn Valley is necessary.87 The three 87 Günther Frh. 60-91.g. Kaiser Sigismund in Ungarn.und Bergunterš nehmengeschichte. as already noted. Festschrift für Marián Skladaný zum 60. “Pramene o banskobystrickej medi v Benátkach z druhej Š polovice 14. “Kupfer aus dem ungarischen Š Königreich im Spiegel der venezianischen Senatsprotokollen im 14. Jahrhundert. 5 (Florence. ed. 210–26.450 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL ing fahlore. 2004). Ihre Entwicklung und wirtschaftliche Bedeutung bis zum Übergang an das Haus Habsburg (1546) (Munich: R. and (c) the road from Buda to Croatia’s Zagreb and then to the port of Senj (It. “Zengg”). on the landward side of the Kvarneric Embayá ment). Datini” di Prato. and from there by ship to the Venetian lagoon. Acta historica posoniensia I. just astride and beyond the present study’s time limits. 61-84. 2004).” in A. Veröffentlichungen des Südtiroler Landesarchivs 16 (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag. storocia. Trasporti e sviluppo economico. “Die Verkehrsroute des Levantehandels nach Siebenbürgen und Ungarn zur Zeit der Könige Ludwig von Anjou und Sigismund von Luxemburg.” in Štúdie z dejín baníctva a banského podnikania. 2001). Obchodná vojna krála Z Šigmunda proti Benátkam (Handelskrieg König Sigismunds gegen Venedig) (Bratislava: Historický Ústav SAV. which usefully expands the relevant sections of the well-known Elemér Mályusz. 1418-1433 und die Verlagerung der Transkontinentalen Transportwege. Akten der internationalen bergbaugeschichtlichen Tagung Steinhaus. Zborník š k zivotnému jubileu Mariána Skladaného (Studien zur Bergbau. 1387-1437 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. The metal normally reached Venice along three alternative routes: (a) the so-called Pettauer Weg (through Ptuj on the Drava River) across the Karst to Trieste. Pál Pach. 260-1. secoli XIII-XVIII. V. Der Tiroler Bergbau und die Depression der europäischen Montanwirtschaft im 14. Westermann. For the old toponymy around Senj. with Vienna as transit hub. which also flowed into Hanseatic trade channels through Poland. von Stromer. Geburtstag). eds. ed. und 15. 1979). See also Martin Stefánik. Europäische Stadtgeschichte in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit (Weimar: Böhlaus. 1966). also known as della Montagna. v. and Z. 48–63. Jahrhundert. This leaves as an acknowledged and much less problematic source of Venetian exports the “Hungarian” Slovak copper. . the IIId Military Mapping Survey of Austria-Hungary. Oldenbourg. 1986). For the VenetianHungarian historical and commercial context from 1409-1412 onward. in the Velebitski Kanal (Canale della Morlacca. Marx. Die niederungarischen Bergstädte. Segna) (opposite the island of Krk. no. and Martin Stefánik. “Die Kontinentalsperre Kaiser Sigismunds gegen Venedig 1412-1413. “Pramene k stredovekým dejinám Uhorska a Slovenska v Š benátskom archíve. see e. (b) the Semmeringstraße.” in Werner Mägdefrau. The c. Nová Bana. Both of these extraction and smelting centres ranked in the early fifteenth century among the key members of the so-called niederungarischen Bergstädte (the mining towns of Lower Hungary: Kremnica. between Banská Bystrica and the cone and fluvial apron of the Pomana andesite stratovolcano and to the north-east of the giant Štiavnica stratovolcano of almost 50 km in diameter. see also š Stefan Kazimir. a little later on.4 to 10. “Baníctvo v stredoslovenskej banskej oblasti. with a 20 km caldera (16.. and (b) the Starohorské Vrchy. an extension of the Dumbierské Tatry portion of the Š Lower Tatra (Nízké Tatry) mountain chain (town of Banská Bystrica [Ger. ASP. 89 S. Hung. 38-49 “Leutschau”. 549.und Hilfsstoffen (13. Banská Bystrica. Jankovic.. bis 18. Besztercebánya]). and the usual blanket mentions of “seven mining towns” are thus inaccurate. 295-305. “Zur Versorgung mittelslowakischer Bergstädte mit Nahrungsmitteln und anderen Verbrauchsgütern vom 14. Zanobi di Taddeo Gaddi to Datini Co. Libethen]). Pukanec. 90 Originally the towns were only six: Banská Belá joined them in 1453. and in particular 430. between Podbrezová E.-18. 1:200. 6 km broad Mubietová mineral zone lines the north-western edge of the Veporské Vrchy.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 451 routes carried both raw copper (probably Schwarzkupfer) and refined metal (“afinato in Ungheria”). fol. Neusohl.88 The Slovak orebodies were located in two discrete zones in the Western Carpathian (Západné Karpaty) geological sub-province of the extensive Carpatho-Balkan metallogenic area.g. Central Slovakia. Jahrhundert) (Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial.5 million years ago). Useful regional overviews are found in Miroslav Kamenický.89 The first one. 1997). “The Carpatho-Balkanides and Adjacent Area: A Sector of á the Tethyan Eurasian Metallogenic Belt. 39-49 “Kassa (Kaschu)”). Venice-Pisa. 130) (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 1r. Banská Štiavnica. forming part of the Veporské Pásmo geological belt (locality of Mubietová [Lybetha. Jahrhundert. Fallstudien zu Beschaffung und Verbrauch von Lebensmitteln sowie Roh.90 Mubietová is located geologically in the north-eastern sector of the Central Slovakia Neogene Volcanic Field. D. Ger.und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. A handy tool for place name concordances are the 1900-1914 topographic maps of the IIId Military Mapping Survey of Austria-Hungary.000 (sheets 37-49 “Neusohl”. 1393.” Mineralium Deposita 32 (1997): 42633. ed. Beihefte.” in Ekkehard Westermann. supplied copper mainly from two regions: (a) the Veporské Vrchy. 88 . Bergbaureviere als Verbrauchszentren im vorindustriellen Europa. Banská š Belá). 8 Aug.” Historický casopis 45 (1997): 173-4. Mubietová and. Reflexionen über dauerhafte Elemente in der langen Frist. Copper mining began to wane š gradually in the seventeenth century. 94 J.91 The first Š š written records of local mining activity date to c. Die niederungarischen Bergstädte. sets Mubietová š and Banská Bystrica into a broader historical and administrative context. 95 The geology of the Stiavnica.” Historický zborník kraja 4 (1968): 363–8. and Kolba. Svätodusná. For useful local observations see Josef Marko. 1350 and endowed with the S Štiavnica Bergrecht (Schemnitzer recht) in 1379. Bolerázsky. the core zone of medieval copper and silver extraction lay north of the town. with associated tetrahedrite.452 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL and Mubietová (partly in the Ciereaz mountain chain).5 km of the settlement. J. “Venné majetky uhorských královien v stredoslovenskej banskej oblasti do roku 1478.95 The polymetallic works at Poniky J. “Tazobný prírodno-technický systém v banskej oblasti Spania š Š Dolina—Staré Hory. 92 Martina Kalabová. The degree of medieval exploitation of porphyry/skarn copper deposits remains unclear.93 The three key copper deposits. Recognized as a community c. but the primary ores consisted of base-metal sulphides (mainly chalcopyrite). under the Pánský Diel peak (in the Vallis dominorum. mainly after 1405. with richer copper content in greater depth on base metal veins. and in the the Staré Hory hills (Ger. “The Banská Stiavnica Ore District: Š š Š Relationship Between Metallogenetic Processes and the Geological Evolution of a Stratovolcano. Banská Bystrica] 8 (1989): 23-68. Sandberg]). Altgebirg. tennantite. In Banská Bystrica.94 Intrusion-related and epithermal vein precious metal/base metal mineralizations associated with calcalkaline rocks are usually identified as the economically viable metal source here.” Historický casopis 52 (2004): 3-30. and siderite. “Príspevok k vzniku a najstarším dejinám slobodného královského banského mesta Mubietová.” Mineralium Deposita 34 (1999): 639-54. 93 Too much economic significance should not be attributed to the secondary mineral libethenite (Cu2[(OH)PO4]) from the local oxidation zone. Lexa. in the S Špania Dolina. Mubietová produced fine copper (ranked so at least in the seventeenth century) rivalling that of neighbouring Banská Bystrica. Stohl and V.” Karpaten Jahrbuch 53 (2002) [2001]: 156-9. 252. See also V. Pomana and Vtácnik volcanic Š š 91 .und Wallfahrtsort.92 Trivial amounts of the fourteenth-century metal may have come from upper oxidation zones with inclusions of cuprite (Cu2O) and low impurity copper. Herrengrund valley). were located at Podlipa. Mazúrek. within 1 to 6. Javorie. 1340. even though it alone was mentioned in the context of pre-modern local mining by Probszt.” in Stredné Slovensko—Prírodné vedy [Stredoslovenské muzeum. arsenopyrite. “Altgebirg—Bergbau. first described in 1823 on the basis of samples from the abandoned works at Mubietová. and all work ceased in 1863. localities of Richtárová and Piesky [Ger. Konecný. Ger. Ger.. “A Review of Metallic ore Mineralization of the Nízké Tatry Mts. 12 km ESE of Banská Bystrica) were more important as a source of silver..” in P. Exploitation largely stopped c. Hitherto documented mining and prospecting activity seems to date only from the later eighteenth century.g. M. tennantite and tetrahedrite ores east of Drienok. Szmolnokbánya. “Das Slowakische Erzgebirge und seine Denkmäler. in the area of Ponická Lehôtka and Farbiste (in the direction of Mubietová) were at all š exploited in the middle ages..” 641 (Fig. Gold. Smolník.” in R. Predbane) (c. Rainer Slotta.. Variscan Metallogeny in the Alpine Orogenic Belt. Gölniczbánya). Silber und Kupfer aus dem Slowakischen Erzgebirge. Bana). Jasov.97 The oldest and most prestigious mining hub š was Gelnica (Hnilec. ed. Ochsenberg). 239-50. ‘Bei diesem Schein kehrt Segen ein’. Slotta et al. Rudabánya. 96 For contextual area geology see e. lay closest to the most significant copper deposits. mineral-bearing zones is covered in Lexa et al. Smolník (Hung.g. Roz š ava. šn and Spisská Nová Ves. the most significant Eastern Slovak extraction centres coalesced in the league of Upper Hungarian mining towns (oberungarischen Bergstädte). “Banská Stiavnica Ore Š District.. often simply referred to as “The Mine” (Bánya. It is uncertain whether the chalcopyrite.. The local copper ores include mainly chalcopyrite and occasional small veins of tennantite. in the area of the Volovské Vrchy (Volovec. 97 As general background see e. Ger. eds. Mineralia Slovaca monograph (Bratislava: Geocomplex. which included Gelnica. Veröffentlichungen aus dem Deutschen Bergbau-Museum Bochum 69 (Bochum. š Located in the Spissko-Gemerské Rudohorie and conjoined formaš tions (Slánske Hory—Hungarian Tokaj Mountains). 648-9. Zips) area. generally present in uneconomic concentrations. 1996). Schmöllnitz). and by the end of the fourteenth century Spis (Zipser) copper had carved out a competitive niche in northern š European markets. Regarding skarn deposits see ibid. Slavkay and M. Hung. Chovan. Telkibánya. . through verleger activities and the ownership of mining-shares in Banská Bystrica by eastern merchants from the Spis (Ger.96 The Central Slovak mining zone was economically cross-connected by the 1380s with the second discrete source zone. A local shift from an earlier emphasis on precious metal extraction to the exploitation of copper and iron can be dated to the 1360s. 71-96. in dolomite and in Triassic limestone. located to the south-west of Gelnica.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 453 (Drienok. 1997). Grecula. lead and zinc than of copper. 4). 1609. Eastern Slovakia. 141. Aggregate figures for Slovak copper output prior to the period of the early Fugger-Thurzo partnership (1494-1525) are scarce. Tepny spolocenského š pokroku.” in Slotta et al. “Výsady banských miest na Slovensku v stredoveku. Ein oberdeutsches Buntmetall-Oligopol 1396-1412. another nearby source of copper was exploited at Rudnany (on the Medený Potok stream. was administratively annexed by Smolník in 1344. sphalerite (ZnS) and galena. 8.” in Marsina. 95. higher criminal justice rights in 1339. “Prvé turzovsko-fuggerovské zmluvy o spolocnom š mediarskom podniku.. von Stromer.” Der Anschnitt 50 (1998). výrociu š š š baníctva v Rudnanoch. Silber.500 zentners of refined copper and c. with some admixture of arsenopyrite. Smolník produced c. 210. plus perhaps around 2. Revue o dejinách spolocnosti 1 (4) (2001): 6-9.” in Marsina. 98-9.100 Other tentative figures are available for the operations of Nürnberg merchants. The local orebodies yielded c.und Kupfererzlagerstätten im Slowakischen Erzgebirge. storocí. mainly based in Banská Bystrica. “Postavenie banského majstra vo východoslovenských banských mestách v 15. š 101 W. Banské mestá. “Zur Geschichte des Edel. “K 655. 2. Smolník received urban rights in 1327. Banské mestá.000-10. Bei diesem Schein. shipped mostly to Venice.und Buntmetallbergbaus im slowakischen Erzgebirge. 182 tons of copper per annum during the first third of the fifteenth century. and by 1338 was already expanding its communal authority to the outlying communities of S Švedlár (Ger.000 zentners of Schwarzkupfer in the early fifteenth century. Meczenzéf) to the east.99 According to some estimates. Banské mestá. Schwedler) to the north and Mnísek š nad Hnilcom (Hung. Ivan Chalupecký.500 zentners of copper sold directly to Nürnberg.000-2..16. tetrahedrite.” in Marsina. “Nürnberger Unternehmer im Karpatenraum. it is necessary to put the Venetian/Majorcan copper trade into a broader quantitative perspective. Michal Popovic.” Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej 16 (4) (1968): 641-62. š 100 Vladimír Segeš. Tichá Voda (Ger. Ger. Stillbach. 19-27. Ivan Hercko. “Das Zusammenspiel oberdeutscher und Florentiner Geldleute bei der Finanzierung von König Ruprechts Italien- . š 99 Marián Skladaný. Smellenczer kopper and its regional complements from Gelnica and elsewhere loomed large among the Slovak and Hungarian metal exports and enjoyed a solid reputation. and thus before the Datini period. 13-19. idem.454 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL The copper came from massive beds of chalcopyrite and pyrite in metamorphic dark schists layered with alkaline volcanic rock.101 This 98 Eugen Kladivík.” Historický casopis 43 (2) (1995): 215-29. To conclude. The source of the socalled Stillbacher kopper. “Die Gold-. š š š 98 Kufurbach or Kupperbach). WNW of Smolník). Mubomír Juck. “Stredoveké mestá na Slovensku.” História. Until the 1360s. and it was normal to see sales feldzug.” 392. in this volume. and Venetian Commerce. 50-86. .. Assuming the capacity of Banská Bystrica. 400-500 and another 125 metric tons (taking a standard zentner of 110. when the Thurzo-Fugger partnership was on the upswing. equivalent to 0. the yearly output may have reached c. “The Monetary Origins of the ‘Price Revolution’: South German Silver Mining. The readily accessible quinquennial aggregates for Central European copper production compiled by John Munro suggest that a century later.102 The Munro aggregates. Jahrhunderts. 1401/2. Wirtschaftsgeschichte 16) (Stuttgart.23 pounds avoirdupois.” in Hermann Kellenbenz. At their peak. Arbeitstagung der Gesellschaft für Sozial. ed.u. ostensibly of an order of magnitude matching quite well the tentative late fourteenth. Gelnica. a comparison with the documented volumes of Datini era Venetian copper exports to the Western Mediterranean is useful. as we have seen. Mubietová. and Smolník together with its dependencies to be a conservative 120 tons per annum each (no more than a guess based on the current data ranges). be this as it may. For the activities of the Kammerer-Seiler and Flextorfer-Zenner companies. Bericht über die 3. these exports stood at 14. 8 (UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-99-02) (rev. output hovered in the range of 396 tons per annum in 1491-1495. Merchant-Banking. The Venice-Majorca-Tuat circuit. 102 John Munro. might in fact be on the low side as far as Slovakia is concerned. University of Toronto.” Department of Economics and Institute for Policy Analysis. and 608 tons in 1501-1505.to early fiftenth-century outputs given above. 44 (Table 4).u. 21 March 2003). 14701540. The corresponding annual exports to Antwerp and Venice were 194 and 60 tons. “Egyptian Specie Markets. As a working average. 480 tons around 1400. was able to absorb between 20 to 80 tons of copper in one trading season through the Datini network alone. At the initial documented low point (1496-1500).05 metric tons)—overall some 625 to 750 tons over what seems to have been a six-year extraction run. But. 541 tons in 1496-1500. 1093 tons per annum (1511-1515). see also Blanchard. Wirtschaftsgeschichte in Mannheim (Forschungen z. the 400 to 500 ton mark is not at all unreasonable. Öffentliche Finanzen und privates Kapital im späten Mittelalter und in der ersten Hälfte des 19. the early sixteenth-century aggregate figures resolve to c. Sozial.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 455 amounts respectively to 100-125. Working Paper No.5 tons (Antwerp) and 89 tons (Venice). for they seem to cover a broader range of sources than just the core Slovak orebody areas. 1971). partly to feed the mints’ production of copper coinage. fol. Niccolò di Giovanni Mazzuoli argued in 1406 that as far as prospects for Datini sales were concerned the HoneinGhassassa market should be deemed worth about 1.é.. When it comes to contemporary estimates.” See Lane and Mueller. The emerging pattern also seems to suggest that at least half the amount shipped to Honein was indeed carried south. “Coin Usage and Exchange Rates in Badoer’s Libro dei Conti..103 A realistic although somewhat conservative guess. Majorca-Valencia. and the Low Countries. Slovak copper. Datini Co. 40 ton capacity of the Honein-Ghassassa gateway as . a starting point. with a starkly simplified and no longer applicable outline of the Central European “mining crisis” (1350-1450). Boaz Shoshan. also travelled in sizeable quantities to Nürnberg.” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 55 (2001): 217-45.” The Economic History Review. Cécile Morrisson. or about 40 metric tons. 1r. For aspects of the VenetianByzantine-Egyptian copper trade in the late 1430s. 23 Jul. 1406. Boaz Shoshan. The conclusion that seems to impose itself. 998. The quantities of copper imported to Egypt in the fifteenth century. Poland. To reach an overall impression of the potential annual demand for copper re-exported from Venice in 1400-1410.000 quintals of . 36 (1) (1983): 61-2 operated. however.5 to 9 metric ton batches per single Venetian supplier. have been generally rated as very large or “astounding. however.é. and the Levant (mainly Egypt).. NS. using an annual trans-Saharan caravan to the Tuat and the Niger Bend. This is the realm of actual transactions. D. and add the hitherto unknown aggregate demand of the Iberian market (Spain and Portugal). “From Silver to Copper: Monetary Change in Fifteenth Century Egypt. therefore. 104 103 . had each of these been able to absorb a mere 20-30 tons (surely an underestimate). the rest of Italy. “Money Supply and Grain Prices in Fifteenth-Century Egypt. one would have to take the c. This would have been just 30 to 60 tons shy of a full one third of the conjectural output of the Slovak copper mines around the year 1400. Venice would have had to supply 100-130 tons of copper annually to satisfy these Mediterranean outlets. copper yearly. is that in years such as 1409. ignoring the Slovak mines.104 In the realm of pure conjecture.” Studia Islamica 56 (1982): 97-116.. when the Datini correspondence documents a drastic temporary disruption ASP. Money and Banking. see e.g. in a good year. Niccolò’s estimate lies in a “sweet spot” between the documented low and high figures from the Datini letters and ledgers.. 1: 560.456 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL of 2. ASP.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 457 in the flow of Slovak/Hungarian copper to Venice.. 1409.105 other sources would have had to fill the gap. Fersina and Imperina. 1: 562. D. Money and Banking. Venice-Barcelona. 3 Aug. 930. Brixlegg. quoted in Lane and Mueller. Lamberti to Datini Co. or other orebody locations typically associated only with fifteenth-century advances in mining technology. Which alternates played this role at any given point remains an open question—and so does the issue of whether we might have to move back to the late fourteenth century the beginning of effective and sustained copper extraction at Schwaz. 105 . 2108 s. 14 d. Mai non potemo sapere a punto quanto si pesò in Vinega il vostro. sum blank in text] restate avere del chonto da noi a voi. 9 1/2 gl’abiamo contato il chintale. Quanto dite del vostro rame abiamo inteso. 1408 Al nome di Dio. Faremo risposta al bisongno. che pens[i]amo alla g[i]ornata d’ogi sia rischattato.458 MARTIN MALCOLM ELBL APPENDIX The following is a transcription of what may be considered the quintessential “Tuat” letter from the Datini archive in Prato. Chome verremo rischotendo. Abiamo avisato Lucha chome abiamo rimetuto per voi in più partite a Barzalona a nostri reali 500. a dì 25 d’marzo 1408 Scrittovi a dì passati il bisongno. Chome vedremo da darli fine lo faremo. to Francesco Datini. che ll’una chontiene quello che l’altra. 4 e Lapacc[i]o lb. che ve n’a[b]ia[n] avisato. Siate avisati. 363 s. e simile il Tosingho. Dio ne li tragha cho’ meno dano si può. Caschuno abbiamo fatto creditore chome dite. Non vi maravigl[i]ate perché si risquuoti [sic] chosí a stento. Delle 14 balle ch’abbiamo qui di vostro niente si truova da fare per anchora. Datini Co. che l’Tosingho v’è per 2/7 e Anto[nio] d’Quinto per 5/7. che questi che chonperarono il chovero lo mandavano a Tuet e una chonpagn[i]a d’Ar[a]bi l’àn[n]o tutto rubato e stavasi sopra rischato. che dite dovete avere lb. 6. che se l’avesimo saputo l’aremo partito: ora c’era detto d’chostà a uno modo. ASP. Noi n’abiamo fidato 1 chostale a uno giudeo che ll’à mandato in certo luogho in Barberia per provare: se gl’verà ben fatto prenderà d’altro. 0 [s. e ora utimamente quando avemo il vostro conto ce’l disono innaltro modo. E ora novellamente n’abiamo rimesso reali 250 a s. né quanto quel’ d’Antonio d’Lapacc[i]o. che per reali 600 n’è stato rubato del suo chon quello d’Antonio d’Quinto. Siate avisati. anche ne gl’abiamo avisati. 25 Mar. or noi l’abbiamo achonco chome c’avete detto. but expanded abbreviations are marked here in italics and lacunae in square brackets. di fatto rimetteremo. Dipoi n’abiamo 2 vostre. che sapremo chome sarà rischattato. 8 1/2 per reale. Voi dite vero che da reali 76 e s. Noi restamo avere d’Andrea Riera per 2 vostre . Ongni dì ci s’atende una nave da Une. Majorca-Florence. e da Barzalona c’era detto innaltro. Da lloro l’arete saputo. 668. che per reali 2000 vi sono tra l’Tosingho e l’Quinto. Lb. For consistency. Quando que’ d’Valenza ci chonterano le spese arano fatte per voi e per Lapacc[i]o partiremo a caschuno la sua erata e ve n’aviseremo. the transcription norms are those adopted for the Majorcan carteggio in Giampiero Nigro’s Mercanti in Maiorca. Tutti sono a vostro conto. D. Ne siamo pressoché paghati delle sanghuinee: siamo per torre vino biancho dal detto e rivenderlo. ma l’amicho c’è l’huole tropo sopramettere. sum blank in text]. e d’altra banda dovavamo avere per lo chonto tinto reali 18 e s.COPPER TRADE AND FRANCESCO DATINI 459 sanghuinee gli vendemo più tempo fa reali 61 s. Dio abi miserichordia della sua anima. che se l’avessi auto salvo n’aresti auto gran piacere. Per questa non vegiamo che più dirvi al presente. Altra volta tocherà a noi. Dio il sa la faticha abiamo durato nello sparviere vi mandavamo. siché sarebe intorno alla somma del chonto. che miglore vale dal mal paghatore prenderne quello che l’uomo può che perdere tutto. che indug[i]o pigl[i]a vizio. 0 [s. sum blank in text]. Christo vi ghuardi. alle quagle fateglele richordante [sic] ch’è un bel dono. e ora n’abbiamo donato uno a Pagholo Biliotti e dettoli si richordi d’voi. Mai vidi il più ardente. Francescho e Christofano in Maiolicha . Nondimeno noi faremo il migl[i]ore che potremo per paura d’non perdere tutto. Della morte d’Giovanni Tosinghi ci pesa asai: non si può più che Dio voglia. e chosí ci trametiamo. 0 [s. Dr Francesco Guidi Bruscoli joined on 1 January 2002. La famiglia Borromeo (Milano: Tamburini. By the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. This paper is the result of research and analysis undertaken jointly by Dr Francesco Guidi Bruscoli and Prof. paragraphs 1. by Queen Mary and Roundhouse Software. This piece of software can be used for any ledger or account book kept in double entry and in money of account. “Borromei di S. for the navigation of the database and will be inbuilt in the CD-ROM. Piero Canetta. Mini- . specific software (Historic Accounts I®) was developed by Roundhouse Software of Winchester. However. Another piece of software (Historic Accounts Enquiry®) was constructed. 48-49. modern or contemporary. accompanied by a CD-ROM containing a database with all the information contained in the two ledgers kept by Borromei companies in London (1436-1439) and Bruges (1438). following a successful application to the Economic and Social Research Council made by Professor James L. Bolton The Borromei family The Borromei were Tuscan by origin. 13: by name (in particular essays by Giorgio Chittolini and Florence Edler de Roover at pp. It will be marketed. This is possible because in November 2000 permission was granted to the Project by Principessa Bona Borromeo-Arese for the exclusive use of the ledgers and other allied material for research and publication.THE BORROMEI BANK RESEARCH PROJECT1 Francesco Guidi Bruscoli James L. information on members of the family for this period (with different degrees of detail and of reliability) has been drawn from Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana. If not otherwise stated. when Filippo di Lazzaro Borromei was hanged as one of the ringleaders. After a failed rebellion against Florentine rule in 1370.2 1 The Borromei Bank Research Project came into existence on 1 July 2001. medieval. There were also major banking companies in all three places headed by a member or members of the family. James L. 1960). Bolton (Award R000239125). 45-46. they fled the town and settled in other parts of Italy. 63-64. one in Milan. 1937). In order to create the database. from the town of San Miniato al Tedesco. 72-75). under licence. 2 Unfortunately no comprehensive study of the family exists for the period with which we are concerned. located between Florence and Pisa. Pompeo Litta. also by Roundhouse Software. a second in Venice and a third in Florence. there were three main branches of the family. Bolton. The main outcome of the project will be the publication of a study of the activity of the Borromei companies in the North of Europe in the first half of the fifteenth century. 3 and 4 were written by Guidi Bruscoli and paragraph 2 by Bolton. 53-55. BORROMEI BANK RESEARCH PROJECT 461 Milan. Before 1393, Borromeo and Giovanni, sons of Filippo di Lazzaro, had established a very profitable business in Milan that was to last until at least 1450. They owed much of their initial success to service to the Visconti dukes. Giovanni was for some time Treasurer General of the city and his nephew and adopted son and heir Vitaliano was also ducal Treasurer at various times between 1418 and 1430.3 He and his uncle made loans to the Visconti in anticipation of taxation and in return obtained widespread privileges, fiefs and estates, most notably around Lake Maggiore, to the north-west of the city. Florence. Another branch of the family, the descendants of Bartolomeo di Francesco, settled in Pisa soon after the expulsion from San Miniato and by 1395 Ludovico, Francesco and Piero di Bartolomeo had their own company there. The partnership was dissolved when Francesco moved to Genoa in 1404, and around 1409 Ludovico and Piero were allowed to return to Florence. This important Florentine branch of the family has largely been ignored by genealogists and historians and it is hard to place it correctly in the family’s genealogical tree. In 1420 Piero Borromei was Treasurer ato,” in Famiglie celebri italiane (Milan: Typ. del dottore G. Ferrario, 1819-1874), 4: by name. For manuscript sources, see: Archivio Borromeo, Isola Bella (ABIB), in particular Box file 661 and Box file 1051; and Archivio di Stato, Florence (ASF), Manoscritti 593, Carte Pucci, sc. III, folders 14, 25; ASF, Ceramelli Papiani 915; ASF, Catasto, 81, fols. 508r-513r; ASF, Catasto 405, fols. 78-84. For the Borromei companies until the beginning of the fifteenth century, see Federigo Melis, La banca pisana e le origini della banca moderna, ed. Marco Spallanzani (Florence: Le Monnier, 1987), in particular 224-32; for the 1420s, 1430s and 1440s see Girolamo Biscaro, “Il banco Filippo Borromei e compagni di Londra (1436-1439),” Archivio Storico Lombardo, ser. 4, 19, anno 40 (1913): 37-126, 283-386; Tommaso Zerbi, Le origini della partita doppia (Milano: Marzorati, 1952), 311-68, 413-46; Patrizia Mainoni, Mercanti lombardi tra Barcellona e Valenza nel basso medioevo (Bologna: Cappelli, 1982), 90-110; Philip Jacks and William Caferro, The Spinelli of Florence. Fortunes of a Renaissance Merchant Family (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 39-51. In the family archive at Isola Bella there are eight surviving ledgers for Borromei companies across Europe: Mastri n. 4 and 5 for Giovanni Borromei & Co. of Milan (1427, 1428); n. 7 for Filippo Borromei & Co. of London (1436-1439), which will be here referred to as BLo; n. 8 for Filippo Borromei & Co. of Bruges (1438), which will be referred to as BBr; n. 9, 10, 11 and 12 for Filippo Borromei & Co. of Milan (1445, 1446, 1451-52, 1453-55). This is a brief account of the family’s history because the main focus of this paper lies elsewhere. A more detailed study of the family and its banking companies will appear in the forthcoming volume. 3 The transcription of one of the ledgers kept by Vitaliano Borromei as ducal Treasurer has been published: Pier Giacomo Pisoni, ed., Liber tabuli Vitaliani Bonromei: mastro contabile del tesoriere ducale Vitaliano Borromeo (1426-1430) (Intra, Verbania: Alberti, 1995). 464 GUIDI BRUSCOLI AND BOLTON of Bologna, following a loan of 15,000 florins to Pope Martin V, and in the same year he was dealing with iron mines in Elba.4 The Florentine Catasto of 1427 shows Giuliano di Piero with assets of about 21,000 florins and Tommaso di Matteo [?] with less than 2,400. Corporate activities in Florence continued in the names of Piero di Bartolomeo and Gabriello di Lodovico, then of Gabriello, followed by Gabriello and Benedetto di Lodovico and eventually, after 1425, of Antonio (? di Lodovico). During these years there may have been yet another Borromei company there, in association with Antonio Corbinelli. Piero di Bartolomeo also became a partner in Galeazzo di Borromeo Borromei & Co. of London, which had recently been established by the Venetian branch of the family. Venice. By 1395 Alessandro di Filippo Borromei had already created a company in Venice together with Domenico d’Andrea, a Venetian citizen of Sienese origin. By 1422 the partnership had changed and become Alessandro Borromei and Lazzaro di Giovanni & Co., the latter being originally from Volterra in Tuscany. During the 1420s, it was this branch which showed most signs of vitality. Around 1420 Galeazzo, nephew of Alessandro di Filippo, created two companies in the north of Europe, in Bruges and London, both in partnership with Antonio di Francesco. Unfortunately hardly anything is known about them, nor about Alessandro’s activity in Venice.5 However, they must have been very successful, because in the Florentine Catasto of 1427 Alessandro was the fourth richest man in the city, being assessed at 57,000 florins, 50,725 of them in luoghi of the Monte Comune (shares of the public debt) and the rest in houses, shops and pieces of land. At his death in 1431, his three nephews, Galeazzo, Antonio and Giovanni, inherited all this wealth, along with shares in the Venetian, Bruges and London companies. In the mid-1430s the Venetian branch of the family also established its own company in Florence, under the name of Galeazzo and Giovanni di Borromeo, and this was to last until the late 1470s. After Galeazzo’s death in 1438, both companies in northern Europe were re-formed in the name of his nephew 4 Peter Partner, The Papal State under Martin V: The Administration and Government of the Temporal Power in the Early Fifteenth Century (London: The British School at Rome, 1958), 67 (n. 4), 70 (n. 2), 177 (n. 4). 5 Scattered information drawn from Venetian Archives can be found in Reinhold C. Mueller, The Venetian Money Market: Banks, Panics, and the Public Debt, 1200-1500 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 272-3, 560-1. BORROMEI BANK RESEARCH PROJECT 465 Alessandro, with Antonio di Francesco still as a partner. Galeazzo had also established a company at the Papal Court in partnership with Tommaso Spinelli who in 1435 was in Basel, where the Great Council of the Church had just opened. On Galeazzo’s death the company passed to his nephew, Borromeo di Antonio. Profits of 7,937 cameral florins were made between 1437 and 1441, but compared to those to those enjoyed by the Medici they were relatively small. On the death of Alessandro di Filippo in 1431, two new partnerships were created in Venice, both with Lazzaro di Giovanni, one in the name of Alessandro’s nephew, Antonio di Borromeo, the other with Antonio’s son, Borromeo. Gabriello Borromei was still working in Florence in 1438, whereas other members of this branch of the family were active elsewhere, notably Gabriello’s cousins Giuliano and Alessandro di Piero who in 1433 were employees of Tommaso Spinelli in Venice. However, in the 1430s the most significant developments were in Milan. Vitaliano Borromei and his Milanese partners had undertaken their foreign operations before then through the companies of the Venetian branch of the family; but around 1434, they decided to expand. Vitaliano was no longer Treasurer of the Duchy, an activity which had undoubtedly brought him wealth and prestige but which also made it difficult to use his resources for other ventures. A single cash loan to the Visconti had cost him almost £20,000 imperial of Milan, for example.6 So the Milanese branch decided to open its own companies in the north of Europe in Bruges and London and then, just a year or two later, in Barcelona. The Borromei Bank Research Project focuses on the activities of the two companies in London and Bruges, from 1436 to 1439 and does so because of the survival in the Borromeo-Arese family archive of two ledgers, one for Bruges for the year 1438 and the other for London for the years 1436 to 1439.7 Zerbi, Le origini, 339. The London ledger was studied almost a century ago by Biscaro. His was a pioneering study which, despite its use as reference source by some leading scholars (de Roover, Mueller), has proved to be not always accurate and complete. Our work on the Borromei ledgers is still in progress: the Bruges ledger has been fully analyzed, whereas we are still in the process of inputting material for the London ledger. There are no surviving ledgers for Barcelona: a short account of this company is given below. 7 6 466 GUIDI BRUSCOLI AND BOLTON Filippo Borromei & Co. of Bruges and London The first company was established at Bruges, under the name of Vitaliano’s teenage son, Filippo, hence its name, Filippo Borromei & Co. It was opened for business on 1 January 1435 and, according to the contract establishing it, was to last for five years. The initial capital was £3,000 flemish which was entirely provided by count Vitaliano Borromei. But the profits were to be divided between Vitaliano (75 per cent), Paolo di Antonio da Castagnolo of Florence and Giovanni di Michele Micheli of Lucca (12.5 per cent each), and it was they who had to go to Bruges.8 Towards the end of 1435 Giovanni Bindotti moved from Milan to London, and began organizing the imminent opening of a branch there. During the first months of his stay he seems to have kept all the accounts in a small ledger, his quadernetto, until 8 March 1436 when Giovanni Micheli moved to London from Bruges and took over the management of the company. It was clearly a branch of the company at Bruges and again in the name of Filippo Borromei: both ledgers record the transfer of £1,600 flemish (or 16,000 flemish écus), equivalent to £1,431.17.1 sterling at an exchange rate of sterlings 21 5/12 per écu, from Bruges to London. As the money came from Bruges, the initial capital of £3,000 flemish must have been used to establish both banks, and cannot be taken as the capital for Bruges only. From the ledgers it is also clear that at the end of each year all the profits from the London branch had to be transferred to Bruges, where they were then credited to the Profit and Loss account of the main bank.9 Around 1436-1437 a third 8 For the contract, written on July 1434, see ABIB, Box file 1051 (b) and Box file 661 (a). A substantial contribution to the capital of the company was also given by the heirs of Giovanni Del Barza of Milan. On 1 January 1438 they had a credit from the previous year of £915.19.7 flemish. On 31 December they were credited with the interest on that sum (the dischrezione). They were holding what is known as a deposito a discrezione, but this time the total sum was not carried forward to the libro azzurro 1439, but to the libro segreto which, unfortunately, has not survived. 9 “I quali denari abiamo chonsignati al detto Giovanni Micheli che in Londra li debi trafighare a nome di Filippo Boromei e compagni. E di tutto il guadagno si farà di netto de la detta compagnia in chapo de l’anno, il detto Giovanni ne de’ fare creditore la compagnia di Brugia e Paulo da Castagnolo ghovernatore di detta compagnia di Bruggia de’ ridure tutti li avanzi di Brugia insieme con queli di Londra e quie partire il guadagno secondo sono d’achordo per la charta à domino Vitaliano Boromei del detto Giovanni e del detto Paulo da Castagnolo” (ABIB, BBr fol. 153.1, BLo fol. 47.7). For Bindotti’s arrival in London, BLo fol. 17.1dare (payment for the rent of the house for one year until 29 September 1436); for his BORROMEI BANK RESEARCH PROJECT 467 bank called Filippo Borromei & Co. was founded at Barcelona, but as there no surviving ledgers it is not known whether it had complete autonomy from the Bruges-London banks or from the main company at Milan.10 The same strategy of founding a main company in Bruges with a branch in London was also adopted by other Italian families: for example the Bardi, the Salviati and the Medici. Before opening their bank in London in 1446, with a capital of £2,500 sterling, the Medici had been operating through an office in London financed and staffed by the Bruges branch.11 In what follows we will try to demonstrate why this was probably a common strategy, in the wider context of a discussion of the evidence from the Borromei ledgers on the balance of trade between northern and southern Europe. In Chapter VI “Banking and the Money Market” of his book on the Medici Bank, de Roover focuses on the difficulties in making settlements between the north and the south of Europe, because the balance of trade was consistently unfavorable to Flanders. Then, in Chapter XIII, “Bruges and London,” he quite rightly says that “in the fifteenth century London was [...] only a satellite that moved in the orbit of Bruges,” as far as banking was concerned, but that the Low Countries depended on England to settle their unfavorable balance of trade with all the Italian city states, because English wool was the only commodity which the Italian were eager to buy and which could be used to restore the balance. [...] The economies of the Low Countries and England were thus linked by a common interest in the wool trade and were interrelated in still other respects, because Bruges needed credits in England in order to buy wool with which to pay Italian claims. The task of adjusting international balances fell upon the Italian banking houses, and it is no wonder that there were active relations between the bourse in Bruges and Lombard Street in London.12 quadernetto, BLo fol. 5.1. 10 See Mainoni, Mercanti, 90-3 on the first years of activity of the Borromei in Barcelona. An isolated reference to a Borromei company in Barcelona at the end of the XIV century is given in Jacks and Caferro, The Spinelli, 47, but no source is provided. 11 Raymond de Roover, The Rise and Decline of the Medici bank, 1397-1494 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1966), 62-3, 321. 12 de Roover, The Rise and Decline, 317. 468 GUIDI BRUSCOLI AND BOLTON De Roover concentrated his attention on the wool trade, in which the Borromei also participated. Between 1436 and 1439 they bought 379 sacks of English wool for export for themselves and in partnership with a third party or parties, at a cost of £4,514.6.3 sterling, from a variety of suppliers in Burford (Oxfordshire) and from a Mr. Thomas of the March of Wales. Probably as a favor, the Borromei bought him an expensive bed and feather mattress in Bruges and had it shipped over to the Marches. They also purchased wool from London and Southampton merchants. Much of it was consigned directly to Southampton, to be loaded on the galleys by the Borromei agent there, Cristofano Cattano, but some was sent to Middleburg for forwarding by sea to Italy. The Borromei Bruges also bought wool directly from the Staple at Calais, but lesser grades from Lindsey (Lincs.), Nottingham, and elsewhere in the Midlands and Eastern England, not for export overland to Italy but for sale to local clothiers in Flanders and Brabant. The two branches of the trade were kept separate, however, with the fine wool going to Italy, to be sold on to lanaiuoli of Milan and Florence, as is clear from the ledger of the Borromei bank in Milan for 1445-1446. As usual, the wool was bought on credit, one third down and the other two thirds at specified dates, so that total payment could be spread over two or three years.13 By the time the wool reached the galleys or other ships and customs duties, inland transport costs and other expenses had been paid, then the total cost of the wool had risen to £6,377.5.8 sterling, from the initial £4,514.6.3 sterling. It is very unlikely that the Borromei could have covered these costs from the sale of their imports, as the Hosting Statute of 1439-40 required.14 Between 1436 and 1439 they sold fustian and cotton to the Londoners for about £2,000 sterling and silk cloth, velvets, satins, damask, and baldechins to the value of £1,859.12.1 sterling. These were their two main imports: the remainder followed the usual pattern of trade to London, some raw materials (madder), spices, 13 For exports of English wool by sea from Middleburg and Arnemuiden see: ABIB, BBr fols. 353.3, 356.2, 358.3, 378.1, 378.3, 381.2, 382.1. For purchases of wool in England and export via Southampton see: ABIB, BLo fols. 68.1 (1436), 101.1 (1437). For purchases at the Staples and subsequent sales in Antwerp and Malines see: BBr fols. 238.1, 248.1, 377.2, 379.1, 383.2, 386.1. For the export to Florence and to Milan see: ABIB, Mastri n. 9-10, passim. 14 18 Henry VI c. 4. BORROMEI BANK RESEARCH PROJECT 469 needles from Milan, other cheap cloth from Holland and some mercery ware, but they did not amount to that much. Moreover, to the value of the wool exports has to be added that of cloth exports which, as E. B. Fryde has already argued, de Roover almost entirely ignored in his analysis of the balance of payments.15 Between 1436 and 1439 the Borromei bought for export English cloth worth £1,415.6.10 sterling, which with expenses came to £1,847.15.9 sterling.16 Purchases of wool and cloth combined far outweighed the money received from the sale of imports in London, and that is true of the Italian trade with England generally for much of the fifteenth century, up to perhaps the 1460s. What the surviving royal customs accounts for 1422-1461 show is that it was the Florentine and Milanese merchants who were interested primarily in wool although, as has been seen, they also bought cloth, to about a third or more of the value of wool. A complete record exists for the loading of the Venetian galleys in London in the autumn of 1438. In all, Italian merchants exported some 8,462 broadcloths or their equivalents in cheaper cloths, worth some £14,809 sterling by customs valuations, with the Venetians themselves being the main exporters with no less than 7,479 cloths. By contrast, in the same year, Michaelmas to Michaelmas (29 September 1438 to 29 September 1439), all Italian imports through London were valued at about £10,075 sterling, for customs’ purposes. These import and export figures are taken from the Petty Custom accounts and so do not include those for wool exports. In 1438-1439 the Italians exported a total of 342 sacks from London, worth perhaps in all another £5,000 sterling, based on Borromei ledger valuations. These are the figures for London only. The Italians exported a further 4,307 cloths and 631 sacks of 15 Edmund B. Fryde, “Anglo-Italian Commerce in the Fifteenth Century: Some Evidence about Profits and the Balance of Trade,” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire 50 (1972): 350-3. 16 Biscaro, “Il banco Filippo Borromei,” 92-5. Most of this was not the traditional English broadcloth, fulled, dyed and finished, and in bolts 24 yards long by 1-1 1/2 yards wide between the lists (the classic definition of a broadcloth), but lighter, half width, cheaper streits, narrow cloths from Essex and Suffolk and from the west country which were probably intended for a mass market in Italy and the Mediterranean world. It is clear both from the London ledger and from the royal customs accounts that many of the Italian exporters were doing the same, buying cheaper, lighter cloths which were then equated to the unit of a broadcloth, with two pieces of streits equaling one broadcloth, for the purposes of collecting the royal customs duties. 470 GUIDI BRUSCOLI AND BOLTON wool worth together about £20,000 through Southampton in 1438-1439 against imports valued at £14,540 sterling.17 Arriving at a figure for the Italian balance of trade in this year is difficult, involving as it does valuations from different sources, along with some estimates, but it was possibly about £15,000 sterling in England’s favor. The Borromei ledgers and the royal customs accounts are at one here, and they show that the much-maligned Italians were a source of considerable profit to the English crown and to English wool suppliers and cloth producers. How were these debits in London to be met? One way was through the transfer of papal revenues from England to Rome, a task traditionally carried out by Italian merchant-bankers. The Borromei ledgers show no operations of this type. Nor could they be covered by profits from the sale of imports in Bruges. The ledger for 1438 shows that their trade in that city was minimal. Most of the imported silk cloth went on to London, as did much of the madder and fustians bought mainly at Middleburg and Antwerp.18 Bruges may have been the international money market for the north, but London and its outports Southampton and Sandwich were the centers for both imports and exports. De Roover argued that the only way the apparently permanent imbalance in trade could be settled was by the eventual shipment of bullion from north to south. But was this really the case? The Borromei ledgers contain no records of the transfer of coin to Italy from Flanders or from England, where the export of bullion in any form was strictly forbidden. Écus were sent from Geneva to Milan, presumably to settle balances between these centers, but that was all.19 There is no reason to suppose that the Borromei would have disguised such transfers. They recorded all other payments and expenses in meticulous detail, especially transport costs, and the only secrecy was in reporting profits to the libro segreto. 17 James L. Bolton, “Alien Merchants in England in the Reign of Henry VI, 1422-61,” unpublished Oxford B.Litt. thesis (1971), 140-1; Appendix 1, Tables 3, 8; National Archives, London, E 122/73/10, 11, 12, E 122/141/23; Eleanora M. Carus Wilson and Olive Coleman, England’s Export Trade 1275-1547 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 60, 95. 18 On the trade of Bruges and Antwerp in the 1430s see our article “When Did Antwerp Replace Bruges as the Commercial and Financial Centre of North-Western Europe? The Evidence of the Borromei Ledger for 1438,” forthcoming in The Economic History Review. 19 ABIB, BBr fols. 305.1dare, 331.1avere. BORROMEI BANK RESEARCH PROJECT 471 Bruges, London and the Mediterranean World Bullion transfers were not at all necessary. What the Bruges and London ledgers also show is that this imbalance was met by moving money as distinct from coin or bullion across Europe by means of letters of advice (lettere d’avixo) or bills of exchange.20 Thanks to the use of technology, we are now able to make some quantitative evaluations. The letter of advice was a financial instrument whereby a merchant-banker asked his foreign correspondent to make someone creditor and someone else debtor at a certain date and at a specific exchange rate. The writers were often one of the parties involved, but that was not always the case. It was a way of transferring credits and debits across Europe without actually transferring bullion and there are, in the Bruges ledger for 1438, 204 letters of advice, for a total value of £22,754.15.8 flemish. A more widely used and better known financial instrument, however, was the bill of exchange.21 The Bruges ledger records 1,233 bills of exchange in 1438 where either the Borromei acted in one of the four main roles, deliverer, taker, payor or payee, or where a third party acted for them, to a combined value of £95,563 flemish and at an average of £77.10.0 flemish per bill. The dominating role of Venice is perhaps not surprising, and fits well with the recent account given by Mueller in his book on The Venetian Money Market.22 Bills to and from Venice, 387 in all, were 31.39 per cent of the total by number but 41.57 per cent by value, at £39,732 flemish. The average value of a bill sent to or from Venice was therefore almost £103 flemish. London came next in the ranking of bills sent and received, 239 to a total value of £16,634 flemish, respectively 19.38 Money is taken to mean here book money, ledger credits and debits or paper money. Coin and bullion were used indiscriminately by contemporaries but the first refers to gold and silver coins, the second to ingots of precious metal. 21 No detailed account of the origins and workings of the bill of exchange is given here, because it is a subject on which much has been written. Good introductions will be found in Raymond de Roover’s Business, Banking, and Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. Julius Kirshner (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1974) and the bibliography quoted there; and in Giulio Mandich’s “Per una ricostruzione delle operazioni mercantili e bancarie della compagnia dei Covoni,” in Armando Sapori, ed., Libro giallo della compagnia dei Covoni (Milan: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1970), CLXXVIII-CXCIII. 22 On the Rialto market and its patterns see Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, in particular 303-37. 20 472 GUIDI BRUSCOLI AND BOLTON per cent of the total number of bills and 17.4 per cent of their value, with the average bill worth almost £70 flemish. Barcelona was only just behind in number with 238 bills, 19.30 per cent of the total, but their value, at £18,261 flemish and 19.11 per cent of the whole, was higher and the average bill worth almost £77 flemish. By contrast, only a few of the transactions involved Geneva, which is slightly surprising, given the importance of the four fairs which every year were held in the Swiss town. One of the functions of the bill of exchange was that of extending credit locally. This could be done in a variety of slightly different ways, but usually involved a re-exchange operation, with or without actual bills being written and sent. A bill, for example, would be sent from Bruges to Venice and then, when it matured or became payable, another would be sent back from Venice to Bruges. The same parties were involved in both bills and in practice this was a loan extended by the deliverer in Bruges to the taker in Bruges, for a four-month period, since the usance between Bruges and Venice is two months each way. The profitability of delivering or drawing bills of exchange obviously depended on the exchange rate. Merchants-bankers were aware of the daily fluctuations in exchange rates, and tried to make the most of the information they received from their correspondents. The wider the difference between the two exchange rates Venice-Bruges and Bruges-Venice, the more profitable it was to lend money and accept repayment by way of re-exchange, and the more costly it was to borrow. Mueller has shown that the first half of July saw exchange rates peak in Venice, when merchants were scrambling for credit with which to pay their obligations as well as for the merchandise and bullion they wished to load onto the departing galleys [to the Levant] as exchange commodities [...] another maturity date that was commonly fixed was the Christmas fair, which it was hoped would coincide with the return of the galleys.23 What really mattered, however, was not knowing the exchange rates between Bruges and Venice on the day but predicting what they 23 Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, 306. . 367 flemish or 46. by ordering one of their correspondents to draw or remit bills of exchange from another place. 21 1/3 per écu (= £102.945 flemish and the Borromei bank acted as payors.1 flemish). to their branch there.1 flemish). but only delivered. In all.12. 49 1/4 per ducat (= £102. at the same time as the Borromei Bruges was delivering money to him from Bruges. On 9 January 1438 Ventura & Co.2 per cent of this sum. for as much as £7. as shown in Graph 3. . they borrowed about £6. So. or by way of arbitrage. and in February.500 flemish. instructing them to credit the account of Cecco di Tommaso for 1.BORROMEI BANK RESEARCH PROJECT 475 In the great majority of cases the Borromei were remitting to or drawing on various banking centers across western Europe in order to make their profits on the movement of funds.130 flemish by way of exchange with Venice in June-October 1438. For this “service” they received three écus or six flemish shillings in commission. In the same month. about £1. of Barcelona drew 400 venetian ducats for the Borromei Bruges on Arrighino Panigarola of Venice. whereas they were deliverers for less than £6. that is. 217. whereas the substantial Catalan co25 ABIB. BBr fols.023 flemish écus at st.430 flemish in the same period. they wrote to London. In other words. for example.6. July and October. or lent. Italian merchant-bankers in Barcelona were creditors in Bruges and debtors in Venice. it was quite common for a correspondent to draw or remit bills for the Borromei Bruges between banking centers outside Flanders. A comparison with Graph 1 shows that the Borromei in Bruges were well aware of the costs of borrowing in August and September and took up most of their loans in June. for example.1dare.25 A more detailed examination of their exchange operations with Venice shows that during 1438 the Borromei Bruges were takers of bills of exchange drawn on Venice to a value of almost £13. or Geneva and Venice.300 flemish. They could conduct these operations from Bruges itself. 285. he was drawing other bills on London for the Borromei Bruges. in Bruges. The value of exchange between Bruges and Barcelona was £15. between Venice and Barcelona. On 24 December. In general.1dare-avere. on 15 December the Borromei Bruges credited the account of Cecco di Tommaso and brothers of Venice upon receipt of a bill of exchange for 500 ducats at gr. . Munro shows how the Staplers and Merchant Adventurers were lending to the Mercers (who were takers of bills). They functioned almost as one unit. . For their part. Bills of exchange met all these needs. The Mercers would then have their money back in the Low Countries. As Munro and others have shown. 194-196. 1272-1663: A Study in Monetary Management and Popular Prejudice. in the trade between the Low Countries and England. but the Borromei ledgers show clearly how the arrangement worked in practice. But the relationship between the Borromei banks in Bruges and London was exceptionally close. The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven: Yale University Press. needed funds there in order to buy their imports. This occurs in 60 of the 96 bills delivered by the Borromei Bruges to the Borromei London but in none of the 47 bills delivered by the Borromei London to the Borromei Bruges. The Mercers. who bought luxury cloths and other goods in the Low Countries and exported them to England. both the Staplers (those exporting wool to Calais) and the Merchant Adventurers (who exported woollen cloth to the Low Countries) needed to remit money back to England. or the Staplers could finance their own trade in England.” in Fredi Chiappelli. from the proceeds of their sales. “Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange in England. by being takers of bills of exchange sold to the Mercers. Munro. merchandise could be consigned to them for sale locally. ed. once their products were sold. in the Low Countries. where they needed it to make their purchases. Staplers and Merchant Adventurers is perhaps drawn too sharply here. Information could be exchanged easily. The Borromei Bruges did not draw on the Borromei London bills payable to London 27 John H. were takers and payors of bills of exchange where the Borromei banks of Bruges and London were respectively deliverers and payees.27 The distinction between Mercers. One man could often be all three. with the main purpose of exchange operations through Bruges being to realize the funds the London branch needed to buy English wool and cloth for export.BORROMEI BANK RESEARCH PROJECT 477 The advantages of dealing directly with a sister company based in another major commercial city are obvious.. A. and money transferred by simple book entries. London merchants. 1979). Staplers and Merchant Adventurers could have their money transferred directly back to England by bill or letter of advice. with the Mercers then repaying the loan in England. often acting through their factors or attorneys in the Low Countries. . . . 0 = c. 185. £fl 240 £st 386. This was an advantage in one sense. His sources were different from ours. On the other hand. ledgers provide the details of the practical operations which are simply not obtainable from other sources and. 257.8 = c. In terms of payments.1 = c. By drawing on Venice so extensively the Borromei in Bruges were in fact drawing on the whole Italian money market. Bruges was highly indebted to both Barcelona and above all to Venice. But there are many questions that still need answers. thanks to computer technology. we are now able to make quantitative evaluations from them and analyze thoroughly the sources available to us. but only because it was transferring large credits to London to pay for exports of wool and cloth. £fl 442 ABIB. But to messer Antonio and Lazzaro di Giovanni they were in debit for the entire year. and to the extent of more than £1. 146. 0. taking London first.800 flemish on both 25 January and 8 May.13. for the Borromei. . The ledgers also demonstrate that.6 for 1436-37) £st 210. 177.BORROMEI BANK RESEARCH PROJECT 481 whole year.28 1436 1437 1438 1439 28 profit profit profit profit £st 24.12. Epilogue The work of de Roover has to be a starting point for any analysis of Italian banking activities in northern Europe. 305.17. 299. 17. £fl 364 (£fl 392. BLo fols. The first must be. because it is much easier to determine the reasoning behind decisions and longer-term strategies from commercial correspondence than from a company’s libro mastro. for the Republic was at its center. 89. £fl 28 £st 318. apart from two short spell between 30 August and 22 September and 6 and 28 November.7 = c. was the enterprise in north-western Europe profitable? What follow are the figures taken from the Borromei’s own records of profits and losses.12. as he mainly based his research upon letters and made only limited reference to account books. 406. Bruges and London must be treated as a single company in the years 14361439 and not as separate entities. 5 per cent by value.1 However. as shown below in Table 1.2. but then incurred heavy losses.2avere.4. Exchange with Venice amounted to 41.482 GUIDI BRUSCOLI AND BOLTON The main sources of profit were exchange operations and trade. It is possible that external factors were partially responsible for these losses. Given that most of the exchange was with Venice.7. 39. This shows the following: 1435 1436 1437 1438 profit profit loss loss c. c. it is more meaningful to consider the profits and losses of the two banks together. The imposition of the bullion ordinances at the Calais Staple 29 ABIB. 162.1avere. 254.2 flemish. England. 162.4.2 flemish to £685. . Operations with London also show losses where the percentage of the total value is greater than the percentage of bills. £fl 714 £fl 799. BBr fols. whereas for Barcelona the reverse is true. but the Borromei of London also enjoyed a steady income from brokerage and commission on trade undertaken on behalf of others. duke of Burgundy. since it has been argued that they were part a single unit. In striking contrast. c.2 634 350 560 Despite making healthy profits in London.29 1435 1436 1437 1438 profit profit loss loss £fl 298. the Borromei were not doing well in northern Europe overall. it is not surprising that most of the losses were incurred in that area. No losses were recorded on exchange operations with other places.6 per cent of the total but the losses incurred in those operations amounted to 61. c. faced severe monetary and political problems in his northern territories as well as with their main trading partner. the Bruges company enjoyed two years of good profits.12. £fl £fl £fl £fl 298. From 1429 onwards Philip the Good.2 c. They were also worse than they first appear. £fl 606 c. The reason for this is clear: the heavy losses suffered by Bruges on exchange dealings which more than doubled between 1437 and 1438 from £322. . the re-coinage proved a success but there are signs in the Borromei ledger of continuing uncertainties. Bernardo Portinari was sent to Bruges by the Medici in 1436 to settle outstanding debits and “to inquire about local customs with respect to trade as well as to bills of exchange.2.” in J. 48. if the Borromei’s profits were severely affected by these circumstances. The evidence from the ledger. Medieval Flanders (London and New York: Lamberts. 1999). The Rise and Decline. The value of the coinage was severely deflated.0 flemish in 1442 and £538. ABIB. and Gold. 82. £498. The Struggle for Bullion in the Anglo-Burgundian Trade. Cloth.484 GUIDI BRUSCOLI AND BOLTON common currency throughout his northern territories and Philip had to agree to maintain monetary stability for the next 20 years. ABIB. BBr fols. Blom and Emiel Lamberts. 320. 95.7.4dare. BBr fols. 1972). and to find out the strength and the credit standing of the principal foreign merchants residing in Bruges.1 and 7. H. 322 (Table 67). Presumably. 133. 54. and they were not. eds. To attract money to his mints the duke imposed strict bans on the export of bullion from his lands and cut his seignorage to a minimum. Bad management may explain the losses in 1437 and it is quite possible that in 1438 a desperate and unsuccessful attempt was being made to recoup them by gambling on the exchange market.1. famines and monetary revaluation did not mean heavy losses for the Medici and other reasons must be sought to explain the Borromei’s failures. however.5.4. . Wool. John H. these are the aggregated figures for the profits enjoyed jointly in Bruges and London.31 Political upheaval. then so should those of other companies. suggests that there was sound commercial reasoning behind the heavy losses on exchange 30 Wim P.6 flemish in 1443. Chapter IV.16.. if failures they were. It was soon making good profits: £670. “The Formation of a Political Union. 82. 359-61.30 Yet. 133. as London was in these years only a “suboffice” (as de Roover defines it) of Bruges.4 flemish in 1441. because he returned to Bruges to act as an agent for the Medici and then became an active partner in the bank they founded there in 1439.3.5dare. A History of the Low Countries (New York and London: Berghahn. 31 de Roover. especially the exchange dealers. Eventually.5avere.0. passim. 1992). A. David Nicholas.5avere. with references to “old. Munro.0 per cent stronger than those of 1428. 32. 249. For Portinari’s account with the Borromei in Bruges.5 flemish in 1439-1440. C. 49.” He must have made a favorable report. Blockmans. and probably by 1437. with new gold and silver coins 6. 1340-1478 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 59-60. £302.” “bad” and “good” money.1avere. The three companies outside Italy. if somewhat speculatively. all belonged to Count Vitaliano of Milan. The Borromei were willing to borrow heavily from their correspondents to finance trade through London. and usually referred to in the ledger as “i Borromei.32 In this context. European view of the banking and trading operations can also be taken a little further. messer Antonio Borromei and Lazzaro di Giovanni. Both these banks continued their operations after Count Vitaliano established his own banks in the north and Alessandro Borromei and Antonio di Francesco & Co. Bruges and London? This may be wishful thinking. in his “Anglo-Italian Commerce.” 353-355. The argument already advanced that the Borromei of Milan took a wide. but it seems unlikely. it must also be remembered that losses on foreign exchange in Bruges in 1438 meant profits for London and Barcelona. There is also a further and probably unanswerable question. albeit from limited evidence. what exactly was the relationship between the Borromei of Milan and the Borromei of Venice? In exchange to Venice in 1438. 75 per cent of the losses were incurred on dealings with one company only. where profits in 1439 were 84 per cent up on the previous year. of Bruges. Further investigation of both the London ledger and those for their main bank may be able to determine whether or not the Borromei of Milan did coordinate their operations so that any losses in the north were more than covered by profits from the sale of English imports in the south.” Were messer Antonio and Lazzaro di Giovanni in competition with or were they prepared to lend heavily to their Milanese cousins not only because they made a profit on the business but also because they were the fifth element in a successful “family” enterprise that ran from Milan through Venice to Barcelona. .BORROMEI BANK RESEARCH PROJECT 485 sustained in that year. but the heavy losses in Bruges can perhaps be 32 This is Fryde’s argument. London and Barcelona. During the 1420s the Borromei of Milan had used the two banks founded in Bruges and London by the Borromei of Venice as their correspondents. As none of the other Bruges ledgers has survived. it is not possible to determine whether the bank there returned to profit. He had provided their initial capital and it was he who took the major share of such profits as there were. in Bruges. of Bruges and Antwerp were one of the best clients of Filippo Borromei & Co. £881. This suggests that they may have still been working for the Borromei. Felice da Fagnano and Alessandro da Palastrello appear in the English Views of Hosts trading in the city in the early 1440s and the ledger of Antonio Della Casa & Co.law was the representative of the company in London. at the Papal court contains accounts for Filippo Borromei & Co. Florence. The substantial losses in the Profit and Loss account. National Archives. 221. “Il banco Filippo Borromei. the managers of the bank at Bruges knew that 1438 was a difficult year. 374 (London). were not carried forward to the libro azzurro for 1439. 254. London and Milan. may have been planning a final year’s trading without the added burden of huge debits from 1437 and 1438. as was the custom. Whatever the explanation. Archivio dell’Ospedale degli Innocenti. 35 Views of Hosts. 80.1.” 313. fols. fols.1. 195 (Bruges). BBr fols.6.33 Why this was done is a mystery and is likely to remain so.486 GUIDI BRUSCOLI AND BOLTON better explained in terms of a co-ordinated and ultimately profitable banking and trading enterprise between five major European centers rather than in the simpler context of Bruges. 150. London and Barcelona.12. 34 33 . of Bruges. 31. Biscaro states that at the beginning of 1441 Felice da Fagnano. In any case. 236. together with the profits from London for the years 1436 to 1438 which amounted to £632. 171.34 The staff of the London branch. 246. E 101/128/30. with Vitaliano’s illegitimate son Giovanni alias Prevosto Borromei as the representative of the company in Bruges. Biscaro. 314. the Bruges bank ceased trading at some time in 1440 and the London bank closed with it. but maybe it was simply not renewed after the end of the first contract. 168.3 flemish in all.35 Vitaliano may himself have been ABIB. 223.19. 172. 247. 221. Paolo da Castagnolo. That is one explanation but another less charitable view is that he was trying to hide the truth from Count Vitaliano in the hope that 1439 would be a better year. Giovanni and Niccolò Micheli. a completely new contract with different partners was then drawn up at Bruges. Biscaro argued that it was the losses on exchange to Venice that caused the closure. 185. but to the libro bianco for 1440. 215. Count Vitaliano’s brother-in. with profits at last wiping out losses. 116. on an informal basis. 270. London. as both the libro azzurro and the libro bianco have been destroyed. fols. The contract for the Bruges bank was due to end on 31 December 1439 and the manager. London and Barcelona in 1441 and 1442. 488. note 11).200 milanese. but they do seem to have worked separately. and Box file 661(a) for the dissolution. Palastrello had also worked for the previous company in London. 94.39 252 (Barcelona).36 However.4 milanese. “Il banco Filippo Borromei. as the company lasted until 1457.BORROMEI BANK RESEARCH PROJECT 487 in financial difficulties in Italy in these years. 36 Mainoni. he still thought it worthwhile to re-found and re-structure the banks in Bruges. Count Vitaliano again provided the capital and was entitled to 66. who was to have two thirds.” 312-3. By contracts dated 12 March 1443 Vitaliano established two new and separate companies.16. Profits had to be divided between Vitaliano. since he had to sell large parts of his estates in 1444.38 The London company had a very similar capital: £19. Prevosto e Alessandro Borromei & Co. Mercanti. in the name of Prevosto only. but in 1446 thought it worthwhile to have two separate companies (see above. Box file 1051 (c) for the contract. and Box file 661 (unnumbered) for the dissolution. whilst the remaining third was to be divided between Prevosto and Alessandro di Piero Borromei. Box file 1051(a. who were sent to Bruges where Alessandro had already worked for the previous company. the same strategy seems to have been adopted by the Medici who in 1439 opened the Bruges company and a “suboffice” in London. The bank was known as Felice da Fagnano & Co. Felice.6 per cent of the profits. whose sister had married Vitaliano and who had been previously involved in the management of the Bruges company. This contract was again for five years (14441448). 37 As we have seen. one in Bruges and the other in London.37 The company at Bruges.076. e) for the contract. is not known. and Felice and Alessandro da Palastrello of Piacenza one third between them. had a capital of £19. London and Barcelona. 39 ABIB.” the parish priest.. to be open for business on the 1 January 1444. Why Giovanni was known as “il prevosto. was the manager. 38 ABIB. Biscaro. but was probably renewed. . All that can so far be said about new company is that in 1448 Vitaliano was thinking of closing it due to bad management but that it was not dissolved until 14 March 1452. possibly to avoid the situation that had occurred in 1440 when the closure of Bruges led to the simultaneous closure of London. Apart from the initial contracts there is very little surviving information for either of the companies. Initially the company was an accomandita in the name of the two factors but well before the end of the contract. Box file 1051 (a-d). Mercanti. Paolo da Castagnolo. who was to have two thirds of the profits. There had been disputes and litigation between the original partners. of Bruges and of London was presumably a complex business and the ledgers would have been scrutinized with great care. That. Vitaliano’s son. 41 Apparently in these years he started managing the ducal treasury. 93). respectively Taddeo di Ardizio Vismara and Francesco di Arrighino Pozzobonello. Mercanti. in particular 90-110. on 20 June 1446.488 GUIDI BRUSCOLI AND BOLTON There was a similar restructuring at Barcelona and on 1 January 1445 a new company was established there with a capital of 6. 500 years later. the agreement was reshaped.000 milanese florins provided by Vitaliano. but went bankrupt in 1447 (Mainoni. is probably why they have survived and why we are able to discuss them here. Other members of staff survived and were promoted but by 1445-1446 he was no longer a shareholder in the main company at Milan nor was he employed by the Borromei in any other capacity.40 The person who seems to have taken the blame for the inadequate performance of the Bruges bank between 1435 and 1440 was its manager. . Filippo. was now to play a much more important role in the management of the bank. They each had a representative in Barcelona. For the Borromei companies of Barcelona see also Mainoni. as Biscaro noted. 40 ABIB. with Arrighino di Ambrogio Pozzobonello taking the other third. and Vitaliano had become increasingly distrustful of Vismara.41 Winding up the affairs of Filippo Borromei & Co. x REGIONAL AND LOCAL MARKETS x . x x . records of this kind are often scarce for the early thirteenth century. shops and shopping have always been hallmarks of urban life. but none of which has drawn the attention of historians of urban trade. however. Garland seems to have lived in Paris until his death sometime after 1258.: Catholic University of America Press. Frank A. 2 Alexander Nequam’s (or Neckam’s) De nominibus utensilium has. He was born about 1195. perhaps after 1272. See Munro. 3 Aside from three years of teaching at the newly-founded University of Toulouse (1229-31) and a brief period in England.C. all of which were published in the nineteenth century. On John of Garland’s life and works. tax lists. and of the American Philosophical Society for a Sabbatical Fellowship in that year.. which enabled me to undertake much of the research and writing for this paper.3 About 1218 he wrote a Latin manual for the use of his stuI am very grateful to acknowledge the generous support of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee for granting me a sabbatical in 2003-4. and then went to Paris. Mantello and George Rigg (Washington.2 In this paper I will focus on three such texts. Historians who have attempted to investigate the urban context of medieval commerce have traditionally relied for sources on the archival records. perhaps teaching the children of noble families (probably between 1232 and 1241). 1996). such as trading regulations. and financial and legal records. However. Morale scolarium of John of Garland (Johannes de Garlandia). produced by towns. “Textiles. and the dictaminal texts that provided models of legal forms and standard letters. been examined by John Munro for its description of weaving on a horizontal loom.SHOPS AND SHOPPING IN THE EARLY THIRTEENTH CENTURY: THREE TEXTS1 Martha Carlin Markets.” in Medieval Latin: An Introduction and Bibliographical Guide. 474-84. ed. institutions. The first is a Latin manual written by John of Garland. where he became a teacher of grammar. All three texts were written in the early thirteenth century by English authors. studied at Oxford around 12101213. in Memoirs of the University of 1 . ed. D. One type of source that has not received much attention by historians of urban commerce in the thirteenth century are didactic texts. and wealthy households. see Louis John Paetow. such as the language manuals used for teaching Latin. 2004). and it survives in numerous manuscripts. trans. and was acquired by a monk of Westminster Abbey around 1250.492 MARTHA CARLIN dents and called it Dictionarius. who dated it to the fourteenth century. 6 G[eorg] Waitz. 7 For a discussion of this manuscript and its date. 88r-133r) that contains a large. 88r-90v. see the introduction to . untitled.5 The second text is a brief. d. and 2: 125-56 (glosses). see Tony Hunt. Garland’s revision of the Dictionarius around 1230 is noted by Lawler. “Handschriften in englischen Bibliotheken. a German scholar. especially 82-96 and 127-31.6 In fact. California. 1: 191-2 and n. fols. The sole translation of the Dictionarius is Barbara Blatt Rubin. see Morale scolarium. the entire volume was written in the first half of the thirteenth century. and Traugott Lawler. Garland’s work was the first to use that word. Rather. Our treatise forms part of a section of this volume (Article 5.” Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für altere Deutsche Geschichtskunde 4 (1879): 339-43. which appeared a decade before Tony Hunt’s edition of the text and its vernacular glosses. but it was not a dictionary in the modern sense. 2005]. 1 of A Library of National Antiquities (Liverpool: Joseph Mayer. John of (b. 1195.” 5 For a discussion of the editions of the Dictionarius by Hercule Géraud (1837). “Garland. The “Dictionarius” of John of Garlande and the Author’s Commentary (Lawrence. Garland revised his Dictionarius around 1230.1. which forms part of a manuscript in the British Library. in or after 1258). Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. no. 4 For a list of more than twenty manuscripts. was based on the edition published by Thomas Wright in A Volume of Vocabularies Illustrating the Condition and Manners of our Forefathers.7 According to H. available online at http://www. Thomas Wright (1857). Kansas: Coronado Press. G. Paetow. Teaching and Learning Latin. 1981). For Hunt’s own edition of the Dictionarius and its vernacular glosses. but until now the only translation of this very valuable work has been a useful but imperfect one that was privately printed and is not generally accessible.4 There is a recent scholarly edition of it. however. 1927). John of. untitled.n. and anonymous dictaminal treatise (a treatise on the art of writing letters). ed. Vol. 4. “Garland. fols. 77-153. and August Scheler (1865). it was a rambling discourse on daily life. Teaching and Learning Latin in Thirteenth Century England. vol.com/view/article/10385 [seen 30 Jan. see Hunt.oxforddnb. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press. and anonymous dictaminal and legal collection that seems to have been compiled at Oxford between 1220 and 1240. s. 3 vols. 1991). c. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rubin’s translation. 129. into which Garland crammed as much Latin vocabulary as possible. Baron [Joseph] Kervyn de Lettenhove (1850). 1: 191-203 (text). and London: Cambridge University Press.. Additional MS 8167. It was transcribed and printed in 1879 by Georg Waitz. 1857).” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press. Folios 97-98 contain notes on how to write and respond to orders and requests. 8 H. and included transcripts of three of the form letters that it contained. and thus also belong to that section of the manuscript that appears to have been compiled at Oxford between 1220 and 1240.9 Turner began his description of the text by noting airily that it came “from a manuscript which has recently fallen under my notice. 10 David Crouch and I are preparing an edition and translation of a large selection of the documents in BL. and a brief reference to a fourth. Six of the letters.10 The authors of the three texts used discussions of urban occupations. The letters are on folios 97r-98v. Turner. and orders from an earl to his officer (probably his household steward). illustrated by ten model letters between five fictitious earls and various merchants and others. I have been able to identify Turner’s mystery manuscript. 9 T. Fortunately. and transcriptions Appendix II. and I wonder if Garland or. to a member of his affinity. “An Oxford Teacher of the Fifteenth Century.” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 23 (1939): 447-50. “Original Documents. Together. illustrated by a small collection of model letters. Additional MS 8167). and it turns out to be the same volume of dictaminal and legal materials that contains our second text (British Library. perhaps. shops and shopping in Paris and England in the early thirteenth century. crafts. our text is the earliest known English dictaminal treatise. and shopping to instruct students in Latin vocabulary and the art of writing business letters.” Archaeological Journal 4 (1847): 142-4. and skinner concerning the order of goods. draper. shops. Richardson.8 There are some striking similarities between it and Garland’s Dictionarius. other than to state that it dated from the reign of Henry III. someone connected with him at Oxford was its author. H. I have provided a translation of Garland’s text. below. Additional MS 8167. G. . The English antiquary Thomas Hudson Turner published a short and sadly incomplete description of this text in 1847. including the four described by Turner. these texts provide a rich array of information on trades. My third text is a set of notes on letter-writing. fols. consist of exchanges between an earl and his vintner. The remaining four letters consist of a refusal from one unidentified man to another.” He provided no other identification of the manuscript whatsoever. 88r-133r. and to his knights.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 493 Richardson. and 72 of the text edited by Tony Hunt in Teaching and Learning Latin. from which he took his name. XIIIe siècle. and bridles. 1268. and goods for sale that were to be seen in his own neighborhood in the newly-developing Latin Quarter. breech-girdles. and brass. A peddler hawks knives. boots and leggings. however. and bridles and breast-straps for horses. leather. My first text. sword-belts. Shield-makers sell shields covered with cloth. and stirrups. “Today. Le livre des métiers d’Étienne Boileau. 1879). curry combs. razors. buckled shoes. see Étienne Boileau. organized by trade and not by topographical logic. takes us on a walking tour of Paris. René de Lespinasse and François Bonnardot.11 Garland lived on the Left Bank. Merchants dwelling on the upscale Grand-Pont (which connected the Île-de-laCité with the Right Bank) sell halters. 11 It is a rambling narrative in some 84 brief paragraphs. Histoire générale de Paris (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale. pillions.12 Garland’s text is. straps. in the clos de Garlande (near the present rue Galande). John of Garland’s Dictionarius. and leather mittens. 50-54. bits. which are arranged topically and are designed to teach the Latin vocabulary for things seen and used in everyday life. files. whetstones. and the boots worn by women and monks. sheepskin. straps. while lorimers sell silvered and gilded spurs. and scabbards. ed. 1: 191-203. since his aim is to provide his students with topical vocabulary rather than a practical guidebook to Paris. canvas. Furbishers sell polished swords. The following discussion is based on paragraphs 9-46. John’s neighbor William sells all sorts of small domestic commodities: needles and needle-cases. “one of my neighbors carried a pole of shoes for sale: laced shoes with pointed toes. 12 For the ordinances of the various craft and trade guilds of Paris c. with painted decorations. Buckle-makers sell buckles. Les Métiers et corporations de la ville de Paris. and purses made of deerskin. and much of his text consists of descriptions of the various artisans. hatters make both hats and caps of various materials.” he says. retail traders. . in Appendices I-III below. and styluses. Saddlers sell both plain and painted saddles. and elsewhere in the city. as well as saddle pads. and fire-irons.” Girdlers sell leather belts with iron or copper studs and girdles of woven silk ornamented with silver bars.494 MARTHA CARLIN and translations of the two dictaminal texts. and pigskin. 66-70. soap. mirrors. sheaths. Glovers sell unlined and fur-lined gloves. He begins by looking at some of the leather and metal trades. and arrows and bolts of ash. rpt.. That was one stitch. et professions exercés dans Paris depuis le treizième siècle (Paris. one from each side. pelisses: fur cloaks or coats.” A penula was a “panel” or “pane” of furs sewn together to make a lining. and . London Record Society. Then he laid a stiff hog-bristle against each end of it. which reproduces many of the cries of the street-cries of Paris./Si le m'aport a rafetier”). They mend mazers and cups made of maple. 1953).16 Street-sellers with baskets of light pastries. while cordwainers make new ones of tawed leather. 748-51. Bibliothèque nationale. Dictionnaire des arts.” 221. edn. 15 Cf.vv. including those of the repairers of mantles and pilches (“Il autres crie a grant friçon:/Qui a mantel ne peliçon.. and little bells made of base metals. make bows and crossbows of maple. Wine-criers cry wine at various prices and offer samples to taste. s.” 14 See Middle English Dictionary (MED). New York: Burt Franklin. 38 (2003).. and In Farmer Boy (rev. Lowly cobblers repair old shoes. Veale. New York.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 495 The bowyers. He bored another hole.v. till the bristles were waxed fast to the thread. and aspen. According to Elspeth Veale. pendants.v.. Then he pulled it and rolled it again. 219. 1268 could go into any tavern that sold wine by retail and demand to be the tavern’s 13 . the bronze bells of the bell-founders toll the hours. in churches. but in the texts discussed in this paper that distinction does not appear. with the fur outwards) and fur linings (penulas. 1968). wafers. and he waxed and he rolled .23: 292-5).13 Skinners sell new pilches (pellicia. fol. furraturas). The English Fur Trade in the Later Middle Ages. linen thread. Paris. who clearly cater to the student market for which he himself is writing. s.15 Next Garland looks at low-level traders in food and drink. s. in England in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries a penula was often larger than a furrura. Brooch-makers sell brooches. 1906.” Elspeth M. plane. “Furrure. “Pilch(e).. They sew the leather into footwear using an awl. 16 According to Étienne Boileau. the criers of wine in Paris c. 2nd edn. and a furrura or furratura was the same. métiers. viburnum. and pulled till the waxed thread sank into the leather. ran the two bristles through it. “pulled a length of linen thread across the wad of black cobbler’s wax in his left palm.: Harper and Row. pulled the thread tight. and pig bristles. etc. who dwell at the Porte St-Lazare. down the front of his leather apron. and he rolled the thread under his right palm. “He ran the two bristles through the hole.. and yew. 246. till the thread was shiny-black and stiff with wax. Les Crieries de Paris (mid thirteenth-century) by Guillaume de la Villeneuve. “Pane” and “Pellicium. printed in Alfred Franklin. Cup-menders cry that they will repair cups with bronze and silver wire. Chap. using his right hand. birch.” The cobbler then clamped the upper pieces of one boot together in a vise and punched a hole through the edges with his awl. no. 837. Laura Ingalls Wilder described the same manner of making shoes in New York state in the 1860s: The cobbler.14 while other men go about the streets of Paris crying that they will repair them. MS fonds français. Lubinus at Chartres. send their servants out into the streets to sell cherries. pears. 4. 21-4. black puddings. wax. Bread. and kerchiefs. and other ornaments. Regrators. butter cakes. Spicers stock spices. wimples. Bread. 1: 221. Hanapers decorate vessels with gold and silver fittings. Pastelers (pie-bakers) make a killing selling to clerks pasties filled with pork. where the money-changers count out Parisian money. Greedy drapers sell a range of false woolen cloths. and tarts and flans—often dirty—stuffed with soft cheeses and eggs. 96. and chervil at premium prices.. color plate 2. but they often sell meat that is raw and badly seasoned to the scholars’ servants. for a fee of 4d. and pork. chicken. of bran. carrying a pot of the wine and a cup to allow potential customers to taste a sample. 127-31. Wine. Some men usurp the office of women by selling linen goods of all kinds: table linens. spiced balls of fruit or minced meat or marrow) cry their wares at night. cress. brooches. who buy goods for re-sale. sometimes measled. The bakers bake bread made of various grains and. where Garland notes that sausages. sell them coarse cuts of beef. 5. on Sundays and Fridays. crier for that day or the following day. The crier was responsible for seeing the wine drawn and for ensuring that the measures used were correct.496 MARTHA CARLIN rissoles (fried. and large pasties were food for sturdy rustics. who hate the scholars. In their windows they display convenience foods: fine white rolls. and lethal andouilles. See Jane Welch Williams. See Williams. and on certain holidays). bezants. color plate 3. Boileau. sausages. The butchers. and medicinal preparations. mutton. apples. black puddings. Chap. and Money. and also defraud their customers by measuring the cloths incorrectly. . black-and-white plates 86. and also candles. lettuce. towels. and black-and-white plates 117.18 and the goldsmiths sit before their furnaces and tables making hanaps (goblets). Métiers. underclothing. Chap. frequently. and Money: The Windows of the Trades at Chartres Cathedral (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. or eel. and tripes. sterlings. Teaching and Learning Latin. and put feet and rims on hanaps. 120. Fast-food cooks roast poultry on hazelwood spits. which have large sulphured wicks to make them burn better. sheets. and other coins on their boards. shirts. 17 Cf. quiches. 1993). Garland’s Commentarius. He was to cry the wine and its price in the streets twice daily (once daily during Lent. soft and hard cheeses. in Hunt. A wine-crier is represented in the bottom panel of the early thirteenth-century window of St.17 The scene now shifts back to the much grander Grand-Pont. ed. haggis. wax candles for churches. plums. Wine. 18 There are a number of scenes of money-changers in the early thirteenthcentury windows of Chartres Cathedral. a seated male weaver works at a horizontal loom with treadles for raising the alternate warp threads. naked and panting. and red. reprinted in Munro. On the possible continued use of the vertical loom. 318-54. when it was decisively superseded by the horizontal broadcloth loom. 11 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Compare Garland’s description of the women weavers.” in The Dictionary of the Middle Ages. “The Eclipse of the Burel Weaver: Some Technological Developments in the Thirteenth Century. it is possible that the warp-weighted loom continued in use into the thirteenth century. Fullers. Dyers dye woolen cloths with woad and madder. They then beat up the weft. who make various things out of wood. Textiles. full shaggy woolen cloths in troughs of white clay and hot water.” Textile History 12 (1981): 59-76. The nature of the loom here is unclear. John Blair and Nigel Ramsay (London and Rio Grande. ed. turn the spool on the windlass. perhaps especially for domestic weaving by women. see John H. “Textile Technology in the Middle Ages. draw their bobbins or shuttles through the warp-threads. Women weavers (possibly working at old-fashioned. Teaching and Learning Latin. Although the horizontal loom had appeared in Europe in the eleventh century. Andrew Woodger. then dry them in the sun and pluck up the nap with teasels. and Trade: Essays in the Econo19 . Nequam’s text is edited in Hunt. blue. and the description of weaving is translated and discussed by Urban Tigner Holmes. 327-9. They scrape the hides with a knife and turn them frequently in their tanbark solution to disperse the raw stench. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. ed. 146-50. who are not described either as seated or as using treadles. pulling the weftthread from the spool and spindle. include coopers. Garland ends his tour with a look at mostly textile crafts. 1991).19 Female silkSee p. Ohio: Hambledon Press. Tanners work hard tanning horsehides and oxhides in hollowed logs. “Textiles. vol. Smiths forge horseshoes and tools for garden and farm. 1988). Based on the Observations of Alexander Neckam in London and Paris (Madison. see also Penelope Walton. Town. 515 and n54 below.. who make wheels for carts and wagons. warp-weighted. Strayer et al. especially pp. Jr. In the latter. 1: 177-89 (the passage on weaving is on pp.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 497 The carpenters. vertical looms). and resume weaving. which had been invented in Flanders in the mid thirteenth century. with the description provided in the late twelfth century by Alexander Nequam (or Neckam) in De nominibus utensilium. Pretty girls turn up their noses at them unless they pay.. who make wooden barrels and other vessels. Andrew Woodger has argued that the warp-weighted loom also survived in commercial use as the burel (broadcloth) loom until the end of the thirteenth century.” in English Medieval Industries. and wheelwrights. Joseph R. 1952). On weaving technologies and terminology. which leave their nails dyed black. in Daily Living in the Twelfth Century. 184-5). Cooks scrub pots and pans and dishes in hot water before their ovens and hearths. Nequam likens him to a rider with his feet in stirrups. Munro. The sweet wines of the eastern Mediterranean were not imported to England in quantity until the fourteenth century. 1. the Île-de-France. mead. 1: 191-7. Female wool-combers. 1994). “Some creditors. 21 Selds emerged at the end of the twelfth century in cities where property values in prime commercial streets were so high that many retail traders could not afford their own shop. 2003).” the author remarks. New York: Harper and Row. David Jenkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Germany.” in Medieval Latin. and wine flavored with mulberry juice are sold there at Christmas. “Medieval Woollens: Textiles. He should serve wine to his customers in gold cups. The Wine Trade (London: Adam and Charles Black. 217-18. perry. fols. spiced wines are expensive.” He then lists some nineteen urban occupations and proceeds to describe them in turn. 221-2. Mantello and Rigg. then shifts to a discussion of how to write letters to creditors. in old pilches and filthy veils.20 Drapers sell their wares both at fairs and in selds (covered bazaars). Additional MS 8167. Gascony. Our second text (British Library. grape juice. much enjoyed by King John and by Henry III. 800-1500. Garland concludes his tour of Paris by describing the poultry and game birds that are sold in the new street before the square of Notre-Dame. in Teaching and Learning Latin. Textile Technology and Industrial Organisation. ale. he adds. The women who wind silk thread into skeins are promiscuous sluts who sometimes clip the students’ purses. and lidded cups. perhaps they were too expensive for tavern use. they rented space in a seld and sold their goods from stalls or benches there.498 MARTHA CARLIN weavers stretch out gold threads on pegs or pins and beat up the weft. 7-9. spiced wines. At Paris. and Munro. he begins. rosé wine. “are urban. The vintner. D. and England. are not mentioned here. 1: 221) notes national preferences in drink: France prefers white wine. 20 The German Rhenish and Moselle wines. and some are rural. sit combing their wool by the fire. 1972. perry. Burgundy.21 A draper should stock a variety of cloths. Hunt. 88r90v) begins by discussing forms of address in writing a letter. c. Chap. and Auvergne. Francis. see John Munro. A. should have wine of Anjou. and mead. cider. and the various kinds of fish sold by the fishermen.” in The Cambridge History of Western Textiles. red wine. Instead. Hampshire: Variorum. both cheap and mic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries (Aldershot. From their woven silks they make the girdles and head-bands of wealthy women and the stoles of priests. On the gender shift in commercial weaving from female to male weavers (perhaps related to the introduction of the horizontal loom). cider. near the privy and the bum-wipers. The selds were typically located behind . 474-84. ed. ed. After this raunchy warning. 1973). Garland’s Commentarius (ed. 15. “Textiles. mazers. vinegar. Architecture and Archaeology in London. Early Charters of the Cathedral Church of St. 83-4. ed.. and Derek Keene. R. follows Eleanora Carus-Wilson in dating this text to the mid thirteenth century. 273. Bodleian Library. at Whitsun and Christmas. For some early references to London selds. 600-1540.. M. 381. Volume 1. London. 211-38. 195-6. According to the Oxford English Dictionary . 1990). 22 Scarlets. fols.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 499 expensive. 243. including English broadcloths. A list in Anglo-Norman of more than a hundred English towns and their attributes identifies Lincoln with scarlet. 23 Imperial was an imported silk. burnets. n. Vol.. Carus-Wilson. c. Patricia Dennison.” 881-4. Textile Technology and Industrial Organisation. 302-5. M. 33-4). 32-50 (see especially pp. 3. 1214.” Economic History Review 14 (1944). Palliser. ed. 1189-1327 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1975). “The Shop Within?: An Analysis of the Architectural Evidence for Medieval Shops. 256. Cartulary of St. 1066-c.. Camden Society. Gibbs.” Textile History 22 (1991). 6.” in The Cambridge Urban History of Britain. Stamford with haberget. and enabled traders to enjoy a prime location at an affordable rent.” in Medieval Art. printed by C. Camden Society. Rothwell. Palliser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lindy Grant (British Archaeological Association Conference Transactions for the Year 1984. His range of goods should also include scarlets. Scarlet was the very finest and most costly woolen. no. D. Russets were among the cheaper woolens. and russets were well-known types of woolen cloth in the thirteenth century. 800-1500. see W. The Bodleian catalogue of Douce manuscripts dates Douce 98 to c. “Medieval Woollens: Textiles. 2000). David M. 38-43. “Shops and Shopping in Medieval London.” Architectural History 43 (2000). English Historical Documents. Clark. 25 (1988). ed. 3rd ser. ed. nos. lighter cloths for making robes for the betterdressed.” 212-5. Westminster Abbey Charters. 1320-30. 336. 282. Edmunds to buy ready-made clothing that included a “complete robe of black burnetta furred with squirrel. available in a range of colors. MS Douce 98. Beverley with burnet. 224-5. Hassall. burnets.. and Colchester with russet. “Clothing Provision and the Great Wardrobe in the Mid-Thirteenth Century. and translated in Harry Rothwell. Paul.” In 1244 four “burnettos bene tinctos” and four black burnetas were listed among the expensive cloths and furs ordered for the king and queen to wear. “The English Cloth Industry in the Late Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries. London Record Society.” English Historical Review 16 (63) (1901): 501-3. Bonnier in “List of English Towns in the Fourteenth Century. 71 (1949). and finer. burels24 made in London or the street frontages in upscale commercial streets. Medieval Merchant Venturers: Collected Studies (London: Methuen. In 1231 Henry III’s tailor was sent to the fair of Bury St. however. 3rd ser. 248. Blyth with blanket. see D. and E. Slater. T. O. “Some Thirteenth-Century English Places and Their Associations. ed. heavy cloths for making hoods. 327. respectively. M.” in The Cambridge Urban History of Britain. Mary Clerkenwell. For a discussion of selds in other English towns. Emma Mason et al. See Derek Keene. Carus-Wilson. 184-5. Kay Staniland. nos. 1: 201. 58 (1939). russets.22 imperials.23 and habergets. See Munro.. eds. See E. “The Topography of Towns 600-1300. 1954). “London from the Post-Roman Period to 1300. reprinted in Eleanora M. Burnet evidently was a very fine-quality woolen cloth. and Rothwell. both (OED). Cordium came in white and black. s. while cordicium was striped.” but it seems to have been a type of muslin.” 243.25 and grisetum (evidently a gray woolen cloth) from Totnes and Cornwall. s. or string. There was a cloth called “card. 24 Eleanora Carus-Wilson tentatively identified haberget as a woolen cloth with a distinctive diamond-patterned twill weave. “Haberget: A Medieval Textile Conundrum. 297-9.(3). “List of English Towns. during the period 1325-1462 the Great Wardrobe purchased imperials only between the years 1379-1381 and 1422-1425. However. and New York: St.” and I have been unable to find any reference to cloths with a corded or ribbed weave. Martin’s Press. although lampas silks. The mid thirteenth-century list of English towns and their attributes (Bodleian Library. In 1483. evidently had declined in popularity by then. and evidently ranged in quality from very fine to very coarse because it was worn by both rich and poor. W. ed. ed. 112. Lisa Monnas.” 59-76). 3.” B.” in Ancient and Medieval Textiles: Studies in Honour of Donald King.v. woven on a warp-weighted loom. 1983). See Bonnier. 420.” 501-3. cordium and cordicium. line. Burel was a cheap woolen cloth. See Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources.v. See Carus-Wilson. the MED defines “corde” simply as “a rope. “Carde. Anne F.” MED. Sutton and P. “English Cloth Industry in the Late Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries. Lucca was producing a heavy cloth of gold called imperial by 1376. 25 I have been unable to identify cordium and cordicium. four pieces of “imperiall with Lukes golde” were bought for the coronation of Richard III. Eleanora Carus-Wilson. “Carda. 3. including imperial.. and resembling the texture of a chain-mail hauberk. See also Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. ed. Vol. s. In England. named Imperial. s.500 MARTHA CARLIN Beauvais. Andrew Woodger identified burel as a broadcloth woven on a warp-weighted loom (“The Eclipse of the Burel-Weaver. cord.” 33-4.” It evidently was so called because it was originally made in Constantinople.v. 1189-1327. and Florence was still producing it in 1458. A silk called imperial was listed in an inventory of St. English Historical Documents.v.” Medieval Archaeology 13 (1969): 148-66 and Plates XV-XXV. MS Douce 98. “Imperial. Publications of the Pasold Research Fund (Leeds: W. often purchased by the king for almsgiving or for servants’ clothing. “Clothing Provision and the Great Wardrobe in the Mid-Thirteenth Century. Next come sellers of foodstuffs. Lisa Monnas and Hero Granger-Taylor. The Coronation of Richard III: The Extant Documents. Paul’s Cathedral in London in 1245.” OED. Our author lists more than two dozen types of fresh sea fish and freshwater fish that fishermen and fishmongers should sell. a sort of precious silk.v. 881-4. 195-6) mentions “Corde de Warwik” (line 55) and “Corde de Bredeport” (line 90) as the signature products of Warwick and Bridport. fols. Haberget was popular between the mid twelfth and mid thirteenth centuries. Hammond (Gloucester: Alan Sutton. 285. . 1325-1462. s. S. “Carde” n. 290. 1990). “Silk Cloths Purchased for the Great Wardrobe of the Kings of England. unshorn and shorn (grossum vel minuetum). citing Daniel Rock’s Textile Fabrics (1876): “At the end of the twelfth century there was brought to England from Greece. Staniland. Maney & Son. Butchers sell carcases and joints. “Imperialis” (5). “The Diffusion of Knitting in Medieval Europe. and seamless knitted gloves. N. work in cowhides. some of the girdles are plain. while flan-makers sell flans made of eggs. crowns. and shears. from which they make a wide range of fine footwear. and sables. G. goat. 2 (London: Heinemann Educational Books. Six of the letters represent exchanges between a fictitious earl and his vintner. for a total of £5. Lastly. B. or game.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 501 salted and fresh.26 Cordwainers work in tawed leather made of goatskin or sheepskin. at a price of 20s per tun. and jewelry. Their equipment includes not only an oven. draper. or leather. Pastelers sell pasties. M. He wishes to Knitted liturgical gloves were used in Europe from the sixth or seventh century. and cheese. Carus-Wilson. and some are decorated with round or square studs. bolting cloth. which was a mechanical device for kneading large quantities of dough. to those of dormice. scissors. This treatise then ends abruptly with a description of the wares of the lorimers. well-spiced and filled with meat. Poulterers sell all kinds of wild birds as well as domestic ones. Cutlers make various kinds of knives. Our third text consists of instructions for writing and responding to orders and requests. Both the hosier and the cobbler. Pasold Studies in Textile History. tableware. dogs. and also offal. lard. squirrels. and waferers sell wafers and little cakes cooked in irons or ovens. Ponting.” in Cloth and Clothing in Medieval Europe: Essays in Memory of Professor E. linen. from those of cats. for The Pasold Research Fund. tallow. 26 . A goldsmith’s stock should include altar plate. however. and mutton. Skinners sell leather garments and fur linings and trimmings made of a wide range of skins and furs. poultry. thin gloves for those who do no manual work. especially 375-82. illustrated by ten model letters. Saddlers sell both saddles and shields in various styles. They sell horse tack and spurs. bread. ed. cowhides and sheepskins. and molding-board. fish. our author looks at the metal and leather crafts. Cobblers make both leggings and shoes. the earl writes to his vintner to order two tuns of Gascon wine and three of wine of Anjou. but also a dough-brake. candelabra. razors. Glovers offer a variety of lined and unlined gloves. In the first of these (Letter 2). Bakers offer a variety of fine and coarse breads. Girdlers sell belts of silk. and skinner. See Irena Turnau. sieve. 1983). crosses. and sheep. in a variety of styles. Harte and K. 368-89. lined gloves for falconers. pork. including heavy work gloves. but hosiers make leggings only and not shoes. of beef. large. as is your custom. He concludes. which is in arrears. The earl hopes that he may have the cloth on these terms without a pledge.” The skinner responds with a very polite letter (Letter 8). The author then suggests a gracious reply for the vintner to send. The earl then writes a rather obsequious letter to his skinner (Letter 6). reminding the vintner of his excellent credit history and promising to pay in full on Palm Sunday. The earl addresses this letter to “his beloved skinner H. on the said day. He acknowledges this time that his merits are somewhat equivocal. He implores the skinner to accommodate him with twenty linings of gris and the same of vair (costly squirrel skins) and of fine-quality lambskins. if the customer’s account is in arrears. beseeching you anxiously that you will pay me in full your old debt. to whom he owes money. promising to pay him on the appointed day. If the skinner does not have these in stock. but if a pledge is required. as in his previous letter. with variant endings (Letters 3-4). you will pay your debt to me in full. by trusting that the draper will act in such a way as to deserve his friendship. depending on whether or not the customer has a good credit record. the earl writes to his woolen-draper in London (Letter 5) to order sixty ells of scarlet cloth.” Next. “I shall accommodate you with the five tuns of wine that you requested. He concludes . at the best possible price. and the fact that he has always paid his bills. he cannot accommodate the earl.” and sends “greetings and the fullest of love. unfortunately. by hoping that the vintner will behave in such a manner as to deserve his gratitude. He ends. on credit.” However.” saying that. again on credit. he has sent ten gold rings and ten silver cups. the tradesman is advised to end his letter instead by saying.502 MARTHA CARLIN buy these wines on credit. when he will pay in full. but hopes that the draper will accommodate him and give him the cloth. somewhat haughtily. addressed to his “beloved friend. until the Sunday after Easter. The skinner explains that his own stock has been destroyed in a fire. and concludes: “I agree to your present request and shall accommodate you with the five tuns that you have sought. equally with this new debt. trusting you that on the day named. the earl asks him to obtain them elsewhere.. and no one will lend him the money to make new purchases since he no longer has any collateral. saying that he needs furs for Easter but does not have the money to pay for them. the vintner recites the earl’s request. In the former case. The writer’s tone this time is quite cutting. and street-furniture used by vendors. cordwainers made shoes of tawed leather. and he angrily reminds the petitioner that one ill turn deserves another: “you disdained to come to my aid. In Paris. 7. not tanned hide. In the leather trades. debt and credit. you will have to be found [to be] a friend. transaction costs. hosiers made leather leggings but not shoes.” The final business letter in this collection is another letter of refusal (Letter 9). And so. These include valuable descriptions of manufacturing techniques and working conditions. since you know the cause of the impediment. and make it clear that by the early 1200s many were already highly specialized. tools. and lorimers made bridles but not belts. but their greatest value is in the considerable information that they provide on many complementary subjects. for example. and cup-menders all occupied separate economic niches within the metal trades. The three texts discussed here touch on some of these topics. and the range of occupations in our texts 27 These letters. as well as Letters 1. and other equipment used in the various crafts. In a period for which commercial inventories are virtually non-existent. Urban trades and crafts were a new topic for writers and artists in the thirteenth century. and 11. stalls. brooch-makers. if you want to have a friend. bakers baked bread but not wafers. of the shops. of the raw materials. of credit practices. and sold by urban artisans and retail traders. this time written by an unidentified man to another man of similar status. Farewell. after having previously refused a similar request by the writer of the present letter. In the food and drink trades. The petitioner has evidently asked for some kind of favor or financial assistance. and the demography and topography of urban trade. . the goldsmiths. hanapers. 10. and a variety of fast foods were offered by a similar variety of specialist cooks. mended. our first two texts provide detailed descriptions of the range of goods made. and commercial hazards. will be discussed at length by Martha Carlin and David Crouch in their forthcoming volume on this manuscript.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 503 by begging “that you do not take it amiss that I have not sent you what you requested. henceforward. wages and prices. vintners sold wine but not ale.”27 The archival records of urban commerce traditionally consulted by economic historians provide crucial quantitative information on such topics as the production and distribution of goods. . . . Rosenthal (London and Rio Grande. (The hot pies and flans described here were among the principal fast-foods of medieval towns. ed. 30 See Martha Carlin. they also speak knowingly of down-market vendors and second-hand goods. Martha Carlin and Joel T. and of the exorbitant cost and dubious quality of unhealthy but irresistible convenience foods. written by and for those who lived on a student’s meager stipend or a scholar’s inadequate pay. and others like them. can clearly add much to our understanding of shops and shopping in the thirteenth century. While they might linger lovingly over the gold and silver plate of the goldsmiths. . which often lacked the means to make a hot meal. Together. 1998). “Fast Food and Urban Living Standards in Medieval England. and even for writing an angry rejection letter.” in Food and Eating in Medieval Europe. not plenty. The presence of fast-food cooks in towns is thus a gauge of urban poverty. Ohio: Hambledon Press.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 507 we get a somewhat more jaundiced view. of retailers who cheat their customers with false measures or adulterated products. in Latin. 27-51. and it lays out standard procedures for buying and selling by correspondence.)30 Our third text also reminds us that even aristocratic shoppers needed to ask for credit. these three texts. Such foods were avoided by the wealthy but were a staple of poor urban households. the elegant woolens of the drapers or the fine furs of the skinners. 1857). Thomas Wright (described above). Collection de documents inédits sur l’histoire de France (Paris: Imprimerie de Crapelet.. Latham et al.. A number of the readings given below are very tentative. and 72 of the text edited by Tony Hunt in Teaching and Learning Latin. 121-38. . R. S.508 MARTHA CARLIN APPENDICES A Note on the Translations in Appendices I-III In translating these texts I have drawn heavily on the texts and glosses in Tony Hunt’s Teaching and Learning Latin in Thirteenth-Century England. which she based on Thomas Wright’s edition in A Volume of Vocabularies . Appendice II. E. and various other medieval word-lists (cited in the notes). Alexandre Neckam et Adam du Petit Pont. for the British Academy. vol. reprint 1973). 1 ([Liverpool]: privately printed. A. publiés avec les gloses françaises (Leipzig: F. I would be grateful to receive any corrections or suggestions for amending them. 50-4. from the Tenth Century to the Fifteenth. 1: 191-203. ed. In addition to dictionaries of Classical Latin I have also used the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. the online versions of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) and the Middle English Dictionary (MED). (London: Oxford University Press. ed. 1867). 1837). in Joseph Mayer (ed. and to David Crouch for assistance with the vocabulary of heraldry and aristocratic correspondence. (Cambridge: D. APPENDIX I Translation of the Description of Shops and Shopping in Paris in John of Garland’s Dictionarius The following translation is based on paragraphs 9-46. 1-83. For John of Garland’s Dictionarius I have also consulted the only previous translation: Barbara Blatt Rubin’s The Dictionarius of John de Garlande and the Author’s Commentary (Lawrence. Kansas: Coronado Press. To facilitate comparison with Hunt’s edition I have included his paragraph numbers below. Lexicographie latine du XIIe et du XIIIe siècle. and August Scheler. Any errors that remain are mine alone.) I have also checked the editions of the Dictionarius in Hercule Géraud. Brockhaus. 3 vols. 66-70. for the British Academy.). 1981). in progress). 1965. “Dictionnaire de Jean de Garlande. to Richard Hoffman for kindly supplying me with information on fish terminology. I owe deep thanks to Richard Monti and Susan Reynolds for general assistance with the Latin. R. A Library of National Antiquities. Latham’s Revised Medieval Latin Word-List from British and Irish Sources (London: Oxford University Press. 1975-. 1991).. E.” 580-612. Brewer. Paris sous Philippe-le -Bel. Trois traités de Jean de Garlande. s.] 9. c. s.v. Daily Living in the Twelfth Century. has in the market before him the following goods for sale: needles and needle-cases. 10. by their files. below. and fire-irons. which presumably is why Garland calls them “resonant. black. “Pyr. “Barre” (6). Holmes. 176v) translates membratas here as ystodyd. For a fourteenth-century silk girdle ornamented with metal bars and excavated in London. 3: 37. Buckle-makers are enriched by their buckles. Shield-makers benefit the citizens of all France (or.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 509 1-8. leather. barrés as a gloss for membratas. pillions (pulvillos).v. Teaching and Learning Latin. straps. and bits. mirrors. MED.” and MED. their resonant poitrels (pectoralia resonancia). s. 13. see Geoff Egan and Frances Pritchard. and the boots (crepitas) worn by women and monks.” 33 Piricudia vel fusillos: fusillos could also mean spindles. and pack-saddles (trusulas). Medieval Finds from Excavations in London. 15.33 Lorimers are highly esteemed by noble knights for their silvered and gilded spurs. England). See Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. razors. See Latham.32 canvas (carentivillas). s. in some MSS. and girdles of woven silk. and also saddle pads (panellos). and brass. “Membrare” (2).v. wellstudded (bene membratas) with iron and copper. and barré as a gloss for stipata (Hunt. s. “Poitrel. and stirrups (strepas). cf. “Fir” 4(c). A fifteenth-century copy of Garland’s Dictionarius with English interlinear glosses (British Library. 14. Today one of our neighbors carried a pole of shoes for sale: laced shoes with pointed toes and buckled shoes. our neighbor. fig. fol. and red [leather] belts. MS Harley 1002.v. and stipata as ybarryd (ornamented with metal strips). 1991).31 Saddlers sell saddles. 3: Dress Accessories. Garland abruptly shifts to a description of the goods for sale in Paris. and their bridles (loralia). painted with lions and with fleurs de lis (leonibus et foliis liliorum depicta). well-barred (bene stipata) with silver. and MED. 1150-c. boots (tibialia). 30. but here it seems to be used as a synonym for pyricudia (fire-irons). Revised Medieval Latin Word-List. MED.v. soap. 32 Cf. “Piln. both bare and painted. 34 The poitrels (or peytrels) here were breast-straps for horses.” They were often hung with jingling bells or pendants. 202). and leggings (cruralia). 1450 (London: HMSO. s. 48. William. whetstones. 12. 20-1. 11. they sell to knights shields covered with cloth. Hunt’s index of glosses includes barre as a gloss for clavis. since there were as yet no breastplates. 31 .34 and their well-made bridles. 101.v.” See the description of the lorimers in Appendix II. 156. Cf. [After a preliminary discussion of parts of the body. Girdlers have before them white. They benefit the city of Paris by saving lasts for shoes and boots36 and spatulas (shoehorns or foot-measures?). MARTHA CARLIN Today I saw a peddler who had before him table knives and small knives (cultellos ad mensam. either “shoehorns” or “foot-measures” would perhaps best fit the context. Cordwainers are those who make footwear of tawed leather. the soles. straps. rabbit fur. There are lowly cobblers who stitch together old shoes. 24. The brooch-makers have before them large and small brooches (firmacula) made of lead and tin. At the Porte St-Lazare dwell the bowyers. and pigskin. and caps of cotton (pillea de bombace). There are subtle artificers who make bells of sonorous bronze by which. nuches. 18. mixing.510 16. They also have beautiful pendants (monilia)35 and little ringing bells.” cf. and little caps of wool and fur (pilleola de lana et pilis). gloves lined with lambskin. see MED. Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. 23. or applying compounds or cleaning wounds). “Lest(e). which has been dyed black. sheaths great and small. but both Garland’s glosses and modern dictionaries of Latin or Middle English translate spatula simply as “slice” (a spatula. 36 For formipedia (lasts) and equitibialia (lasts for boots). renewing the patches. 19. and fox fur.37 They cut the leather. s. styluses.v. 20. Furbishers of swords pile up pence by selling well-polished swords that have gleaming pommels and hilts and new scabbards. Glovers bilk the scholars of Paris by selling them unlined gloves. and mittens made of leather. 21.” 37 The meaning of spatulas is unclear. with a cobbler’s knife. and sew the footwear with an awl and linen thread and a pig bristle. “Formipedia. but Hunt’s glosses translate it as fermals. iron and copper. a flat-bladed utensil used for stirring. in churches. 35 . and the uppers. and purses made of deerskin. and grafting knives. s. and bolts and arrows of ash. anglice broche.v. the welts. 22. and yew. In Classical Latin. who make crossbows and bows of maple. sheepskin. 25. Merchants dwelling on the Grand-Pont sell halters. Hatters make hats of felt and peacock feathers. The MED also gives a secondary meaning as a surgical tool for cutting or lancing. viburnum. mensaculas et artavos). monilia in this context would normally have meant necklaces or collars. the hours of the day are announced by the movement of the clappers and of the pulled ropes. 17. breech-girdles (drawstring belts for men’s drawers). maple and aspen. see Veale.vv. here is glossed with variants of rossole or russole. selling them from baskets covered 28. Vair was the whole skin of the red squirrel in wintertime. some of fox skins. 40 Vinum attaminatum.153. and gris was the gray winter back alone. especially from Scandinavia and Russia. which were the choicest squirrel skins. modern French entamer. s. furraturas). and in another as rewers. and of otters and weasels. Curye On Inglysch: English Culinary Manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century (Including The Forme of Cury). Cisinum meant both vair and gris. 212.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 511 26.” fried balls of minced fruit. Veale. “hem”). See MED. which commonly means meat pies or pasties. while Hunt’s version reads et eorum partem furando.v. Constance B. wine that was broached40 in the taverns. 30. Hieatt and Sharon Butler. s. sixpence.. or marrow)41 at night. “Revers. and trimmings (urlas) of sable and dormouse (laerone). partly by stealing (furando). Skinners sell delightful pelts of coneys and [?eastern] squirrels (cyrogrillorum). The text used by Wright and Rubin gives this final clause as partim furando. “Attaminare. They mend mazers and cups of plane and birch. Glosses for urlas occur in one MS.” 38 . 29. English Fur Trade. 218-29. some made of lambskin. Hunt. Revised Medieval Word-List. Wine-criers cry. of the Dictionarius as hourles (cf. They came from the coldest parts of Northern and Central Europe.” and MED. For reading it instead as “filtered. “Tamisium” (sieve). s. “Attamen” 2. “Ruscheues. with gaping throat.v. But they sell more dearly vair and gris (cisinum). “to hem. “Brochen” 3(a). 41 Artocreas.v. but also from Poland and Bulgaria. sugar.” see Latham. eds. Early English Text Society. which are smaller than [?eastern] squirrels. Street-sellers of light pastries (nebularum) and wafers cry out their light pastries and wafers and rissoles (artocreas: fried balls of spiced fruit. 2: 130. On the terminology of the medieval fur trade. cf. s. English Fur Trade. at fourpence. s. when it had a gray back and white belly. and spices. ed. probably in the modern sense of “revers” (the turned-back edge of a garment. modern French ourler. cf. “Risheu. according to Isidore [of Seville]. There are some criers of pilches to mend who go about the streets of Paris.v. Teaching and Learning Latin. displaying the reversed edge). Skinners grow rich by their pilches (pellicia) and skins sewn together to make fur linings (penulas. Cf. “Attamino” (2): to bolt (flour). or of minced meat or marrow mixed with egg and spices. minced meat. eightpence. 8 (1985). cf. carrying wine poured from a gallon jug into a hanap for sampling. s.” 39 Garland’s play on words here is meant to remind his students not to confuse furs with furtiveness.38 27.39 Menders of cups cry that they will repair cups with bronze and silver wire. 221. and twelvepence. some of the skins of hares. such as a lapel.” and ourlet.. and they repair the fur linings (furraturas) of surcotes and mantles.v. SS. some of catskin. See Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. and of [?western] squirrels (esperiolorum). e. sausages. cress. and the baskets are often hung at the windows of clerks as gaming forfeits. sometimes measled. is glossed here as flamiches. and tripes that they assemble (conveniunt) for the poor rabble. and eels. s. 36. quiches.43 Pastelers make a huge profit by selling to clerks pasties of pork. but often they sell raw meat. and other gleaming coins on their boards on the Grand-Pont. maslin (a mixture of wheat and rye). and pork. Fouaces were cakes made of butter and eggs.v. Simnels.. hoping to make a big profit while evading the crime of usury. Regrators send out their male and female servants into the streets to deceive the clerks. and butter cakes42 lie in the windows of the regrators. But these slaughterers are slain (mactantur) by the angry scholars because of the filthy andouilles. frequently. See MED. oats. bezants. healthful. black puddings. métiers. and. The Middle English adjective therf or tharf meant unleavened. 396. The bakers have male and female servants who sift the coarse flour with a fine sieve and mix the yeast into the dough to make the bread rise in the trough. The butchers in their shambles hate them (i. with a single or double crust. white and black plums. 31. Sometimes they also scrape out the bins with a dough-scraper. along with soft and hard cheeses. mutton. Dictionnaire des arts. 32.v. a flamiche is a quiche or tart. . For dough-scraper (literally. A simnel was a fine white bread or roll. pigeons. selling them coarse flesh of beef. to the foolish servants of the scholars.e. Cooks (i. 34. chicken. Ignacie is glossed as fouaches. sterlings. and sulphured candles. In modern French cookery. and lettuce. which they bake in an oven that has been wiped clean with a cloth. to whom they sell—very dearly—cherries. which the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources defines as flawns or custard tarts. who sell take-away food) turn and roast geese. badly seasoned with sauces and garlic. “Therf. according to Alfred Franklin. brandishing their cleavers and great knives at the scholars. They sell bread made of wheat. 42 Placente is glossed as symeneus.512 MARTHA CARLIN with a white towel. unripe apples and pears. dough-rib). and chervil. evidently boiled like a bagel before being baked. 1968). The money-changers count out money of Paris. seasoned with pepper. “Rib(be)” n. Flamic[i]e. The bakers of Paris knead dough and form loaves. and putting out for sale tarts and flans stuffed with soft cheeses and eggs. which have large wicks to make them burn better. reprint New York: Burt Franklin. but often dirty. et professions exercés dans Paris depuis le treizième siècle (Paris. the scholars). rye. see MED. anglice þerife kakez. 35. 33.. barley.” 43 Archas etiam radunt aliquando cum costa pastali.(3). of bran. fast-food cooks. and capons on hazelwood spits. s. 1906. the high value of burnets and scarlets. 3: 25) includes glosses for camelinos as camelin and camelot (camlet). often of mixed silk and wool. Although they coin pennies.” 183. “Medieval Woollens: The Western European Woollen Industries and Their Struggles for International Markets.” 341. and emerald gemstones for rings. greens. XXXVI). more salable. 44 .SHOPS AND SHOPPING 513 37. 145) translate burneticos simply as burnet and scarleticos as escarlez or scarlet. suggests that these “burnet-ish” and “scarlet-ish” cloths were ersatz. 37) in reading “sui” in place of “sed. coupled with Garland’s emphasis on the drapers’ dishonesty. camelins and blues and imitation burnets. c. Jenkins. 1000-1500. virides. nimia cupiditate ducti. see Munro. 46 “Pannarii.” Sutton and Hammond. radiatos et stanford[i]os. brooches. See MED. cap.44 but are sent to the Exchange to be exchanged by the money-changers (a cambitoribus vel a campsoribus) hoping to make a profit. striped cloths.v. more durable. ungreased worsted warp and a greased woolen weft). and Munro. scarleticos. sell false white and black woolen cloths. 229-30. 40. Drapers. and stamforts (or stanforts). fallaces vendunt pannos albos et nigros. and buttons. more precious. and Scheler (p.” in Cambridge History of Western Textiles. On striped cloths.” According to the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources it could also be cloth made of (or imitatng) camel’s hair. the pennies are not theirs. 39. 41. 128). The artificers who are called hanapers decorate vessels with gold and silver fittings and put feet on hanaps and crown them with rims to make them stronger.” Hunt (Teaching and Learning Latin. Here. The goldsmiths sit before their furnaces and tables on the Grand-Pont. light cloths with a strong. in the late fifteenth century it was a “fine fabric. see Walton.” 45 anchas. 38. ed. Textile Technology and Industrial Organisation. pendants (monilia). camelinos. The skill (industria) of the goldsmiths pounds gold and silver leaf on an iron anvil with delicate little hammers. Camlet evidently was a similar cloth. and make hanaps of gold and silver. s. instead of Hunt’s “Licet denarios monetant. Coronation of Richard III. 594. The moneyers who mint money appear to be rich and yet are not. driven by greed. “Camelin. pins. Camelin was a woolen fabric mixed with silk or other fibers. “Medieval Woollens: Textiles. On stamforts or stanforts (coarse. The glosses in Hunt’s edition (3: 22. “Textiles. I follow Géraud (p. However. et blodios et burneticos. and they select jasper. and encloses precious gems within the cavities45 of the rings that are worn by barons and gentlewomen. Wright (p. 419. 27. imitation scarlets. sapphire. glossed as fosses and fosces. 37). sed non sunt denarii” (cap.46 They defraud buyers by measuring the cloths badly with a short ell and a false thumb (or inch: police fallaci). cap. . pans (patellas) and frying-pans (sartagines). Dyers of woolen cloths dye cloths with woad and red madder (cum gaudone. turns the spool on the windlass (involvit spolam in troclea). 54.” 54 This phrase is puzzling. “Bolle” n. giving examples from his own dwelling.v. the proper books and vestments of a priest.” “Warance. and the online Anglo-Norman 50 . or a built-in cauldron for boiling. mortars (mortaria). which is drawn from a spool and spindle (que trahitur a spola et pano). pots (ollas). See Hunt. 53. of which some are black. cooks cleanse cauldrons (cacabos) and jugs (urceos). dishes (scutellas).(3). MED. In hot water. while they stand before their ovens and fireplaces and furnaces. not forgetting scythes for the meadow grasses and sickles for grains.53 52. On an anvil. 3: Indexes.54 Sandix is glossed variously as both woad and madder. “Furnais(e). Cf. 219). A troclea was a winch or windlass: see Hunt.(2). and the tools used by women. Garland’s Commentarius. s. Women weavers (textrices) lead their bobbin-sticks or shuttles (ducunt pectines: “combs”) through the warp-threads with the weft-thread (per stamina cum trama). Revised Medieval Latin Word-List. 55-65. 170. s. [Garland next discusses home furnishings and clothing. and this confusion seems to have been common. s. unless they are accepted for the sake of cash. a fornax can be an oven. ewers (ydrias). He then continues.” “Sandix. “Sandix. [and] meat-hooks (creagra).SHOPS AND SHOPPING 515 51. where scapha or gate is described as a wooden bowl in which feet are washed (in Hunt. platters (rotundalia).” In Classical Latin. Latham. rubea maiore et sandice). with hammers and tongs and the puffing of bellows.v. Teaching and Learning Latin.” “Weld(e). and MED. a stove (for barbecue-style countertop cooking). spoons (coclearia).vv. s. smiths make coulters and plowshares. basins (pelves). 1: Texts. 3: 142-3.” and “Wod(e). and they scrape the hides with a knife called a scraper. They turn the hides frequently in their tanbark solution so that the raw stench of the hides will dissipate. 51 See MED. some red. the iron edge for a spade or shovel.50 on account of which they have dyed nails. horseshoes.52 gridirons (craticulas). Teaching and Learning Latin. some blue.vv. or mattocks or hoes. church vessels. Teaching and Learning Latin. the duties of a stableboy.v. and so they are spurned by pretty women. s. cf. The woman weaver then beats up the weftthread with her slay or weaver’s sword (Ipsa vero textrix percutit tramam cum lama). Tanners work hard tanning horsehides and oxhides in hollow treetrunks. “Gate” n. graters (micatoria). with a lewd final comment about the latter. sandix meant vermilion or a color like it.] 66. 53 Fornaces: in a culinary context.” 52 Glossed as gates.51 saucers (acetabula). bowls (scaphas).” and MED. “Plater. “Mader(e). . Kenelm the Martyr (17 July).] APPENDIX II Transcription and translation of British Library. trees. also. any small fish of the genus Merlangus. Waitz mistakenly identified this treatise as having been written in a fourteenth-century hand. MS 8167. and some kind of fish would indeed make better sense here than lobsters. ships. I have silently modernized the punctuation. evidently was written in the first half of the thirteenth century. instruments of martyrdom.. and the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources as seal or possibly dogfish. but have used italics to show expanded abbreviations. the entire volume. such as the grayling (Thymallus thymallus). 2r (a front fly-leaf) records that it was acquired for Westminster Abbey by William de Hasele. and esperling (one MS. the pilchard (Sardinia pilchardus). and national events of 1258. together with Crokele’s death at Winchester in 1258 on the feast of St. I have re-checked the manuscript and made a number of corrections to Waitz’s transcript. LXX) and Wright (p." Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für altere Deutsche Geschichtskunde 4 (1879): 339-43. The MED identifies sperling(e) as a “fish of the family Clupeidae.60 73-84. comm. also gives “gamerus gallice vocatur tenche”). also.) that here it may instead mean porpoise. and the Last Judgment. 59 . or of the family Salmonidae. since the gamaros are listed with other fish caught with hooks and nets. the sprat (Clupea sprattus). 88r-90v. cap. In fact. who died as sub-prior of Westminster before May 1283. in the sixteenth century.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 517 fish: gamaros)59 with hooks and nets.. or perh. prostitutes and dancing-girls tormented by serpents (as punishment for their sins). A note on fol. the European smelt (Osmerus eperlanus). which was the meaning used by Albertus Magnus in De animalibus and. house-construction. . but Richard Hoffman has suggested (pers. had probably obtained the volume before 1250. which begin this clause with “et” instead of “quia. since additional notes on fol. garden plants. This transcription is based on that printed by G[eorg] Waitz in "Handschriften in englischen Bibliotheken. Paradise. Hasele. use of “u” and “v. by Conrad von Gessner in Historia animalium. such as the whiting (Merlangus merlangus). cap. None glosses gamaros as lobsters (cf. 72). fols. Classical Latin cammarus). espinocles. esp.” and capitalization.” 60 In the editions of Hunt and Scheler (p. the last clause reads: “quia canes marini ab equore devehuntur. and porpoises (?or sharks: canes marini) are taken from the sea. musicians and their instruments. 35. 135). 2r record a dispute during the abbacy of Richard de Crokele (or Crokesle) in 1250. 608. Additional. Article 5 in the Gamaros: the glosses here read espinoches. which contains a collection of dictaminal and legal materials.” Here I am following the editions of Géraud (p.” The Oxford Latin Dictionary defines canis marinus as shark or dogfish (a small inshore shark). [Garland concludes with discussions of domestic and wild beasts. abbates. and the latter’s acquisition by Hasele and presentation to Westminster Abbey. in literis petitoriis solet ille cui scribitur preponi per dativum casum. vicarii. priores. sive ministri sive ministrelli. “An Oxford Teacher. quedam inferiores. De literis vero creditoriis [corrected in MS from creditores] primo dicere proponemus. Superiores sunt vero dominus papa. inferior postponi per dativum casum. quedam 61 For the dating of the treatise and of Additional MS 8167. constabularii. rustici. summonitores. a mortgage on fol. see Richardson. vicecomites. Richardson and G. Transcription [fol. ut miles militi. 28 October 1216). uterlibet potest preponi alii. barones. see H. in the manuscript the year is given as 30 years from the birth (a carnacione) of Henry III (1 October 1207). set causa benivolencie captande. G. sutores et omnes officiarii. and the Corpus Christi College manuscript (hereafter CCC 297) does not appear to derive directly from the manuscript in Gonville and Caius College (hereafter G & C 205/111). superior debet preponi per nominativum casum.61 For further discussion of this volume and its contents. miles. and H. “An Oxford Teacher of the Fifteenth Century. n. quedam seculares. archiepiscopi. Richardson noted two later versions of both this treatise and of our third text in two Cambridge manuscripts: Gonville and Caius College.2). and Corpus Christi College. parsone. fols. forestarii. et tam harum quam illarum quedam sunt sumperiores [sic]. and this treatise is the earliest known English dictaminal treatise.518 MARTHA CARLIN volume (fols.” 448. tam urbani quam rurales. Si inferior persona scribat superiori. I have checked both manuscripts. Infime sunt presbiteri parochiani. viredarii. In omni peticione facta superiori vel pari debet petitus pluraliter designari. dated 30 years after Henry III’s coronation. duces. 88r] Personarum quedam sunt ecclesiastice. According to the British Library’s online catalogue. Si autem par scribat pari. Inferiores sunt vero archidiaconi. Richardson. episcopi. burgenses. 5 was written after 1246. G. Si superior persona scribat inferiori. Neither seems to derive directly from Additional MS 8167. .” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 23 (2) (1939): 3-24. libere tenentes.” Richardson believed that this date was “a later modification” (“An Oxford Teacher. “is either a scribal error or indicates that most of art. 449-50. comites. imperatores. Infime sunt bedelli. et simplices clerici. MS 205. quod creditorum quedam [recte quidam] sunt urbani. Richardson. 2 55-64 (1270s). Sayles. reges. superior debet preponi per dativum casum. a miscellaneous dictaminal and legal collection. “An Oxford Teacher. not his coronation (a coronatione. 88r-133r). inferiores sunt justiciarii.” 447-50. inferior postponi per nominativum casum. was probably compiled at Oxford between 1220 and 1240. “Early Coronation Records. quedam infime. However. O. MS 297. burgensis burgensi. Superiores seculares.” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 13 (1936): 135. pp.” 447. 95r (line 5). 135v-138r (beginning of the fourteenth century?). officiales. decani. vel magis tenues sive minus spisses [recte spissas] et melius vestientes [sic] ad robas faciendas. cuppos cum cooperculis cuppatos. russetum nigrum vel album. lochias. salmones. Item vinitarius vendat vinum per modios. pannarius sive drapparius. piretum. pigmentum. plucatam. scilicet dimidias quartas. cellarius. vel minus vel pauloplus [sic]. merlingos. caridones [recte capitones]. pectines sive plaiceos. 62 The later of the two Cambridge manuscripts (CCC 297. Item habeat scarletam nigram. flaonarius. per potellos sive floxeos [sic]. habeat pisces marinos vel aque dulcis. imperiale bluetum. conchilia [glossed above the word as wolk]. 63 Both later manuscripts (G & C 205/111. bremnas [recte bremias]. Et de unoquoque istorum suo loco dicemus. sive piscarius. pastillarius. aurifaber. qui hamo vel reti vel lancea. Urbani vero vinetarius. p. per dolea [corrected in MS from doleos] sive tonellos. siseram. per pintas. vel in burnetam. Vinetarius vinum habeat andegavense. clepsedres sive dusellos. p. per pipas. zonarius. cerotecarius. Pannarius in celda sua vel ad nundinas habeat telas varias et multimodas de vili precio sive de vili foro. celluras [?recte siluros] sive minusas. infusoria sive intonellaria. vinum raspatum. gugiones. haubergentum tinctum in viride. [added above line: nigrum.63 verrones. Item habeat grisetum de Totenais. saxifragiatum. piscator. 317) gives “terebellum” here. claretum. radeas. Item habeat grossum russetum vel minuetum. carnifex. per sextaria. sturgiones. and CCC 297. alvealos [added in different hand in margin: pulanos]. vel in bluetum. Item habeat album cordium. corvesarius. zeduarizatum. cordicium radiatum. burellum London’ vel burellum de Beaveis. per lagenas sive galones. vel in nigrum. 261. per quartas. albam vel virede coloratam. et balenas sive tecefocas [corrected in MS from tecesfocas. tabulum [?recte terebellum: gimlet or auger]62 sive penetralium sive persorium. persum. wagetam. imperiale russetum. cados. gasconense. Iterum vinitarius habeat in cellare suo utres. Piscator. 319) . et habeat telas de foro cari [sic. burnetam coloratam violetam. alutarius. Item [habeat] russetum de Laycestre vel de Oxonia. medum sive ydromellum. bluetam. loremarius. cungros. pistor. haubergentum russetum. hadoccos. de Cornubia. rocheos.] grossum vel minuetum. Item habeat telas angligenas latas habentes latitudinem duarum ulnarum. anguillas. burnetam nigram vel sanguineam. vel limosos sive platias. recte cetefocas]. murenas sive lampredas. haubergentum album de Stanford’. acetum. mustum. added in different hand in margin: vel magni]. Item habeat [fol. averenense. p. mecaros sive makerellos. rugetam. per dimidium sextarium. vel in rubeum. telas densiores vel spissiores ad capatium faciendum. costrellos. husuarius sive ocrearius. lupos aquaticos sive luceos. francense.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 519 [recte quidam] rurales. pelliparius et consimiles. murenulas sive lampredulas. cordevanarius. auceps. etiam cum lisuris. 88v] ciphos aureos sive de murra vel de macera. qui vendit pisces. tencas. sperlingos. Et tumberellos ut passeres et alias aves minutas domiciliaria et severundalia capi possit [recte possunt]. porcinas. gallos. scaturizatos. p 259. castrimargios. ancipitres.” CCC 297. avenatum. et clunacula. saimum. unctum porcinum. ordeaceum. Clearer versions can be found in the two Cambridge manuscripts. ut domiciliarios sive scingudarios [sic]. aucas domesticas et alias. reads: “Item habeat macerarius secures quibus boves excerebret et porcos et carnes dividat. Item habeat placencia. reads: “Item habeat secures quibus boves excerebrat. panem album. vel castrimagiarum. G & C 205/111. bisas. tendiculis. vel trappis ut perdices. liba.66 malardos. ovium. auculas. G & C 205/111. columbas. reads “pernas sive petasunculos” here. arietum. pavones. 65 This sentence is clearly defective.” 66 CCC 297. et carnes porcorum dividant [recte dividat]. vel castrimarginario rethe. ut nisos sive spervarios. 318. malvicia. Item habeat recia [sic] unde capiat in rama nisos sive spervarios. 318. agninas. sive multonum. tribratum [recte cribratum]. cokettos. 318. laqueis. sigilinum. pluviarios.” . ut omnes volucres et campestres ut nisi [sic] et alias minutas [sic] capi possint. Item habeat secures quibus [boves] excribere [recte excerebret].67 Pistor habeat panem azimum et panem furvum et panem triticeum. caprinas. edulinas. Item habeat lardum. et libia piperata. vel tendiculis. cigonios. libia. marinos vel ripeos. sive petafulsus [recte petasiculos or petasunculos]. unde porcos. 318. 89r] Auceps sive aucuparius habeat aves silvestres et agrestes et domesticas. p. p. turtura. vel rethe stante vel jacente. Item habeat vicera porcorum vel boum vel ovium. vel rethi pendente. panteris. pullos. p. 67 This last sentence seems corrupt. oves et boves evicerant [recte evicerat] et excoreant [recte excoreat]. saclatum sive temesatum. geturnices [recte coturnices]. laqueis. A much fuller version is given in the earlier of the two Cambridge manuscripts. perrias [recte pernas]. infungia. vel etiam reti quo anglice dicitur lof. gallinas. Item habeat corea bovina et pelles ovinas. panteris. bovinas. mergites. vel cum tumberello ut passeres et alias aves minutas ut domiciliaria. panem furmenteum [?recte fermenteum]. capones. attavos [recte artavos]. anderes [recte anseres or anceres]. p. Item habeat bacones ustos. has a version of this passage that combines elements from both of the other texts and introduces new ones: “Item volucres capit visco. [added in different hand in margin: et sepum] ovinum. perdices [corrected in MS from perdicas]. 259: “Item volucres vel volatilia capit visco. reads “olores” (swans) here.65 [fol. panem bultatum. Item habeat ardeas sive airones. Item give “capitones” here. p. scilicet aucas albas.64 Item habeat carcosia boum. wodecok. grues sive cignes [recte cignos] sive cleres [recte olores]. porcellinas. item habeat bacones. sive severundaria. Item habeat porchetum pudratum vel in succedio positum. vel stante. et tripas boum vel ovium. 64 CCC 297. et omnes volucres silvestres et campestres. et clunacula quibus carnes porcinas dividat. Item capit volucres in visco vel tendiculis vel laqueis vel reti stante vel pendente. vitulinas. vel reti pendente.520 MARTHA CARLIN Macerarius habeat salsas carnes et recentes.” CCC 297. s. membra zonarum. Metallum vero ductile vel fusile est. p. p. sive clibanum. caprea. flaones de ovis. auritallo [recte auricalco]. “corium gremale ad grana colligenda. Revised Medieval Latin Word-List. lest they be lost in his leather apron. confractorem. Aurifaber habeat opus tam ductile quam fusile. forcipes. leather apron] ad gramina [?recte grana] metallorum colligendum [recte colligenda] et expurgendum [recte extergenda]. artocopos. p. que superius enumerantur. bene piperatos.70 malleos. avibus marinis vel silvestribus [corrected in MS from silvestrisbus] vel domesticis. leporis lardo. translated in Holmes. the goldsmith is advised to have a hare’s foot with which he can polish gold or silver and also collect the small particles of metals. [fol. vel dama. catenas. “gremialis. .” see the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. ampollas. an anvil].” 3. parapsides. platenas. candelabrum. coclearea. fioles. De feris vero cerve vel de cerva.” For the translation “leather apron. Pastillarius habeat pastillos de carnibus. Item faciet calices. [added in different hand above line: ollas] iustas. firmacula. Item habeat cupas cum cooperculis et ciphos planos. et superius aureo vel argenteo circumdatos. item ceotelatam [?recte cribelatam] farinam. sed lapis scruptilis [recte scriptilis] tantum. 319) read. Compare this description of the goldsmith with that of Alexander Nequam in De nominibus utensilium (in Hunt. Item habeat de farina [recte ferina] sive venacionis vel carne domestica vel de feris vel de volucribus sive de volatilibus. Latham. inpressum vel insculptum. 89v] vel de ligno brateis sive laminis auri vel argento cooperato. florem frumenti. scutellas. Item habeat opus concavum vel solidum. aurifragium. s. furnum. and CCC 297. p. Operatur siquando in auro. de piscibus.” and “corium gremiale ad gramina metallorum colligenda et extergenda. Item [habeat panem]68 coctum in clibano vel in fornace vel in saritagine vel in cratela. planum vel planatum. et mola [recte molam] ad aciem ferro conferendam. pedem etiam leporis et corte [?recte corium gremiale. filum argenteum. Operatur enim in metallis et in lapidibus.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 521 habeat pistrinum. Item habeat crateres vel crateras cum trifuris vel planos vel sculptos. Item faciat anulos. cupro.v. respectively. tabellam oblitam ad flosculos protrahendos. 68 Both of the Cambridge manuscripts (G & C 205/111. monilia. rotabulum. 1: 189. cruces aureas vel argenteas. 319) supply “habeat panem” here. Item habeat ciphos de macera cum pede aureo vel argenteo. Daily Living in the Twelfth Century. 260. coronas. In Nequam’s text. inclinum [?recte incudem.” 70 G & C 205/111. Item habeat folliculos. pane et caseo compositas. 69 Cf. 261. Item habeat polentridium. Teaching and Learning Latin.v. filateria. [added in different hand in margin: vel trifurat]69 stagno. 71 Where Additional MS 8167 reads “corte ad gramina metallorum colligendum et expurgendum. p. and CCC 297.” the two Cambridge manuscripts (G & C 205/111.71 Habeat etiam vasa varia et minuta. salsaria et salleria. 142). in argento. Wafrarius habeat wafras vel lagana in ferris vel in furnis decoctas. -/fura. Iterum flaonarius habeat opacos. has “incudem” (glossed as “anveld”) here. pelves. “Tri/folium. et totum ad metallum purgandum. 261. Habeat cerotecas magnas et duplices ad opus falconarii.” “Arculis” (saddle-bows) fits the sense of this passage better than “articulis. albas. 320). opere scilicet manuali. vel auro. ad cardanos et spinas trahendos vel colligendos. nigra. et inconsutiles desuper. vel de coreo. p. and CCC 297. cesuras. moncellata. lino. [habeat]72 cerotecas laneas. quaturnata. s. 90r] tentone munitas ad opus hominum. domine.” However. bestiunculis. Sellarius cellas habeat diversas et varias. ad palefridum. p. 262. 263. 73 This phrase is murky. armig[er]i [in MS. pilosas vel planas. Cerotecarius habeat cerotecas grossas. armigi]. Item. p.v. vel auro vel cinoplo coloratas [corrected in MS from colaratas]. Item habeat sotulares pecatos [?recte picatos]. rubeo vel cinoplo. Item habeat scuta listata flosculis. . Habeat estivalia. “dimissis” seems worse than awkward here. et parsone et presbiteri. Husurarius [sic] et sutor in coreis bovinis operantur. azuri. Item faciat novaculas sive rasoria. alba. sed husarios [recte husarius] tantum faciet ocreas et non sotulares. the former gives it as “cum articulis dimissis et latis. Item habeat sotulares cum colariis ligulis ad opus militum. flosculis de flagella [recte glagello]74 vel aliis leoniculis depicta. 74 There is no ablative noun “flagella. et cetera. ad opus monachi cum articulis [?recte arculis]73 divisis et latis non coloratis.” 3. Zonarius habeat zonas de cerico. scilicet nigro. Item. [fol. avibus. Allutarius habeat allutam veram de pellibus caprinis. sive cultellos ad zonam pendentes. p. p. and CCC 297. Sutor quidem ocreas sive husas faciat et sotulares pariter varios et multimodos [corrected in MS from multimodas] ut allutarius. “gladiolous. forfices. see the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. artavos scriptorum vel dolatorum. plusculas de ferro. de pellibus ovinis. insculptas ad opus militum. habeat scuta colorata vel non colorata. et totum contextas. while “divisis” (separate?) seems awkward. vel sotulares cum medullis corrigiis laqueatos. ad equum. messoribus et fossoribus aptas. Of the two later versions of this text (G & C 205/111. lambata rosis. cultellos etiam planos. Habeat mensacula. flosculis. Item habeat planas zonas vel barratas sive membratas. leoniculis vel alicuius hystoria depictis [recte depictas] vel protractas. cupro. and CCC 297. minutas ad opus non laborancium. viridi. 72 Both Cambridge manuscripts (G & C 205/111. servili. 321) read “glagello” here. crepidas sive botas. membris rotundis vel quadratis. vel stricas [recte strictas] ad opus feminarum. p. clunacula venatorum.” while the latter has “cum arculis dimissis et latis. 320) have “habeat” here. Item habeat cerotecas duplices et singulas. 263. largas. rubeo vel albo.” and both of the Cambridge manuscripts (G & C 205/111. Item habeat singulas et cellas verniculatas [recte vermiculatas]. For its translation as fleur de lis. ad sumentorium.522 MARTHA CARLIN Cutellarius faciat varios cultellos. as vos instead of tu]. ex fibro. he to whom it is written is generally put first in the dative case. Urban [are] the vintner. scutellulis pendentibus ferreis vel cupreis deauratis. in pectorali et strepis sive scancilibus. and simple clerks. et rotundas. et cetera. nigras. cordevanarius. Item intelligendum est de strepis et de pectoralibus. edulline [sic]. cingula. the inferiors are justiciars. because some creditors are urban. deacons. cobblers and all workmen (officiarii).. verderers. the superior should be put first in the dative case. laironibus. fisherman (piscator) or fishmonger (piscarius). experiolis. cum duplici coreo. either may be put before the other. others inferior. The superiors are the lord pope. quedam de minutis clavis. ex pellibus ovinis. and some are rural. et habeat urlas de sablino matrice.g. cum virga gracili ad opus monachi. Item. quedam cum campanellis vel anulis. and freeholders. sorellis. and priors. and similar folk. And of each of these in his place I shall speak. hispidis et pilosis. the inferior put after in the dative case. saddler. the one being petitioned (petitus) should be designated in the plural [e. summoners. poulterer (auceps). and of both the former and the latter some are superior. vel calcaria cum virga gracili et rotunda vel quadrata. foresters. Translation Of persons some are ecclesiastics and some are seculars. either officers or servants (tam ministri sive ministrelli). draper (pannarius sive drapparius). 90v] aurata. burgesses. The superior seculars are emperors. Strepas habeat latas sub pede ad opus militum. skinner. Item habeat penulas albas. constables. The lowest are beadles. rotundis. parsons. abbots. baker. cordwainer (alutarius. as a knight to a knight or a burgess to a burgess. strictas et latas secundum varietatem equorum et equietaturum. sint lorene in freno. The lowest are parish priests. glover. corvesarius). officials. some the lowest. however. the superior should be put first in the nominative case.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 523 Pelliparius habeat pellicia. girdler. . the archbishops. in a letter of petition. If. If an inferior person write to a superior. and vicars.[fol. vel ex lutro. but in order to obtain good will (causa benivolencie captande). dukes. In every petition made to a superior or an equal. If a superior person write to an inferior. Item habeat calcaria ad opus militum de. serfs. The inferiors are the archdeacons. scilicet frena. and barons. cum scutis. strepas quadratas. urban or rural. penulas. butcher. grossas [recte grossis] vel super rasas [recte rasis]. kings. fururas ex pellibus agninis vel foleis [?recte follibus] ex griso. ex catis sive ex pellibus catenis. I propose to speak first of letters to creditors. flan-maker. Lorimarius habeat lorenas. counts. lorimer. ex wlpecula [sic for vulpecula] vel roserella. goldsmith. the inferior put after in the nominative case. pasteler (pie-baker). sheriffs. bishops. knights. quedam de clavis latis. an equal write to an equal. ex grossis vel minutis sive crispis. ex cuniculis. hosier (husuarius sive ocrearius). a net or a lance.75 wine flavored with zedoary and with saxifrage. that is. who [fishes] with a hook.v. Let him have unshorn or shorn russet (grossum russetum vel minuetum). mackerels. both cheap (de vili precio sive de vili foro) and expensive. .] unshorn or shorn (grossum vel minuetum) cordium. by sesters. white haberget of Stamford. black. “Raspise” (1440-75). rays (radeas). russet imperial.76 [or] plunket (plucatam: a light or grayish blue). and whales (balenas sive cetefocas).v. and between gloves that are “grossas” (heavy or rough) and “minutas” (fine or thin).” and cat skins that are “grossas vel super rasas. Latham. and Auvergne. salmons. half-quarts. lamperns. by the half-sester. sprats. wachet (wagetam: light blue). lampreys. sweet or rosé wine (vinum raspatum). mudfish (limosos) or flatfish (platias). defines vinum raspatum as “wine freshened after it has gone stale” (Revised Medieval Latin Word-List. s. have sea fish and freshwater fish.” This suggests a contrast between cloth or skins that are shaggy or unshorn and those that are shorn. And let him have gray cloth (grisetum) of Totnes [and] of Cornwall.524 MARTHA CARLIN The vintner should have wine of Anjou.v. Also let him have cups of gold. white. or dyed with green. heavier or thicker cloths for making a hood (capatium). grape juice (mustum). s. burnet dyed violet. russet haberget. cider. let the vintner have in his cellar bottles (utres).” c. Let him have scarlet [that is] black. “Raspatum.78 London burel or burel of Beauvais. eels. cloths of various sorts. by barrels or tuns. A similar contrast is drawn between sheepskins with long-haired fleece (“grossis”) and those with short or curly hair (“minutis sive crispis”). and mead (medum sive ydromellum). including the selvedges. in his seld or at fairs. black or sanguine burnet. Again. and striped (radiatum) cordicium. 75 See MED. “Plunket. 1210). Gascony. s. piment and claré (red and white spiced wines). perry.77 black or white russet. [and] haberget dyed in green. and an auger or gimlet or wimble ([terebellum] sive penetralium sive persorium). Let a draper have. blue imperial. by pipes. troughs (alvealos). whiting (merlingos). bluet (a shade of blue).” 77 See MED. And let the vintner sell wine by measures (modios). breams. Let him have English broadcloths. however. more or less. pike. dressier (?or better-quality: melius vestientes) cloths for making robes (suits of clothing). by gallons.v. Let him have white. casks. the Île-de-France. congers. or red. Let a fisherman. who sells fish. lighter. 76 See MED. haddock. or finer. cockles (?or whelks). plaice.” 78 This text describes both russet cloth and cordium as “grossum vel minuetum. blue. brown. having a width of two ells. slides for lowering casks (pulanos). perse (dark blue). vinegar. sturgeons. “Wachet. by pottles or flasks (half-gallons). costrels. tench. red. [black. s. roach. spigots or taps (clepsedres sive dusellos). funnels (infusoria sive intonellaria). or a fishmonger. and cups with lids. or of maple or mazer (de murra vel de macera). by quarts or pints. and russet of Leicester or of Oxford. See OED. 2: 66. let him have the entrails of pigs. partriches (perdices).v. The OED defines miller’s thumb as “[a]ny of various freshwater sculpins of the genus Cottus. Item. seabirds and riverbirds. (also) a marine sculpin (rare). Item. s. hens. miller’s thumb. celluras [?recte siluros] sive minusas). capitones (bullhead. goats. or fore-quarters of pork (reading petasunculos instead of petafulsus). wodecok). saimum. “bullhead” and “caboche. 83 For saimum cf. the European bullhead. white geese.82 Item. as “caboche vel gurnard” and as “caboge. of cattle.century references to capito as a “bulhede. cranes (grues) or swans (cignos sive [olores]). “caboche.81 Item. such as hawks. cocks. sheep.” The Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources defines “capito” as a “kind of fish. and thrushes (malvicia). let him have axes with which to brain [oxen] and divide up the flesh of pigs. so that all birds [?of the forests] and fields. plovers (pluviarios). lambs. also let him have bacons. Item. can be taken. “Seim(e). MED. pigeons. and the tripes of oxen or sheep.” and cites glossings as bullhead. Teaching and Learning Latin. respectively. goats. or muttons. s. and oxen. quail (coturnices). gray geese. gobio. oxen or sheep. aquatic birds (mergites). Item. a[r]tavos) with which to gut and skin pigs. Let the poulterer have birds of the forests and fields and domestic birds. let him have carcases of oxen. chickens. Item. let him have scorched and scalded bacons (bacones ustos.” and identifies gurnards as marine fish of the genus Trigla or family Triglidae. and knives (clunacula. Item. he takes birds in lime or with snares (in visco vel tendiculis vel laqueis) or with a standing or hanging net. [?and he also takes] other See MED.” and gurnard. which have a large. woodcocks (castrimargios. s. let him have salted or pickled pork. kids (edulinas).” Hunt. or gurnard). Alexander Nequam (or Neckam) included the capito among a list of fish in De nominibus utensilium. let him have herons (ardeas sive airones).vv. aucas domesticas) and others. goslings.v. esp. “Excaturizatio.83 Item.” The hog carcases have been scorched or scalded to loosen the hair so that it can be scraped off. one manuscript of 1250-1300 glosses this as “caboche” while two manuscripts of the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries gloss it. doves. or piglets. sheep.” and “Hec petasiculus. let him have lard (lardum. mallards. a flyk. C. s. half a flyk. storks (cigonios).” and to “caboche” as a fish (bullhead or miller’s thumb). hams (reading pernas in place of perrias). namely. calves. pigs. “Menuse. capons.” 80 79 . domestic geese (anseres [for anderes]. 81 These last two terms may instead represent a flitch and a half-flitch of bacon: a fifteenth-century Latin-English word-list printed by Thomas Wright (Volume of Vocabularies 1: 242) includes “Hec perra.80 and minnows (verrones).v. peacocks. let him have cowhides and sheepskins. scaturizatos).SHOPS AND SHOPPING 525 gudgeons (gugiones. spiny head. unctum porcinum) and sheep’s tallow.” 82 See Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. Let the butcher have salt meat and fresh.” for fifteenth.79 loach. v. scilicet brake. Classical Latin acrozymus (“slightly leavened”). 84 . sive pincam. Infungia was unleavened bread. made without leaven).” A dough-brake was a mechanical device used by bakers for kneading dough. liba. MED.526 MARTHA CARLIN small birds. infungia. Compare it with the fuller versions in the two Cambridge manuscripts. fol. -um. like modern bagels) and libum or liba was wastel bread (the finest white bread).v. “Infungia.88 Item. n. here apparently also made from fine white flour. MED. 341.v.89 Item. Daily Living in the Twelfth Century.” Latham’s Revised Medieval Latin Word-List. 319. MS Lansdowne 560. wastel. 87 Cf. “severunda” (eaves or cornice). See Holmes. item. fine spice-bread (libia piperata) and cocket-bread. Latham.v. and wheaten. s. 89 CCC 297. “Ferment” and “Sour-dough. 3: 17. s. i. Let the pasteler have pasties of meats and fish. placenta(s). [let him have bread] cooked in an oven (in clibano vel in fornace) or in a pan (saritagine) or on a griddle (in cratela). sieved (c[rib]elatam) meal. and Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. -um (Teaching and Learning Latin. pinsa. let him have fine white bread (placencia. panem album).” took this instead to mean a kneading trough or board. second only to wastel bread. of game-birds or domestic birds (vel de feris vel de volucribus sive de volati- This last sentence appears to be corrupt. let him have a bolting cloth or sieve (polentridium) [and] a molding board (rotabulum). barley. s. s. A vernacular gloss to Alexander Nequam’s De nominibus utensilium (in Hunt. quoted in n. baxteris instrument. 86 Placenta were simnels (fine white rolls. above. 3: 92. and Old French sevronde (eaves with downspouts). cf. s. cf. sive braccam.vv. twice-baked or perhaps boiled first and then baked.84 Let the baker have leavened bread (panem azimum)85 and black bread (panem furvum). “Simenel” and “Wastel. Item. 85 Azimus was leaven.” where it is defined as cocket bread (described by Adam of Petit-Pont in De utensilibus as a sourdough bread. oven (furnum sive clibanum).86 sourdough bread (panem fermenteum). -e(s). let him have a bakehouse.” 88 See n. Item. cf. rye and oat bread. s. see Hunt’s glosses in Teaching and Learning Latin. Revised Medieval Latin Word-List. See OED.67 above. “pinsa. 1440): “Bray or brakene. 47r-v (late fourteenth-early fifteenth century) also glosses libum as wastel. and MED.”the latter quoting John Mirfield’s Sinonoma Bartholomei (ante1400): “Placenta est panis factus de pasca [?read: pasta] azima. let him have [pasties] of game (de ferina sive venacionibus) or of domestic meat. such as those that live in eaves or shingles (ut domiciliarios sive scingudarios). See Hunt’s glosses for liba. 363).3). Teaching and Learning Latin.vv. p. which quotes the Promptorium Parvulorum (c.48. cribratum. saclatum. well spiced. 126.v.” A Latin word-list with interlineal English glosses in British Library. elaborates on this term: “confractoreum. s. wheat flour. and dough-brake (confractorem).87 bolted or sieved [?flour] (panem [?recte florem] bultatum. libia. “brake” (n. 289.2): bread made of fine flour. sive temesatum). 2: 84) translates domiciliarum as severunder.86. Item. “Coket” (n. 284. let him have chalices (calices). roe (caprea: female roe deer) or doe (dama: female fallow deer). dubler”). On the other hand. [and] a painted tray for displaying the choicest items (tabellam oblitam ad flosculos protrahendos). fol. tongs. plate.90 Let the goldsmith have stock (opus) both ductile (hammered) and fusile (molten or cast). s. pannecake. brooches. etc. [or ornaments: vel trifurat] in tin [or] brass. crampecake.vv. and British Library. and a grindstone (or whetstone: molam) for putting a sharp edge onto iron. the word-lists in English Glosses from British Library Additional Manuscript 37075. and girdle-studs (membra zonarum). Teaching and Learning Latin. either smooth or engraved. and a hare’s foot and a leather apron (reading corium gremiale for corte) for collecting and wiping up (extergenda. 92 On clunacula (daggers). let him have cups of mazer with a foot of gold or silver. flaones) made of eggs.” “Doubler. or of wood covered with thin sheets or plates of gold or silver. flagons (iustas). Ross and Brooks. British Library. s. fritter. crosses of gold or silver. instead of gramina) of metals. a candelabrum. basins. let him have bowls (crateres vel crateras) with decorations (trifuris). let him have cups with covers and plain cups.62. forest birds or domestic birds. let him make rings. Let the cutler make various knives. parapsis and scutella(s) in Hunt. let the flan-maker have flans (opacos.” “Scutel. for he works in metals and in stones. Let the waferer have wafers or little cakes (wafras vel lagana) cooked in irons or ovens. see also Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. “Dish. let him have little bellows (folliculos). hammers and everything for cleansing metal.” Cf. Item.” “Plater. bread and cheese.” and MED. Metal is ductile or fusile. 31v (“haec scutella a plater/haec parapsis idem”). See the glosses for parapsides. 322b (“scutella. chains. [or] copper. while parapsides were “doublers” (dishes or plates) or platters. of the hind (cerve.v. fol. which are enumerated above. artocopos.92 the knives of scribes (i. “Paropsis. ed. plater/ periapsis. 90 . gold fringe (aurifragium.” 91 Scutella (French esquele) meant dish or bowl. 146-7. monilia). turtel. At times he works in gold. let him have hollow and solid work. 2: 118. crowns. reliquaries (filatria). instead of expurgendum) grains (grana. fol. MS Lansdowne 560. 47r (“parapcid’ dobler”). Item. parapsides). 2: 44 and n. orphrey). pancake. The Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources defines “laganum” as “unleavened cake cooked in oil. of the fat flesh of the hare (leporis lardo). silver. Let him also have various small vessels. but stone is only carvable or engravable (scriptilis). dishes and platters (scutellas. an anvil (reading incudem in place of inclinum). [and] spoons. Item.. Item. huntsmen’s daggers. silver wire. fioles). smooth (planum vel planatum) or engraved (inpressum vel insculptum). of sea birds. cruets for consecrated oil (ampollas. Item. Item.91 saucers and salt-cellars. vel de cerva: female red deer). the glosses in Hunt (3: 88) that translate lagana or laganum as cake. [pots (ollas)]. of game.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 527 libus). III. Item.e. penknives) or of those who chip or chop [food or wood?] (dolaCf. MS Royal 17 A. and bound above with gold or silver. pendants (?or necklaces. see Hunt. that is. Pages 16-20 include drawings and photographs of early-mid thirteenth-century shoes and boots with side-lacing. s. servile work. 2: Shoes and Pattens (London: The Stationery Office. black. Let the cordwainer have true tawed leather of goatskins [and] sheepskins. 119-22. or white. with round or square studs (planas zonas vel barratas sive membratas. let him make razors. Revised Medieval Latin Word List. Item. Medieval Finds from Excavations in London. let him have lined and unlined gloves. fine or thin ones (minutas) for the use of those who do not labor at manual. let him have smooth or barred or studded girdles. Let the saddler have diverse and various saddles: for the use of the monk. Let the glover have heavy or rough (grossas) gloves. suitable for harvesters and dykers. let him have pointed (?or pricked) shoes (sotulares p[i]catos) or shoes laced up the middle with thongs (sotulares cum medullis corrigiis laqueatos).v. instead of cardones) and thorns. Cf.v. palfrey. moreover. s. modern French piquer and piqûre). pointed toes or “peaks.v. and openwork. the parson and the priest. See MED. [and] sumpter. “Pica” (4). 94 In the fourteenth century.” However. the squire. or knives for hanging at the girdle. shears. lined gloves for the use of the falconer. Let him have large. roomy [and] padded with felt (largas. red. tooled (insculptas) for the use of knights. Item. Latham. Let the cobbler make leggings (ocreas sive husas) and shoes equally varied and of as many fashions as the cordwainer.v.”MED. pulling or gathering teasels or thistles (cardanos. s. drawstring-lacing. etc. Item. . membris rotundis vel quadratis). 79-81. Let him have boots (estivalia. with the separate and broad saddle-bows (cum articulis [recte arculis] divisis et latis) uncolored. 44-59. crepidas. namely. red (vermiculatas). Latham. 93 Chipping knives were used to chip or pare burnt crusts from loaves. and seamless. husurarius) and cobbler (sutor) work in cowhides. shoemaking. shaggy (pilosas) or smooth (planas). and cobbling in London. suggesting shoes with pricked or openwork ornamentation. 1988.93 Let him have table knives. or leather. let him have shoes with strapped (?or drawstring) collars (colariis ligulis) for the use of knights. scissors (forfices). “piked” shoes were those with long. tentone munitas) for the use of men. or tight (stric[t]as) for the use of women. but the hosier shall only make leggings and not shoes. Item. let him have girths (singulas) and saddles. with iron or copper studs (membris). [let him have] woolen gloves. and plain knives. Revised Medieval Latin Word-List. of the lady. and with rounded and pointed toes.94 The hosier (or leggings-maker. picare could also mean “to prick” (cf. especially 2-3. s. and entirely knitted (et inconsutiles desuper et totum contextas). For a survey of medieval shoes and footed hose.(1). see Francis Grew and Margrethe de Neergaard. at least. sive botas). “Chippen” v. chopping and paring knives would also have been useful in various types of food preparation. 9-21.528 MARTHA CARLIN torum). for horse. “Dol/atura. Item. 113-6. Item. Let the girdler have girdles of silk. linen. “Pike” 5(a). Item. Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. Brault. [or] tiny beasts. some with little bells or rings. with round dangling shields (scutis. shaggy or shorn (grossas vel super rasas). sorellis). English Fur Trade. painted or drawn with little flowers. I am grateful to David Crouch for this reference. medieval furriers distinguished between gris. Item. fururas) of lambskins. painted or unpainted. of beaver (ex fibro). rough and hairy. narrow and broad ones. white [or] black. one should know about stirrups and poitrels. 1972). some with broad bands. according to the variety of horses and riders. penulas. and variants of the Latin word sciurus (squirrel). and round stirrups. the poitrel (pectorali) and the stirrups (strepis sive scancilibus). or with a device of some kind (vel alicuius hystoria). 209-14. 228). Classical Latin haedulus. s. square stirrups.v. Veale. lioncels (leoniculis: little lions.” “Scurellus. and girths with a leather lining. white [and] black. strewn (moncellata: literally.” Cf. or colored with gold or red (sinoplo). “heaped”) [or] decorated (lambata) with roses. 95 . a little kid. painted with little fleurs de lis (flosculis de glagello) or more lioncels in red (rubeo vel cinoplo). etc. not lion cubs). which “were applied to squirrel skins from parts of Southern and Central Europe.97 of dormice or martens (laironibus). let him On the terminology of heraldry in this period. or of otter (lutro).98 of kid (edulline). [or] azure. of the bellies (?foleis. green. “Experiolus. since rabbits were not introduced into the English mainland until the early thirteenth century (ante1235). Item. Let the lorimer have items made of straps (lorenas). Let him have stirrups that are broad under the foot for the use of knights. usually of little value to the skinner.” 223-4. English Fur Trade.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 529 white. birds. see Gerard J. Item. let him have fur linings. Cf.” 97 The coney (rabbit) skins may have been imported.99 of sheepskins. recte follibus) from the gray [winter coat of] squirrels (de griso. Early Blazon: Heraldic Terminology in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries with Special Reference to Arthurian Literature (Oxford: Clarendon Press. Item. scutellulis) of gilded iron or copper. Item.96 of coneys.” “Griseum.vv. some with narrow bands. of catskins (ex catis sive ex pellibus catenis). “Laëro. Latham. experiolis. around the time of the composition of this treatise.v. Revised Medieval Latin WordList.” 99 Cf. Item. s. quartered (quaturnata). namely bridles. s. “Leron”. let him have shields bordered (listata) with little flowers. which was the finequality gray winter back of red squirrels from the coldest parts of Northern and Central Europe. Veale. of the little fox or weasel (roserella). gold. 98 Cf. 220. s. “Escureus” and “Gris. let him have shields. 219. 96 According to Veale (English Fur Trade.95 Let the skinner have pilches [and] fur linings (pellicia. let there be straps for the bridle.vv. and let him have revers of sable-belly (urlas de sablino matrice). with a slim stirrup-iron (?virga gracili) for the use of the monk. from longhaired or short-haired or curly-haired [sheep]. quarto conclusio. I order you that. having put aside every argument (occasione) and delay. hoc modo. in this manner. First should come the greeting. Sciturus quod ego et commitissa mea fleubotomati sumus apud . The punctuation. above). secondly. fideli suo salutem. you have sent to me by the bearer of these presents two barrels of white wine and two flasks of chestnut wine and one tun of filtered ale.N. Primo debet preponi salutacio. A. 97r-98v (discussed in the introduction to Appendix II. secundo [expunged by underscore: narracio] precepcio vel proibicio. expanded abbreviations are shown in italics. Therefore may you act in such a way that you do not move us to anger by your negligence. the conclusion. fols.’s household steward]. fourthly. the explanation. . or spurs with a slender shank (virga). both round and square. Precipio tibi ut visis literis istis omni occasione et dilacione postpositis mihi mitti facias per latorem presencium duos cados vini albi et duas floscas vini castanei et unum doleum servisie defecate. Additional MS 8167.. (1) Translation Orders and refusals ought to be done thus. the order or refusal. Comes glovernie C. fol. capitalization. Farewell. together with ten sample letters. and use of “u” and “v” have been modernized. Tantum ergo facias ne nos in iram commoveas propter tuam negligenciam. [perhaps A. You shall know that I and my countess are having our blood let at N. greetings. Vale. tercio narracio. from British Library. to his faithful C. Earl of Gloucester. when you have seen these letters. APPENDIX III Notes on how to write and reply to a letter of request. 97r (mid-page) (1) An earl of Gloucester orders wine and ale Precepciones et proibiciones sic debent fieri.530 MARTHA CARLIN have gilded spurs for the use of knights. A. thirdly. until Palm Sunday. quodlibet ad precium . scilicet duo gasconiensis et tria andegavense [recte andegavensis]. vintner of C. and nothing is in arrears. suus A. two of Gascon and three of Angevin. Dileccio domino suo et amico W. A. the more boldly in this present business we have turned to you. usque ad pasca floridum vobis acomodarem. vinetario de C. dolea vero . to his beloved A. Scituri quod denarios vestros ad diem nominatum omni occasione [in MS.[fol. et nichil est in re. ad diem vestrum semper plenarie fol. earl of Gloucester. namely.. Valete.v. 97v persolvemus. dolea vini gasconensi [recte gasconiensis] et tria andegavense [recte andegavensis]. Quum quicquid vobis de vino credito [corrected in MS from creditorio] multociens debuimus.xx. at a price of 20s apiece. Tantum ergo facientes [?recte faciatis] ut vobis ad gratiarum teneamur acciones.. solidorum. to whom he is in debt.xx. solidorum usque ad Pasca floridum nobis acomodetis. quodlibet ad precium . (3) Response to the preceding letter Responsio ad literas predictas. anxiously asking that you accommodate us with five tuns of wine. dolea vini. may you act only in such a manner that we shall be bound to you in gratitude. vinetarius salutem. You will know that we shall pay your money on the day named without any argument or delay.v. audacius in hoc stanti negocio confugimus attencius rogantes quatinus v. Comiti de S. salutem et dileccionem. Litera [recte literas] vestras nuper accepi petitorias quatinus . comes Glovernie dilecto sibi A. Farewell. “aiccasione”] et dilacione remota persolvemus. Quum quicquid mihi debuistis optime persoluistis precibus vestris ad presens adquiesco et . (2) Translation An earl orders his creditor to send him some wine A..SHOPS AND SHOPPING 531 (2) An earl orders his vintner. to send him some wine Comes mandat creditori suo ut mittat sibi vinum. 97v] ragio. therefore. greetings and love. Whereas we have often owed you something for wine on credit. we have always paid in full on your day.. (4) Translation If he has not paid well what he has owed. being so bold as to put your wishes in effect. on the said day. comes glovernie dilecto sibi A. equally with this new debt. (5) An earl sends an order to his draper. to whom he is in debt Comes mandat pannario creditori suo B. (4) How the vintner should respond if the earl does not repay his debts Si non soluit bene quod debuit tunc dicat sic Tantum de libertate vestra confidens presumens preces vestras ad effectum mancipare. A. Farewell. W. beseeching you anxiously that you pay me in full your old debt. dolea vini petita acomodo. then let him say thus Trusting only in your generosity. confident of you that on the day named. you will pay your debt to me in full. Earl of S. I shall accommodate you with the five tuns of wine you requested. de vobis confidens quod ad diem nominatum iuxta consuetudinem vestram mihi debitum meum persolvetis [corrected in MS from persolvistis]. according to your custom. each. at a price of 20s. I have lately received your letters asking that I accommodate you with five tuns of Gascon wine and three of Angevin.v.532 MARTHA CARLIN petistis vobis acomodo. (3) Translation Response to the abovesaid letter To his beloved lord and friend. Since whatever you have owed me you have paid in the best manner.. Valete. vobis . his vintner sends greetings. rogans attencius quatinus de antiquo debito quod super est in reragio pariter cum hoc novo debito ad dictum diem mihi persolvatis. Quamvis merita nostra non exigant (vel non pre- . which is in arrears. pannario London’ salutem et dileccionis affectum. I agree to your present request and shall accommodate you with the five tuns that you have sought. until Pasca Floridum (Palm Sunday).. mihi acomodetis (vel. upon the ten gold rings and ten silver cups that we send you). Valete. pellipario salutem. ad credenciam. omni occasione remota.x. draper of London.x. Earl of Gloucester. until the Sunday after Easter. Tantum ergo faciatis ut vobis tanquam familiari et creditori nostro grates et honores cum denariis vestris referamus. (5) Translation An earl sends an order to his draper. . 98r Comes dilecto sibi H. asking anxiously that you accommodate me with 20 ells of red scarlet. rogans attencius quatinus . [?vel. Habere faciatis de propriis. without any delay. de agnelino minuto et crispo. greetings and love. Quare vos imploro quatinus .. ulnas de scarleta rubea et totidem de perso et totidem de minueto ad rationabile forum vel precium prout sustinere poteritis usque ad clausum pasca. to whom he is in debt Comes mandat creditori suo pellipario fol. Although our merits are not compelling (or. and the same of shorn (minueto) [scarlet].SHOPS AND SHOPPING 533 cesserint) tamen de libertate vestra confidimus (ad vos in hoc instanti negocio confugimus). et amoris integritatem. and the same of perse (dark blue) [scarlet]. senescalli mei recipietis. may you act only in such a manner that we shall return our thanks and respect to you. to his beloved A.xx. without a pledge. if you please (or. de propria selda vestra mihi acomodetis vel aliunde.. Farewell. Therefore.] we have turned to you in this present business). vobis bene persolvemus. absque pignore si vobis placuerit. (6) An earl sends an order to his skinner. super . Valete. at the most reasonable cost or price that you can manage. Sciatis enim pro vero quod ad diem prefixum. to whom he is in debt B. anulos aureos et . Penulis et fururis ad hoc instans pasca quamplurimum indigeo sed denarios ad illas comparandas non habeo.xx. along with your money. For you know it for a fact that we shall pay you well on the appointed day. ciphos argenteos quos vobis transmittimus). nevertheless we have relied on your generosity ([or. as our friend as much as our creditor.] ratum habentes de alienis manibus capientes et denarios vestros ad diem prenominatum omni occasione remota de manibus meis vel R. penulas de griso et totidem ex variis. have not been outstanding). without any dispute. Let you arrange to have [them] from your own stock (de propriis). in such letters there are at least three parts. I am sorely lacking in fur linings at this present Easter. potest ostendere per vero vel per aud [sic] suam impotenciam excusare. Primo debet salutare respondens. (7) Translation In letters of response to a request. Inde per quare vel per quapropter potest procedere ad excusacionem. (7) The manner in which one should write a positive or negative response to a request In literis responsalibus ad peticionem notandam quod aud [sic] comodat aud [sic] expresse negat aud [sic] se excusat. Item. taking [them] from the hands of others. he can conclude. Item qui wlt [sic. if he pleases. quarto si placet poterit concludere. or for what reason he must refuse or excuse [himself]. from your own seld or from elsewhere. Firstly. fourthly. from my own hands or those of R. Wherefore I implore you that you accommodate me with 20 linings of gris. In literis autem talibus visi tres partes ad minus sunt. . to whom he is in debt The Earl to his beloved skinner H. secundo ostendere quid petitum sit. and the same of vair [and] of lambskin with fine and curly [fleece]. he should [say] in what way he wishes to agree. greetings and the fullest of love. on credit (ad credenciam). Moreover. [?or].534 MARTHA CARLIN (6) Translation An earl sends an order to his skinner. my steward.” or excuse his inability [to agree] by “aud” [sic]. he who wishes to agree to requests can show [this] by “vero. he should describe what is sought. note that either one agrees or expressly denies or excuses oneself. secondly. tercio qualiter velit parere vel qualiter debeat negare vel excusare. Then. the respondent should send greetings. for vult] parere [corrected in MS from paretre] petitis.. Farewell. and you will receive your money on the aforesaid day. but I do not have the money to pay for them. by “quare” or “quapropter” he can proceed to his excuse. thirdly. having this authorization (?habentes ratum).. (8) Translation To my beloved friend.. One consent demands another. B. Wherefore I could not send you that which I did not have. that you do not take it amiss that I have not sent what you requested. Et ideo ut de cetero amicum habeas. Obsequium aliud exigit. (9) Another letter of the same type Adhuc de huiusmodi literis dicemus A. I have lately received your letter in which you requested that I purchase for you fur linings (penulas et fururas). of which you have plenty at your place. quod libenter fecissem. Nolo enim ([?vel] velle debeo) tibi de meo succurere. Valete. salutem. Dubitaverunt enim perdere totum quod mihi acomodarent. greetings. since you know the cause of the impediment. quoniam [?quando] de rebus vestris unum pecii dedignatus fuisti mihi subvenire. and a refusal demands a refusal. had not a fire recently occurring reduced my wealth to ashes. Farewell. sed ignis nuper superveniens [corrected in MS. et subtraccio exigit subtraccionem. to B. Precor igitur ne moleste feratis quod petita vobis non misi cum sciatis causam inpedimenti [sic]. Literas vestras nuper accepi in quibus me petistis ut ego vobis penulas et fururas perquirerem. Pecii nuper ut mihi succureres de tignis et trabibus quorum copia penes te est. which I would freely have done. nor have I found creditors who would lend me anything after the fire. therefore. from superveniens nuper] totam pecuniam meam redegit in cinerem. Lately I asked you to help me out with some lumber and beams. Unde vobis mittere non potui quod non habui nec creditores inveni qui aliquid mihi crederent post incendium. I pray. Tu autem surdas aures peticioni mee prebuisti et ideo non mireris [corrected in MS from mirereis] si preces tuas presentes audire recusem. etc. But .SHOPS AND SHOPPING 535 (8) Letter of refusal from a skinner ruined by fire Dilecto amico et cetera. amicum [recte amicus] inveniaris. Valete. for they feared to lose everything that they lent me. (9) Translation Again we speak of letters of the same type A. ordering you ([or. henceforward. And so. vobis mandantes (precipimus. For I do not wish ([or. (10) Translation An earl sends an order to his client.C. Sciturus quod palefridus noster mortuus est et non habemus equum cui possimus confidere. Earl of Chester. De fidelitate tua fol. for the sake of our love and the faith that you owe us. Farewell. preces preceptis adiungentes. Comes Cestrie omnibus militibus suis salutem. to his beloved and faithful A. tibi mandantes (precipimus). salutem.536 MARTHA CARLIN you turned deaf ears to my petition. comes cestrie dilecto et fideli suo A. and we do not have a horse in which we can trust. Quare tantum facias ne negocium nostrum admittatur pro defectu equitature.. Wherefore may you act in such a way that our business be not hindered for lack of a horse. attentissime petimus) quatinus pro amore nostro parati sitis cum equis et armis in die tali coram nobis ubicumque fuerimus. adding prayers to commands. solidos facias nos habere ad unum equum emendum. thus D. Sciturus [recte scituri] quod dominus Rex nos sicut alios fecit summoniri et cum eo transfretaremus cum totis viribus nostris sicut amorem suum desi- . Vale [?or Valete]. (10) An earl sends an order to his client (member of his affinity) Comes clienti suo precipit sic D. ut pro amore nostro et fide quam nobis debes . De dileccione vestra quamplurimum confisi.] we have commanded). greetings. You shall know that our palfrey is dead. you provide us with 100 shillings to buy a horse. you will have to be found [to be] a friend. if you want to have a friend.. (11) An earl orders his knights to equip with horses and arms Comes militibus ut muniantur equis et armis R. and therefore you will not wonder if I refuse to hear your own present prayers.] ought I to wish) to aid you from my [stock] (de meo). [?when] I sought one thing of yours. that. I have put my highest trust in your loyalty. since. you disdained to come to my aid. 98v quamplurimum confisi. Farewell. to all his knights. ordering you ([or. you be prepared with horses and arms on such a day before us wherever we shall be. Quare tantum faciatis ut domino regi placere poterimus et fideliter servire in necessitatibus [corrected in MS. to be summoned to take ship with him with all our men. Valete. for the sake of our love. I have put my highest trust in your love. (11) Translation An earl orders his knights to equip with horses and arms R. . You shall know that the lord king has caused us.. from necessitabtibus]. Wherefore may you act in such a way that we shall be able to please the king and faithfully serve him in his necessities. we have most anxiously besought) that. Earl of Chester. Farewell.] we have ordered. like others. greetings. as we desired his love.SHOPS AND SHOPPING 537 deramus. has preserved a rich collection of documents tracing this story. in marriage. WHAT’S IN A NAME?—THE CASE OF LATE MEDIEVAL GHENT Martha Howell The terms “movable” and “immovable” wealth. northern Europeans of the Middle . Nowhere was the record messier than in cities. The Flemish city of Ghent. questions which arose most often during commercial dealings. however. one of northern Europe’s most important commercial and industrial centers of the late Middle Ages. Throughout the late Middle Ages. The categories did not. for they were quickly conflated with terms that had long been used in the region to separate patrimonial from personal property. however. authorities frequently were called upon to resolve disputes about the movable or immovable status of particular goods or about their patrimonial status. The words had more than descriptive value.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE. for in these commercial centers property was regularly in circulation. Its twists and turns reveal a great deal about how uncomfortably and incompletely the terms of market exchange took form in Europe. social and cultural work that went into its making and the unpredictability of its final shape. and the confusion that resulted produced a messy legal record. Movables and Immovables in Northern European Society and Law Although the terms “movables” and “immovables” (in Latin. arrived in the North of the continent during the high Middle Ages where they conveniently served to distinguish assets that were. “immovable” from those that were not. quite literally. even among people like Gentenaren who lived almost entirely by trade. precisely overlap. It also helps expose what is too often suppressed in our histories of the western market economy: the hard political. and at death—all situations in which property was being transferred. categories bequeathed to Europeans by Roman law. mobilia and immobilia) were imports. quit-rent. according to the feudal conception. the distinction between “movable” and “immovable” wealth was also easily incorporated into northern property law. Easily understood in ordinary discourse. capacious. Land is. Land’s perpetual productivity sealed its status as the premier—virtually the sole—immovable.” In addition. also see Philippe Godding. The medieval economy was an agrarian economy. 142. 2d ed. Even grain or animals. provides a summary of the types of property included in the category in the Middle Ages: the land and everything which is an integral part of the soil. buildings. for that quality made it the fundament of the social order. In contrast. destruction. the movables which adhere to the immovables in the quality of accessories or appendages of the latter (but only on principle. ed.1 Land’s importance in the medieval economy heightened its assumed immobility. movables were an analytically distinct category of property. On the immovability of land. for example). Le droit privé dans les Pays-Bas méridionaux du 12e au 18e siècle. foodstuffs. or plow. rights like established rents and salable offices which had movables as their object but which were immovable or feudal in their origin (270-2). A History of French Private Law. in law. theft. any good given that label was land itself or it was so bound to land as to be inseparable from it. and equipment were. furniture. Thanks to land’s relatively stable value through time. but land was the fundament. rights over the land which are like the ownership because of their duration (servitude. even in the very latest years of the Middle Ages some 85 per cent of what we would called Gross National Product was composed of agricultural goods. For them. . literally movable. Clothing. 1987). were connected with the land itself (right of administering justice or tolls. providing each a social identity and assuring class continuity from generation to generation. quite literally immovable. trans. of course. movables did not hold value as land did. land cannot be transported. or just plain loss. It does not depreciate in the normal sense of the term. if there was a physical connection). rights to land defined both the aristocracy who controlled it and the peasants who worked it. and rents) and rights which. crops growing on branches or roots.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 539 Ages had no difficulty defining an immovable. which were closely tied to the land. coin. of 2nd Fr. Jean Brissaud. or misplaced. for they were subject to depreciation. for unlike a dress. after all. Throughout much of northern Europe. and as such they were readily labeled “movable. were also separable from it. each of the many versions of customary law made a distinction between 1 The category of immovables was. chest. (Brussels: Académie Royale de Belgique. (Boston: Little & Brown. jewels. 1912). hidden. as land never was. 142. treated as patrimony..that the distinction movable-immovable in Roman law has relevance only with respect to tangible (corporeal or material [“lichamelijke”]) property. in fact. perfectly accord with customary law’s distinction between cateyl and erve: “an erve is a good that is both permanently existing and productive . the distinction between “movable” and “immovable” does not. private property while heritage. The distinction drawn in northern property law between chattels and patrimony was not. catheylen. not meubles or immeubles. 1000-1350) (Brussels: Palais der Academiën.” along with their equivalents in French. it is erve and thus usually immovable. For customary law it makes no difference whether a good is tangible (“lichamelijk”) or not.. and Erbgüter were. the same as the common-sense 2 For a fuller discussion. nombreux sont les texts qui mentionnent ‘la propriété’ mais dés le XIIIe siècle les juristes romanisants . derive directly from their movable status. Dutch. They are only substitutes for the concepts of cateyl and erve” (22-3). les mots proprietas. [but] an important difference between Roman and customary law is. In French speaking regions. however. So long as a good has permanent existence and is productive. Anne-Marie Patault. dominium. and bewegliche Güter/unbewegliche Güter in German) were conflated with concepts deeply rooted in these cultures and expressed in a vocabulary that long predated the imported Latin terms. In Dutch speaking regions people spoke of cateylen and erve. Le droit privé.540 MARTHA HOWELL the two kinds of property and the rights attaching to them. . si ce n’est le nom” (19). Introduction historique au droit des biens (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. the Latin terms “movables” and “immovables. meublen/immeublen in Dutch. however. and Dirk Hierbaut. but the English words “chattels” on the one hand. The terms movable and immovable in the acts of practices of the thirteenth century thus have no sense in Roman law. and “patrimony” on the other capture their sense. or German (meubles/ immeubles in French.. and in German-speaking regions of Fahrnis and Erbgüter.2 There are no precise equivalents to these terms in medieval English law. As Hierbaut explains. people traditionally spoke of cateux and heritages (héritages in modern French). and Fahrnis were what we think of as chattels or personal. généralisont les termes romains. for cateux. Over lenen en families: een studie over the vroegste geschiedenis van het zakelijk leenrecht in het graafschap Vlaanderen (ca.. erve.. in fact. 2000). proprietas. pour désigner une technique polymorphe d’appropriation qui n’a aucun point commun avec la propriété romaine. esp. Instead. That difference did not. 1989) also has a useful discussion of the way these terms were transferred from Roman law to customary in the French-speaking regions: “Au haut Moyen Âge.. see Godding. dominium sont toujours utilisés par des scribes qui reproduisent méchaniquement un vocabulaire romain desséché. Also see Philippe Godding. erve. Coutumes de Beauvaisis. 1991). Histoire du droit privé francais de l’an mil au code civil (Paris: A. Amédée Salmon. even someone holding the property as allodium (that is. in contrast. independently of a lord or lessor). Gazzangia. or Erbgüter) and those that were income (cateux. 672-8. not fully available to a single person during his or her lifetime precisely because its productive life far exceeded that of any individual. Beaumanoir perfectly expressed this logic. In his famous customal of the late thirteenth century. Il n’évoque plus l’orgueilleuse puissance solitaire du propriétaire romain. Picard. pour désigner une technique polymorphe d’appropriation qui n’a aucun point commun avec la propriété romaine. those born or not-yet-born. mais seulement la jouissance de ses utilités.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 541 notion of the difference between a movable good and an immovable. elle n’est que l’exploitation de la matiére. La pratique l’appelle ‘saisine. goods that were deemed to be cateux. et J.” and that were perpetual because an “héritage ne peut faillir. see Hierbaut. 1970). la possibilité légitime de tirer un profit de la terre. and Patault. Le droit privé dans les Pays-Bas méridionaux du 12e au 18e siècle. (Bruxelles: Palais des Académies. et pragmatiquement. ed. yielding fruit or income from one generation to the next. cited in P. or Fahrnis were under the Philippe de Beaumanoir. 4 On this point. proprietas. 23. was nothing more than a possessor. 2 vols. In contrast. esp.’ mais dés le XIIIe siècle les jurists romanisants effaceront ce terme du vocabulaire de la propriété et généraliseront les termes romains. reprint Paris: A. Over lenen en families. nos. or Fahrnis).” that produced revenues that “valent par années. si ce n’est le nom” (19). Ourliac and J. cateylen. the fruit or income of these properties had no productive capacity. not “property” in the sense we understand it. Il est seulement maîtrise partiaire enserrée dans la solidarité des rapports avec les autres et légitimée par le consensus du groupe. and as such always had to take account of the interests of relatives by blood or marriage. sections 190-2: 141-3. étrangère aux rapports juridiques entre les hommes. (1899-1900. 19: “Mais le mot désigne alors non plus la maîtrise corporelle de la matière. elle est seulement. Elle ne se confond plus avec la matiére.4 Such assets were patrimony. Michel. cateylen. dominium. La ‘propriété’ n’est plus la souveraineté. The key distinction in customary law was between goods that produced income (heritages. “Héritages” were goods that “ne peuvent être mus. Droit des biens. It was thus intended to serve generations. 1985). Goods that produced income were thought to have perpetual lives.”3 According to the logic of these northern European customs. not individuals. 2nd ed. Any possessor of such a property. 3 . L. a good with perpetual productive capacity was not subject to individual ownership. 233. 1971). were hoarded from one generation to the next and efficiently served to store wealth and preserve status across time.6 Other goods that bore no “immovable” qualities whatsoever might nevertheless have patrimonial uses. In cities. On this see in addition Beaumanior. such problems of definition became acute. for there land played so a minor role in economic and social life that it could not provide the necessary fundament to the immovable/ patrimonial equation. these confusions were one of the major sources of instabilities in the legal records that survive from the age. Droit des biens. for these and other examples from the southern Low Countries. resolved these issues on an ad hoc basis. for disputes about such matters regularly drove people to court or forced judicial authorities to issue clarifications about definition and categorization. Jewels. the two sets of terms were treated as rough equivalents for much of the late Middle Ages.. “La circulation est au meuble ce que la productivité est à la ‘l’immeuble’: le fondament de son utilité sociale” (291). Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte (Graz-Köln: Böhlau. movables were the principal source of wealth in urban economies. As she explains. no. Godding. Coutumes de Beauvaisis. for example. inevitably. mills. each set of customs. Each region. section 195: 145. granaries. . fish—all such goods could arguably be considered immovable. as both the premier immovable and the principal patrimonial asset in the medieval economy. To be sure. For Germany. The imported luxuries that flooded aristocratic Europe after the Crusades had begun were the first to 5 Patault. As a result. 2nd ed. be neatly equated with the chattel/patrimony distinction. as items separable from the land. “depuis le Moyen Age jusqu’à la Révolution. and they changed hands rapidly in these commercial societies. there were occasions when the equation broke down. crops. then. Buildings. see Hans Planitz. Le droit privé. Rather. 6 See.542 MARTHA HOWELL individual possessor’s full control. 622. almost perfectly served as the middle term linking patrimony to immobility. the result was diversity. as integral parts of the land. Although the movable/immovable distinction could not. or they could with equal justice be called movable. provides a full discussion of this logic. The conflation functioned so well because land. Were they not then “patrimonial” in some sense? As we shall see. le meuble a été la seule veritable assise de la liberté de disposition” (283).5 They followed no necessary route of transmission and were thought to change ownership simply with their physical transfer from one holder to another. and. ” that is. Thus. That fund was made of two categories of property. for these were moments of massive property transfers. only legal historians have fully acknowledged that such a fundamental socioeconomic transformation could have occurred only with a comparable upheaval in property law. they have often commented that property law was in motion in this age. the use to which movables and immovables could be put was determined by their relationship not just to chattels and patrimony but also. The first was jointly owned by husband and wife together. manufacturing equipment. in their absence. they have pointed out that the moments of greatest tension—and hence of instability in law—occurred at marriage and death. for children born of the marriage or.7 As we shall see. . and many of them have gone further. and inventories that constituted the productive basis of urban economies. collateral or ascendant lineal kin. Being regularly confronted with the unstable and complex meanings attaching to the categories “movable” and “immovable” in law. The value of all such goods. being joint to husband and wife. goods considered joint were called “partible” (deelbar) because. all of which would sit very uneasily on the “movable/immovable = chattel/patrimony” equation. and eventually even the bureaucratic offices that sovereigns handed out to the hordes of eager bidders of early modern Europe. the second was explicitly reserved for the “line.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 543 disrupt medieval Europeans’ easy assumption that “real” wealth was the same as land. Although all historians of the northern city have energetically taken account of these economic developments and their effects on political. to the marital property fund. social and cultural life. In particular. although relatively small in the context of the entire European economy. where this paper focuses. the surviving spouse got one-half of all partible goods and the heirs of the 7 See in particular Godding. Le doit privé. in most customary legal regimes of the North. Along with all of these movables arrived financial paper of all kinds. dominated the urban. and of more profound importance for city people. via chattels and patrimony. sensing the socioeconomic importance of this story and implicitly calling upon their colleagues to pursue it. 142-3. they were equally divisible between them at death. came the raw materials. land rents that had been generated by loans. Then. In Ghent. To accomplish these apparently incommensurate ends. then Amsterdam and still later London displaced it.544 MARTHA HOWELL deceased got the other half. but each story is particular to the legal jurisdiction in which it occurred. went entirely to heirs. but their meanings and relationships in law changed. in contrast. a movable might acquire that status. and their commitment to values beyond those of the market. In the process. In the end. Gentenaren had to rewrite property law so as to free their assets to the market but at the same time select some of them for the benefit of the family and its descendents. their sense of the link between property and social identity. See below for a fuller discussion of Ghent’s customary marital property law. in Ghent. we shall also see. an immovable good would no longer necessarily be patrimonial. we are granted a rare look at the birth pangs of what we call the market society. By tracing their tortured route. The lineal goods of the deceased. Ghent was also northern Europe’s leading center of 8 The surviving spouse had rights to half the income of this property for life. Until the end of the Middle Ages when Antwerp. waged in terms of the partible/impartible divide. Gentenaren took a giant step towards the “commodification of all” that is the tendency of what we call capitalism but at the same time. Ghent is an ideal setting for such a study. the struggles regarding the definition of movable and immovable and their relationship to chattels and patrimony were. for customary law is by definition local and particular. not just because it has preserved the necessary sources. In this way.8 Thus. It was the second largest northern city of the fourteenth and much of the fifteenth century. Tracking Movables in Ghent A version of the transformation that took place in Ghent was played out everywhere in northern Europe. we can learn a lot about their understanding of property. . as we shall see. the terms survived—both those indigenous to the North and the imported Latin words. a good once labeled movable might at another moment in its economic life be labeled immovable. By the dawn of the early modern period. they learned new ways to resist commodification. A text prepared by Ghent’s aldermen (scepenen). Most of the accessible documents are normative in character. 2. Ghent nevertheless honored the system of private property law traditional in this region of the North. 3. Although almost entirely devoted to production for export and to trade itself. but after 1563 the history of such texts is no longer Ghent’s alone. a privilege granted by the Count of Flanders to what was already his most important industrial center. which exists in three manuscript versions. charters and similar texts. carefully distinguishing movables from immovables and roughly equating the former with chattels (cateylen in the Dutch language of Ghent) and the latter with patrimony (erve). 1. summarizing the customary rules of succession in Ghent and dating from the early sixteenth century (abbreviated here as SC). The Grande Charte of 1297 (abbreviated here as GC).MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 545 commercially oriented industry. and in their preponderance dating from the late thirteenth century to the first homologized custom of 1563. Alongside these normative texts two principal forms of “records of practice” survive: a selection of judgments or vonnissen rendered . for these consist of litigation records of various kinds. Ghent has left rich sources for tracing the long history of this custom. ranging from occasional proclamations to rulings to formal statements of customary practices. prepared by the aldermen in 1546 (abbreviated here as DC). a redraft of the 1546 custom which finally earned ducal approval (abbreviated here as HC). Another set of documents is less normative in character. of course. A draft of the city’s entire custom. although they are supplemented by occasional proclamations. ranging from judgments handed down as a result of disputes to summaries of hearings in court. Similar records survive from later years as well. The 1563 homologized custom. 4. for the later records belong to a larger story of legal change driven by the ducal court and by legal theory explicitly drawn from Roman law as earlier custom was not. Four principal normative texts are a basis of this study. . . 15 Vonnis of 16 June 1367. 14 Coutumes. A vonnis of 1371 decreed that “winter” crops in the ground were immovable. implicitly on the theory that the a crop so close to harvest at the time of death was movable.” for example. the death were to have occurred on 1 March. Also see Meijers. Bijlage 1: 72 (vonnis of 13 February 1370 (n. Bijlage 1: 21-3 (vonnis of 10 December 1371. 13 In Meijers. “Winter” crops or “winter fruit” were those planted in fall for spring harvest. a position reiterated in a vonnis of 1415.15 A turbe of 1525 seems. the surviving spouse could be dispossessed of the eventual crop only after having been repaid his or her costs. were specifically labeled movable in the early sixteenth-century listing of customary rules cited above. OVE.14 Fruit trees caused as much confusion.?). OVE. 1: 588-90. #14): seeded corn on a fief is movable even if the fief is not.12 That ruling assumed. OVE.s. for there all “fruit trees” Meijers. which was undisputedly immovable. These are crops sown in early spring for summer harvest. the heirs would acquire both the land and the crop on the grounds that the seed had then not yet produced a recognizably “harvest-able” crop. however. if one of the spouses were to have died on 31 March. the land alone would go to his or her direct heirs in its entirety. one already in the ground but not yet ready for harvest. Bijlage 1: 21 (#23). was customarily considered part of the land.13 Accordingly. According to the same ruling. in Meijers. Apple trees (appelboomen) more than “knee high. OVE. the surviving spouse of a marriage. But according to a vonnis rendered by the aldermen in 1350. and the survivor would have rights to half the crop in the ground.548 MARTHA HOWELL a seeded crop. If. summer crops became movable after mid-May. however. the reasoning must have been. a statement seeming to confirm a vonnis from 1367 (here the term is bogarde or orchard). presumably since that cost was assumed to have been borne by the couple together. was to be compensated for the money that had been spent in preparing the ground and sowing the seed. however. in recognition of his or her rights to half of all movables in the estate. but only if the death of the landowner had occurred before mid-March. Having paid 50 per cent of planting. out of their joint movable property. #2). When the crop was closer to harvest the situation was muddied. #24). to have revised this norm. Bijlage 1: 3-4 (vonnis of 26 July 1350. 12 . that the crops were not ready for harvest. #24. 1: 564-9 and 588-90. this time leaving little doubt that the category “trees” was unstable. When we turn from “fruit trees” to “trees” more generally. #17. the authors of the document took pains to remark).” and another of 1367 confirmed that willows (wulghen) were movable. Article 20 declared tronckycken (oaken stumps) movable if the trijshoudt (branches or twigs) were older than seven years (the branches themselves were also movable. for the texts are replete with signs of quarrels. Bijlage 2: 79 (#1). dry or green) movable. Bijlage 1: 21. Article 17 of that text flatly declared “upgaende boomen. or in certain locations were movable. 18 Vonnis of 12 October 1367. Bijlage 1: 16. whether inside the city or outside it (“binnen der stede often buuten”). OVE. HC of 1563. to overturn the earlier statement regarding tronckeycken. XX-3 and passim. and no age limit was indicated (turbe of 17 May 1531. Articles XXV-4 and 34. but it is not unreasonable to suspect that the instability of terminology and the frequency with which fruit-bearing trees appear in our sources are the faint traces of debate about definition. indecision. article V-3. HC. in Meijers. OVE.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 549 (fruutboomen) were deemed movables. while in article 22 it was explained that elshaghen (hedges of alders) had to wait five years. however. OVE.” “fruit trees” and “orchards” the same things in the eyes of litigants and the court alike? Nothing in the available sources directly tells us. A vonnis of 1363 decreed bushes (bosch) movable if “one customarily cut them. A turbe of 1531 seemed.18 Turbe of September 1525. here they were declared movable. DC of 1546. OVE. both texts suggesting by their very existence that litigants had contested the principle and were seeking exceptions (vonnis of 29 June 1363. however. were movable after three years (article 21). adding that if the trees were located on a fief. Dornehagen (hedges of pine evergreens). vonnis of 12 May 1367. Some texts flatly labeled trees movable. drooghe often groene” (grown trees. but others implied that only certain trees. of certain heights or age.16 The homologized custom of 1563 repeated the same blanket convention. they were nevertheless divisible as movables (here they were called fruytboomen). Were “apple trees. in Meijers. our suspicions are further aroused. in Meijers. OVE. for it is not clear whether they had to have reached a certain growth. vonnissen of 1399 and 1415 in Coutumes. along with its principal dwelling and major “shade” trees. #22).17 Although clear at one level—apple or fruit trees are movables—these texts are ambiguous at another. without qualification regarding height. whether on fief or free land (“leen of erve”). Bijlage 1: 20-1. even if located on a fief. in Meijers. The sixteenth century SC introduced more vocabulary. Nor is it obvious just what kind of trees were at issue. and changes of direction. in Meijers. 17 16 . no matter how rich. and the heirs of the land would have been as eager to have a decision counting it immovable (in which case they got it all. and the next article (XXV-33) reiterated that doornehagen were movable if three years old. excepting only the schauboomen (shade trees) on a fief. day workers and journeymen regularly skirted disaster and sometimes met it. A slightly earlier turbe of 1525 had provided the same ruling. see Johan Dambruyne. This was. 48 (Brussels: Crédit Communal de Belgique. let us remember. relaties en transformaties in de 16de-eeuwse Gentse ambachtswereld (Ghent: Academia Press. Article XXV-32 again named slachoudt (cut wood) movable. crop yields seldom exceeded 5 bushels per acre (today they are easily 10-20 times that amount). or branches) were included in that ruling. and foodstuffs were relatively so expensive that a family’s subsistence diet took up a significant portion of the daily wage of an adult male unskilled worker. #1). Bilage 2: 79. where Baltic lumber was not yet imported at the rate it would later be (and in any case was used principally Bijlage 2: 99-100. a part of Europe where most woodland had long ago been decimated. sprigs.550 MARTHA HOWELL If we reflect on the role these goods played in the economy of the day. along with troncken. in Meijers. OVE. For the sixteenth century. . adding that the rys. Wood. haer of waey (twigs. The DC of 1546 declared that “boomen” (trees) were movable. becomes comprehensible. confirming the minimum age of three years. and in some years took all of it. was even more valuable than a crop in the ground itself. Les travaux publics de la ville de Bruges. would have hardly been indifferent to the decision taken about a crop’s movability (in which case he or she got half of it as his or her own). contemporaries’ evident concern with trees and crops. les hommes. fuel. again excluding the shade trees on fiefs. even fish and peat. #37). 2002). but thought it necessary to elaborate. Only master artisans in the building trades had incomes high enough to avoid risk of famine. In this age seed yields were only about 4:1 or 5:1. and had to share only half its income during the life of the surviving spouse). Collection Pro Civitate. 230-1 and 308-9. where lords valued their privileged access to forests above most other rights. Corporatieve middengroepen: aspiraties. and the sources he cites. 19 For measures of subsistence wages in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. XIVe-XVe siècles: les matériaux. 1977). any surviving spouse. see Jean-Pierre Sosson. furniture or construction. and slachoudt (cut wood) was movable so long as the schueten (shoots or limbs) were at least three years old (turbe of September 1525.19 Under those conditions. but that text also introduced entirely new terms: hauten (wood) was movable. even if on a fief. The HC of 1563 significantly elaborated this ruling: the movable or partible account included only those boomen whose trunks were wider than two hands and higher than the chest. but the shade trees (schauboomen) were not. whether used for its fruit. treat houses and similar structures as movable assets. in Coutumes.21 A turbe of 1529 flatly repeated the principle. 1: 582-4). another of 1359. Gentenaren deviated dramatically from regional norms. vonnis of 1415. leeninghen ende latinghen. article 17: “huusen. vonnis of 8 April 1359. in Coutumes. 24 The only area of instability or uncertainty concerned houses located on land held in fief. those taken elsewhere. fish and the like resembled. also see article XXI-31 of DC 1546. where houses in the city are once again specifically labeled partible. especially. #17. in Meijers. A vonnis of 1411-1412. in Coutumes. a ruling repeated in the subsequent article as well. Bijlage 1: 14. even if they did not duplicate. are unambiguous. A turbe of 1525 exempted the beste vuurst (best residence) on a fief. While many of the available texts labeled them movable. People. 1: 588-90. a third in 1399 and a fourth in 1415 all routinely included huusen (“houses”) in their lists of movables or chattels.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 551 in shipbuilding and other major projects). for example. #4. and where peat was the sole readily available fuel substitute. staende often wesende up leenen oft erven binnen der stede often buuten es gherekent often ghehauden muelbe (sic). The surviving texts. in Meijers. OVE. Bijlage 2. while the SC of the early sixteenth century elaborated further: article 16 intoned that “all houses or parts of houses” were movable. All the records we have from Ghent. OVE. OVE. hoarded then wood carefully and used it sparingly. “partible and considered chattels and movable property. vonnis of 1399.22 The DC of 1546 spoke even more aggressively: houses in Ghent are. 87-8. in their treatment of houses and. Bijlage 1.”23 The HC of 1563 repeated that clause almost verbatim. as did article 17 of the early sixteenth-century SC cited above. even dully repetitive. schuren. 1: 564. the dispute between a rich widow and her deceased husband’s heirs over household goods and the trees/lumber supplies on the land he had left (vonnis of 12 May 1367. #22). exempted houses on fiefs held of the Duke of Burgundy. A vonnis of 1350.” 23 Article X-25. however. Bijlage 1: 3. so cherished was this item that some people made special bequests of it in their wills. 21 Vonnis of 18 February 1350 (ns). even rich people. of land.20 Similar struggles plagued Ghent’s neighbors and the decisions taken in Ghent regarding crops.24 20 See. in Meijers. for example. according to the custom. others introduced qualifications. repeated in VI-19 of the HC of 1563. SC. in Meijers. OVE. ruling that their status was determined by the feudal court with specific jurisdiction (vonnis of 1411-1412. #14. stallen ende andere edificien. trees. even the earliest. 20-1. . 22 Turbe of 5 June 1529. whether normative or practical. DC of 1546. several cities in West Flanders and some in Germany among them. article XXV-35). see Meijers. OVE. as far as we know. was to be divided between the survivor of the marriage and the deceased’s lineal heirs (as a partible good). It originated in the awkward situation produced when a house and its tenure was being transferred at the end of a marriage.552 MARTHA HOWELL Ghent was not entirely alone in labeling houses movables. #4. in Meijers. Later even those conditions were dropped. Bijlage 1: 17-18. Bijlage 2: 79. This left only land outside Ghent or land held in fief as potentially patrimonial property. Lille. Le droit privé. The transition is documented as early as the fourteenth century. Bijlage 1: 4-7. vonnis of 10 December 1371. article XXI-36. Bijlage 1: 21-3. OVE. others from 1371 and 1450 repeated the judgment (vonnis of 22 June 1353. while the land. when a vonnis of 1353 declared that “erve within Ghent on which rent was being paid were partible. #1. 26 Meijers’s OVE traces this story. Following article 24. At some point during the fourteenth century. although movable.4 and more generally for the Low Countries. in Meijers. repeated in HC of 1563. The house. philosophisch-historische Klasse 5-32 (Heidelberg: Carl Winter. whether or not it paid rent and whether or not it was built. which was traditionally considered patrimonial and thus impartible. and the occupant of the house (typically the surviving spouse) was unlikely to hold the land rights.26 and the DC of 1546 provided that a house in the countryside. 25 For West Flanders. 143-4. Antwerp. being movable. Godding. was considered movable. 33. #19). For Germany. The theory here was that the rental payments had been assumed in order to acquire land for building the house. 2d ed. The story of how Ghent came to this decision is long and complicated. vonnis of 22 November 1363. came article . in Meijers. “Mittelalterliche Bürgertestamente: Neuerschlossene Quellen zur Geschichte der materiellen und geistigen Kultur. and all land in the jurisdiction of Ghent. could be kept whole by the landowner if she or she compensated the half-owner(s) for their share of its value (turbe of September 1525. 1973). OVE. n. Ghent’s aldermen decided to treat these “packages” as movable if the land was encumbered by rental payments.25 But Ghent stands alone. The sixteenth-century SC confirms this reading. #24. which explained that all unbuilt erve in Ghent held of lordships [paying traditional landcijns] were patrimonial.. see Ashaver von Brandt. for some other areas of the North did so as well. The result was confusion: the owner of the land was not the full owner of the house that stood on it. OVE. in labeling most land movable. was to be passed directly to heirs. OVE. vonnis of 1450 in Coutumes 1: 628. in Meijers.” Sitzungberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaft. evident. Like the history of land and its legal status in Ghent. was chattel property and therefore partible. I have been able to check only one of her cases (Gedele 330. article XXV-29]. which deemed movable all patrimonial property (erve) in Ghent that paid landcijns. the land portion was treated as heritable and only the house entered the community of goods (Danneel. and it was this category of asset (or liability if one was the borrower rather than the creditor) that provided Gentenaren a way to both serve the market and preserve wealth for heirs. #22). A French adage of 25. 268. not in the jurisdiction of Ghent. The ruling is first visible in a turbe of 1529 in which “all land within the jurisdiction of Ghent” was deemed cateyl (turbe of 1529. most debts were thought to be personal obligations. No mention here of landcijns.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 553 Debt obligations were.” The 1563 HC extended the reach to the suburbs of Ghent: “land holds the side from which it came. There we indeed find an eervachticheden (patrimonial property) consisting of land and a house. 81). however. Meijers argues that it does not. for that was the only property in his or her possession that was truly personal. whether actually built or not. along with the usufruct attaching to it. the circle had closed by the sixteenth. fols. a considerably more complicated matter than either land or houses. in Meijers. however. Bijlage 2: 91-2. seem to support him.” Whatever the confusions of the fifteenth century. Land. was movable if it was in the jurisdiction of Ghent.” what Gentenaren called erfrenten. Like all other known regions of customary law. and the aldermen did indeed determine that the land held side. #39. whether actually encumbered or not. Ghent assiduously preserved a key feature of the traditional law of patrimony: perpetual “rents. the story of rents and other forms of indebtedness is a complex one. even if the rents were paid on land that was itself considered movable and partible. Section XXI-27 of the 1546 DC was equally precise: “Land ‘holds side’ except [my emphasis] land that is within the city. This land was. and the cases he cites. but in Deestinghem... retained patrimonial capacity. OVE. except [my emphasis] the land inside the city and outer fortifications of the city [which] is partible [movable] . as in all regions of customary law. 133-4. . All land in Ghent. as well as the normative texts. 13 April 1491). n.”[ HC. Its general shape is. and its details beyond the scope of this essay. whether or not encumbered or built. however. which is movable. implying by the contrast with article 24 that built land paying landcijns was intended. while the house itself was partible. Danneel cites two cases appearing to indicate that if a house with land paying rent had been acquired before marriage or inherited during marriage. and thus to attach to the movable goods of the individual who incurred the debt. none of houses. and according to Ghent’s custom as then expressed such land would indeed have “held side. Weduwen en wezen. In Ghent. . in Meijers. specifically naming all “schulden van baten ende van commerce” (“all obligations arising from income and expenses”). 27 . For example. allowing lenders to trade future income for present cash. The annual registers of the Keure (the Jaarregisters van de Keure. see Philippe Lardinois. etc. Bijlage 1: 4. insculden. “accounts receivable. OVE.” Licenciaat. for example. Bijlage 2: 100. a lender who was due 100 pounds but who needed the funds immediately could sell that debt to a third person. the HC of 1563 repeated the sentiment. Droit des biens.. the latter largely with inheritance and what were called “zoenen” or compensation payments for personal (and physical) injury. For a fuller study of this source. #3). civil (private) matters were dealt with by two separate groups of aldermen (scepenen). Another of 1371 was similar: all “huutsculden. while article 32 of the same text mentioned “all debts” and article 26 broadly included all “besproken blat” (“encumbered revenue”).” The former dealt with matters of property transactions.554 MARTHA HOWELL the day expressed the concept succinctly: “meubles sont sièges des dettes.28 During the month of December 1400 alone. who would then collect the amount due from the borrower. A summary of the thesis was published in Hand. debts. U. that debts were to be charged against the movable account of a marriage (vonnis of 15 August 1350. The central fundament of the basic rule was preserved in all the normative statements issued by aldermen and in all the rulings issued by municipal courts. The Jaarregisters of Ghent’s aldermen of the “Keure” contain eloquent testimony to the ubiquity of such unsecured debt.” (“contracts and obligations”) (turbe of 12 July 1531. for example. Fifty-nine of the entries—over half—recorded debt obligations of unspecified origin Cited in Patault. income and expenses”) were movable (vonnis of 10 December 1371 in Meijers. Lenders had other advantages as well because they could claim all the borrower’s movables in case of default and did not have to rely on a single asset for their security. A turbe of 1531 listed all “contracten [ende] obligatien. series 301) were the transcriptions of agreements (of a financial nature) voluntarily brought to the aldermen for registration. baten ende comer” (“payments or receipts on debts. Article 2 of the early sixteenth century SC confirmed the rule. OVE. “Diplomatische studie van de akten van vrijwillige rechtspraak te Gent van de XIIIe tot de XVe eeuw.” and the like) could easily be bought and sold. OVE. in Meijers. 28 From the fourteenth century forward. Geschiedenis Gent 31 (1977): 65-75. Bijlage 1: 21-3. Gentenaren registered 114 transactions with the aldermen.” “debt payments due. #3). The DC of 1546 continued the litany.”27 The notion that debts were personal and thus payable out of personal—movable—property alone had important implications for economic life. Ghent (1975-6). #24). Debts “owned” by lenders (what we might call “collectables. 282. Maatsch. A vonnis of 1350 flatly declared. the “Keure” and the “Gedele. and Negotiability. the three volumes of Regesten op de Jaarregisters van de Keure from 1967.” The International History Review 25 (3) (2003): 505-62. were prototypical. 30 John H. Boon (Ghent: Stad Gent. 1345-46. and such obligations were generally understood to be permanent and of a tenurial nature. just as custom imagined.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 555 and without specific security. Only an immovable good could properly secure a loan. 1343-44. Such assets were. it was thought. Although this evidence seems to insist that secured debts were unknown to medieval custom.29 Another fifteen of the 114 did specify how the debt had originated. ed. and 1972 [no named editor] cover 1400-01) [hereafter RJR]. Boon (Ghent: Stad Gent. No individual. could encumber his or her heirs.” Credito e usura fra teologia. J. for medieval people faced opposition both from spiritual authorities and customary secular law. however. ed. Rentes. for payments on a secured loan looked suspiciously like interest charges unless they totaled no more than the precise amount of the loan—a deal no long-term lender could accept. The problem for the church was usury. and Equality (c. for only such an asset would hold value and generate income to service the loan. École française de Rome. forthcoming). but they did not imply that the object purchased with the money lent was specific security for the loan. the source of patrimonial wealth—wealth due heirs—and in the medieval imagination those heirs were due their property free of debt. Regesten op de Jaarregisters van de Keure. however. The old medieval cens (census in Latin) and aides. and 1349-50. Nature.31 29 This material is all taken from the inventories and case summaries of the Jaarregisters published by the municipal archive of Ghent: Regesten op de Jaarregisters van de Keure [Inventarissen en Indices gepubliceerd door het Archief. “Changing Definitions of Money. but also see Joel Kaye.30 The problem in secular custom involved patrimonial rights. the contrary is in fact the case. 31 The history of debt in medieval Europe with respect to immovables is ex- . XII-XIV) (CNRS. The techniques for securing long-term debt developed slowly and hesitatingly. diritto e amministratione. Linguaggi a confronto (sec. provides a nuanced discussion of usury laws and their effects on financial markets. Università di Trento. 1970. the dues or honorific payments to lords that traditionally were exacted from all users of non-allodial land. Munro’s “The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution: Usury. the only obligations that could attach to or pass with patrimonial assets were those integral to its use. 1969) covers 1353-54 and 1357-58. Accordingly. Stad Gent].1140-1270) and Their Place within Thomas Aquinas’ Questions on Usury. His references are extensive. J. 1968) covers 1339-40. OVE. . #510. money was given in exchange for rent payments in perpetuity. in Meijers. medieval people managed to conceptualize it as a sale (of money) in return for a perpetual rent. secured by a house and tenement (erf). 33 Vonnis of 22 June 1353. Le droit privé and Munro. the “debt” was secured by an asset that the debtor already owned. Originally considered a kind of perpetual lease of land in exchange for a perpetual rent (thus. 1: 529-40. “The Medieval Origins. however. The critical shift. fol. more commonly as time went on. and Meijers. Bijlage 1: 23-9. however. in exchange for an unnamed amount of money. #25. Les rentes au XVIe siècle: histoire d’un instrument de crédit (Paris: S. no usury. The fullest study of rents. clearly declared “eerve.556 MARTHA HOWELL It was precisely the census or cens. so Sersander’s ability to borrow against it a second time indicates that the property produced at least 4 shillings of income a year. and is repeated with casual assurance throughout the period studied.E. In either case no loan was involved—thus. For example.33 The rule is invariable. is Bernard Schnapper. was to what were called rentes à prix d’argent or rentes constituées. for example.. bail à rente).N.V. again in 1372 the same language appears. #4. Although this device had all the earmarks of a secured debt. Jan Sersanders issued a rent (erfelijke rente) to Jan van Maelgavere of 2 shillings gros tournois per year. the money being used by the debtor either to purchase the asset securing the “debt” or. 24v/1. In this case. eeveliike rente” impartible. About a third of the entries in the indexed volumes of the Jaarregisters concern such debts. in both Coutume. which provided the necessary structure for secured debt because it was early and easily conflated with what was called a rente foncière or bail à rente. to invest elsewhere.” 32 RJR. thus aligning it with the rente foncière or old census—and avoiding both usury prohibitions and disgruntled heirs. A vonnis of 1352-1353. payable to a third party. this instrument could also be seen as a sale of land in exchange for a perpetual rent (rente foncière).32 All such rents were treated as immovable patrimony and thus as impartibles. 1957). OVE. Also see Godding. as they had evolved by the end of the Middle Ages and developed in sixteenth-century France (Paris above all). The property was already encumbered with a rent of 2 shillings gros tournois. Bijlage 1: 4-7. In the latter case.E. vonnis of 12 November 1372.P. If the perpetual tremely complex and hard to document in its specifics for a particular locality. #17. were structured just like erfrenten but the borrower could repay the obligation.36 The DC of 1546 as well as the HC of 1583 were clearer still: all “realized” losrenten were treated as immovables. The clause is found in DC XXI-18 and in HC XXV-8 (the term appears elsewhere in these texts as well. #23.” See note 40 below for an explanation of this term. as did a turbe of 1530.37 By the sixteenth century. however.” a debt was pursuable in court and the security underlying it attachable. More than any other financial instrument of the age. OVE. in Meijers. however.34 Other texts. OVE. #9. OVE. Another of 10 December 1529.35 Article 27 of the early sixteenth-century SC repeated the same rule. Because they were detachable from the asset (when redeemed). Once “realized. then. A turbe of 1528 declared all besette renten (secured rents) immovable except lijfrenten. see further in this text for a discussion of this relationship. where besette (secured) losrenten were treated as immovables. 36 Turbe of 10 October 1530. being secured by immovables. article XXV-27). and that is what several early sixteenth-century texts provided. immovable. Bijlage 2: 87-8. redeemable rents. the situation was more complicated in secular law. for under such conditions the rent attached to the real property and followed it. see. Philippe Godding for this explanation. in Meijers. were considered patrimonial and. as they were called in Ghent. Bijlage 2: 96. Dr. even if secured by an asset undisputedly movable such as a house. The logic is. 34 . XXV-40 of the HC). specified that they were movable (common) unless purchased with the proceeds of the sale of an immovable erve. offered a different interpretation. These losrenten. #9. for example.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 557 rent was repurchaseable by the borrower. 38 In what might seem a gross contradiction. I am grateful to Prof. however. at some amount that had been fixed in the original loan agreement. these most resemble our secured loans—and least resemble the old tenurial rent. clear. 35 Turbe of 9 September 1528. Bijlage 2: 83-4. thereby implying that secured losrenten were immovable. Bijlage 2: 83-4. contradicted another turbe (of 9 September 1528. OVE. in Meijers. The difference may lie in the term “besette. as such. whenever desired. the income received by the lender of the funds was treated as a movable (HC. OVE. however. in Meijers. as an explicit reference to a process of formal “registration” (which could have been oral) of a secured obligation. 37 The term “realized” rents first appears in sixteenth-century texts. these debts could logically be considered movable. in Meijers. Losrenten. treated losrenten as movables in that they were part of common account. This judgment. however. #31. even if the security was a “movable” house. Bijlage 2: 92. had to stay attached to that immovable if the creditor was to be properly secured. Again.38 A turbe of 5 June 1529. OVE. naturally. then the borrower would own the pledged property free and clear. or sometimes the entire nuclear family). in that way the creditor was still secured.558 MARTHA HOWELL Clearly. Bijlage 1: 8. Although structured exactly like the rente constituée. not in fact as “debt” per se but as a quasi-tenurial arrangement. temporary. As such these assets lodged. Annuities were. the connection between the financial instrument and its security was. specified that even if the rental payment was secured by immovab1es that belonged to one spouse alone the obligation to service the annuity was movable. #24. in Meijers. 39 This was a fraught issue everywhere in Europe. In this case. 40 Vonnis of 14 August 1355. vonnis of 10 December 1371 in Meijers. conceptualized perpetual rents as a different kind of debt. OVE. in Meijers. common as well). half the rent went with half the house to the heir. rente viagère (lijfrent in Dutch). like others of their age. OVE. Bijlage 1: 12-13. in French. movables. The rent attached to the land went to the heir of the land. however. #6 (here it was explained that the rent had been purchased with common property during the marriage so the income was. By the late Middle Ages a new form of the rente constituée was at least as common. see Schnapper. Oddly. and the other half went to the surviving spouse. this meant that a rent secured by a house and building lot was divided between heirs and the successor to a portion of the house. with the family line and were not freely available to the market. Les rentes. even if the property was sold to a third party or passed on to heirs. ultimately. 244-60. The obligation to pay rent ceased when the creditor(s) died. the annuity was not perpetual but was due only for the life of the creditor (or the group of creditors. #13. and belonged in the partible accounts of Gentenaren. Gentenaren. thus. since such annuities were typically written on several lives—husband and wife. and the patterns of resolution in customary law. explained that the annuity payments received were movables if both they had been acquired with common .39 The individuals paying the rents (the borrowers) also treated their payments as patrimonial in that they passed to heirs along with the property securing the rent. Bijlage 1: 21-3. in effect.40 While the income from the rent could float free of the property and be considered “personal” to the lender. and its appearance further disturbed traditional norms. This was the annuity or. A vonnis of 1 April 1359. For a discussion of the wide variety of solutions. and annuities themselves had short lives—or in any case non-perpetual lives. the capital tied up in debt had to be attached specifically to the asset generating the debt. they believed. Bijlage 2: 83-4. Gentenaren would have been easily inclined to treat all goods as movables. since movables alone could be freely released to the market.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 559 The Import of Change This legal history can seem a linear story in which Gentenaren gradually allowed the imperatives of commerce to trump the weight of medieval tradition. we come to see that the imperatives of commerce were in constant tension with older and more deeply seated notions imbedded in the very concept of patrimony: property rights were the basis of social order. OVE. however. As we have seen. the means for establishing hierarchies among them. Being dependent on industry and trade for their livelihoods and social position. in Meijers. If. and the cash received by the borrower when the loan was first made went into the borrowers’ movable account. they were also convinced that the market alone could not be permitted to allocate property rights. Gentenaren manipulated the partible/impartible divide at the heart of their marital property law. Rather. #9. We can also understand why Gentenaren would have wanted to make such adjustments to law. not incidentally. even if Gentenaren accepted that all wealth had to be released to the market. the annuity payments received by the purchaser during life were counted as movables. A turbe of 9 September 1528. . and if we also observe what Gentenaren actually did with wealth that was considered immovable—we can no longer tell Ghent’s story as the triumph of commerce over medieval legal tradition. There is no doubt that the category of movables and thus of partibles was dramatically increased as the Middle Ages came to a close. To achieve these apparently incommensurate goals. as were the payments made by the borrower. in Ghent’s custom movable (movable) property. Thus. went on to specify that they were partible even if secured by erve (“besetten”). property rights should ultimately be conferred by kinship status. we study the entire three centuries of change. Hence. Instead. These rules were repeated in the SC of the early sixteenth century (article 26) and in the DC of 1546 (XXI-20) as well as the HC of 1563 (XXV-22). the mechanism by which people were connected to each other through time and space and. we might reason. if we look not just at the situations where property was freed but also at those where it was not. and by that mechanism both gender and class hierarchies could be constructed and preserved. Le droit familial (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.” Nouvelle revue historique de droit français et étranger. Histoire du droit privé. which was especially clear on this principle. Although goods labeled “community” were by definition the equivalent of partible goods. she did so only as trustee and under the supervision of adult relatives of the deceased husband. The clause was repeated. however. The surviving spouse of the marriage did. 41 . 3. article XX-23. alienate. For examples of non-marital communities. sell. if the wife died first. without asking permission of his wife or her particular heirs. have lifetime rights to half the income from the portion of the community account (thus 50 per cent of the income from 50 per cent of the community account) that had passed to heirs of the deceased. and at the death of either spouse. the survivor (or the lineal heirs of the survivor) had a full claim to 50 per cent of those assets. the survivor of her marriage. no matter their composition. but even then she assumed ownership only of 50 per cent of the assets. Although the fund was technically jointly owned. see Jean Hilaire. in HC of 1563. see P. 51 (1973): 8-53. even if he was the father of those children. 42 See article XXI-7 of the DC. the 50 per cent of the community account that ultimately belonged to her passed to her lineal heirs. preferentially to her children. All partible goods belonged to what Gentenaren called the community of goods or the community (common) fund that was created when a woman and man married. Legal historians argue that the community property account central to marital property law in this region of Europe was a residue of old systems in which the entire family constituted the community. “Vie en commun: famille et esprit communautaire.. during the marriage it was in fact entirely managed—and effectively owned—by the husband. or encumber the assets however he wished. but those rights expired at the death of the survivor. the other half passed to the deceased husband’s lineal heirs.42 It was only when he died that the woman acquired her rights. de Malafosse. As head of household he could buy. For this argument. did not have full authority over that portion of the community account. Even if those heirs were minor children born of the marriage and the widow managed the assets on their behalf. The reverse was also true. It was thus a supremely important matter to decide whether a good belonged in the community account. almost verbatim. 1968). 4th ser.41 Community goods were the joint property of both spouses. exchange.560 MARTHA HOWELL goods were not only equated with chattels. Ourliac and J. they were automatically considered partible. XXV-31 provided that watermills were movable just like houses and trees.. the husband could manage his wife’s impartible goods. clothing. But there remained a potentially significant category of wealth that would not enter the community account. leaving perpetual rents and land outside Ghent as the only significant outlyers. all goods traditional law had considered movable or chattel were automatically labeled partible—furniture.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 561 neither was contained by the terms “chattel” or “movable. XXV-30 included windmills on fiefs. as well as all goods considered movable chattel. XXV-28 specified non-hypothecated (“onbesette”) rents. household furnishings. XXV-27 included the income from repurchaseable rents (losrenten). windmills on simple erve. raw materials. unless acquired by inheritance or gift promised before marriage. article XXV-6 listed houses or parts of houses in addition to all movables acquired during marriage. leases and mortgages. we have seen. In the language of Ghent’s custom. Another feature of custom expanded the partible account still further. listed “houses. by the 1500s the category of movable chattel had been radically expanded. Any good acquired after marriage. excepting the parts that were not physically movable. was added to the community account. cash. During marriage. even if on a fief but in that case the “stoel metten legghere” [chair with mill-stone] went with the fief. trees grown to the width of a man’s hand span and chest high. but he 43 Various clauses of the HC of 1563 laboriously detailed the items included: article XXV-4. impartibles were individually owned during marriage. peat and stone that has been mined . these were impartibles. kitchenware. for example. inventories. This could—and did—include land both inside and outside Ghent and perpetual rents. and animals. . article XXV-22 listed annuities (lijfrenten) XXV-24 listed income due from leases but not yet paid. unsecured debts. arms. weapons. bows. In contrast to partible goods that entered the community account and were under full control of the husband during marriage. while XXV-39 declared all “personal debts arising from expenses” partible. jewelry. minted and unminted coin. subsequent articles XXV-32-38 provided detailed instructions about trees and fish. for the implied assumption was these assets had been acquired with funds earned during marriage or obtained by sale of other goods in the community account. accounts receivable. horses and harnesses. however. no matter if they had been purchased with impartibles that “held side”. were movable in their entirety.. and they were the residual property of lineal heirs of the spouse who possessed them. excepting the shade trees and best residence on a fief that are expected to follow the fief”. household provisions.43 And. logs.” To be sure. stocks of munitions. chattels. jewels and baubles. 46 In sum. 529-40.44 At death. as well as land within Ghent’s jurisdiction.562 MARTHA HOWELL could not sell. the partible/impartible binary provided Gentenaren a way to limit the free circulation of wealth and direct it where they wanted it to go. almost alone. article 6 and DC. SC. A turbe of 12 July 1531. 45 Article XXV-8. it “held side. When overlaid on the old movable/immovable divide. by 1563 at the latest. were considered partible. governed all marital property relations. however. article 4 of SC. flatly overruled these proscriptions. the impartibles of the deceased passed to lineal heirs. as explained in article XXV-29 of the HC. only land outside Ghent and perpetual rents (including redeemable rents) remained impartible and then if and only if the property had been acquired or pledged before marriage or if given specifically to one of the spouses by a third party (even during marriage). and the surviving spouse had only lifetime rights to half the income produced by the assets. for example. Published law after published law proclaimed this principle. OVE. all impartibles were necessarily immovables but only certain immovables acquired this status. in Meijers. This left land outside Ghent’s jurisdiction. Also see vonnis of 22 June 1353. pp. OVE. specifying that a husband could not “encumber. a See. went further. in Meijers. Customary marital property law was Gentenaren’s chief tool in their larger social project because it. and inheritance in this city. succession. 44 . thus. erfachtycheid often erfvelicke rente” without his wife’s permission. encumber. and they were forbidden to write marriage contracts instituting terms in violation of custom. #4. Thus Gentenaren were denied the right to issue wills privileging a spouse more than custom would have allowed. alienate or sell” “errgront. Only in 1563 was the latter prohibition overturned. 46 Articles XXV-40 and XXV-55. as we have seen. and court case after court case reflected its precepts. or otherwise alienate these goods without her explicit consent. his or her heirs did not assume those rights at the survivor’s death. #39. Article XX-20 of the HC.”45 Other articles in that text included rents that had been secured before marriage as well as land and secured rents acquired by gift or inheritance during marriage. for. articles XXI-2 and 11 repeated the rules. immovables acquired during marriage with common funds. Because all movables were by definition partible. Bijlage 2: 100-1. 47 Vonnis of 1352-3.47 Ghent was. Bijlage 1: 4-7. but instead allowed custom to govern marital property relations and succession. for the only records we have of such contracts are buried in the hundreds of manuscript volumes of Jaarregisters van de Keure housed in Ghent’s municipal archive. we have 26 marriage contracts for a period of about 60 years. but 6 of those elaborately detail the consents obtained from heirs whose interests were at stake in the changes. 1349-50. It is impossible to know how many of these instances there were.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 563 relative latecomer to the marriage contract. loans. in addition. Fifteen of the 26 appear to violate terms of custom. 1343-4. Of the 1. they also got away with it. of Nebraska Press. It is also possible that Gentenaren simply did not register such contracts. On the contrary. Neb. and 1400-01). Altogether then. 1345-6. 1343-4. The entire While all the evidence suggests that Gentenaren did not regularly issue marriage contracts. there are only two. the marriage contract was rarely used in medieval Ghent. of some 16 additional marriage contracts issued between 1345 and 1390 and also registered in the Jaarregisters van de Keure. some people not only chose to overwrite custom. and its citizens resorted to such legal mechanism only in rare circumstances. two of which the aldermen later crossed out as inoperative. 1985) we know. the registers in which private agreements of sales. But most of those texts assume custom’s rules. 1357-8.580 entries for the single year 1400-1401. but that seems unlikely given the care with which the archive has otherwise been catalogued.48 In sum. debt settlements and the like were recorded. and 1357-8. 49 It is also possible that marriage contracts were registered elsewhere than in the Jaarregisters and were simply not mentioned in the published inventory. however. and in those texts it is possible to find occasional discussion of a prior marriage contract that set forth the terms of the inheritance. 1353-4. 1349-50. 48 . Some are referenced in the voluminous Weezenboec[en] where inheritance arrangements were registered. only ten marriage contracts are mentioned. leaving only 19 in 60 years that appear to have violated custom’s norms. 1345-6. and these provide our only systematic guide to the frequency and nature of such contracts. all the presently available evidence depicts people who almost always married under the terms of custom and fought their battles in court over its terms. but that too seems unlikely given the solicitude they showed in registering financial agreements of considerably less importance and given as well the risks that a disgruntled heir or spouse would challenge a marriage contract that violated published law and had not been publicly registered. for many of these entries concern the settlement of orphans’ estates or the terms of wills. This does not mean that custom perfectly satisfied the needs of all but a few Gentenaren. Among the 1. Thanks to David Nicholas’s research for his Domestic Life in a Medieval City (Lincoln.: Univ. 1353-4.49 If they did not—and a few evidently did not—they were careful to make a public record of their decision and often to specially register their heirs’ consent to the new terms. Indices have been published for only seven years of the medieval centuries (1339-40.427 entries in the Jaarregisters indexed for the six years 1339-40. To judge from these documents alone. all the assertions of published law notwithstanding. between family or kin interests on the one hand and individual interests on the other—was disturbed.1969). . social. in all senses of the word—economic. of a deeper conflict in the cultural. trans. With this explosion. H. and even the rare marriage contracts issued to override or supplement custom—speak eloquently about the social tensions embedded in the property relations constructed by marriage in this age.564 MARTHA HOWELL legal record from Ghent—the editions of custom. and economic meaning of property. because such tension is endemic to all societies where women marry out of the line and carry patrimonial property with them. 50 For a structural analysis of these exogamous marriages and the social tensions they produce. legal. although that is its structural precondition. a world of easily fungible property subjected to a logic of profit and price. J. however. but an expression. Press. Bell et al. social. Capital as Patrimony This legal record reveals that Ghent did not steadily progress towards what is called a classic market economy. 1976) and his Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe (New York: Cambridge Univ. the traditional axes by which property relations had been organized—the distinction between patrimony and chattels.50 The evidence from Ghent allows us to go deeper. The Elementary Structures of Kinship. After all. tensions which had their source in the conflict between the interests of the nuclear family on the one hand (“le ménage”) and those of the “line” on the other (“le lignage”). the exposed surface. Wealth as Capital. The power that energized this structural tension there (and I would venture everywhere in commercialized Europe during the age) was the change in the nature of wealth and the proliferation of its meanings. (Boston: Beacon Press. the motor of the struggle between the “ménage” and the “lignage” could not simply have been “tension” between the conjugal unit and the wider kin group. Rather. and cultural—as movable wealth exploded in quantity and kind. and these axes were thus the ground on which this story of “lignage” vs. The basic text for this approach is Claude Lévi-Strauss. “ménage” was played out. This was. Production and Reproduction: A Comparative Study of the Domestic Domain (New York: Cambridge Univ. 1983). Press. see Jack Goody. the court disputes. or what they typically called “goods” (goeden). Peasants were not people who “farmed land” but a social class constituted by their rights to work and inherit the land and to pass those rights to heirs. land had been not only the principal form of capital. they were peasants. These assumptions about property’s meaning were the fundaments of a venerable and deeply rooted economic culture in which land had almost iconic status. was the legal expression of this cultural logic.” While these decisions had a kind of economic rationality. although Gentenaren manipulated law so that they could easily buy and sell. Ghent’s traditional custom. its easy elision of immovables and patrimony and its implicit equation of both with land. but frequently trumped it. To understand their behavior and its historical significance. was constitutive of the self. Goods had cultural and thus social significance that did not just exceed their potential market value. For them. with . Land was the premier vehicle of social promotion in this age. land being a considerably less risky investment than many commercial ventures. In doing so.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 565 Gentenaren deviated from that course by finding new ways to sequester wealth.51 Rents were a close second as status-builders 51 The literature treating this process is rich. were not economic but social. in the legal and cultural imagination. For a general summary. property. alienate and encumber most of their property at will. at least for urbanites. Land was also the basis of the medieval social order. aristocrats claimed noble or high gentry status because they lived from what other people produced for them—from the land—not simply because they were rich. Similarly. the principal rewards of land-owning. they did not abandon their culture’s insistence that property—concrete forms of property—constituted an individual socially. Gentenaren were enacting a sociocultural logic peculiar to their age. the only one. for land could powerfully evoke the old equation between property and status. even as urbanites helped commodify land. often even abandoning more profitable opportunities in commerce in order to become land “barons. For centuries. they intensified its sociocultural value. Thus. it was also. in implicit refusal of such imperatives. They did not “do” peasantry. They also eagerly acquired and hoarded land outside Ghent. we must understand the assumptions about property that informed it. Thus. with its clear distinction between movables and immovables. A few entries suggest the mix: for example. luxury movables such as jewelry and clothing participated in the same logic. 36.. tot het betalen van 7 zakken en 7 mud tiendekoren [Aalsterse maat]. Although it seems that most rents in Ghent were expressed (if not paid) in monies of account (the pound groot.. for it materially expressed the ideological link between rents and land. 15s. Building on an older literature treating costume or dress on the one hand and sumptuary legislation on the other. including the accounts registered on behalf of children who had lost a parent. and presents data showing the extent to which rental payments were made in kind (see in particular pp. par. 249-51 and passim.52 For people such as Gentenaren. The so-called “Orphans’ Books” or Weezenboecen from Ghent provide more concrete evidence of Gentenaren’s commitment to land.. Many rents were actually paid in kind. 239 such accounts were registered. #620 fol. sociocultural historians and cultural studies scholars have taken up the more subtle questions regarding the relationship of clothing and consumption to the creation of the early modern individual. they were of course paid in coin or kind. 53 The history of clothing and consumption has in recent years been given serious attention. For the four years from 1349/50 to 1352/53. Thus. These registers contained records of estate settlements and similar agreements. and their easy circulation steadily eroded the old equation between the self and the self’s vestments. RJR. + 4 6/8 kapoenen . 25v/5. vol. 1982).).. Les rentes. een erfrente van 4 lb... the marital property fund was distributed among the survivor and heirs of the marriage. of California Press. although only about 5 per cent of the accounts listed significant holdings.53 Urbanites like those in Ghent played a major useful references. see Fernand Braudel’s magisterial The Wheels of Commerce.”). tot het betalen van 2 last torven [turf] op 4 schilden .”).566 MARTHA HOWELL and were considerably easier to acquire. of which 79 listed only movables (excluding all real estate) among the assets to be distributed. RJR. About one-third held real estate Ghent. #576... fol. however. and the properties to which he or she was heir would be listed. 28/6 (“. the pound parisis. Important literature (with useful guides to bibliogra- . #606. Cloth and clothing played a particularly complex role.. 2 of Civilization and Captialism. but it also had cultural import. a practice that had practical advantages for bourgeois purchasers because it guaranteed them food supplies.. The Jaarregisters van de Keure in Ghent provide scattered information confirming the same pattern. at least in summary form. 80-3). because although they were traditionally powerful markers of status and social identity. they were also the preeminent commodities of the age. for at that moment. 30v/5 (“. or the gros tournois). fol. any so-called orphan standing to inherit any significant amount of property would have been registered here. 91v/2 (“. not coin. fol.. 15th-18th Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. 52 Schnapper. provides details about the history of these two credit instruments in the Parisian region. the proliferation of variety.. as we have seen. Their increasing abundance. RJR. MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 567 role in this disruption. see Neithard Bulst. for they were both producers and purveyors of these goods. hoarded. and of no source collections containing such legislation. and they have pointed out that sobriety of dress came to mark the bourgeoisie of certain areas (Amsterdam. urbanities were also prodigious purchasers of such luxuries and it is in that capacity that they most clearly displayed their attachment to more traditional ideas of property’s meaning.1967). At the same time. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Blackwell. Philip Siegelman (Ann Arbor. trans. Certainly this was the case in the rich cities of the late medieval southern Low Countries.” French Historical Studies 27-2 (2004): 311-48.: Univ. See Werner Sombart. Vol. Mich.54 phy) includes John Brewer and Roy Porter. 2002). Mass. Norbert Elias’s The Civilizing Process. 1982. in certain periods. he acknowledges that in some cities.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.—Mitte 16. “Regulating Women’s Fashion. eds. “Sumptuary Law in Nürnberg: A Study in Paternal Government. for a useful discussion of the royal French sumptuary legislation and its confused textual and bibliographic history. c. 488-91). Renaissance du pouvoir législatif et genèse de l’état (Montpellier: Socapress. but many historians have argued. 1992) and Catherine Kovesi Killerby. for England. Although Braudel generally assents to the argument that luxury goods were the special obsession of the courtly aristocracy. Jahrhundert). Also see Sarah-Grace Heller. Claire Sponsler. Luxury and Capitalism. “Anxiety. among nobles. they were not so much consumers as obsessive acquirers. 1978) locates such consumption in a larger process of “civilizing. Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law (New York: St. following Sombart and others.Zuber ed. trans. Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory (New York: Cambridge University Press.” Clio 21 (3) (1992): 265-82. 1993). 1988) and Kent Roberts Greenfield. for Germany.. including luxury movables.” in André Gouron and Albert Rigaudière. Aufwands-. in the asset structure of urbanities is well understood. for Italy see Diane Owen Hughes. Anne Jones and Peter Stallybrass. 1996).. I know of no full study of such legislation in the late medieval southern Low Countries.” Braudel returns to this issue (The Wheels of Commerce. for example). for they collected. surely influenced by the sumptuous court of the Duke of Burgundy . “Narrating the Social Order: Medieval Clothing Laws. of Michigan Press. Silences of the Middle Ages. urbanites were just as avid consumers of these products. “Zum Problem städtischer und territorialer Kleider-.” Johns Hopkins Studies in Historical-Political Sciences 36 (2) (1918): 1-139. and displayed their possessions as though they were the material embodiments of an imagined self. In that role. Hierarchy and Appearance in Thirteenth-Century Sumptuary Laws and The Romance of the Rose. that such goods had their most comfortable home in the early modern court. 2 of A history of Women in the West (Cambridge. und Luxusgesetzgebung in Deutschland (13. Consumption and the World of Goods (New York: Routledge. Sumptuary Law in Italy (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2000). Alan Hunt. Martin’s Press.” in Christiane Klapisch. 54 The relative importance of movables. Economies.. . it should be remembered. if nevertheless highly significant. 62 (1976): 216-67. 5th ser. et l’origine du système financier de la monarchie francaise d’Ancien Régime. however. 2000) and Valentin Groeber. of Wisconsin Press. Paravicini.” Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques. The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France (Madison. Alain Guery. “Le roi dépensier: le don. in rarified settings. la contrainte. or in occasional instances of sentithat resided in these cities. Wis. Pamela E. the dress of the contemporaneous Hapsburg court. Selwyn (Philadelphia: Univ.: Univ. clearly attach them to another person. thereby seeking to fix them in social place. My own “Fixing Movables: Gifts by Testament in Late Medieval Douai. “L’origine historique des pots-de-vin. “Dons et pots-de-vin. “Introduction. Civilizations 34 (1984): 1241-64. and that the relationship between class and dress was unstable. intérêt de l’État à la cour des ducs de Bourgogne 1399-1489 (Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke. Braudel is certainly correct. far outside the arena where interchangeable commodities are traded. for their black woolens and velvets and their starched collars were unmistakable marks of luxury—and. and the pattern continued there after the Dutch Revolt. or when we participate in what anthropologists have called distinct “realms of value” where such goods as antiques or artworks circulate.. particularly their role in state building. Sociétés. not for this or that precise thing except for brief moments. Paravicini.” in W. abus de pouvoir. Liquid Assests. 2001). ed. Much of the historical literature on gifts in this period considers them more exclusively in terms of their political significance. we lust for many things. Maurice Arnould.” Annales. of Pennsylvania Press. when we keep unprofitable family farms rather than sell them to shopping-center developers for easy gains. explores gifting practices via testament in the southern Low Countries. Dangerous Gifts: Presents and Politics at the End of the Middle Ages. W.55 The resistance to a market logic implicit in these actions was more than an earlier version of the hesitation we exhibit today when we collect family heirlooms and make gifts of them.” Revue du Nord 70 (278) (1988): 471-87. trans. Invitations au marriage: pratique sociale. not incidentally. they often used them as gifts. Rather than investing ourselves in particular possessions.568 MARTHA HOWELL City people enacted another aspect of this sociocultural logic by exchanging their goods on non-market terms. 2002).” Past and Present 150 (1996): 3-45. to point out that dress—sober or fancy—was a contested site in the cultural history of the early modern bourgeoisie. See in this regard. Marc Boone. 55 The rich sociocultural history of the gift in late medieval and early modern Europe is treated in Natalie Zemon Davis. But our passion for the uncommodifiable is not theirs. And even the subdued garments of the Amsterdam patriciate were extraordinarily costly. aspects de la sociabilité urbaine au bas Moyen Age. Rather than buying and trading these goods in response to price and profit. thus solidifying—and rigidifying—a social hierarchy based on inheritance. and body parts threaten to escape that tiny realm. was an early statement of this position.57 In Ghent. the sphere of the non-commodifiable good is small indeed. family homes or even clothing with the same horror many of us view the selling of kidneys mined from the living.” thereby signaling urbanites’ abandonment of the commerce that had given them birth. a point of view elaborated by such scholars as Friedrich Lütge. courts and country manors in early modern Europe who lived from rents and office rather than pursuing the entrepreneurial activities that had made their predecessors rich. embryos. . industry. they. Giesey. Deutsche Sozial. and Marc Boone. “The ‘Betrayal’ of the Sixteenth-Century Bourgeoisie: A Myth? Some Considerations of the Behaviour Pattern of the Merchants of Antwerp in the Sixteenth Century. 96 (Brussels: Crédit Communal de Belgique. les hommes et les villes. behaved as though goods could not be infinitely abstracted by money and thus rendered essentially identical.” Gemeentekrediet van België. “La terre. rents. It was in this sociocultural context that Gentenaren adjusted law around the movable/immovable divide. 1996). historische reeks in-8 . And. today even babies. it directly illustrates another aspect of this story. for they helped created the early modern “non-commercial” bourgeoisie—the elites of cities.56 The practices are well known to social historians. For us. like all Europeans of their day. This is what other historians have called the “future-oriented” attitudes displayed when elites chose to buy assets such as land and rents rather than invest in commerce. “La ville et la transmission des valeurs culturelles bas moyen âge et aux temps modernes. Although the legal evidence reviewed here reflects this larger context only indirectly. 153-73. While Gentenaren surely did not regard the easy fungibility of land.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 569 mentality. nr. 1952). Quelques considérations autour du thème de l’urbanisation des propriétaires terriens. For the Low Countries in particular. this class prospered because such assets were transferred from generation to generation. see Hugo Soly.und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Berlin: Springer. Spa 16-19 mai 1994. Henri Pirenne’s “Stages in the Social History of Capitalism. “Rules of Inheritance and Strategies of Mobility in Prerevolutionary France.” American Historical Review 19 (1914): 494-515.” American Historical Review 82 (2) (April 1977): 271-89. 57 Historians have referred to these practices as “the treason of the bourgeoisie.” Acta Historiae Neerlandicae 8 (1975): 31-9. as scholars have also pointed out. this social process was managed via the impartible account where rents 56 For a discussion of this social process and its implications for the development of capitalism. or agricultural improvements. see Ralph E.” in Actes du 17e Colloque International. Sylvia Thrupp. While these patterns of investment and inheritance have been most obsessively studied in early modern France. 1991). an essay on the definition of elites in Renaissance France (Chicago: Univ. they did not. Italy. they were not confined there. See. and in the Low Countries. Any Gentenar seeking to preserve or create a stable social lineage was thus well advised. the pattern 58 Case studies such as Michel Mollat’s Jacques Coeur ou l’esprit d’entreprise au XVe siècle (Paris: Aubier. endlessly guaranteeing class status. Les bourgeois gentilshommes. They were not alone. if purchased during marriage. of Chicago Press. 1954). Paris City Councillors (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Landlords. While they understood and accommodated commerce. Press. with references to . Thus. Gentenaren were not capitalists manqués. England. 1988) or Robert Forster’s Merchants. 1948). Ghent’s custom both inscribed the practices of an emergent rentier class and helped to create it. Once “in the family. the more powerfully it established social rank. Press. as elsewhere. Lille and the Dutch Revolt (New York: Cambridge Univ. for the older the property.570 MARTHA HOWELL and land outside Ghent were carefully sheltered. L’assiette de l’impôt à la fin du XIVe siècle. of Chicago Press. R. 1977) surveys and summarizes the literature on France. 1983). Le livre d’estimes des consuls de Saint-Flour—les années 1380-1385 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France. P. George Huppert. Albert Rigaudière. Magistrates: The Dupont Family in Eighteenth-Century France (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. It could even enhance class status. Press. (Paris: Plon. In this way.” however—once passed from father or mother to child—such property could be repeatedly transferred from generation to generation. and sociologically inspired research confirms the patterns.58 Almost next door to Ghent. indeed compelled. Eligible property thus acquired its impartible status only in the second generation (since most gifts were made from one generation to the next and all inheritances flowed in that way). Robert S. they also stubbornly refused the social implications of unbridled commoditization. Barbara Diefendorf. Les hommes de loi lyonnais à la fin du Moyen Age (Paris: Les belles lettres. Propertied urbanites in Germany. 1980) give particularly rich texture to this social history. for a illustrative evidence. The Merchant Class of Medieval London (Chicago: Univ. to collect rents and rural properties and compelled to pass them as gifts or inheritances. Wolff. 1964). Fédou. in Douai. as many historians have noted. the law’s focus on the source of the particular assets eligible for impartible status was key to the social process: if these properties had come to the marriage by gift or inheritance they acquired patrimonial status. did the same. Duplessis. 1977). Commerce et marchands de Toulouse (vers 1350-vers 1450). There. the revolution had emptied the term “immovable” of legal meaning. risks of social derogation minimized. A lot.” As he pointed out. it is clear. and the newcomers more easily kept out. 59 Giesey. not on commerce and industry. broken the venerable equation between land and patrimony. It is the record of a sociocultural revolution essential to the future development of Europe’s capitalist market society. So “uncommercial” did such behavior seem to Fernand Braudel that he declined to label these people bourgeois. it cannot be said that these choices represented an irrational retreat into the past. was in a name. It links these social changes to a redefinition of property itself. thanks to the rich trove of marriage contracts left by its citizenry. and found. . Although these economic practices undoubtedly had a “stifling” effect on capitalistic development as some scholars have charged. even “non-commercial” bourgeois. other countries. but by their way of life.59 Rather. the market could flourish but hierarchy would be shored up. The evidence from Ghent not only illustrates this social history. The confusion about terminology that plagues the city’s legal sources.” summarizes the arguments in this vein. By its end. In this way. redefined property or what Gentenaren simply called “goods” as capital. it suggests that there was still more to this story. giving people like the Gentenaren who stood at the center of this ideological upheaval an important role in the history of capitalism. a way to let wealth circulate. Hence they sought. but also to allow the most culturally significant goods to descend to lineal heirs. “Rules of Inheritance. not even fundamentally about law. they were the solution to the problem of how to accommodate trade while assuring social order. and assigned new patrimonial status to a selected array of capital assets.MOVABLE/IMMOVABLE 571 is especially clear. these people were not distinguished by their entrepreneurial relationship to capital. And by “social order” people meant social privilege and class continuity. it seems. because they immobilized assets that might have been more productively employed. was not just about words. instead he wanted to call them “honorables hommes” or even “gentry. and their way of life was based on distinctive investment and inheritance practices. written sources are also generally quiet about food sources that are gathered rather than grown. although direct evidence on this point is somewhat lacking. 1898). eds. Archaeological material provides good evidence for consumption. such as where and on whose land the plant was grown.. Archaeological sources lack information on production. The case of Lübeck’s urban gardens reveals a closeness in the urban-rural relationship. ASA Interna Markt 9/1 and 9/2 deal with apple-sellers (1614) and the sale of garden produce in the market (1669). Archaeological evidence for the consumption of the produce grown outside the city underlines the importance of the urban-rural relationship. in a broad belt around the city. 10: 631. Produce grown there was presumably sold and consumed within the city. 10 (Lübeck: Edmund Schmersahl Nachf. some information on the size and value of the gardens. Documentary evidence rarely identifies a plant to the species level. . demonstrating that there was some longer-distance trade in this crop (Carl Wehrmann and Paul Hasse.. In July 1465 a sea captain complained that his shipload of apples had been held up in Wisby. respectively.CULTIVATION AND CONSUMPTION: MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS Charlotte Masemann Garden production of food and other crops in medieval Lübeck took place on land located outside the city walls. It also reveals a high degree of involvement of citizens of the city of Lübeck in the life of these gardens and a corresponding closeness in the urban-rural relationship. Much of the evidence for consumption of garden produce is derived from the ambitious archaeological program undertaken since the Second World War by the city of Lübeck.1 Analysis of the evidence of this garden production reveals the types of crops grown in the gardens. Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck (subsequently AHL). A comparative approach to both kinds of evidence provides the fullest possible picture. the location of the gardens and in some cases the identity of the owner or tenant. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. 1 Regulations concerning hawkers of fruit in the marketplace only appear beginning in the seventeenth century. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (subsequently LUB) (vol. 10). vol.. Although the city discouraged people from living right up against the city walls. 1988).7 Many little villages started out as property of the city in 1262. has remained largely unexamined.4 Passages were often constructed through these large houses in order to provide access to an alleyway. which.und Spätmittelalter: Die große Zeit Lübecks. called the Landwehr. “Kleinhausbebauung in Lübeck im 16. 5. Geschichte der Wohngänge (Lübeck: Verlag Lübecker Rundschau. combined with this regulation and others like it. In the fourteenth century Lübeck secured its area. 5 Rainer Andresen. provided a barrier to access to the Landwehr. Jahrhundert. 7 Hoffmann. 2 . with a large ditch.000. but most were alienated into private hands and Erich Hoffmann. The original area of city was the peninsula and the strip of land called Horegenbeke in front of the Burgtor. both within and just outside the city. combined with natural rivers and streams. “Lübeck. the land that was not built up. the gate at the northern end of the peninsula. just south of the Baltic coast in what is now SchleswigHolstein.6 its area and influence extended beyond those walls. was founded in the second half of the twelfth century. 4 Margrit Christensen-Streckebach and Michael Scheftel. The small houses built between and behind the larger houses belonging to the wealthier members of the city were rented out to those with fewer financial resources.3 The pressure of population. Zusammenhänge zwischen Eigentumsentwicklung und Baustruktur.MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS 573 Lübeck. or Gang. with many small houses built on either side. Lübeckische Geschichte (Lübeck: Schmidt Römhild.” 302.5 While the houses and their inhabitants have been closely researched. 3 LUB. 6 A document from 1465 expressly forbids people from living in houses outside the city walls. 10: 651. In 1300 the population of Lübeck was about 15. 10: 651. 1985).” in Antjekathrin Graßmann. “Lübeck im Hoch.” Zeitschrift des Vereins für lübeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde 63 (1983): 168-169. Many of these Gänge survive into the present day. located on a peninsula where the rivers Wakenitz and Trave meet. A document from 1465 expressly forbids people from living in houses outside the city walls. Lübeck. 306.2 There were signs that the city was finding it difficult to contain all its inhabitants within its walls. LUB.000 and by the beginning of the fifteenth century it numbered around 25. meant that by the sixteenth century many of the large blocks of land within the city were being subdivided. ed. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (vol. 1885). Wort. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. Carl Wehrmann. 9).” Zeitschrift des Vereins für lübeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde 9 (1) (1908): 209-212. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (vol..” Kanzlei Findbuch (Lübeck: Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck.. the land was cultivated by the people who lived in the villages. Carl Wehrmann. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde (Lübeck: Verlag des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. Carl Wehrmann. 10 Carl Wehrmann.. 5 (Lübeck: Ferdinand Grautoff. Carl Wehrmann. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (vol.2).” 278. 9 Hartwig. the Lübeckische Urkundenbücher (LUB). 2. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (vol. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (vol. 1). Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. 1881). 1877). 2. 1893).. 8). Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (vol. “Oberstadtbücher. 4 (Lübeck: Ferdinand Grautoff..1 (Lübeck: Friedrich Aschenfeldt. outside the city of Lübeck. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (vol. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (vol. ed. 10 (Lübeck: Edmund Schmersahl Nachf. 5). eds. 8 (Lübeck: Edmund Schmersahl. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. ed. ed. ed. 11). 1873). Carl Wehrmann. 6 (Lübeck: Ferdinand Grautoff. 4).11 The Julius Hartwig. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (vol.. ed. Carl Wehrmann. 3). to some extent. ed. 1871). 1905). a record of all sorts of transactions between citizens of Lübeck. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. Carl Wehrmann and Paul Hasse. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (vol. 1858). 1889).. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde.. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. Carl Wehrmann. While it began as a record of debt 8 .. mortgages and rents within and. 1858). 3 (Lübeck: Ferdinand Grautoff. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (Vol.. ed. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (vol. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. ed. 7). 10). 6). 9. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. ed. Friedrich Techen.d.2 (Lübeck: Friedrich Aschenfeldt. 2. Paul Hasse. Carl Wehrmann. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. 1843). The influence of Lübeck was therefore extensive in the area of the Landwehr and beyond. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. 7 (Lübeck: Ferdinand Grautoff.9 The picture of Lübeck’s gardens is partially derived from records of land transactions preserved in a collection of documents. 1898). Bickelmann.574 CHARLOTTE MASEMANN became holdings (Güter)..und Sachregister zu Band 1-11. H. “Die Rechtsverhältnisse des ländlichen Grundbesitzes im Gebiet der freien und Hansestadt Lübeck. n.. 2. “Die Rechtsverhältnisse. By far the most common source of these documents is the Niederstadtbuch.10 dating from 1270 to 1470. vol.8 Many of these holdings were owned by citizens of Lübeck who looked on the purchase of land as a secure investment.).1). 1932). Carl Wehrmann. 9 (Lübeck: Edmund Schmersahl. The Oberstadtbuch was a record of transactions of movements of property. 1 (Lübeck: Friedrich Aschenfeldt. ed. Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde. 11 Many of the documents preserved in the LUB are derived from the Oberstadtbücher and the Niederstadtbücher. 11 (Lübeck: Lübcke & Nöhring. ed. . . The tithe records usually provide the amount at which the land was tithed. from four schillinge to 96 schillinge. as well as the identity of the person paying the tithes. Most payers were men. These gardens must have been a significant source of revenue for the city. Payments on approximately 500 pieces of land are recorded in the first book. the Wette garden books tell us of the gardens on which rent was paid to the city. an area of land outside the Holsten wall. Most people’s occupations were not given. reveals that while there was a great range in amount of rent paid. however. the owner. rented or mortgaged by its citizens. on the west side of the city. crop and location. cabbages and hops were grown in gardens around Lübeck on land owned. The almost 200 years’ worth of records contained in the Wette garden books provide some useful information on production gardens in Lübeck. Both tithe and land transaction records indicate that fruit. The Wette garden books provide a good general picture of a ring of gardens around the city. if different from the payer. They confirm the impression given in other written records that there were many gardens just outside the city walls. When both the amount of rent and the area was recorded. four schillinge per piece was the usual amount. The location of the garden in relation to the gardens of others and to local landmarks also appears. states that it covers hop gardens and gardens (hoppen höve und garden). Most of these gardens were located outside the city walls to the west and south of the city. Analysis of the records concerning the Soltewisch.17 A leaf inserted into the second garden book 17 AHL HS 289. and the tithe records are concerned with payments to ecclesiastical authorities. and often the previous owner or payer. while the second and third contain records of about 250 and about 300. respectively. Ar. the amount paid for an individual area remained almost constant over almost 200 years. with some women appearing as well. The title page of the second book.MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS 577 usually indicate land use. Whereas the records in the Niederstadtbücher and the Oberstadtbücher deal mainly with transactions between individuals. it is in many cases possible to establish when the same garden has been tithed in two or more of the documents. Because of details about ownership. but none of the entries contains detailed information about crops. . or sage. While the documents that provide the bulk of data for this analysis indicate that hops dominated garden production in Lübeck. Some of its regulations refer specifically to certain produce. for 19 18 . and transportation. the proceeds of which she wishes to go to a brotherhood after her death. “Beiträge zur lübeckischen Volkskunde. The Pocket Guide to Wildflowers (London: Reprint Society. For example. Fitter. 20-1). known as the Willkür der Gärtner. 7v and 8r.” Mitteilungen des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde 5. since it is labeled “Van den Hoppenlande” and concerns the four pieces of hop land and a hof owned by Tileke Warendorp. and records of land transactions involving gardens) and consumption (archaeological data).21 red cabbage and green vegetables should be sold bi AHL HS 289. Nasturtium officinale. Schumann. Pflanzennamen. 3: 771.20 Possibly the authorities wanted to avoid a situation in which large-scale food marketing was taking place outside of the central marketplace. carrots. 78-80. amplify the list of crops. where it could be more closely regulated. Körber-Grohne notes that the names of both these vegetables were often used interchangeably in the Middle Ages.4 (1891): 59-63. it did not allow people to sell produce on the area at their gardens. 2: 54). and it gives rules of behavior for the gardeners of Lübeck. Undated. The document is a prescriptive one. wages. S. which grows in shallow fresh water and mud (David McClintock and R. 20 The words used in the document are kerszen and saluyen. is the hairless creeping perennial known as water cress. Soltau’s Verlag. 90-4. Mittelniederdeutsches Handwörterbuch (Norden and Leipzig: Diedr. it also stated that turnips. Lübben translates kerszen as Kresse. such as C. 1955). sale of produce. cultivation of produce. 1888). which would seem to mean something like crooked carrots. the regulations of the gardeners’ guild. R. I am assuming that it refers to Salbei. or Rorippa nasturtiumaquaticum. completed by Christoph Walther. The Willkür provides a very important link between evidence for production (tithe records. However. Lübben does not provide a definition for saluyen. fencing.19 These regulations cover many aspects of the life of the guild and its members. It could be the wild parsnip. although the definition of a gardener never appears. loose leaf between fols.18 This emphasis on hops tallies well with the information gleaned from other documentary sources. but I have not been able to identify this vegetable more closely. other than cress and sage. nor do others. or nasturtium (August Lübben.578 CHARLOTTE MASEMANN backs up this assertion. krickelmoren. which appears in the archaeological record of Lübeck. among others. LUB. land management. including admission of new members. 21 The document also lists a vegetable called krickelmoren. red cabbage (roden kol). The gardens that appear in these records are located just outside the walls of the city and in the villages of the surrounding Landwehr. because it provides a link between sources on production. turnips (roven). This document forbade anyone to have more than one stall in the market during Christmas and at Easter. Kulturgeschichte und Biologie (Stuttgart: Theiss Verlag. which one would presume to mean from one’s house. garlic (knuflok). and thus shows us that gardeners cultivating produce outside the city brought it into the city for the purposes of commerce. It is one of the very few early documents that proves that people in Lübeck sold produce to other people in Lübeck. and were permitted to sell two types of vegetables at their gardens. One section of the regulations deals with the smoking of garlic. . a greater number from their houses. but also in that it adds to the list of plants we know were cultivated in and around Lübeck. Garlic was to be smoked for nine days. and could not be brought out of the house without being inspected by one of the masters of the guild. No reason for this last stipulation appears. 22 LUB. and green vegetables (groene warmoos). such as the ones being examined in this chapter. Udelgard Körber-Grohne. It is unclear whether one individual would be engaged in all three activities. and also could sell from a stall in the market. carrots (moren). The document is interesting not only in that it tells us how various vegetables were treated. and were not allowed to plant onion seed at all. and the archaeological evidence for consumption. This suggests that the gardeners lived within the city walls. These are onions (cypollen). 1994). The vegetables listed here may be the ones grown in the so-called cabbage gardens. These regulations also make it clear that some gardeners were involved in some processing of their produce. It is one of the very few early documents that proves that people in Lübeck sold produce to other people in Lübeck. Gardeners were not permitted to sell seed if it would be of use to the guild. All of the records examined here demonstrate that there were plots of land called gardens by the people who kept records.MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS 579 sik. 3: 771.22 This document is important in another sense. Nutzpflanzen in Deutschland. 225. example in the Physica of Hildegard of Bingen. written sources are also generally quiet about food sources that are gathered rather than grown. such as where and on whose land the plant was grown. cabbages and berries. Archaeological sources lack information on production. crop rotations or yields of these parcels of land. paying rents from them to the city. The primary crop of these gardens was hops. men and women. Questions regularly asked by agrarian historians will generally go unanswered by the available documents concerning Lübeck gardens. and records involving land transactions provide much useful information.580 CHARLOTTE MASEMANN Citizens of Lübeck. archaeological evidence is an excellent source. Tithe records show that items grown in gardens changed over time. The tithe records show that land use did change over time. The Wette garden books show that the average income paid to the city from gardens outside the city walls remained fairly constant throughout the approximately 200-year period covered by these records. the tithe records. they deal almost exclusively with issues of production. often called gardens. the reasons behind these changes are not clear. Documentary evidence rarely identifies a plant to the species level. While records concerning gardens in Lübeck do not address well the use of technology. For information on consumption. were engaged in paying tithes on them. these records also mention apples. Much of the evidence for consumption of garden produce in Lübeck is derived from archaeological evidence. They ranged in size from small to large. an absolute determination of size is not possible. Little quantitative material is available. The documents also do not specify cultivation techniques. existed outside the city walls and were cultivated for both industrial and food crops. Figures for hop and cabbage prices during the fifteenth century are unfortunately not available. Hops and fruit trees obviously do not lend themselves well to such farming systems. one must assume again that hard work with a shovel and hoe was the primary method of cultivation. and that some gardens went out of production and became bleaching grounds. members of the city elite and artisans. and no records that allow us to calculate the productivity of these gardens or to assess if crop rotation took place. they do reveal that plots of largely unknown size. and engaging in various other transactions involving them. While the Wette garden books. but could have been made based on analysis of prices. . They appear to have been a normal part of the life of the city and its inhabitants. Thus comparison of lists of plants found in digs and lists of plants mentioned in contemporary documents could prove very illuminating. Studies in Palaeoethnobotany (Rotterdam. “Aussagemöglichkeiten. These new species can either be imported fruits. 331-8. 24 Knörzer. Tomlinson. 1984). stem and leaf fragments are much less likely to survive.” in Jane M. to which belong onions. van Zeist and W.. ed.26 The material recovered in Lübeck is almost entirely made up of seeds and fruit-stones.” 331. legumes. A.” 333-6. and can give insight into changes in the species consumed over centuries. Plants and Ancient Man. Root.25 Grains. however. In the case of Lübeck. R. processing as foodstuffs (e.. Karl-Heinz Knörzer. Recent Developments in Palaeoethnobotany (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Cesspits in particular provide evidence for consumption. as well as giving an indication of when new species were introduced into the diet. Fruit stones are usually very well-preserved in cesspits. Pollen grains. were found. Boston: A. or fruit newly going into local cultivation. and leaf and root vegetables are rarely well-preserved. leeks and garlic. since they are collecting points for both human and kitchen waste. Although no plant remains of the genus Allium. “Aussagemöglichkeiten. It would be incorrect to assume. “Vegetative Plant Remains from Waterlogged Deposits Identified at York. and fruit-stones are the most resilient to rot.MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS 581 Thus a comparative approach to both kinds of evidence provides the fullest possible picture. the plant material found there can be damaged by mastication. most of the botanical finds come from cesspits and wells. milling of grain) and the action of the human digestive system. 25 P.24 An awareness of what is likely to survive in the damp conditions of a filled-in well or cesspit is necessary to a meaningful analysis of these plant remains. that these seeds give an accurate representation of all the plants grown in these areas. although some interesting work has been done on identification of waterlogged specimens. wood. 109.23 Although preservation condition in cesspits are usually good.g. eds. the Willkür states that these were grown in Lübeck. 1991). 23 . A. Balkema. seed. Renfrew.. 26 Knörzer. “Aussagemöglichkeiten von paläoethnobotanischen Latrinenuntersuchungen.” in W. Casparie. and are therefore most likely to survive. New Light on Early Farming. particularly when they are used in conjunction with documentary sources. therefore. The data derived from these excavations therefore permit commentary on the types of plants found. but which rotted or sprouted. that direct correlations between botanical macro-remains and the type and number of plants consumed in the area cannot be established through excavation. The following sites are of particular importance. like cabbage or carrots. Despite these caveats. One must always keep in mind the plant remains that may have been excreted or thrown into the cesspit. Similarly. examples of such fruits are strawberries (Fragaria vesca).582 CHARLOTTE MASEMANN Another consideration to keep in mind when examining the results of palaeobotanical analysis is the use of the plant. and merchant/ seafarer. . and the plants which produce many seeds per fruit. The seeds of plants that are used for those seeds (hazel or poppy. respectively. either because they contained numerous species or an unusual combination of species: St.27 These three sites contained the highest number of species. for example) will survive in greater numbers than the seeds of plants used for their leaves or roots. and Alfstrasse/Schüsselbuden. Hundestrasse. outside the city. and presumably. Another consideration is the number of seeds produced by each fruit. seeds of fruits that have their seeds embedded in them and are therefore part of the package will also make their way into cesspits at a greater rate. artisanal and mercantile. Throughout the Mid27 See Tables 1 and 2 for more details. It is clear. Excavations in Lübeck have taken place in a range of sites located in areas of differing socio-economic status within the cities. results of palaeobotanical work can be very informative. A detailed look at species found in Lübeck reveals the diversity of plants grown and consumed in. the plants which were used before they set seed. ecclesiastical. and their relative number of seeds. while a single fig can produce thousands of seeds. A single cherry produces one stone. and damsons (Prunus insititia). Each of the three also represents a different socio-economic category: ecclesiastical. A closer look at the distribution of these species may shed more light on the effects of social class on food consumption in the city. Johanniskloster. cherries (Prunus avium). The data also enable comparison of plant consumption by three socio-economic groups: artisan. as well as analysis of change over time. ” in Graßmann. “Archäologische. 29 Manfred Gläser. the channel was two meters deep and roofed over. Johanniskloster zu Lübeck. during the so-called second settlement period (Siedlungsperiode II). The monks also built a water channel. 28 Rolf Hammel. nearer the harbor. while the artisans resided in the eastern area.” 17. Johannisklosters in Lübeck. as a result of a planned extension of a nearby building.” 10.32 The botanical evidence seems to support this conclusion. “Räumliche Entwicklung und Berufstopographie Lübecks bis zum Ende des 14. The botanically-analyzed samples date from the beginning of the thirteenth century. of poor discipline. he postulated that a garden was cultivated there. apparently.29 The monastery was dissolved in 1574. The monastery was founded in the years after 1173. The excavation took place between 1979 and 1983. .30 The results indicate that use of the site intensified during the first third of the thirteenth century. Lübeck’s inhabitants seem to have lived mainly with their own kind. Jahrhunderts.31 A new well was built during this period. Gläser notes that a layer of humusypeaty soil. 30 Gläser. Johanniskloster was located on the eastern side of the peninsula and occupied about two hectares. carrying water from the Wakenitz for workshops. Merchants and seafarers lived on the western half of the peninsula.” Lübecker Schriften zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte 17 (1988): 118. 31 Manfred Gläser. was found towards the southern end of the area. “Archäologische und baugeschichtliche Untersuchungen im St. It has been dendrochronologically dated to around 1211. The bishop and chapter occupied the southern end of the peninsula. dating to this period. washing and garden. “Die Ausgrabungen auf dem Gelände des ehemaligen St. Because the soil had the smell and texture of garden soil and contained a number of holes from stakes. it began as a Benedictine house.MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS 583 dle Ages. “Archäologische.28 St. 32 Gläser.” Lübecker Schriften zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte 16 (1989): 11. but the Benedictine monks were replaced by Cistercians in 1256 as a result. 64-70. Johanniskloster St. Lübeckische Geschichte. with some members living in the southeastern area towards the Trave. ” 360. possibly cultivated plants appear in the data from St. Johanniskloster. B. as are the vegetables Brassica oleracea/napus. “Archäobotanische Untersuchungen in der Hansestadt Lübeck. are rich and occur over a relatively long span. wild parsnip (Pastinaca sativa) and celery (Apium graveolens). Johanniskloster. with a total of seven species. of these fruits are those that could be either cultivated or gathered.” Offa 48 (1991): 357.584 CHARLOTTE MASEMANN Eighteen species of edible. n. carrot (Daucus carota). They have been dated to five different periods: thirteenth century. Hops are the only beer-brewing plant. such as raspberry (Rubus idaeus). appear in the botani33 Almuth Alsleben. nigra/rapa. elderberry (Sambucus nigra) and wood strawberry (Fragaria vesca). The clergy in the thirteenth century do not appear to have eaten more luxuriously than their artisan brethren residing in Hundestrasse in the same period. Hemp and flax are both found. fourteenth century. such a record would provide a valuable source with which to contrast the archaeological plant remains from this site. to choose those with the highest seed count. “Archäobotanische. 34 See. Landschaftsentwicklung im städtischen Umfeld und Nahrungswirtschaft während des Mittelalters bis in die frühe Neuzeit. indeed that evidence shows a wider range of species. derived from six samples. dating from the thirteenth century. in the artisans’ quarter. Hundestrasse Finds from Hundestrasse. for example.35 No documentary record of the cultivation of this garden in the monastery has been preserved. fourteenth to fifteenth century.34 It is also in contrast with the gold and silver cutlery found on the same site dating from the same period. 35 Alsleben. dill.). Sylvia Landsberg’s discussion of the monastery garden in The Medieval Garden (London: British Museum Press. Most. and before 1615. before or around 1300. This range of finds. . gives the impression of a diet that was based on local crops with not much variation of vegetable matter. No exotic fruits or spices appear. 34-44. Fruits are well-represented.33 This does not tally with the stereotypical image of the monastery garden as described in some literature. if not all. coriander and caraway do not appear in the botanical finds from St. Alsleben finds it surprising that herbs such as fennel. Twenty-one species. Parsley (Petroselinum crispum) and hazelnut (Corylus avellana) also appear.d. New among fruits are elderberry (Sambucus nigra). with a total of 322 items. While it is likely that blackberries were gathered from the wild. most of which were derived from one cesspit at Hundestrasse 9. numbering 1067. These larger numbers may be . The range of fruit is wider than at St. Many of the finds are similar to those of the previous two periods. strawberry and blueberry. legumes are represented in the fourteenth century only by a lone lentil. Additions are blackberry. the other three species were likely cultivated on trees on site. A slightly later sample. whereas previously these had been 523 and 28. or grew at the edges of the garden. The oil seeds gold of pleasure (Camelina sativa) and poppy (Papaver somniferum) are added. Numbers among other fruit finds are generally higher than for the previous periods. One hop fragment was found. hazelnut appears as well. the European plum (P domestica) and dill (Anethum grave. with some of the same possibly wild species appearing. (Morus nigra). while the numbers for strawberry are 910. Hazelnuts (Corylus avellana) also appear. vitis-idaea). apple. deriving from a fecal layer. and sweet cherry. both rich in organic matter. was quite well-preserved. as do coriander and positively identified dill. along with figs. There are no vegetables. Species not represented in the material from the earlier period are the sloe (Prunus spinosa). One find of hops appears. However. lingonberry (Vaccinium cf. 431 fig seeds were found. The only oilseed crop is the poppy. . such as raspberry. As in the previous site. as opposed to 76 for the thirteenth century and 200 circa 1300. damson plum (P insititia) and mulberry . For example. but the legumes pea (Pisum sativum) and broad bean (Vicia faba) are preserved. flax and two types of Brassica appear. The material from this period. Parsley and celery appear. an unequivocally imported fruit. particularly from samples 781 and 832. Grape seeds. perhaps grown locally.MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS 585 cal record from Hundestrasse in the thirteenth century. Johanniskloster. Nine of the species are fruit. European plum is not found from any other period in Hundestrasse. Thirty-two species were identified from the fourteenth century. hops. olens). perhaps from imported raisins. Caraway (Carum carvi) and either fennel (Foeniculum vulgare) or dill (Anethum graveolens) were found. and none of any vegetable. Fourteen species appeared here. sour cherry (P cerasus). as in the other periods. appear as well. pear. The number of individual items found is also high. from a total of 23 samples. was dated to before or around 1300. it does not appear to have derived from fecal material or a cesspit. The only vegetable to appear is the brassica.36 At any rate. unlike the material from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. one poppyseed. The difference in the number of species between the thirteenth-century samples from each is three. sweet and sour cherry. make up the evidence here. whereas the material with the larger number of species from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is derived from six and 23 samples respectively. The one surprise consists of the fact that fig seeds were found on the artisan site and not the ecclesiasti36 Doris Mührenberg. dated to the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries. it is dated to before 1615 and contained fifteen species. but does not provide more details about conditions favorable or unfavorable to preservation. . They number three. It is quite possible that this narrowing of species says more about preservation conditions than it does about changes in cultivation or consumption in this area. over a longer time span. Van Haaster states that the sample came from a cultural layer from the fifth period of building on the site. representing herbs are fennel and coriander. blackberry. pear.” Lübecker Schriften zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte 16 (1989): 271.586 CHARLOTTE MASEMANN a result of the large number of samples taken from a cesspit that provided excellent preservation conditions. Our last evidence comes from one sample taken from Hundestrasse 17. The smallest number of species derives from one sample. Another reason for the smaller number of species may be that the material dated to before 1615 comes from one sample. with raspberry. No hops appear here. since many more samples. Johanniskloster. blueberry and fig. “Archäologische und baugeschichtliche Untersuchungen im Handwerkerviertel zu Lübeck Befunde Hundestrasse 9-17. Fruits are much better-represented. apple. It is not surprising that Hundestrasse provided more species than St. One linseed. from a humus layer. and one stone from a damson plum appear here. hard fruit seeds are more likely to survive worse conditions than are thinner-walled herb and vegetable seeds. and shows that plant material consumed and cultivated in these two gardens was similar. Mit einem botanischen Beitrag zu den spätmittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen Pflanzenresten von Henk van Haaster. and one item from each species was identified. No species were found that had not been unearthed in earlier samples. of the type used by leather workers.40 By the end of the fourteenth century. 41 Stephan. facing onto the street. “Archäologische. which runs contrary to the assumption that the clergy had a higher standard of living than artisans. At the end of the thirteenth century a house with three wings was built on the lots later numbered 13-17.” Lübecker Schriften zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte 23 (1993): 98-101. and a fence divided the land into two parcels. lived in 15/17 in 1293. “Archäologische.” 78. The first building went up in the first half of the thirteenth century. Wilhelm von Warendorp left the house in his will to the poor in 1358. Ergebnisse archäologischer Untersuchungen.economic strata. Timo Wobes. The general excavations undertaken at Hundestrasse 9-17 can be helpful in assessing who lived and worked on these lots. a rosarymaker. Doris Mührenberg drew the following conclusions from the excavations. she notes that the land was increasingly divided and built up over time. She therefore concludes that a boneworker who specialized in combs lived and worked here. from 1358 to the eighteenth century. The lots were divided from one another with brick walls. 39 Doris Mührenberg. Indeed. Evidence from number 15 suggests the activities of a smith. Hundestrasse 9 was a foundation in which poor people lived.37 The richness of the finds seems to attest.41 In the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries wings reaching back into the lot were built out from the houses. In the west wing the archaeologists found a pit containing many bones and half-finished combs. or may show that a diet rich in fruit and vegetables was accessible to all socio. a butcher.MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS 587 cal. date to this period. 38 Van Haaster in Mührenberg. to a high standard of living. however.” Lübecker Schriften zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte 1 (1978): 78.38 These finds may have been deposited earlier in the century. Material from number 37 Hans-Georg Stephan. will show that those who owned these properties were not necessarily from an impecunious social order. and Mührenberg suggests that a shoemaker worked here. Barrels.” 78. lived in Hundestrasse 13 in 1401. a house made of stone had been built on each piece of land. “Archäologische.” 278.39 First. . “Archäologische Ausgrabungen im Handwerkerviertel der Hansestadt Lübeck (Hundestrasse 9-17)—ein Vorbericht. 40 Stephan. An examination of the documentary evidence. conducted below. “Der Markt zu Lübeck. Stephan states that Nicholas Cuper. ” 213. 48 Hammel. “Hauseigentum. while the western half contained owners of more mixed professions. 389. Hundestrasse was divided into an eastern and a western part by the cross street Rosengarten-Tünkenhagen. These streets were: Schüsselbuden. “Hauseigentum.44 Ownership by council families was lower here than on any other street he studied. Fischstraße. and smith.43 During the first half of the fourteenth century. but their numbers were reduced to 11 from 21. Methoden zur sozial. the dominance of the leatherworkers in the eastern half continued. except for the owner of number 11.” 276. among others. Braunstraße. “Hauseigentum. Abbildung. a rosary-maker and a carpenter.” 209.48 He classifies all owners during the second half of the fourteenth century as belonging to what he terms social level III. the eastern half was characterized by a concentration of leatherworkers. It also Rolf Hammel.47 Hammel has developed and analyzed a list of owners of Hundestrasse 9-17. 46 Hammel. eight butchers. 77.” Lübecker Schriften zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte 10 (1987): 85-300. while the number owned by council families went from 10 to 15. “Hauseigentum im spätmittelalterlichen Lübeck. goldsmith.und wirtschaftsgeschichtlichen Auswertung der Lübecker Oberstadtbuchregesten. rosary-maker. 49 Hammel. 44 Hammel.588 CHARLOTTE MASEMANN 17 from the seventeenth century suggests a textile worker lived and worked here. especially those from guilds of about 1350 masters. In the second half of the century.42 His examination of Hundestrasse adds to our understanding of its social composition. “Hauseigentum. the period in which they were kept. two chandlers.49 According to Hammel. social level I consisted of merchants and other people of status. 43 Hammel. carpenter. Hammel’s study of the Oberstadtbuchregesten reveals much about the ownership and residence of houses in Lübeck from 1284 from 1600. 45 Hammel.” 212. The artisans who remained as owners on the street belonged to the occupations of apothecary. the number of houses owned by artisans went from 25 to 15.” 212.” 211. An der Untertrave 96-114/115. 47 Hammel.45 The intellectual occupations were represented by two magistri. “Hauseigentum. Holstenstraße. who belonged to social level I. while social level III was made up of the artisanal middle class. such as two bakers.46 In the western half. “Hauseigentum. butcher. 42 . both of whom lived in the western half of the street. 213. . If that supposition is true. “Hauseigentum. Schüsselbuden is the street on the western side of the market. who owned the house in the first half of the fourteenth century. such as porters. while Alfstrasse runs east-west from the market down to the Trave. Each confirms the other’s assessment of when the lots began to be built up. “Hauseigentum. The inexactitude of both documentary and archaeological evidence does not allow us to conclude who. with some representation from council families. an imported fruit. Alfstrasse/Schüsselbuden We now cross from the eastern side of the city to the western. consumed what. the botanical evidence allows us to suggest that the residents of Hundestrasse 9-17 enjoyed a varied diet of fruit. moreover.51 The archaeological evidence presented by Mührenberg and van Haaster and the documentary evidence by Hammel are quite consistent with one another. The earliest samples are derived 50 51 Hammel. While the guesses of occupation made by Mührenberg do not correspond well to those of the owners in Hammel’s work. The butcher.MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS 589 included some trades with no guild. Both Mührenberg and Hammel suggest that those who resided in Hundestrasse were artisans and mainly belonged to the artisanal middle class. Mührenberg’s guesses are. or may have leased premises and supplied bones to a specialist. the so-called merchant-seafarer section. fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Alfstrasse/Schüsselbuden provides rich botanical evidence from the thirteenth. most of which were indigenous and some of which appear to have been collected from surrounding wild spaces. guesses. herbs and vegetables.50 This is consistent with his characterization of the street as mainly made up of members of social level three.worker plied his trade at this end of the street does not seem to be borne out by Hammel’s findings. we must keep in mind that those who owned the houses did not necessarily live in them. may have made combs from the bones left over from his trade. facing it.” 218. They also enjoyed the fig.” 130. and of what occupation. her supposition that a leather. Hammel. 590 CHARLOTTE MASEMANN from a rubbish pit. pear. from A to D. surface features. and assumed gathered. Fifteen fruit species appear here. His original system contained four classifications. The almost ubiquitous hazel comes as no surprise. from a total of four samples.frühneuzeitliche. Vegetables are represented by the brassicas and white mustard. Alsleben. Hops. measurement and indices.” 168. including the wild. Karl-Ernst Behre. and Engelsgrube. This classification system enables palaeobotanists to distinguish minutely between types. grape. and together they form a varied group of plums. The European plum developed in the same way. the tower of the Heiligen-Geist-Hospital. Two species that have not been seen before in Hundestrasse or St. arguing that a hawthorn tree grew on the property. is not specific about their exact location in relation to the modern house numbers.53 One fig seed makes an appearance. sweet gale and cannabis all appear. both a generic variety and type C. Johanniskloster were found here. “Archäobotanische. while the later samples are taken from two wells. Among the cultivated fruits are apple.” 333. Helmut Kroll. found only at Alfstrasse/ Schüsselbuden. strawberry. The second is walnut (Juglans regia). who performed the botanical analysis. and sloe. noticing a great deal of variation in the C-type among the examples he was finding at Lübeck. Four samples taken from a well and dating to the fifteenth century offer the largest number of species preserved at any one Alsleben.52 Twenty-eight species are attested from the thirteenth century. Kroll. elder. raspberry. 53 52 . The damson plum (P insititia) originated in the East as offspring of the . found on few other sites. von der Wikingerzeit bis in die frühe Neuzeit nach Fruchtsteinen aus Haithabu und Alt-Schleswig. A to F. The largest numbers are found at the probable site of a bakery in Engelsgrube. “Formenkreise von Prunus domestica L. based on shape.” Lübecker Schriften zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte 3 (1980): 167. This variation has led Behre to develop a classification system for the damson plum. “Mittelalterlich-frühneuzeitliche Steinobst aus Lübeck. sloe (Prunus spinosa) and the cherry plum (Prunus cerasifera). legumes by broad bean and another lone lentil. blackberry. It appears for all periods for this site. The oil seeds are gold of pleasure and linseed. The first is hawthorn (Crataegus oxyacanthus). “Mittelalterlich. extended the system to six types. The one herb is fennel. Kroll. and using his finds from Haithabu and Alt Lübeck as samples. sweet cherry and damson plum.” Berichte der deutschen botanischen Gesellschaft 91 (1978): 161-79. caraway.55 A second quince find appears on this site. and coriander. In some cases the number of preserved finds is unusually high. of both wild and cultivated types. sweet cherry (2079). Hops. parsley. carrot. but there are no legumes. All variants of damson plum appear here. Once more. strawberry. Fig. New to this site are poppy. “Mittelalterlich-frühneuzeitliche. Many of these are common to other sites. . the latter a rarely consumed local fruit. poppy. The brassicas appear again. as are the more unusual walnut and mulberry. sloe. and grape (1342). coriander and fennel come as no surprise. caraway. 11: 266. Unfortunately. raspberry. the largest finds are of the variants B. On this site we have the first appearance of what may be quince (Cydonia sp. such as blackberry. LUB. apple species and the damson plum variants B. E and F were found here as well. since they are the variants least suited to drying. which Kroll points out are probably local. blueberry. cannabis. Some examples are sloe (411). These numbers are many times higher than the next-highest find from other sites. Johanniskloster. but presents some hitherto unseen in Lübeck. His wife was petitioning the council in order to have his wares released to her. none of the spices were named. and sweet cherry. C and F. hazel appears. They are the peach (Prunus persica) and the medlar (Mespilus germanica). Johanniskloster in the thirteenth century and not at all in Hundestrasse). with the highest seed count of any site (497). European dewberry we have not seen since St.). The last site to be examined offers somewhat less diversity of species.54 Dyer’s camomile (Anthemis tinctoria) is seen here for the first time since St. black pepper (Piper nigrum) and cardamom (Elleteria cardamomum) are all tropical spices that must have been imported. unique to it. Johanniskloster. echo those preserved elsewhere. The site contains a very wide range of fruit species (25). the brassicas. C. Some of the spices preserved on this site are. and grape are represented. which number 27. Pear species. the former likely imported. 54 A document from 26 July 1467 reports the arrest of a spice merchant from Nymwegen. Many of the species dating from the thirteenth century also appear here. however. namely 46. wild parsnip (these last two seen in St. Many of the fruit species preserved here. Grains of paradise (Afromomum melegueta). dill.” 168-9.MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS 591 site. Two species of fruit preserved nowhere else appear here. 55 Kroll. This site also offers large preserved numbers of individual species. those from Hundestrasse were less numerous (one per period) and derived from soil less favourable to preservation. and six if we count the quince finds also attested for this century. also imported. sloe. such as lentil. all but two are species that one may assume grew in Lübeck.592 CHARLOTTE MASEMANN In general. Both these sets of samples offer a greater diversity of species than the roughly -comparable. may suggest access to more expensive foodstuffs. Johanniskloster) and pea (Hundestrasse). Even more telling than this greater diversity of species is the presence of those hitherto unattested in Lübeck. by the sixteenth. Johanniskloster. The first. The picture presented by the finds from the thirteenth century does not differ markedly from that we derive from the finds for the same century at Hundestrasse and St. . the botanical evidence from Alfstrasse/Schüsselbuden contains a good diversity of preserved species. the number has risen to five. appears in the fifteenth century. Both a wider diversity of indigenous fruits. hawthorn. in terms of date. and some non-indigenous introductions contribute to this picture. the situation is reversed in the case of carrot (found in St. as measured in food consumption. when we examine the samples taken from similar preservation conditions in Hundestrasse. in Alfstrasse/Schüsselbuden in the thirteenth century. Evidence from the later two centuries at Alfstrasse/Schüsselbuden offers much more support for such a claim. were consumed at both Hundestrasse and Alfstrasse/Schüsselbuden. we note that a lower number of species was preserved. Certainly some species that were found in Alfstrasse/Schüsselbuden did not appear in the other two sites for the same century. Much of this diversity is exhibited in the fruit finds. samples from Hundestrasse. The appearance of the walnut.56 However. which was perhaps imported. fennel. Part of this disparity may be explained by the superior preservation conditions offered for this period in Alfstrasse/Schüsselbuden. These species are all exotic and quite probably imported. These differences do not seem illustrative of a significantly higher standard of living. This evidence suggests that the range of foods available in 56 The Alfstrasse/Schüsselbuden samples were taken from a well and were high in organic content. pear and walnut. However. This may be attributable to the earlier time period (fourteenth century) and also to the different socio-economic conditions. More fruit species are preserved at the latter site than at the other two. figs. quince. By the second half of that century.58 The house at the corner of Alfstrasse was number 6. a period not covered by the archaeological evidence presented here. and also a tanner. Unfortunately. on the corner of Alfstrasse. Hammel. he is able to say definitively that the goldsmith in number 12 did not. since the ordinary consumption of a household might not produce quite so many fruit stones. Both these professions are derived from the last names of the owner.” “Hauseigentum. with more than half of the owners being artisans. 197.” 197. No one profession was dominant. and that the two corner lots at Mengstrasse and Alfstrasse were conveniently oriented both to the Marienkirche (the church of the merchants) and to the harbor. His study took in the houses along Schüsselbuden. makes this hypothesis perfectly possible. however. Hammel is doubtful whether the owners necessarily pursued their occupations from these buildings.” “Hauseigentum.57 These artisans were concentrated at the south end of the street.59 Hammel also notes that merchants were concentrated in the northern end of the street. there was a preponderance of owners from council families. 198.” “Hauseigentum. The position of the lot. Permanent market stalls were built in front of the houses and separated from them by a large passage.60 His map for 1350 to 1399 shows a tinsmith at Schüsselbuden 8. 198. . the balance had shifted. Schüsselbuden faced onto the market. which ran straight down to the harbor. but did not extend down Alfstrasse.61 57 58 59 60 61 Hammel.MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS 593 Lübeck was changing as exotic foods made their way north (this does not explain why figs were accessible in the artisanal quarter as early as the thirteenth century) and that the wealthier members of society had access to them first. Hammel’s study of house ownership is not as useful for this site as it was for Hundestrasse. diagram 73. Some of his general remarks on the socio-economic nature of Schüsselbuden may be illuminating. Hammel.” “Hauseigentum. Hammel. Hammel. south of number 16. and he focused on the fourteenth century. “Hauseigentum. In the early fourteenth century. The large number of finds for this century may also suggest commercial activity in that very site dealing in foodstuffs. since goldsmiths were restricted to the 12 stalls underneath the arcade of the Rathaus. “Besiedlungsgeschichte im Lübecker ‘Kaufleuteviertel’. Johanniskloster and Hundestrasse was slightly surprising. . Dumitrache and Remann refer to imported material found on the site that suggests the presence of a wealthy merchant. This anomaly may be due to preservation conditions or the fact that the leaves of many herbs dried and used. suggesting that the standard of living at that time was fairly consistent across social levels. one would expect herbs to be plentiful in this area. rather than their seeds. This evidence suggests that the poor may have been eating rather better than one assumes. It shows that a wide range of fruits and vegetables were consumed on all three sites. it remains suggestive. Unfortunately. the archaeological evidence suggests that this class of person ate a varied diet of locally available produce. because they do not discuss this evidence in detail. Danish and English styles. Some of the evidence from St.62 This closer look at the evidence from sites in three different socio-economic areas of the city is revealing. Archaeologists found very little herb evidence in an area thought to be a monastery garden. Material from Alfstrasse/Schüsselbuden dating from the thirteenth century does not differ markedly from that found in the other two sites. but it does not confirm it either. The real difference appears in the evidence from 62 Marianne Dumitrache and Monika Remann. including fig seeds that must have been imported. Little disparity exists in the evidence from the thirteenth century on all three sites.” Lübecker Schriften zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte 17 (1988): 112. The St. this includes glazed ceramics in Dutch. Material found from the thirteenth century to before 1615 shows a consistently wide range of plant material. Evidence from Hundestrasse also presents something of a puzzle. Hammel’s work certainly does not preclude the presence of a relatively wealthy merchant on this corner lot. in light of documentary evidence from other sites. Documentary evidence shows that the residents of Hundestrasse were primarily middle-class artisans. Johanniskloster site does not present later evidence. The monastery gardeners therefore would have had an incentive to see that their leafy herbs did not go to seed. This appears on a site that was known to be the home of a poorhouse.594 CHARLOTTE MASEMANN No occupation names appear in the map for 1284 to 1349. for fibre. and for oil. This is one of the great boons offered to the historian by the archaeological evidence. Some of these plants. in Lübeck. and cabbages. spices. it worked the other way. . both wild and cultivated. The useful plants preserved there range from fruits. 63 LUB. Others are found only in a very few places during a very short time period. nuts. the evidence provided by plant remains is the only proof that exists that certain types of plants were grown or consumed within the city. merchant. 3: 771. In many cases. as well as the possibility that the site was used by an importer of spices. are found throughout the city. such as hops and raspberries. thus adding to the picture provided by the pollen analysis. also appear in the documents. it can throw open a window and show a much wider range than appears in the documentary evidence. This evidence suggests that produce grown outside the city was consumed within it. since medieval documents name plants according to the custom of the day. In most cases. but its species could not. hops.MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS 595 the sixteenth century. and those used for flavoring beer. such as apples. archaeology makes the identification more specific. in ecclesiastical. This evidence suggests a high standard of living for the residents. herbs. This was an important aspect of the urban-rural relationship. but also how well documentary and archaeological evidence combine to provide a more complete picture than either can individually. vegetables. and not according to the Linnean system of genus and species used by the palaeobotanist. The case of Lübeck also reveals how this archaeological evidence can confirm what is known from the documents. The botanical evidence derived from the archaeological digs in Lübeck records a wide variety of plants. Several of the plants found in the archaeological record. however. such as the peppercorns found only in the merchants’ area.63 The evidence from Lübeck shows not only what people of different economic and social status were consuming. Allium pollen could be identified. In one case. this is the only site in Lübeck containing significant numbers of exotic spices such as pepper and coriander. and that rural growers supplied the urban market. Both onions and garlic were named in a document. and artisanal sites. ”67 The crop that illustrates this point best in Lübeck is the hop. 65 Fritze. 64 Fritze has made similar observations (Konrad Fritze..-20. Studien zu den Stadt-Land-Beziehungen an der südwestlichen Ostseeküste vom 13. Bürger.64 Citizens of Lübeck were also highly involved in gardens outside the city.66 He also indicates that the cultivation of gardens outside the city was strongly linked to the city itself: “Der breite Gürtel von Gartenland. Lübeck included. Irsigler notes that increasing cultivation of cash crops such as woad and hops formed part of the phenomenon of response to demand from urban markets around Cologne.” 186). bis zum 18. 68 Wilhelm Stieda. wurde von der Stadt aus bewirtschaftet. Jahrhundert (Weimar: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger.” in Hermann Kellenbenz. Ownership or renting of land outside the city was of course an economic link. encouraged this sort of economic relationship so as to tighten the city’s hold on the area around it. Hops appear in significant numbers in both documentary and archaeological evidence. “Die Gestaltung der Kulturlandschaft am Niederrhein unter dem Einfluß städtischer Wirtschaft. but it also had important effects on territorial politics. Many of Lübeck’s wealthier citizens owned land around the city. Hopfenbau.596 CHARLOTTE MASEMANN The picture that emerges of the role of Lübeck’s gardens in the life of the city appears consistent with other research on the urban-rural relationship in the Hanse and beyond. 67 “The broad belt of gardens that formed around the medieval cities of the Rhine was cultivated from the city outwards”(author’s translation) (Irsigler. 85. 87). der sich um die mittelaterlichen Städte des Rheinlandes ausbildete. “Studien zur Gewerbegeschichte Lübecks.” Mitteilungen des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde 3 (1-2) (1887): 6-7 . 66 Franz Irsigler. Hops grown around Lübeck were sold within the city. presumably because there was a market for them within the city.68 Hops were unequivocally a cash crop.65 Franz Irsigler has argued convincingly that cultivators in the area around Cologne in the Middle Ages made choices based on demands from the urban markets. 3. 1982). a significant proportion of the gardens around the city grew hops. ed. 68. As we have seen. and some indeed owned whole villages. the possibility is slight that they were consumed only by their growers. 181. Wirtschaftsentwicklung und Umweltbeeinflussung (14. Jahrhundert) (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag. 1976). and were either used for brewing there or for export. Bürger und Bauern zur Hansezeit. Many cities. “Die Gestaltung. 70 F. “Die Gestaltung. 140-1. aufgezeigt am Beispiel Kölns. Olive Ordish (London: Edward Arnold. Riemann. The Agrarian History of Western Europe. Riemann. . Zeven Variaties op het Thema Landbouwgeschiedenis (Wageningen: Veenman. de Vlaamse landbouw in de late middeleeuwen. Edith Ennen. The gardens of Lübeck seem therefore to fit into a pattern seen in other medieval cities in which they were an important part of the city-country relationship. 69 Joan Thirsk. K. K. 15-6. 71 B. 17. Gieysztor (Warsaw: Paxstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. Adriaan Verhulst. or gardens. 1964).” in Cultus et Cognitio. trans. 1953). 1966). 500-1850. agriculture is carried on more intensively as a result of the influence of those urban agglomerations. a model first suggested by F.D. Slicher van Bath.000 gardeners could occupy themselves on land cultivated by 100 farmers (Irsigler.69 Cultivators of gardens usually manured them more thoroughly and cultivated them by hand rather than with a plough. Ackerbau und Viehhaltung in vorindustriellen Deutschland (Kitzingen-Main: Holzner. 1976).” 194). the ratio of land used for intensive cultivation. Alternative Agriculture: A History from the Black Death to the Present Day (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 1997). This was especially true of hop gardens. A. since the perennial plantings made ploughing impossible and hops are very heavy feeders. Many of their owners came from the city. “Bronnen en problemen betr.MEDIEVAL LÜBECK’S GARDENS 597 Historians of agriculture consider horticulture as a more intensive form of cultivation. Riemann argued that in thickly populated areas and those dominated by large towns and cities. “Wechselwirkungen mittelalterlicher Agrarwirtschaft und Stadtwirtschaft. Seen in this light. Irsigler notes that 1.70 This idea has influenced the work of many agrarian historians and continues to have relevance. and they formed a ring of intensive cultivation around the city.” Ceres en Clio. the presence of many gardens just outside the walls of Lübeck can be interpreted as part of an island of intensification that spread out beyond the city. to the land used for field crops is also unknown. they supplied produce for consumers within the city from a range of socio-economic levels. 205-12. H.71 It is unclear how far this island extended. Festschrift A. 29. . . . . . . . . . . x x . 436. 569. David. 403-4. European trade with. 475. slaves. 220. 232. 98. England. 96. 267 accountability. Sicilian wheat. 110. 292. 388. 299. 554. 379 administration. 439 agriculture. 417. 112. 418. 100-1. 431-2 Agordo. Africa. 276 Alchian. Flanders. Provence. 569. 21920. 94-6. 263. 394. 120. Abel. 435-6 . 376. Wilhelm. labor. 597. books and ledgers. 394. 418. Portugal. 212. England. 597. North. products. 102. productivity. 399. Walter. 419. 105. goods. 107. 427 Alberti. 404. 120. 225 Achilles. gold. 314. 267 Alberti. 396. 466. 419 Alberti. 266. Duarte. 199-200 Abbo. 115. 113. 417 Agli. é é é commodities. 94. 297. 539. captaincies.. malagueta. 221. 117. 423 Adrar des Iforas. 387-90. bookkeeping. 560-1. 93. L. 390. 435 . 183. 115. Sultan of Morocco (Marínid dynasty). Yahya. Diamante and Altobianco degli (firm). 250. 502. 223-6. production. 416-7 accounts and accounting. 486. 415 Africa. 164. 112-3. specie market. 413. specie markets. 402-3. 271 Alcudia. 225. 325 Abbeville. 215. Egypt. 417. 435-6 é Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad b. Agrigento. 301. 389. al-Bilad al-Sudan. 441 Aalst. 558. 102. 97. 310. East. 353. 114. 435 Abulafia. technologies of. access to. 213. Provence. commerce. 258. 99-117. Abú Sa‘íd ’Uthmán III. copper. 298 Africa. 469-70. King of Portugal. 176. 99. 105. 375. A. 329. 139. 263 Adrar. historians of. 322. West. 259 ‘Abd al-‘Azíz Abu Faris. 350.INDEX Aachen. 211. improvements. 479-480. é é . 230-1. 413 Afonso. 409 . 212. 477. 217. . Bernabò degli (firm). 435 é . 396. 393. Portugal. 101. 481. 396. 211. Abí Sanuna. 117. rector of the Tarentais. 421 Alexandria. 154. organization and methods. 90. 99. 245. 220. 141. 110 Afonso V. Sultan of é é é Tunis (Hafsid dynasty). 243. 222. financial. A. 105. A. gold. Abí é é . 401. Tuscan. Catalonia.. coinage. 108. 117. 103-4. 307 Ahaggar. 379 Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad I. 99100. 160. 212. Aix (en Provence). 220-2 Africa. 106. Alberto degli. 330. sub-Saharan. 108 Africa. 302. 413 é é Ahmad b. 447 Agricola. 305. Sultan of Tlemcen. 411. 360 Arnold. 341. 51. 482. 460. 320. 328. 95. 435. 550 Bambeke. rents. 193-4. grain prices. 168 Baltic Sea. 519. 3434. 415 Allenbach. Portugal. 448 autonomy (sociological category). 64. 346-7 Bakewell. 103-8 Aristotle. 51 Arabian Sea. 387. 120 Andrea. 100. 391 Arabs. 531-2 Anjou. census. 46. 347. 136. 416. 145. 330. 181 Balearic Islands. protectionism. Adolphus. 85. 83. Abraham. 302. 424. 329. 380. 360-1 ancien régime. 264 Auvergne. Wilhelm. 199. copper trade. 475 Area. 416 Ballard. Barcelona. cities. records. 484-8. copper. 424. 343-4. 426-7. 263 Arnhem. Almuth. counts of. 415 Austria. 41-3. 434-5 Aragon. 346. 66-7. 273 Bailey. 200 Baiano. 464 Andrea. 80 Aups. 41. 326-7. 524. 558-9.610 INDEX Alfons IV. 64 Arquet. money of. 98. 363. 419. 325. Treaty of. 193. wood. 361. 261. 324. 104 Alps. 441. Ethics. 220. 134. 35461. 122. textiles. 498. 337. 126. 258 Annaba (Bône). 123 Alfonso V. 128. 483 Arrow-Debreu model. 416 arbitrage. 252 Asia. 434. markets. 478. 140 Arezzo. 313. 426. Borromei. 460. 447. 389 Asia Minor. 436 annuity. . 415-7. Congress of. 336-7. Magaluf ben. censal. 434. 172 Amsterdam. 41 Arles. Domenico d’. 418. 441 Allmand. 524 Avennes. 199 artillery. 436 Arras. 475. 465. centers. liftrent. 110 Antwerp. staples. grain prices. 396 Atlas Mountains. 132. Thomas (Saint). 426. rente viagère. Francisco de. 501. 416. 467. specie distribution. merchants. 198. grain. 70. 265. companies. Mark. King of Aragon. 3324. 429. 308 Bailleul. King of Aragon. 101. 485. cities. 306 Algeria. 327. 498. 558-9. 373. merchants. Borromei Bank Research Project. 322. 431-2. 519. Bernat de. 41-2. 480. 478. 432. 339. houses. 324 banking and bankers. 203-4. 438. Pinxtenmarkt. wine. 301. 475-7. 431. 419. 306. 387 Alsleben. 573. Christopher. 271 arsenal. 470 Aquinas. 436 Almeida. 455. 485. 380. 466-8. reexports. 238 Artois. Crown of. Giovanni d’. 590 America. Politics. 412. 188 Allon. 166. 315. 280 Arguim. 5357 Anjou. 50. 122. wine. 139. 195-201. 133. 56. 552. 319 Ano Bom Island. 351. 313 Arundell (family). 339. 341. 424 Bedfordshire. uniformity. 387. 135-6. 432 Benedictine Order. miners and mining. 475. 435 é Baratier. Besztercebánya). 465 Bassa.INDEX 611 467. 108 Bardi (family). 467. ratio. 324-5. 54. 262. 146 Blanchard. 47. 392. 475 Banská Belá. 181 Biervliet. 120. 261 Bengal. Pere. 483. 436. Italian. Duarte. Wilhelm. 460. 124. 485. 158. 428. 472. ores. 519. 470-2. 130. 426. 375 Black. 134. 269. 481. Cesare de. 470-1. 451 Banská Bystrica (Neusohl. 324 Bohemia. 480-1. 302 al-Bírí. 389. exchange. 110-1 Bellviure. 451 Banu ’Amr b. Ser Marco. Datini branch. Barcelona. 431 Bordeaux. 389. Girolamo. 478. 154. Henry. 269. 387. equilibrium. 238. 269. 472. agents. Jaume. 487. 262. 484 bi-metallic. Antwerp. 389. 464 Bon. 290. 415-6 Bleiberg. 119. 248-9 Borromei (family). 269. 466 Birgu. 387. 337. 246. 324 Beaufort. 153. 471-9. parity. 467-8. Zoghba. 424. 197 Beauvais. Barcelona bank. 389. 426 bondage. 266-7. 428 Barcelona. 126 Bodrugan (family). 460. 257-8. 477. 485. 153 Belgium. 475. 431-2 Bavaria. to lord. 263-4. “to this land. 500. 127. 428 Bonaccorso. 481-3. 132. Henry. trade. 3901. 484. to land. 138. 252 Boescheppe. 583 Benevent. 486-8. 127. 442 Bologna. Alessandro Borromei and Lazzaro di Giovanni & Co. 391. 418. 387 Bergues. cardinal. 402 é é Biscaro. 485. Edouard.. Peyre de. 431 Bartolo. 485. banks. Bay of. 475. 416 Barcelona. see Maghrib). 322. . 475-6. Borromei. 311 Bello. 111 Benedetti. 476. 122-4. 341. 486-7. 412-3. Marc. 398. Italians. 339. 433 Bere Ferrers. 281-2. 346-7 Berkeley. Battista. Nofri di. 447 Bavinchove. Count of.” 257-258 Bonet. 391 Bindotti. Bernardo. 396. Ian. 191 Beaumanoir. Giovanni. personal. 463-4. 445 Bloch. 199 bill of exchange. 449. 4007. Francesc. 53. standard. 436. 391 Benin (Kingdom of). 464. 468. 467. 467 Barrera. 262 Barchi. 541 Beccario. 432 Basel. Bastiano di. 409-10. 524 Beaugency. 216 Berwick. 343-4. Philippe de. 475. 486 488 Black Death. 265. merchantbankers. 446. 482. Pere. 267 “Barberia” (Barbary. 257-8 Blockmans. 480. 451-5 Banská Štiavnica. Bartolomeo di Francesco. 464. 462 Borromei. Count. 488. 463. Gabriello di Lodovico. 461 Borromei. 463-4 Borromei. Venice partnerships/companies. 464-6. 461 Borromei. 464 Borromei. 466. 488. 466. 465-6. 471. 464-5 Borromei. Lazzaro di Giovanni II. 477 Borromei. 480-1. Borromeo di Filippo. Benedetto di Lodovico. 465. 472. Francesco di Bartolomeo. 487 Borromei. 485-8 Bosporus. 485. 485-8. 463-4 Borromei. Giovanni di Borromeo. Giovanni di Filippo. 471. Dr Rui. 465. 479. 461 Borromei. Venice. 480. 464-5. 485. 485. 464-9. Prevosto e Alessandro Borromei & Co. 486-7 Borromei. Alessandro di Filippo. 462 Borromei. 464-5 Borromei. 482. wool. 460 Borromei. 135 Boston. Galeazzo di Giovanni II. Antonio di Borromeo. Carlo di Antonio. Milan partnerships. London partnerships/ companies. Antonio di Francesco. 462. London. textiles. Geneva. Bruges partnerships/companies. 329 Boto. 465 Borromei. 504 .. 484. 339.612 INDEX 488. 463 Borromei. 478-9. 346-7 Bourges. 460. 463 Borromei. 463-4 Borromei. 465. Piero. Venturino di Vitaliano. Filippo I di Vitaliano I. 462 Borromei. Vitaliano I. Piero di Gabriello. 469-72. Borromeo di Antonio. 468-9. Piero di Bartolomeo. 487. Tomasso di Matteo (?). 464-5 Borromei. 485. 483 Borromei.. Lodovico di Bartolomeo. 462. 465. 465. 464 Borromei. 485 Borromei. 462 Borromei. 483. Francesco. 462. 325. 485 Borromei. Filippo di Lazzaro. 463 Borromei. Florence partnerships. Margherita di Filippo. 462. of London. 465. Antonio di Lodovico.. 464-5 Borromei. 488 Borromei. 462. 246. Galeazzo di Borromeo. 461 Borromei. 463 Borromei. 463. 462. 477. 480-1. 462 Borromei. 468-9. Felipe da Fagnano & Co. profits and losses. 485-8. Alessandro di Piero. 465. 224 Bourbourg. 461. Guiliano di Piero. 475. 464. Giovanni Andrea (Prevosto) di Vitaliano I. 481-4. 472. Filippo Borromei & Co. 464-5. 487. 467. 485 Borromei. 467. 4612. Galeazzo di Borromeo Borromei & Co. 471. 471-3. BorromeoArese family archive. 466. Lodovico. 474. 480. cathedral. 464-5 Borromei. ledgers. 481-3. Antonio. 475-83. 461. 341. 488. 487. 343-4. 337. Alessandro di Antonio. “Borromei Bank Research Project”. Diogo Fernandes. exchange rates. Anthony. 468 Burgundy. 233 Bridgenorth. 482-4. 137 calculability. 254 Britnell. 205 Burgundy. Hundred Years War. 470. 483. 310. Giovanni. 457 bronze. rebellion. 199-200. 359-61 Buckingham. 202-4. 203-4. constitution of. 182 Brien. 334. 483 bullionism. 330 Cannes. trade. 476. rational. 193201. 208-9. 152. 74 Calderini. 331. 206 Brussels. leaders. 571 Brecht. 216 Buda (Tuat oasis. banking. 169. Battista. 331. 473-4. Gene. 336. 427. Dorothy. Britain. 209. 427. 198. 344. 332-3. 324. 76 brass (“yellow copper”). 349. 375 Burgos. Franc of. 449. 329. 197-8. 239. Lord Guy de. coinage. 467. Admiral of the West. 208 Cairo. 332. 208. 321. 421. 43 Cabral. ordinances. 3434. 337. 194-5. markets. 325. 347. 261. 176 Burford. 196-8. 196-8. 206. 187. 327 Burwash. 330. 483. 434 Canary Islands. 483. gold-silver ratio. 337. castellany. 391 Cambrai. 263 Cantor. 327. 468 Brahminism. 110 Cadzand Island. 380. 103. 441. 183. 99. Hanse. 351. 509. grain prices. 351. 346-7 Campanaro. 208. 320. 208. 474-83. towns. 191-2. Italians. sieges. fairs. money market. revenues. 4858. imports. 218. alliance with England. 200. 371. Fernand. 494. 159. 472. artillery. 423-5 Buda (Hungary). 483. 420-1. 197. “Great Bullion Famine. 375 Brittany. Duke of. 190. 450 bullion (see also precious metals). siege of. 483. 350. estates. 510-1 Broussole. 441. 209. copper. 439. Joan of Arc. 194. 419. 334. credit. 447. 108 . 251 Brignoles. 470. alliance with England. 359-61. 482 Calatayud. 402. 334. 123 Brucker.” 383. 98 Canche River. 419. 218. Sahara). 41 Bridbury. wool. port of. 398 Calais. 339. 484. 188. 180-1. 527 Braudel. 325-6. 470-2. Borromei. Jean. 259. 466. 203. 343. 138. 439. 55 Cambay. 239. 380. 341. Catalans. 383. 188. 331. 263 Bristol. 495. 204. 316. 476. 248 Byzantium (Empire). 464-8. merchants. 191. Richard. army. 191. 203. 471-2. hostilities with England. 189-90. 325. grain prices. 198-206. 477. 468. 246. 194. 331. 356. Bertold. 313. fleet. Staple of. 193. 191. 191. 339. 144 Bruges. 315. 356. Dukes of. 218 Buckingham. 154. 326. alliance with France. troops. 253 Brixlegg.INDEX 613 Brabant. Pierre. foreign nation. 83 Ceuta. 261. 111 capitalist. 363. 427 caravan. gold. 221 Champagne. 413. Ypres. 126. 203. 428 central place. land. 57. 279. 466-7. 179. 253. 299-300 Cattano. 281. trails (Sahara). tallia. 90 111. 68. 341. robbery. Jean. 123. 128. 134. 166. 130-2. 168-71. concentration. 122-38. Corts. Carocci. Paolo di Antonio da. Catalan dynasty. 71. 280. 262-3 Catalonia. imports. 179 Carinthia. 310. Cristofano di Bartolo. 264-5 Castile. 62-3. 322. 141-2. 224. 363. 451 Carpatho-Balkan area (metallogenic). 451 Cassel. 571. 135 Catania. economy. 319. 326. 391. working. 446 Š centinaio (unit of weight). 79. value. fixed. market. 571. 151. 136. 283. 245. 128. 139. 328-33 Champion. 97 Capetian dynasty. 220. 168-9. 117 Capitana (galley). assets. fairs. 544. 334. 165. 313-4. 333. Duke of Bourbon. 130-3. 421. 316. 447 Carneiro. 99. 196 Charles VII. count-kings of. 319. 93. 322. 336 political. 150. 434-6 Cardiff. King of France (previously the Dauphin). 312. censal. 394. 326. 277. 391 Chartier.614 INDEX Cape Verde Islands. 131. 424. 571. maintenance. 305. 414. 571. 347 Castagnolo. exemptions. 334 cessant gain (lucrum cessans) (interest title). 73-7. fogatge. 321. 205 charters. 279. 139. 334. 120-1. 396. 261 Catalonia. cartography. 130. 60. 394. 275-7. 134-5. function. 128. 424. Cristofano. 119. 139. 466. 486. 278. 12932. 122-24. 411. 333 China. merchants. 545. 310. 504-6 . 334. 209 Charles. 415. capitalistic development. 114. 326-8. 310-2. 201 Chartres. 114. 138-9. 263 capital. 343-4. 564. 320. 565. 373. 141-2. 444 Cechoslav. theory. 311. 126. Borromei. 275. 83-5. “capitalismo monárquico português” (Portuguese state capitalism). violari. 235. 110-1. 138-9. 130-5. 283 capitals. 346. 146. merchants. merchants. maritime trade. 387. 368. 85. trade. 183. 339. 331. 370 capitalism. 488 Castellane. 322. 96. 325. administrative. 356. 337. 149. 570-1. 468 Celle. imposicions. 292. 121. 485. 65. 106. 487-8. commitment. 155. 428. 68. 192-3. Jan. 235. 423-4. wars with Portugal. 244. 132. 71. 416. 90. concentration of in central place. 427-31 Carpathian Mountains (western). cathedral. losses. defence of. 268. social. 124. investment. 96-9. 231. 311. 311. 110 Cape Bojador. António. royal or government. intensive. 582. 246 Cologne. 154 Chester. 389. North Sea. 363. 143 Cinque Ports. medieval. circulation. 94. 383. debt. export of. 147. 403. 313. Flanders. 403. 306. 260. 400-4. 477. 92. 469-70. 144. 418. 62. 373. English. 313. England. 431. 313. medieval. 68. 491. transfer of. 432. 74. German. classes in. 436 Comino. 172. Picardy. 207. medieval. 379. silver. 425-6. 402. 491. 434. 48. 308. 326. 538. 320. 506. 512-3. 94 Church. Portuguese. 166. 162. 321-2 Colchester. 363-5 Chopa (vessel). 297. 43 Ciereaz Mountains. 597. Papal authority. civitas. 310. 142. 163. 154. Lübeck. European. value of. Egypt). 72. 172. 465. Artois. 583 cities. Levant. luxury. re-coinage. 315. 329. 349. 313. 415. 579. 378. relations with non-Christians. 129. 165. North Africa. 50-2. Flemish. demesnal. 547. 350. 304 Clarence. silver. 559. 596 Collo. 484. types of. 396. 119. 536-7 Chioggia. 102. Majorca. 44. 477. 133-6. 552. industry. 174. regulation. 434. 524. Western Mediterranean. 509. 60. 494. 60. European. 561. 176.501. Walter. Mediterranean. 79 Christians. 216 Clausthal-Zellerfeld. 64. supply of. 401.INDEX 615 Chemnitz. 542. 298. 144-5 Chittagong. 129. 98. 235 Ciompi Revolt. associations. 1224. 408. 418. 120. 546. 250. 401. 444 cloth. Catholic 49. foreign. eastern. early. 399. export of. urban. 524. transSaharan. elites. 299-301. Duke of. 483. American. 387 Cistercian Order. 503-30. 391 Christaller. 64. gold. 401. 81. 314. 484. 43. 119. Flemish. 402. debasement of. 470. 310. 85. Sicilian. 566. 322. 476. merchants. 555. 569-70. 305. 141. 471. 402-3. 379. 119. 181. 322. 412. 441. 435. 369. 77-80. demand for. 322. 499-500. 93. sales of. . English. 430 Christianity. 173 coins. 324. 160. broadcloth. 121. 308. Ghent. 320. 571. 246. 207. 539. Maltese. 97. 82. 496. 151. 334. 452 Š š Ciompi Revolt. 401. Ypres. 126. 596-7. Catalan. 349. 362-3. 569 Cockermouth. 415 commercial. 311. 539. royal. food. 68-9. 483. 227. viability. 147. Italian. 176. 496. 329 clothing. 143 Circassian [Mamluk] (dynasty. fifteenth-century. 59. 470 coinage. 77-9. exchange. 72-3. 207. copper. 374. late medieval. 401-2. 308. 593. rebellion. 433. 301 commerce. 565. 566. 468-9. 499. 418. 513-5. mediumsized. 481. 350. 349. 566. 403. 469. 147. Earl of. 349. 349-50. 496-502. gold. 569. 103. 493. production of. 469. market. administration of. Flemish. 402. 484 Cokerulle. Low Countries. 213. “Old Christians”. 524. 430. 223. activity/presence. Sicily. 515. supply of. 329. 178. 445 Chepstow. 364. produce. 298-9. 191-2. 308. 567. 63. 483. 312. 547. practices. 352. defence of. cargo. 142-3. 484. dealings. 373. sharecropping (see mezzadria). 570 Compiègne. 119. Hunsrück. produce. wood. 308. expeditions. William. 65. 566. scrap. life. 353. 438. 69.” 569. goods. 572. rental.” 447. 364-5. 591-2. 122. 177. raw (Schwarzkupfer). protectionism. 486-7. 472. 113. 260. privileges. 291. 308. Antoni. infractions. 448. 421. customs. 364. 467. sites/venues. 283. ingot (hallmarked). 545. relations. food. 428. 564 commodities. networks. 432-4 Cope. 45. societies. 447. 447. 64. 127. hazards. 437-8. 48. rod. 420. Philippe. 122. 303. 427. 432. 79. 597. 1945. 280-1. 218. inventories. system. 568 commodization. 438. 353. 419. 194. 412. Schwaz/ Brixlegg (Inn Valley). 394. 306. 391. 249. 299 Contamine. urban. 412. centers. regulation. 538. 1567. 432. 96-7. 315. 349. 506. 578-81. 368. Swe- . partnerships. 237. 320. Polish. 445-7. 389. 9. fire- wood. 333. ventures. 401. 150. 431. voyages. Hungarian. 262. 411457. 207. correspondence. 220 copper. 126-7. law. 419. species. 266. 245. industry. artillery. medium vestum. Hammergarkupfer. food. 197-8. 538. 56 consumption. 263.616 INDEX blockade. credit. 171. lease. 325. 481. 173-4. 441. monopoly. 66. 109. reasoning. disputes. grain. 96-100. 85. 195-6. 503. 310. 369. economy. fruit. 48. 79 Constitutum usus (Pisan commercial code). 49 converso (Jewish convert to Christianity). 146. 193. 477. copper. 76-7. 297-8. 190 Contarini (family). 562-4. 69-70. plate. 111. 441. 352-3 consumptibility. 194. 368. 174. “non-commercial”/“uncommercial. 369. 441. 134. 55-6. 428-9. 595. 176. 4425. 494. taxes. emphyteusis. 85. 49. 287. commercialization. 593-4. 166. estate. 277. wheat. centres. 448-50. 284. household. 554. 63. hops. 426 contract. 290. 545. 403. 450-6. 595. Harz. freightage. 298. (loaf) 419-20. 209 Confucianism. 65. 65-6 consumers. 586. 438. 424. 572. Rosettenkupfer. Low Countries (Bruges). 595. stipulatio. 565. 160-3. point of. Salzach. 542. 419. 392. 53. Slovak. 60-1. 592. needs. 90. transactions. 370 contado. plants. loans. Erzgebirge. Enns Valley. 105. 420. 237. 594. Belluno. price inelastic. levels. Alvise. governor of. grain. operations. 596. exploitation. 427. 165-6. 181. 48. 176. 169. interests. 383. 99. 420. 586. 196. 353. norm. siege of. 376. 115. 571. Antonio. 59. 143. marriage. 404-407. 571. “catchment areas. 420. increase in. 448. 419. 589. 399. 93. Edgeworthian contract curves. 314. 438. 503. 402. essential goods. 582. 437. capitalism. 424. 172. 132. 266. 49-50. 582. 228. development. 106-12. 153. 299-301. 146-7. 427-8 430 Contestí. 466. 447. vegetables. cities. 50. 581. census. 268269. 210 Cuper. values of. 231. 469-70. 468. 293. 127. 326. 252 Courtrai. 352. 170. 243. 220. 199 Courtenay (family). 352. 326 Corbinelli. 140. shipping. 190. 363-5.” 442. 235-9. 112. taxation. 564 customs. 362. demographic. 301-2. 267. 111 Cumbria. David. 69. 176. 393. 167. 498. 141. climatic. 228. 407. information. 500. 215. gunpowder weapons. Florence. 187. 507. ports and ships. 245 Cornwall. 290. 269. 291. . Portuguese. 293. 105. 279-80. 177-83. 530-7. 231-2 cruzado (unit of currency). 65. Provence. 559. 468. 235. Sean. 129. 401 customs. 483. 383. 470. customals. trade. 402. 89-118. 475. 142-3. English. 275. 57. commercial. cost-benefit analysis. 268. 152. 244. 101. 319. borrowing/credit. 91. 48. 431. commodity. legal. 466. 479-81. 524. labour. tin. 507. 475. 328. 100. 230-1. 178. 218. Catalonia. 121. Duchy of. 215-6. revenues. socio-political. 187. manipulation of. 321-2. foreign. prospecting. 248. 269. 81. 112. Malthusian. 387. common. 168 credit/creditor. 470. Portugal. Egyptian. 570. prevailing. 53-4. customary law. 464 Cornwall. 468. 197 crisis. 448 Corbie. 233-5 Côte d’Or. 91. PugetTheniers. 253. 237. 103. 551. 441. 50-1. Ghent. 307. 437. Champagne Fairs. 216. fluctuations of.INDEX 617 dish. 480. 133. 135. 324. state and government. gold. 233. 221. 433. 561-5. fourteenth-century. 210. 187. 312-6. 297. 287. 223. Castilian. 214-6. 484. 221. 123-4. 508 Crown. 187. 246. 548. 176-8. Nicholas. 135. “energy. 250-1. 243. 543-9. 447. 251. in Manresa. city. Valle del Fersina. 144. 243. 235 Cunningham. 91-2. 351. creditore. fortifications. 425 Croatia. 310-348 Creil. 140. 130. 376. 132. 267. 148. 468. 539. transaction costs. farm. 517 Croft. 369. 437. 214-5. royal household. 352. 362-4. Venetian. 541. 503. 1978. 173-4. 502. 91. African regions. 416. 373-5. Aragonese. 471-2. 377-9. 475. 353. fractional. 167. 217. 308. Antonio. 555. 587 currency. 329. 401. 428. 143-4. customary charges/dues. 93. 271. 541. 112-3. 291. 113. Richard. 188 Coventry. 85. Sir Richard. 533. Walchen. 449. 458. 458. 245. 315. 216-20. textiles. 467. 252. 519. 96. 220-1. Genoa. accounts. 146. absence of. 248-50. 442. 447. 275. 214. 420 costs. revenue generation. 113. 484. credit market. 332-4. 221. 558. 240-1. 136. Flanders. 281. 555. 119. 553. 310-348. transport and travel. 401. 484. 275-6. monitoring. 287. 399. Ypres. 132-5. 67. 501-3. production. 222-8. opportunity. agencies and officials. 152. war. 250. 218. 212 Crouch. 542. 450 Crokele (Crokesle). 135. 143. 235. 545. 408. valuations. 436-7 Datini (firm). Kelly. 337. secured. 78. 431. 426-9. 119. 134. 434. 411-2. North Africa. policy. 46. 469 INDEX Dalton. 341. 322. 418. Guillaume. 401. recognitions. 486 demography and demographic trends. Compagnia di Catalogna. 144. Ypres and its jurisdiction. 260. 464. 63 double (dobla) (unit of currency). archive. 431-4. 214. 244-6. 475. 144. 554. 481. 570. 423 Dartmouth. 265 Day. & Co. 68. 334 deforestation. 335. 404. 49-60. 417-8. Francesco di Marco of Prato. é 401-4. 142-4. 221-2. 312. 420. 141. 402. 218 Douai. 436. 248. 380. 53. 139. 553-8. 411. 437. 246. 456. 177. 135. 456. 218 Datini. fulus. 426. 268. 252 Dhu ’Ubayd Allah (nomads). 421. 4301. 142. 387 Devon. 219. 427. Florence mother company. 262 dominium. 427. 132. 389. 187 Des Marez. 424. 555- 6. 287. 391 é é Dandolo (firm). 418-9. harbour. 432. 312-5. 430 Danzig (Gdaxsk). Jews. 432. 421. 449. 246. revenues. 3123. 147 Devon. 454. agents and factors. Majorca branch. 310. 437. 413. 310. 436 Darwin. 173 Damghan. . 427. 207. 441 Dorset. unsecured. 163 domination (sociological category). Manuel Nunes. 351. 412. 502-3. 417. competitors. 181 Despy. 154. ledgers. 339. 331. Antonio. 280-3. 471. 273 Dauphiné. 322. double (dobla). system. 227. 244. 458. 180. 93 Dordrecht. 324-9. 179 Domesday Books. 137. 418. Tuat caravan. half-Mu’ayyadí. Barcelona branch. 153. John. 305 De Vries. public. copper. 144. 409-10 dirham (unit of currency). 346-7. 343-4. 303. Valencia branch.. 554. funded. letters. 431-3. 424-7. 325 Derby. 235. é 404. 333. 417. 375. 435 é é Dias. 416-9. 413. 319. 321-2. nasirí é. 561. collection of. 131-3. 418.618 farming-out. 328-9. 458. 331-2. 315-6. 198 dinar (unit of currency). civic. 250-1. 480. 134. Joyceline Gledhill. fixed (certum lucrum). 418 431. 290. 408. 399400. 329. 91. 441. 441 Dar’a. 436. 153. 349. 211. 119. 409é 10 dividend. 274-5. 249. 424. 310-1 Dendermonde. 428. 143. 411. 4368. 442 Della Casa. 389. Mario. 293. 313. 437. 315. 432. Ipswich. 312-3. 90 Dickinson. 250-1. Georges. 429. Earl of. 245. 455-6. 437 (see also dinar) Domesday Book. royal household. 431. 428. 431. 556. revenues. 438. 531-4. 503 Del Treppo. 432-4. 146-8. 251. debtors. 109. 408. 383 debt. 149. 441. 64. goals. 89. 274. dislocation. 233. late medieval. 89. 404 Dufourq. 82. 61 economics. 426. 297. terms. 208 Durance River. 191. reforms. contraction. 475 ducat (aka dinar ifrantí) (unit of é currency). 596. 61. 325. sphere. 215. theories. 409-10. 233. 542. George. transactions. 259. growth. condition. 67. viability. 308. actions. limits. 75-6. development. questions. 191. doctrines. 266. 82. 187. 369 Dyer. 211. recovery. expansion. 50. regions. 79. health/well-being. regional. 405. 266 ducat (unit of currency). 264 Durham. procedures. constitution. profit. practices. 114. crossconnections. depression. 373. 72. costs. 473. 301. economies. 467. 565. 503. 432. 453 Drogheda. 239. status. 270. 91. 571. 44. 62. 139. 92. 100. 41. resources. Economy and Society. 77. institutions. port town. enterprises. 71. 377. meaning. rationale. opportunities. monetized. 272. culture. 250. 298. structures. 208. 77. 376. 61. network. 151. 270 economists. 208. 223. 402. 177. 190. 60. Manresan. pressures. 374. 299. link. 67. 565. 80. 453. 257. 43. thought. 77. 239. Christopher. 62. 365. 75. 543. 77-8. 54. 302. illogic. 81. regulations. 321.” 416. privileges. needs. 153 Drava River. projects. 59-63. 404. rewards. 59. 416 Dulcert. 45. European. issues/matters/affairs. 81-2 economy. problems/ difficulties/troubles. intervention. 114. [financial restraint]. overseas expansion. 311-2. 77. barrier. interests. 268. relevance. rationalized. 91. 71. 539. political. 402. 233. 174. history. 72-3. 96. 112. scene. 298. 324. agrarian. 57. 375. and agriculture. 450 Drienok. 539. 182-3 Dublin. concepts. 152. 60. 64. Angelino. 245. 91. Egyptian. 330 Dover. 272. 67. market. 218. players. 77-8. 61. 544. 173. 236. commercialized. 363. 268. fairs. 596. impact. 308. 176. niches. 418. environment. 297. 235. 147. medieval Europe. potential. 257. equivalent. relationships. and law. firms. . Low Countries. life. activity. rationalization. 351. advantages. 71. integration. 68. 82. 564. maritime. 60. 57. Marianne. 89. 166. 271. 66. 54. 117. 320. change. 368 economic. 70. 91. 80. 47. 550. English. 173. 542. 267. 80. 92. 667. “New Institutional Economics” (NIE). 424 Dumitrache. 78. 82. rationality. 73. process. divide. historians. 182 Duby. 73. 172. 452-3. 82-3. 79. 79. 595. 80. and ethics. 235. 78. 77. 269. 377. 150. Italian. 73. 71. 81. 84. 349. 71.INDEX 619 castellany. 564. events. ethics. viewpoint. 81. results. evolution. sectors. 84. control. 325. 246. Charles-Emmanuel. 350. modern. 259. 191. 503. 146. of household. 594 Dunkirk. process. 543. “middle band. approach. 554. 178. 266. capitalist. medieval. 565. 267. 85. 365. commercial. 364. 538. 272. 405. 250. market integration. 348-9. 391 Elton. 245. king of. 336-7. 67 England. 92. economy. 233. 320. 235-6. 270-1 Erdmannsdorf. 504. 65. 138. 188-90. 327. King of England. Parliament. shopping. 404. Cofferer. 117. 35861. 176-8. 468. and war. 211-20. 233-6. eastern. 329. 210. 105. 253. 91. 65. firewood. legislative control. 349. markets. 92. 172. 570. 346. copper. urban. private. 236. 387. 175. 169. 243. 370. 204. King of England. 69. 485-6. AngloSaxon. King of England. 208. equilibrium (economic). 235. 340. 399. Treasury of the Chamber. 205. 320. 483. 485. 1001. 91. 234. 83 Endemann. 352. 212-5. Africa. 387. 368-9. 413. trade. fairs. 383. 239. 415. 355-6. 249. 400-1. 374-5. overseas. 479. 60. textiles. 248. Papal revenues. 117. business/economic. Treasury of the Household. 400-1. 176 Edward III. gold prices. 469. 237-41. 250. 248. 233. 75. 509. Sir Geoffrey. 106. 245. 211-220. 477-8 English Channel. 203. 300. 248-9. Flanders. revenues. King of Castile. 445-6. 355. fleets. 253 Edward IV. Chancellor of the Exchequer. 231. 146. salvation. 477. noble. conquest of. 60-1. 238. 415. 253. Hundred Years War. 499. royal court. 251 Enns Valley. 467-8. 169. 206. 231. 329. exchequer. 240. 328-9. 456. 176-7 Edward II. 231. 350. 243. 246. 245. 2112.620 INDEX 415. 86. Eiblschrofen. wool. 470. urban occupations. 215-21. 221. 142. 173. 188. 442. 493. 113-5. 111. 467. 446 Erg Chech. Borromei. 380. 150. 448 Enrique I. 156. 216 Egypt. 342-4. enterprise. 220. 212. bills of exchange. 406-7. 350. shipping. 449 Ekelund. 400-1. 248. 328. 146. 231. King of England. 150. 469. 369. silver. imports. 354. 238. copper. 214-7. 235-6. authors. 329. 328. monetary system. 205. conflicts with France. 81 Elba. 217. 399. 102. 238. 389. 231. 376. Borromei. 477. 175. 146-78. 231. site-based. goldsilver ratio. 253-4. 211 Elverdinge. Robert. 214. 363. specie markets. 464 Elburz (Reshteh-ye Alborz). 240. 232. 396-7. 238. 64. 189. shipbuilding. 331. 97. 231. 233. 235 Edward I. 149. 542-3. 233-6. towns. 481. 470. 349. tolls. transfer of coin. 91. 166. Calais. Sicily. 375. and religion. 421 Erzgebirge. balance of trade. 327. Steven. 111. 240. 146-78. 321 emergent loss (damnum emergens) (interest title). 372. 91. 491. 217. 136. 219-20. southeastern. 240-2. 372. merchants. 163. 189. grain prices. 117. 79-80. 354. long distance. royal household. 213. 67. warfare. 415. Crown. 483. shipping-based. 470. royal/state. 91. 90. southern. 447 . 78. 356. 172 epidemics. 369-71. ports. 91 Epstein. 396. 358-61. 299. Wilhelm. urban zones. 234. 413. 331. 310. NorthWestern. 171. 333. capitalism. 543. 383-7. 331. 485. 280. 415. Antwerp. wood. 443. 109 Fernando. of peasantry. 339-48. gold. 121. 407. 455. 440. markets. 464. 361-2. payments. 300. 351-3. 132. 474. 423 Feraig. 571. Christmas. mechanisms (as analogies). 215. bill of exchange. regional. 3304. 564. 485. 453. 3324. 283. Sultan of Egypt. Bruges. 330. 385. 83. 472. Central. 474. 272. debts. 300-1. 467. 330. 121. Champagne. 252. 363. 462. 445-6 Essex. Felice da. 383. 441 family/families. tolls. 272. 261-3. Manresa. 91 Fagnano (family). 476-9. money payments. aristocratic. of tax systems. lords. trade. 338-40. Lamarckian. 478. 109. 426 Falun. 109 Évora. 328. 391. dues. 306 Feria bridge. 274. towns. 238 exchange. Mesen. 389. Ambrogina da. 361. copper. 310. 223. 471-2. 474. 286. 246 Europe. economy. Ypres. 368. Pero de. 401. 121 . English. 356. 211. period. law. 462. Northern. 71. balance of trade. 404 Farbiste. 471. 304. 460-1. Portugal.INDEX 621 Erzgebirgsvorland. 96. 391. 438-9. 413. 108 Fenughil (Fenourhil). 290-2. 552. 588-59. 448 Falchi. 543. royal household. 538-9. 399. 137. economy. 134. local. 272. 330. 464-5. minerals. 43. 211-2. gold-silver ratio. Sicily. 300. 484. 544. 213. 431. 259. 339-48 Falkenstein. 430 Ferdinand I. 328-33. 351. 404-5. Flemish. 370. 407. David. 475. 263. 334. 391. . 120. 123. 320. 324. 148. 413. 123 Evora. 593 famine. 453. 550. 179. 416. mercantile. 431 Felipe (Mestre). 131. 310. 339-48. Rafael. 387. 92. 268. 396. interregional. 167. 91. 483-4 Faraj (al-Nasir). 119. silver. tenure. dominance. banking. 560. 404. 457 feudal. 277-80. 69-70 Exeter. 436. 486-7 fairs. of contract. 141. 70. Giaconello de’. 453 š Farmer. 528. 442. commodities/ goods. 473. 349. Balaix. 161-2 Fazuati. 462. 120. 259. 558. Roman law. 543-4. 432 Fersina. 391. early modern. 114 Ferrer. António. 297. 351. St Bartholomew. 349-51. 85. 60. 137. 538 expenditures. of mezzadria. 447. Ghent. 467. 224. 393-4. 413. revenues. merchants. 313-4. Torhout. Darwinian. 281. 333. 183. 330. 418. 331. 271. state. bullion. King of Aragon. Infante Dom. Giacomo da. St Peter. medieval. 440. 218. 217. 524. Geneva. 126. 542. Samuel. 393. 330. 498. 329. 57. 182 Fernandes. 219. 425. 306. 401-2. 399. possessions. 374-5. Provins. 399. 154. 221-2. 385. 550 evolution. Lille. 389. 331. specie markets. 227 exceptio usurariae pravitatis (canonical defence). 442. 389. 331-3. 154. 121. 56870. 301. 194-6 Flextorfer-Zenner. 336-7. 214-5. consumption. 107. 204. merchants and merchant houses. 425 food and foodstuffs. 321. 578. 392 Florence. 329. 122. 543. paper. 329. 110 Fonseca. 460-1. 134. 549. hostilities by England. 141. and Parliament. 573. 205. 231. incapacity. 375. Paul-Albert. 85. 148. 130. Crown. Catasto of 1427. 103. coinage and money. 572-607. shortages.622 INDEX Février. 145. 173. 212. demand for. 325. 290. burden. 95-6. court. 212. 195 Flavy. 69. institutions. financiers. firewood. subjects of Burgundy. 304. 297. wool. 464-5. 135. 488 Fogo Island. 343-6. 135. 431. access to. 232. 222. 313-4. 372. 312. 189. 464-5. 438. range of. 580. 4645. 441 Fitzwarren. 582. 361-2. 213. 469 florin (unit of currency). raids on. 416. 445. effects. fiscality. 196. 546. 211. planners. production. 128-9 Fischbach an der Nahe. 328. 124. 224-6. 545 Flavy. merchants. 189. 467. 428. 188. 188. conquest. bureaucracy. 188. 187-91. 298. 3504. 328. 432. 371. system. 129. 369 fisc/fiscal. transfer of coin. 148. 552 Figuig. 303. 198. policy. public works. 226-8. 204. instrument. exhaustion. marketing. military. 253. 434. operations. 349. 213-4. responsibility. walls. 336. copper. 324-7. 487.” 117. 371. machinery. royal. ministers. 368-9. textiles. Ghent. 206-8 Finland. 425. cities. 120. Datini firm. 119. balance of trade. 219-20. 302. 460. 211. 126. trade. difficulties. concerns. 210. 220. 114. 368-9. crops. 470. 92. banking and capital market. 129. 150. reform. “domain state. 181. 352. 592. 421. grains. 434. 125. 117. towns. 208. 401. Joham de. 461. 485. 416. 120. 220-1. 188. 467. 312. 471. 218. 308. 91. 206. 259 Fez. alliance with England. 340-1. 216. 431. 222. 280. assistance. duties and taxes. 227. counts of. 552. 218 Flanders. 593. 427-8. 438. 349. exotic. 135-6. 188. 441-2. Louis de. records. recovery. 319. 230. war. 189. 231. controls. districts. 121. 214. 129-30. constraint. forms of. 581. 351. municipal. 286-7. 315. 174. 120. 477. troops. fairs. 134. 2223. institutions. fiscalism. Guillaume de. 333. 315. 119. 592-3. 503. 468 Flanders. 151. 227. 415. 208. 330-3. 306. 557-8. 310. 572. 221. Venetian galleys. 110 Fomseca. 447. 321. rebellions. 424 finance/financial/financing. 2312. 374. 483. 329. 475-6. Julià. 321. stature. Borromei. civic. estates. 550. 476. 410. 129. 52. 491. levies. 199. 392. deficit financing. 592. 320. 104 Fontcuberta. 327. privileges. 313. and gardens. 207-8. west. 267- . innovations. 539. trouble. 212. urban. 374. 538. reform. 320. 68. 435 fief. 122. problem. rebellions. 129. household. 215. imported. 142-4. Afonso de. 349. 53. 464. 308. 407-8. 129. administration. departments. 330-3. 401. 114. 453-5 Geneva. 336. B. Lombarda. 361. 398. nation. 298. 497-8. 392 Galloway. 421. 147. 504. exchange. 427. 368-70 Gambia River. Zanobi di Tadeo. income. 427. creditors. 312. 265 Gdaxsk (Danzig). 474 Gennaio. 363. Capitana. firewood. Moceniga. 238 Fostat (Fustat). 108-9 game (theory). 275-6.. 137. 313. Bánya. 406. 328. 368-9. 514-7. 519. Bana). 509. 416. 261. 508-9. sources of. 493. trade. 262. 273 Gaddi.INDEX 623 8. 314. 147. 301. 333. 201. 570. 498. alliance with England. 333. 475. operations. maritime trade. 465. laws. 275. 268. 392. 264 fortifications. 387 France. Sicilian wheat. 512. 402 . 149 Garéolt. 120. 153 Fryde. 508 Germany. wine. 192. 480. 336-7. 248. supply. 392. 64 Furness. 113. 428 Gallici. positive-sum. 349 . partnership. 158. Venetian. towns. 429 Genoa. 372-3. 564 Funk. taxes on. 55-6. 552. Hundred Years War. 415. 503-7. 134-5. and trade. 454-5 Galápagos Islands. correspondents. 495. 501. 572. 190. wine. 314. 238-9. J. merchants and merchant houses. 412. 141. 298. Fowey Water. 400. 252 Freiberg. 469 fungible. 166-7. 504-6. 369. 354 Gelnica (Hnilec. 427. C. 228. 188. 129. 342-4. 70. merchants. 261 Garland. 514. 129-31. 427. early modern. 327. . 232. 167 foreigners. Verzona. 49-53. merchants. 170. 314. carriers. 332. 570. 298 Freiberg. English armies. James. John. 363. 492-4. 566. FL. 202-3. 363. 42. Forqualquier. debtors. 136-7. creditors. 495-6. 333. 333-4. 340. 432-3. 340-1. 445 Freiberg-in-Meissen. 346-7. 508 Gascony. Pedro. Dictionarius. 500. 173 Fugger-Thurzo. 429. 110 Franks. Hercule. 167. 245. 313. 230. 219. 292 Ganshof. 180 foreign. 313. 400 Frederick II. 327. 524. Holy Roman Emperor. 64. 491. 580. gold-silver ratio. coinage. 420. 519 Francia. 192. 471. zero-sum. grain trade. 259 Francisco. 348-9. Franz Xaver. trade. Majorcan. currency. 470. traders. 369. 438 galley(s). 131. 472. southern. 485. scholars. 189. 527 Ford. cost of. peace with Burgundy. 194. shippers. 245.375-6. Tuccio di. 174. firewood. northern. gold. 250 Fordwich. 446 Frome. 346. trades. 250. E. 338. 343-4. shipping. 300. 407. 427. smelting. Gölniczbánya. 166. 252. 142-4. 208. coins. 251. 300. fairs. 188. 427-8.. 292. 372-3 373-4. Giustiniana. 401. 434 Géraud. 246 Fowey. 531-2 Gaussols. policy. 484. Abbey. 396 Ghassassa (Alcudia). 156. 584. 496. 304. 478. 425. 551. 375. pirated. 389. 418. 529. and income. land. 425 ibn Ghurab. 407. markets. 416. 81. troops. 354.. 228. 546-7. 166. 215 Gloucester. 407. 157-63. 333. 561-2. exhibiting. 102-3. 232. 98. 553-4. stocks. 322 Godinho. Levin. . 315. 553. 387. 112 goods. 558. 564. 538. 277. 550. 404. mining. 389-90. 562. 530-2 Gloucester. 559. 558-60. basic. impartible. 258. 376. lists of. 565. 559. 583 Gloucester. partible. 427 Glandèves (family). 560. 401-8. coinage. 542-3. 552. 94 Gomes. imported. 94. 533. 95. 544. 399. 393- 5. . prices of. 74. 387. 59. 456 Ghent.624 INDEX Ghadames.. 146-7. 407. 484. 391. 553. 251. 389. European. 551. 548. 102 Goldschmidt. 371. 499. 555. 551. immovable. 65. 570. 561. 559. 166. 543. 105. passage of. 507. concealment of. smuggling of. 153. commercial. 434. Manfred. rents. 301. 137. 565. 56970. 236. 383. 156. value of. 166. Duke of. flow of. 565-6. moving. cost of transport. 415. 446 Gozo. 122. 154-5. 383-7. 545. 539. luxury. movable/immovable. 399. 350. 103-4. 388. boom. 95. 567-71. significance of. European. 113. at Ypres. fungible. 399. 383. 246 Godeveertsvelde. community of. 297309. 401. 174-5. 227-8. 545. 218. 498. 565-6. 401. Vitorino Magalhães. 569-71. 161-3. 393 Gold Coast. 324. 546. 402. 147. 550-3. 405. Fernão. custom. 561-2. 549. 429. private property law. 541. supply of. 570. 393-7. 399-400. Crown. 49. 430. 413. 416. 324-6. 389. 383. goeden. 387. 228. 546. Chinese. 396. 423 Ghormali. 350-79. 527.é. 413. 541-2. status of. 156. 262. 106. 306 grain. 378. 389. 554. 119. 166. 391. 396. 547. 571. 98. 252. 75. production. bulk. 391. 329. 564. 95. African. Gentenaren. 310. 391. 546-8. 80 Gomes. 563. exchange for silver. aldermen (scepenen). 419. 334. 157. 493-6. 393. 538. 555-6. Earl of. 524. 122-3. wholesale. 105. 67. 545. 319-20. 330. role of. 42. neighbours. 552. 376. trade. 203-6 Ghir-Saoura. 111. agricultural. 66. 106. 545. 161. 565. 223. prohibited. 156. 107. 99. 562. 407. 420-1. 507. records. 160. 94-5. 546. 139. 375-6. essential. 513. 392. 539. 396. from West Africa. 393. jurisdiction. 159. constitution. 165. 566. 374. 503. 387-90. saleable. 182-3 Gloucestershire. 543. 393. Diogo. 387. minting. 542. export. 515. fairs. 116. 392. houses. 551-2. 100. 98. 265. prices. 95. 547. 411. crisis. 268. 225 gold. sources of. 509. 362. 387. 214. 567. illicit trading. 391. trade. 263 Gläser. 405. 387. 502. 97. 477. 265. manufactured. 516. 98. 131. 538. Ibrahím. 544. 496. 560-561. 373. 148. 561-3. 378-379. 393-4. 401-4 é é Giustiniana (galley). Slovak. 557-8. 334 Gottleuba. 235. King of England. 305. 354. 441. 203 Henry VI. 307 Hereford. 517 Hatcher. 444-5 Hasele. 122. 329 Gross National Product. 300-1. 299 Grand Erg Occidental (Great Western Sand Sea). 200. 154 Grasse. 307. 155 Greece. 447 Harzgerode (Hagenrode). 445. 378-9. 127 al-Hamma. 368. John. 182 Hoffman. demand for. 96. 308 Haverfordwest. 442. 430 Hakím. 306. 252 Hartz Mountains. 220. 442 Gurara. 352. 306. 251. 362. Rolf. 150 Henry III. William de. 199. supply of. David. 300. commodity. 421 Grantham. Upper. 351. 352. 151-2. 207. 354. . 215-8. 450. 169. 413 Haim. 350. 242 Henry VIII. 261. 299. 349. stocks. 143 Heron. Jacques. Infante Dom (Henry the Navigator). 135. 69 Gravelines. 306. permits and licences. 376. 445 Hijaz. 539 Großkogel. hierarchy of. 114 Henrique. production of. 182 Herlihy. 160. 435. 493 Henry V. 173 Grispi. 2102. corvées of. 402 Greenwich. 436 Hammel. 246 Hanse. 421. King of England. 361. copper. David. 319. markets. 370-1. Richard. Aion. King of Castile. sources of. procurement. 100. 300. purchases of. 114 Henry I. 588-9. salt fleets. 370-6. 350. . 304-5. John. 95. 297-8. 252-3. 253 Heers. 356. 300-1. 299302. 352. 391 Hithe. exports. 230-2. 508 Holland. 109 Giovanni. 416 Henrique IV. Polo di. 368-9. King of England. King of England. 368 salma (unit of weight). 426 Goslar. King of England. 373. 422. prices. alliance with England. 435 é Hafsid dynasty. 354. governments and. 435 Haddaj. 581. tolls. 92-3. Pope. 261. 387. yield. 211 Heraclea. King of England. John. 423 Gregory IX. 313-4. 189 Hamilton. 299. 305-6. 305. 378. imports. 206 Great Yarmouth. 303. 304-8. 352-8.INDEX 625 527. lands. 448 Grummitt. trade. Earl. consumption of. 43. Hainault. 264-5 Gratian. 469 . 302-3. 395-6. 217 Hettstedt. 99 Guinea Rivers. 212-3. 402 Hindu Kush. 44 Grimsby. 196. 106. reserves. 211. sale of. 303. 223. 99. 214 Henry VII. meridian. 307. Guinea. 593-4 Hampshire. mints. 220 Guinea. 238 Hawley. 276. 300. 350. 300. 539. 279 gros tournois (unit of currency). 300-1. 300-1. 435 é . 301. shortages. 226-32. 210 Hosenbachtal. 197 Iberia. 231. cities. 165. 91. 244-5. 342-4. 321. 149. 291. 207. income. fixed. 91 Ieper. port towns. 562. 130. 441 Hosenberg. 507. 336-7. 241. 115. 190-1. 250. 249. 538. 111. 302. 221. impact. 441. monetary. 180 Horrox. c. property. central place. 158. 482 India. 323. 233. 227-8. 569. investment. labor. 155. 498. 344-5. net. Upper. 218. 141. 71. 111-2. 196-8. 195 Hora Svaté Kateriny (St š Katharinaberg). 311. future. 208. royal. 392. 119. 555. 339. mines and mining. 368. 451. 428-9. 235. 438. 208 Hundred Years War. noble. 447 Hunt. 210-23. Low Countries. 246 Humphrey. urban. 349. 346. 352-3. Count of. 108. 441 Hostiensis (Henry of Susa. 421. piracy and privateering. costs. household. 364. kingdom of. Jews. 342. Burgundy. 12001271). toll. 239. Ghent. 216. 324. 415. 190. Lower. shipping. 456 Ibiza. 127-8. 580. 556. 374. 429. 115. 238-9. 191. 387. 190. operations. 237-8. 127. 198. 117. 114. 122. 233-5. guaranteed. financing. 170. aristocracy. 580. 441. 239. 239. motivator. Tony. 550. 223 industry. 191. 237. 441. 428. 240. overseas. 228. 174. Rosemary. 392. 208. rents. 311. 545. 89-90. 3924. 236. shipping. Crown Prince. 231. 457. 128. centers of. 188-91. 279. cloth. rural. 173. land. royal. benefits. 415. 242. 437-8. 209. 450. 337. 325-6. 508 Huntingdon. 336 Ifriqíya. 91. 247. troops. 241. 174-5. caravans. 132. historiography. 219. noble. 491. 112. modeling. 413. 93. 101. 127-8. 560-1. 92. 438. 195. 348. copper. 253. 268. 524 Imperina. 226-8. phases. protec- . Duke of Gloucester. 249. 233-5. 593 Hull. 195. silver. 174. 431-2. medieval. textile. 331. capital. 245. 504. 425. 392. 315. 389. 115. 1545. 167. wine. 312. 424-6. 91. 235. 180. crops. sources of. 541. 554. 92. trade. 113. 433-6. copper.626 INDEX Honein. 393. 341. 253. 310. 234. market. 429-30 ideology. maximization. 411-2. 419. 218. 334 industrial. 2447. 215-7. 276. peasant. 310-1. 196. 117. customs. 451 453-4. loan servicing. 453 Hunsrück. 91. infractions. 235-7. 241. outcome. 457 income. 327. 224. 303. 559. 233. profits and losses. 188-9. per capita. 174. spice trade. 546. 141. production. 571. 231 Indian Ocean. 234 Hungary. 187. 92. 44-6 household. 138-9. 311. 96. consumers. Ypres. 446 Hornsea. 431. 435 IJzer. gold. 124. 560. 456. 545. 334. trade routes. 4289. 143. 174-5. 437 Hontiton. 311. 190. 188. sieges. 132. 253-4. 340. 122. 168. 347 Île-de-France. 235. 164 Irsigler. grain markers. 342-4. 320. 82. 324 King’s Lynn. Franz. 525. 392 Kandlerin. Ilona. Maghribi. Gertrud. statutes. Franz. 430. 314. Queen of Castile. 449. privileges. 349. transfer of coin. 74. 93. 324. uses. northern. Pope. 67. 369. 346. 69-71. King of England. 424. 129 Jew(s). 158. 83-5. 290. 82. 328. 43. 349. 274. 125. 429. 299. central. 271 . 423 Ipswich. 374-5. 469. 336-7. copper trade. 76 Italy. 353 Jonas. 437. aljama in Palma de Mallorca. 315. 108. 450 Innsbruck. 369. 298-9. 153 John. 423-4 Kammerer-Seiler (firm). 324 Karimí merchants (tujjar al-karim). 234. 132. 222. 205. 440 Jargeau. money market. 273. 263. 348. 450 Keene.INDEX 627 tionism. 121-2. 425. 191-6 João II. 143. Valencian. Derek. cities and towns. 76-77. 435 é Killem. King of Portugal (previously Crown Prince). leadership. 374-5. 146. 158. A. Ypres. 425. 333. 134-5. 154-5. governments. 421. 232 John XXII. 114 Isaurian Taurus. 180. 424-6. cartography. 114-5. King of Aragon. 53. 555 Inzegmir. 423 . 424-6. 180-1. 416. 331. 426. sharecropping. 61-5. 469-70. 470. textiles. 425. negotiators. 469. Duke of Burgundy. tolls. 379. merchants. wool. 448 interest. 76. 485. 313. 73. transformation. 257-8. 246. 544. banking. 562 Justinian. 270. Kharaj. 265-6. Duke of Bedford. 198 John Lackland. 105. 221. 304. 310 inheritance. 453 Jaume II. 437. 552. trade. 448 Knight. 301. 191 Jasov. 596 Isabel the Catholic. 370 Keller. 168-70. 146. 141-4. 45 Kahal de Tabelbala. 246 ibn Khaldun. 449 Kapelle. R. balance of trade. Crown Princess of Castile. 429 Joan of Arc. 192. 73-81. 114 Judaism. 76-7. Dr Samuel. 467. 79. 392. 468-70 Ixer. 456. 389 Islam/Islamic. sources. Emperor of Byzantium. 319. coinage. 97. 412. 424. 146-8. 425. 281. 480. Walí al-Dín ‘Abd alé é é é é Rahman Abu Zayd. 154. 433. 575 Inn Valley. 467. 267 Juana. 470. 481. 437. 464. 82 jurisdiction. 163. 287. 327. 259 Israel. Honein. 570. Domesday Book. 561-71. 332. 74 Kent. 119. 208 Johnson. é é é é 405 Karst. 340. 45. 178. 424. 433-4. 266. 224. 436. 473. 133. Majorcan. 168. 43. Tamentit. 210. 429. 431. 312. 180 Kleinkogel. J. 56 John the Fearless. 327-9. 259-60.. merchants/ traders. 100.. Tuat. Church. 555. 312. 562. 276. 539-40. 164. northern European. 575. 569. 543. 224. 83. serfs. 374 Langholm. incentives. common. 261. 553. 92. 577-80. 274. casamentum. 561-2. 565. 66. 258-60. 243. 450 Kroll. natural. 107 Lagos Lagoon. law. 315. 265-6. patrimony. 368. 558. 574-5.” 257-8. 192. feudal. 61. 575-6 Langdon. 541. 279. 259-61.628 Kolba. 565. 310 Lagos. 547. 144. 542. 566. 43. labourintensive. land/ labour ratio. Duchy of. labourers. 552-3. 334. 442. 543. 278.Crown. 450 á INDEX labour. 220. 569-71. value. Helmut. E. undersupply of. 539. 94-9. 61-2. 262. 391. 177. 539. 436 La Rochelle. importance. 263 Lancashire. 548. 273-4. inheritance. 302. 299. 291. 173 Lancaster. 221. 325 Kraków. 596. alienation of. 43. commercial. property rights. 572-3. 43-50. 47-53. rights to. 41-58. 275-6. 227. 266-7. 448. 260. 552. 51. 559. 283. “bondage to. private. 562. 215-7 land. 364. 265. 539. . 364. noble. 109 Laguedoc. 552. holdings. 276. canon. 275-85. division of. 580. transactions. 546-7. Ser Antonio di. 283. 51. 350. 74-5. immovability. 292. public. 565. 565. king’s. 279. 55-8. 555-6. 552. 64-7. 559. 231. 376. property. 311. 562. 52-7. area requirements. 197 Lapaccio. Odd. 269. 65 Latham. 579. 553. 224. mining. 268. 446 š Kulmbach. customary. 91. allodial/nonallodial. 214-8. 263. 215-6. 327 Lastig. cost of. 70. Gustav. civil. fungibility. 263. 41. 447 Kupferberg. 445-7 Kutná Hora. market. 275. 261. 259. 352. 362. use. 365. 539. 561. royal grants of. 555. 552-3. 577-8. 548. 265. 441 Kraslice. 56. 265. 218-9. 587. 368. 220-1. 425. 138-9. 64. “land service”. shortages. 231. investment in. 269. 47. 569. colon. navigation. 558. 278. 197. market. 574. 538-9. 127. Portuguese. 334. Flemish. 542-3. 387 Kvarneric Embayment. 565. movable. positive. works (corvées). Hugh de. land/labour ratio. 55 Lannoy. 597. 550-2. 66. 591 Krusné Hory. 528. rents. 121. 596. 552. 78. services. 266. 575. 261-3 Lagny. 368-70. 539. 464. 368-73. 451 Krk Island. 297. 292. 257 La Celle. 66. 508 law. Ghent. 446 Kremnica. John. 259. 553. agricultural. 540. 95 275. R.. 208 Laon. 59. 565. 138. peasant and farm. ownership. 268. 543-6. landlords/landowners. 67-9. 565. 206. 63. 224. English. 546. 570-1. 288-93. 207. 171. products of. 452 Kortrijk. 553. commodification. Abbey of. 262. 544. revenue. 204. 54. 561-2. 432-4. 544. 216. 428. 547. confiscations. 259. urban. 553. development. 64. 524 Leiden. 43. 210. 472 Lewes. 565. 566. 4648. 113. 565. materials. 544. theory. 571. São Jorge Castle. 519. 464-5. 472-5. regimes. systems. 571. 412. government. standard. illegal activities. 97-8. 218. distinctions. Tower of. 70. 94. 43-7. 168. 339. 538. customs. 194. 358. 373. 307. 155. Borromei.INDEX 629 Roman. 259. 543. 324. 330. tender. 315 Lombardy. 485-8. banking. 369. 220. 545. 343-4. 475. 361. 380 Liguria. Peter. 263 Leuprandus. 559. 545. 372. 227. 154. fairs. scholars. arrangements. 477. textiles. 324. 162. 499. 332. concepts. 337. barriers. 85. 440. 112. constitution. August. 538. 524. 246. 154. 307 licences and licensing. 320. 57 loans. 493. reforms. strength. 81. 56. 354-61. leaseholders (trautadores). 559 Leicester. 47. 375. Liverpool. 259 Lombard. 438. heritage. 510 leases and leasing. 428 Lorini. 363. tradition. 158-9. 48. 546. 106-7 legal. 297. 478-83. sources. 502. 174. 341. 307 Lisbon. 557 lead. 258. 169. 468-9. 73-5. 96. defence. 65. 246 loan (mutuum). 83-5. 106-9. revenues. 569. 96-9. doctrine. 273-4. 371. 492. 109 Lille. 168. 219. 231. 555. 240. 77. 370-1. 517. 552. 293. 315. Abbey of. 305. 349. 361 Leighton Buzzard. 334. 543. 326. 85. 266. 149. 518. 168. 153 Leonor. 64. 4778. 313. 52-3.). status. 346-7. 250. 461. 308. liability. 380. 131. 66. wool 468-9 Lorenzo. meaning. opinion. international trade. 467. 4445. merchants. markets. 519. 266. Mercers. 253-4. 179 Licata. collection. 64. 533. construction. 48-50. 133-4. 44 Lombard Street. 333. 61. 182 Lincolnshire. 426-7 Lösch. 467 Lombarda (galley). 193. 191. 228. 374 London. 542. 543. 491. 171. 106. profession. 61-5. 427 Lombards. history and historians. 329. 470. Stoldo di. 51. 478. 555-7 Loire River. change. 456. 471. 564. 442. 545. 232. 477. bills of exchange. 66. 144. 281. food supply. galleys. firewood. 115. 268. 246 Lindsey (Lincs. grain prices. imagination. law. expression. 287. jurisdiction. 287. 299. 392-4. records. evidence. 159. 258. 154-5. 143 Lila. controls. 306 Lier. patterns. Italian imports. 564. mechanisms. 363-5 . 313. castellany. 179 181-2. 96-8. 95. 231. 491. Queen of Portugal. 589. analysis. 212. 369. 404. dissolution. 563. 332 Lincoln. 114 Lérins. Antonio di Filippo. rights. 59. 384. 41-2. 468. merchants. 276-8 Levant. 62. 225. 320. secular. 468 Lipari Island. protection. 469-70. 273. Joham de. 453. 470. 278. forms. 324. 67. towns. 54. 2623. perspectives. 356. 49. Ribeira Palace. 310. 228. 594. 595. 174. 245 Louis IX. luxury articles. 352. 477. Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch (LUB). Soltenwisch. 436. 590-2. 594. market. 188-9. copper. population. 576. markets. artillery. 362. 246 Maastricht. 580. 259 Madeira Island. 190. Mühlentor. 473. 573. gänge. 570. 483 Lübeck. 413-6. 573. 403. towns. citizens of. 577. 556 Maggiore. 184.” 578. 477. 572. 583. 594. 353. 542. Calais. 280. 584. 361. 579. 580. 573. techniques. 275. Oberstadtadtbücher/regesten. Horegenbeke. 579. 581-2. 587. 574-6. 461 Maghrib. 466 Luporini. HeiligenGeist-Hospital. Rathaus. of revenue. Libethen). rebellions. 359-61 Lovell. Tileke Warendorp. 539. 5801. 94-5. Alfstrasse/Schüsselbuden. 340. banking. 582. market integration. 593. St Johanniskloster. 349. King of France. cloth. 591-2. citizens. goods. 372. 590. 577. 582. 280. 436. 503 Marlgavere. 395-6. 573. 578. 598-607. 582-4. of business. 174. 253. 580 Mubietová (Lybetha. 581. archeological evidence and excavations.. 592-4. 350. 387. 590-1. walls. Rosengarten-Tünkenhagen. 593. gardens and gardeners. balance of trade. 577. 575-8. 209. 575. 580. 584-9. Niederstadtbücher. 588. Martin. heating fuel. commodities. 342-3. of property. hops. 566 Lynn. 327. 419. of capital. 576. 600. 434. 596-7. imported. 600-7. 441. 406. 598-607. imports. . 467. equipment. 598-600. 420. eating. 190. inhabitants. 83. Jan van. 400. Hundestrasse. 574. Holsten. 593. 407. 466. southern. rubbishpits and wells. Marienkirche. 74. 418. 593. 173-4 Lostwithiel. 432. 582. cloth. 371. 212-3 Low Countries. 596. 331. gold. 427-8. 71 Luxembourg. Landwehr.é merce/trade. 200. guild (Willkür der Gärtner). 346377. 102. city of. 353-4. movables. grain. 400. 356. 579. 594. 276 Luther. grain prices. 588. 198. elites. 577-9. A. 598-607.630 INDEX loss (economic). 128. 190. 577. Lake. 597. 573- 4. 350-1. 584. Sir Thomas. 432. 577. 577. 351. of income. 208. 586. alMaghrib al-Aqsa. species. demand. 62. 590. 66. 593-6. 276. 586. 455 Lucca. bills of exchange. 338. 336. 322. 593. 417. 595. 209. 567. 441 Macaire. 595. 590-2. 387. “Van den Hoppenlande. textiles. copper and copper trade. 574. goods. 42. 478. 572. Mengstrasse. 575. cesspits. Jews. 598-607. produce. 587. 73. 578. Wette Gartenbücher. 424-5. 595-6. com. 543. 375. 477. 579. 122. Engelsgrube. 380. Jean de. 313 Louvain. 590. Hundred Years War. 441. 356. 228 manufacture and manufacturing. 373. 416 Mâconnais. 206. 584-6. 451-3. 456. merchants. 415-8 425-6. 430. 328. 575. Pierre. holdings (Güter). 244. emergent. 590-2. 333. 582. farmers. English campaigns. 481-6. 194-6 luxury. 433. 418-9. 426. 456. 378-9 marketing. 407. 413. 174. 168. money. 163. 4323. 374. 426. 399. 436-8. 337. 306. 354. African. 327. 81. 114. logic. 331. 150. 148. 412 Mallorca. Italians. 302. 413 Maillane. 117. 411. disorders. 78. internal. distant. 181 Manresa. 418. 434-5 March. 306-8. 427. labour. 399. grain shortages and imports. Turkish invasion. 491. 484. conversos. 429. 558-9. 387. 352. money. 3956. religious. 578. Ciutat de (mod. exchange. 67. capital. 417. 151. 352-4. 424. 361. 481. 571. prices. copper market and trade. 362. 432. 383. 173. 313 Maria. government. 298. 596. 350. 416 Malborough. 544. hierarchies. 194. King of Portugal. 61. 84. 433. 306. 107-8 Marck. 300. revenues and income. 105. 352. 405. 362-3. 375. Mr Thomas of. 334. portolans. city/town. western. 303-4. 436-8. royal. records. internationalization of. 407. 413 market integration. 379. 320. 99. Countess of Flanders. 409. 113. specie. 387. 383. regional economies. late medieval. 421. 432. 396. 396. 383. 261 Maio Island. 166. cotton. 367. 425. Palma). research. grain. 305. 568. 230-1 Ma‘qil. 432. 433-4. 538. 401. 361-2. 351-3. 302-3. 303 Malta Islands. 110 Majorca. mints. 119-144 Mansfeld. 172-3. 202 Margaret. 376. 419-21. 396. marketplace. situation. environment. 424. 426. 175. 147. 154. regional. 578 market(s). Arab nomad group. 105. 308. 349-52. 433-4. access to. 553. 454-5. 430 Malta. development. 356. 362. equilibrium. intermediaries. 399. 114 Marínid dynasty. Maghrib. 153. 334. 538. 177. economy. 352. 111. 301. 368. 571. centre. 425. 326. 427. flood. land. 336. 373. 174. 297. 307. 111. organization. Bartolomeu. 411. 311. 105. integrated.INDEX 631 markets. 85. “old Christians. 427-9. 544. 418. 121. Antonio. commodity. 507. 412. 426-8. 419 424. 301 Manchester. 445 Manuel I. forces. 268. . 222-4.” 425. 564. 354. 268. 415. 411. 218 March. 304-6. local. Kingdom of. 579. 101. 453. rights. 426. 411-2. Jews. 269. 134. society. 427-30. payments. ports. rural. 133. 416. 275. gold. 389-90. 227-8. 431. 418. 135. conditions. tin 420 Majorca. 379. fees. 297. networks. Queen of Portugal. 418-22. 416-7. feudal. notaries. 429. 389. 169 Malfante. 420. 378-9. 297-8. 351. 308. 412-3. copper. 308. 413. 408. 80. 376. 407. 70. 430. 300-301. 467. 363. 168. 431-4. 435. 100-1. Sicilian grain. estates. 172. 324. 593. 297. 399 405. 350. 368. 399. Datini branch. 358. 391-2. 165. merchants. 470-1. 383. 378. 391. 78. credit. 165. 373. 405. 325. 433. 421. 424. 579. 373. 373. 153-5. 468 Marchione. 210-1. 419. 297-8. 300. 233. 392. Karl. Burgos. 418-9. 305. 417. Lübeck. 121. 547. bank.. 322. 327-8. 412. 430 Mauritania. guilds. 153-4. 113. 111 Meneses. 429. wool. 129 Marx. 412. 70. 307 Mazzuoli. 175. converso. 62-3. 69. 313. Italian. seafarer. 163. 162. 314. 400. 415. 394. 374. 328. 16375. 321. Southampton. 165. 429. 568. Pope. 68-9. King of Aragon. Manuel Sánchez. 467. Flanders. “Germanic. English. 330 marriage. Venetian. specie markets. Duarte de. 391. Valencian. 163. 242. 107. 419. 413. 495. 582. 171. 424. 419. native. 98. 173-4. 419. 477.” 327. 469-70. 399. 464 Martínez. 420. 477 merchant(s). 190. of/in town. 405. 538. structure. 332. 300-1. Christian. 403. 437. universal. 181 Me šnec. 399. 431. 105. š 453. 493-4. 170-2. 404 Masschaele. 407. 424-5. 570-1 Marseille. 167. 411. 246 Melo. 471-2. 97. ports. Fez. Jewish. 334. stock. 399. 541. é é Lisbon. 301. Bruges. 165. 44. 465. 42 Melcombe. 261 Marseille. Montpellier. European. Majorcan. wool. 314. 75. Florentine. 103. rights and privileges. 328. 169. 391. 413. Merchant Adventurers. 437. 259 Marseille. 123. 477-8. 101-5. 445.632 INDEX speculation.” 321. 79. 476. 177. 423 Mayer. 165. copper. 431-4. Muhammad. 324. Fernão de. 469. 258. fairs. 552. 240. 327. terms. 432. 446 šde Me šný Potok (Kufurbach. 236. 242. 111. “world market. 472. urban. 588-9. 543. 454. trade. wholesale. 413. 436-7. gold. 455. 114 merchandise. northern. 468. 220. 426. traders. 419. 447. ships and fleet. and taxation/tolls. 168-72. 174. 235 Mdina. 41-2. English. 456 McFarlane. 467. 175. 544. 298. banking houses. 84. London. Joseph. towns. 389. 389. Muslim. Tuscan. 434. Ypres. 305. 168. 274. 165. 429. foreign. 57. 429. 163. banker. 560-4. 166-75. 163. 415. 510. western. 263 Martin I. 131. Milanese. Niccolò di Giovanni. 353. 456. 117. 434. 594. viscounts of. 330 . wine. international. 454 Medici (family). Catalan. 171-2. Karimí. 251. 71 al-Maqrízí. Tlemcen. 484 Mediterranean Sea. 434. 378. value/s. 235. 239. 455 Melanchton. K. Capital. Philip. 329. 411-2. Genoese. 405. 306 Martin V. 384. 565. 391. 593-5. Spis. local. 310. 469. Kupšde perbach). 262. é é é é . 411. Balearic. 583. wealthy. credit. 595-6. 548. 374 Mattei. 350. tolls. 69. ‘Alí al-Qadir b. 508 Mazara. 213. Berber. student. 153. Piero. France. 174. 302 Measham. Taqí al-Dín Ahmad b. 433. private. 472. é é . 312. 484. Nürnberg. 23. 99. 157. 213. 166-7. 170. 332 Mesen. 98. 425. count of. 258. James. B. 331-2. 153. 331. 412. 352. long-distance. Chinese. 152. 429. 202 montes pietatis. 139 Mornevech. 192. 113. 96-7. 76-7. prize.. 496. Mamluk. 508 Montmajour. 416. 436 Moulouya River. 413. 313. 4701. 467. 548. 123. 253. 291. armed forces. 211-212. 469. 421 Mostaganem. 111. transfer. merchants and merchant houses. 225. 48. 502. 116. sources of. 130. 139. 74. 496. 219. Enguerran. making. demonetizing. 482. 387. 389. Marínid. 300. 197 Miller. 468. 460-1. 483. 42. 502. 512-3. 400. 194-6. 468 Milan. 427 Modena. 484. 121. 374. 434-5 Mueller. 531. Richard. 533-4. 213. 216-8. 484. 244. 79. 431. 437. 231. 231-2. . 486 Micheli. Reinekin. 478. 505. 42. supply. confusion. 213. silver. 225. 485-6. Giovanni di Michele. 479. 379. flows. incentive. 513. 468. 81. 226. 372 Midlands. 154 monopoly. 466. 476-7. š 454 Moceniga (galley). 471. 400. market. borrowing. gold. 253. 133. 470. 216-7. Mark. 469. 413. 389. 252 Mnísek nad Hnilcom (Meczenzéf). 395-6. need for. 238. disorders. Jean. payments. 128. king’s. 219. Abbey of. merchants.. 241. 396. 79 Monti. 413. 306 Meung-sur-Loire. collection of. Niccolò. Benedetto di. wool. 132. 4656. 306 Monstrelet. Philip the Good. payments. Hafsid. 402-403. 427 Micheli. 273. 502. problems. 253. 383. 187 monetized economy. 404 409. 191 mezzadria (sharecropping). 220. annuity. stability. 200. 481. 320. 476. owing. 222. specie markets. 226. 488. 402. use of. 300. Joseph C. Borromei. 555. 575. 466. 68. 401 monetary. 278. 486 Middle East. 379. 228. raising. 219. 327. Parisian. money. 220. stock. 435. 415. French. 92. 81.INDEX 633 Messina. 413. 252. 312-3. 228-31. 405 Monroy. royal households. 415. surplus. county. investment of. 41. 113. 387. receipts. 139 morabatin (unit of currency). liability for. 483. system. 212. 228. value. . 407. assignments to royal household. 89 mint(s) and minting. revaluation. changers. 99-100. 475-9. 238. 444 Mixtow (family). 484. 128. 415. 556. 68. 399. 151. 140. 396 Middleburg. mechanisms. 280 Michele. conscience. 98. 396. reform. function of. 197. 258 Montpellier. Maghrib. 266. Gonsalvo. . 424 monetarism. 314. lending and loan. 313. 399. 151. disbursement of. 556 Monmouthshire. purpose. 484 Mittelharz. 468 Milet. 472. 50. 299. 75. income. Monzón. 192. 176. markets. John. 470 Middlesex. 113. Reinhold C. 471. 316. 153. 559. 121. 333 Morocco. 455. taxes. 448 Oberfranken. 565 Noonan. accounts. firewood. 452. siderite. 305. fahlore. council. 272 Netherlands. 448 Odon. corporations. 182-3. 452. 243 Murphy. 587. 413. 133. appointments. 191 Ormuz. 433 Nefzaoua. 354 Northhampton. Pere. 458 nobles and nobility. 442. Doris. 300-1. 507-9. 158. 436 ore minerals. 415. 121. 239. Benjamin. 304. 369. 424 nave (ship type). Hieronymus. 2702 New World. 246 Norwich. 423 . 452-3. 246 Nice. 439. cuprite. 444-5 Öblarn. 155. 452. 254 Newark. 179 Oran. John. 233. 452-4 Orléans. 423 Oued Tuat. tetrahedrite. 589 municipality/municipal. 391. 190. 175-6. 392 New Institutional Economics. 154. 148. 449. 439-40. 456 Niger Delta (Rios dos Escravos). documents. 451 š Novalesa. 452. 454. 176. tennantite. 304-8. 82 Nelson. 133. 439. 468 Nová Bana.634 INDEX Mührenberg. 153. 155. 221.. 454. 182-3. 439. 411. 154. 319 Niger Bend. 423 Oued Saoura. C. 246 Oswestry. 167. 113-4. 325 Oued Guir. 150. 170-1. 123 Munro. Margaret. 162. 421. 447-8. royal. chalcopyrite. 436 Nelson. finance. 253 North. copper. 187-8. 260. 387. 141 Naples. R. 16971. 301. 303-304. 456. 180 Nottingham. R. 447. 368-70 Nadal. 246 Normandy. 454 Ober Enns Valley. 171. fiscal system. sphalerite. 391 Orwell Haven. 349-50. 223. authorities. officials. 54 Noordschoote. sulphide ores. 393 Nunes Jorge. towns. 396. 179. 97 murage. 110 Nürnberg.. 392. merchants. arsenopyrite. universitas. Kupferkies. 259 Novo Brdo. 191. enargite. 107-10 Nigro. 168. 203. 445 Neusohl (Banská Bystrica). 270 North Sea. 162. 234. 80. 128. João de. 477 Münzer. 59. 415 Oued Messaud. 447 Oberharz. 154 Oudenaarde. 91. 324 Norfolk. 182 Northumberland. 151. 392. Abbey of. 351 Neudorf. John T. 129. galena. 158-9. 454. auriferous quartz. 4523. 442. 111 Okehampton. 261 Nieuwpoort. Giampiero.. 314. 539. 183 Newcastle. 429. 306. 418. 205-6. D. 431. 542. 449. 508-10 partnerships. King of France. 199. 187. 425. 75. 193. Right Bank. 494. 245 pavage. 330-3. Paoluccio di Maestro. Arrighino. 151. 484. 510. 510. 462 Palastrello. 74 Patay. 496. 363. 438. 153 Philip. 65. Miguel. 346-7. 276 Paris. 326-7. Latin Quarter. 205. 163-6. 47. 488. 113-4. 327. 159. 74. 340-1. 266-8. and credit/creditors. 448 Pere II. 144. 89. B. 183 Petrarch. GrandPont. 252. 176. 494. 60-6. 503. 268. 326 Persian Gulf. 493-4. 263. 191-3. 494. Pere. dare ad proficuum maris. 62-3. 565. 302. King of Aragon. 498. 174. 260. María Dolores López. Îlede-la-Cité. 204-6. 496. 89.INDEX 635 Oujda. 135. 391 Panigarola. obligations. 62. King of Castile. 74. 540-6. 416 Péronne. Portuguese. 258-60. Porte St-Lazare. 258-69. Henry. 253 peasant/peasants. 491-3. 54 Pettauer Weg. economy. free. 570-1 patronage. 498. 170. 118 Oxford. linen trade. 486-7 Palermo. 486. societas maris (sea-loan). 435 Oundle. 208-9. 90. 265. 120 Pere III. 4201. 316. Africa. 494. 205 Piesky (Sandberg). Infante of Portugal. 4545. 85. 268. 494. Alessandro da.. 354. 141 Pérez. King of Aragon. Duke of Burgundy. 506 Philip the Good. 427 Parco Nazionale Dolomiti Bellunesi. cities. 512. 452 . 257. 468 Oye. 432-3 Padua. 109-11. and capital. foenus nauticum (sea-loan). 506. 516. 268-9. 262. 265. 461. 259. 371. metal trades. 136. 106. 215. and lords. bondage. 464-5. 538. 136 137. commenda. 268 Pedro. 228. 432 Parigi. freehold. 181 overseas expansion. 140 Pegolotti. shops and shopping. 518-9. 452 Paolo. 182-3 Pay. 196-8. 349. 181. 121. 391 Perugia. 266. 504. money-changers. 74. 132. 482-4 Piacenza. tenure. 89. 483 Pánský Diel. 263-6. Nicolau de. 506. 191. 324 Philip Augustus. status. 269. 192 patrimony. 66. 203. Francesco Balducci. 105 Pardo. 450 Pevensey. servitude. 539. 494. 447 Pardo. 555-9. 262. 197. 299 Pamir. 260. Notre-Dame. 92. 233. 552-3. 495. 336-7. 320. 512-3. 328 Peterborough. 491. 475. 343-4. rich. 564-5. 260. 167. 200. 203. Count of Alsace. troops. 487 Picardy. 468. merchants. 62. land. dependent. 524 Oxfordshire. Left Bank. rue Galande (clos de Garlande). 92 Pedro I. 202 Pachs (brothers). 322. dare ad portandum in compagniam (land-loan). 172. 432-3. commercial. 101. 363 Ponická Lehôtka. 597 Portinari. sisa. 249. 188. 127. 287. 285. 228. 2778. 110. Crown. 101. 114. 282-3. 231. urban. 89-90. revenues. nomad. 456. 222. 229. 102-3. 93. fazenda. 94. 142-3. revenues. 94-5. 313. M. 481-2. Predbane). 354. aposentadorias. 192. 226-7. 100. 283. 116. copper. 250-3. 114. 392 Pomerania. 223. 108-9. 221. 451 Poland. 311-2. 232. 329. 228-30. 89-117. almoxarifes. Casa de Guiné e Mina. 327. 222. 321. 92-5. 63. 101. Escrivão da Câmara. 126. 363-6. trautadores. 225-7.103. 225-6. taixas. 113. 92. 231. royal power. Cortes. royal household. 119. 153-5. 229. Artois (Artesian). 452 Pomana. 113-6. grain. almoxarifados. 110. 210.636 INDEX Pinto. 104-5. 97-8. 321. 110 piracy. Contador da Casa. 227. 363-76. 165-6. 92. 1003. 229. moradias. 115. 127-8. 113. 92. overpopulation. 93-4. 301. 221. 350. 314. 100. 466-70. 100-1. 175-6. 290. 245 Portugal. 413. 190. Vedor da Casa. 233. 221. 137-9. 103. alfândegas. 450. Barcelona. 137-9. 428. royal fazenda. harbour. Duarte Rodriguez. 219-20. 227 231. 554. 210-2. 466. 239. 455. 391. 223. 210. Casa da Índia (India House) e Guiné. 465. 151. 101. 170. 137. 223-5. quittances (cartas de quitações). 126. 368-70. 113. 194. . 312. 90. 221-231. 128. 484 Portsmouth. Majorcan. 220232. state capitalism. 161-2. 101. 113. orçamentos (budget estimates). 119. 114. 227. 226. 447. 225. 100-1. 302. 248. 222. 162-3. 250-4 Pisa. 207. 230-2. expenditures. and Africa. 214-7. 111. 303-4. 321. 453 Poniky (Drienok. 438. 122.. 280. 252. M. 65-6. 224-6. 210. and the Papacy. Casa dos Contos. 231. 212. 325. 272-5. 114. taxes. reconquista. 111. 240. 130. 132. 573. 226. 1245. 89. nobility. Aposentador Mor. 252 Poperinge. 105. 95-6. Vintena House. 108. 222. 224-5. 142-5. 249. 107. 117. 143 plague. 92. regimentos. 225. 99. 451 Podlipa. 222. 231. relations with non-Christians. casamento(s). 452-3 pontage. rural. 92. 456. 100. fazenda de Guiné. kings of. 109 Postan. 141. Casa dos Escravos (Slave House). 99. Casa de Guiné (Guinea House). 111-2. Vedores da Fazenda. 222. 227-9. tença(s). 239. royal court. 183 Poole. 311. 235 pound (unit of weight). 93-7. dominium. 460 Pistoia. 227-8. 231 vintena. 128. 322 population. Bernardo. 431. 250. 501. 134-5. lead. dízima. 228. caravel. 221-3. English/sterling. 442 Plymouth. expansion. Armazém. Casa da Ceuta. 99. 267-9. 221-2. 221. 292. 238. 276. 124. Feitoria das Ilhas. 105. 433 pound (unit of currency). 101. assentamento. 231-2. Tesoureiro Mor. 313. 114. 167. 228-9. legislation. 421. 92. 115. 210-1. 101. 89-118. Flanders (Flemish). 111-117. 244-6. 106. 224-7. 245 Podbrezová. Cape Verde Islanders. levels. 545. heating supplies. 305. 376. 96. 420. state agents and officials. 449 producers. 487. 438. 396. 567. fixed. 383. 488. 399-403. 54. 531-3. 392. 96. 351-4. Fernão Gomes. 399-400. financial/capital. baronial. 349. 368-9. 427-8. 420. seigneurial. 548. royal. food. 568. wool. 98. 99. silver. noble. 231. 353. civic governments. 235. institutional. 389. 111. 142. 308. 299300. 453. 239. 177. 216-8. basis. 112. 114. access. 155. 389. fuel. 378. market. zones of. levels of. monopoly. 373. 461. 577-80. 404. of forests. 300. copper. 165. firewood. 364. 163 production. gold. 438. gold. 399. economic. 564. 146. 250-2. 407. 239. 168-70. 306. 541. of gold. 306-7 products. 299. perfume. taixa (Crown price list). life. 580. of assets. 393-7. 364. 376. 571. 390. 375. copper. 304-5. recognition of. agricultural regions. wheat. 79 prices. just (iustum pretium). 404-5. 156-7. social. 571. data. 541 productivity. 140. 262 prescription (praescriptio) (Roman law contract). 375. 393. 404. 391. 389. Ipswitch. 78. 478-84. 374. 394. 96. 550. 183. 407. 70. for export. 369. 387. garden. cloth. 380. 275. crop. 445. 503. 175. spouse. 370-1. 104. 371. 361. São Tomeans. 69. 167. 364 productive. executive. 252 power. 353-63. regions of. 373 Príncipe Island. royal. lack of uniformity in.INDEX 637 471-2. 212. 572. court. 378. 122 127-8. agricultural. 92. 407. 470. 98. 391-4. of gardens. 308. 305. 263. 75. land. 114. fiscal. 452. 513 prerogatives. 111. 107. 375. 92. 379. copper. purchasing. towns. 300-1. 163. 371. trade. 562. 387. 428. merchant. 270. grain. 291. 266. 392-3. tournois. 150. 275. 68. 220. 465 price. 378. 363-6. peasant. of fuel. 486. 262. 383. 504. toll. 546. 373. copper. 100. 349. 92. 168. political. Arrighino di Ambrogio. and transport. 458 precious metals. 373. 383-7. 306. 297. 156. 371. 333. 168. comital. 445. 260. 376. 376. 352-62. 327-8 poundage. 352. 369. 507. inelastic. 291. 112. of wealth. 364. technical coefficients. 420. 379. 575. 373. 419-20. 299. Milanese. 452-3 precious stones. commodities. 126. 170. 361. 411. 580. 495-6. bargaining. 474-6. 375. 231. 308. 117. 140. of subjects. 163. wood. correlation. 407. 303. 388 Prato. 399. 477. 164. 375. royal. 254 privileges. 262-3. 244. 283. 376. 368. 100. 352. 543. 161. legislative and jurisdictional. costs. 49. 171. Francesco di Arrighino. patterns of. 121. 161-4. industrial. 308. control and regulation. movement and trends. cloth. 98. 260. 362. 446 š š privateering. capacity. 121. 369. 363. 114. 363. exemption. 96-7. 91. 224. 454-5. 99. 437. local. 355. 564-6 Pozzobonello. 227. 234. 92. 172. charter of. 545. 376. commercial. 413. 171. 98. . seigneurial. 110 Prísecnice. 501-3. 370. 104-5. 161. 170. 306. 45-6 prestige. 406. agreements. maritime trade. 553. 275. 80. 310. 71. 540-546. 274. 544. 555. 66. 41-2. 570. 74 quayage. 564-5. 257-9. fungible. 556-8. 564-5. 538. 91. 538-9. counts of. 564-6. Calliro. 432-3. 111-4. 461. 82. 92 Redolho. 218. 83 regalian rights. 73. 569. 538. 432. 552. 77. 230-1. 465-6. 300. fairs. 565. 239. loss of. 78 Rau. 553-4. 100. 560. 235. 559. 415 Provence. 324-5. 559. 568 property. allodium. meaning of. 220-3. immovable (immobilia. 396 . 391 reconquista. relations. Rachfahl. 273-4. 556. 434 quintal (unit of weight). ethical. 303 Raimund Berenger V. 444 Ramon Folc IV. 550. Erbgüter). 543 Protestantism. 62-4. 570. 573. 262 Raimund Berenger III. 224-5. 225 Rayy. . 120 rationalization (social process). 546. partible (deelbar). African regions/commodities. 555-9. 308. 270. 562. 59. 555-6. 57.” 556. 567. 389. unbewegliche Güter. Felix. rents. “goods” (goeden). 564. 561. 99. perpetually producing. 556. 552. 569. 61. 575. 324. 48. 73-4. 225-6. 324. 470. 544. 594 rent. 547. definitions. 91. joint. taxation. 562. 553. 96-7. 107-8 Reformation. 231. 107-12. contracts. 262 Provins. Monika. bail à rente. 190. 539. 541.638 INDEX land. 278-9. 562. annuity. 80. 94. transfers of. circulation of. 319. bewegliche Güter. 556. 324. confiscation. 561-2. 76. 541. 421. 538. 64. 569-70. 559. 258. 114-6. 176. residual. marital. 375. patrimony (erve). 565. 48. erfrenten. cateylen. 451 Puritans. 557. 559. 590. 267-9 Pukanec. 5582. 560. 555-7. Virginia. 356. 266. 261. 540. forms of. 94-95. 557-9. 1056. 512-4. 64. Fahrnis. 565. 376 profit and profitability. collection of. 101. 372. 538-48. community. 538. meubles. 436-7. 49. 84 Provence. 564. alienating. 442. 557. 187. 121. 183 Quint. 472-5. 428. 76. 51. erfelijke rente. 262 Rammelsberg. 540. 227-8 Remann. meublen. 561-2. 69. 249-54. soil. 310 Ptuj. 68. 80. 225-8. 571. 363-4. 236. assumptions about. 319. 565. law. erve. 74 Rabat. 543-4. 418. 565. 543. 547. 425. eeveliike rente. 214. inheritance. immeublen. 262-4. 545. 98. “eerve. 215. 556. heritages. catheylen. immeubles. 564. 94. 2669. 538. 302. 82. 429-30. 558. 538-54. 50-1. 559. 77-9. 450 Puget-Theniers. 112 Reggane. 543. fines. chattel). 565. impartible. 45. private. 423-4 real/réis (unit of currency). 564. 216. 106-10. category. 570-1. 405. Viscount of Cardona. real. cateux. 539-541. 456 Quseir. 481-8. 559. Antoni. movable (mobilia. 565. 569. overseas regions. debt. 234. 539. 62. 551-3. 378. 540. 174. economic. rights. 265. 562. 400. 5523. personal. 262-3 . 139-40. Rocchi. 165. 174. 577. Susan. 281. 79-80 Saint Louis. 498. 408 . rente foncière. 415. 396. redeemable. impartible. 596. Lorenzo. areas. 214-32. Agostino. gold.. 312. 565. 557. proletariat. secured (besette renten). 130-4. land. 439. 134. 48. 109 risk. 167. Graviel. 267 Rexpoede. 375. 165. 130. 557 rentables. 237-8. 411. 553. 101. Barbara Blatt. tenurial. 203 Rhineland. 95. central. 392 salvation economy. 453 Rudnany. 117. creditors. 456. 83. 562. 557.INDEX 639 farm. 60. 322. lake. 71. 49. 394. 140. 483 Runn. 595-6 Rye. 553. 421. trade routes. hinterland. 430 Rio Primeiro. 556. 411-3. rentable. 447. village. 393 Rhine River. rente constituée. 109-15. António. 50. 508 Rudabánya. 368. 523. 172. westcentral. 456. 556. 48-52 revenue. 324 Reynolds. northern. copper. 152. W. 105-7. 109. 557. 62-5. 147. 445 Sahara. C. 577. servants. income. 122-8. 266. 145. 155. land. 508 Rheims. G. 322. Saigerhütte. 110 Rodriguez. Clifford. 575. 575. 394 Saigerprozess. transSaharan trade. 580. 210. Raymond de. environs. 125. 392. artisans. 453 šš Rubin. 291. gardens. 117. 368. 228. 371. 174. F. 298. 596. 126-8 ordinary/regular. payments/charges. 556. 370. urban-rural relationship. 413-5 Sahel. 259 Richard III. industry. 556-8. noble/seigneurial. 577.. 387. K. 199 Roznava. 492-3. 412. 518 Richardson. 441 rural. 597 Riera. 454 š Ruffini. 558. 95-6. 418. market. 541. 556. 311. perpetual. 165. markets. 427 Rodrigues. 1455). Papal. people. rentes à prix d’argent. 441. urban. 324. Nicolão. 168. 481 Rotterdam. 212 Richtárová. 572. 180 Roover. 566. 570. 55 Riemann. 189 Romanus Pontifex (Papal Bull. 62 64. maximization. peasants. 110 Rogers. 246 Sachsenberg. 325. 151-6. 110 Rodriguez. 321. 595. 280. growers. 174. 127. 216. 557-8. 556. domains. 81. rentier class. 175. stream. royal. nominal. Ambrogio Lorenzi de’. 94-5. 123. 573. 400. 117. 558. 438. King of France. King of England. 571 ritl (unit of weight). 429. rent-seeking behaviour. 93-4 Romney. royal. 426. 91-2. houses. 570. 302. 441. 91. population. 172-3.. 121. 467-70. tolls. 224-5. extraordinary. 470. 416. 215 Richardson. 562. H. inheritance. lijfrente (rente viagère). settlements. 552. 452 Ridolfi. 543. 566. properties. losrenten. 561. 364. 98. 106. 108. Abbey of. 313. investment. 108. 239. 245. costs of. 326. paying for. 237. 448 Schleswig-Holstein. Abbey of. impressment. 2401. 265 Saxony. Manuel. 326-7 Salisbury. sold.” 240. copper. 299. 266 serfs. 470 Sangerhausen Revier. 261 Semmeringstraße. 241. 239-40. 99. value of. Valencian. 204. funding for. 246. British. 273. mercantile. 243-4. 249. 211 Santiago Island. 233-5. 468. 447. 263 Salviati (family). 199 Saint-Omer. 236. Western Mediterranean. 262. 248. 236. 406. 445 Santarém. 129. 239 Selonnet. 154.640 Saint-Bertin. Yashbak. 238. mining. 328. 248. 71 Schwabboden. 110. expansion of. 110 Santiago de Compostella. economies. 419. 307 Scotland. 447 Samaran. 429. 135-6 Savoy. depots. 261 al-Sha‘baní. 249. 203. 246-7. 374. 248. 241. 450 Senegal. 460-1 San Salvatore. 110-1 São Jorge da Mina. ores. 199. 199. 573 Schmoller. 262-264 Sersanders. 276 Sanchez. cost of. 241-2. Venetian. 249 ships. 401. enemy. 248. 308. INDEX seisin. industry. Crown and. foreign. 373. Gustav. 235-238. 123. 508 Schladming. 556 servitude. 241-4. 551 shipping. 238. 244. 244-5. 517. and Parliament. 239 Scheldt River. 240. 387 449. 394 serfdom. 431 San Miniato al Tedesco. late medieval. trade. 236. 393. 257-258. 467 Salzach. experts. 243-4 shopkeepers. 101-3.. 240 . 239. naval service. August. 442. wars with England. West Country (England). 253. 245. 251. 241. 330 Saint-Quentin. 188. 324. gold. Colette. supply. 239. J. 176. and war. “Councils of Shipping. 99. blockade. 240. 216 Salon. 235. 241. 393. fairs. 300. 250. see mezzadria Sherborne. 207. 248-50 São Tomé Island. 168-169. and Parliament. 236. W. 416. 252. 180. 330 Scheler. 103. 94. 445 Scarborough. 239. 251. 235 shipbuilding. lanes. 450 Serbia. é é é 408 sharecropping. 426. 257-268 Seyne. 250. and war. 221 Sardinia. 457 Schwaz-Brixlegg. 349. 123 Sandwich. 182. merchant. 406. constitution. 171 Senj (Segna). 448 Sciacca. 248. cargo. 449. 237. 236-7. 238. 350-3. 449 Schwaz. arrival of. 175. building. 253. 258. 265 Samuel. 403. 245. Crown reliance on. to Maghrib. 242. Jan. 539. dislocation. ties. 569. 396-7. 326-7. Robert D. 509. 576. 569-570. shopping. 330. 470. rewards. 290. 260. Gerard de. 593. 511. 568. transformation. unrest. Eastern. 413. 564. 165. 200 Smale. goals. 513. 451. implications. 444-6. 307 Sicily. 387. changes. 494-6. 565. spheres. gold. 571. nature. 491. force. 320. 181. 415 silver. significance. 299. 271. wheat. 582. 584. 56. and war. 592. 464. 223. 403. governments. 438. 431 Southampton. 453. 218. 305. 363. 308. 571. 441. position. 297-8. 211. 393 Sluys. 245-6. 114. system. Solomon. barriers. 468. copper. 582. human. 119. 595. strategies. 454-5. necessity. 298-300. groups. sphere. mines and mining. markets. 565. 273. domination. 415. Italian imports. 450-1. 309 Siena. 464 Sierra Leone. lineage. 439. project. Central. 336-7. 233. 544. 302-3 308. 502. 260. 571. 571. 451. 92. 169. composition. 4523. 543 Sombart. status. rank. 259-60. status. 60-1 71. 76 Somerset. commercial. 594. 453 Slovakia. payments. 286. 565. 199. 304-5. history and historians. Schmöllnitz). 392. 297. 391-4. 157. 152. 565. 593. ores and minerals. 527. 233 socioeconomic. Northern European. 582. 95. 453. strata. 507. 543. privilege. 46-8 50-7 Siena. tensions. 447. 259. 89. importance. 154 Sicily. 187 Smolník (Szmolnokbánya. 389. science. 564. landscape. 543 . 570. 559. 214. 153 Somme River. levels. 587. capital. revenues. 588-9. 470 Southwark. 262. 170. 240. 566. 453-5 social. hierarchy. variability. promotion. relations. European. 542-3. 41-2. 449. 538. William. 587. 253 Smith. 301. 569. 114. groups. 1134. asocial. 562. 213. 468. 343-4. class. 260. order. 66. 588. 169. 391-3. silver. 41. Kingdom of. work societal. 180-3. 378-9. wool. 547. 165. 508-30 Shrewsbury. record. capitalist. 261 Slánské Hory. interaction. 571. consequences. 298. towns. 407-10. level. 179 sovereignty. 271. 394. 503-7. 89. life. 493-501. 571. 313. 259. 306. 91. 399-405. 117. 542. 302. 280. 182 Shropshire. meaning. 597. port of. 59. 570. 559. 268. ports. 454-7. identity. 299. 175. approach. 484. 251. category. 77-8. 269. place. logic. autonomy. divisions. 307. roles. 470. 91. 594. 271. 340-1. structure. 212. 438. merchants. 218. 66. 73-4. 413. 155. 564. derogation. 140. 393. 544. areas. 45.INDEX 641 shops. 242. silver mining. 82 society/societies. crises. Werner. 346-7 Sonnenberger Moor. 453. 571. 565. conditions. 387 Sisteron. 539. 80. processes. commercialized. 570. intentionality. 444 Sorell. market. 533. 109 Sijilmassa (Tafilelt). order.. 582. 440. 75. Jews. 258. Western. 122. 514. spicing. late medieval. 411. 308. African. 498. 454 Sweden. 142-3. 456. 424 Tangier. 453 š Spisská Nová Ves. 324 Stephan. 183 St John. 231. 228 ibn Taghrí-Birdí. 402 é Tamentit (Tamantít). 127. 430-1 Sussex. 423 Tanezruft (Sahara Desert). 143. Abbey of. 511. Knights of. 91. 324 Staré Hory (Altgebirg). grain prices. 265. exemptions. 49 stock exchange. 453 š Spissko-Gemerské Rudohorie. 260 St Vällan. 496. 224. 3612 Stufford. 472 Syracuse. é Yusuf. 298.642 INDEX Spain. 182 Styria. 405-6. 425 Tamest. 526. 122-3. 126. 134. 402 Tabelbala. stratovolcano. 496. 451 state/states. Jonathan. 591. 451. 431-2. dízima. 413. 423 Tagenduhet. 96. trade. 396 Sudan. 587 Štiavnica. 421. 423-4. 441 Stamford. 119. Haim. 451 taxes and taxation. 452 Starohorské Vrchy. 417-8. 424 Tademaït Plateau. 421 Tafilalt. Abu al-Mahasin é é é . 465 spices. enterprise. wines (spiced). 451. firewood. 69-70 Strasbourg. 405-7. 298 S Špania Dolina. 124. 107. 97-8. 452 š S Švedlár (Schwedler). 228. 112. spicers. 251. 413. 130-5. 143-4. consumption. 216.” 117. 287.. Iberian. defence of. 595. 216 Spinelli. 416. ships. 142. 437 Susen. 152. 441. 246 Svätodusná. Banská. 127. 505. 584. 142. 305 Syria. 501. 246 Sugden. “domain state. Ayon. 424 Tagus River. 309 Steenvoorde. 60. 452 Spencer. 173. 434 Suffolk. 369 Switzerland. Lower (Nízké Tatry). collection. 301. 128. 270 Sumption. 89. 304 St Kenelm the Martyr. copper. German. finances and credit. 140. Hans-Georg. comital. 524 Spis (Zips). 468. 221 Taoism. 498. 119. 467. 299. 141-2. 76-7 Tartary. 91. 453 š St Ives. 223. 91-2. 2278. 380. 223. city-states. . 105. 153. 149. Sicily. 524 Stapel. civic. 223. 407. direct. R. 415. 132. castrum de. valley. 322. customary. 13740. 139. 595. 188. 452 stipulatio (Roman law contract). censal. 399 Tatra Mountains. 119. 189 Susen. 517 St Victor of Marseille. 461. 448 Suakin. 221. Dumbierské Š Tatry. ore district. lake. 426. 603. burden and coercion. Sicilian wheat. 421. 519. 230. 451-2. 108. Tommaso. 149. 12931. extraordinary. 504-6. 231. 16571. trades. 161. 149. 453 teloneum. display of. 146-8. 438. 152. 169. impact of. 350-1 Tlemcen. 228. sale of. 134. 149. 177. 148. towns. 123. 168-9. 321-2. 268-9 tax farming. 132. 129. 305. grants of. fairs. 48 Timmi. 497. indirect. 246 Thomas. 155. and brothers. 173. 154-5. 434-5 Tokaj Mountains. 165-7. types/forms of. 454 Tidikelt. 329. 210. 126. 123-4. 252. regular. 156. 188. 134-5. 175-7. “toll and team. 146. 147. imported. customary. murage. 334. 174. 156-7. 447 Tits-Dieuaide. 169. 41-53. 156. 146-83. 170 textiles. 420. 425. 122-3. 130. 441 Thorold Rogers. 179 Tortosa. and trade. 334. 96.” 149. violari. 148. lists of. 149-50. sisa. 147-8.INDEX 643 243. 175. 155. Thorn (Torux). 129. 147. 148. 270 Thomaz. 138. 156-60. 156. 167. 327. 107. port towns. 148. 112. imposicions. magnates. 153. 150. 165. disputes. 167-8. 172-4. special. revenue/income generated. 151. description of. Dolors Pifarré. Joan. 163. 138. 108-10. 421 time. 304. 106. 310-1. 171-17. on trade. James. 169. evasion. 328. theolonium). transit. 135 war. crafts. moral. institutions. 224. collection. 102. 229. 310. 167.. tallia. 172. 234. 147. documents. 3323 Torres. 152-3. 233. Flemish. forms of. 148-9. 148. 157-66. 176 Tommaso. 172. 139. 17983. R. municipal. 159-60. 158. 147. 435. 123 . 172. 218. 307 Tewkesbury. 147. 149. 223. right to collect. 416. Luís Felipe. 168-9. 174. 146-7. passage of goods (thurghtoll. 475. 89. Marie-Jeanne. ordinary. 132-42. 148. 244. 125. 253. 174. exemption/freedom from. sales taxes. 588 (see also “cloth” and “clothing”) theology. Manresa. 510 Tirol. 179. 148. 227. 173-4. 1667. structure of. 150-1. 151-2. 56-8 Terranova. 374. 151-2. 126. 323. 149. 321-2. 162. 151-4. entrepreneurs. 177-8. 156. use of. 130-3. 169-72. local. 115. 173. 431-2 Torhout. teoloneum. 156. privileges. 161. 148. 170. 483 Toreyó. 435 Telkibánya. 151-5. collectors. 134-5. 423-4 tin. 148-154. 250. public works. 164 Tichá Voda (Stillbach). trade. 430. assessing. 419 Torksey. 138-9. export. 148-9. 128. 166-7. 12342. sale of. 480. industry. 307. 113. 156. 2235. 173. workers. 173-5. 122-4. 169. 123. 158. 244. 453 tolls. 504-6. 177. 415. 149. rates. 172-8. 146-8. 153 Taurirt. 130-2. 330. sales. Domesday Book. 306. 181. policy. Cecco di. 304 Taunton. 153 Thames River. 165. 151-4. 300. 151. schedules. paying and payers. Anglo-Saxon. teloneum. market. 132. 233-40. 407. 121. control of. 325. 413. 171. Provence. 343-4. economy. 3712. 230. 223. 211. German. Asia. Hanseatic. 165. 434. 370. 238. manual. 341. 467. market. 425. 194. 307-8. 147. fuel. food. 352. 321. 122. foreign. . 147. 306. 383. Walloon. Balearic copper trade. 163. Italian. 375-6. 324-5. 362. 252. export. 248. 589. balance of. terms of. 193. 328. 163. 76. local. 407. bullion. flow of. rights and privileges. 237-8. 149. 146. Portuguese. 372-4. 62. 407. 168-83. slave. 250. 165. 166. 377. 239. 166. 275. inter-regional. 163. 249-51. tolls and. records. Giovanni. size. 325. capture of. 363. 571. 477. 163. 165. 151-77. real estate. 248. gilds. 468-70. 243. litigation. 191.” 426. rivalries. 234-5. 297. 405.644 INDEX Tosinghi. 399. import. intra-European. geography of. 172. 106. 207. 203. 378. councillors. 548. 101. 349. food supply. 361. 411-57. 153. 304-5. 253. 161. Hungary. 227-8. port. trans-Saharan. 174. 208. 146-8. 331. 388. 202. 107. 399. 353. 62. 4245. costs of. 447. 327. 249. overland. 233-53. 120. 363. 195. 375. 165. 1691. Catalan. 224. 128. 299. 568. regional. 228. taxation on. 524 Toulouse. in goods. 97. 597. 230. 349. 327. 446. India. 450. 150. 326. 172-3. 319. leadership. passenger. 420. 349-50. 146. 140. 301. 371. 189. 453. 297. bulk. 297. 453. 178. Brabant. patricians. 110. 415. 350. 156. 174. 101. 146. 337. taxes and tolls. longdistance. 375. conduct of. 151. Low Countries. development of. 300. fish. 391. impediments to. customary. 390. 349. 161. 351. Jewish. 300. bailiwick. defence. commodities and goods. 305-6. 310. permits. shipping. English. 121. 484-5. overseas. 178. 416. 153. 153. 538. network. 243. 147. 316. small-scale. impact on. French. government. carrying. 353-6. 200. grain. 180-1. 346-7 towns. 223. walls. internal. northern Europe. 221. 363. North Sea. 113. 349-50. 389. 231. 168. 405-7. 118. 163. 132. 161. 402. 407. 171. 559. spice. royal. 15083. 224. 374. 315. 227-8. fortifications. 389. 202. 350. 372. jurisdiction. right to. 369-73. 451. 470. 137. revenues. 163. 339. 326. Sicily. resources. 349. gold. 201. royal interference. 172. 371-5. 146. 238. 208. 326 Trapani. centres. 121. 507. 174. 308. 362. 227. 308. 415. 389. 208. 405. 267. 491. 404-6. 374-5. Picardy. Flemish. feudal. 234. mining. hinterland. “secrets. 406-7. 299 trade. 190. 36870. 300. textile. specie. 349-50. 151. 361. 328-34. medieval. 146. 519. villa. 121. 192-3. 156. maritime. 378. 433-4. 301. 376. Netherlands. 312. private. 172. 167. 132-3. 394. coastal. 306. 121. role of. 191 Tournai. 374-5. 173. 500. 228. 156. 437 Totnes. networks. 193. 132. 482. 438. 319. 198. 172. 253. metal. 208. 297-300. 507. 514 Tourelles. 192-3. 176. 324. 74. 262. 157-9. 374-5. silver. constraints on. 305. international. population. townspeople. 136. English. charters. 308. 376. 576. 350. 173 Ungheria (see Hungary). institutions. stone. 497. 411-3. occupations. analysis. 147. sea. households. 72. river. 120. technology. . 500-3. 284. 246-7. 421-6. 275. 170. 172. 275. markets.” 172. elites. 236. 511-12. retail. centres. 497. masses. urban. 493. 54. 150. 172 trades. troops. servants. artisans. 375. 120.” 325. pilgrim. 491. 349. 373. 231. 530-2. characteristics. areas. 374. 120. creditors. 433-7. 509. 539. 451 Unterharz. river. desert. 292. 371. 405. 310. 157. agglomerations. 431-2. 502. 72 tronage. 515-7. 429. 503. 193. 493 498. 394. 106. 425. finance. 373. government. converso. life. 172. network. 286. 441. 425. 411. 523. 515. 491. legislation. inland. 513-16. costs. horses. 523. 503. 527-8. 434 Tuat. 495. Jaume. 216-8. 509-13. towns. development. 67. 515. Maghrib. agriculture. 377-9. 445 Trevelyan (family). stock-market. budgets. 115. 494. 241. 353. 235 Trave River. 220. debt. 252 Turner. 427. gardens. 242. 533-4. 504. 506. 172-5. 501-6. demand/needs. 148. 124. 324. wine. 507. 595-6. 163. metal. 514 transport/transportation. private. wool. 375. population. 523-4. 448 urban. low-level. 327. 589. 578. charters. 597. 301. 389 Tyrol. 117-8. 273. 523. local. 175. 152. 464. 572. 447 Treppenhauer. 165. tax and revenue. 120. rights. 423 Tudela. 128. 565-7. 70. growth. 374 Tyrrhenian Basin. 352. 54 Ulverston. 143. urban. 373. 246. 163. 493 Tuscany. merchants. Thomas Hudson. volume. 376. 450 Troeltsch. 494-5. metals. urban. 363. Hilary. 433. 374. 362-4. 510. small-scale. consellers. commerce. 455-6. leather and skins. 352. 374. 120. 156. 429 Tudor dynasty. 308. 506. 503. 491. 458 Tuat al-henna (see Zaglou). 454. with West Africa. 102-103. 419. 299. 501. 498. 374. Bernat. 178. 493. 513. 509-11. 372. dwellers/urbanites. 427 Tudela. Jewish. Baldus degli. 154 Tuareg. 446. 572. 496-500. 122-3. 468. 494-6. 483 traders. wood. 505. 153. textiles. 444 Unterinntal. 308. 394. 94-112. 155 Turner. 527-9. 523-7. 503. 375. 425. 246-9. food and drink. improvements in. 448 Ubaldi. 297. crisis. 433. 167. poverty. 120. 98. 523. 467-8. 504-5. economy. wholesale. 321. 375. 334. 493. unit of. 211 tunnage. 422-4. Ernst. 328-9. indigenous. mode of. 166. 223. “Transport of Flanders. trade and traders. 174-5. 495-8. 373. 507. petty. 252 Trieste. 299. 510. 378. 470. 92. 174. 374. 415-6. 369-70.INDEX 645 416. 460. consumers. 366-7. 542543. 374. long-distance. 503-6. 106. 507. 165. “enterprise zones. 163. 533. 572 Trento. 374. foreign. merchants. 398. 441 . usurae). monetary. 47-50. 471-2. 71. 469. 112. 565.646 INDEX 172. 59-86 Utrecht. Estevão. 424. 544. 359-61 Valencia. Mecià de. 427. 284. 400. 431. 475-6. and Aragon. 46. measure of 41. Thomas Aquinas on. 430. 313. Borromei. laws. 439. 356. 575. 407. 264 Verzona (galley). 451 Verdon River. textiles. 420. “extrinsic titles” to. 337. galleys. 595-6. gold-silver ratio. 67. 57. 319. 424. Council of (1311-1312). lagoon. 416. 411-2. 354. exports. Weber. 471. 503-4. 99. of gold. 424. Herman. 203 Vaz. 427-9. exchange. 460. 64. 543. 469 values. 428 Veurne. 437. 45. 59-79. 474-8. 52. 433. 144-5. 539. of markets. 586. 402-4. Richard. 468. 431. 433. 429. of tolls. ships. 55-6. 427-8. 539. Datini branch. Gerard of Siena on. of bills of exchange. exchange rates. 406. 95. 134-5. 480. 51. 362. 454-7. Aristotle on. 429. unrest. intrinsic. 419. 589 Var River. Max on. 475. 156-7. 47-53. 313. castellany of. lake. 481-3. 51. 428. bills of exchange. 56 Villadestes. 404. 81-5. 503. 350. market. 325. 450 Vienne. Roman law definition of. 399. 153. 475-6. 450 Veneto. Henry of Susa on. 426-8. 374 usury (usura. 470-1. of trade. 64. 349-50. 412. 41-86. of movables. 482. shipping. 431. 416 Vallis dominorum (Herrengrund valley). 431. of land. 344. 50-3. 447-50. 485. 187 value. 120. 406. 565. 572. 41-2. 568 Van der Wee. 160. 491. 418. 424 Visby. 77. 472. 451 Veporské Vrchy. 406. 380. 324. 351 Van Haaster. Dukes of. copper. 447 Valle Imperina. coinage. 408-9. intermediaries. 434. types. of sales. 475. companies. firms and agents. 473-4. 124. 447 Valois. of immovables. shipping. 153. 419-21. 41. Muslim merchants. 337. silver. 418. 196. 440. 263-4 Varpan. 469. currency. 472. 311. 55-6. 441 Vatican. 484. 424 Vaughan. 347 Vienna. 555. 475. 401. 277. Giovanni d’Andrea on. 392. of commodities/goods/merchandise. 54-6. banking. 464. 450. 426. Henk. 163. 83. 142. currency. 339. 341. 346-7. 341-5. 120 urbanization. 416. 55. 50-3. 50. of cargo. 475 Veporské Pásmo. 464. tin. prohibition of. of gardens. money market. of wool. 103 Velebitski Kanal (Canale della Morlacca/della Montagna). 406. 339. 438. 452 Valle del Fersina. 476. 471. 83. trades and crafts. 329. 45. 63. source of. 464.. 406 Ventura & Co. 50. of imports. grain prices. 402-4. 516. urban-rural relationship. trade. 235. 400. restitution of. 161-5. 316. 56-8. 407. 429. 572. 411. 433. 433. capital. copper. of fungibles. 416. imposicions. 447 Venice. 49. 144. 239. 511. 79. 158-60 162. 56. financing and taxation. Duchy of. 220 Warwick. 135. 233-5. 507. Earl of. 246. Aragon-Sicily. 73-5. 237. benefits. History of Commercial Partnerships. 46770. 767. 254 Westminster. 492. Aragon-Genoa-Venice. “spirit of capitalism. 415 wars and warfare. 136. 73. 188. 208. 363-9. 142. Hundred Years War. medieval. 60. 61. 327. 524. 223. 239. 215. 67. 214. 561. Iberia. Genoa-Venice (War of Chioggia). 108 wool. 49. 91-92. 428. per capita. 61. non-Christian religions. 227-8. 136. Gerolimo. metropolitan. expenditures. 75 77. private. 564. 218 Waterford. 236. 423 é Walchen Valley. 136. 583 Walata.” 543 Weber. 126. 310. 413. 119. King of England. 478. 237. 199. Jean de. public. 237. 442 Wisla River (Vistula). 180. 388 Vitaliani (family). 246 William the Conqueror. 195-6. 464 Waitz. 249. 165. 177. 245-51. 555. 245. 461. 75-84 Weinberger. 121-3. Stephen. 216. 128. 91. 239. 517 Wakenitz River. 249. Ochsenberg). 492. 538-9. 268-9. 161. 233. 571. 235-6. Flanders. 517 Wettinger. 67. 61. 137. 221. 446 Wolof. sieges. 196. dissertation. 228 Vismara. 322. 477. as capital. civil. fifteenth-century. 587 Wargla. 188 Wilson. Godfrey. 233-5. Protestant Ethic. 468 Warendorp. 240. material and supplies. Wilhelm von. 252 West Country. 496-7. 252. 187.” 67-8 71. 328-9. 220. 216. 190. G. Max. 555. movable. 253. 483. cloth and clothing. 236. 453 Volterra. Abbey. Georg. domestic. 124. 60-1. 215. 500. Taddeo di Ardizio. Dukes of Milan. 277. 195. 144.. 119. 238. 91. 183. 195. 462. 510-1. 501-5. Economy and Society. 216 Warwick. 72-3. 260 Welf. 538-9. estates. 189. 190-1. 441 Wobes. 51. 249. 465 Viseu. 124. 246 Winchester. 495. 573. S. 365 Winchelsea. impact. 60. 387. usury. circulation of. 535. 187-8. 565. Portugal-Castile. . 119. 448 Wales. 559. 553. 119. nature of. buying of. 351. Giacomo. 303 Weymouth. 128. Robert. 530-2 Winter.INDEX 647 Visconti. 142. 215. 209. 223. 436. 259. 240. 59-84. Johan. 464-5. 187. 272 Wissenbach. shipping. 127. 517 wine. 376 Volovské Vrchy (Volovec. 564. king’s. patrimonial. 200 wealth.. 191. 542. 221. 182 Waurin. 587 Wolkenburg. 281. Alan G. 444 Wennington. 239. Aragon-Castile. 198. 136. “real. 428. Aragon-Genoa. 248. 244-7. 70-1. England-Scotland. 562. immovable. 300. 67-8. Timo. 238. 498. 241-2. 2534. 135. 462 Von Thünen. Wars of the Roses. 311. 312-3. 508 Wyffels. 316. 332. exports. 477. crown estates. capital and credit. 344-5. 324 merchants. 165-6. central place. 4678. suburbs and satellites. 179 Yemen. trade in. 446 Zwin River. Staplers. 341. 239. 319. 325-6. 342. 347. 206 Zaglou. 218 York. 328-9. 163-4 Worcester. 331-4. 429 Yarmouth. 327. 314. 478. 445 Zwickauer Mulde. 320. 327. 319. 159. 513-5. 329. 175. 477. 257. 207 zentner (unit of weight). 182. Duke of. citizens. 467-70. sale of. 339-40. price of. 158-66. 333. yield. England. 147. rebellions. 454-5 Zerner. 506. 481. 215 Yorkshire. 3369. 158-63. 502. 319. market. 336. 453 Zschopau Valley. 498. 315-6. 175. 328. 321. revenue from. 328. 325. 316. 327. Jucef. 330-1. legal system. Thomas. 324. 168. 420. 329. 313. 330-3. 467-70. 163. 246 Yaxley. 387. 516. 439. 423 Zagreb. 448. 324. 469. 328. value of. 311 Xipio. 392. 147. 327-9. 470. 171. 322. 205. 507. residents. 175.648 INDEX 513. 310. 260-1. 402 York. 321. 321. 329. 266 zinc. merchants. 264. 450 Západné Karpaty. Maghribi. castellany. 188. 451 Zeeland. fairs. 312. 341-2. 329. 339. 127. 322. 321. 483. 246 Ypres. 416. 322. 321-2. 342-8. 319. 417. 347. 164. government. 163. 208 . Monique. imports. 328-9. port. 3334. 516. 329. troops. workers. draper. 322 324. industry. 322. Italian buyers and sellers. 324. 469. 182 Wright. Carlos. 208. 344-5. 328-9. 322. 69. 327. shipping of. 175. 161. 337.