Military Review March 1981

'" , I Military Thp Profpssional of thp , March 1981 ,THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY Published .by US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERp,l STAFF COLLEGE Fon leavenwcnh, KanSCl!; 66027 HONORABLE JOHN O. flll,!lJ'lSH JR. Secretary of the p,rmy LIEUTENANT GENER.I4.L WiLLIAM Commandant BRIGADIER ROBERT H. FORMf"l\j Depu1y Commandant " MILITARY RElC.IEWjSTAFF Colonel John 6:13loom, Editor in Chief Lieutenant Colonel Dallas Van Hoose Jr" Managmg EdItor Mrs Eleanor K Tate, Secretary FEATURES: Major Sandor I KetZls, AssocIate EdItor, Dr Donald E Nease. German Translator PRODUCTION STAFF: Mrs D,Xie R Dominguez, ProductiOn EdItor, Mr. Charles IVle, Art and DesIgn, Mrs. Betty J Spiewak, Layout and DesIgn, Mrs Manlyn A. ·Edwards. Manuscflptllndex Editor, Mrs Joyce F. Shanin, scnptslEdltonal AssIstant, Mrs Peggy A Caltabiano, Books/Edltonai Assistant, Mr Amos W Gallaway, Pnntmg Officer LATIN-AMERICAN EDITIONS: Malor Arthur F Torres, Ed)tor, Mr. Raul Aponte, Editor, Spamsh-Amencan EditIOn, Mr James Bennett. Assistant Edltot, EditIOn,' Mr Francisco D. AlVidrez. Spamsh Translator: Mrs. Cnstma A Kenmngton, Spamsh Edltonal AssIstant, Mr. B Lopes, Editor. Brazilian Edition CIRCULATION: Second lieutenant Stephen M Weicht, BusI- ness Manager; Staff Sergeant Mary L. Jones, Administra- tIOn, Mrs. Barbara Brauer. Accounting Technician, Mrs Mer- nam L Clark. SubSCriptIOns . MR ADVISORY BOARD: Colonel C W Hendrix, Department 01 AcademIc Operations, Colonel John F Moran Jr.. Depart- ment of Command, Colonel J E L. Roberts. Department of Resource Management, Colonel Donald A, Ladner, De· partment of Strategy and Theater Operations; Colonel Clyde Tale, Department of TactICs; Colonel William A Stofft, Combat Studies InsUtute, Dr 0 Clayton James, John F Morrison Chair of MIlItary HIstOry, Colonel W T Coffey, Army NatIonal Guard AdVIser, Lieulenant Colonel C, R. Weber, Army Reserve AdViser Military Review VOLUME LXI MARCH 1981 NO! 3 PAGE 2 10 22 31 51 56 62 66 73 78 81 89 CONTENTS NEW DOCTRINE FOR THE DEFENSE by Colonel Clyde J. Tate. US Army. and Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder. US Army THE SUPERPOWERS' TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN by Malor John B. Lynch. US Army FIELD ARTILLERY INTEROPERABILITY by Major Rolland H. Berry Jr .• US Army EXTENDING THE BAITLEFIELD by General Donn A. Starry. US Army SOVIET AITACK HELICOPTERS. RETHINKING THE THREAT by Captam Steven A. Frith. US Army CLAUSEWITZ by Colonel Walter von Hobe. Federal Republic of Germany Army AN EMERGING TRIAD OF POWER by Colonel Robert L. Dtlworth. US Army SOVIET RADIO-ELECTRONIC COMBAT IN WORLD WAR II by David R. Beachley REVIEWS the best from other loumals LEITERS NEWS BOOKS contemporary reading for the professIOnal MILITARY REVIEW IS published monthly In English and Spanish and quarterly In Portuguese Use of funds for printing this publicatIOn approved by Headquarters. Department of the Army. 25 April 1980 Controlled CIrculation postage paid at Leavenworth. 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Winners AJI--) The voting is in, and the winner of the 1980 Mlhtary RevIew Award for Excel- i lence in Tactical Writing is Colonel Robert E. Wagner, commander of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Nuremberg, Germany. His article "Active Defense and All That," which appeared in the August issue, has earned him the $250 prize money and a certificate attesting to his scholarship. The second-place article was "Gain the Initiative With an Armored Raid" (June) by Major Richard P. Geier. Third place went to "The Warsaw Pact Short-Warning Nuclear Attack: How Viable an Option?: Parts I and ll" (October-November) by Major Donald L. Mercer. These authors were not the only winners, however. The Tactical Writing Awards Program has inspired numerous officers to share their thoughts on tactical concepts and battle doctrine. This presentatIOn of differing perceptIOns and the frank discussion of problem areas has been instrumental in stimulating professional thought and the broadening of our professional knowledge base. Such a trend works for the betterment of us all; In the end, the winners are the men we lead and the country we serve. As General Omar Bradley once said, "For most men, the matter of learmng is one of personal preference. But for Army officers, the obligation to learn, to grow In their profeSSIOn is clearly a public duty." The MIlztarv RevIew is also a winner, for in publishing these articles MR serves as a major forum for the professional growth of the US Army. To those who have won the laurels, our congratulatIOns. To those who have contributed to the forum, our thanks. To the entire officer corps, our encourage- ment to join the discussion, to air your views and to share your thoughts. Specifically, we encourage you to submit your article for consideration in the 1981 awards program. Many excellent articles have been received already, but __________________ =-____ ;: , - . ChOnlicJl dIe r>,J.<J, .. -ro .:j(jr: I") D 8",,1 ' )'111 J' US .drf))\- The C0111ba: i :eratds VlctOi'V LIt"url-'tl, 1'1 C(·/,;!'t" ,H:lff/f) C f '';'/!f'1 US f'4ev\/ Thoughts on t.\iiack Hf Doctrine !1'1djOf Dt'fL /" [.iI/lf.' us ,...l.'rnv DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY "-> & GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH. KANSAS 66027 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300 POSTAGE AND FEES PAID DEPARTMENT OFTHE ARMY DOD 314 (lHCULA'i' IDN j Ui i ;Q<, lLr'13 '1 '. :'0(, N ZGED RD . >, 0; .... ...!JJ '- ne Colonel Clyde J. Tate, US Army, and Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder, US Army The Army's defensive doctrine has been a center of contro- versy sincc its publication in 1976. In the near future, Field Manual (FMI 100-5, Operations, will bc republished. Its approach to defense will retain the classic purposes of defense -to gain time, conserve forces, stop the enemy and to win -but will also emphasizc the need to suit the form of the defense to the operational situation at hand and stress the use of offensh'e tactics in the conduct of the defense. Initia· tive, violence, integration and depth will be the foundations of the new manual's attempt to provide the Army with doctrine suitable for units of .. II types in all parts of the world. N o TACTICAL subject has provoked as much debate m the US Army as that of the active defense. Gallons of ink have been spIlled and dozens of Jeep h,ods dented in ~ g u i n g the merIts and deficienCIes of our defenSIVe doctrine and in trying to define its essence. Certainly, this debate has been worthwhile: Th'e quality of the exchange has been hIgh; fresh concepts have been elaborated'm crItIcizmg and defendmg current ideas; and most serving officers have been stimulated into closer examination of the operational problems of defense, including the effects of electronic warfare and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons It is likely that the debates engendered by the actIve defense wIll be that doctrine's greatest legacy to the Army. March The central question of how we should defend, ·however, has not been fully answered. Critics have identified weaknesses in current doctrine while support- ers of the active defense have stressed Its realism and its principal strengths Still, no real synthesis has appeared, and, today, with a new edition of FM 100-5 in draft, arguments are still swirling around the Army's defensi ve concept. This article is presented to return the debate to its start point by outlIning the form defensive doctrine will take in the Army's new field manuals. It attempts to clarify questIOns raised by the doctrine of 1976 and establish a line of continuity between that concept of defense and the concept which will be described m the new FM 100-5. Its thesis is that defenSive operations will vary greatly With operatIOnal conditions and that no smgle technique of defense can be universally apphcable. Whatever form is chosen must he executed With the greatest possible VIOlence to allow the defender to seize the mltlatlve at the earliest opportunity aVaIlahle. Our new approach to the d['fense must con' tmue to stress concentratIOn, economy of force secunty and combat In depth, but It must alse emphaSize speed, maneuver and surprise far more than the active defense does. The Background Much of the problem With current defen.sive doctrine hes m a misunderstand- Ing of what was origInally Intended The tactics described In the 1976 editIOn of FM 100-5 were Intended to provide general guidance suitable for applicatIOn in any circumstances but specifically deSigned to handle the "worst case"-war in Europe. In fact, the manual sets out very 1981 NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINE few hard and fast rules and allows con- Siderable latitude to commanders in or- ganIzmg the defense. In the conferences preceding the writing of FM 100-5, senior commanders agreed that this latitude was a necessity. They also concurred in emphasiZIng the importance of maneuver and the necessity of reclamllng the initiative at the earliest pOSSible opportunity when defending. The exact form of defense was understood to be variable, depending on the factors of mISSIon, enemy, terrain and troops available IMETT) m each case. In short, the doctrine designed for our manuals and actually written into FM 100·5 was notably flexible and delIberately nonrestric- tive. In fact, Initially, it was simply called 'The Defense." Wbat developed, unfortunately, in the doctrine's extensIOn Into other manuals (notably FM 71-100, Armored and Mech- anzzed v l s l ~ n OperatIOns {How to FIght! I and In its applIcation In the field was a highly structured and rigid conceptIOn of how to defend. ThiS stylized version ofthe "actl ve defense" called for deployment of defendIng forces "well forward" behmd coverIng forces of a single typt' With a nar- rnwly der;ned miSSIOn. It ngorously pro- hlhIted the retention of substantial reserves for fear of thmnIng out committed forces to an unacceptable degree and called Instead for concentration by lateral movement along the forward edge or the battle area 1 FEBA I. Depth was to be achieved by maneuver, but, m execution, this was often translated into a retrograde which ended With a hnear defense at the brigade rear boundary. Offensive action WIthin the defense was anathematized beca use of the antic- Ipated numerical advantage of the enemy, but risks In the form of stripped-out flank sectors were recognized as a necessity. The requirement for defending well for- MILITARY REVIEW ward in Europe, continued analysis of the 1973 Middle East War and the numerical inferiority of our deployed forces in Europe all played a part in reducing the original conception of a flexible defensive doctrine into a dogmatic set of rules. But even more influential in the process was the exag- geration the mechanical-technical aspects of war which accompanied the publication of FM 100-5. The manual's introductory assumptions about the lethality of the battlefield encouraged the growth of a tendency to over- stress firepower factors in relation to all others. The fighting system comparisons and the hit probabihty-kill probability charts of the manual oriented doctrinal development in an extreme and unfortunate direction. As the theme of firepower dominance was developed, the rough com· parlsons necessary to mlhtary estimates degenerated into a form of deceptively pre- cise mathematics for staff college students, war game designers and maneuver um· pires. The "advantages of the defender" (meaning the operation of direct·fire weapons from covered positIOns) assumed such value that counterattacks or resump- . tion of the offensive became too risky to be seriously considered. Simulations, in particular, remforced this view with their crude comparisoris of firepower potential. Moral factors, the effects of enfilading fire and the impact of sur· prise which have decided so many real battles were acknowledged as incalculable and totally suppressed. Maneuver, which is the means through which these effects are obtained, was similarly discounted. Equations tactics on the game boards, and realism suffered as a result. The art ofterram appreciation and utilization was forsaken for ratios. Tenacity, surprise and seizing upon opportunities seilted by a vulnerable enemy were lost in the "calculus of battle." 4 Using the methodology of our war games, Stonewall Jackson's flank blow at Chancellorsville would have been defeated by the firepower score of Oli ver O. Howard's corps even though the Union rifles were, for the most part, stacked around the campfires. The audacity which won Napoleon the Battle of Austerlitz would have c;ost him dearly in today's computer· assisted simulations. By 1978, the flexible concept of defense conceived at the preliminary planning conferences had hardened into an inflexible set of rules for a single type of defense. Surely, this was not the intent of its original "fathers." It was this rigidly limited form of defense which attracted most of the attention of critics and prompted the long series of debates which still goes on. Toward a New Defensive Concept If we are to make proper use of the lessons we have learned in studying and debating current doctrine, we must restate our defensive doctrine carefully and pre- cisely. Our reVised doctrine must incorporate the strengths of current thought and the improvements urged by constructive critics. Our doctrine must be specific enough to guide commanders in devising effe'ctive tactics but sufficiently flexible to be useful in any part of the world under any conditions of combat. Doctrine was never intl"nded to be dogma, and effective use of sound doctrine requires the judg- ment of its user. While retaining our appreciation for the destructiveness of weapons, we must also consider the human factors which influence operations, the advantages ob- tainable through maneuver-particularly. offensive maneuver-and the changing nature of terrain throughout the world. March . : '< It is also Important that our restated defensive doctrine reflects the needs and importance of light forces as well as mechanized and armored units, maintains the time-tested emphasis on combined arms cooperation, takes full advantage of new units and weapons and devotes adequate attentIon to the special challenges of nuclear-chemical warfare and the simultaneous battle in depth. To meet these challenges, the new defensive concept will propose concentration on foul' key elements. These are initiative, VIOlence, integration and depth. Initza{lt'e is the attacker's greatest advantage It must be seized from him tem· poraI'lly whenever possible and finally wrested from him altogether. ThiS requires more than mere reaction to his at· tack: The defender must counter the attacker's initiatives With his own and prevent him from dictating the pace of battle throughout its course. VIOlence is the essence of decIsive combat. The defender must concentrate combat power rapidly In response to the attack and then deliver a stunning counterstroke to halt and shatter the attacker. Nuclear fires are especially valuable In dealing such a blow, but the modern conventional weapons already in our hands also make us capable of concentrating fires against an attacker on very short notice. Mounted ground maneuver forces, air maneuver units and airborne/airmobIle forces can all move fast, strike qUIckly and finish rapid· ly·to defeat enemy forces piecemeal. IntegratIOn is the coordination of every weapon, unit and system aVaIlable In pur- SUIt of victory. Since the defender is normally outnumbered, it is of particular importance that he use hiS strength fully, economically and effiCiently, multiplYing 1981 NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINE its actual force through full exploitation of every advantage. Fires, barriers and maneuver must be meshed perfectly and carefully fitted to the ground. Air and ground operations must be fully complementary. Nuclear and conventional weapons, electronic warfare, combat support and logistical support must also be harnessed to the commander's concept if the defense is to succeed. Depth is Important on both sides of the line of contact. We must see deep into the enemy's territory so that we can fight a Simultaneous, coordinated battle against him throughout the depth of his forma- tIOns. We must organize our defenses In suffiCient depth to permit us to absorb the shock of the attack and regain the initiative Surveillance and long-range fires are the keys to fighting the enemy from his first appearance forward of the line of contact to separate his forces and deny him the concentratIOn and early success he requires. Closely coordinated maneuver and fire through the entIre depth of the defended area are also vital to breaking up the enemy's momentum and defeating his forces. These four fundamentals characterize all defensive operations and set objectives for their conduct. They do not dictate how the battle is to be organized. The exact form of defense cannot be standardized. It will depend on the commander: the terrain and the factors of METT. The commander may defend well forward or in considerable depth if he is not specifically reqUIred to hold a designated position. He may even choose to pre- empt thf' attacker with spoiling attacks if conditions favor such tactics. The actual range of defensive optIOns is very Wide. It can be visualized as a con- tinuum of combinations which proceeds from an absolutel:t static position defense MILITARY REVIEW at one extreme to a totally dynamic form of defense at the other. Between these poles, there are almost infinite possibilities for the combination of position and maneuver. Neither extreme is practical as a form of defense for a sizable force-the most dynamic defense requires some static framework, and the most powerful strongpoint needs at least an internal reactIOn force. In practice, commanders will combine active and positional elements in propor- tions to suit each situatIOn.' When a defensive mission is restrictive, terraIn limits maneuver or the troops available are of limited mobilIty, a pre· dominantly positional defense will be chosen When the opposite conditions exist, a commander may elect to base his defense on mobl IIty, seeking to defeat the enemy by fire wi thin the defensi ve sector and by carrYIng the fight to the enemy by early counterattacks Into the flanks and rear of his formations. The figure summarizes this concept graphicall¥. Within a defensive concept, the combination of active and positional elements may be based on the geography of the battlefield (as at Orsha where Gotthard Hein- rici defeated superior forces by concentrating on a single strong position supported by a wide screen and lateral reinforcement) or on the capabilities of the forces at hand (as at Kharkov where Erich von Manstein used infantry to limit the Russian per:etration and then liquidated it with armor). Forces of markedly different mobility can cooperate in such defenses. Light infantry, for instance, can hold strongpoints, forested areas, villages or towns to facilitate the maneuver of armor units while denYIng otherwise ex· cellent avenues of approach to the enemy. The basic organization of the battlefield will not change. A covering force will still be used to provide security to the defender and to begIn pestruction of the enemy's leading forces. The decisive battle will continue to be fought in the main battle area (MBA). And a rear area will still be Range of Defensive Techniques Available to Maneuver Units Static Terrain RetenllOn <E(;----------+-----------:):.. Or.lented "POSitIOn Defense" "Active Defense" Technique Employed IS Determined In general by METT (MISSion. Enemy. Terram and Troops Available) In particular by' Terrain-Defensibility and obstocle value and depth available Troops available-mobility and degree of armored protectIOn DynamiC Force DestructIOn by Fife and Maneuver OrIented March organized for the support of operations. However, greater freedom will be allowed to commanders in organizing their defenses, and new emphasis will be placed On the tactical interdictIOn battle conducted simultaneously in the area beyond the line of contact, giving depth and flexibility to the defense. The covering force battle provides warning of the enemy's approach and informa· tion on the nature of his attack. Covering forces may be large or small, d!'pending On the operational conditions and the commander's plan for the defensp. Whatever its size, the covering force must protect the defending main body from surprise and direct observation If the covering force IS a heavy one, It can also provIde substantial reaction tIme to the defending commander by sloWIng the enemy's approach and destrOYIng hIS leading UnIts. When the covering force succe!'ds in stopping some attacks or IS not challenged at all In some parts of the battlefield, It can remain forward, per- mIttIng the main force to concentrate against the most serIOUS threats and con- trollIng forward areas whIch offer observation and attack of the enemy's flanks. Whatever ItS compOSItIOn or functIOn, the covering force must be viewed as an integral part of the dpfense WIth a speCIfic role to play In the commander's concept of operation. It can screen areas in whIch enemy progress is acceptable while delay- ing, defending or even attackIng elsewhere to provide a greater degree of res is- tance and protection. . In any case, its fundamental missions will remaIn to establIsh and maIntain contact WIth the enemy: determine the strength, location and general directIOn of enemy attacks; and deceIve the enemy as to the location of the main defenses. The MBA battle IS the deCISIve battle fought along and behind the FEBA by the 1981 " NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINE defender's major forces. Within the MBA, all forces available to the defender are combined to structure the battlefield with fires, barriers and maneuver to create op- portunIties to stop the enemy, Isolate his forces and defeat him. A careful intelligence preparation of the battlefield pre- cedes deployment of defending forces to in- dIcate where the defender must concentrate initially and where he can expect to Interdict the enemy's approach and fight him In depth. The operatIOns conducted in the MBA depend on METT. The commander may choose a static, terrain-oriented form of defense, a dynamic defense based pre- dominantly on maneuver or a balanced operatIOn whIch combines position and maneuver In appropriate measure. The commander's preference, the operational situation and the terrain available to him will all influence his chOIce, but almost every defense wIll contain elements ofpo- sltlOn and movement. Thus, in any defen- sIve Operf<tlOn, mISSIOns of subordInate units "jill vary. DIvisions may have offen- sIve mISSIOns in the conduct of a corps defense. Committed brIgades may delay as part of essentially positIOnal division defenses, and battalIons may screen or defend strongpoInts In the course of an actIve defense conducted by the brIgade. A vital element of the defense, which is ininImized in our current manuals, is maneuver. OffenSIve actIOn as part of the defense IS a vital means of upsetting the !'nemy's plan, counteracting his inItiative and destroying his exposed forces. The defender must avoid premature offensive action and must not commit himself frontally against superIor forces. lIe cannot, on the other hand, expect to win a head-on sluggIng match of attrItIOn against a numerically superior enemy if he remains entirely passive. He must take the offensive. MILITARY REVIEW The defender must aSSlJme the offensive to gain full advantage of his successes in stopping or separating enemy forces. He must take every opportunity to crush isolated attacking units and attempt to destroy the enemy's supporting forces by maneuvering over indirect approaches to firing positions behind and on the flanks of the attacker. These counterstrokes are most effective when the enemy's initial impetus has been checked by the defense and he is bringing up forces to overcome the resistance. Moving between carefully sited obstacles under .the cover of planned direct and indirect fires over familiar terram, the defender's mobile forces can inflict terrific damage on undeployed forces, artillery and command posts from offset firing posi· tions. The psychological shock induced by this exercise of the initIative bv the defender can be paralyzmg to an'dttacker whose plans are suddenly :iisrupted by the appearance of unidentified forces to his rear. Air maneuver units and airmobile forces can be employed in such counterstrokes when the attacker's concentrated forces are moving on narrow axes which permIt movement between them. The long range of infantry and attack helicopter weapons and the improved effects of long- range artillery make such tactics even more reahstic. . The other distinctive features of our new defensive doctrine are greater freedom to retain sigmficant reserves and a stated need for commanders at levels above brigade to fight an extended battle beyond the FEBA. Reserves are necessary in the defense to meet unexpected contingencies, reinforce threatened areas, eliminate penetrating enemy units and strike the attacker when opportunities arise. The size of the reserve will depend again on METT, but 8 some reserve is essential to any defense. The improved mobility of the Abrams tank and the infantry fighting vehicle will enhance the range of reserve forces and increase their effectiveness when they are committed. The tactical interdiction effort begins before the enemy closes with the defender's maneuver force, goes on throughout the decisive battle and, in many instances, will continue after direct contact between the main forces of combatants has ended. This deep interdiction battle is the responsibility of army, corps and division commanders. When fighting a significantly larger enemy, the deep battle may determine ultimate success or failure. In all cases, it can enhance the defender's chances of success by disrupting the enemy at long range, breaking up his coordination and momentum and battering his follow-on forces before they can be com- mItted. Alr-dehvered weapons, tactical nuclear arms, aIr maneuver units and improved surveillance systems make battle at extended ranges practical now. New weapons on their way to the field- FASCAM (family of scatterable mines) systems, the Copperhead. the Multiple Launch Rocket System and others- promise to make tactical intetdiction even morE' effecti ve This battle in depth also extends to the rear where enemy forces may penetrate or be inserted. It may even have to be fought on the flanks of corps and divisions when gaps are created by the use of nuclear weapons. The corollaries of such !'ton- linear combat are increased responsibilities for senior commanders (who can no longer be completely absorbed in concentrating the force and allocating resources), a changed view of the rear area and combat service support and a need for closer coordination between the Army and the Air Force. Our coordination with the Air March Force for the deep battle will be partIcular- ly important SInce the Air Force will carry many of the sensors and weapons which make long-range combat possible. The "new" defensIve doctrine clearly bears many marks of its predecessor. Other connections are more subtle. In combInIng the statIc and dynamic forms of defense, it consummates what the doc- trIne of 1976 Intended and places Impor· tant new emphasIs on offensive maneuver and tactical in.terdiction. Colonel Cl .. Je J Tatt' I.'> dIrcctor (If thj> Depal! mt'n! IIf Tuctlcs. USA('(;SC lIe rn'clt'cd a B 5 from A10Ullt SI Mar;'., of .Han/ancl alld 1'; a g1{ulttntt' III thl! {TSA(,GSC al/(l the Armv War Collq:c Iii- IWb C011ll1lalldrd In/alltn u/Ills and 5(,/,,('11 uS ,Ille(. Uf/cnt.c Committee Df'part. men! of [TSACGSC NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINE The new formulation will be less pre- scriptive and more elastic, but it does not really represent revolutIOnary change. The best defensive commanders, from Hannibal at Cannae to Bruce C. Clarke at Saint-VIth, have uniformly sought to fit their forces to the ground and the enemy. Also, they have c'lnsistentiy capitalized on every opportunIty to seize the initiative and strIke, constructing their defenses according to Clausewltz as "a shield of blows." We must do the same. "4.. Llcutenant Colonel L D IIolder IS a doctrine U'nteru llh thrDepartment o{Tactlcs. L'SACeSC' lIe reLen'ed a R A from P & M UnwerSlt\, an AI A from Ilarrrord Umverslly and 15 a graduate of the USACGSC lIe has commanded troopt> In Germany and Vlctnam and sen'ed as S3, 2d Armored Cavalry Reglment Cruise Missile Tries Water Wings. An overwater test of the US Air Force air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) was successfully completed late last year when the Boeing AGM868 was recovered in mid-air by an Air Force HH53 helicopter (MR, Nov 1979. pp 84-85). The flight was primarily designed to examine the Inertial navigation system. The specially equipped helicopter snatched the missile at the end of Its flight as it floated toward the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Southern California. 1981 The flight lasted approximately three and one-half hours and was the fifth in a series aimed at preparing the missile for operational use. The miSSile was staged from the Air Force Flight Test Center at Ed- wards Air Force Base. California, and conoucted over the Pacific Mis- sile Test Range near Vandenberg Air Force Base and Point Mugu. California. The nearly 21-foot-long miSSile was launched from under the wing of a 852 bomber. Amid the swirling sands of southern Arabia. the United States and the Soviet Union are competing for influence over the "poorest yet most populated country of the peninsula -North Yemen,'" Why? In this article. the background and reasons for North Yemen's seesaw flirtations with the East and West are examined, Major John B. Lynch, US Army The Superpowers' Tug 0' War OverYemen 10 March GEOGRAPHY T HE Yemen Arab Republic INorth Yemen) IS a small country located In the southwestern corner of the ArabIan Peninsula Just north of the passageway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, Its eastern boundary with Saudi Arabia and southern boundary wIth the People's Democratic RepublIc of Yemen (South Yemen) have not been conclusively TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN established (Figure 1l.2 Apart from a hot, dry coastal plain hugging the Red Sea, called the Tihama, the rest of the country is mountainous, It rIses steeply from the coastal plain to a high mountain plateau on which rests San'a, the capital, at an elevatIOn of over 7,000 feet. 3 The Tihama IS barren and sparsely populated, Generally, it is sepa- rated from the sea by swamps and lagoons, An arid wilderness stretches inland to the foothills of the central hIghlands, Rainfall in this area is sparse, yet, because of Ir- rigatIOn systems, the area is conducive to ....... sou ........ Z"04Rf / • Sa'dah ...... u"o / 1981 ....... .!.!./J'rD ,-'" """' ~ * / "( ;;;,,,,<Y .Haradh :$-".1 Vemen Arab Republic I '0<1;"'/ (N h V ) I / PEOPLE'S ort ernen )/ DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC *San'a • Marlb// OF YEMEN Dhamar • • Yarlm 1/ (SOUTH YEMEN) 1 - - J I .... oJ ) 1 r"\_/ Figure 1 11 MILITARY REVIEW the cultivation of tobacco, dates and cotton.' In contrast, the mountamous interior of the country reaches elevations in excess of14,000 feet Rainfall is relatively heavy, varying from 15 to 32 inches per year in the north and southwest mountam regions respectively. This condition, coupled with an ingemous irrigation system deVIsed centunes ago," has served to make Yemen one of the mDSt fertile areas on the Arabian Peninsula. The climate and fertility of the soIl permIt the cultivation of almost every fruit, vege- table and gram Imaginable. DEMOGRAPHY The population of Yemen IS estImated at 6.5 millIon. with an annual growth rate of 3 percent. Only about 10 percent of the populatIOn is urbanized Other national· ities on the peninsula are, for the most part, nomadic. The Yemenites, however, are predommantly sedentary and dwell in llamlets and small towns strewn throughout the countryside. The greatest concentrations are found on the mountain plateaus and are engaged m farm- mg Although prImarily of Semitic origin, the population does show evidence of NegrOId strams confined mostly to the Tlhama regIOn. The people are dIvided religiously be· tween the two major Islamic relIgIOUS sects. The Zaidi community of the Shi'a are located in the northern, central and eastern regions of 'the country, and the Shafe'i community of the Sunni reSIdes primarIly m the south and southwest por- tions of the country. Another sect, the Ismailis, are relatively few in number and are generally found in the remote mountain villages. b 12 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Pre-Islamic Period RIch in hIstory, Yemen is the former home of enumerable ancient ciVIlizations, the most notable being the kmgdom of Sheba' The remains of both the Great Dam at Marib and the temple of Queen Bakis still stand in testimony to the greatness of this civilization. Figure 2 depicts the kingdom of Sheba nearly one cen· tury B.C A decline in trade coupled with invasions by Abysslnians, Persians, Romans and EthIOpians led to the demIse of those ancient Yememte kmgdoms" Arab Conquests The legions of Islam Invaded and con- quered the Yemen in the seventh century and qUIckly spread their religIOn among the mhabitants, thereby underminIng the JeWIsh and Christian influence of prevIous rulers." FIgure 3 portrays Yemen's boundarIes as an Islamic state. Ottoman Rule Yemen remained under Arab control untIl the 16th century when it was con- quered by the Turks and nommally assimIlated into the Ottoman Empire for the next four centuries. '" Turkish control was never wholly effective and was principally restricted to the Tihama. The ZaidI imam and his mountain followers jealously protected their independence against foreign domination. In fact, because of the Turks' inability to subju- gate the mountains, they withdrew from Yemen altogether in 1636 for a couple of centunes.' , March TUG OF YEMEN The remains of the Great Dam at Marib Figure 2 Figure 3 1981 13 The remains 01 the temple 01 Queen Bakls Suffice It to say that the Turks maIn- tained varying degrees of control over Yemen from the 16th century onward, with the last total occupation being from 1872 to 1918 when Ottoman troops were withdrawn after World War I I Figure 41." The Road 10 Independence In 1904, Imam Yahya led a partially successful revolt agaInst the Turks and was subsequently elected Imam of Yemen." Another Yahya-Ied revolt m 1911 resulted m the Treaty of Daan I' This truce splIt the rountry mto two ad- minIstratIve dIVISIOns and set the stage for Yahya to take thp reins upon the evacuat Ion of the Turks. WIth that -done, he moved qUIckly to unite the country under a smgle author- Ity, qUite a chore for a country that had been dIvIded mto minor pnnclpalItIes and mcorporated Into a large empIre by foreign conquerors" Y ahya then laId the theoretical claIm to Aden Ithen a British colony), as well as other lands which nOW compi'ise the country of South Yemen. After a reIgn of 43 years, Imam Yahya TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN was assassinated in 1948 in an unsuccessful coup, but not before Yemen was admItted into both the Arab League and the UnIted N"tions. Imam Sa If ai-Islam Ahmad, Yahya's son, succeeded him and rulpd for 14 years before succumbing to an assassin's bullet His reign is pri- manly noted for frequent border clashes With the Aden Protectorate of which he laId claIm. HIS successor, whose reign lasted only one week, was overthrown by an army coup led by Colonel 'Abdallah al-SalaI'. ThIS abolished the Imamate and the Yemen Arab RepublIc. l .. Imam Muhammad al-Badr surVIved the coup and retreated north where the ZaidI tnbes rallIed behind hIm. At the request of the new regIme, Egypt dIspatched men and equipment to assist m combating Badr and hIS royalIst forces who were beIng backed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan. A bloody CIvil war raged on untIl 1970 when royalist leaders accepted integration under the republican regime as a result of an informal peace settlement arrIved at during talks between the SaudiS and republican leaders. Smce that time, Internal as well as external struggles have plagued North Yemen. This VIOlent perIOd will be diS- cussed in detail later in thIS article. YEMEN AND THE SUPERPOWERS Pre-Civil War Period As mentioned earlier, the long-runnmg dIspute between Britain and Yemen over the latter's irredenta, Aden and the Protectorates, resulted in VIOlent border clashes during the reign of Imam Ahmad. In an attempt to further show his disdain for the BrItIsh, as well as bolster his 15 MILITARY REVIEW nation's defenses, Ahmad solicited the aid of another British enemy, the Soviet Union 17 Thus, on 1 November 1955, Yemen and the Soviet Union concluded another treaty of friendship and commerce.'" It was, as we will see anon, much more substantive than the one agreed to in 1928.'9 Almost immediately, the Soviets provided $30 million in milItary assIstance whIch Included vintage tanks, bombers, small-arms weapons, antiaircraft guns and a small training cadre. 20 ThIs move Inspired other Communist bloc countries to establish trade agreements WIth Yemen. 2l Given that the leadershIp in M05cow had seemingly nothing In common WIth the feudal Imamic regime in San'a, what then motivated the Soviets to de- vote so much effort to thIs ImpoverIshed state'? The answer to thIs question rest,; In the fact that Yemen was, and remains today, a spoke in a MIddle East regional policy wheel desIgned by the SOVIets to enhance theIr Influence and facilItate their global expansion." SpecIfically, a foothold in Yemen was Important to Moscow for the following reasons: • First, they could reduce BntIsh influence in the regibn by continuing to nurture the "antl-Imperaflst" sentIment breWIng in the area, lJ • Second, a considerable amount of US trade and a large portIOn of oIl exports to the West were transported through the Suez Canal vIa the Red Sea. Contl'Ol of the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb by the USSR could have a severe impact on W"stern trade,24 • ThIrd, Yemen's strategic location could provide the SovIets with an excellent staging area for future endeavors into East Africa,25 • Fourth, the area was a potential source of oil and other natural resources. 2 " 16 • FIfth, and finally, Yemen could be used by the Soviets as a base for political propaganda, as well as support for other Arab radicals on the peninsula. 2 ? Having now reviewed Soviet interests in Yemen, it IS lIttle wonder that Moscow jumped at the opportunity to befriend the Imam. In addition to the military assistance deSCrIbed above, the Soviets also prOVIded in excess of $20 million in eco- nomIc aId to the YemenItes prior to the civil war ThIS aid included the development of a port complex at Hodeida and a jet airport at San 'a. It is no coincidence that these faCIlities were deSIgned to accommodate the Soviet aIr and sea fleets!" An ancillary benefit of this aid was that it prOVIded the Yemenites with much-needed lInes of commUnICatIOn, thereby contributIng to their economic growth. It was not untIl 4 March 1946 that the United States recognized the complete and absolute Independence of Yemen. Two months later, a treaty of frIendshIp and commerce was SIgned, as well as an agreement to exchange diplomats. 2 " In 195 I, the j mam requested conSIderable US aId and assIstance. Washington, however, was unWilling to grant the request presumably because officials feared that such aId would be used against the I3ritish in Aden. For the next six years, US involvement in Yemen was confined to mostly philanthropic and cultural ventures. As US Investments in the Persian Gulf in general, and the Arabian Peninsula in partIcular, took on significance, US policymakers sought to protect thIS economic stake in the region. It did so by shunning its indifferent attitude toward the imamate In favor of a benevolent approach, thereby attemptIng to buy in- . fluence: ltl It was at this point that the true impact March of Washington's decision not to support the imam m his time of need became clear Now the Americans needed him, and he knew It. His ambivalence toward the Umted States caused him to allow nomi- nal US presence in Yemen primarily to serve as a hedge against total domination by the Soviets. 1I In January 1959, Yemen accepted Its first mstallment of US aid which con· slsted of foodstuffs Subsequent trans- actIOns generally involved food and medical supplIes. The only substantive project undprtaken by the Umted States m Yemen was the constructIOn of a modern highway which connpcted Mocha with San'a. Total US outlays m eco· nomic aid to Yemen during the period amounted to $16 mIllion.'i MIlitary as- slstancp for thp same penod amounted to a mere 51,000. jl The Era of Civil War FollOWIng the 1962 revolutIOn whIch overthrew the imam and established the Yemen Arab Republic, and throughout the subsequent civil war, the SOVIets contInued to providp unambiguous support to the YemenItp leadershIp In fact, economiC aid alone had almost tnpled by 1965." The extent of milItary assistance durmg thIS perIod IS somewhat more difficult to gauge smcr the Soviets employed Egyptian prOXIeS to carry out their program. Indications are that total Soviet expenditures in military aid durmg the period totaled $70 mIl· lIon." 'The Soviets were in part ~ e s s u r e to mtenslfy their economiC blitz in Yemen because of efforts by the People's Re- public of China and the United States to reduce Soviet influence. The Chmese and Americans mamly confined their efforts to road construction projects. But the 1981 TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN Soviets provided a health, education and welfare package whicli! resulted in the establishment of a cement factory, fish- enes, a hospital, several schools and a stadium, as well as roads. 36 Direct Soviet involvement in the war prior to 1967 was limited to the establishment of a military mission specifically deSigned to help train YemenIte troops:" However, the Soviets were forced to de- viate from this policy in 1967 when a series of complex developments threatened to undermIne their stake on the peninsula. First, Gamal A. Nasser's 88,OOO-man expeditionary force was withdrawn from Yemen precipitated by cir· cumstances surroundmg the Middle East War. Then, a coup snipped the strmgs on Moscow's marionette in San'a, President Salal. These occurrences placed the success of the republicans m jeopardy. Soviet policymakers were quick to em- brace the new leadership in San'a and pledged to fill the void left by the Egyptian withdrawal. Almost at once, Moscow dispatched a shipment of emergency mIli- tary supplies, as well as technologically advanced aircraft. IndicatIOns are that Soviet pIlots actually flew some combat missions. JH It IS considered that thiS prompt Soviet reactIOn, combined With continued milItary assistance, ensured the surVivability of the republican regime in San·a.'9 In 1968, followmg the Withdrawal of the British from Aden and the birth of the independent People's Democratic Repub- lic of Yemen, the Soviets began to shIft their attention southward In an effort to gain another foothold in the area. By 1971, Moscow had scaled down its economic ald to North Yemen significantly m order to focus on the Marxist South Yemen. Mili- tary aid had been cut off in 1970.'" The reasons for this major policy shift will be addressed later. 17 MILITARY REVIEW Washington's hesitation to recognize North Yemen further hindered any US efforts to expand its influence in Yemen 41 despite the fact that it invested $36 million in economic assistance during the period 1962-67,42 The fledgling republican regime was involved in 'a bloody fight for ,its very survival and wanted bullets, not beans, to aid its cause-a commodity the United States was unwilhng to provide,4,' Instead, WashIngton sought to bring about peace through diplomacy and mediation, a strategy that proved to be ineffective, In a surpnse move that caught US policymakers off guard in 1967, San'a severed diplomatic relations with Wash- ington because of American involvement in the Arab-Israeh war 44 Conciliation: The Path to Peace By 1968, It was clear that General Has- son al-'Amri, President Salal's successor, was seeking ways of ending the war, In a concIliatory move, he opened up communications WIth tnbal defectors and former royalists to ascertam the best way to aSSimilate the royalists into hiS regime 'Amri's expressed concern for restoring central control of his government rather than prolongmg the fighting Impressed the Saudis The conservative trends exhibited by the San'a regime encouraged Kmg Falsal to open secret contacts In January 1969, resulting in an informal peace settlement. The Soviet UnIOn understood the im- plicatIOns of reconcilIatIOn between these two Arab nelghbo,"s and realigned its priorities, The Soviets discontinued military aid completely and provided Just enough economic assistance to maIntaIn a positive relationship with the Yemen- ites." Now, Moscow was free to trigger another economic bombardment on the 18 Arabian Peninsula. The target, South Yemen, was vulnerable to a penetration. Ports, airfields and other facilities leu by the British were more sophisticated n those of North Yemen and mol' than tempted the Kremlin. Similar ideo ogical beliefs and mutual needs led to a short courtship and early marriage bet een Moscow and Aden. NORTH-SOUTH FIGHTING: EAST-WEST INVOLVEMENT The stnfe-ridden Yemenites found the decade ofthe 1970s as tumultuous as any period of their turbid history. Once again, the socioeconomic development of these indigent people was relegated to second- ary importance by a political leadership preoccupied with war, crises and coups, and pestilence In 1970, with the Soviets on sabbatical m South Yemen, the mutual needs of the SaudiS and Yemenites combined to allow these former enemIes to put their Inimical past behmd them and get on with the bUSI- ness at hand-namely, stability and development Tempered by the disastrous effects of a severe drought, the initial results of this major shift In Yemenite foreign policy must have be'en encourag- ing to 'Amri. Albeit signs of initial progress were evident, continued growth was contingent on sustenance provided from outSide sources. 4h The Yememtes insatiable need for economic aid prompted San'a to initiate a resumption in relations with the United States In 1972. Despite political rhetoric to the contrary,47 Washington's support to Yemen between 1972 and mid-1976 was tepid at best. US pohcymakers seemed content to let the Saudis and other benefactors bear the brunt of the costs since March US interests had already been placated. It appears that Washington provided just enough aid during this period to keep taut the string of relationship with Saudi Arabia. The United States knew that an expression of less than full commitment in Yemen would jeopardize relations wIth the SaudIs. In thIs regard, the United States provIded $16.8 mIllion In eco· nomic aid and a mere $200,000 In milItary aid'S as opposed to the Saudis who granted over $100 millIon annually in economic assistance alone. 4 <J Despite the fact that both North and South Yemen share the ultimate obJec· tive of natIOnal reunificatIOn, ideological differences between the two have pro· duced chronIc InstabilIty along thplr border. Armed conflIct between the two In September 1972 and again In May 197:l pOInted to the need for North Yemen to amelIorate its defenses. Knowing the United States' averSIOn to provIdIng weapons, compounded by US publIc sentI' ment over future involvement in other Vletnams, the YemenItes In :-.!ovember 1975 dispatched a military delegatIOn (0 the Soviet UnIon. Now, as before, this little Arab country was dpmonstratIng its ability to maneuver the superpowers to its own advantage:'" Fearing that North Yemen would reo turn to Moscow's WIng for shelter, the UnIted States and Saudi ArabIa devised a 10·year milItary modernization program for North Yemen which they quickly announced in January 1976. The first five years of thIS plan called for $139.5 mIl- lion in Saudl·financed, US-supplied mIlI- tary equipment, as well as an additional $80 million In SaudI-financed, French· supph·d military eqUIpment. Although the extent of the last five years of the program was less definitive, it must have been sizable because the Yemenites chose it over a $500-mIlhon 1981 TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN package proposed by the Soviets. 51 In a move apparently designed to keep its options open, however, San'a did accept- delivery of 18 T55 and T34 tanks and 100 trucks [rom the Soviets in mid-1976. 5 " Malevolence intensified in southern Arabia beginning in October 1977 with the assassInation of North Yemen's president, Ibrahim Muhammad al-Hamadi. In early May 1978, Lieutenant Colonel 'Abdallah 'Abd al-' Alim, an army commander, led a brief unsuccessful revolt in Tarzy, after which he took asylum In South Yemen. Shortly thereafter, in a dramatIc sequence of events, the presI- dents of both North and South Yemen were killed almost simultaneously; Ahmad Husayn al·Ghashmi of North Yemen on 24 June and Salim Rubay 'i 'AII of South Yemen two days later. 5 .! At thIS point, anticipatIng conflict between north and south, the United States accelerated delIvery of milItary eqUIpment agreed to in 1976. In Septem- ber 1978, the United States had agreed to consider an urgent request from thp Saudis to supply an additional $400-mil· lIon worth ofmihtary hardware. Included were jets, tanks and armored personnel carriers, as well as training teams, adVIsers and technICIans."' Then, In Feb- ruary 1979, South Yemen forces, supported by Cuban and Soviet adVIsers attacked North Yemen and penetrated the northerners along a broad front."" In an unprecedented move, President Carter waived arms-control restric- tions, declared an emergency and sent North Yemen the arms package described above. In addition, he sent a carrier task force Into the Arabian Sea and dispatched two US AIr Force radar warning planes to SaudI Arabla'b 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the new president of North Yemen, still wanted more. BeSIdes just equipment, he wanted the 19 MILITARY REVIEW United States to prove its resolve by providing a cadre to assIst in the training, maintenance and administration of employing this arsenal. W{th the "Vietnam syndrome" alive and well. one can under- " stand Salih's suspIcions. In May 1979, the Soviet Union's military adVIsory team in North Yemen totaled more than 200 as compared to eight mIlitary men from the United States.'" Indications are that Salih con· sidered the quantIties of his US- supplied weaponry Insufficient compared to that of the Soviet-supplIed South Yemen. Beyond that, he was dissatis- fied with the pace of delivery which was contingent upon Saudi ArabIa's paymg for the hardware.'" • Then came the shock. In mid-September 1 DepaHfTl8ntofSlareBullE'lm 14 Jul'l 1975 074 2 The north SOuth boundary waf, demarcated In 1904 nol b". lrp Yernerllte people tul b". Bnj'5h and Tur1<-'" "'hO controlled A.:len and Vp.rnen re5pect've'-,. 3 Mantred W Wenner MOdl'rn Yemen 1918 1966 Thp J0I1,1<:. Hopkins U"'vers1f'y Press Bailll'Tlore Ma 1967 pp 24 27 .:I R P Owe'" SOlJlhern Arabia WorlrJ Survey Oelober 1973 p3 5 'Yemenlte plateaus and vaile,;s have been terraced Iro'll thel' SummitS to the wadi lIoors bPIow Sloraqe lank." have also been emplac.ed ThiS three to rour mlltenn,um s".<;lem t..se<; and reu<;es ellery drop of .... ale. preclud,ng II tram draIning ,nlO Ihe hot sdr"ds of T,hama 6 Wenner op Cif p 38 7 Tom little Soutn Arabia-Arena Of Conflict PraeQer Publishers NY 1968 pp 1 2 8 Ibid pp d b 9 Don Pererz The M,ddle [ast TOdBy Holt R nehar! a"d Winston Inc N 'y 1978 P 444 10 The Arabldn PenrnsLlla" YhE' Yemen The British April 1966 . 11 M'ddle East YearbOOk 1979 ICr..' ·Magaz,nes Lid LOfljon Eng 1979 p 231 12 Perelz 00 Of 13 Jane SmIley Hart Ba!:.lc ChronOlogy 10' a Hlslo.". ol\l1e YemE'r The Middle fast Journal Numbers 1 and 2 Wln!er SpYIng 1963 p 148 14 Wenner op Cit pp 47 49 15 Ibrd p 555 16 Owen op Cit p 6 17 Wynfred Joshua Sov,et Penetration /{TIO the M,ddle East National Strategy Information Center Inc NY 1971 pp 27 28 18 Nimrod NOVlk On the Shores 0/ Bab AI·Mafl(Jab OJ p/omacy ana Ref}!9nal DynamICS Monograph Number 26 Foreign POliCy Research Instrtute Phlladelph,a Pa 1979 p 4 19 On 1 November 1928 the USSR recognized Yemen and con CIUdea a treaty or friendship and commerce w'th Imam '1ahya AI though Ihe USSR recalled lIS diplOmats a decade late' the treaty was renewed m 1939 See Hart o/J CI/ p 148 Between 1928 and 1953 trade ,yas of minor conseQuence 20 Novik..·o/J c<l 20 1979, having thought it had San'a in its hip pocket, Washington discovered Soviet MIG21s, tanks and a variety of other modern military equipment being off-loaded in North Yemen. 59 Once-again, this little Arab nation had driven a stake In Washington's polItical heart. Regard- less of his motives. Salih used his leverage/ polItIcal jujitsu against the superpowers. Where thIS saga will end is anyone's guess. There has been speculation that Salih has emplaced a modern-day "Trojan Horse" which will result in his UnIfying both Yemens, then turning on SaUdI ArabIa to take over the world's oil supply"" One thing is certain: Yemen has a vast milItary arsenal to draw on for whatever objectives it has in mind hi What's next? NOTES 21 Chanes B McLane SOvlet·M,ddle East Rela! (Ins Sov,et Th,rd World Rela/tons M,ddle East Columb,a Unlllers,ly Press Irving N'y 1913, Volume 1. p 113 In February 1956 Yemen and CZechoSlovakia estabhshed an arms agreement at Soviet urgmg 22 ForeIgn ASSIstanCe Actllll\le5 of the CommunIst BloC afld TheIr fmplicatloflS for me Unded Slates· Stud". Number 8 The COunCillor Economrc anij Indus!ry Research Inc March 1957 p 621 23 Ibl(1 P 667 24 Soviet penetration Iflto EgYD' .... ,ts locahon ao;tr.de the Sue.;: COupled With ItS gnp on Bab el·Mandeb allowed the SOviets 10 con trOI traff.c mto and oul of tM Red Sea See Wenner op Cit. pp 176 89 25 Joshua 00 Cit P 28 26 Mclane OP c,t pp 111 13 SovIet geG1oglsl'r; \'rere dIS patched to 'yemen to study mmeral rpsources In January 1958 ?7 Novlk op Cit. pp 6· 7 28 Joshua Of) Cit P 28 <'9 Hart 00 Cit pp 148 49 30 Wenner o/J CJt pp' 77 ·82 31 Ibid 32 'U 5 Overseas loans and GranlS and ASSistance From Inter natronal OrgamlatlonS-Obflgalions and Loans AuthOrizations Jul". 1 1946 to September 30 1978 a report prepared b". the Olltce of Piafl nlng and Budgelrr19 In the Bureau lor Program and POliCy Coordins lIon of Ine Agency lor Intetnatlonal Development WaShIngton D C prepared at the request of vanous CongreSsional comm,ttees p 31 33 MIlitary ASSiStance and Foreign Military Sales Facts SeLlInl". ASSistance AgenC'f US Department of Defense WaShington DC May lq73 p 8 34 McLane op Cit, p 120 35 Ibid p 121 36 Ibid, P 112, and Joshua, 01) Cit P 29 (SOVlstS buill the San a.. Sada Highway) 37 Mclane op Cit. P 112 38 J C HOI'ewllz Middle East PO/trICS The Mtfltary DimenSion Praeger PLlblishers N Y 1969 P 261 39 Novlk op Cit pp 4 6 40 J Bower Bell Soulh Arabia Violence afld Confltct Studies The Institute for the Study of Conillct London Eng. November 1973 p 9 March 41 Wenner Of] CIt P 202 aM McLane op CIt D 113 AUhough Salal announced the establ'shment of t'le Yemen Arab Republic on 27 September 1962 It wa50 not unlll 19 December 1962 thaI tM United Stales granted recogmtlon to tile republican regime SovIet recognll<On was Immediate 42 US Arms Pollcles In the PerSian Gulf ahd Red Sea Areas Past Present and Future repon of a slall survey miSSion 10 EthiOPia Iran and the Arabian Pen,'lsula H46262 pnnled for the use 01 the COmmittee on International Relations ptJfsuanl to H Res 313 DF'cem ber 1977 pp 7476 and US OverseaS Loans and GranlS and AS sl<;lance Fotom Internatlollal Organlzat,ons- Obl,gallons a"d Loans AuthOtlZ8tlons J.J1y 1 1946 to September 30 1978 op (II 43 Mllllar'y ASSIMance and Foo'elgn Military Sale:. Facts 00 Cit 44 US Arms POliCIes 1'1 tre PerSian Gulf and Red SC'd A'ea:' Past F '<;ent and F ulure Of] Clf P 73 45 Bell L''1 CI/ DP 8 9 46 Countries prO\/ldmg a,d 10 Yemen 101l0 ..... 'ng the eclopse 01 SOviet aid 1f"I 1970 mcluded Saud' Arabia France the People s RepLJbllc 01 China an,j the Federal Repub",c 01 Ger(l18"y 11 ShOUld be DOlnted Ollt that Ihe USSR slill lllaln1alned a reSidual oreserce 47 Josepn J S,<,CO US POI,Cy 'n '''e Pers an Gu I and Arab'a' PenInsula Department of State Bulletm 14 JUly 191'j RonalO I Sp,eIS, US National Secur,t'y POliCy n the Ind'an OLean A,ea Department Of StatB BulleM. 23 Augu,>t 1971 and R,ct'a'd M F-orelgn As-s<stanc8 10' me 5evenloec, lT1essa'le to Qt'20t ConqreS$ Second Ses'Olon US Hou'20e 0 1 Representatives DocLomenl f'lulT1ber 91 3851H380 5) Supe"'"lpnOent 01 Docu<TJents US P'nl .ng Office Wast"ngto" DC I'J Sr>pteIT1I:lP' 1970 TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN 48 US Arlll& POliCies In the Persian Gull and Red Sea Areas Past Present and Future Op CIt PD 74·76 and US Overseas Loans al1d Grants and Asslslance From Internallona! OrganiZations- - Oblogal,ons and Loaos Aulhoflzallons Jul., 1 1946 to SeDlern bef 30 1978 op Cit 49 Middle fast 'r'earboofj 1979 op Cit D 233 50 Novlk Of) Cit P 10 51 US Arms PoliCies In the PerSian Gulf and Red Sea Areas past Present allp Future op CIt P 80 'j2 Ibid 53 Novllt op Cit PO 14 19 54 Wlilam R Crawlord Yemen Department 01 Stafe Bulletm wa!>h I1glon, 0 C June 1979 pp 39 40 55 leWIS B Ware Turmoil ,n Southern A'abla Military ReView Novembel 1979 DD 5154 56 Crawford Of) Cit p 40 'j7 Yemen 5lradd'eS Ea.,1 Wesl With US Soviet AdVIsorS al1d Weapons The WastlinglOn Suu 7 May 1980 58/D,d 59 Daniel Soulherland yemen Arm!> Deal Red Faces lor US J lIer'20 lor SaLJdls The OmSllan Suerlce MonllOf 29 November 19 7 9 P 1 and Fred 5 Hoffman Reds Arm 'femenlS The Kansas Glly Slar 13 5pptemtJer 1979 60 W,lloam 5allre 50vlels Inroads In Yemen The Kansas Oty T'mes 4 December 1979 61 The M'lltury Balance 1919 19BO Tt's Ifl\ernatlonal ,>'lsillule for Slrateq'c Stud,es London E.ng Major ,John B Lynch lS an a"''>l::.tQ'lf pro/!' ... · sur of 111ll11ar\ .'1Cl('llcr nt Old Drunllll01l l'1I1 1981 l t'THt .... :\'or{nlh, \"lrgl1l1a Ife r(,( ell'cd a B S m ({)ml11('rCe and {nOll the U11ll'er .... IIY (II A/ahoma, an M A 11l polwen! sCIence from thl' lflllf·cr::.llv 01 /{(lll"'u .... and (l 198{J nf the USACGSC lie sen ed u,lth th!! 1 sl Cm air .... and the 25th Infantry Ihl'I, ... Wll Notice for Military Review Subscribers. The automatic subscription renewal program has been discontinued. Subscribers must now renew their subscriptions on a yearly basis. Large printed labelS adviSing readers of the need to renew subscriptions will be placed on envelopes of the last two issues of each subscription. Renewals may be made by returning to us the tear out. postage paid subscription card found at the back of each issue. 21 The aim of interoperability is to facilitate smooth and effective operation of multinational forces. This article looks at considerations affecting a US field artillery brigade's participation in such a force. Field Artillery Interoperability Major Rolland H. Berry Jr., US Army O N EVERY major US exercise in Germany, US units practice interoperability with allied forces. Among the most active are US field artillery Units, particularly in operations with the Bundeswehr. Interoperability is US policy.! In fact, equipment standardization is too. But, for many reasons, economic sovereignty being foremost, it is the opinion of this writer that standardization is a difficult at best dream-at least in the near to midterm. One need only look at the perceived relative differences in the US "active defense" and the German "posItion defense" to see that even the standardization of tactics is a near-term impossibility. Interoperabihty, on the other hand, "the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services 'to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together,"2 is possible and indeed practiced by US forces in Europe. Some would contend that interoperability has not been just a buzz word in US Army, Europe, since about 1974 but, rather, a necessity." If it was not a buzz word, it certainly has been a state of mind that allowed doors to open for activities that might not have been conducted. The purpose of this article is to examine one aspect of interoperabIlity-a US field artillery !FA) bngade augmenting Ger- man dIvisional field artillery. The per· tinent questIOns are: What is the best use of the FA brigade In this situation? How is the German division commander lIkely to employ it? What are the interoperability INTEROPERABILITY considerations of such an arrangement? Some basic assumptions have been made which admittedly reflect the bias of the writer: • Interoperability is absolutely necessary to modern coalition warfare. • Standardization is a questionable objective in the near to intermediate time frame. • German nondivisional FA will not be available to augment US divisional FA during the defense of NATO territory. • NATO would be the defender against an armored Soviet attack in Europe {at least the lead maneuver echelons will be armoredJ. j Many artIcles and discussions support the first assumption: InteroperabilIty is a necessIty in NATO.4 Just how far down in the command structure interoperabllIty can or should be conducted is subject to some debate. It appears that brigade or higher level interoperability is the most desirable." However, in FA terms. this may be an FA brigade/group or a US FA battalIon supporting German elements. Second, the Impossibility of achieving standardizatIon is best ·explaIned in an Army magazine article titled, "Standardl· zation: In Search of the Holy Grail." If the title does not tell all, the concluding state· ment of the article does: "The standardization effort will test the skill of NATO's leaders to the utmost."6 With regard to the third assumption, German corps artillery, ifit exists at all in a particular corps, has no more than three battalIons-probably of light artillery.' US-deployed corps artillery consists of 10 to 15 battalions of heavy and missile artillery, and It can reasonably be expected that reinforcements from the United States will contain FA brigades and battalions. Simple arithmetic indi- cates the validIty of this assumption that, if any artillery reinforcement IS provided, MILITARY REVIEW INTER OPERABILITY - The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use· the services so exchanged to enable them to J. operate effectively together. -Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 it will be US FA supportmg German. Concerning the fourth assumption, the lead echelons of a Soviet attack in Europe will probably be an armored force, against which conventional FA is not very effective. However, a significant portion of FA supporting that attack and command vehicles controlling that attack are not armored. 8 That is a vulnerabilIty. Current US Field Artillery Thinking US FA doctrine is currently being con· figured by forward thinkers in the FA community to take advantage of thIS vulnerability. The US FA target acquisi. tIOn capability (currently a target acquisition battery) has been moved from non- dIvisional artIllery to the direct control of the division artillery. Current US FA phIlosophy is that the proper role of an FA brigade is attachment rather than the tradItional mIssion of reinforcing or general support reinforcing to the division artillery. Such actIOns can easily be interpreted as additional and more responsive FA support for maneuver force generated targets. However, thIS mterpretation must be tempered by a careful readmg of a recent incisive analysis of "Field Artillery Employment in the Active Defense" (Mlhtary RevIew, February 1980). Of the several excellent points made in the article, one is of greatest interest here. The author argues that FA priorities in the 24 acti ve defense should be normally weighted toward, first, Soviet artillery and, second, target acquisition equipment and, third, command and control facilities. The definitive US doctrine, Field Manual !FM) 6-20, FIre Support in Com- bzned Arms Operations, dl!fines the target acquisitIon battery as the main component of FA target acquisition. FM 71-100, Armored and Mechamzed DWlsion Opera- tzons, says that diviSIOnal field artillery can acquire targets from several sources, including the target acquisition battery, fire support teams and aerial observers. The US diviSIOn operations manual does not hst any combat electronic warfare intelligence as a target acquisition capabIlity for divisional FA. FM 6-20 further says that the target acquisition battery produces counterfire targets almost exclusively. Certainly, the fire support team and aerIal observers will not locate enemy command posts or enemy target acquisition equipment except by pure luck. Aside from the observation that doctrinally it would appear that US intelligence and US FA operations within US divisions should do a better job of "inter operability ," the purpose of the foregoing discussion is an attempt to portray the orientation of the US field artilleryman as he prepares to support German elements. It should be quite clear that the US FA is oriented to attacking counterfire targets rather than command and targets. The following discussion explains why the US FA brigade is the primary tool the division artillery has for the counterfire task. The reason is that there are four FA battalions in an armored or mechanized division artillery, three m direct support and, whether artillerymen like it or not, controlled by maneuver brigade commanders. The fourth battalion is virtually "given" to the direct support battalion located in the area of the expected penetration. The division artillery commander IS left with: • A tactical operations center (TOe) which FM 6-20 says: ... has been reorganized and augmented {or counter{ire management ... This pro· vldes the commander and FSCOORD [{Ire support coordinator! the Single source management o{the dIVISIOn cou nter- INTER OPERABILITY {ire program . ... The TOe IS responsible {or collecting data, targeting, and appzyzng the best fire support means to de{eat the threat. • A target acquisition battery which produces exclusively counterfire targets. • Three and four heavy cannon battal· ions (the Lance battalions having been retamed under corps controll. • An FA brigade headquarters. The likely use of US FA brigade assets by US division artillery, then, is for counterfire. The need for the FA brigade assets must be obvious to US commanders since there is currently no move afoot to diminish the numbers of nondivisional artillery battalions. In fact, the need is obvious to German force structure Members of the German III Corps and US V Corps on a recent field exercise in the Federal Republic of Germany. The soldiers are preparing communications for installment of a fire direction center. MILITARY REVIEW planners· who are in the process of pro- curing additional corps artillery. Interoperability Considerations Numerous documents, not the least of which is FM 100-5, OperatIOns, purport to describe the factors affecting interoperability of US forces working with German or other allied forces. An article con· cerning the work in 1976 of a trinational division sums it up rather succinctly as language-trained liaison teams; communi· cations compatibility; and standardization of arms, logistic support and doctrine 10 A more realistic approach is taken by FM 100-5 which lists 13 factors that, with some reduction in clarity, can be reduced to language, liaison, clear command relationships and knowledge of allied doctrine. Language. Language study is a problem that is being addressed by US Army, Europe," but, in the writer's opmion, IS not gomg to be solved from the US side in the near term. Language is a very important interoperability consideration, just as standardization is very important, but It ~ not going to be solved in the foreseeable future LWlson. Given the language problem, liaison IS the recognized solution. It is . clearly recognized that knowledgeable US liaIson officers must head competent and fairly large, well-equipped liaison teams. FM 100-5 says: Team members should be bilzngual, and must be knowledgeablJe of organIzatIOn, procedures, and equIpment of both US forces and other NA TO countrzes with which they will be operating. (Emphasis added.) Although FM 100-5 does not say it, the most important aspect of that statement is 26 that a US liaison team must be knowl- i' edge able concerning US organization, procedures and equipment. The Germans already know what their capabilities are -the US liaison officer must know what his forces' capabilities are. In general, if the US liaison officer is not considered capable of being the operations officer of the US force from which he comes, it is not likely that he will be able to interpret the thinking ofthe US operations officer to a German operations officer, no matter what the language capability. Equipment requirements of the liaison team are also important, but they have been discussed extensively in other publications and so will not be explored further here. Clear command relationships. Clear command relationships are also very important-quite simple in theory but exceedingly political and difficult in practice. Simply stated, lines of national authority and NATO authority must be clear. The NATO authority must be supported by national authOrity in all but the most blatant cases. Detaileddiscussion ofthis interoperability factor is beyond the scope of this article. Knowledge of allIed doctrzne. The knowledge of allied doctrine gets at the main point of this article. What is the German division artillery commander likely to do with a US FA brigade? It appears that he has two options. The first is to employ the battalions separately, very likely assigning the tactical mission of Feuerlfeteilzg- ung (fire participation\. , This mission is translated most of the time as general support reinforcing, and it has a very familiar ring for US field artillerymen. The mission is really more analogous to the US reinforcing mission, but the Germans have a tactical mission they call Peuerverstizrkung-literally, reinforcement of fires (reinforcing) which is for yet another purpose. A lot of work has been done on this f ~ e t of interoperability. A clear, concise discussion of tactical FA mISSIOns is in the VII Corps Multinational Inter- operabIlity Handbook and "Interoper- ability-Key to Success in Allied Opera- tions" (Field ArtIllery Journal, July- August 1977)' The conclusions of the FIeld Artillery Journal article are basically that aggressive, intelligent lIaison could have solved just about all problems of interoperability during the tactIcal exercise described. The problem of am- mUnition was not addressed. However, an after-action report of a similar exercise (Joint GYM-X. 9-10 August 1977) as well as a NATO tactical doctnne study {conducted by the 1st Infantry DiVIsion I Forward 1 and Panzer Brigade 30 In 1974 and 19751 Identified ammunitIOn selectIOn, supply and ac- INTEROPERABILITY countability as the critical FA interoperability problems. Of the problems associated with this option of the commander, ammunition logistics is a major one. Although these are the problems most frequently studied, the German division artillery commander appears to have a second option: giving the US FA brigade the counterfire mission. German Use 01 a US Field Artillery Brigade The German usc of a US FA brig e in the counterfire role appears to e the most synergistIc use of avaIlable field artillery assets. Even so, what will the German diVision artIllery commander do A Bundeswehr inspector general exits a jointly operated fire direction center of the 3d Armored Division, V Corps, and the German III Corps in a recent field exercise in Hohenfels, West Germany MILITARY REVIEW with this additional field artillery asset? From the point of view of the US field artilleryman, the use of the FA brigade in the counterfire role fills a vacuum in the German force structure. If executed properly, it avoids many traditional FA interoperability problems such as differences in tactical missions, fire missIOn formats and ammunition logistics. Also, it gains all the advantages of unity of command and mission-type orders .being given to a brigade-size headquarters of one nationality from the division artillery com· mander of another nationahty. German defensive tactics can be characterized as maneuver-oriented!2 as opposed to the US firepower-oriented approach or; further, as a position defense!3 as opp.osed to the US active defense. In any case, German defensive doctrine is to hold teI;rain and positIOns and "use maneuver to create conditions for surprise and shock .... "11 The use of the US FA brigade in the counterfire role complements the maneuver-oriented ap· proach. Soviet artillery can be expected to bombard any defensive positions. There- fore, the German maneuver commander must either shift maneuver forces or \lse the additional firepower assets of an FA brigade to reduce the Soviet capability to direct fire at will on forward defensive positions. Such use complements German tactics but does not impose the US firepower- oriented approach On the German division commander There is great emphasis in German defensive doctrine on creating conditions that call for the employment of the reserve in the counterattack.!5 It may well be that the appropriate use of the firepower available from the assets of an FA brigade during a counterattack would be to seal a penetration or to provide counterbattery fires. In either case, centrally controlled US F A battalions would be of 28 more use to the German division commander than ones parceled out to reinforce brigade-artillery (US direct support FA) battalions. The correct tactics may well pr.ove again to be the opinion of the "senior officer present." Counlerfire Role Inleroperabilily How can the US FA brigade propedy execute the counterfire role for the Ger- man division? By considering the four factors of liaison, clear command relationships and knowledge of allied doctrine-we find the following. The language skill requirement is mimmized by the proposed arrangement except at the brigade TOC where language 'capability becomes quite important. The US FA bngade has two liaison teams already constituted that are intended for full-time use ilt the US division artillery, thereby ehminating the requirement to form ad hoc liaison teams for interoperability. The requirement for knowledge of allied doctrine is reduced sigmficantly. The fires of US battalions are controlled by a US FA brIgade headquarters, thereby eliminating any liaison or language or command relationship problems. Instead of four or five battalion headquarters hav- Ing interoperability requirements, the reo quirements exist only at the FA brigade TOC. The interoperability capabilities can be pooled at brigade. Clear command relationships are enhanced for the same reasons. The critical juncture of this whole arrangement is the interface of the German target acquisition battalion and the US FA brigade TOC. Since a US FA brigade does not contain a target acquisition sec- • tion, target data must come from the March German divIsIOn artillery target acqUIsi- tion battalion. There are several ways to do this. The easiest and most efficient is to collocate the headquarters of the target acquisItion battalion of the German division artIllery with the US FA brigade headquarters as shown schematically m the figure. The normal tactical employment of the German target acquisition battalion headquarters is apart from the diVIsion artil· lery TOC. With the proposed arrangement, it stays apart from the dIvision ar- tIllery ,!,OC-only now a US FA brigade TOe is collocated with the target acquisi- INTEROPERABILITY tion battalion headquarters. Targeting in- formatIOn of a counterfire nature is passed dIrectly from the target acquisition battalion headquarters to the US FA brigade TOC which generates counterfire mISSIOns. The German division artillery commander commands rind controls his target acquiSItion battalion and takes the target mformatIOn he or his headquarters desires through normal German communications channels. The FA brigade locates its organic liaIson teams with the German division artillery to facilItate close cooperation. Tactical Schematic x x 1981 Counterfire Radar x German Control all German battalions • Sound Batteries • Flash • x x x US Brigade Control all US battalions Collocate 29 MILITARY REVIEW Conclusion The major problem created by the proposed solution to the FA interoperability problem is that the normal German method for using more than one artillery headquarters of brigade-size in the dIvi- sion area is to assign one headquarters to control fire support in half of the division sector and the other to the other half of the sector. Such an arrangement probably would not work. or at least would create more problems than it would solve. if one headquarters were German and the other US. Howev,"r, so many interoperabIlity 1 Army Regulation 34 2 Ratlonal.18l1on Standardlzat,on ana Inreroperabihty Department 01 the w2[,hlngton DC 15 May 1979 02·1 2 JOint Cposis of Staff Publicahon 1 Department Of Defense D1ctronal} of Military ana ASSOCIated Terms Oepartl"'1enl :I' Defense WashIJ'gton DC 3 Seplembe' 1974 p 180 3 L leutenanl Colonel WIII'am B Howerton and lV'alor Phlll D W Childress lnleroperabillty- Ke\t to Suer-ess I" Allipd Operallof''> Field Artillery Journal JUly August 1977 PO 66·68 4 For el(amp1e see Ibid or l,eu'enant A.ust,n Bay The T ".,ahonal Fo ........ard February 1977 DO 14.17 5 NATO Tacllcal Doctrine Study ot l::;t Intantry D,VISion (Forwaro) and Panzer Brigade 30 119751 rep'oduced on Reterence BOOk I RBI' 00 3 (nferooerat)/f/fy of BritiSh German anCl US {'orees uS AIm\, CQ'1l'TId01d and Gereral Stall Co(leg8 Fort Leavenworth Kan JUly 1979 6 Caplal" Richard M Saunders Standardization In Search Of Ina Holy Grall Army Februa!) 1979 pp 14 20 7 RS 100·3 100{erOperablhty 01 British German ana US FOrces 00 Cit p212 NOTES problems are eliminated by the arrangement proposed in this article that those created appear to be minimal. . The proper way for a German di vision to employ a US FA brigade is in the counterfire role or at least in a centrally controlled mode to support the counterattack. It appears quite likely to this observer that a German division commander would do just that. This article has not addressed nuclear warfare. and that is certainly one of its limitations. The implications of tactical nuclear coalition warfare should be examined to determine the effect on the proposed counterfire role oCa US FA brigade augmenting a German division_ 8 C N Donnell>y T achcal PrOblems F aCing the Soviet Army Recent Debales In the Soviet Mlllla!) Press Part I Mthtary Rev'ew June 1979 pp , 8 26 condenSed from Interna/lOnal Defense ReView VOlume 11 Number9 1976 9 RB 100·3 lnteroperabM'I of BntlSh German ana uS Forces op or p29 10 Bay.op Cit 11 General George S 81ancnard Language Interoperabi'l!y- A Key lor Increased E ftecllVeness If! NATO Military Rev'eVr OctOber 1978 pp 56·63 12 Lieutenant Colonet Steven l Canby NATO Strategy Pohtlcal Military PrOblemS of Divergent Interests and Operallonal Con. cept M,/lJary Re.llew April 1979 p 57 13 MulJma!lonal Iflteroperab!J!ry HandbOOk Department of the Arm)' US VII Corps Motlrlngen GE 15 June 1976 14 Canby. 00 elc 15 AS 100·3 Interop8rabl)l/y 01 Brlfl['h German ana uS Forces OP CIt pp 3 23 and 3 24 Major Rolland II Berry dr Ui U Ilh the Flcld 30 Arfdlery Sectwn. US V Corps, Frankfurt, Ger- mall} He receIved a B S from Vlr,lfulW Poly- techmc Instllute, an M A from EU'itcrn Kentudz} llnlt'erslt)' and a 1980 graduate of the L\sACGSC He has commanded ballerlc,.;;, 111 Germany, the Continental Umted States anu the 4th lnfantr .... Dlvlswn, Vletnam He has bert'cd as senIOr /0 the commanuwg Menerai, US Army Arr Defense Center. Fort Bhss. Te.xas, and as asslstant to the commandtng general, US VII Corps Artrllery, In Germany . The combined capabilities of acquisition, targeting and weapons systems available to the commander today are astounding. The author contends that these systems, sup- plemented by new ones being fielded, allow the COnif'\ mander to "see" far beyond the front line of troops onto an "extended" battlefield, a battlefield upon which the full potential of our weapons must be exploited if victory is to be attained. While the idea of the extended battlefield is not new, the author argues that the extended attack must be an integral part of every Army combat unit's capability. Extending the Battlef· eld General Donn A. Starry, US Army MILITARY REVIEW T HE extended battlefield concept primarily deals with war in areas of the world where there ar£' large numbers of relatively modern. well-equipped forces who use Sovret-style operational concepts and tactics. Quite naturally. therefore. the threat against which the concept is designed is typified by the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. the larger aggregations of mechanized forces in the Middle East or the threat from the north 'in Korea. The concept emphasizes the a II too frequently ignored or misunderstood lesson of history that. once political authorities commit military forces In pursUit of pohtlcal aims. military forces must win something. or else there will be no basis from which political authorities . can bargain to win politically. Therefore. the purpose of military operations cannot be simply to a vert defeat, but, rather. it must be to Win. This article does not .propose new and radical ways to fight the battle to win. Rather. it describes an extension of the battle and the battlefield which is possible to accomplish now and which, If applied. will reinforce the prospects for winning. The extended battlefield is not a new concept. It IS a more descriptive term for indicating the full potential we must realize from our acqUisition. targeting and weapons systems .. The battlefield ayd the battle are extended in three ways: First. the battlefield is extended in depth. with engagement of enemy Units not yet in contact to disrupt the enemy timetable. compJicate command and control and frustrate his plans. thus weakening his grasp on the initiative. Second. the battle is extended forward in time to the point that current actions such as attack of follow-on echelons. logistical preparation and maneuver 32 plans are interrelated to maximize the likelihood of winning the close-in battle as times goes on. And. lastly; the range of assets figuring in the battle is extended toward more emphasis on higher level Army and sister service acquisition means and attack resources. What emerges is a perception of the battlefield in which the goal of collapsing the enemy's ability to fight drives us to unified employment of a wide range of systems and organizations on a battlefield which. for corps and divisions, is much deeper than that foreseen by current doctrine. The word "doctrine" is used advisedly. It must be acknowledged atthe outset that there is probably little set forth In this article which is not already being done and done well in some operational units. The purpose of this article is less· to suggest innovation than it is to pull together many good ideas for making extended attack an integral feature of our combat capability-in all Units. In essence, Our message can be dis- tilled In four primary notions: • First. deep attack is not a luxury; it is an absolute necessity to winning. • Second. deep attack. particularly In an environment of scarce acqUisition and strike assets. must be tightly coordinated over time with the decisive close-in battle. Without thiS coordinatIOn. many expensi ve and scarce resources may be wasted on apparently attractive targets whose destruction actually has little payoff In the close-in battle. The other side of this coin is that maneuver and logistical planning and execution must anticipate by many hours the vulnerabilities that deep attack helps create. It is all one battle. • Third. it is important to consider now the number of systems entering the force in the near and middle-term future March (see Figure 1). These are o t ~ t weapons of greater lethality and great I' range, but automated systems and co munication systems for more responsiv command control, as well as sensor s stems to find, identIfy and target the e emy and to assess the effectiveness of d ep attack. • Finally, the concept IS designed to be the umfymg Idea which pulls all these emerging capabilities together so that, together, they can allow us to realize theIr full combmE'd potential for winning The extended battlefield is not a futur- Istic dream to remain on the shelf until all new systems are fielded. WIth minor adJ'ustments, corps and divIsions can and must begm to learn and practIce fighting the extended battle now-during 1981. The payoffs in read mess for combat will be enormous, and Implementing the concE'pt today means that we are buIlding the receptacle mto which every new system can be plugged Immediately, EXTENDING THE BATILEFIELD minimizing the buildup time to full capability. To ensure that the extended battlefield concept is understood m the full context of the integrated conventional-nuclear- chemical battlefield, this article will first review, in a broad sense, major aspects of the concept. Then, it will describe how, by attacking assaulting and j follow-on echelons simultaneously, the prospects for winning increase dramatically The Concept In peacetIme, the purpose of military forces, especially in the context of operatIOns m areas critIcal to US in- '\ terests, is to reduce to a minimum whatever incentives the enemy's leadership mIght perceIve as favorable to seek- A Substantial Step Toward Future Capabilities e ' ) (Command, control. commUnications and intelligence) esws (Corps support weapon system) GlCM (Ground-launched crUise missile) MlRS (Multiple launch rocket system) FASeAM (Family of scalterable mines) Figure 1 1981 ..-;::::===77 1986 SOTAS (Stand-off target acquISition system) TAeFIRE (Tactical fife directIOn) 33 MILITARY REVIEW ing military solutions 'to political problems. In NATO, in the Middle East and in Korea, our defensive strategy must extend beyond simply denying victory to the other side. It must, instead, postulate a definable, recognizable (although perhaps limited) victory for the defender. Enemy leaders must be made to understand clearly that, if they choose to move militarily, no 10l).ger will there be a status quo ante-bellum-something to be restored. Rather, the situation they themselves have created is one which will be resolved on new terms, As the strategic nuclear balance teeters, so grows the enemy's perception of his own freedom of action at theater levels-conventional and nuclear. Theater forces should not be considered solely as a bridge to strategic nuclear war. They are weapons which must be considered in the context of a war-fighting capability. These considerations dictate that NATO strategy must, from the outset, be designed to cope with the Soviet conventional-nuclear-chemical-combined arms-integrated battlefield threat. The growing threat of nuclear capabilities elsewhere suggests this strategy to be appropriate in other critical areas as well. The Warsaw Pact/Soviet-style strategy embraces two fundamental con- e p t s ~ • In the first,. mass, momentum and continuous combat are the operative tactics Breakthrough (somewhere) is sought as, the initiator of collapse in the defender's system of defense. • In the alternative, surprise is sub· stituted for mass in the daring thrust tactic. In NATO, this could involve a n\lmber of BMP regiments in independent attacks which, without warning, w01lld seek to deny to defendJ.ng forces the op- 34 portunity to get set forward. Both tactics are essentially maneuver-based schemes whose purpose is to disrupt the operational tactics of the defender, albeit by different methods. The ileed for deep attack emerges from the nature of our potential enemies- their doctrine and their numerically superior forces. Whether our enemy is stylistically echeloned as shown in Fig- ure 2 is not really critical. What is important is that superiority in numbers permits him to keep a significant portion of his force out of the fight with freedom to commit it either to overwhelm or to bypass the friendly force. The existence of these follow-on echelons gives the enemy a strong grip on the initiativl' which we must wrest from him and then retain in order to win. NATO strategy (and defensive strategies in other key areas of the world as weI!) must be designed to' preserve the territory, resources and facilities of the defended area for' the defender. In none of the critical areas of the world, those to which US forces are likely to be committed, is there sufficient maneuver room to accGmmodate a traditional defense-in- depth strategy. The defense must, therefore, begin well forward and proceed aggressively from there to destroy enemy assault echelons and at the same time to slow, disrupt. break up, disperse or destroy follow-on echelons in order to quickly seize the initiative and go on the offense. The operative tactics by which US forces seek to implement the operational concept set forth above must provide for qUick resolution of the battle. under circumstances that will allow political authorities to negotiate with their adversaries from a position of strength. This is so because the enemy generally enjoys a short-term advantage in ability March The Second-Echelon Threat EXTENDING THE BATTLEFIELD Figure 2 to mobilize addItional forces qUIckly. Clearly, then, one purpose of the battle concept must be to pre-empt the possibility of prolonged military operatIOns. Further, these operatIve tactics should seek simultaneously to: • Deny enemy access to the objectives he seeks • Prevent enemy forces from loading up the assault force fight with reinforcing assault echelons and thus achIeving by continuous combat what might be denIed them by a stiff forward defense. • Find the opportunity to seize the initiative-to attack to dostroy the in.tegrity of the enemy operational scneme, forcing him to break off the attack or risk resounding defeat. Because of the enemy's advantage in numbers, attack of follow-on echelons must always begin when those echelons are relatively deep in enemy territory. If an outnumbered defender waits until 1981 hIS numerIcally superior foe has penetrated the defender's territory to mount a counterattack, it is always too late to brIng effectIve forces and fires to bear to defeat the incursion. This would especially be the case if theater nuclear weapons are consIdered necessary to defeat the penetration. Therefore, on an integrated battlefield, systems designed to defeat enemy assault elements, to disrupt follow-on forces and to seize the initiative by attack must be able to deliver conventional and/or nuclear fires throughout the spectrum of the battle-throughout the dopth of the battlefield. Key to a credible war-fighting capability on an integrated battlefield are: • Sensor/surveillance systems to prevent surprise attack in peacetime and provide necessary targeting/surveillance information in wartime. • Delivery systems-dual capable, 35 MILITARY REVIEW with suffIcient range, accuracy and lethalIty to hoHenemy follow-on echelons at risk in peacetime and to attack them successfully in wartime. • Command control sufficient to mte- grate all-source in near real time in peacetime and in wartime and to provide that intellIgence and targeting informatIOn to maneuver force em- ployments in near real time as well. The operative tactics which support such an operational concept of an integrated defense well forward are: • See deep and begin early to disrupt. delay, destroy follow-on/reinforcmg echelolls. • Move fast against the assault echelons. • StrIke assault echelons quichly so as to prevent them from achieving their objectives. • Fmish the opening fight against assault ana follow-on echelons rapidly so as to go on the attack and finish the battle against the assault armies before follow-on armies can join the battle. Areas of Interest and Influence In the executiolO of such a set of operative tactics, there must be a division of responsIbilities among commanders. Just as the means with which commanders see and fight the battlefield vary so should their primary areas of interest vary. As shown in Figure 3, each level of command has a dual responsibihtv. Each must attack one of the enemy's echelons and must see, or determine the intentions' of, a follow-on echelon Doctrinally, we say that the enemy's first-echelon divi- See and Attack in Depth / _____ 2d '''' ml"ll\ _?d __ }d ec'1elol"l :0 -!'l t·'lL''; ,0-48 'lou., 12 B'Eddt' 12 Figure 3 36 March sions, the regiments in front of the assault divisions, as well as the follow-on regiments, are the responsibility of the defending division. In an attack, those same echelons would also be the division commander's re- sponsibilIty. The brigade commander fights first-echelon assault regiments. The .division commander fights the first-echelon assault divisions. The corps commander fights first-echelon armies. It is the corps commander's reo sponsibility to find and disrupt the advance of second-echelon divisIOns of first-echelon armies before they be· come a part of the first·echelon problem. At the same time, the corps commander IS very Interested In whe:'e the second- echelon army of the (ront IS deploYIng. At corps level, he must tie mto natIOnal target acquisition systems and other surveillance means to get Information concerning where that army IS and what It is doing HIS primary responsibility In battle fighting has to do with the follow- on echelons. Attacking the Follow-on Echelons For such a division in areas of interest and influence to be effective in wartime, it must be frequently practiced duro mg peacetime. It IS crItical for us to real· ize that, as the enemy achieves the echelonment so necessary for his success, he inherently creates vulnerabd· itlE:s-targets. These same vulnerabilItIes provide us with the opportunity to put threat second-echelon forces at great risk. But only through repetitive exercise can we capitalize on his vulnerabilities. What we must do is practice acquiring and targeting Warsaw Pact UnIts now- during peacetime-so we will be pre- 1981 EXTENDING THE BATTLEFIELD pared to attack them if need be. In addition, we can do careful intelligence preparation of the battlefield and thus be prepared to attack high-value targets. Such targets incl ude fixed bridges and mobIle sites that will cause threat foJlow- on echelons to bunch up and present themselves as attractive targets. Additionally, attacking other high-value targets such as combat service support facilities, which must exist to support r.olling forces, or selected command posts, will also generate delay Attacks directed m this manner wIll provide friendly forces time to finish the battle at the forward lme of troops <FLaT) Figure 4 shows the problem inherent in fightmg against echelonment tactics. If the battle IS fought With no directed interdictIOn, enemy follow-on echelons have a "free ride" until they enter the close·in battle. Figure 4 suggests what happens when follow-on echelons are Ignored and allowed to stack up behmd assaultmg forces at the FLaT until a breakthrough IS achieved. The enemy retams flexlbihty, InItiative and momentum to apply hiS mass at a point and time of his choice. As indicated by the hachured lines, deep attacks seek to depri ve him of thIS freedom There are three primary tools for a deep attack: • Interdiction-air, artillery, special operatIng forces. • OffenSive electronic warfare. • DeceptIOn. In practical current terms, mterdic- tion-prIncipally battlefIeld air mter- dictIOn-IS the prImary tool of deep attack. At present, the range of jammers pre- cludes effective use against follow-on echelons. However, jamming can be used in the close-in battle as a nonlethal substitute for fires and battlefield air interdiction sorties which can then be freed for deep attacks. 37 MILITARY REVIEW The Problem We would like deep attack to destroy enemy forces before they enter the close- in battle, but, in today's terms, and in all probability tomorrow's as well, expense and scarcity of assets will limit the practically achievable effects to delay and disruption. Delay and disruption, however, must be aimed at more ambitious goals than Just fractional attritIOn or harassment. The real goal of the deep attack is to create opportunities for friendly action- attack, counterattack or reconstitu- tion of the defense-on favorable ground well forward in the battle area, This can be done 'by avoiding piecemeal employment of acquisition means and attack resources. These resources must be concentrated on critical targets which have the most payoff m upsetting enemy plans and to create situations wherein the friendly force can seize the initiative and wm. It IS important'to stress here that the deep attack is not just a tool of the defense. It is, if anything, even more critical in the offense, It IS essential to winning liecause it creates opportunities to seize and retain the initiative. It is equally 38 important that corps and division commanders fight this deep battle at the same time and in close coordination with the close-in battles. It is true that these commanders already have their hands full with the close-in battie, but the compel- ling reason for active corps and division commander involvement is because the number of targets we would like to attack and can acqUire far exceeds available attack assets. It is also essential, then, that attack means not be apphed indiscriminately. Limited strike and acquisition means must be applied in a planned, well- organized and conducted scheme to support the plan for winning. Piecemealing long-range target acquisition and attack resources is a luxury that cannot be allowed. The commander's choice of when to use deep attack means must be taken in such a way that It will create a wmdow for offensive action some hours in the future. That choice must be based on a single unified scheme of maneuver and a plim of fires for the whole of the extended battle. The expected window for decisive action must be created in an area March where previous plans have assured the availability of sufficient logistical support and fire support as well as maneuver forces. This demand for careful coordination of present and future actIOn throughout the depth of the battlefield dictates that the plan stem from the concept of a single commander. Separation ofthe close-In and follow-on battles invites the fisk that windows will not be generated or that, if generated, units will be Ill-prepared to identify and exploit them. What from thIS requirement for unity of command across the near and far components of the fight is a view of an extended battlefield, with well· defined depth and width in which the commander is fightIng not several separate battles, but one well-integrated battle with several parts highly Inter· related over tIme. The depth of thIS battlefield beyond the FLOT IS really a function of the commander's plannIng EXTENDING THE BATILEFIELD horizon expressed in hours. The following scenario describes an integrated battle situation in which it would be greatly to the commander's advantage to fight assault and follow- on echelons simultaneously. From the outset, it is acknowledged that, in this scenario, it would be advantageous to use tactical nuclear and chemical weapons at an early stage and in enemy territory. It is also fully realized, however, that authorization to do this may not be granted in timely fashion. And, that being the case, the battle will have to be fought With so-called conventional systems. Even though this somewhat reo duces defensive combat power, the concept described here maximizes the remaining conventIOnal power. Figure 5 portrays the corps commander's concerns in the deep battle- those enemy forces that are within 72 hours of the close-in battle. The corps commander needs to have a well-laid-out, The I ntegrated Battle The Deep Battle 1981 ... Dela,!, destro\! ... Attacil command contrOl senner support sottertargets ... Air 'land battif' 39 MILITARY REVIEW flexible plan and 72 hours into the future in order to fight both close-in and extended battles, gain the initiative, win the fight and do it quickly. What is the purpose of looking out to 72 hours' depth? There are many things a corps must do in those hours. They should be used to plan, order and execute those maneuver, fire support and logistical preparations necessary to seize on an opportunity for offensi ve action. The presence of any enemy formatIOn m the corps commander's area ofmfluence should trigger a re-evaluation of his long-range plan and generate options for defeating this force along with all others in the area of influence. Several options will probably be retamed at thIS pomt. However, the range of options narrows as the force approaches and closure time decreases. Almost all optIOns will include attack of the force to inflict delay and dIsruption. Although dIstances here are great, the payoff can be considerable since the critical targets include soft- skmned and command control elements value will be far less when closer to the front-line battle. As the force closes (Figure 6), its impending Impact on the front-line battle will become more apparent, and the relative merits of the various attack op- tIOns will begin to sharpen. Options at this stage should include deep nuclear strikes with LalIce or air-delivered weapons. Targets at this stage 'are far more vulnerable to nuclear effects than 'it the FLOT. They are still well beyond the danger radius to friendly forces, and the time until closure is realistic enough to allow request release and execution to occur. Of course, the commander must have a strong conventional optIOn in the event nuclear release is not forthcoming, He must identify the critical time at which The Integrated Battle The Corps Battle . .... Delay dIsrupt dE'')troy .• .,A,,'landbattie ;.' 'J" " / ...... --< 4-+ 60 hours / ...... , + :.t.f'. '- / 7'-tr. Figure 6 40 March EXTENDING THE BATILEFIELD The I ntegrated Battle .... DJsrupt delay .... Real time target aCQUls1t1on .... Attacking force has few movement alternatives .... Tactical nuclear weapons now It they are to be U'5ed at all .... Air/land battle Figure 7 he must finally commit himself to one course of actIOn. In any event, he seeks to hold the enemy formation out of the diVision area of Influence long enough for divIsion commanders to have suf· ficlent space and time to accomplish their missions and prepare for the next echelon. When the force enters thE' divIsIOn area of influence (figure 7)-about 24 hours' distance from the FLOT·-the entire process IS triggered agaIn on a lower scale. Here, the importance of real-time target acquIsitIOn dominates. Since, at thiS point, the attacker IS committE!d to specific attack avenues, he has few movement alternatives left to him. The defender can capitalize on that Again, if tactical nuclear weapons are to be used, they must be used now. A review has been made of innumer- able planning exercises In which assumed enemy penetrations were drawn with great care to reflect that pOint "beyond which the integrity of the 1981 defense IS Jeopardized." It was found that, If the penetratIOn was allowed to develop as it was drawn in the defended territory, It was "lways too late. If for no other reason, therefore, it is of paramount importance that the planmng process begm whIle that follow-on echelon target is still deep in enemy territory and that nuclear release be requested in sufficient time to allow employment whIle the target IS still 24 to 60 hours from the FLOT. As in the earlie, part of this battle, the commander must integrate the full spectrum of air and land weapons systems. It is, at this point, still an airiland battle, perhaps more air than land, however. By the time the following echelons close to withm about 12 hours of the FLOT (FIgure 8), they become the concern of the brigade commander. At the 12-hour line, actions must be taken that not only delay and disrupt the following echelons, but also help to defeat those in contact at the FLOT. Given the right target, and 41 MILITARY REVIEW The I"tegrated Battle Destroy. dISrupt .. Defeat echelon In contact Figure 8 that the enemy has already used chemical weapons, it is here that our use of them can be integrated. They should be used to isolate one part of the battlefield while an attack is launched against another part of the follow-on forces. It is here that the land aspects of the battle predominate- that IS, the battle is more land than air. With a little luck, the outcome (FIgure 9) will find enemy assault forces destroyed, freedom to maneuver rest'oreq and the imtiative captured from the enemy. In the end, this simultaneous attacking of echelons becomes key to the primary objective of the extended battlefield-to win, not just to avert defeat. Studies show c,learly that successful interdiction does result in a degradation of the enemy's massive firepower. It is also clear that successful interdiction results in a reduction of enemy momentum brought on through loss of support and that it provides the defender time to 42 secure nuclear release if required. Finally, interdiction reduces the attacker's alternatives by disrupting his ability to execute his intended plan. The conviction that well-planned . Interdiction can provide these results is based in part on the target value analysis phase of a fire support mission area analysis completed by the US Army Field Artillery School. Part or'that analysis was a simulation comparison of 1980 European corps battles, first without interdiction and then with interdiction. While the predicted availability of lllterdlction means may have been sanguine, some significant trends were, nonetheless, observed. Each of the interdiction effects in Figure 10 is hIghly desirable. But their exact significance is more apparent considering the simulation output over time. Specifically, a look at the effect of interdiction on enemy strength at the March 1981 EXTENDING THE BATTLEFIELD The I ntegrated Battle THE OUTCOME . ,,,.,".,",.,"" ... ., Re,lored Ireedom 10 maneuver L-; A , "', +-r FIgure 9 Effect of Interdiction • Enemy is able to mount fewer regimental attacks • Enemy first echelons defeated earlier • Friendly reserves not needed so early • Enemy penetrations far less extensive Figure 10 43 MILITARY REVIEW Why Deep Attack? Enemy front·llne strength close-in battle shows the real value of deep attack. The top curve in Figure 11 shows that, without interdiction, the enemy IS able to maintam consistent supenonty at the FLOT over time. During this period, the Without interdiction With interdictIOn defender's strength dwindles, freedom of actIOn detenorates and the enemy's grip on the initiative decisively tightens. What properly employed interdiction can provide is shown in the lower curve in Figure 12. Here, enemy follow-on echelons Why Deep Attack? 44 Enemy front·lme strength 'Windows for action Figure 12 Without interdiction March \ are held out long enough to create periods offnendly superiority in which the mitla- tive can be seized with enough time to act. The longer and more frequent these windows can be made, the greater the chance of winning, provldmg we are prepared to identify them and act at the time and in the place where they dpvelop. We may not be capable of creating wmdows of such frequency and duratIOn across the entire corps front. However, it is now possIble to create such opportunities, and, if aggressively exploIted, they could lead to the generation of longer, more extensIve opportunIties for higher level decisIve action building toward'a major offensive (Figure 13). Interdiction Planning Summarizing, it can be seen that inter- dIction is key to battlefield success. The enemy's momentum can be altered by EXTENDING THE BAITLEFIELD attacking high·value, second-echelon targets, reducing his ability to mass and bUIld up momentum. Interdiction is the method whereby we achIeve the leverage necessary to slow hIm down and ultimately stop him from achieving his objectives. It is mterdlction that allows us to focus our attacks on those enemy targets whose damage, destructIOn or dIsruption would help us fight the battle to our advantage. InterdIctIOn has as its main objective that portion of the enemy's force which IS movmg toward the FLOT or is in staging areas preparing to join that fight. This mterdlction concept does, however, Imply some changes in current ways of thinking, especially in command control. In order to execute the concept, we must recognIze the need to learn how to skillfully use resources far beyond those organic to corps and division and to plan theIr applIcation over a greatly expanded battlefield. Of significance here is the establIshment of timely and responsive Why Deep Attack? 1981 Enemy front·llne strength Figure 13 Without interdiction With Interdiction and attack 45 MILITARY REVIEW working relationships with air forces for both target acquisition and attack. The interdiction battle will be fought at the corps and division level. To do this well, it must be practiced routinely. Inter- dictIOn targets at division level are directly linked to tactical objectives. At corps, however, interdictIOn is a funotion of controlling target presentation rates and densities. As the enemy's second echelon moves closer to the FLOT, interdiction becomes more closely related to the defenSIve scheme of maneuver. Advanced planning is absolutely critical to a successful InterdictIon battle. It is imperative that such planning be conducted contInuously. This will en· sure that commanders are aware of courses of action open to the enemy, and the vulnerabilities of each, thus enabling them to attack targets whIch present the highest payoff at a particular time. Prior to and during initial stages of the battle, the diVISIOn Intelligence officer, applying intelligence preparation of the battlefield techniques, must forecast enemy strength, progress and dISposItIOns at selected tImes. By assessing these developIng vulnerabilities, he can recommend courses of action for interdiction attacks. When blended with the scheme of maneuver, t h ~ enemy vulnerabilities can then be exploited. FollOWIng such an interdIctIOn plannIng process, the intelligence officer can develop an enemy probable event sequence which can be used to predict with some high degree of accuracy which courses of action the enemy is likely to follow. That is, the intelIJgence officer should be able to forecast what events must occur and in what order to produce the desired disposition of enemy forces at any critical moment. This probable event sequence is simply a template against which to assess the progress of events. 46 It identifies interdiction requirements which will have to be met if friendly commanders are to influence the battle in a desired direction. Interdiction targeting can be a complex and demanding staff process, particularly at division level. Its effect is to create time and space gaps, not to relieve maneuver forces of having to face second· echelon elements. It is most effective when it IS an integrated effort, one which effectively integrates fire support, elec- trOniC warfare, deception and intelligence with maneuver. Current and Future Capabilities Having made a case for effective, continuous interdiction, what is the Army doing to achieve such a capability? Con- sidering the weapons, sensors and auto- mation capabilities which will be available through Army 86 efforts, we will be able to do these things quickly and ef- fiCIently on the battlefield of the mid-to- late 1980s. But what about now? The answer is that there is, today, conSiderable potential to do Just what has thus far been described. Since the penalty in terms of battle outcome is too severe to wait to adopt the extended battlefield concept untIl 1986, our Army must set about seeing how we might get the most from current capabilities. Even using conservative planning factors, interdiction of critical enemy second- echelon elements is possible within existing means. But, to make that a reality, we must begin transitioning to those concepts now and practice them daily. If we begin that transition with the resources at hand, we will thus be better prepared to fight and win while simul- March taneously maturing the conceptual notions in the day-to-day work of operational units. Such an approach will also ensure that we have the right capabilities included in the Army 86 force designs. And, so, as in all aspects of our profession, we must practice now what we intend to do in war. We must traIn as we will fight. Management of sensor assets in peacetime by those who will be expected to usc them in war is the only prudent approach. The same applies to the correlatIOn of data in determInIng hIgh-value targets. We must get the data into the hands of those who will be expected to use it in the future. We must establish targeting cells in all fire support elements now. It is important that thIS capabilIty be developed at corps and divisIons for nuclear as well as ror conventional and chemical targeting. It is Important that it be done in all US Army UnIts worldwide. For the present. many of the acquiSItIOn means and most of the attackIng means will come from air forces This IS pa·r- ticularly true for corps interdIction re- qUIrements. Regardless of who owns them. these are the meanS we need to gaIn the best battlefield return. Apply· Ing them accordIng to the conceptual no· tlOns described above IS the way to realIze theIr greatest potentIal Recent exercises have demonstrated that the t.ype of targeting InformatIOn deSCrIbed earlier IS avaIlable now-with current means What next needs to be done IS to design exercIses for corps and diVISIons whIch will focus that Informa· tion at their level. To make the interdiction battle occur properly, and In a tImely manner. corps and dIVIsions must also be able to manage the current famIly of sensors. We know the tendencIes and patterns 1981 EXTENDING THE BATILEFIELD of threat units when they are deployed as they would be in a second-echelon formatIOn. The task IS to make this infor- matIOn available to corps and division commanders for their use in interdiction targeting. For tImely acquisition, we need to ensure that corps have control of sensor systems such as the OVID SIde-looking aIrborne radar, Guardrall, QUlcklook and the Integrated Test/EvaluatIOn Pro- gram. Of equal importance is that there be a dIrect down-lInk of this information to dl VIsions. Data from a number of other supportIng means must also be made available. This category includes the RF4C and other national and theater systems. Among the most cha:llenging problems IS to create the down-links necessary to pass what is already available to corps and dIviSIOns In a timely manner. The Need for Training Target Cells To begin an adequate effort at fusing this data and developing InterdIctIOn targetIng. cells must be establIshed In all fire support elpments at levels from brIgade through echelons above corps. These cells must learn to exploit enemy vulnerabIlitIes by hlending the information and expertise available from all- source intelligence centers and elec· tronic warfare support elements. HIS- torically, we have focused all our training efforts on WInnIng the fight in the main battle area. However, we are now entering a new dimenSIOn of battle which permits the SImultaneous engagement of enemy forces throughout the corps and dIviSIOn area of Influence. To accomplish this, we must emphasize' training in four baSIC areas: 47 MILITARY REVIEW • Friendly acquisition capabilities. • Threat tactical norms. Friendly attack systems. • Specific techniques such as target value analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield. For this to be totally successful, both Army and Air Force targeteers must be trained to work together in these func- tions. Microcomputers, which are currently avaIlable In an off-the-shelf configuratIOn, can provide excellent assistance. to this training effort. They can store a multitude of data from terrain features to fire plans, from friendly weapons systems to likely threat courses of actIOns. They can perform target analyses and display them in alpha- numerics and graphics. If such systems were available in diVISIOn targeting cells now, and we created the necessary down- links for passing acqUIsItion data, targeteers could train now at their wartime tasks In a realistic manner. Figure 14 shows a notional dIvision fire support element. The operations cell includes the target analysts. What needs to be done, and we have embarked on this course, is to estabhsh the targeting cell and staff it with people who are currently performing SImIlar tasks elsewhere. We must bring the operatIOns types and the targeting types together. For such a fire support element be effectIve, its personnel must train together daily, as a team, using real-time or near-real-time data supplied by an Integrated sensor network such as that described earlier. If actual real-tIme data is not then simulated acquisition informatIOn could be used, so long as the data base was developed from previously collected actual infor- miltion. Through continuous intelligence preparation of the battlefield, a clearer 48 analysis of the area of operations can be ... developed, one which will facilitate up- dating interdiction plans and thereby better support operations plans. Such a training activity would contribute greatly to developing confidence and proficiency. By exchanging views and working together, Army and Air Force target cell personnel could establish a credible capability now to deal with any future second-echelon threat. Remaining Challenges LIke most things of great worth, this capab!lity w!ll not be easily gained. There are many challenges, but, in the end, it will be worth all the effort necessary to make it happen. Foremost among the challenges are those which inhibit our abilIty to blend current operational requIrements of sensor means with the need to conduct real-time training at divisions and corps. It will also be difficult, though essential, that appropriate security clearances be acquired for all personnel working in the target cells. This is especially i)nportant, for they must have access in peacetime to the data they wIll be expected to process in war. Recognizing it is beyond our capability to conduct actual exercises which simulate threat second-echelon patterns so target cells will have something to train against. it is within the state of the art for computer simulations to postulate and portray scenarios which the enemy traditionally follows because they are based on his known tendencies. This would be a useful substitute for targeteers to practice such analytical tasks as event sequencing. Lastly, we must coutinue to upgrade ouI' communication capability March EXTENDING THE BATTLEFIELD Notional Fire Support Element Target Cell Assistant F Ire Support Coordinator - Jtra,M -ArrniarCAnfc(p PlanOlng ExecutIOn fIgure 14 and take advantage of commercial facilItIes. If we do all this, the payoff will be more than worth the Invest· ment. Summary The challenges notwIthstandIng, the message of all this is quite clear: • Attacking deep is essential to winnIng. • AttackIng deep and the close-In fight are Inseparable. • The extended battlefield concept is the keystone of force modernIzatIOn. • We can begIn today to practIce, learn and refine the extended battlefield concept. The Ideas of the extended battlefield concept are. in fact, the very same Ideas upon whIch the Army 86 concepts are based-see and attack deep. And, as mIght be expected, therefore, organIzations of DiviSIon and Corps 86 correspond In makeup and function to elements of the extended battlefield team. The question before the Army nOw IS how to Implement the concept quickly. 1981 WhIle there are yet some questions, It is not lIkely that man-years of study will clear them up to the satisfaction of all concerned. It IS, therefore, time to field and learn to use the concept on the ground with real troops, real equipment and the real-world problems of field commanders. The tIme for implementatIOn is now. This is so because there is, first of all, promise of a major Increase in combat effectiveness with current means. There also exists an enhanced capabIlIty to ex- plOIt new sensors, weapons and command control systems as they are fielded. ThIs enhanced capability IS even more eVIdent In the field of mIcroprocessors and computers. As a natIOn, we have a considerable advantage over our potentIal adversaries in thIs technological field. If we stn ve to put that advantage to work for us, it could become a signIficant combat multiplier. And, finally, of equal importance, there is an opportumty to cause the enemy to wrestle rIght now WIth a problem he has traditionally assumed does not exist. Army leadership is so convinced that a real pOLential exists now, if current assets are organized correctly, that a four-phase program. has been developed. 49 MILITARY REVIEW Phase one, already begun, includes conferences at each major command designed to ·lay down the basic ideas. This article is part of that phase. In phase two, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command and the major Army 'commands will jointly refine implementation proposals to fit specific priorities and assets. provided to corps and divisions in the field. In phase four, Army service schools and centers will conduct training in the concept and implementing procedures to ensure that officers and noncommissioned officers leaving the training base are ready for their respective roles on the extended battlefield. 50 In phase three, the jomt product will be General Donn A Starn IS commander of the US Army Trammg and"Doctrrne Command, Fort MOlin)£'. VlrgwlO He recewed a B S {mm the USJfA. all M S {YOom GeoY'ge Washlllg- ton Unlterstly and IS a graduate of the USACGSC. the Armed Forces Staff Collelie and the Arm\! War College Asslgnments In· clude sen'l1ig as tommandl1lg oftker of the 11 th Armored lat'alrv Reglment durzng one of three tours ll1 Vletnam and as commander of V Corp", US Army. EUY'ope lils aracle "Dedl- catron of Abrams' Loop at the US Armv Com- mand and General Staff College" appeared m the September 1979 MIlitary Rpvlew '"i.. r'!i' -}.J> - Jj Logistics in a Changing World. The 1981 International Logistics Congress, "Logistics in a Changing World," will be the third biennial international gathering of logisticians, the first to be held in the United States. The previous congresses were held in Japan and Germany. It is expected to attract 600 to 800 individuals from industry, commerce, academic institutions and government. To be held 12 through 15 April 1981, the congress will feature technical papers on a wide variety of managerial and technical subjects in the broad field of logistics. Panel discussions will bring tdgether recognized authorities from several countries to discuss problems of international interest. Areas of interest to be covered at the congress include: Logistics Systems, Physical Distribution Man- agement, Transportation, Material Handling and Facilities Operations. The Society of Logistics Engineers (SOLEj'and the National Coun- cil of Physical Distribution Management are co-sponsors of this congress, The San Francisco Bay Area Chapter of SOLE Is host- ing the event. The congress fee is (US) $400. All correspondence should be addressed to: J. J. Addison, General Chairman, 1981 International Logis- tics Congress, c/o Society of Logistics Engineers San Francisco Bay Area Chapter, P.O. Box 61353, Sunnyvale, CA 94088. March Soviet Attack Helicopters: Rethinking the Threat 1981 Captain Steven A. Frith, US Army The Soviet Union's integration of attack helicopters into its offensive doctrine has advanced to the point where the West must give serious consideration to ways of countering this new threat. The author examines capabilities of the different attack helicopters now in the Soviet inveptory. 51 MILITARY REVIEW F OR every action, there must be an equal and opposite reaction, and our adoption of the active defense has sparked a growing interest in the multiple axis attack as a potentially devastating countermeasure. To succeed, the active defense demands that we identify the crit· ical breakthrough sector quickly and then concentrate our power boldly at the deci· sive point.! If there is no single decisive point, then the concentration of power, no matter how boldly it is done, will leave the defending forces vulnerable to envelop- ment. The doctrine of the multiple penetration with its object of slashing through the forward defenses on multiple axes and linking up in the enemy's rear was honed to a brilliant edge during the Red army's drive to the Elbe. Recalling the Red army's World War II experience, Colonel A. A. Sidorenko noted that when a multiple penetration attack was employed: The attainment of surpnse was faclII' tated, the enemy forces were tIed down on a broad front, It was difficult for hIm to determIne the main strzke, he was deprived offreedom of maneuver, and he was forced to scatter his reserves and use them In detail. Colonel Sidorenko goes on to observe that attacks "on two or several directIOns, achieved quick results and often created the preconditions for 'the encirclement of enemy forces.'''2 The employment of multiple axis attacks rather than the massive single axis breakthrough that Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, seems to envision reduces the attacking forces' vulnerability to nuclear and conventional interdiction.' Even more importantly, it allows the Soviet commander to reinforce success by concentrating forces along the axis of least enemy resistance. Highly responsive artillery and close air support can be .52 employed in the multiaxis attack as combat power multipliers to compensate for the relati ve reduction in mass over that of the single axis breakthrough. Colonel M. Belov, a Soviet military theoretician, stated that the success of the offensive would be doubtful unless massive use is made of helicopters.' Soviet doctrine has long emphasized the importance of close coordination between air and ground forces during the conduct of the attack. Unfortunately, those good intentions for responsive close air support often fell victim to overcontrol of assets by frontal aviation and an excessive dependence on preplan ned strike- mis- siems.' The Soviets are improving the timeliness and effectiveness of their close air support by assigning aviation representatives to every echelon down to division. 6 The aviation representatives at division level are equipped with armored vehicles and special communications equipment that allows them to direct air strikes from the first echelon of the attacking forces. 7 A more responsive and flexible employment doctrine for attack helicopters has evolved out of the Soviets' recognition of the unique relationship shared by helicopters and ground forces. M. P. Odinstov, a Soviet air force general, has observed that the task of helicopters and artillery is to strike on the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), thus releasing high-performance aircraft for deep interdiction. s There is growing evidence to suggest that the control of attack helicopter regiments would be decentralized to such an extent that, during the attack, they would be operating in direct support. Also, in fluid situations such as a multi axis attack, they could even be employed under the operational control of the combined arms command. 9 The last decade has witnessed a near March Soviet Hlntf·D attack helicopters and crews during a break in maneuvers revolutIOn III SovIet attack helIcopter doctrine and technology. The Soviets first began to arm helicopters for active support of gl'Ound forces m the mld·1960s. These first attack or combat helicopters were provisionally armed transports such as the MI·6 Hook and the flJl·8 Hlp.1O The fIJI ·24 Hind was the first Soviet helicopter designed specifically for attack mIssions. It has come to be known in Afghamstan as the "flying tank" because of its combat" effectIveness and heavy armor." There are now five versIOns of the /lznd, with the A, D and E being the progressIvely more advanced operational versions The Hznd is one of the most technically advanced helicopters in the world and has the ability to not only fight, but to survive forward of the FEBA. It is heavily armored with bulletproof windshields and exten· sive structural hardening. The Hznd's armament package gives the crew considerable flexibility in mission·tailoring weapon loads. Wing armament can include up to four 57mm rocket pods (a total of 128 free·fllght rockets) and four antitank guided missiles. In addition, tlie crew has the option of substituting general and multipurpose bombs for the rocket pods. 12 The most advanced version of the 1981 Hznd, the E model, is equipped wIth A T6 SpIral antitank guided mIssiles and is currently bemg fielded in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.13 In addition to the wlllg armament, the HInd also mounts a fnur·barrel 12.7mm Gatling gun in the nose turret. A technologically advanced all-weather and low.light fire control system has been integrated into the Hind-E's armament system. The crew can identIfy and engage targets through the use of electro-optical sensors and a probable laser range finder coupled to forward-looking infrared and! or low-light-level television sensors posi- tioned m the Hind's chin turret. 14 WIth this advanced fire control system, the HInd can continue to support the attack durmg day, night or even in fog, a vital capability for operations in Central Europe. AIr Force Magazine has stated that the Soviets are now fielding new high- performance helicopter designs that have the capability to "fire launch and leave weapons from standoffpositions."15 If the Hind indeed has such a capability, it would greatly enhance its survivability during the vulnerable weapons launch and guidance p h a s ~ 53 MILITARY REVIEW In addition to the Hind's attack and close air support capabilities, it can also perform in a utility role through the transport of troops and supplies. While supporting airmobile operations, the Hind can transport eight armed troops with a minimal degradation of its combat capabilities. The Mi-8 Hip E and F (the export version) pose what could be an even more serious threat than the H tnd because of the tendency to laugh them off the stage as blundering transports. Although the Hip was designed as a transport or utility aircraft, the Hip E and F have the dubious distinction of being among the world's heaviest armed helicopters. The combat versions of the Hip cannot only transport 24 armed troops, but can also provide immediate close air support for those troops. The HIp is equipped with a 12.7mm flex-mounted machinegUil in the nose and outboard weapons racks that can mount up to six 57mm rocket pods (a total of 192 rockets) and four antitank guided missiles. The crew also has the option of substituting general-purpose bombs for the rocket pods. Although the HIp's fire control system is not as sophisticated as that of the Hind, it can still provide effective close air and antltank support to the ground forces. 16 The Soviets believe that attack helicopters can be used effect i ve ly in the offense by operating under the covering fire of artillery and ground troops. In addition to the standard Western helicopter missions that call for attack helicopters to secure flanks, provide close air support and act. as a mobile antitank reserve, we can also 'expect to see Soviet attack helicopters operating well forward of the FEB A on hunting or search-and- destroy missions. 17 Effective flank security is essential for a successful attack, and l providing 54 it is a major mission of the attack helicopter regiments. The mobility of the Hind and Hip and their ability to engage armored targets at extended ranges make them a highly effective and econom- ical means for the Soviet commander to screen his flanks. The attack helicopters could be expected to employ either aggressive strikes or, if time and the situation permit, "wait and see" ambush tactics against counterattacking armored forces. Employing an active defense, the attack helicopters would approach under cover of terrain and then "pop up," engage their target while running toward the enemy, and then break away sharply either to the left or right. ls At first glance, this maneu ver may seem suicidal to those familiar with our own nap-of-the-earth flying techniques. How- ever, the Red Flag exercises of 1977 revealed that helicopters using the "pop- up" attack were spotted only 39.5 percent of the time. 19 The "pop-up" technique is not only a highly effective but is also a highly survivable means of delivering ordnance. Another tactic that the Soviets would likely employ against enemy armored forces is the use of hide positions with predesignated kill zones. Once the target enters the kill zone, the attack helicopter unmasks, identifies and then en- gages the target from a hover. The helicopter then moves on to another hide position under cover of terrain. 20 Maintaining the momentum of the attack by neutralizing strongpoints is another crucial mission for the attack helicopter. The attack helicopter's ability to loiter in the vicinity of the hattIe area greatly increases the responsiveness of its close air support. Both the Htnd and the HIp have an effective area saturation capability through the employment of 57mm rockets and general and multipurpose bombs. In addition, the Hind is March equipped four-barrel 12.7mm Gatlzng gun, d the Hip has a flex- mounted 12.7 machinegun. The emplo ment of attack helicopters well forwar of the FEBA offers a potentially large payoff if the helicopters can reach our relatively vulnerable rear area. The Soviets would probably employ either two or four aircraft flights of Hznds for these hunting missions?1 Hinds would be released for hunting missions during periods of limited visibility or during extremely fluid operations when our short-range air defense systems would be least effective. These hunting missions would be targeted agamst our nuclear delivery systems and storage sites; command, control and communications facilities; armor and troop concentrations; key bridges; and other potential bottlenecks. To win the first battle, we must confront the threat squarely no matter how SOVIET ATTACK HELICOPTERS unpalatable it is. The last decade has witnessed a revolution in Soviet attack helicopter doctrine and technology that has not yet been fully worked into our concept of the threat opposing us in Cen- tral Europe. The Defense Intelligence Agency has stated that approximately 200 to 300 attack helicopters are deployed in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany alone. 22 The Soviets are well aware of their past problems with overcentralized control of close air support and its lack of responsiveness to on-call missions. They have aggressively confronted these problems by assigning aviation representatives down to division level and by developmg a more flexible control doctrine for their helicopter regiments. The continuously improving combat effectiveness of the Soviet attack helicopter forces make it a threat for which we must prepare now rather than after the first battle. NOTES 1 Major Donald K Gn!fl'l II I"'e Don t Mas!> MoMar} Review, Febrl.lar.; 1979 pp 3 13 - 2 Ibid P 11 3 Manual on Soviet Army Ooeratlons US Army l'1le:,'98I1C8 dl"1d Threat AnalYSIS Center Aep"rt N ... mber lAG 13 U 78 Department 01\111" Army Washington DC Apnl1918 p 3 64 4 Capta'" A<cl1ard F RIC.cardell! and Captain Gar.; L Jackson SOviet Close Air Support An Comrade In CO'11blned Arms Opera lions, Millta", Review May 1979 p 14 5 SOVIet A!! Support to Ground TrOO(JS Defense Intelligence Agency Report Number 008-1300 147·79 Departme'" 01 Oe'en58 WaSr'19 Ion 0 C June 1979 p 14 6 Ibid P 16 7 Manual on SOVIet Army Operations, op Cit pp 5 33 8 SOlliet Aif Support to Ground Troops op Cit p 19 9 Ibid P 15 10 Soviet Transport Helicopters fnfernatlona/ Defense Review VOlume 12 Number 8 1979 pI 313 I' AlgtlamSlan Brave Struggll" lor Survival Time 14 April 1980 p56 12 Captain Carl Daschke The Threat The HIND Myths and Facts AViatIOn Digest December 1979 pp 42·4,) 13 Lieutenant General Har/)' Kinnard Airmotllllly RevISited Pari Two AViation Olge<;t July 19BO P 1 I 14 ReVlel\' of Soviet Ground Forces. Oelense Intelligence Agency Report NI.I'11ber RSGF 3·80 Department or Oelense WaSl1·ng ' on. DC May 19BO p 2 15 Kinnard op Cit P 11 16 Captain Carl Daschl<.e Threal the HIP Bus Gunship or Bolh7 AViatIOn Digest July 1980 pp 42·44 17 Soviet A,r SuPPOrT to Ground Troops op Cit p 20 18 Rlccardell! and Jackson op Cit p 15 19 Ibid 20 SOVIet Air Support to Ground Troops op Cit p 20 21 Ibid 22 Review of the SOVIet Ground Forces, op Cit p 21 Captam Steven A Frlth lb commander, Specral Securllv Detachment, US Army AVlatwn Center and Sc/wol, Fort Rucker, Alabama He recewed a B A from the Unwerslfy of Colorado arzd IS currently workwg toward an M.S from the Unl- verslly of Southern Cahfornw Other assrgnments mclude serUlce til Germany wlth the 1 sf Armored DWlslOn and the 2d Armored DWlslOll Forward 1981 55 56 The name Clausewitz is familiar to most of us and belongs to a man whose influence on military thought has been profound. This article examines the relevance of his ideas in light of today's world. L AST year marked the 200th anni- versary of the birth of a man whose work, like hardly any other, has occupIed many a great mind and whose name IS known today throughout the world: Karl von Clausewitz, istrative director of the General War Col· lege in Berlin, After serving in this position for 12 years, he was appointed chief of staff of the Prussian Observation Army in Posen. Soon thereafter, in 1831, he died of cholera. • Wit ... Colonel Walter von Hobe, Federal Republic of Germany Army Here IS '1 brief sketch of i ~ life and hIS historical positIOn: ClausewItz, born In 1780, the son of a Prussian civil servant, Joined the army at the age of 12 and first encountered war as a 1.1-year-old dunng the Rhine Campaign of the Prussian wars As a staff captain, he witnessed the crush- ing defeat of the Prussian army at Auer- stedt. At the age of 30, he became an in- structor at the General War College in Berlin. After the Franco-Prussian mIlItary alliance, he resIgned hIS commission and fought in the Russian army against Napo- leon, In 1815, he gained readmission to the Prussian military service. Three years later, at the age of 38, holding the rank of major general, he was appointed admin- 1981 Clausewitz, a contemporary of other well-known persons lIke Hegel, Marx and Engels, lived In a perIod of revolutionary changes, and his personal fate IS a small reflection of the acting forces of hIS era. During his early years, Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa, the Austrian queen, were stIll VIvidly present. Kant, the famous philosopher. had published his three "Critiques." There were also impending changes in the field of technology; the steam engine had already been in- vented; and, still during hIS lifetime. the first railway line was opened. His span oflife comprises concepts such as linear tactics and national uprising, ca- tegorical imperative and social economics. manual labor and mechanical work. In 57 MILITARY REVIEW this era into which he was born, Clause- witz felt destined for greater tasks than those assigned to him. This brief sketch is meant to bring home to the readers the fact that Clausewitz- just as we are today-was placed in the middle of a rapidly changing environment realizing that current problems cannot be solved with the Instruments of an earlier time. I would, therefore, like to attempt to answer three questions: • Is knowing Clausewitz, his life and hiS teachings still worthwhile today. and can he still mean something to us? • Is his statement concerning the inter- relation of politics and war still valid today? • Is the science that the "defenslve IS a stronger form of war than the offensive" still true?1 During combat operations. Clausewitz gained impressions and reflected by studying more than 120 conflicts on subjects such as "the effects of the moral factors" on the conduct of war, on "man in war" and also on the "integration and coalition With allied troops." With hiS literary lifework. he left to posterity a military theory of war, the es· sential parts of which are combined in his book. On War. Its teachings have become common knowledge of all who seriously study the phenomenon of war. The best known topical statements are the follOWing, • The science of organic connection between war and politics, culminating in the often quoted sentence: "War is a mere con- tinuation of policy by other means."2 • The introduction of moral factors Into the science of war. • The sc(lmce of the defense as "the stronger p ~ t o n with the negative purpose." In particular, it is the first sentence which has lately made Clausewitz and his 58 work the subject 'Of historical, political and military publications and discussions. Any- one leaving behind such a wide. diverse- ly written heritage with such a wealth of ideas is always prone to the danger that individual quotations will be used to prove whatever is required without considering the overall context of his train of thought. Many hold that the thesis above is ob- solete. They feel that it is incongruous with today's Western strategy of preservation of peace and the polIcy of containment of conflicts. Ina nuclear age, the tendency toward the last resort. which according to Clause- witz is inherent in war, is said to be incon- sistent with any sensible political objective. Certainly. the Clausewitzian thesis developed from the realm of thought and the political and technological situation of his period. In view of the state of weapon technology of our age and the political and moral conceptIOns ofihe Free World. it requires a more differentiated and accurate study. It is true that we, today, can no longer regard war as arbitrarily available to political calculus and thus a programmable means of political intention. But that does not abolish war which is proved by the more than 120 armed conflicts which have occurred on our planet since the end of World War II. In view of the geographical and political situations in Western Europe. one cannot rule out the possibility ofa war being forced upon a nation, even with the nuclear powers joining in. And it is at this very point that the Clausewitzian thesis has continued relevance-namely, that .war must not be more than an instrument of policymaking. Politics, however, not only decides on the start and the purpose of a war, but also on the type of means to be used, in fact, in all its phases. It is, therefore, governments and parlia- March ments which, by way of their policy, have to decide on the preservation of peace, on the individual steps of escalation in times of tension and, finally, on the necessity of defense through war. In this process, the armed forces are no more than one of the manifold instruments. It is certainly beyond all doubt that the moral factors which Clausewitz lists as pertaining to war-namely, all psychic forces such as courage, audac· ity, perseverance and strength of character-are of decisive importance in all wartime activIties. The same factors are also pertinent in peacetime and, in addition to formation of character, education, tolerance and nghteous thinking, form part of the principles governing leadership. ClausewItz could not and would not offer pat solutions for every conceivable case. Therefore, many a conflictmg and apparently contradictory idea is bound to come up in the diversity of his thoughts. One should not forget that his book was written more than 150 years ago. And, consequently, we did foresee the develop' ment from wars waged by authoritarian governments in the 17th and 18th centunes to the great wars of the times that came after him. Even the principles of the war of national liberation by partisans and subversive elements taught and encouraged today by the Soviets and especially by Mao Zedong have already been written down by Clausewitz. 3 In the light of this, it is of no importance whatsoever that Clausewitz only knew lan.d warfare and only distinguished between three arms. Broadly speaking, all branches of service and types of weapons are in the last resort in support of the soldier at the front without whom final decisions are inconceivable even in an age of rockets and missiles. In the sixth book of his main work, 1981 CLAUSEWITZ Clausewitz deals with defense and evolved the t h e s i ~ "Defense is the stronger form of making war.'" It is quite worthwhile studying the book on defense. Naturally, defense is not automatically the strongest type of combat, and this statement is not meant to be absolute, but relative. But, as a look at the history of wars will show, it can boast the optimum chance of success. It was not only the Battle of the Marne In 1914, but also the German Campaign against Russia in 1917, and in the West in 1918, whIch were won from a defensive posture. Still more convincingly do the events of World War II plead the defense as the stronger type of combat. In regard to the war in Russia, Clausewitz said, as a result of the lessons learned in 1812, that it is often in the midst of one's own country where one is in the strongest position. Just consider what he says in his book on defense: If we await the enemy wlthzn our own theater of war, however near the frontier the deCISIOn may take place, this theater of war will nevertheless always be entered by the enemy force, whlch must entail some sacrzfice on its part. And he goes on: If we Wish to fight a defenswe battle and lfwe, therefore, leave tis determination and the chOice of time for It to the enemy, it may be that he remazns for some time in oc- cL:pation of the piece of territory and the time which . .. he allows us to gain IS In that way paid for by us." Dealing WIth offensive operations within a defensive war, Clausewitz wrote: We can, therefore, in a defensive campaign fight offensively, in a defensive battle we may use some divlSlOns for offensive purposes, and la.otly, while simply remaining in position awaiting the enemy's onslaught, we still send offensive bullets 59 MILITARY REVIEW (today rockets) into his ranks to meet him 6 This p*ssage will sound very familiar to us, but it is also meant to give us food for thought. Another thing to be learned from this is to utilize terrain as a "natural ally." One often has the impres- sion that we, today, let ourselves be hyp- notized in a highly technical army by mechanical devices and weapon systems and, consequently, lose our natural in- stinct for utilization of terrain A third aspect is that defense includes the element of maneuver. By defense, Clausewitz understands dvnamlc action, only that It is deferred in time. "Defense is composed of waiting and acting," he states explicitly. It can be assumed that this statement refers, rather, to strategIc and political action than to tactical action. The thesis of the "suspension of military activity" has absolutely topIcal relevance In NATO strategy. History teaches time and time again, says Clausewitz, that in war an Interruption of mutual military actlvlty WIll occur and thus the opposing sides are, in a way, inactIvely confronting each other. Both opponents bide their time, the one because he feels that an attack at a later pOint of time would be more appropriate, the other in a feeling of inferIOrity. SummarIzing the Clausewitzian aspect on defense, he sees advantages on the defender's side: the advantage of ground, surprise-normally only expected WIth the attacker-counterfire or even counterattack from several sides, the assistance of the theater of war, the support of the people and the utilization of great moral forces" How topical an.d relevant Clausewitz's teachings still are today does, at thIs stage, hardly require any further explanation. In the beginning, some questions have been raised as to whether we can still profit today from Clausewitz and his book and whether his statements have 60 continued relevance. It should be clear by now that 'Clause- \Vitz, in a manner more topical than any other, has made statements which un- reservedly apply to the officer capable of independent thinking. The voluminous book, On War, cannot be studied and utilized as if it were a service regulation. One very quickly encounters basic questions of philosophy and politics and social life in general. Officers see themselves confronted today with two challenges: to stand the test as in peacetime and, like Clause- witz, to be ready to continuously check their own position. This requires flexible thinking, especially the arnval at logical conclusions. In particular, it is this attitude whIch must precede any experiment of trying out something new, espeCIally in rapidly changing times. Leadership IS of undisputed importahce in war and in times of peace. In both cases, however, different basic conditIOns prevail. The conflicts of OUr age have a confUSing multitude of outward appearances. One must be molded by the will to lead and by a readiness to "grasp the moral forces which are involved." Clausewitz did not devise complicated systems and patterns remote from every- day life, but, based on lessons learned, he reasoned out actIOn. Clear, sound thinking, not emotional vagueness, purpose- ful Rcquiring of knowledge and experience, and determination are the qualities demanded today. Life itself will provide friction. It need not be artificially initiated by complicated trains of thought and oversubtle language intelligible to the expert only. Finally, and in conclusion, a thought- provoking quote from Clausewitz, "It is friction which makes that which appears easy in reality difficult."" March CLAUSEWITZ NOTES 1 Karl von Clausewltz O ..:r War tranSlated by 0 J Jolies In1antry Journal Pre .. s, Washrngton DC 1950 80010, Chapler III p 326 4 Ibid BOOk SIX Chapler I Section 2 p 319 5 Ibid BOOk SIX Ch'l.pler VIII p 345 6 Ibid Book SIX Chapter I. p 317 2 Ibid Book One Chapler t SectIOn 2<1 p 16 3 Ibid. Book SIX" Chapter XXVI 7 Ibid Booi'. SUI. Chapler III p 323 B IOld Book One Chapler VII p 55 1981 Colonel Walter von !lobe It> the German hO/- son offlcer, USACGSC Ill' attended the College In Bad Godesbcrg and 1S a graduate of College, the German General Slaff Colie{Ic and the US Arml!d Forcel> Staff Col· lelIl! He has sen'cd as clllef, G3 Plans and Opera fLOllS. at Headqu.arters, Northern Army Grou.p, as commandlng offlcer of ArtIllery Batta/ton 155, and as cxecutWf? officer to the commandIng offIcer of the General Army Offlcc Army Extends Basic Training. Longer and tougher basic training (BT) will soon face individuals coming into the Army. Plans for a tougher eight-week program instead of the current seven weeks have been announced by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The plans call for more demanding physical conditioning, training in additional soldier skills and the raising of standards for courses at all training installations. The new program will go into effect at some traming Installations in Fiscal Year (FY) 1981 and will inc!ude all training installations by the end of FY 1982. The revamped BT program' leans heavily on the belief that a physically fit Army begins with tough, demanding standards established in BT and continues through all phases of a soldier's professional growth. Increased emphasis will be placed on basic soldier skills. New technical subject materials include map reading and communications. The changes are aimed at developing better trained and more disciplined soldiers who, after assignment to their new Units, can contribute more quickly to Army unit effectiveness. There are 308 hours in the current BT program of instruction (POI). The new POI will contain 405 hours, an increase of 97 hours. The 97 hours contain new subjects, subjects taught in the past but not formally documented, and additional hours on subjects now taught. The increased training will include physical training, weapons familiarization and qualification, individual tactical training, march- es and bivouac and basic rifle marksmanship. New subjects in the POI will be communications, map reading, identification of opposing forces and obstacle courses for confidence and conditioning. Plans also call for the combat arms oriented One Station Unit Training courses to be expanded by one week in FY 1982. 61 No longer is it possible to group various countries and fac- tions into neat categories as was once done. Events have produced new associations that could not have been predicted beforehand. The author now sees a "triangle of power" emerging on the world scene that could affect US strategic interests. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to renect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.-Editor. T HE world power structure is in the process of major adjustment, perhaps the most fundamental and far- reaching in history. Major change is bemg compressed into very short pas- sages of time. When the United States withdrew its forces from Vietnam, it would have been rather inconceivable to forecast an invasion of Vietnam by China in 1979. Who would have predicted the demise of Iran as a pillar of stability or the entry of Mexico on the world stage as a major oil producer? Major changes underway are of profound import for those who must attempt to decipher the tidal motions of history. They are of particular significance in crafting American strategy and politico- military thought. . Events of the last lO years clearly indi- Colonel Robert L_ Dilworth, US Army cate that world trends cannot be interpreted in terms of bipolarity-such as East versus West, Communist versus non-Communist or other convenient gen- eralized dichotomies. While multipolarity is somewhat closer to the mark, it, too, often leads to a carving up of the world into a supposed variety of camps. It has become fashIOnable to talk of not only a third world, but fourth and fifth worlds as well. Such categorization can be of value in diagraming economic differences, but it is of limited use m evaluating power relationships. Power ebbs and flows on the fulcrum of self-interest. Countries such as SaudI Arabia can wield great power influence in deciding critical international issues. Power is probably best vIewed as a mosa- ic, given the ever· increasing velocIty of world change. Power relationships are kaleidoscopic in character, each issue, confrontation or national interest re- shaping the Image Overlaying current world change IS the Soviet Union and its growing mIlitary power at a time when US power and influ· ence is becommg uncertam. There are perhaps two ways of manifesting power, to use the language of fencing, parry and thrust In the European area, the United States and its allies can at best parry the Soviet might. Despite its considerable military capabilities, the Soviet Union finds itself in a similar stance. ThIS IS true in part because of the rise of nation- alism at the expense of Ideology. The So- viet Union can no longer view its East European satellites as vassels, nations that unhesitatingly move to the strmgs of Soviet orchestration. Politics does indeed make strange bed· fellows For example, certain Warsaw Pact nations have reason to view recent events m Iran wIth concern. They could presage a growing dependence on Soviet energy sources, a dependency that was at least partially amelIorated by an Iran under the shah that would sell oil to al· most any natIOn willing to pay, such as Is- rael, East European Communist nations and Japan. The Impasse in Europe in terms of ability to project decisive power seems to have led the Soviet Union into a state of adven· tUrIsm and opportunism elsewhere in the world. At times, It appears as if the Soviet Umon has been given almost an un- limited opening in conjunction wIth its surrogates to project power at will-Af- rIca and Southeast ASia bemg two note- worthy examples. While current power relationships do not gIve the SovIets the ability to move with impunity-the Middle East being one example-they currently have considerable latItude m mfluencing events to their advantage. A growing number ofre- gimes owe their power position, even eco- COPYright :g 1981 by Colonel Robert L Dilworth. US Army 63 nomIC survival, to the Soviet Union- Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Cuba, Syria, An- gola and VIetnam to name only a few. There appears to be a major opportunity open to the United States in par- rying the Soviet surge and mounting a counterthrust. It represents a trIangle of power just now emerging. The countries involved are the Umted States, the Peo- ple's RepublIc of China and Japan. It is by no means a comfortable association at this stage. However, the complementary and mutual interests Involved suggest that this trIangle of power will un- doubtedly grow in importance, especially if US strategIc interests are to be protected and a VIable counterforce to the Soviet Union realized Japan is a gro'wing military power. Re- birth of this power has gone largely un- noticed. Japan now ranks fifth in the world in terms of military expenditures and has an awesome Industrial base on which to further build its military capabil- 64 ities.* The United States continues to have a potent military capability and an industrial strength second to none. The Chinese sector of the triad represents strength of numbers, a will to greatness and an mherent national dynamism, when harnessed, that promises an ultimate elevation to great-power status. Collectively, this triangle of power can represent a decisive force in countering Soviet alms and in restoring a stable pat- tern of international relationships. This tnad may hold the key to world peace, at least over the next 20 years, if that power can be harmonized. The creation of a strong power base WIthin the triad is anything but pre- ordained or simple. Japan and China have never been ready associates. China can be expected to pursue its own self-interests and wIll associate itself with US objectives as long as the affiliation is In consonance \\ ith those interests. However, it Lakes no elaborate analysis to identify bases for a growing sense of common purpose among these three countries. Each can profit from closer as- sociatlOn. China represents a growing trade market for both the United States and Japan. In turn, China can draw from these two countries what it needs most to advance itself economically and politically-technology and infusion of mIl- itary hardware. The best gambit for the United States appears to center on closer ties with these two Asian' powers as partners. If history teaches anything, this triad may not be a lastIng marriage. As the pendulum of history swings and the power of China grows, the relationship may need to be re- assessed. But, in the short run, best measured in terms of a generation, this emerging triad to be the only vi- 'Henry Scotl-Stokes, Irs A.n RighI to Talk Defense Again In Japan, The New York Times Magazme, 11 February 1979, p 18 able alternative for the United States if it is to stem Soviet adventurism. US interests seem well-served at this time by a growing affiliation with Japan and. in particular. with China. In some quarters. this will be viewed as a recklesR and dangerous national pohcy to pursue and a major breach of faith-closely al· lying ourselves with a Communist state and the military rebirth of Ja· pan. The mere act of recognizing mam- land China and moving to establish diplomatic relations has already tng- gered a ground swell among Interest groups that view this initiative as dIsen- franchisement of TaIwan. The facts behe this oversimplistic interpretation of events. While formal diplomatIc relations with Taiwan have been severed. a ,trong informal relatIOnship with Taiwan will un· doubtedly contInue for the foreseeable future. It would have been a defiance of history to continue to recogmze Taiwan as emblematIc of the ChInese people Some opponents of a full Chmese-Amen- can rapprochement will also assert that it causes the Umted States to build relations with some of the more xenophobIC compatrIots of the ChInese. such as North Korea. This would appear to have some element of truth. but the marriage of self· interebt that increasmgly JOInS Chma and the Umterl States does not necessarily herald recognitIOn of the Chinese in·lawR as well. 1981 It IR lIme to place US interests ahead of ideology and emotIOnal mental sets. It is also time to accept the forces of world change for what they are and articulate a strategy that can stabilize existing con- flIcts and produce at least a modicum of peace. US surVIval and well-being must head the list In determining national priontIes. Colonel Robert L Dtlu'orth 18 chIef orthe Arm ... Comptroller Dll;ltJWIl. ,:vatlOnal Guard Bureau. Washzngton, DC He r('celled a B S {rom the Unwersllv ofFlonda, all MP A {rom the UUller- slty of Oldahoma, an M MAS (rom the USACGSC and lS a graduate of the lndustrml College a/the Armpd Forces, the Pro{esslOrlUl Me/· ltury Comptroller School at the Air U1I1ucrsll) and the Instltute {or Jfunagement at North· western Unwersllv He serl'ed wah the 4th infantry D1VrSWll in Vu:tnam. til(' 2d Infantry DWISlOll m Korea. and wIth the afflct', Chief or Staff. US Army. Washlngtoll. D C 65 With daily advances being made in the field of electronics. it can be assumed that the role of electronic warfare will con· tinue to grow in importance and playa larger part in future conflicts. This article examines Soviet use of electronic war· fare in World War II and speculates about future employ· ment. T ACTICAL electronic warfare (EW) has come of age on the modern battlefield. The expanding role of communications electronics for effectIve command and control of forces in rapidly changing combat envIronments has assured that EW will remain a permanent fixture in the field commander's perceptions, plans and course of actIOn In any fu- tUre combat environment. Any possible military confrontation with Soviet forces, whether In Europe, the Middle East or other parts of the world, will see high.intensity EW technIques employed by both sides. Concerning thIs topic, the primary responsibility of the field commander is to expand his knowledge of the Soviet EW threat. Part of this responsibility may be accomplished by ex- amining the Soviet military's view of the historical role of radio-electronic combat tREC) in their ground forces operations during World War II. For the Soviet commander, the World War II expel-ience of Soviet forces offers specific lessons which are readily adapted in a more complex form to modern combat conditions. Accounts of their REC experience on the Eastern Front present instructive accounts of how Soviet Soviet Radio-Electronic Combat in World War II David R. Beachley commanders may apply REC forces under modern conditions against large armored and mechanized units. The Early War Years Soviet authors describe World War II as a perIod of "intensive radIO-electronic combat" with German forces. They outline the "wide application" of radio reconnaissance, radio-electronic Jamming and radio disInformatlOn by SOVIet forces 1 The Soviet army was clearly taken off guard by the massive German EW effort at the beginning of the war, especially theIr voice intercept operations. SovIet authors cite how some commanders "groundlessly" took "sharp measures" and completely forbade the use of radios. They were fearful of detection by German vOIce intercept and radIo dIrection finding and the subsequent pOSSIbIlIty of artIllery or aIr strikes on their positions More· over, some commanders placed their com- municatIOns equipment a conSIderable distance from command points which "im· peded" Its general use. These cases of "so-called radio fear" were criticized due to inaccurate German direction finding and artillery's inabIlity to "accurately hit radio stations and com· mand points."" Soviet forces were III-pre· pared for the formidable German EW effort. The war was well underway before the Soviets would redress their problems and turn the tide of the REC battle against the German forces. First Offensive Capabilities During 1942, the Soviet Command began development of its offensive REC RADIO-ELECTRONIC COMBAT capabilities. Radio voice Intercept was in- troduced to perform three vital missions agaInst German forces. It was employed to: • Create disinformation. • Create jamming to interrupt the "most Important" radio transmissions. • Aid the destruction of artillery and aviatIOn command POInts along with com- mUnications centers. "Special attentIOn" was given to the intercept of tank and aviation units where radIO was the primary means of commu- nIcatIOn. JammIng operations were geared to disrupt hIgh· level command structures. According to Soviet sources, jamming, which was created "in the course of combat operations," disrupted radio communications of the commands of German army groups, field and tank armies, tank and motorized corps and divisions and also theIr combined operations with aviation units. 3 The Battle of Stalingrad in late 1942 witnessed "the first complex in history of all three types of radIO-electrOnic combat" (Intercept, Jamming and disinformationl employed by Soviet forces. Heavy radio reconnaissance was Initiated against Ger- man Units. After the encirclement of the 6th Field Army of FrIedrich von Paulus located west of Stalingrad, the 394th Sectional Radio Battalion was employed to conduct intercept and jamming operations against the German forces. Utilizing the call signs of Erich von Manstein's reliefforce, Army Group "Don," Soviet radio operators entered into communications with the beleaguered 6th Army and accepted messages addressed to headquarters of Army Group "Don" and the German High Command. "Eighty-six operational radiograms" were received from the 6th Army during these operations. Soviet offensive REC capabilities were well underway.' Copyright © 1981 by DaVid R Beachley. 67 MILITARY REVIEW Special REC Battalions In late 1942 and 1943, Stavka, the headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command, activated five special radio battalIons specifically designed to conduct REC operatIOns-especially jamming'-agaInst German forces. The 129th, 130th, 131st, 132d and 226th "Special RadIO Battalions" are cited as the "first units of radio-electronIc Jamming." Their deployment IS described as a "qualitatIve Jump In the development of radio·elec· tronic combat In the Soviet Army." After actIvatIOn, each battalion was as· signed to various front (army group I -level commands. Each of these special UnIts was equipped for radio intercept, Jamming and direction-findIng operations WIth eIght to 10 vehIcle-mounted Jam· mers, 18 to 20 rad,o Intercept receivers and four direction.findIng sets. Captured German radIOs were used for more effec· tlve d,slnformatlOn operatIOns' Primary targets of these special units were "operational-tactIcal links" of army, corps and diVIsion-level commu· nicatlOns systems. OperatIOns were designed to expose main and reserve frequencies of radio stations, theIr locations and also the equipment and activo Ity of enemy forces. Jamming operations against key radio riets employed two jammers to cover both main and reserve fre- quencIes. ThIS provided "uninterrupted interference" against the targeted enemy communicatIOns system." Kursk: The Baptism of Fire The operations of the special radIo battalions at the Battle of Kursk in July 68 1943 offer. a unique opportunity to observe Soviet REC operations in highly mobile defensive and offensive combat. Initially, radio intercept helped to un- cover "completely" the composition of opposing German forces. According to Soviet sources, much of this data was provided by radIO reconnaissance up to two weeks before the battle began. Durl ng the defensi ve stage of the battle, the 130th Radio Battalion conducted Jamming against corps and division headquarters of German units attacking toward Kursk. Soviet sources maintain that "the primary miSSIOn of the first order was to inhibIt or exclude the reception of ciphered radiograms of the enemy." After Soviet forces went over to the counterattack and general offensive, the 130th and 132d Radio Battahons jammed headquarters of the 4th Tank Army, 8th Army, 48th Tank and 52d Army Corps, Army Corps "Raus" and their subordinate divisions along with aviation communications. Especially interesting is that: .. durzng the course of the offensive the 130th continued tojam the formatzons and major field forces of the enemy retreating under the fzre of the Soviet Army. Radio operators practiced imitative operations against German forces, re- laying false and misleading ciphered messages. This practice "loaded down" German communication lines. Soviet authorities maintain that, during the course of the Battle of Kursk and the follOWIng offensive operations, the 132d Radio Bat- talion jammed up to 3,500 enemy radio messages. Under jammIng conditions, the Germans were capable of transmitting less than 30 percent of their "operational radiograms." The two radio battalions 'Jammed the main commUnIcations of the enemy, hindered control, and promoted the utter defeat of German-Fascist forces,"? March Operations Against Encircled Forces Soviet mIlitary wrItmgs outlIne numerous examples of REC operations by the radIO battalions agamst enCircled German forces. In fact, they claim that "the greatest results" of REC operatIOns "were reached in the suppressIOn of radIO communicatIOns of command pomts in thp course of enCirclement and destruction of large groupings of the enemy." Jamming was "especlally effective" m operations agamst surrounded Units since it was designed to conduct "a complete radio blockade of enemy forces."" Operations during the Belorussian offenSive of 1944 prOVide numerous examples of successful Jammmg miSSIOns against enCircled German forces. The 130th and 131st RadIO Battalions played an "active part" In the Belorusslan Cam- paign. Both units conducted Jamming operatIOns against German units surrounded In the area of Vitebsk and south- eastern Minsk. "Special attentIOn" was glVen to Jamming the communicatIOns of the 9th Army "which was known from intercepted radiograms" to be preparing a breakthrough out of the encirclement In additIOn, the 131st Radio Battahon conducted jamming operatIOns against headquarters of the 3d Tank and 4th Ar- mies attempting to communicate With sister forces surrounded east of Minsk. Jamming In 70 radIO nets, the battalion disrupted more than 3,700 radIO messages or up to 90 percent of all radio traf- fiC. Soviet sources maintam that 30 "highly important operational radIO- grams" of forces surrounded east ofMmsk were jammed." Other examples illustrate the Soviet military's employment of REC forces against isolated and surrounded units. 1981 RADIO-ELECTRONIC COMBAT From January through February 1945, the operations of the 130th and 132d RadIO Battalions aided in the destruction of encircled German units In Glog6w, Breslau and Posen. The operations of the 132d are conSid- ered "especially instructive" since the battalion successfully jammed communications between the encircled units and between these Units and relief forces out- Side of the encirclement. "SpeCial attention" was given to jamming the communicatIOns of air transports bringing in supp!Jes to the encircled ~ e s causing crews to lose their bear- s and miSS deSignated drop zones. mmentmg on the effectiveness of REC ope};.atlOns against the encircled forces, s o v ~ authoritieS maintain that the radIO battalions "significantly" inter- rupted the command and control of Ger- man forces and the combined operatIOns between the encircled groupings in Breslau, Glog6w and Posen."This promoted their rapid destructlOn."1<J Similar results are reported on the operations of the 226th and 131 st Radio Battalions In the eastern Prussia oper- atIOn of early 1945. These units jammed "practically all" radIO communications of enemy groups of forces, consisting of 175 radio statIOns in 30 radIO nets on 300 var- IOUS frequencies. Once again, REC IS credited With a significant contribution to successful operations. "Radio-j&mming ... in a great degree promoted the success of Soviet forces In the Eastern Prussia operation."" The Lessons of Berlin Soviet sources maintain that REC "reached perfection" during the offensive operations against Berlin. In the prepara- 69 MILITARY REVIEW tory operation, "frontal radio reconnaissance" uncovered enemy radio communications ~ y s t m s and located headquarters of armies, corps and divisions "in spite of limited radio use and fraudulent operations.," The special radio battalions played a major role in the offensive. "Utilizing the data collected by radio reconnaisslmce and their great ac- cumulation of battle experience," the spe- , cial radio battalions "were completely successful in jamming radio communications of the enemy in the course of all operations. " 70 Participating in the final assault on Berlin were the 130th and 132d Radio Battalions. The jamming operations of the 130th against Army Group "Vistula," the 3d and 9th Tank Armies and their subordinate and neighboring units are especially instructive about the obJec- tives of offensive Soviet REC: Not able to establish communicatIOns, the army headquarters did not know the situation, was not able to lead its subordinate formations and coord mate its actions with actions of its forces attemptmg to help the surrounded groups. As a result, enemy March divisions were thrown in various directions, were not able to organizationally conduct combat operatlOns In order to pull out of the encirclement and were liquidated with Sovwt forces. l " Lower Echelon REC Operations Although the specml radio battalions provided essential REC support to frontal combat operations, a more widespread application of offensive capabIlities was necessary, especially in army-level operations and in the operations of smaller echelons. With the "increase in the sweep of front and army offensive operations" and the "shortenmg of the time of their preparation," It was necessary to develop "new ways to receive sup· plementary mtelligence and to mcrease the effectiveness of reconnazssance."t:l Soviet mIlitary writings outlzne at least one example of the formation and operation of a speCial REC unit deSigned to expand intelligence collectIOn in arn)y- level and lower echelon operations. In July 1944, a group for conductmg operational radio reconnazssance was formed in the 61st Army of the 1st Belorussian Front and attached to the I06th Commu- nications Regiment. This platoon·size formation was called the "group of close reconnaissance with commumcatlons means" or, as abbreviated by Soviet wnt- ings, the GBRSS. According to Soviet authorities, the operations of the GBRSS and the organization of reconnaissance in the 61st Army "offer special interest" under mod· ern conditions. The GBRSS paId "special attention" to the monitoring of German artillery communications in order to determine Soviet forces targeted for fire. The timely receipt of this information 1981 RADIO-ELECTRONIC COMBAT permitted Soviet troops to withdraw from targeted areas and avoid unnecessary losses. Moreover, the unit's operations established order-of-battle intelligence on opposing forces. Radio station accessories" names of commanders and locations of enemy subunits in the defense were determined "without great difficulty."" DUrIng the Vistula-Oder offensive, the GBRSS intercepted regimental, battalion and company-level commumca· tlOns and uncovered at least five planned counterattacks by company and battalion-level forces. In addItion, the GBRSS intercepted units of the 10th SS Tank Division which were trans· mitting their locatIOns and planned cutoff points, mcludmg the schedule for their occupation. Soviet military sources comment on the impact ofGBRSS operatIOns m the 61st Army: ... the presence zn the Army of the group of close reconnaissance with com- m UlllcatlOns means for conduction of oper- atlOl1al reCOl1nalSSanCe .. proVided the r e ~ l p t of Important alld relwble llltel- izgel1cc on the enemy. even by the utiliza- tIOn of usual radiO commUlllcatlOns and In the absence of speCial directIOn findzng systems,l'i Conclusion Soviet offensive REC operations in World War II are credited with expanding the role of artillery and air support through effectIve radio intercept and direction finding on command points, communications centers and radar posts. SOVIet authorIties claIm that: ... the greatest results [of REC oper- atIOns/ were reached in the suppressIOn of radio commUlllcatlOns of command pOlllts In the course of enCirclement and 71 MILITARY REVIEW destructzon of large groupzngs of the enemy. In addition, radio dlsinformation operations deluded the enemy and "at t.he same time, promoted tbe achievement of surprIse."l!l I The preponderance of radio Jammmg durmg REC operations certainly indi- cates that Its application was the primary means of offensive electronIc leombat against command and control commu- nIcations systems throughout the Eastern Front operations. Although radlO mter- cept and dIrection finding receive less attention by Soviet authors, this certainly does not minimize their contrIbutlOn to successful combat operatIOns. The wIde applIcation of radIO reconnaissance prior to offensive operations establIsbed an ex- tensIve order of battle data base agamst German forces not employing proper radio camouflage and protective meas· ures. NOTES 1 Major Ge'1eral A Palll Radio-ElectrOniC Combat In t"e Cour&e Of the Waf Mlilrary·H,sloflcaJ Journal Nu'T1be' 5 1977 P 10 21b,d P 1t 3 lOla pp 11·12 4 Ib,d P 13 Malor General V and ColorE'! V lmll?v<;kll From the Hislor, of Radlo ElectroniC Combat HIs/of/cal Jour nal Number 3 1975 P 84 5 Palll 00 ot P 12 ana Grank,., ana ZrnlevSl<1I 00 elf D BIl The radiO battalions were deSignated sechonal radiO battalions 01 spe· clal des.gnatlon or as abbrevlateo by Soviet aul'lonlles orCIn S'oelsnaz units 6 Palll op CII 7 Ib,(1 DD 1314 and V Grank.n ES!lma!ion olthe RadiO Eledromc SituatIon Ml/!lary Herald Number 4 1976 DD 113 14 SovIet military writings on REC operations on the Eastern Front are certainly not the definitive source on the or-' ganization and operations of offensive So- viet REC units and tactics. Nevertheless, they do provide us with a unique oppor- tUnIty to view the historical role of offen- sIve REC units and their operations through the eyes of the Soviet commander. Under modern conditions, a more perfected and elaborate REC organization can pose a formidable arm of SovIet ground forces operatIOns against an opposing force not properly utllIzmg authOrIzed radlO procedures and SIgnal securIty measures. Our operatlOnal commanders should never forget what Soviet mIlitary WrIters clearly state: ... not one operatIOn of any type of armed forces does not beglll with or IS not conducted Without the wide use of fo,ces and means of radzo-electrolllc combot.17 8 Palll, 00 CIt 0 19 and GranKln ana Zmlevskll op Cit P 85 9 Palll, 00 Cit P 15 and Gram<.ln and lmleVSI\II, op crt, 0 85 10 Palll Op Cit DO 16·17 " Ibid. and Grankln and lm'8vskll op Cit. P 85 12 Pall' op Cit DP 17·18 13 Reserve Colonel V Chlkln. Reconnal&&ance With Communlca lions Means. Military Historical Journal Number 6. 1978. P 87 14 Ibid. DD 87 and 89 and Reserve Colone) V Clw\fn Recon nalssance In the OperatIons of the 61 sl Army Military HistOrical Journal Nu<Tlber 10 1979 PO 53,54 15 Ch,k,'l ReconnaIssance W,It} Communications Means MIlitary· Hlstoncal Journal op Clf DD 88 89 16 Palll, op Cit 019 17 Granl.an and Zmlevskll. <JP clf, D 88 Daud R Bearhley u, a graduate student w RUSSIan area Georgetown Unwer,'>lly, Washzngton, DC He has ::,erved u'uh the .522d Combat, ElectronIc Warfare and Intelligence Bat- lalLOn, 2d Armored DltlSLOn, as senLDr VOlee Inter- cept operalor and lnstructor on Sot'let milltarv tOplCS and tactlcal electrOnIc warfare procedlo'es. 72 March o ~ V I W S The Evolution of Soviet Strategy in the Middle East By Alvin Z. Rubinstein Orb/s, Volume 24, Number 2, Summer 1980 Soviet strategy In the Middle East has become one of increasing concern to the United States. ThiS has become especially true Since the IslamiC RevolutIon In Irall, the SOVle[ Invasion of Afghanistan and, most recently, the lI'anIan-iraql confliCt. What are the goals and objectives of Soviet strategy. and what facts should the United States be aware of? Dr AlVin Z Rubinstein, professor of polItIcal sCience at the UniverSity of Pennsylvania, senes editor for Praeger PublIshers' "Studies of influence In internatIOnal Relations" and author of Red Star on the Nile: The Souze(·Er:;yptwn In(luence Re· latlonshlp Sln('(' the Su-Day IVaI', traces the changes In SOVIL't foreign polIcy rela· tIve to the :Vhddle East and postulates certain generalIzations to be deduced from Soviet hphaVIOr In thiS region. First, Moscow has followed: ... a dlfferentzated polzcy that has been sensitwe to conMralllts and opportunities. The chOice of tarRets, the pro/Talllr:; of aid packaRes, the wIlllnRness to subordinate Soviet deSires to a courted country's preferences and the busmesslzlze man ncr m which most agreements have been car· I'led out, Irrespectll'e of penodlc diS' sonances, bespeak a baSIC soundness of ap· proach and outlook. Second, Soviet diplomacy has been guided by strategic com ,'erations rather than by ideology. Third, the USSR has beE!ll a "reliable patron-protector" to its clients which has enhanced Its credibility. 1981 Fourth, the Soviet Union has utilized arms sales to stimulate the arms race in the area. These sales for hard currency have not brought direct influence on the natIOns. but have aSSIsted in bUIlding anti-US sentiment. Finally. the USSR has consistently endeavored to undermine the position of the United States in the region. given the assumptIOn that the United States is its principal adversary. Dr Rubinstein feels that this<strategy of Influence expanSIOn is directly related to the revolution In military technology and the enormous growth of Soviet milI- tary capabilIties. Consequently, the USSR has subverted US containment polIcy In the Near East. threatens the Western oil supplIes from Saudi Arabia and has stretched its Influence as far south as Yemen and as far west as Algeria in the Arab world. According to Professor Rubinstein. the results of thIS strategy are eVIdent In the fact that the Ul1Ited States no longer controls any "bastion" In the area and Its leadership IS increasingly seen as indecisive and weak Given these pOSitive reo suits, the Soviets are currently pUl'SUlng a more venturesome polIcy than hereto- fore. Part of the explanation for thiS l'lsk- taking may be related to the estimated mld-1980s oil shortages In the USSR and ItS satellites. On the other hand. the more the United States acquiesces to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' conditions and dictates on oil prices. the weaker the United States appears and the more the Soviet connection assumes importance for the Arab states. Professor Rubinstein closes his artIcle by suggesting that the Soviets are the ultimate benefactors of the rapid mod· ernization occurring in the region. lie 73 MILITARY REVIEW quotes Walt Rostow in stating that communism is the "scavenger of modernization." Islamic fundamentalism is only a transition stage which will give way to more disunity and discord and, eventu- ally, communism. As far as solutions to the demise of US influence in the area, Dr. Rubinstein leaves the reader with little except a profound appreciation for the s'uccess of Soviet Mideastern strategy.-DEN. The Soviet Officer by Captain Jon G. Coil avo. USAF Alrltft Operations Review. October 1980 AccordIng to Captain Jon G. Collavo, a phenomenon known as ethnocentrIsm, defined as an attitude that one's own group IS supenor, causes us to believe that a Soviet will react to a situation or stimulus simIlarly to the way a lJS citizen would. This attitude can prove self-defeatIng if It prevails in the decision- making process. In other words, If an AmerIcan declsIOnmaker on any level expects a Soviet to react Just as he would and respond In the same manner, he could be very wrong. Dunng Captain Collavo's service from ,January 197R to 1979 as a Umted Nations MIlitary Observer t UNMO I with the United Nations Truce Supervisory Or· ganlzation, headquartered in Jerusalem, he worked closely with Soviet officers both as a co-worker and as operational commander. Dunng the first five months of his tour, he was,a "common UNMO," and, for the last seven months of hiS tour, he was the assistant operations officer, Observation Group SInai·Cairo. His com- mandmg officer was Lieutenant Colonel V: Skharov of the Soviet army. The duty ofUNMOs in Cairo was to observe that the prOVISIOns of the Smai II 74 Agreement were honored. To do this, they manned observation posts, patrolled disengagement lines and conducted periodic inspections of the Limited Forces' Areas and Missile-Restricted Zones. To perform these tasks, they were formed into two-man teams composed of two officers, never of the same nationalIty. Because of this arrangement and owing to the large US and USSR contingents in Cairo, many times a US officer would be teamed with a Soviet officer. In the case of observatIOn post duty, these officers spent seven full days alone together at a remote location in the Sinai. This situatIOn lent itself to very close observa- tIOn, not only of the desert, but also of your fellow officer. Captain Collavo's im- pressiol).s of Soviet officers were based primarily on his observation of them dur- Ing hiS assignment as a UNMO. The Soviet offIcers Collavo became acquaInted WIth saw the world in terms of right and wrong-the Soviet way was nght; if others disagreed m any particular, then they were He found that, 'fhen the Soviet way of thmking was brought to questIOn, a stone wall was encountered. The Soviet perception of the world was governed by a filtration system baspd on the SocialIst/Communist teachIn?s. In contrast to American officers, the Soviet officers recei ved their advanced educatIOn tcollege eqUivalent! in military or technical schools. The education they received was narrow in scope and limIted in breadth. The end result was that they had a rather limited view of the world as a whole This lImited view affected the Soviets' personal perception of the US/USSR relationship. The Soviet officers seemed (0 believe, without question, that the United States is the enemy. When asked why, their normal response was, "This is simply so." They beheve the United States is aggressive, adventuristic and unbeliev- ably destructive while the Soviets are the March defenders of peace. When asked about the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia. and so forth, they would simply respond that those were necessary for peace. They truly 'Ijlelieve that the Soviet way of lIfe is best and that communism is the wave of the future. According to the author. the Soviet officer is a very capable adversary. Given an objective and an established plan to achieve this objective. he would do well. Otherwise. the officers were inflexible. indecIsive and "lockstep." Nationalistic feeling among the Soviet officers was very strong. Captam Collavo qUIckly learned never to call a Soviet officer a Russian as he would reply, "I am not a Russian: I am Uzbec. Ukraim- an. Tajik." or some other natIOnality. The author believes the SovIets still have great respect for the UnIted States' militarily but are aghast at our lack of resolve.-SIK. Eastern Mediterranean: Sea of Troubles Staff Report, Defense & Foreign Affalfs, October 1980 The situatIOn todav in the Eastern Mediterranean. with the Soviet UnIOn nor the United States m a pOSItIOn to declare the area safe for one side or the other. could best be described as unsure. The Eastern Mediterranean remains a collectIOn of indiVIdual problems. rIvalrIes and Issues whose only unifying framework. vague as it IS. is the US-Soviet strategic struggle 'One important issue whIch seems to transcend even the East-West tension in the area is the Greco-Turkish struggle. This is a contmumg problem with a long historical baSIS. and not one easily resolved. In addition. a closer look at Turkey is also necessary. Turkey is a country which has seen 1981 REVIEWS the development of a kind of double crisis. On the economIC side. it has been unable to modernize ItS economy. Within a past year, inflation has reached 100 percent per year. On the political side. it has had a successIOn of weak coalition governments. alternately left and right of center. As these governments were unable to solve national problems. the Turkish mJlitary. as m the past, took over the government. promising a return to CIvilian rule when practical. but not before the end of 1981. Turkey's military leadership probably means what it says. and it should return to civilian rule. The third important Mediterranean power in the Balkan area, Yugoslavia. has also recently undergone a wrenching change of power with the recent death of Marshal Josip Tito. Thus far. however. Yugoslavia seems to have taken his death m strIde. The two greatest concerns attending TIto's death were fears that the old natIOnalities problem would arIse agam and that the SOVIet Union would decide to mvade. NeIther fear. at least for the present. has materialized. The most serious tensions in the East- ern Mediterranean remain as they havt: been for decades. in connection WIth Israel. What is surprismg IS the lack of movement over the last two years since the original Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. One of the major obstacles has been the continued establishment of new Israeli settlements on the occupied Arab West Bank and the move by Israel to incorporate Arab East Jeru- salem into Israel. With the other Arab states never having accepted the Camp David Accords. and with the Israeli- Egyptian-US negotiations regarding Arab "self-rule" at a virtual standstill. the level of frustration is growing among the various partIes. There is little likelihood of an outbreak of war over this issue in the near future. however. One of the more interesting responses to the Arab·Israeli impasse was the recent Libyan proposal, accepted by Syria. of a 75 MILITARY REVIEW constitutional union between the two countries. How successful this unificatIOn movement will be is open to question, especially considering both countries' unions with Egypt and similar failures in other proposed international unions. Syria may at least derive some badly needed Libyan funds from the effort, however. Finally, there is the overall strategic Issue of the Soviet·US rE'latlOnshlp In the area which is open and undeCIded. The US 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean reo mains stronger than the SovIet fleet, but the Soviet role is more politlca I than milItary The SovIets have not been terribly successful there politically, haVing been thrown out of Egypt and not partIcularly welcomed in any other part of the Eastern Mediterranean However anti-American Libya and Syria "ften appear, the SovIets do not yet seem to have any great oppor- tumties in these countrIes. Although the SovIets may soon .sign a treaty of fnend- shIp and cooperation with Syria, thIS seems to be more of an outgrowth of Syria's money needs than any kind of extensIve political or ideologIcal cooperation. LIbya's leader, Muhamed Qadhaafl, a devout Muslim, distrusts atheists of all kinds, including SovIets. The Soviet prospects in the regIOn In many ways are a functIOn of the US at· titude there In the past, the United States and NATO's othE'r leading members have tended to be more concerned with Front in Europe than with in the north and the southeast. And, at times, rather one- sided US involvement in the Greco· Turkish dispute has also weakened NATO and the US posltioq in the Eastern Medi· terranean. Although the Carter administration moved to end the disrupti ve partial US embargo on arms to Turkey, the overall policymaking of his administration was so erratic that AmerIca's friends, to include those in the Eastern Mediterranean, had made some, If only 76 slIght: movement toward their own private detente with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in the Eastern Mediter- ranean, the signs at present are at least reasonably good for the United States if it begins to exert firmer and steadier leadershIp. With only a reasonable amount of finesse, the United States should be able to preserve and enhance its position in this region.-SIK. The Development of: Soviet Motorised Infantry Born m Battle Magazme, Number 12, 1980 (i?rael) Anyone well-versed in large-scale movements of modern forces could not help but be impressed by the rapidity of the SovIet Invasion of Afghanistan. Th,s operation must evoke admIration when VIewed against the backdrop of the rough tf'fraln and the near-arctic weather con- dItions of the ice and snow-covered.Afghan mountains. Much of the cred,t, accord· Ing to the author, belongs to the motorIzed rifle troops. TheIr development and the histoncal changes in Soviet tactics are the subjects of thIS tImely article. The Soviets have always been fascinat- ed with mechanized mobile warfare. This is perhaps due to the milItary explOIts of the Tartars and, later, the Cossacks In any case, by the Russian CivIl War, the Soviets already possessed 138 armored cars diVIded among 38 sectIOns. So intrigued by the tactical possibIl- ItIes of this type of warfare, gIven the geography of the Soviet Union, the military under the leadership of Marshal MikhaIl N. Tukhachevski developed new doctrines envolvlng combined arms cooperation. The prime role of the tank was to support the infantry, and swift motorIzed columns were to be organized to conduct enveloping attacks on the rear and flanks March of the enemy. Much of this doctrme was conceived in cooperation and consultation with the German Relchswehr which later implemented many of these concepts in the various blitzkrIegs of World War II. The 1930s saw the actual emplacement of the motorized brigade-consisting of two tank battalIons, two motOrIzed infantry battalIons, one reconnaIssance bat· talIon and one artillery battalIon-in the SovIet forces. With a mechanized corps of 500 tanks and 200 armored cani, the battle plan was one of having the motorized infantry follow the tanks for support and further explOIt the situation m the enemy's rear following a breakthrough. Unfortunately, these Ideas, along WIth theIr ongmator, Tukhachevskl. were destroyed durmg the StalinIst purges of 1937. Armored cars and tanks wpre agam reduced to mfantry support misslOns However, thIS change of doctrme did not alter the Soviet fascination with armor. By 1940, they possessPd 24,000 tanks Durmg World War II, there existed ht- tIe transport for SovIet mfantry and no armored personnel carriers I APCs) Consequently, Soviet mfantry was obliged to ride on tanks when closing m on the enemy The early 1950s wltncssed the mtroduction on a grand scale of wheeled APCs in the SOVIet forces. Later models were totally enclosed to survive the reality of the nuclear battlefield How- ever, they were not totally successful since the troops were unable to fight mounted and dlsmountmg was hazardous due to the lack of rear exits Parallel to the mtroduction of these new vehicles was the creatlOn of a new servIce br?'1ch, the motOrIzed rifle arm. All existinl mfantry dIVIsions were con- verted mto motorized nfle diVIsions. REVIEWS The final evolutionary phase was the development of the 8MP 1, an armored troop transport, which possessed enough firepower to enable it to fight on the move as well as to engage targets hitherto ac- cessible only by tanks. The latter was accomplIshed hy an mgenious overlappmg weapons system comprising a long-distance antitank guided weapon, a medIUm- range 73mm smoothbore antitank gun and a short-range RPG7 grenade launcher These attrIhutes, combined with a low silhouette and excellent cross- country capabilIty, gave new life to the old Tukhachevskl mobIlIty and all-arms of- fenSIve doctrIne and restored the doctrine of mounted mfantry. Subsequent to the less-than-adequate performance of the 8MP durmg the 1973 Middle East War, and recent Western antItank defense improvements, the Soviets rethought theIr offenSIve doctnne. Thev now advocate a more fluid, qUIckly sh'iftmg and mobile attack WIth force, spread over WIde areas This doctnne utIlIzes the concepts of "daring thrust" and "deep penetration" with separate tank and motOrIzed rifle approaches As an aSIde, the author feels that such a doctrIne of maneuver demands capabil- ItIes of fleXIbIlIty and deciSIon making from .JUnIor commanders These traIts are foreign to totahtanan SOCIeties. Com- puter SImulators might provide a pOSSIble solutIOn m that they could furnIsh the JUnIor officer with "best" options. However. the author feels that maneuver as the "soul 01 combat" could cause the SovIets real headaches on the battlefield. On the other hand, it wIll demand much greater creatIvIty from the The5e are published as a service to reader!:> EvPI'Y eflort 1<; mad!:' tn em.,Ul"e accurate translatIOn and summanzatIOn However, for mOH' dC'lnIied account:'>. readers should refer to the ongmal artIclps No officwl e-ndorsement oftl1l:" View,,>, opiniOns or fartual htutf'mpnts m the",e Items IS mtended or should be mferred -Editor 1981 77 Then What? Still the Tank In his article, "After the Tank, Then What?" (Military Review, October 1980), Major Orville T. Stokes Jr. asserts that in the near future the tank will fall easy prey to antitank precision guided muni· tions <PGMsl. He forms a scenario in which Warsaw Pact tank assaults are stopped by these weapons. This scenario and the assumptions upon which they are based are invalid. Armor kill probabilities of 80 to 90 percent for PGMs cited by Major Stokes reflect test range performances and have no bearing on their true battlefield worth. In the 1973 October War, used as an example throughout the article, tank kills made by Soviet-built PGMs accounted for only 10 to 13 percent of all Israeli tank casualties. Israeli-operated TOW missiles were employed only III sniping operations and never saw use III high-intensity battle. TOW has half the flight time of Sagger and is automatically guided to its target. Nonetheless, in Western Europe, TOW will face a much harsher test than Sagger met in the Middle East, for it will have to in 'poorer weather and terrain conditions and against an adversary capable of creating a dangerous anti-TOW environment. Unlike Egyptian soldiers who practiced daily for more than three ye'ars before the October War, NATO troops are ill-trained in the use of antitank missiles. In fact, many NATO TOW gunners have neVer fired a round of live ammunition. Likewise, the 80 to 90 percent kill probability of cannon-launched guided projectiles (CLGPs) does not account for battlefield conditions. In battle, communication breakdown and overload 78 occurs, and artillery comes under intense counterbattery fires. More importantly, the high-power laser desig- nators relied on by the CLGPs become vulnerable to detection when deployed in battle and can be countered by tanks, artillery and _moke. There do not exist today mass deployed all-weather sights for PGMs that are capable of penetrating heavy smoke and fog-nor does the probability exist that they will be available in the near future. The high cost of these sights will un- doubtedly limit their presence on the battlefield. Soviet strategy calls for operations in adverse weather conditIOns. The Soviets would employ smoke to protect their forces and, more importantly, would attempt to envelop NATO defensive forces in smoke as well. This tactic, stressed throughout Soviet military manuals, was used to great advantage by Egyptian forces during their attack on the Bar-Lev line. In the 1973 Middle East War, most of the 130 Israeli tanks killed in the first few days were destroyed by PGMs. During this time, Arab armies operated under conditions of tactical and technical surprise, from good geographic positions (ramps behind the can a\) and in a near perfect meteorological and topographic environment. If, under these favorable conditions, PGMs accounted for only 10 to 13 percent of Israeli tank losses, how, then, can PGMs be relied upon for the defense of Western Europe where weather will limit their range and where the enemy will come better prepared? CLGPs, FA SCAM (family of scatterable mines) and the like are unproven systems and are no substitute for strong tank forces. The tank still enjoys the attributes of a major weapons system, for it combines March firepower and maneuverability with good protection. As for the rol.! for artIllery in the active, combined arms defense, Stokes is correct in assigning it an important position. In fact, at times, he underestimates its value. Using 1973 as an example once again, the number of tanks disabled by artillery was far greater than that disabled by PGMs. It should be remembered, however, that under Soviet doctrine, NATO artillery will be one of the first targets to be hit. Much NATO artillery is of the towed varIety and is thus vulnerable. It is too early to WrIte off the tank as a major offensive and defensive weapon. Many tanks may be lost in an assault, but the Warsaw Pact has large reserves. NATO does need more artillery, but it also needs more tanks. Above all, it needs the elements necessary for the successful executIOn of the active defense: trammg, dedication and battlefield leadershIp. Without these, even the most sophis- tIcated weapons will be worthless. Edward T. Schorr, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania OERS Is Not MBO I find no fault with what Captam John E. Stevens had to say III his article, "OERS: Management by ObjectIves" (Military Revlew, November 1980), except to pomt out that the current officer evaluation reportmg system IOERS) is not management by objectives IMBO). Paragraph 4-5f of Army Regulation 623-105, Of- ficer EvaluatIOn Reportzng System, states, "the process does not attempt to force any specific type ofleadership style on the rating chain." He also errs when he states the results of the conversation "are re- corded on the support form"; recording is optional inItially. Captain Stevens is not the only officer who has made these hasty errors, but his mistakes point out the three problems 1981 LETTERS we have always had with the OERS regardless of the form. Officers have: • Failed to read the regulation. • Failed to understand it. • Failed to follow it. The primary function of the officer evaluation report is not to measure a command's MBO program but, rather, to evaluate how one officer performed one duty under one rater. Department of the Army's purpose in the current system is to ensure that there WIll be commUnI- cation and that the rater will have something to put down in between "Sit down" and "Dismissed." D. G. Sandstrom, Indianapolis, Indiana Basic Training I was quite surprised with the Mlhtary ReVIew, and not a little disappomted, when I read Captain Samuel J. Barlot- ta's artIcle, "BaSIC Training: The Verge of Destruction," in the November 1980 issue. I have always regarded the ReVIew as something of a profeSSIOnal journal, characterIzed by temperate, scholarly and generally constructive presentations. How Captain Barlotta's polemic found its way mto that otherwise good company has me wondering. If the object of the article was to spur legitimate debate on the merits of our current initial entry training (JET) philosophy, I would submit that you have done your readers a disserVIce Real and rational concern for the basic training program is swept away by the author's rhetorical excess, and defensive- ness is provoked rather than dialogue. If the article was published simply to permit the airing of an extremist view to contrast the more enlightened Army position, then I think a painfully naive and inexperienced young officer has had those qualities needlessly exposed in the pages of MR. 79 MILITARY REVIEW 1)1 my view, the philosophy behind the Army's lET program is quite capable of standing on its own merit without having to prove itself in the public display of an ill-advised and intemperate critic. If no one else was willing to do it, your staff should have saved the author from himself by returning his manuscript as "not suited to present needs." Lt Col Miguel E. Monteverde Jr., USA, Fort Sill, Oklahoma (One part of the mtsston of MIlItary ReVIew IS to prOl.nde a {orum to thought and ldca (,.1- change on mllztary affairs For thiS reason, WI! are able to prrnt opposlIIg l'leUpOlnts, an el.Ccllcnt e:wmple of which prompted vour A forum cannot eXlst, however, zf only one !:lull' of all argument IS allowed to be mred - -Editor) Have They Changed That Much? It is wLth great interest that I have fol lowed the recent articles in Milztarv Re- Vlew that dealt with the Soviet ariny in Worlu War II. I had the honor of fighting against that "glorious" army from 1942 to 1945 and commanding a German artillery unit from May 1943 through the end of the war. Neither I nor millions of other soldiers on the other side wer.e particularly impressed by the tactics or special abilities of the Soviet army. As an individual, the Russian soldier is brave and will fight to the death, especially when the political commissars drive him forward. He is not, however, and never was, superior to any other soldier in Europe. Also, it is well known that the Soviet army is not a homogeneous one and that it consists of many nationalities who do not get along. For this reason, and also because of poor leadership in the Soviet army, the Germans were able to penetrate deep into Russia and capture more than four million' Soviet soldiers. Without the massive aid provided by the United States, the Soviet army would never have managed to come back. Despite the German High Command's awareness of the intense hatred among the various nationalities in the Soviet army, German generals were too obedi- ent to Hitler and did not have the guts to resist his idiotic policies and the inhuman treatment of Russian civilians by special units-units that should not be confused with the Wehrmacht as a whole. It is now time for Western analysts to study ways of splitting the Soviet army from the inside, an opportunity which the Germans had but missed entirely. Should another war occur, special attention should be given to.oensuring the proper treatment of captured Soviet soldiers. They could determine the outcome of the war, as it is known that two million Soviet soldiers fought against Stalin in World War II despite poor treatment by the Germans Stalin was a shrewd and cunning man who understood that a war agamst Mother Russia was far different from a war against his brutal system. Because he understood this difference, he managed to convince millions of young Russian patriots to fight against the in- vaders who turned out to be occupiers instead of liberators. Lt Col Zvonimir I. Maras, USA, APO New York 09178 Letters IS a feature deSigned expressly to afford our readers an opportumty to air thelf Opinions and Ideas on mlhtary tOPICS. It IS not restrIcted to comments or rebuttals on previously pubhshed materIal but IS open to any variety of whIch may stImulate or Improve the value of thought In the mIlItary commUnity 80 The rIght to edIt IS reserved by the staff of the magaZine and exercised pnmanly In deference to avaIlable space -EdItor March . 1981 UNITED STATES LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE UPDATE Five foreign countries and at least three US corporations have indicated an interest in the Marine Corps' new I1ght armored vehicle (LAV) program -a program that might finally bring Wheeled combat vehicles to the US military. The LAV program will use eXisting off-the-shelf vehicle deSigns as a cheap and qUick means of increasing the mobility and firepower of Marine Corps combat to be used in the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) (MR, Jul 1980, p 86, and Nov 1980, p 75) Although tracked vehicles will not be excluded. from the competition, LAV speed and nOise speCificatIOns appear. heavily weighted In favor of a wheeled vehicle. US firms will face stiff competition from firms in England. Canada, France. Brazil and Germany, all of which have wheeled combat vehiCles in production throughout the world Of the announced partiCipants In the LAV program, only AAI Inc. plans to enter a tracked vehicle In the competition. That particular company developed the experimental High-SurVIVability 'rest Vehicle-Lightweight (HSTV-L) (MR, Jul 1980, P 84) for the US Army. ApproXimately 250 to 300 LAVs are planned to be bought for the Marine Corps. When deployed in mld-1983. the vehicles will fill the Marine near·term reqUIrement for a light, highly mobile combat vehicle for the RDF until they are replaced in the late-1980s by the now developmental mobile protected weapons system According to Manne Corps specifications, the LAV will have 10 variants. Its near-term variations will Include Infantry support, assault gunireconnalssance, command control, mortar carrier and maintenance/recovery. Other follow-on variations Will include air defense, electronic warfare, engineer, logiStiCS and ambulance. In performance, the LAV must be diesel-powered, be capable of 50 miles per hour on a level paved road, be no more than 29,000 pounds at full combat weight and be able to travel 400 miles at 30 to 40 miles per hour on a tank of fueL-OMS Aero- space IntellIgence, 1980. The MIlitary ReView. the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff College assume no for accuracy of Information contained In the NEWS section of thiS publication Items are pnnted as a service to the readers No offiCial endorsement of the views. opinions or factual statements IS Intended -Editor 81 MILITARY REVIEW RADAR GUIDES MISSILES THROUGH SMOKE 82 A still largely unexploited form of radar has demonstrated ItS ability to track targets and gUide missiles accurately through smoke and n;lin as part of a technology experimen.t program aimed at enhancing the Army's ability to fight in adverse combat environments. The radar used operates in the millimeter wave region of the electro- magnetic region of the spectrum. This lies betw(;en the lower frequency conventional microwave radar and the higher frequency Infrared. For purposes of the expenments. a millimeter wave radar unit was used to guide the Hughes Aircraft Company-built Army TOW to stationary targets. In three of the successful launches. the target was obscured by heavy smoke and aerosols. In one of these. the final shot in a series. the TOW antitank missile was guided to the target even though the smoke-shrouded visibility was further detenorated by light rain. Millimeter wave radar is of interest to defense planners because it is superior to conventional radar in angular resolution and is better than infrared in penetrating adverse weather and other battlefield obscurants such as smoke and dust. Microwave radar and infrared are currently the most com- monly used means of tracking targets and guiding missiles in conditions of poor visibility. March 1981 NEWS AUTONOMOUS MISSILE DEMONSTRATED The first flight of what IS believed to be the world's first totally autonomous missile has successfully been completed by Ford Aerospace and Com- munications Corporation. This latest test of the Self-Initiated Antiaircraft MIssile (SIAM) demonstrated the fea- sibility of what could become a new family of small tactical missiles. The SIAM requires no launch support or fire control equipment, and it provides the user a substantially improved capability through the use of an advanced dual-mode (radarlln- frared) seeker. This SIAM flight test was a complete success, producing a lethal pass on a QH50 drone helicopter instru- mented to appear as a moving full- size helicopter. The target helicopter, remotely controlled from the ground, was at an altitude of 1,500 feet and 2 miles downrange. The launch motor ejected the missile vertically from its launch tube to a peak height of about 500 feet. The missile, through jet reaction control, was spun to search an entire hemisphere for a target Since the SIAM is given no target information before launch. Upon finding the helicopter, the spin was automatically stopped and pitchover toward the target initiated. When the radar-tracking antennas locked onto the target, the pitchover stopped and the main flight motor ig- nited, accelerating the SIAM toward the target. As the SIAM approached the helicopter, guidance was automatically transferred from radar to the infrared seeker to perform the extremely accurate terminal homing. Since its Incepllon In 1977, the SIAM program has been sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and administered by the US Army MIssile Command. The purpose of the program is to develop" dual-mode seeker to provide autonomous search, lock on and track and to develop and demonstrate the technology for a small tactical missile to defend against aircraft and helicopters.-Electronic Warfare Digest, All Rights Reserved 83 ~ MILITARY REVIEW CH47 MODERNIZATION BEGINS 84 The US Army's Aviation Re- search and Development Command (AVRADCOM) awarded Boeing Vertol Company the first CH47 Modernization Program production contract. Under this contract, Chinook helicopters will be remanufactured to the new CH470 configuration (MR, Mar 1980, p 83). The remanufacturing of older Chinooks was decided by the Army to be the most cost-effective way to increase the flexibility of Its medlum- lift helicopter fleet's operational capabilities, lower operating costs and extend fleet life. The signing of the productIOn con- . tract marks a significant milestone in the modernization program. After four years of development and testing, it IS entering production. The CH470, with its improved operational capabilities, reliability and maintainability charac- teristics, will extend the life of the CH47 fleet through the end of the century. Flexibility is a hallmark of the CH470. The aircraft, which has a maximum gross weight of 50,000 pounds, can carry 33 troops outfitted in full combat gear, or, with its external cargo hooks, a variety of important battlefield equipment can be lifted without being dismantled, Including: • An M198 howitzer complete with 32 rounds of ammUnition and an 11- man operating crew weighing 21,800 pounds. • An M113 armored personnel carrier weighing 20,000 pounds. • A Caterpillar 05 tractor (bulldozer) weighing 24,750 pounds. • Six fuel bladders filled with JP4 Jet fuel weighing 21,000 pounds. • A rough terrain forklift weighing 23,500 pounds. Initial deliveries are expected to begin in May 1982. M ~ r c h 1981 NEWS SPAIN VAP AMPHIBIOUS LOGISTIC-SUPPORT VEHICLE The Spanish navy IS currently pro- cunng the VAP amphibious 10g1St1C- support vehicle designed to carry stores and eqUipment from transport ShipS, standing some distance off- shore, to the beach and cross country The vehicle was developed by Empresa Nacional de Autocamlones (ENASA) to meet Spanish navy re- qUirements for a vehicle suitable for participating In amphibious-assault operatIOns. The 4X4 VAP has a hull made of steel plate 6 millimeters thick and divided Into several watertight com- partments. The vehicle IS propelled through water by two't-slngle-stage hydrOJets dnven by a hydraUliC pump linked directly to the rear-mounted main engine. The vehicle IS also equipped with semlelliptical leaf- spring suspension and a dual-brake system. The mechanical assemblies are almost Identical to those found on the Spanish army's Pegaso 3045 and 3050 ail-terrain trucks, but modified for a marine environment The VAP's cargo-carrying capacity is 3 tons. Its maximum road speed is 90 kilometers per hour, while its range is approximately 80 kilometers. The hull's angle of approach IS 33 degrees, and ItS angle of departure IS 27 degrees. The vehicle IS said to be capable of operating even In high waves The water-Jets are designed to enable the vehicle to turn on its aXIs and travel astern. Its fuel consumpllon IS estimated at 15 miles per gallon.-Inter- nattonal Defense Review, :0; 1980. 85 · MILITARY REVIEW PEfVPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 86 FIELD ARTILLERY COMPUTERS The People's Republic 01 China (PRC) has reportedly slgl'led a con· tract with Marconi Space and Defence Systems for the purchase of electronic fire control systems for Its Field Artil- lery Computer Equipment (FACE) batteries. According to Its manufacturer, FACE can Increase the effectiveness of every known type of field artillery (including unguided rockets) by automating the preparalion of gun-firing and surveying data. In addition, it allegedly reduces manpower requirements, shortens training time and eliminates human error under battle conditions. All the informalion required to fire the shell qUickly and accurately IS calculated and displayed by a mobile computer. At the touch of a button, correct firing data is displayed at each individual gun. The system apparently is intended to reinforce and enhance the effectiveness of the Chinese artillery Units. This IS part of a modernization program that seems more and more to be based essentially on Western technology. For the time being, It is Europe to whom the PRC is turning in the military implementation of ItS "four mod- ernizations. "-Ground Defence International, © 1980. March I 1981 NEWS AUSTRALIA NEW FIRE SUPPORT VEHICLE (FSV) The end of the Vietnam conflict also signaled the end for the Australia-de- Signed fire support vehic1e-a US M113 modified to accept the turret of a Saladin armored car The 76mm gun mounted on the turret was no longer considered ballistically adequate. '" \/..!b/- . ~ ~ f r , , " -;. ... r' "r! ~ - ~ ~ 1 - After studying several alternative proposals for a substitute vehicle that could assume the mission of the older modified M113s, the Australian army decided to fit the turret of the British Scorpion light armored vehicle to the hull of the MI13A:. The outcome IS the new FSV which combines the fire capacity of the ScorpIOn with the Uni- versally recognized virtues of the M113Al. The new FSV IS primarily Intended for Australian reconnaissance unit training tasks. Two FSVs are normally teamed with two scouting vehicles and a personnel carner to form a reconnaissance unit. As all three vehicles are M113A 1 s, the result IS a highly homogeneous group in which maintenance and the supply of spare parts are greatly simplified.-Ground De- fence International, © 1980. 87 MILITARY REVIEW 88 FINLAND COUNTERMASS ANTITANK ROCKET LAUNCHERS Shown for the first time outside Finland at the Asian Defense Expo' In Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, was the Raikka family of recoilless antitank weapons developed on the countermass principle. The excep- tionally simple and low-cost Ralkka weapons have now been developed and tested in a variety of calibers from shoulder-fired 41mm (see photo) and 55mm up to field a1'ld vehlcle- mounted 120mm. A 150mm vanant IS also available. Using smoothbore or rifled pressure tubes (bought from England) which are open at both ends, the Ralkka weapons have no breech mechanism and eliminate recoil by uSing a countermass (of water, fine steel gnt or sand) placed In the rear of the tube behind the propellant charge. The shoulder-fired weapons fire HEAT (high-explosive antitank), time- fuzed HE (high explosive) and 11- IlJminating projectiles. The heavier 81mm to 150mm caliber types can also fire APDS (armor-piercing discard- ing-sabot) and fin-stabilized, hyper· velocity APDS (HVAPDS-FS). The 120mm version, for example, can fire the tungsten alloy kinetic energy pene- trator of a 6-kllogram HVAPDS-FS round at a muzzle velocity of more than 1,500 meters per second. This gives a flat trajectory and effective penetration of up to 400mm of armor at ranges up to 1,500 meters. In all verSions. the trigger acts on a spnng-Ioaded exterior rod running back to the rear of the launch tube. The rod has a rear-facing flnng pin which fires a .22-caliber cap projecting from the rimmed base of the combined propellant charge/countermass cartridge loaded Into the rear of the tube behind the projectile. The cap ignites a pyro- technic train running forward through the countermass to the propellant charge, thus firing the round.-Inter- national Defense Review, © 1980. March O ~ O O S " BABES IN ARMS: Youth in the Army by David Goltlteb 173 Pages Sage Publtcallons. Beverly Hills. Calli 1980 $1495 In June 1978, Professor David Gottlieb and a team of assistants from the Univer- sity of Houston interviewed 115 first- term enlisted men and women at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The soldiers were asked why they enlisted, what theIr ex- pectations of the Army were, about their experiences with and Impressions of Army recruiters, about Army life and work, and how they felt about the Army and themselves as soldiers. For the most part, these soldiers Jomed the Army to better theIr education, acquire a vocatIOnal skIll or simply to get a job. Most belIeved that recruiters misrep- resented the opportunities the Army of- fered, and a majority expressed feelings of boredom and Job dissatIsfactIOn. Never- theless, almost to a person, these soldIers felt that they had benefited from theIr Army experience. On another note, most of the interviewees felt personally challenged by basic trainIng but doubted their own readiness to fight. Few had thought about war or what war would require of them. Some said they would not fight. One white 18-year-old declared that he would only fight If the war were "here in the U.S. 'Cause I Just joined for the money, I didn't join to go to war and get killed or nothing.' " Gottlieb claIms he is not out to prove anything with this book. He offers no thesis and lays no claim to comprehen- siveness. This IS simply a report. But there is little reason to suspect that the soldiers Gottlieb and his colleagues interviewed at Fort Sill are unique. On that basis, he makes several recommenda- tions. t'irst, the Army needs to make a better 1981 effort to ensure that its recruiting rhetoric matches the reality of the soldier's life. For example, if the Army insists on continuing to stress educational and vocational training opportunities, it must expand both programs. In fact, Gottlieb believes that the Army ought to de-emphasize vocational skill traming and stress its "abIlity to enhance maturity, leadership skIlls, phYSIcal conditioning, and a sense of independence and self- relIance." lie also proposes an elimination of re- cruiter quotas and argues that recruiters be measured on the "staying power of their recruits and less on the number of youths recruited." Finally, the author suggests that the Army conSIder estab- lishmg a system that would assist former soldiers in getting postservice educatIOn, training or employment. Two significant shortcomings of Gottlieb's book are the absence of detailed demographic data on the interviewees and a list of the questIOns they were asked. In the introduction, Gottlieb makes reference to some appendixes that were apparently left out by the publisher. This is unfortunate, for it would be help- l'ul to know more than the soldiers' age, race and gender. SpecIfically, the reader should know the interviewees' education, previous employment and socioeconomic level. Nevertheless, this is an Important little book. It can be r,-,ad in one or two sit- tings. All officers and noncommissioned officers who think they understand enlisted soldiers or who want to get a better understanding of the attitudes and opinions of today's soldiers toward the Army and theIr place in it should read this book. Mal Robert K. Griffith Jr .. USA. Combat Studies Inslilute. USACGSC 89 MILITARY REVIEW THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR by Hamat F Scott and William F Scott 439 Pages Westview Press. Boulder. Colo 1979 $2750 clolhbound $1250 paperbound ' The affordable paperback edition of this valuable reference work is very wel- come; it should be read by every Ameri- can concerned with the Soviet threat. Eleven of its 12 chapters deal comprehen- sively with three maJor topics: fundamentals of Soviet milItary doctrine and strategy, a military force for the nuclear age and a nation in arms. The book is based on voluminous translations from the Soviet military press and on the authors' firsthand observations I they served at the US Embassy in Moscow for four years-1962-64 and 1970-72), In addition to concrete data on or- ganizational structure and key personnel, there are many revealing msights into the Soviet military mind land Western mismterpretations of the same) For example, our confidence m the deterrent effect of mutual assured destructIOn "is irrelevant in the Soviet context." In reality, the major emphasIs and sizable resources devoted to civilian defense since the 1960s "may ... have upset the strategic balance." To take another example, Marshal Ustinov's appointment as defense minister in 1976 was seen by many in the West as a rejection of the military and a reaffirmation of civilian control, "concepts that represent Western mirror- imaging and are without any factual basis." Some strIking points emerge from this scholarly study: Soviet leaders expect to survive and win a nuclear war. Accord- ingly, their true goal is not parity, but military superiority. In contrast to their "peace-loving" pronouncements, they have been deliberately militarizing their youth for more than a decade-a fact largely ignored in the West. "The military indottrination of the presclfool child did not begin until the mid-1960s, after the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev." !Emphasis added.) The authors provide detailed docu- mentation for such disturbing conclu- 90 sions and other controversial points. Keeping current on the complexities of the Soviet military establishment is a full-time job, and it is understandable that the authors may lack depth in Rus- sian history. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that they did not consult a historian on their first chapter-an over- view of the Red army from 1918 through 1945-whlch contains most of the errors in this otherwise reliable work. Examples of the errors are: The infamous Munich Agreement was arranged in 1938 not 1937, and the Soviet Union did not declare war when it attacked Finland on 30 November 1939. Also, Trotsky did not negotiate the Treaty' of Brest Litovsk. Trotsky initially used the Brest Litovsk meetings as a propaganda platform and then disrupted them by his quixotic for- mula "no war, no peace." The treaty was ij signed (not "negotiated") by Sokolnikov, and Trotsky was not even present at the final meetings. Despite such histoncal errors, I strongly recommend this book for its com- prehensive presentation and keen ap- praisal of the contemporary Soviet armed forces. Allen F. Chew. Combat Sludies Inslilule, USACGSC THE WESTERN ALLIANCE: European-American Relations Since 1945 by Allred Grosser Translated by MlChae! Shaw 375 Pages Conllnuum Publishing Corp. NY 1980 $1950 To see one's self through the eyes of a friend is nearly always enlightening though not always comfortable. The same point can be made for seeing a nation through the eyes of a friend. In this cajle, the nation is the United States. The friend is Alfred Grosser, a French citizen who is a polItIcal scientist, columnist, teleVision commentator and a prolific author on public affairs. In The Western AL- liance: European-American Relations Since 1945, he examines the postwar transatlantic relationship from the Euro- pean perspective. March Dr. Grosser begins his discussion with a look at the prewar and wartime foundations of the postwar world. Also included is an interesting section on the uneven course of relations between Charles de Gaulle and his Anglo-American Allies, the fallout from which has lasted to the present. From there, The Western Allzance takes a basically chronological course through the major transatlantic Issues of the postwar world These include the struggle to reconstruct Europe after the war, the creation of NATO and the major economic and polItical 'controversles which have disrupted the alliance from time to time. One theme running throughout the book IS the rise of the European Economic Community from a concept m the minds of Jean Monnet and a few other vision- aries to a financIal and commercial reality and titan. This book provides the reader With an excellent presentation of the major trends of postwar transatlantic relatIOns. It IS highly recommended Maj David L. Walkins. USA, Counterintelligence Department, Fifth US Army Area Inlelligence School A CONTINENT ASTRAY: Europe, 1970-1978 by Waller Laquour 293 Pages Oxford University Press, N Y 1979 $15 00 Walter Laqueur is the director of the Institute of Contemporary History and Wiener Library, London, and is a recognized authority on international affairs. He offers a wide-rangi ng analysis of the major problems that face contemporary Europe. These problems are of such com- plexity that he says, "Europe of the 1970's presents a melancholic picture of frag- mentation, internal squabbles, and aimlessness. " The easy answer IS to blame it all on the state of the European economy during this period. But Laqueur considers the economic considerations to be only one ev- 1981 BOOKS idence of the crisis and not the decisive one at that. Equal consideration must be given to the mental state of individual Europeans and the resulting behavior of their nations. The author uses the 19th- century psychiatric term of "abulia" to describe Europe as a whole. Its meaning and use, when it was used as a term, related to a lack of will. The 1970s have shown that groups of people or nations can suffer from mental disorders in a similar manner as individual people. The book IS orgamzed into nine chapters with each describIng a facet of the European economic and political spec- trums The chapter titles in order are: "AbulIa or the State of Europe"; "Euro- Economics"; "European Politics, 1970- 1978"; "Eurocommunism"; "Euro- socialism"; "EuronatlOnalism"; "Detente In Europe"; "Finlandization"; and "Euro- pean Perspectives." The last two chapters present the core of Laqueur's theme of abulIa. He de- SCrIbes the basis of the term Fin- landlzation and what it means to Westerners and to the Finns. He argues that the threat of Fmlandization to the whole of Europe is a basic factor m the development of the state of abulia. The term essentially descrIbes a "process or state of affairs in which under the cloak of friendly and good neighborly relations the sovereignty of a nation IS reduced." Over a perIod of time, the country concerned (Finland m the historical in- stancel adapts its government personnel and ItS foreign policy to accommodate the wishes of the stronger power. Laqueur brings out, however, that there are opposing views on this defini- tion. The official Finnish interpretation is that the word is an invention of those who have a misunderstanding or lack the will to understand the position of Finland and its foreign policy. Opposing views or not, the author's final chapter states that the danger of Finlandization applies to Europe's position with respect to the Soviet Union, the 91 'MILITARY REVIEW United States and the oil-producing countries. His contention early in the book was that a malaise occupies Europe to such an extent that no dynamism exists in national life. He considers it a' dis- tinct possibility that Europe will· simply evolve into an accommodation with the two superpowers and the oil producers. This accommodation, in itself, will be a version of Finlandization. The author hopes, however, that other factors in Eu- rope can work toward the offsetting of any such accommodation. The book ends on a faintly optimistic note with Laqueur stating: The posslblirties for a recovery of Eu- rope certainly eXIst and WIth them the hope for a new beginning out of the Inertla and the present confUSIOn. The next chapter of European hIstory WIll probably not be a pleasant one, but nor wIll II be the last. John L. Griftin, Combined Arms Combat Development Activity BOMBER COMMAND: The Myths and Reality of the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939·45 by Max Hasllngs 399 Pages D,al Press. NY 1979 $12.95 Max Hastings can be forgiven for the misleading title which conveys the im· pression of a complete examination of the United States-United Kingdom strategic bombing offensive against ..Nazi Ger- many. Hastings' current offering, Bomber Command, recounts the British air offensive only-but what a superb effort results. Anyone interested in dIscovering "the way it was" in the air over Germany must read this stirring of men at war. Bomber Command tells the history of that remarkable campaign on two levels: from the air headquarters view and from the view of the aIr crews. Each succeeds admirably. The impossible doctrine that "the bomber will always get through" launched Britain into World War II with inadequate aircraft that could not hit tar- 92 gets at night and could not break through the German defenses during daylight. Without fighter protection, the efforts of deep daylight penetrations were hopeless. Hastings describes the air crew environment through the chapters devoted to six live bomber squadrons at various stages in the war. ThIS technique dramatically captures the tedium and the terror in their lives. On a larger scale, the bomber strategy was always questIOnable. The British inability to conduct precision bombing led to the strategy in late 1941 to switch to area bombing-an approach for whIch they were internally criticized on moral grounds. Some believed that it contributed to the "terrible moral collapse" in the war. Whatever the case, the Bomber Command did keep alive British hopes untt! the Allied combat power took the war back onto the Continent in mid- 1944. It also pern,itted BritaIn to respond offensively against its enemy with the only powerful weapon available, particu· larly dUrIng those dark days from 1939- 42 when England VIrtually stood alone. High-level strategIes and high-level heroics blend together with telling effect In this excellent addition to the history of World War II. Col John G. Fowler Jr., USA, Combined Arms Combat Development Activity THE UNITED STATES IN THE 19805. Ed,led by Peler DUignan and AlVin Rabushk.a 868 Pages Hoover Inslttullon Press, Stan- lord. Calif 1980 $2000 As stated In the preface, this book is "a • review and analYSIS of major domestic and International issues that will face the United States in the 1980s." It is not an exhaustive study, but it is, nevertheless, a scholarly work on the perplexing problems that all confront today. Prominent talent from the disciplines of economics, political science and history is aligned for concise exposition of vari'ous March optimistic and pessimistIc vIews as to how to deal effectively with both problems and opportunities in the domestic and foreign policies of this nation. The list of con- tributors is impressive and includes such familiar scholars as Robert A. Scalapino, Milton Friedman, P. T. Bauer and 29 other renowned and widely respected specialists. There IS a foreword by W. Glenn Campbell who is director of the Hoover Institution. He says that the United States is entering the 1980s in a mood of peSSImism but agrees with the speciahsts' arguments that we have an alternative There is also an introductIOn by co-edItors Peter Duignan and Alvin Rabushka, both senior fellows ofthe Hoover Institution It is a concise summary of the essays that wdl follow. The co-editors hope that theIr work will stimulate discussion and debate and, therefore, contribute to the resolu· tion of our current problems The book is divided into two parts. In Pa,rt I, "Domestic Issues," edIted by Alvin Rabushka, 14 domestIc pohcy Issues (including economy, tax, welfare reform, social security, bureaucracy, energy, environment, health, hOUSing, education and public opmlOn) are examined. Diffi- culties and possible alternatives are also assessed. In Part II, "Foreign Affairs," edIted by Peter Duignan, the authors examine nine foreign policy issues (arms control, Soviet nuclear pohcy, foreIgn intellIgence, technology, world energy, foreIgn aId, foreIgn or international economy and international business I and six areas' problems (Asia, West Europe, East Europe, Middle East, Latin America and Africa!. In all tnese, the authors analyze the central issues, describe the policy choices open to the nation and recommend spe· cific courses of action to deal WIth the problems. For policymakers-military or civilian -scholars, journalists, businessmen, political scientists, economists, hIstOrians, politicians and common citizens alike, this book will prove to be faSCinating and 1981 BOOKS thought-provoking. Most of all, the authors convincingly demonstrate that there are realistic limits to America's ability to solve all the difficulties, domestic or international. They also stress that we Americans should make a bold beginning on facing the new reality. They un- derline the fact that America's predicament is not going to be alleviated unless every American's cooperative effort with our nation is launched. II Ro Suh, Baker University THE CENTRALIST TRADITION OF LATIN AMERICA by ClaudiO VeliZ 355 Pages Pnnceton UnIVersity Press. Pnnceton. N J 1980 $22 50 clothbound $9 75 paperbound BolIvia's elected democratic govern· ment, In office less than two months, is overthrown in a military coup and re- turned to a dIctatorship. Does a similar fate lie in store for the continent's remaining l1edgling democracies: Ven- ezuela, Peru and Ecuador? In his latest book, Claudio Veliz offers a penetrating analysis of the Latin American proclIvity for stable central authority at the expense of mdivldual freedom. Latin America IS portrayed as a con- tment apart-observing, participating vi- cariously, but seldom contributing to the social and economic revolutIOns which produced contemporary Western order. The absence of religIOUS dissent allowed the ReformatIOn to pass almost un- noticed. The French Revolution caught the imagination of a vocal but isolated in- telligentsia, but failed to sway a conservative, vested bureaucracy. The industrial revolution passed as a dust storm WIth VIrtually no proletariat or sympathetIC mercantile class in which to take root. Veliz attributes this firm resistance to change to the strength and rigidIty of the early Spanish colonial administration. Three centuries of bureaucratization created a powerful constituency wedded to the status quo. . 93 MILITARY REVIEW Veliz argues convincingly that this middle. class with its strong sense of order and direction has long dominated Latm American politics. The traditional aris- tocracy has by and large refrained from involvement in the political arena. Th,e caudplos-Peron, Stroessner and eVen Castro-rose to power at the behest of these conservative elements. Veliz sees the military as an extension of this bu· reaucratic elite, an 'elite which has reduced the region's three revolutIOnary movements to single-party systems. This theme, the Latm's overriding pref· erence fol' order and routine, has dominated the writmgs of Professor Veliz over the last two decades. In this book, he restates this thesis with a force that IS at once convmcmg and less than reassurmg for democratic prospects m the region. Veliz should be read by all those charged with creating and executing our polIcies toward Latm AmerIca-particularly those who see human rights as ultimately preferred and transcending order and stability. Col John W. Messer, USAR WORLD ARMIES by John Keegan 843 Pages Facts on F,le. N Y 1979 $4000 Considering the recent u r ~ of books by and about things military, It is startling that no one has thought before nuw to put together such a reference work as this, in any language. Since 1945, the number of armies in the world has doubled. At the end of World War II, for instance, there were only four independent armies on the African continent, whereas now there are'more than 30. This record has been matched elsewhere, mainly in other developing nations, Under the direction of John Keegan, senior lecturer in war studies at the Royal Mil.itary Academy, Sandhurst, and author of the well-known study, The Face of Battle, a team of historians, political scientists, sociologists and specialists in 94 international relations and area studies has examined every standing army in the world. Their aim has been to "provide a portrait of each army in its domestic context; historical, social and political as well as military." Each of tbe more than 150 entries follows a particular scheme, 'detailing the army's history, its strength and budget, its command and constitutional status, role, commitment, deployment and recent operations, organization, recruit- ment, training and reserves, equipment and arms industry, regalia, and current developments. The sum of these compendia makes a volume which is ap- pealing in its coverage and detail-some of it probably impossible to obtain elsewhere-on the military establishments of all the world's nation-states, and thus a volume which is the dream of serious observers of the international mIlItary scene. The volume will serve well both oc- casional and constant researchers interested in the details ofa particular country's army. The work also stands as a kind of collective biography. The por- traits of these armies show us military establishments whIch thrive despite the absence of any reahstic threat from withm or without, and there are many. As Professor Michael Howard reminds us in his introduction, only older armies are so bound by such reasons for existence. The maintenance of newer armies depends upon justifications much more tenuous: as emblems of national develup- ment, as proofs of legitimacy to both the citizenry and the world at large and for a congeries of other reasons decidedly nonmilitary. But, whatever the country, these armies are inextricably bound to the nations they sometimes serve and sometimes control. World Armies should acquire a large readership, including professional officers of any nationality. It is a welcomed book, Roger J. Spiller, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC March .. EIN STOCK VON UNS by Roll Vogel Hase & Koehler, Main" GE. OM 32 The place of Jews in the German armies hetween 1813 and 1976 is detailed in this little-known and researched piece of Ger- man military history by Rolf Vogel. Who would have realized that 12,000 Jews gave their lives for the Vaterland in World War I-a number greater than the losses incurred by the Israeli forces in all four PalestInian conflicts? This book of four chapters begins with the military and social environment of 19th-century Germany In whIch even then anti-Semitic tendencies are noted, Even though Kaiser WIlhelm II asserted at the beginningofWorId War lthat he did not recognize ethnic or racial differences, there were many cases of discrimInation Yet 100,000 served in the armed forces of Imperial Germany and received both ac- colades and decorations, That these citizens were proud to serve is IndIcated by a quote from the diary of LIeutenant Zuerndorfer, killed in action as a pIlot In 1915: "As a German I serve to help my oppressed fatherland, But also as a Jew to fight for the equalIty of my brothers," The most depressing chapter deals with the "Third Reich," In that era, highly BOOKS decorated ,Jewish officers were physically abused aml even murdered. But there were Wehrmacht officers who stood up for the persecuted-truly a beacon of hope in Germany's darkest hour, In the final chapter, Vogel discusses the situation of Jews in the postwar Bundes- wehr, Although Jews are fully integrated into all branches and barracks bear the names of Jewish war heroes of World War I, many times their backgrounds and families are unknown to their fellow soldiers, Consequently, it would appear that there exists yet some Angst (anxiety) felt by the Jewish servicemen in the Bundeswehr, The author himself was recruited into the army and rose to the rank of first lieutenant before he began this book which, incidently, has been awarded many prizes, In essence, this is a tragic volume deserving the full attention of the younger, as well as the older, generation, not only of Germans, but of all peoples, This book demonstrates conclusively that these German Jews were as German as any BavarIan, Swablan or Saxon, Col Wolfgang Gerhardl, GE Army, Direclor of Ihe Exercise Division (Bundeswehrj, G/adbach, GE NEW BOOKS RECEIVED ThiS hFitmR 19 pubhshed to brmg new prof"""lOnui books to thl' attention ofrl'adcn, Books nrc Il\udublc for rc\icw purpo!>l's toquuhficd profl''lsionuls, For more mformlltlOn, contiH:t Dr Don Nca'l(', Books Editor, at (913)68-1·5642or AL'TOVON 552·5642 FLIGHT INTO EGYPT by Amos Elan 264 Pages Doubleday & CO,NY 1980 $1095 THE ALMANAC OF WORLD MILITARY POWER; Fourth Edlfion by Colonel Trevor N Dupuy US Army Aebred, Grace P Hayes and Colonel John A C Andrews. US Air Force, Rellred 418 Pa- ges PresidiO Press, Son Ralael. Calli 1980 $40 00 AMERICAN GUERRILLA IN THE PHILIPPINES by Ira WOllert 242 Pages Banlam Books, N Y 1980 $2 50 AMERICAN SECRETARIES OF THE NAVY Volume I; 1775· 1913, Volume II; 1913·1972, Edlled by Paolo E Colella, Dr Ao· bert G Albion and Dr K Jack Bauer 1,028 Pages US Naval InSlitute Press, Annapohs, Md 1980 $5995 AMERICANS AT WAR, From the Colonial Wars to Vielnam by Wilham j Koenlng 352 Pages G P Putnam s Sons, N Y 1980 $2895 1981 FRANCIS PRESTON BLAIR by Elbert B Smllh 481 Pages Free Press, NY 1980 $1500 AMERICA'S MILITARY PAST; A GUide to Information Sources: VolUme 7 in the American Government and History Informa- tion Series. Edl1ed by Jack C Lane 280 Pages Gale Research Co , DelrOl1, Mlch 1980 $28 00 ANSWER TO HISTORY by Mohammad Aeza Pahiavi. the Shah 01 Iran 204 Pages Stem & Day. BrIarehll Manor, NY 1980 $1295 APOCALYPSE; Nuclear Calastrophe in World Politics by LoUIS Rene Beres 315 Pages University of Chicago Press, Chicago. III 1980 $2000 APPLlED,ECM; Volume 1 by Leroy B Van BrunI 973 Pages EW Engineering Inc, Dunn LOring, Vo 1980 $3995 ARABIA, THE GULF OF THE WEST by J B. Kelly 530 Pages BasIC Books, NY 1980 $2500 95 MILITARY REVIEW ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: Texts and tIIstorles of Negotiations: 1980 Edition. 239 Pages US Government Printing Olilce. Washington. 0 C 1980 THE ARMY AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA. 1945·1962: Pe· ron to Frondlzl by A. Potash 418 Pages Stanlord Uni- versity Press. Stanford. Calif 1980 $25 00 ARMY BRAT: A Memoir by Wltllam Jay Smith 225 Pages Per- sea Books. N Y 1980 $1500 THE ART OF JOYCE'S SYNTAX IN ULYSSES by Roy K Gott- tried 191 Pages University of Georgia Press Athens. Ga 1980 $1500 ARTILLERY IN COLOR, 1920·1963 by tan Hogg 187 Pages Ar- co Publishing. NY 1980 $1195 ctothbOund $795 paperbound ASSAULT ON ETERNITY: Richard E. Byrd and the Exploration o.f Antarctica. 1946-1947 by Llste A. Rose 292 Pages US Navat tnstltute Press. Annapolis, Md 1980 $19 95 ATOMIC SOLDIERS: American Victims of Nuclear Experi· ments by Howard L. Rosenberg 192 Pages Beacon Press Bos- ton. Mass 1980 $11.95 AUSTRALIANS AND EGYPT. 1914·1919 by Suzanne Brugger 178 Pages tSBS tnc. Forest Grove. are 1980 $2450 BAT-21: Based on the True Story of Lieutenant Colonellceal E. Hambleton by Wilham C Anderson 188 Pages Prentice-Hail Englewood CII"s, N J 1980 $995 BATTLE OF BRITAIN by Len Delgoton 224 Pages Coward McCann & Geoghegan. N Y 1980 $1995 THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. Ediled by Gerald Siandley 15 Pages Candle Press. Garnesville, Fla 1980 $1 50 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND by Geollrey Bennett 208 Pages Hlppocrene Books. NY 1980 $1495 BATTLE OF THE BULGE. 1944 by Naplel Croo,enaen 160 Pa- ges Scnbners, N Y 1980 $17 50 BATTLESHIP BISMARCK: A Survivor's Story by Burkard Baron von Mullenhelm-Rechberg Translated by Jack Sweetman 290 Pages US Navalfnstltute Press Annapolis, Md 1980 $1595 BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. Edited by RIChard E Caves and Lawrence B Krause 388 Pages Brookings Institution. Washmgton, 0 C 1980 $t8 95 clothbound $795 paperbound THE NAKED FLAGPOLE: BaHle for Bataan: From the Diary of Richard C. Mallonee. Edited by AlChard C Mallonee II 204 Pa- ges PreSIdiO Press, San Aalael. Calli 1980 $11-1)5 CAESAR'S INVASION OF BRITAIN by Peter Berreslord EllIS 144 Pages New York UniverSity Press. NY 1978 $t750 CAMOUFLAGE: A History of Concealment and Deception in War by Guy Hartcup 160 Pages SCribner's. NY 1980 $t495 THE CHIEFS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. Edited by Robert Wil- liam Love Jr 448 Pages US Naval Institute Press. AnnapoliS Md 1980 $28 95 CHINA SINCE MAO. Edited by Kwan Ha V,m 202 Pages Facts on File. NY 1980 $1500 CIVIL AIRCRAFT OF THE WORLD by Gordon Swanborough. 176 Pages SCribner's, N Y 1980 $12 95 A CIVIL WAR COURTSHIP: The LeHers of Edwin Weller From Antietam to Atlanta. Edited by William Wallon 202 Pages Doubleday & Co. NY 1980. $11 95 CIVIL WAR NURSE: The Diary and LeHers of Hannah Ropes, Edited by John A Brumgardt 144 Pages UniverSity ofT ennessee Press. Knoxville. Tenn. 1980 $1250 COMBAT FLEETS OF THE WORLD, 1980/81: Their Ships. Air· craft. and Armament. Edited by Jean Labayle Couhat Translated by A. D. Baker III 794 Pages US Navallnshtute Press. AnnapoliS. Md 1980 $6495 96 A COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS: NATO and the Military Assis- tance Program. 1948·1951 by Lawrence 5 Kaplan. 251 Pages US Government Pnntlng Office. WaShington. 0 C 1980 THE COMPLETE MEMOIRS OF GEORGE SHERSTON by Sleg- Ir,ed Sassoon 656 Pages. Faber & Faber, Salem. N.H 19BO $2395 clothbound. $13.95 paperbound CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS: Second Edlllon. Edited by DuPre Jones 215 Pages Congressional Washlnglon. 0 C 1980 $6.95 CUSTER'S WEST: Map I: An "Unknown" Region: Map 11: Sus' plclous Paper; Map 111: Well Known Land: Map IV: The Ray- nolds Map of 1875: Map V: The Western Territories, 1876; Map VI: A Map From Custer's POCket. Map Posler Senes edited and annotated by W Kent King J MOrriS & ASSOCIates. Washington. DC 1980 $2250 DARBY'S RANGERS: We Lead the Way by Witham a Darby WIth William H B$.umer 198 Pages PreSIdio Press. San Ratael. Calli 1980 $14.95 DEADLY QUARRELS: lewis F. Richardson and the Statistical Study of War by DaVid Wilkinson 206 Pages UniverSity of Cali- forma Press. Berkeley. Calli 1980 $1850 THE DEATH Of THE TIRPITZ by LudovlC Kennedy 176 Pages Lmle, Brown & to Boston. Mass 1979 $1495 DECISIONS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNIT· ED STATES: Volume 58: October 1, 1978, to September 30, 1979. 974 Pages US Governmenl Pnntlng Office WaShington. DC 1980 DEFENSES OF NARRANGANSETT BAY IN WORLD WAR II by Walter K. Schroder 131 Pages Rhode Island PubhGahons Socie- ty, ProVidence. A I 1980 $5 95 THE DEPENDENCE DILEMMA: Gasoline Consumption and America's Security. Edited by Damel Yergln 180 Pages Harvard Umverslty Center for International Affairs. Cambrrdge. Mass 1980 $495 DESPERATE SIEGE: The Battle of Hong Kong by Ted Fergu- son 252 Pages Doubleday & Co, N Y 1980 $1095 THE DIARIES OF PRIVATE HORACE BRUCKSHAW. 1915- Edlled and IntrodUCtion by Manln Middlebrook 229 Pages Archon BOOks. Hamden. Conn 1979 $1850 DIARY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION by Carlos FranqUi Trans- lated by Georgette Felix, Elaine Kerngan, Phyllis Freeman $.nd Hardie 51. Manln 546 Pages Viking Press, N Y 1980 $25 00 clothbound $1695 paperbound DRIVING WITHOUT GAS by John Ware Lincoln 150 Pages Gar- den Way PUblishing Co. Charlotte. VI 1980 $695 KENNEDY AND ROOSEVELT: The Uneasy Alliance by MIChael A Beschloss Foreword by James MacGregor Burns 318 Pages W W Norton & Co. NY 1980 $1495 EAST TO AMERICA: A History of the Japanese In the United State. by A Wilson and Blit Hosokawa 351 Pages Willi"'" Morrow & Co. NY 1980 $1295 EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE by Wilham Appleman Williams 226 Pages Oxlord University Press, NY 1980 $1495 ETHNIC SOLDIERS: State Security in Divided Societies by Cynthia H Enloe 276 Pages UniverSity of Georgia Press. Athens. Ga. 1980 $1900 EUROCOMMUNISM BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. Edited by Vernon V. Aspatunan. Jill Valenta and DaVid P Burke 373 Pages Indiana UniverSIty Press. Bloomington, Ind 1980 $32.50 clothbound $9 95 paperbound w u E' o FIFTH ARMY AT WAR by George Fony 144 Pages SCribner's. '" NY 1980 $1750 March Documents Similar To Military Review March 1981Skip carouselcarousel previouscarousel nextFile-140191050425818052FM 7-7J Mechan. 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