M. Ayoob - Inequeality and Theorizing in International Relations, The Case for Subaltern Realism (2002)

Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern RealismAuthor(s): Mohammed Ayoob Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 27-48 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186462 Accessed: 25/06/2010 13:16 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The International Studies Association and Blackwell Publishing are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Studies Review. http://www.jstor.org Inequality and in The Case Theorizing International Relations: for Subaltern Realism Mohammed Ayoob ow does the impactof inequalityin international relationsaffecttheorizing in InternationalRelations (IR)?' I use "internationalrelations" to refer to the subject of our analysis and "InternationalRelations" to describe the discipline that aspires to study the subject. InternationalRelations reflects and reproduces the inequality present in the disposition of material capabilities in the internationalsystem. Power translatesinto dominationin the sphereof the manufacturingand reproductionof knowledge. Dominationin the arena of knowledge further legitimizes inequality in the internationalsystem because it augments the capabilities at the command of dominant states and societies by adding "soft"power to "hard"power. Breaking the monopoly that controls knowledge demands that we seriously attempt to present conceptual alternatives to the dominant theories in IR. Leading academic institutions in powerful countrieshave producedthese theories and thus caterto the perceived requirementsof the policymaking communities in major capitals. I attemptto provide an alternative,or at least a supplement,to make a dent, however modest, into the inequality that pervades the field of IR. This essay makes several pleas and presents a perspective, but it does not claim to furnish a paradigmcapable of explaining the entirety of international relations to the exclusion of all other perspectives. It pleads for greaterinclusivity in terms of the phenomenathat are observed for the purpose of drawing generalizationsin InternationalRelations. In social science terms, it argues for broadening the universe from which data are selected to generate theoretical propositions.At the same time, it is a plea for less "theory"(especially in the attheInternational StudiesAssociation 1An earlierdraftof thispaperwaspresented conventionin Chicagoin February2001 as one of the featuredpresentationson the key themeof the convention. ? 2002 InternationalStudies Association Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF,UK. My perspective. 31-54. I build on the normative insights of the English School aboutproviding orderto an internationalsociety 2For an early iterationof subalternrealism.greatermodesty in our claims for our favored perspective. Martin's Press.First. "Subaltern Realism:International RelationsTheoryMeetstheThirdWorld. InternationalRelations Theoryand the ThirdWorld(New York:St.see MohammedAyoob. finally."sets out to do exactly this. I shall build upon three scholarlytraditionsand then attemptto integratethe insights gleaned from them with the internationaland domestic contexts within which the majorityof states operate currently. such a perspective has enormous capacity to explain two of the most importantissues that any IR theory must satisfactorilyexplain to be credible: (1) the origins of the majorityof currentconflicts in the internationalsystem."in StephanieG. Second. I build on the insights of the historical sociological literaturethat relate to state formationin modernEuropefrom the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries and have contemporaryrelevance. 1998). The two issues are inextricablyintertwined with each other. a plea against mindless "scientism. Neuman. Yet it does argue that it is relevant to a particularepoch because it can provide meaningfulexplanationsabout importantissues that are relevant to that epoch." which attemptsto find law-like generalizationson the model of the physical sciences.. while modifying and adapting earlier perspectives to fit contemporarysituations. It is. as well as mattersof war and peace. like Thomas Hobbes. writing in a context of domestic as well as internationalanarchy.28 MohammedAyoob singular) and more perspectives.pp. It does maintainthat it has the capacity to fill importantgaps in the IR conceptual literaturethat currently dominanttheories. and (2) the variables determining the domestic and external behavior of the majorityof members of the internationalsociety regardingconflict and order. Third.""Perspective" thrives by building upon earlier insights. . Simultaneously. ed. therefore. This does not mean that scholars should eschew rigorousand carefultesting of alternative explanations. It is historically shaped and does not lay claim to universality across time. especially neorealism and neoliberalism.2 It does not claim to be timeless. and for more explicit reliance on the exercise of judgment and."it does not claim to be the sole repositoryof "truth. I build on the insights of classical realist thinkers. All it denotes is that we must desist from making claims about finding timeless universal laws divorced from historical context.As I shall explain below. A perspective by definition does not exclude other perspectives because unlike "theory. which I call "subalternrealism. who were primarily domestic order theorists. nor does it profess to supplantother perspectives in IR. are unable or unwilling to fill.I attemptto put forwarda perspective that is inadequately emphasized and barely discussed in IR theoreticalliterature. "3 Finally. Hurrell and Ngaire Woods. interests.41-60. 1984). eds. I especially engage Hedley Bull's attempts in his later years to reconcile the norms derived from a Europeaninternationalorder with the expansion of international society after World War II. These theories successfully explain importantaspects of how the internationalsystem works. This limitation does not render such theories completely irrelevant as explanatorytools. 3 (1977). I attempt to marry the cumulative insights of these scholarly traditions to conclusions deduced by observing the behavior of the majority of states in the contemporarysystem and by decipheringthe causes of most of the currentand recurrentconflicts in the internationalsystem. The monopoly over the constructionof theoreticalknowledge depicts fundamentally the problem of inequality in both internationalrelations and International Relations..K."Order. as well as theoretical conclusions that have now come close to being accepted as "truths"(even if competing "truths")worldwide.. . dominatedas it is by American scholarship. the production and reproduction."5 3 Forexample. This knowledge monopoly is intimatelyrelated to the monopoly over what forms the legitimate subject of study in IR.: Clarendon Press. U. In IR theory. and contemporarydilemmas of the large majority of states. and contemporary dilemmas of a certain portion of the society of states at the expense of the experiences.pp."Daedalus106. 25."who gets to make the rules within which international relations proceed and who decides how and where to enforce them. we can sum up this issue as follows: not only is knowledge power.eds.Yet all of the contesting truth claims have one thing in common: they privilege the experiences. In this context. andInequalityin WorldPolitics. more substantively. The Expansion of InternationalSociety (Oxford. To achieve these multiple objectives. Yet it does restrict radically their explanatory power because they fail to reflect fully the totality of the phenomenathey purport to explain and aspire to predict.construction and reconstructionof conceptual assumptions. Inequality. some marginally and others more dramatically. an expansion that had its roots in what Bull characterized as "the revolt against the West.The Case for SubalternRealism 29 based on a fragile consensus among its members.4These theoretical assumptions and conclusions may diverge from each other. "TheRevoltagainstthe West. Globalization. It shapes the thoughtpatternsof policymakers and analysts alike across much of the globe."inAndrew 5 NgaireWoods.1999).p. Globalization.depictthis phenomenonmost clearly. Put simply. we must begin by grapplingwith the issue I first stated. as well as.No."in HedleyBull and Adam Watson. 4 StanleyHoffmanncapturedthisrealityclearlya quartercenturyago in "AnAmericanSocialScience:International Relations. and WorldPolitics (New York:OxfordUniversityPress. but power is knowledge as well.see HedleyBull.pp. 217-228. interests. InternationalTheory:Positivism and Beyond (New York:CambridgeUniversity Press.Approachesto World Order(New York:CambridgeUniversityPress. 7RobertW.. "All theories have a perspective. and the research that builds upon their basic assumptions are unable to satisfactorily meet the challenge that Michael Mann has posed to IR theorists: "What we outsiders really want from IR is substantivetheory on its most importantissue of all: the question of war and peace. 221."as scientifically oriented scholars would aver) to provide answers to the question of war and peace."7 In their pursuitof "scientism."in RobertW. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space.30 MohammedAyoob This leads to a major problem that could be potentially self-defeating. and the neoneosynthesis thatcapturesthe increasinglyexpandingcommon groundbetween them. even for those who are the primaryexponents of such theories and for their natural constituencies among the policymakers and commentators in the capitals of the major powers." Cox argues further:"There is.Neorealism and neoliberalism suffer from two problems in this regard. it is the more importantto examine its ideology. "SocialForces. As a result of this limitation. divorced from a standpoint in time and space.KenBooth. Second.andWorldOrders:BeyondInternational RelationsTheory."in SteveSmith. the predominanttheories in InternationalRelations try to portray themselves as "scientific" and encourage the misleading conclusion that they are the repositories of "universal" laws that transcendtime and space. which Robert Cox sums up succinctly. no such thing as theory in itself.1996)."neorealism and neoliberalism.andMarysiaZalewski. . Such a portrayal of "theory"defies the basic logic of theorizing in the social sciences. have lost substantiallythe sense of both geography (limited as their universe is in terms of geographiclocale) and history (including the history of the A Contribution fromCom6Michael Mann."Authoritarian andLiberalMilitarism: parativeandHistoricalSociology. the dominantparadigms in InternationalRelations.p.p. emphasisin original. 1996). it does not reflect many of the major realities in the contemporaryinternationalsystem. and to lay bare its concealed perspective. theorizing on the basis of inadequate knowledge of the historical and geographic contexts can be misleading and counterproductive. 87. neorealism and neoliberalism. When any theory so represents itself. Sinclair. Since much of the theoretically sophisticated IR analysis is based on premises that are of limited relevance. First.States. they neglect a major part of the political universe that must form the basis of observation (the source of "data. accordingly. Cox. Cox notes that in the social or human sciences. eds."6 Since questions about war and peace cannot be addressed without referring to the context in which conflicts occur and are managed and resolved. Cox with TimothyJ. and Zalewski.. "International .philosophy.N. for we can explain change only if we have a vision of historical continuity (including the discontinuities embedded in the historical record) and spatial inclusiveness. it restricts their potential to accommodateand explain change in the internationalsystem.The Case for SubalternRealism 31 geographic area from which they draw much of their data). No were realism and liberalism 'incommensurable'-on the con1980s. eds. theoretical andtheybecametherebyincreasminimalism.. InternationalTheory.eds.8This shortcoming deprives much of the theorizing done under the rubricof the two paradigmsof historical depth and geographic comprehensiveness. ContendingApproaches to InternationalPolitics (Princeton. 163-164. Baldbridgetheneorealist-neoliberal gapandcreatea neo-neosynthesis.. a conception science.1969)."See MartinWight.a shared trarythey willingnessto operateon thepremiseof anarchy(Waltz)andinvestigatetheevolution of co-operationandwhetherinstitutionsmatter(Keohane). 1966). DiplomaticInvestigations (London:Allen and Unwin. ed.and Buzaniansecurityanalysiscan all be seen as locatedin this field.alliancetheory.eds.. longer shared of a 'rationalist' researchprogramme."p. "International Theory:TheCasefora ClassicalApproach.butit certainlydid not becomea theory.. Neorealismand Neoliberalism:TheContemporaryDebate (New York:Colum- bia UniversityPress. and acutely conscious of its temporaland geographiccontext and the limitations accompanyingit. Rosenau."Duringthe 1980s. does not make false "scientific" claims. 20.claimedthatthere cannotbe an "international theory." Knorrand James N.'0 Nor does it lay claim to methods of analysis popularin the naturalsciences. 1oOneof the leadinglightsof the EnglishSchool."The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate. The contrastbecomes particularlyclear when we juxtapose the "scientific" approachof neorealism and neoliberalism against what Hedley Bull called the "classical approach"to InternationalRelations. in Klaus 9HedleyBull.In other words. win."II It is this "explicit reliance on the exercise of judgement"that provides the clue to the fact that scholars in the classical traditionare better able to expand 8According to Ole Waever. 1'Bull. and law.:PrincetonUniversityPress. Bull described the classical approachas "a scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition [thatis] characterizedabove all by the explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement.. Regimetheory.Booth. A dominant became theresearchprogramme of the neo-neosynthesis inglycompatible.cooperationunderanarchy.hegemonicstability...tradenegotiations. The EnglishSchool did not propounda theory.J.Both underwenta self-limitingredefinition towardsananti-metaphysical. "WhyIs There No InternationalTheory?"in HerbertButterfieldandMartinWight. the classical approachespecially as employed by the English School. For an exampleof the scholarshipattemptingto see DavidA..9Imbuedwith history.MartinWight.1993).pp.It developedan approachthatmayhaveturnedintoa traditionor even a school (althoughthe lattertermmaybe too strong).."Ole Waever.realismbecameneo-realismand liberalismneo-liberalinstitutionalism."in Smith. Theory. Vincent.see the worksof R. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in WorldPolitics (New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress. including those thatembody internationalnorms. he recognized that this universe was shrinking further in importance because the major empirical source for generalizing aboutthe futureof the internationalsystem had moved beyond the original Europeanhomeland of the modern system of states. among 12For alizing the Westin InternationalRelations (New York:Palgrave.'2 This awareness made Bull realize during the last decade of his life that the universe from which he had drawn his material for his magisterial work.Englishschoolscholars equateinstitutionswith practicessuch as sovereignty. A valuableadditionto thisgenreis JacintaO'Hagan'sbook. Furthermore. which I find to be relevant to the contemporarysituation.institutionsarepracticesembeddedin the fabricof international society.. from "the long history of observation and reflection on internationalrelations and from the many theoristswho have contributedto thattradition.Inorderto understand theinstitutionof for an school would advocate a historical sovereignty. demonstrateclearly..theinstitutionsof international societyhavea longerhistorythan theproliferating regimesof thelatetwentiethcentury. 75-76. 2002). English approach to it of the term and the state leaders at particularhismeaningsgiven by sociology of toricaljunctures. which emphasizedthe expansion of internationalsociety.Conceptuothers.Holsti. pp."Such reflection inclines them to accept the idea that change and movement are not only possible. but also inevitable.32 MohammedAyoob their horizons and select materialfrom wider geographiclocales and historical sources.J.thediplomaticdialogue. As Bull's last works.2000). It does so not merely because it can take into accountunfolding events and the emergence of new social forces.'3 In addition.Suchaninvestigationis notamenableto the 'neo-neo'requirement of like contention testable across cases. 15The historicalandintellectualdepthof the EnglishSchoolbecomesclearwhen we compareits definitionof institutionswiththe neoliberalone. TheAnarchical Society. The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (New York:OxfordUniversityPress. but also by permittingits practitionersto learn.internationallaw. 13Hedley Bull.moreover. as is often assumed.balanceof power. as Robert Jackson points out.] framing hypotheses the neoliberalmodelis thatcooperationcan be understoodwithoutrecourseto com- ."14 My own recent work has attemptedto combine the historical groundingof the classical tradition-in terms of both the history of institutions. the classical approachprovides a sense of history and is open to the idea of change and movement.'5 I example. was even more limited than he had been willing to concede until the mid-1970s..and K.andwar. example. the crucial [Furthermore. 14Robert Jackson.1977).RobertJackson. and ideas formulatedby the greatthinkers of the past.J.this reflection leads scholars in this traditionto realize that the crux of historical analysis reflects the maxim that "Theory is hostage to practice and not the other way about. "ForEnglishschool theorists. WithWightandBull. repeated in a smaller measure in the early 1990s.emphasisin original.the perspective must explain adequatelyissues of war and peace. To retain its significance.but whose importancehas been inadequatelyrecognized in IR theoretical literature. 186. the transformationsthat have taken place in the society of states during the past fifty years. while asserting at the same time its pertinence in terms of unraveling the currentmysteries of war and peace. A principalreason why IR theoristsin the West and especially in the United States neglected the importance of this factor from 1950 to 1990 was their preoccupationwith the bipolarity that emerged in the wake of World War II. Martin'sPress. Neorealism and neoliberalismfail to performthese twin tasks because neither can explain adequatelywhy the majorityof states behave the way they do internationallyand domestically. A combinationof these two interrelatedfactors holds the key to explaining the behaviorof the majorityof states. . The analysts' fascination with bipolaritybecame an obsession with superpower monbeliefsor sharedvalues. the perspective must be able to explain why the majority of conflicts occur when and where they do.But . both as beginnings and causes.The first of these is the unprecedentedincrease in the numberof new states as a result of rapid decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s. To meet Mann's criterion for successful theorizing in InternationalRelations.thushelpingthe policymakingcommunity. conflict and order. a coreassumptionof HedleyBull'sis theway in whichinternational cooperationis rootedin the sense of beingboundby intersubjec- tively created rules. Any perspective that claims to provide an intellectually satisfactory explanationin the field of IR must be able to explain adequatelythe behaviorof the primaryunits constituting the internationalsystem." Tim Dunne. They also fail to explain sufficiently the origins.p. Furthermore. and particularemphasis on. as well as the origins of the majorityof conflicts in the internationalsystem. Inventing International Society: A History of the EnglishSchool(New York:St.The Case for SubalternRealism 33 have tried to combine this with a keen sense of. of the majority of conflicts in the internationalsystem today. My perspective is particularlyinfluenced by the normativetensions created by two major factors operatingin the internationalsystem during the past half century...They fall shortin performingboth these tasks adequately because they pay insufficient attentionto the preeminenttransformationarising from the numericalexpansion cited above.1998). The second factor is the continuing attemptby these new members of the system to replicate the Europeantrajectory of state making and nation building in a vastly different internationalsetting where the postcolonial states are much more vulnerable to physical and normative intrusionfrom outside. My approachis historically groundedbut makes no claim to timelessness. The latterfunction may also indicate how such conflicts can be managedanddiffused. it is importantto concentrateon these two factors as explanatoryvariables. ."in GwynPrinsandHylkeTromp.andaccumulations powerunnecessaryas precisionreplacesbruteforce. Such revolutions have been a consistent feature of the modern system of states. descriptionof revolutionsin militaryaffairs(RMA)well. spawning deterrencetheories based upon the notion of MutualAssuredDeterrence(MAD).but they also added to the ahistoricalnatureof much of the theorizingin the field. whichis manifestedin conventionalhigh-techweaponsandlinkedto the information andcommunications revolutions.. it failed to end war and conflict in the international system. The nuclearrevolutionfits this (Boston:KluwerLaw International. This expansion of the internationalsociety led to the entry into the system of postcolonial states with certain sharedcharacteristics. [Second.. Thecurrentphaseof RMA.."Revolutions in MilitaryAffairs. '7HedleyBull arguedthatthe "balanceof terror"was but "a specialcase of the balance of power" (The Anarchical Society. p.which set them 16LawrenceFreedmanstatesthatthe revolutionin militaryaffairs. Yet when seen from a long-term historical perspective. economicmobilizationless relevant. 230. . Bipolarity was but one. 112).of which the nuclearrevolutionis a part. More important. bipolarityand nuclearweapons not merely overshadowedall other post-World WarII developments as far as IR theorists were concerned. while unquestionablyimportant.17 We can arguethatbipolarityandnuclearweaponswere second-orderchanges.Manpowerhas of raw becomeless important.has manifested"threebasictrendsover the pastcentury. [Thirdand paradoxically.the reachof militarypowerhas been steadilyextended. The last was clearly demonstratedby the events of 19891991. Not only the strategic studies discourse.. The development of nuclear weapons was a part of the continuing saga of the revolutions in military affairs that have renderedweapons more lethal and accurate. especially when comparedto the unprecedentedexpansionof the system's membership.eds. these two developments. transitorymanifestationof the balance of power mechanismthat had helped ordergreatpower relations in the internationalsystem for some four hundredyears.16 The nuclearrevolution may have ruledout directconfrontationamong nuclearpowers with secondstrike capability. This was the case because bipolarityand nuclearweapons were perceived to be novel featuresby both theorists and practitioners.but it ended neither competition among the great powers nor their rise and fall.] societyas a wholeseemsto be decliningwhenit comesto wagingwar. As two defining elements of the Cold War..34 MohammedAyoob rivalry following the introductionof nuclear weapons.is thelateststageof thisrevolutionandcomplements the nuclearone.. p.]as the rangehas been extendedso all aspectsof civil society have become steadilymore the degreeof dependenceupon vulnerableto attack. albeit the latest. TheFutureof War 2000). but also a greatdeal of the IR literaturecame to be dominated by nuclear concerns."LawrenceFreedman.did not make a fundamentaldifference to either the workings of the internationalsystem or the norms of international society. First. despite the fact that in the realm of security-the majorpreoccupationof neorealist thinkers-the new states redefined the very notion of the security dilemmaby making it primarilya domestic ratherthan an interstatephenomenon. Classic Readings in InternationalRelations.19 Kenneth Waltz's and John Mearsheimer'sargumentsabout the superiority of bipolarity over multipolarityin terms of providing order and stability to the internationalsystem expose more clearly than others the inability of the dominantparadigmsto addressmost states' securityissues andto capturethe dynamics of the overwhelming majorityof conflicts in the internationalsystem. Waltz. eds.pp.see Mohammed Ayoob. 2d ed.Yet this was not the case duringthe past half century because postcolonial states were generally weak.The Case for SubalternRealism 35 apart from most other established members.20 In making this case. the Future:Instabilityin Europeafterthe Cold War. since it had the ability to generate changes that would outlive the temporaryfascination with bipolarity and nucleardeterrence. thus renderingabsurdthe concept of absolute gains-the leading neoliberal assumptionwith regardto cooperation under anarchy.Mass.1999).:HarcourtBrace.1994). and powerful members of the internationalsystem.. eds. The Cold Warand After: Prospects for Peace.Dependence. vulnerable.Regional Conflict. affluent. The Political Economy of Underdevelop- ment(New York:CambridgeUniversityPress.1996). The State. This neglect persisted. 1995). '19Fordetails. Lynn-Jonesand Steven E. the postcolonial states stood the logic of interdependenceon its head.Donald Goldstein."in Sean M. ed. The neglect of this variable in theorizing about internationalrelations was a glaring demonstrationof how inequality works in both internationalrelations and InternationalRelations.77-85.Tex. (Cam- bridge.pp. not interdependence.:MITPress. 20KennethN. Colo. 1983). these states were vastly unequalto those seen as the "moversand shakers" within the internationalsystem.defined the pattern of their economic relationship with the established.and the State of War(New York: CambridgeUniversityPress.: Lynne Rienner. and poor.. andJohnMearsheimer. 2d. Their security predicamentalso demonstratedthat the external security concerns of the majority of states could not be easily separated from those of internal security."TheStabilityof a BipolarWorld.'8 Such preoccupationwith internal security would have been perfectlyintelligibleto Hobbesbuteludedthe understanding of contemporaryneorealist thinkers. Miller. . they ignore the fact that stability in Europe was achieved at 18sFordetails. War. Also see Kalevi J. Therefore. 141-192. Astute observers of the international system should have perceived this expansion as possessing the potential for majorlong-termnormativeand empiricalimpact."in PhilWilliams.and the InternationalSystem(Boulder. In the realm of economics. upsettingmuch of the validity of the neoliberal argument. Holsti.The ThirdWorldSecurityPredicament:State Making. "Backto (FortWorth. see Amiya KumarBagchi. and Jay Shafritz. 1984).21 Similarly. ed. 23The democratic peace thesis. It also assumes economic affluence and societal cohesion within these units and."World Politics 43. N. see Robert Keohane. especially if we put such gains in a long-term perspective.andsocietalcohesiveness. Cooperation underAnarchy (Princeton. above all.J. possibly the most influential offshoot of neoliberalism. 105-139.. Yet much of this comes at great cost. 1986). the neoliberalemphasis on absolute gains as the primarybeneficial outcome of cooperationwithin an anarchical system assumes much interdependenceand a high degree of identification with each other among actors engaged in cooperation.36 MohammedAyoob the expense of stability and orderin much of the rest of the world.22The conclusions do not correspondto reality when applied to the internationalsystem as a whole but are the result of several factors. WorldOrder(Canberra: Also see MohammedAyoob.They neglect the fact that most ThirdWorldstates are economically and militarily far too dependent on their external benefactors to benefit substantiallyfrom relationshipsbased on the notion of absolute gains.J.with frequentmajor negative political and social effects and exacerbationof intra21 Sisir Guptacapturedthis realitythirtyyears ago in a seminalarticle. and KennethA. indeed reap some immediate benefits. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the WorldPolitical Economy (Princeton. like InternationalMonetaryFund (IMF) and World Bank loans or military hardwareby cooperatingwith the industrializedstates. N.the neoliberalthesis on cooperationunderanarchyskews the data in favor of affluent. SuperPowersand AustralianNationalUniversityPress. "Great PowerRelationsandthe ThirdWorld. 2 (1991). which often leads to deindustrializationand structuraladjustment. suffers acutely from confusing cause with effect. Oye. including prematureeconomic liberalization. thus intensifying disorderin the international system. and especially their regimes. pp. . Insteadof recognizing democracy as the dependent variable that results from long periods of territorialsatiation.: Princeton University Press. The result exacerbated conflict in the peripheryboth within and among states. economicaffluence.It variablesdeterminebothdemocratic refusesto recognizethatthesesameindependent outcomesandpacificrelationsamongmatureliberaldemocracies.. First. Many of these states. 22For more on the neoliberal or liberal institutionalistpositions. 257-283. industrializeddemocracies of the global North that form a small minorityof the total membershipof the internationalsystem."in CarstenHolbraad. territorialsatiation(whethervoluntaryor enforcedby the outcomeof two "world" wars) in their relationshipwith each other. 1971). No.ed.: PrincetonUniversity Press.it assignsto it the role of the independent variablethatmakesinterstateinteractionsamongdemocraticstatespeaceful. pp."TheSecurityProblematicof the ThirdWorld.23 These assumptionsgeneratea false sense of mutuality. The unwillingness of the superpowersto challenge the statusquo in Europewas more than compensatedby their eagerness to choose sides and fight intrastateand interstate proxy wars in the Third World. Moreover.andthe remainderwas dividedamongmorethan100 poor nations.8 developingcountriesreceived about20 percent. SAARC. As Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson point out.25 Such statistics make much of the "interdependence"and "absolutegains" arguments appearirrelevantas far as the majorityof states are concerned.2d ed. "The Great Divide in the Global Village. No.The Case for SubalternRealism 37 state and interstateconflicts. Most of these states are neither economically affluent nor socially cohesive.Althoughtherehave been some attempts at building institutionsto promote security cooperationand increase economic interactions among regional states (including ASEAN.the trulypoorcountriesreceivedless than7 percentof the foreigndirectinvestmentto all developingcountriesin 1992-98.they interact with other statesthatpossess similarcharacteristics. 25Bruce R. Rather foreign direct investment (FDI) is highly concentratedamong the advanced industrial economies and the ThirdWorldremainsmarginalin both investment and trade. 164. 2."24 Bruce Scott has pointed out the following: The total stock of foreigndirectinvestmentdid rise almostsevenfoldfrom 1980 to 1997.p.Globalizationin Question.1999). increasingfrom4 percentto 12 percentof worldGDPduring thatperiod. .U. they have met with limited success. The relationship among contiguous and proximate states has been mostly one of suspicion.In 1997.about70 percentwentfromonerichcountryto another.if not more important. 1 (2001). Scott.intrastateand interstateconflicts have become intertwinedin the ThirdWorldfor numerousreasons. take place among the triad of North America. Equally.Accordingto the WorldBank.K.the fact thatthey cut through 24Paul Hirst and GrahameThompson. Europe. and ECOWAS). These include the arbitrarynatureof the colonially craftedboundariesof postcolonial states.Butverylittlehasgoneto thepoorestcountries. and Japan.:Polity. if not outrightconflict. Furthermore. and many suffer from the impulse of irredentismand the threatof secessionism. These costs raise doubts about the notion of absolute gains in terms of North-Southrelations. Many regional cooperationarrangementshave been bedeviled by the covert if not overt hostility among members of regional institutions." Foreign Affairs 80.which lead to interdependence in a "globalizing" world.the concept of absolutegains fails to capture the reality of interstaterelationshipsamong ThirdWorldcountries themselves. (Cam- bridge.the overwhelmingmajorityof economic interactions. p. "Capitalmobility is not producinga massive shift of investment and employment from the advanced to the developing countries. Since much of the interactionof ThirdWorld states-especially in the security sphere-is limited to their immediate neighborhood. a small minority of newly industrializingcountries apart. Moreover.and. As the history of early modern Europe clearly demonstrates. which can be constructedusually at the expense of neighboring states. Most states that have emerged into formal independence within the past fifty years are currently struggling to approximatethe ideal of the Westphalianstate by acquiringeffectiveness andlegitimacy within a drasticallyshortenedtime frame and in highly unfavorablenormative and practical circumstances. In addition. By doing so. the nature of many of the regimes within these countriesthat promoteexclusionary rather than inclusionarynation building projects. It is essential to posit a supplementary. I believe the perspective also must demonstratethe capacity to provide intellectually satisfactoryexplanations for the origins of the majorityof contemporaryconflicts in the internationalsystem. This has been a subject of perennial importancein politics.26 The inability of the dominantparadigmsto addressthese realities. ch.To demand that they transcendthe Westphalianmodel and open themselves to unbridled 26For details. It also illustratestheirinability to explain the behavior of most states in the internationalsystem. it must be able to demonstratethe illusory nature of the broader liberalagendaandespecially of its maverickoffshoot. above all.perspectiveto the currentlydominantIR theories. globalism. as any readerof Hobbes or Niccol6 Machiavelli would divine. . the reality that some violence inevitably accompanies early stages of state making. It must investigate above all the natureand internaldynamics of most states in the internationalsystem. It would take a very farsightedpolitical leader to visualize the benefit of absolute gains in such a politically charged context.concurrent state building among neighboringpolitical entities is usually a recipe for conflict and leads to the search for relative ratherthan absolute gains. it will be able to expose the interconnectionsamong domestic and internationalorderissues. let alone capturethem. andunfavorableones obstructsuch efforts. such a perspective must be able to transcendthe ethnocentrism of neoliberalism that limits its universe largely to one corner of the globe.38 MohammedAyoob groups that can be considered to have primordialties to each other.perhapsalternative. where the security and sometimes the survival of states and regimes hang in the balance. 3. This search is based on the simple logic that favorable regional balances. Such a perspective must surpass the simplistic structuralassumptions of neorealism. Also. The ThirdWorldSecurity Predicament. which attempts to impose a set of normative constraintson state action that are largely inapplicable to the state-making stage where most states find themselves. As most contiguous andproximatestates are usually at similarstages of state and nationbuilding and their populations overlap with each other. aid the state-making projectsof particularstates. these processes often have transborderimpact.esp. results in their incapacity to explain the origins of most conflicts in the internationalsystem. see Ayoob. (b) the astute analysis of historical sociology. especially the literaturethat pertains to state formationin Europewhen states therewere at a similar stage of state makingthatmost Third World states find themselves today. The latter task is essential because it is these problems. Collapsed States: TheDisintegrationand Restoration of LegitimateAuthority(Boulder.is now the sole and indispensable provider of order within territoriallyorganized polities. see I.principallyHobbes. while attempting to provide domestic order. among others-will be sufficient to recognize the verity of this proposition." whichcapturesthephenomenon of statefailurein manycasesbetterthan"statecollapse. the state forms the cornerstone of tolerable political life within discrete territorialcommunities. as human society progresses and develops to a "higher"stage. I believe that an alternativeperspective with sufficient explanatorypower can be fashioned successfully by drawing upon the insights emanating from various sources identified above. Although this could change in the future. the state continues to be the principal actor in the internationalsystem. We must begin this exercise by reiteratingthat despite the proliferationof nonstate actors and their increased capacity. especially Hedley Bull's analysis of the expansion of international society and its impact on internationalnorms.which is essential for routine societal interactions to be stable and predictable. Without it life would be truly "poor.. Robert Jackson in his latest book. among others. to influence international and national outcomes.27and (c) the normativeperspicacityof the English School. in relative terms. These insights then must be combined with a judicious interpretationof the currentdomestic and external." A cursory glance at the cases of state collapse or "state evaporation"28-Somalia." 27A 29For details. that generatemost conflicts in the internationalsystem.N. Colo: Lynne Rienner. and Congo. a tradition currently representedby. Since no other institution can provide this order.ed. The Global Covenant.J.29 Globalization does not so much marginalize the state as make it transparentthat only those states that possess the capacity to ade- leadingexampleof such scholarshipis CharlesTilly.The Case for SubalternRealism 39 economic and political penetrationby powerful external forces. brutish and short.. nasty. 1995).normativeand practicalpredicamentsfacing the postcolonial states. Liberia.1975). . TheFormationof NationalStatesin WesternEurope(Princeton. as the exclusive repository of legitimate authority. William Zartman.:PrincetonUniversityPress.defies all political logic. many of them relatedto early state making and late entry into the states system. 281 am gratefulto KeithKrausefor introducing me to theterm"stateevaporation. Sierra Leone. it is clear that the state. These include: (a) the penetratingobservations of classical realist thinkers. ed. as well as determinethe external and domestic behavior of most states. "Tradingin Illusions."TheEclipseof the WorldPolitics50.the road map for weak states is not to transcendthe Westphalian state and adopt post-Westphaliancharacteristics (whatever that may mean for polities struggling to establish themselves).it is equally true that to be legitimate over the long term.only effective statehoodcan help solve the economic underdevelopmentandpoverty problemsthatplague much of the ThirdWorld."p. in exchange for opening their economies. No.PeterEvans. the dynamics of interactionamong the great powers and the affluent. industrializedstates of the global North. Only by approachingthe Westphalianideal more closely can the postcolonial states provide stable political orderdomestically and participateon a more equal footing in writing and rewritingthe rules of internationalorder. No.40 MohammedAyoob quately regulate intrasocietal and intersocietal interactions can prosper and thrive in the twenty-first century."ForeignPolicy 123 (2001)." (1997). 1 State?Reflectionson Statenessin an Eraof Globalization."31 It is disingenuousto advise ThirdWorldstatesto remove all barriersto externaleconomic penetrationandreducethe role of the statein formulatingeconomic policy in the hope thatforeigntradeandinvestmentwill solve theirunderdevelopmentandpovertyproblems. 55. 62-87. pp.1998).N.32Moreover. 171. economic liberalization appearsirrationalwhen. I call this alternativeperspective "subalternrealism"because it draws upon the experience of subalternsin the internationalsystem. . most poor states receive but a pittance in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the multinationalcorporations(MNCs) based in the global North. WhyDo More Open Economies Have Bigger Gov- Mass."but becomes synonymous with that strategy.As Dani Rodrikpointsout. 5537. but to create political structuresthat approximateto a much greaterdegree than at present the Westphalian ideal type by increasing both their effectiveness and legitimacy. states must be effective.The dictionarydefinitionof "subaltern"denotesthose thatareweak andinferior.Y.NBER ernments?(Cambridge.see LindaWeiss. respectively. WorkingPaper 31 Scott."The state's crucialrole is evident in the West's economic development.p.:CornellUniversityPress. 32DaniRodrik. Moreover. a "perversion of priorities"resultswhen "opennessto tradeandinvestmentflows is no longer viewed simply as a componentof a country'sdevelopment strategy.TheMythof the Powerless State(Ithaca.:NationalBureauof EconomicResearch. These subalternsare largely ignoredby the elitist historiographypopularizedby both neorealists and neoliberals as a result of their concentrationon. It is truethatto be effective over the long haul states must be legitimate.Europeaneconomic supremacywas forgednotby actorswho followed a 'Washingtonconsensus'model but by strongstates.Yet it is the common experienceof all humansocieties thatthese are 30Forcorroboration of this argument.1996). Dani Rodrik.30 Consequently."TheGreatDivide in the GlobalVillage. 2d ed. 46-47. 213-236.50. and self-help. given theirrelative powerlessness andtheirposition as a large majorityin the internationalsystem. subalternrealism borrows from the insights of classical realist thinkers sensitive to both domestic order and internationalorder issues. 35Michael Oakeshottnotes:"Itbelongsto the natureof a traditionto tolerateand uniteaninternalvariety.eds. despite the emergence of a plethoraof nonstate actors."Sociology's in ThedaSkocpol.SelectedSubalternStudies(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress. p." and Method in Historical Sociology (New York:CambridgeUniversity Press. 34TimothyDunne. andbecause."36 In situating the ThirdWorld state in time and space. The Globalizationof WorldPolitics(New York:OxfordUniversityPress. for.TheAnarchicalSociety.The Case for SubalternRealism 41 the elements that constitutethe large majorityof membersin any social system. and take temporal sequences seriously in accounting for outcomes. 227."In Rationalismin Politicsand OtherEssays. 114-119.pp.34I refer to realism as a traditionratherthan as a theory or school because the term "tradition"does greaterjustice to the richness and variety of realist thinking. [m]ost basically ask questions aboutsocial structures or processes understoodto be concretely situated in time and space.:LibertyPress.. emanating from my position that. Althoughborrowedfrom the subalternschool of history."InternationalOrganization.it has the ability to changewithoutlosing its identity. They address processes over time. Hobbes is the foremost example of such thinkers..see RanajitGuhaand GayatriChakravorty Spivak. 36 ThedaSkocpol. form the quintessentialsubalternelement within the society of states..eds."in JohnBaylis and Steve Smith. Therefore.Ind."Realism.notinsistinguponconformityto a singlecharacter.pp. 37Bull.my use of the termdoes not conform strictlyto the usage by thatschool. this perspective is a part of the realist traditionbecause it accepts the three fundamentalelements of "essential realism"-statism. This is a deliberateapplicationof the term. No..p. the contemporaryinternationalsystem is essentially a system of states. survival. as Bull has pointed out "Hobbes's account of relations between sovereign princes is a subordinatepart of his explanation and justification of government among individual men. statesshouldstill formthe primaryunitof analysisin InternationalRelations.ed.1988). 1. (Indianapolis."37 33For a collectionof seminalarticlesin subalternstudies. 1984). 2 (1996).1997). It does so by adopting a historical sociology approachthat conforms to Theda Skocpol's prescription:"Trulyhistorical sociological studies . Also see MichaelWilliams."Hobbes and InternationalRelations:A Reconsideration. At the same time. further.. ratherthan subalternclasses..35The subalternrealist perspective attempts to go beyond the narrowstructuralconfines of neorealism and examine the essential nature of the subalterncategory of states.33 ThirdWorldstates. Vision HistoricalImagination..1991). pp. .. 2d ed.J. U.butthe rule of law.:Cambridge Europe..TheSovereignStateand Its Competitors(Princeton.not arbitrary. which make up most of the ThirdWorldtoday.K. Unless the insights provided by Hobbes's deductive reasoning are accompanied by the historical sociology of the modern state based on inductive reasoning.:PrincetonUniversityPress.1992). TheInsecurityDilemma: National Securityof ThirdWorld States(Boulder.p. 227. such historical explanations debunk the neoreal- 38Oakeshott. anyone familiar with the legitimacy problem of many ThirdWorldstates will recognize the need for a social contract between citizens and citizens and citizens and the state. For him. is excluded from Hobbes's civitas is not the freedom of the individual.:LynneRienner. 282. 63-80.Hobbes's social contractwas obviously abstract."TheSecurityPrediccomparedto its Europeancounterpart. 40For some of the best differingperspectivesof the originsof the modernstatein U. but the independent rightsof spurious'authorities'and of collections of individualssuch as churches. Capital.see E. . (Cambridge."39 Similarly. What .. it capturedthe essential dilemma of modern state making and the fundamentaldeparturethis entailed from the multiple overlapping authority structuresof the medieval period that lay at the root of much of the violence and chaos of Hobbes's time. which he saw as the source of civil strife of his time. Coercion."38 Anyone familiar with the problem of competing "authorities"in multiethnic and multireligioussocieties.TheEuropeanMiracle. 1994).. Charles Tilly.N.if not mythical. would immediately understandHobbes's basic predicamentand his attemptto overcome it by creating an institution-the sovereign-based on the "masterconceptions of Will and Artifice.L. ed. "Hobbes conceives the Sovereign as a law-makerandhis rule. but. Peramentof the ThirdWorldState:Reflectionson StateMakingin a Comparative spective.Jones.pp. For similaritiesand differencesin the state-makingprocessin the ThirdWorldas see MohammedAyoob.Rationalism in Politics. 1987). Historians of state making in early modernEuropeprovide the best source for these additionalinsights based on inductive reasoning since Europe was the original home of the modern sovereign state. our perspective will remain incomplete. and European States. p.K." in BrianJob.40 Above all. Nonetheless. . the solution was to concentratepower in the person of the sovereign. University Press. AD 990-1990 (Cambridge.Colo..andHendrickSpruyt. Such a contract would free the state from challenges to its authority. This explains the relevance of Hobbes's conclusions to our times.1990)..42 MohammedAyoob Hobbes's writings also highlight the tension between liberty and authority. the domestic context in which many ThirdWorld states function today resembles that of the late medieval and early modern period in Europe. 39Ibid.. based as it was on deductive logic.to insist that the sovereign be legitimate (the productof a contract) and legal (bound by laws).:Basil Blackwell. In uncanny ways. equally important. BringingtheStateBackIn (New York:CambridgeUniversityPress. 173. This should lead us to recognize that what we now call "internalwar" contributedto state making equally. . Pirates. entailed the exercise of 41 SteveSmith.N. pp." on the part of recalcitrantelements within their populations or by those who aspired to replace the "successor elites" and take over the reins of state power themselves. In many cases. Constructingand imposing political order is by necessity more a domestic than an internationalactivity.The Case for SubalternRealism 43 ist claim that all states are the same. to whatever extent this was possible.J. Historical sociology undercuts neo-realism because it shows that the state is not one functionally similar organization. The Globalization of WorldPolitics. This becomes clear by Tilly's own admission that "Earlyin the state-making process. most states were initially constituted by juridical sovereignty conferred upon them by departing colonial powers and subsequently endorsed by the internationalcommunity through membershipin the U. Evans. 149.1994)."in JohnBaylisandSteve Smith. Tilly's conclusion is based on the European experience."43 In the case of many Third World countries.. 181."in PeterB. establishingeffective statehood. "The central feature of historical sociology has been an interest in how structureswe take for granted (as 'natural') are the productsof a set of complex social processes. 178. in the process duringwhich the state's armedforces became relatively unified and permanent.et al. many parties sharedthe right to use violence.but instead has altered over time. 43CharlesTilly. Thomson. . the practice of using it routinelyto accomplish theirends.p... Tilly's famous dictumthat "warmade states and states made war"capturesthis reality in a nutshell. . . The distinctionsbetween 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' users of violence came clear only very slowly. The national state that emerged in 1900 was fundamentally different from its 42 predecessor.: PrincetonUniver- sity Press. eds.. which must be readin its properhistoricalcontext."WarMakingandStateMakingas OrganizedCrime. p. 1985).. or both at once. 42Janice E. Yet this did not make them immune to challenges to their authority.their "rightto rule. N."NewApproachesto International Theory. eds."41 This insight lies at the base of Janice Thomson's assertion that "internationalrelations specialists would do well to abandonthe notion that the state is the state is the state. that violence inevitably accompanies the process of state formation and consolidation. than interstatewar. . if not more so." The historicalsociology literatureaboutstateformationin Europealso relates to anotherfundamentalaspectof the currentdilemmafacingThirdWorldstatesnamely. and Sovereigns: State-Building and ExtraterritorialViolence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton. Mercenaries. This appearancecan be explained by the fact thatjuridical sovereignty was not conferred as clearly on one of the parties as it is in the case of ThirdWorldstates today. in the ThirdWorld domestic and international issues became inextricably intertwined with each other.InternationalRelations and the ThirdWorld(New York:CambridgeUniversityPress. we can see the similarities in the security predicamentsfaced by ThirdWorldstate elites and the state makers in early modern Europe. Caporasopointsout.44 MohammedAyoob violence and counterviolence by the state and its opponents.46In the ThirdWorld.Large Processes.""Changesin the Westphalian . 44Fora discussionof juridicalandeffectivestatehoodandthe differencebetween them. bordersamong states were not as clearly delineated as during the past fifty years. One fundamentaldifference between modern Europeand the context in which ThirdWorldstates have had to undertaketheir state-makingprojects is related to the fact that modernEurope's state building was largely an autonomous and often unpremeditatedactivity by early state makers.44The imposition of domestic orderbecame the prime preoccupationof state elites in most countries following decolonization."Big Structures. "Thestatestructures thatactuallytook shapegrew largely as unintendedby-productsof other activities.1990). In other words. even if todaywe confusinglydefinethe stateas sovereign. Also. This occurredwithout the notion of legitimacy privileging any one party over the other until quite late in that historical process.1984). see Robert Jackson.45 For the ThirdWorld. the geopolitical contours of states were established largely by outside forces. 46 JamesA.This definitionaltangleof separatepropertiesmasksa complexhistorical Order: interactionbetweenstatesandsystemsof rule. Postcolonial state elites were left with the task of mobilizing humanand materialresourcesto effectively administerterritories encompassed by colonially crafted boundaries. in the ThirdWorld.p. Despite differences in historical contexts. As in early modern Europe. The major difference was that during much of the relevant period in Europe the distinction between internaland externalwars was far fuzzier thanhas been the case duringthe past half centurybecauseterritorialdomainswere continuouslycontestedandchanged hands often. these are not enough to complete the perspective that must account for both the similarities and differences and continuities and discontinuities between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. Huge Comparisons(New York:RussellSage Foundation. Quasi-States: Sovereignty. thus making it appearthat much of the state-makingconflict between "princes"was interstate in character. 141. state making is both less of an autonomous activity and more of a directed or premeditatedone. In Europe sovereignty followed the establishmentof effective statecontrol. 45Accordingto CharlesTilly. Although classical realism and the historical sociology accounts of state formationin Europeprovide subalternrealism with fundamentalinsights."Sovereigntyas a claimaboutultimaterulewithin a territorycameafterthe stateitself. The Case for SubalternRealism 45 juridical sovereignty preceded the establishmentof such control.These concurrentbut contradictorydemandsmake the task of ThirdWorldstate makersenormouslydifficult. These states are faced with severe problems related to the operation of internationalnorms and the recent changes thathave occurredin thatnormative environment. Yet internationalnorms compel them to acquire both in a much shorter time compared to their European predecessorsor to face internationalderision. It is not merely the geopolitical contours of Third World states that have been shaped by external forces.Furthermore.Quasi-States. Zaire/Congo. as well as those that increasingly encourageinternational interventioninto the affairs of weaker states. These problems have been compounded further by the policies of great powers that have traditionally interfered in the process of state building in many ThirdWorldcountries to advance their own global and regional political agendas. As a result. Europeanstate makers at a corresponding stage of state building did not have Amnesty International and the U. Vietnam. In doing so.Angola. They enjoin the demonstrationof effective territorialand demographiccontrol by the state. No. PublicAuthority. 10. This has had major consequences for the level of conflict both within and among ThirdWorld states. internationalnorms that define effective and legitimate statehood.N. Ratherit was a preconditionfor establishingterritorialanddemographiccontrol.largely at the behest of the developed states of the global North. At the same time. (2000). As new entrantsinto the internationalsystem. External actors also have determinedthe normative environmentand the distributionof power in the internationalsystem. HumanRights Commission breathingdown their necks. Mozambique.and Sovereignty.The internationalpower hierarchy and its capacity to displace great power conflicts onto Third World states and regions have impinged greatly on the process of state formation in the postcolonial countries. have influenced crucially the trajectories of state formation among subalternstates. the history of state creation in the ThirdWorldhas been subject to major external influences and determinants. they magnify the difficulties inherentin providing political order to emerging polities. 2 Territory.contemporaryinternational norms place contradictorydemands on ThirdWorld state elites. 47 RobertJackson."InternationalStudiesReview2. and easier because the trajectory for ThirdWorldstates is clearly mappedout and unforeseendirectionsare ruled out.who had won control of territoryby the exercise of superiorforce. they requirethe state elites to treatthe domestic opponents of the state humanely. p.47This makes the task of ThirdWorldstate makersboth difficult and easier-difficult because it makes state elites less legitimate than those in Europe. . their state structureslack adequate effectiveness and unconditionallegitimacy. In addition. I have deliberately not addressed the issue of the plight of the subaltern classes. TudorEngland. Clearly.Nor is the intent to justify repressionby predatoryregimes for self-aggrandizement. For instance. Indian actions in Kashmir or Turkey's repression of its Kurdishpopulation should not be equated with the predatoryactions of the Mobutu regime in Zaire/Congo or the Nigerian military regime's suppression of the Ogoni people. Second. Historians studying Bourbon France. there are domestic repression problems within many Third World states. 5 and7. and individuals within Third World states. as well as actual or potential instances of state failure. The reason is that the internationalsystem has not yet progressed from being an international society to that of a world society.46 MohammedAyoob Afghanistan. the security of the state and the regime become closely intertwined. This is not to condone state repression of selected groups. Most importantdecisions about security and welfare 48Fordetails. Scholars must not shirk from exercising their informedjudgment on this issue in relation to discrete cases. 49For the distinctionbetweeninternational societyandworldsociety. .we are still stuck at the stage where most people's primarypolitical loyalties are to their states and nations. or Kemalist Turkey will immediately recognize the verity of this assertion.see Ayoob.49It is only at this latterstage thatquestions of equity andjustice within polities would reachthe top of the internationalagenda and invite concerted internationalaction.esp. chs. ch. Yet use of force and state collapse are integralpartsof the state-makingsaga.see Bull. groups. state repression for consolidating state authority should be distinguished from the purelypredatoryactivities of self-seeking rulerswho areinterested not in consolidating state authoritybut merely in privatizing the state to enrich and empower themselves.48 Consequently. Without the security of the regime. the security of the state is likely to fall into utter disrepair. Although analysts ought to distinguish among the purely predatoryactivities of ruling elites and those relating to state consolidation strategies. and Somalia. they must also be aware that sometimes actions to secure regimes in the Third World are essential for the existence and security of the state. who protest against the environmentaldegradationof their oil-rich lands. 1.if not disappearaltogether. in many newly established states.The intent is to invite reflection on two dimensions of this problem. bear direct testimony to this fact.especially if the repressionis systematicand sustained. among others. The Anarchical Society. One cannot make law-like generalizations in this regard that would fit all cases of state repression and the exercise of violence domestically.ThirdWorld state making has proceeded in a far more difficult internationalenvironmentthan in Europe two or three centuries ago. Fortunatelyor unfortunately. especially at early stages of state formation. First.The ThirdWorldSecurityPredicament. 81-102."Humanitarian eignty." InternationalJournal of HumanRights. we must continue to see states as the primaryactors on the internationalscene. must receive analytical priority if we are to explain successfully most current conflicts in the internationalsystem because they are the primarydeterminants of such conflicts. It attemptsto construct this comprehensive picture by weaving together several different intellectual strands. It also exhibits a clear normative preference for the pluralist structureand ethos of internationalsociety for reasons repeatedlycited. issues of domestic order and conflict are not Intervention andStateSover50Fordetails.Again. Treatingthe internationalsystem in normativeterms. Conceiving international society in such false terms will permit the dominantpowers to act even more arbitrarilyby arrogatingto themselves the right to act on behalf of the internationalcommunity. as if a world society were alreadyin existence.see MohammedAyoob. especially in the arena of conflict and security. As a result of the confluence of these various strands. It is likely to have a major negative impact on the level of order existing within the internationalsystem and increase the level of confrontationalrhetoric and action. The subalternrealist perspective is groundedin what it perceives to be the existing realities of the internationalsystem. and by the current predicaments facing weak and vulnerable Third World states that are at the early stages of state making. would be self-defeatingandcounterproductivebecause it would projecta solidaristconception of the internationalsystem that does not correspond to contemporaryinternationalrealities.The Case for SubalternRealism 47 are made at the state and national level. with state and national concerns determining such decisions. by the intriguing but important role played by the operation of international norms in orderingboth domestic and internationalsocieties.50Some cases of so-calledhumanitarianinterventionalready point toward this trend. 6. 1 (2002). Its contributionto the analysis of InternationalRelations is likely to come from its capacity to provide more comprehensiveexplanations for the origins of the majorityof conflicts in the internationalsystem and for the behavior of most states inhabiting it. primarilyconnected with the state-makingenterprisewithin states. No. pp.by historical sociological literatureconcerning the formationand legitimization of states in Europe. these strandscomprise the insights regardingthe creationand orderingof political communities provided by classical realist thought. In addition. As long as this is the case.the subalternrealist perspective assumes that issues relating to the maintenance and creation of domestic order and those of internationalorder are inextricably intertwined. . It also assumes that domestic orderissues. The danger is that repeated arrogation of authority based on a solidarist conception of world order is likely to erode severely the fragile consensus undergirdingthe currentpluralistnotion of internationalsociety. it does go a long way toward filling important gaps in the theoreticalliteratureand correctingthe acute state of inequality thatpervadesInternationalRelations theorizing. "theory. Finally. Although subalternrealism does not necessarily aspireto supersedeor supplant neorealism and neoliberalism as the "theory"that fully can explain how the internationalsystem operates.By integratingthese variousstrandsof analysis. theories attemptto be parsimonious. conflict and orderin the currentera. Otherwise. we could begin the task of addressing inequality in internationalrelations by incorporatingmore widely in our discussions the subalternrealist perspective as an analytical device." . It is this combination of explanatorycapacities that makes it a powerful tool that can be used quite successfully to analyze issues of war and peace. and. There is no doubt in my mind that the issue of inequality in internationalrelations needs to be addressedmore seriously at the beginning of the twenty-first century than has been done so far.It does so by making the experiences and concerns of the majority of states the centerpiece of theorizing in InternationalRelations. It does so by highlighting the intertwiningof the state-makingenterprise with regional balance of power issues.this perspectiveattempts to provide explanationsfor both the origins of most contemporaryconflicts and the behavior of the majorityof states currentlyinhabitingthe internationalsystem. One last word about theory: to be elegant and comprehensible. yes.Yet parsimonyperpetuatesinequalityby providing the opportunityto the more powerful to exclude and occlude the interests and experiences of those who have less power and less voice. this perspective takes into account the impact of the international normativeframeworkon state making and nation building in the ThirdWorld. especially given the permeabilityof the majorityof states to externalpolitical and economic actors.there is the dangerthat the "global covenant"that sustainsinternationalordermay begin to fray beyond repair. Acknowledging the complexity in human affairs-less "theory"and more "perspectives"-opens up avenues for accommodation and adaptationthat permit the subalternsto enter the world of ideas. As professionalscommittedto teaching and researchin InternationalRelations.48 MohammedAyoob immune to either regional or global external influences. yet it seems to be intensifying as a result of globalization and the latest revolution in military affairs. The subaltern realist position also posits the linkage between domestic and external variables to explain the nexus between intrastateand interstateconflicts. Inequalityis certainly not new. as well as the ThirdWorldstates' insistence on maintainingthe essential norms of the Westphaliansystem to protectthemselves from unwantedexternal intervention. concepts.