Ltd Digest 3

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO VALERIANO, GABRIELA VALERIANO VDA. DE LA CRUZ, LETICIA A. VALERIANO and MARISSA VALERIANO DE LA ROSA, respondents. FACTS: In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976, private respondents (Applicants, for brevity) claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on May 2, 1958; that it is not within any forest zone or military reservation; and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes in their names. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain. After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Applicants. This was affirmed on appeal by respondent Appellate Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Courts can reclassify the subject public land. RULING: NO. The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Decision reversed and the application for registration is dismissed. G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS, in his capacity as Judge of CFI South Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City, ISAGANI DU TIMBOL and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, respondent. Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan and Solicitor Patricio M. Patajo for petitioner. Quitain Law Office for private respondent. Page 1 ESGUERRA, J.:p Petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case No. 1253, entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Isagani Du Timbol and the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Defendants", instituted by the plaintiff to declare null and void Free Patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 based thereon issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol; to order the aforesaid defendant to surrender the owner's duplicate of O.C.T. No. P-2508 and the defendant Register of Deeds to cancel the same; to decree the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public domain, and granting such further relief as may be just and equitable in the premises. The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila Soria, who on February 23, 1966, transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application therefor on February 3, 1969, as a transferee from Precila Soria. On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the President of the Philippines for the land in question, and on July 20, 1970, after transmittal of the patent to the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 was issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol. On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City (Civil Case No. 1253), to declare free patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2508 in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public domain. The action is based on the ground that the land covered thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act; that in a reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity where the land in question is situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said land was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700 to be inside the area which was reverted to the category of public forest, whereas the application for free patent by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on June 3, 1969, or more than eleven years thereafter; that the said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land applied for. Invoking the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-28591, 30 SCRA 207-301), holding that a certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land covered by the application is part of the public domain when it is not, the respondent court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Certificate of Title based on the patent had became indefeasible in view of the lapse of the oneyear period prescribed under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act for review of a decree of title on the ground of fraud. From this order of June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines has appealed to this Court for review. After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title is not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and, hence the patent and title thereto are null and void. Page 2 The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973. Although the Director of Lands has jurisdiction over public lands classified as agricultural under the constitution, or alienable or disposable under the Public Land Act, and is charged with the administration of all laws relative thereto, mineral and timber lands are beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber land is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958. When the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for free patent over the land in question on June 3, 1969, the area in question was not a disposable or alienable public land but a public forest. Titles issued to private parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land covered thereby is not disposable public land but forest land are void ab initio. In Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA p. 508, 512, this Court said: And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue a patent because the land involved was still inalienable forest land when granted, then it may be plausibly contended that the patent title would be ab initio void, subject to attack at any time by any party adversely affected. (Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, supra, citing Civil Code Arts. 1409 and 1421; Vaño vs. Insular Gov't., 41 Phil. 161; Aderable vs. Director of Forestry, L-13663, March 25, 1960). A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no authority to do so (Knight vs. Land Ass., 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, 35L ED. 974; emphasis supplied). If a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included. (See Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769) The case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-28591, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 297, relied upon by respondent Court in dismissing this case, is not controlling. In that case no forest land was involved but agricultural public land which was first covered by a patent issued to one party and later registered under the Torrens System by the other party. The litigation was between private parties where the party who registered it under Act No. 496 sought the nullity of the title of the patentee under the Public Land Act. In the case at bar the party seeking the nullity of the title and reversion of the land is the state itself which is specifically authorized under Section 101 of the Public Land Act to initiate such proceedings as an attribute of sovereignty, a remedy not available to a private individual. The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that applicant Isagani Du Timbol was never in possession of the property prior to his filing the application, contrary to the provisions of law that the applicant must have been in possession or cultivation thereof for at least 30 years; that the applicant, after diligent search by the Acting Chief of the Survey-Party, Francisco R. Alcones, in Page 3 A title founded on fraud may be cancelled. vs. could not be contacted because he is a resident of Davao City. De los Santos vs.. alteration. emphasis supplied).. 946: Eugenio. Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. L-15398. 6 SCRA 938. 1961). May 23. and that said ranch has a fence around it to show that other persons could not enter and cultivate the same. Macalindog. M. No. 96 Phil. 1954. 1966. No. No. page 38). and any false statement thereon or omission of facts. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. and any subsequent modification. No. Considering that it is the state is seeking the cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani Du Timbol. notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof. (J. May 19. changing. therefore.. 1955.. or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statement. 24. 51 O. through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General. et al. p. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap G. L-17696. Jugado et al. 405). title or permit granted. May 19. The above alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud in the filing of the application and obtaining title to the land. bushes and small trees. or change of the material facts set forth in the application shallipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession. that no monuments were placed on the area surveyed which goes to show that there was no actual survey thereof. G. Perdido. . et al. A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. and that the signature of then Acting District Land Officer Elias de Castro of South Cotabato has been forged to facilitate the issuance of patent in favor of Isagani Du Timbol. December 29.R. Tuason & Co.R. Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the state (Article 1108. paragraph 4 of the New Civil Code). L-6088. failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void (Director of Lands vs. et al.. title or permit issued on the basis of such application. inside the forest zone..South Cotabato. 2414 Phil. 94 Phil. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred Page 4 . (Sumail vs. that there are no existing signs of improvements found in the area in question as it is not under cultivation but covered with grasses. The misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law which provides as follows: That statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions or parts of any concession. 17 SCRA.. 1244 and. that the property in question is inside the ranch of the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot under Pasture Lease Agreement No. G. L-7083.G. vs. that it is being used as ranch for grazing cows by the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot. said title has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the state. would be the height of absurdity. G. 79-80. The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof. L-14707. 1962. for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration. Court of First Instance of Cotabato. A title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud. L-8278.R. even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law. Feb. 71. and if proven would override respondent Judge's order dismissing the case without hearing. as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another. Inc. R. Court of Appeals. In the case of disposable public lands. both issued in Civil Case No. FOR ALL THE FOREGOING. L-15484. L-52518 .. the Congress enacted R. The respondent court shall proceed to hear said Civil Case and render judgment thereon accordingly. which was granted by the government and shall be valid for 25 years. 1973. It renewed its timber license. respondents-appellants. including Paete. are hereby annulled and set aside. the land covered thereby may be reconveyed to the state in an action for reconveyance under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act). G. Government of the Philippines vs. No. The said experiment station covers a portion of the timberland in Paete. G. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. processing and exportation of plywood. 1253 of the respondent court. April 29. L-23712. No.A. Even granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol can no longer be reopened under the Land Registration Act. et al. 1968. for the remedy of reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the complaint for the grant of such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises. 3990. Ramona Ruiz. 47 SCRA 12. G. Said license authorizes the company to cut. Ramos. 751-753). petitioner-appellee. Jan.August 13. CAMPOS. denying the motion for its reconsideration. UP (200 SCRA 554) INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES.. Monte de Piedad 35 Phil. IHVCP v. in early 1960. vs. dated June 22. and that of September 29. 1963. JR.R. 1991 Facts: IHVCP is a company engaged in the manufacture. an Act establishing an experiment station for UP. the order of the respondent court.prescription (Republic of the Philippines vs. In 1964. 728. No. Costs against respondent Isagani Du Timbol.R. 1973.R. dismissing the complaint. People vs. 31. collect and remove timber from the portion of timber land located in certain municipalities of Laguna. 23 SCRA 348. occupied by Page 5 . IHVCP so UP. being the owner of the land.A. 3 of R. the said Act removed and segregated it from being a public forest. who claims ownership of said portion of timberland. "any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines. IHVCP rejected the demand and it filed a suit against UP.A. instead of the BIR. The Court ruled that R. which means that the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain.‖ The provision of the Act is clear that UP. petitioner. which provides that. demanded the latter to pay the forest charges to it. claiming that R. 3990. Director of Lands v. Issue/s: Whether or not UP is the owner of the portion of timberland in Paete. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 701) DIRECTOR OF LANDS. 3990 ceded and transferred in full ownership to UP the area. measure and seal the timber cut by it within the tract of land referred to in said Act. In respect to the areas covered by the timber license of IHVCP. Ruling: Yes. The Court further cited Sec. and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed by the BIR. 3990 does not empower UP to scale. Page 6 . has the right to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of IHVCP insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned.A. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE F. SALAZAR, JESUS F. SALAZAR, PEDRO F. SALAZAR and AURORA F. SALAZAR, respondents. G.R. No. L-50340; December 26, 1984 Facts: In 1965, the Salazars filed an application for the registration of the 291 hectares of land (a forestland), which they acquired from their mother Soledad. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands (DoL) and by 25 occupants of the land. To prove their ownership, the Salazars claimed that their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of owner for more than thirty years prior to their application and the siblings further presented tax declarations but the DoL still claimed otherwise. In 1977, the CA denied the application but in its 1979 resolution, it reversed itself and granted the application. The basis of the reversal was the declaration made by the Director of Forestry in April 28, 1961, reclassifying the subject land as alienable and disposable from being a forestland. Issue/s: Whether or not the applicants proved their ownership of the land. Ruling: No. The Court affirmed the CA’s 1977 decision and acknowledged that the latter held Page 7 correctly through Justice Serrano in its decision that whatever possession of the land the Salazars and their predecessors might have had prior to April 28, 1961 cannot be credited to the thirty-year requirement. In the present case, the thirty-year requirement should be reckoned from April 1961, the point when the forestland was reclassified by the Director of Forestry to be alienable and disposable and not prior thereto since it was still a forestland, a public dominion, thus, non-registerable. G.R. No. 69969 December 20, 1989 ANTONIO L. TOTTOC, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SATURNINO DOCTOR, respondents. Quirico L. Pilotin for petitioner. Miguel M. Guevara for private respondents. REGALADO, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the former Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV No. 00034, 1 reversing in toto the decision in Civil Case No. 2212 of the then Court of nest Instance, Branch II, Nueva Vizcaya, the disposition of respondent court being as follows: WHEREFORE, finding the decision appealed from not consistent with the facts and the law applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another entered1. Declaring Patent of l24175 and Original Certificate of' Title No. 3428 issued by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya in the name of plaintiff Saturnino Doctor valid and existing: 2. Ordering the defendant-appellee to restore possession of the subject property unto the plaintiff-appellant and to respect such possession; Page 8 3. Ordering defendant-appellee to pay the plaintiff the sum of P l,000.00 annually from the filing of the complaint until possession is fully restored as actual damages. 4. Ordering defendant-appellee to pay the sums of P 2,000.00 as exemplary damages and P l,000.00 as and for attorney's fees. Costs against the defendantappellee. SO ORDERED. REVERSED 2 The antecedental facts which led to the filing of the original action below are undisputed and are hereinunder set forth as synthesized by the court a quo and adopted by respondent court. 3 On April 9, 1949, petitioner applied for the lease of a pasture land consisting of 78.6 hectares, situated at Lacangan, Barrio Madiangat, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, before the Bureau of Forestry, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, thru the office of the Provincial Forester at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. By virtue of said application, petitioner was granted Ordinary Pasture Permit Ps- 993 after a survey of the area involved. Thereafter, petitioner occupied said 78.6 hectares of pasture land and fenced the same, without anybody disturbing his possession thereof. Private respondent, being a neighbor of petitioner, was aware of such occupation of the land by petitioner since 1949. On September 21, 1951, petitioner was again granted Ordinary Pasture Permit Ps-993 Extension by Director of Forestry Florencio Tamesis, authorizing the former to occupy the same area, the first permit having expired on June 30, 1952. Finally, on August 6, 1958, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Juan de G. Rodriguez, under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1228 covering the Identical area for a period of 11 years. Meanwhile, private respondent, upon verification from the Bureau of Forestry supposedly before 1963 that the pasture land in question was reportedly untouched and outside the pasture land of petitioner, filed his application for a homestead with the Bureau of Lands and entered the northern portion of the land, clearing and cultivating an area of less than 4 hectares in 1963. On January 7, 1965, private respondent secured a certification from Assistant Chief Maximo A. Abuan of the Bureau of Forestry office in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, certifying to the fact that the land in question is alienable and disposable. Private respondent further claims to have secured another certification from an employee of the Bureau of Lands who based the same on a certification on file in the Bureau of Lands office as furnished by the Bureau of Forestry. On February 25, 1966, petitioner caused the relocation survey of his pasture land in the presence of Bureau of Lands Inspector Marcelino Hernaez and private respondent. It was found in said survey that a portion of the land subject of private respondent's application was within the pasture land of petitioner and within the so-called Forest Zone. In view thereof, petitioner requested Inspector Hernaez to send a telegram to the Director of Lands in Manila reading: "Lands Director Jorge, Manila. Please hold action homestead application Saturnino Doctor and Luis Carub, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Re- investigation in progress. Land claimed by Mayor Tottoc Investigator Hernaez." Page 9 On March 1. P-3428 under Homestead Patent No. Forester Buenaventura Caguioa. Range and Wildlife Division of the Bureau of Forest Development. private respondent and one Luis Carub requested the Bureau of Forestry to relocate the pasture land of petitioner to determine any encroachment on his land. private respondent was prevented from occupying and cultivating the disputed portion of 16. Quezon.00 for attorney's fees.400. 2. After trial. petitioner requested in a letter to the office of the Bureau of Forestry at Nueva Vizcaya the relocation survey of his pasture land pursuant to which the district forester sent Forester Nicasio Pascua to relocate the same on April 26. furnished petitioner a copy of the renewed Pasture Lease Agreement No.5459 hectares.5 hectares. With these documents in favor of petitioner. be approved and that only 3. a recommendation was made that the application filed by petitioner for the renewal of the pasture lease agreement. filed an action for recovery of possession with damages. 124175 was issued to private respondent over a parcel of land situated in Inatub. Caroler and Buliwao. private respondent. on the instructions of the Director of Forestry dated November 25. 1971 thru District Forester Geronimo Falloran conducted the relocation survey. and to pay the costs of the suit. In view thereof. 1966. and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the amount of P l. the court a quo rendered judgment on May 28. Consequent to such findings. Nueva Vizcaya. Quezon. more or less. were present during said relocation survey. dated May 3. Inatub. Forester Caguioa submitted his memorandum to the district forester indicating that the area in the title granted to private respondent traversed a portion of the pasture land of petitioner and that only 3. Manila. who in turn indorsed the same on June 23. Drilon. On March 23.5 hectares of land be retained by private respondent. 1972. As a consequence. Officer-in-Charge of the Parks. Carolet Madiangat and Buliwao.1994. Quezon. said memorandum report of District Forester Falloran was forwarded to the Director of Forestry. herein petitioner and private respondent. as well as several laborers.000. Thereafter.6 hectares of land granted to petitioner for pasture purposes. entered into by the petitioner with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 1968. 1969. which expired on June 30. 4 Page 10 . Forester Pascua recommended that all certifications and/or patents issued in favor of the lot owners or claimants of said encroaching lots be nullified for the good of the public service. Eladio Miranda. On November 29. to expire on June 30. and covered the 1 20 hectares of pasture land in Lacangan. Original Certificate of Title No. Nueva Vizcaya. Tuguegarao. Thereafter. 1972. Aniceto Bueno. 1966. A cartographer of the Bureau of Lands. 1981 in favor of therein defendant and against the plaintiff. was verified to be within the alienable and disposable area. On March 8. On June 17. containing an area of approximately 20 hectares.00 as actual and litigation expenses. 1967.Aside from this survey. to the bureau director indicating the different positions of the lots that had encroached on the pasture land of petitioner. 1228. through the Regional Director of the Bureau of Forestry. Nueva Vizcaya which made a total of 120.1972. petitioner was granted another ordinary pasture permit by Acting Director of Forestry Antonio Quejado to occupy and use for pasture another 42 hectares of public forest land situated in Inatub Lacangan. P 3. Mr. Forester Pascua submitted his memorandum. The lease was for a period of 25 years. dated November 9. Said additional area was likewise fenced by petitioner. Jose D. 1972. Region No. Cagayan. Jr. 1972. the decretal portion whereof reads: WHEREFORE. 1981. petitioner maintains that respondent court should not have relied on the certification issued by District Forester Abuan.000. therefore. Grants the defendant's Partial Motion for Reconsideration. was filed by petitioner with respondent court with a supplemental memorandum in support thereof. (2) in concluding that petitioner.00 as attorney's fees. a pasture lease permittee has no legal personality to question the patent and title of private respondent Doctor over the disputed area. 6 On the first assignment of error. 2. 3428 issued by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya. it being hearsay evidence by reason of Abuan's failure to testify thereon. dated June 29. and 2. but not only for the reason that the evidence-in-chief of private respondent may. said decision was amended by a resolution issued on January 7. Succinctly reduced to salient terms. Declaring Patent No. in point of strict law.00 as actual and litigation expenses and P 3. petitioner assails respondent court's disregard of the testimonies of Foresters Pascua and Caguioa who certified that the land was within the Forest Zone after having conducted an actual verification survey of the area. petitioner's submissions are that respondent court committed errors of law (1) in concluding that the land in dispute is alienable by relying on the certification issued by District Forester Abuan and in disregarding the contrary testimonies and certifications of Foresters Pascua and Caguioa. Ordering the plaintiff not to molest the defendant in his peaceful and public occupation in the land in dispute the same being still a part of the Forest Zone and a part of his pasture land.400. this Court hereby: 1. respectively. The present recourse is before us as a consequence.124175 and Original Certificate of Title No. amended to read as follows: WHEREFORE. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. Moreover. 5 As stated at the outset. A motion for reconsideration. and to pay the costs of the suit. in favor of the plaintiff. The dispositive portion of the decision is. Condemning the plaintiffs to pay the defendant the amounts of P l. dated October 15. tills Court: 1. but the same was denied in respondent court's resolution of January 28. for lack of merit. 1981. covering the land in dispute which is within the Forest Zone as null and void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction. as defendant and plaintiff.1982. dated May 29. be constitutive of hearsay. The question as to whether a Page 11 . and 3. 1985. We agree with petitioner.On a "Partial Motion for Reconsideration" filed by petitioner. said decision and resolution were appealed to respondent court which reversed and set aside the same. Denies the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial. and (3) when it ruled that private respondent is entitled to the award of damages. in view of all the foregoing. 1984. and a "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial" of private respondent. said exception cannot find application in private respondent's favor since petitioner's interests commenced and vested very much earlier than any claim thereon by the former. on the other hand. more than preponderate over and definitely override the enervated evidentiary value of the certification of Abuan and Delizo. started his controversial cultivation of the lot only in 1963 and secured the questioned certification in 1965. being a grantee of pasture lease permits which expired in 1969. 8 We have reviewed the testimonies of the witnesses for private respondent and nowhere do we find any cogent basis for the certification made by District Forester Abuan. 7 Thus. 10 In diametrical contrast. 13 All these on-the-spot surveys. Nueva Vizcaya. Aside from his assertion and admission that the sole basis for his certification was merely an office copy of the certification also of Forester Abuan himself. Delizo further admitted that he had not made any actual verification of the subject area.particular portion of land is forestal or any other class of land is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. such invalidation being necessitated for the good of the public service. While private respondent denies having received any copy of the memoranda executed by the foresters despite his admitted presence during the surveys and investigations. 11 the same does not relieve him of the consequences of imputed knowledge of the findings therein considering the facility in obtaining copies of the same. Private respondent. While we admit an exception to the rule that the Bureau of Forestry has the power to set aside for forestry or mineral purposes a particular land in question. District Land Officer of Bayombong. including private respondent himself. even before the relocation survey made by Forester Caguioa. despite his zeal and desire to possess and own the land in controversy. of the subject area by Foresters Pascua and Caguioa conducted in the presence of all the interested parties. 9 Neither could he even conclusively establish that the lot mentioned in his certification was Identical to the lot in question. which could possibly have energized private respondent's case. Precisely. is itself plagued with not a few vacuities. uninterrupted and peaceful possession and occupation of the disputed land since 1949. 15 The long period of time from 1949 to 1969 during which the land was under pasture lease permits granted to petitioner all the more lends credence to the Page 12 . 14 and that is when there was prior intervention of private interests. Besides. Bureau of Lands Inspector Hernaez conducted his own survey and found that the land subject of private respondent's application for a homestead patent was within the pasture land of petitioner and within the Forest Zone. an advice to hold said application was sent to the Director of Lands in Manila upon petitioner's request. the findings wherefrom are unassailed and uncontradicted. 12 It will also be recalled that consequent to Forester Pascua's survey and findings. Petitioner had open. ocular and technical. including private respondent. Notably. would prefer to remain in deliberate ignorance of the results of said surveys through his unexplained inaction and inexplicable indifference. the pasture lease permit granted to petitioner was issued after a series of actual investigations. The testimony of Sabino Delizo. the mere classification or certification made by the Bureau of forestry that a part of the public domain is timberland is not controlling in all cases. a further recommendation was made to the Director of Forestry for the nullification of all certifications and/or patents issued in favor of the owners and/or claimants whose lots had intruded upon petitioner's land area. it is an affront to credulity that a person like private respondent who. .. et al. Were we to uphold private respondent's theory that petitioner is devoid of personality to question the invalidity of the former's patent and title. Page 13 . 1409. Dir. no matter how long cannot convert it into private property. Moreover.. private respondent makes the riposte that petitioner cannot question the validity of the title registered in the former's name. we held: 20 where the original It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. Hon. 161. And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue a patent in favor of appellee Francisco Gatchalian because the land involved was still inalienable forest land when granted. it was private respondent himself who initiated the original action below for recovery of possession with damages. these parties have already acquired possessory rights that they may vindicate and defend against intruders without better title. If there is any party who can question his title on the ground that it includes therein a forest land. rather than forestal. 19 the Court had the occasion to render the following ruling: As to the alleged lack of personality of defendants-appellants to assail appellee's land grant and certificate of title for the reason that said appellants are mere prospective homestead applicants. 16 The Court neither loses sight of the presumption.. et al. petitioner was virtually compelled to litigate in order to protect his own right to possession which in part hinged on the nature of the land in dispute. 1421. .. L-13663. not when it involves opposing rights of private citizens against each other. vs. 25 March 1960) . in lieu of contrary proof.. divest him of valid defenses. proceeding was also between private citizens... that would be a procedural inequity since it would thereby prevent petitioner from fully protecting his interests or.fact that said land was within the Forest Zone as only lands of the category of public forest land can be the subject of such permits. Pavilin. If somehow forest land happens to have been included in a Torrens Title. private respondent deposits that it should be the Bureau of Forest Development. 41 Phil. however. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after forest land has been declared alienable and disposable. Intermediate Appellate Court. It is not registrable. as it is for the good of the country to have the large public domain come under private ownership. Ironically. then it may be plausibly contended that her patent title would be ab initio void subject to attack at any time by any party adversely affected (Civil Code. the title is null and void insofar as the forest land is concerned. Insular Govt. Vano vs. 18 This counter-argument is an effete pretension. Adorable vs. Possession of forest land. . In the case of Gatchalian vs. that the land is agricultural in character. of Forestry. Arts. that such presumption obtains only when the conflict of interest is between a private citizen and the Government. in Vallarta. On the second assigned error. 17 It is to be emphasized. et al. at the very least. As a consequence. it is sufficient to remark that by reason of their prior occupancy and cultivation. . Properties Inc. 2008 Facts: In 1999. SO ORDERED. June 26. the land is alienable and disposable. it submitted two certificates. located at Sto. issued by CENRO and FMSDENR and both certifying that the land applied for was alienable and disposable. petitioner. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson). (555 SCRA 477) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. No. strategy or stealth. G.A. concur.N. The decision of the trial court. Republic v. T. JJ. Batangas and with an area of 56. except as to the award of attorney's fees and the payment of the costs of suit both of which have no legal bases and are consequently ordered deleted. Properties filed in the RTC of Batangas an application for the registration of a land.. is hereby REINSTATED. represented by the Director of Lands.A. On the contrary. threat. the assailed decision and resolution of respondent court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.N.N. Paras. PROPERTIES. 154953. T. The Republic of the Philippines. T. Padilla and Sarmiento.R. Page 14 . suffice it to state that the records are bereft of any substantial evidence showing that private respondent was deprived by petitioner of the possession of the land through force. the evidence convinces us that petitioner was well within his rights in taking possession of the lot in question a matter which we need not belabor with any further disquisition. vs.N. on the partial motion for reconsideration by herein petitioner as defendant therein.On the third supposed error.4007 hectares. respondent. To support its application. ACCORDINGLY. 1982. Tomas. intimidation. dated January 7. Properties did not prove that the land was alienable and disposable.A. Issue/s: Whether or not the applicant proved that. opposed the application on the ground that T.A. INC. 4007 hectares.A. T. and DAO No.R. 20 (DAO No. 20) and DAO No. 151 SCRA 88 . In the present case. open. Page 15 . 38. 1987. DE PORKAN June 18. L-66866: REPUBLIC VS. Properties did not prove that the land is alienable and disposable. thus CENRO has no jurisdiction over it.N. It is the burden of the applicant to prove that the land subject to registration is alienable and disposable and for such the applicant must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. The land applied for in the case has an area of 56. 1099 and 1546. 38 provides that CENRO can issue certificates of land classification for lands having a maximum area of 50 hectares.A. exclusive and undisputed possession for more than 30 years. It is clear from the aforementioned DAO’s that the documents submitted by T. No. For the documents provided by the company. Properties did not provide the needed proof. An issue over said lots arose when a certain Viola Azurin obtained from the then Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering portions of Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546 from their predecessors-interests.Ruling: No. who in turn acquired said lots though a grant by the government by virtue of their proven.N. classifying lands to be alienable and disposable.Possession resulting in presumption of right to grant application FACTS Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog acquired Lots Nos. G. the Court cited DENR Administrative Order No. 20 proves that FMS-DENR has no authority to issue certificates. DAO No. 1099 dates back to the time of the Spanish colonial period. After hearing however. when the case was brought to the Court of First Instance. the respondents had already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant over Lot No. 1546 and the Free Patent of Macatindog over Lot No. Page 16 . the SG stated that the disputed portions of land were actually claimed by Azurin and that such lands could not be disposed by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act.Azurin filed with the Bureau of Lands a complaint for correction. exclusive and undisputed possession for more than 30 years. open. 1099. Hence. since the Spanish colonial period. As early as 1953. Such possessions of the said public land has attained the character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an express grant from the Government. The Solicitor General sided with Azurin. The possession of a public land identified as Lot No. HELD Yes. amendment or cancellation of the Homestead Patent of De Porkan over Lot no. By legal fiction. misrepresentation and illegal machinations. certified as such as more suitable for fishpond development. 1099 alleging among others that the patentees secured their patents and titles through fraud. but a grant of the Government over the same alienable land by virtue of their proven. The SG in the present petition avers among others that the lots in dispute could not be the subject of disposition under the Homestead and Free Patent provisions of the Public Act since they are marshy and swampy. The mandate of the law itself provides that possessors “shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title”. the land ceases to be public and thus becomes a private land. the patents and titles issued to de Porkan and Macatindog were void insofar as the portion occupied and covered by the fishpond permit of Azurin. ISSUE Whether or not possession and cultivation of a land for more than 30 years will entitle the possessor thereof of a government grant and a certificate of title. the CFI dismissed the complaints and upheld the validity of the titles/patents of de Porkan & Macatindog over the lands in dispute. disposable only thru lease under the Public Land Act. containing an area of One Hundred Three Thousand Three Hundred Fifty (103. 6) a Tax Declaration. among others. J. 70077. J. G.350) square meters. 2010 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION PERALTA. the assessed value and market value of the property. BERSAMIN.R. there were no other oppositors to the application. Except for the Republic. Cebu. pursuant to Presidential Decree (P. TRADING CARPIO. Petitioner. CASE NO. 4488. 5) a Geodetic Engineer's Certificate attesting that the property was surveyed. 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.versus - HANOVER WORLWIDE CORPORATION. 3) a copy of the Deed of Sale in favor of Hanover’s President and General Manager. 7) a tax clearance.D. continuous. Chairperson. 4) a copy of a Waiver executed by the President and General Manager of Hanover in favor of the latter. 172102 Present: . which affirmed the August 7. ABAD. 2006. Petitioner also assails the CA Resolution[2] dated March 30. 1529. and 9) a CENRO Certification on the alienability and disposability of the property. 1993. exclusive and Page 17 . its title thereto having been obtained through purchase evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. CV No. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation filed an application for Registration of Title over Lot No. Respondent. among others. more or less. situated in Barrio Sacsac. 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City. The Republic contended. Consolacion. that neither Hanover nor its predecessors-in-interest are in open.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. denying its Motion for Reconsideration. JJ. N-281. The application stated that Hanover is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. and MENDOZA. 4488 of Consolacion Cad-545-D (New) under Vs-072219-000396. Branch 56.R. The facts of the case are as follows: On October 15.. Promulgated: July 2. Attached to the petition are: 1) a Verification Survey Plan. in LAND REG. otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. 2) a copy of the approved Technical Description of Lot 4488. PERALTA. seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision [1] dated May 6.) No.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. 8) a Municipal Assessor's Certification stating. No. the instant petition based on the following grounds: I THE DEFECTIVE AND/OR WANT OF NOTICE BY PUBLICATION OF THE INITIAL HEARING OF THE CASE A QUO DID NOT VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE THEREOF. 1997. the RTC rendered its Decision [3] approving Hanover’s application for registration of the subject lot. and that it had registrable title thereto in accordance with Section 14 of P.D. Unfortunately. the judgment of the RTC was affirmed by the CA via the presently assailed Decision and Resolution. On August 7. tax declarations and receipts of tax payments attached to or alleged in the application do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for. 1995 (45 days from June 13. The Republic was represented in the proceedings by officers from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Hanover is a private corporation disqualified under the Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain. the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic and are not subject to private appropriation.notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12. 1995 (90 days from June 13.D. the initial hearing was scheduled and actually held on September 25. in the concept of an owner. The petition is meritorious. pursuant to Section 23 of P. 1995 in an Order dated June 13. Petitioner also argues that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence in the form of specific facts indicating the nature and duration of the occupation of its predecessor-in-interest to prove that the latter has been in possession of the subject lot under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since June 12. It held that from the documentary and oral evidence presented by Hanover. 1529. of the land applied for registration of title. 1995) and not later than September 11. public. 1945 or earlier. II DEEDS OF SALE AND TAX DECLARATIONS/CLEARANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE “WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE” EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO ACQUIRE TITLE THROUGH ADVERSE OCCUPATION. the muniments of title.[4] Petitioner claims that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Hence. however. the initial hearing of the case must be not earlier than forty-five (45) days and not later than ninety (90) days from the date of the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing. 1529. the trial court was convinced that Hanover and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open. 1945 or prior thereto. 1995. continuous. The case was then called for trial and respondent proceeded with the presentation of its evidence. some fourteen (14) days later than the prescribed period. the initial hearing should have been set not earlier than July 28. Since the RTC Order was issued on June 13. It avers that the RTC set the initial hearing of the case on September 25. 1995). 1995. notorious and peaceful possession. On appeal by the State. 1998. Petitioner contends. that. Page 18 . there is no dispute that sufficient notice of the registration proceedings via publication was duly made. he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his duties. 1529. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. 1995 was outside the 90-day period set forth under Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. though. and (b) that respondent substantially complied with the requirement relating to the registration of the subject land. the Court agrees with the CA in ruling that the setting of the initial hearing is the duty of the land registration court and not the applicant. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control. provides: Page 19 . the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date.D. Inc. especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law. that what is more important than the date on which the initial hearing is set is the giving of sufficient notice of the registration proceedings via publication. the Court agrees with petitioner on the more important issue that respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it or its predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject property for the period required by law. petitioner concedes (a) that respondent should not be entirely faulted if the initial hearing that was conducted on September 25.. In the instant case. Citing Republic v. Moreover. 1529. there is no dispute that respondent complied with the requirements of the law for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. The foregoing notwithstanding.D. Section 14 (1) of P. on the issue of jurisdiction. Manna Properties. Inc.As to the first assigned error. San Lorenzo Development Corporation[6] that: The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land registration court. as amended. x x x In the instant case.[5] this Court held in Republic v. After an applicant has filed his application. Moreover. A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. the Court finds that the RTC did not commit any error in giving due course to respondent’s application for registration. the Court is not persuaded by petitioner’s contention that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The notice of initial hearing is a court document. it is evident in Manna Properties. however. It is true that in land registration cases. 1529. the applicant must strictly comply with the jurisdictional requirements. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA [Land Registration Authority]. This involves a process to which the party-applicant absolutely has no participation. With respect to the setting of the initial hearing outside the 90-day period set forth under Section 23 of P. x x x xxxx x x x a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court. Hence. by himself or through his predecessorsin-interest. Who may apply. continuous. started on June 12. 14. as respondent argues. pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of law. a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not sufficient. continuous. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. or earlier. 1945. Therefore. that an examination of these requisites involve delving into questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. 1945 or earlier. or earlier. surmises and conjectures. 1945.[8] As the law now stands.D.[7] Likewise. and (2) that they have been in open. immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. to wit: xxxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open. as amended by Section 4 of P. since the effectivity of P. whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open. The following described citizens of the Philippines. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141. occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. Page 20 . since June 12. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.SEC. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14 (1) of P. 1073. may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor. applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain. –The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land.D. under the Land Registration Act. Factual findings of the court a quo are generally binding on this Court. continuous. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. It is true. [10] to wit: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation. 1073 on January 25. 1529. 1945. states: Section 48.D. or earlier. except for certain recognized exceptions. it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant.[9] Thus. 1977. but whose titles have not been perfected or completed. 1945 or earlier. the others being 1973. (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents. they constitute proof of claim of ownership. by incontrovertible evidence. No testimonial evidence was presented to prove that respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had been possessing and occupying the subject property since June 12. Hanover’s President and General Manager testified only with respect to his claim that he was the former owner of the subject property and that he acquired the same from the heirs of a certain Damiano Bontoyan. [11] The Court finds that the instant case falls under the third and ninth exceptions. [13] In the present case.[12] The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by respondent neither show that its predecessor’s possession and occupation of the subject land is for the period or duration required by law. Lastly. (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial Court. that Hanover caused a survey of the subject lot. Settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by clear. went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. the pieces of evidence presented by respondent do not constitute the “well-nigh incontrovertible” proof necessary in cases of this nature. the payment of realty taxes starting 1965 gives rise to the presumption that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest claimed ownership or possession of the subject lot only in that year. Respondent failed to present any credible explanation why the realty taxes due on the subject property were only paid starting in 1965. the Court notes that respondent failed to prove that the subject lot had been declared alienable and disposable by the DENR Secretary.[15] The onus to overturn.[14] Unfortunately. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the disputed parcel of land since June 12. in making its findings. positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law. absurd or impossible. and that his and Hanover’s possession of the property started in 1990. (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion. the presumption Page 21 . that he caused the payment of realty taxes due on the property. A careful reading of the Decisions of the RTC and the CA will show that there is neither finding nor discussion by both the trial and appellate courts which would support their conclusion that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had open. (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. as petitioner contends. The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting.(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership. 1992 and 1993. 1945 or earlier. duly approved by the Bureau of Lands. that a tax declaration was issued in favor of Hanover. 1980. continuous. and (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. The earliest date of the Tax Declarations presented in evidence by respondent is 1965. (6) When the Court of Appeals. He was not the one who prepared the Certification.[18] In the instant case.[20] Moreover. Page 22 . CV No. Hence. WHEREFORE. the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. 70077 and the August 7. Hanover submitted a Certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO) attesting that “lot 4488.” However. Hanover’s President and General Manager. Cebu. The contents of the Certification are hearsay. Even if the subject Certification is presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence. CAD-545-D. The government official who issued the Certification was not presented before the RTC so that he could have testified regarding its contents. It is settled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein. however. The May 6. is a private individual. the CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of public lands. per map 2545 of Consolacion. Inc. it has no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable x x x. T. In Republic v. to prove the alienability and disposability of the subject property. 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Cebu. [21] Thus.350) square meters. N-281 are SET ASIDE. containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY (103. this certification is not sufficient. land classification project no. 4488 of Consolacion Cad-545-D (New). Properties. under Vs-072219-000396. 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. 2005 Decision and March 30. the RTC should not have accepted the contents of the Certification as proof of the facts stated therein. [17] this Court held that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. [16] In the present case. Barrio Sacsac. Cebu” was found to be within “Alienable and Disposable Block-1. situated at Sacsac. the CENRO Certification should have been accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. even the veracity of the facts stated in the CENRO Certification was not confirmed as only the President and General Manager of respondent corporation identified said Certification submitted by the latter.R. failed to comply with the foregoing requirements. is DENIED. thus: x x x The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. Consolacion. [19] In the present case.N. 28.A. Respondent Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation’s application for registration of Lot No. because Hanover’s President and General Manager was incompetent to testify on the truth of the contents of such Certification. In addition.that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. who identified the CENRO Certification. the petition is GRANTED. Consolacion. more or less. Branch 56 in Land Registration Case No. Respondent. Petitioner. which are situated. identical to lot 3135-A. Province of Cebu.SO ORDERED. 20’E.69 m.3 Antecedent Facts On July 17. No.4 to wit: TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS Lot 2007. 1995. 61 deg.. Cebu. 3135-A and Lot No. the respondent sought the registration under her name of the lands denominated as Lot No. In her verified application in LRC Case No. 2007 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-GR. Consolacion. All [sic] of Cad. on the SW. which granted the application of Diosdada I. 545-D (new). 545-D (New). Gielczyk (respondent) for the original registration of title of Lot Nos. both situated in Jugan.. Csd-072219-004552 (Luisa Ceniza) A parcel of land (lot 20047. The petitioner prays that the Court annuls the CA Decision dated September 21. 2013 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1878. being a portion of lot 3135. situated in the Barrio of Jugan.R. along line 3-4 by lot 3126. 70078. 83 deg.. on the NW. the respondent claimed that she is the owner of the two parcels of land. Cad. Cad. N-452 for utter lack of merit. 40. J.. DECISION REYES. CV No. Csd-072219-004552). to point 2. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being S. vs. along line 2-3 by Camino Vicinal Road. 70078. 179990 October 23.. Island of Cebu. affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Mandaue City. from BLLM No. Cebu. Cebu. N-452. GIELCZYK. Both lands were situated in Jugan. Csd-072219-004552). Bounded on the NE. bounded and specifically described in Plans Csd072219-004552 and Csd-072219-004551. Cad. Municipality of Consolacion. identical to lot 3135-A. along line 4-1 by lot 3136. 3135-A and 3136-A of Plans Csd-072219-004552 and Csd-072219-004551.545-D. Consolacion. Branch 56. 17’E. 3136-A of Plans Csd-072219-004552 and Csd072219-004551. on the SE.: The present petition is one for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court. and that it should dismiss Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. Page 23 .69 m. CV No. DIOSDADA I. Consolacion. The Republic of the Philippines petitioner) challenges the Decision1 dated September 21.. Respondent. 545-D. G. along line 1-2 by lot 20048 (identical to lot 3135-B. thence S. 1. 2007 in CA-GR. situated in the Barrio of Jugan. identical to lot 3136-A.L. 1878. to point 3.. 1987-November 11. Province of Cebu. 10’W. Cebu. 545-D (New).. 57. Csd-072219-004551 (Constancio Ceniza) A parcel of land (lot 20045. along line 2-3-4 by lot 3126..400.610) SQUARE METERS.S. on the SW. 65 deg.02 m. Bearings Grid.05 m.. 545-D.39 m. there is no mortgage nor encumbrance of any kind affecting said land.. to point of the beginning. cyl. 2. 12. No. more or less.55 m. 15x40 cms. on the NW. 65 deg. to point 5. Cad. date of original survey July 14. Cad. thence S. Containing an area of TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TEN (2.. 1.. date of original survey July 14. 1987. 58.S. 26 deg. 58. Cad.thence S. 37’E. to point of the beginning. along line 6-1 by lot 20046 (identical to lot 3136-B.80 m. points 1 and 2 by P. Bearings Grid. 1994.M. 43’E. 15x40 cms. on the NE.69 m. 59’W. 59’E. 17’E. 44. thence N. to point 4. along line 6-1 by lot 20046. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being S. 35 deg. 44’E. cyl. Csd-072219-004551). thence N.00. identical to Lot 3136-A.. 1987-November 11. 1987. thence N.. conc. and the rest are old P. Csd-072219004551). points 1 and 6 by P. conc. to point 4.79 m..285) SQUARE METERS.. Containing an area of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (2. 15’W. 20 deg. to point 2. mons. Abella on November 19. to point 3. 23 deg. conc. mons. Abella on November 12.6 The respondent further alleged the following: (a) that the said parcels of land were last assessed for taxation atP2.. and that of the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Norvic S. and that of the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Norvic S. 38. (b) that to the best of her knowledge and belief. mons 15x60 cms. being a portion of lot 3136. 1993 and approved on May 26.. thence N. Consolacion. 23 deg.5 TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS Lot 20045. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows. Bounded on the SE. thence N.545-D. 46.02 m. 26’W. and the rest are old P.40 m. 83 deg. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows. Island of Cebu. All [sic] of Cad. 1993 and approved on May 24.48 m. 14’W. mons 15x60 cms. along line 1-2 by lot 3135. 545-D (New). more or less.L. 61 deg. 20 deg. cyl. from B. conc. to point 6: thence S.S. cyl. 1994.S. nor any person having interest Page 24 . Municipality of Consolacion. thence N.. 41. Cebu East .13 (f) Deeds of Sale in favor of the respondent.therein. Rogelio M. Technical Services Section. Luisa Ceniza Jugan. Miguel Hortiguela Jugan. Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner over said parcels of land up to the present time for more than 30 years. ADJOINING OWNERS OF LOT 3136-A: North . owned by the applicant. Cebu South .10 (c) Certification from the Chief. Consolacion. 3135-A and 3136-A. owned by Mr. owned by Mr.Lot 3136-A owned by the applicant. Rene Pepito Jugan. Cebu East . including the possession of her predecessors-in-interest. (c) that she had been in open. continuous. Consolacion.14 Page 25 .12 (e) Latest tax clearance of the same lots.11 (d) Latest tax declarations of the lots. Consolacion. Cebu West . Central Visayas Lands Management Services in lieu of surveyor’s certificates.7 The respondent. and (e) that said land is not occupied. South . Consolacion.Lot 3126.Lot 3135-A. as far as known to her.9 (b) Approved technical descriptions of the same lots. legal or equitable. the respondent submitted the following pieces of evidence: (a) Approved plans of Lot Nos.Lot 3135-B owned by Mrs. Cebu8 To prove her claim.Lot 3138. Pepito Jugan. also alleged that the full names and complete addresses of the owners of all lands adjoining the subject land are the following: ADJOINING OWNERS OF LOT 3135-A: North . (d) that she acquired title to said land by virtue of the deeds of absolute sale. Cebu West . complete. Region 7.Lot 3136-B.Lot 3126 owned by Mr. Consolacion.Municipal Road c/o Municipal Mayor Consolacion. Constancio Ceniza Jugan. owned by Mr. 22 (2) That the muniments of title and/or the tax declarations and tax payment receipts of the respondent attached to or alleged in the application do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of their open. and that said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and the tax declarations and/or tax payment receipts indicate the pretended possession of the respondent to be of recent vintage. her testimony sought to establish the following: (i) That the respondent acquired Lot No.610 sq m). Tax Dec. and Lot No. No. and is situated in Jugan. 29200 for the year 1981. 1945.285 sq m) through purchase from Constancio Ceniza and Luisa Ceniza respectively. No. No. 021294 for the year 1968. In fact the following tax declarations were issued for Lot No. continuous. 01258 for the year 1948.18 (iii) That the said parcels of land are alienable and disposable and are not covered by subsisting public land application. 20846 for the year 1980. Tax Dec. peacefully. No. 04210 for the year 1985. Tax Dec. while the following tax declarations were issued for Lot No.23 Page 26 . Tax Dec. or prior thereto. 13275 for the year 1989. No. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of an owner since June 12. No. DENR. and Tax Dec. alleging among others: 1) That neither the respondent nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open. Consolacion. Tax Dec. Tax Dec. No. Tax Dec. notoriously and adversely. Cebu. 13274 for the year 1989. Consolacion. continuous. No. exclusive. exclusively. Tax Dec.20 and (v) That the respondent is a Filipino Citizen and that despite her marriage to an American national.19 (iv) That the respondent and her respective predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of Lot No. 20849 for the year 1980. Tax Dec. 01411 for the year 1974. and no other person has claimed ownership over the same land. she has retained her Filipino citizenship. 012459 for the year 1965. 1995 to the respondent’s application for registration of title. 25146 for the year 1973. 012931 for the year 1965. 3135-A (which is identical to Lot 20047. with an area of 2. Tax Dec. with an area of 2. Region 7.(g) Certifications from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO). Tax Dec. Cebu. Cebu City that the same lots are not subject to public land application. 1945 or prior thereto. completely. 04208 for the year 1985. No. 01670 for the year 1948. 3136-A (which is identical to Lot 20045.15 and (h) Certification from the Chief. 3136-A for more than 40 years in the concept of an owner. No. publicly. when the respondent testified in court. No. 3136-A: Tax Dec. No. 21 The petitioner filed an opposition dated September 18. and is situated in Jugan. continuously. that the lots are alienable and disposable. 3135-A: Tax Dec. Cebu City. No.16 Furthermore. and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12. Records Section. 3135-A and Lot No.17 (ii) That the respondent was never delinquent in paying the taxes for the said lots. No. the petitioner further alleged that the instant application was filed on July 7. the petitioner filed an appeal dated August 5. American national. GIELCZYK. 1976 as required by Presidential Decree (P.27 Not convinced of the RTC’s decision. the Court finds and so holds that the applicant has registrable title over subject lots.30 Our Ruling Page 27 . Filipino.D. Metro Manila. 2002 before the CA. let a corresponding decree of registration and original certificate of title be issued to subject lot in accordance with Sec. the petitioner filed the present Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court. PD 1529. and the same title is hereby confirmed. NOTORIOUS.. as her exclusive paraphernal property. 44 years old. Cebu in the name of the applicant DIOSDADA I. Land Registration Authority is hereby directed to issue Decree of Registration and Original Certificate of Title to Lots 3135-A and 3136-A [sic]. resident of No. Paranaque. From the records. 39. the RTC rendered its Decision26 in favor of the respondent. raising the sole issue: Issue THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT SHE AND HER PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN. SO ORDERED. Consolacion.25 On November 3. Consequently.24 (4) That the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the petitioner and that the said parcel is not subject to private appropriation. UHV. COMPLETE. EXCLUSIVE AND PEACEFUL POSSESSION OVER THE LANDS SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION FOR A PERIOD OF OVER 40 YEARS THROUGH MERE TAX DECLARATIONS AND IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF WHEN THE SUBJECT LOTS WERE DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. the Administrator. the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED in its entirety. from all the foregoing undisputed facts supported by oral and documentary evidence.28 the dispositive portion of which provides: WHEREFORE. Upon finality of this judgment. 892. which was also denied on September 21. 2007. CONTINUOUS. 1999. 4 Noel St. married to Philip James Gielczyk. 1995.29 Thus. both situated at Jugan. the dispositive portion of which provides: WHEREFORE.(3) That the respondent can no longer avail of the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant since she has failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six months from February 16.) No. 2011. In the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Section 14(2). the development of the national wealth and have been converted into patrimonial property. this Court resolved to dispense with the respondent’s comment and shall decide the instant petition based on available records. continuous. (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law. Section 14 of P. 14. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws. whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in. 1529 or The Property Registration Decree enumerates the persons who may apply for the registration of title to land.32 The CA said: However. No. but under Section 14(2) of said issuance. in the Resolution31 dated March 30. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land." A closer scrutiny will show that the questioned decision was based on PD No. notorious. continuous. and to meet the period of possession and occupation required by law. 1529. PD 1529. for a period of over 40 years. in the concept of an owner and that applicant has registrable title over same lots in accordance with Sec. exclusive and peaceful possession over the lands herein applied for registration of title. The respondent failed to completely prove that there was an expressed State declaration that the properties in question are no longer intended for public use. Thus.D. public service. the Court resolves to grant the petition.interest have been in open. to wit: Sec. 1529 and not on Section 14(1) of the same decree. Who may apply. or earlier.D. After a thorough study of the records. Court of Appeals and Naguit. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws. 1945. 1529. Section 14(1). The pertinent portion of the decision is quoted as follows: "From the documentary evidence presented and formally offered by the applicant. complete. it was ruled that: Page 28 . a judicious scrutiny of the attendant facts would reveal that the assailed decision of the RTC was based not on PD No. 14. No. the CA explained that the RTC’s decision was based on Section 14(2) of P. In the assailed decision granting the respondent’s application for registration of title. the Court is convinced that she and her predecessors-in-interest has (sic) been in open.It must be noted that the respondent did not file any comment on the petition despite efforts to notify her and her counsel of record. 34 correctly explained. 1529 and not on Section 14(1) of the same decree. continuous and exclusive. Moreover.36 the Court further clarified the difference between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of P. 1529. As the CA. not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership. Registration under the first mode is extended under the aegis of the P. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the second mode is made available both by P. the 30-year period is in relation to possession without regard to the Civil Code. possession over which commenced only after June 12. then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. All told. which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. No.Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P. or at the least constructive. They constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. 1529. 1529 and the Civil Code. and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. such acts strengthen one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. an applicant may apply for registration of title through prescription under Section 14(2) of P. they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual. while under Section 14(2) of P. No. continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years. However.D. nevertheless. 1472.37 Indeed. under Section 48(b) of the PLA. continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests. as amended by Republic Act No.35 In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. applicant-appellee was able to present tax declarations dating back from 1948. 1529.D. considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.D. 1945. No. including his intention to contribute to the needed revenues of the Government." In the instant case.D. 1945? It did not. while the latter entitles the applicant to the registration of his property on the basis of prescription. No.D.D. and such possession being been [sic] open. citing Republic of the Philippines v. the foregoing jurisprudence clearly shows the basis of the respondent’s application for registration of title. such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2).33 (Citations omitted) The Court agrees with the CA’s finding that the RTC’s grant of the respondent’s application for registration of title was based on Section 14(2) of P. Court of Appeals and Naguit. particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. No. the petitioner argued that the respondent failed to show proof of an expressed State declaration that the properties in question are no longer intended for public Page 29 . stating that patrimonial properties of the State are susceptible of prescription and that there is a rich jurisprudential precedents which rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open. The former refers to registration of title on the basis of possession. the 30-year period involves extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open. No. Republic. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain. No. possession. Thus.D. but it also announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties." "Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12. With such conversion. 2. Consolacion. It pointed out that the certification which the respondent submitted did not indicate when the lands applied for were declared alienable and disposable. particularly Annex "G" and Annex "G-1" or the June 28. situated at Jugan. the development of the national wealth or have been converted into patrimonial property. Caña for CONSTANCIO CENIZA ET AL was found to be within Alienable and Disposable Block I of Land Classification Project No. 1997.use. the Court cannot. Lands Verification CONSTANCIO CENIZA ET AL (Consolacion. 1995 Certifications issued by Eduardo M. the Court cannot completely agree with the petitioner. This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. (Emphasis Supplied) This is to certify further that the subject area is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Watershed Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. Cebu as shown and described in the sketch plan at the back hereof as prepared by Geodetic Engineer Aurelio Q.687) square meters[. 28 per L. C. close its eyes to the September 23. 2545 of Consolacion. public service. While the RTC and the CA failed to cite the evidence which the respondent submitted.] more or less. 2004 Certification issued and signed by Fedencio P. Constancio Ceniza for the purpose of ascertaining the land classification status only and does not entitle him preferential/priority rights of possession until determined by competent authorities. Page 30 . CENRO. Cad 545-D(New) containing an area of FIFTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN (15. Cebu) C E R T I F I C AT I O N TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that per projection conducted by Forester Restituto A. Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. Inting. 1074 dated Sept. 1965.39 as a supplement to her earlier submissions. Llegunas a tract of land lots 3135 and 3136.40 Carreon’s Certification is reproduced here: Republic of the Philippines Department of Environment and Natural Resources COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICE Cebu City 23 September 2004 CENRO. OIC.38 On this point. the respondent attempted to show proof as to when the subject lands were declared alienable and disposable. Carreon (Carreon). 4-1063 dated September 1. Cebu City. in the name of substantial justice and equity. Indeed. Map No. which the respondent attached in her Appellee’s brief in the CA. CENRO. 46 In the said case. Inc. 4-1063 dated September 1. T. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation.FEDENCIO P. The respondent failed to present specific acts of ownership to substantiate her claim of open. In Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo. we ruled that for as long as the land was declared alienable and disposable. Here. continuous. exclusive. Granting por arguendo that the respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the subject lots since 1948. the same is susceptible of prescription for purposes of registration of imperfect title.A. public service or the development of national wealth. the Court cannot still tack those years to complete the 30-year possession period since the said lots were only declared alienable and disposable on September 1. the respondent should have submitted a certified true copy thereof to substantiate the alienable character of the land. notorious and adverse possession in the concept of an owner. While the certification refers to Forestry Administrative Order No. continuous. In any case. public dominion lands become patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable but also with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use. the respondent failed to meet the required period of possession and occupation for purposes of prescription. the Court clarified what it actually meant when it said "open. exclusive and notorious possession of at least 30 years. Indeed. notorious and adverse possession in the concept of an owner. the Court agrees with the petitioner’s argument. continuous.41 this CENRO Certification by itself is insufficient to establish that a public land is alienable and disposable. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lot.42 In Lim v. CARREON OIC.45 the Court ruled that for an applicant to ipso jure or by operation of law acquire government grant or vested title to a lot. continuous. 1965. Republic. short of two months to complete the whole 30-year possession period. Properties.43 we further clarified that "while a property classified as alienable and disposable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open. continuous. Community Environment & Natural Resources Officer However. Aklan v. 1965. the Court does not need to further discuss whether the respondent was able to overcome the burden of proving that the land no longer forms part of the public domain to support her application for original land registration because of other deficiencies in her application. From the time of the declaration on September 1. the respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the said properties for only 29 years and 10 months.N. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.. The petitioner contends that the respondent failed to present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the latter’s claim of open. following our ruling in Republic of the Philippines v."44 While the subject lots were supposedly declared alienable or disposable on September 1. the respondent still failed to complete the 30-year period required to grant her application by virtue of prescription. exclusive. Municipality of Buruanga. 1965 that the properties in question are purportedly alienable and disposable up to the filing of the application of the respondent on July 17. 1995. In Naguit. he must be in open." to wit: Page 31 . 1965 based on the Certifications of the CENRO. Aklan. As this Court stated. 926 and Act No. while it may be constructive. the record is bereft of any evidence that would tend to show that such possession and Page 32 . its open. Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious." possession under paragraph 6 of Section 54 of Act No. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" of the land by the applicant. exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit. It is continuous when uninterrupted. Laurel. When. therefore. One of the important requisites for the application of the pertinent provisions of Act No. in Lasam v. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership. Justice Jose P. Director of Lands . The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. However. continuous. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. "possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. continuous. the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the order [sic]. and this court was careful to observe that among these qualifications is "one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant. the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section. Indisputably. x x x. continuous.The petitioner submits that even granting arguendo that the entire Lot 138 was not assigned to it during the Spanish regime or it is not the owner thereof pursuant to the Laws of the Indies. the law adds the word occupation. apparent. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. But it should be observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject to certain qualifications. 2874. his possession of the land must not be mere fiction. 2874 is the "open. a vested title. xxxx Possession is open when it is patent. as amended by paragraph (b) of Section 45 of Act No. through then Mr. 926." Since these words are separated by the conjunction and. it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. It cites Subsection 6 of Section 54 of Act No. notorious and not clandestine. This contention is likewise not persuasive. Taken together with the words open. therefore. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 138 since 1894 and for many decades thereafter vests ipso jure or by operation of law upon the petitioner a government grant. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 138-B since 1894 as evidenced by the church structure built thereon. is not gained by mere nominal claim. visible. is not a mere fiction. continuous. unbroken and not intermittent or occasional. exclusive and notorious. to the subject property. The Director of Lands: x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos v." While. the petitioner has been in open. The phrase "possession and occupation" was explained as follows: It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation. 2874. 926 and Subsection b of Section 45 of Act No. and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. Court of Appeals. "Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. no government grant or title to Lots 138-A and 138-C had vested upon the petitioner ipso jure or by operation of law. Buruanga community Medicare hospital [sic].occupation extended to Lots 138-A and 138-C beginning the same period. These acts of dominion were the following: (a) they constructed permanent buildings on the questioned lot. notorious and not clandestine. unbroken and not intermittent or occasional. his possession of the property must be patent. the rural health center. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" does not suffice. e. Its unsubstantiated claim that the construction of the municipal building as well as the subsequent improvements thereon. Admittedly. Rizal monument and grandstand. and (f) they religiously paid taxes on the property. 2874. in the present petition. 926. a simple claim of "open. The applicant’s possession must not be simply a nominal claim where he only plants a sign or symbol of possession. An applicant for a grant or title over a lot must be able to show that he has exercised acts of dominion over the property in question. (d) they collected fruits from the fruit-bearing trees planted on the said land. is not gained by mere nominal claim. No single instance of the exercise by the petitioner of proprietary acts or acts of dominion over these lots was established. as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. was [sic] by its tolerance does not constitute proof of possession and occupation on its (the petitioner’s) part. continuous. continuous. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereon since 1894. (b) they collected rentals. apparent. et al. basketball court.g. and it should be conspicuous. visible.48 The Court held in Cruz v. but these tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of land.47 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied) In sum. (e) they were consulted regarding questions of boundaries between adjoining properties. In other words. it should be uninterrupted.. which means generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. (c) they granted permission to those who sought their consent for the construction of a drugstore and a bakery.. Absent the important requisite of open. Page 33 .49 that therein petitioners were able to show clear. Possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. competent and substantial evidence establishing that they have exercised acts of dominion over the property in question. the respondent failed to specifically show that she and her predecessors-in-interest had exercised acts of dominion over the subject lots.50 However. the respondent’s best evidence to prove possession and ownership were tax declarations and receipts issued in her name or the names of her predecessors-in-interest. it should demonstrate exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit. Germino: Yes. Your Honor."51 In the instant case.286 square meters." Unfortunately.Yes. Court: Excuse me. She did not present anyone else to support her claim of "open. it was only the respondent who testified to substantiate her allegations in the application. In fact. Court: Is that reflected in the tax declaration? Atty.Yes. 3135 and 20045. Court: Page 34 .00 per square meters is the assessed value reflected in the document.Are you familiar with Lots No. Q . exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. P430. Germino: Who is the owner of these lots? A .The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in.interest does not necessarily prove ownership. the respondent failed to show that she or her predecessors-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the said parcels of land. You can answer in English? You don’t need an interpreter? A . Your Honor. Q . Gielczyk. the applicant in this case? A . to wit: DIRECT EXAMINATION: Q .How much is the assessed value of Lot 20047? A . They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. both of Consolacion.Mrs. are you the same Diosdada Gielzcyk.It has an area of 2. continuous.I do not think. her testimony simply made general declarations without further proof. Q .I am the one. Atty.Yes.How large is 20047? A . Cebu? A . Court: The same property? A . for over a period of 40 years. Q .Then the tax declaration would be the best evidence. open and uninterrupted.Including my predecessors-in-interest.Your Honor. Germino: Q . continous [sic]. peaceful. Atty.How long have you been in possession of the lots? A . Atty.No. Germino: Q .Near my parents’ house.I am in possession. sir.Adverse against the whole world. Q . Court: Proceed. Germino: Q .How did you acquire Lot 20047? Page 35 .What is the nature of your possession? A . Court: Physically? I thought you are residing in Manila? A . I have my parents and brothers there.Because my family is living there in Consolacion and I always come home every month.Are there liens and encumbrances affecting the lots? A .No sir. Atty.Who is in possession of these lots? A . Q .Do you know if there are other persons who are interested whatsoever over the lots you have mentioned? A . 021294 in the name of Luisa and Constancio Ceniza for the year 1968.A . Q .Do you know how did Luisa Ceniza acquire the same? A .Showing to you tax declaration No. Germino: Q .Showing to you tax declaration No. Germino: Q .I purchased it from Luisa Ceniza. xxxx Atty. Q . xxxx Atty. 01670 in the name of the heirs of Remigio Ceniza covering land in Consolacion for the year 1948. Q . please examine and tell the court whether that is the tax declaration of Lot 20047 for the year 1948? A . xxxx Atty. your possession including your predecessors-in-interest has been for over forty (40) years.This is the same.Yes. Germino: Q . I have. 012931 in the name of heirs of Remigio Ceniza for the year 1965.Do you have a deed of sale in your favor? A .52 xxxx Atty.Yes. please examine the same and tell the Honorable court what relation has that to the tax declaration of lot 20047 for the year 1965? A . Germino: Page 36 .Yes.She inherited it from her father Remigio Ceniza.You said that includ[i]ng your predecessors-in-interest.Showing to you tax declaration No. this is the same. please examine and tell the court whether that is the tax declaration of Lot 20047 for the year 1968? A . Do you have the tax declaration of Lot 20047 since 1948 until the present? A . this is the one.Yes. 1985.2. GERMINO: Q .P970. [no number was indicated in the TSN] in the name of Luisa Ceniza for the year 1963 tell the court whether that is the tax declaration for the year 1973? A .Q . Gielczyk.Personally. Germino: Q . ATTY. how long have you been in possession of this property? A .I am the one. one of the last lot subject to [sic] your petition is Lot 20045.Mrs.Yes.00 Q . Q .I purchased it from Constancio Ceniza.If I remember right.610 square meters. how large is this lot? A .How long have you been in possession? A .How did you acquire lot 20045? A . She testified thus: xxxx Atty.Including my predecessors-in-interest is [sic] over a period of 40 years.Yes. this is the one. COURT: We are talking about 3136-A? Page 37 . the respondent added no further information for this Court to conclude that she indeed exercised specific acts of dominion aside from paying taxes.Showing to you tax declaration No.Do you have a deed of sale in your favor? A .53 In the continuance of her testimony. Q . COURT: (to witness) Q .Who is in possession of this lot? A . Q .How much is the assess value of this lot? A . Yes.Yes. Q . series of 1988. Proceed. ATTY.No. Q . 1980.I am showing to you tax clearance issued by the municipal treasurer of Consolacion. we are through with Lot 3135? COURT: This is 3136-A equivalent to Lot 20045. please examine this document and tell the Court if that is the deed of sale? A . 6 in all. Cebu. 1965. xxxx COURT: (to witness) Q . from the (sic) year 1948. as Doc. ATTY.ATTY. 1985 and 1989.You said that including your predecessor-in-interest. Q . do you have a Tax Declaration of lot 3136-A from 1948 until the present? A . is that the tax clearance you referred to? A . GERMINO: I am showing to you a deed of absolute sale by Constancio Ceniza over lot 3136-A acknowledged before Notary Public Marino Martillano.Are you not delinquent in the payment of taxes for lot 3136-A? A . sir.Do you have a tax clearances [sic]? A . xxxx Q . your possession of the land applied for is more than 40 years. 1981. sir. 2637 book 4. GERMINO: Yes. No.Yes. COURT: Mark it. I have.Yes. GERMINO: We ask your Honor the tax clearance be marked as double "C".I am showing to you a bunch of Tax Declaration. please examine this Tax Declaration and tell us whether these are the Tax Declarations of Lot 3136-A from 1948 until the present in your name? Page 38 . When was that? A .In other words.A .But you are not in actual occupant [sic] of the property because you are residing in Paranaque? A.Yes.54 The respondent’s cross-examination further revealed that she and her predecessors-in-interest have not exercised specific acts of dominion over the properties. Q.If I remember right in 1985 or 1986. Q .These are the ones. you srarted [sic] possessing the property since 1985. Q. GERMINO: We ask that the Tax Declaration in bunch be marked as Exhibit double "F" and the succeeding Tax Declaration to be marked as double "FF-1" up to double "F-5". until the present? A.How did you acquire this lot [sic]? A .I purchased it [sic] from Constancio Ceniza.Mrs. COURT: Mark it. COURT: Proceed.2 portions. to wit: COURT: Cross-examination? FISCAL ALBURO: May it please the Honorable Court. FISCAL ALBURO: Q . ATTY. Page 39 . Gielczyk. how many lots are involved in this petition? A . Q .But I have a cousin in Consolacion. the respondent did not exercise acts of dominion over it.55 (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing testimony of the lone witness (the applicant-respondent herself).My brothers. the Court can deduce that. The pieces of documentary evidence. Q . it was only in Tax Declaration Nos. Q. Neither can the Court give credence to the respondent’s claim that her predecessors-in-interest had exercised dominion over the property since the respondent failed to present any witness who would substantiate her allegation. the deed of absolute sale simply said that the improvements on Lot No. one (1) caimito tree and one (1) jackfruit tree. which was actually possessed by the vendor Constancio Ceniza. one (1) mango tree.56 The tax declarations have not shown any indication supporting the respondent’s claim that she exercised specific acts of dominion. 3136-A.My brothers because there are coconut trees and some fruits and he watched it [sic]. where the residential building was first indicated.Just for consumption. specifically the tax declarations and the deeds of absolute sale. is Page 40 . Tax Declaration No.58 And based on the records. Moreover. there are few coconuts. your property is being taken cared of by your brothers? A . 29200. FISCAL ALBURO: That is all. your Honor. can neither be relied upon because the same revealed no indication of any improvement that would have the Court conclude that the respondent exercised specific acts of dominion.Q.Yes. ATTY. the deed of absolute sale showed that there were 14 coconut trees.Who is using the coconut trees and the fruits? A . GERMINO: No redirect. 3136-A. 04210 and 13275 where it was declared that a residential building has been built in Lot No.57 As to Lot No. your Honor.I used to go back and forth Cebu and Manila. Q . and a residential building.But you are not residing in Consolacion? A. where do you stay often? A . 3135-A.In other words. 3135-A consisted of two (2) coconut trees. besides intermittently paying the tax dues on Lot No.Who takes care of the property in Mandaue City? A . Q . For instance. 29200.Who is in charge of your property in Consolacion? A. COURT: (to witness) By the way.Usually in Manila. eight (8) jackfruit trees. and considering that the respondent did not present any other witness to support her claim. Justice Tinga correctly pointed out the need to review our present law on the distribution of lands to those who have held them for a number of years but have failed to satisfy the requisites in acquiring title to such land. Once that sense of security is deprived. by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain lands. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable. but also to the person s family. Thus. such as through homestead or free patent. continuous. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. The informal settlement of public lands. and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment. as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. whether declared alienable or not. the Court has no other recourse but to declare that she has not presented the premium of evidence needed to award her title over the two parcels of land. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. This could be accomplished.1âwphi1Nonetheless. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this decision. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. One’s sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that individual. It may be said then that it was only in 1981 when the respondent’s predecessors-ininterest exercised specific acts of dominion over Lot No. Tinga in the case of Malabanan59. to cite two examples. Justice Tinga eloquently put the matter before us. the Court cannot end this decision without reiterating the final words of former Associate Justice Dante O. They have been regarded for generation by their families and their communities as common law owners. discomfiture over the implications of today’s ruling cannot be discounted.60 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied) Page 41 . has considerable limits. thus: A final word. as revealed in this decision. and is common among the so-called "Third World" countries. the respondent has not completed the required 30 years of "open. if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. For. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law. life and livelihood are put on stasis. or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial. Finally. have proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said properties. the period of which consists barely of 14 years.dated 1981. 3136-A. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble." Clearly. yet even that system. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly. from the pieces of documentary and testimonial evidence. There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. There is much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. is a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence. CA AND NAGUIT G . N o . declaring the land as alienable and disposable. 1 4 4 0 5 7 J a n u a r y 1 7 . The MCTC rendered a decision confirmingthe title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal opposition to the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property RegistrationDecree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable beforethe applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start. RULING: Section 14 ( 1) m erely requir es t hat the propert y sought t o be regist er ed as alrea dy alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. 70078 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or proclamationstating the intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. like herein respondent. filed a motionfor reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open. and which this Court will interpret and apply as justice requires. Naguit could not have maintained a bonafide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposableonly on October 15. The alienable and disposable character of the land shouldhave already been established since June 12. 2 0 0 5 Tinga. 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration. R . FACTS: Cor azon Naguit filed a petition f or r egistration of t itle which seeks judicial confir mation of her imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas. J.Indeed.To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction of Section 14 (1)would render the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that alllands of public domain which were not declared as alienable and disposable beforeJune 12.The Solicitor General. wish to acquire title to a land that they have bought. 1945. 1980. the Court can only do as much to bring relief to those who. There are three requirements for registration of title. continuous andexclusive possession must first be alienable. 1945 or earlier. no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. it having been Page 42 .thus. and exclusive possession and occupation. It was allegedthat Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in theconcept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the governmentuntil she filed her application for registration.R. and. (2) that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open. In effect. WHEREFORE in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions.The land in question was found to be cocal in nature. REPUBLIC VS. (1) that the subject propertyis alienable and disposable. 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. (3) thatthe possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. it precludes the government frome n f o r c i n g t h e s a i d p r o v i s i o n a s i t d e c i d e s t o r e c l a s s i f y l a n d s a s a l i e n a b l e a n d disposable. It is for our lawmakers to write the law amending the present ones and addressing the reality on the ground. Aklan. However. representing the Republic of the Philippines. CV No.it is presumed that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property andthe possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into ownership throughacquisitive prescription. the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated September 21. continuous. if there has been none. MANNA PROPERTIES. per Report dated November 21. JOSE TANYAO. 539-D of As-013314-001434. respondent. San Fernando. 1994 together with the notice of the Initial Hearing. 1995. which was forwarded to the Land Registration Authority on December 22. hence agricultural. the full names and complete postal addresses of all adjoining lot owners were not stated for notification purposes. San Fernando. 1006. N-2352 (“LRC No. petitioner. 1994 of the Land Registration Authority. La Union measuring around 1. 1994. 9515. Antecedent Facts As culled by the Court of Appeals from the evidence. 1994. 1994.planted withcoconut trees now over fifty years old. specifically: a) Lot No. There is no impediment to theapplication of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. applicant-appellee filed an Application for the registration of title of two (2) parcels of land. which was reset to April 13. As a result thereto. La Union (“trial court”) dated 21 February 1996 in Land Registration Case No. the applicant filed its compliance. (“Manna Properties”) for the registration in its name of a parcel of land located in Barangay Pagdaraoan. postal money orders for publication purposes and record were forwarded to the Land Registration Authority by the Court a quo on October 7. Initial hearing was set on February 16. However. Represented by its President. Cad. Branch 26. vs. and b) Lot No. located in Barangay Pagdaraoan.. DECISION CARPIO. Copies of the application. Naguit had the right toapply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. On December 14. 1995 by the court a quo. 1994. Page 43 . per Order dated December 5. J. the applicant was directed to submit the names and complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners of Lots 9514 and 9516. San Fernando. Cad.: The Case This is a petition for review[1] seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals’ Decision [2] dated 20 December 2000. 539-D of As-013314-001434. INC. the facts of the case are as follows: On September 29. La Union. The inherent nature of the land but confirms itscertification in 1980 as alienable. N-2352”) approving the application of respondent Manna Properties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Inc.480 square meters. 6. 1995. accordingly. 353 or ninety (90) days from date of the Order to allow reasonable time for possible mail delays and to enable them to cause the timely publication of the notice in the Official Gazette. Page 3 of Ilocos Herald dated January 12. 1995. Per Certificate of Publication issued by the LRA and the National Printing Office. 14. the Land Registration Authority requested for the resetting of the initial hearing since April 13. 1995 fell on Holy Thursday. 5. It was again requested that the initial hearing be moved to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to hold alienable lands of public domain. 7. reset to April 20. 9515. 1995 by the court a quo. 12. the court a quo rendered a Decision dated February 21. Certificate of Notification of all adjoining owners of the Notice of Initial Hearing on July 18. who testified on the acquisition of the subject property as well as Manuel Sobrepeña. 4. the initial hearing was reset to July 18. Sheriff’s Return of Posting. 1995 from the LRA with the information that the notice can no longer be published in the Official Gazette for lack of material time since the National Printing Office required submission of the printing materials 75 days before the date of the hearing. a non-working day to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 9515 and 1006. 1006. (sic) [3] Page 44 . the Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the June 12.On January 31. 8. Clipping of the Notice of Initial Hearing. 1995. 11. 1995 issue of the The Ilocos Herald. Technical Description of Lot No. Applicant-appellee presented its president Jose [Tanyao]. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the Circulation Manager of the Ilocos Herald. 10. 1995. 353. Thereafter. 9. who testified on the possession of the applicant-appellee’s predecessors-in-interest. Whole Issue of the Ilocos Herald dated July 12. 1995. the court a quo received a letter dated March 6. The initial hearing was. 1995. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the LRA. Certificate of Latest Assessment. Technical Description of Lot No. Per Order dated March 15. 1996 granting the application. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the National Printing Office. The [documentary] evidence presented were: 1. The same notice was published in the July 12. Notice of Initial Hearing. 13. 3. 2. On March 14. 1995. Certificate in lieu of Lost Surveyor’s Certificate. Plan AS-013314-001434 of Lots No. among others. co-owner of the subject property. 1995. The Opposition to the application stated. 1995 issue of the Official Gazette officially released on June 19. represented by its President Jose [Tanyao]. Page 45 . Inc. “A” and the technical description described in Exhibit “B” and “B-1”) shall be registered in accordance with Presidential Decree No. San Fernando. promptly appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals. 1529[5] (“PD 1529”). The trial court ruled in this wise: WHEREFORE. the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal. premises considered. Pagdaraoan. The Issues Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution: 1.[4] The Court of Appeals’ Ruling The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling and dismissed petitioner’s argument that the applicant failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of Presidential Decree No. and orders that the parcels of land identified as Lots 9515 and 1006 of Cad. La Union and embraced in Plan AS-1331434 (Exh. 1529. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION. The Court of Appeals stated that the records of the case reveal that the testimony of Manuel Sobrepeña was not the sole basis for the trial court’s finding that Manna Properties’s predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in question as early as 1953. Hence. and 2. appearing on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (“petitioner”). WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES HAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE REQUISITE PERIOD. pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. married to Marry [Tanyao] with residence and postal address at Jackivi Enterprises.480) square meters. this petition. situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan. 1529. the Court hereby approves the application. The Land Registration Authority (“LRA”) did not present any evidence in opposition to the application. La Union. 5[3]9-D San Fernando Cadastre with a total area of One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1. San Fernando. On 20 December 2000. they are “the best indicia” of possession.. otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree in the name of the applicant Manna Properties. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the 90-day period for setting the initial hearing under Section 23 of PD 1529 is merely directory and that it is the publication of the notice of hearing itself that confers jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals added that while tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership. Filipino citizen.The Office of the Solicitor General. of legal age. The Regional Trial Court’s Ruling The trial court found that Manna Properties has substantiated by clear and competent evidence all its allegations in the application for original land registration. the applicant must strictly comply with the jurisdictional requirements. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA. Considering that there are 125 days in between the two dates. which could affect the timely publication of the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette. – The court shall.” The petitioner is mistaken. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. Petitioner limited itself to assailing the lapse of time between the issuance of the order setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself. petitioner argues that the trial court exceeded the 90-day period set by PD 1529. The records show that the Docket Division of the LRA repeatedly requested the trial court to reset the initial hearing date because of printing problems with the National Printing Office. within five days from filing of the application. the applicant complied with the jurisdictional requirements. This involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no participation. In this case. Indeed. We have held that “a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court. nothing in the records indicates that Manna Properties failed to perform the acts required of it by law. The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing date was set beyond the 90-day maximum period.”[6] A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. After an applicant has filed his application.The Ruling of the Court On Whether Manna Properties Failed to Comply with the Jurisdictional Requirements for Original Registration Petitioner contends that PD 1529 sets a 90-day maximum period between the court order setting the initial hearing date and the hearing itself. the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases. issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing which shall not be earlier than fortyfive days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. Petitioner does not raise any other issue with respect to the sufficiency of the application. petitioner concludes “the applicant [Manna Properties] failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original registration. The pertinent portion of Section 23 of PD 1529 reads: Sec. Thus. he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his duties. Petitioner does not also Page 46 . but the trial court set the hearing date itself on 18 July 1995. the trial court issued the order setting the date of the initial hearing on 15 March 1995. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control. publication etc. especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law. xxx The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land registration court. Notice of initial hearing. The notice of initial hearing is a court document. 23. Petitioner points out that in this case. continuous.” Section 48(b) of the said law. as amended by Presidential Decree No. Thus. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. Manna Properties is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the public domain. the notice of hearing was published both in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation well ahead of the date of hearing. except by lease. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application of Manna Properties that. Generally. On Whether Manna Properties Sufficiently Established Possession of the Land For the Period Required by Law Petitioner asserts that Manna Properties has failed to prove its possession of the land for the period of time required by law. except in the presence of some meritorious circumstances. The governing law is Commonwealth Act No. (Emphasis supplied) Page 47 . The issue of whether Manna Properties has presented sufficient proof of the required possession. petitioner does not dispute the real jurisdictional issue involved in land registration cases — compliance with the publication requirement under PD 1529. The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the review and revision of errors of law. Petitioner cites the constitutional prohibition in Section 3 of Article XII in the 1987 Constitution. [9] We find one such circumstance in this case. Absent any of the established grounds for exception. under abona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. Rule 45 does not allow this. this Court is bound by the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts. the land was already private land when Manna Properties acquired it from its predecessors-in-interest. 1945 or earlier. 141 (“CA 141”) otherwise known as the “Public Land Act. [7] This Court is not bound to analyze and weigh evidence already considered in prior proceedings. On the other hand. Consequently. Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still part of the public domain. 1073. raises a question of fact. The evidence on record does not support the conclusions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. under a bona fide claim of ownership. Manna Properties claims that it has established that the land in question has been in the open and exclusive possession of its predecessors-in-interest since the 1940s. [8] It invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record.question the sufficiency of the publication of the required notice of hearing. provides: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. This complies with the legal requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice of the registration proceedings. Petitioner invites us to re-evaluate the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial and appellate courts. Petitioner alleges that the trial court and the Court of Appeals based their findings solely on their evaluation of the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties. Matters of proof and evidence are beyond the power of this Court to review under a Rule 45 petition. As the records show. exclusive. as a private corporation. since June 12. Under the Regalian doctrine. the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. Following our ruling in Director of Lands v.[10] Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely confirms the earlier conversion of the land into private land. Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated. [16] transferee’s affidavits. Manna Properties may rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land.[11] Under CA 141. the reckoning point is June 12.[12] Manna Properties. Although Manna Properties claimed during trial that they were presenting the tax declaration proving possession since 12 June 1945. Beyond stating that the cancelled tax declaration was issued in 1945. exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by CA 141 ipso jure converts such land into private land. The tax declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and marked as Exhibit Q-16 bears several irregularities. There is another reason why the application for registration of Manna Properties must fail. We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. [13] Any applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified to have the land titled in his name. [17] However. A substitute is not enough. or earlier. A tax declaration issued in 1945 may have been issued in December 1945. before or after 12 June 1945. The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length of possession consists of the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest.[18] a scrutiny of the tax declaration reveals that it is not the tax declaration Manna Properties claimed it to be. a private corporation. is material to this case. continuous and adverse possession for the requisite period of time. The annotation at the back of this tax declaration indicates that it was issued to replace the 1945 tax declaration covering the land in question. We have held that open. the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties do not serve to prove their cause. It is unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on.[14] Although Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise to a right that is only subject to formal recognition. A tax declaration simply stating that it replaces a previous tax declaration issued in 1945 does not meet this standard. it is still incumbent upon any claimant to first prove open. compliance with the reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established. If the predecessors-in-interest of Manna Properties have been in possession of the land in question since this date.Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from the public domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. and several tax declarations covering the land in question. it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession. 12 June 1945. however. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12 June 1945 or earlier. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. We rule. Manuel Sobrepeña (“Manuel”). A small annotation found at the bottom of the back page of Exhibit Q-16 states it cancels a previous tax declaration. the conversion having occurred in law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. Exhibit Q-16 was in fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly issued on 28 November 1950. 1945. The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date. Exhibit Q-16 does not provide any of the required information that will enable this Court Page 48 .[15] It is only when the applicant complies with this condition that he may invoke the rights given by CA 141. may apply for judicial confirmation of the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in-interest first. IAC. that the land in question has not become private land and remains part of the public domain. 19 The blanks left by Exhibit Q-16 render any attempt to trace the original tax declaration futile. Not only is such evidence insufficient and self-serving on its own but. Ynares-Santiago. SO ORDERED.21 Manna Properties’ evidence hardly constitutes the “well-nigh incontrovertible” evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse occupation under CA 141. The form used to prepare the tax declaration marked as Exhibit Q-16 states that it was “FILED UNDER SECTION 202 OF R.R. 156117. 1950…” This means that the tax declaration was issued more than forty (40) years before the form used came into existence. The same can be said of the transferee’s affidavit. May 26. continuous and adverse possession of the land in question since 12 June 1945.R.. Manna Properties can only prove possession since 1952. Moreover. T h e y c l a i m t o b e t h e Page 49 . San Fernando. Petitioner.J. 52562. on its face Exhibit Q-16 lacks any indication that it is only a substitute or reconstituted tax declaration. At best. CV No.A. Manuel did not also specifically testify that he. concur. The earliest of the “un-cancelled” tax declarations presented by Manna Properties is dated 1950.” Republic Act No.Respondents.480) square meters situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan. 539-D. We REVERSE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2000 in CA-G. The totality of these circumstances leads this Court to conclude that Exhibit Q-16 was fabricated for the sole purpose of making it appear that Manna Properties’ predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land in question since 12 June 1945. This is clearly insufficient to prove possession of the land since 12 June 1945. Davide. Manna Properties gave no explanation why its tax declaration used a form that did not exist at the time of the alleged issuance of the tax declaration. We have previously cautioned against the reliance on such secondary evidence in cases involving the confirmation of an imperfect title over public land.or any interested party to check whether the original 1945 tax declaration ever existed.Respondents filed a single application for two parcel of lands located at Cabangahan. The sworn undertaking by the Deputy Assessor who allegedly prepared the tax declaration reads. Manna Properties relied on shaky secondary evidence like the testimony of Manuel and substitute tax declarations. Jr. over Lots No. Manna Properties did not present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest have been in open. No.20 Other than the mentioned pieces of evidence. The Application for Registration filed by Manna Properties. Quisumbing. and Azcuna. 7160. 9515 and 1006 of Cad. The net effect is an attempt to pass off Exhibit Q-16 as the original tax declaration. is DENIED. “Subscribed and sworn before me this 28 (sic) day of Nov. with a total area of One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1. we GRANT the instant petition. which was dated 1955. Inc.. JEREMIAS A N D D A V I D HERBIETO.. 7160 is the Local Government Code of 1991. JJ. or his parents or predecessors-ininterest were in possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. vs. 2005] Facts: This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the CA. C e b u . REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. C. C o n s o l a c i o n . La Union. affirming the decision of theMTC granting the application for land registration of the respondents. The only clear assertion of possession made by Manuel was that his family used to plant rice on that piece of land. (Chairman).22 WHEREFORE. Manna Properties’ reliance on Manuel’s testimony is similarly misplaced. [G. in the case at hand there was indeed a lack of jurisdiction not because of them i s j o i n d e r b u t b e c a u s e o f : a . As we can notice the publication on theFreeman and the Banat News was only done 3 months after the hearing which renders inutile the intention of the mandatory publication. Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay. The said lots are public lands classified as alienable and disposable only on June 25. 2009 FACTS: On 20 February 1998.An initial hearing was set on Sept. 1963and the respondents were seeking for a confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titlethrough judicial legalization. dated 25 June 1963.) Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the SubjectLots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.) Did the respondents had open. wherein two or more distinctor contradicting rights or demands are joined. Respondents were not able to prove their continuous ownership of theland since June 12. 1963. and adverse possession of the Subject Lotsin the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite. 1999. The notice was also published in the officialgazette on Aug. which is the rulinglaw in this case. does not remove the court’s jurisdiction.48 of the Public Land Act.324 square meters.)Does the MTC have the jurisdiction? 2. Issue: 1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. 3. and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been Page 50 . since there was a procedural defect in the filing of asingle application for two parcels of land. 2 1999 and on the Freeman and Banat news on Dec. ) T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T F O R P U B L I C ATI O N . continuous.) On Jurisdiction – the procedural defect or the misjoinder. i t i s mandatory that the publication be made in the official gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation before the initial hearing. They also submitted pertinent documents to prove their claim and withemphasis on the Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office(CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable. 4-1063. consisting of 71. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. Under Sec. because said lands were only classified as alienable and disposable only on June 25. 1999 and notifications were posted in conspicuous places on the subject lots and on the municipal hall. 19. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco. and adverse possession of the SubjectLots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.o w n e r o f s a i d l o t s b y v i r t u e o f i t s p u r c h a s e f r o m respondents’ parents. HOWEVER. P e t i t i o n e r a s s a i l e d s a i d decision on the grounds of: 1. continuous. Held: 1.) Respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open. 2.Application for land registration was dismissed. by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 179987 April 29. 1945 or earlier.M T C r e n d e r e d a d e c i s i o n g r a n t i n g t i t l e t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t s . HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs.) Jurisdiction. 2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code? 3. had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father.” On 3 December 2002. Lino. and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Upon Lino’s death. Lino had four sons– Benedicto. exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office. 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open. 1945 or earlier? 2. otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan. should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12. But by 1966. continuous. Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR). 3013 established under Project No. 1529.Magdalena. which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. Gregorio. which originally belonged to his uncle. notorious. 1982. Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? Page 51 . the RTC approved the application for registration. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001. Lino Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather. includingLot9864-A. On 23 February 2007. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription? 4. Esteban’s wife. Eduardo Velazco. his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. ISSUES: 1. their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties.in open. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena. a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open. However. prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. exclusive. (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession. the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable. Page 52 . public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription. and registrable title to. continuous. (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired. 1945” have acquired ownership of. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. under Article 422 of the Civil Code. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription. (a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. regardless of good faith or just title. such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. since June 12. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession. a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years. consider that under the Civil Code. ripens into ownership. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.HELD: The Pertition is denied. in good faith and with just title. (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. On 1963. September 10.Thus. the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving a certain lot as a school site. . they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. DOLDOL 295 SCRA 359. there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence. Page 53 . Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. the Opol High School filed a complaint for accion possessoria with the RTC. Sometime in 1970. he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said area but the Director of Forestry rejected the same. respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Opol. conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Sometime in 1965.REPUBLIC vs. Misamis Oriental. This lot unfortunately included the lot of Doldol. Thus. 1998 FACTS: Sometime in 1959. the court ruled on school’s power. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open. without the necessity of title/certificate of tile being issued. the CA reversed the decision of teh court ruling that Doldol was entitledto the portion he occupied.On appeal. ______________________________________________________________________________ Page 54 . exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. continuous. When the conditions set by law are complied with the possessor of the land. by operation of law. a government grant. acquires a right to grant. Doldol thus meets the first requirement. he having possessed the same for 32 years (19591991). The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable in accordance with the District Forester’s Certification. ISSUE: Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in dispute? HELD: No. prior to divesting by the government of title thereof stands eventhough this may defeat the imperfect right of settler. REPUBLIC OF THE G. or to reserve them for public use. Petitioner. and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired” (Solicitor General) In sum. No. Chairperson. Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over the land in dispute. Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed land since his occupation of the same started only in 1955. 168184 PHILIPPINES.Consequently. Present: PUNO. Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a right to assert a right superior to the school given that then Pres. 1945. “The privilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting confers no contractual or vested right in the land occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public. Not having complied with the conditions set forth by law. QUISUMBING. C.R..J. much later than June 12. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry. Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School.* Page 55 . versus - CARPIO. 2009 x-----------------------------------------. Respondent. Cad-355. CORONA. Branch 18 (trial court) in LRC Case No. Page 56 .. CV No. J.. Promulgated: June 22. The 30 January 2004 Decision affirmed the 21 September 1998 Decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City... The 12 May 2005 Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic). TG-788[5]which approved the application of respondent Ruby Lee Tsai for the confirmation and registration of Lot No. with an area of 888 square meters (subject property). Tagaytay Cadastre.. 70006.-x DECISION CARPIO..R. RUBY LEE TSAI.. JJ. and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO.. described in plan Ap-04-010084.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review [1] assailing the 30 January 2004 Decision[2] and 12 May 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA G. 7062. [11] (2) that the tax declarations and tax receipt payments attached to the application do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of respondent’s open. respondent filed an application [6] for the confirmation and registration of the subject property under Presidential Decree No. and (3) that the subject property forms part of the public domain and is not subject to private appropriation. Respondent stated that on 31 May 1993. through Wendy Mitsuko Sato. continuous.The Facts On 3 December 1996. [12] Page 57 . Except for the Republic. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. de Carungcong (Carungcong). continuous. 1073 (PD 1073). [10] as amended by Presidential Decree No. Carungcong’s daughter and attorney in fact. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) [9] of Commonwealth Act No. The Republic opposed respondent’s application on the following grounds: (1) that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest failed to present sufficient evidence to show that they have been in open. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier. 141 (CA 141). [8] Respondent declared that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open. she purchased the subject property from Manolita Gonzales Vda. [7] Respondent alleged that she is the owner of the subject property and the improvements thereon. there were no other oppositors to the application. continuous. 1529 (PD 1529). Official Receipt No.[15] 5. 07209-B for the year 1974. Tax Declarations corresponding to different years showing that the subject property has been declared under the name of Carungcong for tax purposes: Tax Declaration No. GR-016-1776-R and 016-1084 for the year 1994 showing that the subject property has been declared under the name of respondent for tax purposes. Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 May 1993 between respondent and Carungcong. 4879620 dated 3 June 1993. 016-0635 for the year 1980. GR-016-1610 for the year 1992. GR-016-0735 for the year 1985 and Tax Declaration No. 2. Official Receipt No. Tax Declaration No. 013976-A for the year 1965. Official Receipt No. 4997840 dated 10 January 1994. 7304615 dated 15 Page 58 . Official Receipt No. Official Receipts corresponding to different years showing the payment of real property taxes under the name of Carungcong: Official Receipt No. Tax Declaration No. Official Receipts corresponding to different years showing the payment of real property taxes under the name of respondent: Official Receipt No. Tax Declaration Nos. [13] 3.After establishing the jurisdictional facts. 4641772 dated 27 May 1991. respondent presented the following documents to support her application: 1. Tax Declaration No. Tax Declaration No. Tax Declaration No. 0535585 dated 10 June 1992. 2326477 dated 10 December 1992. 010158-A for the year 1960. 4879666 dated 28 May 1993 and Official Receipt No.[14] 4. 02226-A for the year 1948. Lot 7062 described in plan Ap-04-010084. Metro Manila. SO ORDERED. Parañaque. Tagaytay Cadastre. City of Tagaytay. Ana Drive. both of legal age and residents of Sun Valley Subdivision. Certification of the City Treasurer of Tagaytay City stating that the real property taxes for the years 1994 to 1997 were paid. Once this Decision becomes final and executory.February 1995 and Official Receipt No. the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue. Act 496 and/or P. of San Jose. The dispositive portion states: WHEREFORE. 1529. this court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141.[16] and 6.[17] On 21 September 1998. the land. Cad-355. situated in the Brgy. containing an area of Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) Square Meters in the name of RUBY LEE TSAI. otherwise known as Property Registration Law. 9115050 dated 31 March 1997. married to Tsai Yu Lung.D. Sta.[18] Page 59 . the trial court granted respondent’s application for registration. it is not sufficient that respondent proved possession of the subject property for more than 30 years. In the assailed 30 January 2004 Decision. According to the Republic. The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court According to the trial court. respondent was able to establish her title and interest over the subject property. exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Hence. the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals Page 60 . continuous.The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in granting the application for registration despite respondent’s failure to prove open. The trial court also declared that the subject property was residential and not within any forest zone or the public domain. The Court of Appeals denied Republic’s motion. The trial court found that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in actual possession of the subject property for more than 30 years. this petition. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration. Page 61 . The Issue The Republic raises the sole issue of whether the trial court can grant the application for registration despite the lack of proof of respondent’s open.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open. According to the Court of Appeals. exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. continuous. continuous. The Court’s Ruling The petition has merit. The Republic argues that respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to show that she and her predecessors-ininterest have been in open. exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. According to the Republic. exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier. respondent need not prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier because Section 48(b) of CA 141 was already superseded by Republic Act No. 1942 (RA 1942). [19]which provides for a simple 30 year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of title. continuous. continuous. . respondent did not specify under what paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529 she was filing the application. whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. The Court notes that in respondent’s original application before the trial court. 14. Who may apply. she claimed that she was entitled to the confirmation and registration of her title to the subject property under PD 1529. However. respondent insists that it is sufficient that she proved that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open. as amended by PD 1073.respondent only proved possession since 1948. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under Page 62 . it appears that respondent filed her application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land. But going over respondent’s application and the evidence she presented before the trial court. which is in violation of Section 48(b) of CA 141. continuous. which states: SEC. [20] On the other hand. The following described citizens of the Philippines. and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. to wit: xxx Page 63 . by reason of the claimant’s open. but whose titles have not been perfected or completed.a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. which provides: Sec. occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein. or earlier. exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable land of the public domain. (2) that the applicant by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous.(Emphasis supplied) Thus. may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor. continuous. 1945. A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of CA 141. as amended by PD 1073. there are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of PD 1529: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. under the Land Registration Act. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to 12 June 1945 or earlier. 48. (Emphasis supplied) According to the Court of Appeals. This was superseded by R. continuous. No. which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[21] The Court of Appeals failed to consider the amendment introduced by PD 1073. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive period. No. or earlier. immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. InRepublic v. 1945. 1894.A.A. Page 64 .(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open. except when prevented by war or force majeure. exclusive. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain.141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26. 1942. Through the years. Doldol. The same. respondent need not prove possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier because Section 48(b) of CA 141 was amended by RA 1942. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. Section 48(b) of the CA 141 has been amended several times. [22] the Court provided a summary of these amendments: The original Section 48(b) of C. The Court of Appeals appears to have an erroneous interpretation of Section 48(b) of CA 141. since June 12. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529.[23] (Emphasis supplied) As the law now stands. approved on January 25. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. respondent failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation of the subject property. exclusive. Section 48(b) now reads: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open. a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not sufficient.[24] In this case. it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant.however. immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. since June 12. 1945. as required by both PD 1529 and CA 141. continuous. started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. except when prevented by war or force majeure. Therefore. 1977. 1073. by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest. We agree with the Republic that respondent’s evidence was not enough to prove that her Page 65 . or earlier. since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977. As amended. the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.A.R. we note that respondent also failed to prove that the subject property has been declared alienable and disposable by the President or the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Properties. We SET ASIDE the 30 January 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G. In addition. and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In Republic v. [25] the Court said: [T]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.possession of the subject property started since 12 June 1945 or earlier because respondent’s earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of her predecessors-ininterest only in the year 1948. Inc. In view of the lack of sufficient showing that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. respondent’s application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 and CA 141 should be denied. T. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.N. we GRANT the petition. CV No..[26] WHEREFORE. 70006 and the 21 September 1998 Decision of the Regional Page 66 . Finally. Trial Court of Tagaytay City. Page 67 . in LRC Case No. 7062 described in plan Ap-04-010084. Tagaytay Cadastre. TG788. We DENY respondent Ruby Lee Tsai’s application for confirmation and registration of Lot No. Branch 18. Cad-355. SO ORDERED.