LTD Compilation as of September 8

PartI1.VALIAOv. REPUBLIC GRNo. 170757, 28November 2011 PERALTA,J.: FACTS: PetitionersValiao filed forthe registration their parcel of land (Lot No. 2372) whichthey acquired fromtheir uncle in 1947. The Solicitor General and privateoppositors, Zafra andYusay, opposed said registration on the followinggrounds: (1) the land appliedfor has not been declared alienable anddisposable; (2) there was no proof thatthe applicants had in open, continuous,exclusive and notorious possession of theland in question since June 12, 1945or prior thereto. In the petitioners’defense, they alleged that the possessionof their uncle since 1916 until 1966had been open, continuous anduninterrupted; thus, converting the said land intoa private land. Issue:Whether or not Lot No. 2372 is an alienable land of the PublicDomain under theRegalian Doctrine. HELD: No,Lot No. 2372 isinalienable. Underthe Regalian doctrine,all lands of the public domain belong to the State. Alllands not appearing tobe clearly within private ownership are presumed tobelong to the State.Accordingly, public lands not shown to have beenreclassified or released asalienable agricultural land or alienated to a privateperson by the State,remain part of the inalienable public domain. Propertyof the public domainis beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible ofprivate appropriation andacquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in theconcept of owner no matterhow long cannot ripen into ownership and beregistered as a title. To prove thatthe <a></a>landsubject of an application for registration isalienable, the applicant mustestablish the existence of a positive act of thegovernment, such as apresidential proclamation or an executive order. Theapplicant may also securea certification from the government that the<a></a>landclaimed to have been possessed for the required numberof y<a>earsis alienable and disposable.</a> Inthis case, no such evidencewas offered by the petitioners to show that the <a></a>landinquestion has been classified as alienable and disposable<a></a>landof the <a></a>public domain. In the absenceofincontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property isalreadyclassified as alienable and disposable, Lot 2372 is still an inalienablepublicdomain. 2. Secretary of the DENR vs. YapG.R. 167707 October 8, 2008Sacay et. al and Secretary of DENRG.R. 173775 Reyes, R.T., J.:Facts: There are two consolidated cases in this petition.G.R. 167707On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve. On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.G.R. 173775On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twentyeight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Issue: Whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitionersclaimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.Held:NO. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and classified. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. 3(Gina) FERNANDAARBIAS - versus - THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 173808 September 17, 2008 CHICO-NAZARIO, J Facts: On 12March 1993, Lourdes T. Jardeleza (Jardeleza) executed a Deed of Absolute Sale sellingto petitioner a parcel of unregistered land situated at Poblacion, Estancia,Iloilo, for the sum of P33,000.00. According to theDeed, the subject property was residential and consisted of 600 square meters,more or less. Three years thereafter, on 17 June 1996,petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Application for Registration of Titleover the subject property. She attached to her application the Tracing Clothwith Blue Print copies, the Deed of Absolute Sale involving the subjectproperty, the Surveyors Certification, the Technical Description of the land,and Declaration of Real Property in the name of petitioner and her spouse Jimmy. Thereafter,the respondent filed an Opposition to petitioners application for registrationof the subject property. In its Brief, respondent questioned the failure of petitioner to prove thecontinuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession by theirpredecessor-in-interest. On 26June 2000, the RTC granted the petitioners application for registration in thiswise: As tothe issue that muniments of title and/or tax declarations and taxreceipts/payments do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence ofownership, the same cannot hold through (sic) anymore it appearing from therecords that the muniments of titles as presented by the herein applicant arecoupled with open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of anowner, hence, it can be given greater weight in support of the claim forownership. The [herein petitioner] is a private individual who is qualifiedunder the law being a purchaser in good faith and for value. The adverse, open,continuous and exclusive possession of the land in the concept of owner of the[petitioner] started as early as in 1992 when their predecessors in interestfrom Lourdes Jardeleza then to the herein [petitioner] without any disturbanceof their possession as well as claim of ownership. Hence, uninterruptedpossession and claim of ownership has ripen (sic) into an incontrovertibleproof in favor of the [petitioner]. It wason the issue of possession, however, that the Court of Appeals digressed fromthe ruling of the RTC. The appellate court found that other than petitionersown general statements and tax declarations, no other evidence was presented toprove her possession of the subject property for the period required by law.Likewise, petitioner failed to establish the classification of the subjectproperty as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The Court ofAppeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. 1529 states the requirementsnecessary for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title to be issued. Underthe Regalian doctrine. For theoriginal registration of title. the applicant must overcome the presumptionthat the land sought to be rehgtered forms part of the public domain. petitioner miserably failed to discharge the burden of proofimposed on her by the law. area and boundaries thereof. The applicant must show that the land subject of theapplication is alienable or disposable. This same doctrine also states thatall lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership arepresumed to belong to the State.Issue: whether ornot the petitioner has proved that the subject land is an alienable land. paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree No. The Deed of Sale did not state the duration of timeduring which the vendor (or her predecessors-ininterest) possessed the subjectproperty in the concept of an owner. The Survey Planand Technical Description of the subject property submitted by petitionermerely plot the location. Section14. Unlesspublic land is shown to have been reclassified or . and 2) the classification of the land as analienable and disposable land of the public domain. In thecase at bar. Well-settled is the rule that taxdeclarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of theright to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. the burden of proof in overcoming thepresumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the personapplying for registration. andthe State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and chargedwith the conservation of such patrimony. Hence. Held: No. Theapplicant for registration under said statutory provision must specificallyprove: 1) possession of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownershipfrom 12 June 1945 or earlier. all lands of the public domain belong to the State. incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. DENR G.alienated to a private personby the State. The renewal given to petitioner was for another 25 years. On April 10. To overcome such presumption.occupation thereof in the concept of owner. 2018. who maintain that they and their predecessors have been cultivating. 4(Zhon) Case Number I. July 31. The subject land. despite the pendency of the COSLAP case. private respondents. representing the B'laan and Maguindanao tribes. no matter how long. filed a complaint against petitioner before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No. since 1983. petitioner was able to renew FLGLA No. 542 when it expired that year. In 1993.d. General Santos City. .Alcantara vs. 161881. is being claimed as the ancestral land of the indigenous B'laan and Maguindanao people. or until December 31. 542 . possessing and occupying it since time immemorial. Absent such evidence. and despite opposition from private respondents. 542 and the reversion of the land to the indigenous communities.A.the land sought to be registered remains inalienable. 1990. it remains part of the inalienable public domain. issued by the DENR. Indeed.R. Barrio Apopong. 2008 Facts:Petitioner is a lessee under FLGLA No. cannot ripeninto ownership and be registered as a title. of 923 hectares of public forest land (subject land) located in the vicinity of Sitio Lanton. No. 8371. c) the 923 hectares covered by FLGLA No. ordering the DENR Sec. 2002. ordered the DENR Director of Region 12 toconduct a review and investigation of FLGLA No. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before SC. 542. to implement the August 3. On August 3. inter alia. cancellation of respondents renewed FLGLA No. docketed as G. and. sent a letter to petitioner. On November 26. No. the COSLAP issued a writ of execution of its decision. COSLAP denied petitioner’s MR. the COSLAP rendered its decision. 542 and placing in possession the subject land to the petitioners in order to start cultivation and plant crops for their food. 542. which directed the immediate installation and occupation of the area by the private respondents indigenous communities. 145838. or the Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA). Upon appeal. 542 was issued in violation of the law. advising him to vacate and remove all improvements in the area within 10 days from receipt of the letter. Petitioner’s MR was denied. CENRO Patricio issued an Installation Order. 1998 decision as affirmed by SC. On August 15. 2002. the CA affirmed said decision in toto. 1998. recommending to DENR Sec. Alvarez cancelled FLGLA No.. which was intended to recognize andpromote all the rights of the country's Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) within the framework of the Constitution. Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) Andrew B. holding that a) COSLAP had jurisdiction to decide the case.R. Patricio Jr.On October 29. On July 29. 1997. DENR Sec. Sec. SC upheld the CA and the COSLAP. 2002. On November 27. 542 were ancestral land of the private respondents. Congress passed Republic Act No. b) FLGLA No. The latter found violations by petitioner of the terms of the FLGLA. . 2002. FLGA is a mere permit which. 542 which is supposed to be the source of petitioner’s right was already cancelled and held contrary to law. a privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. even if not cancelled. In cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare. Like timber or mining licenses. In the case at bar. about 900 meters away the Laguna de Bay. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker. June 22.) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER. Inc. the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal. 163766. 5(May Ann) 6(Rhea B. whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. does not confer any right. 2006Facts:On April. FLGLA No.R. all surnamed Cruz. holding that issue was already decided by SC in GR No. Antonia. 29. 145838. cancelled. Thus. rescinded. No. as well as to the police power of the State. by executive action. FLGLA 542. the former must yield to the supremacy of the latter. FLGLA No. Further. for a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine.50m. 2018) Held:No. amended or modified. G. Hence. can be revoked. . this instant petition via Rule 45.GR. 1999. Eladia. INC. 31. Issue: w/n petitioner has residual rights over subject property until the expiration of FLGLA 542 (Dec.Upon appeal.NO. Petitioner has no residual rights to speak of because such right presupposes an existing right. and Felisa. inalienable and indisposable. respondent failed to prove that it possesses registrable title over the property. as applicant. Inc. hence. which he inherited under Igorot customs. Province of Benguet.The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable and disposable zone. applied for the registration of a certain land situated in the town of Baguio. the LLDA filed its opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed. all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those . an Igorot. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use. filed an application with the MTC of Taytay. On July 2001. In light of the foregoing. 7(Angel) 8. However. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years. such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to presumptive grant from the state. The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not operate against the statute unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of the same after a claim ofownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. the Land Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership.Candy Maker. its jurisdiction. Cariño vs Insular Government. and if so.Ruling:The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land. the Republic of thePhilippines. whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove it’s ownership over the property. Under the Spanish Law. a public land within. the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted.Issue:Whether or not the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State. Rizal for registration of it’s alleged title over the lot. On the other hand. 41 Phil 935 Facts: Carino. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. 2000 FACTS: Petitioners Isagani CruzandCesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizensandtaxpayers. The petitionersassailcertain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground . Issue: Wether the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine? Held: No.” There is an existence of native title to land. as far as testimony or memory goes. the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership. as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. 9. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land. Cruzvs Secretary ofDENR GR. The United States Supreme Court. through Justice Holmes declared: “It might perhaps. and never to have been public land. it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest. 135385. be proper and sufficient to say that when.6. assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions ofRepublicAct No.with permit private titles. Dec. otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of1997(IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). 8371. Moreover. there is no prescription against the Crown.No. or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown. Examining theIPRA. No. and at the same time. Additionally. However. the right of ownership and possession by theICCs/IPs of theirancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does notinclude the rightto alienate the same. inviolation ofthe regalian doctrine embodied in section 2.R. Ownership over thenaturalresources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and therightsgranted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources intheirancestral domains merely gives them. Article XII of the Constitution. Theyare private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title. as owners and occupants of the landonwhich the resources are found.theprovisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. a priority in their largescaledevelopment and exploitation.there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership overthenatural resources within their ancestral domain. the right to the small scale utilizationofthese resources. Yap (568 SCRA 164) G. 167707 (8October 2008) . ISSUE: Dotheprovisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution? HELD: No.which is a conceptof private land title that existed irrespective of any royalgrant from theState.ancestrallands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the publicdomain. 10(Lou) Secretaryof DENR vs.that theseamount toan unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of thepublicdomain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein. then President Ferdinand Marcos issuedProclamation No. no.96) hectares ofagricultural land (alienable and disposable).R. toimplement Proclamation No. The Proclamation likewiseprovided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line ofroads and trails. the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarlydenied. 167707 and G. On November21. 2006. 1999.R. President Marcos later approved the issuanceof PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3. No. 2004. Hence. The RTC upheldrespondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. President GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of thearea reserved for forest land protection purposes. 1982. Again. this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions (G. the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision.R. during the pendency of G. 1801 declaring Boracay Island. The Republic then appealed to the CA.No.The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declarationthat the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forestreserve. the RTC rendered a decision in favor ofrespondentsclaimants. caves and peninsulas in the Philippines. the present petition under Rule 45.R.The Office of the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration but itsmotion was denied. 1978. . 173775 On May22. 2006. 167707.No. 173775) as they principally involve thesame issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.Facts:On November 10. On July14. 1801. as touristzones and marine reserves under the administration of the PhilippineTourism Authority (PTA). amongother islands. G. 1064[26] classifying BoracayIsland into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protectionpurposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628. On December9. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 1801 and 82converted Boracay into an agricultural land. asamended. Also they alleged thatthe proclamation and its implementing circulars did not place Boracay beyondthe commerce of men and was classified as a tourist zone. or through their predecessors-in-interest. There is nothing in the law or theCircular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. it was susceptible ofprivate ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. It formed part of the mass of lands classified aspublic forest. Theirright to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants relianceon PD No. The proclamation did not convert Boracayinto an agricultural land. 3-82 to private lands and areas declared . 3- Held:No. Since Boracay Island had not been classified asalienable and disposable. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. they had the right to have the lotsregistered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. 3-82 was misplaced. PTA Circular No. opposed the petition:Because Boracay Island was an unclassified land ofthe public domain. which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a)of Presidential Decree (PD) No.705. 3-82 did not convert the whole ofBoracay into an agricultural land. continuous. and notorious possession and occupation in Boracaysince June 12.otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Issue/s:W/N Proclamation No. 1945. or earlier since time immemorial. exclusive. Thereference in Circular No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. had been inopen. They declared theirlands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. ProclamationNo. TheOffice of the Solicitor General (OSG).Respondents-claimants allegedthat they themselves. Privateclaimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 141. 1801 as basis for judicialconfirmation of imperfect title. whatever possession they had cannot ripen intoownership. he would have identified the specific limits of each. 926 ipso facto converted the island into privateownership. or both. TheDENR and the National Mapping and Resource InformationAuthority certify that Boracay Island is an unclassifiedland of the public domain. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed toclassify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. 926 does not create a presumptionthat the land is alienable. Hence. they may apply for a title in their name. This was not done inProclamation No. 1801. 1064. Privateclaimants also contend that their continued possession of portionsof Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) yearsunder Act No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind thedeclaration of Boracay Island. It does not address the areas alienability. 1064. Exceptfor lands already covered by existing titles. asPresident Arroyo did in Proclamation No. as a tourist zone and marine reserve to beadministered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of thepublic and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potentialwith due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. together with other islands. TheWhereas clauses of Proclamation No. WHEREFORE. caves andpeninsulas in the Philippines. Privateclaimants continued possession under Act No. IfPresident Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable orforest. Such unclassifiedlands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.as alienableand disposable does not by itself classify the entire island asagricultural. the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourismand ecological purposes.judgment is rendered as follows: . Simplyput. Therefore.Proclamation No. Boracay was an unclassified landof the public domain prior to Proclamation No. Prior toProclamation No. industrial or commercial. --. 71118 REVERSED AND SETASIDE. the 1973 Constitution provided the followingdivisions: agricultural. a doctrineconsistently adopted under the 1935.R. only agricultural lands may be alienated. giving the government great leeway for classification. Regalian Doctrine. Words and Phrases.R. timber or forest and grazing lands and such other classes as may beprovided by law. 1973 and 1987 Constitution. 2006. 167707 is GRANTED andthe Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.Boracay was an unclassified land of the public Domain. The doctrine has been consistently adoptedunder the 1935. CV No.The petition for certiorari in G. 173775 is DISMISSED forlack of merit. No. resettlement. 1064 of May 22.1064 of May 22. No.R. that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership ofland and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. SOORDERED. Thenthe 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with oneaddition: national parks.The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong tothe State. That theState is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged withthe conservation of such patrimony. . 1973. Meanwhile. Boracay Island had never beenexpressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions.The petition for certiorari in G. residential.1.mineral.The1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural. Boracay Island had never been expresslyand administratively classfified under any of the grand divisions of land.Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. 2006. 2. and 1987 Constitutions. Syllabus: Natural Resources. Public Lands. Of these.forest or timber.Prior to Proclamation No. The Regalian Doctrinedictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. 1945 lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to theState. it remains part of the inalienable public domain." -. 495 SCRA 529(2006)) Underthe Regalian doctrine. ownership of all lands. and. either by purchase or by grant. Jacob. and notorious possession and occupation of the sameunder a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June12. Which laid the foundation that "alllands that were not acquired from the Government. Upon the Spanishconquest of the Philippines. territories andpossessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. (Republicvs. belong to the public domain.TheRegalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws ofthe Indies and the Royal Cedulas.continuous. and that the occupants or possessor claim an interest thereon only byvirtue of their imperfect title as continuous open and notorious possession. all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearlywithin private ownership are presumed to belong to the State -unless publicland is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a privateperson by the State.. either by purchase or bygrant.Ourpresent land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine.(Republicvs. 492 SCRA 272 (2006)) Historyof Public Land Dispostition TheRegalian principle traces its roots: . all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly withinprivate ownership are presumed to belong to the State -applicants forconfirmation of imperfect title must therefore. (b) that they have been in open. belong to thepublic domain." NOTES: Under the Regalian doctrine. exclusive. Candy Maker. which laid the foundation that "all lands that werenot acquired from the Government. prove the following: (a) thatthe lands of the public domain. Inc. The Regaliandoctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the laws of the Indiesand the Royal Cedulas. oruntil April 17. Privateownership of land could only be founded on royal concessions which tookvarious forms.Uponthe Spanish conquest of the Philippines. UnderSection 393 of the Maura Law. However. (3) composicioncon el estado or adjustment title. from the date of its inscription. either bypurchase or by grant. the lands would revert to the State. TheRoyal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the SpanishMortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. which laid thefoundation that all lands that were not acquired from the Government. and (5) informacion posesoria or possessoryinformation title. possessory informationtitle had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law. ownership of all lands. undercertain conditions which were set forth in said decree. andadverse. 1895. an informacion posesoria orpossessory information title. (4) titulo de compra ortitle by purchase. namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant. public. It established possessoryinformation as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land. is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty(20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual. The Lawsof the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria orthe Mortgage Law of 1893.(2) concesion especial or special grant. when duly inscribed in the Registry ofProperty. Otherwise. The Spanish Mortgage Law providedfor the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessoryclaims.territories and possessions in thePhilippines passed to the Spanish Crown. AmericanRule: .The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines throughthe Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. belong to the public domain. as amended. to wit: agricultural. exclusive. which was the first Public Land Act. The Philippine Bill of 1902: lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions. 926. 1894. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26. 1903. CA No. more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. The act provided for. open. 1936. 2874 on December 1. 926 was superseded by Act No. 141. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain. and timber or forest lands. It also provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands. CA No. This is known as the Torrens system. among others. 1919.  On February 1. was required. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute. 141 amended Act No. otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. To this day. and imprescriptible. 1903. 2874. remains as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public . possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial.  On October 7. This new. continuous.  After the passage of the 1935 Constitution. the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. or since July 26. the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). the Philippine Commission passed Act No. Act No. mineral. otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. For judicial confirmation of title. 496. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. Under the Act. indefeasible.  On November 29. 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. R. all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. No. 1945. as amended by Act No. and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.  The issuance of PD No. It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands. known as the Property Registration Decree. 1942. including chattel mortgages. 496 was amended and updated by PD No.  On June 11. 1894. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26. Malunhao. Rodrigo L. Act No. this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. Under the decree. 3344. G. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16. the recording of all unregistered lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code. The provision was last amended by PD No. However.domain other than timber and mineral lands. which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12. 892 on February 16. . 1976. Thereafter. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. 11(Jess) CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. or earlier. 1073. 1529.  Section 48(b) of CA No. 184869 Represented by Officer-In-Charge Dr. which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. 1978. 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the action. however. Chairperson and Commissioner of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC. NCIP. CMU obtained title in its name over 3. Forty five years later. Meanwhile. reserving 3401 hectares of lands of the public domain in Musuan . pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive Department done in Manila. et al) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City (Branch 9). CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive Secretary. and proceeded . Maramag. Bukidnon. as school site for CMU. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES.Petitioner Vs THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. and THE LEAD CONVENOR OF THE NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY COMMISSION. the Presidential Proclamation 476. and Lead Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty Commission (collectively. 2003. the government distributed the remaining untitled lands to several tribes. The Malaybalay RTC denied the motion. Respondents. President GMA issued PP 310 that takes 670 hectares from the CMUs registered lands for distribution belonging to tribes in Barangay Musuan. Bukidnon On April 3.080 hectares of those lands under OCT. Facts Central Mindanao University is a chartered educational institution owned and run by the State. however. seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional. THE CHAIRPERSON AND COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES. In 1958. The NCIP. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. 2003.to hear CMUs application for preliminary injunction.[4] the CA dismissed CMUs appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Issue Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 can distribute the land of CMU given by PP 476 in 1958 Held: No It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who. being a valid State act. The RTC said that the ultimate owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in its behalf. . Meanwhile. the lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMUs use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. after hearing the preliminary injunction incident. ruling that CMUs recourse should have been a petition for review on certiorarifiled directly with this Court. attempted by proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. because it raised pure questions lawbearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310. 2004.[2] In a March 14. the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional. Still. As already stated. 2008 decision. CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but the RTC denied the same on April 19. respondents NCIP. in this case.This prompted CMU to appeal the RTCs dismissal order to the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station. They have ceased to be alienable public lands. et als motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed CMUs action for lack of jurisdiction. The CA added that whether the trial court can decide the merits of the case based solely on the hearings of the motion to dismiss and the application for injunction is also a pure question of law. et al moved for partial reconsideration of the RTCs order denying their motion to dismiss. the RTC issued a resolution granting NCIP. On October 27. 2009 Thepetition. it provided in Section 56 that property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon its effectivity shall be recognized and respected.R. 179987 April 29.notorious. (Represented by Sally A.vs.No. Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registrationcovering a parcel of land identified as Lot9864-A. In this case.Besides. 1529) FACTS: On20 February 1998. Cad-452D. transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA. G. and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for morethan thirty (30) years.situated in Silang Cavite. 12(Diane) HEIRSOF MARIO MALABANAN. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the propertyfrom Eduardo Velazco. testified atthe hearing. Respondent. Consequently. Malabanan). Petitioners. was accepted by the Court enbanc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scopeof original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of theProperty Registration Decree (PDNo. Velazco testified that the property was . while unremarkable as to the facts. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open. Malabanan and Aristedes Velazco. when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371in 1997. Silang Cadastre. ownership over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958. the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan. Neithercan petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. CA reversed the decision and dismissed theapplication of Malabanan. TheRepublic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvertthe application.originally belonged to a22 hectare property owned by his greatgrandfather. The Republicappealed to the Court of Appeals.” On3 December 2002. Lino Velazco. HELD: No. Whilethe subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982. it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. issued bythe CENRO-DENR. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan orpetitioners as his predecessors-ininterest have been in possession of theproperty since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Malabanan died while the case was pending with theCA. Malabananpresented evidence during trial a Certification dated 11 June 2001. which stated that the subject property was “verified to bewithin the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. there isno competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or forthe development of the national .Evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan hasacquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the PublicLand Act. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 onMarch 15.3013 established under Project No. 1982. ISSUE: Whetheror not Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section48(b) of the Public Land Act. Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain arefurther classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural. industrial. or for similar productive purposes. or other similar purposes. timber. supplies the detailsand unmistakably grants that right. and notorious possession and occupation of alienable anddisposable lands of the public domain. it is insusceptible toacquisition by prescription. The following described citizens of the Philippines. Section11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable foragricultural purposes may be disposed of “by confirmation of imperfect orincomplete titles” through “judicial legalization. 1945. as amended by P. The President is authorized. may apply to the Court ofFirst Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation oftheir claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor. to wit: (b)Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open. Thus. conformably with Article 422 of theCivil Code. toclassify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable. 141 (Public Land Act) governed the classification and disposition oflands of the public domain. occupying lands of thepublic domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposableland of the public domain does not change its status as property of the publicdominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. under a bona fide claim of acquisitionof ownership.48.evidence. under theLand Registration Act. since June 12. butwhose titles have not been perfected or completed. No.continuous.or mineral lands. charitable. immediately preceding the filingof the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by waror force majeure. DOCTRINES: CommonwealthAct No. (c)educational. or (d) reservations fortown sites and for public and quasi-public uses. exclusive.” Section48(b) of the Public Land Act. (b)residential. subject to the requisites stated therein: Sec. 1073. These shall be . commercial. or earlier.D. from time to time. Notwithstandingthe passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section14(1) therein. 1945. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation ofalienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claimof ownership since June 12.D. continuous. the term“agricultural lands” was changed to “alienable and disposable lands of thepublic domain.” Second. 141 is virtuallythe same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.” Itbears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. the Public Land Act has remained in effect. 1945 or earlier. whether personallyor through their duly authorized representatives: (1)those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been inopen. alienableand disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only“agricultural lands.conclusively presumed to have performed allthe conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to acertificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. First.the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for “thirty(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application” to possession“since June 12. . Twosignificant amendments were introduced by P.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of FirstInstance an application for registration of title to land. Who may apply.” UnderSection 9 of the Public Land Act. Act No. or earlier. “agricultural lands” are a mere subset of“lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition. No. 1073. SECTION14.” Evidently. whether personally or through their dulyauthorized representatives: Itis indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantiveownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the propertysince 12 June 1945. 9176 in 2002) limits theperiod within which one may exercise the right to seek registration underSection 48.Bothlaws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who “have beenin open. occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any suchland or an interest therein. to wit: xxx Sec.” Theopening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of theProperty Registration Decree warrant comparison: Sec.as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for thejudicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation ofalienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claimof ownership since June 12. 1945. Section 47 ofthe Public Land Act (amended by Rep.48 [of the Public Land Act]. but whose titles have not been perfected orcompleted. continuous.— The following personsmay file in the proper Court of First Instance an application forregistration of title to land. may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province wherethe land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of acertificate of title therefor. The following described citizens of thePhilippines. under the Land Registration Act. Thereis another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). or earlier. . Act No. Section14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizesthe substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. That this period shall apply only wherethe area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided. – “adopting the OSG’s view. Discussedin Naguit. all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the PropertyRegistration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. “ “[T]hemore reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requiresthe property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at thetime the application for registration of title is filed. but this Section shall not be construed asprohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time priorto the period fixed by the President.” .That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance withSection FortyFive of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in theprovisions of this Chapter. 2020 within which to avail of thebenefits of this Chapter: Provided. Followingthe OSG’s approach. the alienable and disposable character of theproperty must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. it is not enough that the applicant and his/herpredecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim ofownership since 12 June 1945. the Philippines was not yeteven considered an independent state. that all lands of the publicdomain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12. further. 1945.Section47. Such interpretation renders paragraph(1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government fromgiving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands asalienable and disposable. no matter the length ofunchallenged possession by the occupant. not to extend beyond December 31. 1945would not be susceptible to original registration. Thesubstantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31December 2020. The unreasonableness of the situation would even beaggravated considering that before June 12. The OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire theright to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the publicdomain. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby grantedtime. even if possession of the alienablepublic land commenced on a date later than June 12. Theevidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode ofpossession on their part prior to 1948. TheCourt in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section14(2) Prescriptionis one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. Theobiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as thepossible basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Theapplication therein was ultimately granted.[[31]] With such conversion. but not before 12 June1945. and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquiredownership through prescription. then the possessor may have theright to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the PropertyRegistration Decree. their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under abona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years. thereby precluding the applicationof Section 14(1). 1945.It reads: . citing Section 14(2). and such possessionbeing been open. There is aconsistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable publicland may be converted into private property by reason of open. it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitionerstherein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section14(1).Petitionersmake the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto areobiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void abinitio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of thenotice of initial hearing. continuous andexclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.Specifically. Thus.such property may now fall within the contemplation of “private lands” underSection 14(2). continuous and exclusive. shores. All other property of the State. areproperty of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. Property of the State or any of its subdivisionsnot patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. The following things are property of public dominion: (1)Those intended for public use.420.unless otherwise provided. shall form part of thepatrimonial property of the State. banks. and others ofsimilar character. Thecritical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus:“[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial incharacter shall not be the object of prescription. rivers. and are intendedfor some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Article422 of the Civil Code states that “[p]roperty of public dominion. roadsteads. whether declared alienable and disposable or not. without being for public use.421. which is not of thecharacter stated in the preceding article.Allthings which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription. which generally includes propertybelonging to the State. Art.” Accordingly. torrents. is patrimonial property Itis clear that property of public dominion.there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominionproperty is no longer intended for .” The identification whatconsists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421 Art. such as roads. portsand bridges constructed by the State. (2)Those which belong to the State. canals. cannot be the object of prescription Landsof the public domain. when nolonger intended for public use or for public service. Registrationunder Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep.Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the PropertyRegistration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the CivilCode. Asthe application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within theframework of prescription under the Civil Code. Act No. wouldthe period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion intopatrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of thepossessors? .while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decreeis founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code. . Whetherunder ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription.public service or the development of thenational wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. there is no way that possessionduring the time that the land was still classified as public dominion propertycan be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justifyregistration. the period of prescription begins to runin favor of the possessor. while Section 14(2)entitles registration on the basis of prescription.We rule in the negative. But after theproperty has been become patrimonial. the period ofpossession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonialcannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. Section14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession. 1472 isbased on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code. Shouldpublic domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in aduly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longerintended for public service or for the development of the national wealth. subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public LandAct. Andonly when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period forthe acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. (a)Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and doesnot require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during theentire period of possession. exclusive. since June 12. public domain landsbecome only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these arealienable or disposable. Section48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who bythemselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open. and notorious possession and occupation of alienable anddisposable lands of the public domain. It should be remembered that registration of property is not amode of acquisition of ownership. (2)In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership. such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.Oncethe possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonialproperty.continuous. The person acquiresownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code isentitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of theProperty Registration Decree. There must also be an express government manifestationthat the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public serviceor the development of national wealth. under Article 422 of the Civil Code.consider that under the Civil Code. the possessor is entitled to secure judicialconfirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable anddisposable. under a bona fide claim of acquisitionof ownership. (b)The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Actis further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property RegistrationDecree. (a)Patrimonial property is private property of the government. 1945” have acquired ownership of. and registrabletitle to. the ideal next step is the registration of the property under theTorrens system. However. . prescription is recognized as a mode ofacquiring ownership of patrimonial property. (1)In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. one ordinary and other extraordinary. Branch IV.(b)There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may beacquired. J. regardlessof good faith or just title. petitioners. vs. a person’s uninterrupted adversepossession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years.) FACTS: The petitioners had alleged in their complaint for ejectment thatthe private respondents had forced their way into the disputed premises withoutany right whatsoever and had refused to vacate the . in good faith and with just title. 1987 CRUZ. as Presiding Judgeof the CFI of Laguna Branch II. a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property throughpossession for at least ten (10) years.: -------------------------------------------------------------------(Thispetition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtseeks a reversal of the decision of the respondent court nullifying thejudgment of the municipal court in a forcible entry case on the ground of lackof jurisdiction. ASUNCION. Under ordinary acquisitiveprescription. 13(April) JOSE CHING AND CARIDAD CHING. Hon.Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription. MALAYA. ANTONIO Q.L-56449 August 31.R. Hon. No. respondents. ripens into ownership. G. and Spouses CESAR ALVARADO and ARACELIALVARADO. as Presiding Judgeof the CFI of Laguna. MAXIMIANO C. These demands were based on the petitioners’ case that they were theowners of the said property.”. Themunicipal court. Theprivate respondents. arising in his municipality orcity. No. arguingthat the property belonged to them by right of inheritance. this decision was set aside by the respondent judge. proceeded totrial and thereafter rendered judgment ordering the private respondents tovacate the disputed property. ISSUE: 1)Whetheror not the case at bar falls in the exception.same despite repeateddemands. but the said justice orjudge may receive evidence upon the question of title therein. At any rate. 88.00 attorney’s fee plus the costs of the suit. theyhad argued. and not exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance. – “Inall civil actions. in their answer. thejustice of the peace (now municipal judge) and the judge of a municipal court(now city court) shall have exclusive original jurisdiction .00 a month until actual surrender of thepremises.A. 296 readas follows: Sec. including those mentioned in Rules fifty-nine and sixty-two(now Rule 57 and 60) of the Rules of Court. affirming its jurisdiction. It also required them to pay the petitioners backand current rentals at P 1. the municipal court had no jurisdiction and should dismiss thecomplaint... who held that themunicipal court had no competence to resolve the case as it involved a questionof ownership.000. RULING: .000. Original jurisdiction incivil cases. 2)Whetheror not party may introduceevidence of ownership to prove character of possession and amount of damagesfor unjust deprivation thereof. solely for the purpose of determining the characterand extent of possession and damages for detention. whatever may bethe value of the property. the justice of the peace or judge ofthe municipal court shall have original jurisdiction. as the basic question was one of ownership and not of merepossession. Inforcible entry and detainer proceedings. as well as a P 3. Onappeal. had challenged the claimed sale. The Supreme Court provided the pertinent provisions of R. having acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. TheCourt ruled that the fact that the petitioners themselves adduced evidence ofownership over the property in question did not.T-85126 and registered in the name of petitioner Jose Ching in the Registry ofDeeds of Laguna.1) No. Thepetitioners were only trying to prove their right to possession and damages byestablishing their right of ownership. more so since thequestion of ownership was appropriately being litigated in the annulment suit. 296: the plaintiff in an ejectment case may introduce suchevidence for the purpose of proving the character of his possession and theamount of damages he is claiming for unjust deprivation of such possession. Cesar Alvarado’s supposed father. isbinding against the whole world unless annulled for cause in proper cases. The basis of the registration is a deedof sale executed in his favor by Felix Carpio. No. Thereis no encumbrance on the land. Theproperty in question consists of a residential house and lot covered by TCT No. as claimed. and there is no adverse claim or notice of lis pendis annotated in thecertificate. the former owner. Afterexamining the facts. the Court finds that it does not come under the exceptionto the rule.Significantly. which in the absence ofevidence to the contrary should be presumed valid. TheCourt also provided that fact alone could not divest the municipal court ofjurisdiction to continue trying the question of possession. As permitted in the Section88 of R. Therecord does not show that such registration has been challenged since theissuance in 1978 of the said certificate of title. who hadacquired it from Brigido Alvarado. Such registration. the deed of sale being challenged in that action was differentfrom the contract involved in the exception 2) Yes.A. 14(Daniel Eblahan) . it may be added. have the effect ofdivesting the municipal court of its jurisdiction. Thedefendant should have taken notice that the property was registered to theplaintiffs six years before he did.MSaleeby separated by a stone wall located on her side. The courtdenied them because they did not object to the error when the defendantregistered his lot.: Facts: Consuelo Legarda and her husband owned a lot in Ermita adjoining the lot of N. The . L-8936. Saleeby owns the wall and the land occupying said wall Held: No.Legardav. The wall was not a jointwall. In the original certificate andtitle issued to them. 1912 N.J. 1915 Johnson.M Saleeby also petitioned the Court of Land Registration toregister his lot and was also allowed. On March 2 1906. the Court disagreed with the reason of the lower court that the plaintiffsdid not object to the registration of Saleeby. because the presumptionthat he has examined every instrument affecting the title is irrebutable. In this case. The Torrens system intended to quiet title. The Court declared thatif the holder of the certificate cannot rest secure in the registered title. putting a stop to anyquestion of the legality of the title. Saleeby GRno.the purpose of the Torrens system is defeated and nothing is gained by theregistration. The defendant cannotraise the defense that he is an innocent purchaser. Oct 2. provided by the Torrens system. the plaintiffs would always be on alert if another personregisters the property and should immediately oppose. the wall was included. The Court argued that shouldthis be the case. the Court decided to award theplaintiffs the property because they were the once who acquired and registeredit first and complied with the requirements of the law. OnMarch 25. Consuelo petitioned the Court of Land Registration toregister their lot and the court allowed them. The spouses discovered this error andpetitioned the Court of Land Registration to adjust and correct it. The wall was also included in hisoriginal certificate and title. Issue: Whether N.M. including Lot 13713. 00449. 2009 Facts: Petitioner is a judgment creditor of Raquel K. including the Government and all the branches thereof. and recreational uses was approved and the property was not covered by a certificate of title.R. ESCUTIN G.title. or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. She immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice . whether mentioned by name in the application.000 square-meter. or citation. Perla Moratilla. to residential. 15. Before the scheduled public auction sale. petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation. All persons must take notice. 171056 March 13. Significance: The purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet the title of a land registered under said system. No. notice. whether judicial or patent. is notice tothe whole world. Inc. Moratilla. once registered. commercial. her mother. When the petitioner verified the property. covered by Tax Declaration No." 15(Melodia) ________________________________________________________________________ __________________________ 16(Mel) DINAH C. Urbana Kalaw and sister. CASTILLOvsANTONIO M. she found out that the application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club. Racquel. for conversion of several agricultural landholdings. Once registered it is notice to the whole world and shall be conclusive upon and against all persons. co-owned Lot 13713. Petitioner then proceeded to levy on execution Lot 13713. or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern. However. filed by Summit Realty before the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City. her Tax Declaration No. There were also missing information in the said Deed. as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact. . the Petition for Issuance of New Owner’s Duplicate of TCT No. while Urbana and Perla owned the other 10. Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbac’s death.975 square meters. she was shocked to that. 181 was lost and the fact of such loss was annotated at the back of the original copy of TCT No. some of whom again transferred their shares to other persons. both in the name of Francisco Catigbac. 181 In Lieu of Lost One. Subsequently. TCT No. Petitioner bought Raquel’s 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot and was then issued Tax Declaration No. 181 in the name of Catigbac. 00-0376. 181 with the Registry of Deeds. without giving her notice. During the ex parte presentation of evidence in the latter part of 2000.000 square meters of Lot 13713. having acknowledged the same in LRC Case No.President. Summit Realty separately bought subdivided parts of Lot 181 from their respective owners. 181 in the name of Catigbac. Lot 1 of Plan Psu-12014. Orense testified on behalf of Summit Realty that Catigbac’s property used to form part of a bigger parcel of land.648 square meter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B. reflecting the supposed sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty.648 square meters. under the same terms and condition as in its original form. with a consolidated area of 105. 00942-A. 129642 bore three entries. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and overlapping with the 105. 00-0376 and directed the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 00942-A was cancelled. 181 covering the same was never cancelled. Lot 1 was informally subdivided into several parts among his heirs and/or successors-in-interest.000 square meters. in an Order dated 3 January 2001. covered by TCT No. after Catigbac’s death. the RTC granted the Petition in LRC Case No. The reverse side of TCT No. In the supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty by Leonardo Yagin. and the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. she claimed that Orense did not show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty. and identified as Lot 1-B after survey. When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes. Orense. despite the subdivision and transfer of ownership of Lot 1. measuring 132. it did not express the desire of Summit Realty to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its consent and conformity to the terms of the Deed. indicating that she owned 5. 181/No. through a letter dated 27 June 2001. 129642 in the name of Catigbac. in the absence of any other certificate of title to the same property. 129642. Hence. Summit Realty bought Lot 1-B measuring 105. conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbac’s ownership of Lot 1-B. was superior to petitioner’s. who. . which was based on a mere tax declaration. it was the former cancelled title which was used as basis for canceling petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00-0376. T134609 in the name of Summit Realty. Tax Declaration No.Petitioner cast doubt on the acts undertaken by Summit Realty in connection with Catigbac’s property. requested the cancellation of TCT No. later cancelled and replaced by TCT No. despite the cancellation of TCT No. 00942-A. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty. 129642. the former is evidently far superior and is. specifically covered by TCT No. 00949-A was thus still issued in the name of Catigbac. evidenced only by a tax declaration. Catigbac’s certificate of title is binding upon the whole world. and petitioner’s title. including respondent public officers and even petitioner herself. and Yagin had no participation at all in said case. Issue: Whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5. Ruling: As between Catigbac’s title. Petitioner questioned why. yet it was Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No. Catigbac’s right as registered owner of Lot 1-B under TCT No. 181 covering Lot 1 and the issuance of a new certificate of title for Lot 1-B. The Court ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the same. ownership of Lot 1-B was transferred from Catigbac to Summit Realty. purportedly without legal personality and capacity. Petitioner acquired her title to the 5.648 square meters. covered by a certificate of title. The Special Power of Attorney dated 6 February 1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac. 129642 in the name of Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT No. it was not Yagin. Summit Realty had every reason to believe in good faith that said property was indeed owned by Catigbac on the basis of the latter’s certificate of title over the same. but Orense.000 square meter property from Raquel who.000 square meter property. instead of Summit Realty. it was Orense’s request which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. both in the name of Catigbac. As a result of such purchase. Likewise. real or personal. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB andthe public auction of the properties as null and void. It is that which is the foundation of ownership of property.it is important to note. Title. a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title. is a mere evidence of ownership. 153 SCRA 435 FACTS: Thesubject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be the conjugalproperty of the spouses Donata Montemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of which theyclaim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession. therefore.Court of Appeals. or a Transfer Certificate of Title. the Court of Appeals aptly observed that. ISSUE: Doesthe presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the spouses duringcoverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil . They invoked the case ofVitug vs. In addition. petitioner had so far remained utterly silent." A title is different from a certificate of title. 1953 which is anaction for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein theproperties were found to be conjugal in nature. on the other hand. ________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________ 17(Rocky) Philippine National Bank vs. Certificate of title. "curiously. or which is the foundation of ownership of property. Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. Under the Torrens system. it is not the title to the land itself. Moratilla and her supposed co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated in TD No. 20. which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration. Raquel K. as to how and when petitioner’s alleged predecessor-ininterest. likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence her title. 00449. Montemayor. L-5297 decided by this Court on Oct. issued subsequent to the original registration. the PNB was a purchaser for value ingood faith. widow. In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor. So its right thereto is beyond question. if the PNB knew ofthe conjugal nature of said properties it would not have approved the mortgageapplications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without requiringthe consent of all the other heirs or co-owners thereof.19 SCRA 931 . As correctly held by thelower court. In this case. Hilario vs. Indeed. Moreover. this is an indication that the property belongsexclusively to said spouse. a widow.The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question the status of said registered ownerand her ownership thereof. City of Manila. when saidproperties were sold at public auction. The presumption applies toproperty acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. itappears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by DonataMontemayor when she was already a widow. When the property is registered in thename of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property wasacquired by said spouse.Code apply to propertycovered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow? HELD: The petitionis impressed with merit. The well-known rule in thisjurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land has a right torely upon the face of the torrens certificate of title and to dispense with theneed of inquiring further. except when the party concerned has actual knowledgeof facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man make suchinquiry. The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on thecertificates of title of the properties mortgaged. On its face the properties are owned by Donata Montemayor.the PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title andno more. Relying on the torrens certificate of title covering saidproperties the mortgage loan applications of Donata were granted by the PNB andthe mortgages were duly constituted and registered in the office of theRegister of Deeds. Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug as occupants and lessees of theproperty in question cannot now dispute the ownership of their mother over thesame who was their lessor. When the subject propertieswere mortgaged to the PNB they were registered in the name of DonataMontemayor. 1949. left its original bed and meandered into the Hilarioestate. and Engr. Busuego. In 1945. In 1947. segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular piece of land. to whom a new certificateof title was issued. Theoperations eventually extended northward into the strip of land. On 22 October 22. Plaintiff also converted his claim to one purely for damages directedagainst the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works. allegingthat the latter have fenced off the disputed area in contravention of anagreement had between the latter and the Director of Public Works wherein thedefendants were allowed to continue their operations but subject to the finaloutcome of the pending suit. To prevent itsentry into the land. Subsequently. For years. During the lifetime of plaintiff’s father. solidarily. Upon his death thisproperty was inherited by his son.plaintiff filed his complaint for injunction and damages against the defendantsCity Engineer of Manila. Eulogio Sese. the ProvincialTreasurer of Rizal. the US Army opened asand and gravel plant within the premises.. theplant was turned over to herein defendants-appellants and appellee who tookover its operations. as per issue of fees and penalties for materials(sand and gravel) extracted. Rizal). Jose Hilario. ordering the City ofManila and Director of Public Works to pay Hilario in solidum the sum ofP376. thethen administrator of Dr.the Bureau of Mines and Atty.FACTS: Dr. as the cost of materials taken since 1949. a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed onthe northwestern side. a great and extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the entire placeincluding the neighboring barrios and municipalities. However.Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land around 49hectares in area (Barrio Guinayang. Maximo Calalang were respectively allowed to jointhe litigation as intervenors. The River destroyed thedike on the northwest. defendants filed a petition forinjunction against plaintiff and intervenor Calalang in the same case. plaintiff amended his complaintand impleaded as additional defendants the City of Manila. and started scraping. On 13 May 1954. San Mateo. the Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Consequently. the lower court rendered its decision. Hilario’s estate. The US Army paid. gravel and sand from the nearby areas along the River. On 21December 1956.a claim for damages was filed with the US War Department by Luis Hidalgo. District Engineer of Rizal.000.989. and Engr. as well asthose to be extracted therefrom until defendants stop their operations. the new Engineer-in-charge of theplant. these safeguards served their purpose.000. excavating andextracting soil.60 as cost of gravel and sand . This was further fortified by a stonewall built on thenorthern side. Jr. On 14 March 1954. Thedisputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip which now standsbetween the old riverbed site and the new course.00. the Hilarioestate was bounded on the western side by the San Mateo River. the Director of PublicWorks. in theamount of P1. in1937. from1950 to 1952. 1957. Further. underproper authorization. These floods can hardly be called “accidental”. through the defendants. the lower courtresolved the motions to reconsider with an order. The Colegio deSan Jose case is not exactly in point. and the portionwithin the strip of land question declared not part of public domain andconfirmed as part of Hilario’s private property. holding that the 2/5 portionof the area in controversy to Hilario. andfrom 1953 to 1955. but not unjustly. the extremities of the west bank further receded eastwardbeyond the camachile tree. Hilario andCalalang filed a second motion for reconsideration. What was mainly considered there wasArticle 74 of the Law of Waters relating to lakes. (b) When a river. . this bank had moved. to the east. Evidence shows that the River floods with annual regularity during therainy season. No Costs. leaving its old bed.extracted from the plaintiff’s land. until they lay just about 20 meters east of saidtree. may have beenenriched by chance. and his agent and employees. thewest bank of the River extended westward up to the “secondary bank” line.None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and they allsought a reconsideration of the same. The government. and enteredanother judgment to the effect that the City of Manila and the Director ofPublic Works. They were not responsible for theshifting of the river.Hence. changes its originalcourse and opens a new one through private property. (b) From 1945 to 1949. its lateralborders running along a line just 20 meters west of the camachile tree. none of these is involved. defendants were extracting from public property then. ponds and pools. On August 30. and ordering the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal to reimburseintervenor Calalang of P36. with the River. the appeal. ISSUES: (a)Whether or not the northern two-fifths of the disputed area belongs toplaintiff Hilario.plus costs.80 representing gravel fees illegally collected. It was due to natural causes for which no one can beblamed. and dismissing the case against theBureau of Public Works insofar as money claims are concerned without prejudiceto Hilario taking action against proper party in such claim. would the new riverbankslining said course be of public ownership also? HELD: (a) TheSupreme Court set aside the decision and orders appealed from. In thepresent case. which the lower court denied. Defendants cannot be accusedof unjustly profiting at plaintiff’s expense. are absolved of liability fromextracting materials from subject property (of public domain). Roberto. more or less. They alleged that they are theco-owners of the subject lot. Bulacan. Ong vs. In the absenceof such classification. Pangasinan with an area of five hundredseventy four (574) square meters. 1999. however long.filed an Application for Registration of Title[4] over Lot 15911 (subject lot)situated in Barangay Anolid. ISSUE: Whetheror not the courts can reclassify the subject public land. Courtof Appeals..and. The recommendation of the DistrictForester for release of subject property from unclassified region is not theultimate word on the matter. GR No. The conversion of thesubject property into a fishpond by Applicants does not automatically renderthe property as alienable and disposable. the land remains as unclassified land until it isreleased therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 12 March 2008.175746. It adjoins the Kailogan Riverand private respondent Valeriano have converted it into a fishpond. The Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land infavor of the Valerianos. represented by the Dir of the Bureau of Forest Development. Since the subject propertyis still unclassified. This was affirmed by the CA which said in part that´since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes. Alberto and Cesar. 548 SCRA 160 FACTS: OnJuly 1. cannot ripen into private ownership.. namely. whatever possession Applicants (Valeriano) may have had. Bulacan and that such area are denominated asFORESTLANDS-do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of thepublic domain. it’s beyond their competence and jurisdiction. it cannotbe categorized as part of forest lands. that the subject lot is their exclusive propertyhaving acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and . private respondents claimed that they are the co-owners infee simple of the land partly through inheritance and partly by purchase andthat..Director of Lands vs. In theirapplication in 1976. HELD: Courtscannot reclassify. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as dulyauthorized representative of his brothers. opposed theapplication on the principal ground that the land applied for is WITHINTHEUNCLASSIFIED REGION of Obando. The Republic of thePhil. 179 SCRA 522 FACTS: Theland in question is situated in Obando. Mangaldan. Republic. it is not within any forest or military reservation. Theclassification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Departmentof the Government (Bureau of Forest Development) and not of the Courts. petitioner Charles L. ) No. opposed the application forregistration of title. that the tax declaration appended tothe application does not appear genuine and merely shows pretended possessionof recent vintage. the Court of Appeals which In reversing the decision ofthe trial court. that the subject lot is presently unoccupied. petitioner could not fairlyclaim possession of the land prior to 1971. only respondent Republic of the Philippines (respondent). that applicants failed to adduce anymuniment of title to prove their claims. 1945 or earlier asrequired by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 892. and that the subject lot is part of the public domain whichcannot be the subject of private appropriation. as amended byPresidential Decree (P. continuous andpeaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more thanthirty (30) years. Neither was petitioner able toprove that he or his predecessors-ininterest actually occupied the subject lotprior to the filing of the application.D. petitioner failed to prove that heor his predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse possession of the subjectlot in the concept of owner since June 12. However. andthat they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open.AliciaVillamil on August 24. respondentappealed to rendered the assailed Decision. 1998. the trial court erred in grantingthe application for registration of title over the subject lot. Thus. On January 16.represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. it was incumbentupon petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature andfor the duration required by law.D. exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12. ISSUE: (a)Whether or not petitioner. 2002.D. After due notice andpublication. together with his brothers have registrable ownershipover the real property and (b) whether or not the findings and conclusions ofthe Court of Appeals that the subject real property is a public land iscorrect. . 1529. 1073. 1945 or earlier as mandated bySection 14(1) of P. It noted that the earliest tax declaration whichpetitioner presented is dated 1971. No. Consequently. continuous. that the application was filed beyond the period allowedunder P. Thus. the Court of Appeals found that the subject lot is part of thealienable and disposable lands of the public domain. thetrial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and his brothers. 141. Aggrieved. Respondent asserted that neither applicants nor theirpredecessors-in-interest have been in open. A. 1945 orearlier. possession alone is not sufficient to acquiretitle to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requirespossession and occupation. that it is not within any forest zone or militaryreservation. Bulacan.HELD: Thepetition lacks merit. as correctlypointed by the Court of Appeals. The Republic of thePhilippines. likewise. The law provides that applicants for registration oftitle must prove that: (1) the subject land forms part of the disposable andalienable lands of the public domain. or earlier. issituated in Obando. represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Developmentopposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for iswithin the unclassified region of Obando. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same undera bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. In their application forregistration. The Report of the Bureau of Lands stated that the subject lot is withinthe alienable and disposable zone. Director of Lands vs. The land in question.129 SCRA 689 FACTS: Petitionersseek a review of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirmingthe judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. continuous. and has an area of approximately 9. decreeing registrationof a parcel of land in private respondents' favor. petitioner failed to prove thathe or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open. Bulacan.3 hectares. embodied in theReport of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources CommunityEnvironment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue print Copyof the plan covering the subject lot. There is no dispute that thesubject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of the publicdomain. private respondents claimed that they are the co-owners in feesimple of the land applied for partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly bypurchase on May 2. C. and that areas within theunclassified region are . 1945. However. Itadjoins the Kailogan River and private respondents have converted it into afishpond.continuous. and (2) that they have been in open. 1958. exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12. Theserequisites involve questions of fact which are not proper in a petition forreview on certiorari. This finding is. Further. and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes in theirnames. one of which is Renito Dumolong. Placida. the petition. TheTorrens system of land registration should not be used as a means to perpetratefraud against . On March 11. 166SCRA 519 FACTS: In 1927. Having bought the land registered under the Torrenssystem from the vendor who procured title thereto by means of fraud.T15856 was issued in the name of the vendees. Thedeed was registered and pursuant thereto Transfer Certificate of Title No. Spouses Bornales were declared purchasers in bad faith. SixtoDumolong married to Isabel Marquez-Dumolong was awarded a parcel of landdenominated as Lot 1318 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.1980. A supposed thumbmarkof Isabel appeared in the document. On appeal. Renito and all the other parties named in the ExtrajudicialAdjudication and Sale of Real Property alleging forgery thereof. The subject lot was further sold to Spouses Bornales. Since1920 however. The lower court rendered judgement in favorof Isabel and against all the defendants. In March 1978 aDeed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property was executed byRenito and Isabel as settlement of the conjugal estate of Sixto involving Lot1318 and its eventual sale. the appellate court affirmed theappealed decision with modifications as it found that the subject land was theexclusive property of Sixto who had other illegitimate children surviving withRenito. hence. and eventually they were able to secure a TCT in their names. 6161. they cannotinvoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against Isabel to theextent of her interest over the lot. ISSUE: Whether or not SpousesBornales indefeasibilityof a certificate of title? may invoke the HELD: No. Sixto then cohabited with one Placida Dumolong and they had children. said spouses have been living separately and that they had nochildren. Isabel filed an action for reconveyance and damages against SpousesBornales. It further denied the hereinpetitioners motion for reconsideration. the cultivators ofthe subject lot.denominated as forest lands and do not form part of thedisposable and alienable portion of the pub 18 (Maribeth) Bornales vs Intermediate Appellate Court. 583 hectares was owned by Ayala y Cia and the Zobels. CA.. 174160 Facts: Hacienda Calatagan covered by TCT 722 with an area of 9.G. CHAVEZ. Petitioner. 173 SCRA 26 22 (Nelson) HACIENDA BIGAA. versus EPIFANIO V. 19 (Ailyn) 20 (Jen) 21 (Bambi) .Hindi ko mahanap ang Galloy vs.652. they . substituted by SANTIAGO V. must be made ingood faith. -. Respondent. to be effective. No. Registration.R. INC. CHAVEZ (deceased).the rightful owner of real property. It is a settled rule thatthe defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title does not extend to atransferee who takes it with notice of the flaws in his transferor’s title. and occupying the lots without the prior consent and against the will of Hacienda Bigaa. 44695 and 56120 have not been specifically declared void by court order and must be given probative value. among others of beach. 1996. subsequently building a house on the property. that the areas covered by the permits are the same parcels of land which he presently occupies as Zoila's successor-in-interest and which Hacienda Bigaa also claims. 1996 the premises of Hacienda Bigaa's properties (subject land) by cutting through a section of the barbed wire fence surrounding the properties and destroying the lock of one of its gates. Batangas a complaint[for ejectment (forcible entry) and damages with application for writ of preliminary injunction against respondent Epifanio V. strategy and/or stealth. 129. Notwithstanding the prior ruling of the court dated 1965 that renders Hacienda Calatagan as public land including the expanded area outside the land. It likewise posits that Chavez failed to introduce evidence before the MTC that the land subject matter of the suit is the same land covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the antecedent cases. Ayala y Cia. filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calatagan. Hacienda Bigaa also contended that the rulings in the antecedent cases on the nullity of its subdivision titles should not apply to the present case because the titles TCT Nos. 1979) was a fishpond permittee/lessee under Fishpond Permit Nos. one of them was the Hacienda Bigaan(herein petitioner). foreshores and bay areas. and navigable waters(excess areas).expanded the lot to cover 2000 hectares consisting. by force. . Chavez (Chavez). Issue: 1. making it appear that these excess areas are part of the hacienda. F-4572-0 and F-24735 issued by the Bureau of Fisheries on April 21. a buyer or transferee of the subject land. 1966. respectively. docketed as Civil Case No. Zoila de Chavez (who died intestate on September 14. 1959 and June 3. On June 5. The complaint alleged that Chavez. petitioner Hacienda Bigaa. entered on April 29. They sold the excess area to different third parties. and De los Angeles). Whether or not Chavez has a better claim over the subject land. Defendant (now respondent) Chavez alleged in his answer before the MTC of Calatagan that his mother. they still sold it to another contending that the subject land is not included in the prior decision(antecedent cases of Dizon. Held: 1. the Zobels and/or Hacienda Calatagan covering areas beyond the true extent of TCT No. lots and their titles derived from the Ayalas and the Zobels TCT No. we declared in De los Angeles that the Republic. The Court rejected this contention in light of our holding in the Ayala y Cia and De los Angeles cases that apart from those expressly litigated and annulled. 722 not shown to be within the original coverage of this title are conclusively public domain areas and their titles will be struck down as nullities. NO. (2) Ayala y Cia and the Zobels of Hacienda Calatagan are mere usurpers of these public domain areas. Yes. and De los Angeles. Ayala y Cia. 722 that are null and void because they are lands of the public domain. Significance: . To reiterate. as the rightful owner of the expanded areas portions of the public domain has the right to place its lessees and permittees (among them Zoila de Chavez) in possession of the fishpond lots whose ownership and possession were in issue in the case. What could have saved Hacienda Bigaa.Significantly. Hacienda Bigaa however failed to discharge this burden. that: (1) all expanded subdivision titles issued in the name of Ayala y Cia. and that (3) these areas must revert to the Republic. all other subdivision titles over the excess areas of Hacienda Calatagan must be nullified for covering unregisterable lands of the public domain that must revert to the Republic. Batangas. Alfonso Zobel. the case before us inevitably brings to memory the antecedent decided cases touching on the ownership of the vast tract of land in Calatagan. 722 are null and void because they cover areas belonging to the public domain. Jacobo Zobel and Enrique Zobel and/or Hacienda Calatagan the predecessors-in-interest of petitioner Hacienda Bigaa. 1.2. As framed above. We ruled in the antecedent cases of Dizon. Whether or not Hacienda Bigaa’s title carry no probative value. as successor-in-interest of the Ayalas and the Zobels. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. is competent evidence that the subdivision titles in its possession do not fall within the excess areas of TCT No. 722 in the name/s of Ayala y Cia. June 28. It was given a Certificate ofPrivate Woodland Registration sothat it can operate in a 72000 hectare. Director of Forestry. In 1964. ISSUE: Whether or not Piadeco can claimownership over the property.It also has a Titulo de Propriedad which it acquired in1894 under the Spanish regime. The latter ruled that the Spanish title isno longer recognized and should have never been used to applyfor a Certificate. INC (Piadeco) is a company engaged in logging.The registration of lands of the public domain under Torrens System. . The lower courtruled in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa. 23 SCRA 1183 (L-24796. the NAWASA director orderedthe cancellation of Piadeco’s certificate because it encroached beyond what wasallowed in the certificate. It actually cut trees inthe Angat and Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. 23 (JM) Director of Forestry vs. 1968) FACTS: PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION. Piadecosought to renew its certificate but it was deniedby the Asst. by itself cannot convert public land into private land. Munoz. and regulating the use and occupancy of theforests and forest reserves. with the approval of the department head. The Spanish title it acquired cannotbe used to register for another Certificate.HELD: No. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. empowers the Bureau of Forestry. to the same end. 24 (Maris) 25 (Reg) 26 (Greg) 27 (Ed) 28 (LJ) 29 (Zax) . Section 1817. RevisedAdministrative Code. There should be no question nowthat Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the forceand effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. to issue regulations deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of thepublic forests in such manner as to insure a continuedsupply of valuable timber andother forest products for the future. 77294 December 12. No. FACTS .30 (Clathem) 31 (Lea) 32 (Rubie) #19 Ailyn Part 1 G. LADRIDO and L P. 1988 ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO VIAJAR.plaintiffs-appellants.R. LADRIDO. COURT OF APPEALS.defendantsappellees. LADRIDO.LOURDES LADRIDO IGNACIO. EUGENIO P. vs. LEONOR P. On February 15. The facts admitted by the partiesduring the pre-trial show that the piece of real property which used to be LotNo. Subsequently.and that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession of LotNo. that at the time ofthe cadastral survey in 1926.defendant Ladrido filed his answer with a counterclaim. Viajarsold his rights over Lot No. sold this lot to AngelicaF. Iloilo. Pototan.089 square meters. 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in thepossession of Ricardo Y. 7511 of the Cadastral Survey ofPototan situated in barangay Cawayan. Consequently.819 square meters of what was Lot No. The Viajars filed theirreply to the answer. that the area of 11. Iloilo. plaintiff Celso F. Defendant Te filed his answer tothe amended complaint and he counter claimed for damages. 7340 to his mother and coplaintiff. Viajarinstituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages againstRicardo Y. 7511 and Lot No. The Viajars answeredthe counterclaim. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay GuibuanoganPototan. A Torrens title was later issued inthe names of Angelica F. Summoned to plead. Ladrido.Viajar. that it consisted of 20. Viajar for P5. Viajar now appears to be the soleregistered owner of this lot. Ladrido. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan. Ladrido were the owners of Lot No.000. Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. 1974. defendant Ladrido died. Viajar.1973. Lot No.7340 has been in the possession of the defendants.The spouses Ricardo Y. Viajarhad Lot No. Ladrido andLeonor P. Viajar and Celso F. During the pendency of the case. has also been in the possession of the defendants. and their children. Teand Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land described intheir title as Lot No. The Viajars sought the annulment of the deed ofsale and the restitution of the purchase price with interest in the event thepossession of defendant Ladrido is sustained. 7340 were separated bythe Suague River. 7340. 1981. For this reason. Angelica F. plaintiff Angelica F. Spouses Rosendo H. the trial court rendered . On September 6. 1978.036square meters. that the area of 14. Ladrido. with the conformity of Ana Te. Rosendo H. On December 10. which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River percadastral survey of 1926. Te as another defendant. Later. On May 25. Te. Leonor P. Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. He wassubstituted in the civil action by his wife. she demanded its return butLadrido refused. the complaint was amended to implead RosendoH. The rulethat registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owneragainst the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradualchanges in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled. the plaintiffsappealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled: . the Court of Appeals held that the appeal of Viajar isnot impressed with merit. 109 Phil. ISSUE Whetherthe registration of the land is not a mode of acquiring ownership RULING TheCourt affirmed the decision of the lower court. 366 of the Civil Code does not apply to Torrens registered land." Accretions of that character are naturalincidents to land bordering on running streams and are not affected by theregistration laws.N. Not satisfied with the decision. It follows that registration does not protect the riparianowner against diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in thecourse of the adjoining stream. 133.Hodges vs. Thatarticle provides that "any accretions which the banks of rivers maygradually receive from the effects of the current belong to the owners of theestates bordering thereon. In C. In thedecision appealed from.its decision in favorof the defendants Ladrido. Thecontroversy in the present cases seems to be due to the erroneous conceptionthat Art. Garcia. Part 2 Non-registrability of navigablerivers G. Art. L-31271 April 29. which iscovered by a Torrens Certificate of Title. The factthat the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiffs estate. No. Accretions which the banks of rivers may graduallyreceive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of thebanks (Art. Such accretionsare natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisionsof the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Registration Act.R. Registration does not protect the riparian owneragainst the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the courseof the adjoining stream. 366 of the Old Civil Code. 457 of the New).It clearlyappearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's estate as aresult of accretion. it follows that said land now belongs to him. cannot preclude him (defendant) frombeing the owner thereof. 1974 . the former. 1914. HON. . Because Potenciano Garcia wasprevented by the then municipal president of Lubao. on appeal. are the registered owners of two (2)parcels of land located in Lubao. sold it. by decision promulgated June 12. who in turn.The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino Montemayor. which. which was issued against saidmunicipal president. After the death ofPaulino Montemayor the said property passed to his successors-in-interest. the dikes aroundthe property in question remained closed until a portion thereof was againopened just before the outbreak of the Pacific War.spouses. was affirmedby the Supreme Court on August 21. vs. decision. Pedro Beltran. petitionersappellants. respondentsappellees. as well as thefirst parcel. 1914. and on even date.Maria Montemayor and Donata Montemayor. to a certain Potenciano Garcia. 1916. Pampanga. Both parcels of land are fishponds. now petitioners-appellees. From June 22. whosecured a "titulo real" over it way back in 1883. on June22. 1918. filed Civil Case No. 1407 with the Court of First Instance againstthe said Pedro Beltran to restrain the latter in his official capacity frommolesting him in the possession of said second parcel. SECRETARY andUNDERSECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS & COMMUNICATIONS.applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court. fromrestoring the dikes constructed on the contested property.ROMEO MARTINEZ and LEONOR SUAREZ. FACTS The spouses Romeo Martinez andLeonor Suarez. declaredpermanent the preliminary injunction. COURT OF APPEALS. said Sub-Committeesubmitted its report to the Committee on Rivers and Streams to the effect thatParcel No. as chairman.Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources and Secretary of Public Worksand Communications. covering said parcels 1 and2 was issued to the spouses Potenciano Garcia and Lorenza Sioson. 1954. the Committee on Rivers and Streams rendered its decision restoring theownership to the exclusive possession of spouses Martinez Themunicipal officials of Lubao. by then composed of the Honorable Pedro Tuason. To avoid any untoward incident.On April17. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of both parcels ofland in his name. led by Acting Mayor Mariano Zagad. On July 7.the ownership of these properties changed hands until eventually they wereacquired by the herein appellee spouses who hold them by virtue of transfercertificate of title No. and the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. original certificate of title No. apparentlyrefused to recognize the above decision. and on March 11. These parcelsof land were subsequently bought by Emilio Cruz de Dios in whose name transfercertificate of title No.the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the Committee on Rivers andStreams. at that time Secretaryof Justice. 1925. Pursuant to the Court'sdecision. 14318. This committee thereafterappointed a Sub-Committee to investigate the case and to conduct an ocularinspection of the contested property. Thereafter.1954. 751 beforethe . respectively. and the Honorable Salvador Araneta and Vicente Orosa. 1421 was first issued on November 9. because on September 1. 2 of transfer certificate of title No. 15856 was not a public riverbut a private fishpond owned by the herein spouses. thespouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez instituted Civil Case No. as members. granted the registration over and against the opposition ofthe Attorney-General and the Director of Forestry. 15856. 1954. 1925. sitting as landregistration court. which was decidedin their favor by the lower Court. approved on June 13.Court of First Instance of Pampanga against said Mayor Zagad. 1953. and while Civil Case No. To Regulate Works in Such Waters or Waterways And InCommunal Fishing Grounds. on the strength of theauthority vested in him by Republic Act No. Or Any Other Walls In Public Navigable Waters. praying thatthe latter be enjoined from molesting them in their possession of theirproperty and in the construction of the dikes therein. whichdismissed Mayor Zagad's petition on September 7. Remove and/or Demolish the Construction ofDams. directing the appelleesherein to remove the dikes they had constructed. whoimmediately elevated the injunction suit for review to the Supreme Court. then Secretary of Public Works and Communications. And To Provide Penalties For Its Violation. Dikes. ISSUE Whethernavigable rivers could be registered as private property . 2056. 751 was still pending the HonorableFlorencio Moreno.entitled "An Act To Prohibit. And ForOther Purposes. 1959 the present case. Asagainst this judgment respondent officials of the Department of Public Worksand Communications took the instant appeal. Some four(4) years later. orderedanother investigation of the said parcel of land.embodied a threat that the dikes would be demolished should the hereinappellees fail to comply therewith within thirty (30) days. Or Waterways and InCommunal Fishing Grounds. 1958. The spouses Martinez replied tothe order by commencing on January 2. The writ of preliminaryinjunction applied for was issued against the respondent municipal Mayor. The said order which gave rise to the instant proceedings. With this dismissalorder herein appellee spouses proceeded to construct the dikes in the disputedparcel of land. being ofthe public domain. Municipality of Iloilo. therefore they are outside the commerce of menand not subject to private appropriation. the Court held: A simplepossession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does notnecessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property describedtherein. 769. . is included among the various exceptions enumerated inSection 39 of Act 496 to which the said certificate is subject by expressprovision of the law. 329 in her favor because the said certificate does not confer uponher any right to the creek in question. 592. inasmuch as the said creek. In Ledesmav. Municipal President of Macabebe. it was also said: It isuseless for the appellant now to allege that she has obtained certificate oftitle No. The abovementioned properties are parts of the publicdomain intended for public use. lands which cannot be registered under the Torrenssystem. In Mercadov. 59 Phil. he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of theland illegally included. 49 Phil.RULING TheCourt affirmed that the judgment of the Court of Appeals appealed from is inaccordance with law . If a person obtains title under the Torrens system which includes bymistake or oversight. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the publicproperties fraudulently registered and which are not capable of privateappropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe. 20 SCRA 704. 61 Phil.The sameruling was laid down in Director of Lands v.et al. the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards theLot No. No. it was held that the incontestable and indefeasiblecharacter of a Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the landcovered thereby is not capable of registration. new CivilCode). Roman Catholic Bishop ofZamboanga. 15856.Hence. April30.. The rulingthat a purchaser of a registered property cannot go beyond the record to makeinquiries as to the legality of the . by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive periodprovided for by the Statute of Limitations (Article 1108.R. 2 (PlanPsu 992) of Transfer Certificate of Title No. L-20355-56. 644.R. The evidence submitted before the trial court whichwas passed upon by the respondent Court of Appeals shows that Lot No. No. 15856 in the name ofpetitioners-appellants may be attacked at any time. par. In Dizon. et al. 4. is a river of the publicdomain. and cannotvalidly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private applicant. 2 of Certificate of Title No. 1965. v. L-20300-01 and G. the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works &Communications under Republic Act 2056 to order the removal or obstruction tonavigation along a public and navigable creek or river included therein. The LandRegistration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties. Rodriguez. It is now clearthat the authorities cited by the appellants as to the conclusiveness andincontestability of a Torrens certificate of title do not apply here. as regards public plaza. hasbeen definitely settled. either directly orcollaterally. When it comes to registeredproperties. G. suchas public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain. title of the registered owner. .cannot be availed of as against the law and the accepted principle that riversare parts of the public domain for public use and not capable of privateappropriation or acquisition by prescription. but may relyon the registry to determine if there is no lien or encumbrances over the same. then President Marcos issuedPresidential Decree No. through theCommissioner of Public Highways.” and “to develop. x x x lease and sellany and all kinds of lands. No. PUBLIC ESTATES BAY DEVELOPMENT FACTS On November 20.” On the same date.Part 3 NATURE OF RECLAIMED LANDS G. signed a contract with the Construction andDevelopment Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshoreand offshore areas of Manila Bay. improve.tasked “to reclaim land. AUTHORITY AND AMARICOASTAL CORPORATION. RESPONDENTS VS.R. 1977. On February 4.2002 FRANCISCO I. PETITIONER. 1085 . 1973. acquire. 1084 creating PEA . 133250 July 9. then President FerdinandE. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. the government. including foreshoreand submerged areas. CHAVEZ. the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and PublicEnterprises.on April 9. On April 25. and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers andInvestigations. Ramos. and (3) theJVA itself is illegal.filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of aWrit of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. then President Fidel V. Aquino issued Special Patent No. (2) thecertificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void. the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issuedTransfer Certificates of Title in the name of PEA. then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilegespeech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the “grandmother of all scams. Parañaque City. 1995. . 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study onthe legality of the JVA. Petitionercontends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA ofthe reclaimed lands to AMARI. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA. On June 8.”As a result. a private corporation. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiationwithout public bidding. Ramos issued PresidentialAdministrative Order No. OnNovember 29. 1988. then President Corazon C. 1995. petitioner Frank I. granting and transferring to PEA “the parcels of land so reclaimed underthe Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) . Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose theterms of any renegotiation of the JVA. 1998. to developthe Freedom Islands. Among the conclusions of theirreport are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under theJVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified asalienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands.3517. On April27. OnDecember 5. approved the JVA. 1996. covering the three reclaimedislands known as the “Freedom Islands” located at the southern portion of theManila-Cavite Coastal Road.contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees. conducted a joint investigation. OnJanuary 19. throughthen Executive Secretary Ruben Torres.transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in theforeshore and offshore of the Manila Bay” under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Roadand Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).Subsequently. 1988. Chavez (“Petitioner” for brevity) as a taxpayer. then President Fidel V. PEA entered intoa Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI. 1997. the Office of the President under the administration of thenPresident Joseph E. RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED. Article II. UnderSection 2. The 1987 Constitution declares that allnatural resources are “owned by the State. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.has adopted the Regalian doctrine. 1999.On May 28. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARIof lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3. Estrada approved the Amended JVA. the foreshore and submergedareas of Manila Bay are part of the “lands of the public domain. andSection 7. the Courtgave due course to the petition and required the parties to file theirrespective memoranda.” unless they areclassified as “agricultural lands” of the public domain. PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement (Amended JVA). Article III.” As such.” and except foralienable agricultural lands of the public domain. On March30. VIOLATE THE 1987CONSTITUTION RULING The 1987 Constitution. waters x x xand other natural resources” and consequently “owned by the State.invoking Section 28. like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it. petitioner nowprays that on “constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contractbe declared null and void. In a Resolution dated March 23. of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people toinformation on matters of public concern. Due tothe approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President. Article XIIof the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the publicdomain to private corporations. natural resources cannot bealienated.foreshore and submerged areas “shall not be alienated. 1999. 1999. The mere reclamationof these areas does not convert .” ISSUE WHETHERTHE Lands reclaimed from foreshore andsubmerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable WHETHERTHE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TOAMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS. contracts whose “object orpurpose is contrary to law. . Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. Landsreclaimed by the government are sui generis. There must be alaw or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed landsas alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. not available forsale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands.”are “inexistent and void from the beginning. Clearly.these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if thelaw has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3. and therefore declares the Amended JVAnull and void ab initio.” or whose “object is outside the commerce of men.” The Court must perform its dutyto defend and uphold the Constitution. Moreover. Reclaimed landsretain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. Article XII of the 1987Constitution.these inalienable natural resources of theState into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Inc. petitioners. ANTONIOARANETA. No. Amendments. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did itspredecessors possess the land for at least thirty (30) years immediatelypreceding the filing of application. 73246 March2. FACTS The case is aboutthe registration of the Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf situated in theMunicipality of Bani. Other private parties also filed theiroppositions. under the provisions of the Land RegistrationAct. JUDICIAL REGISTRATION h. 2 The Director of Forest Development alsoentered its opposition alleging that the land is within the unclassified publicland and. Act No. vs. 496. PacificFarms. IAC.PART 4 VIII. 219 SCRA 399 G. DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND J. respondents. . The Republic of the Philippines. The opposition likewise specificallyalleged that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the(1973) new Philippine Constitution from acquiring alienable lands of the publicdomain citing Section 11. inalienable. The initial application for registration wasfiled for Pacific Farms. as amended. Article 14. Inc. thru theDirector of Lands opposed the application alleging that the applicant. Need forpublication and notice if change are substantial i. 1993 DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND DIRECTOR OF FORESTDEVELOPMENT. Pangasinan.R. hence. but were subsequently withdrawn. PROCEEDINGS FORREGISTRATION OF LAND A. that when he first came to know the property it wasthen owned by and in the possession of Paulino Castelo. Inc. Antonio Araneta Inc. was a mere attempt to evade disqualification.. despite absence of any specific invocation of this law in the originaland amended application. Inc. respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of privaterespondent. Apparently. Juan Ambrosio and JulioCastelo. as applicant. Pacific Farms. Garcia who in turn assigned his rights and interest in the same property toJohnny A. filed a manifestation-motion to change theapplicant from Pacific Farms. otherwise known as the Property RegistrationDecree. the Court did not agree withpetitioners' position . to J. Inc. 1979. respondent amended its application toconform with the mandates of the law. Vicente Castelo whoin turn sold it to J. Antonio Araneta had assigned his rights to and interestin Tambac Island to Amancio R. However. there was no republication.Antonio Araneta. On appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court.. ISSUE Whether the lowercourt erred in adjudicating the land to the applicant under the provisions ofPresidential Decree No.In an amendedapplication. fishery guard of Pacific Farms. RULING The Court agree with petitioners that the amendment ofthe application from the name of Pacific Farms Inc. Khonghun whose nationality was not alleged in the pleadings. Despite the supposedamendment. 1529.Apparently realizing such prohibition.the trial court rendered a decision adjudicating the subject property to J. Antonio Araneta. While this case ispending. thedecision of the lower court was affirmed on December 12. and later on the whole island was bought by Atty.. On October 4. Antonio Araneta. to the nameof J.Evidence presented by the applicantinclude the testimony of Placido Orlando. The1973 even the 1987 Philippine Constitution prohibits private corporations orassociations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease. 1985.who said he has known the disputed land since he attained the age of reason forsome forty (40) years now. PART 5 THE POWER TO CLASSIFY OR RECLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDSINTO ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS BELONG TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THEGOVERNMENT G.that the absence of republication of an amendedapplication for registration is a jurisdictional flaw. On the other hand. ANTONINA ESTARES. GORGONIO BERMUDEZ. No. Amendments to theapplication may be due to change in parties or substantial change in theboundaries or increase in the area of the land applied for. SADIN MARAUG. 1987 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. JUAN ARANGALI. MINDA DE PORKAN. REGISTEROF DEEDS OF DAVAO DEL NORTE and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT [Fourth CivilCases Division]. republication is required if the amendment is due tosubstantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area of the landapplied for.R. requires republication and registrationmay be allowed by the court at any stage of the proceeding upon just and reasonableterms. vs. nor Presidential Decree No. MEDORI DE PORKAN. respondents. otherwise knownas the Property Registration Decree.LOLITA MACATINDOG. as amended. FACTS . petitioner. L-66866 June18. 1529. Neither the LandRegistration Act. the predecessors-in-interest of the private respondents. there had been changes in the ownership of the land within the de Porkanfamily which was approved by the government until a problem arose at the timeof ownership of Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog. were respectively allocated to Medori and Macampon de Porkan. Davao del Norte. On May 26. 1980 dismissing the complaints for cancellation oftitles and upholding the validity of the patents/titles of Lolita Macatindogand Minda de Porkan. alleging. On November 26. Azurin filed with the Bureau ofLands a complaint for the correction.The family of Sadin dePorkan. father of Medori and Macampon de Porkan. thePhilippine Fisheries Commissioner ordered the Regional Director at Davao Cityto investigate the conflict of fishpond applications between Viola C. For the succeedingyears. the intrusionof the families of the Azurins. both native Muslims of La Paz. had been in actual possession as owner since theSpanish colonial period of a tract of land planted with coconuts situated insaid municipality. Rodriguezes. Beleno. which from time immemorial had been occupied and cultivated by theirancestors and predecessors-ininterest.the Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte. that the patentees secured their patents andtitles through fraud. Azurinand Moonyeen R. Minda de Porkan andLolita Macatindog similarly claimed in their separate answers that they werethe ones who first protested.while the fishpond conflict case was pending investigation by the PhilippineFisheries Commission [Davao City]. 1937. After a joint hearing. Branch [Tagum] rendered itsdecision 41 on November 18. as well as the titles of their transferees co-defendantsJuan Arangali and Gorgonio .Carmen. Panabo [now Carmen]. 1969. 1972. along with their Muslim relatives. among others. Davao delNorte. and Belenos into their "ancestrallands. Viola C. During the Tagum Cadastral Survey of July 22. thistract of land.amendment or cancellation of Homestead Patent of Minda de Porkan and FreePatent of Lolita Macatindog situated at La Paz. misrepresentation and illegal machinations. was included in theTagum Cadastral Survey of July 22. The nature and character of said tract of public land. Villena.A. Davao del Norte. now Court of Appeals. 1099. 141.by virtue of its being part of the unregistered lands.which were categorically stated in the separate investigation reports in 1953of Vicente J. moreparticularly Lot No. Carmen [formerly Panabo]. as one found inside an "agriculturalzone". the Intermediate AppellateCourt.all native Muslims of La Paz. [a] of the Public Land Act [C. 1937 and formed part of the disposable oralienable agricultural lands of the public domain referred to under Section 6. On February 29. as one suitable for rice cultivation.as amended]. occupied. 1984.par. The Solicitor Generalappealed the decision of the lower court to the then Intermediate AppellateCourt. affirmed the decision of the lower court. which. now Court of Appeals. ISSUE Whetherthe executive branch of government has the power to classify and reclassifypublic lands into alienable and disposable lands RULING It is significant to notethat the tract of public land then possessed. junior public land inspector of the Bureau of Lands[Davao] is binding on the courts inasmuch as it is the .Bermudez. par. 1546. developed and plantedto coconuts by the family of Sadin de Porkan and his predecessors-in-interest. who were adjudged to be innocentpurchasers for value and in good faith. and that of Lot No. [a] in relation to Section 9. exclusive prerogative ofthe Executive Department of the Government to classify public lands .classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber. The mandate of the law itself is that the possessors"shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditionsessential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate oftitle" and by legal fiction. 10 Phil. 1902. manglares. dates back to the time of the Spanishcolonial period. Whatever may have been the meaning of the term'forestry' under the Spanish law. C. such possession of the said tract of public land has attainedthe character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an expressgrant from the Government. whether they are used as nipaswamps. the Act of Congress of July 1st. this court said that the phrase 'agriculturallands' as used in Act No. fisheries or ordinary farm lands.Panabo [now Carmen]. 175. Davao del Norte. Where. the possession of a public land by Sadin de Porkan. Since the disputed tractof public land is neither timber nor mineral lands. In the case of Mapa vs. and their predecessors-in-interest who were native Muslims of la Paz. . 141thru homestead settlement or free patent. the land ceases to be public and thus becomesprivate land. father of Medori dePorkan. and all public lands that are not timber or mineral landsare necessarily agricultural public lands. mineral oragricultural lands. as in the instantcase.A. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spainwhich are not timber or mineral.Insular Government. under Section 11. the same is alienable oropen to disposition as public agricultural lands. R. 2008 SPS. PEDRO TAN AND NENA ACERO TAN. No. who became Australian citizens on 9February 1984. 177797. PETITIONERS. The subject property was declaredalienable and . RESPONDENT FACTS The spouses Pedro Tan and Nena AceroTan were natural-born Filipino citizens. VS. December 04.Part 6 TAX DECLARATION G. They seek to have thesubject property registered in their names. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. Refusing to give up. . Cagayan de Oro City. In 2000. On 8 December 1999. The spouses Tan tookimmediate possession of the subject property on which they planted rubber. the subject property was in thepossession of Lucio and Juanito Neri and their respective spouses. a certain Patermateo Casiño(Casiño) claimed a portion of the subject property. Casiño's application was ordered cancelledby Officer Ruth G. Sabijon of DENR-CENRO. Prior to the spouses Tan.disposable on 31 December 1925. Thesaid Resolution became final and executory on 3 June 1991.gemelina. thespouses Tan filed on 5 October 2000 an Amended Application for Registration ofTitle to the subject property. On 29 August 1989.Casiño filed an Application for Free Patent on the subject property before theBureau of Lands. However. prompting the spouses Tanto file a Complaint for Quieting of Title against him before the RTC of Cagayande Oro City. The application of the spouses Taninvoked the provisions of Act No. Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO). In compliance with therequest of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) dated 29 August 2000. In a Resolution the appellate courtdismissed for lack of interest to prosecute. upon the requestof herein petitioner Pedro Tan.The spouses Tan acquiredthe subject property from Lucio and Juanito Neri and their spouses by virtue ofa duly notarized Deed of Sale of Unregistered Real Estate Property dated 26June 1970.141.as amended. They declared the subject property for taxation purposes in their names andpaid realty taxes thereon. Lucio and Juanito Neri had declared thesubject property for taxation purposes in their names." Casiño appealed thesaid RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals . In a Resolution dated 13 March 1991 the Court denied Casiño's Petition for beinginsufficient in form and substance. Casiño elevated his case to this Court via a Petition for Review onCertiorari.Cagayan de Oro City. the RTC rendered a Decision favoring thespouses Tan and declaring their title to the subject property thus"quieted. 496 and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. as established by a Certificationdated 14 August 2000 issued by the Department of Environment and NaturalResources (DENR). the spouses Tanfiled their Application for Registration of Title to the subject propertybefore the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City. the declared owner of the subject propertypursuant to the 29 August 1989 Decision of the RTC. and other fruit-bearing trees. except as against theRepublic. as amended by Presidential Decree No. After the establishment of thejurisdictional facts. and reversingand setting aside the 9 May 2001 Decision of the RTC on the ground that thespouses Tan failed to comply with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. They called attention to the statement in . When no opposition to theapplication of the spouses Tan was filed by the time of the initial hearing theRTC issued on 23 April 2001 an order of general default.otherwise known as the Public Land Act. On 28 February 2006. Lucio Neri. but failed to submit awritten opposition to the application of the spouses Tan.The Office of the Solicitor General(OSG) entered its appearance on behalf of the Republic. the spouses Tanalready made a formal offer of evidence. The spouses Tan filed a Motion forReconsideration of the foregoing Decision of the Court of Appeals. the appellate court ordered the spouses Tan to return thesubject property to the Republic. Thereafter. Acero . To refute the finding of the appellate courtthat they and their predecessorsin-interest did not possess the subjectproperty by 12 June 1945 or earlier. the spouses Tanwere allowed to present their evidence ex-parte. the spouses Tan attached to their Motion acopy of Tax Declaration No. The Republic appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals.On 9 May 2001. the RTC rendered a Decision granting the application of thespouses Tan. 4627 covering the subject property issued in 1948in the name of their predecessor-in-interest. the RTC heard the testimony of John B. which was admitted by the court a quo. the Court ofAppeals rendered a Decision granting the appeal of the Republic. 141.1073. After Acero's testimony. nephew andlone witness of the spouses Tan. which requires possession of the subject property to start on or prior to12 June 1945. Hence. 2948 was available even in the Office of the Archive of the Province of MisamisOriental. they constitute mere prima facie proofs . 4627 that it cancelled Tax Declaration No. it can bepresupposed that Tax Declaration No. Theearliest evidence of possession and occupation of the subject property can betraced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of theirpredecessors-in-interest only in 1952. The spouses Tan asserted that judicial notice may be taken of thefact that land assessment is revised by the government every four years. Unfortunately. 4627 was not newly issued but cancelled TaxDeclaration No. 2948 was issued in the year 1944. which they had attached totheir Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals but which theappellate court refused to consider. At most. no copy of Tax Declaration No. 2948. and should the Court take judicial notice of the factthat tax assessments are revised every four years. the spouses Tanpoint out that Tax Declaration No. 2948.TaxDeclaration No. 4627 issued in 1948.the spouses Tan are now asking the kind indulgence of this Court to take intoaccount Tax Declaration No. andsince Tax Declaration No. ISSUE WHETHER TAXDECLARATIONS AND RECEIPTS ARE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP RULING Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence ofownership. Just as they had argued before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsiderationof the spouses Tan in a Resolution dated 12 April 2007. 4627 was issued in the year 1948. However. then Tax Declaration No.2948 covering the subject property was issued as early as 1944. tax declarations are inadequate to establish possession of theproperty in the nature and for the period required by statute for acquiringimperfect or incomplete title to the land. No other evidence was presented by thespouses Tan to show specific acts of ownership exercised by theirpredecessors-in-interest over the subject property which may date back to 12June 1945 or earlier. in contrast. but bythemselves.there was a dearth of evidence that their predecessors-in-interest possessedand occupied the subject property in the same manner. they had to tack their possession of the subjectproperty to that of their predecessors-in-interest. the earliest of which. having been issued only in 1948. TaxDeclaration No. To justify their application forregistration of title. In the absence of actual.They may be good supporting or collaboratingevidence together with other acts of possession and ownership. the declaration of the land for tax purposesdoes not prove ownership. this Court hasno other option but to deny their application for judicial confirmation andregistration of their title to the subject property. The possession and occupation of the subjectproperty by the predecessors-in-interest of the spouses Tan were evidenced onlyby the tax declarations in the names of the former. While the spouses Tan undoubtedly possessedand occupied the subject property openly. exclusively andnotoriously. by immediately introducing improvements on the said property. as amended. 4627. For failure of the Spouses Tan to satisfy the requirementsprescribed by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.public and adverse possession. The spouses Tan purchased the subject property and came intopossession of the same only in 1970. continuously. . inaddition to declaring the same and paying realty tax thereon.of ownershipof the property for which taxes have been paid. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. RESPONDENT FACTS On 10August 1992.123346. VS. Hipolito’s titleemanated from Jose Dimson’s (Dimson) TCT . 2007 MANOTOK REALTY. a title issued pursuant to an orderof the Court of First Instance (CFI) of . AND MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION.R. whichtitle in turn was derived from Estelita Hipolito (Hipolito) by virtue of a Deedof Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated 10 December 1988. CLT’s claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate ofTitle (TCT) issued in its name by the Caloocan City Register of Deeds. December 14. INC.PETITIONERS. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possessionof Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed before the Regional TrialCourt of Caloocan City. CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover fromManotok Realty. Inc.Part 7 DECREE OF REGISTRATION G. No. Their motion for reconsiderationhaving been denied. subdivided into seven (7) parcels each in the name ofeach of the Gonzalezes. ruling for CLT. hence. Francisco Felipe Gonzalez andConcepcion Maria Gonzalez under TCT No. per annotationdated 21 November 1946. The trial court. The Manotok title likewise traced as itsprimary source OCT No. The lot was then.ascribing error to the appellate court in upholding the trial court’s decisionwhich decided the . was irregularly issued and. On 3 March 1920. was transferred toAlejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who had previously acquired the property on21 August 1918 by virtue of an “Escritura de Venta” executed by Don TomasArguelles and Don Enrique Llopis. whichaffirmed the decision of the trial court. they filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.Caloocan City. Consuelo Susana Gonzalez. claiming that Dimson’s title. 35486. The Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals. Maria Clara Gonzalez. the same and subsequent titlesflowing therefrom are likewise void. For their part. 496 by virtue of which OCT No. 994. thelatter’s property indeed encroached on the property described in CLT’s title. the proximate source ofCLT’s title. Ruiz and Leuterio sold theproperty to Francisco Gonzalez who held title thereto until 22 August 1938 whenthe property was transferred to Jose Leon Gonzalez. 994 wasissued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. on 9 September 1918. Dimson’s title appearsto have been sourced from OCT No. adopted the factualfindings and conclusions arrived at by the majority commissioners appointed toresolve the conflict of titles. The Manotoks asserted their ownership overLot 26 and claimed that they derived it from several awardees and/or vendees ofthe National Housing Authority.Juana Francisca Gonzalez.that Lot 26 was transferred to CLT byHipolito whose title was derived from the Dimson title and that on the basis ofthe technical descriptions of the property appearing in the Manotok titles. 994 which. the Manotoks challenged the validity of thetitle relied on by CLT. It was established that the entire MaysiloEstate was registered under Act No. R. In the Manotok petition. It is evident from all three titles CCLT’s.case on the basis of the majority commissioners’ report andoverlooked relevant facts in the minority commissioner’s report.994 originally registered on 19 April 1917. The Court pointed out that the titles of respondents inall three cases were derived from OCT No. None of these three titles can beaccorded recognition simply because the original title commonly referred totherein never existed. In fact. 994 of the Registry of Deeds ofCaloocan City registered on 19 April 1917. the Court upheld thevalidity of the trial court’s adoption of the commissioners’ majority report aspart of the decision. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually existed. The Manotoks filed their respectivemotions for reconsideration. the cases were elevated to theCourt en banc.” As earlier established. CLT has specifically manifested that the OCT No. CLT and theDimsons were given the opportunity to submit such proof before this Court. No. Hipolito’s andDimson’s—that the properties they purport to cover were “originally registeredon the 19th day April 1917 in the Registration Book of the Office of theRegister of Deeds of Rizal. These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proventhat OCT No. ISSUE whether the titles issued in thename of CLT IS valid RULING With respect to G. On 5 June 2006. . there is no such OCT No. To conclude otherwise would constitute deliberatedisregard of the truth. CLT hadoriginally filed a complaint for annulment of the titles in the name of theManotoks. butthey did not. alleging that it was the registered owner of Lot 26 of the MaysiloEstate. 123346. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void.Given thisessential clarification. This error alone is. there is only one OCT No. Acertificate of title is deemed as regularly issued with the issuance of theoriginal copy and owner’s duplicate . It may also be acknowledged. The land becomes a registered landonly upon the transcription of the decree in the original registration book bythe register of deeds. there is no sense in affirming the 2005 Decision whichsustained the complaints for annulment of title and/or recovery of possessionfiled by CLT and the Dimson when their causes of action are both founded on aninexistent mother title. as appearson the title. that mother title was received for transcription by the Register ofDeeds on 3 May 1917. As it appears on therecord.994they concede as true is also the one which the Office of Solicitor Generalsubmitted as true.any title thattraces its source to OCT No. sufficient to invalidate theDimson and CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placedby them on the dates appearing on their respective titles. Second. the date and time of such transcription being set forthin the process and certified to at the foot of each entry or certificate oftitle. First. the Court is able to make the followingbinding conclusions. that OCT No. and that is OCT No. Issuance of additional copies arepermissive and their non-existence does not affect the status of title. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. From these premises. The issuance of the original and owner’s duplicate certificates arebasic for the valid existence of the title. and that should be the date which should be reckoned asthe date of registration of the title. in fact. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree ofregistration on 17 April 1917. for such mothertitle is inexistent. although such date cannot be considered as thedate of the title or the date when the title took effect. 994. ordered the DENR Director of Region 12 toconduct a review and investigation of FLGLA No. ordering the DENR Sec.land of the private respondents. to implement the August 3. 2002. the COSLAP issued a writ of execution of its decision. 1998 decision as affirmed by SC.On July 29. The latter found violations by petitioner of the terms of the FLGLA. . 542. DENR Sec. sent a letter to petitioner. Petitioner’s MR was denied. 2002. 2002. No.Nicolasa M.On August 15. as inthis case. Sometime in May 1962 Almirol went to theoffice of the Registerof Deeds to register the deed of sale and to secure inhis name a transfercertificate of title.R. advising him to vacate and remove all improvements in the area within 10 days from receipt of the letter. the survivinghusband cannot dispose of the wholeproperty. 145838. Since. Alvarez cancelled FLGLA No. the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal.Issue: w/n petitioner has residual rights over subject property until the expiration of FLGLA 542 (Dec� PartII 1.On November 27. holding that issue was already decided by SC in GR No. 2002. Sec.Upon appeal. Althoughthe reasons relied upon by the Registrar evince asincere desire on his part tomaintain . Patricio Jr. this instant petition via Rule 45. Registration was refused by theRegister of Deeds becauseaccording to the Registrar. 1961. G. Abalo. bothspouses must sign the Deed of Sale.On November 26. 542. Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) Andrew B. Register of Deeds 22SCRA 1152 March 20.this function belongs properly to a court of competentjurisdiction. Issue:Whether or not the Registrar has the power to determine thevalidity of adocument sought to be registered. Held: No.Almirol v. the wife has alreadydied when the sale was made. the land was a conjugalproperty and therefore. CENRO Patricio issued an Installation Order. Hence. which directed the immediate installation and occupation of the area by the private respondents indigenous communities. 1968 FACTS: On June 28. the Register of deeds is not granted theauthority to determine. whether adocument is validor invalid.TeodoroAlmirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land covered byoriginalcertificate of title P-1237 in the name of Arcenio Abalo and hisdeceased wife. Sur. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin. Whether the document is invalid. 1953). Hence. Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Section 55 of Act 496. for and in the name of the vendees. these do not constitute legalgrounds for his refusal to registerthe deed. Sur. itis not the duty of a Register of Deeds todecide.Issue: Whether the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is proper." obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question.inviolate the law on succession andtransmission of rights over realproperties. There being several copies of the same title in existence. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos. I. such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains an additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title No. 1969Makalintal.Facts:On November 15. Register of Deedsof Rizal. Sept. 548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan.Held: Yes." Mainly because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title No.frivolous or intended to harass.. L-20611 May 8. namely. that of the registered owner himself. The entire area of the land is 11. Balbin vs. 548 had not been presented by petitioners. registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. J. 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. I.2225 hectares. the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation. 1956 at Vigan.30. appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (²/³) portion thereof in favor of petitioners. which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument. et al. Notary Public of Caoayan. but a court of competentjurisdiction. L-17956. Andres Cabeldo. Register of DeedsG. this 5th day of January." with the request that the same be annotated on the title." It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers. (Gabriel vs.The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law. it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely .the refusal of theregistration of document was invalid.R. 548. If this were not so. OnAugust 10. 2262. petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to themin a private document. 1937.: Facts: Thesubject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated inCavinti. Cadastral Record No. if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations. 136.L-67742 October 29.R. Laguna consisting of 81. 150562 issued in L. affecting the land covered by the title. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original.affected if an encumbrance. more or less. 1924owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva pursuant toDecree No. an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that wasallegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and transfering theproperty in question in favor of the petitioners. No. or an outright conveyance. is annotated on one copy and not on the others.300 square meters. initiallycovered by an original Certificate of Title No. 1987 PARAS.J. 3(Gina) MELITONGALLARDO and TERESA VILLANUEVA vs. Cad. 1. particularly voluntary ones. . Case No. HONORABLEINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G. the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.R. which means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions.C. issued on April 2. petitioners instituted court suit against the privaterespondent and her husband. 1977.Subsequently. 23350) in the name of the petitioners. where the original of their new transfer certificate of titlewas kept. Accordingly. 1984. Dr. by filing a complaint forQuieting of Title and Damages with the Court of First Instance of Laguna onFebruary 3. Marcelo S. affirmed in toto the decision of the trialcourt. Such findings of fact besides beingbased on the records.6293 (No. Issue: .the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled on the basis of the privatedocument of sale and a new certificate of title was issued in the name of thepetitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23350)on January 4. by virtue of an Affidavit ofReconstitution dated December 2. were completely burned. Accordingly. Agana. 1958 and upon presentation of the Owner'sDuplicate Certificate of Title. Sr. among other demands. were sustained by the Court of Appeals The IntermediateAppellate Court. However. the records as well as the Office of the Register ofDeeds of Laguna. the title was administratively reconstitutedand the Register of Deeds of Laguna issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. The trialcourt found that said private document was null and void and that it was signedby somebody else not Pedro Villanueva. demanding that their title over the questioned land befortified by a declaration of ownership in their favor and avoiding theaf/recited Deed of Conveyance and Release of Claim. de Agana refused to sign anAffidavit of Quit-claim.RT-6293 (No.private respondents in their answer countered that the Deed of Sale in Tagalogand petitioners' title over the land be declared void ab initio. on May 22.when private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. RT. Duringthe Second World War. 1944. among other things. were sustained by theCourt of Appeals. However. that the conveyance be executed "before thejudge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public ora justice of the peace. Uponconsideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of theassailed document. The next sentence providesthe exception. True. Said law is Section 127 of Act 496 whichrequires. who shall certify such acknowledgment substantially inform next hereinafter stated.whether or not there was a validreconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. thereby lendingcredence to the claim that private respondent Marta Agana was unaware of suchreconstitution and possession until she discovered the same in the Office ofthe Register of Deeds in 1976. As . In thecase at bar. 1356 is that contractsare obligatory. Held: No. provided all theessential requisites for their validity are present." Such lawwas violated in this case. essentially ex-parte and without notice. the trial court found that said private document was nulland void and that it was signed by somebody else not Pedro Villanueva. a private conveyance of registered property is validas between the parties. the only right the vendee of registeredproperty in a private document is to compel through court processes the vendorto execute a deed of conveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration. RT-6293 (No.as argued by appellants. The general rule enunciated in said Art. in whatever form they may have been entered. The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna inallowing the registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and didnot lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. it will be noted that what transpired was an administrativereconstitution. Suchfindings of fact besides being based on the records. 23350) issuedin the names of petitioners.Plaintiffs-appellants' reliance on Article 1356 of the Civil Code isunfortunate. requiring a contract to be in some form when the law so requiresfor validity or enforceability. 8371). DENR Sec. extraction. 2000 Facts: This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the following provisions of Republic Act No. 4(Zhon) Cruz vs. in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2. No.R.such it cannot be claimed that she slept onher right as from that time on. mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples. otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). G. defines ancestral lands. on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein. 135385. 6.. bodies of water. (3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains andancestral lands.A. (5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands. (6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting. it is undeniablethat she filed her adverse claim on the said lot. in turn.development or exploration of . (4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains. 8371 (R. and Section 3(b) which. (2) Section 5. Article XII of the Constitution: (1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains. Dec. in relation to section 3(a). which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands. minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains. by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas. series of 1998. sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R. develop. forest cover or reforestation.Petitioners also content that. Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners. and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contendsshould be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale . wildlife sanctuaries. renewable for not more than 25 years. In addition. protected areas. They contend that said Rule infringes upon thePresidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17. series of 1998. mangroves. petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII. Justice Kapunan filed anopinion. which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo. and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years.A. which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challengedprovisions of the law with the exception of Section 1. and (7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain. andSantiago join. protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds. Part II. Part II. Issue: w/n the assailed provisions are constitutional Held: Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition.Article VII of the Constitution. 1. wilderness.8371. Rule III of NCIPAdministrative Order No. Finally. the Rules and RegulationsImplementing the IPRA. Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1. petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Quisumbing. .Buena. the voting remained the same. INC. Gonzaga-Reyes. fictitious and issued under mysterious circumstances considering that the holders thereof and their predecessors-in-interest were never in actual. 6. 8371 areunconstitutional. and 57 of R. 614 from which the foregoing TCTs originated of were derived. the petition is DISMISSED. 5.A. Quezon City. and continuous possession in the concept of owner of unregistered parcels of land in Sitio Mabilog. Justices Melo.A. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. and related provisions of R. 2008Facts:Petitioners filed a complaint and an amended complaint for cancellation of title to property covered by several TCTs for being spurious.Accordingly. However.exploitation of naturalresources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2. 59. Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections58. and physical possession of the property rendering them ineligible to acquire title under the Friar Lands Act. And that . and De Leon join in the separate opinions of JusticesPanganiban and Vitug. 7 (a)(b). and 66 of the law. Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss thepetition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversyand petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R. 8371 are unconstitutional. Pardo. GENUINO ICE CO. On the other hand. 5(May Ann) 6(Rhea B. adverse.A.As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majoritywas not obtained. They also seek to annul OCT No. pursuant to Rule56. 7. the case was redeliberated upon. Article XII of the1987 Constitution. 8. 154080 January 22.8371.Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections3(a). peaceful.) CANETE V. afterredeliberation. The amended complaint alleged that the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest are among those in actual.GR No. adverse. 65. which he believes must await the filing ofspecific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view thatSections 3 (a)(b). that no relief may be granted as a matter of law. and that petitioners failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. It has been found that OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the name of the Philippine Government in 1910. and the allegations are mere conclusions of law also. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the CA which granted the petition and dismissed the amended complain of the petitioners. all lots in the Piedad Estate had already been disposed of. 7(Angel) . Also. An Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of Natural Resources specifically tasked to investigate the historical background of the Piedad Estate. the allegations of fraud are not specific and were not substantiated.the real property in question is a portion of the friar land known as the “Piedad Estate”. On real-parties in interest may file for the cancellation of title of property and not one whose interest is based on mere expectancy.The initial claim that OCT 164 of which all the other subject titles are derivatives is null and void has been proven wrong as held in previous cases (Pinlac).Issue:Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the certiorari and dismissing the complaintRuling:No. The Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system which means that all lots therein are titled. sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action because petitioners are not real parties-in-interest. The plaintiffs gave only an incomplete narration of facts unsupported by documentary or other exhibits. as well as his successors-in-interest. as held in the Balicudiong case one who acquired title under the Friar Land Act. Being so. may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-interest were actual settlers and occupants at the time said land were acquired by the government. The complaint and amended complaint failed to state the “ultimate fact” which are essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The motion to dismiss was denied. found that as early as prior to the Second World War. the plaintiffs did not pray to be declared owners of the subject property-despite their alleged adverse possession-but only to be adjudged as the bona fide occupants thereof.Respondent. which is intended for distribution among the bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. Their interest is mere expectancy based on the probability that the government would give them preference as buyers or lessees of the subject lands. they are not real parties in interest for the purpose of maintaining a suit for cancellation of the subject titles. conceding to the State’s ownership of the property. Also. which was divided into two parcels. Issue: Whether properties in dispute are capable of private appropriation? Held: . 1956. the Alagads were declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining portion. and hence. G. Lot 1 and Lot 2. continuously. insofar as the 1. Alagad Facts: On October 11. namely. Pila. The Republic filed a petition for “annulment of title and reversion. publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26. and had since time immemorial. January 26.8. defendants filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga. by virtue of a final judgment supplemented by orders.R. Laguna. 1989 Republic v. available disposition and registration. According to the trial court. No. On January 16. 66807. The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly. contending that such is foreshore land. 1951. been foreshore land reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna de Bay.42 hectare northwestern portion on end of Lot 1 is concerned. the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. or Lot 2. was declared public land. They are things res publicae in nature and hence. As we have pointed out. all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Toavoid any untoward incident. incapable of private appropriation.R. now petitioners-appellees. Thus. under the present Constitution. 1974) FACTS:The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez. Both parcels of land are fishponds. The property involved inthe instant case is the second parcel mentioned in the above-named transfercertificate of title. the Republic has legitimate reason to demand reconveyance. and that as foreshore land. available for disposition and registration.covered by transfer certificate of title No. the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.No. it is not registerable. COURT of APPEALS.According to the trial court. 9(Mike Jayson) 10(Lou) RomeoMARTINEZ and Leonor Suarez v. assuming that the properties are foreshore in nature. with the exception of agricultural lands. 15856 of the Register of Deeds ofthe said province. the Government holds otherwise. Thus. L-31271 (April 29. This committee thereafter appointed aSub-Committee to investigate the case and to . Pampanga. The law provides that property of the public dominion refers to things held by the State by regalian right. the disputants agreed to refer the matter to theCommittee on Rivers and Streams. SECRETARY andUNDERSECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS & COMMUNICATIONS G. and hence. arethe registered owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Lubao. With this dismissal order hereinappellee spouses proceeded to construct the dikes in the disputed parcel ofland. said Sub-Committee submitted itsreport to the Committee on Rivers and Streams to the effect that Parcel No. Remove and/or Demolish theConstruction of Dams. entitled "An Act To Prohibit. Thespouses Martinez replied to the order by commencing on January 2. 1954. To Regulate Works in Such Waters orWaterways And In Communal Fishing Grounds. on the strength ofthe authority vested in him by Republic Act No. apparentlyrefused to recognize the above decision.1958. Asagainst this judgment respondent officials of the Department of Public Worksand Communications took the instant appeal. who immediatelyelevated the injunction suit for review to the Supreme Court. 15856 was not apublic river but a private fishpond owned by the herein spouses. And To Provide Penalties For ItsViolation. and while Civil Case No. which was decided in their favor by the lower Court in a decisiondated August 10. Thesaid order which gave rise to the instant proceedings. directing theappellees herein to remove the dikes they had constructed. Somefour (4) years later. approved on June 13. The writ of preliminary injunctionapplied for was issued against the respondent municipal Mayor.conduct an ocular inspection ofthe contested property. which dismissedMayor Zagad's petition on September 7. 1953. 2056. led by Acting Mayor Mariano Zagad. Or Any Other Walls In Public Navigable Waters. OrWaterways and In Communal Fishing Grounds. . And For Other Purposes. 2of transfer certificate of title No. 1959. embodied a threat thatthe dikes would be demolished should the herein appellees fail to complytherewith within thirty (30) days. 751 was still pending theHonorable Florencio Moreno. Dikes. 1959 thepresent case. Themunicipal officials of Lubao.ordered another investigation of the said parcel of land. and on March 11. then Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Hence. he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of theland illegally included. TheLand Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties. Municipality of Iloilo. lands which cannot be registered under the Torrenssystem. and banks shores. 49 Phil. this Court held: Asimple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does notnecessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property describedtherein. and bridges constructed by the State.2 of Certificate of Title No. are outside the commerce of men and. RULING:No.That destined to the public use. 101-104. therefore.such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain. canals. If a person obtains title under the Torrens system which includes bymistake or oversight.ISSUE:W/N the Court may adjudge title over non-registrable properties such as publicnavigable river. torrents. such as roads. roadsteads. InArticle 339 of the old Civil Code which reads as follows: Propertyof public ownership is: 1.) In Ledesmav. (Par. 6th ed. 15856 in the name of . 1) Theabove-mentioned properties are parts of the public domain intended for publicuse. 769. rivers. andcannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private applicant. not subject to privateappropriation.the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. ( 3 Manresa. andthat of a similar character.ports. The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerableproperties. Significance: LandRegistration. new Civil Code). 4. et al. may be attacked at any time. 15856 in the nameof petitioners.by the state which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by theStatute of Limitations. 664). Hence.-. Nevertheless.. 37 Phil. the judgment of the Court of First Instance ofPampanga as regards the Lot No. it cannot be contended that the appellants whowere the vendees did not know exactly the condition of the land that they werebuying and the obstacles or restrictions thereon that may be put up by thegovernment in connection with their project of converting Lot No. either directly or collaterally.petitioners-appellants maybe attacked at any time. and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of aprivate applicant. Theruling that a purchaser of a registered property cannot go beyond the record tomake inquiries as to the legality of the title of the registered owner. Court may not adjudge title over nonregisterable land. either directly or collaterally. One who buys something with knowledge ofdefect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he acquired it in goodfaith (Leung Lee v.. cannot be availed of as against the law and the accepted principle thatrivers are parts of the public domain for public use and not capable of privateappropriation or acquisition by prescription. such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the publicdomain. Strong Machinery Co. 2 in questioninto a fishpond. par. they willfully and voluntarily assumed the risksattendant to the sale of said lot. . Beforepurchasing a parcel of land. by the State which isnot bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations(Article 1108. but mayrely on the registry to determine if there is no lien or encumbrances over thesame. 2 of Certificate of Title No. After his motion for reconsideration was denied. 1961. segregating therefrom the portion alleged to have been erroneously included. petitioner. m. under said section. for it will involve the correction of the technical description of the land covered by the certificate of title in question. Issue Whether or not it is under Section 112 of Act No 496 . which eventually will cause the amendment of the original decree of registration. HON. 496. the court can only authorize an alteration which may not impair the rights recorded in the decree. the court a quo issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and requiring Navera to answer the petition within the reglementary period. or one which is consented to by all parties concerned. on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. ETC. Navera filed the present petition for certiorari disputing the jurisdiction of the court a quo.11(Jess) GODOFREDO NAVERA. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera. or can authorize the correction of any error or mistake which would not involve the reopening of the original decree of registration. the municipality of Ligao filed with the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition under Section 112 of Act No. or one which will not prejudice such rights. PERFECTO QUICHO Facts On January 24. was erroneously included in said title during the cadastral survey of Ligao. This cannot be done at this stage after the lapse of 23 years from the issuance of the certificate of title. covering Lot No. vs. Here the petition will have such effect. He contends that... ET AL. for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title No. After hearing both parties. as amended. Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the relief which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act 496 because the same would involve the opening of the original decree of registration. respondents. 2793-A. or inchoate. such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties. While this section. have terminated and ceased".2 But this theory only holds true if there is no dispute that the portion to be excluded is really part of a public highway. and apparently the petition comes under its scope. contingent. is in our opinion correct. There being dissension as to an important question of fact. No costs. We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in finding that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present petition for the simple reason that it involves as controversial issue which takes this case out of the scope of Section 112 of Act No. alteration. are hereby set aside. among other things. 496. the petition cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act No. otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs. authorizes a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure.Held: No The theory entertained by the court a quo that if the portion to be segregated was really erroneously included in the title issued to petitioner because it is part of the Natera street which belongs to the municipality of Ligao that portion may be excluded under Section 112 of Act 496 because under the law1 any public highway. 496. or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest. 12(Diane) . whether vested. This principle only applies if there is unanimity as to the issue of fact involved. WHEREFORE. The claim of the municipality that an error has been committed in the survey of the lot recorded in respondent's name by including a portion of the Natera street is not agreed to by petitioner. or amendment of a certificate of title "upon the ground that registered interests of any description. expectant. 1961. even if not noted on a title. is deemed excluded therefrom as a legal lien or encumbrance. The order of respondent court dated March 8.1äwphï1. In fact. as well as its order dated March 25.ñët Here said unanimity is lacking. This is upon the principle that a person who obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be registered does not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner of the land erroneously included therein. petition is granted. he claims that is a question of fact that needs to be proven because it is controversial. 1961. The respondents rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition. The fact that it has not been used for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property.R.G. On July 25. The property is classified under Art 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service. Aquino to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm. They were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property was specifically designated under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy. . 92013 July 25. HELD: No. The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation agreements. the President issued Executive Order No. ISSUE: Whether or not the Roppongi property can be alienated by the Philippine Government. No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale. VicePresident Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion. 300 dated June 27. lease or disposition. A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises. transfer and devolution of the title to a property. There can be no doubt that the property is of public dominion. 1958. 1987. Such conversion happens only if property is withdrawn from public use. through an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property. 1990 FACTS: The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract No. L-18339. It cannot be alienated. meters. the municipality of Ligao petitioned theCourt of First Instance of Albay to correct the Transfer Certificate of Titleof Navera because a portion of his lot was erroneously included in the title. it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.ruling that he cannot be the owner of the portion of the lot . Albay. Navera moved to dismiss thepetition because the correction would involve. and resides in the social group. As property of public dominion. On January 24. the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. not the correction of the title.It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. Quicho GRno. The purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but the citizens. June 29 1962 BautistaAneglo. J.Said portion was a part of a street and the encroachment allegedly deprived thestreet of an area amounting to 123 sq. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment. The lower court dismissed his motion and granted the petition.: Facts: Godofredo Navera owned a lot inLigao. 13(April) 14(Daniel Eblahan) Navarav. in application to the satisfaction of collective needs.but the opening of the original title and return of said portion to themunicipality. 1961. not through the petition to correct petitioner’stitle. Issue: Whether or not the petition tocorrect the title of Navera should be allowed. Held: No. Inthis case.which was part ofthe street since public highways and streets cannot be registered and isexempted as a legal lien or encumbrance. this theory applies only if there is unanimity among theparties that the land is in fact part of the street and there is no adverseclaim or any serious objection from any party in interest. The Court ruled that even thoughthe lower court was correct in its theory that the portion of the lot wasreally a part of the street and is excluded and cannot be registered and ownedby the petitioner. there is a controversy and it should beresolved in an ordinary case. the Court ruled that there is no unanimity since there is anobjection coming from the petitioner. 15(Melodia) ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________ 16(Mel) REPUBLIC V. AYALA y SIA 14 SCRA 259 Facts: . The defendant company caused the survey and preparation of a composite plan of Hacienda Calatagan. Thus. T-9550 issued to defendants Dizons covering Lots 360. by taking or including therein lands of public dominion. the court rendered judgment annulling TCT No. The defendants contended that the excess was insignificant in nature and attributable to the inaccuracy of the magnetic survey that was used in the preparation of the plan upon which OCT No. the plaintiff sought the annulment of titles allegedly obtained by the defendant over portions of the territorial waters of the public domain. and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private property covered by TCT No.000 hectares. beach and foreshores of the bay.652. Issue: Whether the areas in dispute are territorial waters of the public domain. This ruling was based upon the finding that the disputed areas form part of the navigable water. as well as other subdivision titles issued to Ayala y Cia. 363 and 182. plaintiff also prayed for recovery of possession of such areas in excess of those covered by TCT No. 362.. Ruling: . 722) to 12. and for which fishpond permits were already issued in favor of bona fide applicants. Miguel Tolentino and 22 others alleged holders of fishpond permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries over the areas supposedly outside the boundaries of Hacienda Calatagan. increasing its area from 9. were allowed to intervene in the case and make demand for recovery of possession of said areas. or are portions of the sea.583 hectares (as evidenced by TCT No. 20 was based. After trial. 722. 722. and claim for damages for the deprivation of possession thereof allegedly by the illegal acts of defendants.In an amended complaint filed against Ayala Y Cia et al. claiming thatthey are the owners in fee simple. the court adjudicated and orderedthe registration of LotNos. ___________________________ 17(Rocky) 18(Maribeth) Republicvs Sioson. And. 9 SCRA533 FACTS: OnNovember 6. their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant. . In the present case.. TheDirector of Landsopposed the application for registration over Lot 4 based onseveral reasons.1951. T-9550 issued in the names of defendants Dizons (and which were purchased by the latter from defendants Ayala y Cia. 1. or of the navigable water itself.The decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.one which is that Lot 4 is a part of the public domain and assuch belong to theRepublic of the Philippines. beach. as the lots covered by TCT No. Spouses Sioson filed with the CFI an application forregistration of fourparcels of land situated in barrio San Roque. it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration. Paombong.Bulacan. and/or Alfonso Zobel) were found to be portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters. The areas in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries) were found to be portions of the foreshore. After hearing. the lower court committed no error in rendering judgment against said defendants and ordering the reversion of said properties to the public dominion. they allegedamong other things that Lot 4 was and still is intruth and in fact an accretionto a titled parcel of land. hence an appealby the Republicof the Philippines. the lower court ordered theissuance of the decree on Lot 4. recommended the registration of Lot 4 in the name oftheSpouses. 1956.the Sol. OnApril 25. then President Marcos issued Proc. among other islands. Gen. without hearing andpresentation ofevidence entered an order denying the petition. 1801declaring Boracay Island. thelower court’s decision was modified as the Sol. Gen. in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filedwith the lowercourt a petition for review of the decree of registration andcancellation oftitle over Lot 4 alleging actual and extrinsic fraud by theSpouses. Onappeal. If itis true that Lot 4 is or forms part of the bed of anavigable steam. No.. caves and . No adjudicationas to Lot 4 hence the appeal with the Court of Appeals. the decree and title to it in the name of theSpouses would not givethem any right or title to it. 1978. The lower court.2 and 3 in favor of the Spouses. 8 OCTOBER 2008 FACTS: On November 10. GR NO. ISSUE: Whetheror not Lot4 being a part of the bed of a navigable river may be registered inthe name ofthe Spouses? HELD: No. By virtue of the modifiedjudgment. 19(Ailyn) 20(Jen) SECRETARY OF DENR VS YAP.Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registeredunder the LandRegistration Act. 173775. in behalf ofthe Directorof Lands. In the Spouse’s opposition tothe petition. creek orriver. byintentional and deliberate concealment of facts and connivance withthe landinspector. Mila Y. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. The Republic. and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo. continuous. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code. or through their predecessors-in-interest. Yap. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. through the OSG. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes. or earlier since time immemorial. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable. respondentsclaimants Mayor Jose S. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. 3-82 was misplaced. Jr.” which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code. whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. 1801 and PTA Circular No. and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12. . Sumndad. respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest. 1945. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. They declared that they themselves.peninsulas in the Philippines. President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3. as amended. Libertad Talapian.. opposed the petition for declaratory relief. 1801 and PTA Circular No. as amended. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone. it was susceptible of private ownership. they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. exclusive. Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801. No. Aklan. 1982. to implement Proclamation No. had been in open. In their petition. “PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition. 2006. during the pendency the petition in the trial court. petitioners-claimants Sacay. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code. as amended. declaring that. ISSUE: Whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. 2006. mandamus. Again. HELD: petitions DENIED. On In 2004. On August 10. On May 22. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. this case. and nullification of Proclamation No. the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. On November 21. Hence.On July 14. the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondentsclaimants. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. Hence. the present petition under Rule 45. The CA decision is reversed. 2006. 1064. . 1999. the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government. or certification was presented to the Court. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership). Of these. however.” Applying PD No. PD No. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No.Prior to Proclamation No. are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order. no such proclamation. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. 705. all unclassified lands. 1064. 705. the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and . 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. 705 defines a public forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. administrative action. an administrative action. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The records are bereft of evidence showing that. such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. statute. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership. report. prior to 2006.Except for lands already covered by existing titles. forest or timber. including those in Boracay Island. and a legislative act or a statute. Section 3(a) of PD No. investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators. Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. executive order. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural. In the case at bar. 2006. who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. 1064 of May 22. only agricultural lands may be alienated. or both. L-17821. Acting on the report which the investigator submitted tohim. which had been blocked by means of dikes and dams andconverted into fishponds. No. Proc. FLORENCIO MORENO. the Secretary rendered his decision on August 10. 1801. HON. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1963. CENONMATEO. finding that theSapang Cabay was a public navigable stream and ordering Cenon Mateo. No. Moreno. 2056 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates judicial power tothe Secretary and unlawfully deprives the appellant and others similarlysituated of their property without due process of lawHELD: Theconstitutionality of the aforesaid statute has been upheld by this Court inLovina vs. They call for proof. the hereinpetitioner-appellant.R.disposable. was dismissed by the Court a quo. sent a letter-complaint tothe Highway District Engineer of that province asking that the Sapang Cabay. The letter was referred to the Secretary of Public Works andCommunications. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest. No. 1064. G. vs. as already stated.L-21024 July 28. otherwise they would be removed athis expense. be ordered reopened and restored to its originalcondition. who caused an investigation to be conducted pursuant toRepublic Act No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. furthermore. apublic navigable stream. November 29. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. shortly before thepresent appeal was submitted for decision. whereupon he filedthe basic petition to restrain the respondent Secretary from enforcing hisdecision. he would have identified the specific limits of each. Bulacan. 2056. The petition.R. That case held. who had in the meantime acquired the property insidewhich the said creek is situated. G. 1969FACTS: Sometimein 1959 a number of residents of Guiguinto. defendant-appellee. 1959. to remove the dikes and dams thereinconstructed within thirty days from notice. as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. in his capacity asSECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS. thatthe absence of any mention of a navigable stream within a property covered by acertificate of title does not preclude a subsequent investigation anddetermination of its existence .ISSUE: whether or not RepublicAct No. petitioner-appellant. Mateo moved to reconsider but was turned down.The certification of the appeal to us was upon motion of both parties in viewof the constitutional question involved. categorizedas lot 1. and thus. Issue: Whether or not man-made alluvial deposit are registerable.The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in thenames of the private respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of theMeycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domainunder Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502. The decision appealed from is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. as long as such findings are supported by substantialevidence. They are theregistered owner of parcel of lot(Transfer Certificate of Title No. They are not open to registration under the Land RegistrationAct. error of law. WHEREFORE. Lot 1 and lot 2 are accretions tothe land owned by the respondents and so the trial court ordered theregistration of land in favor of them. that the findings of fact made by the Secretary of Public Works andCommunications should be respected in the absence of illegality. and that the ownership of a navigable stream or of the bed thereof isnot subject to acquisitive prescription. 22(Nelson) Republicvs CA 132 SCRA 514 Facts: Respondents sought to register the land adjacent to their fishpond.fraud or imposition. HELD: NO. 89709)bordering on the Bocaue and Meycauyan rivers. The private respondents are .the instant petition is GRANTED. it is man-made and artificial and not the result ofthe gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river. if there isany accretion to speak of. The petitioner submits that there is noaccretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because whatactually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred theirdikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River. paragraph 1 of the Civil Code ofthe Philippines.nor make it private property of the titleholder. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the namesof the private respondents is null and void. lot 2 and lot 3(later on lot 3 was withdrawn). Pangasinan. Adriano Maneclang et al filed a complaintfor quitting of titleover acertain fishpond belonging to them situated in Bario Salomague. therefore public innatureand not subject to private appropriation. 38 and 95 authorizing public bidding forthe lease of allmunicipal ferries and fisheries. and the annulment of Resolution No. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (IAC) 161SCRA 469 FACTS The Municipal Council of Bugallion.Pangasinan passed aResolutions Nos. Due to lack of interest commentingthe complaint. 38 and 95 of theMunicipalCouncil of Bugallion. The trial court dismissed the complaint upona findingthat the body of water traversing the titled properties of petitionersis acreek constituting a tributary of the Agno River. of respondentsAlfredo Maza in The parties entered into . including the fishpond.Bugallion. 23(JM) MANECLANGVS.Alfredo Maza theawardees in the public bidding.ordered to move back the dikes oftheir fishponds to their original location and return the disputed property tothe river to which it belongs. Presiding . is a property belonging to thepublic domain which is not susceptibleto private appropriation and acquisitiveprescription. ISSUE: Whetherthe creek or the body of watertraversing the titled properties of Maneclang etal is susceptible to privateappropriation. petitioners.R. Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS. or armextending from a river from a river andparticipating in the ebb and flow ofthe sea. No. THE HON. ANDRES REYES. vs. 1987 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.amicablesettlement by Submitting to theCourt a Compromise Agreement praying thatjudgment be rendered recognizing theownership of petitioners over the land thebody of water found within theirtitled properties. 24(Maris) 25(Reg) 26 G. and as a public water itcannot be registered under the TorrensSystem in the name of any individual. HELD: CREEKis defined as a recess. L-30263-5 October 3. Cenidoza. 1967. Eusebio and Lara filed with the Bureau of Lands their Free Patent Applications for the parcels of land designated as Free Patent Application Nos. respondents. On March 16 and 22. claiming that the Branch IV had not acquired jurisdiction over his person. 7-207 and 7-208 for Lot no. Branch VI. Court of First Instance of Rizal. Taguig. declared the earlier decision null and void. LARA. These additional persons were alleged to have bought the subject lands from Eusebio and Lara. Venezuela and Cenidoza . FACTS: Sometime in 1965. EUSEBIO. Despite records showing that the Director of Lands had not been properly served. both Eusebio and Lara executed separate affidavits admitting noncompliance with the requirements of the Public Land Act and expressly agreed to have their patents and certificates of title cancelled. AND JOSEFINA OROSA (Spouses). The CFI Rizal ordered the cancellation of the patents. and Orosa acquired Transfer Certificates of Title from Eusebio and Lara for P10. 1 and Lot no. GODOFREDO R. filed a Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings with Additional Parties. on June 3.Judge. Eusebio and Lara failed to file an answer and was declared in default. RAMON OROSA. GIL VENEZUELA. Five years later. Branch II had not acquired jurisdiction over their persons and their decision was procured through fraud.000. The Director of Lands. THE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL. 7th District. Rizal. Their application was approved and the patents were registered in the Register of Deeds. RODOLFO CENIDOZA. 2 respectively situated in Napindan. Branch IV. both claimed to have long surrendered the same to Atty. Javier of the Investigation Section of the Bureau of Lands. It was later discovered by the Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands that the lands were under water and form part of the Laguna de Bay – no signs of cultivation or of any improvement thereon. The plaintiffs filed a case for the cancellation of the patents in the CFI Rizal. 7th District. the defendants were declared in default. Eusebio and Lara (plaintiff here) filed for the annulment of the decision on the same cases alleging that the CFI Rizal. Venezuela. CFI Rizal. 1960. When advised to surrender their owner’s duplicate copy of Original Certificates. URBANO C. This rule applies even after the issuance of the certificate of title. The petition was then denied after a motion for reconsideration filed by the intervenors. the free patents and certificates of title issued to Eusebio and Lara cover areas which form parts of Laguna de Bay. Venezuela and Cenidoza would be considered as buyers in good faith. 27(Ed) 28(LJ) . Any false statement in an application for public land shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the title granted.transferred their rights to Orosa. the mere possession of land does not itself divest the land of its public character. A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud. Likewise. These are neither agricultural nor disposable. Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of its ownership of the land nor operate to change the public character of the land to private. Subject patents and titles were erroneously issued due to misrepresentations and false reports and must therefore be cancelled. Spouses Orosa had executed a deed of mortgage in favor of Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank. HELD: It is well settled that any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser of value. In the case at bar. shall be cancelled. and the doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud. ISSUE: Whether Orosa. In Land Registration Case No. Thus. Record on Appeal).29(Zax) 30(Clathem) Republic vs Sps. The CA reversed CFI’s decision.R. 181502. 135 SCRA 156 Facts: This case is about the validity of the registration of 885 hectares of public forestal land located in Mulanay. less 200 hectares which should be registered in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo Consolacion (72. it was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain. SC already ruled in Director of Lands v. 1961 rendered a decision. Quezon. Thus. 237. 2010DIAZ vs. Mulanay. The decision became final and executory.Issue: Whether or not the Inclusion of a forest land in a title nullifies the title. Quezon. Its inclusion in the public forest certified by Director of Forestry shall annul the title of Maxino spouses. A decree and an original certificate of title were issued. 81-G of the Court of First Instance at Gumaca. It is incontestable that Lot 1. Judge Vicente del Rosario on March 21.The CFI ruled in favor of Garcia. represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked. 31(Lea) G. The CA found that Reyes case was applicable to petitioner’s . in the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales. publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years.The Republic of the Philippines. opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR). Nueva Ecija and Palayan City. Significantly. Flora Garcia (Garcia) .Held: Yes. Lot 1. allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang). REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Petitioner’s late mother. Maximo. developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously. No. ordering the registration of said land. the 885hectare area registered by the Maxinos is within the public forest. Reyes that the property subject of Garcia’s application was inalienable as it formed part of military reservation. filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land located in Laur. February 2. not alienable and disposable nor susceptible of private appropriation. established by virtue of Proclamation No. Therefore. timber and mineral lands) coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest. she was not able to produce such evidence. any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act. 141. there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration. Section 49 [b] of CA No. Garcia passed away and was substituted by her heirs.The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4. whether such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration. CA annulled the compromise agreement.Unfortunately for petitioner. ISSUE: Whether petitioner can acquire the subject land that is part of military reservation. even if possession was for more than 30 years.case because it involved the same property. Restituto S. it could never ripen to ownership. acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. nullifies the title. her occupation thereof. . For her part. Forest lands or area covered with forest are excluded. RULING:By way of a background.However.689 hectares supposedly outside the FMMR. They filed a motion for approval of the amicable settlement in the CA and CA approved. Accordingly. could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. applies exclusively to public agricultural land. it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable.During the pendency of the case in the CA. the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration and informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land. and that of her predecessors-in-interest. petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of the property inside the military reservation. SC recognized in Reyes that the property where the military reservation is situated in forest lands are not registrable under CA 141. Lazaro. and its inclusion in a title.However. one of whom was petitioner Florencia Diaz. as amended.But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a military reservation. : FACTS: A land consistingof 178. extendingtheir rootsdeep into the mud and casting their seeds.Insular Government (1909). J. which also germinatethere. ISSUE:Whether or not mangrove swamps are comprised within the publicforests oragricultural lands. including the petitioner onbehalf ofthe Republic of the Philippine on the ground that mangrove swampswhich formpart of the public forests are cannot be disposed. However. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration alleging that heand hispredecessors-ininterest had been in possession of the land for morethan 40years.Capiz.DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. 1989 CRUZ.R. L-32266 February 27.No. He was opposed by several persons. Thus.113square meters of mangrove swamps is located in the municipality ofSapian. In the case ofMontano v. the Philippine Legislature subsequentlycategoricallydeclared that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests ofthis countrywhich are inalienable.mangrove swamps were considered agricultural lands and so susceptibleof privateownership.alternately washed and exposed by the tide. in which grows variouskindredplants which will not live except when watered by the sea. HELD: .PartIII 1. mangrove swamps or manglares are mudflats.VILLAREAL G. Santiago M. cut trees for the firewood purposes and also had a salt factory. leased the land to Leopoldo L. 4 is cadastral Lot No. and in effect vetoit. Bermejo and one of the parcels known as parcel No. may still be considered as part of the timber .Facts:The testimonial evidence shows that as early as the year 1905 the parcel of land which later became Lot 855 of the cadastral survey of Pilar. 1977Fernando. Somes with the approval of the Court of First Instance of Capiz. Upon the death of Santiago M. On January 4.Mangrove swampsor manglares shouldbe understood as comprised within thepublic forests of the Philippines asdefined in the aforecited Section 1820 ofthe Administrative Code of 1917. Bermejo. Macario Bermejo. thecourts have no authority to ignore ormodify its decision. in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the late Santiago M. 2. 855. Director of ForestryG. L-34463 September 27. due to lack of funds. Tongson vs. asserted to have originally been mangrove swamps. When Macario Bermejo took possession of the land in 1953 he converted it into a fishpond and started to construct fishpond dikes. Assuch.in-interest and the oppositor Bermejo as far back as 1905. At present Leopoldo L. On May 1. Bermejo in 1951.R. Somes is in actual possession of Lot 855 by virtue of said lease contract. up to the year 1910. was under the exclusive possession of Francisco Boria who cut trees therefrom and converted them into firewood. his children took possession of this parcel of land and when Macario Bermejo was appointed judicial administrator by the Court of First Instance of Capiz. 1917 Antero Borja sold the land to Deogracias Gayacao. He also established a salt factory and that he sold the firewood and the salt without having been disturbed by anybody. After the death of Francisco. the Supreme Courtruled that Villareal was not able to establish hisright to the registration ofthe subject land in his name because mangroveswamps are inalienable. 1956. in the possession of the predecessors. However. in the exercise of the courts’discretion. Issue: whether or not a parcel of land. Thelegislature having so determined. Deogracias Gayacao sold five parcels of land to Santiago M. On May 30. Boria. During his lifetime. No. At present Lot 855 is a completed and producing fishpond. the construction of the fishpond was not completed. his son Arturo Borja took possession of the land. Bermejo possessed said parcel of land. J. thereafter converted into a fishpond. 1940. domain which is not disposable.Held:No. The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that in the land covered by the application there are mangrove lands, but the court thinks this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, in as much as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forests lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress. It could be said, therefore, that even on the assumptions that the parcel of land in question could be characterized as mangrove swamps, the conclusion reached by the lower court is not without support in the applicable authorities. "Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber, do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain." 3(Gina) REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO G.R. No.L-69002 June 30, 1988 Facts: Sometimein 1951, the late Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcelsof land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas, described inPlan Psu-119166, with a total area of 39,755 square meters. In a decision datedAugust 31, 1951, the said Modesto Castillo, married to Amanda Lat, was declaredthe true and absolute owner of the land with the improvements thereon, for whichOriginal Certificate of Title No. 0-665 was, issued to him by the Register ofDeeds at Batangas, Batangas, on February 7, 1952. TheRepublic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower court forthe annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendasors of ModestoCastillo, and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby (Lots 1 and 2,Psu-119166) to the State. It was alleged that said lands had always formed partof the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof, and being ofpublic ownership, it could not be the subject of registration as privateproperty. On theother hand, private respondents maintain that Lots 1 and 2 have always been inthe possession of the Castillo family for more than 76 years and that their possessionwas public, peaceful, continuous, and adverse against the whole world and thatsaid lots were not titled during the cadastral survey of Tanauan, because theywere still under water as a result of the eruption of Taal Volcano on May 5,1911 and that the inundation of the land in question by the waters of Taal Lakewas merely accidental and does not affect private respondents' ownership andpossession thereof pursuant to Article 778 of the Law of Waters. They finallyinsisted that this issue of facts had been squarely raised at the hearing ofthe land registration case and, therefore, res judicata. Otherwisestated, it has been satisfactorily established as found by the trial court,that the properties in question were the shorelands of Taal Lake during thecadastral survey of 1923. The trial court decided the case in favor of thegovernment but the decision was reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whetheror not the lakeshore lands are part of the public domain. Held: Yes Lakeshoreland or lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question must bedifferentiated from foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the seawhich is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides. Suchdistinction draws importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of alake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they havebeen added while accretion on a sea bankstill belongs to the public domain, and is not available for private ownershipuntil formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use. But saiddistinction will not help private respondents because there is no accretionshown to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that theoccupants of the lots who were engaged in duck raising filled up the area withshells and sand to make it habitable. Thedefense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, asalready ruled by this Court, mere possession of land does not by itselfautomatically divest the land of its public character. 4(Zhon) Republic vs. Alagad, et al. 169 SCRA 455, G.R. No. L-66807, January 26, 1989 Facts: On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, which was amended after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares. The Republic opposed the application on the ground that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. Defendants were declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining portion, or Lot 2, was declared public land. Decree No. N-51479 was entered and Original Certificate of Title No. 0- 40 1, dated October 18, 1956, was issued in the names of defendants. In August, 1966, Civil Case No. 52 of the Municipal Court of Pila, Laguna, was filed by defendants to evict the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. On August 8, 1968, judgment was rendered in the eviction case ordering the defendants therein to return possession of the premises to herein defendants, as plaintiffs therein. The defendants therein did not appeal. Republic filed a petition for annulment of title and reversion, claiming that the subject land is a foreshore land, belongs to the public domain, and concomitantly, cannot be appropriated by respondents. On October 6, 1970, as prayed for in the complaint, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna or his deputies from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 52, and the defendants from selling, mortgaging, disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the area. This case was set for pre-trial on July 6, 1971. Despite notice of the pretrial, Atty. Alejandro A. Ponferada, Special Attorney, Bureau of Lands, representing plaintiff Republic, did not appear. On July 16, 1971, the trial court dismissed the complaint. In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that under the Rules of Court, dismissal was proper upon failure of the Republic to appear for pre-trial. It likewise ruled that the judgment, dated January 16, 1956, in the said LRC No. 189 has long become final. Issue: 1. w/n the Gov’t be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of its official or agents2. w/n the subject land is a foreshore land [define foreshore land]Held:1. It is well-established that the State cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of its official or agents, 7 much more, non-suited as a result thereof. 2. A foreshore land is a strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. If the submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite its proximity to the waters.Since this issue is a question of fact, SC remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether or not the property subject of controversy is foreshore. Held: 1. It is well-established that the State cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of its official or agents, 7 much more, non-suited as a result thereof. 2. A foreshore land is a strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. If the submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite its proximity to the waters. Since this issue is a question of fact, SC remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether or not the property subject of controversy is foreshore. 5(May Ann) 6(Rhea B.) DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT VS CA205 SCRA 486Facts:Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.Issue:Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.Ruling:YES. Petition was There is no alternative. 1951 Modesto. de Castillo. et al. washed and inundated by the waters thereof. Castillo. being outside the commerce of men. G. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons. 7(Angel) 8. Lots 1 and 2. 1988 Republic vs.The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. including the state. located in Tanauan. No.granted.. as heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Vda. Being in rem. Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of land. 163 SCRA 286 Facts: In 1951. After Modesto’s death. the process must strictly be complied with. who have rights to or interests in the property. Consequently. de Castillo. Petitioner contends that Lots 1 and 2 had always formed part of the Taal Lake. for which Original Certificate of Title was issued to him by the Register of Deeds. L-69002 June 30. married to Amanda Lat. thereis room only for application. and that since the lots in litigation are of public domain. vacillation or equivocation. Batangas. was declared the true and absolute owner of the land. . et al. the same were not subject to registration. Amanda Lat Vda. the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future. executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio L. after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with. Time and again. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear.The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State. 1529 requires publication of the notice of initial hearing. the registration court (of 1951) did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands as private property. Thus. this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language.R. This being so. On August 31. The Republic of the Philippines filed a case in the lower court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendantx. there is no room for interpretation. private respondents maintain that Lots 1 and 2 have always been in the possession of the Castillo family for more than 76 years and that their possession was public. like the lands in question must be differentiated from foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides. After trial the Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. 1911 and that the inundation of the land in question by the waters of Taal Lake was merely accidental and does not affect private respondents' ownership and possession thereof pursuant to Article 778 of the Law of Waters. Issue: Are the properties in dispute capable of being registered? Held: No. like Laguna de Bay. Their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant. and adverse against the whole world and that said lots were not titled during the cadastral survey of Tanauan. because they were still under water as a result of the eruption of Taal Volcano on May 5. peaceful. Such distinction draws importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a lake.On the other hand. continuous. therefore. not registrable. Thus. The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint. Shores are properties of the public domain intended for public and. It has been satisfactorily established as found by the trial court. Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake. it has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added while accretion on a sea bank still . that the properties in question were the shore lands of Taal Lake during the cadastral survey of 1923. mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character. Meanwhile. and is not available for private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use.belongs to the public domain. The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because. Submitted his report stating that there was bo overlapping ofthe lot of Cantoja and the Foreshore area. To prove. Director Momongan dismissed theprotest. 9 Cantoja vs Lim Facts: Late Roberto Cantoja Sr. On Feb 1996. as well as Lim’s TCT. GenSan City.filed with the office of the DENR. GenSan. Lim protest questioning thesaid FLA to Cantoja based on his allegation that Cantoja committed fraud andmisrepresentation in declaring in his application that the subject foreshorearea adjoined hi (cantojas) property. in compliance with the Oct 1995 Order of the City and NaturalResources Office. On May 2. Cantojafiled again a motion for Recon. Regional ExecutiveDirector Momongan of DENR Davao assigned the case to Investigator Marohomsalicfor further investigation which found that Cantoja was in acyual possession ofthe foreshore area which utilized as dock-board of the Cantojas FishingBusiness. 2000. Cantoja was arawded theFLA (Foreshore Lease Agreement) on Novemver 1990.DENR Sec. an application for a ForshoreLease Contract over an area situated in Makar. Geodetic Engineer Soria. . inalienable. as already ruled by this Court. The suit was anchored on the findingsand recommendations of Maromhomsalic that the area in question is partly foreshoreand partly river bed of the Makar GenSan and therefore. he presented his TransferCertificate Title which adjoins the foreshore area subject of the lease. Cerilles cancelled the FLA previously granted to Cantoja. on Oct1997 DENR instituted Civil case for annulment of Patent coth issued in the Nameof Jacinto Acharon. CONCEPCION D. On appeal. Coronel.Coronel.Cerilles set aside its 2 May 2000 in favour of Cantoja. Ruling: No.R. Sec. Gonzales. the Officeof the president rendered herein assailed decision affirming the 17 Oct 2000Order of the DENR Sec. Cantoja committed fraud when he misrepresented himself asthe riparian of littoral owner in his application for the foreshore lease. Issue: Whether the CA erred in cancelling the Foreshore Lease Contractgranted ro Cantoja covering the foreshore area. Coronel) executed a document entitled receipt of .: FACTS: On January 19. Tupper. any fraud or misrepresentation committedby the applicant is a ground for cancellation or rescission of the FLA.Sec. 10(Lou) BALAIS-MABANAGv. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON City. Annabelle C. Withoutwaiting. 1985.for the result of the investigation of said team. Floraida C. Lim appealed to CAwhich reinstated the May 2 2000 decision of the DENR Sec. Coronel. J. and RAMONAPATRICIA ALCARAZ G. Annette A. It is undisputed thatCantoja is the not the Registered owner of the land adjacent to the foreshorearea leased to them. ALCARAZ. however. which cancelled andrescinded the FLC covering the foreshore area. 15 of the FLA.Under stipulation no. andCielito A. Alarico A. Coronels (Romulo A. 153142 (29 March 2010) BERSAMIN. Cerilles issued special order for thecreation of a team to conduct investigatiob and ocular inspection.No. 103577). Quezon City.240.down payment.the petitioner and the Coronels appealed the CA judgment to this Court (G. the petitioner and the Coronels). 351582 was issued in the name of the petitioner. the Coronelsrescinded their contract with Ramona by depositing her downpaymentof P50. 1985. TCT No.580. Branch 83. and ordered on April 8. Alcaraz(Concepcion). 119627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. which promulgated ajudgment on December 16.000. which affirmed the CA on October 7.000. fully upholding the decision of the RTC. . 1991. 1996. the RTC approved the respondents’ motion for appointment of suitableperson to execute deed. etc. through Ramona’s mother.00 for their "inherited house and lot. covered byTCT No. Uponfailure of the petitioner and the Coronels to comply with the writ ofexecution. OnMarch 1." OnFebruary 18.00 after the latterdelivered an initial sum of P300. 327043 tothe petitioner for the higher price of P1. For this reason.00 as downpayment on the total purchaseprice of P1. On June5. the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No. the sum of P50.000. theCoronels and the petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA. to execute the deed of absolute sale in favorof Ramona in lieu of the defendants (i.e.. respondent Concepcion D.00 in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. thedecision of the RTC became final and executory.000. Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration. 1998 the Branch Clerk ofthe RTC.R. 1989. 1985.00. Thereafter..No. TheCoronels executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioner. Thus.stipulating that they received from respondent Ramona Patricia Alcaraz(Ramona). the RTC rendered its decision ordering defendant to execute infavor of plaintiffs(Concepcion and Ramona) a deed of absolute sale and nopronouncement as to costs.000. Thepetitioner and the Coronels filed in the CA a petition for certiorari assailingthe RTC’s orders of October 1, 1997 and March 10, 1998, but the CA dismissedthe petition on July 30, 1998. OnSeptember 2, 1998, the RTC held in abeyance the respondents’ motion reiteratingprevious motion to resolve respondents’ motion, whereby the respondents soughtan order to direct the petitioner to surrender her TCT No. 331582, and theRegistrar of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the petitioner’s copy of said TCTfor her failure to comply with the earlier order for her to surrender the TCTto the Registrar of Deeds pending resolution by the CA of the petitioner’s motionfor reconsideration. Ultimately,on September 30, 1998, the CA denied the petitioner’s motion forreconsideration. ISSUE:W/N the petitioner lacked the personality to file the suit. HELD:YES. TheCourt stated that under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg.185, the Solicitor General or his representative shall institute escheatproceedings against its violators. Although the law does not categoricallystate that only the Government, through the Solicitor General, may attack thetitle of an alien transferee of land, it is nonetheless correct to hold thatonly the Government, through the Solicitor General, has the personality to filea case challenging the capacity of a person to acquire or to own land based onnon-citizenship. This limitation is based on the fact that the violation iscommitted against the State, not against any individual; and that in the eventthat the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affectedproperty reverts to the State, not to the previous owner or any otherindividual. Herein,even assuming that Ramona was legally disqualified from owning the subjectproperty, the decision that voids or annuls their right of ownership over thesubject land will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner. Instead, thesubject property will be escheated in favor of the State in accordance withBatas Pambansa Blg. 185. WHEREFORE,the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the decision datedDecember 5, 2000 promulgated in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 55576 is affirmed. Coststo be paid by the petitioner. SOORDERED. Significance:Only the Government through the Solicitor General, has the personality tofile a case challenging the capacity of a person to acquire or to own landbased on non-citizenship. 11(Jess) 12(Diane) OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY v. MARIO D.EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010 FACTS: Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a parcel of land in Parañaque City covered by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He also paid taxes for the land. Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the land. On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a resolution seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents immediately opposed and the project was suspended. On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for further dialogue. ISSUE: Whether or not the State may build on the land in question. HELD: No. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State. Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law. NOTES: ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. 13(April) 14(Daniel Eblahan) Directorof Lands v. Rivas GRno. L-61539, February 14, 1986 Aquino,C.J.: Facts: On March 14, 1873, the Alcalde Mayorand the Court of First Instance of Tuguegarao granted Domingo Bunagan apossessory information title called “informacion posesoria”, for a tract ofland “destined for grazing their cattle”. On November 3, 1885, he also obtaineda gratuitous adjustment title called “composicion gratuita” for the parcel ofland in Nottab, Enrile, Cagayan. After Bunagan’s death, the land was sold todifferent people. In another case the court ruled that the whole land was soldto Cagayan Valley Agricultural Corporation. In this case, a remainder of theland was transferred to respondent Rivas by his brother and the land waseventually sold to the other respondents. The trial court declared the landpublic land and dismissed both their claims. The appellate court reversed theruling of the lower court and granted the respondents’ application. TheDirector of Lands appealed, contending that the land is part of a forestreservation. Issue: Whether or not the land in dispute isinalienable land Held: Yes. The Court ruled to dismiss theapplications of the respondents because the land is inalienable public grazingland, part of a forest reserve under Presidential Proclamation 129 and cannotbe registered. Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under the 1935and 1973 Constitutions and cannot be the subject of private ownership. In this case, the land in questionwas issued to the original claimant in 1873 was described in the “informacionpossessoria” as “una estancia de ganado al terreno” or grazing land. RespondentRivas leased it in 1962 as “pasture land”. In the 1960 and 1968 taxdeclarations of respondent Rivas described the land as for “pastureexclusively.” In the sale to respondent Pascua’s father describing the land as“a parcel of pasture land.” The land has always been described and treated aspasture or grazing land. 1987 FACTS: On December 8. Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol 155 SCRA 412 November 5. it is claimed . The CFI of Bataan ruled on the case. be held accountable for the lapse of their predecessor to file a cadastral claim to the property. granted. reserved. leased. petitioner vs Intermediate Appellate Court. a petition was filed by Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol with the then Court of First Instance of Bataan with alleging ownership of a parcel of land which they have purchased from its original owners and thereafter. or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government. they have actual possession of the said land tacked on to their predecessors-in-interest for a period exceeding 30 years. The private defendant may tack their period of possession with that of their vendors totaling to more than thirty (30) years. reopening cadastral proceedings is allowable only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated. When the Solicitor General appealed it to the Intermediate Court pointing out Section 1 of Republic Act 391. the CFI of Bataan ruled that the private respondent’s possession of the land was in good faith and that the private respondent should not as a consequence. 1968. as amended by Republic Act 2061. Applying said provision to the lot in question. wherein the Solicitor General reiterated that.15(Melodia) ________________________________________________________________________ _______ 16(Mel) Republic of the Philippines. favoring the private respondent citing that “after the sale had zealously cultivated the property and religiously paid the taxes thereon for a good numbers of years”. No. In support of the contention of the Solicitor General. not disposable under any circumstances. stating that under the Proposed Land Classification Project No. The Intermediate Appellate Court rendered its decision affirming the decision of the CFI and disagreed with the contention of the Solicitor General. __________________________________________________________________ 17(Rocky) 18(Maribeth) .A.A.that the registration is not possible as said land is actually already forest land and/or part of military reservation. 4-C of Mariveles Bulacan. 141) and R. hence. 1275. HELD: No. the contested lot has already been delineated and classified by Bureau of Forestry as alienable and disposable public land and was approved by the Director of Lands as disposable in character. ISSUE: Whether or not a mere proposal to classify a Military Reservation as alienable and disposable public land is allowed. it also cited the report of Forest Guard Cresencio Abuzman to the District Forester which states that “the area involved is a portion of former Military Reservation turned over to the Philippine Government. the Supreme did not sustained the ruling of the Intermediate Appellate Court that the land in dispute is no longer a part of Military reservation on the basis of a mere proposal to classify it as a alienable and disposable public land that is needed according to the Supreme Court is a formal act declaring forest land reservation for the purpose of classifying it as a alienable and disposable public land need the approval of the President of the Philippines as required by Public Land Act (C. whichwas asubstantial compliance with . Where a party proceedswith the case as though hisadversary's pleading were verified. Milagros. and sufficient to give them legal standingincourt and would entitle them to notice. 1958 applicants finished adducing evidenceand rested their case.After parties hadfiled memoranda.The court heldthat the written appearance with opposition presentedbypetitioners was a valid one. The Director of Landsand Bureauof Public Highways filed written oppositions. DirectorofLands. The lowercourterred in choosing to ignore the written appearance with opposition. the court issued an order dismissing theunverified opposition. OnAugust 20. Masbate. as a matter of right.Afternotice and publication. 1958 the private oppositors presented their firstwitness. The privateoppositors appealed from bothorders alleging among others that lack of. he waives thelack of verification of suchpleading. Thus.Motion for reconsideration was denied. 1956. Miller and Espinosa applied for registration in theCFI ofMasbate covering a parcel of land located in Tigbao. 12 SCRA 292 FACTS: OnJune 18. ordefect in the verification of apleading may be waived by the adverse party'sfailure to make a proper andtimely objection thereto. private oppositors weregiven 5 days to filewritten opposition for which 28 filed written butunverified opposition.Miller vs. Applicants’presentation of evidence ensued.the private oppositors offered to verify their opposition. After hiscross-examination. OnAugust 27. counsel for applicants called the Court'sattention to thelack of verification in the opposition filed by the privateoppositors and movedto dismiss the same. initial hearing was held. ISSUE: Whetheror not the belatedobjection to the unverified opposition to the applicationshall be considered awaiver to such defect? HELD: Yes. while 35 individualsappeared andexpressed verbal oppositions. 1921. In lieu of that sale.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at P100. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus. in any event. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221. 73 SCRA 146 FACTS: On January 22. Theprivate oppositors should be allowed. while a certain Dr. 1934. CA. accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land.50 per hectare The Director of Lands. VS. that requires a formal answer. On January 23. 19(Ailyn) 20(Jen) REP.Theorders appealed from are set aside and the case is remanded to the court aquo for furtherproceedings. Eugenio de Jesus.the law. asthey had requested. another bidding was held on October 4. Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). the Bureau of Lands. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. through its Davao District Land Officer.00 per hectare. The property applied for was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.50 per hectare. failed to participate in the bidding for nonservice of notice on him of the scheduled bidding. however. applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. thesupposed defect is deemed waived. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron. . annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant. Eugenio de Jesus. 1934. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100. to verify theiropposition because. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. Eugenio de Jesus paid P660. In the following October 9. On September 7.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of Davao. under the administration of the Chief of Staff. the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award.6400 hectares. President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. 1176-B-2) as the same had already been excluded from the Sales Application at the time the payment was made. President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. the remaining area after his Sales Application was amended. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. the said application is amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back thereof. 1936.8081 hectares. 1936. and as thus amended. on December 6. On August 11. consisting of 12. 1969. This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No. it will continue to be given due course. 1956. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes. On November 29. On August 28.On November 23. The Medical Center claimed . President Manuel L." The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes. Whereupon.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for 20. 1934. the very land in question. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital. petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of the 12. 85 and declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach. Davao City. Philippine Army. 1939. 85 withdrawing Lot No. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over a full 12. Hence. this case. 1966 the CFI of Davao awarded the lot to Mindanao Medical Center. petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration. 350 reserving the area for medical center site purposes. had aquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the Director of Lands.8081-hectare land by virtue of an . On September 2. CA modified the judgment denying the claim of Arsenio Suazo and affirmed the appeal of Alejandre Y. Bureau of Medical Services. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus. On July 5. Department of Health. but the Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied the motion on June 17. de Jesus."fee simple" title to the land on the strength of proclamation No. the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus. opposed the registration oil the ground that his father. maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12. 1974. Eugenio de Jesus. Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals.8081 hectares. The two oppositors. A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him. 19750. 1956. Thus. granted. 1176-B-2. the Medical Center has registerable title on the portion occupied by it. vsHON. respondents. when the proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12. Department of Health. DAISY PACNOS. on the basis of Proclamation No. its nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances. are granted"the right . of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center. orare about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicialproceedings" instituted within the forty-year period next preceding June20.8081 hectares. its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances. have been. PETER PARAN and MARTINAPIRASO. SPOUSES ALBINO REYES and ISABEL SANTAMARIA. validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act." 9 It would be completely absurd to rule that. and ARTUROTONGSON. "in case suchparcels of land on account of their failure to file such claims. REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINES. HELD: Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area of 12.petitioners. the time of the approval of this particular enactment. of the whole lot. and not only on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center.8081 hectares to the Center. KOSEN PIRASO. 350. 350. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY.executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical center site purposes. FACTS: It is by statute provided thatall persons "claiming title to parcels of land that have been the objectof cadastral proceedings" in actual possession of the same at the time ofthe survey but unable for some justifiable reason to file their claim in theproper court during the time. MARCOS. Act 496] and shall become registered lands. the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act. SAMAY PIRASO. 1953. Section 122 of the Act. Proclamation No. JUDGE. limit established by law. which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands. Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. PIO R. and not on the full extent of the reservation. dated October 9. Bureau of Medical Services. COTILENG PIRASO. Court of First Instance of BaguioCity. provides that "Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the Philippines are alienated. designated Lot No. or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations. . 1910.' "The conclusion is therefore inescapable that. respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction to pass uponthe claim of private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No.. William H. petitioners being the Republic of thePhilippines and the Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy. within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries ofthe areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservationsshall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act. reserved. 931 speaks in a manner far from ambiguous. granted. is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. Marcos to act in accordancewith Republic Act No..within five years" from said date to petition for areopening of the judicial proceedings but "only with respect to such ofsaid parcels of land as have not been alienated. 1922. 627 of the Philippine Commissionand Section 1 of that Act provides that 'All lands or buildings. The establishment ofmilitary reservations is governed by Act No. allsurnamed Piraso.included in which are the other respondents. likewise respondents. that if the parcels ofland were not the object of cadastral proceedings. Considering that as far back as October 10.. It is quiteexplicit and categorical. as contended bypetitioners. a 1926 decision.. Court ofFirst Instance of Pampanga. orotherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government. respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction to pass upon the claimof private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. the thenPresident of the United States. therefore.What is even more conclusive asto the absence of any right on the part of the private respondents to seek areopening under Republic Act No. Daisy Pacnos and the spousesAlbino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria. . they could not have beenthe object of the cadastral proceeding involving the Baguio townsitereservation. decided only on November 13. has jurisdiction to order the registration of portions of a legallyestablished military reservation cannot be sustained. We there explicitly held:"The defendant's contention that the respondent court. HELD:Republic Act No.. or anyinterest therein."The jurisdiction of respondent Judge Pio R. ISSUE:Whether or not .. joined by his kinsmen. leased. issued an executive orderreserving for naval purposes the lots now disputed. 931 is our ruling in Government v. 931. in a cadastralcase. 931. then this statute finds noapplication. Taft. . 931 in connection with the petition for a reopening filedby respondent Kosen Piraso. Only persons "claiming title to parcels of landthat have been the object of cadastral proceedings" are granted the rightto petition for a reopening thereof if the other conditions named therein aresuccessfully met. It cannot admit of doubt. HELD:No. then section 48(b) and (c) of thePublic LandLaw should be applied because they and their predecessors have beeninpossession of the lots for more than thirty years. The period of more than fifty yearscompletelybars the applicants from securing relief due to the alleged lack ofpersonalnotice to their predecessors. Alternatively. Jr. PabloRamos. SamuelBaliwan. Josephine Abanag. Lagya Paris. 496 on anypurchase orgrant from the State nor on possession since time immemorial.. 496 cannot apply to them. EmilianoBautista and OdiDianson filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguioapplications for theregistration of lots (with considerable areas) inside theBaguio TownsiteReservation. Victor. Menita T. they allege that in case the lotsare notregisterable under Act No. Thatis why ActNo. Theapplicants do not base their applications under Act No.22(Nelson) hindi ko makita ung case ni marcos 23(JM) REPUBLICVS. The law helps the vigilant but not thosewhosleep on their rights. JUDGE SINFOROSOFAÑGONIL 133SCRA 517 FACTS:After more than half a century fromthe 1922 decision declaring BaguioTownsiteReservation as public domain. “For time is a means of destroying obligations and actions.becausetime runs against the slothful and contemners of their own rights. The Director of lands ontheother hand contented that thedisposition of the said lots should be made by theDirector of Lands underChapter 11 of the Public Land Law regarding TownsiteReservations.” . 496. Modesta Paris. ISSUE:Whetheror not the applicants may file for the registration of lands covered bytheBaguio Townsite Registration. INOCENCIO. FACTS: December 3. Petitioner. and likewise posted in a conspicuous place on the subject lots and bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig. . filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan. REI presented witness testimonies that they and its predecessors-in interest have been in open. exclusive and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12. Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette. thus an order of general default was issued. 1945. Inc. MM. 2014 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. 21.R. 2002 – reset to May 30. People’s Balita. 199310 February 19. No. Remman Enterprises. The original possessor of the land.24(Maris) 25(Reg) 26 G. REMMAN ENTERPRISES. 2001. vs. 10 days later. through her caretakers and hired farmers.. Only Laguna Lake Development Authority appeared as oppositor. Respondent. Veronica Jaime. represented by RONNIE P. continuous. Taguig. INC. the RTC issued the Order finding REI’s application for registration sufficient in form and substance and set it for initial hearing on Feb. cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said lots. Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate. tax declarations for 2002. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12.The following documents were presented by REI: Deed of Absollute Sale dated August 28. whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open. 1989. RTC ruled on May 16. or the Public Land Act as amended. 141. Section 14(1) of PD 1529 provides that: Sec. Under Section 14(1). 14. which granted the application for registration filed by the respondent. 1945. Section 14 of PD 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act no. or earlier. Second. continuous. that the applicant and his predecessors-in interest have been in open. applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: First. Who may apply. survey plans of subject properties. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated May 16. 2007 granting REI’s application for registration of title. The following persons may file in the proper CFI an application for registration of title to land. certification issued by Corazon Calamno. 2007. This was affirmed by the CA. technical description of subject properties. and . Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR attesting the lots form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain. exclusive and notorious (OCEN) possession and occupation of the same. continuous. HELD: Petition is meritorious. 27(Ed) 28(LJ) 29(Zax) 30(Clathem) Del Rosario-Igbiten V.N. It consists of manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.Third. Inc. issued by Calamno attesting that the subject lots form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. or earlier. They must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records. 158449. PENRO or CENRO certifications are not enough. applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. bearing no info on the land’s classification. GR No. 1945. that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. For the second requirement. Mere casual cultivation of portions of the land does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. Roche only presented the survey map and technical description of the land. T. This is insufficient. The Court clarified in Republic v. petitioners filed with the trial court an application . Properties. proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of OCEN possession and occupation of the subject land.A. that in addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable. Republic. 22 October 2004Facts: On 08 January 1998. the respondent presented two certifications. there already exists a title which the court only needs to confirm. uninterrupted. 1976. both take the nature of judicial proceedings. In the same year. 1529. the Tonido family sold the Subject Property to petitioners. and adverse possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner for more than 30 years. of rights adverse to the record title. It bears noting that. applicant acquired the land applied for registration by purchase from Ricardo Natividad .R. a Torrens title.Issue: whether or not the the decision approving petitioners application for registration of the subject property is valid. public. On the other hand. which aims at complete extinguishment. under the Public Land Act. and notorious possession thereof. there exists a presumption that the land applied for still pertains to the State. the Subject Property was transferred to spouses Alfredo Tonido and Agatona Calanog. by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. No. as required by both the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. On August 17. petitioners have failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation of the Subject Property. namely. proceedings under the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act are the same in that both are against the whole world. 1987DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. On 21 November 1995. and that the occupants and possessors can only claim an interest in the land by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous. They differ mainly in that under the Property Registration Decree. and the decree of registration issued for both is conclusive and final. 31(Lea) G. Nonetheless. as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. open. Cavite. Metro Manila on December 4. in the end. 1979. The application covered a parcel of land in Silang. Petitioners alleged that they acquired the Subject Property by purchase. Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject Property in 1968. On 15 August 2000. the two laws arrive at the same goal. open. MERALCO FACTS:Manila Electric Company filed an amended application for registration of a parcel of land located in Taguig. L-57461 September 11. and that they. continuous. had been in actual. otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. once and for all.Held: No. the trial court rendered a decision approving petitioners application for registration of the Subject Property.for registration of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. Art. 1970 Applicant's predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property under the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. RULING: Yes.In the Acme decision (The Director of Lands v.In the case at bar. contends that a corporation is not among those that may apply for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.ISSUE: Whether a corporation may apply for registration of title to land.R.On May 29.As ruled in the Acme case.No. if the land was already private at the time Meralco bought it from Natividad.Petitioner. 141. 11) does not apply. then the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease (1973 Const.. this Court upheld the doctrine that open.L-24066 December 9. exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land." Considering that it is not disputed that the Natividads could have had their title confirmed. ceases to be public land and becomes private property. Inc. "productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings. only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny private respondent the right to register its property which was validly acquired. See. however.. The property was declared for taxation purposes under the name of the applicant and the taxes due thereon have been paid. the Public Land Act. 146 SCRA 509). 1986).. No. 1981 respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the registration of the property in the name of the private respondent. the fact that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental circumstance. etc. XIV. PartIV 1.. The Director of Lands interposed this petition. RAZON G. L-73002 (December 29.who in turn acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad as evidenced by a Deed of Original Absolute Sale executed on December 28. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction.SUSIv. 1925 . continuous. theDirector of Lands sold the land toAngela Razon. thatis.publicly. and through his predecessors.J. since the year1880. byoperation oflaw.Angela Razondid not thereby acquire any right.However. After havingbeen in possession thereof for about eight years. Angela Razoncommenced an action in the Court ofFirst Instance of Pampanga to obtain thesaid land but the court dismissed thecomplaint. Having failed in her attemptto obtain possession of the land inquestion through the court. or disturbance. then a fish pond. After making theproper administrative investigation. except duringthe revolution.1880. Pinlacsold the land in question. adverse andpublic.Garcia and Mendoza sold theland to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12.Consequently.adversely. Thepossession and occupation of theland in question by different owners has beenopen. It clearly appears from the evidence thatValentinSusi has been in possession of the land in question openly. on September 13. Angela Razonapplied to the Director of Lands forthe purchase thereof. ISSUE:Whether or not Angela Razon mayapply for the registration of said land in herfavor. to Garciaand Mendoza.the act of the Director of Deeds in selling the land over whichhe had no anytitle or control to Angela Razon was void and of no effect. By virtue of said grant.VILLA-REAL. 2(Charleen) . HELD: No because she Susi isthelawful owner of the land. not only a right to a grant. continuously. Angela Razon is not allowed to applyfor thegrant in her favor since Valentin Susi had already acquired. Thus. for about forty-five years. 1913. without any interruption.: FACTS: OnDecember 18. personally. Razonapplied for the proper certificateof title and the register of deeds ofPampanga issued thereafter issued it. but a grant of the Government. then .3(Gina) Priolovs Priolo. please tell me so I can digest it for theclass. then Director of Lands Jose P. 5436 of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes.6400 hectares. applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. the area was reduced to 20. The area excluded was identified as Lot 1176-B-2. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus. the very land in question. 1976 Facts: On January 22. Gaz. On August 28. 1934. the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 48. after the conduct of survey by the Bureau of Lands. Thank you very much. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron. 85 withdrawing Lot No. December 1. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 1936. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes.R. However. 1936. President Manuel L. No. 1921. the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus. :) 4(Zhon) Republic vs. consisting of 12. September 30.8081 hectares. Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). On September 7. Eugenio de Jesus. On November 23. CA and Alejandro de Jesus G. Philippine Army. On the same date. GR No. under the administration of the Chief of Staff. L-40912. 1948. On May 15. If you find it. 37698. 1975 *casecannot be found. 71 Of. the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award. 350 issued by PresidentMagsaysay. Proclamation No. opposed the registration. 1956. designated Lot No. President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No.Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted the Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus. Davao City. the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus. 1966.8081 hectares. 85 and declaring the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital. petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of Lot 1176-B-2 with the CFI of Davao. is sufficient for initial .8081-hectare land by virtue of an executiveproclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical center sitepurposes Held: Petitioner has registerable title over the whole contested area of12. On October 9. and not only on a portionthereof occupied by the Medical Center. the CFI of Davao rendered judgment directing the registration of the title to Lot No. which legally effected a land grant of the whole lot to theMindanao Medical Center. 1969. CA held that Lot 1176-B-2 must be registered in the name of Alejandro de Jesus. this petition. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus. revoking Proclamation No. Issue: whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerabletitle over a full 12. 328. 328 and reserving the same Lot No. President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. On September 2. 1956. but he is hereby ordered to relinquish to the Mindanao Medical Center that portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical center and nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances. revoking this Proclamation No. On December 6. 1176-B-2 of in the name of the. its nervous disease pavilion andtheir reasonable appurtenances. Hence. 350. 1176-B-2. Upon appeal. On August 11. " Similarly.. The applicants alleged that they acquired said parcel of land by way of an absolute deed of sale from the spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca and that they have been in possession thereof for more than 34 years.. any land belonging to the private domain of theGovernment of the Philippines.) LARAGAN G. granted. includingreservations for .R. the Solicitor General filed a written opposition. other improvements for the public benefit.. provides that "Wheneverpublic lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of thePhilippines are alienated. or forquasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it. or of the inhabitants thereof. the same shall be brought forthwith under theoperation of this Act and shall become registered lands. 1987 Facts: On 14 October 1968. or conveyed to persons or to public orprivate corporations. section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowersthe president "(t)o reserve from sale or other disposition and for specificpublic uses for service. Section 122 of the Act.. Ilagan.registration under the LandRegistration Act [Act 496].. on behalf of the Director of . situated in the Barrio of Sto. Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes thePresident to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of thepublic domain as reservations for the use of the commonwealth of thePhilippines or of any of its branches. Tomas. VS No. Isabela. L-47644 August CA 21. the herein petitioners filed an application with the CFI of Isabela for the registration of their title over a parcel of land with an area of 221. .” 5(May Ann) 6(Rhea B. more or less. The Land Registration Commission issued a notice of initial hearing. On 7 July 1969. The land reserved "shall be used for the specific purposes directed bysuch executive order until otherwise provided by law. m. the use of which is not otherwise directed bylaw.” Further.667 sq. Lands, alleging that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest do not have sufficient title to the parcel of land sought to be registered. He prayed that the land be declared public land. On 2 August 1969, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Vicente Leano, Francisco Leano, and Consolacion Leano filed their opposition to the application claiming that they are the owners, pro indiviso, of the southern part of the land applied for, with an area of 16 hectares of their deceased parents and which has been in their possession for more than 30 years. The trial court rendered judgment confirming the title of the applicants over the parcel of land applied for and ordering its registration in the names of the applicants. The oppositors appealed to the CA. On 9 November 1977, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but excluded the southern portion of the land applied for, the appellate court declaring such excluded portion to be public land, and part of the public domain, in view of the failure of the applicants and oppositors to prove registrable title over the same. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but their motion was denied. Issue: Whether the appellate court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring the parcel of land in question as public land. . Held: The argument is untenable. While it may be true that the Director of Lands did not appeal from the decision of the trial court, his failure to so appeal did not make the decision of the trial court final and executory, in view of the appeal interposed by the other oppositors, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Francisco Leano, and Consolacion Leano, who also seek the confirmation of their imperfect title over the land in question. Neither did such failure of the Director of Lands to appeal foreclose the appellate court from declaring the land in question to be public land, since the oppositors and the herein petitioners are both seeking the registration of their title pursuant to the provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law where the presumption always is that the land pertains to the state, and the occupants and possessors claim an interest in the same, by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required number of years. Besides, it is an established rule that an applicant for registration is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered in his name simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of the land. He must show, even in the absence of opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny registration of the land under the Torrens system, if the facts presented do not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he seeks to register. The petition is denied for lack of merit. 7(Angel) 8(Janine) 9 Kidpalos vs Baguio Gold MiningCompany 14 SCRA 913 Facts: Petitioners sued the Baguio Gold Mining Companyand the director of Mines in the court of First Instance in Baguio, seekingjudgement declared said plaintiffs to be the owners of certain parcels of landsituated in Sitio Binanga, Barrio of Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, Mt. Province, to annulthe declarations of location of certain mineral claims of the Baguio GoldMining Company, overlapping the parcels claimed by plaintiffs, and to recoverdamages from the company. The complaint also sought to enjoin the director ofmines from proceeding with the lode patent applications of the Mining Companyand to have the mine buildings erected on the land in question demolished atthe latters expense. The defendant BGMC, claiming the virtue of valid locationsof the claims since 1925 to 1930. Issue: WoN an applicant who was previously deniedclaims of ownership in revindicatory action cannot file for registration ofsame land involved. Held: If the record of theformer trial shows that the judgement could not have been rendered withoutdeciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled thatmatters as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgement necessarilypresupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgement itself. Since there can beno registration of land without applicant being its owner, the final judgementof CA in the previous litigationdeclaring that the mining company’s title is superior to that of appellantsshould be conclusive on the question in the present case. 10(Lou) SPOUSESFRANCISCO LAHORA and TORIBIA MORALIZON, vs. EMILIODAYANGHIRANG, JR., and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, (37SCRA 346) G.R.No. L-28565 (January 30, 1971) FACTS:On 26 November 1965, appellants petitioned the Court of First Instance of Davaofor registration of nine (9) parcels of land located in barrio Zaragosa,municipality of Manay, province of Davao. Appellant (Toribia Moralizon) alleged one-half of the parcels of land having been acquired by inheritance,and the other half by purchase and by continuous, open, public and adversepossession in the concept of owner. One of the said parcels of land isidentified as lot No. 2228, plan SWO-36856, Manay Cadastre. Oppositorsalleged that lands belonging to him and his wife were included in theapplication for registration, mentioning specifically Lot No. 2228 which wassaid to be already covered by Original Certificate of Title no.P-6055 in thename of oppositor's wife on 21 June 1956. Thus, Oppositors filed a motion forcorrection of the number of the certificate of title covering Lot No. 2228,erroneously referred to as OCT No. P6055, when it should properly be OCT No.P-6053 and also prayed in the same motion that the petition be dismissed. TheDirector of Lands also filed an opposition to the petition, contending that theapplicants or their predecessors-in-interest never had sufficient title overthe parcels of land sought to be registered, nor have they been in open,continuous, and notorious possession thereof for at least 30 years. TheCourt of First Instance of Davao (in Land Reg. Case No. N-86), dismissing theirpetition with respect to Lot No. 2228 on the ground of previous registration,said appellants claiming that the question of the validity of a certificate oftitle based on a patent allegedly obtained by fraud can be raised by them in aland registration proceeding, contrary to the ruling of the court a quo. ISSUE:W/N Lot No. 2228 can be the subject of two registration proceedings. RULING:No, Lot No. 2228 cannot be the subject of two registration proceedings. Inthe present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the name ofoppositors' wife as of 21 June 1956, nine (9) years earlier. On 26 November1965, the appellants' petition for registration of the same parcel of landbased on the ground that the first certificate of title (OCT No. P-6053)covering the said property is a nullity, can no longer prosper. Orderlyadministration of justice precludes that Lot 2228, of the Manay Cadastre,should be the subject of two registration proceedings. Having become registeredland under Act 496, for all legal purposes, by the issuance of the public landpatent and the recording thereof, further registration of the same would leadto the obviously undesirable result of two certificates of title being issuedfor the same piece of land, even if both certificates should be in the name ofthe same person. And if they were to be issued to different persons, theindefeasibility of the first title, which is the most valued characteristic ofTorrens titles, would be torn away. Forthis reason, this Court has ruled in Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43Phil. 558, that in a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decreeagain the registration of land already decreed in an earlier case; and that asecond decree for the same land would be null and void. Of course, if thepatent had been issued during the pendency of the registration proceedings, thesituation would be different. WHEREFORE,finding no error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, withcosts against the appellants. Significance:Land Registration Act; Character of certificate of title for public landpatents. -- The rule in this jurisdiction,regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of titlethat may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by thegovernment to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor isrecorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee becomingentitled to all safeguards provided to the grantee becoming entitled to all thesafeguards provided in Section 38 of the land Registration Act, the titleissued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided inSection 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year fromits issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable andindefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding. Periodfor review of decree; Proper party and relief after expiration of period.-- Even assuming arguendo that there indeed exists a proper case forcancellation of the patent for intrinsic fraud, the action for review of thedecree should have been filed before the one year period had elapsed.Thereafter, the proper party to bring the action would only be the personprejudiced by the alleged fraudulent act -- the owner and grantor -- and notanother fraudulent act -- the 3739). NOTES.once a homestead patent is registered. Correctionof typographical mistake in title number in motion. 23. 29. .1952. Judge of First Instance of Cotobato. (Sumail vs.G. Feb. 2413) A certificate of title issued on registration of a homestead patent partakes ofthe nature of a certificate in judicial proceedings as long as the land isreally part of the disposable land of the public domain.and not another applicant orclaimant.G. L7886. De los Santos. Sept. not in another registration. and the certificatebecomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year fromits date of issuance ( Lucas vs. the relief provided by the law in such instance may besecured by the aggrieved party.L-8278. 496 as to whichadverse title cannot be acquired by prescription. as required by. Anore. 1954.owner and grantor -. for land alreadyregistered in the name of a person cannot the subject of another registration. the land covered thereby ceases to be a part of the public domainand becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neithercontrol nor jurisdiction.-As regards the complaint against the alleged correction of the number of thecertificate of title covering Lot No.but in an appropriate action such as one for reconveyance or reversion. If theland was private. April 30. 51 O. there is nothing irregularin the lower court's order granting the same.-. Furthermore. Sept. 53 O. L-4136. the land become"registered land" within the meaning of Act no.Effect of registration of administrative land patent. L-5828. or fordamages in case the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaserfor value. the grant is a nullity (Vital vs. 1955. 29. 1957). Durian. As stated in Acierto vs. P-6053. -Aftera free patent application is granted and the corresponding certificate of titleis issued. it appearing that the motion wasintended to rectify a clearly typographical mistake. Tuktukan who was 70 years old at the time he testified shows that he acquired the land from his father-in-law. PETITIONER. 63528. Atok Big Wedge Mining Company contended that the said parcel of land was being registered in the office of Mining Recorder in 1921 and 1931 pursuant to Philippine Bill of 1902. They also showed the payment of annual assessment fees for the said land since 1931. They also claim that it is a mineral land. that he lived on the land since his marriage up to the present. that at the time of his acquisition. that he was never disturbed in his possession. it was planted with camotes. thereafter being subject to the same rights andprivileges as other registered lands (Eugenio vs.1955) 11(Jess) 12(Diane) ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY. . Supporting his oral testimony. casava.A homestead acquired in public land become registered land as soon as thepatent issued to the homesteader is recorded in the registry of deeds and thecertificate of title issued. No. VS. 1948. gabi. langka. Itogon. that he was then 18 years old. when he married his daughter. It is about sixteen years before TUKTUKAN declared the land in question for taxation purposes and thirty four (34) years before private respondent filed the land registration proceedings in 1965. Dongail. he submitted tax declarations both dated March 20. L-7083. May 19. coffee and avocados. September 9. that he has been paying the taxes during the Japanese occupation and even before it. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TUKTUKAN SAINGAN [G. 1996] FACTS: Atok Big Wedge Company and Tuktuktan Saingan are both claiming ownership over subject land situated in the barrio of Lucnab. HON. Benguet.R. the former for a rural land and the latter for urban land and improvement therein. Perdido. a foreshore land. adjoins a parcel of land acquired by Ignacio from thegovernment in 1936 and has occupied the land since 1935. SC also said that payment of annual assessment fee is not enough proof. He had improved also almost 90% of the said parcel of land. L-12958. Director of Lands GRno. open and uninterrupted for a period of more than 30 years.The trial court dismissed the application.: Facts: On January 25. When an ocular survey was made. May 30.ISSUE: Whether or not Atok Wedge Mining Company has a better right on the subject land. There must be an annual performance of labor or undertaking of improvements in the mine.J. He also had paid tax declaration of the said land since 1948 up to present. . ruling that the parcel of land isforeshore land. Rizal. continuously. Navotas.This parcel of land. 13(April) 14(Daniel Eblahan) Ignaciov. The Director of Landsopposed this application because the land is public domain. The SC ruled in favor of the Tuktukan because he has proven that he had in possession of the said land in a concept of an owner. it was evident that there was no improvements being made in the said land and there is any sign of mining had happened in the land. 1950. HELD: No. formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by theaction of the Manila Bay. 1960 Montemayor. FaustinoIgnacio applied to register a parcel of mangrove land in Gasac. DE PORKAN G. It is apart of the sea. 151 SCRA 88 .Issue: Whether or not the parcel ofland in question is public domain Held: Yes. 15(Melodia) ________________________________________________________________________ _________________________ 16(Mel) REPUBLIC VS. The Court affirmed thetrial court in ruling that the land is public domain. 1987. part of the public domain.The court disagreed with the petitioner that Manila bay is not a sea. The Court ruled that theland formed by the actions of the sea is property of the State and that the lawon accretion only applies to lands that are situated on the banks of rivers. No. the petitionercannot claim private ownership of the land because the land in question is notsituated in a river bank. The alluvial depositsand accretion was caused by the actions of the Manila Bay.Possession resulting in presumption of right to grant application . In this case. it is situated in Manila Bay. The land formed is thus. a mere indentation of the same. L-66866 June 18.R. which is a part ofthe sea. 1099. who in turn acquired said lots though a grant by the government by virtue of their proven. ISSUE: Whether or not possession and cultivation of a land for more than 30 years will entitle the possessor thereof of a government grant and a certificate of title. since the Spanish colonial period. 1099 alleging among others that the patentees secured their patents and titles through fraud. open. Hence. 1099 and 1546. After hearing however. open. the CFI dismissed the complaints and upheld the validity of the titles/patents of de Porkan & Macatindog over the lands in dispute. when the case was brought to the Court of First Instance. but a grant of the Government over the same alienable land by virtue of their proven. The SG in the present petition avers among others that the lots in dispute could not be the subject of disposition under the Homestead and Free Patent provisions of the Public Act since they are marshy and swampy. exclusive and undisputed possession for more than 30 years. certified as such as more suitable for fishpond development. 1546 and the Free Patent of Macatindog over Lot No. exclusive and undisputed possession for more than 30 years. Azurin filed with the Bureau of Lands a complaint for correction. The Solicitor General sided with Azurin. the respondents had already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant over Lot No. amendment or cancellation of the Homestead Patent of De Porkan over Lot no. As early as 1953. the patents and titles issued to de Porkan and Macatindog were void in so far as the portion occupied and covered by the fishpond permit of Azurin. the SG stated that the disputed portions of land were actually claimed by Azurin and that such lands could not be disposed by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act. 1099 and 1546 from their predecessors-interests. misrepresentation and illegal machinations. disposable only thru lease under the Public Land Act. HELD: Yes. An issue over said lots arose when a certain Viola Azurin obtained from the then Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering portions of Lots Nos. .FACTS Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog acquired Lots Nos. 1555. amotion to reopenCadastral Case No. thus an order for the issuance of a decreeof registrationover the said lot. the Sol. The Land RegistrationCommission then issuedDecree No. No. 013541 and . 127177 as the basis of the issuance of OCTNo. ________________________________________________________________________ __________________________ 17(Rocky) 18(Maribeth) REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINES vs CAet. 0-13541 in his favor. 97. its order for the issuance of the decree ofregistration as well asOCT No.cancellation of titlesand for reversion of Lot No. Such possessions of the said public land has attained the character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an express grant from the Government.Gen. 7718 toAlpuerto. 1099 dates back to the time of the Spanish colonial period.Portions of the lot were subsequently transferred tovarious persons who wereissued their respective transfer certificates oftitle. Rec. 1971. LCR Cad. By legal fiction. 1966. After trial. the land ceases to be public and thus becomes a private land. the lowercourt renderedits decision adjudicating to said Alpuerto Lot No.. 7718 of the Mauban (Quezon) cadastre. 7718 of Cadastral Survey ofMauban. and ordered the issuance in his favor of thecorresponding decreeof registration. PerpetuoAlpuerto. filed for the government a complaint for annulment. The mandate of the law itself provides that possessors “shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title”.The possession of a public land identified as Lot No. and to admit hisanswer over LotNo. among whom are privaterespondents. 99 SCRA 742 FACTS: OnMay 16. OnApril 6. 7718 togetherwith itsimprovements. al. Quezon to theState on the ground that the decision of the court adjudicatingLot No. filed with the CFI of Quezon (Branch II). Afterhearing the motionsfor dismissal and the opposition thereto.all its derivative titles are allnull and void and withoutlegal effect because the court had no jurisdiction toallocate the subjectland. butgranting themotion to dismiss filed by Respondents Industrial Marketing andothers anddismissing the complaint filed by petitioner. the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of saidlandunder the provisions of the Public Land Law. HereinRespondents IndustrialMarketing and Investments Corporation.by virtue of the said certificate of title alone. by oversight. which isinalienable? HELD: No. ISSUE: Whetheror not thecourt had jurisdiction to allocatethe subject land. likewise fileda motionfor dismissal of the complaint. Defendant.It was held that where the land covered by the homestead applicationofpetitioner was still within the forest zone or under the jurisdiction of theBureauof Forestry. The motionfor reconsideration was likewise denied.petitioner appealed the caseto the CA which affirmed the order of dismissal bythe lower court. and the petitioner acquirednoright to the land. the grantee doesnot. Consequently. hence. which is inalienable. Andres Laredo. become the owner of thelandillegally included". the lower courtissued an orderdenying the motion to dismiss filed by Respondent Laredo. 19(Ailyn) . lands which cannot beregisteredunder the Torrens system. sincetheofficer who issued it had no authority to do so. or when the Director of Lands did nothavejurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest. based on the grounds that the complaintstatesno cause of action and that venue is improperly laid. AntonioAngeles and AureaAngeles filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging thatthe action isbarred by a prior judgment and that the court lacks jurisdictionover thenature of the action or suit. Henry O. It follows that "if a person obtains a title underthePublic Land Act which includes. The title thus issued is void at law.this petition. The motion forreconsideration was further denied. They made inquiries regarding theprobable claim of defendants. that the amendments and alterations.. as described in their respective complaint. Tuason. HELD: We believe that the lower courterred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction torender the . illegally entered and started defacing. 17431. whichwere made after the publication of the original application. 1 appearing in the application for registration aspublished in the Official Gazette. in theirrespective complaint. using bulldozers andother demolishing equipment. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of theoriginal applicants for registration.No. 1914 a decree ofregistration was issued on July 6. technical descriptions and areas of parcel No.demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs'lessees. Tuason and Co. as well as the improvements.Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz.20(Jen) G. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate ofTitle No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. SupraFACTS:The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged. Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz. particularly thedefendant J. Inc. that pursuant to the decision of March 7. 1 were altered and amended.The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registeredowners had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as theSanta Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate. Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz. known as Decree No. 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. by direct or constructive fraud.that the area of parcel No. through their agents and representatives. L-26127 June 28.boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. containing theboundaries. 7681 basedon the amended plan. 7681. 1 (Santa MesaEstate) and parcel No.Issue: W/N the LRC hadjurisdiction to render the decision for the reason that the amendment to theoriginal plan was not published. were neverpublished. had either beenfraudulently or erroneously included. that the registration proceedingswere docketed as LRC No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the OfficialGazette. 1914. decreeingthe registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land(Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate). and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoyingthe peaceful possession of their lands. now defendants. 17431 is bigger thanthe area of parcel No. by force and intimidation. and in 1953 they discovered for the first timethat their lands. They allegethat the application for registration in LRC No.with the aid of armed men. 7681. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. Mariano Severo Tuason yde la Paz. 1974 Benin vs. the area. that on March 7.M.R. the defendants. that before the decision was handed down in LRC No. in whatappears as Parcel No. The reason is because without a new publication. 7681. CA G. Thepurpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concernedregarding the amended application.R.But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area coveredby the original application and the original plan as previously published. and the decision of theregistration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns thenewly included land. or order. an amendment of the application forregistration when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary andproper. herein private respondent Maguesun Management and DevelopmentCorporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of twoparcels of unregistered land located in Tagaytay . 1997 FACTS: OnJuly 1990. the lawis infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registrationproceedings. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an applicationto be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of theapplication. anew publication is not necessary. aspublished. or in both. Under Section 23 of Act 496. The amendment may be made in the application or in the surveyplan. If theamendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of anarea or parcel of land not previously included in the original application. the jurisdiction of thecourt over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a newpublication.decision in LRC No. Without a new publication the registrationcourt can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that isadded to the area covered by the original application. In the latter case. 22(Nelson) ROXASVS. a new publication of the amended application must be made. and third parties who have not had the opportunity to presenttheir claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice. 118436 March21. theregistration court may allow. since the application and the survey plan go together.No. Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of AbsoluteSale dated June 10.00. occupants or adverse claimants. de Roxas learned of its sale and theregistration of the lots in Maguesun Corporation’s name.de Roxas was not named therein. 1990. de Roxasfor P200. not written by the same person. Adocument examiner from the PNP concluded that there was no forgery.After an Order of general default was issued. as evidenced by a Deed of Saleand an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. continuous. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. In support of itsapplication for registration. Petitioner further denied that she soldthe lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and that hersignature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit ofSelf-Adjudication. Eventually. Zenaida Melliza in turn. occupant or adjoining owner in theapplication for registration submitted to the LRA such that the latter couldnot send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. however. the signatures were re-examined by another expert fromNBI.000. the trial court proceeded to hearthe land registration case. bought theproperty from the original petitioner herein (because she was substituted byher heirs in the proceedings upon her death).on April 1991. former President Manuel A. executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicatingthe purchase price to be P170. She alleged that the lots were among the properties sheinherited from her husband.Uponpetitioner’s motion.City. Itwas only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the landthat petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. adverse and uninterrupted possession of thesubject property in the concept of owner for more than thirty years before theyapplied for its registration under the Torrens System of land titling (in whichno decision has been rendered thereon). The latter testified that the signatures on the questioned and sampledocuments were. on February 1991 the RTCgranted Maguesun Corporation’s application for registration. petitioner filed a petition for review before the RTC to setaside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporationcommitted actual fraud. . Trinidad de Leon vda. she was not sent a notice of the proceedings. Roxas and that her familyhad been in open. Hence.000.00 two and a half months earlier. She also claimed that Maguesun Corporation intentionallyomitted her name as an adverse claimant. Noticesof the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) onthe basis of Maguesun Corporation’s application for registration enumeratingadjoining owners. Even to alayman’s eye. not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud. it concluded that thequestioned documents were not forged and if they were. Ina decision dated December 8.The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actualfraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed bypetitioner.and not Maguesun Corporation. TheCA held that petitioner failed to and demonstrate that there was actualor extrinsic fraud. The Decision of the CA is herebyREVERSED AND SET AS 1. Placing greater weight on thefindings and testimony of the PNP document examiner. Petitioners pray that the registration ofthe subject lots in the name of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled. thereare sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the“innocent purchaser for value” who merits the protection of the law. Zenaida Melliza’s nonappearanceraises doubt as to her existence . the trial courtdismissed thepetition for review of decree of registration.Despitethe foregoing testimonies and pronouncements. MaguesunCorporation did not commit actual fraud. reveal forgery. ISSUE: WONprivate respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud (signatureforgery) in obtaining a decree of registration over the two parcels ofland. it was Zenaida Melliza. a prerequisitefor purposes of annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. as well as the enlarged photographic exhibit of thesignatures. the documents. 1994.the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the CA erred in rulingthat Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud warranting the settingaside of the registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis ofMaguesun Corporation’s good faith. respondent court deniedthe petition for review and affirmed the findings of the trial court. Additionally. A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to theirresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar. who was responsible. Accordingly. HELD: WHEREFORE.the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. that saidproperty be adjudicated in favor of petitioners and that respondent corporationpay for damages. actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review a decreeof registration. Hence.Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun Corporation’s directparticipation in the execution and preparation of the forged instruments. as far as known to the undersigned. (Section 15 of PD No. Respondentcorporation likewise failed to comply with this requirement of law. Hence.000.000.00 when it was earlier purchased for P200. Roxas.) . some of which areleased out as restaurants. Jose Gil. the answer to thesame number is as follows: HilarioLuna. Leon Luna.000 sqm of primeproperty for P170. Provincial Road allat Tagaytay City (no house No. it is unlikely that indication that shewould sell over 13. as having a claim to or as anoccupant of the subject property. In the copy submitted to the trial court. Thediscrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionallyomitted their name.000. it is reasonableto assume that the reason is to mislead the court into thinking that “Roxas”was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner. Would an ordinary person sell more than 13. If the word “Roxas” wereindeed erased and replaced with “Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no houseNo.Petitionerand her family also own several other pieces of property. MaguesunCorporation. annexed a differently-worded application for thepetitionto review case.000 sqm of prime property in Tagaytay City to a stranger fora measly P200. TG-373 BUT thecopy with the word “Roxas” was submitted to the trial court. and occupants) and of the person shown onthe plan (original application submitted in LRC No) asclaimants are as follows: HilarioLuna.occupant or claimant. of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5(mortgagors. or that of the Roxas family. if knownand if not known. however.Petitioner Vda. This is an indication that petitioner is not unawareof the value of her properties. Thenames in full and addresses. the same application which formed the basis for the LRAAuthority in sending out notices of initial hearing.)” in the original application submitted in LRC No.) 30 Thehighlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter. encumbrancers.00? 3. encumbrancer. the extent of the search made to find them. of the ownersof all adjoining properties. Jose Gil. Leon Luna. with the first fiveletters of the word “provincial” typed over correction fluid.00. 1529actually requires the applicant for registration to state the full names andaddresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners. Through such misfeasance. Respondent Maguesun Corporationalso declared in number 5 of the same application that the subject land wasunoccupied when in truth and in fact. the Roxas family caretaker resided in thesubject property. L-26127 Facts: June 28. 23(JM) Beninv.exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner over the subjectlots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza.No.Respondentcorporation’s intentional concealment and representation of petitioner’sinterest in the subject lots as possessor. Tuason G. Toconclude. Zenaida Mellizaconveyed not title over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation asshe was not the owner thereof. it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack itspossession to that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. 1529. the Roxas family was kept ignorant of theregistration proceedings involving their property. thus effectively deprivingthem of their day in court Thetruth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property uninterruptedlythrough their caretaker.R. uninterrupted.She therefore retainstitle proper and sufficient for original registration over the twoparcels of land in question pursuant to Section 14 of PD No. occupant and claimantconstitutesactual fraud justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration. 1974 . Maguesun Corporation is thus notentitled to the registration decree which the trial court granted in itsdecision. Petitionerhas not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open. Jose Ramirez. Theplaintiffsalleged that they were the owners and possessors of the threeparcels ofagricultural lands. We find that the plaintiffs donot claim aright which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin.plaintiff’s grandfather. that they inherited said parcels ofland from theirancestor Sixto Benin. described in paragraph V of the complaint.Tuason & Co. .1894. adversely. respectively.constructed their houses thereon and paid monthlyrentals to plaintiffs.located in thebarrio of LaLoma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality(now city) ofCaloocan. Only defendant J. that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Landsof the lands inBarrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claimthe ownershipover said parcels of land. or sometime in 1942 and subsequentlythereafter.of Elias Benin. and peacefully. who in turn inherited the same from hisfather.it is presumed. Theother defendants were ordered summoned by publicationin accordance withSections 16 and 17of the Rules of Court.M. against Jose Alcantara. Issue: Doesan amendment due to exclusion does not requirea publication? HELD: Yes. asplaintiffsin Civil Cases Nos. Elias Benin andPascualPili(along with four other plaintiffs) should apply not only against theheirs. therefore. The other defendants were all declared indefault. that they declared said lands fortaxation purposesin 1940 under Tax Declaration No. and against Pascual Pili.M. 2429. that they and their predecessors in interest hadpossessed these threeparcels of land openly.. which affirmed the order of the Court of FirstInstanceof Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara. evacuees from Manilaand other places. EugenioBenin. province of Rizal. thatthedecision of this Court. appeared. but alsoagainst all theother plaintiffs in those cases. after having secured thepermission of the plaintiffs. 24(Maris) . 3622and 3623. Tuason & Co. Inc.Inc. had said parcels of land surveyedon March 4 and 6.that Eugenio Benin.. that after theoutbreak of the lastWorld War.cultivated the same andexclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom. was actuallyserved with summons. Onlydefendant J. Therefore. 3621. that as occupantsproper notices thereof were servedon them and that they were aware of saidproceedings. Vicente Gengos. 1960 setting the hearing of the petition to October12. on behalf of the SolGen. L-32398 January 27. newspaper of general circulation in the prov/city of Iloilo. 1962 and directing publication of the order in the Official Gazette and in the Guardian. filed a motion to reconsider as Po Yo Bi had not complied with Sec. An Amended Notice of Petition was issued on January 18. Po Yo Bi filed for an amendment of information. vs. petitioner-appellee.4 of the Revised Naturalization Law on filing his declaration of intention. 1957. the trial court. newspaper of gen. Another amendment was filed (without claiming good moral character) and the Deputy Clerk of Court issued another Amended Notice of Petition for Philippine Citizenship setting the hearing to February 26. No. The petition was granted after trial on October 15. The Assistant City Fiscal of Iloilo. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1963. issued a Notice of Petition for Philippine Citizenship setting the hearing of the petition to January 18. 1959.25(Reg) 26 G. 1960 and ordering the publication of the said notice once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and in the YUHUM. through the Deputy Clerk of Court. ISSUE: . 1960 and ordered the publication and posting of the notice. On March 5. Po Yo Bi filed a petition for naturalization. the second amended petition ITSELF was not published or posted in a public and conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court or in the building where such office is located.R. 1992 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF PO YO BI TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES: PO YO BI. FACTS: On February 9. respondent-appellant. HOWEVER. circulation in the prov/city of Iloilo. HELD: The second amended petition was not published. It constitutes a FATAL defect. (3) and these must be consecutive. affects the jurisdiction of the court. relative to the publication of the petition.Whether the court erred in not finding that the amended petition for naturalization was not published in accordance to the requirements of section 9 of CA 473. including the decision rendered in favor of the applicant. Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires that the petition itself must be published. namely: (1) the publication must be weekly. Neither were the original and the amended petitions. regardless of whether the one to blame therefor is the clerk of court or the petitioner or his counsel. for it impairs the very root or foundation of the authority to decide the case. What the Office of the Clerk of Court did was to prepare and issue NOTICES of petition.” The Court held that the requirement that a copy of the petition to be posted and published should be textual or verbatim restatement of the petition as filed is jurisdictional. 27(Ed) 28(LJ) 29(Zax) . non-compliance with the requirements thereof. IT was said notices alone which were ordered to be published and posted. as amended. Thus: “In short. Non-compliance therewith nullifies the proceedings in the case. The Court further ruled that the publication is a jurisdictional requirement. Failure to raise this question in the lower court would not cure such defect. (2) it must be made three times. This provision demands the compliance of the following requirements. On or about December 17. Leyva's counsel was allowed to stay in court to collaborate. Leyvaobjected thereto on December 10. which they had acquired from thedefunct "NARRA". and sincethe Director of Lands has already filed an opposition based on the ground that the land sought to be registered is public land. with respect to a portion of said landof about one (1) hectare which he claimed to have adversely possessed in goodfaith and under legal title since 1937. 1958 his wife Eufemia L. in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. as in fact he did collaborate. with the provincial fiscal. for theregistration of three (3) parcels of land situated in Cotabato. but could collaborate with the provincial fiscal. another portion of said land of about 88 meters by 6. made in good faith. also. the court ruled that theLeyvas have no right to appear as independent oppositors.30(Clathem) LEYVA V. Issue: whether or not the opposition of Leyvas will prosper.. The Court of Appeals denied the opposition of Leyvas declaring that the claim oft he Leyvas may be recognized only if the land in question is public land.66 meters. 1958. including one by the Bureau of Lands. and that both had similarly occupied as owners since 1937. Held: No. Leyva filed another opposition alleging that she and her husband hadoccupied a portion of the land in question.. Eligio T. JANDOC." Later. whichclaimed the land applied for as part of the public domain. otheroppositions were filed. 1958."with their improvements . ManuelaJ andoc applied. The law provides that any person claiming any kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration must be based on a . 4 SCRA 595 FACTS: On September 10. their right is completely subordinate to the interests of the Government. The CFI also denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. JANDOC4 SCRA 595 FACTS: Respondent Laiz filed before the Court of First Instance of Cotabato a petition for cancellation of adverse claim annotated on the back of his transfer certificate of title covering a parcel of land registered in the name of Manuela Jandoc.Petitioner Leyva claimed that he executed a Compromise Agreement in 1963 (notarized in 1972) with Manuela Jandoc where the former will withdraw his opposition in the Land Registration case in the condition that certain properties automatically belong to him in case of favorable judgment for Jandoc. Invariably. the rights of the Government.it is incumbent upon the duly authorized representatives of the Government torepresent its interests as well as private claims intrinsically dependent uponit. However. and not at all subordinate to. Respondent Laiz reasoned that a private agreement of sale was executed in 1959 between him and Respondent Jandoc. and must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of the public domain. It is well-settled that the interests of the Government cannot berepresented by private persons.in the case.The Court of First Instance of South Cotabato ruled against petitioner and confirmed the sale between Laiz and Jandoc pertaining to the parcel of land. since the petitioners are foreshore lessees of public land. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed in toto the lower court’s decision.Hence a petition for review on certiorari was filed by petitioner .right of dominion or some other real right independent of. 31(Lea) LEYVA vs. This Court has ruled in the case of Vda. basing his claim on a Compromise Agreement. Jr.. one of the signatories in the Deed of Transfer. are subject to inherent infirmities. has a better right over the parcel of land than respondent Laiz. No.contending that the IAC committed grave error in ruling that Laiz’s deed of absolute sale prevailed over Levya’s compromise agreement.Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave more weight to the testimony of Fiscal Sarinas as corroborated by Catolico. who executed a Deed of Sale with respondent Jandoc. formerly Chief of the Chemistry Branch in the PC Crime Laboratory who testified that the Agreement could have been written within the years 1964 to 1967. ISSUE:Whether petitioner Levya. RULING:The instant petition is without merit. Crispin B. a handwriting expert of the PC Crime Laboratory. Marcos January27.But Leyva lays much stree on the findings of Francisco Cruz. it is well established that the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court for the latter is in a better position to gauge credibility of witnesses.: FACTS: .J. Camp Crame who testified that the purported signature of Jandoc appeared to be of another person and of Col. a notary public. De Roxas v. that “the positive testimony of the three attesting witnesses ought to prevail over the expert opinions which cannot be mathematically precise but which on the contrary. and Versoza.De Castro v. PartV 1. L-26093 SANCHEZ. Garcia. 1969 G. the Court of appeals concluded that the Compromise Agreement whether executed in 1963 or 1972 between Leyva and Jandoc cannot prevail over the Agreement of Sale between Laiz and Jandoc and that Laiz has a better right over the property in question than Leyva.Upon consideration of the foregoing. Roxas.” In any event.R. upholding the validity of the assailed Sale Agreement. Petitioner. as claimed.the award up to now has not been fully .we declared thatpersons who claim to be in possession of a tract of publicland and have appliedwith the Bureau of Lands for its purchase havethe necessary personality tooppose registratior. and all persons who claimto be in possession prior the issuance oftheir titles or awards to public landare can be considered as equitable owners. purchaser offriar land. However. should be regarded as an equitableowner of theland. Since Petitioner Virginiade Castro is an awardee inthe public sale held upon her own township salesapplication. DeCastro then filed with the Bureau of Lands TownshipSales Application coveringthe parcel of land. The award itselfis enough to prevent the reopening by respondentAkia as to the land disputed. Itappears that De Castro wasthe highest bidder in the public sale of a 1.To claim ownership. de Castro movedto intervene. de Castro have legalstanding in the proceedingsbelow? HELD: YES. petitionerVirginia L. 922square meters of landsituated in the City of Baguio. Baguio City and such land was thereafterawarded in her favor. Shestressed the fact thatshe was not a mere applicant of public land but anequitable owner thereofbecause she paid to the government in full the value ofthe land she appliedfor. Similarly. a purchaser of friar land must have anequitable title tothe land before the issuance of the patent.Privaterespondent Rufino Akiacommenced a petition before the Court of First Instanceof Baguio City.000square meter-parcel of land inQuezon Hill. actingas a cadastral court. Recently.Mere citizens could haveno interest in public land and to give a partystanding in a court of landregistration. to register in his name 15. However.922 square meters of land specified inAkia's petition. Her interest is in the 1.the Respondent Judgedismissed the opposition of de Castro on the ground a mereapplicant has nopersonality to sue but de Castro moved to reconsider. he must make some claim to theproperty. ISSUE:Does petitioner Virginia L. Homesteader. a homesteaderwho had not yet been issued his title but whohad fulfilled all the conditionsrequired by law.Of course. had beenpaying taxes on the lot.000 squaremeters is allegedly includedin the 15. 1970 Makalintal. TheSupreme Court.ruled that petitioner has legal standing before thecadastral court.implemented because she hasnot yetcomplied with one condition imposed on her. FERNANDEZvs. township of Coron. FELIZA ABORATIGUE G. accordingly. No. Palawan. enough topreventreopening by respondent Akia as to the land disputed. claiming ownership of a parcel of land situated in sitio Dipulao. filed suit 1 in the Palawan Courtof First Instance to have the defendants vacate a portion of said land andcease exercising acts of ownership therein. But. and as such was allowed to plant . if the award is notapermanent disposition. father of defendant FelizaAboratigue. was during his lifetime employed as guard at one of the gates tothe property.L-25313 December 28. it is at least a provisional one. It wasalleged in the complaint that Vicente Aboratigue.: Facts: Theplaintiff.J.R.barrio Central. 2(Charleen) 3(Gina) ANA P. In theiranswer to the complaint the defendants alleged. butthat later on they claimed to be the owners of the said portion. 182913. Therule is that the owner of buildings and improvements should claim them duringthe proceedings for registration and the fact of ownership. There is no such notationhere in favor of the appellants. were allowed to stay therein. and the lower court'sdecision allowing them to recover the value of the improvements is not now inquestion. and that after his death the said defendant. inasmuch as the improvements in thedisputed area have been acknowledgment by plaintiff in her complaint asbelonging to the appellants' predecessor-in-interest. The trial court has leftthe determination of such value to mutual agreement between the parties. No. Issue: Whetheror not the improvements on the disputed land belong to the Aboratigue. bythemselves and through their predecessors-in-interest since the year 1901.R. this right of the appellants must be upheld. 2013 .fruit trees in a small portionin the immediate vicinity. Thisdisposition should be modified in the sense that if they fail to agree. Antonio Bacas G. 4(Zhon) Republic vs. However. thematter should be submitted to the said court for hearing and adjudication. November 20. if upheld by thecourt. continuous possession and cultivation of the disputed area. as basis of their claim ofownership.together with her husband Restituto Bacnan. Held: Yes. must be noted on the face of the certificate. The Republic failed to appeal said decision. They indicated therein the names and addresses of the adjoining owners. 3494] and another against Chabons [Civil Case No. by the Philippine Army. 265. then Municipality of Cagayan. On May 8. Republic filed with RTC a civil case for annulment. The RTC dismissed the petition. "subject to private rights. The Republic failed to appeal said decision. LRC granted the application. Misamis Oriental. if any. (2) assuming arguendo that respondents were guilty of fraud. inter alia. 1974. the names of adjoining owners. appeared and participated in the proceedings so the Republic is estopped from questioning the proceeding. if any there be. reserving for the use of the Philippine Army 3 parcels of the public domain situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen." The Bacases filed their Application for Registration on November 12. the Republic lost its right to a relief for its failure to file a petition for review on the ground of fraud within one (1) year after the date of entry of the decree of registration. 4354] which is a portion of those reserved in PP No. also reserved in PP No. 4357. The parcels of land were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for military purposes. 265. 1964 covering a parcel of land [Lot No. 265. Commonwealth President Manuel Luis Quezon (Pres. which took effect on March 31." The presidential proclamation did not. cancellation of original certificate of title. reconveyance of lot or damages against Bacases [Civil Case No. Quezon) issued Presidential Proclamation No. but no mention was made with respect to the occupation. 5918]. They alleged. apply to the respondents because they did not apply to acquire the parcels of land . and should not. as well as the occupancy of the PH army by mere tolerance. the Chabons filed their application for Registration of Lot No. 265 pursuant to a proviso therein that the same would not apply to lands with existing"private rights. The LRC granted the application. 1938.Facts: In 1938. and (3) the subject parcels of land were exempted from the operation and effect of the Presidential Proclamation No. holding the following: (1) the stated fact of occupancy by Camp Evangelista over certain portions of the subject lands in the applications for registration by the respondents was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law and the respondents did not commit fraud in filing their applications for registration and that the Republic was then given all the opportunity to be heard as it filed its opposition to the applications. theGovernment can still question the registration of Bacas’ land on the groundthat the same is still under the public domain pursuant to Pres.265. . Pursuant to . CA affirmed the RTC decision.in question from the government. Such omissionconstituted fraud and deprived the Republic of its day in court. but simply for confirmation and affirmation of their rights to the properties so that the titles over them could be issued in their favor.to come forward and show to the court why the application for registrationthereof is not to be granted. it shall state what search has been made to find them. Not beingnotified. who may have any rights or interests in the property. Even if the Bacases successfully allege the names and addresses of allpersons concerned who may have any rights or interests in the property. The purposeof this is to serve as notice and publication of the hearing that would enableall persons concerned. and also the names andaddresses of all adjoining owners and occupants. if notknown. and. Proc. if known. whether or not the decisions of the LRC over the subject lands can still bequestioned 2. No. Upon appeal. The Republic can question even final and executory judgment whenthere was fraud. As such the subject land is inalienable and cannot be registered. Issue: 1. the Republic was not able to file its opposition to the applicationand. whether or not the applications for registration of the subject parcels ofland should be allowed Held: 1. They also did not indicate any efforts or searchesthey had exerted in determining other occupants of the land. naturally. The Chabons did not make any mention of the ownership or occupancyby the Philippine Army. the application for registration shall state thename in full and the address of the applicant. 2. it was not able to file an appeal either. ISSUE: whether or not respondent established the identity of and title to the land sought to be registered in his name? HELD: Contrary to the claim of petitioner. prescription or estoppel cannot lie against the governmentbecause it is a well-settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic or itsgovernment is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of itsofficials or agents. 1991 REPUBLIC CEMENT CORPORATION.R. open.Further. The technical description and the survey plan duly approved by the Director of Lands . FACTS: Republic Cement Corp. They were later substituted by Moises Correa as subsequent purchaser of said parcel of land. COURT OF APPEALS. 85991-94 July 3. public.) G. respondents. Republic Cement Corp. It was opposed by Rayo. was able to establish the identity of and title to the land sought to be registered in his name. through his predecessors in interest. The court ordered the registration of the 3 parcels of land in the name of Correa. 5(May Ann) 6(Rhea B. peaceful and uninterrupted possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner for a period of over 60 years and having acquired ownership thereof by donation on the occasion of their marriage from the parents of Jose Rayo. adverse. having been in actual. Nos. private respondent. contends that respondents failed to prove the genuineness of their title. MOISES CORREA and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN. petitioner. Mangahas and Legaspi stating that they are the owners of the eastern and east central portion which is sought to be registered by petitioner. vs. filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan for the registration in its name a parcel of land which they bought form persons who had occupied and cultivated it continuously since the Spanish regime. TEODORO LEAÑO. petitioner is now seeking the registration of the whole of Lot No. INDEPENDENCIO SIBBALUCA. Based on said transfers. is limited only to whatever rights the latter may have had therein. VALDEZ vs. and CONSOLACION LEAÑO . The deeds of sale relied upon by petitioner do not constitute sufficient legal justification for petitioner's claim over all of Lot No. SIBBALUCA. 7(Angel) 8(Janine) 9(Mike Jayson) 10(Lou) 11(Jess) 12(Diane) FELIPA S. FRANCISCO LEAÑO. LARAGAN. TOMAS LEAÑO. as the successor in interest of said heirs. This we cannot allow. Petitioner's title over said lot. 2880. Survey plan of the property showing its boundaries and total are clearly identifies and delineates the extent of the land. 2880 in its name. It is elementary that a grantor can convey no greater estate than what he has or in which he has an alienable title or interest. AURORA C. and ZENAIDA S.submitted in evidence by private respondent fully describes the metes and bounds of the parcels of land involved. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. R. was for the confirmation of an imperfect title. that the possession and occupation of the land by the spouses Anastacio and Lucresia Sibbaluca are tainted with bad faith so that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law. however. and Consolacion Leano filed their opposition to the application for registration. ISSUE: Whether petitioners can register the subject land. The law applicable is Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. in fee simple. filed with the lower court. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Laragan. to the satisfaction of the court. Independencio Sibbaluca. CA affirmed the decision but declared the southern part as public land. The application for registration. Tomas. They claimed that they are the owners of the southern part of the land and that they have been in possession for more than 30 years. HELD: No. Ilagan. Tomas Leano. It is an established rule that an applicant for registration is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered in his name simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of the land. that he is the absolute owner. On 2 August 1969. even in the absence of opposition. Vicente Leano. Aurora Sibbaluca. L-47644 August 21. He must show. 1987 FACTS: Felipa Laragan. He prayed that the land be declared public land. No. . Francisco Leano. Isabela.G. Teodoro Leano. Solicitor General filed a written opposition alleging that the applicants and their predecessor-ininterest do not have sufficient title to the parcel of land sought to be registered. It would appear. The applicants alleged that they acquired said parcel of land by way of an absolute deed of sale from the spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca and that they have been in possession thereof for more than 34 years. and Zenaida Valdez filed an application with the CFI of Isabela for the registration of their title over a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Sto. 13(April) 14(Daniel Eblahan) Director of Lands v. exclusive. under the Land Registration Act. The Court ruled that . L-50260. Estanislao Patricio was a known to possess a 256 hectare tract of land within Timberland Block A in Masbate. Calanog then applied to register the land but she was opposed by the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein. On January 20. CAGR no. 1956. They also opposed the application of title by Calanog.:Facts: In 1914. Thirty-seven other people petitioned to lift the general default. corrals and enclosures. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. The court issued a general default. 48. to wit: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open. July 29. may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor. among them are two people issued with certificates of title. This land was then sold to Vicente Montenegro. He used it as pasture land. claiming two-thirds of the land.NOTES: Sec. continuous. but whose titles have not been perfected or completed. The following described citizens of the Philippines. Montenegro used the land the same way Patricio did. Issue: Whether or not there the respondent has a valid claim to the landHeld: No. J. excluding the two other lots with certificates of title. The trial court granted the application. 1992Romero. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by way or force majeure. He sold the land to Maria Calanog in 1938 and used it the same way. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. along with 100 cattle and their offspring. rearing up to 500 animals by 1941. The Directors alleged that neither Calanog nor her predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title over the land and that it is public domain. No convincing proof was given by the respondent on the matter. and transfer certificates of title. In order to register a land of public domain under the Public Land Act before its amendment. notorious. The public respondents had satisfactory proof that the 256 hectares of the land are timberland as evidenced by documents such as reports and sketch plans. petitioners vs. On the other hand. Bureau of Lands and Philippine Fisheries Commission. and uninterrupted possession of the land and it must be proven by the applicant. very different to the 598 hectare land sought to be registered. respondents G. Court of Appeals and Filomeno Gallo. # L-37995 August 1987 FACTS: On July 11. 1894 and must have open. 15(Melodia) ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________ 16(Mel) Bureau of Forestry. free patents.respondent can claim neither the 256 hectare land disputed by the public petitioners nor the remaining land claimed by the thirty-seven oppositors.1 four (4) parcels of lands situated in Buenavista. It found out that in the deed of sale in 1928. The oppositors also had proof that they had been occupying and possessing the 342 hectares of the land as early as 1954 as evidenced by homestead applications. the Court found no adequate proof for the respondent’s claim. 196. the earliest evidence of possession by her predecessor-in-interest was only in 1914. Iloilo described in Plan PSU-150727 containing an . The respondent also did not have proof of the required possession under the Public Land Act. it required adverse possession from July 26. only 200 hectares of the land was sold. the Court found that both the public respondents and the oppositors have evidence to support their claims on the land. In this case.R. HELD : No. ________________________________________________________________________ __________________________ 17(Rocky) . respondent Filomeno Gallo having purchased the subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago on April 27. 1965. move to be substituted in place of the latter attaching to his motion an amended application for registration of title. With these rules. petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved to be substituted in place of Bureau of Forestry as oppositor over portion of the land sought to be registered. forest or mineral but the executive branch of government through the office of the president. 1966. Nava who in his lifetime the lands in turn from Canuto Gustillo on June 21. the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the four (4) parcels of land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo. 1965. there should be no more room for doubt that is not the court which determines the classification of lands of public domain into agricultural. Petitioners appealed from said decision to the respondent court of appeals which in turn affirmed the Regional court decision. 1934. On April 6.approximate area of 30.5943 hectares were the subject application for registration by Mercesdes Diago who alleged others that she herself occupied said parcel of lands having them from the estate of late Jose Ma. ISSUE : Whether or not the court has the power to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable and disposable lands. 1965. Also on August 30. The supreme court ruled that the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable. of an among bought bought On June 30. mineral or forest land is now a prerogative of the executive department of the government and not of the courts. which is inalienable. 99 SCRA 742 FACTS: On May 16. 7718 toAlpuerto. After trial.Gen. 013541 and all its derivative titles are all null and void and withoutlegal effect because the court had no jurisdiction to allocate the subjectland. No. and ordered the issuance in his favor of the corresponding decreeof registration. PerpetuoAlpuerto. a motion to reopenCadastral Case No. likewise filed a motionfor dismissal of the complaint. the Sol. Herein Respondents IndustrialMarketing and Investments Corporation. based on the grounds that the complaint statesno cause of action and that venue is improperly laid. Antonio Angeles and AureaAngeles filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the action isbarred by a prior judgment and that the court lacks jurisdiction over thenature of the action or suit. cancellation of titlesand for reversion of Lot No. The Land RegistrationCommission then issued Decree No. filed with the CFI of Quezon (Branch II). 7718 of the Mauban (Quezon) cadastre. its order for the issuance of the decree of registration as well asOCT No. among whom are private respondents. Rec. 127177 as the basis of the issuance of OCTNo. On April 6. the lower court renderedits decision adjudicating to said Alpuerto Lot No. LCR Cad. al. 1555. . 7718 together with itsimprovements. Quezon to theState on the ground that the decision of the court adjudicating Lot No. 7718 of Cadastral Survey of Mauban. 97. thus an order for the issuance of a decree of registrationover the said lot. filed for the government a complaint for annulment. 1966. 0-13541 in his favor.18(Maribeth) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CAet. Defendant. Henry O. 1971. Portions of the lot were subsequently transferred tovarious persons who were issued their respective transfer certificates oftitle.. and to admit his answer over LotNo. Andres Laredo. 1991Facts: IHVCP is a company engaged in the manufacture. the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of said landunder the provisions of the Public Land Law. No. by oversight. and Jose Campos. which is inalienable? HELD: No. University of the Philippines. become the owner of the landillegally included". processing and exportation of plywood. the lower court issued an orderdenying the motion to dismiss filed by Respondent Laredo. L-52518 August 13. which was granted by the government and shall be valid for 25 years. It renewed its timber license. Jr. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. collect and .by virtue of the said certificate of title alone. since theofficer who issued it had no authority to do so. and the petitioner acquired noright to the land.this petition.R. 19(Ailyn) 20(Jen) IHVCP vs. vs. The title thus issued is void at law.petitioner appealed the case to the CA which affirmed the order of dismissal bythe lower court. in early 1960. The motion for reconsideration was further denied. the grantee does not. It was held that where the land covered by the homestead application ofpetitioner was still within the forest zone or under the jurisdiction of the Bureauof Forestry. Said license authorizes the company to cut. hence. Consequently. lands which cannot be registeredunder the Torrens system. International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines. It follows that "if a person obtains a title under thePublic Land Act which includes. G. or when the Director of Lands did not havejurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest. ISSUE: Whether or not thecourt had jurisdiction to allocatethe subject land. but granting themotion to dismiss filed by Respondents Industrial Marketing and others anddismissing the complaint filed by petitioner. UP 200 SCRA 554.After hearing the motionsfor dismissal and the opposition thereto. Issue: . province of Capiz.The court further cited Sec. 3990. measure and seal the timber cut by it within the tract of land referred to in said Act. Facts: Ibarra Bisnar and Amelia Bisnar applied for the registration of their two titles to two parcels of land. an act establishing an experiment station for UP. continuous.” The provision of the Act is clear that UP. IHVCP rejected the demand and it filed a suit against UP. exclusive and notorious possession over the subject land. and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed by the BIR.Held: Yes. The court ruled that R. which means that the Republic of the Philippines completely recovered it from the public domain. 3990 does not empower UP to scale. who claims ownership of said portion of timberland.A. respectively containing 24 hectares and 34 hectares of land in barrio Gen.A. vs. The said experiment station covers a portion of timberland in Paete. In respect o the areas covered by the timber license of IHVCP. Hizon. including Paete. So UP. claiming that R. being the owner of the said land. 22(Nelson) G. the said Act removed and segregated it from being a public forest. 3990 ceded and transferred in full ownership to UP the area. 83609 October 26.R. COURT OF APPEALS. 3 of R. occupied by IHVCP. has the right to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of IHVCP insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. respondents.Issue: Whether or not UP is the owner of the portion of timberland in Paete. which provides that. IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR. No. the Congress enacted R. 3990.remove timber from the portion of timber land located in certain Municipalities of Laguna. instead of the BIR.A. Mun.In 1964. The parcels of land in question here are forest lands but their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than 50 years and in an open.A. The CA granted their application for confirmation and registration of the titles. “any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines. of President Roxas. demanded the latter to pay the forest charges to it. 1989 petitioner. Whether or not the CA erred in granting the application of the claimant. Capiz. VS. the director of Forestry also filed an opposition regarding allthe claims of the land claiming that the land . filed his claim over another portion of the lot. Thus. 1983 FACTS: Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre filedan application for a registration of a certain land located in Pilar. Anotheroppositor. DIRECTOROF FORESTRY. PETITIONERS. Indue time.R. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. November 29.L-27873. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. possession of forest lands. 23(JM) HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI. G. RESPONDENT. Held: Yes. cannot ripen into private ownership. however long. Emeterio Bereber.Subsequently. the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. the heirs of Amunategui filed an opposition to the application of theBorres and prayed that a portion of the lot be conveyed to them. No. Commonwealth Act No. Further. a land classified as a forest landcan not be owned by private individuals by virtue of its actual state. The heirs of Amunategui appealed the case to the SupremeCourt. The contention of the petitioners with regards to theprovision of Section 48. the CAissued a ruling denying all claims on the land and seconded the stand of theDirector of Forestry that the land is a forest land therefore it can not beowned privately. the land remains as a forest land thereby not subject toprivate ownership. ISSUE: Can a land classified as forest land. The CFI of Capiz ruled on the issue and favored Bereber. In addition they claim that the land is more productive as anagricultural land than as a forest land. Classificationof lands is left to the executive department of the government.Alpasan and Melquiades Borre of their claims. They claim that the land is not a forest land since it is already swampyand mangroves have grown on the area. 141. there are no trees classified insection 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code which would make a land aforest land. as amended by Republic ActNo. A forestland is defined by the law even if it is stripped of its forest cover. It cannot be said that by virtue of the cultivation of private persons using suchland as an agricultural land changes its classification as a forest land. the heirs ofamunategui and the Director of Forestry appealed the case to the CA.was a forest land. They further contend that they havebeen in possession of said land for many years however such claim was belliedby the Director of Forestry through his evidence that even Jose Amunategui evenapplied for permit to cut timber on said land. During thetrial Roque borre sold his rights to Angel alpasan who later on filed his claimon the said land. Devoid of anygovernment act.be subject to private ownership by the fact that it was used as an agriculturalland and that its actual state is no longer a forested area? HELD: NO. Thereafter. 1942 is untenable since such act only apply to agricultural lands and notto . 1963. vs. 1990 SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC. and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATAAN. 24(Maris) 25(Reg) 26 G.. Bataan. It was registered to the Register of Deeds who in turn issued Original Certificate of Title to Sunbeam and Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of Coral Beach. FACTS: On April 29. HON. petitioners. In the case at bar the land in question had never ceased to bea forest land. .R. a Sales Patent issued by the Director of Lands in favor of Sunbeam for parcels of land situated in Mariveles.. L-50464 January 29. CORAL BEACH DEVELOPMENT CORP. CA reversed the CFI decision and decides to give due course to the petition of the SolGen. 4062 favoring Sunbeam and Coral Beach claims with the CFI of Bataan.forest lands. Sunbeam and Coral Beach moved for dismissal and was approved. COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. respondents. The SolGen instituted an action for the reversal of the Civil Case No. No. Petition denied. before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.ISSUE: Whether the classification of the subject lots are forest lands. The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest. HELD: Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural. timber. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. Whether the title conferred by the Director of Lands is valid for forest lands. Thus. and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. there must be a positive act from the government. 27(Ed) 28(LJ) 29(Zax) 30(Clathem) . HON. In their application dated 13 February1970. the Reforestration Administration. they contend that it had already been released therefrom.R. Private respondents do notdispute that the land was formerly a part of the Central Cordillera ForestReserve. filed a Motion to Dismiss. 2061.Chief of Land Classification Party No. petitioners vs. ELISAPARAN MAITIM and SINA PARAN. Another Order 6 was then issued denying the motion todismiss filed by the Provincial Fiscal.Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.Benguet. and (3) the applicationfor registration was filed after expiration of the period provided for in R. Issue: Whether or not the certificationsigned by the chief of Bureau of Forest Development is an adequate proof toreclassify the land. On 12November 1970. respondents. hence the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction overthe case. 57 of the Bureau of Forest Development. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal ofBaguio and Benguet. G. No. 1991 Facts:Private respondents are applicants for registration ofa parcel of land situated in Beckel La Trinidad. exclusive and open possession thereofsince time immemorial. Privaterespondents submitted a certification 17 signed by Leopoldo Palacay. DIRECTOR OF LANDS andDIRECTOR OF FORESTRY. the Office of theSolicitor General filed on behalf of the Director of Lands anOpposition contending that: (1) private respondents have no registrabletitle. COURT OF APPEALS. private respondents claim to have acquired the land from their fatherDayotao Paran and by actual. on the other hand. PAULINA PARAN. and the Bureau ofForestry. physical.No. the land registration court issued anOrder 5 declaring a general default against the whole world exceptthe Bureau of Lands. 48327 August 21. On 18 November 1970. . covered by Survey Plan Psu-105218.A. (2) the parcel of land sought to be registered is part of the publicdomain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. showing the legal nature orstatus of the land as alienable or disposable.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. The estate of Jose Zurbito was placed under administratix thereof. the privaterespondents' application for registration was in fact opposed by the Directorof Lands as well as the Director of Forestry. Once a parcel of land is shown to have been included within a ForestReservation duly established by Executive Proclamation. the evidence of record thusappears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively that theland here involved had been officially released from the Central CordilleraForest Reserve to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the publicdomain.R. Furthermore.Upon the death of Jose Zurbito. The difficulty in the instant case is that while thecertification of Leopoldo Palacay on which private respondents rely may. Masbate inherited by Jose Zurbito from his parents.Held: No. L-46048 November 29. unsworn statement of a minorfunctionary of the Bureau of Forest Development is not. 1988 REPUBLIC vs. . be evidence that a reclassification had occurred. No. while the Court considered the reports of the District Forester and theDistrict Land Officer as adequate proof that the land applied for was no longerclassified as forestal.standing alone. as in the instant case. suchevidence. The land thus acquired by the spouses comprises the two parcels of land). A simple. 31(Lea) G. his wife Soledad Buencamino Zurbito and his children succeeded to his estate and continued his possession. CA FACTS: Spouses Jose Zurbito and Soledad Zurbito purchasedsmall parcels of land from various owners adjoining the 30 hectares of land located in Calulod Pauwa.a presumption arises that the parcel of land continues to be part of suchReservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent withdrawaltherefrom or de-classification is shown. The spouses occupied and cultivated these properties. Moreover. by itself. it iscontradicted by an official report of Luis Baker. However. Filipino. interest and participation in the parcels of land subject of this registration proceedings in favor of the herein applicant and her son-in-law. de Zurbito eventually sold her rights. now the private respondents herein. in stated shares. Dr. Marcelo consolidated ownership of the properties by executing and registering in 1954 an affidavit of consolidation dated December 2.000. title shall automatically vest in the vendee. de Zurbito. Then Soledad vda. of the entire property involved . de Zurbito. Soledad vda. Under the provisions of the aforementioned deed. appealed the aforequoted decision to respondent Court of Appeals. married to Celia Zurbito. as co-owners. The Opposition of the Director of Forestry is centered on the claim that approximately 22 hectares of the land is within the forest zone.00.The Director of Forestry (now Director of Forest Development) and the Heirs of Jose Zurbito.Soledad vda. Dr. The authentic document evidencing the classification of the land applied for registration as a forest zone has been presented. Sampaloc. When the vendors-a-retro failed to repurchase the properties within the period agreed upon.000. as oppositors. This arrangement was made in consideration of the personal relationship between the applicant and Soledad vda. title. to continue managing the properties. the vendors were given the option to repurchase the properties within five years from the date thereof (October 24. within the alloted time. as administratix of the estate of the deceased Jose Zurbito and in behalf of her children co-signed with her other children a deed of sale with a right to repurchase wherein they sold to Miguel Marcelo for and in consideration of the sum of P12. 1944) extendible for another period of one year at the option of vendors and that upon failure of the vendors to redeem the properties. Miguel Marcelo. CA confirmed and ordered the registration of the title over the property in the name of Miguel Marcelo. de Zurbito. Manila.1953 in the office of the Register of Deeds of Masbate. of legal age and residing at 687 General Geronimo. he allowed his mother-in-law. Miguel Marcelo under a deed of absolute sale for and in consideration of the sum of P10.CA rendered judgment declaring the applicant and the private oppositors.00 the remaining one-half undivided portion of the properties mentioned in the previous deed of sale. Dr. whereas the possession thereof by private respondents and their predecessor-in-interest commenced as early as 1909. 3. While the Government has the right to classify portions of Public land.while denying a motion for reconsideration filed by oppositor-appellant Director of Forestry. classifying the 22-hectare area as timberland. “Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. it may be stated. in the first instance may. ISSUE:Whether the 22 hectares area which forms part of the land applied for registration by and decreed in favor of herein private respondents is disposable agricultural land. the primary right of a private individual who Possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been anticipated. Great consideration. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide. Thus. 1924. the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. unsupported by satisfactory evidence. decide for itself what portions of public land shall be . “ It is not disputed that the aforesaid Land Classification Project No. was certified by the Director of Lands only on December 22. and undoubtedly will be. if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest. by reservation. paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. We have held that the Government. RULING: Yes. will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant. should. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry. REPUBLIC v. the spouses contended thatthe former declaration that the land is alienable estopped the Government toannul the decision on the ground that the said land was discovered to be apublic forest and thereafter cannot be registered. 1961. On the other hand. decree. The certification was reiterated by the Director of Forestry on May20. More than eightyears later. The decision became final and executory. 1985 FACTS: Spouses Maxino andTarciana Morales registered their parcel of land located at Barrio Cambuga(Anonang). On March21.considered forestry land. the Republic of the Philippines filed an amended petition tonullify the decision. ordering theregistration of said land. and title on the ground that the decision wasvoid because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified publicforest. Part VI 1. Quezon. ISSUE: Whether or not the mistake of the lower court in granting theland title in favor of the spouses estopped the Government from . 1948. Mulanay with the Court of First Instance at Gumaca. unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. CA (135 SCRA 156) 135 SCRA 156 January 31. Judge Vicente del Rosario rendered a decision. It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Itsinclusion in the public forest was certified by Director of Forestry FlorencioTamesis . A decreeand an original certificate of title were issued. Bulacan. private respondents(Applicants. 1976.R.declaring theland not alienable and not susceptible of private appropriation. is within the publicforest and therefore not alienable and disposable nor susceptible of privateappropriation. for brevity) claimed that they are the co- .and has an area of approximately 9. however long.3 hectares. It adjoins the Kailogan Riverand private respondents have converted it into a fishpond. Cad-302 is situated in Obando. Identified as Lot 2347. Possession of public forestal lands. the Governmentshould not be estopped by the mistakes or error of its agents. HELD: NO.It isincontestable that the area registered by the Maxinos. In theirapplication for registration filed on May 10. No. May 31. cannot ripeninto private ownership 2(Charleen) 3(Gina) Directorof Lands vs. Court of Appeals G.1984 Facts: The landin question. the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor ofthe Applicants. 637 dated March 1. which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. It further opined that"since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes. per BFMap LC No. continuous. what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property fromthe unclassified category.and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes in their names. represented by the Director of the Bureau ofForest Development opposed the application on the principal ground that theland applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando. This should be so undertime-honored Constitutional precepts. 1958. itcannot be categorized as part of forest lands. that it is not within any forest zone or military reservation. 1927. Afterhearing. " Issue: Whetheror not applicants are entitled to judicial confirmation of title.The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the ExecutiveDepartment of the Government and not of the Courts. Ineffect. therefore. peaceful andadverse possession of the subject parcel of land under a bona fide claim ofownership for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application"and are. public. TheRepublic of the Philippines.owners in fee simple ofthe land applied for partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchaseon May 2. Held: No. entitled to registration. This was affirmed on appeal by respondent Appellate Court. This is also in consonance with theRegalian . Bulacan. and that areas within the unclassified regionare denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable andalienable portion of the public domain.which found that "through indubitable evidence (Applicants) and theirpredecessors-in-interest have been in open. the land remains as unclassified land until it is releasedtherefrom and rendered open to disposition. In the absence of suchclassification. doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. and.R. Although classified as forest land. Sincethe subject property is still unclassified. Ozamis City. 1989 Facts: Respondent Bacus claims to be the owner of a parcel of land consisting of 496 square meters and situated in Manga. The Republic appealed but CA affirmed in toto the appealed decision. the subject land has become highly developed residential-commercial land. andthat the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land andcharged with the conservation of such patrimony.On September 14. No. The application was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines through the Director of Lands on the grounds that the applicant did not have title to the property nor was it available for private appropriation since it was still part of the public domain. prompting the instant petition. Tinago. 1981. however long. Francisco Bacus G. Bacus filed an application for its registration in his name with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental. . 73261. whatever possession Applicants mayhave had. cannot ripen into private ownership. August 11. The registration court ruled in favor of the applicant [Bacus]. 4(Zhon) Republic vs. no court has jurisdiction to order their registration in the name of a private person. shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into:(a) Alienable or disposable. 1827 of Revised Administrative Code provides. 3. shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another. It is for the claimant to show that it has been released for private appropriation. 5(May Ann) 6(Rhea B. but this he has failed to do.Issue: w/n the subject land has changed its status as forest land due to its development into residential and commercial land Held: The subject land is still a forest land despite it being used as residential and commercial lands. Sec. As long as they remain forest lands. Nota bene: 1. to wit. not including forest reserves.) . upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest.Lands in public forests. 141 provides. (b) Timber. Forest lands are not alienable as such and can be the subject of private appropriation only when they are declassified and declared as alienable. Sec. for the purposes of their administration and disposition. No evidence has been offered to prove that the lot had earlier been declassified as forest land by the proper authority. the President of the Philippines. 2. 6 of Act No.The President. upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. and (c) Mineral lands. Reyes. Issue: Whether there was no evidence adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration Held: Yes. it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment. and some others. 1.REPUBLIC vs SAYO Facts: The respondent spouses filed an original application for registration of a tract of land having an area of 33. The Solicitor General contends that no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration. The remaining area of 5. In a decision rendered on 1981. There was no competent evidence adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration.950 hectares. as counsel of the Republic. the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval. through the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry. Oppositions were filed by the Government. Jose C. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years. neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise agreement. that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise. in payment of his attorney's fees. but it is not.500 hectares was. he should have been but was not given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein. The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of . under the compromise agreement.500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel. but out of this area. The respondents contended that the Solicitor General's arguments are premised on the proposition that the disputed land is public land. was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library. it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration. as this Court has already had occasion to rule. it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime. The decision of the respondent Judge complained of is annulled and set aside. declared null and void. But that compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. 7(Angel) 8(Janine) 9(Mike Jayson) . and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.evidence of title required of the private respondents It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. In the proceeding at bar. founded on nothing but the agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the land. and set aside. as they are hereby. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership. a totally unacceptable proposition. It is an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question. What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein. It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be. to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their application. that Spanish document cannot be considered a title to property. But. LEONIDA V. No. as plaintiffs. FELISA BANQUILES. "who have been hired as tenants on the land have been illegally occupying for more than one year now several portions of the said property. SAMUEL PIMENTEL in his own behalf and in behalf of the minors. SEBASTIAN VILLANUEVA AND JUAN BANDAYRIL vs. In both cases. The Pimentels prayed that the Carabots and the Villanuevas "be compelled to disclose the facts on which they base their claims" and be declared to have no title to or interest of any kind in the property. Quezon. she placed as tenants on portions of the land the herein petitioners and that. as defendants. the Carabots and the Villanuevas asserted interest adverse to the Pimentels. the herein petitioners. that they . San Narciso. L-50622-23 November 10. ALMABELLA and CLARIBEL all surnamed. THE Hon. OLIMPIA L. (FIRST DIVISION). Quezon.. ALEXANDER MANUEL. NATIVIDAD RIOFLORIDO. San Narciso.10(Lou) 11(Jess) 12(Diane) BERNARDO CARABOT. She alleged that the herein petitioners. BANQUILES. JUAN BANQUILES." Ribargoso prayed that she be declared the lawful owner of the property and that her possession over the occupied portions be restored. pretending or assuming to be public land applicants. The Pimentels claimed that during the lifetime of Estrella Ribargoso.R. ENDIAPE. PIMENTEL. Tala. Tala. after the death of Estrella. 1986 FACTS: Samuel Pimentel and his children. claimed ownership of a "portion of the land in Bo. alleged that they are the pro-indiviso owners of a parcel of land in Bo. assisted by her husband GREGORIO DINGLASAN G. LEON VILLANUEVA. Natividad Rioflorido assisted by her husband Gregorio Dinglasan. COURT OF APPEALS. asserted that they have never been tenants of the private respondents. JR. there is no sufficient proof to show that what was described in the Spanish titles was precisely the same land in dispute. In this regard the Supreme Court has ruled that: All lands that were not acquired from the Government. The trial court ruled that the homestead and free patent titles of the petitioners are null and void. CA affirmed. 1884. then. either by purchase or by grant. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. that the titles of Dona Agripina Paguia were secured pursuant to the provisions of the Royal Decree of December 26. as previously stated. It appears. SC has already ruled that "In order that natural boundaries of land may be accepted for the purpose of varying the extent of the land included in a deed of conveyance the evidence as to such natural boundaries must be clear and convincing. Petitioners failed to do so. There was no proof regarding the validity of the Titulo de Composition con El Estado. belong to the public domain. HELD: No. The parcels of land are not private property. for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. granting that the existence of such documents has been proven by the certification of the Registrador de Titulos. ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land occupied by the petitioners and titled in their names as a result of homestead and/or free patents were already private property. Furthermore.occupied the land as their homesteads and that they have already applied for patents under the Public Land Law. 13(April) . The Court ruled that in the Public Land Act. a land forming part of the public domain that became alienable on December 31. REPUBLIC OF THE . 1925. public. 179987April 29. and notorious possession of the subject property. the earliest evidence of possession was a tax declaration from 1952. Moreover. the spouses failed to prove said requirement. continuous. 15(Melodia) 16(Mel) HEIRS OF MARIO PHILIPPINES MALABANAN GR No. in Misamis Oriental from the Neris through a sale dated on June 26. exclusive. 1970. tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership in the absence of actual. The mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain since June 12. continuous. the Court denied the petition because the spouses failed to satisfy the requirements of the Public Land Act. 2009 vs.14(Daniel Eblahan) Tan v.:Facts: Spouses Tan acquired an unregistered parcel of land. exclusive. and adverse possession.Significance:Proof of ownership: tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership. RepublicGR no. and there is no other evidence showing acts of ownership exercised by their predecessors-in-interest. The spouses immediately possessed the property and planted trees and fruit bearing plants. persons occupying or claiming to own public domain should prove that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. In this case. To prove this. The spouses sought to register the land and was allowed by the RTC. making the property public domain. Even if their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for thirty years or more. The Court of Appeals ordered the Tans to return the property to the Republic. 177797.Held: No. December 4. 1945 or earlier. 2008Chico-Nazario J. The Republic assailed the decision in its appeal to the Court of Appeals and contended that the Tans did not have an open.Issue: Whether or not the Tans have an open. the possession and occupation of the land must have started from June 12. continuous and notorious possession of the land because their predecessors-in-interest did not possess it before June 12 1945. 1945. But by 1966. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001. consisting of 71. On February 23. including Lot 9864-A. Gregorio. and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Eduardo Velazco. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena. notorious. Issues: . Lino Velazco.324 sq. arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15.3013 established under project no.Facts: On February 20 1998. which originally belonged to his uncle. Lino. his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 2002. Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite. the RTC approved the application for registration. and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR). 1982. and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years. their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties. meters. Esteban’s wife. 2007. Magdalena. Upon Lino’s death. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco.” On December 3. Lino had four sons– Benedicto. Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather. the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan. exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June12. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription? 4. otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code? 3. continuous. and notorious possession . 1945 or earlier? 2. exclusive. continuous. should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12. 1529. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section14 (1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? Ruling: The Petition is denied. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.1. 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open. prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable. subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. CA. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession.and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. and registrable title to. such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. since June 12. Patrimonial property is private property of the government. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. However. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. under Article 422 of the Civil Code. 17(Rocky) 18(Maribeth) MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO vs. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 120 SCRA 734 . 1945” have acquired ownership of. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. consider that under the Civil Code. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. 131. privaterespondents had reiterated their petition to admit answer. Eulalio Bayaua filed a claimwith respect to Lot 4976 during the cadastral survey. and (3) on tax receipts. mistake or excusable negligence. respondent heirs of Eulalio Bayaua filed a Petition toAdmit their Answers to Lot No. wherein the name of "DonLiberato Bayaua" was listed as "proprietario" over a 3hectare. Private respondents did notmove for the reconsideration of the foregoing Order. Province of Isabela. private respondents and theirpredecessors-ininterest did not file any claim to Lot 8000-A. Estadisticade los Terrenos de propiedad particular existantes en este pueblo de Carig. 4976 and Lot No. but due toaccident. for. nor did they appealtherefrom. They claimthat they possessed said property in the concept of owners since timeimmemorial through their predecessors-in-interest. may have by virtue andpursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1927 to March 23. 1957-1959 in the name of Eulalio Bayaua. 1932. alleging that previousanswers had been filed by Eulalio within the statutory period.1945. 6 del ano 1896" on file with theDivision of Archives. which includedthe bigger portion of the market site. son of Liberato Bayaua. Private respondents did not move for the reconsideration of said Ordernor did they take other remedial steps to have the Answer admitted. another Order was issued in the cadastral .the surviving spouse of Eulalio Bayaua. however. 4976-A and 8000-A locatedin the Municipality of Santiago are being claimed by respondent Maria Cauiñan.1968. The only ones who filed theircadastral Answers with regards to Lot 4976 were the Municipality of Santiagoand one Antero Catabas. on July 19.FACTS: Lots Nos. 5 During the cadastral surveyof the Municipality of Santiago from October 30. to whatever rightsthe Municipality of Santiago. The Court denied admission of theAnswer. After the suspension of thehearing due to war. 1-D. the allegedoriginal occupant thereof. 4976 public land subject. Bureau of Public Libraries. Petitioner opposed admission. The lower courtthen issued another Order declaring Lot No. They base their claim ofownership on (1) a Spanish document entitled. Apparently. 61 centare lot. the same could not be found in theCourt records. 1938-1939.Provincia de la Isabela de Luzon Num. (2) on Tax Declarations for the years 1921. but did not file anAnswer during the cadastral proceedings. andthe cadastral proceedings that followed in 1939. 1977. L-65334 FACTS: On August 8. 1963.R. In that sense. One of the two applicants was Conrado Eniceo. for short). Zapanta G. Makati (the Registration Court. and the land they were applying for . The other applicant was "Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño". As pointed out by the Trial Court. Private respondents appealedto the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the Trial Court anddeclared private respondents the lawful owners and possessors of the disputedland through acquisitive prescription. possession is not exclusive and notorious so as togive rise to a presumptive grant from the State.case denying admission on theground that Lot 4976 had been declared public land in the Order of September17. privaterespondents merely showed a "sporadic feeble cultivation of portionsthereof which does not amount to possession as owner". Hence. He had applied for registration under the Torrens system of a parcel of land containing 258 square meters. the present appeal by certiorariby the Municipality. Private respondents failed to submit convincingevidence of actual. 19(Ailyn) 20(Jen) Municipality of Antipolo December 26. 1984 vs. peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner ofthe entire area in question until the time they were allegedly dispossessed bythe Municipality sometime in 1951. which Order had become final (Exhibit "6"). No. a single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct applicants before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. ISSUE: Whether or not theproof of possession adduced by private respondents constitutes exclusive andnotorious possession under claim of ownership? HELD: No. Branch XV. A mere casual cultivation of portionsof the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim ofownership. Branch XIII. It never attained finality. Both parcels were situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. the appeal was dismissed despite the fact that before the dismissal.On May 22. and can be attacked at any time. pleaded a special defense of res judicata.registration was a parcel (hereinafter called the DISPUTED PROPERTY) containing 9. It follows that the titles issued in favor of the AVENDAÑO HEIRS must also be held to be null and void. The fact that the DISPUTED PROPERTY may have been declared for taxation purposes in their names or of their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 does not necessarily prove ownership. 909. ANTIPOLO had also declared the DISPUTED PROPERTY as its own in Tax Declarations Nos. ANTIPOLO perfected an appeal to the then Court of Appeals. the CASE BELOW was dismissed. which ANTIPOLO claimed it had not received. Pasig (the CASE BELOW.826 square meters surveyed in the name of the Municipality of Antipolo (ANTIPOLO. they must be ordered cancelled. They forget that all lands are presumed to be public lands until the contrary is established. Upon motion of the defendants-appellees to dismiss on the ground that ANTIPOLO had not filed its Brief within the reglementary period. in their Answer. its Decision adjudicating the DISPUTED PROPERTY as of private ownership is null and void. It was not a bar to the action brought by ANTIPOLO for its annulment by reason of res judicata. used long before the war as a public market and other public purposes.Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of public property of ANTIPOLO. since as far back as 1916. ANTIPOLO filed a complaint in Civil Case No. After a preliminary hearing on the mentioned special defense. erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that time.A notice to file Brief was issued by the Appellate Court.Issue: Whether or not the registration court did not have jurisdiction over the land subject of registration. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. its appeal was disallowed. Perforce. . The defendants. and hence actually devoted to public use and service. 41353.Held: The claim of the AVENDAÑO HEIRS that they merely tolerated occupancy by ANTIPOLO which had borrowed the DISPUTED PROPERTY from them. 993 and 454. since they had been in possession. for short). also of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. ANTIPOLO took steps to interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend the Record on Appeal. 1980. They were issued by a Court with no jurisdiction over the subject matter. The applications were approved by the Registration Court on February 26. 1981. for short) against named "Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño". and their assignees (hereinafter called the AVENDAÑO HEIRS) praying for nullification of the judgment rendered by the Registration Court. ANTIPOLO had submitted its Appellant's Brief. it being property of the Municipality of Antipolo. we find that contention to be meritorious. Facts: This is an application for registration of land with an area of more than 11 hectares located at Barrio Tambo. mother and father. under abona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. her sister. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of public agricultural land. The taxes for 31 years. . COURT OF APPEALS and TEDITA INFANTE TAYAG. Furthermore. Camarines Sur which was opposed by the Director of Lands. who testified that he was the overseer of Tedita’s father and he supported the claim of Tedita. No. who claimed the land on 1976. who died in 1937.22(Nelson) HINDI KO PO SURE KUNG TAMA UNG CASE G. were paid only in 1976. have been in the open. The realty taxes of the subject land from 1946 up to 1976 were only paid in 1976 by Tedita’s brother-in-law. The only witness of Tedita was Abraham Morandarte. Tayag (who does not know the boundary owners and the area of the land) and Morandarte. Held: No. her overseer since 1973. Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by Tedita is enough to grant the application for registration. Tedita. by himself and through his predecessors in interest. contended that the subject land was possessed by her father Froilan Infante. a few months prior to the filing of the application. 1984 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of Lands). for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by force majeure. The testimonies of Mrs. petitioner. are not sufficient to prove the alleged thirty years' possession in the concept of owner by the applicant. continuous. Buhi. Under that law. L-61462 July 31. vs.R. Tedita knew the land but not aware of its history. the applicant must prove that he. respondents. 1946 to 1976. After a study of the records. R. REYES vs. Registering the property in his own name because of the failureof the mortgagor to redeem the property would constitute pactum commissorium. He declared that he inherited the landfrom his father Vicente Reyes Sr. 890). Vicenteclaimed it was a contract of sale. 75 Phil.No. 548). Since the execution of thedocument. Basilia borrowed from Vicente’s father and secured the loanof P 100 with the piece of land in question. Although the document is a contract of mortgage and not acontract of sale.FRANCISCO SIERRA et. 23(JM) VICENTE C. the court is of opinion that it is mortgagecontract. L-28658 October 18. 93 SCRA 472 (G. 25 Phil. The land was originally owned by BasiliaBeltran’s parents. 1979) Facts: Vicente Reyes filed an application for registration ofhis title to a parcel of land in Rizal. the trial court ruled that the petitioner acquired ownershipover the property by prescription having been in constructive possession of theland since 1926.The applicant failed to satisfy the requirements for judicial confirmation of her alleged title (Maloles vs. However. Director of Lands. Director of Lands.. the father of Vicente began paying taxes up to his death. al. . The intention of the parties at the time of execution of the contractmust prevail. An opposition was filed byFrancisco Sierra and Emilio Sierra. who died in 1944. The said land must be presumed to be still a part of the public domain (Oh Cho vs. When possession is asserted to convert itself intoownership. nor continuous. Thetrial court's finding that since applicant and his father had been continuouslypaying the realty taxes. Applicant failed to presentsufficient evidence to prove that he is entitled to register the property.Mere failure of the owner to pay the taxes does not warrant a conclusion thatthere was abandonment of a right to the property. a new right is sought to be created. and the law becomes moreexacting and requires positive proof of title. 24(Maris) 25(Reg) . The payment of taxes onproperty does not alone constitute sufficient evidence of title.The trial court also ruled that applicant and his father’scontinuous payment of the realty taxes constitutes strong corroboratingevidence of applicant's adverse possession. that fact "constitutes strong corroboratingevidence of applicant's adverse possession. thepossession of applicant was not adverse. In the case at bar." does not carry much weight. Issue: Whether payment of taxes is a sufficient evidence toprove entitlement to register the property Held: No. Bulacan.26 G. Norzagaray. .R. 1991 REPUBLIC CEMENT CORPORATION. RCC appealed the CFI decision. 85991-94 July 3. petitioner. The CA upheld the decision of the trial court. ordering the registration of the claimed lots for Legaspi. The technical description and the survey plan duly approved by the Director of Lands submitted in evidence by private respondent fully describes the metes and bounds of the parcels of land involved. showing its boundaries and total area. was able to establish the identity of and title of the land sought to be registered in his name. The three applications were tried jointly. Correa. A counter application was filed for the two oppositors. HELD: Petition lacks merit. Contrary to the belief of RCC. MOISES CORREA and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN. Nos. clearly identifies and delineates the extent of the land. COURT OF APPEALS. FACTS: Republic Cement Corporation filed a petition in the CFI Bulacan. Branch V for the registration in its name of a parcel of land located in Bario Minuyan. The CFI rendered in Land Registration Cases in favor of the oppositors. Owners of the east central portion of the subject land opposed the application. Survey plan of the property. vs. respondents. spouses Rayo and Mangahas were able to prove the genuineness of his title and the identity of the lands he claims for his own in the manner and with the degree of evidence required by law. spouses Rayo and Mangahas. ISSUES: Whether Legaspi. Mangahas was later substituted by Moises Correa. through his predecessors-in interest. through its Davao District Land Officer. represented bythe MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER.An applicant for registration of land. he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title. 1934.L-40912 September 30. must prove not only the genuineness of said title but also the identity of the land therein referred to. 1934. 1976 Facts: On January 22. If he only claims a portion of what is included in his title. respondents. however. Eugenio de Jesus. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS. accepted sealed bids for the purchaseof the subject land. applied with the Bureau of Landsfor Sales Patent situated Davao City. 1921. . No. 27(Ed) 28(LJ) 29(Zax) 30 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. annulled the auction salefor the reason that the sales applicant. In lieu of that sale.the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus. On January 23. Eugenio de Jesus. The Director of Lands. another bidding was held on October 4.Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. failed toparticipate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduledbidding. vs. the Bureau of Lands. G.R. HON. if he relies on a document evidencing his title thereto. petioner. Philippine Army.On September 7. on December 6. TheMedical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strengthof proclamation No. provides that "Whenever public lands in the PhilippineIslands belonging to the Government of the Philippines arealienated. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center hasregisterable title over the whole contested area of 12. under theadministration of the Chief of Staff.or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations. Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tileor absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. . petitionerMindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of the12. 1969. 1936. Issue: whether or not petitioner MindanaoMedical Center has registerable title over a full 12. The Court of appeals denied the petition ofMindanao Medical Center. Held: Yes. 1176-B-2 from sale andsettlement and reserving the same for military purposes. It proceeds from the recognized competence of the president toreserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for aspecific public use or service. Whereupon. granted.designated Lot No. Section122 of the Act.8081-hectare land byvirtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medicalcenter site purposes. President Magsaysayrevoked this Proclamation No. President Manuel L. 1176-B-2 formedical center site purposes under the administration of the Director ofHospital. and not only on a portion thereof occupied by theMedical Center. which governs the registration of grants or patents involvingpublic lands. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 350 is free of any legalinfirmity. Proclamation no. 350 reserving the area for medical center site purposes. 1176-B-2.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of Davao.Quezon issued Proclaimation No. Thus. On October 9 1956. its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonableappurtenances.8081 hectares. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. Inasmuch as both the fiscal and Llarena failed to file their respective oppositions within the period set by the court. He alleged therein that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title to acquire ownership of the land the same not having been acquired by means of any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish government or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent laws. on December 12. 141 is misplaced. was filed by Espartinez on May 17. filed an opposition to the application for registration.ISSUE:Whether the subject parcel of land is alienable and disposable. one Perpetua Llarena appeared and. continuous. not subject to private appropriation. 1942. as amended by Republic Act No. RULING:No. and that the parcel of land involved is part of the public domain and therefore. exclusive and notorious possession of the land for at least thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application. That law is premised on the prior classification of the land involved as a disposable agricultural . On the same day. the Solicitor General entered his appearance for the government and at the same time. 1972. which allegedly contained an area of 1. 141. that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest were in open.172 square meters. He alleged therein that he acquired lot by purchase from Sotera Llacer. together with the fiscal. IAC195 SCRA 38FACTS: The application for the registration of the subject lot.036. that Espartinez may not avail of the provisions of Section 48 of the Public Land Act for failure to fulfill the requisites prescribed therein. Act496] and shall become registered lands.Espartinez' reliance on Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. the lower court issued an order of general default with the exception of said government agencies. and considering that only the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry represented by the fiscal had appeared. 1972. she was required to file an opposition to the application. it commissioned the clerk of court to receive evidence. Thereafter. however." 31(Lea) DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs.The jurisdictional requirements of publication of notice of initial hearing and posting of such notices in conspicuous places in the parcel of land involved and in the municipal building having been complied with.the same shall bebrought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act. should the Land Registration Act be not applicable. He invoked Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. CA 154 SCRA 476 Facts: In 1968.exclusively. Espartinez having failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and forms part of the disposable public domain. TheCFI granted the application. It also noted the failureto prove that trees are thriving in the land. which the latterclaimed to be in their possession and occupation openly. and however long. REPUBLIC V. supra).Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title under this provision has. continuously.Martina Carantes for and in behalf of the heirs of Salming Piraso filed in theCFI of Baguio an application for the registration of the land.PREMISES CONSIDERED. which was also affirmed by the CA. the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. whatever possession he might have had. Part VII 1. cannot ripen into private and his failure to adduce clear and convincing evidence of his claim over the land has given rise to the presumption that Lot 6783 is still part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Juana Carolino. under the ruling in Heirs of Amunategui vs. Issue: . opposed the application on theground that the said portion land is within the Central Cordillera ForestReserve as shown in the reports and testimonies of the district foresters. the land subject of the application for registration and confirmation of imperfect title is hereby DECLARED as part of the public domain. notoriously since 1915. Thegovernment’s failure to show that the disputed land is more valuable for forestpurposes is one of the reasons for the CA’s ruling.land. The Director of lands. through theSolicitor General and the Director of Forestry. Director of Forestry. where it stated that possession of forest lands. the Court also addressed the CA’s ruling by citing its decision inHeirs of Amunatequi v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69. TheCourt ruled that the petitioner clearly proved thru the reports and testimoniesof the district foresters that the land applied for registration is a part of aforestland. The Courtagain reiterated that there must first be a formal Government declaration thatthe forestland has been re-classified into alienable and disposableagricultural land. The classificationis descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to bedescriptive of what the land actually looks like. In itsdecision. cannot ripen into private ownership.Whetherthe land in dispute is alienable and disposable. 75). no matterhow long. Forestlandsdo not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.―A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not losesuch classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it ofits forest cover.Munoz (23 SCRA 1184). As to the claim of the applicants that they have been in possessionof the land since 1915. 2. where it ruled. GOMEZ VSCOURT OF APPEALS 168 SCRA503 FACTS: . before private persons in accordance with the various modesof acquiring public agricultural lands can acquire it. the court cited its decision in Director of Forestry v. Ruling: No. HELD: Yes. the trial court issued an order of generaldefault. 30 and32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration Act) which provides that after judgment has become final andexecutory. Gomez et al invoked Sec. TheSupreme Court has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered bythe Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) yearhas not elapsed from date of entry of such decree. That once the judgment becomes final and executory under Sec 30.Unlike ordinary civil actions. GLROChief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and petitioned for its settingaside. The decision became final and executoryhence the court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office toissue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated. and there being noopposition to the application. Under the law. After notice and publication. Consolacion later died and the 12 parcels ofland were inherited by Gomez et al – her heirs. the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of LandRegistration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate oftitle. Thelower court granted Silverio’s recommendation. the title is not finally adjudicatedand the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under thecontrol and sound discretion of the court rendering it. . ISSUE: Whetheror not to set aside the lower court’s initial ruling on approving theadjudication even after it had become final and executory. On 5 August 1981. He discovered that the 12 parcels of land were formerly part of a titledland which was already granted by homestead patent in 1929. land already granted byhomestead patent can no longer be the subject of another registration. The heirs agreed to divide theproperty among them. the court rendered its decision adjudicating thesubject lots in Gomez et al’s favor. the adjudication of land in a cadastral or landregistration proceeding does not become final.Acourt ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12 parcels of landbelonged to one Consolacion Gomez. in the sense ofincontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entryof the final decree of registration. thedecree of registration must issue as a matter of course. HENCE. During pendency of the application before the landregistration court. In 1968. Mendoza sold the land to Daniel Cruz. however. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor ofCruz. ordering the registrationof the two parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to the usufructuaryrights of Mendoza. it was proven that aparcel of land located in Sta. The land registration court ruled in favor ofMendoza on the ground that the court erred in its earlier decision in issuingthe land title to Cruz – who was not a party to the application of titleinitiated by Mendoza. Ruling: Yes. is owned by Mendoza. Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in thename of Cruz be cancelled. Maria. The Court ofAppeals ruling must be sustained. MENDOZA VS. 3. The decision became final andexecutory. Issue: Whether the title can be dealt with in the name of a“third party”. CA 84 scra 76 Facts: In 1964. Cruz appealed. First of all. Mendozaapplied for a title. Theregistration court rendered a decision in July 1965. it was proven that Mendozacaused the registration in the name of Cruz . uponfailure of Cruz to pay Mendoza.the case may still be reopened and the decision set aside when granted. Bulacan. The contract of salewas admitted in court in lieu of the pending application for land title. JULIA CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA 26 DECEMBER 1984. present such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead ofpresenting them to the office of the register of deeds. 4. The interested party may. the land therein described may be dealt withand instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of theregister of deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of title. or order the decree of registrationissued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has beenconveyed by said instruments. 133 SCRA 718 Facts: . “SEC. and the courtafter notice to the parties. .pursuant to their contract of sale. together with a motionthat the same be considered in relation with the application. shall order such land registered subject to theencumbrance created by a said instruments. and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to thecase. in thesame manner as if no application had been made. . After the filing of theapplication and before the issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of theGeneral Land Registration Office. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show thatthese requirements have been complied with in this case. Mendoza overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act whichexpressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of aregistration proceeding in the name of the buyer (Cruz) or of the person towhom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the intervalof time between the filing of the application for registration and the issuanceof the decree of title.Second. A stranger or a third party maybe dealt with in the land registration proceedings. 29. . The only requirements ofthe law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by theinterested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relationwith the application.however. thelatter’s land was erroneously included.attested that de Vera’s portion of land is only 5417 sq. m. De Vera’s nephew(Salvador Estrada) took over as administrator of De Vera’s estate. Estrada sued to evict Juliana. more or less. the only portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Vera’sestate is that which was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). Thediscrepancy approximates the portion of land actually being occupied byJuliana. Estrada howevernoticed that the Torrens title under De Vera indicated that his propertymeasures 8752 sq. He learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. The inclusion ofJuliana’s land in De Vera’s title was erroneously done. Hiswidow administered his property until her death in 1966. Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq.Mariano De Vera died in 1951. an unlettered woman. m. Issue: Whether the disputed portionshould be adjudged in favor of De Vera’s estate. m. m (more or less). Prior to thewidow’s death. she made an inventory showing that De Vera’s property (locatedin Calasiao. Juliana averred that she and herfather have been in open. agreed to have Mariano de Vera borrow her titlefor the purposes of Mariano obtaining a loan during de Vera’s lifetime. By that. The error ishighlighted by the fact that de Vera’s widow. that they’ve been paying taxes. in her inventory before she died. beingoccupied by Juliana. Arecalculation must however be made to specify the exact measure of landbelonging to each: 3732 . thatwhen de Vera registered his portion of land adjoined to that of Juliana. It was shown thatJuliana. exclusive and notorious possession and inthe concept of an owner of the land since 1921. Ruling: No. continuous.that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it only took them toinitiate an action in 1967 therefore laches has set in. V-19 had beenissued to him by the Bureau of Lands on the following August 19. Upon investigation. P-880 from the Office ofthe Register of Deeds for the Province of Isabela on November 10. Tolentino having complied with the legal requirements as to actualoccupancy. cultivation and improvement of the area applied for as well as thepayment of the purchase price. an investigation was conducted by the DistrictLand Officer for Isabela. 1949. and it was upon recommendationof that office that the patent was issued by the Director of Lands. situated in BarrioCallang Municipality of Gamu. the land was advertised for sale tothe highest bidder and on February 15. under which certain areas of public agricultural land inIsabela were reserved for settlement purposes.1950. L-17696 Facts: On November 19. the Director of Lands signed the correspondingorder for the issuance of a patent in his favor. should go to de Vera’s estate. specifically that portion identified as LotNo. 5. however.the applicant discovered that a portion of the land covered by his applicationwith an area of 2. Upon protest by Benito Tolentinofiled with the Bureau of Lands. for thecancellation of the homestead patent and the original certificate of titleissued to the defendant Braulio Cosme. and when it was verified that the land covered by thehomestead patent was embraced within the area awarded to Tolentino in 1928. Province of Isabela. 1953. 8091 Pls-62. pursuant towhich he obtained Original Certificate of Title No.R. which was given number 8706. No. . 610promulgated in 1940. theDirector of Lands filed the present action on November 27. m. DIRECTOR OFLANDS VS THE COURT OF APPEALS G. 1949 and that Homestead Patent No.3506 hectares.sq m should be retained by Juliana (portion which sheactually occupies) and 5020 sq. 1928 was duly awarded to the applicantpursuant to the provisions of Chapter V of the Public Land Act On January 19. Thehomestead settlement application had been filed with the now defunct NationalLand Settlement administration pursuant to Executive Proclamation No. had been applied for as a homestead by the herein defendantBraulio Cosme on March 22. In accordance with theapplication. 1926 a salesapplication was filed with the Bureau of Lands by Benito Tolentino for a tractof public agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares. . in appropriate cases and after prioradministrative investigations by the Director of Lands.. and the consequent reversion of the land to theGovernment. Ruling: No. a certificate of title. is that.said property becomes registered in contemplation of Act 496.Their principal contention isthat after the certificate of title was issued on November 10. may only be ordered cancelled under special circumstances. the said title becameincontrovertible. 22. therefore. while with the due registration and issuance ofa certificate of title over a land acquired pursuant to the Public Land Law. . andone of them is when the title is void. And a title will be consideredvoid if it is procured through fraud. Ramoso vs. properactions may be instituted by said official which may lead to the cancellationof the patent and the title. Olviga. 70 Phil.. even after the expiration ofone year from the issuance thereof.As a matter of fact. must give wayto the latter.free or sales patent. and becomesindefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the dateof the issuance thereof. Where a portion of a landsubject of a land registration case are covered by titles based on homestead. such certificate of title. Obligado. 60Phil. as when a person applies for theregistration of a land in his name although he knows that the property belongsto another. becomes incontrovertible. as long as the land disposed of is really a partof the disposable land of the public domain (El Hogar Filipino vs.On the other hand certificate of title issued pursuant to Act2259. 86 and others).The inescapableconclusion. isstill subject to certain conditions and restriction. A certificate of title based on a patent. 1949 by virtueof Homestead Patent No V-19 the land in question came under the operation ofthe Land Registration Act as provided in Section 122 thereof. the court cannot simply invalidate them. Issue: Whether the court can invalidatethe lands covered by titles based on homestead. when in conflictwith one obtained on the same date through judicial proceedings. and that upon theexpiration of one year from the date of its issuance. after the lapse of one (1) year.in view of itsnature and manner of acquisition. be it original or aduplicate.free or sales patent.7 A certificate of title issuedpursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the patent to a certificate issuedin a judicial proceeding. 6.000 hectares. SAYO G. The respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed thetitle and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. HON. and 4) in favor ofPhilippine Cacao & Farm Products. Reyes. The remaining area of 5.341 hectares. a compromise agreement wasentered into by the parties.SOFRONIO G. an area of 4. 236. 1. 2) in favor ofthe Bureau of Forest Development. After about 20 years.000 hectares. 8. Inc. Under the compromise agreement.109 hectares. but out of this area. The land wasformerly part of Santiago.500 hectares was adjudicated to and acknowledgedas owned by the Heirs of Sandoval. Isabela.. Then. an order of general default was enteredagainst the whole world except the oppositors.950 hectares tract of land but wasopposed by the government including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua . The applicants for registration presented a mere photocopy of acertification of the National Library stating that the property in .R. but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcayain virtue of Republic Act No.500 hectares wereassigned to their counsel. the Heirs ofCasiano Sandoval renounced their claims and ceded — 1) in favor ofthe Bureau of Lands. L-60413 Facts: Spouses Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez filed anoriginal application for registration of 33. 12. 3) in favor ofthe Heirs of Liberato Bayaua. in payment of his attorney's fees. No. Jose C. 4. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. and second. Portions of the land in controversy were assignedto persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownershipof any part of the land. anduninterrupted possession of the land for 20 years. as here.But. . Whether informacion posesoria is a prima facieevidence of possession. that Spanish document cannotbe considered a title to property. The decision of the Registration Court aquo is based solely on thecompromise agreement of the parties but such included private persons who hadnot adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject ofthe registration proceeding. but where. Issues: Whether the Registration Court correctly rendereddecision based from the compromise agreement of the parties. What was done was to consider the compromise agreementas proof of title of the parties taking part therein. adverse. Under the Spanish Mortgage Law. actual.question wasregistered under the Spanish system of land registration as private property. founded on nothing but the agreement among themselvesthat they had rights and interests over the land. proof offulfillment of these conditions is absent. public. a totally unacceptableproposition. informacion posesoria was considered a mode of acquiringtitle to public lands. Ruling: The compromise agreement and the judgmentapproving it is declared null and void. subject to two conditions: first. and obviously not constituting primary evidence ofownership. the inscriptionthereof in the Registry of Property. it not being one of the grants made duringthe Spanish regime. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no littleextension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation at all of theirpretensions to ownership. situated at the municipality ofLaur. sought the registration of title underAct 496. that approximately 13.957 hectares of said landconsist of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established underProclamation No. claiming that the applicant was without sufficient title and wasnot in open. VS HON. The Director of Lands.7. interests. province of Nueva Ecija. The land is largely uncultivated. L-27594 Facts: On February 24. No.R. REYES G. 237. exclusive. dated December 19.al. 237.the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin. It is beyond disputethat the land subject of the application is included within the area reservedfor military purposes under Proclamation No. mountainous and thicklyforested with a heavy growth of timber of commercial quantities. 1964. claiming ownership in fee simple byinheritance from the late Maria Padilla. The applicant AlipioAlinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of parties. ownership anddominion over the property subject matter of the application. The motion was granted by the lowercourt. . continuous and notorious possession and occupation ofthe land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding thefiling of the application. ofthe President. requesting that theParañaque Investment and Development Corporation be considered as the applicantin his place. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS et. 1955 of the President. 1955. dated December 10. and the Armed Forces of the Philippines opposed theapplication. SALVADOR C. as amended. of a vast tract of land.Director of Forestry. it having acquired all his rights. admittedly inside the boundary of the militaryreservation of Fort Magsaysay. 1967. the lower court.It is claimed by theapplicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by virtue of a possessoryinformation title issued during the Spanish regime on March 5. the Amended Record on Appeal was duly filed and copies servedupon the appellees.Tamayo. OnMarch 16. Lallo. one-third (1/3) portion of the saidproperty.the lower court rendered decision holding that the parcel of land applied foris adjudicated to and ordered to be registered in favor of: (a) Parañaque Investment and DevelopmentCorporation. and uponhis death in 1900. a Philippine corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens. 1967. directed the issuance of a decree of registration of the entire land. Tamayo. Cagayan.Tamayo. On November 19. so as to include thereincertain orders and pleadings. withaddress at Manila. By an order. Both motions were opposed by the Government. filed a motion for the issuance of a decree ofregistration. theapplicant Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation filed a motion forthe issuance of a decree of registration pending appeal. The latter in turn continued tocultivate the land thru tenants and utilized portions for pasture. Maria Padilla. 1895.resident of Cullit. . the lower court required theProvincial Fiscal to file an Amended Record on Appeal. thru counsel. Philippines. Director ofForestry and the Armed Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal fromthe said decision to the Supreme Court. married. ruling thatits decision of November 19.one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso in favor of Roman C. The oppositors Director of Lands. Filipino citizen. subject to the final outcomeof the appeal. 1966. andtwo-thirds (2/3) proindiviso in favor ofParañaque Investment and Development Corporation. he transmitted the ownership and possession thereof to hisdaughter and sole heir. On March 11. within ten days from receipt of the order. Tamayo. 1966 had become final as to the share of Roman C. Roman C. until herdeath sometime in 1944. Likewise. two-thirds (2/3) portion. Pending the approval of the Record on Appeal. subject to the rightsof Ariosto Santos and (b) Roman C. wasforwarded to this Court in due course of appeal. the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. the petitionersinstituted before the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari andmandamus with preliminary injunction. seeking to nullify the order dated March11. together with the evidence and transcripts. Thus. In any event. the Commissioner of LandRegistration issued Decree No.On March 14. and. Innocent purchasers maybe misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which maybe reversed on appeal. and it is . 0-3151of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Nueva Ecija. 113485 pursuant to the said order. A Torrens titleissued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity. As the lower court denied reconsideration of theorder directing the issuance of a decree of registration. Issue: Whether thelower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in orderingthe issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken fromthe entire decision a quo. the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto and OriginalCertificate of Title of the Register of Deeds for the province of Nueva Ecija. as it isviolative of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act whichrequires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating thetitle becomes final and executory. Werule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registrationproceeding. 1967. 1967. Ruling: The appeal takenby the Government was from the entire decision. the lower court approved theAmended Record on Appeal which.the appeal affects the whole decision. which is not severable. On April 12. 1967. on March15. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. 1967. Gomez(father of Consolacion).1981.the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction inordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timelytaken from the entire decision a quo. He recommendedthat the decision of August 5. Consequently. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Abran. Afternotice and publication. VS HON. ATTY. Chief of the Division of OriginalRegistration.al. Land Registration Commission submitted a report to the court aquo stating that portionsof the land sought for registration were covered by homestead patents issued in1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. On 5 August 1981. 1984. Gomez owner of certain lots in SitioPoponto Bayambang. GOMEZ et. OnJuly 11. Pangasinan. G. 1968.The lots were among those involved in the case of Governmentof the Philippine Islands vs. 77770 Facts: Petitionersapplied for registration of several lots situated in Bayambang. 1981 had become final anddirected the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the correspondingdecrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of August 5. Pangasinan onAugust 30. 1981. Perez. the trial court issued an order expressly stating that the decisionof August 5. 8. OnOctober 6. No. respondent Silverio G. 1981 and the order of October 6. pointing . COURT OF APPEALS. whereinthe Supreme Court declared Consolacion M. the courtrendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor.on the basis of said decree thatthe Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title. Petitioners opposed the report. thetrial court issued an order of general default. 1981 be setaside. JOSE S.R. and there being no opposition to the application. inthe sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) yearafter the entry of the final decree of registration. This being thelaw. Afterhearing. 1981 should be implemented because it had long becomefinal and executory. once the judgment becomes final and executory under section30. AHence. petitioners assert. DE LOS SANTOS 21 SCRA 1348 Facts: .he clearly acted without jurisdiction. Petition denied.D.D. No. the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981. 1981 and the order dated October 6.Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 ofP. 1981 had become final and executory. Ruling: Petitionersanchor their claim on section 30 of P. Petitioners'contention is not correct. thecourt shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registrationfor the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. 1981 for the issuance ofdecrees. when respondent Judge set aside in his decision. dated25 March 1985. Issue: Whetherthe decision dated August 5. the lower court rendered a second decision setting aside the decisiondated August 5. 1529 (Property RegistrationDecree) which provides that. this recourse. the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. after judgment has become final and executory. Unlike ordinary civil actions. 9. 1529 in that. Petitionersmoved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. or set aside. CAYANAN V.out that no opposition wasraised by the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that thedecision of August 5. reviewed. that it mayno longer be reopened. the adjudication ofland in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final. it may. It was stated further that a simulated Deed ofAbsolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent appellee. however it wasdenied.Felix Camaya. andthe period of one year filed for the review thereof has not elapsed. It prayed further for the opening of the decree ofregistration. there was a petition for review for the saidlot. aswell as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lotin favor of petitioners. As long as the final decree is not issued by theChief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with the law. . Issue: Whether the case may still be reopened and the decision set asidewhen granted Ruling: Yes. through deceit and through intentionalomission of facts. now appellant Cayanan. the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title. the titleis not finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered continues to beunder the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.The title of appellee De Los Santos to Lot 56 of Porac Cadastrewas confirmed by Judge Santos of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. It was alleged that said lot was registered in the name of appellee De losSantos through actual fraud. In the same year. 10.R." OnJune 13. Moreover. Inc. on a claim that they have beenin actual. one of the successors-ininterest of LaUrbana. the respondent DeBanuvar acquired lot 1 from de Erquiaga. long before theWorld War II. who was thus substituted as a partyfor the latter. HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS vs. and ordered the registration of these lots in favor of thelatter. over lot 5 and lot 1. open and uninterrupted possession and occupation of thesaid parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial. thecourt issued another order granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvarand "against all persons who have entered and occupied portions of lot 1.On May 17. 1960 de Erquiaga. They prayed that theapplication for the reconstitution of records be denied and that "theparcels of land in question be ordered registered in the respective names ofthe herein oppositors or declare the same as public land and be subdivided tooppositors who are landless. Inc. . DE BANUVAR G. the petitionersopposed the application for the reconstitution. after finding that the decision in theland registration case had already become final and executory. During the pendency of the reconstitution proceedings.Psu-56145 before the issuance of the decree. No. with certainreservations. filed a petition for reconstitution of the decision of March 24. FACTS: On March 24.1938. L-22110. However. 1963 the respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor ofDe Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only. and have introduced improvements thereon. adverse. 1938 the CFI rendered a decision confirming thetitles of La Urbana. Psu-56145." ISSUE: Whether the issuanceof the order is proper. 11. the issuance of a decree is aministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission. Rule 39. G. Forthis reason. Furthermore..et al. the order of granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvaragainst the petitioners. is proper and justified. regardingthe execution of a judgment in civil action. EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA.1963 when the decree in question was issued.ANGEL ALBANO. 6. 1988 . the petitioners' alleged possession and occupationof portions of lot 1 arose prior to or during the registration proceedings. No.but also against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at anytime before and up to the issuance of the final decree.. except the proceedings to placethe winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession.RULING: In the opposition to thepetition for reconstitution. Furthermore. that the judgment ismerely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforcedagainst the adverse party. The decision in aland registration case unless the adverse or losing party is in possession. or the person inwhom the land is ordered to be registered. The fundamental rule is that awrit of possession can be issued not only against the original oppositors in aland registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest.et al. DE BARROGA.becomes final without any further action. VS.R. The petitioners hereinadmittedly took possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 prior to July 1. there is noprovision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. upon the expiration of the period forperfecting an appeal. The reason is . L-43445 January 20.failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that nomotion therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner. There is nothing in the law that limits the period within whichthe court may order or issue a decree. Thereafter. 1970. who wasdeclared in default. The writ ofpossession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period of timethat had elapsed from the date of the . inclusive of persons not partiesthereto. 1979. The plaintiffs appealed. this petition. However. EufemiaBarroga and Saturnina Padaca. Issue: Whether theCourt could still issue orders despite lapse of long period of time from entryof judgment. 1973. et al. On August 8. 9821in favor of Delfina Aquino. thedecree of registration was only issued on October 14. and it was only onNovember 17.the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual. 1975. and particularly uponthose who had actually taken part in the proceeding as well as their successorsin interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or specialproceeding. 9821.One of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual.binding generally upon the whole world.Facts: On July 31. CFI Ilocos Norte rendered a decision inCadastral Proceeding No. 44 adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot No. litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in thesame capacity. that an original certificate of title was issued in DelfinaAquino's name. Hence.1975. A writ ofpossession dated August 28. and that title be adjudicated in their favor. Barroga'sand Padaca's complaint was denied by the court. the Court of FirstInstance ordered execution of the judgment on December 6.On August 11. for a writ of possession as regards Lot No. 1955. 1975 was issued. the Cadastral Court promulgated an order granting the motion of AngelAlbano. 1941. Held: The judgment of the cadastral court was ajudgment in rem. broughtsuit in the same Court of First Instance praying that Delfina Aquino's title bevoided and cancelled. Themotion was thereafter denied by the court by Order dated September 22. Defendants. Mamerta de la Merced. was able to obtainOriginal Certificate of Title. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastralcourt in favor of his father. after filing a homestead application therefor.Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. and. directed defendants to vacate Lot. the filing of theinstant petition for review. 12. the Director of Lands no longerhad authority to grant the homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced.the same as well as the certificate of title issued thereafter was null andvoid.registration decree. parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos. despite the lapse of many years. Thecadastral court declared the lot a public land. resisted plaintiffs'claim and asserted their ownership over said property as evidenced by an OCTissued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced and their continuous possessionof the land for more than 30 years. in their answer. The appellees are entitled to said writ ofpossession. their right thereto beingimprescriptible at least as against the persons who were parties to thecadastral case or their successorsin-interest. as a consequence of which Juande la Merced. MAMERTA DE LA MERCED VS. The court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs after making afinding the lot was part of the OCT in the name of the spouses Inocencio de losSantos and Victorina Macapagal. Issue: Whether the property thereby affected still be lost byadverse possession. a legitimate daughterof Juan de la Merced. was allowed to intervene and make common cause with thedefendants. since the right tothe same does not prescribe.. While the court held that the landhaving ceased to be part of the public domain. Ruling: . Hence.COURT OF APPEALS 5 SCRA 240 Facts: Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) is claiming ownership of LotNo. Holding that the cadastral court had nojurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lot public land. the court ordered the cancellation of OCT in the name of Juan de laMerced. therefore. J. They were occupying the possessing said land continuously. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case. and there being no imputation of irregularity in thesaid cadastral proceedings. under the Public Land Act. orderingthe issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over LotNo. 2010Peralta. which shall be the basis of thecertificate of title to be issued subsequently by the corresponding register ofdeeds. under Act496. They filed a Quieting of Title with the same court against Eland Philippines. Issue: Whether or not the summary judgment was properHeld: No.:Facts: The respondents owned a parcel of land in Tagaytay City. registered property whichcould not be acquired by adverse possession. and adversely for at least thirty years. As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court. from that time. 173289. The Court reversed . The certificateof title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequentdisposition of the land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary. The title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon theexpiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by thecadastral court. v. The land. They later found out that the petitioner has applied to register the land with the Regional Trial Court and that the same court has already issued a decree. are two different things. In a summary judgment. to beissued by the Land Registration Commissioner. that quiets title to and bindsthe land. without such an appeal having been perfected. had become. February 17. the same trial court ruled in favor of the respondents as the absolute owners and rightful possessors of the land and set aside its earlier decree. 13(Douglas) 14(Daniel Eblahan) Eland Philippines Inc.A decree of registration and a certificate of title. publicly. And it is the decree of registration. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said propertyhad already become final. forall intents and purposes. GarciaGR no. title of ownership on the said adjudicatee wasvested as of the date of the issuance of such judicial decree. Petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land.R. 1938. No. the Court ruled that the quieting of title was not the proper remedy but a petition for review of the decree of registration. This petition may be availed a person deprived of land or any interest or estate by reason of fraud when the following requisites are satisfied: 1. filed a petition for reconstitution of the decision of March 24. DE BANUVAR G.Significance:A review of a decree is allowed when the person is deprived of land or his interest or estate within due to fraud. ruling that summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact. In this case. The petition must be filed within one year from the issuance of the final decree by the Land Registration Authority 4. During the pendency of the reconstitution . a genuine issue of fact has been raised by the respondents that tend to prove the invalidity of the petitioner’s claim. Psu-56145. These issues can only be resolved in a full trial. The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value. In this case. the period of one year before the decree becomes final and incontrovertible has not yet lapsed when they filed the complaint for the quieting of title and because the decree was not yet issued by the Land Registration Administrator.the lower courts’ decision. over lot 5 and lot 1. 1960 de Erquiaga.interest of La Urbana. one of the successors-in. with certain reservations. The Court also laid down the rules on how to avail said remedy. T Court also noted that the petition may be filed after the decision of the court up until before the one year expiration period from the entry of the final decree issued by the Land Registration Administrator. 15(Douglas) 16(Mel) HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS vs. 2. and ordered the registration of these lots in favor of the latter. Also.On May 17. Inc. He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration 3. Inc. FACTS: On March 24. 1938 the CFI rendered a decision confirming the titles of La Urbana. L-22110. open and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial. Furthermore." On June 13. Rule 39. the court issued another order granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar and "against all persons who have entered and occupied portions of lot 1. the petitioners opposed the application for the reconstitution. on a claim that they have been in actual. the petitioners' alleged possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 arose prior to or during the registration proceedings. The decision in a land registration case unless the adverse or losing party is in possession.proceedings. 1963 when the decree in question was issued. Moreover. who was thus substituted as a party for the latter. Psu-56145 before the issuance of the decree. long before the World War II. the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from de Erquiaga. 6. and have introduced improvements thereon. there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. RULING: In the opposition to the petition for reconstitution. becomes final without any . However. the order of granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar against the petitioners. but also against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree. For this reason. adverse. The fundamental rule is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest. except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. 1963 the respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only. after finding that the decision in the land registration case had already become final and executory. The petitioners herein admittedly took possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 prior to July 1." ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the order is proper. is proper and justified. They prayed that the application for the reconstitution of records be denied and that "the parcels of land in question be ordered registered in the respective names of the herein oppositors or declare the same as public land and be subdivided to oppositors who are landless. regarding the execution of a judgment in civil action. Upon being notified of the petition foradministrative reconstitution. The reason is .No. real estate tax receipts. failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner.further action. upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. they submitted the owner’sduplicate copy of TCT No.210177 issued in the name of Homer L.R. that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party.. G. 162335. In support of said petition. RT-22481. which was destroyed in the firethat gutted the Quezon City Hall. 1997. Furthermore. the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission. Manotok filed their opposition thereto claimingthat the lot covered by the title under reconstitution forms part of the landcovered by their reconstituted title TCT No. denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 2005 FACTS: Respondents Barque. 210177.Bustos.. or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered. filed a petitionwith the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 17(Douglas) 18(Maribeth) Manotok vs. Benjamin M. 210177 in the name of petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest is spurious. December 12. Barque. tax declarationsand the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property. Barque. as reconstituting officer.210177 on grounds that: . Atty. There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. including the Office of the Register of Deedsof Quezon City. and alleging that TCTNo. On June 30. Mtrs. 210177 when heissued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands.<a></a><a>6</a> Respondents’ motion for reconsiderationwas denied hence they appealed to the LRA which ruled that the reconstitutingofficer should not have required the submission of documents other than theowner’s duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the petition andshould have confined himself with the owner’s duplicate certificate oftitle.. They duly presented the original of the owner’s duplicate copy ofTCT No.at the time of the destruction thereof. 210177 as among the titles lost. 210177absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823Piedad Estate . reconstituted under Adm.G. Lots 823-A and 823-B.. respectively. 210177. 210177 was one of the titlesdestroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall. It thus opined that respondents’ title . genuine. Land Management Bureau. and 171. authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 372302 registeredin the name of Severino M. Q-213 dated February 01.. Mtrs. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is aspurious document as categorically stated by Engr. the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and thesame is mandatory.containing an area of 342. Under suchcircumstances. in his letter dated February19. L.Geodetic Surveys Division. Manotok.. Mtrs. authentic andeffective. Dalire. Privadi J. L. was valid.473 Sq.containing areas of 171.472 Sq.covered by TCT No. 210177. Nevertheless. The Register of Deeds of Quezon Cityhimself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No. Form No. 1997. appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate. Fls-3168-D. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 andB. 210177 wasestablished indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. It therefore becomes evident that theexistence. 1991.Reconstitution No. The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCTNo.1. notwithstanding the conclusionthat Respondents’ title was fraudulently reconstituted.945 Sq. Chief. 210177. validity. et. as indicated in the B. theBarques have established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. It is likewise noteworthy that thetechnical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. al. the LRA noted that itis only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which can declare that the same wasindeed fraudulently reconstituted. covered by TCT No. Form No. The LRA further declared that based on the documents presented. 2.. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. the SecondDivision of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision the dispositive portion ofwhich reads: WHEREFORE. In CA-G. From the foregoing. Petitioners’ filed a motion forreconsideration which was opposed by respondents with a prayer thatreconstitution be ordered immediately. T-210177. SP No. the Third Division of theCourt of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due courseto the petition for reconstitution since there is yet no final judgmentupholding or annulling respondents’ title. respondents filed apetition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G. theThird Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision on October 29. 1998 is AFFIRMEDin toto and the petition for review is ordered DISMISSED. our decision dated 13September 2002 is hereby reconsidered.66700 and praying that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute TCT No. Petitioners’ motion for reconsiderationof the amended decision in CAG. Accordingly.R. No. Meanwhile. the SpecialDivision of Five of the Former Second Division rendered an Amended Decision inCA-G. Petitioners likewise filed a petition for review with theCourt of Appeals docketed as CA-G. The Resolution of the LRA dated 24 June 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED. RT-22481 of privaterespondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwithpetitioners’ valid. 66642. in CA-G. 2003. the petition is herebyDENIED.<a></a><a></a> . On November 7. 66700.R.mayonly be reconstituted after a judicial declaration that petitioners’ title wasvoid and should therefore be cancelled.2003.RT22481 [372302] should first be cancelled by a court of competentjurisdiction. SP No. genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. In so ruling.R. 162605. the Register of Deeds ofQuezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. SP No.R. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. 66642. SP No.R.Respondents moved for reconsideration. 66700. thepetition docketed as G. SP No. SP No. 66700 was denied.R. Both were denied.210177 without being subjected to the condition that petitioners’ TCT No. the foregoing premisesconsidered the assailed Resolution of the LRA dated June 24. hence.R. 162335.<a></a><a>29</a> .the same should have more than sufficed as sources for the reconstitutionpursuant to Section 3 of RA No. Plainly. 66700 and CA-G.R. 162605 and G. That in casethe reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sourcesenumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act. or with a certified copyof the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the sameproperty. Section 12 of the same law requires that thepetition shall be accompanied with a plan and technical description of theproperty only if the source of the reconstitution is Section 3(f)of RA No. Thus: Section 12. ISSUE: Whether or not the LRA could proceed with thereconstitution of the tile? HELD: Yes.R. they submitted in support thereof the owner’s duplicatecertificate of title. 26 clearlyprovides: Section 3.R. From the foregoing decisions of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G. Transfer certificates oftitle shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated asmay be available. RT-22481 and directing the LRA toreconstitute forthwith respondents’ TCT No. the petition shall further beaccompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approvedby the Chief of the General Land Registration Office. the Motion forReconsideration is hereby GRANTED. 66642.R. In addition. SP No.No. When respondents filed the petition forreconstitution. real estate tax receipts and tax declaration. 26.Respondents’ motion for reconsiderationwas granted by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals on February 24. No. SP No. … Provided. Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. respectively. The court held that the LRA properly ruled that the reconstitutingofficer should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate certificate oftitle prior to the reconstitution. 26 which explicitly mandates that thereconstitution shall be made following the hierarchy of sources asenumerated by law. petitionersfiled separate petitions for review before the Supreme Court docketed as G.thus: WHEREFORE. in the following order: (a) The owner’sduplicate of the certificate of title. T-210177. 2004. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds ofQuezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. then President FerdinandE. On April 25. granting and transferring to PEA “the parcels of land so reclaimed underthe Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) . 1995.Since respondents’ source ofreconstitution is the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. 1973. PEA entered intoa .” On the same date. Aquino issued Special Patent No. x x x lease and sellany and all kinds of lands. PETITIONER. 1084 creating PEA . 1977. RESPONDENTS FACTS On November 20. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 133250 July 9. then President Marcos issuedPresidential Decree No. 1988.By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution. No.2002 FRANCISCO I. VS. the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issuedTransfer Certificates of Title in the name of PEA. 19(Ailyn) NATURE OF RECLAIMED LANDS G. Parañaque City.” and “to develop. much lessdeny the petition on the ground that the submitted plan appears to be spurious. the government.tasked “to reclaim land. there is no needfor the reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan. OnJanuary 19. On February 4. including foreshoreand submerged areas.3517. then President Corazon C.R. 1085 transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in theforeshore and offshore of the Manila Bay” under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Roadand Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). acquire. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARICOASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. 1988. covering the three reclaimedislands known as the “Freedom Islands” located at the southern portion of theManila-Cavite Coastal Road. improve.Subsequently. itis the intent of the law to give more weight and preference to the owner’sduplicate certificate of title over the other enumerated sources. through theCommissioner of Public Highways. signed a contract with the Construction andDevelopment Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshoreand offshore areas of Manila Bay.on April 9. CHAVEZ. Among the conclusions of theirreport are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under theJVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienablelands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands. Ramos issued PresidentialAdministrative Order No. 1996. a private corporation. throughthen Executive Secretary Ruben Torres. conducted a joint investigation. then President Fidel V. to developthe Freedom Islands. the Courtgave due course to the petition and required the parties to file theirrespective memoranda.”As a result. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose theterms of any renegotiation of the JVA. Article XIIof the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the publicdomain to private corporations. OnDecember 5. Petitionercontends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA ofthe reclaimed lands to AMARI.contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees. Estrada approved the Amended JVA. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARIof lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3. 1999. Ramos. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA. Article II. 1999. and (3) the JVA itself isillegal. then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilegespeech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the “grandmother of all scams. 1998. approved the JVA. Article III.Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI. of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people toinformation on matters of public concern. On June 8. Chavez (“Petitioner” for brevity) as a taxpayer. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study onthe legality of the JVA. OnNovember 29. (2) the certificates oftitle covering the Freedom Islands are thus void. invoking Section 28.On May 28. and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers andInvestigations. On March30. 1995. 1997. . the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and PublicEnterprises. andSection 7. In a Resolution dated March 23. then President Fidel V. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiationwithout public bidding.filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of aWrit of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. petitioner Frank I. PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement (Amended JVA). the Office of the President under the administration of thenPresident Joseph E. On April27. 1999. petitioner nowprays that on “constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contractbe declared null and void. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. The 1987 Constitution declares that allnatural resources are “owned by the State.has adopted the Regalian doctrine. Clearly. UnderSection 2. like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it.” or whose “object is outside the commerce of men. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.” ISSUE WHETHERTHE Lands reclaimed from foreshore andsubmerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable WHETHERTHE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TOAMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS.the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3. VIOLATE THE 1987CONSTITUTION RULING The 1987 Constitution.Due tothe approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President. Moreover.foreshore and submerged areas “shall not be alienated. the foreshore and submergedareas of Manila Bay are part of the “lands of the public domain. RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED. natural resources cannot bealienated. Article XII of the 1987Constitution. Landsreclaimed by the government are sui generis. not available forsale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. The mere reclamationof these areas does not convert these inalienable natural resources of theState into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.” As such.” unless they areclassified as “agricultural lands” of the public domain. waters x x xand other natural resources” and consequently “owned by the State. contracts whose “object orpurpose is contrary to law. There must be alaw or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed landsas alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.” and except foralienable agricultural lands of the public domain.these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if thelaw has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.” The Court must perform its dutyto defend and uphold the . Reclaimed landsretain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.”are “inexistent and void from the beginning. and other fruit-bearing trees.Constitution. prompting the spouses Tan to file a Complaintfor Quieting of Title against him before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City. a certain Patermateo Casiño (Casiño) claimed aportion of the subject property.gemelina. who became Australian citizens on 9February 1984.Cagayan de Oro City. PEDRO TAN AND NENA ACERO TAN. In a Resolution the appellate court dismissed for lack ofinterest to prosecute. Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO). On 29August 1989. as established by a Certificationdated 14 August 2000 issued by the Department of Environment and NaturalResources (DENR). December 04. The subject property was declaredalienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. 177797. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. The spouses Tan tookimmediate possession of the subject property on which they planted rubber. The said Resolution became . Prior to the spouses Tan. RESPONDENT FACTS The spouses Pedro Tan and Nena AceroTan were natural-born Filipino citizens. Lucio and Juanito Neri had declared thesubject property for taxation purposes in their names.R. They seek to have thesubject property registered in their names. TAX DECLARATION G." Casiño appealed the said RTC Decision to theCourt of Appeals .PETITIONERS. Casiño elevatedhis case to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari. the RTC rendered a Decision favoring the spouses Tan and declaringtheir title to the subject property thus "quieted. However. No. 2008 SPS. and therefore declares the Amended JVAnull and void ab initio. the subject property was in thepossession of Lucio and Juanito Neri and their respective spouses. In a Resolutiondated 13 March 1991 the Court deniedCasiño's Petition for being insufficient in form and substance.The spouses Tan acquiredthe subject property from Lucio and Juanito Neri and their spouses by virtue ofa duly notarized Deed of Sale of Unregistered Real Estate Property dated 26June 1970. VS. They declared the subject property for taxation purposes in their names andpaid realty taxes thereon. Casiño's application was ordered cancelled by Officer Ruth G. and reversing and setting asidethe 9 May 2001 Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan failed tocomply with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. the spouses Tan already made a formal offer ofevidence. On 9 May 2001. nephew and lone witness of the spousesTan. Cagayan de Oro City. the spouses Tan filed on 5October 2000 an Amended Application for Registration of Title to the subjectproperty. the Court of Appeals rendered aDecision granting the appeal of the Republic. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered itsappearance on behalf of the Republic. otherwise known as thePublic Land Act. except as against the Republic. Sabijon ofDENR-CENRO. Casiño filed an Application forFree Patent on the subject property before the Bureau of Lands. but failed to submit a written oppositionto the application of the spouses Tan.final andexecutory on 3 June 1991. In compliance with the request of the LandRegistration Authority (LRA) dated 29 August 2000. as amended by Presidential Decree No. In 2000. Thereafter.as amended. When no opposition to the application of the spouses Tan wasfiled by the time of the initial hearing the RTC issued on 23 April 2001 anorder of general default. 141. the spouses Tan filed their Application forRegistration of Title to the subject property before the RTC of Cagayan de OroCity. the RTCrendered a Decision granting the application of the spouses Tan. which requirespossession of the subject property to . the declared owner of the subject property pursuant to the 29 August 1989Decision of the RTC. 496 and/orSection 48 of Commonwealth Act No. The Republicappealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. After Acero's testimony. On 8 December1999. 141. On 28 February 2006. the spouses Tan were allowed topresent their evidence ex-parte. 1073. upon the request of herein petitioner PedroTan. Acero . which was admitted by the court a quo. the RTCheard the testimony of John B. After the establishment of the jurisdictional facts. Refusing to give up. The application of the spouses Tan invoked the provisions of Act No. 2948. Unfortunately. 4627 thatit cancelled Tax Declaration No. Hence.2948 was issued in the year 1944. They called attention to the statement in Tax Declaration No. the spouses Tanare now asking the kind indulgence of this Court to take into account TaxDeclaration No. ISSUE . 4627 issued in 1948. and should the Court take judicial notice of the fact that taxassessments are revised every four years. 2948. The spouses Tanasserted that judicial notice may be taken of the fact that land assessment isrevised by the government every four years.start on or prior to 12 June 1945. 4627 was not newly issued but cancelled Tax Declaration No. no copy of Tax Declaration No. then Tax Declaration No. 4627was issued in the year 1948. 4627 covering the subject property issued in 1948 in the name of theirpredecessor-in-interest. The earliestevidence of possession and occupation of the subject property can be tracedback to a tax declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interestonly in 1952. the spouses Tan attached to their Motion a copy of Tax DeclarationNo. The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsiderationof the spouses Tan in a Resolution dated 12 April 2007. However. the spouses Tan point out that TaxDeclaration No. it can be presupposed that Tax Declaration No. Lucio Neri. Just as they hadargued before the Court of Appeals. To refute the finding of the appellate court that they and theirpredecessors-in-interest did not possess the subject property by 12 June 1945or earlier. which they had attached to their Motionfor Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals but which the appellate courtrefused to consider. 2948covering the subject property was issued as early as 1944. and since Tax Declaration No. The spouses Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of theforegoing Decision of the Court of Appeals.the appellate court ordered the spouses Tan to return the subject property tothe Republic. 2948 was available even inthe Office of the Archive of the Province of Misamis Oriental. The possession andoccupation of the subject property by the predecessors-in-interest of thespouses Tan were evidenced only by the tax declarations in the names of theformer. Tax Declaration No. Whilethe spouses Tan undoubtedly possessed and occupied the subject property openly. in contrast. No other evidence was presentedby the spouses Tan to show specific acts of ownership exercised by theirpredecessors-in-interest over the subject property which may date back to 12June 1945 or earlier. In the absence of actual. the declaration of the land for tax purposesdoes not prove ownership. For failure of the Spouses Tan to satisfy the requirementsprescribed by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. there was a dearth of evidence that theirpredecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject property in thesame manner.WHETHER TAXDECLARATIONS EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AND RECEIPTS ARE CONCLUSIVE RULING Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence ofownership. by immediately introducingimprovements on the said property. they constitute mere prima facie proofs of ownershipof the property for which taxes have been paid.They may be good supporting or collaboratingevidence together with other acts of possession and ownership. exclusively and notoriously.continuously. having been issued onlyin 1948. . The spouses Tan purchased the subject property and came intopossession of the same only in 1970. To justify their application for registrationof title. in addition to declaring the same and payingrealty tax thereon. as amended.public and adverse possession. but bythemselves. the earliest of which. they had to tack their possession of the subject property to that oftheir predecessors-in-interest. At most. this Court hasno other option but to deny their application for judicial confirmation andregistration of their title to the subject property. tax declarations are inadequate to establish possession of the propertyin the nature and for the period required by statute for acquiring imperfect orincomplete title to the land. 4627. For their part. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possessionof Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed before the Regional TrialCourt of Caloocan City. hence. the proximate source ofCLT’s title. claiming that Dimson’s title. CLT’s claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate ofTitle (TCT) issued in its name by the Caloocan City Register of Deeds. RESPONDENT AND CLT MANOTOK ESTATE REALTY DEVELOPMENT FACTS On 10August 1992. CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover fromManotok Realty. VS.R. INC. CORPORATION. was irregularly issued and. 2007 MANOTOK REALTY.123346. the Manotoks challenged the validity of thetitle relied on by CLT. 994.DECREE OF REGISTRATION G. No. The Manotoks asserted their . CORPORATION. December 14. Hipolito’s titleemanated from Jose Dimson’s (Dimson) TCT . Inc. a title issued pursuant to an orderof the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City. whichtitle in turn was derived from Estelita Hipolito (Hipolito) by virtue of a Deedof Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated 10 December 1988. Dimson’s title appearsto have been sourced from OCT No. the same and subsequent titlesflowing therefrom are likewise void.PETITIONERS. adopted the factualfindings and conclusions arrived at by the majority commissioners appointed toresolve the conflict of titles. The Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals. The trial court. ISSUE whether the titles issued in thename of CLT IS valid . per annotationdated 21 November 1946.ownership overLot 26 and claimed that they derived it from several awardees and/or vendees ofthe National Housing Authority. 496 by virtue of which OCT No. on 9 September 1918. 994 wasissued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Their motion for reconsiderationhaving been denied. Maria Clara Gonzalez. they filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.that Lot 26 was transferred to CLT byHipolito whose title was derived from the Dimson title and that on the basis ofthe technical descriptions of the property appearing in the Manotok titles. Ruiz and Leuterio sold theproperty to Francisco Gonzalez who held title thereto until 22 August 1938 whenthe property was transferred to Jose Leon Gonzalez. 35486.Juana Francisca Gonzalez. The lot was then. Consuelo Susana Gonzalez. subdivided into seven (7) parcels each in the name ofeach of the Gonzalezes. thelatter’s property indeed encroached on the property described in CLT’s title. 994 which. was transferred toAlejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who had previously acquired the property on21 August 1918 by virtue of an “Escritura de Venta” executed by Don TomasArguelles and Don Enrique Llopis.ascribing error to the appellate court in upholding the trial court’s decisionwhich decided the case on the basis of the majority commissioners’ report andoverlooked relevant facts in the minority commissioner’s report. The Manotok title likewise traced as itsprimary source OCT No. On 3 March 1920. Francisco Felipe Gonzalez andConcepcion Maria Gonzalez under TCT No. whichaffirmed the decision of the trial court. ruling for CLT. It was established that the entire MaysiloEstate was registered under Act No. 123346.RULING With respect to G. None of these three titles can beaccorded recognition simply because the original title commonly referred totherein never existed. The Manotoks filed their respectivemotions for reconsideration. . These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proventhat OCT No. To conclude otherwise would constitute deliberatedisregard of the truth. No. the Court upheld thevalidity of the trial court’s adoption of the commissioners’ majority report aspart of the decision. 994 of the Registry of Deeds ofCaloocan City registered on 19 April 1917. butthey did not. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree ofregistration on 17 April 1917. alleging that it was the registered owner of Lot 26 of the MaysiloEstate. The Court pointed out that the titles of respondents inall three cases were derived from OCT No. the cases were elevated to theCourt en banc. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. CLT has specifically manifested that the OCT No. there is no sense in affirming the 2005 Decision whichsustained the complaints for annulment of title and/or recovery of possessionfiled by CLT and the Dimson when their causes of action are both founded on aninexistent mother title. there is no such OCT No.Given thisessential clarification. as appearson the title. that mother title was received for transcription by the Register ofDeeds on 3 May 1917. CLT hadoriginally filed a complaint for annulment of the titles in the name of theManotoks. there is only one OCT No. 994.994 originally registered on 19 April 1917. Hipolito’s andDimson’s—that the properties they purport to cover were “originally registeredon the 19th day April 1917 in the Registration Book of the Office of theRegister of Deeds of Rizal. First. and that should be the date which should be reckoned asthe date of registration of the title. On 5 June 2006.” As earlier established. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually existed. the Court is able to make the followingbinding conclusions. In the Manotok petition. and that is OCT No. As it appears on therecord. From these premises. 994they concede as true is also the one which the Office of Solicitor Generalsubmitted as true. In fact. It may also be acknowledged. that OCT No.R. It is evident from all three titles CCLT’s. CLT and theDimsons were given the opportunity to submit such proof before this Court. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void. the date and time of such transcription being set forthin the process and certified to at the foot of each entry or certificate oftitle. The issuance of the original and owner’s duplicate certificates arebasic for the valid existence of the title.although such date cannot be considered as thedate of the title or the date when the title took effect. Acertificate of title is deemed as regularly issued with the issuance of theoriginal copy and owner’s duplicate �7�L�% 20(Douglas) 21 (Douglas) 22(Douglas) 23(Cha) .any title thattraces its source to OCT No. for such mothertitle is inexistent. in fact. sufficient to invalidate theDimson and CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placedby them on the dates appearing on their respective titles. The land becomes a registered landonly upon the transcription of the decree in the original registration book bythe register of deeds. Issuance of additional copies arepermissive and their non-existence does not affect the status of title. Second. This error alone is. 2 under pain of demolition and to vacate the premises in favor of private respondents within thirty (30) days. The respondents appealed to the CA which reversed the decision of the trial court and confirmed the ownership of said Lot No.Issue: WON the court is correct in issuing the writ of possession with a special order of demolitionHeld: The SC held that the respondent appellate court committed no reversible error in holding that the writ of possession issued by the trial court and it is a necessary consequence of the adjudication of ownership and the corresponding issuance of the Original Certificate of . issued the questioned writ of possession with the complimentary directive for the oppositors to dismantle and remove their building and/or structure from Lot No. IAC 162 SCRA 154 Facts: Petitioners oppose the application for registration and confirmation of title over Lot 2. On motion of private respondents.24(Cha) 25(Cha) 26(Cha) 27(Cha) 28 (Cha) 29(Cha) g g g g g g A writ of demolition is but a compliment of the writ of possession and may be issued by a special order of the court. on March 19.Gawaran v. Bacoor. The petitioners appealed but the petition was dismissed. 1985. the respondent RTC. Cavite." The trial court awarded the lot to the petitioners. 2 in the names of private respondents. PSU-173975 situated in Digman. on which petitioners had their residential house and a "camarin. and an order for the issuance of a decree in favor of private respondents was issued. on April 11. Ray Burton Development Corp. 1988.188 square meters. RBDC submitted to AYALA for approval a set of architectural plans for the construction of a 5-storey office building on the subject lot. 1988. The said land is now the subject of this case. but also against any one unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree. The said estate was originally a raw land which was subdivided for sale into different lots devoted for residential. this time to .” Since the building was well within the 42-meter height restriction.Early in June of 1990. In a registration case. Hence. AYALA approved the architectural plans. now respondent. Salcedo Village. On March 20. the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily carries with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the right of ownership. commercial and industrial purposes. 1:51pmMush TapaIn lieu of demolition. v.Ayala Corp. On February 18. that the vendee would comply with certain special conditions and restrictions on the use or occupancy of the land. As in the KARAMFIL-PALMCREST transaction. It is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the successful party. award of damages proper. 294 SCRA 48Facts: Petitioner Ayala Corporation (AYALA) is the owner of the Ayala estate located in Makati City. located at what is now known as H.Title. Sometime in June of 1989. g g g g g g 9/7.V. among others. RBDC made another set of building plans for “Trafalgar Plaza” and submitted the same for approval. KARAMFIL sold the lot to Palmcrest Development and Realty Corporation (PALMCREST) under a Deed of Absolute Sale of even date. The transaction was documented in a Deed of Sale of even date. AYALA gave its conformity to the sale. Block 2 consisting of 1. Karamfil Import-Export Company Ltd. Makati City. PALMCREST in turn sold the lot to Ray Burton Development Corporation (RBDC). 1984. The building was to be known as “Trafalgar Tower” but later renamed “Trafalgar Plaza. a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case. with the agreement that AYALA retains possession of the Owner’s Duplicate copy of the title until a building is erected on said parcel of land in accordance with the requirements and/or restrictions of AYALA. subject to RBDC’s compliance with the special conditions/restrictions which were annotated in the deed of sale. de la Costa Street. which provides. AYALA gave its written conformity to the sale but reflecting in its approval the same special conditions/restrictions as in the previous sale. (KARAMFIL) bought from AYALA a piece of land identified as Lot 26. the building was to be 26-storey high. Cavite.Facts: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. in lieu of demolitionHeld: Yes.500. and we assume.. ordering Ray Burton to comply with its contractual obligations in the construction of ‘Trafalgar Plaza’ by removing or demolishing the portions of areas thereof constructed beyond or in excess of the approved height. RBDC began to construct “Trafalgar Plaza” in accordance with these new plans. among others. is now fully tenanted. or a height of 98. there is more than ample evidence on record pinpointing RBDC’s violation of the applicable FAR restrictions in the Consolidated and Revised Deed Restrictions (CRDRs) when it constructed the 27-storey Trafalgar Plaza. The alternative prayers of petitioner under the CRDRs. and approved by. and a certificate of completion thereof was issued by the Makati City Engineer’s Office per ocular inspection on November 7.Issue: WON award of damages is proper. 1996. Ayala.e. The CA Decision denied the appeal filed before it by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and affirmed the Decision of the 2nd MCTC of SilangAmadeo.In sum. The prayer of petitioner is that judgment be rendered.However. not to AYALA. 174633. should be held liable to pay AYALA exemplary damages in the sum of P2. and thus by way of example and correction.g g g g g the Building Official of the Makati City Engineer’s Office. Thus. After having obtained the necessary building permits from the City Engineer’s Office. Apparently Trafalgar Plaza has been fully built. 26 August 2008. the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply.000. Silang. with a total gross floor area of 28. granting the application for registration of title . as shown by the building plans submitted to. No. 1:52pmMush TapaJUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLERepublic v.R. i.00. Diloy G. 563 SCRA 413Unless the land has been classified as alienable and disposable. we perforce instead rule that RBDC may only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligations – the payment of damages.60 meters. 9/7.600 square meters. Ray Burton Development Corporation acted in bad faith in constructing Trafalgar Plaza in excess of the applicable restrictions upon a double submission of plans and exercising deceit upon both AYALA and the Makati Engineer's Office. In these plans. the demolition of excessively built space or to permanently restrict the use thereof. the record reveals that construction of Trafalgar Plaza began in 1990. are no longer feasible. including any other portion of the building constructed not in accordance with the said building plans. Hence. The period of possession by the respondent of the subject property cannot be considered to have started in 1979.Issue: WON the respondent has acquired a registrable titleHeld: The Petition is meritorious. Municipality of Amadeo. What is more telling is that the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982. as her predecessors-in-interest declared the subject property for taxation purposes only in the year 1948. which was short of three years from 12 June 1945. respondent did not acquire an imperfect title. Prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1982. respondent's possession of the subject property started only in the year 1979 when her mother executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same in her favor. covering an area of 22. which is the reckoning period specifically provided in Section 14(1) of PD No.e. Diloy over a parcel of land located in Barangay Dagatan. indeed. i. 1529. which may be confirmed through a judicial proceeding. continuous.30 The Republic reveals that the subject property was only declared alienable and disposable on 15 March 1982 per Forestry Administration Office (FAO) No. we hold that respondent failed to prove that she or her predecessors-in-interest were already in possession of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.While this Court agrees with the lower courts that. however. From 1982 when the property was declared alienable and disposable to 1997. the .249 square meters. and respondent's possession lacked the required number of years (30 years) for her to acquire the same through prescription. PD No. exclusive and notorious. 1529 because the subject property was not yet alienable and disposable on 12 June 1945. 4-1650. Thus. any occupation or possession thereof could not be considered in the counting of the 30year possession requirement. the respondent had only been in adverse possession of the subject property for a period of 15 years. there was no compliance with Section 14. The Resolution denied the MR filed by the Republic. respondent's possession of the subject property was open. Section 14 of Presidential Decree No.g filed before it by the respondent Gregoria L. Neither can her possession of the subject property be tacked to that of her predecessors-in-interest. when the same was conveyed to her by her mother. There was also no showing that her predecessors-in-interest had already been in possession or had already exercised acts of ownership over the subject property since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto. even if they had occupied and were in possession of the same since 1948. As can be gleaned from the records.. 1529.The Republic persistently argues that the respondent's Application for Registration of Title should have been denied because the latter failed to comply with the period of possession required by law. Province of Cavite. What was clearly established by the respondent was possession of the subject property by her predecessors-in-interest beginning 1948. because during those periods. or earlier. Villanueva. Misamis Oriental (subject property) to respondent. Possession of the subject property could only start to ripen into ownership on 15 March 1982. with an area of 215. . continuous. N-2000-055. Republic of the Philippines (Republic). exclusive. Through the years. thus. such possession can never ripen into ownership and. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject [property]. spouses Pedro and Nena Tan (spouses Tan). No. can never ripen into ownership. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. In its assailed Decision. the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC of Misamis Oriental. located in Calingagan. 04 December 2008.Issue: WON [the Spouses Tan] have been in open. 573 SCRA 89Facts: This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the CA. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership. in LRC Case No. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. whether spanning decades or centuries. Cagayan de Oro City. the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject lot was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. As amended. Republic G. g g g g g g g g 9/7. In its assailed Resolution. In the absence of such classification.subject property had not yet been classified as alienable and disposable land capable of private appropriation. when the same became alienable and disposable. continuous. to return the parcel of land known. Possession of the land by the respondent under the circumstances. 10th Judicial Region. the appellate court denied the spouses Tan’s MR. 177797. the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition. Branch 39. finds the present Petition devoid of merit.698 square meters. Section 48(b) now reads: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open. since [12 June 1945]. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has been amended several times.R. immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of titleHeld: The Court rules in the negative and. and ordered petitioners. 1:52pmMush TapaTan v. unless the land has been classified as alienable and disposable. Antipolo City. as amended. being a part . On 14 February 2000. It must be shown. a mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient.909. For failure of the Spouses Tan to satisfy the requirements prescribed by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.g g g g g g g g under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership. ownership of the property was consolidated in the name of respondent and the mortgage constituted thereon released in December 1997. The property was thereafter privately surveyed under PSU-178075 and approved on 25 January 2000. The application alleged. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. 173088. respondent purchased from a certain Jose Tajon a parcel of land situated in Barrio Colaique (now Barangay San Roque). who has been in open. 9/7. for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title. that possession and occupation had started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. as amended by PD No. The application was docketed and raffled off to Branch 74 of said RTC. as shown on Plan PSU-178075 containing an area of 8. this Court has no other option but to deny their application for judicial confirmation and registration of their title to the subject property. 1945 or earlier.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest. our hands are tied by the law’s stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles. respondent filed before the RTC of Antipolo City an application for registration of a parcel of land. No.00 through judicial consignation. Much as this Court wants to conform to the State’s policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice. As the law now stands. continuous. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 25 June 2008. Upon full payment of the balance of P1. that respondent "subrogated former owner Jose Tajon. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited.R. Credit Corp. the possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicants. 1073. 555 SCRA 315Facts: Respondent Imperial Credit Corporation is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.993 square meters. presently requires. among others.986. since 12 June 1945 or earlier. immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or force majeure. G. On 07 March 1966. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the parcel of land. since June 12. Rizal for the sum of P17. too. 1:53pmMush TapaRepublic v. survey description. the tracing cloth plan. respondent’s possession and occupation of the property for the length of time and in the manner required by law. Under the Regalian doctrine. who had been overseeing said property since its acquisition from Jose Tajon. Any applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified to have the land titled in his name. dismissing the appeal by the OSG. under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945. contending that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence that respondent and its predecessor-ininterest have been in open continuous. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. After respondent presented evidence establishing the jurisdiction facts. No. respondent’s evidence failed to satisfy the requirement under paragraph (1) of Section 14. the other documentary evidence submitted consisted of a 1993 tax declaration. the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.g g g g g g g g g g of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. 1529. seasonably appealed from the RTC’s Decision to the CA. and that . no one else had laid possessory claim on the property. that is. Ricardo Santos. by virtue of Deed of Sale with Mortgage executed on 07 March 1966. On 21 November 2002. the RTC issued an order of general default against the whole world allowing respondent to present its evidence ex parte. Palapus also corroborated Santos’ testimony and added that except for some trespassers.D. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Issue: Although petitioner concedes that respondent was able to show that the land applied for has been declassified from the forest or timber zone and is an alienable public agricultural land. The reckoning date under the Public Land Act for the acquisition of ownership of public lands is June 12. Held: The petition is meritorious. Aside from the transfer documents. respondent’s legal researcher and duly authorized attorney-in-fact. testified on the fact of respondent’s actual possession through its caretaker. 1945 or earlier. At the hearing. P. Teodisia Palapus. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines. the RTC rendered judgment granting respondent’s application for registration. a certification from the Land Management Sector in lieu of the geodetic engineer’s certificate and the report by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office that the property falls within the alienable and disposable zone. through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). The CA rendered a Decision on 02 June 2006. No. and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty years. exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?4. should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12. Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land in Silang Cavite. Jr. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco.R. 29 April 2009The SC en banc upheld the ruling of the CA denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig. and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open.Facts: On 20 February 1998. The application was raffled to the RTC CaviteTagaytay City. Malabanan himself and his witness. 9/7. Aristedes Velazco. The OSG duly designated the Jose Velazco. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of PD No.(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. continuous. 1529. While a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership. otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. 1:54pmMush TapaMalabanan v. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?Held: The Petition is denied. it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act . 179987. who testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather. 1945 or earlier?2. Lino Velazco. Silang. Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of PD No. Apart from presenting documentary evidence. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?3.g g g g g g evidence of possession from that date or earlier is essential for a grant of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. notorious. Republic G. 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open.Issues: 1. to appear on behalf of the State. 1529 (Property Registration Decree). regardless of good faith or just title. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. under Article 422 of the Civil Code. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription. continuous. Thus. according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. one ordinary and other extraordinary.(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. since June 12.(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government.(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. While the subject property was .recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open. a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription. they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable. However. a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years. exclusive. ripens into ownership. and registrable title to. prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. in good faith and with just title. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. 1945” have acquired ownership of. such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. consider that under the Civil Code. That on September 21. thereafter sold the same lot to Wilfredo Vagilidad (hereafter WILFREDO) as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7.] [appear] to have been given the same entry number in his notarial books as both contained the designation Document No. there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence. Branch 11. Series of 1989[. T-16694. covering 4. the heirs of ZOILO. Consequently. 1988. the sale of Lot No. Sixth Judicial Region. which were both executed on December 7. 1253-B to WILFREDO was registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Antique under Entry No. TCT No.declared as alienable or disposable in 1982. 1253-B. it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. 1253-B which was sold to him by LORETO in 1986. 1995. The plaintiffs claimed that they are the lawful owners of Lot No. 1989 [and] notarized by Atty. 180425. Book No. cancelling TCT No. 1987. against spouses WILFREDO and Lolita Vagilidad (hereafter LOLITA). On even date. 1038 where the property was specified as Lot No. 16694.] is a nephew of defendant WILFREDO. 1253-B in defendant WILFREDOs . The aforementioned deeds. TCT No. but on even date. g g g g VAGILIDAD v. 49. 1987. That On January 29. 161136 (Part 1)Facts: That on January 20. conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. Reconveyance and Damages. Efren Labiao (hereafter EFREN) and Priscilla Espanueva (hereafter PRISCILLA) executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating the entire Lot No. Page No.] That on February 14. EFREN and PRISCILLA.280 square meters. was issued in the name of LORETO alone.] paid real estate taxes on the land he bought from LORETO as per Tax Declaration No. Thus. with the Regional Trial Court of Antique. to transfer the ownership of Lot No. 236. 1253.R. 1990. died. was issued in favor of WILFREDO pursuant to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7. T-16693 was issued in favor of LORETO. to LORETO. They likewise raised that when GABINO SR. Loreto Labiao (hereafter LORETO). Dorothy Vagilidad (hereafter DOROTHY). Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Land involving the opt-described property was also executed by LORETO in favor of WILFREDO. No. T-16693 was cancelled and TCT No. as plaintiffs. spouses GABINO and Ma. GABINO JR. 1989. docketed as Civil Case No. VAGILIDAD G. Gavino Vagilidad Jr ( hereafter GABINO JR. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. covering the said property. filed a Complaint for Annulment of Document. XI. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. 1989. Warloo Cardenal[.That on September 29. defendant WILFREDO requested GABINO JR. T-18023. 2825. They alleged that [GABINO JR. 1253-B to GABINO. Febe Mabuhay. 1 of the Court of Fisrt Instance of Baguio establishing the Baguio Townsite Reservation in favor of the registration of the private respondents. Two. supports the claim that there was bad faith in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. 9:08pmMelodia Lawangen DagasenRepublic v. JR. he filed a Petition for the Surrender of LORETOs title on July 31. the testimony of Atty.. GABINO. for the exemption from the payment of capital gains tax when LORETO sold to him the subject parcel. Three. 1253-B to them. paid the real estate tax on the subject parcel in 1987. JR. 1986[20] by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. the evidence preponderates in favor of GABINO. executed the Deed of Sale dated December 7. Mabuhay used to work as secretary for Atty. then Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Antique.017 square meters inside . JR. Third. Issue:Whether the Deed of Sale executed in favor of the petitioners ( spouses Gabino Jr and Dorothy Vagilidad) validly convey Lot No. Ernesto Estoya. 1987 so he could transfer the title of the property in his name. promulgated as far back as November 13. also on May 12. 1973. pursuant to the mentioned agreement.First.1253-B from LORETO on May 12. They added that. One. established the irregularity. the testimony of a disinterested witness.Held:the evidence preponderates in favor of the petitioners ( spouses Gabino Jr and Dorothy Vagilidad). JR. DOROTHY. 1 of the Court of Fisrt Instance of Baguio establishing the Baguio Townsite Reservation. without the knowledge and consent of his spouse. L-32941 July 31. The Deed of Sale executed by LORETO did validly convey Lot No. g g g g g 9/7. the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued a Certification. thus enabling private respondents the registration of an area of 74. Second. 1989 in favor of defendant WILFREDO receiving nothing as payment therefor. Cardenal and co-signed as witness in both Deeds. 1986. that LORETO and WILFREDO had employed the scheme to deprive him and his wife of their lawful title to the subject property. the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land dated December 7. 1989 between LORETO and WILFREDO is tainted with blatant irregularities. did reopen Civil Registrartion Case No. With these corroborating circumstances and the following irrefragable documents on record. Four. Fourth. Marcos No. plaintiff GABINO JR.Facts: That the respondent judge at the instance of private respondents. he acquired Lot No. 52 SCRA 238 (Part 3)Issue: Whether or a not the respondent judge has the power to reopen Civil Registration Case No. 1922. we give credence to the testimony of GABINO.name for loaning purposes with the agreement that the land will be returned when the plaintiffs need the same. Mila Y.That on August 22. The lots now disputed was reserved for naval purposes dated back as far as October 10. 9:19pmMelodia Lawangen Dagasen(Part5) Sec. President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3.The respondent judge was without power to reopen Civil Registration Case No. respondentsclaimants Mayor Jose S. 1978. Sumndad. Of DENR vs. cannot be thus ordered registered in favor of private respondents. 1969.That on December 8. to wit: " subject to prior and existing private rights. it is undeniable that the land in question. the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and settling aside the decision of the respondent judge. g g g g g g g g 9/7.What is more. 1968."Held. Libertad Talapian. 1969. to implement Proclamation No. RA No. 1.Wherefore. 1801.That on November 9. Aklan. His decision was impressed by the claim that the private respondents had been in the possession " since the Spanish regime. then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 167707. 8 October 2008. Yap. and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo." and thus within the protection on the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp John Hay. as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). being a part of a duly established military camp or reservation. 568 SCRA 164Facts: That on November 10. That Claiming that Proclamation No. caves and peninsulas in the Philippines.. only persons ' claiming title to parcels of lands that have been the subject of cadastral proceedings' are granted the right to petition for the re opening thereof if the other conditions named therein are successfully met. 1801 and PTA Circular No 382 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes. 1910 through an executive order issued by then President William Taft and thus could not have been the object of the cad astral proceeding. the Solicitor-General filed a motion to annul the decision based on the lack of jUrisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings as the land in question is a part of a duly established military reservation. the respondent judge ordered in favor of private respondent for the registration of the aforesaid area. 1982. Yap. Jr. among other islands. GR No.the Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center. 931 is quiet explicit. which was decided on November 13. the respondent judge denied the motion. 1922. 1801 declaring Boracay Island. . through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). or earlier since time immemorial. They declared that they themselves. as amended. continuous. 1976. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. 1801 and PTA Circular No.g g g g g g g g g g g g g g That in their petition. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. That the Republic. 141. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. the reference in the Circular to both private and public . 3-82 to private lands and areas declared as alienable and disposable does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12. 1801 and PTA Circular No. otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. 705. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.Issue: whether Proclamation No. That Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. exclusive. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. 3-82 can be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land Held: Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. opposed the petition for declaratory relief. 1801 and PTA Circular No. respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. it was susceptible of private ownership. April 14. they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island. had been in open. That the OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. 3-82 was misplaced. Clearly. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. The reference in Circular No. 141 and PD No. 1945. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest. or through their predecessors-in-interest. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. the subject property to their children. Simply put. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest. as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island. Petitioners. the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. the petitioners presented 5 witnesses. caves and peninsulas in the Philippines. BUENAVENTURA. Therefore. This was not done in Proclamation No. 2007 Facts: Petitioners Angelita and Preciosa filed an Application for registration of Title on June 5. Petitioners contend that "they and their predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the said parcel of land thru inheritance. After the Execution of the said Deed of Sale. he would have identified the specific limits of each. They likewise presented and identified several documents to establish further the following: 1. as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. BUENAVENTURA and PRECIOSA F. Said petitioners are heirs of Spouses Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores from whom they acquired the same. It does not address the areas alienability. the Spouses Buenaventura transferred by way of Deed of Sale. 5) ANGELITA F. or both. the Spouses Buenaventura transferred the tax declaration in their name. In 1978. 1064. among who are the petitioners in the instant case. transfer and possession as owners of the same since time immemorial and/or within the period provided for by law". 166865 March 2. Proclamation No. To buttress their claim. The property was acquired by the Spouses Buenaventura from the Heirs of Lazaro De Leon even before World War II. Respondent. together with other islands. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. G. vs. g The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 2000 before the RTC of Paranaque City for a particular Lot situated in San Dionisio. 141. Paranaque. 1801.g lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No.R. No. However. it was only on January 30 1948 that the deed of sale was executed in favor of Spouses Buenaventura.) petitioners' fee simple . exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner. The Republic appealed the case with the Court of Appeals. It was stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest only had possession of the subject property in 1948. and 4. application for registration of said property is still possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which speaks of prescription. the date when according to evidence. The trial Court. 1945? Ruling: Yes. 1945 or earlier as provided for in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. 2000. 1968. 3.) the nature of the possession and occupation of the property. when the subject property was finally declared alienable by the DENR to the time they filed an application for registration of title on June 5. 2. Said court reversed the trial court’s decision and explained that the petitioners failed to show possession and occupation of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. the voluntary . while petitioners' possession over the subject property can be reckoned only on January 3. reckoned from the year 1968. Furthermore. Petitioner's possession of the subject property since 1968 has been characterized as open.) its classification as part of the alienable zone of the government. The records reveal that they were in possession of the property for 32 years. Even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced only after June 12. 1945. without need of title or of good faith". Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership. continuous. they can still have the said property in their names by virtue of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.) the improvements introduced thereon and the taxes paid on the subject property. ISSUE: Can the petitioners validly register the land under their names even though their possession commenced only after June 12. October 2001 rendered a decision granting the application for registration of title. In the present case. Article 1137 of the Civil Code states that “Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years. Under the Civil Code. on 29. the subject property became alienable.title over the property. 1985. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 40287 on the ground that these entries .declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes and the presentation of their realty tax payments of said property are good indicia of possession in concept of an owner. annotated at the back of the Original Title of Certificate (OCT) No. Case No." There is one exception. In such a case. the Court finds that it does not come under the exception to the rule. 24: Ching v. the fact that the petitioners themselves adduced evidence of ownership over the property in question did not. Salazar Facts: On November 10. respondents Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar filed a petition for the cancellation of the entries of the late spouses. Malaya. "The mere circumstance that proof of title. The petitioners alleged in their complaint for ejectment that the private respondents had forced their way into the disputed premises and refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands. the issue of possession cannot be decided without deciding the issue of ownership. by the nature of the evidence presented. It is settled that the mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg. and that is where it appears during the trial that. as claimed. the jurisdiction of the municipal court is lost and the action should be dismissed. had been introduced during the trial before the Municipal Court would not deprive said court of jurisdiction to rule on the question of who had the prior physical possession. supra Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether the municipal court had the jurisdiction over the case. have the effect of divesting the municipal court of its jurisdiction. Finally. Acosta vs. however. Held: Yes. On appeal. for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. The municipal court rendered judgment ordering the private respondents to vacate the disputed property. After examining the facts of this present case. this decision was set aside by the respondent judge claiming that the municipal court had no competence to resolve the case. The petitioners claim that they own the property by a virtue of valid sale while the respondents claim that the property belonged to them by right of inheritance. or evidence of ownership. 9297 which supposedly cancelled the said OCT is non-existent. the petitioners. Moreover. the absence of indispensable parties over the .have no consolidation rights in the Registry of Deeds (RD) of Tarlac and that the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. Moreover. requiring no personal notice to the owners to acquire jurisdiction over the case. With this. the proceedings instituted by the Salazars with the RTC Branches 63 and 64 of Tarlac can hardly be considered as actions in rem. The Salazars then filed for quieting of title with the RTC Branch 64 of Tarlac but was denied and ruled in favour of the herein petitioners contending that the RTC Branch 63 had no jurisdiction over the matter and that the TCT registered under their names was null and void. While it is true that a proceeding regarding a registration of land is a proceeding in rem. the Salazars then appealed to the Court of Appeals which ruled in their favour contending that the RTC Branch 64 of Tarlac had no authority to dismiss RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac’s decision because it is a court of equal rank. The RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac granted their petition and ordered the RD to recall all titles. This is because the petition for cancellation of entries should have been directed against specific persons: namely. CA also struck down the arguments raised by the titleholders and contended that the proceeding was a land registration proceeding. which is an action in rem. and to direct the owners of the said property to appear before the court for objections. the heirs of Juan Soriano and the successors-ininterest who have acquired different portions of the property. Issue: Whether the Salazars’ filing of action with the RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac is valid Held: No. together with the 27 titleholders of the disputed property filed a complaint contending that they had acquired their titles in good faith and that the court committed an abuse of discretion acting as a land registration court because it had no jurisdiction over issues of ownership. Unsatisfied. to cancel all tax declarations of the said entries. Since no indispensable parties were included in the petition and were not impleaded by the Salazars. The RD complied with the RTC’s orders and transferred the entries of the late spouses under the Salazars’ names. and requires no personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land in order to vest the court with jurisdiction. the said petitions with the RTC are not quasi in rem. HON. G. November 29. as already stated. No. whereupon he filed the basic petition to restrain the respondent Secretary from enforcing his decision. the herein petitioner-appellant. FACTS: Sometime in 1959 a number of residents of Guiguinto.R. was dismissed by the Court a quo. 1963. L-17821. the Secretary rendered his decision on August 10. sent a letter-complaint to the Highway District Engineer of that province asking that the Sapang Cabay. who caused an investigation to be conducted pursuant to Republic Act No. petitioner-appellant. the Court of Appeal’s decision is set aside and the the RTC Branch 64 of Tarlac’s decision is reinstated. defendant-appellee. 1969 CENON MATEO. Moreno. in his capacity as SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS. Mateo moved to reconsider but was turned down. Bulacan. which had been blocked by means of dikes and dams and converted into fishponds. G. The petition. who had in the meantime acquired the property inside which the said creek is situated. be ordered reopened and restored to its original condition. FLORENCIO MORENO.issue should have been a ground for the RTC to dismiss the case. 2056 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates judicial power to the Secretary and unlawfully deprives the appellant and others similarly situated of their property without due process of law HELD: The constitutionality of the aforesaid statute has been upheld by this Court in Lovina vs. ISSUE: whether or not Republic Act No. L-21024 July 28. 1959. No. Rarely will the court allow another person to attack the validity and indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate. a public navigable stream.R. otherwise they would be removed at his expense. That . Acting on the report which the investigator submitted to him. vs. The certification of the appeal to us was upon motion of both parties in view of the constitutional question involved. unless there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct action filed in court proceeded in accordance with law. finding that the Sapang Cabay was a public navigable stream and ordering Cenon Mateo. to remove the dikes and dams therein constructed within thirty days from notice. shortly before the present appeal was submitted for decision. Furthermore. With this. 2056. the property in dispute is under the protection of the Torrens system and the Salazars don’t have the right to impugn its legality. The letter was referred to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Rubie: LEDESMA VS. We are of the opinion that the lower court did commit the error attributed to it.case held. that the absence of any mention of a navigable stream within a property covered by a certificate of title does not preclude a subsequent investigation and determination of its existence nor make it private property of the title holder. that the findings of fact made by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications should be respected in the absence of illegality. This was because said Deed of Sale was allegedly fictitious and the father’s signature was forged. as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence. The court then issued a writ of preliminary injunction. On the same day. Hence. present action. Thereafter. Ledesma filed his own petition asking that the Register of Deeds be ordered to register the aforementioned Deed of Sale on the ground that the earlier case was already dismissed and the writ was dissolved. Villaseñor moved for reconsideration but was denied. ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in issuing the order for registration. and that the ownership of a navigable stream or of the bed thereof is not subject to acquisitive prescription. furthermore. The least that the court could have done was to afford appellant proper . the court granted the petition without notice to the Register of Deeds and to Villaseñor and issued the order for registration. the RTC eventually dismissed the petition and lifted the writ on the ground that Ledesma had not been impleaded as a party-defendant and he only intervened in the case. RULING: Yes. VILLASEÑOR 13 SCRA 494 FACTS: Felix Villaseñor is the special administrator of the estate of his deceased father. He filed a petition with the RTC (CFI) of Negros Occidental to prohibit the Register of Deeds of the same province to register a Deed of Sale of two lots made by his father in favor of Jose Ledesma. The court had no authority to issue the orders after just 2 days after lifting the injunction and dismissing the civil case without notice to the Register of Deeds or appellant considering that it was not yet final. The Register of Deeds hence cancelled the certificates of title and issued new ones in Ledesma’s name. Eusebio Villaseñor. fraud or imposition. Two days later. error of law. Issue: Whether the appellate court acted in grave abuse of discretion in ordering the suspension of the proceedings. 2009 SM PRIME HOLDINGS. and quite another thing for the court itself to order the registration. citing that since the survey plan is a mandatory requirement in land registration proceedings. The RTC concurred with petitioner’s claims. Pangasinan. Furthermore. with costs against appellee. During the pendency of the petition. Hence. The court a quo. MADAYAG. conflicting judgments. It is one thing for the Register of Deeds.notice and hearing as it knew of the pendency of that case and that the relief sought therein was precisely to prevent registration.G. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s ruling. The former does not contemplate notice to and hearing of interested parties such as are required in a judicial proceeding nor carry with it the solemnity and legal consequences of a court judgment. confusion between litigants and courts. unnecessarily took the matter out of his hands and at the same time preempted the question of registration still pending in the civil action filed by appellant. Facts: Petitioner sought the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the suspension of the land registration proceedings filed by Madayag over seven parcels of land in Urdaneta. 1529 eliminated the distinction between general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when . Respondent. The power to stay proceedings is an incident to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases in its dockets. INC. stating that the administrative case is prejudicial to the land registration case. The orders appealed from are hereby set aside. ANGELA V. vs..D. No. to register an instrument which in his opinion is registrable. Ruling: Yes. in the exercise of his ministerial duties under the law. P. every order suspending proceedings must be guided by the following precepts: it shall be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations. SM Prime Holdings filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings. in anticipating the action of the Register of Deeds.R. or when the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled. cancellation thereof would be prejudicial to the petition for land registration. with economy of time and effort for the court. there was grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner. 27. 164687 February 12. No. counsel and litigants. Marcos allocating 24. The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. Effect of the Regalian Doctrine: All lands of the public domain belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to an asserted ownership of land. which included said portion of private respondents’ alleged property. through the Solicitor General. The MCTC ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of their and their predecessors’ open. On June 19. 157485 Facts: On August 26. creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.0551 hectares of land within the area. exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an imperfect title. The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan. appealed to the RTC of Kalibo. Issue: . Petitioner. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. NO. the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of the private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Aklan a complaint against Lucio Arquisola (Superintendent of ANCF) for recovery of possession. Aklan and the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC Judgment. 1991. continuous. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of first-level courts. the court now has the power to hear and decide controversial cases which involve substantial issues. 2000. which should be respected and protected.acting merely as a land registration court. such as the case at bar. Hence. Case 7 B. REPUBLIC VS HEIRS OF LACHICA-SIN GR. respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo. quieting of title. Aklan. Petitioner Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review and the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.231-square meterportion of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership. Respondent heirs claim that a 41. and declaration of ownership with damages. declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY. the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Respondent. continuous. namely: (1) open. R. It must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree. 141. 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. the members of this Court were in disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after June 12. no disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect. citing petitioner’s failure to show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such on said year. Accordingly. 2074 as to prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject property. 2006 PEDRO R. through their predecessors-in-interest. 156888 November 20. the courts a quo held that the disputed property was alienable and disposable before 1960. With respect to the second requisite. Petitioner. vs. 1945. SANTIAGO. and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property. exclusive. 1960. respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. G. it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the government. The SC grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss the civil case for lack of merit. In Heirs ofMalabanan vs Republic. Ruling: The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title. The Court held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. In the case at bar. for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland on December 22. There was. Since respondents failed to do so. No. FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of . however.Whether or not the CA gravely erred on a question of law in upholding respondents’ claim to supposed “private rights” over subject land despite the DENR certification that it is classified as timberland. such as an official proclamation. Taking the law as a whole.e. Santiago is presently occupying the land. Santiago. Victoria leased two parcels of land to Santiago and Mateo for a period of 50 years. plaintiffs still claim that they have a cause of action. filed by Victoria M. is claiming possessory. Rodriguez is the sole heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez who. being subject to Prescription. Armando G. 6 months from its . on the other hand. Santiago against respondent Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Victoria M. Petitioner Santiago’s immediate resort is by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rodriguez. was the owner of parcels of land registered in his name under a Spanish title. Although PD 892 reads: “Whereas. The court is not convinced. by using them for its own commercial and other purposes. Mateo and herein petitioner Pedro R. are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual possession…. Despite the fact that said title was never registered under Act 496. Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system. in his lifetime. the land Registration Act (later PD 1529). Armando G. if not proprietary. By virtue of the lease. Because of this inherent weakness. rights over the parcels of land. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Actual proof of possession only becomes necessary because Spanish titles are subject to prescription.. It is now the desire of plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez to recover possession of the property from the defendant so that she could comply with her contractual commitments to her co-plaintiffs. subsisting and enforceable title. ISSUE: Whether or not Spanish Titles are still admissible as evidence of ownership of lands RULING: No. The holder of a Spanish title may still lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually possesses the same for the required prescriptive period. Rodriguez. RTC: Plaintiffs’ complaint is anchored on a Spanish title which they claim is still a valid. SBMA.Property.” petitioners cannot claim that they can still present the Spanish title as proof of ownership since they were in actual possession. it has clearly set a deadline for the filing of applications for registration of ALL Spanish titles under the Torrens system (i. the applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in actual possession of the real property by virtue of prescription. alleged that: Victoria M. which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject Property. which this Court has already controverted. And. among other islands. and the Spanish title. assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property. it was . Therefore. Rodriguez. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest. such as those provided in PD 1529 or in the Public Land Act. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone. and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the property. this does not bar holders of Spanish titles from claiming ownership of real property on some other basis.R. For sure. Respondents-claimants alleged that it raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.affectivity or on 14 August 1976). the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint. the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the property when they filed the complaint with the RTC on April 29. without legal or equitable title to the subject property. after which. whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title. by which means he can maintain control and. as a rule. Victoria M. 1996 does not exclude them from the application of PD 892. regardless of whether the real property was in his actual possession. if such land registration proceeding was filed and initiated after 14 August 1976. However. the applicant could no longer present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership of the real property. Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. 5) SECRETARY OF DENR VS. 167707 Facts: The DENR identified several lots in Boracay as being claimed by named persons. the Spanish titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership. NO. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. However. Therefore. 1801 declaring Boracay Island. Armando G. President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. caves and peninsulas as tourist zones and marine reserves under administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Petitioners though failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside from possession of the Subject Property from time immemorial. YAP G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago lacked the personality to claim entitlement to possession of the same. Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. without executing an extrajudicial settlement of Prudencio's estate and adjudicating the said 29-hectare land to themselves. The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve. It does not address the areas’ alienability. This was not done in Proclamation No. 81-G of the Court of First Instance at Gumaca. Quezon. Thus the islands remain as public domain which is governed by the Regalian doctrine. 1801. the wife of applicant Prudencio Maxino who was Maria's son and the grandson of Prudencio Tesalona. 1801 has posed any legal impediment to the titling of lands in Boracay Islands. Lot 1. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. in the names of the spouses .susceptible of private ownership. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island. 1801 was not a legal impediment in the titling of lands in Boracay Islands. the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. executed an " absolute sale" of the land in favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxin. 1064. The Office of the Solicitor General countered that Boracay Island was unclassified land of the public domain which formed part of the “public forest” . The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1961 rendered a decision. CASE NO. Mulanay. Judge Vicente del Rosario on March 21. He was survived by his two children Maria and Lucila. 13: Republic of the Philippines vs. as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. Simply put. as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. or both. In Land Registration Case No. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest. Issue: Whether or not the Proclamation No. ordering the registration of said land. Ruling: The RTC and CA ruled that the Proclamation No. Court of Appeals 83 SCRA 453 FACTS: Prudencio Tesalona died in 1905. caves and peninsulas in the Philippines. he would have identified the specific limits of each. Proclamation No. allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang). The two heirs. together with other islands. Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales. The decision became final and executory. A decree and an original certificate of title were issued. More than eight years later, or on June 20, 1969, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Gumaca court an amended petition to annul the decision, decree and title on the ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified public forest. Moreover, the possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only 29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares. The petition was verified by the Acting Director of Forestry. The Maxinos opposed the petition but it was denied by the Appellate Court, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the registration of the 885 hectares of land is valid. RULING: No. It is incontestable that Lot 1, the 885-hectare area registered by the Maxinos, is within the public forest, not alienable and disposable nor susceptible of private appropriation.Its inclusion in the public forest was certified by Director of Forestry Florencio Tamesis on July 6, 1940, as per Land Classification Map No. 1386, Tayabas Project No. 16-E of Mulanay, and as shown in the report and testimony of Lorenzo R. Tria, a forest station warde. Tria recommended that the title of the Maxino spouses be annulled. It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies the title. Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Thus, the registration of the 885 hectares is not valid. Case No. 24: Republic v. Reyes, 155 SCRA 313: GR No. L-30263-5 Facts: Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara filed their Free Patent Applications for their parcels of land situated in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal at the Bureau of Lands. The applications were approved and registered at the Register of Deeds of Sale. In an investigation conducted by the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Board of the Bureau of Lands it was discovered that the parcels of land patented were actually under water and form part of the Laguna de Bay and neither of the respondents were able to occupy or possess said lots. Respondents admitted their noncompliance with the requirements and agreed to have their patents be cancelled. The petitioner, represented by the Director of Lands, filed complaints at the Court of First Instance against Eusebio and Lara. However, due to the respondents’ failure to answer the complaint, CFI of Rizal rendered decisions where the respondents’ patent numbers were declared null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel the said patent titles. After the lapse of almost 5 years, respondents filed for the annulment of the decision of the CFI of Rizal alleging as grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction over their persons and that the decision was procured through fraud. Director of Lands had not been properly served with summons and thus, CFI of Rizal allowed the respondents, now plaintiffs, to adduce their evidence before the Special Clerk of Court. However, CFI of Rizal again rendered a decision declaring the patent numbers null and void and ordered the Director of Lands to reinstate the free patent numbers issued in the names of the respondent. Notwithstanding the fact that their patents and certificates were declared null and void, respondents executed separate deeds of absolute sale involving the alleged lands. Issue: Whether the land patented is entitled to an absolute deed of sale. Held: No. That it is well settled that any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. In the case at bar, the free patents and certificates of title issued to Eusebio and Lara cover areas which form parts of Laguna de Bay. These are neither agricultural nor disposable. Subject patents and titles were erroneously issued due to misrepresentations and false reports and must therefore be cancelled. Any false statement in an application for public land shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the title granted. This rule applies even after the issuance of the certificate of title. A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud, and the doctrine of indefeasibility of torrens title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud. Likewise, the Court ruled that mere possession of land does not itself divest the land of its public character. Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of its ownership of the land nor operate to change the public character of the land to private. It is apparent that the law on innocent purchasers for value does not apply insofar as non-disposable public lands are concerned. 27.) G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS, in his capacity as Judge of CFI South Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City, ISAGANI DU TIMBOL and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, respondent. Facts: The Republic assailed the decision of the Court of First instance through the respondent judge which granted the conveyance of a land to Isagani Timbul. The Court of First Instance, through respondent judge, averred that the State’s right to assail had already prescribed because over one year had already lapsed since the title transfer pursuant to Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, and that the free patent issued therefor is indefeasible. The petitioner argued that the land is a forest land; hence, it is of public dominion and can never be appropriated. Issue: Whether the land, even though issued as a free patent, may be alienated and disposed. Ruling: Yes. The land in question is a forest land, thus it is part of the public dominion and it may not be disposed and alienated. The title granted to the private respondent by virtue of the land registration proceeding is void. It is the Bureau of Forestry which has been vested the sole prerogative over the demarcation, administration, protection and occupancy of the country’s forestry. Moreover, since it is the State which assails the title, prescription may not be invoked against the same: The Statute of Limitations does not lie against the State. Case 7 a. Properties of public dominion REPUBLIC V. CA 131 SCRA 532 Facts: Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property but the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration. The private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court, hence it was ordered withdrawn from the application. and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892. On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 however, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds. Issue: Whether the registration of the lots valid. Ruling: No, the registration of the lots is not valid. The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation. # 29 [G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.] HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Respondent. Facts: There were two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons, Borre and Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name. During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name. Issue: WON the lot in question can be subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of the private person. Held: NO. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court's finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest”. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. The possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Therefore, the lot in question never ceased to be classified as forest land of public domain. 5) REPUBLIC V. CA 131 SCRA 532 the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. Ruling: No. 1976. Meycauayan. 1982. 19. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan. 89709 however. They are not open to . Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502. The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents. the registration of the lots is not valid.Facts: Respondents Benjamin Tancinco. Azucena Tancinco Reyes. On June 26. the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. hence it was ordered withdrawn from the application. On August. The private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property but the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration. There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds. Issue: Whether the registration of the lots valid. Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void. had acted in good faith and relied. The proviso in favor of bona-fide holders of titles issued on or before July 31." It was held that the CFI of Baguio and Banquet had no jurisdiction to reopen the case on the ground that it did not par-take of the nature of cadastral proceedings as contemplated in Republic Act No. old man Kiang who in turn inherited the land in possession of his parents since Spanish times. Reservation had been illegally decreed in favor of private individuals. Held: No. Recognizing that before the promulgation of said decision . Old man Kiang filed an application for registration of the land but it was dismissed by the CFI of Banquet. with the exception of lands reserved for specific public purposes and those claimed and adjudicated private property. The exception provided for in the Section 79 of Commonwealth Act No. The republic. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. 1973 does not apply to the case at bar. Marcos rendered a decision adjudicating the land in favor of the respondents. PD 1271 was issued intended to protect title holders who. 24: Republic v. L. and that lands within Government reservations cannot be registered in favor of private individuals. 931. L-58822 Facts: The subject property was inherited by Kiangs from their father. Sangalang. represented by the Solicitor General. Issue: Whether the Kiangs are entitled for the registration of the land. although mistakenly.registration under the Land Registration Act." This exception cannot possibly apply to the respondents Kiangs since the land which was the subject can no longer be considered land "claimed by or belonging to private parties. Mt Province due to Civil Reservation Case No. The respondent court presided by Judge Pio R. 1973. filed a complaint for the annulment of the decision of Judge Marcos. Case No. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation. They existed only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. on the indefeasibility of torrens certificates of titles anal had introduced substantial improvements on the land covered by said certificates. Kiangs filed an application for registration of the parcels of land in question. About 31 years later. as amended. 141 refer to lands "claimed by or belonging to private parties. 159 SCRA 515: GR No. large portions of the public land within the Baguio Towns. since the .declaring as public lands all lands within the limits of the Baguio Townsite Reservation. before the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision on July 31. the court ordered the issuance of OCT No. Neither is there any showing that respondents complied with the requirements of Section 1 of PD No. among others. that in 1938 respondents obtained a loan of P400. Finding the claims of the herein respondents sustained by the evidence. Las Pinas Rizal. The Court of Appeals stated:.. 8777 was cancelled and substituted by Tax Declaration Nos.certificate of title of the respondents Kiangs was issued only on June 5. 2273 in the petitioners’ names. the private respondents filed a petition to review the decree of registration on the ground of fraud. On March 30.. 144 SCRA 292 Facts: On September 15. enjoy its fruits. it ordered the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. 9522 and 2385 issued in the names of the petitioners. The Court ruled that the issue was submitted to the appellate court and was correctly resolved therein. 1960. and that the respondents took possession of the land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938. 1937 which they allegedly found accidentally in March 1960. 1975. 1937 and April 23. The petitioners presented parol evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lost and no copy or record of the same was available. 2273 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of herein petitioners and the issuance in lieu thereof of another original certificate of title in the names of herein respondents. Thereafter. 8. the court found that the deeds of sale were spurious. Tax Declaration No. After trial. They alleged. In their answer.00. the spouses Ramirez denied the material allegations of the petition.The petition alleged that 'the applicants Hilario Ramirez and Valentina . 1271 for the validation of their title. and pay the land taxes thereon. Issue: Whether or not an antichretic creditor can acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor.00 from the petitioners which they secured with a mortgage on the land in question by way of antichresis and that for this reason. they based their claim to the land on two deeds of sale allegedly executed on April 15. Ruling: NO. RAMIREZ VS C. petitioner. mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P400. It was agreed that the respondents could not redeem the property within a period of five years and that the petitioners would take possession of the land.1959.spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio filed an application for registration of a parcel of Riceland in Pamplona.A. It is alleged that the applicants are owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the land.00. Case No. In the applicant's application for registration. The Director of Lands filed an opposition after the initial hearing stating that the land is a portion of the public domain. which followed the form required by the Land Registration Act. the applicants alleged that 'to the best of our knowledge and belief.' These we believe are sufficient allegations of extrinsic fraud. remainder. over which a homestead patent was issued during the pendency of the registration proceeding. it could only result in the finding that when Julio Hidalgo’s homestead patent was issued over on the said lot was no longer public. there is no mortgage or incumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land. as We have found. If applicants were to successfully prove the averment and show their alleged registrable title to the land. San Mateo. in the case at bar. Since the existence or nonexistence of applicants' registrable title is decisive of the validity or nullity of the homestead patent issued as aforestated on said lot the court a quo's jurisdiction in the land registration proceedings could not have been divested by the homestead patent's issuance. for. Julio Hidalgo also filed an opposition claiming that they are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in question for having acquired homestead patents over said lots. reversion or expectancy.' This allegation is false and made in bad faith. The Province of Rizal also interposed asserting the required 3. nor any other person having any estate or interest therein. Held: Yes. the applicants are not the owners of the land sought to be registered and they are in possession thereof only as antichretic creditors. L-19615 Facts: Leonor de los Angeles and seven co-applicants filed an application for registration of title to 12 parcels of land in Ampid.Bonifacio willfully and fraudulently suppressed the facts that the petitioners are the legal and rightful owners of the rice field in question and that they possess the said rice field merely as antichretic creditors as security for the loan of P400. legal or equitable. The land registration court would have to order a decree of title issued in applicants' favor and declare the aforesaid homestead patent a nullity which vested no title in the patentee as against the real owners. Santos. in possession. Issue: Whether the court erred in dismissing the application for registration. that the applicants are guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment when they declared in their application. 12 SCRA 622: GR No. 24: De Los Angeles v. that no other person had any claim or interest in the said land. A homestead . Rizal.00 meters strips of public easement on lots along Ampid river and creek. alleging first. The court granted the petitionand. 1974. Webber. with respect to the contract of personal and professional services wherein it was agreed that the plaintiff shall head the legal department of defendant Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation. in that with regard to the stock certificates the same are in the name of Vicente Resonda. 1973. . L-38974. March 25. While the motion to dismiss was pending resolution by the court because defendants had not yet presented to the court the required proof of service. and. it received ex parte the evidence of the plaintiff and rendered judgment in favor of Catolico. as to the second cause of action. WEBBER vs. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: namely (1) improper venue. VALLEJOS. and. in that the case was filed in Cavite where plaintiff is not a resident. therefore. JUDGE AMADOR T. On June 16. the case should have been filed in Manila in accordance with Section I of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. ALFREDO CATOLICO. does not finally dispose of the public or private character of the land as far as courts upon proceedings in rem are concerned. Alfredo Catolico.R. No. 1974. and. the contract of personal and professional services between plaintiff and defendants was entered into in the City of Manila.patent. 1973. therefore. and the second. 1975] Facts: On June 1. defendants had not filed their answer to the complaint. on January 11. and LEONARDO ALCID. or after a lapse of seven (7) months from the service of summons. in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite. filed against Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation and Frederick G. for the return of ten (10) certificates of stock of the corporation borrowed from him by the defendants. neither the parties nor their respective counsels appeared in court. for the payment of his services as legal counsel for the corporation. that as of January 11. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but Catolico file a motion to postpone hearing of motion for reconsideration. plaintiff. the date set for the hearing of the motion to dismiss. OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and FREDERICK G. and (2) lack of cause of action. consequently. the latter in his personal capacity and as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of said corporation. Applicants should thus be given opportunity to prove registrable title to Lot 11. 1973. in his capacity as City Sheriff of Manila [G. filed a petition to declare the defendants in default that defendants had been served with summons and copies of the complaint on June 8. 8. the truth being that he is a resident of Quezon City where he has his permanent family home. as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of defendant Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation.On May 31. and it is generally irregular to enter an order of default while a motion to dismiss remains pending and undisposed of. their time for filing an answer had not yet commenced to run anew because on said date. The motion to dismiss was pending before the court when such declaration was made. that there was a "manifest attempt on the part of the defendants to delay the proceedings to afford them an opportunity to have all their assets and shares dissipated by continuous sale of the same to the prejudice". Catolico filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment. Defendants’ filed their notice of appeal. Pio R. The irregularity of the order of default is evident from the fact that when the petitioners were declared in default. There may be cases where the attendance of certain circumstances "may be considered substantive enough to truncate the adverse literal application of the pertinent rules violated. that the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. wrote a letter to respondent Sheriff asking that the defendants be given a little chance to exhaust the legal remedies available to hold in abeyance the execution and garnishment for the reasons that defendants were not given a chance to have their day in court in the motion for immediate execution of judgment and that they have already appealed from the lower court's decision and order of immediate execution. Marcos. in receiving plaintiff's evidence ex parte and in rendering judgment. therefore. they were." Inasmuch as petitioners were declared in default while their motion to dismiss was still pending resolution. alleging that said judgment had already become final and executory because the defendants failed to have the order of default lifted. 1974. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he declared the petitioners in default. their counsel had not yet received any notice of the action taken by the court on their motion to dismiss. . while defendants' motion for reconsideration was still pending before the court because the defendants had not filed yet their reply to the opposition as they had not received a copy. Thence. Issue: Whether respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the defendants in default. On July 22. the court denied the defendants’ motion for reconsideration. incorrectly declared in default. Consequently. the order of default. . without due notice to them of the date of hearing. the judgment and the order of execution are patent nullities. was a denial of due process. in their absence. and the holding of the trial of the case on the merits.