Local Government Cases

K. LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1. LIMBONA V MANGELIN GR No.80391 28 February 1989 Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution. Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of selfgovernment given to the autonomous governments of Region XII? Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith. 2. QUEZON CITY VS BAYANTEL G.R. No. 162015 Respondent Bayan Telecommunicatio n s , I n c . (Bayantel) is a legislative franchise holder under RA 3259 toe s t a b l i s h a n d o p e r a t e r a d i o s t a t i o n s f o r d o m e s t i c telecommunication s , r a d i o p h o n e , b r o a d c a s t i n g a n d teleca sting. A tax provision in its charter exempted Bayantel from payment of realty taxes actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. O n J a nu ar y 1 , 2 0 0 2 , t he L G C t oo k e f fe ct w hi ch grants LGUs the power to levy tax on real properties. On July20, 1992, Congress enacted Rep. Act No. 7633, amending Bayantel’s original franchise which contained once again the exemption of Bayantel from payment of realty taxes actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. In 1993, the government of Quezon City enacted the Quezon City Revenue Code (QCRC), imposing a real property tax on al l re al p ro pe rt i e s i n Q ue zo n C i ty w h i c h i nc l ud e d so m e properties of Bayantel. Bayantel did not pay the realty taxes prompting theQ C T r e a s u r e r t o i s s u e w a r r a n t s o f l e v y a g a i n s t t h e properties. Threatened, Bayantel filed with the RTC a petitionfo r p ro hi bi ti o n w i th an ur g e nt a pp l i ca ti o n f or a t e m po r a ry restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Should Bayantel exemption? be granted tax to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. The power of the legislative authority relative to the fiscal powers of local governments has been reduced to the authority to impose limitations on municipal powers. There can really be no dispute that the power of the Quezon City Government to tax is limited by Section 232 of the LGC. Under this law, the Legislature highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of local government units. Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was e n a c t e d subsequent to the LGC. The Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an express and real intention on the pa r t of C o n gr e s s to on ce a ga i n re m ov e f ro m t he L GC s delegated taxing power, all of Bayantel’s properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise RULING: Ye s. T he po w e r to t ax i s p ri ma ri l y ve st e d i n th e Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely be virtue of a validd e l e g a t i o n a s b e f o r e , b u t p u r s u a n t t o d i r e c t a u t h o r i t y conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. Under the latter, the exercise of the power may be subject to such g ui d e l i ne s an d l i m i t at i o ns as th e C o ng re s s ma y pr ov i d e which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Section 5 does not change the doctrine that municipal corporations do not possess inherent powers of taxation. What it does is to confer municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue. They no longer have 3. ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS. ZAMORA G.R. No. 144256 Subject: Public Corporation Doctrine: Automatic release of IRA Facts: Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It provides under the heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS” that the IRA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000”. In another part of the GAA, under the heading “UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA. On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor MagtolisBriones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions) Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under “Unprogrammed funds”. Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic. ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA. HELD: Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides: SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic. Respondents counter argue that the above constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA. Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of the government from “unilaterally” withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, “This essentially means that the President or any member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute, withhold the release of the IRA.” As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute – a proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently. Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified by the words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA. In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas: …if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable intent to “lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.” The pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: “[T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.” WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND. remained in the LTO. Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code are the powers of LTO under R.A. No.4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or operated on or upon any public highway" in the country. The Commissioner of Land Transportation and his deputies are empowered at anytime to examine and inspect such motor vehicles to determine whether said vehicles are registered, or are unsightly, unsafe, improperly marked or equipped, or otherwise unfit to be operated on because of possible excessive damage to highways, bridges and other infrastructures. The LTO is additionally charged with being the central repository and custodian of all records of all motor vehicles. Adds the Court, the reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing power of local government units, specifically under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is tangential. Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty which the State might share with local government units by delegation given under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for a public purpose and legislative in nature but the similarities just about end there. The basic aim of police power is public good and welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses on the power of government to raise revenue in order to support its existence and carry out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in many respects, the grant of one does not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two powers are, by tradition and jurisprudence, separate and distinct powers, varying in their respective concepts, character, scopes and limitations. To construe the tax provisions of Section 133 (1) of the LGC indistinctively would result in the repeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory power which evidently has not been intended. If it were otherwise, the law could have just said so in Section 447 and 458 of Book III of the Local Government Code in the same manner that the specific devolution of LTFRB's power on franchising of tricycles has been provided. Repeal by implication is not favored. The power over tricycles granted under Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local Government Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. The exclusionary clause contained in the tax provisions of Section 133 (1) of the Local Government Code must not be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the express power of LTO to cause the registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. These functions 4. LTO V CITY OF BUTUAN G. R. No. 131512. 2000 January 20, Facts: Relying on the fiscal autonomy granted to LGU's by the Constittuion and the provisons of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Butuan enacted an ordinance "Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and Imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof. Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national government that, indeed, has been transferred to local government units is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles. The RTC and CA ruled that the power to give registration and license for driving tricycles has been devolved to LGU's. Issue: Whether or not, the registration of tricycles was given to LGU's, hence the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. Ruling: No, based on the-"Guidelines to Implement the Devolution of LTFRBs Franchising Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire to Local Government units pursuant to the Local Government Code"- the newly delegated powers to LGU's pertain to the franchising and regulatory powers exercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions of the LTO relative to the registration of motor vehicles and issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. Corollarily, the exercised of a police power must be through a valid delegation. In this case the police power of registering tricycles was not delegated to the LGU’s, but of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a statute must not be construed in isolation but must be taken in harmony with the extant body of laws. LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof, and not to issue registration. Ergo, the ordinance being repugnant to a statute is void and ultra vires. – the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.x x x But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV industry. LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC 5. BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGASCITY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004] FACTS:On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, “provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondents Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines. ISSUE :may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction? HELD: No.x x xThe logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies. x x xLike any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system 6. MAYOR MAGTAJAS & CITY OF CAGAYAN v. PRYCE PROPERTIES & PAGCOR Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection an d s o d i d t he w o me n 's gr ou ps an d th e yo ut h. De m on st ra t i o n s w e re l e d by t he ma yo r an d t he ci ty legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan d e O ro C i ty O rd i n an ce N o . 3 3 5 3 pr oh i b i t i n g th e us e o f bu i l di ng s f or t he op e r at i o n o f a ca si no a nd Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for review. Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid Held: No Ratio: Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:** *S e c . 1 6 . — Ge ne ra l W e l f ar e . — E ve ry l oc al g ov e r nm e n t u ni t sh al l e xe rc i se t he p ow e r s e x p r e s s l y g r a n t e d , t h o s e necessarily implied therefrom, as w e l l a s p o w e r s n e c e s s a r y , appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictio ns, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,e n c o u r a g e a n d s u p p o r t t h e d e velopment of appropriate and selfr e l i a n t s c i e n t i f i c a n d technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. There is a requirement that the ordi nances should not contravene a stat u t e . M u n i c i p a l g ov e r nm e n ts ar e on l y ag e nt s o f t he n at i o na l g ov e r nm e n t. L oc al c ou nc i l s e xe rc i se o nl y d e l e ga te d legislativ e powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.T he re f or e , t he p e t i t i o n i s DE N I E D an d th e ch al l e n ge d de ci si o n o f t he C ou rt o f A pp e a l s i s AFFIRMED Drilon vs Lim GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994 FACTS: Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter,” while the second is “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.” ISSUES: The issues in this case are (1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and (2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local government HELD: The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower court’s finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. Miranda vs. Aguirre FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the constitu-tionality of Republic Act No. 8528, converting the City of Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city to merely a component city. On May 5, 1994, RA No. 7720 was signed into a law, which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. on July 4, 1994, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. On February 14, 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a merely component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite. Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction. ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT RA NO. 8528 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ITS FAILURE TO SUBMIT IT TO PROPER PLEBISCITE. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS LACKS STANDING OR PERSONALITY IN FILING THIS PETITION. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION AT BAR ON THE GROUND THAT IT INVOLVES A POLITICAL QUESTION. DECISION: Petition was GRANTED. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing the said law. RATIO DECIDENDI: RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional because Sec. 10 of Art. X of the 1987 Constitution clearly states that: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional. Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government. That the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional. PUBLIC CORP DIGEST FOR Miranda v Aguirre (1999) FACTS: 5 May 1994: RA 7720 converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. 14 Feb 1998: RA 8528 was enacted, amending RA 7720. It changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of this RA since it lacked a provision submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The respondents raised the defense of standing and the political question doctrine. The Sol Gen argued that the RA merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any “creation, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units.” ISSUE: WON a reclassification of a city from an independent component city to a component city requires a plebiscite. YES. RATIO: The wording of the constitution has a common denominator: the material change in the political and economic rights of the LGU directly affected. The consent of the people is required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power. The changes are substantial. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will have to be shared with the province. There would be a reduction in their IRA. When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for that purpose. There is no reason why the same should not be done when RA 8528 downgrades the status of their city. The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward so long as they result in a material change in the LGU directly affected. NAVARRO v ERMITA Facts: Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality for not being in compliance with the population or the land area requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec. 461. Previous decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the province as unconstitutional. Issue: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional? Held: YES. SC now looked at the central policy considerations in the creation of provinces. They compared the LGC provisions on the creation of municipalities and cities and how they allow an exception to the land area requirement in cases of non-contiguity as provided for under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC.SC concluded that it must have been the intent of the legislators to extend such exception to provinces especially considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was absent under Section 461 of the LGC (provision relating to creation of provinces), such was incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus correcting the congressional oversight in said provision and reflecting the true legislative intent. Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction which could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity. Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals (161 SCRA 646) Facts: Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT "Batman." Pursuant to this agreement, Mauro B. Ganzon sent his lighter "Batman" to Mariveles where it docked in 3 feet of water. Then, Gelacio Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for loading which was actually begun on the same date by the crew of the lighter under the captain's supervision. When about half of the scrap iron was already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan, arrived and demanded P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The latter resisted the shakedown and after a heated argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula drew his gun and fired at Gelacio Tumambing. The gunshot was not fatal but Tumambing had to be taken to a hospital in Balanga, Bataan, for treatment. After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on 4 December 1956, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied by 3 policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza and his crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked. The rest was brought to the compound of NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron. Tumambing instituted with CFI Manila an action against Ganzon for damages based on culpa contractual. The trial court rendered a decision absolving Ganzon from liability. On appeal, however, the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision appealed. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. Held: Now the petitioner is changing his theory to caso fortuito. Such a change of theory on appeal we cannot, however, allow. In any case, the intervention of the municipal officials was not In any case, of a character that would render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation. The petitioner was not duty bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the sea the scrap iron. Moreover, there is absence of sufficient proof that the issuance of the same order was attended with such force or intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the petitioner's employees. The mere difficulty in the fullfilment of the obligation is not considered force majeure. We agree with the private respondent that the scraps could have been properly unloaded at the shore or at the NASSCO compound, so that after the dispute with the local officials concerned was settled, the scraps could then be delivered in accordance with the contract of carriage. Pablico v. Villapando J. Ynares-Santiago, G.R. No. 147870. July 31, 2002 FACTS: Solomon Maagad and Renato Fernandez, members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan filed an administrative complaint against Alejandro A. Villapando, the mayor of San Vicente, Palawan for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution for entering into a consultancy agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections where Villapando was elected. They allege that the consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-year period under Article IXB, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution. Villapando, on the other hand, argues that he did not hire Tiape, but appointed him and invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice which states that the appointment of a defeated candidate as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution. The Sangguniang Panalalawigan of Palawan found Villapando guilty of the administrative charge and dismissed him from service which was affirmed by the Office of the President. Meanwhile, Ramir Pablico, the vice-mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor afterwhich, Villapando filed with the RTC of Palawan for a temporary restraining order which was first granted, then denied by the RTC. So Villapando now goes to Court seeking to annul the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan and the affirmation of the Office of the President, and the denial of the temporary restraining order by the RTC. He argues that under Sec. 60 of R.A. 7160, an elective local office may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated under Sec. 60 by order of the proper court. Without such order of the court, he cannot be dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, may validly impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials? RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that it is clear under Sec. 60 of R.A. 7160 that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law. In Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., it was held that “[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60.” Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, however, adds that – “(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.” The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President. As held in Salalima, this grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the “disciplining authority” to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. K.13. ATIENZA V. VILLAROSA RAMON M. ATIENZA, in his capacity as ViceGovernor of the Province of Occidental Mindoro, petitioner, vs. JOSE T. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Occidental Mindoro, respondent. FACTS: Petitioner Atienza and respondent Villarosa were the Vice-Governor and Governor, respectively, of the Province of Occidental Mindoro. On June 26, 2002, the petitioner ViceGovernor received the Memorandum dated June 25, 2002 issued by the respondent Governor concerning the “AUTHORITY TO SIGN PURCHASE ORDERS OF SUPPLIES, MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT[S], INCLUDING FUEL, REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN.” (JUNE 25, 2002) Such purchase orders shall be approved by the governor in his capacity as the local chief executive of the province. In reply to the memorandum, the petitioner governor stated that such purchase orders are included under those as authorized for signature by the ViceChief executive of the Sanggunian on the basis of the DILG Opinion No. 96-1995 as affirmed by the COA Opinions, and coursing it to the Governor for his approval is no longer necessary, the fact that [Secs.] 466 and 468, RA 7160 already provides for the separation of powers between the executive and legislative. Such authority even includes everything necessary for the legislative research program of the Sanggunian. Unimpressed, the respondent Governor issued the Memorandum relating to the “TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF SERVICES OF CASUAL/JOB ORDER EMPLOYEES AND REAPPOINTMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE RECOMMENDEES.” It terminates all existing contract of employment – casual/job order basis and reappointment of the recommendees – entered into by Vice-Gov. Atienza, it for being unauthirized. (JULY 1, 2002). The respondent Governor issued another Memorandum regarding the “ENFORCIBILITY (sic) OF PREVIOUS MEMORANDA ISSUED ON JUNE 20, 26 AND JULY 1, 2002.” In his letter, the petitioner Vice-Gov. Invoked the principle of separation of powers as applied to LGUs. The petitioner Vice-Gov. reiterated his request for the respondent to make a “deep study” on the matter before implementing his memoranda. However, the respondent governor insisted on obliging the department heads of the provincial government to comply with the memoranda. Petitioner Vice-Gov. filed a petition with CA for prohibition assailing the Governor’s Memoranda dated June 25 and July 1, 2002, claiming that such memoranda excluded him from the use and enjoyment of his office in violation of RA 7160 or the LGC 1991, and its implementing rules and regulations. It prayed that the respondent governor be enjoined from implementing the assailed memoranda. PETITION FOR PROHIBITION – DISMISSED, the Court citing Sec. 344 of RA 7160. The CA explained that Section 466(a)(1)[7] of the same Code, relied upon by the petitioner Vice-Governor, speaks of the authority of the Vice-Governor to sign “all warrants drawn on the public treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan.” In declaring this provision inapplicable, the CA reasoned that the approval of purchase orders is different from the power of the Vice-Governor to sign warrants drawn against the public treasury. Anent the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002, the CA ruled that the issue on whether it could be enjoined had already been rendered moot and academic. The CA pointed out that the subject of the said memorandum could no longer be enjoined or restrained as the termination of the employees had already been effected. It opined that where the act sought to be enjoined in the prohibition proceedings had already been performed and there is nothing more to restrain, the case is already moot and academic. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed, seeking to reverse and set aside the CA’s decision – dismissing his petition for prohibition. ISSUE: Who between the petitioner and the respondent is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in connection with the procurement of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan? RULING: The court held that it is the ViceGovernor who has such authority. Under Rep. Act No. 7160, local legislative power for the province is exercised by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan[13] and the ViceGovernor is its presiding officer. Being vested with legislative powers, the Sangguniang Panlalawiganenacts ordinances, resolutions and appropriates funds for the general welfare of the province in accordance with the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7160. The same statute vests upon the Vice-Governor the power to: (1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan. Since it is the Vice-Governor who approves disbursement vouchers and approves the payment for the procurement of the supplies, materials and equipment needed for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, then he also has the authority to approve the purchase orders to cause the delivery of the said supplies, materials or equipment. Indeed, the authority granted to the ViceGovernor to sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of theSangguniang Panlalawigan as well as to approve disbursement vouchers relating thereto is greater and includes the authority to approve purchase orders for the procurement of the supplies, materials and equipment necessary for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on theSangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor of the executive functions. The Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002 of the respondent Governor, which effectively excluded the petitioner ViceGovernor, the presiding officer of theSangguniang Panlalawigan, from signing the purchase orders for the procurement of supplies, materials or equipment needed for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as from appointing its casual and job order employees, constituted undue interference with the latter’s functions. The assailed memoranda are clearly not in keeping with the intent of Rep. Act No. 7160 and their implementation should thus be permanently enjoined. The petition is GRANTED. The Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002 issued by respondent Governor Jose T. Villarosa are NULL AND VOID. K.14. LATASA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Latasa vs. Comelec FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was elected Mayor of Digos, Davao del Sur to 3 three consecutive terms (1992, 1995, 1998). During his third term, a plebiscite was held to convert Digos into a component city (2000). The ratification of the Charter of the City of Digos ended the tenure of Latasa as Mayor. However, he was still mandated as hold-over mayor of the city until the next election. For the election of 2001, Latasa filed his COC for his first term as mayor of the city. He acknowledges that he served as mayor of Digos when it was still a municipality. Sunga, also a candidate for mayor, filed a petition to disqualify Latasa as he already had served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. Comelec issued a resolution in favor of Sunga and disqualified Latasa. Latasa submitted a motion for reconsideration which was not acted upon by the Comelec until the end of the May 14 elections. As a result, Latasa was still able to continue his campaign and eventually won the election. Sunga now also sought to annul Latasa’s proclamation. Comelec only rendered its decision denying Latasa’s motion for reconsideration in 2002. Sunga claims that he should be proclaimed mayor as he holds the second most number of votes in 2001 ISSUE: WON Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly -created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. HELD: Latasa cannot serve as Mayor of the new city of Digos. Latasa having been elected as mayor in 1998, the conversion of Digos from a municipality to a city in 2000 falls within his term. As Digos acquired a new corporate existence, qualifications for its elective positions also change. As a result, the Office of the Municipal Mayor was abolished to make way for the creation of the Office of the City Mayor. However, under the Charter of the City of Digos, the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos shall have hold-over power until a new election and the duly elected officials have assumed their office. Latasa never ceased to discharge his duties as Mayor during the conversion of Digos. Also, although Digos was converted into a city, Digos never redefined its territory, the inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. Sunga’s cannot claim that he be proclaimed as mayor after the disqualification of Latasa, the SC already ruled that the disqualification of the winning candidate does not entitle the second highest vote earner the position of mayor. Vacancy be filled by succession. K.15. LACEDA, SR. V. LIMENA K.16 RIVERA III VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FACTS: The case is a resolution of two consolidated petitions – one filed by Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera III and Atty. Normandick de Guzman against Marino “Boking Morales, and the other one filed by Anthony D. Dee, the candidate who obtained the second highest vote after Morales. In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160. Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January to July 1999. ISSUE: Whether or not Morales violated the three-‐term limit rule when he ran for re-‐ election as mayor in the 2004 elections. HELD: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. His assumption of office for the second term constituted “service for the full term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes. K.17. DIZON V. COMELEC Case Digest FACTS: Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality. Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term should be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second term. COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the three-term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections. Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. COMELEC En Banc: affirmed. The three-term limit is not applicable here for: 1) Morales was not the duly -elected mayor of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term primordially because he was not even considered a candidate thereat; and 2) Morales has failed to serve the entire duration of the term of office because he has already relinquished the disputed office on May 16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to the end of his supposed term. ISSUES: WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term HELD: NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes. Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code state that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales’ service with respect to the 1998 - 2001 term because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term. Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term) K.18. MONTEBON V. COMELEC Montebon Vs Comelec FACTS: Petitioners Montebon and Ondoy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Elections. On April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates for municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term. In his answer, respondent argues that he cannot be disqualified on the ground of the 3 term limit rule because his second term was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-mayor due to the retirement of elected vice-mayor Petronilo Mendoza. Petitioners maintain that respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. They argued that, according to the law (constitution and LGC), voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official concerned was elected. On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied the petition for disqualification ruling that respondent's assumption of office as vicemayor should be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service. His second term having been involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus not be disqualified to seek reelection as municipal councilor. On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First Division. Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal councilor. ISSUE: WON the private respondents’ assumption of the vice-mayor office, by virtue of succession, can be considered as an effective disruption in his full service of his second term as councilor. HELD: YES. In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that he has FULLY served three consecutive terms. In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court emphasized that the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected three consecutive times; he must also consecutive terms in the same position. have served three In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the concept of voluntary renunciation as follows: The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, ‘Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.’ The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vicemayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law. We quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC that – The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest--‐ ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the contemplation of law. Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty by a government official, the nonperformance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary. In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, it must be considered as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last term of service. Pending the resolution of the case before the COMELEC, Bolos Jr. won in the election. BOLOS V COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for 3 consecutive terms (1994,1997, 2002). The COMELEC resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum three consecutive term for an office and thus disqualified to run for the same office. It further ordered that the proclamation of Bolos Jr. be annulled and that the office will be succeeded based on Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code. In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He assumed office on July 1, 2004 leaving his post as Punong Barangay. Issue: After serving his term as a councilor he filed his candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the same office, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum limit of three term hence no longer eligible to run and hold the position in accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991. Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by Bolos Jr. when he assumed the post of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have served for three consecutive terms. Held: YES. The three-term limit for elective official is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states: Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’ relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew that if he won and assumed the position, there would be a voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay. “Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.” The Local Government Code provides for the term of office of Barangay Officials: Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term. The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification. (c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided, that the sangguniang kabataan members who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next regular election of barangay officials. What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his position as Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won as Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed said office. Socrates v. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts: x x x The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. The Court agrees with the COMELEC that petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan, he was not deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary. In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the Court stated that the second part of the rule on the three-term Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his third term as Punong Barangay. deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160 The term "operation of law" is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected." Black's Law Dictionary also defines it as a term that "expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mere application to the particular transaction of the established rules of law, without the act or cooperation of the party himself. Issue: Whether Asilo’s preventive suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term? An interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation of law, is exemplified in Montebon v. Comelec and Borja vs. Comelec. In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay. (Bolos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009) Held: The “interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009 Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law. Facts: Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office. Preventive suspension – whether under the Local In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to Government Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, or the Ombudsman Act – is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability. Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. This was what exactly happened to Asilo. Hence, the preventive suspension of public officials (Asilo) does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. 4 On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution5 and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code6 both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution7 on 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Pertinent portions of the 18 February 2010 Resolution read: Respondent Lonzanida never denied having held the office of mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than nine consecutive years. Instead he raised arguments to forestall or dismiss the petition on the grounds other than the main issue itself. We find such arguments as wanting. Respondent Lonzanida, for holding the office of mayor for more than three consecutive terms, went against the three-term limit rule; therefore, he could not be allowed to run anew in the 2010 elections. It is time to infuse new blood in the political arena of San Antonio. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent Romeo D. Lonzanida for the position of mayor in the municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby CANCELLED. His name is hereby ordered STRICKEN OFF the list of Official Candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in May 10, 2010 elections. SO ORDERED.8 Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012 EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to review and nullify the Resolution2 dated 2 February 2011 and the Order3 dated 12 January 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo v. Romeo D. Lonzanida, docketed as SPA No. 09-158 (DC). The petition asserts that the COMELEC issued the Resolution and Order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Facts Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010.9 On the same date, Aratea wrote the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S. 201010 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanida’s disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was deemed permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration. In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated 24 August 2010, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the [COMELEC]."11 On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution12 disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prisión correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People,13 before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. Pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read: Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three (3) consecutive terms and for having been convicted by a final judgment of a crime punishable by more than one (1) year of imprisonment, is clearly disqualified to run for the same position in the May 2010 Elections. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.14 On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention.15 She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 elections. In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who received the second highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by Section 4416 of the Local Government Code to succeed as Mayor. The COMELEC’s Rulings The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12 January 2011, stating: Acting on the "Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention" filed by Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) and pursuant to the power of this Commission to suspend its Rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice, this Commission hereby RESOLVES to: 1. GRANT the aforesaid Motion; 2. ADMIT the Petition-in-Intervention filed by Antipolo; 3. REQUIRE the Respondent, ROMEO DUMLAO LONZANIDA, as well as EFREN RACEL ARATEA, proclaimed Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, to file their respective Comments on the Petitionin- Intervention within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof; 4. SET the above-mentioned Petition-inIntervention for hearing on January 26, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. COMELEC Session Hall, 8th Floor, Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros, Manila. WHEREFORE, furnish copies hereof the parties for their information and compliance. SO ORDERED.17 In its Resolution dated 2 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc no longer considered Lonzanida’s qualification as an issue: "It is beyond cavil that Lonzanida is not eligible to hold and discharge the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. The sole issue to be resolved at this juncture is how to fill the vacancy resulting from Lonzanida’s disqualification."18 The Resolution further stated: We cannot sustain the submission of Oppositor Aratea that Intervenor Antipolo could never be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Antipolo [sic] for being a second placer in the elections. The teachings in the cases of Codilla vs. De Venecia and Nazareno and Domino vs. COMELEC, et al., while they remain sound jurisprudence find no application in the case at bar. What sets this case apart from the cited jurisprudence is that the notoriety of Lonzanida’s disqualification and ineligibility to hold public office is established both in fact and in law on election day itself. Hence, Lonzanida’s name, as already ordered by the Commission on February 18, 2010 should have been stricken off from the list of official candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby: 1. Declares NULL and VOID the proclamation of respondent ROMEO D. LONZANIDA; 2. GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela D. Antipolo; 3. Orders the immediate CONSTITUTION of a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to PROCLAIM Intervenor Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales; 4. Orders Vice-Mayor Efren Racel Aratea to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor, and to cause a peaceful turnover of the said office to Antipolo upon her proclamation; and 5. Orders the Office of the Executive Director as well as the Regional Election Director of Region III to cause the implementation of this Resolution and disseminate it to the Department of Interior and Local Government. SO ORDERED.19 Aratea filed the present petition on 9 February 2011. The Issues The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanida’s removal. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. The dissenting opinions reverse the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution and 12 January 2011 Order. They hold that Aratea, the duly elected Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, should be declared Mayor pursuant to the Local Government Code’s rule on succession. The dissenting opinions make three grave errors: first, they ignore prevailing jurisprudence that a false representation in the certificate of candidacy as to eligibility in the number of terms elected and served is a material fact that is a ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; second, they ignore that a false representation as to eligibility to run for public office due to the fact that the candidate suffers from perpetual special disqualification is a material fact that is a ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; and third, they resort to a strained statutory construction to conclude that the violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, even when it is clear and plain that violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office. The dissenting opinions tread on dangerous ground when they assert that a candidate’s eligibility to the office he seeks election must be strictly construed to refer only to the details, i.e., age, citizenship, or residency, among others, which the law requires him to state in his COC, and which he must swear under oath to possess. The dissenting opinions choose to view a false certification of a candidate’s eligibility on the three-term limit rule not as a ground for false material representation under Section 78 but as a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the same Code. This is clearly contrary to wellestablished jurisprudence. The Court’s Ruling We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor. Qualifications and Disqualifications Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points to the Local Government Code for the qualifications of elective local officials. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 and Section 40 of the Local Government Code provide in pertinent part: Sec. 39. Qualifications. ‒ (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province x x x; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. xxxx (c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vicemayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. xxxx Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis supplied) Section 12 provides: of the Omnibus Election Code Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied) The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code are specifically enumerated: Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis supplied) A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." 20 All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws . There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,21 this Court ruled: [T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. x x x Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the threeterm limit rule, or his conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground for a petition under Section 68. False Material Representation Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy: Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied) Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy : Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was thus required to provide 12 items of information in the certificate of candidacy: 22 name; nickname or stage name; gender; age; place of birth; political party that nominated the candidate; civil status; residence/address; profession or occupation; post office address for election purposes; locality of which the candidate is a registered voter; and period of residence in the Philippines before 10 May 2010. The candidate also certifies four statements: a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; a statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and a statement of the candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 23 The certificate of candidacy should also be under oath, and filed within the period prescribed by law. The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification . — The duration of the penalties of prisión mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty. xxxx Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects: 1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election. 2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. 3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned. In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence. 4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held. Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification . — The penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects: 1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected. 2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification. Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification . Art. 42. Prisión mayor — Its accessory penalties . — The penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied) The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, 24 the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisión mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run. In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna),25 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification: On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellee’s conviction of a crime penalized with prision mayor which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment. The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961. But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides: Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage . — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of disqualification. The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually.” The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time the judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 . 26 Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,27 the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in Fermin: Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.28 (Emphasis supplied) Latasa, Rivera and Ong: The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for Ineligibility Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election. Thus, Section 74 states that " the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible for said office. ” The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorate’s freedom of choice, 29 is found both in the Constitution 30 and the law.31 After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election32 because he is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"33 means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office. In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,34 petitioner Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The Municipality of Digos was converted into the City of Digos during Latasa’s third term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. Romeo Sunga, Latasa’s opponent, filed before the COMELEC a "petition to deny due course, cancel certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification" under Section 78 on the ground that Latasa falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City. Latasa argued that he did not make any false representation. In his certificate of candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote after the phrase "I am eligible" and indicated " *Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor." The COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasa’s certificate of candidacy for violation of the threeterm limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court affirmed the COMELEC En Banc’s denial of Latasa’s motion for reconsideration. We cancelled Marino Morales’ certificate of candidacy in Rivera III v. Commission on Elections (Rivera).35 We held that Morales exceeded the maximum three-term limit, having been elected and served as Mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms (1995 to 1998, 1998 to 2001, 2001 to 2004, and 2004 to 2007). We declared him ineligible as a candidate for the same position for the 2007 to 2010 term. Although we did not explicitly rule that Morales’ violation of the three-term limit rule constituted false material representation, we nonetheless granted the petition to cancel Morales’ certificate of candidacy under Section 78. We also affirmed the cancellation of Francis Ong’s certificate of candidacy in Ong v. Alegre,36 where the "petition to disqualify, deny due course and cancel" Ong’s certificate of candidacy under Section 78 was predicated on the violation of the three-term limit rule. Loong, Fermin and Munder: When Possession of a Disqualifying Conditionis Not a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the grounds for eligibility and ineligibility vis-à-vis qualifications and disqualifications. For example, a candidate may represent that he is a resident of a particular Philippine locality37 when he is actually a permanent resident of another country.38 In cases of such overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available multiple remedies.39 Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy before the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the election. Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification using grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was discussed in Loong v. Commission on Elections 40 with respect to the applicable prescriptive period. Respondent Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional ViceGovernor of the Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false representation as to his age. The petition was filed 16 days after the election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25 day period from the last day of filing certificates of candidacy. This Court ruled that Ututalum’s petition was one based on false representation under Section 78, and not for disqualification under Section 68. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period provided in Section 78 should be strictly applied. We recognized the possible gap in the law: It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of the candidate committing the misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied. At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative branch of the government to fix a definite time within which petitions of protests related to eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, as seen in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called “procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribe what the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and remedy. 41 In Fermin v. Commission on Elections, 42 the issue of a candidate’s possession of the required oneyear residency requirement was raised in a petition for disqualification under Section 68 instead of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Despite the question of the one-year residency being a proper ground under Section 78, Dilangalen, the petitioner before the COMELEC in Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and 5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 780043 and filed the petition under Section 68. In Fermin, we ruled that "a COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility , and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds."44 A petition for disqualification can only be premised on a ground specified in Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Thus, a petition questioning a candidate’s possession of the required one-year residency requirement, as distinguished from permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country, should be filed under Section 78, and a petition under Section 68 is the wrong remedy. In Munder v. Commission on Elections,45 petitioner Alfais Munder filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur on 26 November 2009. Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip filed a petition for Munder’s disqualification on 13 April 2010. Sarip claimed that Munder misrepresented that he was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he was eligible to register as a voter in 2003 even though he was not yet 18 years of age at the time of the voter’s registration. Moreover, Munder’s certificate of candidacy was not accomplished in full as he failed to indicate his precinct and did not affix his thumb-mark. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed Sarip’s petition and declared that his grounds are not grounds for disqualification under Section 68 but for denial or cancellation of Munder’s certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Sarip’s petition was filed out of time as he had only 25 days after the filing of Munder’s certificate of candidacy, or until 21 December 2009, within which to file his petition. The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified Munder. In reversing the COMELEC Second Division, the COMELEC En Banc did not rule on the propriety of Sarip’s remedy but focused on the question of whether Munder was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court reinstated the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution. This Court ruled that the ground raised in the petition, lack of registration as voter in the locality where he was running as a candidate, is inappropriate for a petition for disqualification. We further declared that with our ruling in Fermin, we had already rejected the claim that lack of substantive qualifications of a candidate is a ground for a petition for disqualification under Section 68. The only substantive qualification the absence of which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 is the candidate’s permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country. The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification under Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from running for public office despite the possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the [Local Government Code]." In so holding the dissenting opinions write in the law what is not found in the law. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification under said Section. The grounds for filing a petition for disqualification under Section 68 are specifically enumerated in said Section. However, contrary to the specific enumeration in Section 68 and contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, the dissenting opinions add to the enumerated grounds the violation of the three-term limit rule and falsification under the Revised Penal Code, which are obviously not found in the enumeration in Section 68. The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanida’s possession of a disqualifying condition (violation of the three-term limit rule) with the grounds for disqualification under Section 68. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification: the commission of specific prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code and possession of a permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country. Any other false representation regarding a material fact should be filed under Section 78, specifically under the candidate’s certification of his eligibility. In rejecting a violation of the threeterm limit as a condition for eligibility, the dissenting opinions resort to judicial legislation, ignoring the verba legis doctrine and wellestablished jurisprudence on this very issue. In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility, and thus qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even though the certificate of candidacy does not specifically ask the candidate for the number of terms elected and served in an elective position, such fact is material in determining a candidate’s eligibility, and thus qualification for the office. Election to and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanida’s representation that he was eligible for the office that he sought election constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office. Legal Duty of COMELECto Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law. Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."46 The disqualification of a convict to run for elective public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all the laws" relating to the conduct of elections. Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.47 We quote from the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution with approval: As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second Division had already ordered the cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the list of official candidates for the mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the Commission En Banc in its resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution disqualifying Lonzanida. Our findings were likewise sustained by the Supreme Court no less. The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En Banc resolution that Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.48 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied) in the original; italicization Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. 1âwphi1 Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who therefore received the highest number of votes. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and the Order dated 12 January 2011 of the COMELEC En Bane in SPA No. 09-158 (DC) are AFFIRMED. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. SO ORDERED. Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 196804 October 9, 2012 MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 197015 PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA RUBY TALAGA and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the office following the substitute’s disqualification. The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul and set aside the En Banc Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 in SPC No. 10-024 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the Second Division; 2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of Roderick A. Alcala; 3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of respondent Barbara C. Talaga as mayor of Lucena City and CANCELLING the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation issued therefor; 4. Ordering respondent Barbara Ruby Talaga to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor; 5. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Lucena City, the proclaimed ViceMayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor as provided under Section 44 of the Local Government Code; 6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Resolution to the Office of the President of the Philippines, the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Department of Finance and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Lucena City. Let the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Regional Election Director of Region IV of COMELEC implement this resolution. SO ORDERED.1 Antecedents On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections. 2 Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-KampiCMD,3 declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to. Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena, which was docketed as SPA 09029 (DC).4 He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections. The pertinent portions of Castillo’s petition follow: 1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of Barangay Mayao Crossing, Lucena City but may be served with summons and other processes of this Commission at the address of his counsel at 624 Aurora Blvd., Lucena City 4301; 2. Respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is likewise of legal age, married, and a resident of Barangay Ibabang Iyam, Lucena City and with postal address at the Office of the City Mayor, City Hall, Lucena City, where he may be served with summons and other processes of this Commission; 3. Petitioner, the incumbent city vice-mayor of Lucena having been elected during the 2007 local elections, is running for city mayor of Lucena under the Liberal party this coming 10 May 2010 local elections and has filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor of Lucena; 4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and 2007 local elections based on the records of the Commission on Elections of Lucena City and had fully served the aforesaid three (3) terms without any voluntary and involuntary interruption; 5. Except the preventive suspension imposed upon him from 13 October 2005 to 14 November 2005 and from 4 September 2009 to 30 October 2009 pursuant to Sandiganbayan 4th Division Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27738 dated 3 October 2005, the public service as city mayor of the respondent is continuous and uninterrupted under the existing laws and jurisprudence; 6. There is no law nor jurisprudence to justify the filing of the certificate of candidacy of the respondent, hence, such act is outrightly unconstitutional, illegal, and highly immoral; 7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected for and had fully served three (3) consecutive terms as a city mayor of Lucena, he still filed his Certificate of Candidacy for City Mayor of Lucena for this coming 10 May 2010 national and local elections; 8. Under the Constitution and existing Election Laws, New Local Government Code of the Philippines, and jurisprudence the respondent is no longer entitled and is already disqualified to be a city mayor for the fourth consecutive term; 9. The filing of the respondent for the position of city mayor is highly improper, unlawful and is potentially injurious and prejudicial to taxpayers of the City of Lucena; and 10. It is most respectfully prayed by the petitioner that the respondent be declared disqualified and no longer entitled to run in public office as city mayor of Lucena City based on the existing law and jurisprudence.5 The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate under the existing Election Laws and by the provisions of the New Local Government Code.6 (Emphasis supplied.) Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence 7 to the effect that an involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule. In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,8 holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, on December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino. Relevant portions of his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve are quoted herein, viz: 4. When respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City, the rule that ‘where the separation from office is caused by reasons beyond the control of the officer – i.e. involuntary – the service of term is deemed interrupted’ has not yet been overturned by the new ruling of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, the prevailing rule then of the Honorable Commission in [sic] respect of the three (3)-term limitation was its decision in the case of Aldovino, et al. vs. Asilo where it stated: "Thus, even if respondent was elected during the 2004 elections, which was supposedly his third and final term as city councilor, the same cannot be treated as a complete service or full term in office since the same was interrupted when he was suspended by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division. And the respondent actually heeded the suspension order since he did not receive his salary during the period October 16-31 and November 1-15 by reason of his actual suspension from office. And this was further bolstered by the fact that the DILG issued a Memorandum directing him, among others, to reassume his position." (Emphasis supplied.) 5. Clearly, there was no misrepresentation on the part of respondent as would constitute a ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy at the time he filed the same. Petitioner’s ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy thus has no basis, in fact and in law, as there is no ground to warrant such relief under the Omnibus Election Code and/or its implementing laws. 6. Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the Supreme Court in respect of the issue on the three (3)-term limitation, respondent acknowledges that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City having served three (3) (albeit interrupted) terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the 2010 elections. 7. In view of the foregoing premises and new jurisprudence on the matter, respondent respectfully submits the present case for decision declaring him as DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City.9 Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his CoC. Acting on Ramon’s Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution on April 19, 2010,10 disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to run for Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. SO ORDERED. Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. 11 Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for Reconsideration. 12 At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had nominated Ramon.13 On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramon’s Ex parte Manifestation of Withdrawal, declared the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated April 19, 2010 final and executory. 14 On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes.15 Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the suspension of Barbara Ruby’s proclamation.16 It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation of its Law Department,17 gave due course to Barbara Ruby’s CoC and CONA through Resolution No. 8917, thereby including her in the certified list of candidates.18 Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena City.19 On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC,20 docketed as SPC 10-024. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray. In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation,21 Barbara Ruby maintained the validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramon’s COC, despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 900622 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her favor. On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene,23 positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s substitution had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections. On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and Alcala’s petition-in-intervention,24 holding: In the present case, Castillo was notified of Resolution 8917 on May 13, 2010 as it was the basis for the proclamation of Ruby on that date. He, however, failed to file any action within the prescribed period either in the Commission or the Supreme Court assailing the said resolution. Thus, the said resolution has become final and executory. It cannot anymore be altered or reversed. xxxx x x x. A close perusal of the petition filed by Castillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that it was actually for the disqualification of Ramon for having served three consecutive terms, which is a ground for his disqualification under the Constitution in relation to Section 4(b)3 of Resolution 8696. There was no mention therein that Ramon has committed material representation that would be a ground for the cancellation or denial of due course to the CoC of Ramon under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The First Division, in fact, treated the petition as one for disqualification as gleaned from the body of the resolution and its dispositive portion quoted above. This treatment of the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification only is affirmed by the fact that its members signed Resolution No. 8917 where it was clearly stated that the First Division only disqualified Ramon. Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in Miranda v. Abaya is not applicable. Ramon was rightly substituted by Ruby. As such, the votes for Ramon cannot be considered as stray votes but should be counted in favor of Ruby since the substituted and the substitute carry the same surname – Talaga, as provided in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006. xxxx Moreover, there is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code or any election laws for that matter which requires that the substitution and the Certificate of Candidacy of the substitute should be approved and given due course first by the Commission or the Law Department before it can be considered as effective. All that Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code as implemented by Section 13 of Resolution No. 8678 requires is that it should be filed with the proper office. The respondent is correct when she argued that in fact even the BEI can receive a CoC of a substitute candidate in case the cause for the substitution happened between the day before the election and mid-day of election day. Thus, even if the approval of the substitution was made after the election, the substitution became effective on the date of the filing of the CoC with the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance. There being no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon as candidate for mayor of Lucena City, the counting of the votes of Ramon in favor of Ruby is proper. The proclamation, thus, of Ruby as mayor elect of Lucena City is in order. Hence, we find no cogent reason to annul the proclamation of respondent Barbara Ruby C. Talaga as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Lucena after the elections conducted on May 10, 2010.25 Acting on Castillo and Alcala’s respective motions for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2011 reversing the COMELEC Second Division’s ruling.26 Pointing out that: (a) Resolution No. 8917 did not attain finality for being issued without a hearing as a mere incident of the COMELEC’s ministerial duty to receive the COCs of substitute candidates; (b) Resolution No. 8917 was based on the wrong facts; and (c) Ramon’s disqualification was resolved with finality only on May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc concluded that Barbara Ruby could not have properly substituted Ramon but had simply become an additional candidate who had filed her COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should succeed to the position pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code (LGC).27 Issues The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband. Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending parties should assume the contested elective position. Ruling The petitions lack merit. 1. Existence of a valid CoC is a conditionsine qua non for a valid substitution The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit: Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. Section 74 of the Omnibus Election specifies the contents of a COC, viz: Code Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.— The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. x x x The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing them are, namely: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to the regular election, the candidates from among whom they are to make the choice; and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. If the law does not confine to the duly-registered candidates the choice by the voters, there may be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes may be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election. 28 Moreover, according to Sinaca v. Mula,29 the CoC is: x x x in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated. Accordingly, a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate. There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,30 thuswise: x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.31 Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact of a candidate’s permanent residency in another country when that fact affects the residency requirement of a candidate) are separate and distinct from the grounds for the cancellation of or denying due course to a COC (i.e., nuisance candidates under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code; and material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code), the Court has recognized in Miranda v. Abaya 32 that the following circumstances may result from the granting of the petitions, to wit: (1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid CoC; (2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have filed a valid CoC; and (3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due course or cancelled. In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or withdraws his CoC before the elections, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the option of substitution, to wit: Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. — If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than midday of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission. Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, 33 there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. 34 Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.35 2. Declaration of Ramon’s disqualificationrendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was nota valid candidate to be properly substituted In the light of the foregoing rules on the CoC, the Court concurs with the conclusion of the COMELEC En Banc that the Castillo petition in SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v. Commission on Elections:36 Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. Castillo’s petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Ramon made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material matter that would affect the substantive right of Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (c) Ramon made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible.37 The petition expressly challenged Ramon’s eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and the Local Government Code against any person serving three consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that "the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent Ramon be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate."38 The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false.39 A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC that is short of the requirements will not be granted. In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,40 the Court stressed that there must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, thus: The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are different, for they are based on different grounds, and can result in different eventualities.41 A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC.42 Miranda v. Abaya43 has clarified that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate.1âwphi1 To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for all elective local officials, to wit: Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis supplied.) The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office." The Court underscored this objective in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,44 stating: x x x The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it. To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation even worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the nuisance candidate may remain eligible despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of due course to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.45 Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC.46 That sufficed to render his invalid, considering that for all intents purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of disqualification had the effect of announcing he was no candidate at all. CoC and his that Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Miranda’s CoC. The Court explained: The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled. The Court rules that it was. Private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled. Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for. (Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.) In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec ruled favorably in the following manner: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections. SO ORDERED. (p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.) From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. x x x.49 xxxx x x x. There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As Miranda v. Abaya aptly put it: Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non. All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution. 47 (Emphasis supplied) 3. Granting without any qualification of petition in SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELEC’s intention todeclare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC That the COMELEC made no express finding that Ramon committed any deliberate misrepresentation in his CoC was of little consequence in the determination of whether his CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. In Miranda v. Abaya, 48 the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due course and/or cancelled." The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced — in apparent contradiction — that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. x x x.50 The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of cancelling or denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any qualification. Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although Castillo’s petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC) specifically sought both the disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC categorically stated in the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 that it was granting the petition. Despite the COMELEC making no finding of material misrepresentation on the part of Ramon, its granting of Castillo’s petition without express qualifications manifested that the COMELEC had cancelled Ramon’s CoC based on his apparent ineligibility. The Resolution dated April 19, 2010 became final and executory because Castillo did not move for its reconsideration, and because Ramon later withdrew his motion for reconsideration filed in relation to it. 4. Elected Vice Mayor must succeedand assume the position of Mayordue to a permanent vacancy in the office On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections51 should not apply to him because Ramon’s disqualification became final prior to the elections.52 Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on Elections,53 where the Court said: x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case. Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally nonexistent in the 10 May 2004 elections. The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states: Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added) Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6. The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng’s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none.54 Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that he was entitled to assume the position of Mayor of Lucena City for having obtained the highest number of votes among the remaining qualified candidates. It would seem, then, that the date of the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Ramon disqualified is decisive. According to Section 10, Rule 19 of the COMELEC’s Resolution No. 8804, 55 a decision or resolution of a Division becomes final and executory after the lapse of five days following its promulgation unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. Under Section 8, Rule 20 of Resolution No. 8804, the decision of the COMELEC En Banc becomes final and executory five days after its promulgation and receipt of notice by the parties. The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its Resolution dated April 19, 2010, the copy of which Ramon received on the same date.56 Ramon filed a motion for reconsideration on April 21, 201057 in accordance with Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696,58 but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010, 59 ostensibly to allow his substitution by Barbara Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any motion for reconsideration. Such circumstances indicated that there was no more pending matter that could have effectively suspended the finality of the ruling in due course. Hence, the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have attained finality upon the lapse of five days from its promulgation and receipt of it by the parties. This happened probably on April 24, 2010. Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc continued to act on the withdrawal by Ramon of his motion for reconsideration through the May 5, 2010 Resolution declaring the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division final and executory. Yet, we cannot agree with Castillo’s assertion that with Ramon’s disqualification becoming final prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the ruling in Cayat was applicable in his favor. Barbara Ruby’s filing of her CoC in substitution of Ramon significantly differentiated this case from the factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat. Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April 17, 2004, and his disqualification became final before the May 10, 2004 elections. Considering that no substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his rival, remained the only candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she became a contender for the same position vied for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillo’s claim of being the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being consequently entitled to assume the office of Mayor. Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer.1âwphi1 Labo, Jr. should be applied. There, the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will." 60 Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not be deemed elected to the office.61 There was to be no question that the second placer lost in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the vacated position.62 No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative.63 The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.64 Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected.65 But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact of Barbara Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the decisions. On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate.66 A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:67 Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and ViceMayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vicegovernor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases; AFFIRMS the Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 by the COMELEC En Banc; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) assails and seeks to nullify (1) the February 8, 2012 Resolution1 of the Second Division, Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-252010 and (2) the May 10, 2012 Resolution 2 of the COMELEC en banc affirming that division’s disposition. The assailed issuances, in turn, affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55 declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. The antecedent facts are undisputed. For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy 3 for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, the corresponding petition,4 docketed as SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the threeconsecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution 5 finding for Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes6 and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes. Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 201716 January 8, 2013 MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto 7 action before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes, docketed as Election Case No. 55, to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify. The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. SO ORDERED.9 In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,10 found Abundo to have already served three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term. Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and actually served as Viga mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be exact. To the RTC, the year and a month service constitutes a complete and full service of Abundo’s second term as mayor. Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-252010. The Ruling of the COMELEC On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELEC’s Second Division rendered the first assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac, Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.11 Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Abundo on the strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule. In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its equally assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012. The fallo of the COMELEC en banc’s Resolution reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.12 In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc held in essence the following: first, there was no involuntary interruption of Abundo’s 2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he is considered never to have lost title to the disputed office after he won in his election protest; and second, what the Constitution prohibits is for an elective official to be in office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms and not to the service of the term. Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction. Intervening Events In the meantime, following the issuance by the COMELEC of its May 10, 2012 Resolution denying Abundo’s motion for reconsideration, the following events transpired: 1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Order13 declaring its May 10, 2012 Resolution final and executory. The following day, June 21, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Entry of Judgment.14 2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for Execution15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes. 3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on Vega’s counsel’s motion16 filed a day earlier, issued an Order17 directing the bailiff of ECAD (COMELEC) to personally deliver the entire records to said RTC. On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the entire records of the instant case to, and were duly received by, the clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43. 4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records, the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega’s Motion for Execution through an Order18 of even date. And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on the same day. 5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and served the same at the office of Mayor Abundo on the same day via substituted service. 6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO 20 enjoining the enforcement of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions. 7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s July 3, 2012 Resolution21 and a copy of the TRO. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of office 22 as mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively. 8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of Abundo’s Seventh (7th) Most Extremely Urgent Manifestation and Motion23 dated June 28, 2012 praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or status quo ante Order. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes––who had taken their oaths of office the day before—assumed the posts of mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.24 9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To Admit Attached Manifestation)25 and Manifestation with Leave to Admit26 dated July 5, 2012 stating that the TRO thus issued by the Court has become functus officio owing to the execution of the RTC’s Decision in Election Case No. 55. 10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his Comment/Opposition with Leave to the Petitioner’s Prayer for the Issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order27 reiterating the argument that since Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes already assumed the posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante Order would serve no purpose. 11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert the July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status Quo Ante Order (In View of the Unreasonable and Inappropriate Progression of Events).28 It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was dislodged from his post as incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be sure, the speed which characterized Abundo’s ouster despite the supervening issuance by the Court of a TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost on the Court. While it is not clear whether Vice-Mayor Tarin and First Councilor Cervantes knew of or put on notice about the TRO either before they took their oaths of office on July 4, 2012 or before assuming the posts of mayor and vice-mayor on July 5, 2012, the confluence of events following the issuance of the assailed COMELEC en banc irresistibly tends to show that the TRO––issued as it were to maintain the status quo, thus averting the premature ouster of Abundo pending this Court’s resolution of his appeal––appears to have been trivialized. On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment on Abundo’s petition, followed not long after by public respondent COMELEC’s Consolidated Comment.29 The Issues Abundo raises the following grounds for the allowance of the petition: 6.1 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared the arguments in Abundo’s motion for reconsideration as mere rehash and reiterations of the claims he raised prior to the promulgation of the Resolution. 6.2 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has consecutively served for three terms despite the fact that he only served the remaining one year and one month of the second term as a result of an election protest.30 First Issue: Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not Mere Reiteration The COMELEC en banc denied Abundo’s motion for reconsideration on the basis that his arguments in said motion are mere reiterations of what he already brought up in his appeal Brief before the COMELEC Second Division. In this petition, petitioner claims otherwise. Petitioner’s assertion is devoid of merit. A comparison of Abundo’s arguments in the latter’s Brief vis-à-vis those in his Motion for Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the arguments in the MR are elucidations and amplications of the same issues raised in the brief. First, in his Brief, Abundo raised the sole issue of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to consider the quo warranto case since the alleged violation of the three-term limit has already been rejected by the COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), while in his MR, Abundo raised the similar ground of the conclusiveness of the COMELEC’s finding on the issue of his qualification to run for the current term. Second, in his Brief, Abundo assailed RTC’s reliance on Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued that the Court’s pronouncement in Aldovino, Jr., which dealt with preventive suspension, is not applicable to the instant case as it involves only a partial service of the term. Abundo argued in his Brief that his situation cannot be equated with the case of preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued before that the almost two years which he did not sit as mayor during the 2004-2007 term is an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term. Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the issues in the MR are a rehash of those in the Brief. Core Issue: Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials. On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Emphasis supplied.) and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly: Sec. 43. Term of Office. — xxxx (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis Ours.) To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.31 Judging from extant jurisprudence, the threeterm limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus, has its complicated side. We shall revisit and analyze the various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the Court on the matter. As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the observation that the law "does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect ‘continuity of service for a full term’ for purposes of the three-term limit rule."32 As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections,33 the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term,34 albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition. There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected." This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the threeterm limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes. While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials who were elected and served for three terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by what they view as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the official by operation of law, and other analogous causes. This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms were considered or not considered as having been "involuntarily interrupted or broken." (1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr.35 (1998) and Montebon v. Commission on Elections36 (2008), the Court delved on the effects of "assumption to office by operation of law" on the three-term limit rule. This contemplates a situation wherein an elective local official fills by succession a higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the following contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.37 In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja. Capco was then elected and served as mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. When Capco expressed his intention to run again for the mayoralty position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification for violation of the three-term limit rule. Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, "it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply."38 There was, the Court ruled, no violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law"39 when a permanent vacancy occurred in that office. The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There, Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001- 2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that Montebon’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of service as councilor. The Court emphasized that succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vice-mayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor. (2) Recall Election With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service, Adormeo v. Commission on Elections40 (2002) and the aforementioned case of Socrates (2002) provide guidance. In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit rule. The Court held therein that the remainder of Tagarao’s term after the recall election during which Talaga served as mayor should not be considered for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the continuity of Talaga’s mayorship was disrupted by his defeat during the 1998 elections. A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in that case assailed the COMELEC Resolution which declared Edward Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule. In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled: x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates. From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.41 The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term and, hence, any subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer covered x x x."42 (3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity of service. The Court said so in Latasa v. Commission on Elections43 (2003). Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During his third term, Digos was converted into a component city, with the corresponding cityhood law providing the holdover of elective officials. When Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as mayor for the 2001 elections, the Court declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City for violation of the three-term limit rule on the basis of the following ratiocination: This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos. (Emphasis supplied.) (4) Period of Preventive Suspension In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the period during which a local elected official is under preventive suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of his service. The Court explained why so: Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.44 (Emphasis supplied.) (5) Election Protest With regard to the effects of an election protest vis-à-vis the three-term limit rule, jurisprudence presents a more differing picture. The Court’s pronouncements in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections45 (1999), Ong v. Alegre46 (2006), Rivera III v. Commission on Elections47 (2007) and Dizon v. Commission on Elections 48 (2009), all protest cases, are illuminating. In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same post. The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must concur for the three-term limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms."49 In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent in the case of Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of office as mayor "cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation." And as a corollary point, the Court stated that Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term, a situation which amounts to an involuntary relinquishment of office.This Court deviated from the ruling in Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre50 owing to a variance in the factual situations attendant. In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004. During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during his supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified Ong’s proclamation on the postulate that Ong lost during the 1998 elections. However, the COMELEC’s decision became final and executory on July 4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position as mayor, which his opponent opposed for violation of the three-term limit rule. Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be considered as having served as mayor from 1998-2001 because he was not duly elected to the post and merely assumed office as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing Ong’s argument, the Court held that his assumption of office as mayor for the term 19982001 constitutes "service for the full term" and hence, should be counted for purposes of the three-term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions stated in Lonzanida in the sense that Ong’s service was deemed and counted as service for a full term because Ong’s proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the term. The Court noted that the COMELEC decision which declared Ong as not having won the 1998 elections was "without practical and legal use and value" promulgated as it was after the contested term has expired. The Court further reasoned: Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would – under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.51 (Emphasis supplied.) The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of Ong was different, to wit: The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayorelect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.52 (Emphasis supplied.) Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the consolidated cases of Rivera III v. Commission on Elections 53 and Dee v. Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the following consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004. In relation to the 2004 elections, Morales again ran as mayor of the same town, emerged as garnering the majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo warranto was later filed against Morales predicated on the ground that he is ineligible to run for a "fourth" term, having served as mayor for three consecutive terms. In his answer, Morales averred that his supposed 1998-2001 term cannot be considered against him, for, although he was proclaimed by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as elected mayor vis-à-vis the 1998 elections and discharged the duties of mayor until June 30, 2001, his proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his closest rival, Anthony Dee, proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served as a mere caretaker. The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and held that the case of Morales presents a factual milieu similar with Ong, not with Lonzanida. For ease of reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong, in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like Morales, had served the three-year term from the start to the end of the term. Hence, the Court concluded that Morales exceeded the three-term limit rule, to wit: Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. xxxx Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.55 (Emphasis supplied.) The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the expiry of the term, cannot constitute an interruption in Morales’ service of the full term; neither can Morales, as he argued, be considered merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer" for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections,56 the Court would again find the same Mayor Morales as respondent in a disqualification proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty candidate during the 2007 elections for a term ending June 30, 2010. Having been unseated from his post by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Rivera, Morales would argue this time around that the three-term limit rule was no longer applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled in his favor, holding that for purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term limit rule was no longer a disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote: Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. 57 (Emphasis supplied) To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz: 1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon). 2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates). 3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa). 4. Preventive suspension is not a terminterrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.). 5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida). 6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera). The Case of Abundo Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling that he had already served three consecutive terms and is, thus, barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the current 2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo arguments run thusly: 1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt with preventive suspension which does not interrupt the continuity of service of a term; 2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be interrupted so as to remove him from the reach of the constitutional three-term limitation; 3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its reliance on a mere portion of the Decision and not on the unified logic in the disquisition; 4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida58 and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections.59 5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no interruption in the service of Abundo since what he considered as an "interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred before his term started; and 6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation was adjudged invalid was interrupted while that of the protestant (Abundo) who was eventually proclaimed winner was not so interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical. Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr. finds application in the instant case. The COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to the office as his victory in the protest case confirmed his entitlement to said office and he was only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office during the pendency of the election protest. We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election protest, for which the rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and Dizon appear to be more attuned than the case of Aldovino Jr., the interrupting effects of the imposition of a preventive suspension being the very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the same, We find that Abundo’s case presents a different factual backdrop. Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in the election protest and each declared loser during the elections, Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both unseated toward the end of their respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had assumed the remainder of the term. Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s pronouncements in the past as instructive, and consider several doctrines established from the 1998 case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving at this Court’s conclusion. The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of political power" and prevent elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest in their position" 60 but also to "enhance the people’s freedom of choice."61 In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "while people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed."62 In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule. It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his election protest against Torres and his consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the threeterm limit that the official has been elected is satisfied. This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served for "three consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately before the 2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during the three threeyear periods, resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty. The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term. There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled. A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals,63 means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office."64 It also means the "time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another."65 It is the period of time during which a duly elected official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June 30 of the first year of said term. In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less. Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.67 The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension.68 To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent. 69 When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word "renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or resign.70 Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to. In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, applying Aldovino, Jr.,71 held: It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence deems an exception to the three-term limit rule, implies that the service of the term has begun before it was interrupted. Here, the respondent did not lose title to the office. As the assailed Resolution states: In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the office. On the contrary, he actively sought entitlement to the office when he lodged the election protest case. And respondent-appellant’s victory in the said case is a final confirmation that he was validly elected for the mayoralty post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007. At most, respondent-appellant was only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office to which he was validly elected during the pendency of the election protest, but he never lost title to the said office.72 (Emphasis added.) The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the actual length of service by the public official in a given term is immaterial by reckoning said service for the term in the application of the three-term limit rule, thus: As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe to the argument that since respondent Abundo served only a portion of the term, his 2004-2007 "term" should not be considered for purposes of the application of the three term limit rule. When the framers of the Constitution drafted and incorporated the three term limit rule, it is clear that reference is to the term, not the actual length of the service the public official may render. Therefore, one’s actual service of term no matter how long or how short is immaterial.73 In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the actual service of the term is immaterial in his case as he was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor. The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commend themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot simply find its way clear to understand the poll body’s determination that Abundo was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor during the pendency of the election protest. As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term. This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004—the start of the term —until May 9, 2006 or during which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondent’s cause of action, or to COMELEC’s resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the Court succinctly defines what temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective office means, thus: On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.74 We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post. For one, during the intervening period of almost two years, reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such elective office. For another, not having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in the election protest accords him title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor.1âwphi1 Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of the remaining term. At this juncture, We observe the apparent similarities of Mayor Abundo’s case with the cases of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were not proclaimed winners since they were non-candidates in the regularelections. They were proclaimed winners during the recall elections and clearly were not able to fully serve the terms of the deposed incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the Court deemed their terms as involuntarily interrupted, Abundo also became or was a private citizen during the period over which his opponent was serving as mayor. If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanida’s service because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest, then with more reason, Abundo’s term for 20042007 should be declared interrupted since he was not proclaimed winner after the 2004 elections and was able to assume the office and serve only for a little more than a year after winning the protest. As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the "law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit."75 Applying the said principle in the present case, there is no question that during the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people of Viga, Catanduanes. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because, as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundo’s opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation. As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess the mandate to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a fortress against the injustices it may bring. In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave injustice to Abundo––an elected official who was belatedly declared as the winner and assumed office for only a short period of the term. If in the cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a losing candidate––or the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office but held it anyway––We find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by popular vote, deserves title to the public office but whose opportunity to hold the same was halted by an invalid proclamation. Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice that may likewise be committed against the people of Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of the Constitution, We bear in mind that We "cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want"76 and hence, should, as much as possible, "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to curtail the power when it overreaches itself."77 For democracy draws strength from the choice the people make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to protect. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed February 8, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and shall revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of this Decision. The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. GARCIA V. COMELECSept. 30, 1994 FACTS:On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227. The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so, they resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited the required number of signatures to repeal the said resolution. However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum. On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is “merely a resolution and not an ordinance.” ISSUE:w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative? Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set aside? HELD:The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside. RULING:The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation because of the event in February 1986. The new Constitution became “less trusting of public officials.” Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides “amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voter therein.” The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum. On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.” YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides “ the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly proposeand enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body. Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:1. Initiative on the Constitution – petition to amend the Constitution 2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to enact a national legislation3. Initiative on local legislation – petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is “the power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.” Adormeo vs COMELEC [76 SCRA 90; GR 147927; February 4, 2002] Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011 (Municipal Corporation: Interruption, Recall – Exception to the 3 term limit) Facts: Petitioner and private respondent incumbent mayor were the only candidates who filed their COC for mayor of Lucena City in the May 2001 elections. Private respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where he served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in May 1995, where he again served the full term. In the recall election of May 2000, he again won and served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to the latter in the 1998 election. Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or disqualification of the respondent in the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms contending that serving the unexpired term of office is considered as 1 term. Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and during Tagarao’s incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been a mayor for 3 consecutive terms. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office of elective officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that “no local elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.” Issue: WON private respondent had already served 3 consecutive term for mayor of Lucena City. Held: No. Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his term as mayor was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service (Lonzanida vs COMELEC). Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3 consecutive term limit. Note: Recall – a petition designed to remove an official from office by reason of lack of confidence. It is initiated only in the middle of the year. Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002 Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011 (Local Government, Recall Election: Exception to the 3 term limit) Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002. On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states: “Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.” This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides: “Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.” The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. MMDA vs. G.R. No. 130230 April Chico – Nazario, J.: Garin 2005 MMDA vs VIRON TRANSPORTATION Case Digest THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al. v. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., et al. 530 SCRA 341 (2007), EN BANC, (CARPIO MORALES, J.) It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the mass transport system. FACTS: To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 179, ―Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation System. As determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles and commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes. To decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a recommendation, proposing the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, and the construction of mass transport terminal facilties to provide a more convenient access to mass transport system to the commuting public. The project provided for under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila Transport System‖ (Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro Manila Council the governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support of the project. The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed the constitutionality of E.O. 179 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O., insofar as it permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of property without due process; that it contravened the Public Service Act which mandates public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as common carriers; and that Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order the closure of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional. 15, FACTS: Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt and his driver’s license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for case to be filed in Court. Without an immediate reply from the reply from the Chairman, Garin filed a complaint for preliminary injunction assailing among other that Sec 5(+) of RA 7942 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rules in his favor directing MMDA to return Garin’s driver’s license and for MMDA to desist from confiscating driver’s license without first giving the driver to opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 5(+) of RA 7942 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic constitutional. RULING: The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislative to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for subjects of the same. There is no provision in RA 7942 that empowers MMDA or its council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. All its functions are administrative in nature. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, P.O., NGO’s and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services.” The MMDA argued before the Court that there was no justiciable controversy in the case for declaratory relief filed by the respondents; that E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that the President has the authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179 was a valid exercise of police power. ISSUE: Whether constitutional or not E.O, 179 is such as the mass transport system. By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. In the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services, including transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion has been recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not granted police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Greater Manila Transport System as envisioned by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents‘ terminals. Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport system. With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide HELD: By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater Manila Transport System,” the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President Aquino in her exercise of legislative powers. This executive order reorganized the Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and defined its powers and functions. It mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law. The President may also exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the mass transport system project, which admittedly is one for transportation. Such authority springs from the President‘s power of control over all executive departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws under the Constitution. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities. Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas. The Court fails to see how the prohibition against respondents‘ terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents‘ bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to another. Moreover, an order for the closure of bus terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by provincial bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites. autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinceswhere the favorable votes were obtained. there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates s ubstantially the samerequirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus: “SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shalltake effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituentunits provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscitewhich shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundredtwenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only theprovinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which inthe plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remainthe existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions. “ Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shalltake effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in aplebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the OrganicAct shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such amajority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that evenif an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) citiesmentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution a n d R . A . N o . 6 7 3 4 w i l l t h e r e f o r e b e det erminative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and(2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. 2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of theconstituent units, or both? The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effectivewhen approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite calledfor the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It willreadily be seen that the creation of the autonomous Abbas vs. COMELECG.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989Topics: nature of plebiscite, constitutionality of RA 6734Facts: A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan,was scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" (Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conductingthe plebiscite; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. The argumentsagainst R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of thefollowing: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that certainprovisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement. Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional. Held: The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such t hat even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an region is made to depend, not on thetotal majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituentunits and the proviso underscores this. 3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included inthe Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas, which do not strictly share the samecharacteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of theautonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited. Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by whichCongress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided bythese constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share commonattributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of thisascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. 4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates theconstitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers ona provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between theMuslim Code and the Tribal Code on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitionersmaintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbassupports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions. In the present case, no actual controvers y between real litigants exists. There are noconflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolvewhat is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code andnational law. 5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.While the power to merge admini strative regions is not expressly provided for in theConstitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitatethe exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. There is no conflictbetween the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because thereq uirement of a plebiscite in a merger expr essly applies only to provinces, cities,mu nicipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions. 6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the groundsraised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable. Ordillo v. Comelec Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.” The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned. Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit. Issue: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region. Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case. Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that: “SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .” From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area Cordillera Broad Coalitionvs.Commission on AuditFacts: Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera Peoples LiberationArmy (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall notundertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as politicalnegotiations.A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement states that theyare to:Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that couldperform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studiesleading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel indrafting the Executive Order.Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine governmentand of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into law by President CorazonAquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR],which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and theCity of Baguio.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said order,the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from itsmandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Cordillera Broad Coalition vs COADate: January 29, 1990Petitioner: Cordillera Broad Coalition Respondent: COA, et alPonente: CortesFacts:-EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII,sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policyformulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shalle xist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized. In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, inthe exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organicact and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. I ss ue : W O N E O 2 2 0 i s v al i d RULING:Yes A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras". The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and development programs. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras. Issue: WON CAR is a territorial and political subdivision. Ruling: No We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion that E.O. No. 220contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision. After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas. The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of PD 1, established 11regions, later increased to 12, with definite regional centers and required departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be provided by law.CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National Government but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose. Issue: WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) andcity (Baguio City) which compose the CAR. Ruling: No, It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. Local autonomy is not unique to the1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution. And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act(R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of ane xecutive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions. As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy. Disomangcop 2004) Facts: − On Aug. 1, 1989, RA 6734 was passed (Organic Act of ARMM). Four provinces voted for inclusion in ARMM, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with it, EO 426 was issued by Pres. Cory Aquino on Oct. 12, 1990. The same devolved to the ARMM the power of the DPWH. On May 20, 1999, DO 119 was issued by DPWH Sec. Vigilar. It created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur. On Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which created a new Engineering District in the first district of Lanao del Sur was passed by Pres. Estrada. On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 which amended RA 6734 was passed. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join ARMM through said law. Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang in their capacity as OIC and Enginer II respectively of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur filed a petition questioning v. Datumanong (Tinga, the constitutionality and validity of DO 119 and RA 8999 on the ground that they contravene the constitution and the organic acts of the ARMM. Issue: WON DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid and constitutionally infirm. Held and Ratio: On RA 8999 RA 8999 never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a RA 9054. By creating an office with previously devolved functions, RA 8999, in essence sought to amend RA 6074, which is an organic act which enjoys affirmation through a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute such as RA 8999. The amendatory law needs to be submitted also to a plebiscite which is lacking in the case of RA 8999. RA 6734 devolved the functions of the DPWH to ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur. − Moreover, RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054 which is a later law. RA 9054, which is anchored on the 1987 Constitution advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARMM which covers among others Lanao del Sur. However, RA 8999 ventures to reestablisht he National Government's jurisdiction over the infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective of devolution of the functions of DPWH in line with the policy of the Constitution to grant LGUs meaningful and authentic regional autonomy. On DO 119 - DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO 426 which implements the transfer of control and supervision of the DPWH to the ARMM in line with RA 6734. The office created under DO 119 having essentially the same powers with the District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur as created under EO 426, is a duplication. The DO in effect takes back powers which have been previoulsy devolved under EO 426. RA 9054 however has repealed DO 119 because the former seeks to transfer control and supervision of DPWH offices to ARMM. − − − − − − Municipal Corporation – Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM) – Population Requirement The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato because inclusion City is part City of the province against in of its Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM Cotabato in a voted held plebiscite 1989. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation. ISSUE: Whether create validly LGUs. HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create subject barangays to within their with jurisdiction, the criteria compliance or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1stlegislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities. A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should decisive be called Shariff from Kabunsuan Congress with as to Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a declaration Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any). Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative Cotabato district st of S. Kabunsuan Sema with was (1 district). Later, contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically and gains S. legislative Kabunsuan representation since established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province. excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces. Kida v. Senate I. THE FACTS 1. Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153. II. THE ISSUES: III. THE RULING [The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.] YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections. In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections. 1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]? 2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution? 3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional? 2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-onseparate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance , explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner: The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement. President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.] 3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours] Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx. 3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional [During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken. Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. 3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order special elections. Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power. 3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid. Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections. The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity. At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states: After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours] express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are: First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. [T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires. Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an