Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. No.154512, November 12, 2002 considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.‖ The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. (Local Government, Recall Election: Exception to the 3 term limit) Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002. On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. COMELEC‘s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states: ―Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.‖ This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides: ―Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be 3[3] On October 27. 1999. Laxina guilty of grave misconduct. TERESITA S. LAXINA. in view of all the foregoing. Branch 40. the COMELEC. acting on respondent‘s motion to cite Fermo for contempt. On January 18. ROSARIO B. JR. On October 28. Fermo was served a copy of the writ of execution but refused to acknowledge receipt thereof. respondent took his oath and thereafter assumed office as the duly proclaimed and elected barangay captain of Barangay Batasan Hills.R. 1999 Order of the Court a quo is hereby ANNULLED. the Commission En Banc GRANTS the petition. ESPINO. assailing the November 13. SR. prevent respondent and his staff from discharging their functions and from holding office at the SK-Hall of Batasan Hills. SO ORDERED. 2003] KAGAWADS JOSE G.. Roque Fermo. BARANGAY CAPTAIN MANUEL D. which set aside the decision of the City Council of Quezon City finding respondent Barangay Captain Manuel D. No. however. Ramos as Barangay Secretary6[6] and on November 8.4[4] This did not.8[8] issued . 1999 order of the trial court. Private respondent ROQUE FERMO is hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from further performing the functions of Punong Barangay of Barangay Batasan Hills. He also refused to vacate the premises of the barangay hall of Batasan Hills. the COMELEC issued a writ of execution directing Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay Chairman of Barangay Batasan Hills. City Mayor of Quezon City. in the 1997 Barangay Elections. filed an election protest with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.FIRST DIVISION [G. respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC questioning the January 20. his rival candidate. Respondent filed a notice of appeal with the COMELEC while Fermo filed a motion for execution pending appeal. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO. On September 16. MATHAY. 1999. On January 20. 1999. Thereafter. vs. Fermo was declared as the winner in the Barangay Elections. respondent appointed Godofredo L.5[5] On the same date. On May 27. petitioners. Accordingly. J. Quezon City. Liquido as Barangay Treasurer. MENDOZA. pending final resolution of appeal. Hence. 2000 Summary Judgment1[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. July 14. he appointed Rodel G. the January 20. 1999. JORGE BANAL. The dispositive portion thereof reads: WHEREFORE. Quezon City and to relinquish the same to Petitioner MANUEL LAXINA. Chairman of the Special Investigation Committee on Administrative Cases Against Elected Barangay Officials of the Quezon City Council and ISMAEL A. 1997.7[7] On November 12. an order was issued by the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal. Branch 77. respondent. 1999. District II. SR. respondent vacated the position and relinquished the same to Fermo.. Meanwhile. 1999. MENDOZA. 1999. 146875.: Is the taking of an oath of office anew by a duly proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective official a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office where the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) orders the relinquishment of the contested position? This is the legal question raised in this petition under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. the COMELEC issued a resolution2[2] annulling the order which granted the execution of the decision pending appeal on the ground that there existed no good reasons to justify execution. 1999. 001-S-1999 ratifying the appointment of Godofredo L. 017-S99 as well as said payroll. namely. Ramos. 001-S-1999. effective November 1. 1999 to December 31.10[10] The following day. Mendoza. They contended that defendants made it appear in the payroll that he and his appointees rendered services starting November 8. 1999 after respondent took his oath and assumed the office of barangay chairman.14[14] In Resolution No.9[9] which was likewise returned unsatisfied.13[13] However. 1999.326. Liquido. Espino and Teresita S. Jr.. 1999. and SK-Chairman Sharone Amog. Liquido.an alias writ of execution. Mendoza. the Barangay Council of Batasan Hills issued Resolution No. petitioner barangay councilors filed with the Quezon City Council a complaint18[18] for violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act and falsification of legislative documents against respondent and all other barangay officials who signed the questioned resolution and payroll. 1999. Petitioners also contended that respondent connived with the other barangay officials in crossing out their names in the payroll.11[11] On November 20. Barangay Kagawad Charlie O. refused to sign Resolution No. Mangune. 002-S-1999 ratifying the appointment of Rodel G. In order to accommodate these appointees. They further claimed that the effectivity date of the barangay secretary and barangay treasurer‘s appointment. who were barangay councilors. 1999.7. 1999. Elias G. as Barangay Treasurer.17[17] Sometime in January 2000. November 17. 1999. Gamboa. they commenced to serve only on November 17. respondent took his oath of office as Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills..16[16] Petitioners Jose G.19[19] defendants claimed that the taking anew of the oath of office as barangay . Finally. Castañeda. Ramos as Barangay Secretary. the barangay council of Batasan Hills. Roque Fermo turned over to respondent all the assets and properties of the barangay. Barangay Secretary Godofredo L. 1999. respondent agreed to grant them allowances and renumerations for the period of November 1. also effective November 1. Jr. was November 16. 1999. Barangay Treasurer Rodel G. in truth. 1999 when. 017-S-99 dated December 11. but respondent fraudulently antedated it to November 1. the barangay payroll was issued on December 18. Briones.15[15] Pursuant thereto. Gonzalo S.00 for the November to December 1999 salary of its barangay officials and employees. In their joint counter-affidavit. as approved in Resolution No. authorized the appropriation of P864. the appointees of Roque Fermo to the same position registered objections to the said Resolutions. Maryann T. 199912[12] and Resolution No. 1999. Quezon City before Mayor Ismael Mathay. Rosario E. on November 16. Sr. enumerating the names of respondent and his appointed barangay secretary and barangay treasurer as among those entitled to compensation for services rendered for the period November 8. a summary judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of respondent. the Quezon City Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the Committee. exonerated him on the basis of the finding of the City Council that he did not act in bad faith but merely ―misread the law as applied to the facts. Nevertheless. 2000. the decision finding herein petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension and loss of concomitant benefits for two (2) months is hereby annulled and set aside. arguing that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case because appeals from the decision of the City Council should be brought to the Office of the President. 1999.‖22[22] On October 3. It did not rule on the propriety of the re-taking of the oath office by the latter. On November 13. seeking to annul the decision of the Quezon City Council. As to Barangay Kagawad Charlie O. 1999. 2000. the Special Investigation Committee on Administrative Cases of the City ruled that respondent had no power to make appointments prior to his oath taking on November 16. Maryann T. Mangune.20[20] On October 2. states: WHEREFORE.‖ The dispositive portion of the said decision. it found respondent guilty of grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of 2 months suspension. The suspension of the petitioner is hereby lifted and all benefits due to him are ordered restored. . Gamboa. inasmuch as the City Council‘s disciplinary jurisdiction is limited to elective barangay officials only. Briones. In their answer.25[25] Respondent filed a petition for certiorari26[26] with the Regional Trial of Quezon City. They contended that respondent‘s appointees are entitled to the remuneration for the period stated in the payroll as they commenced to serve as early as October 28. petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the petition. SO ORDERED. and SK-Chairman Sharone Amog. They added that the names of the 3 petitioner barangay councilors who refused to sign the assailed resolution and daily wage payroll were crossed out from the said payroll to prevent any further delay in the release of the salaries of all barangay officials and employees listed therein..27[27] Petitioners filed the instant petition for review raising pure questions of law. Castañeda. Elias G. [they] conspired with Punong Barangay Laxina …Ramos and Liquido in committing the acts therein complained of. found that respondent and the other barangay officials who signed the questioned resolution and payroll acted in good faith when they erroneously approved the grant of renumerations to respondent‘s appointees starting November 8. 1999.23[23] Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. Sr. however. Before going into the substantive issues.. 2000. Branch 67. however.chairman was a mere formality and was not a requirement before respondent can validly discharge the duties of his office. but nevertheless. Gonzalo S. the charges against them were likewise dismissed on the ground that there was no ―separate and independent proof that …. The charges against Barangay Secretary Godofredo Ramos and Barangay Treasurer Rodel Liquido were dismissed. The motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of respondents and the motion to drop City Councilor Banal as party respondent are both denied. 2000.24[24] On October 9. Quezon City. the City Council implemented the decision and appointed Charlie Mangune as acting barangay chairman of Batasan Hills.21[21] The Committee. we shall first resolve the issue on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence. Decision of the Office of the President shall be final and executory. are not. admits of exceptions. be appealed to the following: xxx xxx xxx (b) The Office of the President.32[32] Furthermore.31[31] In the case at bar. are certainly questions of law which call for judicial intervention. in the event the appeal results in his exoneration. provide: Section 61. Under Section 68. he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.The trial court ruled that Section 67 of the Local Government Code. the trial court did not consider Section 68 of the same code which provides: An appeal shall not prevent a decision from being final and executory. — Decisions in administrative cases may. In interpreting the foregoing provisions. Sections 61 and 67 of the Local Government Code. if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be availed of by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction. is not applicable because the decision of the City Council is final and executory. These phrases simply mean that the administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions. the said Code does not preclude the taking of an appeal. of the Local Government Code. as well as the propriety of taking an oath of office anew by respondent. it specifically allows a party to appeal to the Office of the President. Hence. then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court‘s judicial power can be sought. The phrases ―final and executory. in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities. A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows: xxx xxx xxx Sanggunian concerned. an appeal to the Office of the President would not necessarily render the case moot and academic. the issues of whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in disciplinary cases is appealable to the Office of the President. Administrative Appeals. which allows an appeal to the Office of the President. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration. as erroneously ruled by the trial court. the respondent shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.‖ and ―final or executory‖ in Sections 67 and 68. before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. indicative of the appropriate mode of relief from the decision of the . 67.29[29] It is clear that respondent failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies available to him. respectively.30[30] The application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. as the case may be. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.28[28] The decision is immediately executory but the respondent may nevertheless appeal the adverse decision to the Office of the President or to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. one of which is when the issue involved is purely legal. It added that respondent correctly filed a petition for certiorari because he had no other plain. (emphasis supplied) Sec. Obviously. The rule is that. the execution of the penalty or expiration of term of the public official will not prevent recovery of all salaries and emoluments due him in (c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event that he wins such appeal. The premature invocation of the court‘s intervention is fatal to one‘s cause of action. speedy and adequate remedy. On the contrary. however. The trial court further ratiocinated that an appeal to the Office of the President before going to the regular courts might render the case moot and academic inasmuch as the penalty of suspension might have been fully served by the time the court renders a decision. within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Clearly. 1999. He is therefore vested with all the rights to discharge the functions of his office. was sustained by this Court on March 13. Hence. For purposes of determining the continuity and effectivity of the rights arising from respondent‘s proclamation and oath taken on May 27. but the latter refused to comply therewith. To reckon. therefore. 1997 operated as a full investiture on him of the rights of the office. Undoubtedly. in Fermo v. the taking anew of his oath of office as Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills. would be to sanction dilatory maneuvers and to put a premium on disobedience of lawful orders which this Court will not countenance.33[33] However. albeit for the wrong reasons.case he is exonerated of the charges. Hence. prompting the latter to move for the issuance of an alias wit of execution. it is as if the said writ of execution pending appeal was not issued and he was not ousted from office. To be sure. the execution of said decision was annulled by the COMELEC in its September 16. the effectivity of respondent‘s assumption in office on November 17. a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. Although in the interim. as petitioners insist.34[34] Unless his election is annulled by a final and executory decision.36[36] It was held therein that ―[w]hen the COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal in favor of FERMO. 1999. It is only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. Quezon City? The records show that the COMELEC served on October 28. which was granted on November 12. 1999 Resolution which. Having thus ruled out the necessity of respondent‘s taking anew of the oath of office. It follows that all lawful acts of the latter arising from his re-assumption in office on October 28. no grave misconduct was committed by him in . 1997 and thereafter assumed office. an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office. 1997. the date Roque Fermo turned over to respondent the assets and properties of Barangay Batasan Hills. Quezon City starting October 28. 1999 are valid. the latter exercised the powers and functions thereof at the SK-Hall of Batasan Hills.35[35] or a valid execution of an order unseating him pending appeal is issued. Quezon City. It was only on November 17. a public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise the functions thereof. respondent was proclaimed as the winner in the 1997 Barangay Elections in Batasan Hills. Quezon City was not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office and to the exercise of the functions thereof. or from November 17. His re-assumption in office effectively enforced the decision of the COMELEC which reinstated him in office. 1999. We now come to the substantive issues. 1999. the decision of the MTC proclaiming FERMO as the winner of the election was stayed and the ‗status quo‘ or the last actual peaceful uncontested situation preceding the controversy was restored…‖37[37] The status quo referred to the stage when respondent was occupying the office of Barangay Captain and discharging its functions. The re-taking of his oath of office on November 16. It is essential to the effective administration of justice that the processes of the courts and quasi-judicial bodies be obeyed. His supporters prevented respondent from occupying the barangay hall.38[38] Moreover. 1999 was a mere formality considering that his oath taken on May 27. he took his oath on May 27. the next question to be resolved is: when is respondent considered to have validly reassumed office – from October 28. 1999. it was Fermo‘s defiance of the writ that prevented respondent from assuming office at the barangay hall. therefore. the trial court correctly took cognizance of the case at bar. 1999 a writ of execution ordering Fermo to desist from performing the function of the Office of Barangay Captain. 1999 that the turn-over to respondent of the assets and properties of the barangay was effected. incidentally. once proclaimed and duly sworn in office. In the case at bar. Commission on Elections. it is worthy to note that although the physical possession of the Office of the Barangay Captain was not immediately relinquished by Fermo to respondent. 2000. he has the lawful right to assume and perform the duties of the office to which he has been elected. the date of service of the writ of execution to Roque Fermo and the date respondent actually commenced to discharge the functions of the office. he was unseated by virtue of a decision in an election protest decided against him. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming office or from discharging his functions. Ramos and Rodel G. in Civil Case No. However. Respondent was also charged of conniving with the other barangay officials in crossing out the names of the petitioner barangay councilors in the payroll. in view of all the foregoing. Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentire. they were not able to receive their salaries for the period November 8 to December 31. is AFFIRMED.. The trial court therefore did not err in exonerating respondent and pursuant to Article 68 of the Local Government Code. Q-00-42155. Liquido as Barangay Secretary and Barangay Treasurer. Sr.appointing Godofredo L. Laxina.40[40] Hence. respectively. WHEREFORE. of the charge of grave misconduct and ordering the payment of all benefits due him during the period of his suspension.39[39] A reading of the payroll reveals that the names of said petitioners and their corresponding salaries are written thereon. The Summary Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Branch 77. he who suffered injury through his own fault is not considered to have suffered any damage. The petition alleged that as a consequence of the striking out of the names of the petitioner barangay officials. the instant petition for review is DENIED. Indeed. exonerating respondent Manuel D. they refused to sign the payroll and to acknowledge receipt of their salaries to manifest their protest. and in granting them emoluments and renumerations for the period served. he should be paid his salaries and emoluments for the period during which he was suspended without pay. 1999. SO ORDERED. . the investigative committee correctly brushed aside this charge against respondent. 2004. as may be necessary. v. Catanduanes under the three-term limit rule. Catanduanes Posted: February 7. In the Court‟s 35-page decision. as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections. upon receipt of this Decision. Jr. He assumed office from May 9. The Court further ruled that the COMELEC erred in applying Aldovino. While awaiting the pendency of the election protest. COMELEC‟s En Banc resolution in EAC (EA) No. Mayor of Viga. Tarin and Cesar O. Commission on Elections. He was proclaimed winner of the 2001 and 2007 elections. and to express my own views on how our present Decision should be read in light of other three-term limit cases that have been decided under a protest case scenario. Proclaims Abundo Winner of 2010 Mayoral Elections in Viga. Cervantes were also ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga. which declared Abundo ineligible to run in the 2010 Mayoral elections of Viga. Jr. As a result of such reversal. Catanduanes. 2006 and served a little over one year and one month only. 2012. Commission on Elections which the COMELEC erroneously relied upon in affirming the grant of the quo warranto petition against Abundo. setting aside the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division Resolution dated February 8. “the two-year period which his opponent. 2012. he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constitutents.the eventual winner who is so . v. the Court declared Abundo eligible for another term as Mayor to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and immediately reinstated him to such position. respectively and to revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and first Councilor. and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac.. which is immediately executory. Justice Arturo D. Abundo protested Torres‟ election and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. Jose Torres was proclaimed the winner of the electoral race and Mayor of Viga. was occupying the mayoralty seat. 43(b) of the Local Government Code. based on the requirements that Borja established. he was relegated to being an ordinary constituent and private citizen since his opponent. The Court emphasized that pending the favorable resolution of Abundo‟s election protest. 2007. Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the constituents of Viga and cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner. and has no choice but to adjust its appreciation of these realities. In the 2004 election. Sr. however. 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30. Emeterio M.SC Clarifies "Three-Term Limit" Rule. which effectively removed Abundo‟s case from the ambit of the threeterm limit rule. and 2010. Brion wrote to “briefly expound on the Court‟s ruling in Aldovino. 2012 to restrain the COMELEC from enforcing the abovementioned resolutions. It stressed that Abundo‟s case differs from other cases involving the “effects of an election protest because while Abundo was the winning candidate. A25-2010 dated May 10.” In his separate opinion. This was because he assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9. Catanduanes in the years 2001. written by Justice Presbitero J. Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. Velasco. The Court likewise lifted the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) it issued on July 3. Torres.. the three-term limit rule constitutes a disqualification to run for an elective local office when an official has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and has fully served those three consecutive terms. Catanduanes due to an actual involuntary interruption during the 2004-2007 term. 2010. respectively. 2013. As provided for in Section 8.” ruled the Court. which held that “service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule” as the doctrine refers to a situation where the elected official is under preventive suspension and is only temporarily unable to discharge his functions yet is still entitled to the office as compared to the situation of Abundo where he did not have title to the office.” He stressed that “the Court cannot avoid considering the attendant factual and legal realities. was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption. performing the functions of the office. Abundo ran for the position of Municipal Mayor of Viga. Padilla The Supreme Court En Banc has partly granted the petition for certiorari under rule 65 of Abelardo Abundo. it unanimously held that Abundo did not serve three consecutive terms as Mayor of Viga. 2007. Catanduanes Branch 43‟s Decision in Election Case No. 55 dated August 9. Catanduanes.” Justice Brion agreed that the Aldovino ruling relied upon by COMELEC “cannot be used as a basis for the conclusion that there had been no interruption in the case of Abundo . Thus. Jr. By Bianca M. 2013) . Alegre.” Based on this analysis. on the other hand. The Court also summarized the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and involuntary interruption. Notably in Aldovino. his term is interrupted when he losess in an election protest and is ousted from office. This is the view that best serves the purpose of the three-term limit rule. As mentioned above. (GR No. Commission on Elections). Jr. although Ong fully served the elected term. the factual reality should prevail. Lonzanida v. Ong served the full term. Aldovino. then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. Commission on Elections. v. Montebon v. Jr. Commission on Elections states that preventive suspension is not a term interrupting event as the elective officer‟s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension. his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption. January 8. provided the cause is involuntary is sufficient to break the continuity of service. what it affects is merely the authority to discharge the functions of an office that the suspended local official continues to hold… the local elective official continues to possess title to his office while under preventive suspension. so that no interruption of his term ensues. 201716. Justice Brion concluded his separate opinion by stressing that “Abundo should not be considered to have been elected for the full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Abundo v. v. immediately suggest that the Court‟s ruling in the cited cases cannot simply be combined nor wholly be bodily lifted and applied to Abundo. v. Commission on Elections supplemented this by saying that if the official runs again for the same position he held rior to his assumption of the higher office. where less than a full term is served by a winning protestant. while preventive suspension is an involuntary imposition. despite the legal reality that he won the election. both Lonzanida and Ong were protestees who faced the same legal reality of losing the election. Commission on Elections provides that when a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position through succession. Leonardo-De Castro joined Justice Brion‟s separate opinion. and that reality is that he served for less than this full term. On the issue of recall elections. Commission on Elections. as in Ong. At the simplest. had an interruption in the continuity of the official‟s servicefor he had become in the interim a private citizen. who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth trm. aside from their differing election results. Thus. Adormeo v. Borja. for Abundo. Justice Brion pointed out that “the differing factual situations of the cited cases and Abundo that necessarily gave rise to different perspectives in appreciating the same legal question. Commission on Elections continued on to rule that when a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office.‟ Ong and Abundo. have differing legal and factual realities. although he is barred from exercising the functions of the office during this period. the legal reality is his recognized and declared election victory. but this similarity is fully negated by their differing legal realities with respect to the element of „election. Lastly. Commission on Elections ruled that the abolition of an elective office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not. by itself. In terms of factual reality. Commission on Elections declared when an official is defeated in an election protest and decision becomes final only after the official had served the full term for the office. his service for the unexpired portion of the term cannot be treated as one full term. Latasa v. Commission on Elections held that an elective official. no continous and uninterrupted term should be recognized. Jr.recognized only after winning his protest case. Ong v. Commission on Elections and Socrates v. An interruption for any length of time. Commission on Elections and Dizon v. and Borja.” After discussing the prevailing jurisprudence cited by the majority (Ong v. while Abundo only enjoyed abbreviated term. but later won in a recall election. His full service should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term. Lonzanida and Abundo may be the same since they only partially served their term. Alegre and Rivera III v.” Justice Teresita J. work to interrupt the incumbent official‟s continuity of service. Lonzanida v. Catanduanes In the Court‟s 35-page decision. written by Justice Presbitero J. Jr. Abundo v. which effectively removed Abundo‟s case from the ambit of the threeterm limit rule. it unanimously held that Abundo did not serve three consecutive terms as Mayor of Viga.” ruled the Court. Notably in Aldovino. what it affects is merely the authority to discharge the functions of an office that the suspended local official continues to hold… the local elective official continues to possess title to his office while under preventive suspension. 201716. This was because he assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9. 2006 and served a little over one year and one month only.x x x. while preventive suspension is an involuntary imposition. was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption. “the two-year period which his opponent.” (GR No. January 8. so that no interruption of his term ensues. Torres. Velasco. Catanduanes due to an actual involuntary interruption during the 2004-2007 term. Thus. Commission on Elections." SC Clarifies "Three-Term Limit" Rule.. Proclaims Abundo Winner of 2010 Mayoral Elections in Viga. Justice Brion agreed that the Aldovino ruling relied upon by COMELEC “cannot be used as a basis for the conclusion that there had been no interruption in the case of Abundo .the eventual winner who is so recognized only after winning his protest case. 2013) . On 5 November 2004. MUNICIPALITY OF BAYOMBONG PROVINCE OF NUEVA VISCAYA vs. amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are essentially judicial” an aggrieved party may have direct recourse to the courts. respondent Barangay Chairman Severino Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner Sangguniang Barangay (municipal legislative council) through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 61 of Rep. wheels and other spare parts of the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of said truck from the garbage fees collected as income from its Sold Waste Management Project. 7160. he. PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO MARTINEZ. the Philippine Supreme Court. 4.R. 5. in the recent case of THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS. as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. since the power was exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code. x x x. lubricants. otherwise known as the Local Government Code. x x x. March 3. gasoline. Martinez was placed under preventive . in most cases. Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel for private persons without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from this source appears in the year end report even if payments were collected x x x. 2008. Failure to submit and fully Barangay Treasurer the income waste management project particularly the sale of fertilizer composting.Partisan politics and the law In the midst of the vindictive and discriminatory partisan politics prevailing in the Philippines. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable materials taken from garbage collection. (b) that Article 125. which. Act No. Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 was invalid and unconstitutional. reiterated its past rulings stating (a) that the Office of the President and the local Sangguniang (local legislative councils at the Barangay. municipal/city and provincial levels) were without any power to remove elected officials. however. 170626. Pending the administrative proceedings. No. x x x. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003 because although a cash advance was made by the respondent for the said purpose. and (c) that “where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal. G. did not attend said seminar because on the dates when he was supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the barangay. remit to the of their solid since 2001 derived from 2. Using/spending barangay funds for repair. 3. That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain because respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session. alleging the respondent’s: 1. 6. has rendered the Philippine justice system helpless. The pivotal issue was whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez. since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code”. The Court nullified the aforequoted rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its authority when it granted to the “disciplining authority” the power to remove elective officials. the Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor Bagasao questioning the validity of the Decision dated 28 July 2005 of the Sangguniang Bayan. Guingona. It further “invalidated Article 125. the Court nevertheless settled the legal question because it was capable of repetition yet evading review. the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office.suspension for 60 days by the Sangguniang Bayan. are empowered to remove an elective local official from office. Thus..” The Court reiterated its previous ruling In the case of Salalima v. Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office when it provides that “an elective local official may be removed from office xxx by order of the proper court. The trial court further ruled that Martinez properly availed himself of the remedy of Special Civil Action. On 28 July 2005. where it declared that “the power to remove erring elective local . Although Martinez’s term as Punong Barangay expired upon the holding of the 29 October 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections and. the trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. the Order of the Sangguniang Bayan removing Martinez from service is void. and not the petitioner. in accordance with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. rendering this petition moot and academic. On 20 October 2005. thus. where the order assailed was a patent nullity. a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. an elective local official. the pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by this Court firmly establish that the Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to do so. Villapando. Jr. On 26 August 2005. where the Court en banc categorically ruled that “the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials. Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against petitioner. The Court likewise reiterated its ruling in the case of Pablico v. from office. Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. According to the Court. which provided that “an elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other”. It maintained that the proper courts. and their discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of removal from office (would be) left to be exercised by political factions which stand to benefit from the removal from office of the local elective official concerned. “the courts would be stripped of their power of review. if found guilty. of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code. that “such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panglunsod. where court rules of procedure and evidence can ensure impartiality and fairness and protect against political maneuverings” and that “elevating the removal of an elective local official from office from an administrative case to a court case may be justified by the fact that such removal not only punishes the official concerned but also. that “the law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied. and that “vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may be removed from office.officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts”. that in such a case. deprives the electorate of the services of the official for whom they voted”. Thus. would merit the penalty of removal from office. The Court opined that “the rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority”. Once the court assumes jurisdiction. it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove”. is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991”. in effect. “Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after a trial before the appropriate court. that “Article 125 (b). and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision. the Sangguniang Panglunsod or Sangguniang Bayan “cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office. and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith. it retains . insofar as it vests power on the ‘disciplining authority’ to remove from office erring elective local officials. which “would be an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers” because it would “place the courts under the orders of the legislative bodies of local governments”. or Sangguniang Bayan”. “the case should be filed with the regional trial court”. However. would still not free the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority”. if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and. The Court clarified that Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the Sangguniang Panglunsod or Sangguniang Bayan. the very evil which Congress sought to avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local Government Code”. According to the Court. Rule XIX. as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code”. that the “their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority”. for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage”. that “where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove. amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are essentially judicial”. the Court stated that although the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review and that non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action. 9) when the issue of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. the Court held that “where the case involves only legal questions. 3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant. In rejecting the theory of the petitioner that the respondent should have first sought recourse from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. speedy and adequate remedy. Thus.jurisdiction over the case “even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate”. Such act was patently illegal and. no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 10) where there is no other plain. 4) where the amount involved is relatively small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive. therefore. The Court cited Paragraph 2. Gloria. although as a general rule. the rule is not applicable “where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal. then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court”. 11) when strong public interest is involved. In this case. which provides that “judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”. 5) where the question raised is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice. Martinez was no longer required to avail himself of an administrative appeal in order to annul the said Order of the Sangguniang Bayan. the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought”. his direct recourse to regular courts of justice was justified. 6) where judicial intervention is urgent. nonetheless. 2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal. In addition. Issues of law “cannot be resolved with finality by the . Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. 7) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage. 8) where the controverted acts violate due process. the said doctrine “is not inflexible” because it is subject to the following exceptions: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine. On the other hand. the Sangguniang Bayan acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated 28 July 2005 removing Martinez from office. Section 1. which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. and 13) in quo warranto proceedings. citing its ruling in the case of Castro v. In fine. “the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panglunsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension” and that “if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted. Sangguniang Barangay members and SK chairmen constituting a majority of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Caloocan passed Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. It then declared the recall proceedings to be in order.administrative officer” and an appeal to the administrative officer would only be “an exercise in futility”. Malonzo filed a petition with COMELEC challenging the validity of recall process. HELENE VALBUENA. and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him. The COMELEC. In response to petitioner's request for a technical examination of the recall documents. he could validly exercise . GLORIA M. MIRALI M. ROGELIO SARAZA. 1996. Moreover. on July 7. CRUZ. rejected the petition. The said resolution. The ERSD in turn performed its task and reported its findings to the COMELEC. petitioner. Service was done through personal delivery or by mail. and HIGINO RULLEPA. The ERSD and the COMELEC found that the notices were properly served. AURELIO BILUAN. HELD: Yes. respondents. 699 barangay officials. vs. The resolution was properly adopted in a meeting conducted by the PRA. expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo. sent the notices is of no moment. Morever. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY (Caloocan Chapter) and ALEX L. 1997 FACTS: Malonzo was elected as Mayor of Caloocan City in the elections held on May 8. president of the Liga ng mga Barangay. 01-96.R. CRUZ. RATIO I. it was the PRA which initiated the recall and not the Liga ng mga Barangay. Service of the notices The COMELEC adequately ruled on the issue of the service of notices to the members of the PRA. the Court said. The notices were propery served to the members of the PRA. DURR. 1. The recall process was valid. FERMIN JIMENEZ. 1995. However. CONRADO G. he argued that it was the Liga ng mga Barangay and not the PRA which initiated the recall. along with other relevant documents. that Alex David. No. essentially claiming that the notices for the meeting of the PRA were not properly served. Most of these were properly received while there were some who refused to accept the notice. These were all duly noted. DAVID. 927 notices were sent. Malonzo challenged the recall proceedings. TRINIDAD REPUNO. 1. Malonzo then filed a Petition for Certiorari With Prayer For Temporary Restraining Order and Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction". He also claimed that the proceeding followed for adopting the recall resolution was defective and therefore void. REYNALDO O. Moreover. assailing the COMELEC's resolution as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The COMELEC found no irregularities in the service of the notices. the COMELEC directed its Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to resolve the matter of notices sent to the Preparatory Recall Assembly members. barely a year after his election. G. As a member of the PRA. there were 1. MALONZO. contrary to the requirements under the Local Government Code. however. was filed by the PRA with the COMELEC. A legal question is properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an administrative body. 127066 March 11. ISSUE: Whether or not the recall proceeding was valid.057 Punong Barangays. At the time the PRA was convened. attached to his .the prerogatives membership.