The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Security Challenges
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE Francisco ALDECOA LUZÁRRAGA, Ph.D. Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain Carlos E. Pacheco AMARAL, Ph.D. University of the Azores, Ponta Delgada, Portugal Tom CASIER, Ph.D. Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, Brussels, Belgium Vasile CUCERESCU, Ph.D. ECSA Moldova, Chisinau, Moldova Gaga GABRICHIDZE, Ph.D. ECSA Georgia, New Vision University, Tbilisi, Georgia Nico GROENENDIJK, Ph.D. ECSA World, University of Twente, Enschede, the Netherlands Ioan HORGA, Ph.D. Institute for Euroregional Studies, University of Oradea, Oradea, Romania Anatoliy KRUGLASHOV, Ph.D. ECSA Ukraine, “Yuriy Fedkovych” Chernivtsi National University, Chernivtsi, Ukraine Ewa LATOSZEK, Ph.D. PECSA, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland Marta PACHOCKA, Ph.D. PECSA, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland Mihai SOFONEA, Ph.D. “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, Romania Tigran YEPREMYAN, Ph.D. ECSA Armenia, Yerevan State University, Yerevan, Armenia
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The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Security Challenges
CONTENTS PART I. KEYNOTE SPEECH .............................................................................................. 9 Challenges for the Eastern Partnership in the Context of Sovereign Tendencies of EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe Ioan HORGA, Eduard Ionuț FEIER ...................................................................................... 11 PART II. SECURITY PARADIGMS ..................................................................................... 31 Regionalism and Regional Autonomy in an Age of Renationalization Carlos E. Pacheco AMARAL ................................................................................................ 33 The EU’s Global Strategy and Its Initial Impact on the Eastern Partnership Francisco ALDECOA LUZÁRRAGA, Victoria RODRÍGUEZ PRIETO .................................. 47 Incompatible Partnerships: The Inherent Tension in the EU’s East-European Policy and Its Implications for Security Tom CASIER ........................................................................................................................ 67 The Eastern Partnership Area in the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: What Is Shared by Partners? Vasile CUCERESCU ............................................................................................................ 81 Eastern Partnership Lacks Collective Approach to Security Rahim RAHIMOV ................................................................................................................. 109 EU Arms Export Control and the Eastern Partnership Nico GROENENDIJK ........................................................................................................... 131 Eastern Partnership Countries between Two Models of Regional Integration (Hard vs. Soft Choice) Vladimir ZUEV ...................................................................................................................... 149 PART III. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: PATTERNS AND CHOICES ................................ 167 Efficient Political Communication – Precondition for Development and Security of Eastern Partnership States Ludmila ROȘCA ................................................................................................................... 169 Transformation of the Security Environment at the EU’s Eastern Borders: Amplification of the Russian Factor Aurelian LAVRIC .................................................................................................................. 179 5
The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Security Challenges
Russian Media Policy as a Factor of Political Destabilization in Central and Eastern European Countries Pavlo KATERYNCHUK ........................................................................................................ 185 The European Integration of Eastern Partnership Countries – Security Challenges and Opportunities: The Case of the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia Natalia CIOBANU ................................................................................................................. 199 The Future of the Eastern Partnership in the European Security Architecture: The Role of the Republic of Moldova Mihaela STICEA ................................................................................................................... 211 The Security of Ukraine: Is Adhesion to NATO a Final Solution? Karim BELGACEM ............................................................................................................... 219 Armenia within the Complex of “Overlapping Authority and Multiple Loyalty”: Security Challenges Tigran YEPREMYAN ............................................................................................................ 227 PART IV. TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION .................................................................. 243 Socialization Practices and Dynamics of (In)Security in EU-Russia-Neighbours Energy Relations Maria Raquel FREIRE .......................................................................................................... 245 The European Union and Its Eastern Partnership: Energy Security Challenges Helena TENDERA-WŁASZCZUK, Magdalena ZAJĄCZKOWSKA ...................................... 259 The European Union Water Initiative and Its Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia Component: In Search of Water Security by Looking at the EU Water Policy and Law Model Paulo CANELAS DE CASTRO ............................................................................................. 269 Cross-Border Employment in European Border Regions: A Security Issue or a Daily Reality in the Bihor – Hajdú Bihar Euroregion István POLGÁR .................................................................................................................... 295 Romania’s Main Hard and Soft Security Challenges in 2018: Present and Future Approaches towards the Desired Stability and Prosperity Mihai SOFONEA .................................................................................................................. 305
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Efficiency of Cooperation and Intelligence Sharing among Law Enforcement Agencies in the European Union in the Fight against Terrorism: Sharing is Caring?! Edina Lilla MÉSZÁROS, Constantin Vasile ȚOCA ............................................................... 317 PART V. INSTITUTION BUILDING ..................................................................................... 345 Societal Security and State-Building in the Republic of Moldova: Complications for Regional and European Contexts Octavian ȚÎCU ............................................................. ........................................................ 347 Risks and Threats to the National Security of the Republic of Moldova Simion ROȘCA ..................................................................................................................... 367 Leveraging Resilience? Implications of the EU Global Strategy for the Republic of Moldova Kerry LONGHURST, Mihai MOGÎLDEA ............................................................................... 379 Perspectives for Implementation of the Anti-Bribery Management Systems in the Republic of Moldova Tatiana MOSTOVEI .............................................................................................................. 393 Multiple Citizenship in Georgia – Security Concerns vs. Proportionality Gaga GABRICHIDZE ........................................................................................................... 407 The Effects of the EU’s Scientific Cooperation on the Eastern Partnership Countries: Development Impact of the Integration into European Scientific Community Honorata MAZEPUS, Dimiter TOSHKOV, Tatsiana CHULITSKAYA, Ina RAMASHEUSKAYA ............................................................................................................. 421 PART VI. SOCIETIES AND GEOPOLITICS ....................................................................... 451 Rethinking the Twin Migration and Refugee Crises in Europe through the Lens of Safety and Security Marta PACHOCKA, Anna VISVIZI ....................................................................................... 453 Intellectual Migration under Internationalization of Higher Education: The Case of EaP Countries Irina SIKORSKAYA .............................................................................................................. 471 Massive Impact of Migration on the Security of the European Union and the Republic of Moldova Tatiana DAUD ...................................................................................................................... 483
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Security Challenges of Language Politics’ Discussion between Ukraine and Hungary: The Case of Transcarpathia Region Myroslava LENDEL .............................................................................................................. 493 Securing Insecure: Ukraine on the Margin of European Integration Process Anatoliy KRUGLASHOV ....................................................................................................... 511 Information Warfare against Ukraine: Security Challenges for the European Union Nataliya NECHAYEVA-YURIYCHUK ................................................................................... 525 ABOUT AUTHORS .............................................................................................................. 537
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LEVERAGING RESILIENCE? IMPLICATIONS OF THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA Kerry LONGHURST Mihai MOGÎLDEA Abstract. This paper looks to analyse the priorities set by the EU Global Strategy in relation to Moldova, with a focus on the mechanisms and instruments related to the resilience concept. By examining the key objectives of EUGS in the area of resilience and state building, this paper will evaluate the EU’s potential to build up a ‘more resilient’ Moldova in a very challenging environment of ‘state capture’ and fragile democracy. Keywords: EU Global Strategy, state capture, resilience, security.
We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead. 1 It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state. 2 Introduction
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n 2016 the European Union and its Member States founded the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in an attempt to recast the Union’s external profile, boost its global influence and potential and to become a more effective security provider and motor for development beyond its borders. By establishing the EUGS the EU set itself a ‘transformational agenda.’ 3 The EUGS is about recalibrating the EU’s interests and priorities in light of new and complex realities, stressing the indivisibility of the EU’s internal and external security and affirming the EU’s identity, role and aspirations as being beyond those of a purely regional actor. The EUGS, and its follow-on documents, is also marked by its efforts to develop a more seamless connection 1 EUGS: European External Action Service, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: “Shared Vision and Common Action: A Stronger Europe,” 2016, 11, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/ top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (accessed 10 February 2018). 2 Ibid., 23. 3 European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council ‘A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action,’ JOIN(2017) 21 final, Brussels, 7 June 2017, 2.
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between the political, development and economic (especially trade) elements of the EU’s external policies and to smoothen out inter-institutional cooperation across EU bodies, with the goal of improving overall policy coordination and effectiveness of delivery. The Global Strategy also seeks to forge a more unambiguous alignment between EU foreign and security policy objectives and methods and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) than was hitherto the case in EU external action strategies. Providing the overarching ‘concept’ and ‘mission’ for the EUGS is the notion of ‘resilience’ and the idea that it is in the EU’s essential or ‘enlightened self’ interest to help create and support resilience in states and societies. Resilience first appeared in EU external policy parlance in a 2012 communication “The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises.” 4 Resilience is a nebulous, yet interesting and appealing term deriving from development/ humanitarian aid policy and practice, as well as social-ecological studies. At its most fundamental resilience is about the capacity of a system, whether that be a family unit, group, community, society or state to absorb disturbance, to reorganise and to adapt while undergoing change without a loss of its essential functions. 5 In this sense, the idea of resilience is closely linked to ideas of ‘flexibility’, ‘hardiness’ and ‘buoyancy’. Resilience (especially the lack of it) resonates loudly in the case of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood: to greater or lesser extents the states of the region are characterised by fragility, run by weak or dysfunctional public institutions that lack legitimacy and also continue to experience flawed transitions pathways and a lack of unsustainable development, evident since 1991. Crucially, all of this adds up to a situation where states and societies lack resilience and thus are insecure and vulnerable to external and internal shocks. Moldova as a Captured State: A Test-Case for Building Resilience The current paper posits that the Republic of Moldova is fundamentally lacking in resilience, in fact it is arguably one of the most un-resilient countries in the Eastern Partnership (EaP). From an EU perspective a lack of resilience equals insecurity. Crucially, though it has the most advanced relationship with the EU out of all in the Eastern Partnership states, the Republic of Moldova lacks resilience because it is a ‘captured state’, implying certain political and socio-economic conditions, endemic corruption, oligarchism and insecurities that impede the country’s transition and also limit the country’s capacity to
4 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises,” COM (2012) 586 final, Brussels, 3 October 2012. 5 For an expansive discussion of resilience in the context of social-ecological systems see Brian Walker, C. S. Holling, Stephen Carpenter and Ann Kinzig, “Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability in Social-ecological Systems,” Ecology and Society 9, 2 (2004): 5, https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/ (accessed 10 February 2018).
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implement reforms associated with EU norms and modernisation in a sustainable way. 6 The notion of State Capture was developed by the World Bank in a series of studies on developments in the business environments of post-Soviet transition states in the 2000s. State Capture was used as a measure to see how far firms and private individuals were able to ‘shape and affect the formation of laws, policies and decrees’ in accordance with their own private business interests. 7 Leitner and Meissner provide a useful overview of Moldova as a captured state. For them, Moldovan life and politics suffer from the persistence of informal practices, which act as ‘compensatory mechanisms’, regulating normal ways of life and bypassing official rules, laws and principles. This, they argue, is due to the fact that the state is weak in its capacities to provide for the wellbeing of its citizens and, secondly, that is not able to reward rule conformity or punish rule breaking. As a consequence, key public institutions, such as schooling and education, the judiciary, police, healthcare and the mass media tend to function according to ‘principles other than those stated in law, which contributes to the spread and perpetuation of corruption.’ 8 Further instances of Moldova’s state capture and lack of resilience can be identified as following. First, Moldova has an oligarchic system that revolves around one central oligarch who has strong vested interests in maintaining the status quo in order to preserve his own business and political interests. This is significant for the proposed project since a ‘monopolistic oligarchic system’ such as this entails a very strong concentration of power, which reinforces state capture by preventing economic and political liberalisation and pluralism. Next, Moldovan domestic politics remain heavily tainted with low public trust, contested elections, abundant scandals and corruption pervading private and public sectors. Evidence of high-level corruption in the judiciary and national banking system are particularly evident and are major contributing factors to reinforcing State Capture. Third, the past 25 years have seen Moldovan Governments and foreign policies oscillate between pro-European and pro-Russian directions and loyalties. This has had the effect of creating political instability and uncertainty, The concept of ‘state capture’ implies systemic and widespread political corruption, a situation where the private interests of individual oligarchs or small groups palpably influence a state’s institutional set up and decision-making structures to their own political or economic advantage. Crucially, this is manifest in discrete and hidden manoeuvres and deals within or amongst all organs of government across the executive, ministries, legislative and judiciary. 7 See Joel S. Hellmann, Geraint Jones and Daniel Kauffmann, “’Seize the State, Seize the Day’: State Capture, Corruption and Transition,” World Bank Policy Research Paper 2444, 2000. 8 Johannes Leitner and Hannes Meissner, eds., State Capture, Political Risks and International Business (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017). See also: World Bank, Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate, Washington DC, 2000, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/contribu tion.pdf (accessed 10 February 2018); The World Bank / European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, Trends in Corruption and Regulatory Burden in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, A World Bank Study, Washington DC, 2011. See, for example Evgeny Yakovlev and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “State Capture: From Yeltsin to Putin,” CEFIR Working Paper 52, 20 October 2005, http://www.cefir.org/papers/WP52.pdf (accessed 10 February 2018); Camelia Florela Voinea, “State Capture and Political Clientelism in Central and Eastern Europe,” SSRN Electronic Journal XXXIX, 4 (2015): 9-31. 6
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as well as inconsistency in trade policy for example. Moldova’s incomplete transition has also been shaped by ideological debates on statehood and national identity, which have tended to distract from the process of state building. Significant delays in economic modernisation are worsened by the fact that the state and civil society is hollowed out by mass outwards migration, which also means that the country is heavily reliant on remittances, as well as international donors. Finally, what further compounds the problems associated with State Capture is the fact that Moldova is a fractured state in a ‘Frozen Conflict’. The breakaway ‘Republic of Transnistria’, which declared its independence from Moldova, is a de facto state. Although it remains unrecognised in international law, the fact that it has its own government and functioning institutions, a loyal population and is financially and militarily supported by Russia means that it is another major hindrance to Moldova’s pro-European transformation. As a result of this ‘state capture’, Moldova has the ‘classic’ conditions and symptoms of a state and a society that lacks resilience, owing to a large part to the condition of state capture: ● Public institutions and policies in Moldova often fail to perform their fundamental tasks and thus lose citizen’s support and legitimacy; ● People tend to depend on informal practices to ‘get by’, as they feel they cannot rely on state institutions; ● The political system lacks pluralism and a stable party system; democracy remains highly fragile; ● Political interests and business interests are often closely fused; ● The implementation of the rule of law remains stymied and unreliable not least because of the questionability of the independence of the justice sector; ● National assets and the media are often beholden to individual’s business interests; ● Economic growth and the country’s overall socio-economic development remains patchy; ● The persistence of oligarchic capitalism warps development and further weakens state institutions and the development of the business environment; ● The consistent outwards migration of young people implies that the resident populations is being hollowed out; ● Corruption persists at many levels and has become ‘part of everyday life; ● National identity tends towards atomisation, resulting in a rather weak sense of what it is to be Moldovan; ● The country itself is physically fractured as a result of the break-away territory of Transnistria. With these factors in mind, this paper will argue that the Republic of Moldova represents a pertinent case study with which to examine the validity and usefulness of the EU’s Global 382
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Strategy, its assumptions and the ways and methods it proposes to implement external action and to render the EU a relevant security provider in the Eastern neighbourhood. More specifically, Moldova is a perfect test case for the European Union’s goal to create and support ‘resilient’ states and societies. The paper will proceed in two main sections. First, the EUSG will be examined using the following scoping questions: What kind of security actor does the EU aspire to be? What are the EU’s key priorities and interests? How does the EU define the notion of ‘un-resilient’ / ‘resilient’ states and societies and what strategies and formula are articulated to bring about the latter? The next part of the paper hones in on concrete examples of sectors where the effects of state capture palpably shape the kinds of policy outcomes that run counter to the public good, enrich the vested interests of individuals and, in turn, weaken the resilience of the Moldovan state and society. By way of a conclusion, the paper will give an overall evaluation of the implications of the EUGS for the Republic of Moldova and return to the question as to whether it can ‘leverage’ resilience. The European Union Global Strategy – Assumptions and Implications for Moldova As already noted, the EUGS represents a response to a new global security environment, described in the document as a ‘difficult, more connected, contested and complex world’ and a time of existential crisis for the Union. 9 The EU’s overall approach to these new realities is both familiar in the sense that it generally affirms the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, but also bolder, more confident and far reaching. To begin with, in the EUGS the EU casts itself in far more certain and self-assured terms, as: A key global stakeholder and manager of the challenges and opportunities associated with interdependence; A relevant and important international actor that other states and regions look up to for solutions and inspiration; A distinctive actor able to draw on unparalleled resources and credibility to make a difference in the world; An actor guided by a strong sense of responsibility, commitment to the rule of law, principles of the United Nations and a rules-based World order; An instinctive ‘multilateralist’, nurturing global partnerships with international organisations and ‘like-minded’ states and regions; An active player in conflict resolution committed to tackling the root causes of conflict and risk; An innovator committed to working with a variety of stakeholders in the ‘networked world’, including civil society and the private sector. Arguably what distinguishes the EUGS of 2016 from the ESS of 2003 is its emphasis on the idea of resilience, the necessity of ‘prising open’ the state to engage with non-state actors and third, its prescription element regarding the absolute necessity of bringing into a coherent strategy the full repertoire of the EU’s external policies and instruments. The ‘global’ in the EUGS implies not just a geographical marker, but just as importantly the notion of developing a comprehensive and flexible security strategy replete with a capacity to engage not just with states, but also individuals, communities societies and regions. EUGS: European External Action Service, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: “Shared Vision and Common Action: A Stronger Europe,” 7. 9
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Resilience is one of the leading ideas in the EU Global Strategy, it is both a priority and a cross-cutting theme throughout, and provides a platform for the comprehensive and multi pronged approach that the EU is endeavouring to conceive and implement. By placing resilience-building as a core EU goal what should follow is an external action capable of bringing together all of the EU’s policy instruments into an overarching and coherent strategic approach. In other words, ‘resilience’ necessitates the breaking down of traditional policy barriers and institutional remits, as well as the bringing in of less obvious policies and instruments – not normally associated with foreign policy, such as youth policy, education and health, which nevertheless can have a positive bearing and feed into the job of enhancing societal and state resilience. The EUGS captures this logic, stating that the EU’s role needs to be configured to be able to focus on ‘military capabilities and anti-terrorism as much as on job opportunities, inclusive societies and human rights.’ 10 The core position of this paper is that the Eastern neighbourhood and Moldova in particular are excellent test cases for the EU’s capacity to deliver on its new commitment to resilience building. If we bear in mind the basic definitions of resilience depicted earlier as being to do with a system’s capacity to be able to cope with change and shocks without losing its essential functions and ideas of flexibility, hardiness and buoyancy, alongside the EU’s own conceptualisation of a resilient state as one based on democracy, functioning state institutions and sustainable development, then it is not difficult to reach a conclusion that EaP states are largely un-resilient. The EU’s assumptions about how to create more resilient states and societies in the Eastern neighbourhood arguably revolve around the following: ● Authoritarian undemocratic states might be ‘stable’, but are ultimately fragile and insecure; democracy is the best way to counter fragility and build enduring security; States, regimes and leaders are often part of the problem and contribute to perpetuating weak resilience; ● Creating resilient states based on democracy, outwards facing economies and accountable public institutions lays the basis for state’s capacities to withstand externally imposed pressures and shocks and therefore enhance regional security; ● Resilient societies are an important part of the equation; without such societies composed of engaged citizens and an effective civil society able to scrutinise governments and elites sustainable security cannot exist; ● Civil society needs further enabling as a means to ensure societal resilience and on route to sustainable democracy building and functioning public institutions and policies viewed as valuable and legitimate by citizens; ● Conditionality works: the EaP as a formula has an important role in resilience building; the strict conditionality laid out in the Association Agreements and DCFTAs represent impulses for transformation and alignment with EU norms, which help to 10
Ibid., 4. 384
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embed resilience factors such as independence of the judiciary etc.;
democracy, transparent government,
● A more joined up approach is needed, which entails the breaking down of traditional external action policy areas and instruments aligned to the UN SDGs, and to also bring on to the agenda a more diffuse range of policy areas, such as youth, education, culture and health; ● Taking a less ‘linear’ approach to conflict resolution; stressing instead anticipation, prevention and preparedness; ● Infrastructure, ecological and environmental vulnerabilities can get exacerbated in un-resilient states, thus a strategy for resilience building needs to involve attention to strengthening key sectors such as energy, environmental protection, roadways and transport and the agricultural / rural sectors and communities. Whilst the EUGS provided the narrative or script the translation into an implementable strategy was provided by the joint communication on developing a strategic approach to resilience in the EU’s external action. 11 The aim here was to create a clearer sense of how resilience can be mainstreamed across all aspects of external action to provide focus, a method of evaluation and a temporal reform time table. Again, the neighbourhood is singled out as a region where the building of resilience is crucial for the security of the region and of the EU itself and is therefore the first port of call for the implementation of the resilience building agenda set by the EUGS. What are the most salient points and considerations from the Joint Communication and what might they entail for the Republic of Moldova? The following analysis draws from the list of ten guiding considerations presented at the end of the 2017 Communication. The EU sees that strengthening resilience is a ‘means and not an end in itself’ This would entail the EU taking account of what has already been achieved and what has not in terms of reform in Moldova; asking serious questions about the health, durability and legitimacy of public institutions and policies, especially as seen in the eyes of citizens and civil society. How well and consistent are state institutions delivering public goods and how far are they affected by the vested interests of certain groups and individuals. Understanding factors of resilience and sources of risk This would entail the EU acquiring a thorough understanding of the formal and informal complexities that contribute to governance and daily life in Moldova. How in cases of external European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council ‘A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action,’ JOIN(2017) 21 final, Brussels, 7 June 2017. 11
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shock or crisis (such as export boycotts) do state institutions and relevant Ministries cope? Equally, how do informal structures and actors acting in the grey economy for example, adapt and overcome shocks and crises – what’s the level of self-reliance? The lack of relevance and value attached to some state institutions for ordinary citizens means that the EU also has to scrutinize the resilience and risk coping capacities of other ‘systems’, such as families and communities. Developing long term strategies and taking account of local contexts The main challenge for the EU in this regard will be how to strike a balance between assuming and promoting a transformation agenda (which lies at the forefront of the EUGS), whilst at the same time working with local stakeholders and state institutions that may well have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Addressing resilience at multiple levels EU efforts will need to be re-doubled at engaging individuals and communities, especially in provincial towns and rural areas, as full stakeholders in the design, implementation and appraisal of EU policies aimed at resilience building. The case of Moldova holds great promise in this respect as long as informal practices as modes of everyday life and transactions can be somehow folded into the resilience building strategies. Resilience as a transformational endeavour and not status quo oriented Again, the challenge here will be to find ways to support those formal institutions that largely ‘work’ and to reform, if possible, those that do not; where is root and branch change needed and where are the existing institutions and policies that correspond with EU norms and thus can play a constructive role in resilience building? The EU will need to have acute powers of scrutiny when it comes to analysing the extent to which public institutions have undergone sustainable reforms and have enjoyed public trust. Identifying vulnerabilities for risk assessments Attention in this regard needs to be placed on identifying long term as well as more immediate sources of risk and vulnerability across a number of sectors. For example, outwards migration and the economy’s reliance on remittances poses short term risks associated as Moldova is exposed to external shocks and changes in the global economy, but this also implies long term problems and vulnerabilities associated with a depleting domestic work force, an ageing population and splintered families with children often being left behind with their grandparents.
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Moldovan Realities: How Does ‘State Capture’ Affect the Resilience Building Process? In 2015, in an op-ed article for the New York Times, the former Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjorn Jagland, has named Moldova a ‘captured state,’ 12 characterized by endemic corruption and oligarchic control over the state institutions. This comment was the first statement in which the notion of ‘state capture’ has been used to articulate the stagnation of Moldova’s reforms on its association path with EU. In the years which followed Jagland’s assessment, the concept of ‘state capture’ within Moldova has been explored and analyzed in various ways by political figures, independent experts and scholars, making reference to the politicization of rule of law institutions and the full control of oligarchs over the decision-making process. However, the phenomenon itself has yet to reach a full understanding among the interested public, both in theoretical and practical terms. Given its variable-geometry and multidimensional characteristics, the concept of ‘state capture’ is built upon a weak operating capacity of the public institutions due to the interference of the private interests with their strategic actions. While reflected horizontally by targeting ministries and agencies, it creates undoubtedly a non-institutionalized vertical of power within the state, designed under a veil of normative democracy and balanced decision-making across the legislative, executive and judicial actors. The continuous perpetuation of state capture raises serious doubts over the legitimate government’s capacity to assure the securitization of its own public goods, such us the national budget, financial flows, energy sector, economic development and infrastructure. The assessment of these sectors, together with other civil security pillars, tends to portray the (in) security implications of state capture in Moldova. The perpetuation of private interests across key sectors of the Moldovan public administration and economy has lowered state institutions’ capacity to assure the securitization of these sectors. Furthermore, since the private ownership of decision-making is highly dispersed across the governmental authorities, the rule of law institutions tend to refrain from investigating politically affiliated oligarchs to the governing party. This practice of ‘double standards’ is questioning the integrity of the authorities and leads towards a decrease of citizens’ trust in the genuine willingness of these actors to perform their commitments. Hence, the lack of resilience arises when there is a mismatch between the use of public resources for extending one’s private gains and the incumbent legal-based response from the state entities for this type of frauds. According to the Eastern Partnership Index for 2015-2016, 13 Moldova has experienced after 2014 the transition from the ‘success story’ of the Eastern Partnership to a ‘captured state’, affected by multiple problems in the political and economic fields. The authors have emphasized a few systemic issues, which tested Moldova’s resilience in the last years: bank fraud and financial downturn, endemic corruption and ‘almost full control of key state bodies by Thorbjorn Jagland, “Bring Moldova Back From the Brink,” The New York Times, 10 October 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/opinion/bring-moldova-back-from-the-brink.html (accessed 10 February 2018). 13 Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016: Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development, 2017, 31. 12
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narrow political and private interests.’ 14 While encountering a period of political stability after 2016, the Moldovan government has yet to meet its commitments taken in front of the EU partners in such fields as anti-corruption, rule of law, institution-building and the public administration reform. One of the most relevant examples in this regard is the change of the electoral system, adopted in July 2017 by the Moldovan parliament. The voting of the mixed electoral system has raised serious concerns regarding the state of democracy and the political competition during the next parliamentary elections. Although the draft law was criticized in the report of the Venice Commission, 15 which elaborated a series of recommendations for the reviewing process of this law, the governmental coalition and the main opposition party have decided to partially ignore the recommendations and pass the electoral law in the parliament with a majority of 71 votes out of 101. Furthermore, the adoption of this law emphasized the limits of the EU’s bargaining power in terms of political constraints. The messages from Brussels have not been well received in Chisinau and, as the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions 16 mention, with reference to the Venice Commission’s earlier report, there is a ‘risk that majoritarian candidates may be influenced by business people or other actors who follow their own separate interests.’ In wider terms, this formulation refers to the possible ‘capturing’ of the elections and the degradation of the political competition in Moldova. Beside the electoral system, the energy field has been influenced by the mechanisms of ‘state capture’ and the interference of private business. In 2015, a group of independent experts have published a resolution 17 for the public authorities, through which they requested an in-deep investigation of public procurement deals in the electricity sector. As their investigation has demonstrated, an import scheme of electricity has been designed by the Transnistrian and Moldovan obscure groups of interests through which they have obtained important profits and prejudiced the consumers. The scheme, called ‘Energokapital’, functioned between 2014 and 2016, a period in which Moldova has bought electricity from the Transnistrian region. The Moldovan authorities refrained from investigating this case and did not manifest any interest in elucidating the systemic issues on the public procurement dimension in the energy sector. Even if Moldova is a member of the European Energy Community, this country still lacks a full compliance with the Energy Community acquis, especially in areas of strategic interest such as the trade balance of resources. These cases, together with previous mentioned bank fraud, are the most recent occurrences of ‘state capture’ in Moldova. They have negative repercussions over the EU-Moldova Ibid. Venice Commission, Joint opinion on the draft laws on amending and completing certain legislative acts (electoral system for the election of the Parliament), Venice, 15 June 2017. 16 Council of the European Union, Relations with the Republic of Moldova – Council conclusions, 6280/18 COEST 37, 26 February 2018. 17 “Criza din sectorul energetic poate fi depăşită: Experții solicită autorităților să publice mai multe documente,” Agora, 24 September 2015, http://agora.md/stiri/12853/doc--criza-din-sectorul-energetic-poate-fi-depasita-expertii -solicita-autoritatilor-sa-publice-mai-multe-documente (accessed 10 February 2018). 14 15
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partnership and tend to affect the resilience-building objective of the EU in the region. Moreover, while the EU is trying to encourage a more resilient public system to the external threats and challenges, some of the main risks are coming from the internal ‘capturing’ actors engaged in the policy-making cycle. Conclusions: Can the EU Leverage Resilience in Moldova? The concept of ‘resilience’ is relatively new for Moldova and the development rhetoric used inside the country. While being relatively dependent on the external aid and the technical assistance offered by the EU and other donors under strict conditionality, this country is advised now to build its own reform agenda, capable to strengthen the level of democracy and life standards. However, this resilient strategy might fail because of an increasing degree a ‘state capture’, which is blocking the key reforms in judicial, anti-corruption and rule of law systems. Beside ‘state capture’ in Moldova, the challenges that the EU is facing today might undermine the EU’s capacity to engage in a continuous reforming process in Moldova. The exportation of resilience at the EU borders could not reach the expected results due to a lack of synergy between the EU’s priorities disseminated through formal channels of communication and the national informal networks of power, which tend to promote their private interests. As such, resilience cannot arise without Moldova’s commitment to fight against the oligarchic interest groups. One of the EU’s priorities for empowering the resilience in Moldova and the EaP should be focussed on strengthening the civil society sector. The institutional platforms established for developing the people to people contacts in the Eastern Partnership region together with EaP Civil Society Forum should serve as the basis for cross-border cooperation of the CSOs in this region. Furthermore, by creating a regional group of CSOs committed to investigate the phenomenon of ‘state capture’ and the ways to address it, the national governments could benefit of an in-deep expertise on this topic. Through debates, public pressure and thematic studies, the notion of ‘resilience’ could become the optimal solution for ‘state capture’ and generate solutions to the most pressing issues. Bibliography Hauck, Volker. “Will the new Communication on resilience help to make EU external action more effective?” European Centre for Development Policy Management, 17 March 2017. http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/new-communication-resilience-eu/ (accessed 10 February 2018). Hellmann, S. Joel, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kauffmann. “‘Seize the State, Seize the Day’: State Capture, Corruption and Transition.” World Bank Policy Research Paper no. 2444, 2000.
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Jagland, Thorbjorn. “Bring Moldova Back From the Brink.” The New York Times, 10 October 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/opinion/bring-moldova-back-from-the-brink.html (accessed 10 February 2018). Leitner, Johannes, and Hannes Meissner, eds. State Capture, Political Risks and International Business. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017. Voinea, Camelia Florela. “State Capture and Political Clientelism in Central and Eastern Europe.” SSRN Electronic Journal XXXIX, 4 (2015): 9-31. Walker, Brian, C. S. Holling, Stephen Carpenter, and Ann Kinzig. “Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability in Social-ecological Systems.” Ecology and Society 9, 2 (2004). http://www.e cologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5 (accessed 10 February 2018). Yakovlev, Evgheny, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. “State Capture: From Yeltsin to Putin.” CEFIR Working Paper no. 52, 20 October 2005. http://www.cefir.org/papers/WP52.pdf (accessed 10 February 2018). “Criza din sectorul energetic poate fi depăşită: Experții solicită autorităților să publice mai multe documente.” Agora, 24 September 2015. http://agora.md/stiri/12853/doc--criza-din-sectorulenergetic-poate-fi-depasita-expertii-solicita-autoritatilor-sa-publice-mai-multe-documente (accessed 10 February 2018). Council of the European Union. Relations with the Republic of Moldova – Council conclusions. 6280/18 COEST 37, Brussels, 26 February 2018. Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016: Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development. 2017. European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council ‘A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action.’ JOIN(2017) 21 final, Brussels, 7 June 2017. European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises.” COM (2012) 586 final, Brussels, 3 October 2012. European External Action Service. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: “Shared Vision and Common Action: A Stronger Europe.” 2016. http://eeas.eu ropa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (accessed 10 February 2018). The World Bank. Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate. Washington DC, 2000. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/contribution. pdf (accessed 10 February 2018). The World Bank / European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Trends in Corruption and Regulatory Burden in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. A World Bank Study. Washington DC, 2011.
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Venice Commission. Joint opinion on the draft laws on amending and completing certain legislative acts (electoral system for the election of the Parliament). Venice, 15 June 2017.
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Report "Leveraging resilience? Implications of the EU Global Strategy for the Republic of Moldova"