Legal Methods Digest Full

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 1 ROUND 1STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 2 People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3 FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case without prejudice to the refiling thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 yea rs olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 o r the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 year s of age at the time of the filing of the case . The subsequent issuance of PD 603 know n as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as one who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accus ed who are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM: 35 Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14 FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, particularly, for overtaking a truck . Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for th e issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it must not contravene the statute for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the s tate. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 6c, 49 3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez Case No. 48 G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31 FACTS: Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee La w) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 2 5% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner s separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Se c. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: The margin established by the Monetary Board shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. ISSUE: W/N urea and margin fee. HELD: The term urea formaldehyde used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate from urea and formaldehyde which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a fi nished product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of urea margin fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Astorga v. Villegas Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37 FACTS: and formaldehyde is not exempt from the imposition of the formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of d attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy as a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the both houses certified an became RA 4065. Senator of House Bill No. 9266 w amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued th at the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bill s due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bil l s due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law. LATIN MAXIM: b2 4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42 FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA 1180 An Act to Regulate the Retail Business on the following grounds: a) It is a violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their libert y, property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requi rement that a bill s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because regulate doe s not really mean nationalize and prohibit 3) the Act violates International treaties and Laws ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the constitutional requirement that A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed in its title. This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation b ecause the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope , and consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of o ne department to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines Case No. 181 G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42 FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the Plaintiff s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defend ant on the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is unconstitutio nal. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales because according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not th e said Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces two subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund. ISSUE: W/N RA 1435 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by its title Road and Bridge Fund. Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of t he term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberal ly construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the p ower of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved agai nst the doubt and in favor of its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional requirement that A bill shall embrace only one subject, expres sed in its title. This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37, d 5 People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje Case No. 203 G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46 FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the violation of illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor. Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a certificate to practice medicine. She treated and manipulated the head and body of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of doctor should be understood to refer to doctor of medicine and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that A ct 3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject. ISSUE: W/N chiropractic is included in the term practice of medicine Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code. HELD: Act 3111 is constitutional as the title An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended) is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter of each section. Chiropractic is included in the practice of medicine. Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirem ent as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technical ly or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity . A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title, to prohibit duplicity in legisl ation by apprising legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences o f the law. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 7a, 25c, 37, d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Alalayan v. National Power Corporation Case No. 8 G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968) under Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46 FACTS: Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121 . In Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the elec tric power and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not more than 12 % annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed to renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could b e given effect. ISSUE: W/N Section 3 is Commonwealth Act violative of the cted into law, cannot title. HELD: Section 3 is constitutional. Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121). Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to includ e the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and eve ry ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. Title doesn t need to be a complete index of the contents of the act. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d a subject which the bill title An Act to Further Amend No. 121 does not embrace, thus making it a rider because it is constitutional provision requiring that a bill, which may be ena embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its will be regarded as valid. 81 G. d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tobias v. 1994) Chapter I. Page 12. 7675. Cabatuando Case No. and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be.47 FACTS: Republic Act No. HELD: Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act. ISSUE: W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Footnote No. The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single general subject. Page 12.47 FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. L-114783 (December 8. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the constitutional provision that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. No. 2263: An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No.R. 1962) Chapter I. Section 19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice.R. Abalos Case No. Hon. otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong because Article VIII. Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/ Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenant s shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. 291 G. Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Constitutiona l provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so na rrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. ISSUE: . Congress then amended this in Republic Act No. Footnote No. L-14542 (October 31. 37.Cordero v. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. No. 1199. so long as they are not inconsiste nt with or foreign to the general subject. Contrary to Petitioners' district for Mandaluyong of its conversion into a highly of its conversion into a highly assertion. 7675. LATIN MAXIM: 20a. HELD: RA 7675 is constitutional. fully index or catalogue all the conten ts and the minute details therein. the creation of a separate congressional is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence urbanized city Moreover. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment.W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R. d . language of such precision as to mirror. No. a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.A. section 3 of the Jones Law . No. 11 G. HELD: Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916. section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provided that no private or local bill which may be ena cted into law shall embrace more than one subject. after payment of a fee of P50 annually. 13. An Act amending the Administrative Code. Commission on Elections . and that subject shall be expresse d in the title of the bill because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a local bill. with nets denominated cuakit and pantukos. before engaging in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this municipali ty. now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917. 14019 (July 26. payable every three months. be cause it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code enacted fo r the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act. are obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal government . section 2 of which provided that all owners and proprietors of the industry known as fish ing. which provided that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. Provincial Board of Rizal Case No. 1919) FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas. now section 2323 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is valid.7 Ayson and Ignacio v. The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of the Administrative Code. LATIN MAXIM: 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lidasan v.R. It does not violate Paragraph 17. ISSUE: W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916. It does not violate Paragraph 17. The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title. is invalid. 148 G. and the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their town s and provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. it kept the publi c in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. Thes e are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790. Not the sligh test intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. Page 13. The title An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton. which is entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur as unconstitutional on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province. HELD: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional. violating the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. in the Province of Lanao del Sur projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. 1967) Chapter I.Case No.R. No. Footnote No. prompted by the upcoming elections. LATIN MAXIM: d . L-28089 (October 25. The title did not inform the members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law. which adopted a resolu tion in favor of RA 4790. The phrase in the Province of Lanao del Sur makes the title misleading and deceptive. This question was initially presented to the Respondents.51 FACTS: Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790. which is Cotaba to. it did not apprise the people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law. 1935) Chapter I. costs. He failed to pay some of the installments. entitled An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting between Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fiftyfive thereof a new section. v. The company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay th e deficiency of the debt. with interest. had no further action against him for the rec overy of the unpaid balance owed by him. The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title whic h declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. Page 13. The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the City o f Manila. 43263 (October 31.R. having chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage. Footnote No. Reyes Case No. as provided by Act No. 4122.8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. After applying this sum. 4122. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. The controlling purpose of Act No. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mort gage. HELD: Act No. 53 FACTS: Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments. the latter owed the company a balance of P275. ISSUE: W/N Act No. and liquidated damages to Respondent s indebtedness.47 with interest. Ferrer . He pleaded as a defense that the company. is valid. 169 G. The proper approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in fav or of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the Constitution. to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A. Page 13. scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. 9d.50 FACTS: Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic Act No. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its constitutional violations. HELD: Yes.Case No. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms the nature. 1972) Chapter I. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents. 51d . to which the Government appealed. and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. The lower court declared the statute void on the grou nds that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The Anti-Subversio n act fully satisfies these requirements. becomes or remains a member of the CPP or any other organization subversive in nature. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 208 G. The cases we re dismissed. willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with. and need not recite the details of the Act. No.R. 1700. L-32613-14 (December 27. Footnote No. RA 1700 outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other subversive associations and punishes any person who knowingly. ISSUE: W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles. otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. A narrow and technical construction is to be avoided. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses Nos. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to a nd are comprehended by its title. not power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call the convention itself. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject. It is enough that it fairly indicates the ge neral subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people. The said Act purportedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fails to in clude the phrase TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES. Carbonell. which phrase is reiterated in Sec. Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen. Providing for Proportional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Delegates t o and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention. 33 G.R. Case No. and for Other Purposes. 1 of both Resolutions. 2 and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called fo r therein is to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. et al. The for on. 2 and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969. whose raison d etre is to revise the present Constituti It is required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in matters of detail.9 Del Rosario v. and both Resolutions No. 1970) FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 9d. 51d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION . L-32476 (October 20. The statute plainly reads: An Act Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numbered Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention. No. HELD: No. 36a. the one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills only. and transfer of firearms . did not include weapons other than firearms.People of the Philippines v. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution. pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitu tion. possession. LATIN MAXIM: 30a. ISSUES: 1. W/N Act No. acquisition. Page 14. 50 . 55 FACTS: Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of Section 26 of Act No. and to bill s to be enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect.R. The provision of Section 26 germane to the su bject expressed in the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsis tent with the Constitution. 1957) Chapter I. use. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 230 G. 1907. which was an Act t o regulate the importation. and that Section 26 violated the constitutional provision that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. L-9659 (May 29. 1780 on October 12. 46a. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. No. and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa Case No. Footnote No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule 2. The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that the title of the act. 10 People of the Philippines v. guilty of treason. Page 16. 210 G. (3) a provision which changed t he existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail. 37 1. ISSUE: W/N the People s Court Act was unconstitutional. No.83 FACTS: In March 1954. (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Co urt and provides a procedure for their substitution. 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No. Leoncio Lim Case No. and (4) a provision which suspen ds Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. L-14432 (July 26. Footnote No. such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of F irst Instance. Appellant attacked the constitutionality of the People s Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expresse d in its title. Apolonio Carlos Case No.R.63 FACTS: The People s Court found the Appellant. 4003 (Fisheries Act) is sued Fisheries Administrative Order No. . The Congress is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title. 37. LATIN MAXIM: 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Section 2 of said order prohibits trawl f ishing in certain areas in Samar. 1947) Chapter I. L-239 (June 30. trial and judgment of treason cases. HELD: No. FAO No. Page 19. The People s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment. 204 G. No. The provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People s Court Act.R. Footnote No. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 1960) Chapter I. FAO No. 37 1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years fo r any single period of time. 37 1 was invalid. it was ruled that in case of discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it. but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission. HELD: Section 2 of FAO No. the accused in violation of said order. Although FAO No. 37 1 was defective because it failed to specify a period for the ban. ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of FAO No. challenged its legality on the ground that FAO No. 37 1 was contrary to Act No. 37 1 was valid.Leoncio Lim. 4003. 38a . LATIN MAXIM: 37. the former having no fixed period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter stating that pr ohibition was for any single period of time not exceeding five years duration. the basic law prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law. No.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescri bed fares. Petitioner fil ed a petition opposing the increase in fares. L-34526 (August 9. Garcia Jr. ISSUES: 1. Inc. LATIN MAXIM: None STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hijo Plantation. 2. 6125 entitled An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate value from July 1. LTFRB issued Memoran dum Circular No. v. No. 57 G.R. SC issued a temporary restraining order to prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the increase thus viol ating the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year.11 KMU Labor Center v. Central Bank Case No. 68 G. Case No. PBOAP. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for t he fare increase. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP. 1973. 1994) FACTS: DOTC Memorandum Order No. the stabilization . 1972-June 30. 1972. 2.R. availed of the deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. The Central bank released Monetary Resolution No. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January 1. 115381 (December 23. as provided in the Act. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15 % is unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpos e in the said increase. without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB. 1972-June 30. 1988) FACTS: Congress approved RA No. HELD: 1. 1974. HELD: Central Bank acted with grave abuse of discretion. For during the period from July 1. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said la w. the basic law prevails.tax shall be at the m July 1. For exports of bananas shipped during the period fro 30. the stabiliza the rate of 2%. 1973-June 30. The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the basic law. 1973. 1972 to June exports of bananas shipped tion tax shall be at ISSUE: rate of 6%. 1995. LATIN MAXIM: 9c . the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. The properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3. 3135 is the governing law. Administrative Order No. The loans matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. HELD: 1. 1960) FACTS: The decedent is a driver for People s Land Transportation Company.China Banking Corp. W/N Administrative Order No. the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative directive. plus burial expenses not exceeding P200. v. 1996) Chapter I. No. ISSUE: 1. Respondent. and its president. 1989 the court ruled on the side o f So Ching. in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. No. instead of Administrative Order No. 3 as So Ching was contending. 3135 was the governing rule in their case. in a civil case filed by the mother o f the . Thus. Footnote No.R. This caused Petitioner to file fo r extra judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. 121158 (December 5. Two extra mortgages were additiona lly executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. The Workmen s Compensation Commission awarded the decedent s widow the amount of P3. Page 19. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted.R. Honorable Estenzo Case No. 2.40. Act No. 140 G. Petitioner sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. So Ching. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an adminis trative directive. 2. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. 1993. After 5 years. therefore the sal e of the two mortgaged properties was stopped.84 FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. LATIN MAXIM: None STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. They were appealing that Act No. Petitioner can foreclose the properties. 59 G. L-14740 (September 26.494. On April 28. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure. CA Case No. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties. of which Petitioners are manager and proprietor. 35. Petition was dismissed. W/N the attorney s HELD: Rules of the Workmen s Compensation Commission amended R.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules. Furthermore.A. ISSUE: 1.decedent. 2. No. The Commission. or any of its rules. W/N the 772 and as 2. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified ba sed on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen s Compensation Commission and prays further that the P500 in atty s fees exceeded the allowed fees according to Sec. court committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in fees. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since the said rule only applies to the Commission and not the Court. the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the main case. LATIN MAXIM: 30. cannot amend an act of Congress. 1. a result deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the case. ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorney s fees for failure to comply. 46a . Footnote No. Petiti oner argues that Respondent should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. which has a technical meaning. who is also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. ISSUE: W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively due to its wording. Since Respondent was reelecte d. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed as intende d to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings. 1997) Chapter I. Commission on Elections Case No. 46c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. His qualifications are being questioned by herein Petiti oner. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. The fact that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively. 1981. 125955 (June 19. Page 23. Municipal of Caloocan Case No. this does not fall under the scope of the term.R. Petitioner brings into consi deration the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon fi nding of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on October 31. No.13 Grego v. unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. HELD: Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied retroactively. 120 G.98 FACTS: One of the Respondents was elected for his 3rd and final term as councilor of th e 2nd District of Manila. The term to be looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT. Petitioner further argues that the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively. referring only to an appointive position. 141 . it overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. if the parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vit iates the others. No. 24. exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction provided by Commonwealth Act 655. 1963) FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No. pursuant to Commonwealth Act No.R. When Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees. and internal organ fees. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the municipality certain fees including slaughterhouse fees. corral fees. 655. LATIN MAXIM: 15a. One of the rules of statutory construction is that certain sections or parts of s ections of an ordinance may be held invalid without affecting the validity of what remains. HELD: Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. in the issuance of Ordinance No. ISSUE: W/N Respondent. th e court ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the exception of slaughterhouse fees.G. L-15807 (April 22. Incidentally. The Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees. 37 . Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance. The only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. meat inspection fees. 00 pursuant to PD 42. HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative enactments.R. The t . and the lease continued from 1979 to 1982.600. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just compensation. but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the governme nt shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x o r the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor. Reyes Case No. then from 1982 to 1985.14 National Housing Authority v. Respondents claimed they should be paid the assessed value of P6. He cited PD 464 which provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner in the amount of P1. LATIN MAXIM: 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Francisco Lao Lim v. 73 G. that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the price.00. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy Case No.400. The case was terminated by a compromise agreement. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit.600. The petition for Certiorari is granted. No. 49439 (June 29. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriatio n cases. 1983) FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25.R. subject of an expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. After it expired. 87047 (October 31.00. whichever is low er. 1990) FACTS: Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a period of 3 years. No. Private Respondent refused to vacate the pr emises. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6. 85 G.000 sq/rn. Petitione r opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constituti on x x x. and hence. and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res judicata. Petition er appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also affirmed the decisio n of the trial court. LATIN MAXIM: 1. the compromise agreement does not apply because the present case requires a different set of evidence.rial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract has not expir ed. the lease is not for perpet ual renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties. and hence. W/N the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. 26. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms the reof. . On the second issue. 11a. W/N the action for ejectment is barred by compromise agreement on res judicata? HELD: This is untenable because the continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. On the compromise agreement. res judicata does not apply. ISSUE: 1. 2. L-25246 (September 12.A. Pacquing. No. 1995) FACTS: Executive Order No.O. 74 G. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate JaiAlai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. 169 G. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associate d Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. but the Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked P. ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai. to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Victoriano v. Felipe G. Then Pres ident Aquino issued an E.15 Hon. Lim v. 392 removes the power of local governments to issue license and permit. PD 771 was not repealed or amended by any subsequent law. 115044 (January 27. ISSUE: 1. Elizalde Rope Workers Case No.R. Case No. 0. 37. 169 expressly repealing PD. 6c.R. No. HELD: R. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P. All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. In 1998. No. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. No.O. 1974) Union . license or permit. And E. No.D. It did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by th e local governments without exceptions. 771 is violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. 44.D. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power to franchise the operation of Jai-Alai. Alfredo S. 810 which revokes and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporati on. Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant franchise. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution. 40b . W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association? 2. 875: Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement RA 3350 amended RA 875: but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.A. provide that the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. W/N RA 3350 is constitutional? 3. which wrote a formal let ter to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ruling that the Union should pay 500 and attorney s fee. Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that attorney s fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded when the defendant s act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest and in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered . an Iglesia ni Cristo . as well a s Section 7 of Art IV of the 1973 Constitution. was a member of the Respondent Union which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision allowed under R. HELD: The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization.FACTS: Petitioner. Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union. ISSUE: 1. 31025 (August 15. The court. 1986) Chapter I. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1929) FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13. ISSUE: W/N the clause otherwise provided in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of publication. 287 G. the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it. and th e court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately. 1928. . agreeing that if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certa in land. L-63915 (December 29. Page 37. the stipulated or fixed period had alr eady elapsed. it was not so when it was otherwise provided as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. the Defendants appealed that by that time.R. 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gutierrez v.16 Tañada v. there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia Legis non excusat . But when the Plaintiffs duly tendered the amount. No. No. the ownership would vest in the Defendants. Footnote No. which cannot in any event be omitted. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule. Carpio Case No. therefore. the clause otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se.R.159 FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. August 13. Publication in full should be indispensable. Tuvera Case No. HELD: No. 55 G. Without such notice or publication. 1928. declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect. In computing any fixed period of time. and on the day from which it should be counted. the day from which the time is reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included. with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done within a certain limit of time. 39a . Article 7 of the Civil Code had been modified by Sec. HELD: No. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise.ISSUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering. according to which month now means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. The above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. unless otherwis e provided. 13 of the Administrative Code. on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month . LATIN MAXIM: 25a. 161 G. Judgment was rendered against the principal on February 7. No.S. as amended by Act No. 88 o f the CCP. L-17986 (October 21. or to deposit in court . 1920 to the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. 1921) FACTS: Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certai n properties in Manila. and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereo f their principal. the sums of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property held by them. setting aside the forfeiture of a bail bond. ISSUE: W/N the payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month.R. HELD: The payment made on August 11. No. in case they desire to avoid the immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal. The Defendants made such dilatory payments however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day of the month. 9.R. to pay the Plaintiff. 8223 (March 4. 25c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U. On Feb 28. v. The uns uccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. 2588. As a resul t. The term month must now be understood to refer to calendar month. the court ordered that the Defendant s bond be forfeit ed . 7 of the civil code in so far as the latte r fixes the length of a month at thirty days. 1914) FACTS: This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments. it is their duty to conform with the provisions of Sec. 56 G. inasmuch as Sec 13 of the Administrative Code has modified Art. Lichauco Case No. 1921 was one day late.17 Guzman v. Paniaga Case No. HELD: Sec. with government as the purchaser. By various orders of the court. On July 13. in this case. and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. th e principal was arrested. LATIN MAXIM: 6c . if the last be a Sun day or a legal holiday. and final ly occurred on July 8. on application of the suret ies. there is no necessity for such computation for the date is fixed for when the act be performed.and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount thereof. 1912. It is also dire cted that the sale should take place on a named future date. the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last. the sale was postponed from time to time. set aside the order of forfeiting the bond. it shall be excluded. 1912. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: unless otherwise specially provided. The sale here of the property must stand. However. the court. 1912. On July 10. and ordered the sheriff to annul the sal e. This section is only applicable if there i s a computation needed to be done. ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed by the court. respectively.18 PNB v. Private Respondent mortgages two lots to Petitioner bank. 238 G. The d ate March 28. 9a. The notices of sale of Appellant s foreclosed properties were published on March 28.R. HELD: It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is week . Andueta. No. 3135 requires that the notice of au ction sale shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks . Then.19 FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previous . In Concepcion v. Hidalgo Case No.R. For failure to pay the obligation. 1970) and G. 9b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hidalgo v. 124 G. No. April 11 and April 12. No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. Th e Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publicati on. L-25327 (May 29. Footnote No. 1969 falls on a Friday. 1970) Chapter II. Page 52. the term week was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. CA Case No. Petitioner bank extrajudicia lly foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale . Section 3 of Act No. 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record . a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party. 1993) Chapter I. Footnote No. L-25326 (May 29.195 FACTS: To secure payments of his loans. 98382 (May 17.R. Page 47. while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Frid ay and Saturday. ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. Agrarian Court dismisse d petitions. 13 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. claiming that share tenanc y and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code that the code expressl y grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else. The policy of t he State is to establish owner cultivatorship. 30b. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants. 9c. Adherence to the letter would result in absurdity. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 36a.ly given to them by the vendor of the latter s intention to sell the property and whe re the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital pur pose of the statute. 12a. 11a. 40a Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c. 12 of the same c ode is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants. reducing agricultural lessee to only leasehold tenants . 43 . the section would have expressly said so. HELD: Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises. Moreover. 37. the court held that if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share tena nts through judicial legislation. The purpose of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. R. HELD: It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the immediate context of provisions of the statute defining property qualifications of a voter.S. Navarro Case No. Both qualifications a re under a single head. and of the statute as a whole. 12a. 2. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N the said statute s true test of property qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof. property qualification is an alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. Evidence showed that the Appellants. Another section of the statute disqualifies people who are delin quent in the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. Page 52. v. 1909) that t hey owned real property with the value of P500. LATIN MAXIM: 10. 13. 149 . except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to secure p urity of the ballot box. did not own property of the asses sed value of P500. 36a. 28. 300 G. 1911) Chapter II. Eduvala Case No. from voting. This prov ision was directed to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as all other taxes.20 FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig (in proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. 6160 (March 21. In the statute. 1898. it would b e highly improbable to enforce the statute within a reasonable time because it will be di fficult to determine. 11a. If the property qualification is actual/market value.19 U. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Litex Employees Association v. No. suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind of the legislator. required referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affi liation with Federation of Free Workers. 9c. 1977) Chapter II.G. 24a . Petitioners contended that there was no statuto ry authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N there is a statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction. HELD: Article 226 of the Labor Code addresses this. No. Article 226 of Labor Code is very cle ar concerning executive department s original and exclusive authority to act . LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations.R. 20a. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction. Page 53. Petition denied.22 FACTS: Respondent. L-41106 (September 22. Footnote No. v. 1993) Chapter II.E. In her defense.R. Act No. Yulo Case No. 46a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. 80223 (February 5. 1931. 3899). as further amended by Act No. Villar assumed office. 1935) Chapter II. Esteban T. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved. A few years later. Footnote No. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the plac e of Petitioner.R. Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided b y Sec.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in upholding her rights as a lessee. amended further by Act. which aims to protect tenants fro m unjust eviction. HELD: Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by said amendment (Act No. San Diego Inc. No. 27 FACTS: On March 3. 3899). No. 1986. Page 55. ISSUE: W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code. On December 17. Albay. . Shortly thereafter. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 203 of the Administrative Code. Footnote No. No. L-42293 (February 13.20 Regalado v. Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of la nd in said area. 26 G. 255 G.25 FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao. On November 16. De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered by PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517. 3899. CA Case No. 1934. Page 56. the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the ag e of 65. While it may depart from its source. 25a . as well as unjust eviction. said provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land. LATIN MAXIM: 12a. PD 1517.HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a tenant. 33 FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be considered exempt from income tax. Footnote No. 1949) Chapter II. ISSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. 8. Footnote No. HELD: No. Dinglasan Case No. 671 (Emergency Powers Act). said proclamations were also terminated. 1942. No. That when Congress conven ed again on Jan. 1953) Chapter II. 98 G. 1. Petitioners question the legality of RA 590. 29 FACTS: Executive Orders. L-2044 (August 26.R. which shall not b e diminished during their continuance in office. L-6355-56 (August 31. No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease . HELD: These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted during the time of the inability of the Congress to function. Page 56. While Art. 84 G. were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Conven tion of 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. 9 of the Const itution states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law. payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by law.21 Araneta v. Page 56. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Endencia and Jugo v. in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. Sec. David Case No.R. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on h is salary not for his own benefit but for the public.in compensation is a clear interpretation of Which shall not be diminished during th eir continuance in office . to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. Through the separation of powers. LATIN MAXIM: 1. such a task must be done by the Judiciary. 24a . 7a. by the Legislature. 6c. Footnote No. 335. 30a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CIR v. Footnote No. 1967 (L-28571) and December 11. 77 G. cannot adopt. HELD: No. the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law a nd. No. Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by. Brought to the C ourt of Tax Appeals.50 FACTS: Prior to this case.22 Daoang v. Page 61. acknowledged natural children. 1967 (L-286 44) .48. legitimated. 1970) Chapter II. or children by legal fiction. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31. resolved at September 20. Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy.R.137 and P7. No. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas. Furthermore. the court was correct.55 FACTS: In 1959 and 1960. 1988) Chapter II. 9a. do not include grandchildren. the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26. Petitioners stated that the Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy. that those who have legitimate. the Petitioners argued that the adopting would introduce a foreign element into the family unit. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that. Page 62. and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as grandchildren. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for Agonoy. stating that under Art. Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which later were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. and would result in the reduct ion of their legitimes in terms of inheritance. Limpan Investment Corporation Case No.240. L-34568 (March 28. what is expressly inc luded would naturally exclude what is not included. who is the deceased mother of the Petitioners. 335 of the Civil Code. 84 G. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in Art. Ilocos Norte Case No.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. at 1% for 3 years. In L-28571.respectively. In L-28644. Section 51 of the NIRC provides the following-On Tax shown on the return. 7a. the interest shall be at 1% a month for 3 years. at the rate of one per centum a month. The same goes with deficiencies. from April 4. ISSUE: W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the payment of surcharges and interests. else the same interests apply. a surcharge o f 5 per centum of the amount of tax unpaid. if the amount in the notice isn t paid within 30 days. 1966. With r egard to surcharge. plus the surchar ge of 5% on failure to pay the deficiency tax. 1965. the interest shall be comput ed from September 7. HELD: The CTA s decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in error. provided th at the maximum amount for the interest doesn t exceed the amount corresponding to a period of 3 years. plus the 5% surcharge. in failure to pay the required amount on or before the date prescribed. 24a. 6c. interest up on such unpaid amount shall be collected as part of the tax. from the date prescribed for the payment until paid. 26 . 1963 to April 3. 1962 to September 6. LATIN MAXIM: 1. except that the additional tax must be paid within 30 days of the notice. 000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff s delinquency in municipal license tax. 53 G. 1961. Municipality of Naga. On July 6 . LATIN MAXIM: . it did not take place on July 27. proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account. 1961. this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 1961.56 FACTS: Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax from 1960. Garagay. Nos. he gives Plaintiff a per iod of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. Page 62. The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no r oom for doubt. defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was dist raining 100. together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the expenses of the distraint. at the time required. in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question. hav e all been met with rebuff. defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as prov ided for under Sec. the municipal treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien. Cebu Case No. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. 1962 ISSUE: W/N the distraint and public auction were valid. 1961. who acknowledged the distraint.23 Cebu Portland Cement v.300. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by publ ic auction to the highest bidder on July 27. amounting to a total sum of P204. HELD: Both actions are valid. Despite notice of sale. notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. According to the Revised Administrative Code: The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing a ny municipal tax or revenue to pay the same. 1968) Chapter II.R. Footnote No. 24116-17 (August 22. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code. Finally on June 26. as well as penalties. 1961 but on January 30. Plaintiff must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which upheld the validity of the auction. Also. 43 . as separate units. a finished product which is distinct and different from UREA and FORMALDEHYDE . 7a. Much less do they in dicate the view of the House of Representatives. Page 62. Pe titioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Audi tor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previous resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the importation of urea and formaldehyde. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Resins. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner s allegations are valid.R. Inc. Auditor General Case No. 7a. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. by members thereof (referring to the Journal). during consider ation of the bill before said House.6c. The Auditor General was just doing his duty. L-17888 (October 29. it should be corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. HELD: The Act clearly states UREA FORMALDEHYDE as a finished product and not UREA and FORMALDEHYDE as separate units. did not come within the purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption. The specific language of the Act speaks of UREA FORMALDEHYDE . 1968) Chapter II.57 FACTS: Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of UREA AND FORMALDEHYDE . If there was any mistake in the printi ng of the bill. 260 G. Individual statements made by Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. Petitioner argues his view. Footnote No. following what was written in the statute. citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate. No. v. W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20. Respondent filed on October 14. 1953.59. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23. HELD: RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for whic h back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20. Respondent Sheriff scheduled the public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure file d by DBP. Manila Railroad Company . 248 G. ISSUE: W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. 1954. No. to RA 304. 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners.R. It cannot be said that there was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. the original Back Pay Law. 1970) Chapter II.24 Quijano v. 1953. 1965. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14. Respondent advised Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20.58 FACTS: Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitatio n Finance Corporation (RFC). While Petitioner s loan was approved on April 30. Page 62. 000 for his outstanding obligat ion out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. the Amendatory Act of June 20. Footnote No. As of July 31. L-26419 (October 16. 1953. They mortgaged real estate properties to secure the loan. when RA 897 was approved. 7a. outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13. 1953. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION KMMRC Credit Union v. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23. 1953). LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1954. 1954. 1953. Development Bank of the Philippines Case No. 983. loan was approved on April 30. they only availed of it much later on March 23. HELD: No. according to th e Petitioner. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first pri ority in the salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion. Justice Barrera adds: the writ never issues in doubtf ul cases. LATIN MAXIM: 7a . 1979) FACTS: The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.Case No. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. L-25316 (February 28. The lower court has alre ady granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit uni ons in the payroll collection. and the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful . it is wel l established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union s credit into a first priority credit. that th e right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear. Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that. RA 2023 grants to them.R. 66 G. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 co mpels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. No. to which the contract with tax exemptions was given. heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. Angel Cruz. Firstly. NPC. O n two different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installation in its facilities. ISSUE: W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case of Petitioner. HELD: No. is not a competing party to Petitioner.25 Davao Light & Power Co. volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the municipality. No.R. v. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is obliged to . 1972) FACTS: Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install. Secondly.R. Petitioner cannot rely on RA 358 as amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption. Du rian and Academia law firm. Page 62. a private lawyer and head of the Cruz. operate and maintain an electric light. Court of Appeals Case No. Exemption from taxation i s never presumed. L-41295 (December 4. Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its 74 hectare fishpond. LATIN MAXIM: 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Alfredo Ramos v. 1989) Chapter II. the provision cited by Petitioner states that the franchise must be granted to a competing party . 29 G. 252 G. No. L-28739 (March 29. Commissioner of Customs Case No. Footnote No.60 FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy. Atty. the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given in the other franchise . Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its imports should be waived by the collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were delivered at the port of Cebu) pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard Electric Power and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company should be granted franchise more favorable than the one previously granted to another company. it is always explicitly stated. Under section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners move to disqua lify said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the munici pality to hire a private counsel. HELD: No. the municipal attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the council.pay them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. These laws are implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the expen se of hiring a private lawyer. LATIN MAXIM: 7a . under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act. The municipality s interest would be best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigatio n. Furthermore. the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any court. ISSUE: W/N it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case. recovered damages under the Workmen s Compensation Act. Salazar Case No. 17. applied and gave effect to the consti tutional guarantees of social justice. No. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of acti on simultaneously. Philex Mining Corporation Case No. 1985) FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground minin g operations. 1990) FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt . 47 G. Petitioners. the Court stat ed that it did not legislate in this case but rather. a later report on the accident showed there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. LATIN MAXIM: 1. if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular courts. 92163 (June 5. Thereafter. with the exception of Floresca. 40 G.R. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing of the worker s right under the Workmen s Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts under th e Civil Code for higher damages.R. Petition ers filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation s reckless and wanton negligence. in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the Workmen s Compensation Act. the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent t he instance of double recovery. However. HELD: Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages.26 Floresca v. L-30642 (April 30. However. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts. No. 40a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Enrile v. The charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders a re absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Justice Feliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could be prosecuted separately from rebellion. HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. LATIN MAXIM: 1. charges against Petitioner s in the information should be understood as that of simple rebellion under the RPC. Petitioners contend that they are being charged for a criminal offense that does not exist in the statute books because technically. the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof. then t he principle of non-retroactivity would be violated. 48 . in a concurring opinion. 46a. 1990. Furthermore.from November 29 to December 10. Therefore. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Hernandez doctrine. Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committ ed on the occasion thereof. Manikad v. Tanodbayan Case No. 162 G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984) Chapter II, Page 63, Footnote No.65 FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of AntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent. Petitioners argue that the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the E PZA and is not in the Respondent s jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states: The E PZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal l aws committed inside the zones owned and administered by the Authority ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from investigating complaints within the Export Processing Zone. HELD: No, the use of sole in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although the EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the Zone, it is not the on ly authority that may investigate complaints, especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 35 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Senarillos v. Hermosisimo Case No. 278 G.R. No. L-10662 (December 14, 1956) Chapter II, Page 67, Footnote No.74 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the charges filed by Petitioner, Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibo nga and investigated by a police committee composed of 3 councilors created by Resolution No.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council. The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequently signed by the members of the council. This was appealed to and affirmed by the Commissione r of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. HELD: No. Under RA No.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof. Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. RA No.557 has elimin ated the provision authorizing investigation by a committee council. Hence, the decision against him was invalid, even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors. The fact that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued before the decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police committee . The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council by the civil service authorities could not val idate the proceeding. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 3a, 6b, 7a 28 People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang Case No. 211 G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.87 FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in Lanao. Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Govern or Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor s letter which he presented as and evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He has then bee n appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides th e peace officers are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him in the categor y of peace officer equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section 879. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Mapa Case No. 213 G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89 FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appointment. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possessi on of firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The Court s ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 30a, 35, 46c 29 Co v. CA Case No. 65 G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.91 FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: CLOSED ACCOUNT. A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delive ry of a rubber or bouncing check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. HELD: No. According to them, Que v. People should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operativ e fact doctrine. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prej udice of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary o f Justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 46a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sy Kiong v. Sarmiento Case No. 150 G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951) FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail dealer s for purposes of retail. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of the City of Man ila assessed against him the sum of 566.50php which represents the alleged deficienc y municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale. ISSUE: W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be manufactured into bread are retail or wholesale. HELD: The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into bread and to be resold to the public, in the absence of any express provision of law on the matter, sho uld be treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 43 30 Sumulong v. Commission on Elections Case No. 149 G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941) FACTS: On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the fir st congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner , the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. El even days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. ISSUE: W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority parties, the right to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled, cannot be clai med by any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall have the discretion to choose the minority inspector. LATIN MAXIM: 36a, 37, d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Central Capiz v. Ramirez Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920) Chapter III, Page 79, Footnote No.8 FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30 years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the same. The Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate A ct No. 2874, An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain, and for other purposes, since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural lan d. ISSUE: W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned. HELD: The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in private o wnership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Jones Law of 1916: That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. LATIN MAXIM: d 31 Eugenio v. Drilon Case No. 104 G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996) Chapter III, Page 81, Footnote No.20 FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopm ent on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree , the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondent s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petiti oner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payme nt of the amortizations. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly pr ovide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unm istakable intent of the law. The intent of the statute is the law. LATIN MAXIM: 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Purisima Case No. 221 G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978) Chapter III, Page 76, Footnote No.16 FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 insurrection. No. viz. pointed. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P . or rebellion. It failed to state one essential element of the crime. ISSUE: W/N P. b2 . 9 shows that the prohibi ted acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. organized lawlessness or publ ic disorder.D. No. 9. 9. No. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Legislative int ent is the controlling factor. connected with or related to subversion. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitut e the offense penalized by P. it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and thi s can be found among others in the preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanct ions stated therein.. or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of.D.D.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a blad ed. Nos. the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City . The lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is not part of P.R. Echaves Case No. which penalizes squatting and similar acts applies to agricultural lands. No.R.D.22 FACTS: The issue is whether or not P. 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. 772 applies to agricultural lands HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did. 1965) Chapter III. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Footnote No. L-14526 (March 31. 1980) Chapter III.D. 4 G. 772. ISSUE: Whether or not P. It stated that the rule of Ejus dem Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when th e legislative is uncertain. L-47757-61 (January 28. The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court.D. thus bring ing the case at hand. City of Cebu Case No. Page 82.32 People of the Philippines v.23 FACTS: The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers located in the said City but owned by the National Government. Page 77. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. But the Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is unmistakable.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of th e same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agricultur e. 207 G. Footnote No. declaring that P. According to Respondent. 36b . Hence. both fall within the scope of the power granted. through its ordinance. has the right to charge wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. T he Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are owned by the City and those of the National Government. HELD: The term public refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in th e light of the meaning of public wharf as it may have bearing on the right to charge wharfage. The Court states that on ly those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property. ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu.of Cebu and the National Government and that consequently. 25a. 80 G. Inc. 1957) Chapter III. TMX Sales. Footnote No. No. Aquino Case No. 36d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Feliciano v. 292 of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the ot her provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity.R. 36b.25 FACTS: Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as provided in Sec. Sec. 83736 (January 15. 105 G. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. challenging Petitioner s eligibility on the ground that Respondent wa . Tarlac. Page 83. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law a nd every part of the act is to be taken into view. 1992) Chapter III. Footnote No. Case No. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final paymen t). defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warran to proceedings. Four days after the proclamation. on the other hand. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provid ed in the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than two years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a two-year prescription. No. Page 83. that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustmen t Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive pe riod and not the quarterly payment made.R.28 FACTS: Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion. ISSUE: W/N the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. The Supreme Court said that.Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 10201 (September 23. The Respondent contends. HELD: The date of filing of the final payment should be considered. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as eligible or ineligible in the said section. HELD: The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to do contrary. Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words. converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrative Code. not capacity to assume office. after plainly and unequivocally requiring that the candidat es of other elective offices should possess the age qualification at the time of the election . the law should suddenly change the requirement for the case of municipa l officers. No reason is shown why.s not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. does not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the time of the elect ion but rather at the time of the assumption of office. 11a. taking part in the election is meant . provided that he had fulfilled t he first two requirements. 36b . 9d. Aquino claimed that age requir ement refers only to the age at assumption of office. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the elect ion of Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal. He appealed that the existence o f a semi-colon. ISSUE: W/N the election of Aquino is unlawful and illegal. 11e. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature. 1913) FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No. defendants are acquitted. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts. separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the country without means of support. disregarding superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which i s reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will. 519 which punishes every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops o r gambling houses. LATIN MAXIM: 11e. or tramping or straying through the country without visible mea ns of support . therefore was not a viable defense. Hart Case No. 33 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: Estate of Johnson Case No. L-8327 (March 28. The prosecution persisted that the phrase without visible means of support was in connection to the second part of the said portion of Act No. it may be as an addi tional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. separated by t he comma. Inasmuch as defendant had . visible means of support and that the absence of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses. or inserting others when necessary. 131 . 159 G.34 US. 519.R. Though it was proven that Hart and the other Defendants had visible means of support . it was under the first part of the portio n of law for which they were charged with. v. No. ISSUE: How should the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. 1918) Chapter III. being a US citizen. 12767 (November 16. Footnote No. 25a. thus an alien. Page 86. and in this connection. or heading. 636 of the Code of the Civil Pro cedure states Will made here by an alien will made within the Philippine Islands by a citi zen or subject of another state or country. 636 is applicable only to wills of aliens. allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.38 FACTS: Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States but died and left a will in Manila. a citizen of the U.R. 37. and which might be proved. 42a. 48 . is covered by Sec. 636. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low de gree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the inte lligible meaning of the written words. No. may be proved. The will of Johnson was probated and allowed in the lower court. attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to fu rther fact that the word state in the body of the section is not capitalized. Sec. but Petitioner contends that Sec. The will duly probate d. cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text.G. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. HELD: The fact that the words state and country are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is excluded from the phrase another state or country . allowed by the law of his own state or country. which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject. Petiti oner. is covered by Sec. ISSUE: W/N the will of Petitioner. of a section being nothi ng more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision. The epigraph.S and therefore an alien. 636. 26. there is no need to resort to the preamble. 1993) Chapter III. and suggests that the law is applicabl e only when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. or from the Spanish caption.R. HELD: No.112 G. in accordance with Art. L-38076 (November 4. No. HELD: . Respondent relied on the word another appearing in the English translation of the head note of Art. According to him. 160. he w as punished with the maximum period for murder. not create doubts. heading.R. While serving sentence. After conviction. They were tried and convicted. 231 G. Mendoza Case No. 85472 (September 27.35 People of the Philippines v. ISSUE: W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict. No. Page 87. which are mere catchwords or reference aids. When the text of the law is clear and unambiguous. 1933) FACTS: Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administrative Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballots whi ch they prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters. epigram or hea d note of a section for interpretation of the text. he killed another prisoner. 160. 7a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. consulted to remove. his conviction for mur der is not different because it involved homicide. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Footnote No. 160 of the Revised Penal Code. No such deduction is warranted from the text itself. He was consequently charged for murder. Yabut Case No.43 FACTS: Defendant was convicted for homicide. What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election case which has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in th e criminal case.No. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict tha t defendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. Judgment was reversed . LATIN MAXIM: 50. The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note cl early shows that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit s a ballot in the ballot box. d . Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter. As the fir st complaint was not signed by the offended party. On appeal. (after the first of March) despues de . 334 of the Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. 110 G. in violation of Sec. 1761. 1910) FACTS: Defendants.S. Manaba Case No.36 People of the Philippines v. the Opium Law . 162 G. 1908 were caught in the act of smoking opium. HELD: No. v. on the night of March 1. Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy. the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape. The Spanish equivalent of the word filed is not bound in the Spanish text which is controlling. 5654 (August 27. After trial.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdic tion over subject matter. because the complaint was not signed by the offended party. but it was denie d and he was convicted. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy. Defendants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on the Spanish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect l primero de Marzo. Art. L-39037 (October 30. 32 of Act No. and defendant was never in jeopardy. 36a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U. it was not a valid complaint in accordance with law. Quintanar Case No. No. No. Subsequently. 1933) FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. The complaint was signed by the Chief of Police. because it w as the Spanish text approved by the legislature.R. HELD: The translation of the Defendant is not accurate. LATIN MAXIM: 6c . Where the Act was originally promulgated in English. The English and original text says: on and after March 1.ISSUE: W/N the Defendant should be punished under Act No 1761 which takes effect despues del primero de Marzo. it shall prevail over its translation. 1908 . 40188 (July 27. or the Torrens system. 175 G. 496. Act No. 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION McMicking v. which includes the interest arising from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent.49 FACTS: This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against Defendant Chu Chan Chac. 7896 (March 30. are a term exceeding three years. Lichauco Case No. Inc. rent to corresponding years paid in advance. 51 and 52. They argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds beca use it is not a real right. there was another case pending in its duration: an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata where judgment execution is. 496. which it does not harbor.R. 1934) FACTS: Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. v. But the English enacted by the Legislature. there was yet anot her pending appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara Lichauco . in the duration of Mata s judgment. only real rights can be registered. No. 39 G. and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law. 1914) Chapter III. This act expressly provides that all interests must be registered in order to affect third persons. HELD: The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No. China Banking Corporation Case No. The only exceptions. Sec. Page 88. The Spanish text of the l aw was relied upon by the Petitioner the Mortgage Law. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. or an expres s covenant requiring the lease to be registered. 21192 so that the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records.Employees Club.R. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be registered. However. No. should prevail. And likewise. the judgment.P17. ISSUE: With these two cases. o rders and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminology have been modified under the new Code of Civil Procedure. who has preference over the funds owed by Lichauco. Mata must have immediate recourse to the property of Lichauco based on the first judgment. not destroye d. HELD: Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. Even if there was a new judgment. The preference on Mata was based on Art. The lien of a judgment is not necessarily destroyed by the perfecting of an appeal but simply suspended. drawn in part from American and English precedents. One must take into account that classification and the incidents of judgments. which secures preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are final in the sense that no appeal lies therefrom). strictly. until the allotment o f time for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was not taken. 49 . 1924 of the new Code of Civil Procedure. However.60. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. One should look rather to the spirit than the letter of the law. it is simply reversed.666. is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal terminology where it would be explained that the right to share in the distribution of the debtor (Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) until he has the right to. the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. De Macabenta v. 12a. Page 89. W hile Art. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales alth ough no notice in writing was given to them. LATIN MAXIM: 1. there was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement of the law. the Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice. 8. No. the Petitioners occupied after the said sa les. 11 G. representing the portions bought. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale.54 FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents.R. 9a. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. HELD: Although there was no written notice. By virtue of such agreements. 2/5 of the lot. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. L-72873 (May 28. W/N Art. It is unbelievable that the co-heir s were unaware of the sale. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company Case No. 2. 1987) Chapter III. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed.R. ISSUE: 1. 11d. 17 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Vda. Page 89. They subsequently enclosed the ir portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. L-27489 (April 30. despite their obvious knowledg e of it. Footnote No. W/N there was a valid notice.Alonzo v. 10.57 FACTS: . 156 G. 11e. No. 1970) Chapter III. not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales. Footnote No. whether or not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. and unmarried. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 37 . However. which led to his death 16 days later. Racquel. 7a. to the posthumous daughter of the deceased.At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12. 1962. a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughte r. 12a. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8. ISSUE: W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the Workmen s Compensation Act. are still con sidered dependents under the Act. they were lawfull y wedded. 9c. HELD: Yes. the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the past 3 months. According to the Workmen s Compensation Act. 1961. if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting herself. on the day following the accident. Although not his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his death. he was substituted by his heirs. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. Footnote No. represented by his widow. Page 91. 34382 (July 20.Tinio.R. the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issu ed a patent in his favor.R. and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. No.61 FACTS: Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved in 1917. heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover the land. 1983) Chapter III. but because Sergio Nicolas died. Footnote No. together with the fruits of the land as damages.64 FACTS: Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against Defendant Company. 125 G. et al. Eastern Shipping Lines Case No. ISSUE: W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land was valid. v. 1955) Chapter III. 290 G. Page 90. In 1943. In 1947. In this regard. L-7747 (November 29. and that the conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Case No. In 1953. 9b. 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Home Insurance Company v. Frances. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own. HELD: No. et al. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered by the cargoes and goods shipped. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. the lower court dismissed the two . Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was null and void. the heirs transferred their rights to the hom estead to the Defendants. 38b. No. 37. prove legal capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the compla int was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law to transact in the Philippines. said insurance contracts were void from the beginning as the purpose was contrar y to public policy. Otherwise. such as Plaintiff Company. no cause of action accrues in favor of t he Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. Therefore.cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to s ue. 8. 9c. In the case at bar. The law on the matter is that a suing foreign company. 37 . LATIN MAXIM: 4. the insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed long before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the Philippines . in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal capacit y to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases. must. HELD: Yes. 36a. 11a. th e percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring business. the Internal Revenue Collector. with its gross receipts from the said busin ess amounting to P242. Page 91. 11a. They executed a promissory note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within three months. Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from Defendant. 19864 and 19685 (October 17. 1922) Chapter III. ISSUE: W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec. 2711. 281. No. Footnote No.R. 1462 of Act No.81. and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. On the same day. 28 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Go Chioco v. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. HELD: A contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an independent occupation. 113 G. Martinez Case No. which had been paid under protest. doing business in the City of Manila. representing the will of his employer only as to the res ult of his work. No. consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports.93 FACTS: Petitioner made a loan of P40. 154 G. Under the provisions of Sec. 1462 of Act No.71 FACTS: Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands.R. the Plaintiff was engaged in business as a contractor. 2711. 2711. 18316 (September 23. 4. 9c. Footnote No. the sum of P2. 1462 of Act No.422. Defendant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921. Therefore.40 Luzon Stevedoring Company v. the tax paid by the Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid. Plaintiff is not a "contractor" based on Sec. 1923) Chapter III. Page 93.33. at certain r ates of charge per unit of cargo. Trinidad Case No. Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note . 5b. Engaging in a stevedoring busines s.000 to Respondent. HELD: No. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18 % was in violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. the current law RA 2655 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishm ents for violations. one may consult the history of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent. The current law also does not expressly mention that the principal i s also forfeited.800. Then Respondent Hermanos paid P25. with the third cycle's promissory note bring du e only a month later and with a check for only P600. 9c. Thus. 2992). Therefor e.800 to Petitioner. which was cashed. Petitioner filed a complaint. and with this note. 36a. unlike the pre vious law.000 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15. Respondent Hermanos sent a check for P1. In a previous law RA 2073. when the intent of a law is ambiguous. However. Again. he could not pay so they executed another promissory note and sent another check worth P1.850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15.800. again due within the next three months. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. th e principal loan was forfeited together with the interest. Taking into consideration the history of the Usury Law. He now executed a new promissory note.and sent a check of P1. ISSUE: W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loaned together with the interest. As a rule of construction. This cycle was repeated a total of 7 times.000. After three months.000. the intent of the framers is clear. he must give back P11. Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. 37 . since only the interest is forfeited. Page 94. HELD: Sec. Footnote No. L-34135-36 (February 24. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. The Solicitor-General asks for the dis charge of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice. However. the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future pro secution. 22a. 297 G. looking at the legislative history of the statute. Upon reaching the witness stand. Luna Case no.R. 1915) Chapter III. Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fear of the police officers. No. L-9144 (March 27. discharge cannot be a n acquittal since it was made prior to his trial. Footnote No. b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basiana v.102 FACTS: Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect . along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling. 31 G. 1981) Chapter III. was convicted of asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as wi tness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right t o plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Page 95.R. Defendant was discharged before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the Government against his co-accused. De Guzman Case No.41 US v.95 FACTS: Defendant. ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Nos. nevertheless. 19 and 20 are constitutional. Finally. Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey. or other government agencies. An initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie point. private or mineral land survey. 137) provides: For the purpose of this section. and were merel y abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees. a junction of known rivers or creeks. Petitioner s contention that the word MAY suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since it goes against the legislator s inten t to eliminate claim jumping and overlapping claims.A. 2 of the Mining Law (C. 36b . or location monument or triangulation station established by the Bureau of Lands. a known publi c or private structure. No. disclaimed such consent. Bureau of Mines. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner s mining claims are valid. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid. a permanent and prominent object used as a tie point MAY be an intersection of known roads. 47 par. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: Sec. a kilometer post of public road. Consequently. 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna. 30a.with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner however. Army Corps of engineers. Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlappi ng Petitioner s claims. a corner of approved public. Luna amended the declarations with the intention of clearing c laim names and tie points. Realizing that there was something wrong with the declaration of location records. Petitioner prospected 1 83 claims. a clear disregard of their agreement. 33. 27 G. The Civil Code does not prevail. It was the clear intent of the legislator t o create a uniform law for material aid. RA 390 is a special law and thus must be take n to constitute an exception to the general law which is the Civil Code. HELD: No. 399 of the New Civil Code thus terminating the guardianship. b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Villa v. and is therefore. 399 of the Civil Code shall prevail over RA 390. PNB Case No. However. No. 1956) Chapter III. No.R. L-9695 (September 10. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N Art. CA Case No.103 FACTS: Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the intention of being modeled after the US version. 87416 (April 8. Inserting provisions of the Civil Code wo uld result in discordance with intent.R. Petitioner alleges tha t she has married and has become emancipated under Art.110 FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check. Footnote No. 1991) Chapter III. RA 390 Sec. 50. not covered by the said la w. Page 95. RA 390 provides that a guardian ship can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. Page 96. ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question.Baga v. 88 G. . he contends that the check was drawn against a dollar account with a foreign bank. 23 applies notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to judicial restora tion and discharge of guardians. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmake rs is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. With regard to Petitione r s allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22. the same is controlling and sufficient to ves t jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. Thus. it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. 26. 43. the Court revealed that the records of Batasan.HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. 24b. Vol. 17. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore. b2 . Hence. Jr. laid down the compulsory retirement age of PNP officers. Page 96. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 89 insofar as the retirement age is concerned. of the Interior and Local Government. Case No. No. Respondents argue that the age of retirement (56 ) of said law cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. they contend that the term INP includes both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP). 1973) FACTS: A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the . No. Had it been otherwise. 106724 (February 9. HELD: The intent was to classify the INP in such manner that Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.R. L-34964 (January 31. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N the legislative intent was to classify the INP as applicable only to the local police force. 89 of the same law (which temporarily extended the age of retirement). Indeed. b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION China Banking Corporation v. 1994) Chapter III. 12a. otherwise known as An Act Establishing the PNP Under a Reorganized Dept. De Guzman. 11a. 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police force. 185 G.R. the law distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed th at INP as used in Sec. The legislature did intend to exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. Responde nts wanted to be extended the same privileges as the local police. The use of the term INP is not synony mous with the PC.110 FACTS: RA 6975. Ortega Case No. the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just t he INP. 21 G.43 National Police Commission v. 27. In other words. Furthermore. 43. by invoking RA 1405. RA 1405 also imposes criminal liabilit y on any official or employee of a banking institution who breaks the confidential nature of this law. ISSUE: W/N a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor. a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff and served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier. Tan Kim Liong. The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest with curr ent Petitioner Bank. HELD: No. 35. b2 . 11e. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. The trial court declared the said corporation in d efault. He refused to disc lose the sought information. 38b. The discussion of the confer ence committee report of the two houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Thus.collection of a sum of money. 30b. citing the provisions of RA 1405 which prohibits the dis closure of any information relative to bank deposits to any person except upon written permission of the depositor. 12b. 111 FACTS: Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different shipments. v. et al. Hence this appeal. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstak . No. 67 G. controlling in th e interpretation of the law. ISSUE: W/N the opinion of a legislator in the deliberations of a law. v. Page 96. LATIN MAXIM: b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Kilosbayan. 173 G. 1995) FACTS: Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan. Courts are not bound by a legislator s opinion expressed in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation.R. HELD: No. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax o n the automobiles. Footnote No. said co urt modified Respondent s decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a refund. Petitioner requested for reconsideration and. Inc. It is deemed t o be a mere personal opinion of the legislator. it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting CIR Case No. Morato Case No. The Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the case. After the hearing. 118910 (November 16.44 Mayon Motors v. 15000 (March 29. No. 1961) Chapter III. Guingona. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted by the tax c ourt and insists the court s interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a statem ent made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations on the amendments for the Tax Code.R. this request havi ng been denied. when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority. as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with an y party in operating an on-line lottery. ISSUE: W/N under its charter (RA 1169. lotteries and other similar activities. association or joint venture with others or by itself. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42. lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with an y other party because of the clause except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A) in paragraph (B) of Sec. but also the phrase by itself. HELD: No. Petitioner s interpretation fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B). 36b . What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepst akes. LATIN MAXIM: 34. races. It is prohibited from doing so whe ther in collaboration.es. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under protest. 1 of C. 444. Sec. 71 G. provides that when the work is not continuous. Nos. 77 G. ISSUE: 1. 2. No. shall not be counted in the eight working hours. four hour s overtime). A laborer need not leave the premises of the factory. given three free meals a day and 20 minutes rest after mealtime. No. 9265 (April 29. Employees of the company are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am 6:00 pm (12 hours of work. W/N a different criterion should be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen's employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of work from that of a dry land laborer. shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted.Luzon Stevedoring Co. 48886-8 (July 21. known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law.A. and may rest completely. ISSUE: . Inc.R. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to dry land laborers equally applicable to seamen.. HELD: The definition of hours of work equally applies to seamen and no need for a different criterion. Luzon Marine Department Union Case No. Court of Tax Appeals Case No.133 FACTS: Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan. Iligan City . 1957) FACTS: Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of Industrial Relations ruling that the 20 minutes rest given to employees after mealtime shoul d not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work. it being enough that he cease to work. the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can reset completely. 26 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Customs v. v. Page 101. 1993) Chapter III.R. Footnote No. Since the said law limits the berthing taxes to national ports only. as amended by P. Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code. Sec.W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged berthing fees under Sec. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. 25d. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom memorandum circular 33-73 or E. 34.O. as amended by P. 30a . LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 34 speaks of the national ports only. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it was amended by the presidential decree. 72. HELD: No. and this amendment indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original.D. it is obvious that the private ports are not included.D. 141 FACTS: The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 13(3) of the Co nstitution refers to suspension in its punitive sense. HELD: Yes. Footnote No. No. 28 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Carolina Industries Inc.R. Case No. Sec. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints. while Sec. This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and eff icient investigation on cases filed against the officers. 106719 (September 21.46 Buenaseda v. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conduc ted by his office. A preventive measure is not i n itself a punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. Page 104. 1993) Chapter III. 9 of the 1987 Constitution. 47 . who were employees of the national center for men tal health. v. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charge s. 40 G. 13(8) of Art. Secretary Flavier Case No. as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. In response. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc. the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventiv e suspension of the Petitioners. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. LATIN MAXIM: 27. L-46908 (May 17. The courts use of a ruling in foreign case is only right because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United States. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. 9 . Within three months.G. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffi ce to prove such consent. it is the duty of the broker to do so. Page 106. HELD: If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself. the Petitioner s amount deposited was completely wiped out without his permission. and how these statutes are interp reted. ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock trading.146 FACTS: Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing. carrying and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange. the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this decision. 1980) Chapter III. No.R. Footnote No. Respondent now question the appellate court s ruling on the ir violation of the SEC rules and securities Act. They also purchased a lot located in Q.959. HELD: No.0 00. representing all eged deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said estate. for P132. No 10765 (December 22.00. 1944 which they sold for P94. No L-15290 (May 31. The Collector of Inter nal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived fro m the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowable.00 on Feb. The appraisal is correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb the same. filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora. 1963) FACTS: Mariano Zamora. bought a piece of land located in Manila on May 16. R. 11-year old son of the Plaintiff.00 and sold it for P75.000. The injury was att ributed to the boy s inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the first time a nd without prior instruction. Page 106. 1916) Chapter III.00 on March 5. LATIN MAXIM: b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tamayo v. The CTA ordered the estate of the late Felicidad Zamora. to pay the sum of P235. for P68. 1944.000.149 FACTS: This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries suffered by Braulio Tamayo. owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora Manila.47 Zamora v. 282 G. 1951. R. Esperanza Zamora appealed and alleged that the CTA erred. 1951.C. ISSUE: W/N the CTA erred in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano Zamora.00 on January 19. 176 G. Footnote No. Gsell Case No. . Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. 9. The Legislature intended that the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought under the Employer s Liability Act to be the same as that in the country from which the Act was taken. being of American origin.ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the Employer s Liability Act. LATIN MAXIM: b2 . HELD: Yes. R. on the ground that the amount of t wo notes.000. L-6884 (March 21. Posadas Case No.59 to said plaintiff. was in . 1929) FACTS: Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P56.12 5 and P1. The Municipal Court likewise dismis sed the case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for collection of the same promissory notes object of the former action. No. It is ordered that the Defendant make two separate assessments of the additional income tax.246. 17 G. LATIN MAXIM: b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Campos Rueda Corp. for lack of jurisdiction. returning the sum of P56. holding that the two notes constitute two separate causes of action involving less than P2. according to the complaint.R. ISSUE: W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintiff s wife constitutes her separate estate within the scope and meaning of this phrase for the purposes of the additional income tax. and the other against his wife on her paraphernal property. which the Defendant. Cruz Timber Co. L-31088 (December 3. Sta. HELD: Yes. collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have collect ed by way of income tax. v. 1956) FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner against Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of P1. one against the Plaintiff.48 Ossorio v. the additional income t ax for the income from her paraphernal property. 93 G. in accordance with law. and Felix Case No. which Petitioner now consolidated under a single cause of action. No.203.72. without prejudice to his levying against and collecting from said Plaintiff s wife upon he r own separate individual declaration.075. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.excess of its jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the Municipal Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant s complaint. 7a . The jurisdiction of a court depends. but upon the totality of the demand in all the causes of action. HELD: No. not upon the value or demand in each single case of action contained in the complaint. and 15th of February. posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public places. to wit. 1930) FACTS: This is a foreclosure of mortgage. No. 99 G. 8 G. 65 of the Philippi ne Insurance Act as it was taken verbatim from Sec. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co. more particularly on t he 2nd. is valid and sufficient under Sec. The Respondent Company has appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract. 32124 (March 27. ISSUE: . HELD: Yes.R. 192 9. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 33637 (December 31.000 was in force. In pursuant thereof. the sheriff on January 3 0. A rider attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in the contract of insurance. at the market. 1931) FACTS: Petitioner s warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out with Respondent for the amount of P10. 1929 and the sale took place on February 19. 9th. ISSUE: W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void because it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act. 2605 of the Civil Code of Calif ornia which states. b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pando v. 7a. Notice o f the sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publication. 1929. upon the land itself. and the editor certif ied that he published it once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warr anty may be contained in another instrument than the policy when expressly referred t o in the policy as forming a part thereof.49 Ang Giok Chio vs.R. and on the municipal building of Pasay. Kette and Sellner Case No. Case No. HELD: Yes. 692 of the California Code. LATIN MAXIM: b2 . The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted from Sec. the requirements of the law regarding the notic e of the sale in question have been substantially complied with.W/N the posted notices of the sale in 3 public places and publication in La Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive weeks satisfied the requirements of the la w regarding the notice of the sale in question. 156 FACTS: Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post Office. However. b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. and on June 29. 2252. v. neither the said amount nor any part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff Guerrero. Due to the failure of J. Defendant Rader and Plaintiff Guerrero went to J. Respondent Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would need. However. the former endorsed the mortgage deed. Therefore. Northcott. ISSUE: W/N the promissory notes in question which have not been paid. Wells Case No. No. Footnote No. is substantially the same as that contained in Sec.R.R. 135 G. we believe that the construction placed upon it by the court in the cases cited is applicab le to the case at bar. Co. Northcott to pay said amount of P12. 1971) Chapter III. or to any of his co-Plaintiffs . E.Reyes v. HELD: There was evidence on the part of the promissory notes in question. Soriano Case No. He . 30587 (December 4. The prohibition contained in sa id law against a witness testifying upon any transaction or communication between himsel f and a deceased person. Rader and J. the P laintiff sustained damages for default in the payment of the instalments due. No. Plaintiff Guerrer o said that he could not do so for the lack of money to operate the machine. Educ. 383(7 ) of our Code of Civil Procedure. 1929) FACTS: Defendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping machine and an International truck in a shed lot for P23. 192 2. Page 107. 235 G. L-22405 (June 30.000. as amended by Act No. Plaintif f would just have to make out two promissory notes in favour of the mortgage. 4604 of the Code of Iowa. These are also in line with Sec.000. LATIN MAXIM: 1. are not supported by the evidence in relation to the competence of the testimony of Guerrero. managed to leave the building without knowledge of the teller. Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Pos t Office notified the Bank of irregularity. b2 . 9a. in the same way the bank of America debited Petitioner s account with the same amount. These are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construction of US s own postal statutes. US held that postal money orders are not negotiable instruments. HELD: Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in the US. and deducted from the bank s clearing account the said amount. Respondent. LATIN MAXIM: 2b. ISSUE: W/N the postal money order in question is a negotiable instrument. Petitioner requested to reconsider the action but was denied. in the absence of any special reason justifying departure f rom the policy or practice. Palomar received one money order as part of their sales receipt and subsequently deposited it in the Bank of America. Defendant Belizo was however ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4. L-8257 (April 13.900 and pay the sum of P5 . The court rendered judgment declaring Defendant Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question and ordered t he Plaintiff to return it to said Defendant and.00 as death benefit which they had been previously paid by virtue of the provisions of RA 610.900. with legal interest from the date of the decision. No. 7a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic v. he returned the automobile to Bulahan who in then surrendered the check for cancellation.51 Cruz v.00 plus attorney s fee of P600.000 as moral damages.000. No. 1956) FACTS: Defendant bought an automobile from Bulahan.R. Bulahan claims that he bought the automobile from Belizo without having any knowledge of any defect in the title. 1972) FACTS: Petitioners seek full compensation of P6. He set up a counterclaim for attorney's fees. to pay him the sum of P4.000. upon his failure to do so. He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the check upon impoundment and as a result. ISSUE: Who has a better right of the two over the car. 132 G.900 which he paid in check. without deducting the P3. Pahati Case No.00 under the WCC. It was found out that Belizo falsified a l etter that enabled him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit. 28 G. for P4. Workmen s Compensation Commission Case No. L-29019 (May 18. The counterclaim of Defendant was denied for lack of evidence. The claim for damages and attorney's fees of Bulahan was denied. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived because of the scheme of Belizo even if both the Plaintiff and Bulahan acted in good faith.R. HELD: Plaintiff has a better right to the car than Bulahan and therefore can recover the said car. ISSUE: . 9 is highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent fu rther recovery of compensation benefits under other laws. generally. It is difficult t o construe that the legislature intended to double the compensations received. 38b. Sec. HELD: The resolution of the WCC is modified. the P3. LATIN MAXIM: 17.000. 5 of WCC bar payment under other laws. It was also contended that the phrase or any other law granting similar benefits to officers or employees. 9 of RA 610 and Sec. 39. considering that at the times said laws were approved the finances of the government could not have conceivably permitted the outlays needed for the purpose. of the national.00 received under RA 610 should be deducted from the full grant received under the WCC.W/N the beneficiaries of military personnel who have received the death gratuity under RA 610 should still be paid the death compensation under the WCC. Furthermore. 40b . provincial or mun icipal government in Sec. 29. 19b. 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ESSO Standard Eastern Inc.Garcia et al. 1903) FACTS: Judgment was rendered for the Defendants on May 1. Therefore. it seems impossible that the Commission intended to deprive the cou rt and the parties of the power to extend the term. Case NO. it cannot be extended. considering when the law was adopted. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 1989) FACTS: . which on August 5 was al lowed and signed by the court. which was denied on July 23. they excepted to the judgment and presented a motion for a new trial. it cannot be said that an extension of this time is an extension of the time to appeal. The right of the parties to the appeal was already fixed by t he notice of the intention to prepare a bill of exceptions entered of record in the clerk s office. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. after the rig ht to remove the case has been secured. v. HELD: The period of 10 days and the subsequent period of 5 days have to do with the mechanical part of the appeal the preparation of the papers for transmission t o the Supreme Court. v. 41 G. given the physical impossibilit y to comply with it in many cases. 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the parties to consent to or for the judge to order an extension of the 10-day period. The Plaintiffs were notified thereof on May 21. 19b. No.R. The term of the court in which the case was tried expir ed on May 30. No. Hipolito et al. Moreover.R. 53 G. On July 28. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. L-1449 (November 30. 1903. the Plaintiffs presented their proposed bill of exceptions. If the period corresponds to the appeal or for suing out a writ of error found in most other laws of American origin. 27. Two days after. But that period is en tirely different from the 10 days for allowing the preparation of papers. 70037 (July 7. 92 for 1960. 7a . LATIN MAXIM: 1. This was a revenue measure formally proposed by President Carlos P.246. Garcia to Congress as part of. entitled An Act to Authorize the Central Bank of the Philippines to Establish a Margin over Banks Selling Rates of Foreign Exchange . HELD: RA 2609 is a police measure as it is applied in order to strengthen our country s international reserve.234. is a police measure or a revenue measure. since such legislative history may only be resorted to for the purp ose of solving doubt. at least two cases had been decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a tax. As a matter of fact. Moreover.The case is an appeal on the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the Petitioner s claims for refund of the margin fees P102. the language of which is plain and unambiguous. there may be no resort to the legislative history of the enactment of a statute. and in order to balance. Petitioner contended that margin fees are taxes and cited the background and the legislative history of the Margin Fee Law showing that RA 260 9 was nothing less than a revival of the 17% excise tax on foreign exchange impose d by RA 601. The CTA stated that it is a well-settled jurisprudence that only in extremely doubtful matters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of Con gress become important.00 for 1959 and P434. the budget for 1959-1960 . ISSUE: W/N RA 2609. not for the purpose of creating it. No. 1975) FACTS: Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code. unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antago nism should arise and one amends or repeals the other. 36b. In fact every statute shou ld receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body o f laws. either expressly or by implica tion. Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Director of Lands . but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. and th at the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in RA 1394. b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pascual v. HELD: Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Spec ial Import Tax' is taken to include customs duties". and of facts which affect their derivation. L-28329 (August 17.53 Commissioner of Customs v. 38a. In order to determine the true intent of the legislature. the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions. 26 G. ISSUE: W/N the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by RA 387 should include the special import tax imposed by RA 1394.R. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. validity and operation. or the Special Import Tax Law. Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice o f the origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer. The Court examined the six statuettes repealed by RA 1394. Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is t o be avoided. L-15816 (February 29. in c ases of lease the law requires that no lease shall be permitted to interfere with any pr ior claim by settlement or by occupation. pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 102 C. HELD: No.R. 141. No. No. No. In the present case. in violatio n of the terms and conditions of the lease. 100 G. 33. it appears that the trial court reversed not only the decision of Respondent and of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources but that of the Office of inion. to g the actual occupant of public land which Petitioner is . If anyone should be given prior right of entry at all. without the record disclosing in our op erroneous and unfounded. Thus. a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on the ground that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and the ta xes thereon since 1947. or until such claim shall be legally extinguished (Sec. namely. until the consent of the occupant or settl er is first had. The policy in the disposition and concess ion of public land is to give priority or preference to the actual occupant. that the same are clearly to be in consonance with the ive priority or preference to not. they appear purpose of the law invoked by Petitioner.Case No. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given by administrative officials to a law they are bound to enforce or implement deserve s great weight. ISSUE: W/N the ruling of the trial court upholding Petitioner s claim to a right of entry was correct. and on the further ground that he and his successors-in-inte rest had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvements thereon. 141). it should be the actual occu pants who have presented several petitions for the subdivision or and sale of the land to them. 1964) FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondents.A. LATIN MAXIM: 2a the President. C.A. To the contrary. 107 G. to follow the approach of counsel for Petitioner. the answer was not in doubt. L-28997 (February 22. 92 G. they chose to follow the princi ple that a public office is a public trust. LATIN MAXIM: 2a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION m i k iPeople of the Philippines v. Respondents filed their answer.54 Orencia v. is more qualified than Petitioner. increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Divisions. who is only a high school graduate with second grade civil service eligibility.R. and he has been performing functio ns of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered and recognized as su ch until RA 4040. that Respondent. interposed a defense that Petitioner is unqualified for the position of Assistant Chief. HELD: For Respondent officials. and after usual admissions and denials. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23. 1933) . No. one which admittedly. and praying that the petition be dismissed ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission. and being a new position created under RA 4040. being a lawyer. one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate. 1974) FACTS: Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Cou rt Division of the Land Registration Commission. has an ambiguous aspect. Hernandez Case No. was implemented where he was left out while co-assistant chief of the nine other div isions of the Land Registration Commission were so recognized and extended increased compensation. such a contemporaneous constr uction. Certainly. Nos. is entitled to t he highest respect from the judiciary. Since there was a new legal provision to be construed.R. the same can only be file d by a qualified person. Enrile Case No. among o thers. 2659 refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been elected without possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as provided by law. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office. while not conclusive.000 for land taxes to the government. taxes had been paid for. 1932. 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived the right to suffrage and public office. By September. on the condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. 32. in April 1932. The Chief of Executive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification for assuming a public office. he was a delinquent in the payment of P2. Under these circumstances. HELD: No. The Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor. he was charged for violat ing Sec. Rafferty: long continued administrative interpretation of a tax law. And in this case.FACTS: Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on October 16. However. Sec. should be followed unless clearly erroneous. it wa s not. this does not incapacitate him from assuming office. 2659 can be applied to refrain Respondent from taking office as Governor in Camarines Norte. At this time. we should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs . 1931. the municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. Hence. even though Respondent did not pay his land taxes. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 42b . LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Page 112. to its registered tenants or their successors i n interest. However. 73603 (June 22. b efore converting these store units into their dwelling homes. No. In accordance with RA 3208 . LCH Project 3. there is no showing of a clear and certain right to compel Respondent Corporation to sell them the units for a price lower than what is bei ng offered. HELD: No. In 1971. People s Homesite and Housing Corporation Case No. t he price of P50 is not excessive or unreasonable considering that the market value for the l ots is at least P120. The Petitioners first leased these units for business purposes. clear and certain. 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION . Quezon City were meant to be used for this purpose. For mandamus to lie. the lots located in Block 330. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. in reference to Sec. Thus.55 Sagun v. low cost housing for those who are unable to provide themselves with this. 1988) Chapter III. In the case at bar. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Corporation can be compelled by mandamus to sell these lots for not more than P10/sq m. 1 of RA 3802. aside from the fact that the determination of the selling price requires exercise of discretion on their part.R. The action of Respondent Corporation neither conflicts with the l aw nor does it demonstrate any abuse of discretion to warrant its reversal. under RA 3802. Footnote No. the Petitioners first used the lots for store purposes.180 FACTS: Respondent Corporation was created to provide decent. Petitioners dec ided that they wanted to buy these lots from Respondent Corporation but filed a petit ion for mandamus alleging that Respondent Corporation was selling the lots at P50/sq m. which was in violation of RA 3802.. t here is no obligation of Respondent Corporation. Moreover. 266 G. Petitioner s rights should be well-defined. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is authorized under RA 4617 to establish stations in places or points outside Metro Manila? HELD: Yes. 236 G. In January 1979. 1986) Chapter III.181 FACTS: In 1976. an application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu for the purpose of rendering international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outsid e the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. In 1977.R. RA 4617 clearly authorizes Petitioner to construct. which rul ed in favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the authority to establish other stations aside from the station in Makati. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Relova Case No. Petitioner filed with the Board of Communication. Footnote No. 3 and 4 wherein other stations may be established as long as it is approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Manila was designate d as the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. L-60548 (November 10. v.Philippine Global Communications. now NTC. This ca n be seen in Sec. apart from its principal station in Makati. Page 112. maintain. other stations or branches within th e Philippines for purposes of its international communications operations. No. The opinion of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice which affirmed the authorization of othe r stations is material and must be considered in favor of the Petitioners. Inc. applicant shall cease its operations. 36b . Respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration of said decision. and operate. subject to that as soon as domestic carriers have upgraded their facilities. BOC gav e Petitioners authority to establish a station in Cebu. This is a petition se eking to set aside the ruling rendered. 38b. the containers mentioned therein as long as he exports them withi n one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry. Under the law in effect at that time. 27761 (Dec. HELD: No. Commissioner of Customs Case No.56 Asturias Sugar Central v. free from import duties.183 FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for review of the unfavorable decision of the CTA which denied the recovery of the sum of P28. 6 1927) Chapter III. The second contemplates a case where import duties are first paid subject to refund to the extent of 99% of the amount paid. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import taxes and duties.186 FACTS: . 241 No. offer two options to an importer. Collector of Customs Case No. L-19337 (September 30 1969) Chapter III. it is non-extendible. The first gives him the privilege of importing. Sugar Central Agency v. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of taxes and duties paid for importation of containers provided importer re-exports said containers within a 1year period. 4. Footnote No. Page 112.42 which the Petitioner paid und er protest in the concept of customs duties and special import tax. Also Asturias contends that they are entitled to an alternative recovery of the said amount minus 1% under Sec.629. The provisions invoked by the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refund. 106(b) of the Customs and Tariff Act. The 1-year period mentioned in the Philippine Tariff Act contains no express mention of any extension or of any grounds for it to be extended. Page 113. Footnote No. provided the articles mentioned are export ed within three years from importation. 24 No. LATIN MAXIM: 3a. Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. The Government can be allowed to collect because not to do so would overthrow and destroy the whole system of the Government. in and by which millio ns of pesos have been levied and collected and expended in the construction of Government wharves. Dissenting Opinion: Historically. HELD: Yes. 11d . Wharf was built and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. 37. and it would have defeated the construction of the Government wharf at Pulapandan. 5b.416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar to Un ited States in a wharf on Pulapandan.Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. shipped 5. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant can collect wharfage dues on wharves not owned by government. Defendant collected wharfage dues on petitioner s wharf. wharves not owned nor operated by government cannot be taxed or levied upon. Occidental Negros on steamship Hannover.124. 4. 193 FACTS: The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed by the then National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) workers for an obligation created by agreement . 4 of RA 309. 1960) Chapter III. 253 G. Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ramos v. Petitioner s claim that to allow the PCSO to use their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO. L-22753 (December 18. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983. it is clear that the text is permissive and is not mandatory. as amended by RA 983. 6g. No. the GAB reduced the number of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities b y six. The words of members of Congress are not representative of the entire House of Representatives or Senate. Games and Amusement Board Case No. Footnote No. CA Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Petitioner s claim that the intent of the legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day are untenable. HELD: No. 1967) Chapter III. Also. v. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days.57 Manila Jockey Club Inc. Page 114. Page 115.R. 37.190 FACTS: The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved for any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of their right. 164 No. RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. The private individuals and entities are not en titled to the use of such days. L-12727 (February 29. tha t the unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or groups duly licensed by the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). Footnote No. RCA is not liable to the abovementioned obligation. The reason for this is that such construction comes from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the particular law involved. by law of the Commonwealth Act otherwise known as the Budget Act. night work and work rendered on Sundays and legal holidays by its laborers and employees. and corn.confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations directing NARIC to pay 25% for additional compensation for overtime work. they are merely an office directly under the President. rice. a governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to stabilize the price of palay. Not a matter of right. HELD: While executive construction is not necessarily binding upon courts. There has been consistent administrative interpretat ion by the Office of the President as to what may. 38b . RCA depends for its continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside by the General Appropriations Act. and not for profit. such compensation was given upon authority of the Budgetary Act. be granted to RCA work ers and employees for overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays. Thus. which was possessed with a distin ct and separate corporate existence. To carry out t his function. 11a. Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) claims that unlike NARIC. ISSUE: W/N RCA should be held answerable when NARIC ceased to exist and RCA was created for the said obligation. unless the President specifically appropriates the 25% compensation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. it is entitled to great weight and consideration. under law. Construction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes from that branch called upon to implement the law. 267 G. 30a. On appeal. 305 G. Page 115. 970 was issued by the President stating that except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees bona fide tenants of dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction. 1971) Chapter III. HELD: No. 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION University of the Philippines v.193 FACTS: Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold the said land to Private Respondent Mendiola.R. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. Thus.R. Memorandum Circular No. particularly if the only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or th eir families. 1978) Chapter III. No. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot. a petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court. Footnote No. CA Case No. After the trial. personal use of property by the owner or lessors or their families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees. Page 115. the CFI through Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the City Court ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. No.195 FACTS: With the filing of Petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Man ila.58 Salaria v. L-45642 (February 28. Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Respondent from dismi ssing . Footnote No. namely. Buenviaje Case No. A formal letter of demand to vacate the premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case. L-28153 (January 28. P. and removal of the civil service employees of the University. independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Serv ice and the Civil Service Board of Appeals. the Supreme Court ruled that the President a nd Board of Regents of the U. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of original Petitioners in the case by the Board of Regents is final. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 38b .them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be dismissed from the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but by the Civil Service Commissioner. including those of the Philippine General Hospital. 94. or requires further action by the Civil Service Commission. possess full and final authority in disciplining. the President tran sferred them under herein Respondent. 20c. 9b. s uspension. HELD: The management of Philippine General hospital was initially under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Under RA 51 and E. Thus.O. 6c. Bautista . Inc. Tallied votes are as follows: NAFLU 429 PAFLU 414 Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted) Abstained 4 Total Ballots 864 (Note: NAFLU didn t obtain the majority vote. L-43760 (August 21. which is 432. Company. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was base d on the Industrial Peace Act. the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been already been made known to public and as such has the enforcing power in the case at bar. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines vs. CIR. 39a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Everett v. 120 G. No. HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labo r Code. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 1976) FACTS: Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in Philippine Blooming Mills. Also. Bureau of Labor Relations Case No.) Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a previous case. 2a.R. which has been superseded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot apply to the case at bar.59 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. 94 is in accordance with law. cinematographs. whose admission price exceeds P0.A. During the first Quarter of 1937. 881. imposition tax is at 5% of the gross receipts of theaters. contemporaneous constructio n is given weight. No. 43 G.50. Sec. HELD: Yes to both. At that time.40 (Sec. The partnership charged admissio n fees of P0. which they refused to pay. LATIN MAXIM: 2a .R. The law does not say how tax should be imposed in cases where the daily receipts are not made at the same rate. 1939) FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were partners who owned and managed Queen s Theater during the first Quarter of 1937.Case No. 128). 46505 (November 7. W/N the collection to said tax is in accordance with law. 2.40 per seat and at other times charged more than P0.4 1. ISSUE: 1. 1&3 of C. W/N Regulations No. 1458. They were asked to pay P992. the Collector of Internal Revenue issued Regulations No. etc. 94. which states that the daily receipts of prices charged differently will be joint ly taken into account for computation purposes. No. 1458 of the Administrative Code stat es that penalty for late payment will be at 25% of the tax imposed.70 per seat. It has also been held that where there is ambiguity in the language of the law. As such. The interpretation given to a law by an officer charged by reason of his office to carry out its provisions should be respected. their receipts were P15. The parties fai led to pay the tax on time and therefore subject to Sec.40 but not more t han P0. No. 1988) FACTS: . L-52415 (October 23. Sec. 2. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing t he Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. 62 G. 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No. 119 G. 37. Inciong Case No. HELD: A judgment in a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked after finality of judgment. L-50320 (March 30. IBAA filed a moti on for reconsideration to Respondent. 17. And also. W/N Sec.R. Later. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of DOLE). Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbi ter s decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. 1984) FACTS: Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank of As ia and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. IBAA then appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. 40c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage in compliance to the issuance of Sec. ISSUE: 1. NLRC Case No. It has been held that where the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The Petition was granted and IBAA paid for the holiday wage. Respondent granted IBAA s motion for reconsideration. IBAA waived its right to appeal by paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment as correct.R. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respon dent of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneou s. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent considering that it has become final and had been partially executed. the same must be declared null and void. 9 are valid.60 Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees Union (IBAAEU) v. In the case at bar. 9 are both null and void since the y amended the provisions of the Labor Code. At this point. No. 2 and Policy Instruction No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a . 1977. P. 1123 gr anted a P60. Labor contends that increase does not fall within the exemption since the CBA was signed on September after P.00 increase.D. provided that those who were granted an increase of less that P60. Moreover. 1123. on May of the same year. 1977 and was signed on September 7. Moreover. 1123 has been passed. ISSUE: W/N the case falls under the exception of P. However.00 increase in monthly wage of workers t hat will retroact from April 1. It was unlawful and beyond the scope of law.00 increase in living allowance which will take effect from January 1. HELD: No. Management argues that since on April 2.00. 1977 regarding the increase. PAI only had to pay the difference of P38. 197 7. CBA stipulated a P22. There was no formal agreement on April 2.D. there has been an agreement to a P22.A collective bargaining agreement was made between Petitioners and Management of Philippine Apparel Inc. the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor was based on a wrong premis e and misinterpretation by PAI Management. (PAI) on April 2.D.00 will be giv en the difference. PAI was able to get the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor support ing the PAI Management. 1977. and death.206 FACTS: Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay tax for their operations. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. Footnote No. sickness.61 United Christian Missionary Society vs. claiming that the assessed penalties were inequitable. 1969) Chapter III. old age. there is no room for interpretation.214 FACTS: . Good faith and bad faith are irrelevant since the law makes no distinction. it has no legal authority to condone. or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under th e SS Act. Petition is dismissed on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting Responden t the power to condone penalties. 26 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Yra v. 7a. 6b. Respondent said that their organization is embraced in the Social Security Act. establish gradually and perfect a so cial security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people to provide employees against the hazards of disability. The reason of the law is to develop. Page 118. Footnote No. 1928) Chapter III. they paid their premium remittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty fees since they did not kn ow that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances. L-26712-16 (December 27. Social Security Commission Case No.R. Abaño Case No.R. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain. 293 G. 30187 (November 15. Page 206. therefore the assessed penalties are impose d on them. waive. HELD: Respondent has no such authority. 316 G. upon knowledge thereof. 9a. No. waive or relinquish the penalty prescribed by law for l ate payment of remittances. ISSUE: W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to condone. Nevertheless. No. he is a registered voter in Manila and to be a candidate. 6c. Fernando Ma. qualif ied elector meant that he has all the qualifications provided by the law to be a vote r and need not be register. The conclusion to which was. However. 432 of the Election Law. Assembly was alleged to be unqualified for the position on the ground that he was not registered in his electoral district. Guerrero a candidate for representative to the Phil. However. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. his hometown. Laurel. It would be an absurdity to hold one a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his own municipality. 11a . 431 and none of the disqualifications stated i n Sec. In a previous case contested in th e Philippine Assembly. it is not least to disregard the forcible argu ment advanced that when the law make use of the phrases. one of the qualifications is t hat he/she who is running should be a duly qualified elector therein . HELD: Yes. The same was the case and decision of the Executive Bureau on the qualifications of Senator Jose P. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is an eligible to run as a local official of Bulacan. qualified electors and qualified voter the law means what it says. 3a.Respondent was running for office in Bulacan. It is sufficient that he possess the qualifications stated in Sec. He is qualified to run for local office. Page 120-121. CIR Case No. impost. No. The stubs and the daily reports of the conductor did not state the value of the goods transported. Inc. W/N the Court of Appeals decision is erroneous.R. The regulation (Sec. 1924. 129 . Footnote No. 79 of the Revised Administrative Code. b. 134 G. bills of landing and receipts were re-enacted. assessmen t or tolls. 1956) Chapter III. 4 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: McCulloch Dick Case No. or any penalty in relation thereto.62 Interprovincial Autobus Co. v. Pursuant to Sec. Petitioner asked for a ref und and the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental rendered a judgment in the ir favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The regulations were approved on September 16. L-6741 (January 31. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 121 and 127 of the Re vised Documentary Stamp Tax Regulations of the Department of Finance. W/N the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case. 2. When the National Internal Revenue Code was approved on February 18. The provincial revenue agent for Misamis Occidental examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had been issued by Petitioner. 121 falls within the scope of administrative power of the Secretary of Finance as authorized in Sec. The decision of the Court of Appeals however was not erroneous: a. 121) is valid also because of the principle of legislative approval be re-enactment. 1939. ISSUE: 1. the same provisions of stamp tax. the agent assumed that the value of the goods was more than P5.222 & 227 FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in transporting passengers and freight by means of TPU buses in Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga.. Sec. HELD: The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction because according to both the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the Constitution the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any tax. 1918) Chapter III. HELD: Yes. L-13862 (April 15. 69 o f the Administrative Code. 2113 and Sec. Page 120. 2113 were enacted and continued in force by the enactment of the Administrative Code and again continued in force by the enactment of the Jones Law the construction theretofore placed upon it by this court became an integral part of these statutes having th e force and the effect of a legislative command. 69 of the Administrative Code to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. Before the Governor-General gave his order. He is being detained because the Governor-Gener al of the Philippines ordered his deportation. 9a . In the interpretation of reenacted statutes. the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press. filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief of police of the city of Manila. 4.R.223 FACTS: Petitioner. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such statutes originally had. there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. When the provisions of Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. ISSUE: W/N the Governor-General has the power under Act No. the Governor-General has the power to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the sam e effect.G. the court will follow the construction which they received when previo usly in force. Footnote No. 3a. No. Plaintiff filed a claim for a refund of the paid tax.222 and 224 FACTS: Commonwealth Insurance Co. (CIC).R. Ltd. Only the tax rate was amended. L-19392 (April 14. on behalf of Plaintiff. HELD: No. This principle is not applicable for the aforementioned sections were never re-enacted. 144 . 53 and 54 were substantially re-enacted by RA 1065.63 Howden & Co. Plaintiffs stated that since Sec.. Footnote No. the premiums remitted were to indemnify CIC against liability. Baltazar Case No. Page 120. CIC remitted to Plaintiff reinsuran ce premiums and. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. The administrative rulings invoked by the CIR were only contained in unpublished letters. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. v. ISSUE: W/N the tax should be withheld. 1965) Chapter III. This took place withi n the Philippines. stating that it was exempted from withhold ing tax reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies by foreign insurance companies not authorized to do business in the Philippines. said rulings should be given the force of law under the principle of legislative approval by re-enactment. such action is confirmatory to an extent that the r uling carries out the legislative purpose. 1291 and 2343. It cannot be assumed that the legislature knew of these rulings. 9 G. Finall y. No. paid income tax on the premiums. The principle of legislative enactment states that where a statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re-enacts the provis ions without substantial changes. thus subject to income tax. 4 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Laxamana v. a domestic corporation. entered into reinsurance contracts with 32 British companies not engaged in business in the Philippines represented by herein Plaintiff. 225 FACTS: The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. which was taken from Sec. Sec. upon re-enacting Sec . 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. L-5955 (September 19. 1952) Chapter III. by virtue of Sec. the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with this contemporaneous interpretation. 2180 in Sec. 21 of the Revised Election Code. 2195 of the Revised Administrative C ode applies to the office of mayor in particular. Hence. the incorporation of Sec. 21 of the Revised Election Code. Also.R. the Provincial Governor. No. HELD: Yes. Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the office. Respondent should assume the vacated position. However. 50 . 4. 21 does not enlarge its scope but merely supplements it. By virtue of Sec. appo inted herein Petitioner as the mayor.G. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is the right person to assume office. 2180. Page 121. the interpretation is deemed to have been adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 1. A special provision overrides a ge neral one. 38b. 2180 of the Revised Admin Code. applies to municipal officers in general while Sec. the vice-mayor shall assume office. It has also been consistently held in case of suspension of the mayor. Footnote No. 187 .R. He relinquished his office after he had reached the age of 65 because of the provis ions of Act No. Page 121. ISSUE: W/N the veto of the Governor-General of Sec. HELD: Yes. The executive department sustained the validity of the veto as well . this practice of vetoing the separate it ems in a bill by the Chief Executive has long been allowed and to rule against it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality. Footnote No. Province of Lanao del Sur Case No. Furthermore. 3899. they must be given great respect. 12 that the Legislature intended this Act to be an appropriation measure and that it anticipated the possibility of a future vet o by the Chief Executive. No. 3a.64 Bengzon v. 2b. 7 was valid.226 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of the Governor-G eneral by claiming that the Act was not an appropriation bill and hence. 1936) Chapter III. Secretary of Justice Case No. 32 G. but when two co-equ al branches of government have adopted and accepted the construction of statutes. the legislature accepted the veto and made no attempt to override it. Contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts. L-42821 (January 18. Pangasinan. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION NPC v. the Governor can constitutionally veto certain items on this bill. Also. Hence. It is clear from reading Sec. 7 of the Retirement Gratuity Law which entitled justices of the peac e to gratuities. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the benefits under t he vetoed Sec. was not subjec t to item-veto. 96700 (November 19. 1931.232 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was assessed real property taxes by Respondent since its tax exempt status was revoked by P. 5b. 37. 5a. Footnote No. 49 . With the Resolutions issued by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB). Note however. Furthermore. However. W/N Respondent Province and provincial officials can validly and lawfully assess RPT against. No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Macaraig case stating that the FIRB Resolution is in accordance with the requirements of the law if it was properly approved by the Minister of Finance.G. but its privileges were only suspended.R. 2. HELD: The Petitioner never lost its tax exempt status. the FIRB Resolutions reinstating the status were properly approved by the Minister of Finance. since the Petitioner was never delinquent in paying RPT. W/N Petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges. Respondent contends that t he Resolutions issued by the said Board was void relying on an earlier case between the Petitioner and the Province of Albay stating that FIRB does not have power to re store tax exemptions and that the said Board can only recommend to the President or th e Minister of Finance which subsidiary of the Government can be given exemptions. including its exemption from payment of RPT. the tax exempti on privileges of the Petitioners were restored. 9a. Thus. Because of the Petitioner s failur e to pay. 20a.D. Petitioner contends that its status was never revoked but merely suspended. that the Albay case was already superceded by the Maceda vs. 38a. Page 122. 1996) Chapter III. and thereafter sell at public auction the subject properties of the Petitioner to effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such t axes. ISSUE: 1. In the present case. the Respondent cannot assess deficiency RPT against the Petitio ner. the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole bidder. the subseq uent auction and sale of the Petitioner s assets is also considered void. Sec. Tuason & Co. 735 and the titles derived t herefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceedi ng. improper venue. v. The Congress may authorize. Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they were able to purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No.R. Tuason. ISSUE: W/N OCT No. 1970) Chapter XI. 1914 in Case No. Tuason. 7681 of the Court of Lan d Registration. Tuason and Pili vs. They seek to nullify RA 2616 which directs the expropriation of two lots inside the e state. Land Tenure Administration Case No. 735 is valid. Under Art. upon paymen t . HELD: OCT No. Alcantara vs.65 J.M. 735 is valid. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 4 of the Constitution.7 FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a land called Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. No. The validity of OCT No. L-21064 (February 18. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petitioners ) pursuant to a decree issued on July 6.M. 5b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION J.R. The Tuason s prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 1978) FACTS: Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. Page 434. Footnote No. laches and prior judgm ent. Tuason v. 135 G. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs. Mariano & Aquial & Cordova Case No. 8. L-33140 (October 23. No. prescription. 64 G. 735. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. ISSUE: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional. The Constitution clearly states that land not landed estates can be expropriated.of just compensation. 37. 40c . as long as there is a need to address a growing social problem such as inequality. allowing the legislature to expropriate more types of land. HELD: No. 26. 24a. The question is one of constitutional construction. the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lot s and conveyed at cost to individuals Petitioner contends that said law is unconstituti onal because the provision in the Constitution refers to lands not landed estates. It has a broader scope. The law does not distinguish between different types regardless of how big or small it may be. 9c. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution would be modified. 15 of the Constitution calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution N o. L-34150 (October 16.66 Tolentino v. . 1. This proposal was to be submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite coinciding with the Nov ember 1971 elections relying on Sec. Commission on Elections Case No. An elect ion only means one. Petitioner. 45459 (March 13. Art. 1. HELD: There was a violation.R. 1 of Art.R. 1937) FACTS: Respondent. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 4 G. Also. The amendments being proposed by the convention in must be seen in relation to the whole. 1 of Art. who is the Director of Post. 154 G. Because such amendments regardless of how many are to be submitted to the people for their ratification in an election. 5 of the Constitution reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. 15 of the Constitution: The Congress in a joint session assembled. ISSUE: W/N there is a limitation or condition in Sec. No. 7a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aglipay v. by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate a nd the House of Representatives voting separately may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be vali d as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an el ection at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. announced that he would order the issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the celebration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress in accordance with Act No. no fixed frame of reference is given to the voter. Ruiz Case No. No. 4052. 1971) FACTS: The 1971 Constitutional Convention seeks to amend Sec. 36a. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.who is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church. ISSUE: W/N the sale of such stamps is in violation of the constitutional mandate of religious freedom. Act. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. 13. HELD: Act No. 37 . Art. In this case. N o. 4052 grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs " as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. 6 of the Constitution. the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling. What it gives the Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government. seeks prohibition of such because it violates Sec. Footnote No. 1922) Chapter XI. Page 437. v.O.A. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of government. Resolutions an d memorandum from the COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice states that only provinces voting favorably in the plebiscite shall constitute the region. 6766 (Organic Act creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region) with the votes of the people in the provinces of Benguet.U.R.R. 53 follows Act No. HELD: The act is unconstitutional. ISSUE: W/N Act No. Page 435. ISSUE: . which are sacred under the Constitution. No.S. LATIN MAXIM: None STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ordillo v. No. Ang Tang Ho Case No 295 G. 2868 is unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative power. Out of the provinces.24 FACTS: A plebiscite was held pursuant to R. Footnote No. Abra and the city of Baguio. No.12 FACTS: Respondent was charged for violating E. no nation living under republican form of government can enact a law delegating the power to fix the price at which rice should be sold. Respondent contends that the Legislature has not defined any basis for the order but has left it to the discretion of the Gov ernor General. the law is dealing with pr ivate property and private rights. only Ifugao managed to get a majority vote. Ifugao. 2868 which penalizes monopoly and hoarding of products under extraordinary circumstances. permanent and substantial. This power is exclusive to the legislative. 93054 (December 4. As known. 1990) Chapter XI. Without leaving the discretion to say which extraordinary circumstances to the Governor General are. 53 (which fixes the ceiling price at which rice may be sold) when he sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by law. Kalinga-Apayao. Defendant will not be charged. In fixing the price. The Constitution is something solid. E. 17122 (February 27. COMELEC Case No. 192 G. Mountain Province.O. 25a. cities. The provisions of R. 15 of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that there shall be created autonomous regions consisting of provinces. Sec. X. No. 11g.A. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. it can be derived that the term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. municipalities and geographical areas From this.W/N Ifugao being the only one which voted for the creation of CAR can alone. 6766 also show that the Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the Autonomous Region. HELD: Art. 7a. legally and validly constitute a region. 28 . Nos. 2545 of the Revised Administration Code authorizes the President to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein. The position of city engineer is neither of the above-stated. until he res igns or is removed for cause. Mallare Case No.33 and 54 FACTS: This case questions the legality of the Petitioner s removal from the same office which would be the effect of Respondent s appointment. 12. the rules of construction inform us that the words used in construc tion are to be given the sense they have in common use. but notes that there is a difference between this case and the Lacson case. No. he can not be removed against his will and without cause. all officers or employees i n the unclassified service are protected by the above provision. 1 of the Constitution. 177.68 De los Santos vs. 4 protect s those appointed into the service that do not fall as any of the following: policy determining.A. this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution. primarily confidential or highly technical in nature . Petitioner contends that under the Constitution. Footnote No. L-3045-6 (August 31. The two provisions are repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. Sec. This is confirmed by the enactment of C . citing Sec. and that Respondent s appointment is ineffective in so far a s it may adversely affect those emoluments. Furthermore. Sec. 1950) Chapter XI. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N the position of City Engineer is an unclassified service. As a contemporaneous construction. Respondent admits that the position of City Engineer belongs to the unclassified service . 12 of the Constitution which reads: No officer or empl oyee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided b y law. Art. 4. Romero. rights and privileges. The Court therefore held that Petitioner De los Santos is entitled to remain in office as the City Engineer of Baguio with all the emoluments. 89 G. rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. According to Lacson vs. LATIN MAXIM: 39 . Page 440 and 450. it is clear that Sec. one of who is the city engineer. Reading Art.R. Art. Sec. the Members of the Cabinet. their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. particularly during the Marcos era. HELD: No. 7. in effect. 7. par. Footnotes No. This run s counter to Art. Executive Secretary Case No. b2 . 51 and 71 FACTS: Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which. 83896 (February 22. To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution. 7 cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions of Sec. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision. 13. No. Sec. 9a. Vice-P resident.R. The qualifying phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution of Sec. allows members of the Cabinet. 450 and 454. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. 2. unless otherwise provided by the Constitution. E. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the President. members of the Cabinet . 41. 7. 9-B of the 1987 Constitution. and their deputies and assistants shall not. 9-B. 1991) Chapter XI. Vice-President. their deputies and assistants. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Art. hold any other office or employment duri ng their tenure.O. The former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multip le offices applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latt er is meant for the exception of the President. 64 G. Sec. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition in Art. 7. Pages 443. Art. 284 is therefore declared null and void.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Civil Liberties Union vs. Art. 217 G. 8 of the Constitution manda ting that during their continuance in office. Footnote No. Sec. Page 446. HELD: No. Page 447. and that would be reclusion perpetua . 1987) Chapter XI. Muñoz Case No. The penalty for murder under Art. 20a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Nitafan v.R. even as i t is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution . the Court found that the applicable sentence would be the medium period of penalty prescribed in Art. which does not follow the Masangkay ruling. In the case at bar. Footnote No. 248 of the Revised Penal Code . ISSUE: W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general . 10. contrary to the provision of Sec. No. ISSUE: W/N this Court would adhere to the Masangkay ruling that the abolition of the death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods.46 FACTS: Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries.R. to wit. 190 G. LATIN MAXIMS: 1. 3. t he minimum and the medium. L-38969 (February 9. No. 6c. their salary shall not be decreased . 1989) Chapter XI. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death but this was modified by Art.69 People of the Philippines vs. 78780 (July 23. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution providing that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion temporal. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No.42 FACTS: The Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder. HELD: Yes. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax. David confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer. LATIN MAXIM: 3. Fox. have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec. According to Perfecto vs. b1 . Concepcion. income taxes are part of the diminut ion of judges salaries because the independence of judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries . to make the salarie s of the members of the judiciary taxable. a s the alter ego of the people. 10 Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution. and Bernas). that is.e. However both decisions must be discarded because the framers of the fundamental law (i. Meer.income tax applied to all taxpayers. Endencia vs. L opez. The word shall is imperative in nature relative to t he number of members of the Electoral Tribunal and this is borne in the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel. No. even in a doubtful case. 451. if the judgment of the court. Cuenco. et al Case No. 11a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aratuc v. Respondents alleged. Then. it may be rejected. Lopez. 6b.R. COMELEC Case No. 1979) Chapter XI. No.70 Tañada v. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 286 G. Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of SET. such construction is erroneous and its further applicatio n is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy. the other Senator s must be nominated by the Citizens Party.62 FACTS: . Page No. Footnote No.55 FACTS: The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel. however. 19 G.R. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Hence. the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET. HELD: No. Footnote No. is mandatory. 1957) Chapter XI. Upon nomination of the Citizens Party. and Primicias. Page 452. 9b. L-10016 (February 28. contemporary or practical construction is n ot necessarily binding upon the courts. that six members of the Electoral Tribunal shall be members of the Senate or the House of Representatives . ISSUE: W/N the election of Respondents as members of the Electoral Tribunal was valid or lawful. The application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted except as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department. L-49705-09 (February 8. and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET. The Supreme Court cit ed differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to the Supreme Court s power over COMELEC decisions in 1935. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions made by the Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the Petitione rs. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. 9a. Respondent s decisions may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone. errors of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable in certiorari.Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to address irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batasan g Pambansa. the Supreme Court may review Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari. 1973. HELD: No. 25a . This highlights the 1973 Constitution s intent to strengthen Respondent s independence. Consequently. except for temporary appointments to executive positions when public interest is at stake. 159 G. 15 prohibits the President from making any appointments two months before Presidential elections. 8. Sec. the former validating this action and the latter proscribing it. the appointments were void. 35. Temporary appointments to executive positions are the only exception.79 FACTS: The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. 15. ISSUE: W/N the appointments were valid. There are two conflicting provisions in the 1987 Constitution. 4 requires that all vacancies in the judiciary be filled with in 90 days of such vacancy. Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two informations both dated Feb. Nos. Manguera Case No. b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Magtoto v.R. 1998) FACTS: Judges were appointed to the RTC by the President on May 12 1998. 36b. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shal l be inadmissible. No. Sec. 7. Art. 1973.In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta Case No. 17. 98-5-01-SC (November 9. Page 457. During the trial. 50. 38a. 23. The general rule is that the President must fill in vacancies in the Judiciary within 90 days. O n the one hand. The provision reads: Any person under investigation shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. within 2 months before the election. his extrajudicial confe ssion dated Nov. 20 Art. 59 A. L-37201-02 (March 3.M. On the other hand. 1972 was admitted in evidence over the objection that it was take n while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC without his having bee . and to b e informed of such right . 1975) Chapter XI. The prohibition is for public policy purposes. but this does not apply in the spe cial circumstance of Presidential elections. Art. 4 of the New Constitution which took effect on Jan. 1973. 9a. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. which occurs only once every six years. HELD: No. Footnote No. to prevent midnight appointments which is more compelling than temporary vacancies in the judiciary. Petitioner s confession is admissible. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied retroactively. 46a . The court ruled that a confession obtained from a person under investigation. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective effect. Giving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted hard ship on the part of the prosecutor. 2. W/N Sec. Yes. W/N the Petitioner s extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. who has not been informed of his rig ht to counsel. since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. such confession is inadmissible if the sa me had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution. Art. LATIN MAXIM: 12a. ISSUE: 1. 1972 is admissible as evidence. 20. 2. is admissible in evidence if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution. 15. Conversely. No. HELD: 1.n informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. waivers of th e right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel d uring the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should. 106 G. Upon the capture of his co-accused. he admitted involvement in the crime and pointed his other confederates. W/N the said provisions of 1987 Constitution can be applied retroactively. Accordingly. W/N the Petitioner s extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the presence of a counsel. without the presence of a counsel.72 Filoteo v. 66 G. Footnote No. Yes. ISSUE: 1. House of Representatives Case No. Petitioner claims tha t such proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him retroactively. 79543 (October 16. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30. Page 457. 5a. it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution. Petitioner executed sworn statements (confessing what had happened). 2. Th e 1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Nos. 1991) Chapter XI. On May 30. he was pointed out as t he mastermind. HELD: 1. 1982. Footnote No.82 FACTS: . even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983. 46a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Co v.R. 1996) Chapter XI. by such argumentation.R.80 FACTS: Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court for the crime of robbery of a postal delivery van. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver b y an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made w ith the assistance of a counsel may not be applied to him retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the said const itution. Page 457. 2. No. Electoral Tribunal. No. When Petitioner was captured. Sandiganbayan Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. be admis sible. The provision in question must be applied retroactively since it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under t he 1935 Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born while children born of Filipino mothers and alien father s were not. as a natural born Filipino citizen. 1 par. Jose Ong. elected representative of Northern Samar. Jr. Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao. 4 Sec.. 3 of the Constitution.Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr. is not a natural born Filipino citizen having been born to a Chinese father. 42a . HELD: Yes. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens. 1948 (during which the 1935 Constitution was operative). ISSUE: 1. 9a. Under of Art. 2. W/N this provision should be applied retroactively. children born of Filipin o mothers before January 17. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987 Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. They need not perform any act of election granted that his father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957. when he was only 9 years old. who was born on June 19. 1973 shall be accorded natural born status if they el ect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. by the President of heads of executive departments. and othe r officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution with the requirement of CA approval. other public ministers and consuls. Mison Case No. Sec. HELD: No. Respondent sent a communication to the . 7 must not be construed as to suppose that officers in the second sentence shall be appointed in a like manner as that o f the first group. 1998) FACTS: Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD.84 FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of appointment of Respondent as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that it was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Page 458. 16 Art. 7 provides for officers other than the first group to be appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.73 Sarmiento v. No. Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission revea l that the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position head s of bureaus from CA confirmation with the intent of reconciling the 1935 Constitution which turned the Commission into a venue for horse-trading . ISSUE: W/N Sec. 112371 (October 7. b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Domingo v. 1987) Chapter XI. 7 only provides for the appointment. 32.R. 39a. Footnote No. 16 Art. Commission on Audit Case No. ambassadors. 37 G.R. Nos. 80519-21 (December 17. 16. 24b. officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. 277 G. Art. and that of the 1973 Constitution which placed absolute power of appointment in the President. The wo rd also in the second sentence of Sec. The Court favored the Respondent based on express provisions of the 1987 Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. ISSUE: W/N a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided with a government vehicle. Petitioner asserted that even if she was assigned a government vehicle. HELD: The General Appropriations Act of 1988. she was entitled to transportation allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle.Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement accoun ts showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting transportation allowances when they should not be. 24a . for the days the officia l did not actually use the vehicle. 1990 and 1991 clearly provides that transportation allowance will not be granted to officials who are assigned a government vehicles except as approved by the President. 7a. HELD: The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. On appeal. 82511 (March 3. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar answerable as well and. Public Service Commission Case No.3 FACTS: Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar under preventive suspension because it appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to infor m her employer. On May 9. Responde nt required the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of thirty da ys an application for a certificate of public convenience for the operation of his tru cks since they were said to be devoted to the transportation of cargo with . 1992) Chapter IV. thereby. Petition er merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with Saldivar. 2. Page 124. the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited back wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages. NLRC and Salazar Case No. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar. Footnote No.R. No.Globe-Mackay v. she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar s questionable activitie s. ISSUE: 1. 112 G. L-37661 (November 16. LATIN MAXIM: 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Luzon Brokerage Co v. 1932) FACTS: Petitioner has been operating a fleet of trucks utilized exclusively for the carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers.R. No. 1932. An exce ption to this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations between the employer and the employee. The position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may be characterized as such. 76 G. justify her dismissal. Moreover. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for ot her damages. 3108 by Act No. 13 of the Public Service Law. notwithstanding the changes in the wording of the defini tion of the term public service introduced by Act No. ISSUE: W/N the amendments introduced into Sec. The insertion of the phrase for hire or compensation does not show the intent either. there were no alterations made in the basic provisions of the other sections. This is a stock phrase found in most definitions of a common carr ier and a public utility. Also. 13 of the phrase for public use in the definition of a public service does not mean that the Legislature meant to extend the jurisdicti on of the PSC to private enterprises not devoted to public use. 36b . 13 of Act No. although it is not a common carrier.compensation as provided in Sec. Public service is a se rvice for public use. Respondent has no jurisdicti on over Petitioner. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 3316 conferred jurisdiction on the Respondents over the Petitioner s business. 3316. HELD: The omission from Sec. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 75 ROUND 2 . 13 appointing Petitioner as General Manager of NARRA. 248 of the RPC 2) Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866 Par 2 of Sec 1 of P. his rights. Petitioner s term of office is deemed expired. Quijada Case No. 1960. 1962. 24 wherein the President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the incumbent Genera l Manager up to March 31. He was convicted of 2 offenses. which were separately filed: 1) Murder under Art. Th e word term describes the period that an office may hold office and upon expiration of such term. duties. In this case. On January 15. 1962. Footnote No. the te rm of office is not fixed by law. 115008 (July 24. ISSUE: W/N Resolution No.D.A. 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. and authority must cease. Court of Appeals Case No.R. the Board approved Resolution No. Said law also empowered its Board of Directors to appoin t and fix the term of office of the General Manager subject to approval of the President.76 Aparri v. the If homicide or murder is committed with . but by the Board.R. 1160 expressly gives the Board the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager. the Board approved Resolution No. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. Page 124.4 FACTS: R. G. 1866 states that. HELD: No. Nos. R. L-30057 (January 31. 1984) Chapter IV. 15 G. 1996) FACTS: Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm.A. On March 15. 24 constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause. 1160 created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). Barros. HELD: 1) The trial court s judgment is affirmed.D. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of illegal possession with homicide or murder .use of an unlicensed firearm. 2) 2nd par of Sec 1 of P. ISSUE: 1) W/N the trial court s judgment should be sustained in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People v. 2) W/N the 2nd par of Sec 1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm a nd the resultant killing into a single integrated offense. Tac-an. etc. It does not use the clause as a result on the occasion of to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime. People v. LATIN MAXIM: 6c or . People v. Tiozon. OR to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. the penalty of death shall be imposed. but rather it uses the clause with the use of . Caling. G.D. Dept. 2. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid subsisting by this Court. 4517. whi ch the court found out to be privies of the Private Respondents tasked to delay the implementation of the final decisions of the Court. L-81163 (September 26.77 Baranda v. It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration . 1988) Chapter IV. of Justice Case No. What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title? HELD: of the and annul 1.R. Footnote No. Another group filed a separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the TCT of said lot. Lot No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basbacio v. 1529 which provides: Cancellation of lis pendens Before the final judgment. The Court. Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that. Office of the Secretary. Gustillo Case No. 109445 (November 7. ISSUE: 1. No. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed s stand. after discovering that private respondent s TCT was fraudulently acquired. He forgot the 1st par of Sec. 1994) . 77 of P. Page 125. he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of such denial in writing. a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing that it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered. If the instrument cannot be registered. 2. 30 G.5 FACTS: Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land.R. ordered a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. No. stating the ground therefore. and advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta. Thus. provides for compensation of persons unjustly accused. whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and imprisoned. unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-la w. For one to be unjustly accused one must be wrongly accused from the very beginning. he is not. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation. and imprisoned. 25a . due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama wer e charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wif e and son. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. on appeal to the CA . he does not fall under RA 7309. convicted. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309. HELD: No. Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-i nlaw was not proven. However. 11a.FACTS: RA 7309. In the case at bar. Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. among other things. No. NPC Board approved. Jurisprudence is clear that upon determination of the val idity of the information. Tayabas. The lowest bidder. Gen. Sandiganbayan Case No. were downgraded thereby ineligible as bidders. Yulo Case No. petitioners were suspended from office. extending undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality. Sandiganbayan. Page 127. evident bad faith and gross inexcusab le negligence. 7a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tanada v. the committee declared a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. The project was eventually cancelled.R. Under the act. Later in his service.78 Segovia v. regardless of stage of execution and mode of participation. Socrates v. Joint Venture was disqualified after th e PCAB verified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder. He reached his 65th birthday on October 35. ISSUE: W/N it is mandatory or discretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it. 124067 (March 27. 1998) FACTS: Petitioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee for NPC s Mindanao project. assigned to Alabat. Mariano. LATIN MAXIM: 1. HELD: Yes. 5a. 1 . v. Since all other bids exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project. Petitioners wer e charged under RA 3019 for in one way or the other. shall be suspended from office. Luciano. it is mandatory. 1935) Chapter IV. a court must issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan. Urban Consoli dated Constructors. with the consent by the Philippine Commission.11 FACTS: Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Tayabas. G. For this. 43575 (May 31. one accused of any offense involving fraud upon government public funds or property whether the crime is simple or complex. et al. but for reasons not on record. 288 No. he was transferred to Perez. Footnote No. no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of the jurisdiction grounded on original appointmen t. W/N his transfer is considered a new transfer and requires confirmation by the Philippine Commission. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. subsequent to the approval of Act No. HELD: No. acting upon the directive of the S ecretary of Respondent Justice. ISSUE: 1. 7a . 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effe ct on January 1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office. The judge of First instance. 2. No. 1933. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold office are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect. not thereafter.934. 3899. Therefore. his transfer is not a new appointment. Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in good behavior or does not become incapacitated. directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to A ct No. Hence. 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Radio Communications of the Philippines v. where the law is clear. 1987) FACTS: . LATIN MAXIM: 6c. claiming that public convenience did not need another ice plant. the Commission nor the Court may not disregard. Belen Cabrera Case No. Case No.R. owner of another ice plant already in the same area. Aspillera was delegated by the Commissioner to receive testimon y and conduct hearing of the contest. though the law makes it inconvenient or cumbersome for the Commission to handle contested cases. 1951) FACTS: Respondent filed an application with the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience. the reception of evidence may only be delegated to one of the Commissioners. L-68729 (May 29. opposed Respondent s application. 3 of the same act provides that in (1) all contested cases and (2) cases involving fixing of rates. or interpret the law any other way. and not just specific provisions. No. 146 G. Aspillera to hear the case is lawful. ISSUE: W/N delegation to Atty. circumvent. you have to look at the entire Act. the delegation is unlawful. No. 7a. After which. in applyin g the law. Atty. Thus. Com. Plu s. Petitioner.79 Eliseo Silva v. to be able to operate an ice plant in the Cit y of Lipa. 129 G. 8a. Although Sec. National Telecom. no one except the Commissioner may hear contested cases. L-3629 (March 19. Sec. 32 of Public Service Act allows the Commission to delegate to any of their attorneys the right to receive eviden ce or take testimony.R. Petitioner claimed that under the law. HELD: No. thereafter the Commission en banc rendered a decision that Respondent was allowed to operate the ice plant. In 1980. after conducting a hearing upon a complaint by Kayumanggi. However. 30. 1 abolished the Public Service Commission and EO 546 created the Respondent Commission. Petitioner was created under RA 2036. Mindoro. radio companies did not need a certificate of public convenience to operate. they need such certificates to validly operate. ordered Petitioner to stop operating. because it didn t have a certificate of public convenience. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have.Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1957 by RA 2036 to operate a radio communications system.D. Under it. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. and Samar. Petitioner then established services in Sorsogon. governed by the Public Service Commission. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy before it can validly operate. recognized by the Public Service Commission (PSC). 46a. P. which is necessary under EO 546 for an y public service to operate. Respondent. 49 . Respondent must issue a certificate of public convenience for the operation of radio communicati ons systems. which replaced the PSC. HELD: Yes. t he Respondent. authorized Kayumanggi to set up radio systems in Mindoro and Samar too. 6c. Under EO 546. BP 130 amended t he same section. 84 G.D. respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to act on the case.R.16 FACTS: Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual. acknowledged natural. 7a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pascual v. the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Thus the law is clear. No. However. 1367 amended Sec. Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruction of p rivate property. Footnote No. Thereafter. but without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money claims aris ing from employer-employee relations. But again P.D. 6c. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case belongs to Labo r Arbiter and not for courts to decide. 217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. who died intestate without any issue. L-61236 (January 31. Page 127. Hon. the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. 198 G. 1984) FACTS: Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termination of their union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. Eisma Case No. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction. 1992) Chapter IV. In the process. 217. Pascual-Bautista Case No. P. 1691 amended Sec. they blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the premises. LATIN MAXIM: 1. adopted or spurio . No.80 National Federation of Labor v.R. In the Labor Code. 84240 (March 25. legitimate. vesting courts of first instance with origi nal jurisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. Sec. Additionally. ISSUE: W/N courts may be labor arbiters that can pass on a suit for damages filed by an employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC? HELD: Yes. this Court ruled that Art.us children. ISSUE: W/N Art. 7b. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual. IAC. They may have a natural tie of blood. can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased. which states that An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate chil dren and relatives of his father or mother. 36b . HELD: In Diaz v. nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child . 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate childr en. but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 992. 7a. full blood brother of their fat her. 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestat e between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father o r mother of said legitimate child. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 1996) Chapter IV. 7b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. Page 127. Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect whe n the offense was committed. No. ISSUE: W/N Sec. and to pay the costs. 201 G. the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Amigo Case No. the Court held that A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly decla res the abolition of the death penalty. the death penalty had been abolished and hence.16 FACTS: The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. 19 (1). 1976) FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years.R. . and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. HELD: In People vs. Santayana Case No. Muñoz. 115 No. 116719 (January 18. Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition a gainst the death penalty. L-22291 (November 15. 19 (1). Art.People v. the doctrine then prevailing was enunciated in the case of People vs. HELD: Yes. Macarandang wherein it was held that the appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace a nd order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the categor y of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 . which apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms.ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special agent of the CIS. LATIN MAXIM: 46a . exempts him from securi ng a license or permit corresponding thereto. At the time of appellant s apprehension. 1969) Chapter 4. 1960. on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. 1996. Case No. 127325 (March 19. HELD: NO. 1965. the month of February in both had 29 days. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1997) Chapter IV. Private Respondents filed with Respondent Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative S ec. Footnote No. 1965. et al.650 days. 1960 and 1964 being leap years. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. the sum of P7.. The com plaint was dismissed as having prescribed. Page 129. Miguel D. (NAMARCO) v. Art. it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. expired on December 19. No. 1955 expired was considered to be December 21. ISSUE: W/N the date on which ten years from December 21.18 FACTS: On 14 November 1955. so that ten (1 0) years of 365 days each. defendants were ordered by the Court of First Instance of Manila to pay PRATRA. from December 21. 13 of our Civil Code. Plaintiff filed a compla int against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the init ial case. 90 G.. "When the laws speak of years . Tecson Case No.R. or an aggregate of 3. Page 127. 7b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santiago v.26 FACTS: On December 6. 2. Commission on Elections.R. Petitioners filed a special civil action for p rohibition based on the argument that the constitutional provision on people s initiative can . No.200 plus 7% interest until the a mount was fully paid until May 25. On 21 December 1965. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint. 1955. 184 G.82 National Marketing Corp. L-29131 (August 27. This conspicuous silence as to the latter si mply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and loc al laws. the primacy of interest. it could have provided for a subti tle therefore. ISSUE: W/N RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of th e initiative on amendments to the Constitution. which a re specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. on statutes. Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution. considering that in the order of things.A.only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been passed. 43 . If Congress intended R. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III). no subtitl e is provided for initiative on the Constitution. HELD: NO. unlike in the other modes of initiative. or hierarchy of values. the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constit ution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. and on local legislation. No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Cons titution. it failed to provide any subtitl e on initiative on the Constitution. This deliberate omiss ion indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to som e future law. However. L 54718 (December 4. 1980. COMELEC Case No.R.35 FACTS: . The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have gu ided Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates. his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day. Page 133. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of th e proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that Mendoza s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects. HELD: No. Petitioner s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw aft er January 4. Also. 9a. 170 No. 39c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mario R. which should not be used to frustrate the people s will in favor of Petitioner as the su bstitute candidate. even going by the literal reading of the provision by Respon dent Commission. 1986) FACTS: On January 25. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoz a who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. 1991) Chapter IV. The fact that Mendoza s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality. 177 G. Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Responden t Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner s candidacy was not duly approved by Respondent. 95398 (August 16. Melchor v. Commission on Audit Case No.83 Villanueva v. No. Footnote No. and that assuming it was effective. For this reason the petitioner was made personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. who had substantially complied with the mandate of LOI 96 8. 2. Also. W/N the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid to th e contractor. it was highly inequitable for the C ourt to compel the Petitioner. 9a. Petitioner. entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for the construction of one of the school buildings. Consequently. 1983. ISSUE: 1. to shoulder the construction cost of the building. as school administrator of Alangalang Agro-Industr ial School of Leyte. During construction. which was approved by the Minister of Education. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. but eventually gave up the project to save itself from losses. The school accountant issued a certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but failed t o sign as a witness to the contract. which was being utilized by t he school when he was not reaping benefits from it. the matter was referred to Respondent Commission who disallowed the payment in postaudit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it. W/N the contract was null and void. the contractor sought additional charges due to labor cost increas e.On July 15. The chief accountant s issuance of a certificate of fund availability served as substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of t he contract. The contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore th e approval of the Minister of Education. 12a . HELD: No. 11 months and 24 days elapsed. or a p eriod of 3 years. Thus.41 FACTS: . 86 G. and Exequiel Magsaysay Case No. the Court issued two more writs on Ma y 6. 1970) Chapter IV. He also filed a motion for suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution. Fo r this reason. 11. Magsaysay filed a motion for execution of the writ dated Dec. the date when Private Respondent s motion for execution was filed. From Dec. Hence Private Respondent s motion for execution was not time-barred. 1963. Page 134. 19 63 and another on Feb. The Court granted the motion for suspension but the civil case was dismissed when it reached Respondent Court. 11a. 11. the Petitioner filed a ca se before the Court of First Instance of Zambales. 1958 and April 14. Court of Appeals. the time during which the writs of execution could not be served.R. to Dec. a period of 6 years. 6. only 3 years. 1964. on Oct. City of Manila Case No. 1959. No. HELD: No. Page 134. 26. CAR denied the motion holding that its decision da ted Oct. Footnote No. From th is period. 1956 could no longer be executed on mere motion for the reason that a period of five years has already elapsed from the said date. Consequently. ISSUE: W/N the motion for execution which was filed beyond the reglementary period was time-barred. No. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. to vacate the premises and remove his house. 26. Petitioner refused to comply.Mateo Casela v. L-9337 (December 24.38 FACTS: Petitioner was ordered. L 26754 (October 16.R. asking Private Respondent to pay him th e value of his house in addition to damages. 11e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Jesus v. Instead of obeying the writs. 9c. 1956 when the decision in question became final and executory. 50 G. 9 months and 25 days must be subtracted. 1956. 1914) Chapter IV. 1 month and 29 days can be charged against the reglementary period. Footnote No. 11d. 17. the original owner incorrectly declared the size of the land. Petitioner paid the taxes. the original owner was paying lesser taxes than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1907 1910. Petitioner bought from an original owner a piece of land in Manila which was under the Torrens system. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should still pay the taxes which were not assessed before. 43. from 1901 1907. Apparently. and interest of P2. Petitioner was awarded P1. LATIN MAXIM: 6. he protested and filed an action to recover the same amount. Taxes may not be due and payable until they are assessed. Upon finding out that he was not paying the correct amount of taxes. 38b.49 for the unpaid balance of the years 1901 -1910. HELD: Petitioner should only pay the taxes when he was the owner of the property. 096. Soon after.In 1907. So. 9a.82. 649. 50 . fees. Petitioner contends that the supposed taxes from before 1910 were not actually taxes because they had not yet been assessed. On September 27. the company was able prove their financial situation by giving financial statements. In absence of any grave abuse of discretion. Moreover.R. 42 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Morales v. W/N the petitioners were in a financial position to pay the additional emerge ncy allowance. Paredes Case No. L-34428 (December 29.85 Federation of Free Workers v. No. 9a. No. amounting to loss of jurisdiction by approving both applications. 1977. 6 stated that Employers may apply for exemption with the Secretary of Labor within 30 days from the effectivity of these rules. 45 G. only the Department of Labor and Wage Commission can decide if the petitioner was in a financial position to pay. L-48848 (May 11. 1930) FACTS: . Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. Se c. Respondent approved both applications granting exemptions for the company. 83 G. The increase was set at May 1. The law takes into consideration that there is a possibility t hat some employers are not financially capable to pay such wages and such incapability may happen anytime within the year. 1988) FACTS: In April 1977. PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the private sector to pay their employees an extra P60/month as emergency allowance.R. the company fil ed with the Wage Commission its application for exemption from paying the increase. 2. HELD: No. W/N the first application was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period. the application was not a strict rule. Inciong Case No. ISSUE: 1. as well as the rules issued on the same day. their recommendations will be respected by the courts. 1977. The purpose of the PD is to protect wages and income. LATIN MAXIM: 8. No. The Department is in a better pos ition to assess the matter. 513 if the Code of Civ il Procedure. HELD: Supreme Court cannot open a new trial. therefore. Respondent Judge granted the registration of the land to the two claimants. 513 if there are other adequate reme dies available. Petitioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsideration case with t he Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two other people have already registered such land as their own. The Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to reopen judgments under Sec. Petitioner brought the present a ction to the Supreme Court praying that the decision of Respondent Judge be set aside and a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. ISSUE: W/N a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. While the Motion was still pending. that action should be finished first. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure. LATIN MAXIM: 9c . 12. Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. No. 1956) FACTS: Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez children without the benefit of marriage. COMELEC Case No. 8a. 104712 (May 6. Republic of the Philippines Case No.R. 1992) FACTS: . ISSUE: W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother. HELD: The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. Contending that this is unnecessary would den y the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. No. 39b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Guia v. The trend when it come s to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his natural fathe r or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against Art. they should be allowed adoption. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and fo llowing the words of the law. The law does not prohibit t he adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural child is equitable.86 Prasnik v. The Solicitor General opposed t his stating that Art. 36a. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child. 30 G. 125 G. 26.R. 335. 9. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are much le ss than those of a legitimated child. L-8639 (March 23. 37. The explanatory note in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the divis ion into two legislative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the 1992 elections. Par (d) Sec. 36b. HELD: No. b2 . The court real ized that the language of the law in this case seems abstruse and the key to determine wha t legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the stat ute. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have been no reason for the RA to single out the single district provinces. 11a. members of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. 3 of RA 7166.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. 37. ISSUE: W/N par (d) Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 2. The law specifically stated that provin ces with only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large.Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 9c. Held: The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. 1989) Chapter IV. the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private Respondent. 78687 (January 31. constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private individua . Court of Appeals Case No. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the proper ty under Sec.R. 27. No. Footnote No. 68 G. the elected Mayor of Barobo. For foreclosure sales. With regard to prescription. The distinction made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. Castillo Case No. l969) Chapter IV.500. was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent. the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be diffe rent. Petitioners contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. 26. 276 G. Page 136. Footnote No. Respondent states that the sale of the pro perty disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-à-vis the said property. For failure to pay th eir loan. No. The act.119 of the Public Land Act. 9b. Surigao del Sur. the prescription period starts on the day after the expir ation of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed. Angeles.47 FACTS: On December 4. 42a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sarcos v. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said Act. Page 135. L-29755 (January 31. W/N the prescription period had already prescribed. vs. 48 FACTS: Petitioner. LATIN MAXIM: 9b. the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2. 1973. ISSUE: 1. Respo ndent also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescribed based on Monge et al.R.Salenillas v. the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. 2. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967.ls in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and benefit. And on the basis of such administrative complaint. to the damage and prejudice of the public and of the government. 6c. 6d. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations by vesting the power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the power of suspension. 5185. HELD: The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the Provincial Board. 5. LATIN MAXIM: 1. The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor. 7a. otherwise known as the Decentralization Act of l967 . of RA No. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension by Respondent pursuant to Sec. 36b. 49 . 9a. R. LATIN MAXIM: 1. But other line leaders were allowed to resume their work despite their absence on Ma y 5 and 6. 1991) Chapter IV. 61 FACTS: . 5a. 122165 (February 17. On May 10. The Labor Arbiter was wrong in awarding backwages for a period of not exceeding three years. Page 142. 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jose Comendador v. a new doctrine allowed the awarding of full backwages and also prevented the company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees elsewhere during the pendency of their case. l993. No. On May 5 and 6. l993. and then required to submit written explan ations as to their absence. l993. 6a. 6c. ISSUE: 1. Despite their explanation. 69 G. Renato S. 53 FACTS: Respondents were both employees of Petitioner and holding position as line leaders. Footnote No. Page 138.R. On May 6. 7a. 7 G. tasked to supervise 36 sewers each. l997) Chapter IV. they were not allowed to resume their work and were advised to await the decision of the management whether or not the real reason for their absence was intended to sabotage the operations of Petitioner. Inc. De Villa Case No. Private Respondents were not allowed to enter the premises of the Petitioner.88 Ala Mode Garments. W/N the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their work constitutes dismissal from the service? 2. However. Footnote No. NLRC Case No. the backwages that can be awarded to illegally dismissed employees was not to exceed a period of three years. v. No. all the line leaders did not report for work. l993. 93177 (August 2. Private Respondents tendered their explanation letters. W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the award of backwages for only a period not exceeding three 3 years? HELD: Under the old doctrine. ISSUE: 1. But when the same was lifted. petitioners invoked their right to perem ptory challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree. a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial was formed.The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their participation in the failed coup d etat on December l to 9. The reason being. W/N there was a legal basis for the Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and order for the release of petitioners. W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM No. 2. 10 . the right was suspended due to the creati on of military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may b e referred to them. l989. HELD: The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial Law was declared. 3. W/N there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial investigation. In connection with their prosecution. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the right to peremptory challenge was revived. the right to peremptory challenge was effectively revived. so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals were abolishe d. 9a. 14 to deny the right of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge. During their trial. Later the two were married. The Manila Customs Collector assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. Page 143. Cervantes Case No. No. 172 G. L-9274 (February 1. 9a.Matabuena v. Inc. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1971) Chapter IV. v. No. 9c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lopez & Sons. The duties . Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other. After the death of Felix Matabuena. Footnote No. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written.76 FACTS: Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany.R.69 FACTS: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage. 1957) Chapter IV.133 of the Civil Code Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. however. Page 144. HELD: Yes. L-28771 (March 31. sought the nullifica tion of the donation citing Art. his sister. The court. there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to commo n-law relationships. 151 G. Petitioner. Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Footnote No. The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating. During this period.R. It merely rect the wordings of the statute to carry out the consp Under the rule of statutory construction. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Administrative Code. under Sec. Provision says that the Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of Commissioner of Customs. HELD: Yes. 11 of same Act. 16c. 7 of RA 1125 creating said Tax Court. the Collectors of Customs a re mere Subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom he has supervision and control. However.were paid and the shipment released. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Collector of Customs. the court did ified an apparent clerical error in icuous intention of the Legislature. it is no the intent of the legislature that is important. the Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the C ollector of Customs when brought by persons affected thereby. Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but they dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec. the Supreme Court cited that under the Customs Law as found under Sec. . 7 and 11 of same RA. To support this. there is indeed a disparity between Sec. Thereafter. In this ruling. t the letter. 36a not engage in judicial legislation. the Manila Customs Collector reassessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation an d imposed additional duties. but the spirit of the law and LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 11 and the word Collector should read Commissioner. The Supreme Court concurred with the positions of the Solicitor General that a cleri cal error was committed in Sec. 16a. R. 36f. 36b. this evident typographical error. No. 9d. sp in the ordinary courts of law.78 FACTS: Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the funds of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. . In Spanish. it may if there is no other plain. of Internal Revenue v. 36d. 222 more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. 11a. L-7806 (July 12. HELD: There appears to be a typographical error in the wording of Sec. there is no plain. 190 which reads in part: When the complaint in an action in a court of First Instance alleges that any inferior tribunal. which. the said section in the Californ ia Code reads course of law instead of courts of law . 1912) Chapter 4. 222 of Act No. 11d. 12a.90 Lamb v. However. Petitioner thus filed an action for mandamus clearance. Page 144. ESSO Case No. such as will effectuat e the legislative intent and to avoid injustice or an absurd conclusion. 143 G. Spanish translation of said Sec. The phrase courts of law should read as course of law . On its face. would render the law nonsensical. the other reme dy is not limited to the ordinary courts of law . if uncorrected. 27 to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot is no showing that. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 36a. prosper since there eedy and adequate remedy ISSUE: W/N the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction to cases where there is n o other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law. Copied verbatim from the Code of Civil Procedure of California. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law. It is therefore the duty of the court to give the statute a sensible construction. as provided by law. Phipps Case No. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Com. Footnote No. 2. in respect of which no interest could be charged. Respondent s payment for 1960 was found to be short. W/N Respondent is entitled to a refund. W/N Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367. It is well established that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner a s to subvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be countenanced. 1960. Nothing i s better settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which w ould lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. 1964. Since the amount of P221. 033 was already in the hands of the government as of July. which arises from the moment that payment is made. and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. It was accordingly granted a tax credit by Petitioner on August 5. Statutes should receive a sensible construction. 1964. 12b . Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency tax toget her with interest for the period of April 18. such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.G. No. arguing that it was more than what was properly due. Thus. ISSUE: 1. claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount of the difference between the deficiency tax and Respondent s overpayment. L-28502-03 (April 18. 8b. 12a. Having been paid and received by mistake.R. 11e. 033 representing the excess payment of Respondent. Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due. 1961 to April 18. It protested the computation of interest. However. whatever obligation Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the government would have to be reduced by that sum. 994 with interest. HELD: The government already had in its hands the sum of P221. 1989) FACTS: Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. On August 10. 11d. a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. 1964. Moreover. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. 11a. the sum belonged to Respondent and the government had the obligation to return such amount. HELD: Yes. since the Court of Fi rst Instance would have jurisdiction if the only offense were the damage of property . R. Angeles et al vs. a similar case. if given jurisdiction. 106 G. held that jurisdiction was with the Court of First Instance and not the municipal court.636 fine for the damage to property committed. The Justice of Peace. it would be absurd to say that the graver offense of serious and less serious physi cal injuries combined with damage to property through reckless imprudence is in jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. R. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction. would find itself without jurisdiction to impose the P2. Moreover. 1961) FACTS: Defendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical injuries with damage to property in amount of P2. since such fine cannot be less than the amount of the damage. and even applied to its maximum degree. Also. The case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance. 11 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Footnote No. 1992) Chapter IV. LATIN MAXIM: 5. The case was considered beyond the court s jurisdiction because of the fine imposable upon the accused.362 through reckless imprudence in the Justice of the Peace Court of Batangas. which also declared itself without jur isdiction because the penalty for the more serious offense of physical injuries through re ckless imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods.People v. L-15014 (April 29. there is the possibility that the prosecution will fail to prove the physical injuries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to property.97 FACTS: . 116 G. 100285 (August 13. Jose. It should remain within the jurisdiction of the J ustice of Peace. Villanueva Case No. Duque Case No. Page 149. 3326 provides that prescription shall begin to r un from the day of the commission of the violation of the law. from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial procee dings for its investigation and punishment . It must be construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention and avoid absurd results. 11d. and if the same be n ot known at the time. 38 . LATIN MAXIM: 9. 2 of Act No.Accused was charged with illegal recruitment because he was not licensed nor authorized by the proper government agency. According to Accused. Institution of judic ial proceedings for its investigation and punishment may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word until . POEA. Sec. 15. a literal reading suggests that the prescriptive period would never begin to run. 11a. 12. ISSUE: What is the prescription of the criminal offense of the Accused? HELD: Prescription began from the time the activities of the Accused were ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government. 2 but Accused does not benefit from a literal reading. There is absurdity in Sec. The Labor Code provides that the offense shall prescribe in 3 years but does not contain any provision o f how to compute it. defeating its pu rpose and stressed that it is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to a void such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity . They dismissed the petition. Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit t he execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. 12. The Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute. 15 G. 1974) FACTS: Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance. L-38161 (March 29. 11a. HELD: Yes. 3) dir ecting the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to t he proper court. it held that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as principal party respondent and thus it could not grant any relief at all even on the assumption th at Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities . Court of Appeals Case No. The Prosecutor filed a petition to dismiss appeal. 9c. Court of Appeals . 8b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Cesario Ursua v. The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismissal of the app eal. 11g. which should have been taken directly to Respondent Court. 11h. ISSUE: W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of judicial decision. Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50. 9d. R. 9e.92 Bello v. 3 as an analogous provision. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First Insta nce may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. The provision should also be taken within the context and spirit of Rule 50. 36. Sec. The Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and justice to be bound by the same rule. had to attend some personal matters. He was requested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman because the law firm s messenger. 112170 (April 10. The court may consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to injus tice and absurdity. No. 11a. and in favor of the accused. 142 is a penal statute that should be construed st rictly against the state.Case No. Likewise. he wrote his name at the logbook as Oscar Perez. ISSUE: W/N the acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be remedied by C. Oscar Perez.A. 142 HELD: Petitioner was acquitted.A.112 FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. At the Office of the Ombudsman. 1996) Chapter 4. No. 142. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.R. Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. 12a. Page 152. No. 41a . No. 306 G.A. C. He was charged and convicted for violation of C. Petitioner s real identity was eventually discovered by the employees of the Ombudsman. Footnote No. L-1715 (July 17. 1948) Chapter 4.16. citing Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 which reads The court shall further the order of confiscation in favor of the Government as well as the machinery. No. Republic Case No. and secure the benefits intended. 95 G. Court of Appeals Case No. Footnote No. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the e vil to be suppressed. page 156 FACTS: The Solicitor General opposed the claim of the Petitioner for exemption from filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the requirement for exemption. 1997) FACTS: Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in illega l logging operations. 68a. 705. and they should be given such construction as will advance the object. . 68 of P. Issue: W/N the Petitioner should be allowed to avail of the exemption by invoking the aforementioned provision. 36a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pritchard v. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. equipment which are illegally used ISSUE: W/N the petition should be granted in light of Sec.R.R.D.114. He insists that only the Court can do so. 245 G. it is imperative that Petitioner s children should be enrolled during t he entire period of residence. he failed to comply with one of the conditions required to e ntitle him to exemption from filing a declaration of intention. and that the Petitioner having failed to enroll all of his children in school. suppress the mischief.93 Paat v. 111107 (January 10. The above-quoted provision should be read together with Sec. HELD: No. No. The drafters of the law could not have intended to create an absurd or impossible situation. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. 19a .HELD: The provision of law invoked by appellant must be interpreted in the sense that the enrollment required by law must be made at any time during the entire period of the residence of the applicant. it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right an d justice to prevail. in case of doubt as to the interp retation or application of laws. the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in order to draw from the American s bank account to pay the fees. stating Art. 1997) Chapter 4. as amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a foreigner. 1967) Chapter 4. L-28396 (December 29. 91 G. which states that foreign curr ency deposits shall be exempt from attachment. 245 G. the economy has now somewhat recovered from the financial drought. In order to pay for moral damages. No. Footnote No. Central Bank of the Philippines Case No. 113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank. 21. As. Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh. 39 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Demafiles v.18. Comelec Case No. Footnote 126. ISSUES: W/N Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427. Hence. 10 of the Civil Code.Salvacion v. page 156 FACTS: An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed. No. where foreign investments were minimal. such is the law and stood firm on the policy. the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the innocent. 14.R. China Bank responded by invoking Sec. garnishment or any other process of an y court.114. 94723 (August. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of economic cri sis. some time has already passed since t he crisis that enacted RA 6424. page 159 FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to . justice would be undermined.R. HELD: Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the deposit of foreign currency.16. LATIN MAXIM: 2. W/N the board members who from sitting in the board in 3. since there is a possibility of fraud. LATIN MAXIM: 15. stating that the 2 board members in quest ion were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as municipal. 35. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitione r. W/N Respondent Commission . HELD: the board had the authority to reject the returns f were candidates for reelection were disqualified its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers. W/N this case is moot and rom Precinct 7. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of January following their election. the canvass made and proclamatio n should be annulled. can order the board of canvassers to count a return RA 4970 reads the first mayor. The Supreme Court ruled that and shall have qualified is devoid of meaning. 26 . there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular. vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials an d shall have qualified. consi dering that they were reelectionists. However. Galido then asked for reconsideration. despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality. shall be incomp etent to act on the said body. No.reject returns. In light of this. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit. Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclamation. ISSUES: 1. 2. 43. a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. The law states any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election. Respondent Commission reversed its previous decisio n. 80 7 Sec. No.R. 56 implements the said provision. 26.R. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall. HELD: Petitioner is government owned as it never had any private stockholders. decided in favor of the Private Respondent. While the amendments in section 1 article 12b of the 1973 constitution states that The civi l service embraces every branch. the Labor Code state s that the mentioned corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law. P. 1985) FACTS: For being declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned by Petitioner. 119407 (July 7. The 1935 constitution s section 1 article 12 states that A civil service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the government shall be provided by law. Furthermore.R. 118940-41 and G.95 National Housing Corporation v. Respondent Court however. 1997) FACTS: Sec. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads: Sec. Private Respondent was terminated. be punished by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years. L-64313 (January 17. Clearly. despite past decisio ns. including every government owned or controlled corporation. irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken. agency. 111 G. In addition to this. the inclusion of government owned or controlled corporation carries out a message that the coverage is broad and all-embracing. . ISSUE: W/N employees of Petitioner are covered by the Labor Code or by the laws and regulations governing the civil service. No. 86 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6. 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Nos. Juco Case No. 7. 24. He filed a complaint with Respondent Court and Petitioner replied stating that the Respondent Court is without jurisdiction as Petitioner Corporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds for dismissal were for valid reasons.D. subdivision and instrumentality of the government. Mejia Case No. 14. W/N the phrase is killed covers both homicide and murder. T he killing. W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate offense. 2. 7a. 43. 38a. If the crime was frustrated murder. 14 by means of violence or in intimidatio n of persons . would the penalty be life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death? 3. and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. 26. 48 . LATIN MAXIM: 6c. or occupant is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. when the owner. cannot be treated as a separate offen se and only serves to qualify the carnapping. driver. and not frustrated Frustrated homicide (or murder) is not treated as a separate offense as it is deemed to fall under the clause of Sec. HELD: The words is killed make no distinction between homicide and murder.when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or in intimidation of persons or force upon things. refers only to consummated murder. whether it is homicide or murder. ISSUE: 1. The phrase is killed murder. Whether it is one or the other which is committed in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof makes no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. 20a. No. which took effect on Jan. 1949. but protested the Ordinance. 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION . Inferentially. 23 G. imposing an additional one-half percent realty tax. 43. L-37251 (August 31. While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent. 1981) FACTS: The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18. Judge Gomez and Esso Philippines Case No. 7125. 1. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447) . 38b. the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. ISSUE: W/N the tax ordinance is valid. The fact that the 1974 Real Prope rty Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. imposed an annual additional one percent tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manila s contention that the additional one-half percent real ty tax is sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education Fund Law that the total r eal property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum . R. effective beginning the third quarter of 1972. and that the city of Manila should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the 1969 Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax. Respondent Corporation paid the tax. 1969. the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is void as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law. With the three percent maximum limit set by RA 5447. It fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. That w as also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance. that law fixed at two percent the real ty tax that would accrue to the city or municipality. The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be impo sed by municipal corporations.96 City of Manila v. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result. regardless of age. 60 G. 1992) Chapter IV. Civil Service Commission Case No. temporary. 2. however. who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation Petitioner Lydia Chua. which. denied the same. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondent s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law . 20a. Page 164. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. 20b. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular. 1989 with Respondent Administration. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). filed an application on January 30. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case. 12a. No. casual and emergency employees. Coverage. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: Sec. 37 . Footnote No. 88979 (February 7. 11e.Chua v.R. LATIN MAXIM: 2a.146 FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program. HELD: The petition is granted. On May 7. 2. Regino Veridiano II Case No. gave rise to the closu re ordered by the FDA. 1980. Petitioner then revoked the Mayor s Permit issued to Olongapo City Drugstore. a signboard was posted by the Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure.171 FACTS: Respondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City Drugstore. ISSUE: The conflict between the FDA s and the mayor s power to grant and revoke . v.R. No. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Richard Gordon v. FDA approved Respondent s request to exchange the locations of the two drugstores (which were 5m apart and in the same building). 84811 (Aug. Page 170. Teresita Payawal Case No. 20c. 8. 116 G. L-55230 (Nov. No. 280 G. Page 169. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Petitioner contends tha t the case should have been heard by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and not the RTC.R. 29. A test buy operation at San Sebastian Drugstore. W/N the applicable law is the general law (BP 129) or the special law (PD 134 4) HELD: The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the respondent s argument relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that shoul d prevail. Upon knowledge of this. wherein agents were sold 200 tablets of Valium without a doctor s prescription. Before such order was promulgated. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.97 Solid Homes Inc. 1988) Chapter IV. ISSUE: 1. 1989) Chapter IV. Footnote No. Footnote No. the Mayor revoked the Mayor s Permits issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently.164 FACTS: The Court of Appeals sustained that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Respondent against Petitioner for fa ilure to deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. In the case of Olongapo City Drugstore however. the Mayor however did not. the authority rested on the Mayor (local jurisdiction).licenses for the operation of drugstores. 38b . LATIN MAXIM: 20c. RULING: The FDA had the authority to order the closure of San Sebastian Drugstore. Page 171.R. No. done away with by the Local Autonomy Act (Sec. 1966) Chapter IV. 37.202 FACTS: Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Puno Y Concepcion. 155 G. 31.98 Eufronio Llanto v.61 salary appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Assessor to the general f und. wherein the Respondent s motion to dismiss was granted hence the current action. Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. 2747 which says that T he National Bank shall not. Footnote No. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo Case No. The leg al issue was fully discussed in the motion and opposition thereto. 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. 20a. 3a of RA2264). Was the dismissal order issued without hearing on the motion to dismiss? 2. it is not void. 205 G. grant loans to any of the membe rs of the . 35 of Act No. Is it void? RULING: There is no need for a hearing and no. Oral arguments are the n reduced to unnecessary ceremonies. which can be determined by reference to the facts in the averred pleading. however. Page 176.R. then held by the Petitioner. en C. The question raised is purely one of law. 19190 (November 29. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. The motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action. No. a co-partnership. S. Concepcion Case No. 1922) Chapter IV. Defendant s wife was a director of this co-partnership. petitioner contends that the stamp o f approval of the Secretary of Finance is needed in abolishing his position. was abolished. 32. L-21905 (Mar. Footnote No. Further. The position. Such action was. ISSUE: 1. directly or indirectly.178 FACTS: The Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte reverted the 60. Petitioner came to the cou rt on mandamus. 37. 1921. such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try. 2747 provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of th e Act. which were repealed by Act No. 2747. 6b. 2938 approved on January 30. This Section wa s in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938 has served to take away basis for criminal prosecution. Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. ISSUE: W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. HELD: In the interpretation and construction. the primary rule is to ascertain and giv e effect to the intention of the Legislature. 25 of Act No. 38b . 9a. convict and sentence offenders charged with viola tions of the old law. The Court holds that where an act of t he Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense. 2938.Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks. Section 49 in relation to Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. under Section 33 of P. Page 176. 9d. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension to the Auditor General and members of COMELEC.2 be subject. 11g. v. 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act). 1994) Chapter IV.R. HELD: No. 1986. 38b. 285 G. who took over as Chairman. Likewise. Domingo Case No. Withholding the rule that r intention is . created an inventory/audit of all equipment acquired during the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the committee recommended Petitioner s clearance from accountability and after another special audit. No. Footnote No. R. No. levy or execution. levy or other processes. 9b. 96422 (February 28. Jr. NLRC Case No. he submitted his resignation and sought a second clearance for the period from January 1. Respondent approved Petitioner s application for retirement but added that ½ of the money value of benefits due would be withheld subject to the findings of the aud it. the benefits granted shall not among others. Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. property. and other accountabilities in preparation for hi s retirement. 42a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Alpha Investigation and Security Agency.D.99 Tantuico. garnishment. he applied for and obtained clearance. After the EDSA Revolution. 11h. v. Well-settled is etirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the to provide for the retiree s well-being. On December 1985 . to attachment. which covered the period from 1976 to 1985. 11f. 1986 to March 9. Responden t.205 FACTS: The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioner s retirement benefits. Petitioner s benefits is not allowed in this case. Inc. 12 G. the benefits granted shall not be subject to garnishment. from all money. Page 177. 111722 (May 27. 11i. 1997) Chapter V. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can authorize that half of Petitioner s retirement benefits may be withheld. Footnote No. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolate d part or a particular provision alone. as well as the intendment of the law. Security guards working in DMMSU filed before the Regi onal Office of the DOLE a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance with the cur rent minimum wage order. HELD: Yes.FACTS: Petitioner provides security services. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding Petitioner and DMMSU solidarily liable for the salary differential owed to the security guards. 36c. Section 6 of RA 6727 (Wage Rationalization Act) provides that in case of wage increases resulting in a salary differential. and not wages in general as provided by the Labor Code. 25a. Th is interpretation is not acceptable. Petitioner contends that the matter involved in the case at bar hinges on wage differentials and wage increases. It is a cardinal rule in statutory constructio n that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used. a careful review of the whole law. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. One of its clients is Don Mariano Marcos State University (DMMSU). as prescribed i n Section 6 of RA 6727. 38b . must be made. the liability of the principal and contractor shall be joint and several. Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should be borne by DMMSU. 36a. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for nonpaymen t of minimum wage. The same liability attaches under Art icles 106. Petitioner is jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of wage increases. Footnote No. She exercised her right to suffrage under the same name. ISSUE: W/N legitimate and legitimated children are required to use the surname of their father. 3. She has been enrolled from Grade school to College in the same name. 102 G. 1980) FACTS: Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon. 2. 6 G. L-51201 (May 29. Petitioner is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Alfon Duterte to Estrella Alfon LATIN MAXIM: 1. 4. 17. 1973) Chapter V.R. 42a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Espino v.25 FACTS: Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition for declaratory relief filed by 18 Respondents for a judicial declaration of their rights under RA 1862 as amend ed by RA 4902 in the matter of conversion lump sum gratuity to annual retirement .R. Republic Case No. The reasons she gave on why she was petitioning to have her name changed are the following: 1. The word "principally" as used in Article 364 is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is equally ent itled. Page 182. All acquaintances know her as Estrella Alfon. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon from infancy. Cleofe Case No. L-33410 (July 13.100 Alfon v. HELD: No. No. No. 9a. A contrary interpretation which would allow or authorize retired military personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratuity to annual pension would virtually abolish the essential distinction between the two types of retirement benefits and render the option under the law meaningless and nugatory. 1967. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Looking at the legislative intent through the explanatory note the persons referred to are those who had retired and received the gratuity in lump sum afte r June 22. HELD: No.pension. 25a . ISSUE: W/N the provision applies to military personnel who retire even after its June 17. 7a. 1957 but prior to the approval of the act on June 17. 1967. 17 of Act No. 24b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Asiatic Petroleum Co. 1971) Chapter V. Said Act took . Even without undue scrutiny it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country. 24a. which is imported into the Philippines. hence. 1915. a charge of 2 pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage ISSUE: W/N the words products of the Philippines excludes bran and pollard on the ground that they are from wheat grain. 2432 provides that no tax (imposed by this law) shall be collected on such articles which. Footnote No. 1918) Chapter V. 2432 upon all such oi ls which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1st day of January. under threat of penalty. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Sec. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. Footnote No. The law is clear. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. L-28463 (May 31. Commissioner of Customs Case No: 258 G. HELD: No.39 FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in whi ch they found in Sec. 12687 (August 27. Page 187. they fall within the terms of the above section. 7a. Page 184. 6d. before the taking effect of this Act.Republic Flour Mills.R. The Plaintiff contends that the tax collected was illegal. Inc v. it must be obeyed. No.47 FACTS: The Defendant. The tax was pai d under protest. Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) under Sec. v. compelled the Plaintiff to pay the Internal Revenue Tax provided for under Sec. 10 G. No. The Term product of the Philippines should be taken in its usual signification to mean any product produced in the country. bran(ipa) and pollard(darak) produced from wheat imported into the country are products of the Philippines. 1 7 Par 72a of Act No. shall have been disposed o f to consumers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale dealers. R. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which states: There shall be levied collected and paid on products of the Philippines exported from the Philippines. should be given its commercial sense and not a technical interpretation. 2432. prior to the 1st day of January 1915. 1915. upon mineral oils. but not delivered. and not the vendor. was subject to pay such tax in the absence of stipulations to the contrary. The Legislature evidently intended. by said phrase. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 6c. composed of kerosene and gasoline which had been sold. 2432. 43 . The Legislature. to mean that merchandise dispose of had been sold. fully recognized that the phrase disposed of meant nothing more or less than a contract whereby the vendor was bound to furnish an article. 17 of Act No. HELD: No. 2445. LATIN MAXIM: 3. provided for under Sec. 25a. by Act No. because in said Act it provided that the purchaser. The phrase disposed of as used in Sec. ISSUE: W/N a dealer is required to pay the Internal Revenue Tax.effect upon the 1st day of January. Inc v. 19 and the Memorandum Order dated April 20.R. 1964 and Customs Administrative Order No. This is in order to make available at all times adequate space in all ports for the loading and unloading of cargoes. 32. 25a. The request was based on the Memorandum Order No. 38a. the administrative order has no requirement similar to that found in Memorandum Order No. No. 130-63 whereby the owners of the impounded vans should be notified in writing.46 FACTS: . Page 187. The two customs regulations under consideration are in pari materia so far as both operate under the flexible cargo system. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Calder & Co v. it becomes necessary for all empty sea vans to be removed from the pier premises by their owners or shipping agents within ten days after the vans have been completely emptied of all their contents. Baluyut Case No. Footnote No. 173 G. After the merchandise had arrived at the port and the cargo vans had been emptied of their contents. L-27350-51 (May 11. and that the said objects were lawfully detained by Appellee in his warehouse pending the payment of storage charges.R. 22-64. As plainly worded in the administrative order. 44 G. they were left along Muelle de San Francisco Stalag. The trial court held that the transfer of Appellants empty cargo vans to the warehouse of Appellee was done by authority of Customs Memorandum of April 20.102 Wil Wilhemsen. The United States Case No. 1978) FACTS: Empty cargo vans were used by Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and sale storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign ports o f Manila among others. The Defendant applied to the Surveyor of Port for the transfer of these empty sea vans. In addition. 1964. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 35. 1907) Chapter V. ISSUE: W/N the decision of the trial court is legally valid. HELD: Yes. 2839 (August 15. Nos. and all other machinery for the generation of power. 25a. HELD: A turbine engine and generator. hot well and pumps.The following were imported into the Philippines "One steam turbine. 9c. exc iters. although intended for use as a powergenerating device. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. does not constitute a complete power generation machine. The trial court reversed the classification m ade by customs authorities and classified it under Par 250 as "Dynamos. generators. condensing machinery." ISSUE: W/N the machinery in question should be classified under Par 257b or Par 250. 43 . complete with parts and accessories" the steam turbine was classified under Par 257b as other machinery and detached parts not otherwise provided for". Component parts must still be added for that purpose to be achieved it should be classified as "other machinery" under Par 257b. L-4268 (January 18. Respondent Quirino and Respondent Corporation. a daily newspaper. of the Daily Record. 25a. and Printer s. asking damages aggregating P90. Respondent Judge declared that the suit. commenced a joint suit against the sheriff. 11531. in which the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the attachment of the properties above mentioned and (2) P45. is not absolute but left to the sound discretion of the court to allow. L-56028 (July 30. the Plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50. 12263. Page 188.51 FACTS: Respondent filed a libel suit. docketed as Civil Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.52 FACTS: A Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).103 Manila Herald Publishing Co v. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co. Lising et. Inc. Page 188. 12263.. Inc. This suit was docketed as Civil Case No. managing editor an d reporter..000 bond. Borres. HELD: Yes. 163 G. He was suspended from office but he died during his . al Case No. Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor. 36a. 12263 at the stage when it was thrown out of court. No. R. editor. respectively. Ramos Case No.000 damages. Manila Herald Publishing Co.. against Aproniano G. Inc. unlike the right to bring a new action.1981) Chapter V. 1951) Chapter V. With the filing of this suit. The Sheriff of the City o f Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in the premises of the Daily Record. 30. 11531. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge has authority to dismiss Case No. should do was intervene in Case No. in case No. 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Malanyaon v. and Printers..000. the right to intervene. Footnote No. was "unnecessary. Inc. 160 GR No. Footnote No. superfluous and ill egal" and so dismissed the same. 25a . Dismissal of the case is not equal to acquittal of the accused. In People vs. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides. and while the case was pending. " Acquittal is always based on the merits but dismissal d oes not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. but if he is acquitted. The case was dismissed due to his death. Salico (84 Phil.incumbency. 722). he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefit s w/c he failed to receive during suspension . 7a. HELD: No. It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted" it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court found that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the case due to death of the accused constitutes acquittal. 53 FACTS: Petitioner was accused. Footnote No.104 Rura v. Hence. No. which disqualifies persons who have previously been convicted by final judgment from applying for probation.60 FACTS: Petitioner. 9 of the Probation Law. 1947) Chapter 5. Although he was guilty of five counts of estafa. The fiscal invoked Sec. No.R. 139 G. In 1945. On ly a single decision was rendered. 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Krivenko v. The counts were consolidated and tried jointly. The trial court denied his application on the belief tha t since the crimes were committed on different dates. L-360 (November 15. he was guilty on each of those dat es. Page 190. Lopena Case No. Register of Deeds Case No. Petitioner however contends that since there is only one decision. he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the previously be construed? . He is eligible for probation under such circumstances. he has not ye t been previously convicted. an alien. tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates. Page 189. Footnote No. The Petitioner then applied for probation but was denied by the fiscal on the ground that he had been previously convicted by fina l judgment of an offense. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 7a. when Petitioner applied for Probation he had not yet had a final judgment of conviction on his record. ISSUE: How should the word HELD: The word previously refers to the date of the conviction and not to the dates of the crimes involved. 139 G. 1985) Chapter 5. t hey were tried jointly and only one decision was handed down. R. bought a residential lot but its registration was interrup ted by the war. L-69810-14 (June 19. 9a. ISSUE: W/N residential land falls under the phrase agricultural lands XIII of the 1935 Constitution. 30a. No. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Mani la which ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds. It may safely be presumed that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. Soon after. LATIN MAXIM: 1. If the term "private agricultur al lands" is to be construed as not including lands not strictly agricultural. which includes residential lands. the result would not be in line with the conservative spirit of the Constitution. It is clear that the three branches of the Government have always maintained tha t residential lots are included in agricultural lands . 2a. 141 which permits the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to corporations controlled by such citizens. 25a. only agricultural lands may be alienated. 5a.A. b as stated in Article . In addition. aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands. the interpretation given by the Secretary of Justice (1939) also supports the claim that residential land is part of public agricultural lands . the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and pa ssed C. Such revision is equivalent to a decla ration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands.register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. for under the Consti tution. HELD: Under the Constitution. etc. 1993) Chapter V. COMELEC Case No. Footnote No. 7227. ISSUE: W/N the word immigrant only refers to a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. Case No. No. o ther than a nonimmigrant. An amendatory law was then passed which changes the classification of pre-arranged employees from immigrants to non-immigrants. 1955) FACTS: Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre-arranged employment as immigrants under C. 109 G. etc.105 Chang Yung Fa. et al. 192 FACTS: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.R. Page No. 19 G. Gianzon. Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. v. A review of the whole law would disclose no such intention which denotes that the purpose of the law is to give broad power to the Commissioner of Immigration on matters pertaining to the admission of immigrants into the Philippines. HELD: The only definition given by our law to the term "immigrant" is: "any alien departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines.67. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. 10. 613 with the express condition that their stay shall b e limited to two years.R." The law gives no definition to the term "nonimmigrant" fro m which we may imply that the term "immigrant" is merely intended to include any a lien coming to this country for permanent residence as now contended by appellants. 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Garcia v. L-7785 (November 25. No. No. 9a. Serye 1993. they should have been admitted for permanent residence in this country because the word immigrant is defined to be a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. 111511 (October 5. Petitioners contend that having been classified as non-quota immigrants . and De la Cruz.A. Respondent Commission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and refere . the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. 50 . 32 of Art. ISSUE: W/N a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an initiative and referendum. Resolutions are still proper subjects of an ini tiative according to the Constitution and RA 6735. 11a. Also. Although the Local Government Code does not include the word resolution in its definition. includes resolutions as among the subjects of initiat ive. the law providing for a system on initiative and referendum. 9c. the court holds that the definition does not limit the coverage of l ocal initiatives to ordinances alone. The same is being asserted by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiativ e. RA 6735. VI of the Constitution).ndum on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance. It contends through the Office of the Solicitor General that under the Local Government Code of 1991. HELD: The petition to review and set aside the issued COMELEC resolutions is granted because resolutions are appropriate subjects for initiative and referend um (Sec. an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must b e rejected as not in accordance with the legislative intent.73. L-45302 (July 24. decision or ruling may be raised only by motion in the main case. order. The law provides further that th e propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award. W/N the word court refers to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals 2. Footnote No. the word court refers to the trial court. No. order. dela Paz Case No. decision or judgment may be raised only by motion in t he main case. The law unequivocally stated its declared objection that appeal shall not stay the appealed decision. The Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the issuanc e of unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its stockholders. LATIN MAXIM: . 1990) Chapter V. ruling.106 Motoomull v. on motion. 31. The exception is given where the officer or body rendering the same. Accordingly. after hearing. The propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body render ing the award. HELD: Yes. ruling. Petitioner sought issuance of a preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the enforcement of the SE C decision pending resolution of the appeal. and on such terms as it may deem just. 180 G. after hearing should provide otherwise. W/N the Court of Appeals can grant a stay in the execution of the decision. order. award. 195 FACTS: The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sarkara Trading Corporation. decision or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or th e court. ISSUE: 1. More important ly where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptib le of various meanings. 1974. or the cour t on motion. orde r. The Court however held that it had no jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal shall not stay the award. should provide otherwise. The resolution was then amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on a two is to one basis to its stockholders payable on Aug. its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associa te words. Page No.R. 4 Series of 1995 provides: Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao. the Government never shared in the profits they generated . While it appears that the National Government is the owner of the fishpond. Nazario Case No. 37 . Footnote No. ISSUE: 1. the word owner cannot be construed to include the Government because of the ancient principle that the government is immune from taxes. W/N the ordinance is null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain. 36a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. HELD: No. He admits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional. Sec. he c omes within the term manager . LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ordinance at bar be said to be tainted with vagueness. shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3. And obviously.9a. 1988) Chapter V.R.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. 6c. Page No. 218 G. No. Quezon. 197 FACTS: Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to pay municipal taxes worth P362. 12a. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused. L-44143 (August 31. 2. or assuming its constitutionality that it does no t apply to him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager. 1 Ordinance No. logical that Accused alone shoulders the burden of the taxes under the ordinance. It is therefore. As the actual operator of the fishponds. It is unmistakable from the above provision that t he Accused falls within the coverage.81.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated demands. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no jurisdiction because the checks involved were non-negotiable checks. . Private Respondent filed his application for probation on December 28. LATIN MAXIM: 6. HELD: Yes. 1996) FACTS: Private Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. No. Private Respondent was clearly precluded fr om the benefits of probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer s recommendation and granted Private Respondent s application on April 23. It is thus covered by the prohibition that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction and that the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting private respondent s application for probation.23 as a consequence of six crossed Manager s checks which turned out to have forged and/or unauthorized endorsements appearing at the back of each check. 1993. Evangelista Case No. he had alre ady waived his right to make his application for probation. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank to pay the said amount. Equitable Banking Corporation Case No. 74917 (January 20.R. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation only after the Court o f Appeals had affirmed his conviction. However. 26. 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. after PD 1990 had taken effect. Chief Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial of Private respondent s application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial.982. No. Private Respondent filed a petition for probation. Philippine Clearing House Corp. 1992. 106 G. 1988) FACTS: Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank for reimbursement of P45. 12 G. 84332-33 (May 8.107 People v.R. 25b. 25a.ISSUE: W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over checks which are non-negotiable. HELD: Yes. 24b. There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought t o be but as they find it and without regard to consequences. including nonnegoti able checks. Clearly. the term checks refer to checks in general use in commercial and business activities. No doubt non-negotiable checks are within the ambit of PCHC s jurisdiction. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. 26 . its operation extends to clearing checks and other clearing items. As provided in the articles of incorporation of PCHC. Petitioner filed a motion to di smiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was without jurisdiction i n taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer involving mineral land. 905 (February 12. residential or mineral. leaving a last will and testament. 1. Zambales Chromite Mining Co. 1895. The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void on several grounds.108 Robles v.R. most importantly that the hour is not stated..R. Case No. No. Upon violation of the terms of agreement. 261 G. No. . Page 199. the company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. 1903) FACTS: Santiago Velasco died in Namacpacan. we should not distinguish. Lopez Case No. Any land spoken of in this provision obviously includes all kinds of land. 308 G. ISSUE: W/N Sec. ISSUE: W/N the will of Santiago Velasco is void because the hour of its execution is not stated. whether agricultural. 1958) Chapter V. al. 26 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Velasco v. L-12560 (September 30. It is a well known maxim in statut ory construction that where the law does not distinguish. La Union on December 4.90 FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent Company entered into a contract by virtue of which the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over whic h it had control to Petitioner who was to extract. HELD: Yes. Footnote No. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court includes any kind of land. mine and sell ores from said prope rties upon payment of certain royalties. et. including mineral lands. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. Chapter I. Book III.HELD: Yes. (art 695) Any will. month. (art 687) It was stated that if the decision would be in favor of the Defendant (overlooking the absence of the hour) the Court may disregard one formality afte r another until eventually they had to repeal the entire system established by the code. day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud. shall be void. Title II. Afte r the testament has been drafted in accordance with the same. year. 7a . LATIN MAXIM: 6d. (art 687) The law explicitly defines what shall consist in open wills (art 695) and what t he sanctions shall be if such formalities aren t met. stating the place. in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in this chapter have not been observed. Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code explic itly states that said wills without necessary formalities will be void: The testator shall express his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. Petitioner pays the Centr al Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost. Footnote No. Lamadrid . cattle. The stabilizers an d flavors the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of fo od products. Though stabilizers and flavors are preceded by items that might fall under food products. the following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer. transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of stabilizer and flavo rs shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore. 36 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Oliva v. Therefore. No. na mely: food products. 67 G. 29.95 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax ISSUE: W/N the imports of dental cream stabilizers and flavors are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law. L-14787 (January 28. not the parts and categorizations posited by the respondent. the Exchange Tax Law.R.109 Colgate-Palmolive Phil. Under such law. Gimenez Case No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class. and industrial starch. transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601. Because such items will be used for toothpaste. Page 199. For every importation. it is not a food produ ct and therefore not subject to exemption Petitioner s arguments effected the grant of the refund: RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. vitamin concentra te. poultry feed. it was also provided that: Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost. Importation of materials including stabilizers and flavors is among those Petitioner imports. the law must be seen in its entire context. LATIN MAXIM: 26. 1961) Chapter V. HELD: No. Inc v. On May 31 1963. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan. However. HELD: No. No. as a former owner of land with a homestead patent and a torrens title. 4 1963. under RA 720. 141. 38a. the Court had already decided that Sec. they should be unified. 141 is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or a free pat ent. but five (5) years after the title was sold because he was a holder of a free patent and torrens title. 39a. 191 G. claiming that under C. 5 of RA 720. Plaintiff offered to repurchase. 119 of C. Where the general law is the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the Republic Act. Page 200.Case No. ISSUE: W/N the period of redemption is governed by Sec. 119 of C.R. therefore.A. 30a. 1969) Chapter V. not two (2). No. the property was foreclosed and sold to Respondent.96 FACTS: Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as security for the payment of a loan. and should abide by the conditions of the times. is not included in those enumerated in RA 601 and therefore not s ubject to the two (2) year allotment for redemption. No redemption was made withi n that time. b2 . 1951. 141 of Sec. In July 30. Feb. he was entitled to repurchase the land.A.A. L-23196 (October 31. the land could be redeemed two (2) years after the sale. the plaintiff may use its provision of five (5) years. No. b. Footnote No. No. 50. Petitioner. LATIN MAXIM: 1. filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. the employee cannot avail of the privi leges under the Social Security Act. L-72005 (May 29. San Miguel Brewery. During the pendency. They were given sick leave pay pursuant to it s Health.R. having been enacted for the welfare of the employees. Case No. Page 200. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners were entitled to additional sickness benefit allowance under the Social Security Act. 100 G. Welfare and Retirement Plan. Footnote No. 3a. fell ill. cannot be given an interpretation that would defeat such purpose. No. Page 200. Inc. Footnote No. The Social Security Act.110 Escosura v. Respondent Corporation countered that having already received sick leave pay. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31.99 FACTS: Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc. they cannot claim benefits under the Social Security Ac t as these are exclusive to those not receiving any leave privileges at all from the employer.97 FACTS: Petitioners are employees of San Respondent Corporation who at various times during employment. No. Intermediate Appelate Court Case No. would be to enable the employer to defeat the purpose of the law. 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine British Assurance v. the employees claimed for sickness benefit allowances under the Social Security Act contending that their receipt of sick leave pay of less than the full wage does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances provided in the law. 2b. HELD: To uphold the theory that as long as the employee receives any amount as sick leave pay by a private benefit plan. Respondent attached some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersede s . 234 G. Despite receipt of the sick leave pay from Respondent Corporation.R. 1962) Chapter V. LATIN MAXIM: 26. 1987) Chapter 5. ISSUE: W/N the counter bond issued was valid. The only logical conclusion is that an execution of a ny judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted. 5. 26. Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its appli cation to a final and executory judgment.bond. which was granted. the writ of execut ion was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached per sonal properties upon demand. The rule therefore. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the exec ution of a judgment of pending appeal. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attache d properties were released. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian. 36a . It appllies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. However. is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. Footnote No. Where the law makes no distinctions. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31. Three days later. Page 201.100 FACTS: On March 22. Commission on Elections Case No. one does not distinguish. B2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pilar v. ISSUE: W/N the facts charged against him constituted an offense. 7a. Court of Appeals Case No. Footnote No. in a confrontation in the latter s office allegedly vexed. Respondent Commiss ion imposed a fine of P10. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. 115245 (July 11. R. The statute's intent to penalize all pers ons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier " any". Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim. No. 242 G. he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. 1962) Chapter 5. 1992. 9a. As a result. Thus. Page 201 .100 FACTS: A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent.R. The act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. 251 G. 1995) Chapter 5. insulted and humiliated him. not authorized by all the parties in an y private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. 24a. No.000 pesos for failure to file his statement of contributio ns and .111 Ramirez v. respondent and filed a c riminal case. 11a. Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the positio n of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. HELD: The law makes it illegal for any person. 2348 categorically refers to icate of candidacy . 7a. HELD: Yes. 26. Sec. the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign. and should have either won or lost. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candida te must have entered the political contest. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same. having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. 37. 14 of RA 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.expenditures. but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. b2 all candidates who filed their certif . LATIN MAXIM: 6c. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributio ns and expenditures since he was a non-candidate . 13 of Resolution No. 13(2) of BP 697 is clear that even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision.18. Later.112 Sanciangco v. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 7a. he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1984 Batas an elections. v. HELD: The legislative intent of Sec. he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. Page 203 . Roño Case No. R. attorney s fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation. ISSUE: W/N an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. Petitioner failed to pay and prays that t he latter be directed to pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint. 1984. 28. He was not successful in the said elections. Court of Appeals Case No.290. Despite repeated demands. 38 G. who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14. ISSUE: . 273 G.106 FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain. 116356 (June 29. 9c. Inc. 1987 to July 22. No. 1984 elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao alliance. 1985) Chapter 5. should be considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon filing of his certific ate of candidacy. No. R. 68709 (July 19. 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Eastern Shipping Lines. Since he is unquestionably an appointive member. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his Cer tificate of Candidacy for the May 14. 1998) FACTS: Davao Pilots Association elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a sum of money and attorney s fees alleging that DPA had rendered the pilotage services to Petitioner between January 14. 1989 with total unpaid fees of P703. Footnote No. HELD: No. Administrativ e or Executive Acts. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Orders and Regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. 9a. 37 49 . The Court s holding clearly debunks Petitioner s insistence on paying the pilotage fees based on the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA. the court upheld the validity of EO 1088 and it shall not depart from t his ruling. In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines v. Court o f Appeals.W/N EO 1088 is unconstitutional. 5a. No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union. HELD: Yes. 7a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. ISSUE: W/N the deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to sign the order for preventive suspension. 1971) Chapter 5. 46 of C. There is nothing in RA 7975 which may suggest that the Ombudsma n and only the Ombudsman may sign an order preventively suspending officials occupying positions classified as grade 27 or above. Emilio A. Director. placed the Petitioners under preventive suspension for 6 months. Gonzales III.R. Petitioners contest that the Deputy Ombudsman has no power to sign the order of preventive suspension.110 FACTS: Respondents were charged with violating Sec. L-33487 (May 31. .R. Page 204. 1998) FACTS: Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor alleging irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and Provincial Engineer. The Court dismissed the charges on the ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulacan against ot her Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction. The word or is clearly disjunctive in this case signifying dissociation from one thing from the other. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No. G. specifica lly in the act of bringing in and landing. Footnote No. Martin Case No. and Jesus G uerrero. The deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to preventively suspend the Petitioners. Barbers Case No. 214 G.113 Castillo-Co v. 129952 (June 16. The items purchased were reconditioned instead of brand new and included other irregularities. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. No.A. 613 clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts. different. The wo rd OR in C. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.A. They are two separate offenses. 15b . C. The words in the information suggesting conspiracy ar e considered a mere surplusage. 37. Each act possesses its own distinctive.A. and disparate meaning. HELD: No.ISSUE: W/N the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with concealing and harboring. No. 7a. No. 613 cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separat ion of one act from the other. Pryce Properties Corp. women s and youth groups. Case No. Petitioners argue tha t by virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC). 126496 (April 30. Therefore the acts of Chairman Kintanar are void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. Case No. 1896. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez.D. leased a building belonging to Pryce in order to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. 49 G. No. 15a. Executive Order 146 creating the NTC clearly shows that the NTC shall be composed of a head commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners suggesting its collegial nature. 7a. Bell Telecommunications Inc. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two ordinances disallowing the building of the planned casino. The denial was promulgated despite the approval of the CCAD of its feasibility a nd the endorsement of Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Various civic organizations. 158 G.114 GMCR v. 1994) Chapter V. Page 208. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: The NTC is a collegial body and its decisions should be reached by a majority vote. and even the local officials angrily denounced the project. created by P. Footnote No. 130 FACTS: PAGCOR. ISSUE: Whether the NTC is a collegial body or under the direct and sole control of Commissioner Kintanar. No. religious elements.R. the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general welfare of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling. 24a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Magtajas v. ISSUE: . 1997) FACTS: NTC Commissioner Kintanar denied the request of Bell Telecommunications for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation of telecommunications equipment pursuant to its congressional franchise to operate.. 111097 (July 20.R. Inc. must be prevented or suppressed. Phil. Casino gambling is authorized by P.W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro are valid. 37. In Basco v. LATIN MAXIM: 5a.D. Amusements and Gaming Corp.D. this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. 28. HELD: The two local ordinances are not valid. 38. local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance. Under th e LGC. 11e. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullifie d by a mere ordinance. Since the world gambling should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which. 9c. 1869.. On the assumption of a conflict between P. like the other prohibited games of cha nce. 18 69 and the LGC. 50 . the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to g ive effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. The Tax Court held that the term industry should be understood in its ordinary and general definition. No. and not to all ventures and trades falling under the ordi nary and general definition. ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Acetylene Co. and highly defamatory statements against May or Lacson through an amplifier system before a crowd of around a hundred persons. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1962) Chapter V. 9c. 211 FACTS: The information alleges that Santiago has committed the crime of "libel. 224 G. 1971) Chapter V. Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged .Commissioner of Customs v. No. Inc. Philippine Acetylene Company Case No. 135 FACTS: Charles Butler. In granting the exemption. may be considered engaged in an industry as contemplated in Sec.. Page 136.R. 6 of RA 1394 and therefore exempt from the payment of the special import tax with respect to the gas tank in question." The accused delivered false. 28. Tax exemptions are held strictly against the taxpayer. L-17663 (May 30. imported a custom-built LPG tank which is used to contain LPG from the refinery in Batangas and to trans port it to the company s plant in Manila. Footnote No. Page 210. HELD: Philippine Acetylene is not exempt from the special import tax. Footnote No. which is a ny enterprise employing relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor. 11a. 72 G. L-22443 (May 29.R. malicious. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Santiago Case No. it would have been illogical for Congress to specify importations needed by new and necessary industries as the term is defined by law and in the same breath allowed a similar exemption to all other industries in general. 11d. RA 1394 provides a tax exemption for the importation of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with RA 901. manager of Respondent Company. The obvious legislative inten t is to confine the meaning of the term industries to activities that tend to produce or create or manufacture. ISSUE: Whether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation. It has also been held in the United States that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel. 353 . while transmission of words by mea ns of an amplifier system is not thru "electromagnetic waves" but thru the use of "conducting wires" intervening between the transmitter and the receiver. and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation.therein is not libel but oral defamation. of the same Code. HELD: The facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation. namely. 358 of the Revised Penal Code. or libel. The word "radio" should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated. all of which have a common characteristic. Radio as a means of publication is the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening between transmitter and receiver. their permanent nature as a means of publication. in relation to Art. under Art. LATIN MAXIM: 11h. 28. 25a. b2 . under Art. 355. 1966) Chapter V. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications .R. enterprise. Inc. There was no fee or consideration required to be paid. Palomar Case No. Footnote No. 272 G. There being no element of consideration in said contest. 19650 (September 29. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to co rrupt public morals. 138 FACTS: . gift. nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the contest. Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied citing said contest is a gift enterprise deemed as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.116 Caltex (Phil. Page 211. Page 137. No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. or scheme for the distributi on of money or any real or personal property by lot.R.). 28 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION San Miguel Corp. or drawing of any kind means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. chance. Petitioner filed a petition fo r declaratory relief. HELD: No. The term gift enterprise and scheme in the provision of the Postal Law making unmailable any lottery. ISSUE: W/N the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest falls under the term gift enterprise which is banned by the Postal Law. 80774 (May 31. v. (2) chance. 1988) Chapter V. NLRC Case No. Footnote No. The word lottery is defined as a game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration. the spir it of the law is preserved. No. said contest is not a gift enterprise. 45 G. 211 FACTS: Petitioner conceived the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest where participants have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense during a specific period of time. and (3) prize. Hence. v. 1 (unfair labor practices). 2 (terms and conditions of employment). SMC denied utilizing such proposal but Vega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with th e NLRC which arbitrated against the Petitioner. The jurisdiction of the NLRC is outlined in Art. 36b. ISSUE: W/N the money claim of Vega falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC. 5 (prohibited activities). LATIN MAXIM: 28. separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement While par. par. said money claim falls outside the jurisdiction of said agencies. Rustico Vega submitted his proposal entitled Modified Grande Pasteurization Process and claimed entitlement to the cash award. 3 refers to all money claims of workers. HELD: No. overtime compensation. 4 (household services).Petitioner Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded cash to SMC employees who will submit ideas and suggestions beneficial to the corporation. par. The scop e of par. 3 all money claims of workers. 1-5 is that they refer to cases or di sputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. 217 of the Labor Code which include s in par. Par. The unifying element of pars. 3 is clarified by its associated paragraphs wherein money claims falling wi thin the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC are those which have some reason able causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. 36e . it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of mon ey claims has been absorbed into the jurisdiction of the NLRC. par. 3 should not be read in isolation with the context formed by par. including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages. HELD: No. fire. Union Ins. enemies. barr atry of the master and mariners.R.117 Gotiaco v. 114 G. jettisons. The insurer undertakes to insure aga inst perils of the sea and similar perils. from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship. and of all other perils. No. LATIN MAXIM: 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Soc. Footnote No. It was appropriately held that the ship was not seaworthy. the owners of the damaged rice must look to the shipowner for redress and not to the insurer. losses. or from the negligent failure of th e ship s owner to provide the vessel with proper equipment to convey the cargo under the ordinary condition is not a peril of the sea. Page 213. and misfortunes The tria l court ruled that the ship was unseaworthy and Defendant is not liable. The rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage because of a defect in one of its drain pipes. men of war. and misfortunes are to be interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind with the particular risks w hich are enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contract. The words all other perils. Plaintiffs sought recovery from Defendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo from: Perils of the seas. in the ordinary course of events. pirates. thieves. Plaintiff s appealed hence this action. Of Camilon Case No. ISSUE: W/N the insurer is liable for the loss. results from the natural and inevitable action of the sea. not against perils of the ship. Oil Industry Commission Case No. rovers. losses. 1919) Chapter V. A loss which. 141 FACTS: The Gotiaco Brothers transported a cargo of rice from Saigon to Cebu. It was fou nd that the cargo was improperly stowed and that the owners of the ship were chargeable with negligence for failure to protect the pipe by putting a case over it. 122 . 13983 (September 1. 30. Such limitation is included in the provision in Sec. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission had jurisdiction over the contractual disputes. No. L-41315 (November 13. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will say that there has not been an express provision providing f or disputes involving the gasoline dealer and the oil company.R. to set the conditions means th e right to prescribe rules and conduct. 1986) FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was contending that Respondent Commission had no jurisdiction over the contractual disputes between them and a gasoline dealer in the name of Manuel Yap. Sec 6 of R. the jurisdictional power should be restricted to mere regula tory and supervisory power and not judicial. 36 . Thus. 6173 restricts the extent and scope the OIC prerogative of jurisdiction in sub paragraph a to f. It only pertains to rule making power and not adjudication. 31.A. What the law intend here is to be all embracing to the jurisdictional power of Respondent Commission so anything not mentioned are not or cannot be presumed or indicated.G. The phrase. 7(4d) LATIN MAXIM: 25. HELD: The contention of the Petitioner is well founded. as amended. Court of Appeals Case No. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for d rinking. white flint bottles with the mark La Tondeña. which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income. although regulated. a case was initiated against Petitioner for using the 350 c. and in violation of Sec. was unable to produce his supporting evidence. 43 G. 26. a retired lt. the 350 c.158 FACTS: La Tondeña registered with the Philippine Patent Office. Hon. together with his supporting evidence.118 Cagayan Valley Enterprises. 257 FACTS: Acting on information received. 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Rep. the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private Respondent to submit his explanation or comment. despite several postponements. No. colonel. 123248 (October 16. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 2 of RA 623 as amended by RA 5700.c. To limit the coverage of the law onl y to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very purpose of the law. referring to all beverages not prohibited by law. Inc. Migrinio and Tecson Case No. without La Tondeña s written consent. it is within t he purview and coverage of RA 623. hence. Thereafter. vs. because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. 1997) Chapter V. HELD: The words other lawful beverages is used in its general sense.c. ISSUE: W/N La Tondeña was part of the protected beverages of RA 623 amended by RA 5700. The anti-graft Board was created by the PCGG to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices . is not prohibited by law. and Ginebra San Miguel stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same with Petitioner s liquor product bearing the label Sonny Boy for commercial sale and distribution. Private Respondent.R. white flint bottles it has been using for its gin popularly known a s Ginebra San Miguel . Inc.. pursuant to RA 6231. Page 217. Footnote No. Hard liquor. of the Philippines vs. HELD: No. the term subordinate as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife. 38 . both retired and in active service. an agency of the PCGG. dummy. 36b. for violation of RA 3019 and 1379. and close associate in EO 1 and the close relative. agent. or nominee in EO 2. similar to the immediate family member. business associate . 30. Applying the rule in statutory construction.of AFP personnel. relative. LATIN MAXIM: 28. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board. . Sto.Commissioner of Customs vs. Page 220. ISSUE: W/N the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband. He was prosecuted under Act No. 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. The trial court ruled that. LATIN MAXIM: 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION United States vs. kris or other deadly weapons. HELD: Yes. the law will only apply to bladed weapons ISSUE: W/N the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. 2301 of the same code. 48886-88 (July 21. 302 Chapter V. using the principle of ejusdem generis. 71 G. Nos.133 FACTS: Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is prohib ited and the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Sec. 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code.172 FACTS: Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. Nino Case No. 1993) Chapter III. which stated that it shall be unlawful for any person to carr y concealed upon his person any bowie knife. and are not as stated by Respondent Court. The imported foodstuffs are considered prohibited importation under Sec. The foodstuffs in question being articles of pro hibited importation cannot be released under bond. Footnote No. among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec. provide that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the posses sion of persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the sa me under the provision of this Act. dirk dagger. Footnote No. 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code therefore these foodstuffs may be released under bond as provided in Sec. Page 101. 1780.R. In this case. the rule must give way. 29 . The trial court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is only resorted to in determining the legislative intent. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were covered by the law and as such the law is not limited to bladed weapons. such that if the intent is cl ear.HELD: No. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. HELD: No. Social Security Commission Case No. business. because the phrase activity of any kind in the definiti on is preceded by the words any trade. industry. 1961) Chapter V. Page 221. Petitioner contends that the term employer as defined in the law should following the principle of ejusdem generis---be limited to those who carry on undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain. No. v. Petitioners filed an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction . 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Rep. It is n ot controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations. wholly or partially. which are di rectly or indirectly. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. 1980) Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision by the Cadastral Court to declare Lot No.R. No. or which are pursued for profit or gain.R. undertaking. The definition of the term employer is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities no t organized for profit.175 FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that Catholic Charities. Footnote No.120 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. L FACTS: 35376 (September 11. Estenzo Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. ISSUE: W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case. 263 G. otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. L-15045 (January 20. G. operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land. 7a. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. ISSUE: W/N RA 6236 applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. RA 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands.over the petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings. not interpret it. The Respondent judge was wrong i n interpreting that RA 6236 is applicable. HELD: No. 32 . 30. the job of the judiciary is to apply la ws. 68. Pascuala. v. 9351 (January 6. LATIN MAXIM: 30a.R. Since Vicente wa s born in 1905 after the said law was enacted. The trial court dismissed this claim stating the Petitioner d id not file within the time limited in the notice to creditors in the intestate proceedings. which was promulgated on December. E.121 In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes Case No.R. 180 FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate and was survived by his 2 legitimate daughters. 1899. Petitioner filed a Civil Case claiming liabilities and obli gations from the Rufino estate. Rufino died intestate and was survived by his widow and 7 children. 130 G. A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed by the Petitioner on the decision of the trial . Footnote No. Page 223. No. and Aurea have since died. HELD: Yes. Page 223. Petra had 2 legitimate children. G. he is considered an acknowledged natural child. 35. Petra and Pascuala. Almost 1 year later. They then executed a Partition Agreement agreeing to pay for all liabi lities or obligations of the decedent. No. 1979) Chapter V. ISSUE: W/N Vicente was an acknowledged natural child. L 38268 (May 31. Vicente. repealed the law that priesthood was a ground for declaring a marriage void. Aurea. Footnote No. and had begotten a natural child by a pr iest. Petra. 1915) Chapter V. Rufino Case No. Pascuala had 1 legitimate child. 181 FACTS: Vicente A. 97 G. The lower court held that Vicente was the owner of all the separate property of Aurea and half of the esta te of Francisca. 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Empire Insurance Co. Rafael and Josef a. 18. LATIN MAXIM: 29. but a claim on the estates of the Respondents. 45a . The liabilities claimed by Petition er were not listed in the obligations acknowledged by the Partition Agreement. HELD: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit.court claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the estate of the decedent. 30a. Footnote No. Also. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly e lected to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unlawfully held the same. Page 224. G. HELD: Citizenship is not a right but a mere privilege.Ching Leng v. 341 of the Civil Code does not include acquisitio n of citizenship. 254 of the Civil Code enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and acquisition is not a part of t he said enumeration. 49 of a special law that provides the character of natur alization enumerates the means of acquiring citizenship and adoption is not part of it. the children are now considered as Filipino citi zens. No. Flor Case No. (2) adoption gave the adopted children the same rights and duties as if they were th e legitimate children of the adopter. Art. Galang Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 30a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Acosta v. Furthermore. 5 G. 1958) FACTS: Petitioner obtained judgment granting his petition for naturalization. R. Petitioner then requested the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel the alien certificate of registration of their children based on the following groun ds: (1) by virtue of their naturalization. (3) since a legitimate child follows the nat ionality of the adopter. The petition was later granted. 2122 (September 13. ISSUE: W/N citizenship can be acquired by a child through adoption. No. not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latter s allega tions that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. Art. He and his wife later petitioned to the Court of First Instance in Rizal for the adopti on of his five children who were all minors and Chinese nationals. 1905) Chapter V. 187 FACTS: The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the Office of the Municipal President of Laoag. Art. Nor can it be . R. However. L-11931 (October 27. the children are considered Filipino Citizens. Ilocos Norte. or for any other reason. ISSUE: Can the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the Defendant from the exercise of said office? HELD: No. 199. the right to bring such action. If the legislative had intended to give all citizens alike the righ t to maintain an action for usurpation of public office. as a result of s aid election. Art. as the case may be. LATIN MAXIM: 30a .inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he. 200. was entitled to the office of Municipal Presi dent of Laoag. and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals. now held by Defendant. it would have plainly said s o in the law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance. City Treasurer of Davao Case No. L-2783 (November 29. Lerum and Fernando filed for this petition in order to test the sufficiency and probative value of a testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the issuance of a divorce decree. 732. declaring as officially and legally existing several barrios of the cit y. 3 of RA 3590. is not included in the enumeration. contract or other written instrument. Cruz Case No. Thus. Footnote No. No. asked for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected o n real property located within the barrio. 192 FACTS: This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. Bucana and Poblacion. L-25811 (April 3. The sufficiency and probative value of a testimony. Under Sec 1. in relation to barrios Agdao and Bucana. 55 G. R. Page 225. 1950) Chapter V. 146 G. Footnote No. as provided in Sec. No. Page 225. Respondent refused to release the share on the ground that the amount pertaining to the sai d barrio. pursuant to RA 2370.123 Lerum v.R. LATIN MAXIM: 30a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Central Barrio v. declaratory relief may only be granted to a person whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance. 193 FACTS: On August 29. will. Among these were barrios Agdao. also called barrio Central. ISSUE: Can the attorneys file a petition for declaratory relief regarding the sufficien cy and probative value of (former) Judge Cruz s testimony? HELD: No. 1962. the assailed order is affirmed. Attys. which is the subject matter for declaratory relief in the instant cas e. cannot be determined because th . Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. Subsequently. 1968) Chapter V. the petition for declaratory relief cannot be granted. barrio Poblacion. the City of Davao passed Resolution No. or who is interested under a deed. Auditor and Mayor with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao. there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished Barrio Central as part of Da vao City. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal order was correct. HELD: The dismissal was affirmed. Council. Thus. 2 of RA 4354 enumerated the barrios comprising the City of Davao. The Petitioner thus filed a case against Davao City s Treasurer. which did not include the Petitioner.e respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law. amending the charter of Davao City. LATIN MAXIM: 30 . A non-existent barrio or a barrio not situated in Davao City cannot presen t a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under RA 3590. Sec. which dismissed the case on the ground that the issue had been rendered academic by the passage of RA 4354. 315 of the Tax Code states that payment of income tax shall be a l ien in favor of the government from the time the assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests. 197 FACTS: The case is an appeal questioning the lower court s judgment declaring . 312 G. No. Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. penalties. A perusal of the aforequoted provision shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary obligations of the deceden t created by law. such as taxes which is entirely different from the claims enumer ated therein. etc. Footnote No. City of Iloilo Case No. The cases were for the claim and payment of deficiency income taxes in the total sum of P3.124 Vera v. Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court bars claim of the government for unpaid taxes. 55 G. 44 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Villanueva v. 30. the unpaid taxes due the decedent may be collected. L-26521 (December 28. 5. Branch V in relation to the intestate estate of Luis D.254. ISSUE: W/N the statute of non-claims under Sec. even without its having been presented under Sec.R. The Petitioners were denied the said claim and payment as they were barred under Sec. 1979) Chapter V. 1968) Chapter V.R. as provided in the Tax Code .L-31364 (March 30. 5. 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. LATIN MAXIM: 27. Par.80 with 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest. HELD: The order appealed from is reversed. No. 193 FACTS: This case is an appeal with regard to two orders promulgated by the CFI of Negros Occidental. Tongo y. Footnote No. Page 225. before the inheritance has been passed to the heirs. Fernandez Case No. Thus . Page 226. No. Eusebio and Remedios Villanueva. 4. Is the City of Iloilo empowered by the Local Autonomy Act to impose tenement taxes? 3. The Petitioners. which should not apply. The same tax may be imposed by the national government as well as by the local government. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. No. It is clear tha t the intention of the ordinance is to impose a tenement or apartment tax. the city was able to collect P5. 2. ISSUE: 1. 30. RA 2264 confers on local governments broad taxing authority. the ordinance is valid. 35. Yes. 3. which i s not among the exceptions listed in Sec. 1. 11 as illegal. a re owners of 5 tenement houses containing 43 apartments. the tax in question is neither a debt nor a poll tax. 42 . No.824 from the spouses for the years 1960-1964. By virtue of the ordinance . Is it oppressive and unreasonable because it carries a penal clause? 4. Is Ordinace 11 illegal because it imposes double taxation? 2. Does it violate the uniformity of taxation? HELD: The judgment is reversed.Ordinance No. The lower court had in mind the constitutional provision that no person shall be imprisoned for a debt or non-payment of a poll tax . 20c. Taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of the same class or character within the taxing authority. 275 G. Page 226. co-Petitioner. 968) S ec. Cruz-Paño. as Assistant Secretary. as enumerated in the probation law (P. He is a first-time offender and his offense has relative lightness. Mr. In a motion for reconsideration. the mayor of Caloocan. Besides. Footnote No. 3. terminated the services of Respondent. Talens. and that Santo To w as not a penitent offender. Cruz-Paño Case No. 9. the clear intent is to allow the benefits of probation to those not included in the enumeration. through Administrative Order No. 199 FACTS: Petitioner Santo To was convicted of estafa for a bouncing check and was sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Samson v. He then filed a petition for probation but was denied by the Respondent judge. Page 226. L-43182 (November 25. No. He appealed to the Court of Appeals. The law gives more importance to the offender than the crime. Footnote No. 1983) Chapter V. on the ground that granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. Court of Appeals Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. the Solicitor General recommended the grant because the Petitioner was not among the offenders disqualified to avail probation. despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office. and appointed Mr. which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision correctional. L-55130 (January 17. RA 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) Sec 5(f) declares that the po sition of . where the Probation Law expressly enumerates the persons disqualified to avail of its bene fits.D. to said position. because of lack and loss of confidence. 1986) Chapter V. No.R. 270 G. the Res pondent judge cannot assume that To had not shown repentance. 200 FACTS: Petitioner Samson. ISSUE: Can Petitioner To avail himself of probation? HELD: Yes.Santo To v. Hon.R. Liwag. In addition. Where the law provides that positions in the government belong to the competitive service. Talens asserts his position was n ot covered by the said act and. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Talens. ISSUE: Was the termination of Talens illegal? HELD: Yes. 30 . The nature of functions attached to a po sition determines whether such position is highly confidential. the legislatu re is presumed to have intended to exclude those not enumerated. primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. his position is not among those expressly declared by law as highly confidential. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. it wou ld have included them in the enumeration. for otherwise. except those declared by law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are policydetermining. The Court of Appeals also affirmed said decision. Talens termination was illegal. being permanently appointed. declaring the order null and void.secretaries to city mayors as non-competitive. he can only be removed for a cause and after due process. Page 228. chairman of the group.126 Finman General Assurance Corp. The fact remains that the death of Surposa was pure accident on the part of the victim. No 100970 (September 2. Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound. Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using expressio uni us exclusio alterius in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting f rom murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded therefrom. Page 228. Villalon-Pornillos Case No. vs. The insurance company was found liable by the Insurance Commission to pay P15. ISSUE: Did the CA make a mistake in using the said principle? HELD: No. the personal accident insurance policy specific ally enumerated only 10 circumstances where no liability attaches to the insurance company. and this decision was affirmed by the appellate court.500. Footnote No. However. the latte r denied the claim. 203 FACTS: In 1985. 113092 (September 1. 1988. On October 18. Court of Appeals Case No. Furthermore. 1992) Chapter V. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 54 G.000. President of Tikay.R. After a written notice of claim by the beneficiaries to the insurance company. the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan. 202 FACTS: Carlie Surposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his beneficiaries.R. No. this solicitation was made without a . Footnote No. approached Judge Angeles. and the latter solicited P 1. 1994) Chapter V. 107 G. saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy. Failure to include death through murder or assault meant it had not bee n intended to be exempt from liabilities resulting from such. Martin Centeno. 30 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Centano v. be extended to others. 1564 is meant to include . Moreover. Since P. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.D. ISSUE: W/N the phrase charitable purposes religious purposes.D. 1564. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a permit from DSWD. it may not. this means that the framers of the law never intended to inclu de solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.D. which states Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or pub lic welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional Office of the Departmen t of Social services and Development.permit from the DSWD and as a result. penal law must be construed strictly against the State and l iberally in favor of the accused. 48 in P. 27. 25. it was contended that Centeno violated P. HELD: No. by interpretation or construction. 11g. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters. sinc e this is a criminal case. The 1987 Constitution tre ats the words charitable and religious separately and independently from each other. 11i. 30. The term charitable shou ld be strictly construed to exclude solicitations for religious purposes. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court of First Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an amendment made for Art 360. 12. He contended that the city fiscal of Cotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation. De Aquino Case No.Escribano v. Page 229. L-30375 (September 12. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manabat v. ISSUE: Whether the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel or whether that power is lod ged exclusively in the city attorney of that city. Avila Case No. 101 G.R. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigation s by the CFT is the exception to the rule and not the general rule. No. 205 FACTS: Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato. No.R. HELD: Yes. Footnote No. L-5558 (April 29. 1953) Chapter V. The enumerati on in the law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct preliminary investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. 11e. Escribano questioned Judge Avila s authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. filed a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before the Court of First Instance (now the RTC) to Judge David Avila. Page 229. 161 G. 1978) Chapter V. 208 FACTS: . The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney. The power of the CFT to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of power for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest an d search warrants. Footnote No. the papers were actually received by th e court on September 24. LATIN MAXIM: 3a. Thus. HELD: Yes. Uniformity of rules is to be desired to simplify procedure. 1951. the Judge of First Instance declared that the appea l was late and dismissed it. 1 of the Rules of Court must be applied which will result to the date of deposit in the post offic e by registered mail of court papers as the date of filing. Rule 27 Sec. 9c.74 plus interest for usury. wherein the couple failed to appear in court and present evidence in the hearing. when they were actually received by the court. 2. W/N the appeal has been perfected within 15 days. The appeal was perfected within 15 days.261. Notified o f the decision on September 7.Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1. Whether the appeal was deemed filed on September 22. Thus. when they were deposited by registered mail. Petitioners filed their appeal just in time. ISSUE: 1. However. or Sept 24. 12a . 11d. they filed for an appeal by registered mail on September 22 of that same year. HELD: No. 1989 FACTS: Petitioner carried a bladed weapon outside of his residence while PD 9. Nos. It would make n . ISSUE: W/N a bayonet is not a bladed or blunt weapon that falls under the purview of PD 9. Plaintiff should not have his license restored. 115 No. Page 229. 126 G. 48468-69. Petitioners defense of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is weak and incomplete. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff should have his license restored. the bladed weapon he was carrying. CA Case No. Petitioner claims that his administration of opium to p atients was not a grounds for unprofessional conduct because it has been repealed by subsequent Opium Laws. 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Primero v. Footnote No.Gomez v. The subsequent Opium Laws cannot be held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as these did not conflict o r remove said prior laws. November 22. 32441. was neither a blunt nor bladed weapon enumerated in PD 9 and therefore he was not guilty of violating the law against bladed or blunt weapons. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners Case No. Petitioner answers in his defense that a bayonet.R. the bayonet is a bladed weapon that falls under PD 9. the prohibition against fan knives. March 29. HELD: No. 1930 Chapter V. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.209 FACTS: Plaintiff had his license revoked on unprofessional conduct due to the administration of opium. The Opium Laws are in fact in force and the ill-defined term of unprofessional conduct can include improper administration of opium to patients. balisong or clubs was in effect which thereafter resulted in his arrest. o sense if possession of a fan knife. 30a . LATIN MAXIM: 9a. which is less lethal than a bayonet. would b e punishable while possession of a bayonet would not. denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of Cuevas. Page 234. Respondent Cuevas became ill and had to be confined to a hospital. impugning the decision of the judge for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cuevas. HELD: Past Presidents may run again for positions in the board. ISSUE: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case. 229 FACTS: Respondents were charged of murder. The CA then issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan from conti nuing with the trial. 23. No.R. There is nothing in th e rules and regulations of the association or the BIR that past presidents of the association may not run again for board membership even as they are automaticall y made ex officio members of the board. 1939) Chapter V. the Petitioner.129 SEC Legal Opinion re BIR Employees Association Inc. Case No. The court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evidence and their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused. Judge Roldan. 46825 (October 18. . 1987 FACTS: Petitioners inquired as to whether or not past presidents can run as board members or are merely ex-officio board members. Respondents then institut ed a certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals against the Petitioner. 262 G. During the trial. 142 Oct. Footnote No. LATN MAXIM: 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Roldan v Villaroman Case No. ISSUE: W/N past presidents of the association can run again as members of the board or are automatically ex officio members. b2 . This ruling is in conjunc tion with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent.HELD: No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Moreover. 36b. the rule in the interpretation ap plied is in fact the general rule in the interpretation of qualifying or conditional phra ses found in a law. the same should be made extensive to the whole. 9c. but this rule is subject to the exception that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the provision. 6d. The CA resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. w hich held that the phrase in aid of its appellate jurisdiction only refers to its proxi mate antecedent and to all other auxiliary writs and process. CFI of Laguna. 33. is to make the Ac t offensive not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is constitutionally entitled bail. 12a. and since the lan guage used in this court in construing the Constitution and other statutes on the matt er of bail is substantially the same as the language used by the People s Court Act on t he same subject. Footnote No. No. HELD: Yes. The constitutional mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable. 11g. the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capi tal offenses before conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination o f whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. and (b) previous association with the enemy. 230 FACTS: Petitioner was apprehended by the US Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment under Security Commitment Order No. 6d. 42a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jose Antonio Mapa v. was delivered by the US Army to the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of December 29. she was detained by said Government under that charge. 35. L-278 (July 18. 37. 122 G. 1944. except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. 1946) Chapter V. along with her co-detainees and coPetitioners in that case. 26. Director of Prisons Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation . When she. which is cont rary to the most elementary rules of statutory construction.R. 286 wherein she was specifically charged with (a) active collaboration with the Japanese. Since the People s Court Act and the Constitution and other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one law. 38b. To hold that the People s Court ha s uncontrolled discretion in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence o f guilt is not strong or there is absolutely no evidence at all.130 Herras Teehankee v. Page 234. Hon. And under the same charge during all the time referred to. she has remained in custo dy of the Commonwealth Government. no further written commitment was made by the developer. 78585 (July 5. The words which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans refer not only to other forms of development but also to facilities. pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of defau lt payment from Mapa. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued t o do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. improvements. 1989) Chapter V. Page 234. Petitioner contends that P. Footnote No. and infrastructures fo r the lots. The word and is not meant to separate words. 231 FACTS: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. 7a. and other forms of development if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans.D. No. making the cancellation of the contracts of sal e incorrect. The latter informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled. 170 G. 33 . within 3 years from the date of the contract. but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the facilities. HELD: No. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the governmen t. but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the fou r contracts. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale.Case No. P. other than those provided in Clause 20 . ISSUE: W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lot s. and. improvements.R. and infrastructures . 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent. forty-eight days from July 24th . his counsel subseque ntly filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which states that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from.R. Footnote No. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10. 38 G. ISSUE: W/N the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of promulgation of the decision. Teodoro Tamani Case No. not 47. HELD: Yes. No. They invoked Sec. Page 234. 1921) Chapter V. 227 G. 1963.131 People of the Philippines v. L-22161 (January 21. Footnote No. he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on Ju ly 13. as Appelle es contend. 34 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Andres Borromeo v. 1963 through the counsel s wife. Page 236. which is the reglementary fifteen-day period f or appeal. Upon receipt of a copy of this order. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis. 8a 11g. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No. which was denied. L-16808 (January 3. 240 FACTS: . the word promulgation should be construed as referring to judgment . the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice .R. Fermin Mariano Case No. 1963. No. L-22160 and G. The lower court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on Ju ly 13. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that t he appeal was forty-eight days late. 6. 1974) Chapter V. while notice should be construed as referring to order .R. 19 63. 232 FACTS: Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court on February 14. Tamani s appeal is therefore 58 days late. 7a. Nonetheless. 155 of the Administrative Code used by the Attorney-General should be construed as a proviso. The Attorney-General assails the validity of the later appointment by arguing on the basis of Sec. should mean the nomination or designation of an individual . 7a. appointee s consent is needed and he has power to refuse an appointment. but the power to accept lies solely on the appointee. 155 of the Administrative Code. 9a. In upholding the independence of the judiciary and the state s separation of powers. 9c. The provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. The word appointed in the proviso should be given its meaning in the ordinary sense. 12a. The power to appoint lies on the appointing officer. ISSUE: W/N Borromeo has the right to sit as the Judge of the 24th Judicial District. he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District. 24a. and thus. although it did not start wit h the usual introductory word. Hence. and Fermin Mariano was appointed Ju dge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. HELD: Yes. provided . Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District . 37 . 1920. 1914. which states that nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appoin ted to be judge of another district. r etire or are removed through impeachment proceedings. the only way to remove Borromeo from power is by impeachment. effective July 1. They ho ld these positions of Judges of First Instance of definite districts until they resign. On February. 25. Judges of First Instance are appointed Judges of the Courts of Firs t Instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands.Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twentyfourth Judicial District. The concluding part of Sec. 20 G. 280 of the Labor Code. The provision calls for casual employees. this provision does not apply to them. t he fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they are automatically converted into regular employees. 33 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Arenas v. City of San Carlos. Footnote No. P350 of wh ich was from the national government and the remaining P650 comes from the city . 2 of Art. the proviso in par . No.R. Petitioners contentions stemmed from Art. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners should be considered regular employees.) In Mercado. and not to other sections thereof. vs. 1. Page 240.00. Page 240. and that would have been more than enough to conside r them as regular employees. their services will no longer be needed. 1978) Chapter V. Moreover. No. The workers contend that they should be considered regular workers as opposed to project workers. HELD: No. 251 FACTS: RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an annual salary of P18. (They were hired as project employees for the 5-year expansion program. NLRC Case No. Footnote No.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who do n ot qualify under the definition of such workers in par. 109328 (August 16. LATIN MAXIM: 1. L-34024 (April 5. Pangasinan Case No. Since Petitioners were considered project employees.132 ALU-TUCP v.R. 250 FACTS: Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five year expansion program. Sr. 2 G. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary of P1000. ALU-TUCP claim s that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is necessary for the business. Once that project is done. The proviso is to be con strued with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached. 1994) Chapter V. as the NSC and NLRC ruled. NLRC. 6.000. and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.000 to P18. 43. the intention in enacting the RA was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayo r.48. HELD: Looking at the Senate deliberations.000. is given preference because it is the latest expressio n of the intent of the legislation. whether a proviso or not. but more so because provisos are negatively written a nd gives off a more mandatory tone. 33. Moreover. ISSUE: W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the increase in his salary from P12. In case t here is repugnancy between the proviso and the main provision. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA bu t the Respondent City refused. exceptions. the latter provision. should be strictly but reasonably const rued. b2 .government. they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. as a general rule. etc. 1630 as urgent and the presidential certification dispensed wit h the requirement not only of the printing but also that of reading the bill on three separate days. has been constitutionally passed. 1994) Chapter V. an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. No. 115852 (August 25. In other words. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i. because the two are really coordinate clause s of the same sentence." in Art. LATIN MAXIM: 33 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ALDECOA v. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment.. Secretary of Finance Case No. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank . 1630 did n ot pass three reading on separate days as required in the Constitution because the second and the third readings were done on the same day. Sec 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three reading s on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. Page 243. No. Footnote No. 266 FACTS: Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause.133 Tolentino v. VI.R. printing and distribution t hree days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar but it would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. HELD: There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution thre e days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days. ISSUE: W/N RA 7716. 292 G. The President had certified S.e. No. The said firm. she emancipated her sons and mortgaged their properties with her consent.Case No. was heavily indebted to the Defendant corporation. In order to mortgage these properties. 272 FACTS: The mother of the Plaintiffs. (March 23. The Code of Civil Procedure impliedly repealed some parts of the old Spanish code. LATIN MAXIM: 49 . Isabel s remedy for this was to furnish certain securities and obligations to the Defendant Corporation. and to mortgage certain real propertie s of her sons. Aldecoa & Company. At t he time of the furnishing of the mortgage emancipation documents. The Petitioners now seek to cancel the instruments of mortgage executed by them. HELD: We must look at the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (American) relating to guardianship and upon certain provisions of the Civil Code (Spanish) relating to the control of the parents over the person and property of their min or children. Joaqin was alread y of legal age and so his mortgage remained valid. was a general partner in the firm. 126 30 Phil. while Zoilo s mortgage was not valid even if he signed it with his mother because he was a minor when he execut ed the mortgage. Footnote No. Isabel Palet. however. and in so doing. ISSUE: W/N Isabel Palet can legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force in this country in 1903. confer upon them the capacity to execu te a valid mortgage on their real property with her consent. 228. According to the Code of Civil Procedure. 1915) Chapter V. there is no longer a nee d to be formally emancipated by the parents after attaining the age of majority. Page 245. Bello. 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained Edgardo Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. Page 248. No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. L-32293 (January 24. 1969 a complaint was lodged with the Police Commission for the same grounds. L-39419 (April 12. On March 17. 6c. Sec. 1982) Chapter VI. 26 of the Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to administrative cases involving police personnel and service pending at the time of the effectivity of the Act (September 8. The power of local officials to investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personn el has been transferred to the POLCOM under RA 4864. Sec. Footnote No. 1974) FACTS: On September 11. and therefore falls under the exception to the curfew rule.R. 228 which fixed curfew hours. Hon. 1969). No. 8 FACTS: Petitioner Mrs. 26 may not be interpreted t o mean that the Board of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally function to carry into effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of th e 100 days. According to Commission v. On appeal. and commission of a felony. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec.134 Ocampo v. which is considered as a wholesome assemblage. The Mayor issued an ordinance exonerating the policemen.R. 189 of the . 6d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aisporna v. 88 G. ISSUE: W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative cases involving police service and personnel. the minors were acquitted since the reason they violated t he ordinance was to attend a birthday. Roberto Ocampo filed a complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct. HELD: The Respondents argument is devoid of merit. Buenaventura Case No. The minors were then convicted for violation of said ordinance. 6 G. Court of Appeals and People Case No. grave abuse of authority. A statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisio ns wherever possible. HELD: Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance agent. 36d. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of Sec. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par. The term agent used in par. 189. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 36b. ISSUE: W/N the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of Sec. Aisporna. and that she did not receive any compensation. however. 36c. maintained that she was not liable because she only assi sted her husband. 2 of t he same section. 2 to the age nt in par. a kept subservient to the general intent of the enactment. 28. 37 . Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts. Mrs. 1 of Sec. 189. and not separately and independently.Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing a certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance Commiss ioner. Every part of the statute must be considered together with th e other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 189 is defined in par. 9c. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No. Indeterminate Appellate Court Case No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as the devices enumerated in Sec. That same day. 1 RA 4200. 249 G. although not exclusive to that enumerated therein.135 Gaanan v. 1 of RA 4200. Furthermore. 75222 (July 18. In the case of Empire Insu rance Company v. b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Radiola-Toshiba Phils. Inc. Edgardo Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. 1986) Chapter VI.R. Atty. Rufino. should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same nature. Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone call through the extension phone. 36d. 1991) . 29. 11 FACTS: Atty. 30a. 1 of RA 4200. 108 G. it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accu sed. Page 249. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal of his complaint for direct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu. ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is one of the prohibited devices covered by Sec. Footnote No.R. No. When complainant Pintor called up. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate insta llation of a device. but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. 36c. L-69809 (October 16. 48. v. In order to determine the true intent of t he legislature. that is. Laconico called the Appellant. Intermediate Appellate Case No. the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be tak en as detached and isolated expressions. HELD: Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act. instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. held that the phrase device or arrangement in Sec. 11g. 32 and Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. 1980 by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. 79. Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils. Sec. 36a. Under the circumstances. ISSUE: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment. there is no conflict betwee n Sec. Also. However. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretat ion. Footnote No.Chapter VI. 20 FACTS: The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4. the insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Ange les City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said attachment. contended that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and w as not dissolved thereby. Page 252. HELD: No. the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will rende r the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other. 37 . From the very context of the law. 136 G. Lopez and Javelona. was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION JMM Promotions v. NLRC Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 9b. It was only wi th respect to the usurious interest. They contended that the court erred in holding that the word void . was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. 21 FACTS: JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30. HELD: No. 000 and a surety bond of P50. 109835 (November 22. Page 251. the legislature. Every part of the act should be read with the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature. not from the consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law. in whose favor the loan was made.R. sought to have the contract of loan and mortgage annulled on the ground that the agreement was usurious. as required by the POEA Rules.R. 000 and posted a cash bond of P100. 152 G. 1925) Chapter VI. did not intend that the transaction should be a complete nullity. as used in the Usury Law. No.000. The intention of the legislature must be ascer tained.136 Lopez v. When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA. b ut from the context of the whole law or from a portion thereof. as compared with the who le. Page 251. 25a. El Hogar Filipino caused the mortgaged properties to be sold publicly in an extra-judicial sale. 1993) Chapter VI. 16 FACTS: Pursuant to a contract of loan and mortgage. No. in using the word void . the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as required by Art. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N the meaning of the word void . El Hogar Filipino Case No. 223 of the Labor Code. L-22678 (January 12. Footnote No. . as used in the Usury Law. 36a. in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money. an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. 37 . as required by Art. considering it has already posted a cash bond and surety bond. 6d. 12a. 223 of the Labor Code.ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. as required by the POEA? HELD: Yes. 7a. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. A reading of the POEA Rules shows that. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. P 300 for a house. the legislature s intent is to give them opportuni ty for dispassionate reflection. Concepcion Case No. Defendant therein filed an omnibus pe tition to secure the custody of their three minor children.000 as attorney s fees. 36a.R. 1922) . the determination of the custody a nd alimony must have been given force and effect. HELD: No. Footnote No.R.000 for herself and said children. After the issues were joined. 103 of the Civil Code.137 Araneta v. it would violate the intent of the law regarding the 6-month cooling p eriod contained in Art. a monthly allowance of P2. to enjoin Plaintiff f rom ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her. that the case was filed after 6 months of the filing of the legal separation case. L-19628 (December 4. No. 36d. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lichauco vs. Page 252.300 for support for her and the children. As such. 17 G. 147 G. The judge refused to reconsider the or der. The judge rendered his decision regarding the omnibus petition and granted the custody of the children to Defendant. and to have Plaintiff t herein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. provided it did not go to the ext ent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. If the parties are allowed to present evidences regarding the omnibus petition. (July 31. a monthly support of P5. however. No. 27. Note. and the return of her passport. ISSUE: W/N the parties are required to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition. A recital of grievances in court may fa n their grievances against one another. 24 FACTS: The husband filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the ground of adultery. L-9667. and P2. Apostol Case No. 36c. 1956) Chapter VI. is of a general nature. Footnote No. 1762 of the Administrative Code prohibition against bringing of animals fro m infected foreign country Sec. 1762. 1762. 1762. However. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 1770. It now desires to import from Pnom-Pehn a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. 1762 and it must be consid ered as a special qualification of Sec. 1762. Page 252. 23 FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals. 1762 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 36a.Chapter VI. 38b. Sec. 3052. 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code Bringing of diseased animal into islands forbidden Sec. 50 . which extends merely to the importation of draft animals for purposes of manufacturing serum. being a special law having special contingency not dea lt within Sec. the Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle. as amended. 1770 therefore is not considered as inconsistent with Sec. Sec. has been repealed by the implication in Sec. HELD: No. Sec. 3052 Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands ISSUE: W/N Sec. except upon the condition stated in Administrative Order No. Legislations involved in the case: Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code re mains in full force and effect. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn. 1762 of the Administrative Code. as amended by Act No. while Sec. Before the arraignment of the accused. Page 257. No. known as the Public Land act. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. as when general and special provisions are inconsistent. which created the PNB and authorizes it to have extra judicial foreclosure of mortgage respectivel y. Banco Filipino Case No. L-3540 (July 30. 40b. thu s it is an exception to the coverage of RA 2938 and 3135. Footnote No. Plaintiffs defaulted and PNB extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it to Cabatigan. Footnote No. 31 FACTS: Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land to PNB for P600. 51 G. RA 2874 specially relates to specific property. 38b. After 1 year but before the expiration of 5 years.138 Cassion v. the crime falls under the jurisdiction of t . 35 FACTS: Palmon was charged with serious physical injuries (prision correctional in med and max period 2 yrs. 87 of RA 296. 1950) Chapter VI.R. the judge motu proprio dismissed the case on the ground that under Sec. 220 G. 1 day 6 yrs) before the CFI of Capiz.R. 1951) Chapter VI. PNB relied on RA 2938 and RA 3135. Plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land but PNB turned down the offer. 38a. LATIN MAXIM: 9. while Plaintiffs relied on RA 2874. Page 256. 4 mos. No. the latter is paramount to the former and a particu lar intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it regardless of to the respective dates of passage. which provided that every conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shal l be subject to repurchase by the applicant for a period of 5 years from date of conveyance ISSUE: Which of the conflicting statues should prevail? HELD: When two or more conflicting statues exist. Palmon Case No. L-2860 (May 11. he justice of the peace. Sec. 87 of the same act also confers original jurisdiction on the justic e of the peace and the judges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating to ass aults where the intent to kill is not charged upon the trial. the CFI and justi ce of the peace courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the case. However. 36d. LATIN MAXIM: 36c. Hence. 37 . ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction to try the case? HELD: Sec 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on the CFI over all criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more th an 6 months. the solicitor general contended that CFI has jurisdiction. Plaintiff asserted tha t since the insolvent had been declared as such. Page 257. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habe as corpus. Maximino s father then submitted an application for writ seeking the release of his son. 35 FACTS: Umberto de Poli was declared to be in a state of insolvency at the instance of Plaintiff. 36c. the PNB had obtained a writ by virtue of which th e sheriff also seized certain goods owned by the insolvent. insurrection or sedition. provision and clause of a statue must be expounded in reference to ever y other. and the sheriff was ordered to take possession of all property of sai d Defendant. 60 as stated in the other provision of the same law. all civil proceedings against him shoul d have been suspended according to the last portion of Sec. Three days aft er. 60 of the insolvency l aw. 36d. 1952) Chapter VI. LATIN MAXIM: 9. 36e.R. Pres. 37. No. No. Footnote No. Page 258. ISSUE: Which provision is controlling upon the case? HELD: To ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the insolvency law. 1921) Chapter VI. . Sec. 57 G. 179 G. and as such the PNB falls under the exception to Sec. Castañeda and Balao Case No. every section.R.Chartered Bank v. Thus. 60 should be understood in reference with the other provisions of the same law. L-4221 (August 30. b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Montenegro v. 39 FACTS: Maximino Montenegro was arrested in Manila by agents of the Military Intelligence Service of the AFP for complicity with a communistic organization i n the commission of acts of rebellion. Footnote No. Quirino issued Proclamation No. In an earlier case. 17222 (March 15. Imperial and National Bank Case No. 20b. Aruego. Art. 7 only provides invasion. W/N Proclamation No. b2 . insurrection. Moreover. as posed by Prof. W/N the Bill of Rights prohibited the suspension of the privilege of the writ. 36f. HELD: There is no doubt that it was erroneous to include sedition. the debates voted down an amendment to add another cause. while Art. 210 is erroneous since it included sedition. insurrection or rebellion. the Bill of Rights impliedly denied suspension in case of imminent danger.ISSUE: 1. 2. rebellion or imminent danger as grounds for suspension. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 7 expressly authorized the President to suspend when there is imminent danger. Also. 15a. during the Constitutional Convention. Sedition should be deemed as a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole. which is imminent danger of invasion. which is not under the Constitution. 11e. Footnote No. 50 FACTS: . 12a. No. HELD: The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the ordinance as a sales tax ordinance. 1975) Chapter VI Page 259. It is ev ident from the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon to the volume of sales. 20a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Paras v. ISSUE: W/N Arabay Inc.140 Arabay Inc. v. Arabay Inc.. distributor of gas. is entitled to a refund.R. diesel fuel oils. 2264. The reasonable and practica l interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusio n that Congress. 1996) Chapter VI. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits th e municipality from imposing sales and specific tax. contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a municipality to levy under Sec. there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. 14. in excluding gasoline. with the exception of gasolin e. an d petroleumbased products. oil and other petroleum product s. 2 of RA No. L-37684 (September 10. Page 259. 196 G. 43 FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. to a refund. No.R. which provides that municipali ties may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline. 16 G. deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes. COMELEC Case No. 123169 (November 4. 19 that charged tax for the selling and distribution of gasoline. but also because the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. lubricating oils. CFI of Zamboanga Case No. Since Sec. Footnote No. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Mond ay of May 2006. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall onc e during his term. 37. 27. ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election. interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. determines its construction. An interpretation shoul d be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated.A petition for recall was filed against Paras. as provided in par. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 7160. HELD: No. who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The spirit. 11d. the Court a ssumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. In interpreting a statute. rather than the letter o f a law. no recall may be instituted. inoperative or nugatory. 38 . no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. 25b. (b). The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner s opposition that und er Sec. 74 of RA No. meaningless. T he evident intent of Sec. (a) and par. Thus. 36b. or corporation other th an the local government. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Footnote No. No. Page 262.141 Javellana v. entity. not only in Bago City. Appellant claims that a public market is one that is not owned privately. whereas the appellees say that is one that serves the general public. 6d. which consists of store spaces and of permanent and movable stalls leased to vendors. No. CFI of Negros Occidental. 1 50 had been enacted prohibiting the establishment.R. Page 262. ISSUE: W/N the marketplace owned by Petitioner is a public market. but also those coming from other municipalities. 21 of RA 4858 (the . HELD: The test of a public market is its dedication to the service of the general public and not its ownership. L-30324 November 29.60 FACTS: Petitioner is a Civil Service eligible and was appointed city engineer of La Carlota City by the City Mayor pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 1982 Chapter VI.R. 188 G. 2a. Branch II Case No. Bago City. it is meant one that is intended to serve the general public. 138 G. Footnote No. L-33169 July 30. Said market has served the general population of the City of Bago for m ore than twenty (20) years already when it was denied the payment of Petitioner for a municipal license for the 3rd quarter of 1968 on the ground that Ordinance No.55 FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a market (building and lot) in Crossing Bago. maintenance or operation of a public market in the City of Bago by any person. 40c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Niere v. Kintanar Case No. A scrutiny of the charter provision will readily s how that by public market. The Petitioner himself so declared when he testified that his market is engaged in servicing the public. 1973 Chapter VI. City Charter). who. this prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the Philipp ines. 21. Nothing could be more substantial than the vesting of a power to appoint such an important city official as the city engine er. HELD: 1. the position of said engineer was deleted in the final draft of Sec. 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution. b2 . W/N appointing authority for the post of city engineer belongs to the city Ma yor or not. 2. which became RA 4585. 29. 38b. After the enactment of the Decentralization Act. 9711. W/N deletion of the position of city engineer in Sec. 30a. 32. Private Responde nt was appointed by the President of the Philippines as city engineer of La Carlota City. Such section expressly limits the appointing authority of the mayor. 21 is without authority to appoint the ci ty engineer. under Sec. it is a substantial amendment. 21 of RA 4585 an amendm ent purely of form only or not. shall nominate wi th the consent of the Commission on Appointments all other officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 21 of the City Charter to that effect. it could have easily re-phrased Sec. Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he was the one legally appointed as city engineer under RA 4858. 21 of said RA. House Bill No. NO. originally expressly included city engineer as one of those whom the city mayor can appoint under Sec. ISSUE: 1. Since the city mayor under Sec. 2. If Congress wanted to authorize the city mayor to appoint all heads and employees o f city department. but during the period of amendment in the Senate. NO. 1951. is required. W/N the application for naturalization may be granted. Forthwith. Footnote No. HELD: 1. 176 v.61 FACTS: Petitioner-appellee was born. On July 15. ISSUE: 1. 473 requires applicant for naturalization to reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up t o the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. 307 G. After finishing primary and secondary education here in the Philippines. W/N domicile and residence are synonymous. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines. No. 7. he filed for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. or temporary occupation. No. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. notwithstanding the fa ct that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petitio n and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof . Residence indicates permanency of occupation. a meaning distinct and diff erent from that of the other. in strict legal parlance. each has. 1927. 2. distinct from lodging or boarding. Section 7 of C. of Chinese parents in Dumaguete. 11a. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manila Lodge No. Hence. 1950. he went to the United States to further his studies from the ye ar 1947-1950. Court of Appeals . No. 1954) Chapter VI.142 Uytengsu vs. 25a. Page 263. Republic of the Philippines Case No. had to be postponed. 1951. he returned to the United States and took a post-graduate degree which he finished in July 1951l bu t he did not return to the Philippines until October 13. 2. Although the words residence and domicile are often used interchangeably. No. the original da te of hearing the case. not legal residence or domicile.A. originally scheduled to take place on July 12. Domicile is residence with intention to stay. Negros Oriental n October 6. L-6379 (September 29.R. to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC). The reclaimed area was to form part o f the Luneta extension. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. 63 FACTS: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. the ar ea reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without c ost to the City of Manila. which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. Later. HELD: The petitions were denied for lack of merit. toge ther with all the improvements. 36b. The grant made by Act No. the City of Manila con veyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner.R. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila. ISSUE: W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila. 9a. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a public nature. Page 264.Case No. Hence. No. would defeat the policy of legislation. 43 . 1976) Chapter VI. if included. 1360. The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 6c. as amended.L-41012 (September 30. In the case at bar.R. and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the recla imed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Footnote No.L-41001 and G. 37. No. Then Petitioner sold the land. Such grants have always been strictly constr ued against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resou rces. 165 G. in order to unravel the legislative intent. the letter of the statute should be narrowed to ex clude matters which. the Board refused to recognize Petitioner as its secretary and. 71 FACTS: Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence. RA 2709 amended Sec. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City.A 183.R. Marave Case No. the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the Municipal Board of said City. provides in its Sec. in turn. Page 266.L-27760 (May 29. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Abellana v. alter. 14 of R. or modify in any way the provisions of Sec. 14 of the City Charter. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City Charter. 12 of RA 183. At this stage. ISSUE: Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the Municipal Board of Pasay City? HELD: The petition was dismissed. as am ended. the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed with another b ranch . 3 G. 1965) Chapter VI. 67 FACTS: RA183. LATIN MAXIM: 9c.L-23800 (December 21. Footnote No. 37. unless it is manifested that the legislature so intended. The very next day. 1947).R. the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21. No. appointed Respondent Florentino to the position. Petitioner appealed such decision to the CFI . Footnote No. On the strength of Par. 49. 1 4 that the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve durin g the term of office of the members thereof On June 18. No. Repeals by implication are not favored.143 Almeda v. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal. 10 G. 1974) Chapter VI. 1960. whic h found Petitioner guilty as charged. purportedly under Sec. Florentino Case No. Page 265. increase or modification of substantive rights. literal construction of the la w is not favored. par. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm. . Lastly. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of suc h action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing th ereof in the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issued the order to deny Petitioners ISSUE: W/N the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. it is a well-settled doctrine that a c ourt is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. particularly a procedural rule. Such interpretation. X. Petitioner s literal reading of the Sec. 1 o f Rule 111 of the Rules of Court ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts as provided in Sec. Sec. HELD: Petition for certiorari is dismissed. 12a.2 As stated in Art. 7 of Rule 123.of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. in the case at bar. a separate and independent civil action for damages. the grant of power to this Court does not extend to any diminution. there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. does likewise. 5. Thus. gi ve rise to a constitutional question that may trench on a substantive right in accordance t o Art. 33 of the Civil Code. 37 motion to dismiss.5 of the 1973 Constituti on. This liberal interpretation is re asonable and it upholds constitutionality. L-36049 (May 31. No. tax ordinances take effect 15 days after . Agna Case No. ISSUE: Is Act 2972 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. was penalized for keeping books written in Chinese. Page 268. or have a duplicate in any of these languages.Yu Cong Eng v. Spanish. Footnote No.R. City of Manila. LATIN MAXIM: 1a. Spanish. This decision is con sistent with the ruling in Kwong Sing v. Page 267. Yu Cong Eng. 1925) Chapter VI. 9c. Instead of interpreting the Act as a blanket prohibition against ke eping books in Chinese. The Naga City government. pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. claimed that under the Local Autonomy Act (RA 2264). Class legislation is thus allowed if i t is for the public good. 78 FACTS: Act 2972 prohibited record books of Merchants from being written in a language other than English. Respondent taxpayers insisted on paying the new taxes the following year. on the other hand. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION City of Naga v. It stated that tax enactments changing the current system prior to December 15 should take effect the following year. Footnote No. 11e. 1976) Chapter VI. 63 G. or a local dialect. 317 G. a Chinese merchant. 2309). The purpose of the Act is to prevent fraud in book keeping and evasion of taxes for the protection of the public good. or a local dialect. where laundrymen were prohibite d from issuing receipts written in Chinese.R. No. L-20479 (February 6. He and other Chine se merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law. Trinidad Case No. 6d. it may be interpreted as a directory measure that records pertaining to taxes must be written or annotated in English. 83 FACTS: The City of Naga changed its tax system from graduated tax to percentage tax. publication; this allegedly impliedly repealed Sec. 2309 of the Admin Code. ISSUE: Did RA 2264 repeal Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code? HELD: No, it did not. There is a presumption against implied repeal; a subsequent provision only repeals a prior provision clearly contradictory to it. If two law s can be harmonized, then the Courts shall do so. Sec. 2309 of the Revised Admin Code applies in this case because the new tax changed a prior tax system. RA 2264 onl y applies for entirely new tax provisions. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38a, 38b 145 Tan v. COMELEC Case No. 152 G.R. No. 112093 (October 4, 1994) FACTS: BP 885 is an act creating the new province of Negros del Norte. The plebiscite for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prospective ly composing the new province. The parent provinces, which will get also affected, were not included in the plebiscite. ISSUE: Is BP 885 unconstitutional? HELD: It is unconstitutional. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite must be held in all units affected, including the parent province, and not just the new areas . The draft bill provided that the plebiscite be conducted in all units, and not just the areas constituting the new province, but the final bill only limited it to the latter. LATIN MAXIM: 12a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Government v. Municipality of Binangonan Case No. 118 G.R. No. L-10202 (March 29, 1916) Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 84 FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Cardona challenged the constitutionality of EO 66 by the Governor-General granting Binangonan municipal authority over 7 additiona l barrios. Petitioner claimed that the Governor-General has no legislative authori ty and that this legislation was not for the public good. ISSUE: Is EO 66 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. Every act of legislation is presumed to be constitutional and for the public good; facts need not be stated to prove it. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37 People v. Del Rosario Case No. 105 G.R. No. L-7234 (May 21, 1955) FACTS: On July 27, 1953, information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay charging Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on May 28, 1 953. The accused presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Art. 90 and Art. 91 of the RPC. The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. Hence, an appeal against the dismissal is made to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: 1. Whether the prescriptive period should commence from the very day on which the crime was committed, or from the day following that in which it was committed; 2. W/N the term month in the RPC should be understood to be a month of 30 days, instead of the civil/calendar month. HELD: 1. In computation of the period of time within which an act is to be done, the l aw has always directed that the first be excluded and the last included (Art. 13, Civil Code). Art. 18 of the CC directs that any deficiency in any special law must be supplie d by its provisions. As the RPC is deficient in that it does not explicitly define ho w the period is to be computed, resort must be had to Art. 13 of the CC. 2. By express provision of Article 13 on the new Civil Code, a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month. In accordance therewith, the term month used in Art. 90 of the RPC should be understood to mean the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month. Hence, the Court held that the offense charged had not yet prescribed because July is the 60th day from May 29. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 38b, 46a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals Case No. G.R. No. 107797 (August 26, 1996) FACTS: Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and was survived by his legitimate brothers, Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio, and Macario, and a sister, Marcela. His estate consisted of 3 parcels of land (Lots 25, 26, & 27). Macario sold the 405 sq. mts . out of the 749 sq. mts. total area of Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo. Eventually, an extraju dicial partition with confirmation of sale was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs of Enrique, which consisted of the aforementioned lots. Thereafter, Venanc io sold Lot No. 7 (which belonged to him by virtue of the said partition), and a 14 9-sq. m. portion of Lot 26 to spouses Longalongs. It turned out, however, that Anselmo al ready obtained an OCT covering the whole of Lot No. 26. The complaints for reconveyanc e were filed 5 years after the issuance of such OCT to Anselmo. ISSUE: 1. Which prescriptive period for actions for annulment should prevail, Art. 1391 of the new CC or Art. 1144 of the same Code? 2. W/N there was a double sale. HELD: 1. Art. 1144 of the CC prevails. The prescriptive period for such actions is 10 years, as held in previous cases. Hence, the action for reconveyance had not yet prescribe d. There is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partiti on. Thus, the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. What Anselmo bought from his father was only 405 sq. m of Lot 26. The registration of the whole Lot 26 in the name of Anselmo was, therefore, done with evident bad faith. 2. There was no double sale. Both parties did not dispute the contents of the extrajudicial partition. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 6c, 7a 147 Pasno v. Ravina and Ravina Case No. 199 G.R. No. 31581 (February 3, 1930) Chapter VI, Page 273, Footnote No. 104 FACTS: Labitoria, during her lifetime, mortgaged 3 parcels of land to the PNB. When Labitoria died, a petition was presented for the probate of her last will and testament. During the pendency of the case, a special administrator of the estat e of the deceased was appointed by the court. The special administrator failed to comply with the conditions of the mortgage, and the PNB asked the sheriff to proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. The CFI ruled in favor of the spec ial administrator requiring the sheriff to abstain from selling the said lands. ISSUE: 1. W/N the will is valid 2. W/N the PNB had the right to foreclose in its favor the mortgage which was executed by Labitoria now that the mortgaged property is in custodia legis. HELD: 1. The law does not require that the will shall be dated. Accordingly, an errone ous date will not defeat a will. 2. Yes. The PNB had the right to foreclose the said mortgaged property. The mortgagee should foreclose the mortgage in accordance with Sec. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since Act 3135 fails to make provision regarding the sale of the mortgaged property which is in custodia legis, it would be logical to suppose Se c. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure would govern latter contingency. Act 3115 must be presumed to have been acquainted with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. LATIN MAXIM: 38a, 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION C & C Commercial v. NAWASA Case No. 42 G.R. No. L-27275 (November 18, 1967) Chapter VI, Page 274, Footnote No. 107 FACTS: NAWASA conducted three separate bids for the three different waterworks projects in Manila, Davao and Iloilo. However, C & C Commercial Corporation, one of those who participated in the bidding but eventually lost, filed three corresponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterworks projects contending that NAWASA violated Sec. 1 of RA 912, which should give preference to local materials that are available, practicable and usable. The sa id law also provides that this nationalistic policy of preferring for locally produ ced materials is in relation to the construction or repair work undertaken by the Government. NAWASA alleged that it should not be included within the meaning of the term Government as used in the said law. ISSUE: W/N NAWASA falls under the term HELD: Yes. The NAWASA should be deemed embraced within the term government found in RA 312, and in the construction of their works or purchase of materials thereof, local material should be given preference whenever available, practicable and usable. Government-owned or controlled corporations are not exempted from RA 912. Two laws are being considered in this case: C.A. No. 138 a nd RA 912. Both relate to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic purpose or object which is to give preference to locally produced materials in purchases, works or projects of the Government (referring to Filipino-First poli cy). LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 35, 36, 37, 38a, 38b government under RA 912. 148 Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan Case No. 41 G.R. No. L-21516 (April 29, 1966) Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 119 FACTS: The Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under RA 399 for an electric light, heat, and power system in Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, together with th e issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Serv ice Commission. However, the City of Butuan issued Ordinances numbered 11, 131 and 148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in the city. Butuan Sawmill, Inc. questioned the validity of the taxing ordinance which is deemed to have impaired the obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitio ner of property without due process of law. On the other hand, Respondent maintained that it was vested with the power to provide for the levy and collection of taxes for general and special purposes as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 19 50. ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the franchise business of Petitioners falls within the coverage of the taxing ordinances pursuant to the city s power of taxation. HELD: No. the inclusion of the franchise business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its chart er. Neither could the latter s power therein granted be taken as an authority delegate d to the city to amend or alter the franchise, considering the absence of an expre ss or specific grant of power to do so. Where there are two statutes, the earlier spec ial and the latter general and the terms of the general are broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special the fact that one is special and the othe r is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as a remainin g exception to the general as a general law of the land, while the other as the la w of a particular case. LATIN MAXIM: 25, 50, d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty Case No. 168 G.R. No. 14205 (September 30, 1919) Chapter VI, Page 279, Footnote No. 124 FACTS: The Defendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal revenue taxes upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine by virtue of an act of Congress in 1913. The latter contended that the taxes had been illegally collected pursuant to a private charter granted by the legislature in 1906. On t he other hand, Rafferty asserts that the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 pri vate charter. ISSUE: W/N the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter. HELD: No. A special law (including private charters) having the character of a private contract, supposes that the legislators intended to attend to the specia l facts and circumstances, the consideration of such being embodied in the special law. A general law subsequently enacted by the legislature cannot be taken to have modified or altered the charter, unless the intent to modify or alter is manifes t. Where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 50 People of the Philippines Case No. was charged by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan with the violation of the 1978 Election Code . The legislative intent in granting COMELEC the said power i s to insure the free. HELD: No. Sec 184 of the Election Code. 117 FACTS: The Petitioner. prosecute and try the offense charged against him is lodged with th e COMELEC. COMELEC registrar of Casiguran. 160 6 which speaks generally of other crimes or offenses committed by public officers in rel ation to their office. Almond . ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over election offenses with respect to public officers. At the same time.D. 9. 38. Page 277. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION US v. 37. orderly and honest conduct of elections. Sec. He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the jurisdiction t o investigate. Footnote No. The former cannot be construed as impliedly repealed by the lat ter thereby continuing to be an exception granted the more specific legislative inte nt it evinces. while Sec 182 of the 1978 Election Code vested the Commission with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and subsequently prosecute all election offenses punis hable under the same Code. R. To divest the COMELEC of its authority would seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving the aforemention ed constitutional mandate. coincidentally. and. XII [C] of the 1973 Constitution granted COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. LATIN MAXIM: 6. 1983) Chapter VI. the Court of First Instance (now RTC). No. which de als specifically with election offenses. must be favored over provisions of P.149 De Jesus v. L-61998 (February 22. 87 G. 2 of Art. He permitted Tawas Tahan to land in the Philippine Islands from the steamship at a place and time other than that designated by the immigration officers. ISSUE: W/N a conviction can be sustained when it appears that there was no consent. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. it was made withou t the Defendant s knowledge or consent. agent or person in charge of the vessel.W. 48 . 18 imposes upon one who has brought immigrant aliens into a United States port the duty of adopting due precautions to prevent the landing of any s uch alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officer s and fixes a penalty for permitting an alien so to land. The evidence showed that Defendant adopted due precautions to prevent the landing of Tawas Tahan. Almond. either tacit or express. to the landing of the alien. master and in charge of the steamship Rubi brought Tawas Tahan. The word permit implies that t he landing of the alien must be with the express or tacit consent of the owner.Case No. and that if the landing was made.R. 157 G. off icer. is an alien of East India who is afflicted w ith trachoma. HELD: Sec. 1906) FACTS: The complaint alleges that R. 41a. 11e. No. 2517 (June 2. R. 480.R. Estapia Case No. HELD: The term cockpit as used in the statute has a limited meaning so it cannot be construed to mean or include a clearing such as had been used by the Defendants. No. 298 G. Page 290. Page 289. 294 G. ISSUE: W/N the Appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law. 1917) Chapter VII. The Defendants held a cockfight on a cleari ng near a grove of buri palms. HELD: The Appellant must be acquitted since it is undisputed that he took no part in the keeping of the book in question and that he never personally made an entry i n it as he left everything to his bookkeeper. 1915 indicating whether any business was done on that day or not. including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue. 37.S. The prosecution argued that the term cockpit should be construed to mean any place in which a cockfight takes place. ISSUE: W/N the clearing where the cockfight was held by the Defendants is a cockpit within the contemplation of the law. v. in violation of Sec. unless th .US v. Courts will not hold one person crimina lly responsible for acts of another done without his knowledge or consent. Penal provisions of a statute are to be construed strictly and parti cular words used in the law should be construed in relation to the context. 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U. 28 FACTS: The Appellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue Law by failing to make an entry for the January 5. 1 of Act. Footnote No. He had employed a bookkeeper with the expectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his posit ion. Abad Santos Case No. 12262 (February 10. Footnote No. 1917) Chapter VII. 23 FACTS: A case was filed against Defendants for having engaged in cockfighting. 12891 (October 19. No. No. LATIN MAXIM: 25. 48 .e law clearly so provides. LATIN MAXIM: 41a. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 151 ROUND 3 . LATIN MAXIM: 30a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. natural or adopted brother or sister. a German citizen. and to death for the third. Neither can we appreciate relationship as aggravating. Padilla Case No. The Appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. acting . and Von Arend. Page 290. descendant. 1998) Chapter VII. no other relationship between the offender and the victim may aggravate the imposable penalty for the crime committed.152 People v.R. HELD: 1. 12 years old. 202 G. the common-law wife of the Appellant. ISSUE: 1. The trial court erred.R. 47027 (February 4. The trial court sentenced him to 2 terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts. Th e scope of the relationship under Art. holding that his common-law relationship with the victim s grandmother aggravated the penalty. 15 of the RPC encompasses only the spouse. W/N the trial court erred in appreciating the nighttime and relationship as aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly committed. 113 G. Nos. Private complainant Regina Guafin. W/N the trial court erred in finding Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. Page 291. Footnote No. Nocturnity must have been deliberately sought by the Appellant to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or facilitate his escape. 124303-05 (February 10. ascendant. 1941) Chapter VII. legitimate. 29 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of 3 counts of rape. Footnote No. Atop Case No. 2. No. and rel ative by affinity in the same degrees. a Filipino citizen. is the granddaught er of Trinidad Mejos. The offended party s straightforward and unequivocal statements show indelible badges of truth. 2. 30 FACTS: Appellants Padilla. Outside these enumerations and consistent with t he doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused. illegally. and criminally ev aded the provisions of Art. Under Act No. 4 of C. any legal provision. 108. 1 of the same Act applies punishme nt provided therein to all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision requ ires Philippine or United States citizenship as a requirement for the exercise or enj oyment of a right. franchises or privileges. 108. No. It is co ntended. would fall within its scope. franchise or privilege. HELD: Yes. citizens hip before the exercise or enjoyment of the privilege established in said article. which requires Philippine or U. No. that notwithstanding the infringement of Sec.S. Sec. No. 6c. The very title of Act No. 108.A. 108 gives unmistakable notice of the legislative inten t and purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationalization of certain rights. Any citizen of the Philippines or of the United States who knowingly allows his name or citizenship to be used so that a person not so qualified may enjoy t he privilege granted to domestic entities by C. franchise or privileges. as well as any alien pro fiting thereby. No. 138.A. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. One of such legal provision is Art.A. 4 of Act No. voluntarily. 4. No. 138. 138. entitled An Act to punish acts of evasion of the laws on the nationalization or c ertain rights. however.jointly and conniving with each other. 138 may be prosecuted under C. the Appellants cannot be punished therefore since the said Act imposes no penal sanction whatsoever. 138.A. 9a .A. whene ver existing at the time of the passage of said Act or promulgated thereafter. is guilty of violation of C. of Act No. ISSUE: W/N a violation of C. the sum of P13. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. to indemnify the Government without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. did willfully. and convert to h is own personal use and benefit. not only his guilt. LATIN MAXIM: 7b. 41 . Footnote No. His plea of guilt carried with it the acknowl edgement or admission that the willful acts charged were done with malice. that he willfully. and as such.77. When he entered the plea of guilty. Page 292. the sum of P13. and to pay the costs. to pay a fine. which he later withdrew and changed to guilty. L-2873 (February 28.R. he did not apply the missing funds to his personal use an d benefit but lost the same while he was drunk.897. There is nothing in the record that supports the claim that missing funds were lost while the Appellant was drunk. to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification.153 People v. Upon arraignment. The Appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in sentencing him to suffer the aforementioned penalty on the ground of lack of malice in the commiss ion of the crime. feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence. 36 FACTS: The Appellant was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds. namely. from said funds. Page 293. and convert to his own personal use and benefit. HELD: No. Salazar Case No. feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence. misappropriate. misapply. L-13371 (September 24. Footnote No. in that.77. he thereby admitted. accountable for the funds collected and received by him. Garcia Case No. from said funds. 1950) Chapter VII. ISSUE: W/N the penalties imposed by the lower court were excessive given the contention of Appellant. embezzle. misappropriate. 223 G. 41a.897. the Appellant pleaded not guilty. 209 No. He was sentenced to be imprisoned. but also all the material facts alleged in the information. No. The Appellant being the then Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer. 11e. 1959) Chapter VII. thus clearly indicating malice or evil intent on his part. and that conflicting interest in the same statute a re never to be supposed or so regarded. 80 as amended. pa r. unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language. the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison. All pa rts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof. 2. 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. RA 47 which amended Art. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication ha s also amended par. There is no incompatibility between granting Appellant o f the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. par. 68. HELD: Yes. which provides that when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age. ISSUE: W/N the Appellant. 2 of Art. has given rise t o the controversy. 68 of the RPC. benevolent or charitabl e institution. being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. ignoring the Appellant s minority. 2 of the RPC. 38b . We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. LATIN MAXIM: 37. as it now stand s and Art. was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art.FACTS: The lower court. sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years. 80 of the RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to be committed to the custody or care of a public or private. but always in the proper period. 68. R. 229 G. 1983) Chapter VII.R. HELD: The 8 year prescriptive period should be applied.154 People v. LATIN MAXIM: 43. 5060 (January 26. Page 293. L-23625 (November 25. Case No. 48 FACTS: Evidence suggests that Appellant slaughtered the carabao for human consumption. al. These parcels of land were forest land and as such are not disposable. et. Page 295. Slaughter of Large Cattle. Footnote No. Terrada. Appellees claim that the crime has already prescribed accordin g to the RPC. No. which is in violation of Act No. 3585 where the crime of perjury prescribes in 8 years. Branding. 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION US v. 3585. the one favorable to the accused or the sho rter prescriptive period should be applied. Penal statutes must be strictly applied. Footnote No. three separate informations for falsification of publ ic document were filed against the Appellees for having conspired with one another through false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the qualifications and had complied with all legal requirements of the law to entitl e them to a free patent. It appears that in the town of . ISSUE: W/N the prescriptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC or 8 years under Act No. 1910) Chapter VII. and Terrado applied for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in Camarines Sur. Gundran. 1147. 304 G. Appellees Obo. On March 1962. Toribo Case No. but the State argues that the crime has not prescribed under Act No. No. An Act Regulating the Registration. Where a crime is punishable by both a special law and the RPC but with different prescriptive periods. 42 FACTS: On November 1951 and May 1952. 1147 applies only when there is a municipal slaughterhouse. Well s ettled is the doctrine of the State s legitimate exercise of the right of eminent domain lai d down in jurisprudence. As long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption is done without a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer. 1147 do not penalize slaughter of large cattle without permit. Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible o f many interpretations. imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease. Appellant suggests that under such circumstances. 9a. against theft and to make recovery and return of the same easy. there aren t any slaughterhouses. Appellant also alleges that it is an infringement on his right over his property (carabao). 37 .Carmen in Bohol. making it reasonable fo r the legislative to prohibit and penalize a perfectly legal act utilizing personal pr operties of citizens (cattle) if not for the extraordinary conditions/threat present. More importantly . the penalty under t he Act applies. the provisions of Act No. ISSUE: W/N Act No. it is to protect the very life and existence of the inhabitants of the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. and the slaughter of a carabao is made therein. HELD: No. that which stays true with the intent of the law must be observed. The Act primarily seeks to protect the large cattle of the Philippine I slands. comes within the purview of the class of articles referred to by the law. and it is clear so no interpretation is required. 9a. No. 299 G. 2. criminal intent is not necessary. had no corrupt intention to violate the law. 7a. upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguina ldo. Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made by statutory requirement. 1909) Chapter VII.155 US v. but to a type of flag. 43. Director of Public Works Case no. The description in the law refers not to a partic ular flag. 49 FACTS: Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec. emblem. 11a. He claims acquittal o n the ground that his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the law wa s referring to identical banners. W/N to be in violation of the Flag Law. flag. 4963 (September 15. No. 2. a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Arriete v. 37125 (September 30. W/N the wording of the law exempts the articles displayed by the Defendant. Page 295.S. HELD: 1. No. ignorance of the law is not a valid defense for violation thereof. in the form of a small butt on. ISSUE: 1. Footnote No. Appellant must have acted with criminal intent. though not exactly identical. 1696 or the Flag Law. Clearly therefore. 9c. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 1933) . and the flag or banner or device used during the late armed insurrection in the Philippine Islands against the U. 22 G. criminal intent isn t necessary for violation of the Flag Law. Appellant claims that he is ignorant of the law and consequently. The medallions. The statute did not include intent as an element of a crime. displaying in his store a number of medallions. 1 of Act No.R. etc. and its executi on impossible.R. Go Chico Case No. Intention of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial bec ause to hold otherwise would render the statute substantially worthless. she acquired no right at all. HELD: No. like the right against undue deprivation of property. these statut es are construed strictly. Thus. It is not sufficient that they had actual knowledge. 7a. as legal guardian on behalf of minor Carmen Jagunap. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. but Carmen Jagunap was. However. under the Irrigation Act No. 2152 provided that regarding expropriation of land. Page 296. 52 FACTS: Appellant Arriete. No such publication or notice was evident in this case. 43 .Chapter VII. sought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold by the sheriff in a public auction to Appellee Ledesma (and thereafter sold to Fermin Caram) to satisfy the judgment of a lien for nonpayment of taxes. whenever there are statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land or property. Act No. 2152. ISSUE: W/N Appellee Ledesma has any rights over the lots acquired in good faith under the final deed of sale of the provincial sheriff. Statutes in the derogation of rights are construed strictly. and notice should be given to the owners to file answer or appear in the civil case. it was found that the delinquent taxpayer was not the owner of sa id lots. This is because people in a republi can state like ours enjoy inherent rights guaranteed by the Constitution or protecte d by law. the list of lands filed by the Director of Public Lands m ust be published. HELD: No. Between two constructions. Footnote No.R. he won. Now (1980) he is running for Governor again under KBL. 1994) Chapter VII. Footnote No. At that time. ISSUE: W/N COMELEC was correct in dismissing petition which contended that Respondent San Luis should be disqualified from running due to turncoatism. he cannot be disqualified. the latter construction must be adopted.R. 246 G. 57 FACTS: . He was expelled from the LP in 1978 and this can t be construed as a willful chang e of affiliation. 57 FACTS: Nacionalista Party (NP) filed a petition against Respondent San Luis of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for turncoatism. L-53460 (May 27. so Respondent could not have changed affiliations simply to anticipate the next election. Page 297. The constitutional prohibition cannot be applied to the period beyond the frame-up (1971-1975) term to which public officials were elected in 1971 because this would unduly impinge on freedom of association guaranteed to all. No.156 Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. Reyes Construction Inc. 108718 (July 14. 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Genaro B. Page 297. but it was extended lawfully by the President. 1983) Chapter VII. 51 G. No elective public officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office or within six months immediately preceding or following an election. He did not change affiliations during his term. Court of Appeals Case No. 37. Under the law. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. No. one of which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so. When Respondent San Luis ran as Governor of Laguna under Liberal Party (LP) in 1972. COMELEC Case No. no one even knew when the next elections were. v. The normal expiry f or the term was 1975. D. Petitioners howeve r claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly by DPWH. 102. Terminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil. HELD: No.Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the notice of pre-termination in their contract for construction of the flood contro l facilities and land improvement works in Butuan City. Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% negative slippage (delay in the infrastructure project). Petitioners won in a publi c bidding held for this purpose. Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the contract to other bidders. 12a . a previously disqualified bidder. 1870 and DPWH Circular No. 9a. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or res cind the contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurre d a negative slippage of 15% or more. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed construction projects with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily to save money and to avoid dislocation of the financial projections and/or cash flow of the government. ISSUE: W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid. according to P. the government was either author ized to take over the project or let another contractor finish it. would actually result in a financial loss to the government . but also termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reaches 15% . and must be at least substantially or fully and fairly complied with. the steps prescribed by the statute must be followed or the proceedings will be void. alleging that the land is a part of certain lands described in condemnation proceedings. Since these statutes are in derogation of general righ t and of common-law modes of procedure. Case No. et al. LATIN MAXIM: 21a. Footnote No. Chinese Community of Manila. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for trespass on his land on the ground that it was his duty to seek redress in the condemnation proceedings instituted by Defendant company. 62 FACTS: Defendant company took possession of and occupied a small parcel of land without the express consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefo re. and recover damages for its full value.R. 1912) Chapter VII. No. 289 G. they must be strictly construed in favor of th e landowner. Footnote No. No. L-14355 (October 31. and by its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to th e Plaintiff.R. the Plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute any appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a resul t of an unauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property. 64 FACTS: . Thus. 1919) Chapter VII. HELD: As a general rule. Page 297. In the absence of proof of a substantial compliance with the provisions of law touching such proceedings. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION City of Manila v. 61 G. Page 297. The theory on which the trial judge correctly proceeded was that Defendant company having unlawfully taken possession of a part of the tract of land in question. Case No. L-6690 (March 29. Plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire tract.157 Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co. If that is true. It is alleged. those questions (of necessity). would make the cemetery in question public property. and hear proof upon. be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement the extension of Rizal Avenue. and hear proof upon. the petition of the Plaintiff must be denied. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge. it intended that the courts should inquire into. the necessity of the expropriation. HELD: In our opinion. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question. 24a. the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. 43 . when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists fo r the exercise of eminent domain. in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery. the courts may inquire into. and not denied. that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese. for the reason that the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public prop erty.Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands. ISSUE: W/N in expropriation proceedings by the Appellant. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or exped ient that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes. which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff. which fact. Page 299. L-12408 (December 28. 76 FACTS: Petition for naturalization of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the requirements of the law. the law requires that he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior t o the filing of application unless he is exempt from complying with said requirement. as he claims. 1959) Chapter VII. Footnote No. he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and h as given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools recognized by the government. 76 FACTS: Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship. In the instant case. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lee Cho v. Republic of the Philippines Case No. Page 299.R. Footnote No. ISSUE: . 1960) Chapter VII. Republic of the Philippines Case No. and (b) if he has continuously resided in the Philippines for a period of 30 years or more provided that he has given primary and secondary education to all his children either in a public school or private sch ools recognized by the government. The law exempts one from filing a declaration of intention in two cases: (a) if he i s born in the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school recognized by the government. No. Petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because. Considering that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant . 72 G. No.Velasco v.R. L-14214 (May 25. HELD: No. we are constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for naturalization. 165 G. Considering that the provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled.W/N the Petitioner has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his duty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children. The government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education to his daughters Angelita and Lourdes. It was further shown t hat in spite of Lourdes s alleged sickness. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 43 . the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petitio n should be denied. The reason that Angelita was not able to complete her studies because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but betr ays the sincerity of Petitioner in embracing our citizenship. 7b. HELD: No. she continued her studies in a Chinese school which strictly employed a Chinese curriculum. but rather stated that he believes in democracy upo n cross-examination. 76 FACTS: Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION . Footnote No.159 Co v. The court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to Petitioner after the l apse of two years from the date the decision became final and all the requisites provide d for in RA 503 were met. L-12150 (May 26. It is contended that such belief is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our constitution." the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization.R. The government appealed the decision contending that from the evidence itself introduced by Petitioner it would appear that he failed to c omply with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to becom e a Filipino citizen. Page 299. 7b. Republic of the Philippines Case No. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the qualifications for naturalization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in the law. Thus. No. 1960) Chapter VII. he has not stated that he believes in the principles underlying the constitution. Petitioner did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are ref erred to in the law. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws. Conside ring that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in f avor of the government and against the applicant. 24 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: Yes. it is claimed. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproacha ble manner in his relation with our government as evidenced by his failure to regist er his family with the Bureau of Immigration and to file his income tax return. . Marcos Case No. Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu. OIC. levy. 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. this exemption was withdrawn by Sec. 157 G. LATIN MAXIM: 43 taxable person. taxation is the rule. or are the lifeblood of the nation. a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Sec. 85 FACTS: Respondent Cesa. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislat ive intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a taxable person under its Charter. Such power is guaranteed by the Constitution and enhanced further by the LGC. Page 301. demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the Petitioner. No. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is a HELD: Yes. 1996) Chapter VII. L-120082 (September 11. exemption therefore is the exception. 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes. it has the power to impose. it had already become.Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. except real property tax. in light of the foregoing disquisitions.R. and collect taxes within its jurisdiction . 234 of the LGC. Else wise stated. While i t may be true that under its Charter the Petitioner was exempt from the payment of realty taxes. Even if the Petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax. who objected to such demand claiming in its favor Sec. assess. Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as an LGU and a political subdivision. Footnote No. Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society. the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting ta x exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liber ally in favor of the taxing authority. Court of Tax Appeals and Ateneo de Manila University Case No. the Commission had in view not only the conditio ns peculiar to and inherent in Roman Catholic parishes in the Islands. No. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. Court Of Appeals. No. 136 G. 1906) Chapter VII. W.160 The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines v. 79 FACTS: In 1901. 1997) Chapter VII.R. and although a parsonage within the area was already exempt. Although separated from th e cathedral by an intervening block. but their in tent was to extend the exemption to the parsonages appurtenant to all churches. And it is a general rule that statutes exempting charitable and religious property from taxa tion should be construed fairly and not unnaturally though strictly and in such manne r as to give effect to the main intent of the legislators. 81 FACTS: . and the City of Manila Case No. Hastings. 183 of the Philippine Commission. 74 G. Footnote No. overruling the claim that it was exempt from taxation as provided by Sec. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Page 300. ISSUE: W/N the house of the archbishop of Manila should be exempted from tax. being 80 to 100 meters distant from the church. Assess or and Collector of the City of Manila. Appellant imposed a tax upon the residence of the Roman Catholic archbishop of Manila. 1974 (March 15. Footnote No. Page 300. 9b. the residence of the archbishop should still be exempted from taxation as a parsonage adjacent to the cathedral. A. The Appellant contended that the said property was not a parsonage and not adjacent to the cathedral. and that the exemptio n privilege was already exhausted by its allowance to the parsonage of the adjoini ng chapel. 115349 (April 18. 48 of Act No.R. HELD: In enacting its exemption laws. Private Respondent is a non-stock. 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner contended that private Respondent was an independent contractor within the purview of Sec. and therefore subject to 3% contractor s tax. performing the work of an independent contractor and. one of which is the Insti tute of Philippine Culture (IPC). and was conducting studies for a fee. HELD: No. Petitioner issued a demand letter regarding the institution s tax liabilities. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent. the IPC. In 1983. LATIN MAXIM: 43 . Petitioner erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first applying a strict interpretation of the tax laws. which is engaged in social sciences studies of Philipp ine society and culture. The research activity of the IPC was done in pursuance of maintaining privat e Respondent s university status and not in the course of an independent business of selling such research with profit in mind. There was no evidence that the IPC ev er sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in business apart from the academic purposes of the university. non-profit educational institution with auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines. thus subject to 3% contractor s tax levied by Sec. through its auxiliary unit or branch. 205 of the Tax Code. 167 G. ISSUE: Whether dust shields should be classified as manufactures of wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways. manufactures of wool. 30264 (March 12. not otherwise provided for ar e subject to 40% ad valorem. not otherwise provided for. the CFI overruled the decision and classified dust shields as detached parts of vehicles f or use on railways. and detached parts thereof are subject to 10% ad valorem. Under par. the particular enactment must be operative. Footnote No. No. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. And when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former. 84 FACTS: Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of wool on all of its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from dust the oil deposi ted therein which serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. HELD: Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of vehicles under par. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language use d. 197 of same law. LATIN MAXIM: 38a.161 Manila Railroad Company v. 1929) Chapter VII. 43. 256 . Page 301. On the other hand. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic v. 141 o f Sec. they should be construed strictly against the government and in f avor of the citizen. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified dust shields as manufactures of wool. vehicl es for use on railways and tramways. under par. and the general one must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. Upon appeal. In case of doubt. Insular Collector of Customs Case No.R. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909. 197. however. 213 because of Revenue Regulation No. 23. 8-72 was null and void. The Government contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax amnesty under P. then such provision is null and void for being contrary to the Presidential Decree.117. If Revenue Regulation No.000. L-69344 (April 26. Due to this.D. ISSUE: W/N Respondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty. 26 . 213 and 370.D. Footnote No.283. 621.D.63 for taxes from the years 1955-1959. 84 FACTS: Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1.R.D. 1991) Chapter VII. A reinvestigation of their debt was m ade and the amount was changed to P17. HELD: Yes. 8-72 which stated that amnesty is not allowed for those who had pending assessments with the BIR.G. Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation No. T hey paid such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of such. Page 301.08. because Revenue Regulation No. LATIN MAXIM: 8. 8-72 provided an exception to the coverage of P. 213. their debt even decreased to about P12. No. 213 did not contain any exemption wherein one should not be allowed to amnesty. Revenu e regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a Presidential Decree. 8-72 was null because P. They applied for tax amnesty under P. Page 301. Department of Finance Secretary Case No. Respondent con tends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes. 42a. L-23623 (June 30. 103(a). No. 1977) Chapter VII. 3 G. In fact. Inc. Footnote No. copra was classified as a food product under Sec.R. ISSUE: . ISSUE: W/N copra is an agricultural food product which is exempt from VAT and thus not under the purview of RMC 47-91. although copra is from coconut. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue s interpretation is entitled to great respect because it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and implementation of tax laws. it is not an agricultural food product. 1994) Chapter VII. 103(b). copra per se is not intended for human consumption. Page 301. 108524 (November 10. No. b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Acting Commissioner of Customs v. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and therefore exempt from tax in all stages. thus it is not exempt from VAT. and 80% of the coconut plant is edible. Under Sec. Footnote No.Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders.R. Manila Electric Company Case No. HELD: No. the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owne r of the land which the same is produced. 82 G. Prior to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91. 85 FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buying and selling copra. the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT in all stages. RMC 47-91 then reclassified copra as a non-food product. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Under Sec. 85 FACTS: RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature. v. including distribution. 43. The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Brady. The law frowns on exemption from taxa tion. The Supreme Court looked into the definition of insulating oils under Materials Handbook by George J.W/N insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its taxes. insulating oil is different from insulators. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimi juris. 8th Edition. HELD: No. b . Footnote No. 1988) Chapter VII. Manila Jockey Club Inc. 97 FACTS: Respondents Manila Jockey Club Inc. L-8755 (March 23. 7a. or operator. the PCSO. and Philippine Racing Club Inc. lessee. 27 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. The lease by the Respondents of the l and clearly has nothing to do with horse racing. HELD: The law refers to gross receipts and not gross income . No. ISSUE: W/N rentals received by the Respondents from private horse owners or trainers. singly and not all at one and the same time. 68 G. the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society ar e subject to the 20% amusement tax. 1956) Chapter VII.Collector of Internal Revenue v. Footnote No. L-46881 (September 15. thereby positively implying that the tax should be paid by either the proprietor. as the case may be. Page 304. the three tax payers being connected by the disjunctive conjunction or .R.R. are corporations organized primarily for holding horse races. Page 306. the lessee. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. or the operator. the White Cross. 102 FACTS: Respondents were charged of 8 criminal cases for violating the National Internal Revenue Code for manufacturing alcoholic products subject to specific t . It is to be remembered that the law makes the proprietor. Castañeda Jr. This necessarily excludes income of the Respondents received on days when they d o not legally and actually hold horse races. This clause is plain demonstration that the gross receipts refer to the collections on days when the race track is open to the general public and admission fees are or are not charg ed. No. Petitioner is contendi ng that payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and lea se are subject to the 20% amusement tax in the National Internal Revenue Code. Case No. Case No. of the amusement place liable for the amusement tax. 104 G. HELD: To be entitled to the extinction of liability provided by P.D. 370 took effect. 370. 370 which declares tax amnesty. but rather to the sworn information or complaint f iled by an informer with the BIR under RA 2338 in the hope of earning an informer's rewa rd. the claimant must have voluntarily disclosed his previously untaxed income or wealth and paid the required 15% tax on such previously untaxed income or wealth. the claimant is not entitled to the benefits expressly exclud ed from the coverage of P. Respondents argued that they are exempt from taxes because they are entitled to the benefits available under P.D. 370 refers not to a criminal information filed in cou rt by a fiscal or special prosecutor.D.ax without having paid the annual privilege tax therefore. 370.D. the violations with which the Respondents were charged had already been discovered by the BIR when P. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is entitled to the benefits of tax amnesty under the P. 43 . Where the disclosu re was not voluntary. It is necessary to note that the "valid information under RA 2338" referred to in Sec.D. 1(a)(4) of P. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.D. In the instant case. 25a. No. No. 259 G.164 Zamora v. Inc. The rule of strict constructi on of statutes granting exemptions from taxation is not applicable in this case. 27. 123. b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic Flour Mills. Page 306. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. L-25602 31 (February 18. 975 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons who have paid an excessive assessment on taxes prior to the creation of the Board of Tax revision. . Footnote No. 9d. 9f. 82 and 551. v. City of Manila Case No. Petitioner was granted tax-exemption privileges pursuant to RA 901. While some of the Acts of the Commission have consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a special signification. Petitioner prays that the word land in the title and body of the statute be interpreted to mean land including buildings and improvements thereon . ISSUE: W/N the word land should be interpreted liberally to mean land with the buildings and improvements thereon. providing for a refund of taxes which have been collected unju stly and upon an unfair and inequitable valuation of land. 1970) Chapter VII. 3433 (March 2. and the plain principles of justice suggest that the act under consideration should be construed with some liberality. 1907) Chapter VII.R. nevertheless such use has not been uniform and the deviat ions therefrom have been so frequent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation . 175 G. HELD: While the distinction does not appear to have been consciously made in Act No. This rule is not without its exceptions and limitations. 102 FACTS: Act No. 103 FACTS: In 1957. Page 306.R. It is a remedial statute. Footnote No. it is disregarded in Act Nos. 186-A of Internal Revenue provides that whenever a tax-free product is utilized in the manufacture or production of any article. Respondent Commissioner finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency tax of P23. but the cost of wheat lef t over was treated as deductible item from gross sales in 1959. and are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer.55. 43 . Petitioner imported a quantity of wheat grains. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.170. so that there is n o occasion for the court s seeking the legislative intent. 7a. part of which was not u sed in the business that year. the law must be taken as it is. Petitioner paid sales tax of P37. HELD: No. it is equally a recognize d principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous. devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. the value of such tax-free product shall be dedu cted. While It is true that tax exemptions (and deductions) are not favored in the law . Sec. in the determinatio n of the value of such finished article. The surplus of wheat grains were finally utilized into f lour and sold in 1959.In 1958.17 because material s purchased from tax-exempt industries were not acquired from one enjoying taxexemption privilege under our laws. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales tax.275. 7a. No. The trial court granted and/or admitted the decedent s holographic will to probate. the . 8 13 of the New Civil Code affects only the validity of the dispositions in the will. 1960) Chapter VII. L-14322 (February 25. 6c. 117 FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for probate of holographic will left by the late An nie Sand.R. 61 G. bu t not its probate. In case of alterations. On appeal. 5 G. Page 309. 814. LATIN MAXIM: 1. It was also opposed by Dr. correctly held that Annie Sand could not dispose the other property including the house and lot. They alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind. 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. Footnote No. Page 309. Art. notwithstanding no ncompliance with Art. ISSUE: W/N the CA is correct that the will did not comply with the law. Private Respondent opposed the petition claiming the will or testament was not of the decedent and the same was procured through improper pressure. A holographic will can still be admitted to probate. 117 FACTS: In the matter of Petition for Probate Proceedings before the CFI of Cebu. but not its entirety. said Decision was reversed by the CA for its failure to comply with Art. HELD: No. 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy Case No. however. cancellations or insertions. The CA. the lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. 106720 (September 15. 1994) Chapter VII.R. and was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.165 Ajero v. Footnote No. No. Court of Appeals Case No. which she shares with her father s other hei rs. Jose Ajero claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner of the property. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallo wance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. as amended. HELD: Yes. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements. and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the test ator and of each other. 618 of Act No. which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clau se. 190. and courts cannot supply the defective execution of the will.will consists of two pages and the last page had been duly signed by the testatr ix and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page but the testa trix failed to sign the left margin of the first page. 618 of Act No. Sec. for failure to comply with it is fatal to the val idity of the will. The lower court denied the petition because the will was not executed in accordance with law. This requirement is mandatory. All t hese requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed. citing Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. ISSUE: W/N the probate court (CFI) is correct in denying the petition for the allowance of the will. Accordingly. 190. otherwise it is entirely void. requires that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses. cannot be admitted to probate. Thus. as amended. it has been held that Statutes prescribing the formalities to be obse rved in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. 7a . we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore. Footnote No. 70 G. Footnote No. . 626 but was denied by the GSIS. L-17750 (August 31. as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive. Page 310.L. 78617 (June 18. Borja Case No.R. On June 18. Respondent filed the present proceedings on the Court of Industrial Relations. Employee s Compensation Commission Case No. v.D. W/N the scope of the term action falls under RA 1994. 1 G. The statute under consideration is undoubtedly a labor statute and as such must be liberally construed in favor of the laborer concerned. The allegation in the complaint filed by the Respondent employee that he was separated automatically from the said employment with Defendants. 2. and notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement. But. No. he met an accident and as a result. For injuries su stained. the Petitioner rendered full duty. HELD: 1.166 A. and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs justif y the conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wages. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm. No. The Petitioner contends that the phrase action already commenced employed in the statute should be construed as meaning only actions filed in a regular court of justice. Defendants refused and still refuse to reinstate Plaintiff. he claimed for disability benefits under P. W/N the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction. This was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. LATIN MAXIM: 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lazo v. Page 310. On his way home. With this limited and narrow interpretation. 1990) Chapter VII.R. 1986. and damages. 2. we cannot agree. he sustained injuries. 123 FACTS: Petitioner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned t o its main office. 1962) Chapter VII. ISSUE: 1. Inc. Pending this. 123 FACTS: Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the CFI of Albay to recover compensation for overtime work rendered. Ammen Transportation Company. the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the next day. In the case at bar.ISSUE: W/N the denial of compensation under P. While presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen s Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code.D. because the reliever did not come on time. 626 was valid. it can be seen that Petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off. it is significant that the liberality of the law in ge neral favor of the workingman still subsists. LATIN MAXIM: 9a . HELD: No. There is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from h is usual. regular homeward route. LATIN MAXIM: 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Abella v. 2 G. 1981) Chapter VII. The Petitioner appealed to the ECC which affirmed the denial. 1987) Chapter VII.R. 124 FACTS: Petitioner leased a farm land. She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. with the GSIS. Neither is there a showing that he used drugs. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a bout of alcoholic intoxication shortly before he died. 626. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino and the nature of his employment. Footnote No.167 Villavert v. employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Constabula ry. includi ng its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor. L-48605 (December 14. Hacienda Danao Ramona. 313 G. Page 310. in Negros Occidental for a period of ten years. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. Employee s Compensation Commission Case No. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code. 124 FACTS: The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert. It is renewable at her instance. No. ISSUE: W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of the Petitioner. computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. Page 310. which she . HELD: From the foregoing facts of record. it is clear that Marcelino died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as coder verifier. a s amended. Footnote No. 71813 (July 20.R. who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic. No. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 9d . The court held such contention untenable as th e issue had already been adjudicated in the case of Anucension v. because when she leased the farm land. ISSUE: W/N the Respondents are entitled to separation pays. Petitioner dismiss ed the two Respondents. The prohibition is general. and that all doubts shall be resolved in favor of labor. The court further stated th at the purpose of Art. It was sta ted in the said case that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is no t absolute and unqualified. the worker s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. NLRC. Upon expiration of the leasehold rights. During the existence of the lease she employed the private Respondents. for another ten years. 284 of the Labor Code. employees like the Respondents will lose the benefits to which they are entitled.opted to do. Without such law. 284 is for the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment. Notwithstanding the contention of the Petitioner that the aforementioned provisi on violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts. Moreover . neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to the workers upon the expiration of the lease. 9a. it is well settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code. The applicable law on the case is Art. HELD: Yes. entered into a contract of services with Calmar Security Agency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. No. Jr. Footnote No.168 Del Rosario & Sons v. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. L-64204 (May 31. the widow of the . ISSUE: W/N the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should invalidate the appeal. The lack of verification could have easily been corrected by making an oath and even though the payment was late. died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a teacher in the Las Piñas Municipal High School. filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against the Petitioner and the security agency. 124 FACTS: Nazario Manahan. herein Respondents. The claimant. The Labor Arbiter found the security age ncy to be liable for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging company. 79 G. it was still paid. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late. in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters. 221 of the Labor Code. L-44899 (April 22.R. 36 No. Page 310. The latter allowed the appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure by which the appeal was made. Footnote No. 1981) Chapter VII. The security agency appealed the case to the NLRC. Page 310. a logging company. the rules of evidence prevailing in cou rts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code that the Commission and the Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of justice. 124 FACTS: Petitioner. The securi ty guards. 1985) Chapter VII. Employee s Compensation Commission Case No. 40b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manahan v.. 9d. According to Art. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. HELD: No. Moreover. thus the presumption of compensability should be in favor of the claimant. Again she was denied by the GSIS. HELD: Yes. Epigastric pain is a symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of Ente ric Fever. ISSUE: W/N the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits. the case should be resolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberall y construed to give relief to the worker and his dependents. 40b . The findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of hi s employment. GSIS denied such claim. he was treated for Epigastric pain-and ulcer-like symptoms. ECC. 9a.deceased. it is well settled that in case of doubt. 9d. This was supported by his medical records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. the provisions of the Workmen s Compensation Act shall be applied. filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husba nd was due to his occupation. However. Claimant filed for a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prio r to his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his employment. Pursuant to the doctrine of Corales v. Bernabe . LATIN MAXIM: 5a. She then appealed her case to the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim. an d one of them happens to be insolvent. L-12164 (May 2. They hired Roque Balderama as a security guard. other provisions of l aw show how their liability is solidary. ISSUE: W/N the Commission erred in ordering the Appellants to pay jointly and severally. L-1916 (April 30. 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code and Se c. However. Art. reasonably and liberally for the employee and dependents.R. Page 310. If the responsibility were to be merely jointly. HELD: No. 279 G. which is evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protection to employees . 1949) Chapter VII. 75 G. His widow and children filed a claim fo r compensation with the Workmen s Compensation Commission. the award would only be partially satisfied. the liability of busines s partners should be solidary. 36. 38. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.494. Footnote No. 40 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sibulo v. 124 FACTS: Appellants Benito Liwanag and Maria Liwanag Reyes are co-owners of Liwanag Auto Suppy. Altar Case No. 1959) Chapter VII. 2 of the WCA reasonably indicate that in compensation cases. Although the WCA does not contain any provision expressly declaring that the obligation arising from compensation is solidary. Appellants did not question the right of Appellees to compensation nor the amount awarded. Workmen s Compensation Commission Case No. 9c. the compensation should be divisible. Footnote No.R. No. 125 FACTS: . Page 310. The WCA should be construed fairly. 9d. who was killed in the line of duty by criminals. No.40 to the claimant in lump sum.169 Liwanag v. they claim that because the Workmen s Compensation Act did not give an express provision declaring solidary obligations of business partners. which was granted in an award that ordered the Appellants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P3. Petitioner. 9c. Petitioner was to furnish the work animals and farm implements and Respondent was to defray all expenses of planting and cultivation . entered into a contract of tenancy with Respondent. The Tenancy Act is a remedial legislation intended to better the lot of the share-cropper by giving him a more equitable participation in the pro duce of the land which he cultivates. 36. the legislatu re could not have meant to sanction other stipulations which. 7 of the Tenancy Law. 12a. are similar to those expressly mentioned. ISSUE: W/N the contract is against public policy as contemplated in Sec. In declaring certain stipulations to be against public policy. the tenant shall receive 50% only. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. owner of first class agricultural land. It was taken to the Court of Industrial Relations. 7 of the Tenancy Law. though not specified. for the reason that instead of receiv ing 60% of his total share. 7 of the Tenancy Law. The purpose of the law might easily be defeated otherwise. which declared the contract illegal as against public poli cy as contemplated in Sec. HELD: No. The net produce was to be divided equally. it should be construe d to further its purpose in accordance with its general intent. Being a remedial statute. Petitioner claimed th at the contract is not among those expressly declared to be against public policy in Se c. which he argues to be an exhaustive list. The contract was disapproved by the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice because the divisi on contravenes with a provision of the Tenancy Law. 40 . 38 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Vicente v. L-44570 (May 30. The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenan ts into farmhands or hired laborers with no rights. The Petitioners then claimed that since the basis of t he suit was a share tenancy agreement. the Code of Agrarian Reforms was passed repealing the Agricultural Tenancy Act. 127 FACTS: .170 Guerrero v. which ordered his reinstatement. Afterwards. 1991) Chapter VII. the rule that the repeal of a stat ute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has the exception when vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired.1986) Chapter VII.R. 12. the decisions lost their validity. 32. Employee s Compensation Commission Case No. The Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court. An agreement is not abrogated by the subsequent repeal of the law. HELD: No. Footnote No. Court of Appeals Case No. He was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation. No. which affirmed the Court of Agrarian Reform s decision. th e Agricultural Tenancy Act would govern their relationship. He shared 1/ 3 of the proceeds with his coconut-related responsibilities. Page 310. No. ISSUE: W/N share tenancy ended. Footnote No. 85024 (January 23. 54 G. Later the Petitioners ordered Benitez out. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. the Petition ers and Benitez executed an agreement allowing Benitez to continue working as tenant. Page 310. Pending appeal. Benitez sued in the Court of Agrarian Relations. 126 FACTS: Apolonio Benitez was hired by the Petitioners to work in their plantation. 168 G. But assuming that they were. The Agricultural Tenancy Act an d Agricultural Land Reform Code have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform.R. The Petitioners appealed to the CA. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The application was supported by a physician s certification that Petitioner was classified as under permanent total disability. The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incur red. 11b. he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to income benefits under the GSIS retirement program. So at the age of forty-five. The significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner could avail of the full income benefits. GSIS contended that Petitioner was only perman ent partial disability . 12a . ISSUE: Whether Petitioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial disability. The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision. he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. especially the humble rank and file. HELD: Petitioner was under permanent total disability. It is for this reaso n that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries and requi res a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. At the course of his employment. The Court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the we lfare of government workers.Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. an additional amount for accrued leave alleged to be due them under the same section of the Administrative Code. On her 5th pregnancy. that is to say. The matter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed becau se the cause of his wife s death was non-work-related. herein Petitioner. Page 311. ISSUE: . 1994) Chapter VII. when the hotel was leased to a private concern on June 30. An hour later.. Footnote No. She underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards. No.171 Tamayo. 128 FACTS: 265 employees of Appellee Manila Hotel Co. filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS. LATIN MAXIM: 46a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Corporal v. Her husband.R. who had to be dismissed and paid the value of their accumulated leave under Sec. Manila Hotel Company Case No. HELD: No. it can only be given effect from the date of its approval. On her 4th pregnancy. she had several pregnancies. 266 of the Administrative Code. she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a hilot . 1957) Chapter VII. No. brought the present action to recover from the Appellee Manila Ho tel Co.R. 83 G. As RA 1081 does not provide that it is t o have a retroactive effect. approved on June 15. 131 FACTS: Norma Corporal was an employed public school teacher. as later amended by RA 1081. Page 311. 86020 (August 5. she suffered complete abortion. as amended by RA 611. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued benefits. Footnote No. But said ag ency denied. she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vagi nal bleeding. 283 G. During the course of her work. et al. 15 days before they were separated from the company. v. 1954. L-8975 (June 29. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. 1954. Art. Employee s Compensation Commission Case No. While as a rule that labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applica nt. HELD: No. 43 . The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma s uterus developed before or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her physiological structure and changes in the body.W/N Petitioner could avail the compensation benefit. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. there is also a rule that such liberal construction cannot be applied if the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code are clear. it mak es no exception. Page 320. When the statute makes no distinction. Furthermore. 22 should still apply to special laws. 1989) Chapter VII.R. Also. 74226-227 (July 27. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1922. it was increased to 6 months. 168 FACTS: On June 1983. 1923) Chapter VII. 17905 (January 27. A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than t o annul prosecution of the offender. Art. 3030. 37. the SC contends that Art. 7.172 People v. which was enacted by th e Legislature on March 9. HELD: Act No. Statutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mizaph Reyes through falsified . No. 167 FACTS: Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. Footnote No. 46a. 22 of the RPC can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty. LATIN MAXIM: 26. 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Footnote No. 3030 is meant to apply to the Administrative Code and whether the said act should be retroactive with respect to Art. pursuant to Sec. 222 G. Nos. 3030 is intended to be amendatory to several sections of the Administrative Code. Moran Case No.R. Defendant alleges that the crime ha s already prescribed. The new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign acknowledges that the previous one was unjust and enforcing the latter would be contradictory. Reyes Case No. 71 of Act No. When the decision was published. Hence with regard to Art. 22 and 7 of the RPC. 216 G. Page 320. Moran. The court will not hesitate to apply rules of construction in civil cases to tha t of criminal ones. as the registration of land acts as a notice to the whole world. always susceptible possible challenges. LATIN MAXIM: 48 . should the circumstances warrant. as stated in People v. Furthermore. This should also app ly to criminal cases. the lower courts held that the period of prescri ption has long passed. in the interpretation of the law and that of the prescription of crimes. it is also presumed that t he purchaser has examined the instruments of the record. 1961.signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. a liberal reading that is most favorable to the accused is the one to be adopted. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the case due to the passing of the prescriptive period. Rights should not be left on a precarious balance. HELD: The SC ruled affirmed the decision of the lower court. Under this. However as the deed was registered on May 26. 173 Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Respondent Gasilao only received a 25% increase and on ly after January 15. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in the retroactivity of Respondent Gasilao s pension. After finally complying with all the necessities. from Jun e 22. 1968. To pay the difference of P100 plus P30 per month and P20 per month for each minor from June 22. 9 and RA 1920. and then P100 plus P10 per minor. 1957 to August 7. due to the lack of funds.50 per month for his wife. 1968. The laws on veteran pension must be liberally construed as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. Page 321. 1972 is subject to the release of funds by the government. Granting su ch pensions the earliest possible time is more in tune with the spirit of RA 65. the difference of P75 plus P22. 1971. for P100 a month and an additional P10 per minor. 40b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION . as the government has yet to provide the necessary funds. 1969 to January 14.R. 1957 up to August 7. The difference fr om June 22. and P20 per minor from Jan uary 16. 170 FACTS: Respondent Gasilao. on June 22. 1982) Chapter VII. 1971 up to December 31. the judgment of the lower cou rts is modified as. starting from December 18. Sec. increased to P100 from June 22. No. Footnote No. Later. 1971. 1955 at the rate of P50. effective December 18. 1971. failed to present all the necessary papers to receive his pension. he was aw arded with the full benefits of RA 65. However . 1969. The lower court granted Respondent Gasilao his pension. 37 G. HELD: Respondent Gasilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the prescriptive period for filing for his pension. L-37867 (February 22. 1955 at P50 plus P10 per month for each minor. RA 5753 was approved. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Bautista Case No. a veteran. Bu t. 1969 up to January 15. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 186. 186 prohibiting an employer from paying double retirement benefits to an employee. be construed in relation to C. as amended by RA 6389. that would suggest that an employee who is laid-off or prefers to be laid-off can receive two pensi on benefits.A. No. all other laws extending retirement benefits to government employees should. No. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the legislature enacts a provision . 186. No. as amended by RA 1616 but denied his cla im for gratuity under RA 3844. No. sent a letter to the Respondent Secretary of the Department. 186. 186.Legaspi v. Executive Secretary and Agrarian Reforms Case No. on the condition that he would also be paid the gratuity benefits to which he might be entitled under C.A. in case of ambiguity. an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms.A.A. as amended by RA 6389. There is nothing in RA 3844. which should all be construed together. No. 173 FACTS: Petitioner. as amended by RA 6389. 38b . Conrado Estrella. No. 186 and in the light of its prov isions.A. Page 322. Petitioner expressed his desire to be laid-off under the provisions of RA 3844. L-36153 (November 28. GSIS approved his retirement gratuity under C. and RA 3844. the new provision should be deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied i n prior statutes. This interpretation is more in line with the policy of the law embodied in C. and that in the absence of an express repeal or amendment therein. 1975) Chapter VII. Being the law governing the retirement of government employees. it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject ma tter. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to both gratuity benefits under C. Footnote No. as amended by RA 1616. as amended by RA 6389. 145 No. as amended by RA 1616. HELD: No.A. one under its provisions and another pursuant to C. 60 A. However.D. plus 3) longevity pay (whic h was considered part of the salary starting in 1983 pursuant to Sec.D. in the same manner as it has done since 1978. This is definitely more in keeping with and gives substance to the elementary rule of statutory constructio n that. Since 1978 however. The basis was the copy of P. 42. 41 provided that th e monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement is equivalent to the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. ISSUE: Which version of P.174 Re: Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Case No. plus 2) highest representation and transportation allowances (RATA). 174 FACTS: This matter was brought about due to two separate publications in the Official Gazette of the same amendment to RA 910 (Special Retirement Law of Judges and Justices). 09-9-019-SC (October 4. 74 of the Official G azette. 1990) Chapter VII. BP 129). 1438 which was published in Vol. No. Page 322.D. 30.M. No. No. P. being remedial in character. w hich did not provide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement. 1438. 1438 was published in Vol. for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom wit h relative security. GSIS computed the monthly pension as follows: 1) highest salary. 1438 must be followed. retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. not only for those who have retained their vigor but. 30. 74 of the Official Gazette. as amended by P. HELD: The Court directed GSIS to continue implementing RA 910. more so . 40b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION . Footnote No. 74 of the Official Gazette. in Vol.D. Britanico of the IAC Case No. As provided in Sec. Justice Britanico served the government for 36. resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office. 1989) Chapter VII.A. HELD: He belongs to the second category of Sec. the judges or justices who may enjoy retirement be nefits with their lifetime annuity. 1986. not being a voluntary resignation (as held in Ortiz v. 1 of RA 910. which he could have very well held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70 years. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. and 27 days were served in the Judiciary. COM ELEC). Footnote No. those who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their office and had rendered at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both XXX ISSUE: Which category Justice Britanico belongs to. 6484-Ret. They fall into three categories: XXX 2. should have rendered at least 20 years service in th e judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both.Re: Application For Retirement Under R. 177 FACTS: Justice Britanico requested that he be granted retirement benefits under RA 910 in addition to or in lieu of benefits he received under RA 1616 upon termina tion of his service in the Judiciary by the acceptance of his courtesy resignation by Pr esident Aquino.23 years. pursuant to Proclamation No. No. 2 months. 40b. Page 323. 1.M. No. 128 A. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Retirement laws should be liberally construed to and applied in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. requiring all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Court. 1 dated February 25. The acceptance of his courtesy resignation. of which 10 years. 43c . (May 15. R. Page 323. 130 G. 1990) Chapter VII. Footnote No. The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retirin g employee. No. The De La Llana ruling is an essential factor in dete rmining whether or not the judges should be granted the benefits they ask for. The court only allows the use of the Plana or Britanico ruling if the career of the judge was marked by competence. 42a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ramirez v. Most of the judges however retired bowing to policy consideratio ns. id est courtesy resignations. A close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of the judges is necessary to determine their qualification to receive benefits under R A 910.M. Paredes and Gerochi. de Lara. Arrieta Case No. HELD: No. namely Pineda. 132 A. 178 FACTS: These are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed by six retired judges. It stated that if a judge was not recommended for reappointment following their courtesy resignations then the relevant factors were considered and they were found wanting. Montesclaros. in addition to or in lieu of the benefits under RA 1616 or P. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. asking th at they be granted gratuity and/or retirement benefits under RA 910. 1962) . Pineda Case No. 6789-RET (Jul 13. as amended. When the court allows exemptions to fix rules for certain judges. 1146. L-19183 (Nov. They want to take advantage of the Plana and Britanico ruling. No. integrity and dedication to the public service.175 Re: Gregorio G. ther e are ample reasons behind each grant. 29.D. The crediting of leaves is not done indiscriminately. Montecillo. 37. 9e. ISSUE: W/N they should be granted benefits under RA 910 pursuant to the Plana or Britanico ruling. The Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal. it should suffice. Rules of procedure should be liberally construed in order to promote their objec t and assist the parties in obtaining a just determination of their cases. 11b . 9d. The action of the CFI is harsh and improvident according to the SC. Plaintiff interposed a petition f or mandamus to the SC saying that the CFI committed a grave abuse of discretion. The clerk of court suggested that the document first be completed by the Plaintiff before filing it . Defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appeal bond since it was fi led one day after the end of the reglementary period. the defect in the appeal bond. The bond would have been filed on time if it had not been for the defect. 181 FACTS: Petitioner filed an action against Apolinar Serina seeking the annulment of a transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation. the court would not have been deprived of jurisdiction since it was filed within the reglementary pe riod. HELD: Yes. it would suffice that the court approves such. Moreover. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Page 325. ISSUE: W/N the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the appeal bond. the Rules of Court also state that the appeal needs only one surety. Further more. The e nd of the 30 day period fell on a Sunday hence it was moved to the following Monday bu t one of the two bondsmen was unable to sign the appeal bond. The CFI dismissed the complaint. The judge disapproved the bond and rendered the judgment final and executory. Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete document the next day. even if indeed 2 sureties were needed.Chapter VII. So long as the surety is solvent and acceptable to the court. Footnote No. 9e. According to the Rules of Court. it did. a personal appeal bond need not necessarily be subscribed by 2 sureties. Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the money market investment which was subsequently granted by the court. The decision of the CA is affirmed. The mortgaged properties were auctioned. Footnote No. 11b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION . HELD: Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the setoff against the other is neither clear nor liquidated. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 9d. 30. The amount approved for release was used to pay for h er other obligations to Petitioner. Meanwhile. Private Respondent filed an ex parte motion praying that five branches of the bank pay her the total amount of the money market interest. Thus. No. alterations. 181 FACTS: Private Respondent secured a loan from Petitioner s predecessor in interest by mortgaging her properties. private Respondent claimed that she never received anything from the approved loan. and/or additions. LATIN MAXIM: 9c.R. Page 326. Private Respondent made a money market placement. The debt of P6. 1988) Chapter VII.81 M of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in doubt. The supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred by erasures. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made by the insurance company itself since there were no ready-made forms available. Petitioner is indeb ted to private Respondent in the amount of the money market interest. Such bond was therefore rendered withou t force and effect. The court issued a writ of execution against Petitioner s property. The filing of insufficient or defective bond does not dissolve absolutely and unconditionally the injunction issued.International Corporate Bank v. ISSUE: W/N there can be legal compensation in the case at bar. applying the amount instead to the deficiency in the mortgage. 63 G. This prevents legal compensation from taking place under Art. L-6970 (Jan. 1290 of the Civil Code. Compensation cannot extend to unliquidated disputed claim arising from breach of contract. she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the ban k refused to pay the interest earned by the placement. Petitioner failed to comply with all t he said orders. which was granted. the Res pondent Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint for failure of the Plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference. LATIN MAXIM: 8c. The Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of Court themsel ves. Page 326. mandate a liberal construction of the rules and plea dings in order to effect substantial justice. L-77154 (June 30. He could have easily required counsel for Plaintiff to buy the documentary stamp and affix it to the special power of attorney and it would not have taken ten mi nutes.Del Rosario v. the present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court would have been avoided. Had Respondent Judge been less technical and more sensible. fortified by jurisprudence. 181 FACTS: For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for pre-trial purposes. Respondent denied the Petitioner substantial jus tice. By such rigidity. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case because the document did not have the required one-peso documentary stamp. 9d. Footnote No. in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff. Hamoy Case No. 35 No. 18b . 18a. 1987) Chapter VII. HELD: Yes. 1984) Chapter VII. 69 No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 22 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act and Sec. Page 326. save in exceptionally meritorious cases. 5b. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. a decision was promulgated by the Respondent court ruling that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended and declared the case terminated. The motion for extension of time must b e filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period of appeal. Securities and Exchange Commission Case No. The Court further restates an d clarifies the modes and periods as follows: (6) Period of extension of time to f ile petition for review: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision . 1986) Chapter VII. 27 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gimenez v. L-68568 (December 26. an extension of only 15 days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the CA. Page 326. 181 FACTS: A decision was rendered against Petitioner by the RTC. 181 FACTS: Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a motion for reconsideration before the . that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review under Sec. may properly be filed wi th and granted by the IAC (now the Court of Appeals). 22(b) of the Interim Rules. 52 No. Footnote No. The Court rules. ISSUE: W/N Respondent court erred in terminating the case. Footnote No. L-73146-53 (August 26. thus counsel for Petitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days extension to file a petition for review.Lacsamana v. HELD: Yes. for the guidance of Bench and Bar. The Respondent court cited a Supreme Court decision where the issue was regarding an extension to file a moti on for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the question of granting a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. However. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 6 of P. 24a. Repeals by implication are not favored. The SEC denied their motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. 7a. The 30-day period fixed by P. 39 of BP 129 applies to the SEC. The SEC ruled that the 3 0-day period provided for in Sec. 38b . Sec.D. ISSUE: W/N Sec. It is an administrative agency.D. the organic law of the SEC. is still in force. The SEC is not a court. 39 of BP 129 expressly refers to courts . 902-A.Commissioners of the SEC 27 days after receiving their decision. resolutions. 39 of the Judic iary Revamp Law (BP 129) which provides for a period of 15 days for appealing from fi nal order. awards of decisions of any court. 37. HELD: No. 902-A was modified by Sec. 76 of Act No. 1946) Chapter VII. Case No. The Sheriff is then tasked to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy . L-832 (October 14. The fact that the corresponding receipt ther efore has not been issued or the failure to present the same in due time should not af fect the remedy. 187 FACTS: Herein Defendants were to pay a counterbond to which they had complied with. Footnote No. In lieu of such bond the Appe llant may file with the justice a certificate of the proper official that the Appellan t has deposited P25 with the municipal treasurer (In Manila with the Collector of Inte rnal Revenue). The Petitioners therefore have complied with said requirements. The non-presentation of this certificate was not due to the Petitioner s failure or omission but to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to receive t he deposit tendered by the Petitioner. 36 G. Bernabe and Lawyers Cooperatuve Publishing Co. Jugo Case No. Footnote No. They furnished the Sheriff with a copy of the said counterbond to comply w ith the requirement. 7a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Case and Nantz v. ISSUE: W/N the requisites were complied with and W/N the court should grant the remedy prayed for by the Petitioners. 190 on how appeals are perfected. 183 FACTS: To comply with the requirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the notice along with a money order for the sum of P16 to the Collector of Internal Revenue. The bond to be given shall be filed with the justice of peace . 49 G. Page 326.R. On the . 6d. No. HELD: Under Sec. L-44970 (March 31. 1936) Chapter VII. No. With such. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the appeal was not deemed filed for failure to comply with the requirements. Page 327.Blanco v. However the Collector returned the said money order to sender for the reason that he had no authority to be its depositary.R. occasion when the Sheriff received the copy of such. 9a. the counsel of the Plaintif f was present in his office. There was substantial compliance with this when their attorney was shown in the Sheriff s office the Defendant s counterbond. ISSUE: W/N the Defendants complied with the requirement of filing a counterbond and W/N the Plaintiff was furnished a copy of such. Due to unfortunate circumstances the Sheriff failed to deliver a copy of such counterbond to the counsel to formalize the act of furnishing a copy. HELD: Yes to both issues. 9d . He asked the latter if there were objections to the said counterbond and the counsel replied none. LATIN MAXIM 6d. The sole purpose of the counterbond is to enable the Plaintiff to see that the bond is in the prescribed form and for the right amount. Negligence or unavoidable circumstances should not adversely affect the Defendant under the circumstance of this case. No. Footnote No. . ISSUE: W/N the redemption has been effected in good faith and in accordance with the requirements of law. Page 328. Viuda de Ordoveza v.R. which had been effected a brother of the execution debtor (Julio Javellana). 1936) Chapter VII. 14881 (February 5. L-45155 (July 31. No. 91 G. Mirasol and Nuñez Case No. Under the Rules of Court the court may. 1920) Chapter VII. on motion to the Appellee and notice the Appellant or on its own motion dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal. The word may implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the court. HELD: Yes. 192 FACTS: A redemption in behalf of n this case as void redemptioner of property from an execution sale. 189 FACTS: Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the opposing party failed to file her brief within the 15-day period which makes her appeal ipso facto dismissed and the CA had no authority to grant additional 5 da ys to file her brief. Raymundo Case No. was attacked i because of a supposed collusive agreement between the (Luis Mirasol) and sheriff (Geronimo Nuñez) whereby the latter agreed to withhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the redemptioner if the latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to t he same property in other litigation.R. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N the CA had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the Appellant an additional 3 days with which to file her brief.179 C. 65 G. LATIN MAXIM: 9d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Javellana v. Page 327. to the end that the property of the debtor may be made to satisfy as m any liabilities as possible. Any ordinary creditor.HELD: A liberal construction will be given to statutes governing the redemption of property. or assignee as such. The act of the redemptio ner in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an officious act in any sense. having a judgment subsequent to that under which the property was sold may exercise the right of redemption. 41 . Redemption of property sold under execution is not rend ered invalid by reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of redemption is effected by means of a check for the amount due. It was on the contrary necessary to the reasonable protection of his right as a subsequent judgment-creditor of Maximino Mirasol. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. There is an ambiguity in this respect in the policy. father of the insured.000. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. 7136 on the life of Francisco del Rosario. No. ISSUE: How much the Defendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of Francisco del Rosario. Page 328. 34 G. 156 G. Petitioner. Inc. Defendant company refused to pay more than P1. The insurance company has already paid the amount of P1.000. filed a claim f or payment with Defendant company when his son died of drowning after being forced to jump off the motor launch ISLAMA on account of fire. Equitable Ins. and Casualty Co. 1. L-16215 (June 29. Footnote No. HELD: The policy does not positively state any definite amount that may be recovered in case of death by drowning. 38 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De la Cruz v. L-16138 (April 29.. Page 328.. 192 FACTS: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co. Case No. Footnote No. Inc.180 Del Rosario v.000 to Petitioner so tha t there still remains a balance of P2. Petitioner is entitled to recove r P3.000 of the amount to which he is entitled to recover. as ind emnity for the death of the insured.000 to P3. binding itself to pay the sum of P1. & Surety Co.000 since they alleged that their liability was only said amount pursuant to Sec. Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on . 1961) Chapter VII. Capital Ins. Part I of the provisions of the policy. which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Case No. In a boxing contest participated into by the insured. 192 FACTS: Defendant company issued Personal Accident Policy No. 1963) Chapter VII.R.R. No. was not accidental and. LATIN MAXIM: 3. 25a. therefore. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage. 30a against death or . causing Eduardo to fall. HELD: The terms accident and accidental . intracranial. ISSUE: W/N Eduardo s death falls under the definition of the policy disability caused by accidental means. have not acquired any technical meaning. filed a claim with the insurance co mpany for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. the father of the insured.the left part of the back of the head. as used in insurance contracts. unexpected. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional. and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. not covered by insurance. Simon de la Cruz. l eft. Defendant company set up the defense that the death of the insured. T he failure of the Defendant company to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from the liability for such death. caused by his participation in a b oxing contest. with his head hittin g the rope of the ring. 9c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Capati v. the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties.R. the disability suffered by him was not covered by his policy. 192 FACTS: Plaintiff Diosdado C. 1953. As the terms of the policies are clear. No. Inc. among which being the eight above named Defendants. On December 24. Footnote No. a fire broke out which totally destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of acciden t and notice of claim with all of the Defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the policy but the Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reaso n that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand. express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof.181 Ty Vs. which is not disputed on appeal. Case No. Ocampo . There was no such amputation in the case at bar." In addition. an interpretation that would include the mere frac ture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. Plai ntiff was injured on the left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total disability of his left hand. Fighting his way out of the factory. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies. was that the physical injuries "caused temporar y total disability of plaintiff's left hand. First National Surety & Assurance Co. All that was found by the trial court .. 1961) Chapter VII. Page 328. L-16138 (April 29. 7a. HELD: The clear and express conditions of the insurance policies define partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist. 156 G. ISSUE: W/N it is necessary that there should be an amputation of the left hand of the Plaintiff before he can recover on the insurance policies. which issued to him personal accident policies. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. 46 G. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. opportunity. 1982) Chapter VIII. No. Hence. at the el ection of the Plaintiff. or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides. a resident of Pampanga. However. the construction was completed on a date later than what was agreed in their contract. HELD: No. the term "may be" connotes possibili ty. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 330. 25a. entered into a sub-contract with the Defendant. Under ordinary circumstances. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue was correct." The word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer discr etion upon a party. Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampanga an a ction for recovery of consequential damages due to the delay. permission or possibility. The CFI of Pampanga dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint on ground of improper venue. 2(b). Footnote No.Case No. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty. L-28742 (April 30. 8 FACTS: Plaintiff. b .R. a resident of Naga City. it does not connote certainty. The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Sec. which provides that such "actions may b e commenced and tried where the Defendant or any of the Defendants resides or may be found. The Defendant completed a construction job for the Plaintiff. L-6481 (May 17. Figueroa Case No. ISSUE: W/N the unnumbered circular and the undated memorandum of understanding are directory and permissive in nature. 10 FACTS: Iloilo city branch of Petitioner bank was accepting postal money order from the general public since 1946. unauthorized arrangements and any claim for settlement of any unpaid money orders should be directed against the said cashier. 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Guiao v. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. involving the installation of a new postal money orde r system which requires that all commercial banks. These orders were presented to the Iloilo city of fice for payment and if said office could not pay in full. Footnote No." effective October 1. No. On 1968. 9a. Petitioner bank continued its transactions with the post office under the old pr actice through the latter's Acting Cashier beyond October 1. Footnote No. 1954) Chapter VIII. regardless of location. Page 331. 58 G. the Bureau of Posts issued an unnumbered circular: "Memorandum of Understanding Covering Cashing and Clearing of Money Orders. 1968. National Government Auditing Office Case No. 36a.R. No. L-38513 (March 31. 17 FACTS: . HELD: Respondents are correct by saying that the purposes of the new postal money order system negate the contention that said circular and memorandum are not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience of commercial bank s operating in the Manila area only.R. they would issue receipts for their remaining balance. 1968. Page 333.182 Chartered Bank v. 121 G. 1987) Chapter VIII. must cl ear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the Central Bank at Manila. The post office said that the arrangements made by the acting cashier and the Petitioner bank were private . 2 of this Act. except in the cases determine d in Sec. Sec. ISSUE: W/N a fiscal may be compelled by mandamus to include in an information persons who appear to be responsible for the crime charged therein. HELD: Yes. and two new accused were included. The use of the word "shall" and of the phrase "except in cases determined" shows Sec. A perusal of Act No. Jesus Guiao and Eulogio Serrano. 2709 states that. But Dizon and Manalo were not included. 9a. 2709 discloses the legislative intent to require that all persons who appear to be responsible for an offense should be included in the information. namely. an amended information was filed. Every prosecution for a crime shall be in the name of the United States aga inst all persons who appear to be responsible therefor. After the reinvestigation. not merely directory. 1 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court taken from Act No. 25a . LATIN MAXIM: 6c. In view of th e failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons. 1 is mandatory. the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as witnesses for the State. the action for ma ndamus was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Dizon and Manalo as accused in his information.In the trial of People v. Gopez. Later.183 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association. 117188 (August 7. 38b. 1997) Chapter VIII. 153 G. (LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate bylaws. The legislature s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for it s failure to pass its by-laws. b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Director of Lands v. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution.R. 22 FACTS: The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. Page 334.R. The language of the statute sh ould be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in usi ng the word must or shall . 25a. 95 G. 23 FACTS: . 36a. Hence. Court of Appeals Case No. 102858 (July 28. it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. The word must in a statute is not always imperative b ut it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. 1997) Chapter VIII. No. LGVHAI complained and got a favorabl e result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. v. Inc. Court of Appeals Case No. Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. No. Page 334. Footnote No. HELD: No. 9a . The trial court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction . he died and his heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the petition. ISSUE: Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or directory. However . Petitioner bro ught the case to the Supreme Court. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the c ourt order setting the time for initial hearing.Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of a land title. Thus. it is held that in the present case the term mu st be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due process. While such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. The reason for the dismissal is that the applica nt failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation p ursuant to a law. During the pendency of the said petition. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: It is mandatory. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. continuous and exclusive possessi on of the subject land since 1938. it was found that the applicant had been in open. as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision. Case No. an action for specific performance to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of stock with a face value o f P8. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the ca se for failure to prosecute Petitioner s appeal. R. 1997) FACTS: Private Respondents filed in court a quo. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it. 25 FACTS: Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court.184 Bersabal v. ISSUE: W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecut e. The law provides that Courts shall decide cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city courts: Provided parties may submit memoranda if so requested It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional. Salvador Case No. HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. No.R. 133 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic Planers Bank v. 34 G. 1978) Chapter VIII. The court a quo ren .000. The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency. No.00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest thereon as quarterly dividend owing t hem under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stock. Page 335. After receipt. 51765 (March 3. the court issued an order stating that counsels for both parties are given 30 days fro m receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this cas e to be submitted for decision by the court. Agana Sr. L-35910 (July 21. Footnote No. the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said stock certificates clearly allows the same. On the question of the redemption by the Defendant of said preferred shares of stock. 7a. 30b. It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "ma y" denotes discretion. the option to do so was clearly vested in the Petitioner Bank. Furthermore. 6b. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in compelling Petitioner bank to redeem Private Respondents preferred shares HELD: Yes. and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in question. the terms and conditions set forth therein use the word "may". LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 36a . What Respondent Judge failed to recognize was that while the stock certificate does allow redemption. Respondent Judge.dered judgment in favor of Private Respondents. The redemption therefore is clearly the t ype known as "optional". stated that. P. 2 of P. therefore. because the Respondent Commission has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Sec. v. Petitioner states that SIP sc hedule presented by the Private Respondent is pre-mature and. but the expenses should not be shouldered by th e telephone subscribers. 94 G. v. Inc. L-63318 (November 25. Without promulgation of rules and regulati on there would be confusion among the rights of Private Respondent.R. 9d. the consumers and the government itself. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion.D. Th e Department of Public Works. illegal and baseless. L-63318 (August 18. 1983) FACTS: Respondent Commission approved a revised schedule for Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) filed by Private Respondent. 11b. 217 which provides. . NTC and PLDT (Resolution) Case No. 121 G.D. HELD: Yes. innovative and untested such that existing substantive and procedural laws would not be applicable. Consumers Foundation. Nat l Telecommunications Commission Case No.. 1984) FACTS: Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it is joining Private Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. Considering the multi-million profits of the company. LATIN MAXIM: 8b. the cost of expansion and/or improvement should come from part of its huge profits. 12a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil.185 Phil. the SIP was so set up precisely to ensure the financial viability of public telecommunicatio ns companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost the benefits of a telephone facility. No. Transportation and Communications through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated . Inc.R. Thus. Consumers Foundation .. 217 deals with matters so alien. The plan to expand the company program and/or improve its service is laudable. No. 6d. the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed to mean "shall" or "must". Hence. HELD: Yes. unless a contrary intent is manifest from th e law itself. 39c .D. 36. Transportation and Communications as mandatory. 217 to the then Department of Public Works.The decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2 of P. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 217 should be reconsidered. The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the la w must be given its ordinary meaning. which construction is not supported by the actual phraseology of said Section 2. 9f.D. ISSUE: W/N the previous decision rendered making it mandatory to set rules and regulations implementing P. 24. 30b. His basis was Sec. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation Case No. that the verbphrase is mandatory because not only the law uses at not more but the legislative purpose and intent. the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under RA 304. 2 of RA 304. The low er court sustained Respondent company. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.186 Diokno v. Respondent company contended however that the word shall used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. the interest to be charged. for whose benefit the same have been issued. 1952) Chapter VIII. It is true that in its ordinary signification. But as to when the discounting or acceptan ce shall be made. Footnote No. No. it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are available loanable funds. However. the word shall is imperative. 93 G. the rule is not absolute. to conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the be nefit of the holders.R. If th e acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be subject to the condition of the availability of loanable funds. The modifier. at not more than tw o per centum per annum for ten years. In other words. which pr ovides that investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlle d by the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds accept or discoun t at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate for certain specified purposes. 26 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION . 25a. the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. it may be construed as may when required by the context or by the intention of the statute. L-4712 (July 11. HELD: No. 32 FACTS: Petitioner. Page 336. . sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there ar e loanable funds. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. et. depending upon consideration of the entire provision where it is foun d. 34 FACTS: Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of Tiwi. and 2) dishonesty. and accordingly. The first sentence of Sec.A. suspended in both cases. I n the absence of an express repeal. 68 provides that an a ppeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. Page 337. Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed for stay of execution under Sec. it was by implication which is not favored. Sec. HELD: No. 67(b) of the LGC. Footnote No.O. 6 of A. which contains a mandatory provision t hat an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory. No. a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between t he two. al. The term shall may be read mandatory or directory. 50 . The Office of the President s tayed execution. If there was any repeal. RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. Petitioner further contends that A. 6. Respondent mayor was convicted. No.O. 26. the governing law is RA 7160. 18. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec. No.Berces v. According to Petitioner. 1995) Chapter VIII.O. Guingona. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws on executive orders that are intende d to be repealed. 33 G. citing Sec.O. 18. ISSUE: W/N R. 530(f). Case No. No. 7160 repealed A. There is none in this case. Albay for 1) abuse of authority. It gives discretio n to reviewing appeals to stay execution. A.R. No. 18 was repealed by RA 7160. with the Sangguiniang Panlalawigan. 112099 (February 21. 26 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Fule v. The Labor Arbiter found the shutdown with cause but without the required notice. issued and made out check No. Inc. and on appeal. HELD: No. Page 337. 37 FACTS: Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. L-79094 (June 22. Instead. Under Art. 81 G. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. Despite the reduction granted. He was convicted by the trial court. he submitted a memorandum confirmi ng the Stipulation of Facts. .R. No. National Labor Relations Commission. 123669 (February 27. the Bouncing Checks Law. Said check was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed. Footnote No.Mers Shoes Manufacturing. No. Case No. and order ed Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay. 35 FACTS: Petitioner hired Respondent workers as piece rate workers. Footnote No. v. prosecution presented its evidence and the Petitioner waived his right. Perfection of appeal is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal. Petitioner appealed to Responden t NLRC but sought a reduction of the cash or surety bond. Petitioner barred its workers from entering the company to wor k. 1988) Chapter VIII. 48 G. Alleging serious business decline. The workers challenged the legality of Petitioner s stoppage of operations. thus in violation of B P 22. 223 of the Labor Code. resulting to the d ismissal of appeal for failure to perfect it. Page 337.R. Petitioner still failed to post bond within 10 days. Upon the hearing. The word only makes it perfectly clear that the posting of bond is to be the exclusive means by which an employer s appeal may be perfected. et al. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. 1998) Chapter VIII. an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation. an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting of cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to th e monetary award. Court of Appeals Case No. th e Appellate Court. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. Also. No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel . Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 9d . in its language. the rule is mandatory. penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the acc used. 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides. HELD: The CA erred. Therefore. Because of the word shall . 188 McGee v. Republic Case No. 174 G.R. No. L-5387 (April 29, 1954) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 37 FACTS: Petitioner, an American citizen married to Leonarda Crisostomo, wants to adopt her children by her first husband. However, he is barred from doing so und er Art. 335 of the old Civil Code which states that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction cannot adopt. Petitioner and Leonarda have one legitimate child. Despite Art. 33 5, the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption, invoking Art. 338 which states t hat a step-child, by the step-father or step-mother can be adopted. ISSUE: W/N a husband having a legitimate child may adopt a step-child. HELD: No. One strong argument presented by the trial court in upholding the adoption is that to hold otherwise would render Art. 338 meaningless and a surplusage. However, it must be noted that Art. 335 and Art. 338 should be considered in relation to each other. That a parent can adopt a step-child is li mited by Art. 335 that said parent cannot have a legitimate child in order to qualify as an adopter. One principle behind this is to protect the successional rights of the legitimate child. In addition, under the laws of statutory construction, negativ e words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Art. 335 is phrased in a negative manner: cannot adopt. While Art. 338 is positive: the following may be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 15a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Penid v. Virata Case No. 101 G.R. No. L-44004 (March 25, 1983) Chapter VIII, Page 338, Footnote No. 40 FACTS: Confidential Information No. 28 of the BIR was filed by the Petitioners. It is a sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had been falsely declaring their gross earnings on the basis of a parity rate of P2.00 to US $1.00 defrauding the Philippine Government of millions of pesos in taxes. Further, Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the Confi dential Information. One of these was Pan Fil Co. Inc. Now the Petitioners seek their 25 % reward taken from the total revenue collected from shipping companies in payment for their deficiencies ISSUE: as provided by RA 2338. W/N the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Fil Co. Inc, a company which is not included in the Confidential Information. HELD: Yes. According to Sec. 4 of RA 2338, In order to entitle an informer to a reward, the information given by him must lead to or be instrumental in the disc overy of the fraud or violation and results in the recovery of collection of revenues Not only did the BIR rely on the Confidential Information submitted by the Petitioners for their investigation, but also on the categorical statement that other shipping companies falsely declared their gross earnings, which led to further investigations and, consequently, recovery of collection. Therefore, this inform ation was instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation. In jurisprudence, statues offering rewards must be liberally construed in favor of informers and with regard to the purpose for which they are intended. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9d . 189 Pahilan v. Tabalba, et al. Case No. 96 G.R. No. 110170 (February 21, 1994) Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote No. 63 FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban, Camiguin. Respondent Tabalba was proclaimed Mayor. Petitioner Pahilan filed an election protest although the docket fees he paid were insufficient. The trial c ourt dismissed the election protest for non-payment on time of the required fees for filing an initiatory pleading. Within the 5-day period to appeal, Petitioner filed a ver ified appeal brief. But the Clerk of Court said that his office did not receive any noti ce of appeal from Petitioner. Petitioner s appeal was then dismissed for failure to appeal within the prescribed period. ISSUE: 1. W/N the verified appeal was validly dismissed. 2. W/N the trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner f or non-payment on time of the required fees. HELD: 1. No. The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief. The filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of t he notice of appeal. The RTC was sent copies by registered mail within the prescrib ed period, and is assumed to be received in the regular course of the mail, filed a s of the date of mailing. 2. No. The docket fee was paid although insufficient. Statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed that the will of the people in t he choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 9d, 40b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pimentel v. Festejo Case No. 124 G.R. No. L-2327 (January 11, 1949) Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote No. 64 FACTS: Festejo was proclaimed Mayor of Santa Lucia with Appellant protesting. Appellant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 59 bal lots which would have made him win. Appellant s name in the 59 ballots were written on different lines such as those corresponding to vice-mayor, member of the provinc ial board or councilor. Appellant claimed that his name was only misplaced but the intention to elect him as mayor was apparent. ISSUE: W/N Appellant can claim as votes in his favor ballots with his name which does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor. HELD: No. For any ballot to be counted for a candidate for mayor, it is indispensable that his name be written by the voter in the ballot and cannot be mistaken by a person who, as provided by the Constitution, is able to read. A name can be counted for any office only when it is written within the space indicated upon t he ballot for the vote for such office. It is impossible to count a ballot as vote for a candidate for mayor, when his name is clearly written in the space reserved for another office. Considering that in 59 ballots claimed by Appellant in this appeal his name does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor, he cannot claim them as votes in his favor as candidate for mayor. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7b, 43 Roxas v. Rafferty Case No. 264 G.R. No. L-12182 (March 27, 1918) Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote No. 75 FACTS: Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. In the latter part of 1913, the construction of a reinforced concrete building was begun. It was finished in all respects on Feb ruary 15, 1915. The city assessor and collector of Manila, under the date of December 1, 1914, sent Plaintiffs notice, received by them on December 25, 1914, requiring t hem to declare the new improvements for assessments for the year 1915. Plaintiffs pa id the amount of the taxes, which amounted to P3,000, under protest. Suit was begun in the CFI of Manila to recover this sum with interest at the legal rate from th e date of payment. ISSUE: W/N the assessment was legal. HELD: No. The assessor cannot make a valid assessment unless he has given proper notice. The law requires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintiffs d uring November. His attempted notification on December 25, 1914, was not given during the time fixed by statute, thus there was no legal assessment of the Roxas Build ing for the year 1915. Furthermore, the city assessor and collector were under the obligation to add any completed improvements to the assessment list. The city assessor and collect or could not prematurely perform this duty on improvements not yet completed. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 19 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Serfino v. Court of Appeals Case No. 145 G.R. No. 40858 (September 15, 1987) Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote No. 75 FACTS: A parcel of land, consisting of 21.1676 hectares situated in Sagay, Negros Occidental, was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor, under Homestead Patent No. 44139. Upon registration of said patent, OCT No. 1839 was issued by s aid office in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. In 1945, Casamayor sold the land in fa vor of Nemesia Baltazar. Apparently, OCT No. 1839 was lost during the war and upon t he petition of Baltazar, the CFI of Negros ordered its reconstitution in the name o f Casamayor. On the same day, TCT No. 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT No. 14-R. In 1951, Baltazar sold the property to Respondent Lopez Sugar Central, which did not present the documents for registration until December 1964 to the Office of Registry of Deeds. Said of fice refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by another certificate of title, TCT No. 28985, in the name of Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the purchase by Respondent Lopez Sugar Central of the lot in question was null and void from the beginning. HELD: No, applying Sec. 118 of C.A. No. 141, which prohibits the alienation of homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years from the date of the issuan ce of the patent, and not Sec. 121 which governs sale to corporations. Since the grant was more than 5 years before, the transfer to Nemesia Baltazar was valid and legal. LATIN MAXIM: 37b, 43 191 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines Case No. G. R. No. 26419 (October 16, 1970) FACTS: Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with respondent which was approved. The loan was to be released in installments. The outstanding obligation of the petitioners with respondent, including interests, amounted to P13,983.59. Petiti oner wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P14,000 for his outstandin g obligation, out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to RA No. 897 (RA 897). Respondent advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of the offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 when RA 897 was approved. ISSUE: W/N petitioner s obligation is subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. HELD: No. The provision expressly provides that the obligations must be subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. Hence, when such backpay certificates are offered in payment to a government-owned corporation of obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said Act on June 20, 1953, su ch corporation may not legally be compelled to accept the certificates. The Court cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambigu ous language of the provision of law. LATIN MAXIM: 28, 7a, 6c, 1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections Case No. 137 G.R. No. 119976 (September 18, 1995) Chapter VIII, Page 347, Footnote No.84 FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same posit ion, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with respondent COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residen cy. ISSUE: W/N petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the 1995 elections. HELD: Yes. Residency qualification pertains to domicile. As a minor, petitioner followed the domicile of her parents in Tacloban, Leyte. As domicile, once acqui red, it is retained until a new one is gained. In spite of the being born in Manila, Tacloban was her domicile of origin by operation of law. Parenthetically, when she marrie d then Congressman Marcos, petitioner was obliged, by virtue of Art. 110 of the Ci vil Code, to follow her husband s actual place of residence fixed by him. Although Mr. Marcos has different places of residence, and even if he had designated one, wha t petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. Therefore, she did not los e her domicile of origin. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 37, 39a 192 Portillo v. Salvani Case No. 243 G.R. No. L-32181 (March 10, 1930) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No. 130 FACTS: Appellant Salvani won the elections in 1928 for the office of provincial governor of Antique. Appellee Portillo, his nearest opponent, filed an election protest on July 9, 1928. Decision was rendered on August 15, 1929 declaring appellee Por tillo the winner. ISSUE: W/N the decision by the trial judge declaring appellee Portillo is valid. HELD: The decision is void for want of jurisdiction. The Election Law provides that al l proceedings in an electoral contest shall be terminated within one year. Legisla tive history of the said legislation reveals that the shift of the tenor of the statu te from silence to mild admonition to stronger suggestion and finally to an emphatic and explicit provision suggests the legislative intent to make the provision mandato ry. One year having already elapsed, the proceeding is deemed terminated and the court loses jurisdiction rendering any subsequent decision void for want of juri sdiction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 7b, 9a, 43, 45, b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Querubin v. Court of Appeals Case No. 247 G.R. No. L-2581 (December 2, 1948) Chapter VIII, Page 332, Footnote No. 14 FACTS: Petitioner defeated Felipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of Ilagan. Mamuri filed an election protest in the court, lost and filed an appeal thereaft er. The appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to dismiss the cas e for the court had lost jurisdiction. Sec. t his provision is directory in nature since to apply a mandatory character would defe at the purpose of due process of the law. 39b . 18b. The dismissal in such a case will constit ute a miscarriage of justice. The doctrine in Portillo v. HELD: No. Salvani should be abandoned. 5b. However. 178 of the Election Code provides that appeals from decisions in election contests should be decided within three months after filing.ISSUE: W/N the CA had lost their jurisdiction to decide the appeal. 2. LATIN MAXIM: 1. The legislation involves social justice .R. ISSUE: W/N the amendment of RA 6389 has retroactive effect. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal citing that RA 3844 was amended on September 10. L-4495 (June 6. 1951) FACTS: Petitioners were appointed members of the Board of Dental Examiners. No. 1 thereof amended Sec. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold syst em. 1971 removing personal cultivation from the grounds for ejectment. in enacting RA 546. ISSUE: W/N it was the intention of Congress. 1968. Furthermore. 4007. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless it is explicitly provided. 46b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Salcedo and Ignacio v. 1984) Chapter III. whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the petitioners. 138 G. to abolish all the .193 Nilo v. Court of Appeals Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. By virtue of this law. Art. HELD: No. a Board of Dental Examiners was appointed by th e President.R. Private respondent then filed for ejection citing personal cultivation on March 7. 189 G. Page 89. to rule against the small landowners would be thwar ting legislative intent of creating independent and self-reliant farmers. Footnote No. L-34586 (April 2. however the landowners being holders of only small parcels of land should also be entitl ed to social justice. RA 546 was approved and Sec. No. 46a. 59 FACTS: Private respondent Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at Bulacan with an area of 2 hectares. 10 of the Reorganization Act No. Carpio and Carreon Case No. HELD: Appointment of the respondents is valid. but that status is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for i ts operation. 46. In the case of Camacho vs. or in other words part of the requirements for its action and applica tion is drawn from a time antedating its passage. Court of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception. 4007. that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation.pre-existing Boards of Examiners existing after the time of the enactment thereo f. It is obvious that it is the intention of Congress to do so. because the provisions of said Act are inconsistent with thos e of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past. 9c. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 49 . . They do not constitute a part of the machinery of t he general government. RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law. all laws to the contrary notwithstanding. 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gallardo v. Footnote No.R. but made it in lieu of any and all taxes. instead o f the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Borromeo Case No. 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal application. RA 3843 did not only fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its g ross receipts. The Legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of a particular case. L-23771 (August 4. 50 G. Sec. RA 3843 w as passed.R. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code. and power. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%. thus leaving no room for doubt regarding the legislative intent. granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of light. 9c. L-36007 (May 25. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 14 FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from respondent deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax rate of 5% as prescribed in Sec. Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts.194 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. heat. HELD: It is valid. Case No. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co. No. No. Inc. 1988) FACTS: Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he (plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government job a uniformity and . Pending the case. 78 G. Page 355. ISSUE: W/N RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equality of taxation clause of the Constitution. 1988) Chapter IX. 46. In applying Art.s a letter carrier. 7 of RA 6389. held that the landowner s desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 4 of the New Civil Code. 46e . the CA applying Sec. ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application to Sec. R. RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear impl ication of the law to that effect. The applicable law when petitioner filed his complaint was RA 3844 which provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant should the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding. Since Congress failed to express an intention to make sa id RA retroactive. The newer law.A. HELD: No. it may not apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudicati on by the courts. Upon appeal. 7 of RA 6389. 6389 elimina ted this ground. ISSUE: Whether RA 1229 applies prospectively or retroactively.R. 14880 (April 29. No. While the purpose of the amendment. 15 FACTS: The case involves petitioner s claim for refund of sales tax paid from November 1954 to March 1955. 46c. and ad valorem tax paid from April 1955 to September 1956 from the sale of APO Portland cement produced by petitioner. Since 1952. unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. however. Footnote No. 1960) Chapter IV. LATIN MAXIM: 46a. 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. it also protested the payment of t he ad valorem taxes. 76 G. petitioner had been protesting the imposition of the sales tax on its APO Portland cement. No. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwise. 20563 (October 29. HELD: A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively. 1968) Chapter IX. the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. was not only to accelerate the collection of mining royalties and ad valorem taxes but also clarify the doubt o f the tax-paying public on the interpretative scope of the two terms. Filipinas Compania de Seguros Case No. producers of cement ar e exempt from the payment of said tax. and on January 1953. In every case of doubt. CIR Case No. 52 G. Petitioner claimed for refund and brought its case to the Cour t of Tax Appeals. a s mentioned in the explanatory note to the bill. Page 134. Footnote No.195 Cebu Portland Cement v. it certainly coul d not have been the intention of the lawmakers to unsettle previously consummated transactions between the taxpayer and the Government. Page 355. 41 FACTS: . Petitioner contends that the percentage taxes collected by responde nt are refundable since under RA 1229 (effective June 1955).R. Petitioner a ssessed against the respondent taxes (to which the insurance company has already paid in full on January 1956) for the year 1956 based on RA 1612. 46e . LATIN MAXIM: 46a. Respondent appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was gran ted a decision in favor of it. The rule applies with greater force to the case at bar. 46c.Respondent. laws have no retroactive effect. unless the contrary is provided. HELD: No. considering that RA 1612 . was engaged in business as a real estate dealer. expressly provides that said Act shall t ake effect upon its approval. this took effect on August of 1956. As a rule. which imposes the new and higher taxes. an insurance company. RA 1612 amended the National Internal Revenue Code and provided for a scale of graduated rates. ISSUE: W/N RA 1612 should be applied retroactively. Court of Appeals and Passion Case No. pleading that there is no sufficient legal gr ound for continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last sentence of Art. The crime took effect before the effectivity of the RPC. 1 FACTS: Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica.196 Laceste v. and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. 36(1) of RA 3844. However. LATIN MAXIM: 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Balatbat v. No. Footnote No. petitioner maintains that the case should have been decided in light of Sec. 36886 (February 1. L-36378 (January 27. 73 FACTS: Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. Footnote No. The principle granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall no t be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused applies. Lachica married the victim. in view of the appeal the respondent still . Ana.490 square meters of land owned by Garcia. 29 G. 140 G. 7 of RA 6389 since. The petitione r continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at libert y through the writ of habeas corpus. Page 363. Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant to Sec . No. HELD: Yes. Garcia sold the land to private responden t Pasion and had declared it for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. Page 351. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect. Magdalen a de Ocampo. The petition for habeas corpus was granted. Santos Case No. Pampanga containing 18.R.R. 1932) Chapter IX. ISSUE: W/N the last paragraph of Art. 1992) Chapter IX. 344 of the RPC. 126. However. Conscience and good law justify this exception. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 4 of the Civil Code provides that there should be no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided by law. 46e . HELD: No. thus laws have no effect in past times but laws look forward in the future.does not have the vested right to acquire the land. In order for a law to have a retroactiv e effect it should have a provision stating its retroactivity. 46b. LATIN MAXIM: 20. Furthermore the law is a rule established to guide our action with no binding effect until it is enacted. 7 of RA 6389 should be given retroactive effect. Art. otherwise nothing s hould be understood which is not embodied in the law. At the time the agreement was made the law in force was C. LATIN MAXIM: 11b. 232 G. 1951. It does not appear in the language of RA 145 that it should be given retroactive effect.R. 1955) Chapter IX.A. No.People v. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the agreement for the payment of a 5% fee on the amount collected was void and illegal. ISSUE: W/N RA 145 has a retroactive effect. Furthermore.R. Case No. strict construction on the la w was made so as not to prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law not to have any retroactive effect. No. 104 FACTS: Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has in her pre-war loan with defendant. The lower court decided for defendant to retu rn the interest to the plaintiff. L-7766 (November 29. No. 1955) Chapter VI. 1946 to March 14. There is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to act on cases under the old law. Footnote No. Footnote No. 675 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the claimant would collect. 20. the former law condoning the pre-war loans and the interest corresponding from January 1. Zeta Case No. Page 266. 271 G. Rehabilitation Finance Corp. The basis of the suit was RA 671 amending RA 40 1. Page 369. L-7140 (December 22. 72 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees in excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as compensation for services rendered. 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION San Jose v. Laws cannot be given retroactive effect unless i t is specifically stated in the provision. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N the lower court was correct in imposing the return of interest to plaintiff . It did not include within its term completed payment and paid interest.by the defendant. LATIN MAXIM: 20. Where a statute was amended and reenacted. RA 671 is made to condone only the unpaid interest. the amendment should be construed as if it had been included in the original act. but it could afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made so by the terms of the amendment. HELD: Yes. 46e . However. both the CA and the SC affirm ed the sentence of the lower court. L-49187 (December 18. Based on the records. L-68043 (October 31. On appeal. 97 G. The attorney prays that the reading of the sentence be suspended and t hat petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.R. ISSUE: W/N the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or motion should be granted. HELD: No.198 People v. 111 FACTS: The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correctio nal to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. 226 G. No. 1946) Chapter IX. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regula ting the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending a nd undetermined at the time of their passage. 1984) FACTS: Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Damages with . LATIN MAXIM: 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Palomo Building Tenants Association v. Sumilang Case No. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. Footnote No.R. Page 371. the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice because then he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Marki ngs guerilla. No. a copy of the resolution of the Court denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner s attorney. Respondent GSIS and Capitol Hills filed separate motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action a nd that there are other actions pending between the same parties for the same cause . A Record on Appeal is no longer necess ary for taking an appeal. and the five (5) judges of the then City Court of Manila i n the injunction aspect of the case. 46e . as appe llants. denying petitioner's motion for approval of the record on appeal due to failure to amend the record on appeal within the period granted them. Sumilang. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules an d Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11. those provision s may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners. Petitioners invoke Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129) which dispensed with the record on appeal and claim that herein respondent IAC erred in not applying retrospectively the said law. 129 is now in full force and effect. 77 Phil. Being procedural in nature. ISSUE: W/N the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) erred in sustaining the order of respondent. Ruled in Alda y vs. as principal defendants. Camilon. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.Preliminary Injunction before the then Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Capitol Hills. 1983. BP Big. HELD: Yes. Respondent judge granted private respondents' motion to dismiss. 7 64 [19461.] " LATIN MAXIM: 5a. "[t]he reorganization having been declared to have been completed. Procedural laws a re retrospective in that sense and to that extent' (People vs. Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that after prosecution has rested its case.R. or threat or by taking such advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner. otherwise known as the Anti Squatting Law has three elements: (a) accused is not the owner of the land. 89 G. 1989) FACTS: The petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the CA affirming the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as th e prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages.R. Court of Appeals Case No. v. 1989) FACTS: Petitioner began construction of his house without permit from the owner. attorney s fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from the defendants but left them to the discretion of the Honorable Court. (c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will o f the owner. HELD: Yes. intimidation. the court may dismiss the case on the ground of . No. 15. 1 of P. Sec. 78 G. Petitioner never showed title to the land he claimed to have purchased. ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. Inc. 772. 86675 (December 19. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to action s pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. while being informed of P. LATIN MAXIM: 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ocampo v. exemplar y damages.199 MRCA.D. No. (b) he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force. 772. Court of Appeals Case No.D. 7960 (December 8. Sec. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. ISSUE: 1. 46b . petitioner waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his de fense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. 2. HELD: Yes on both counts. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. W/N a motion to dismiss bars a petitioner from presenting his evidence.insufficiency of evidence. LATIN MAXIM: 45a. W/N petitioner is guilty of the crime of squatting. 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aris (Phil. No. 12 of RA 6715 to Art. 223 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: W/N a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action. Page 372. Footnote No. reserves his right to institute it separ ately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 21 G. 117 FACTS: Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence. Footnote No. respectively. The provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor a rbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state. the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unl ess the offended party waives the civil action. 91856 (October 5. HELD: Yes. No. being without malice. and the contested provisio n is .) Inc. HELD: Yes on both counts. and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the basis of being in violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Art. Court of Appeals Case No. 33 of the Civil Code. v. 90501 (August 5. Page 372. 119 FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. 315 G.Yakult Philippines v. 1990) Chapter IX. 12 of RA 6716 to Art.R. 1991) Chapter IX.R. 223 of th e Labor Code. ISSUE: W/N amendments introduced by Sec. and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constitutional. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. The questioned Interim Rules can be given retroactive effect for they are procedural or remedial in character.then a police legislation . 46e . entered into a compromise agreement. LATIN MAXIM: 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Government of the Philippine Islands v. However. 1915) Chapter I. 1281 prevails. 44 FACTS: This is a registration proceedings instituted by the Director of Lands under Sec . Page 373. 1990) Chapter IX. Court of Appeals Case No. Cebu. These 9 overlapping mining claims became the subject of administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won. 124 FACTS: Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby the said petitioner was granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging to the latter located at Toledo City. 117 G. ISSUE: W/N P. Footnote No. No. 12 of P. This compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9 overlapping mining claims. seeking to compel the registration of all private property wi thin a . Municipality of Binalonan Case No.R. Petitioner also entered into a similar agreement with BIGA COPPER. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general application. v. CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER. 926. the trial court is deemed to hav e lost jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 61 of Act No. of the tot al mining claims "leased" by petitioner from both CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER. 25 G.R. L-8243 (December 24. 1281. Page 12.D. L-54305 (February 14. Footnote No. HELD: P.201 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City. No.D. 9 mining claims overlap. 1281. During the pendency of this appeal.D. a number of the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. 7(a)(c) and Sec. They alleged that the operati ng agreement which BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by a letter and that by reason of this rescission. Due to the promulgation of P.D. Cebu. Cadastral Act (No. 61 of Act No. or. LATIN MAXIM: 46e . 926 does not necessarily rebut this conclus ion. 926. No reference is made in Act No. Act No. Sec. Pangasinan on two parcels of l and. ISSUE: Whether Sec. The Act does not touch upon the compulsory registration of private titles. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory registration proceedings against private owners or whether it is not confined exclusively to public lands. 61 of Act No. 61 of Act No. HELD: Act No. 926 does not permit of simil ar proceedings. The title of the Public Land Act contains no mention of compulsory registration proceedings. 61 of Act No. lands claimed by the Government.prescribed area in the municipality of Binalonan. 2259 to the repeal or amendment of Sec. at most. 926 is not applicable to any other than public lands. 2259) authorizes the Director of Lands to institute compulsory registration proceedings against all owners and claimant s of property within any area which has been regularly surveyed and platted under the procedure prescribed in the Act. The fact that the new Act does not expressly state that it amends or repeals Sec. 2259 was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of existing legislation on the same subject. v. Court of Appeals Case No. 1989) . Hon. 13 of RA 85. LATIN MAXIM: 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Briad Agro Development Corp. dela Serna. the sales agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immediately for registration by the DBP. Case No. Then. No. and dela Cruz. 1980) Chapter IV. a curative statute to render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC. Page 175. It is. was to erase any doubts regarding the legality of the acquisit ion by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the housing project which it intended to establish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own. However. However. the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and because the subdivision plan for the area was still pending approval by the Bureau of Lands. 92 G.R. et al. 199 FACTS: The Board of Governors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing project for its employees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for 20 years. 83225 (June 29.202 Development Bank of the Phil. a portion of t he property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP. 13 of RA 85. RA 3147 was enacted.R. amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter (RA 85). No. ISSUE: W/N there is retroactivity of the amendment of Sec. 13. by amending Sec. 13 of RA 85. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it could acquire the property in question for the intended purpose of a housing project in the light of the then Sec. were segregated and a separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHHC w herein there was no annotation whatsoever to the title. without the knowledge of the DBP. 39 G. by RA 3147. Footnote No. L-28774 (February 28. One of the purposes of Congress when it enacted RA 3147. HELD: Yes. the refore. among which was Sec. v. 136 FACTS: The case arose out of a complaint filed by Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services WFTU Local Chapter No. 46e . overtime pay. night shift differential pay. 111 has the character of a curative law to remedy a defect that attached to the provision subject of the amendment. 111 amending Art.O. Footnote No.30. Briad Agro questioned the Regional Director s authority to entertain the pecuniary claim of workers. 30b.O. ECOLA. 13th month pay and service ince ntive leave pay. HELD: The Court held that E. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. This was clear f rom the proviso: The provisions of Art. 217 of this Code notwithstanding The intended effect was clearly to make the Secretary of Labor and the various Regional Direc tors have concurrent jurisdiction.Chapter IX. which granted to Regional Directors jurisdiction over monetary claims. 38b. Respondent failed to submit controverting evidence despite due notice . legal holiday pay. E.909. which NLRC dismissed on t he strength of E. Director Balbin thus ruled in favor of the employees and ordered respondent to p ay P5.O. In its appeal to the NLRC. 111 therefore has retroactive effect. ISSUE: W/N the jurisdiction over money claims is exclusive to the Labor Arbiters. by force of Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code. Page 376.369. 217 of the Labor Code. 9. ROI-005 against respondent agricultural f irm for alleged underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage. Footnote No.Erectors. Gaanan and Aguilar. 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. No. plus his contractual bonus. 37. 99 G. vested with the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims between employers and employees abroad.R. 274 G. Footnote No. another contract was executed which changed his position into that of a helper/laborer. ISSUE: W/N E. 1691 and 1391. For convenience. 46a.O. he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract an d the amount actually paid to him. in this case. Inc. Page 377.R.D. the title was issued in Santos s name. Months after. When private respondent returned to the Philippines. 140 FACTS: Private respondent was recruited to work in Saudi Arabia as a service contract driver. . 46c. 797 was passed.O. National Labor Relations Commission. Furthermore. creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). 134 FACTS: Duata and Aguilar bought a parcel of land which subsequently became a quarter part of Lot No. Laws should only be applied prospectivel y unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly decla red or is necessitated.O. the jurisdiction over the subject matter is determine d by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The Labor Arbiter still proceeded with the case and rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent. 104215 (May 8. th ese were P. Page 376. and Burg os Case No. 1996) Chapter IX. HELD: No. Andres. No. L-20901 (August 31. 1965) Chapter IX. The lot was purchased by Santos. No. LATIN MAXIM: 35. 797 should be given retroactive effect and thus divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. Duata and the Court of Appeals Case No. 797 is not a curative statute and is therefore not included in the exception to the rule on prospectivity. v. Hon. Private respondent filed the complaint with the Labor Arbiter but E. Jr. E. it envisioned contracts of sale with right to repurchase where the real intention of the parties is that the pre tended purchase price is money loaned. the CA ruled that the transactio n was actually an equitable mortgage under Art. intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro. Santos denied t he spouses ownership. in executing the said private document.On August 3. Art. 21. 1955. private respondent Duata. 46e . 1602 of the New Civil Code and set asi de the decision of the trial court. 17. 37. LATIN MAXIM: 8c. Said article is remedial in nature and can thus be applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether Santos and Aguilar. claiming that the land had been sold to her by Aguilar in a private document. and in order to secure the payment of the loan. instituted an action for reconveyance of ¼ of Lot No. 1602 was designed primarily to curtail the evils brought about by contracts of sale with right of repurchase. HELD: It is a mortgage. Upon appeal. a contract purporting to be a pacto de retro sale is drawn up. The trial court pronounced the document as a pacto de retro sale and ruled in favor of Santos. the daughter of the Duata spouses. 193 . petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullificati on of E. 442 of RA 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 442(d) of RA 7160. they cont end that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law. Then by virtue of E. 182 G. is also curative statute. 150 FACTS: President C. LATIN MAXIM: 46e. 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ortigas & Co. which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executives o rders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding off ice at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regula r municipalities. Sr. ISSUE: W/N the E. Footnote No. 103702 (December 6. Quezon. Feati Bank & Trust Case No.O. as it validates the creation of munici palities by executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power. Sec. Case No. Mendez. HELD: Yes. v.O. 174. Macapagal. 442(d) of the LGC of 1991. issued E. It was t hen attacked of its validity. Page 381. 2 of RA 1515. issued by President D. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres.R.O. and any attempt to apply Sec. The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded.O. 1994) Chapter IX. th e municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec. Garcia. creating the municipality of San Andres was cured by Sec.204 Municipality of San Narciso. No. Quezon v. 353. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality. L-24670 (December 14. Even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant as vendee of Lots Nos. HELD: The trial court held that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 133 FACTS: Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6. Resolution No. defendant having filed building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong. peace. among others. safety. Page 312. 5 and 6. Appellant demanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the said lots. prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appe llant on the lots in question and if Resolution No. The latter refused to comply. 27 was passed in the valid exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health. contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations. and held that the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendant. 27. to be devoted to banking purposes. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of poli ce power. 46e . Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R. It upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the area along EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone.G. in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the contractua l obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. good order and general welfare o f the people in the locality. ISSUE: W/N the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 27. 5 and 6. No. as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality. 1979) Chapter VIII. No. 144. 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine National Bank v.R. No. 237 G. as amended by RA 1993 to the effect that any action to enforce any cause under this Act shall be commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued. L-17566 (July 30. Footnote No. HELD: It would have applied. 1977) Chapter X. Respondent contends that petitioners are barred due to prescription under Sec. 7-A of C. No. No. claimants whose claim s were injuriously affected thereby should have a reasonable period of one year fr om the time the new statute took effect within which to sue on such claims. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.205 Billones v. Asuncion Case No. As th e statute shortened the period of action accrued. 1965) Chapter IX.A. Footnote No. as amended by RA 1993.A. 144. L-46095 (November 23. 35 G. Page 387. provided that actions already commenced before the effective date of this act shall not be affected by the period prescribed. which required them to work 18 hours a day without giving them additional compensation. 119 FACTS: Petitioners were allegedly employees of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. ISSUE: W/N Sec. The court ruled that a statute of limitations is p rocedural in nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom. it was contended that to give it retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude the six years from their accrual. otherwise it shall be barred forever.R. 7-A of C. Page 372. 3 . Because the statute shortened the period within which to bring an action and in order not to violate the constitutional mandate concerning due process. There was an amicable settlement but petitioners disclaimed having knowledge stating they did not authorize the filing. Court of Industrial Relations Case No. ISSUE: W/N the Courts interpretation of Sec. 1216 of the New Civil Code gives the creditor the right to proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors. before the case was decided. Ma nuel Barredo passed away. or some. 1216.FACTS: On January 1963. Moreover. 1977 the outstanding balance was over P8 million. 6 of Rule 86 simply provides the procedure if in case the cr editor desires to go against the deceased debtor. Barredo and cannot be brought against other surviving debtors. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. HELD: No. Art. 6. Thus. Carmen and Tomas Borromeo and Manuel Barredo. 1216 because substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. The case was dismissed pursuant to Sec. Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted Fabar Incorporated a loan secured by joint signatures of Jose Barredo. the choice is left up to PNB to decide. Rule 86 prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors is accurate. Rule 86 of the R ules of Court that the claim of PNB should be filed with the estate proceedings of M. increase of modify substantive rights. 9c . the Rules of Court may not prevail over Art. By May. Sec. or all . To require PNB to go against the esta te would deprive PNB of his substantive rights provided by Art. However. PN B filed a case against all 4 signatories. 6. the 1987 Constitution states that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish. In this case. the original contract starting an equal sharing of profits shou ld be followed. Act 4054 was amended by RA 34. producing retroactive effect. No. he was given a sentence of six years and 1 day . No. However. Because he pleaded guilty in his trial.R.R. Ongsiako in sists that RA 34 is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot be given retroactive effect . Because of this. 90 G. Ongsiako (landowner) and Gamboa (tenant) entered into a contract pursuant of Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. laws concerning this issue have been amended with the intent of being remedial and therefore. 1950) FACTS: In 1946. People Case No. HELD: Yes. Gamboa Case No. In the past. later that same year. ISSUE: W/N RA 34 is remedial in nature and should be given retroactive effect. During liquidation. L-1867 (April 8. 9a. 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Amandy v.206 Ongsiako v. it is clearly shown in the recommendation of the President concerning RA 34 that this b ill seeks to amend the Rice Share Tenancy Act in such a way to make the division of the crops more equitable to the tenants The principal feature of this bill is to incr ease the participation of the tenants in the production of the land he is cultivating . 7 G. 6b. 8 of Act 4054. 1988) FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1. This act provided that the palay would be divide d equally by the 2 parties. 79010 (May 23. Gamboa sought application of the amendatory law which provided for crop division on a 55-45 basis in favor of the tenants. Moreover.6 grams of marijuana. D.(the minimum time for his offense). 1990 had repealed P. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the former prevails. Where the law is clear and unambiguous. 36a.D. The law clearly declares who are entitled to probation and who aren t. Because P. However. 1990 was promulgated after P. it must be taken as it is. 7b. 22a. 49 . 25a. 43. 968.D.D. 7a.D. n o longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligible for probation. devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 968. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in disapproving Amandy s petition for probation. HELD: No. 968. the petition was denied because P. Petitioner then filed for probation alleging P. Petitioner does not fall under those entitled because those who have been sentenced to serve a maximum term of more than six years are excluded from the benefits of the Probation Law. 00 a s estimated cost of publication in the Official Gazette of the initial notice of t he hearing of the case. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stating that such insertion is unconstitutional being as it is revenue-raising. The law that petitioner relies on was Sec.R. Court of Appeals Case No.862. Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman and the latter set the case for hearing. When the par ties . 96 G. 28 FACTS: On several occasions. otherwi se known as the Appropriations Act for the current fiscal year. Page 390. 1960) Chapter X. W/N petitioner can be exempted. 197 G. pursuant to Special Provisions of RA 2300. Land Registration Commission Case No. No. 16 FACTS: Petitioner was required by the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) to remit to the Commissioner's office. W/N the law states that persons will be made to pay for the publication. He prays that he be exempt from such a deposit and that the LRC and the Director of Printing be ordered to publish th e notice in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: 1. Footnote No. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands. but private respondents failed to appear. 1995) Chapter X. private respondent Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store all valued at P7. No.55. HELD: Petitioner was made to pay. LATIN MAXIM: 11. 2.R. 114 of Act 496. L-16011 (July 26. the sum of P57. Page 391. 115213 (December 19. The reenactment of the same law as RA 117 did not include the said provision of Act 496. 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Diu v. 32. Footnote No.207 Parras v. D. 5b. 9a. It must be noted that P. Sec. of the latter law. LATIN MAXIM: 4. 1508.00 representi ng the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. ISSUE: W/N parties did not meet in presence of a Pangkat as required by law. 410(b) and 412 respectively. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the LGC of 1991. otherwise kno wn as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law". 4 and 6 of the former law have been substantially reproduced in Sec.0000. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial court bef ore the effectivity of the LGC. and (2) another for P12. while admitting indebtedness. HELD: Petition was granted without prejudice to the re-filing of the case by petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P.met. Nevertheless.227.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and rep air of the boat belonging to petitioners. interposed two counterclaims: (1) for P6. 36b . Private respondents in their Answer. they failed to reach an amicable settlement.D. However. 1927) Chapter I. 1992) Chapter X. 1990. Commission on Audit Case No. The National Coal Company was formed by the Philippine Government. as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 2705. as amended by Sec. Footnote No. the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mecano v. as amended. However. 699 o f the Revised Administrative Code (RAC). Springer Case No. 2 of Act No. HELD: Yes. . 2822. two from the legislative and one from the executive. 4 of Act No. is unconstitutional and void. th ree members of the government appeared. the respondents are stated as usurping and illegally occupying said positions since they were not elected by the proper shareholders. No. on account of whi ch he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. 119 G. No. 9a. 103982 (December 11.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that the RAC Sec. Page 38. During the election of directors. L-26979 (April 1. Page 395. 30a.Government v. ISSUE: W/N the executive is the sole administrator of the Philippine Government. 166 FACTS: The National Coal Company elected its board of directors via vote in accordance with its by-laws. Sec. The Government intended to retain a majority stake in the said company. 176 G. Footnote No. He wa s hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7. it ended up occupying almost 90% of the stock. however.R. 45 FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 32. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. 173 of the Labor Code. and the Court consid ers such implied repeal as not favorable. The Court finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal.D. 49 . 2. 699 of the RAC whose benefits are administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of th e government. expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. 37. HELD: Petition was granted. W/N petitioner can claim from the COA. The question of whether or not petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec.ISSUE: 1. Also the Court finds that laws must be in accord with each other. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. W/N Sec. The second sentence of Art. 1921. as amended b y P. 38b. LATIN MAXIM: 30a. 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. any person confined in any asylum by order of the court in accordance with Art. 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. The court permitted accused to leave the hospital two years later on the strength of doctor s reports. par.209 Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee v. 1048 of the Administrative Code confers on the Director of Health the autho rity to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. a company engaged in the coastwise shipping business. Art. 1930) FACTS: The accused. 1048 of the Administrative Code. was acquitted of murder but was ordered to be committed to an asylum. of the Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum possesses the power to permit said insane person subsequently to leave th e asylum without the approval of the Director of Health. No 12330 (January 25. Likewise. The powers of the courts and the Director of Health are complementary with each other. one Chan Sam. On the other han d. this should be done. 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ynchausti & Co v. sought to prohibit the Insular Collector of Customs from enforcing the requireme . when two portions of the law can be construed so that both can stand together. 33281 (March 31. HELD: It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that when there is no express repeal.R. Thus. 4. Sec. Stanley Case No. In issuing the order of release t he respondent judge relied upon Art. 8. 174 G. Concepcion and Lee Voo Case No.R. No. 1917) FACTS: The petitioner. none is presumed to be intended. 20 G. The converse proposition equ ally holds true. 2614 was not and could not have been repealed by the Administrative Code. 49. The Philippine Legislature could not h ave intended to repeal said Act within less than three weeks after its passage and substitute in its place absolutely nothing except the uncontrolled judgment of t he Insular Collector of Customs. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 2614 and paragraph (e) of Sec. 2614 being specific with regard to the management of Philippine vessels. Act No.nt. 1312 of the Administrative Code. 9c. HELD: There is no express repeal of Act No. which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the officer s on each vessel. 2614. The petitioner relied upon the ground that Act No. 50 . It is apparent that there was no specific intention to repeal the statute. ISSUE: W/N there is a conflict between Act No. 25. 70832 (December 18. The United States Congress never intended to relax the stringent provision s relating to the smoking of opium or to its use in any of its forms whatever. 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Fabros. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. four schools prayed for the lifting of the TRO on the ground that their . relative to Student Fees for School Year 1985-1986. Laya promulgated the disputed MECS Order No. Whether or not an Act is impliedly repealed is a question of legislative intent to be ascertained by a n examination of both statutes. HELD: That the United States Congress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws dealing with the subject of opium appears from the law itself. v. and thereafter. which was granted to them. purpose. The Educat ion Act of 1982. under the Education Act of 1982 (BP 232). 44 G. ISSUE: What the effect of said Act was upon local legislation dealing with the subject of opium.S. Then Minister of Education Jaime C. 11338 (August 15. and in the light of the reason. No. R. 451. 1987) FACTS: This is a consolidated case involving the allocation of the incremental proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in Sec. 2381 and all other laws had been repealed by the Act of the United States Congress. However. 1916) FACTS: The defendant was charged with having illegally in his possession and under his control a certain amount of opium. v. The trial court dismissed the complaint o n the theory that Act No. No. 3(a) of P. et al. Petitioners pra yed for temporary restraining order on the Rules and Regulations. and objec t of both. 164 G.210 U.D.R. The Government appealed. Tantoco Case No. entitled Rules and Regulations to Implement the Provisions of BP 232. Laya Case No. P.D. the authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges by private schools is lodged with the Secretary of Education and Culture. Hence. which the Court thereby lifted. 451. while BP 232 provides that the increment shall be applied or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the MECS. there was a repeal. 451 which thereby makes MECS Order No. LATIN MAXIM: 4.D. 451. 25 valid.D.D. HELD: Yes.tuition fee increase has already been approved pursuant to P. 451 provides that 60% of the incremental proceeds of tuiti on fee increases shall be applied or used to augment the salaries and wages of members of the faculty and other employees of the school. 42 of BP 232 liberalized the procedure by empowering each private school to determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. Under P. ISSUE: W/N BP 232 has repealed P. 39b . where Sec. 211 Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association. It was approved. although with a common objective. The two laws. 70. HELD: The importation may be illegal on the ground that such importation belong exclusively to private parties. L-24022 (March 3. the President may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. 16 . the latter statute must be irreconcilably incons istent and repugnant to the prior existing law. ISSUE: W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. 1965) Chapter X. Tan Lua. 61 FACTS: Private respondent Feliciano. Footnote No. pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. Case No. In orde r to effect a repeal by implication. Inc. No. wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of rice. v. 127 G. thru a government agency which the President may designate. RA 2207 provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in th e local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. Feliciano Case No. The Presiden t designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. hence there was no repeal. Petitioners con tend that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. series of 1964. the Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration. thereby prohibiting any government agency from d oing so. The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of th e legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. and this is certified by the National Economic Council. 39a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Brias de Coya v. et al.R. refer to different methods applicable to diffe rent circumstances. Page 399. R. the former from their commencement. 1931) FACTS: Defendant-appellant Tan Lua was declared an insolvent in the Philippines while she was in China. Defendant-appellant executed a mortgage deed of a parcel of land to petitioner so as to secure a loan. At this. The assi gnee filed his appointment for the purpose of transferring the property to him. No. A certain Vicente Nepomuceno was appointed assignee of the involuntary insolvency. she appointed her son to manage. HELD: The Insolvency Law and the Land Registration Act compliment each other and are both intended to protect the rights and interests of creditors. Construing the Insolvency Law together with the Land Registration Act. which was registered with a Torrens title.G. 39a . Petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore the mortgage upon the land given to him by the latter. against which the y may enforce their credits. is legal and valid. 30756 (September 22. sell and encum ber her properties situated in the Philippines. accordin g the latter a means for securing their insolvent debtor's property. both such proceedings and the assignment must have been recorded in the registry of deeds. ISSUE: W/N the mortgage given by respondent to petitioner was valid and legal considering the fact that the assignee recorded his appointment after the transf er has been made. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. we reach the conclusion that in order that the assignment of t he insolvent debtor's real property made by the clerk of the proper court to the as signee may operate to vest in said assignee all of said estate from the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer. 1971) Chapter X. (January 24.R. 137 G. A subsequent statute. Footnote No. unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. Page 411. Subido Case No. RA 5185. 4 of the Decentralization Law. 1974) .96 FACTS: The Secretary of Finance authorized Jose R. and not by Sec. Petitioner. general in character as to its terms and application. series of 1968. (September 30. Endaya Case No. Mayor of the City of Manila. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer. L-23894.R. HELD: No. disapproved the appointment. 9. L-31711. on an opinion of the Secretary o f Justice.212 Villegas vs. to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers i s still governed by Sec. In an Administrative Order. LATIN MAXIM: 1. basing his action. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jalandoni vs. Petitioner. 2088a of the Revised Administrative Code. saying that Romualdez is not empowered to make such designation. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it b e shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. appointed Manuel D. is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment. Reyes. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Law should govern. d irected Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Ass istant City Treasurer. It has been the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legis lature so intended. a 1908 decision. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. No. 314 G. No. Respondent. 9. Libel is one of those offenses in cluded in such category. 360 of the Revised Penal Code. 49 . HELD: No. (the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the of fended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense). ISSUE: W/N Municipal Court of Batangas has jurisdiction over case at hand. Footnote No. Responde nt Judge was devoid of jurisdiction to do so. he did base his action on what for him was the consequence of the Judiciary Act as amended by RA 3828. 360 as last amended by RA 1289 conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts of first instance. as noted. Sec. 87 of which would confer concurrent jurisdiction on municipal judges in the capital of provinces with court of first instance where the penalty provided for by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. There was. 1963.Chapter X. As is clear from his well-written memorandum. 62 FACTS: Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel against a Serafin Cruz in t he Municipal Court of Batangas presided over by the Respondent Judge. During the hearing of the libel case Cruz. a negative respo nse. the provisions of Art. LATIN MAXIM: 1. through counsel manifested in open court that un der Art. was thus repealed by implication. Respondent still tried the case. He would thus conclude that as the amendatory act came into effect on June 22. the miners will stand to benefit from any of the government endeavors and it will no longer be correct to asseverate that the imposition of the increased rat es in specific taxes to augment the general fund for government undertakings is "unfai r" to the miners because they are not directly convenienced. then the proviso i n Sec. 1991 Chapter X. While we generally do not favor repeal by implication. Nos.213 CIR vs. We find that the disputed proviso found in Sec. 79 G. Footnote No.303. 5 of RA 1435 has truly become an anachronism.R.64 FACTS: Respondent Corporation filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue two separate written claims for refund in the amounts of P974. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act No.978. Given the present concept of the general fund and its wide application. LATIN MAXIM: . representing 25% of the specific taxes collected on the refined an d manufactured mineral oils. 231. Case No. sooner or later. 1435 (An Act To Provide Means of Increasing the Highway Special Fund) or certain provisions thereof have been repealed by subsequent statutes. respectively.50 and P424. using RA 1435 as basis. 436 and 711.33 . motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had utilized in its operations as a mining concessionaire. 83583-84 September 30. it cannot be denied that situations can and do arise wherein we are left with no other alternative b ut to concede the point that an earlier law has been impliedly repealed or revoked by a later law because of an obvious inconsistency.D. HELD: Yes. Page 400. The Court of Tax Appeals decided that Respondent Corporation can no longer claim this due to P. It is inevitable that. 5 of RA 1435 was drafted to favor a particular group of taxpayers-the miners and the lumbermen-because it was "unfair" to subject them to the increased rates and in effect make them subs idize the construction of highways from which they did not directly benefit. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation. 111 G. 2710 should be applied in the case. the later mus t be given effect. Tuazon Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. Even if the said Act has no repealing clause. ISSUE: W/N Act No. Act No.R. Footnote No. 2710 states that a petition of divorce due to adultery or concubinage cannot be granted except upon conviction.49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Valdez v. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to divorce based on prevailing laws before the enactment of Act No. for the language of the statute is so plain that its meaning is unmistakable. The respondent has never been convicted of the offense of adultery. 2710. No. when there is a plain and unavoidable repugnancy between two laws. and must be presumed to have been intended as a repeal of all conflicting provisions. L-14957 (March 16. The situation in this case does not require the application of any of the artificial canons of interpretation. 1920) Chapter X. 2710 should be applied. 9 FACTS: This is a petition for divorce filed by petitioner against his respondent wife. HELD: Act No. 49 . Negative statutes are mandatory. Page 388. On the last sale. Mota registered the contract as an unregistered real property.R. Mota also sold his half to the same purchaser. Serra foreclosed the mortgage given to him to secure the unpaid port ion of the selling price of the railway. 2. HELD: 1. a justice of the peace is vested . Lazaro Mota and Salvador Serra entered into a partnership to construct several kilometers of railroad in Occidental Negros. 155 G. ISSUE: 1. 194 of the Administrative Code clearly recognizes the validity of such a contract between the contracting parties. LATIN MAXIM: 1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Torrente v. 1905) FACTS: This case is an appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding. vs.R. HELD: Under the provision of Sec. L-2340 (December 21. ISSUE: W/N the Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wherever he may be in the Philippines. According to Standard Oil Co. W/N a mortgage over an unregistered property is valid. 1932) FACTS: In 1919. discharging the petitioner from detention. In December of the sam e year. No. were illegal and void. 13 of G. Concepcion Case No. The election to enforce the contract of mortgage is fatal to the right of rescission.O. W/N enforcement of mortgage is fatal to right of rescission. Sec. Serra transferred his half interest to Concepcion and Whitaker. L-34581 (March 31. so Concepcion and Whitaker mortgaged to Mota the railroad. Castro. No. It is contended that the arres t and detention of petitioner. Grove Case No. 58. 42 G. 2. In 1920. only part of the price was paid.Estate of Mota v. It is alleged that the order of arrest is illegal on its face in that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction to issue the order directing t he making of an arrest outside the Province of Cebu. No. Due to contrary provisions. The co urt however said that the opinion of the law making authority as to the meaning and effect of the law does not determine what the law actually is. 59 is a proof that the Civil Commi ssion deemed it necessary to make an express grant of such authority and that they wer e of opinion that prior to the publication of the said law the processes of the ju stices of the peace did not run throughout the province. it is entitled to respectful consideration. wherever he may be in the Phil ippines. The contention of the petitioner that Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 4. the general order has impliedly repealed the Spanish law. but it is not conclusive on the courts. 49 .with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest. much less the archipelago. No such repugnance is discernible. Bohol. No.R. 2175 was no longer operative. 200 G. LATIN MAXIM: Dissenting Seven: 9a. ISSUE: W/N an ecclesiastic is eligible to be elected. filed fo r Gonzaga s disqualification based on Sec. Though the five were a minority. 1978) Chapter I. L-26551 (February 27. Teleron Case No. The petitioner. himself an aspirant for the office. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of Albuquerque. the supreme law. HELD: The vote was indecisive. L-34854 (November 20. 37. Seven believed Sec. therefore there can be none. 30a. 32. 148 FACTS: Respondent Fr. The Court cannot rewrite the law under t he guise of interpretation. 49 Minor Five: 6c. Minor Five: For a later provision to repeal a prior one there must be such absolute repugnance between the two. 7a. Five believed that the prohibition was not tainted with any constitutional infir mity. Also. which mandated that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of political rights. 2175 was also repealed by th e Election Code for ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of ineligible persons. Footnote No. 2175 has neither been repealed nor superseded. Sec. No. legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upo n the subject shows the legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law. 1976) . the votes of the seven were insufficient to ren der the provision ineffective. Page 33.215 Pamil v. Gonzaga was ordered to vacat e the mayoralty. Sec. 2175 of the Administrative Code which stated that in no case can ecclesiastics be elected to a municipal office. Almuete Case No. hence it was presumed valid. The section also admitted no exception. 195 G. Dissenting Seven: The challenged provision was superseded by the 1935 Constitution.R. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. 7c. The accused filed a motion to quash alleging that at the time of the supposed offens e. 10. Footnote No. HELD: Sec. revising the whole subject matter of a former statute operates to repeal the for mer statute. It inst ituted the leasehold system and abolished the rice share tenancy system. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law (ATL). The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant s act of pre threshing is evident by not re-enacting Sec. al. The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. Page 142. 39 of the ATL. ISSUE: W/N pre-threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed. allegedly pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or obtaining her cons ent. there was no longer any law punishing the act. et. tenants of Fernando. The ALRC suspended the ATL. 61 FACTS: Almuete. The prohibitio n against pre-threshing is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy sys tem and is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-threshing. 47.Chapter IV. 49 . were charged with the violation of Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. A subsequent statute . 39 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which was already in force at the time of the act. The evident purpose i s to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. The accused. The defenda nt argues that the latter has no power to levy the tax in question under Sec. 3422. 148 G. ISSUE: W/N Act No. jurisdiction to control rates of airships was taken away from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and re-vested in the Public Service Commission (PSC) since RA 2677 impliedly repealed RA 776 which conferred to the CAB the power of control over air rates and fares. ISSUE: . under both statutes.R. 71 G.R. Plaintiff p aid the license fee under protest and contended that defendant had no authority to impose such tax and that the ordinance in question is null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 37. No. 1972) FACTS: Petitioner contends that by the enactment of RA 2677 amending Sec. 3422 repealed Sec. 2625( d) of the Administrative Code but it does have such power under a subsequent enactment of Act No. If the legislature intended its repeal.216 Smith Bell & Co. Municipality of Zamboanga Case No. 226. 2407 of the Administrative Code. A general affirmative act will n ot be construed to repeal a special or local statute unless the intention is manifest. it would have made specific reference in the repealing clause as it did in expressl y repealing Sec. L-32979-81 (February 29. On the other hand. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lechoco v. HELD: Repeals by implication are not favored. 1930) FACTS: Municipality of Zamboanga imposed upon the plaintiff a license fee for its machine for the baling of hemp in accordance with Ordinance No. respondents argue that jurisdiction over air fares and rates were. v. L-33318 (December 20. No. No. exercisable concurrently by the CAB and the PSC. Civil Aeronautics Board Case No. 146. 2625(d) the Administrative Code. 13(a) and 14 of C.A. 38b . HELD: Authority to fix air carrier s rates is vested in both the CAB and the PSC. the CAB can fix and determine reasonable individual. LATIN MAXIM: 37. Under RA 776.Whether the authority to fix air carrier s rates is vested in the CAB or in the PS C. Furthermore. implied repeal of statutes is not favored. joint or special ra tes charges or fares for air carriers but is subject to the maximum rates on freight s and passengers that may be set by the PSC under RA 2677. Furthermore. suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in the competitive service. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Villegas v. which negates the assumpt ion of authority on the part of the petitioner. HELD: No. Subido Case No. HELD: . No. Enrile Case No. then the authority to appoint a City Fiscal is not lodged in respondent Secretary of Justice but in him as Mayor of the City of Manila.R. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 4 of the Decentralization Ac t be given effect. The City Mayor was ordered to cease from deciding administrative cases of officers and employee s in Manila and submit to the Commissioner of Civil Service all pending disciplina ry cases. The defense of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing effectivity of the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila. No. 172 G. L-29827 (March 31. petitioner ignored the provision that t he City Fiscal is not included in the enumeration made in the Decentralization Act. 1965) FACTS: The Commissioner of Civil Service claims that RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557and 409 providing for the removal and suspension of policemen. 5a. 171 G. ISSUE W/N RA 2260 impliedly repeal RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA 409 so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service the exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove.Villegas v. The issue in this case was already decided in previous jurisprudence in the case of Villegas v. Subido. 1973) FACTS: It is the contention of the petitioner that if Sec. L-24012 & L-24040 (August 9. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Act impliedly repealed the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila.R. 38b. RA 557 and 409 are special laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the City of Mani la. It does not state that the power of removal is conferred to the other body. RA 2260 states that the removal and suspension by the City Mayor can be passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Repeal by implication is not favored and if two laws can be reconciled. RA 557 and 409 subsists side-by-side with RA 2260 and are not impliedly repealed by the latter which is a general law. instead of to the President . LATIN MAXIM: 9a. the construction will be against such repeal. RA 2260 contemplates appeal from the decision of the City Mayor to the Commissioner of Civil Service. 50 .No. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 5939 (March 29. 82 continues in force. 11002 (January 17. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The petitioners a re the surviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon Sec. 758 of the Code of Civil Pro cedure which provides that When a devise or a legacy is made to a child and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator. Palacio Case No. 301 G. 2238 provides no penalty thus. No. leaving issues such issue shall take the estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done unless a different disposition is required by law. 82. 100 FACTS: Felisa Hernandez died before the testatrix. v.218 U. 1911) Chapter X.S. Nacianceno Case No. 87 of Act No. Act No. Page 411.R.R. 82 because of the clause in Sec. 2238 repeals by implication Act No. 87 of Act No. The executor of the will opposes the payment upon the ground that such legatee had no interest therein. . Sec. He posits that Act No. 171 G. unless it is manifest that such is the intention of the legislature. 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Marin v. 2238 had repealed the penal effect of Act No. Footnote No. Act No. Page 406. 1916) Chapter X. 82 when he willfully omitted from the tax lists real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable. but the testatrix did not alter her will in respect to this legacy after the death of the legatee. 18 that states all acts or parts of Acts in conflict therewith are repealed. having died before the tes tator so as to pass to the heirs. 77 FACTS: Respondent was accused of violating Sec. Repeals by implication are not favored. No. HELD: No. Footnote No. 82. 2238 had done nothing but to change the method and procedure provided in Act No. ISSUE: W/N the heirs of Felisa Hernandez become the heir to her legacy after her death even if the testator did not alter her will. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. then Sec. The construction by the respondent would repeal or annul the section absolutely. HELD: Yes. 11 . 758 would have no value and might as well have never been written which is an absurd interpretation. It is tantamount to saying that the legislature enacted a law and repealed it at the same time. If petitioners are not entitled to the payment of this legacy. No. 1988) Chapter X. Page 413. Chief. Repeals by implication are not fav ored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators in manifested. 1850 was repealed by E. the widow of Lozano then filed for a criminal case where it was found that there exists a prima facie evidence that petitioner. 194 G. Averia Case No. the alleged boat owner. Marges. 1040 & 1012. Page 412.O.R. Petitioner contends that General Cou rt Martial has no jurisdiction since P. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pacis v. Footnote No. HELD: Yes.D.R. commenced a seizure and forfeiture proceedings pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code referring to the incident wherein sailors were wounded in a chase for boat loaded with untaxed cigarettes. the Acting Collector of Customs.O. Philippine Constabulary Case No. with deliberate intent and with intent to kill. On the same day.O. The allegation that P. 27. 1850 has been expressly repealed by clea r and precise provision of E. 20c. it is the exerci se of administrative control and supervision over units of the INP that was transferred to the President. The fishing boat therein was transfe . 1040. L-22526 (November 29. Footnote No.D. 1966) Chapter X. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Under E. shot Lozano during the performance of duty. 309 G. Anacorit a. 1012 that it is only the operational supervision and direction over all units of the INP that was transferred from the Constabulary to the city/municipal government. ISSUE: W/N the Court Martial has jurisdiction. 1040 is inaccurate. 105 FACTS: Petitioner. No. An altercation occurred which resulted in the shooting and death of the driver Lozano. It is specifically stated under E.Velunta v. filed a Civil Case for replevin alleging that the boat was stolen. L-71855 (January 20. 102 FACTS: Petitioner as patrolman and member of the Integrated National police (INP) apprehended a motorcycle driver for violation of traffic rules.O. HELD: 1. 49 . and later on to Marges as commanded by respondent Hon. Yes. He went beyond his official acts and proceeded to espouse th e cause of the boat owner giving impression that his interest in the subject is mo re than just the interest of a public official. 2. W/N Marges could recover the fishing boat.rred to the Provincial Sheriff. 20c. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. It has also caught the Supreme Court s notice that respondent sheriff has practically taken the cudge ls for the boat owner. The writ was received by respondent Sheriff. No. It is axiomatic that t he later law prevails over the prior statute. 4. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in RA 1937 which took effect much later than the Judiciary Act. Averia. W/N Provincial Sheriff may be held in contempt for failure to comply with the writ. ISSUE: 3. No. Footnote No. by his own declaration. and in consideration of the cancelled contract for his services to the respondent. The Code of Civil Procedures must prevai l because it is a later expression of legislative will than Art. In Sec. Cruz. et al. San Andres Development Corporation. 107 FACTS: Two Philippine corporation attempting to develop the commercial radio business (Far Eastern Radio Inc. thus enabling the latter to acquire on lease the equipment of AMEX. The said Arbiter awarded backwages and separation pay. and Radio Corp. 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine National Bank v.) agreed to merge. he ca nnot be permitted to falsify it. Page 414. Footnote No. Case No. Radio Corporation of the Philippines Case No. Page 414. it w as agreed in the contract of merger that he should be offered the post of manager o f the traffic department. 123 G. appealed and alleged that the workers should be given . 333 of the Code of Civil Procedures. The petitione r herein has been largely interested in the respondent corporation.R. No. 80593 (December 18. it mentions that whenever a party has.Herman v. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.M. intentionally or deliberatel y led another to believe a particular thing is true and to act upon such belief. 1927) Chapter X. 239 G. Sec. 1815 of the Civil Code also does not apply sinc e the transaction was more than a compromise. HELD: Yes. as mortgage-creditor. 108 FACTS: Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) suffered huge financial losses and was unable to pay its remaining employees. The unpaid workers filed for monetary compensation before the Labor Arbiter. 1989) Chapter X. AMEX entered into an operation contract agreement with T. 1815 of the Civil Code. act or omission. 26802 (July 15. Two years after. AMEX did not appeal but PNB. ISSUE: W/N Herman s claim for salary has been expressly waived in the final agreement.R. their unpaid wages only and not the termination pay. Art. 49 . ISSUE: W/N Art. The NLRC denied the appeal of PNB. his workers shall enjoy FIRST preference as regards to their unpaid wa ges. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. It specifically states that In the event of bankruptcy of an employer s business. HELD: No. 110 of the Labor Code is to be construed as not favoring the unpaid workers because of the order of preference provided in Art. any provision of law to the contrary not withstanding such unpaid wages shall be paid in FULL before claims of the government and other creditors may be paid. 110 of the Labor Code provides for worker preference in case of bankruptcy . this instant petition by the PNB on the grounds that Article 110 of the Labor Code does not create lien in favor of the workers for unpaid wages upon th e properties of the employer. 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code. Hence. ISSUE: 1. Sec. 8 of the Constitution.R. COMEL EC had the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election should be when it stated that the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away. Footnote No. Sec. 85 G. R. 6679 provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. No. except barangay officials. 9a. Furthermore. 81 FACTS: This is a petition to reverse the Decision ordering the refund of the GCL Retirement Plan representing the withholding tax on income. Court of Appeals Case No. No. should be the one foll owed. Art. The term of office of elective local officials. 7160 or the Local Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years.221 David v. 8 of the Constitution provides that. Commission on Elections Case No. 73 G. 10. 8 of the Constitution. No. 2. R. 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.R. Petitioner David contends that an earlier law. HELD: 1. the same having been scheduled in May 1997 .A. 1992) Chapter VII. Footnote No. 95022 (March 23. the Supreme Court in Paras v. The COMELEC s basis is R. 6679.A. 105 FACTS: Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangay elections should be held and questions the COMELEC s schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. 1997) Chapter X. 2. 127116 (April 8. shall be three years It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of off ice for barangay officials. W/N there was a violation of Art. 20a. What the term of office of barangay officials is.A. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the lat er legislative enactment prevails. Sec. Page 300. Page 413. He also contends that there is a violation of Art. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 10. RA 4917 exempted the GCL Retirement Plan. including all the retirement . which shall be determined b y law. 10. and that GCL Plan is subject to the final withholding tax. Soo n after. The deletion in P. Also in Villegas v.D.D. It is known in statutory construction that a subsequent statute that is general in character can t be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless there is a legislative manifestation of such effect. 1959 is a general law. 50 .D. 1739 if the recipient of the interest is exempt from income taxation. Subido.D. LATIN MAXIM: 1.D. such rule is upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are sufficiently compreh ensive to include what was set forth in the special act. it can t repeal a specific provision impliedly. 1959. ISSUE: W/N GCL Retirement Plan retains its tax exemption after the promulgation of P. Petitioner contends that P.D. from income tax. P. 5a. 1959 of the provisions regarding tax exemption under the old law can t be deemed to be applicable to the employees trusts. The GCL Plan is one of those exempted from income tax under RA 4917. P. 1959 impliedly repealed the provisions of RA 4917 and RA 1983. 43.benefits given to officials and employees of private firms. hence. HELD: Yes. 1959 was promulgated abolishing the exemption from withholding tax o f interest on bank deposits previously given by P. 114307 (July 8. v. A mont h after. No.222 People v. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Airlines Inc. After presenting the evidence. Case No. No.R. urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 37. At the time the order was issued by respond ent judge. also known as Anti-Squatting Law before t he RTC presided over by respondent judge.R. The Anti-Squatting law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. 13 of the 1987 Constitutio n. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. 1998) FACTS: Private respondent Edilberto Castro was hired as manifesting clerk by petitioner PAL. Unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this cour t. respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case motu proporio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. P. notwithstanding the social justice provision of the Constit ution. the respondent judge dismissed the case again. Jr. 1998) FACTS: The Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate information for violation of P. 772 was still effective. ISSUE: W/N responded judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the subject criminal case. 772 is obsolete and deemed repealed by Sec. which provide that. Neither has this court declared its unconstitutionality. 772. Respondent was apprehended by government authorities while about to board a . Leachon.D. the CA ordered the continuation of trial of the subject case. 108 G. 9 and 10 of Art. 118 G. a law will always be presumed valid.D. the prosecutio n rested the cases. Thereafter. 108725-26 (September 25.D. opining that P. Almost a year after the prosecution has rested. 34 of RA 265. HELD: Yes. respondent filed a claim against PAL for backwages and salary increases granted under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) coverin g the period of his suspension. The said resolution likew ise required respondent to affix his signature therein to signify his full conformity to the action taken by PAL. Upon his reinstatement. as a mended by CB Circular 383. PAL issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of the offense charged but nonetheless reinstated the latter. the employee shall be entitled to his salaries and other benefits that may accrue to him during the period of such suspension. ISSUE: W/N Castro is entitled to backwages and salary increases granted under the CBA during his period of suspension. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. If the suspension is otherwise extended. in relation to Sec. the employee must be reinstated t o his former position. The rules clearly provide that a preventive suspension shall not exceed a maximum period of 30 days. 13b . after which period. PAL placed Castro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct. Three years and six months after his suspension. as amended.flight en route to Hongkong in violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular 265. however.R. and Jasaan. 231) and pursuant thereto. demanded payment of the provincial franchise tax from CEPALCO in accordance with the Local Tax Code (P. No. A special and local statute applicable to a particular case is no t repealed by a later statute which is general in its terms. Custom s took custody of the shipment.D. 1967) FACTS: Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu Company Ernerose Commercial. the Provincial Revenue Ordinance No. 3570. and 6020 to install. Case No. No. L-24037 (April 27. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of First Instance for Customs to release the goods. Lantin Case No. . Inc. the Bureau of Customs discovered that the goods to be delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company. th e Secretary of Finance made it clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax Code may only be imposed on companies with franchise that do not contain exempting clause. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Joya v. The franchise of CEPALCO expressly exempts it from payment of all taxes of whatever authority except 3% tax on its gross earnings. heat and power system i n Cagayan de Oro City and its suburbs including the municipalities of Tagoloan. 19.R. 3570 and 6020. 45355 (January 12. However. 31 G. The Provincial treasurer of Misamis Oriental. No provision in P. 127 G. RA 1937 and 1125.Province of Misamis Oriental v. Also. Villanueva. Op ol. ISSUE: W/N CEPALCO is exempt from paying the provincial franchise tax. operate and maintain an electric light.D. provisions and applic ation even if the terms of the general act are broad enough to include cases in the sp ecial law unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law. Francindy insisted that the CFI had jurisdiction o n the basis of the Judiciary Act and not the Bureau of Customs. HELD: No. 231 expressly or impliedly amends or repeals RA 3247. 1990) FACTS: Respondent CEPALCO was granted a franchise under RA 3247. vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedi ngs to the Bureau of Customs. HELD: The Bureau of Customs does. In case of conflict. whereas the Judiciary Act is a general law. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the shipment. RA 1937 and 1125 are special laws. special laws prevail over g eneral ones.on the other hand. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited. 16. LATIN MAXIM: 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sitchon. et al. The special law must prevail. the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of the law. 701 and 702. which are contrary to the Civil Code. 9 G. His widow. Joya Case No. Cecilio died before fully paying the Government for the lands. while Act 1120 is a special law. the City Engineer of Manila. on the other hand . It lays down provisions regarding acquisition. Art.R. and he started paying the Government for such. Sec. 1956) FACTS: Respondent Aquino. 147 G. he conveyed some o f the lots to respondent F. L-8500 (February 27. The court then sought to deliver the property to Florentino for liquidation and distribution. was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision on conjugal property. ISSUE: Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act 1120 s full conveyance of the property to the widow. and transmission of friar lands.R. The Civil Code is a general law. 1928) FACTS: Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots. No. . Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120. it is the distr ict health officer who should remove public nuisances. because their houses were public nuisance s built on public streets and river beds. Petitioners contend that under the Civil Code. herein petitioner. HELD: Act 1120 prevails. demolished the houses of the six petitioners in this class suit. No. Respondent. L-28067 (March 10. Joya as administrator. disposition. v. Aquino Case No.224 Arayata v. whereas RA 409 is a special law that pertains solely to the City of Manila. has jurisdiction. the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. the health officer under the Civil Code or the city engineer under RA 409. under RA 409. When a general and a special law are in c onflict. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . HELD: The City Engineer. The Civil Code is a general law applicable throughout the Philippines.argues that RA 409. the latter prevails. ISSUE: Whose job it is to determine and demolish public nuisances. grants the power to remove public nuisances to the City Engineer. 225 Bellis v. Relying on Art. par 2. 16. ISSUE: Whether Texas Law or the Philippine Law must apply in intestate and testamentary succession. As further indication of this intent. which w as executed in the Philippines where the properties involved were situated. par. which did not provide for legitimes. No. Macuan Case No. After the execution of the decedent s will. and Art. Bellis Case No. 1930) FACTS: . 1967) FACTS: Amos Bellis.R. in intestate or testamentary successions. 16 of the New Civil Code which provides that the national law of the decedent shoul d apply (Texas Law). died. a citizen of Texas USA. all surnamed Bellis. No. Art. He had 7 legitimate and 3 illegimate children.R. It must have been the purpose of the Congress to make Art. the exe cutor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testat or s 7 legitimate children. Art. Herein appellants filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the partition deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. v. 1039 provides that the capacity to su cceed is governed by the national of the decedent. HELD: Texas Law should apply. 1039 of the Civil Code render applicable the national law of the decedent. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. 123 G. It is thus evident that Congress has n ot intended to extend our system of legitimes to the succession of foreign national s. L-23678 (June 6. 9c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Trust Co. 16. 2 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succ ession. the CFI of Manila denied such oppositions. 14 G. 32280 (March 24. et. w hich is more specific. HELD: 1. which is general in character. which was later granted by the Court.. who became mentally incapacitated. No. Tormo. her undivided half of the conjugal propert y. Civil Code takes precedence over the Code of Civil Procedu re. praying th at the guardian be instructed to file a complete inventory of all the property belongin g to his ward. 2. ISSUE: 1. referring to the management of the property of a demented ward who is married. The defendant. which is claimed to be conjugal property. W/N a married woman judicially declared mentally incapacitated is entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is conjugal. which still subsists. being the guardian. M. Defendant filed a petition to the Court asking that he be appointed guardian of the person and estate of his wife. A special guardian. Philippine Trust Co. 2. Tormo. was appointed for the recove ry of the ownership and possession of the property herein involved. filed a motion. LATIN MAXIM: 50 .Defendant Macuan married F. W/N the defendant may be compelled to include in the inventory of his mentally incapacitated wife s property. The Court relied on 1 ) the Code of Civil Procedure. the latter consisting in undivided half in a cert ain land with improvements. cannot be compelled to include in the inventory of the same.. in the inventory of her property. said half of the conjugal property. al. Subsequently. She is not entitled to include half of the legal conjugal partnership. and 2) the Civil Code. Thus. barred the appellant to receive compensation for damages.00. with interest from the damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff due t o the wrongful and unauthorized delay and careless handling in the transportation of a cargo of eggs undertaken by defendant for plaintiff from the port of New York. ISSUE: W/N the action for damages had already prescribed. Relying on the ruling in previous cases. claimed by the defendant to have already prescribed in accordance with the prescription given by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 1991) Chapter X.R. 153 G. 75 G. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. The suit was brought more than a year from the receipt of the goods. American President Lines. Ltd. Court of Tax Appeal Case No. a British-owned foreign corporation was granted a legislative franchise.Tan Liao v. No. Footnote No. The CIR assessed the corporation in the amount of 7M pesos representing deficiency income tax maintaining that the franchise was inoperativ e . pursuant to RA 808. Page 415.755. 44007 (March 20. L-7280 (January 20. the Court held that the prescrip tive period of 1 year established by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act modified pro ta nto the provisions of Act No. 115 FACTS: Private respondent. HELD: Yes. and thus. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides that loss or damage suit must be brought within one year after the delivery of t he goods.R. 1956) FACTS: This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant Tan Liao for the recovery of P92. 190 as to goods transported in foreign trade. U SA to the port of Manila. the form er being a special act while the latter is a law of general application. and thereby. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. it has already prescribed. No. Case No. which included a tax exemption from t he payment of all taxes except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross earnings and tax on its real property. As a charter is ate contract. ISSUE: W/N the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of only 5% of the gross receipts in lieu of any and all taxes is unenforceable and without legal e ffect. HELD: No. the Corporation Law and the Public Service Act.for failure to comply with Sec. Art. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with the 1935 Constitution. the imposition of another franchise tax on the l authority would constitute an impairment of the contract and the corporation. The Court of Tax Appeals rendered t he franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitioner s assessment without effect having been made beyond the prescribed period stipulated in the Tax Code. The legislative franchise was valid. 8. RA 808 as a special statute must be the general laws as it was meant to meet particular sets circumstances. 50 in the nature of a priv corporation by the loca between the government deemed an exemption to of conditions and . 14 of the 1935 Constitution which limits the grant of franchise to Filipino-owned corporations. R. 1990) FACTS: The Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. On the other hand respondent invokes P. No. No. 72477 (October 16. v. Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the collection of real property tax covering the period 1978 to 1984. Special laws ought to be upheld and construed as exceptions to the general law in the absence of special circumstances calling fo r a contrary conclusion LATIN MAXIM: 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lopez. 464 on the matter of which tribunal or agency has jurisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real property taxes.D.D.227 NPVC v. Footnote No. 87 G. Jr. Civil Service Commission Case No. 87119 (April 16.R. 1991) Chapter X. Petitioner contends that the court has no jurisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper forum for the ad judication of the case pursuant to P.D.D. Page 415. XXV Case No. HELD: Yes.D. 150 G. claims and controversies between or among government agencies and instrumentalities. 242 is a general law that deals with a broad coverage concerning administra tive settlement of disputes. 242 must yield to P. gra nted that the latter is a special law dealing specifically with real property taxes w hereas P. 242 which provides that disputes between agencies o f the government including GOCC s shall be administratively settled or adjudicated b y the Secretary of Justice. Presiding Judge RTC Br. cities and municipalities thereby justifying its position in favor of the concerned municipal corporations. ISSUE: W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction over the civil action. P. 464 which governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of taxation b y provinces. 116 . Also. RA 5185 and BP 337 as general laws were not meant to deprive the City Council of Manila of its appointing power. However. HELD: No. The City Legal Office r then rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor an d not the City Council. 38b. conflict between the statutes should be very clear to favor the assumption that the latter in time repeals the other. ISSUE: W/N the Charter of the City of Manila has been repealed by RA 5185 giving mayors the power to appoint all officials entirely paid out by city funds and BP 337 empowering local executives to appoint all officers and employees of the city. LATIN MAXIM: 37. the City Budget of Manila questio ned whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may be paid out of city fun ds on the basis of the appointments signed by the Vice Mayor. since repeals by implicati on are not favored. 50 . Regardless of their date of passage. a special law (RA 409) providing specifically for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila prevai ls over a general law.FACTS: The Vice-mayor of Manila submitted to the Civil Service Commission the appointment of 19 officers in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer pursuant to the provisions of RA 409. Footnote No. 38. the latter opined that the MTC should take cognizance of the case based on Republic Act 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of Metropolitan. amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. ISSUE: W/N the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints for libel. LATIN MAXIM: 37. who initially recognized that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the cas e thereafter forwarding the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.228 Manzano v.R. No. and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to hear and decide criminal cases where the penalty does not exceed 6 years. 1961) Chapter VI. HELD: No. Ho wever. 1998) FACTS: A criminal complaint for libel was filed in the sala of herein petitioner. Case No. Pascual. 7691it must be maintained that a special law cannot be repealed.R. 80 G. Page 277. Municipal Tri al.A. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Garcia v. et al. L-16950 (December 22. the said law is of general character and doe s not alter the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC. 122068 (July 8. Gran ted that there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libe l cases from the provisions of R. 118 FACTS: . which is a law of special nature. 110 G. Although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trial Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts. The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with the Co urts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). Petitioner thus filed a motion to dismiss upon the respondent s acceptance of the case for the MTC s lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. No. Valera Case No. there being no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the clerk of court. 50. When vouchers were submitted to the mayor. otherwise known as the Judiciary Act. Also. 36d. 75 of RA 296 provides that all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities shall be appointed by the mayor. 75 of RA 926. a junior typist civil service eligible. he did not want to approve them. which is claimed to have repealed Sec. 75 of the Judiciary Act and that the two laws may be reconciled following the principle of law that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent general law. 9a. was appointed by the Justice of Peace as clerk of the municipality of San Jose. 75 of the Judiciary Act provides that justices of peace may have clerks of court at the expense of the municipalities and shall be appointed by respective justices. His reason was RA 1551 has repealed Sec. RA 1551 however. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. 32. ISSUE: W/N Sec. the power to appoint should not be considered lodged in the said mayor. Lastly. the intent of the law in placing the appointment of the clerks in the ju stice of the peace is to prevent the importunities and pressure of prejudicial politics. Nueva Ecija.Petitioner. b2 . Sec. 75 of RA 926 has been repealed by RA 1551. HELD: The judge ruled that said RA 1551 did not expressly repeal Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Pract . et al. 141 G. An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes. Footnote No. and For Other Purposes. ISSUE: W/N the enactment and enforcement of Ordinance No. 11a. The Municipal of Manila repealed RA 409 and enacted Ordinance No. 126 FACTS: Petitioner operates 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight.R. Moreover. Footnote No.A. 83 FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522. and null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Ramirez Case No. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C. Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the reason that a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with. illegal. L-23305 (June 30. 4986. Page 268. No. RA 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts. so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of th e former act and the latter acts. 28 G. ultra vires. the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic. No. 1966) Chapter X. 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Bagatsing v. HELD: No. Page 420. No. City of Manila. entitled An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila. 4986 is unconstitutional. 49. Case No. L-41631 (December 17. 548 and the Public Service Law.R.229 Lagman v. c) Sec. b) the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment. 1976) Chapter VI. ices Act has been violated, and d) the ordinance would violate P.D. 7 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products. ISSUE: What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code. HELD: The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that the special law is to be considered an exception to the general . The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of ordinance in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges particular. In regard therefore, the Local Tax Code controls. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 11a, 17, 40b, 49, 50 in STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 230 Latin Maxims Chapter II CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION Chapter IV ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERAL INTERPRETATION B. POWER TO CONSTRUE 6. Index animi sermo est. 1. Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet. Speech is the index of intention. Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul. Chapter III AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of the statute there should be no departure. C. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION Maledicta et exposition quae corrumpit textum. It is bad construction which corrupts the text. 2. Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege. Littera scripta manet. Contemporary construction is strongest in law. The written word endures. Optima est legum interpres consuetudo. Clausula rebus sic stantibus. Custom is the best interpreter of a statute. Things thus standing. Regula pro lege, si deficit lex. In default of the law, the maxim rules. 7. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required. 3. Optimus interpres rerum usus. Dura lex sed lex. The best interpreter of the law is usage. The law may be harsh but it is the law. Communis error facit jus. Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est. Common error sometimes passes as current law. It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written. Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescit. That which was originally void, does not by lapse of time become valid. B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION 4. Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur. 8. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis. Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate. Equity never acts in contravention of the law. Aequum et bonum est lex legume. 5. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. What is good and equal is the law of laws. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Jus ars boni et aequi. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. Law is the art of equity. The interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation. 9. Ratio legis est anima legis. The reason of the law is the soul of the law. 231 Littera necat spiritus vivificate. The letter kills but the spirit gives life. Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservice. Words ought to be more subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words. Benignus leges interpretandae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conservetur. Laws are to be construed liberally, so that their spirit and reason be preserved . Qui haret in littera haret in cortice. He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning. Quando verba statute sunt speciali, ratio autem generalia, statum generaliter est intelligendum. When the words used in a statute are special, but the purpose of the law is general, it should be read as the general expression. 10. Cessante rationi legis, cessat et ipsa lex. When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. 11. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens e t absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted. Legis construction non facit injuriam. The construction of the law will not be such as to work injury or injustice. Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in lege. An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law. Verba nihil operari melius est quam absurde. It is better that words should have no operation at all than that they should operate absurdly. Lex simper intendit quod convenit rationi. The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason. Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus. Like reason doth make like law. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. An argument drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law. De similibus idem est judicium. Concerning similars, the judgment is the same. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ubi eadem est ratio, ibi est eadem legis disposition. Where there is the same reason, there is the same law 12. Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret. That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice. Lex injusta non est lex. An unjust law is not a law. 13. Fiat justitia, ruat coelum . Let right be done, though the heavens fall. Nemo est supra legis. Nobody is above the law. Nulla potential supra legis esse debet. No power must be above the law. 14. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem. It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger should reap the pecuniary produce of another man s work. 15. Surplusagium non nocet. Surplusage does not vitiate a statute. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful. ) 16. Falsa demostratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat. False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute. Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel persona constat. Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the description is sufficiently clear. Certum est quod certum reddi potest. That is sufficiently certain which can be made certain. 17. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur, inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit co ntras jus basque. Where anything is granted generally, exemption from rigid application of law is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right. 232 18. Summum jus, summa injuria. The rigor of the law would be the highest injustice. Jus summum saepe, summa est militia. Extreme law is often extreme wrong. 19. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Impossibilum nulla obigatio est. There is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. The law does not require an impossibility. Lex non intendit aliquid impossible. The law does not intend the impossible. C. IMPLICATIONS 20. Ex necessitate legis. By the necessary implication of law. In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus. The greater includes the lesser. Cui jurisdiction data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus jurisdiction explicari non potuit. When jurisdiction is given, all powers and means essential to its exercise are also given. 21. Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there is a remedy for violation thereof. Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum. Where the law is uncertain, there is no right. 22. Ex dolo malo non oritur action. An action does not arise from fraud. Nullius commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria. No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act. In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis. Where the parties are equally at fault, the position of the defending party is the better one. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 23. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum. What cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Chapter V INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES A. IN GENERAL 24. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. General words should be understood in their general sense. Generis dictum generaliter est interpretandum. A general statement is understood in its general sense. 25. Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam. A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used. Verba mere aequivoca, si per communem usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur, talis intellectus preferendus est. Equivocal words or those with double meaning are to be understood according to their common and ordinary sense. Verba artis ex arte. Words of art should be explained from their usage in the art to which they belong. Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personam. General words should be confined according to the subject-matter or persons to which they relate. 26. Ubi lex non distinguit necnon distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. 27. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar. B. ASSOCIATED WORDS 28. Noscitur a sociis. A thing is known by its associates. 29. Ejesdem generis. Of the same kind or specie. 233 30. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Expressum facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. 31. Argumentum a contrario. Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. 32. Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 33. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential. A qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. 34. Reddendo singular singulis. Referring each to each, or referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place. C. PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES 35. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis. A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule. STATUTE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES Chapter VI A. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE 36. Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself. Ex tota materia emergat resolution. The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Injustum est, nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita indicare vel respondere. It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law. Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere possit antequam totum interum atque interim perlegit. The sense and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one whole and not of one part only by itself. Ex antecendentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation. A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it. Verba posterima propter certitudinem addita ad priora quae certitudine indigent sunt referenda. Reference should be made to a subsequent section in order to explain a previous clause of which the meaning is doubtful. 37. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. B. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES 38. Pari materia. Of the same matter. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. Every statute myst be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law. 39. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura. Distinguish times and you will harmonize law. -Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur in illis. -Times have changed and laws have changed with them. Mutatis mutandis. With the necessary changes. He who is fir st in time is preferred in right. Lex de fut uro. 42. The law looks forward. Nullum crimen sine poena. Nullum tempus occurit regi. An act done by me against my will is not my act. -A new statute should affect the future. pending. Lex prospicit. Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur. Actus me invito facturs non est meus actus. non respicit. MANDATORY STATUTES 40. The law aids the vigilant. -Nova constitutio futuris forma m imponere debet non praeteritis. not retrospect ive. Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subv eniunt. The law provides for the future. Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonem concedentis. the judge for the past. There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. et magna cum cautione sunt adhibendae neque Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants e nim janus locatur in legibus. pendentibus negotiis cautum sit. Salus populi est suprema lex. for Janus has Renunciatio non praesumitur. Strictissimi juris. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. really no place in the laws. Statutes enacted for the publc good are to be construed liberally. nisi nominatim et de praeterito tempore et adhuc 43. Laws should be construed as prospective. not those who slumber on their rights. Laws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received. . B. IN GENERAL B. Potior est in tempore. A. 45. not backward. them. non ad facta praeterita revocari. Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare formam negotiis.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 234 Chapter VII L STATUTES STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION Chapter VIII MANDATORY AND DIRECTIONA A. Renunciation cannot be presumed. potior e st in jure. judex de praeterito. 41. Follow the law strictly. The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED 46. unless they are expressly made applicable to past transactions and to such as are still 44. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT 47. The voice of the people is the supreme law. Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur. IN GENERAL A. Leges quae retrospciunt. The private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of Ch apter IX PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES the public. nulla poena sine lege. not the past. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. there is no penalty without a law. Favorabilia sunt amplianda. . odiosa restringenda. 48.There is no crime without a penalty. Generalia specialibus non derogant. 50. Legislators pass over what happens only once or twice. BINDING FORCE OF RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION A. and not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. CODIFICATION AND REPEAL A. Laws are understood to be adapted to those cases which most frequently occur. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION TITLE OF THE ACT (INTRINSIC AID) D. REVISION. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE WHEN AMBIGUOUS B. Ignorance of the law excuses no one. Laws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most frequently. The law does not concern itself with trifling matters. Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto. In obscuris inspici solere quod versimilius est. Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence. De minimis non curat lex. When matters are obscure. Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum. Quod semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE AND HARDSHIP C. Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt non quae ex inordinato. REPEAL 49. . it is customary to take what appears to be more likely or what usually often happens.235 Chapter X AMENDMENT. aut quod plerumque fieri solet. The black (body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or rubric of the statute printed in red). Ad ea quae frequentibus accidunt jura adaptatur. A general law does not nullify a specific or special law.