Labor Standards Digests (Azucena)

G.R. No.78909 June 30, 1989 Maternity Children’s Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor EN BANC: MEDIALDEA, J.: Facts: Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club itself as well as from paying patients, averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De Oro City government. Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, the employees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from their respective salaries On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X, for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86. On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and Welfare Officers to inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of the allegations in the complaints. Based on their inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director issued an Order dated August 4, 1986, directing the payment of P723,888.58, representing underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner's employees. Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment, Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez, who rendered a Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying the said Order in that deficiency wages and ECOLAs should be computed only from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986, On October 24, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Secretary of Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so, the extent of coverage of any award that should be forthcoming, arising from his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code. Held: This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111. Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned. Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September 16, 1987). Decision: ACCORDINGLY, this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as regards all persons still employed in the Hospital at the time of the filing of the complaint, but GRANTED as regards those employees no longer employed at that time. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño- Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur G.R. No. 132564 October 20, 1999 SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Third Division, Q.C. and PRISCILA ENDOZO, respondents. FACTS: Private respondent Endozo was employed as domestic helper in Taiwan. The employment contract was for a definite period of one (1) year, with six (6) months probationary period. She stayed in Taiwan only for eleven (11) days as her employer terminated her services, and sent her home for alleged incompetence. Hence, private respondent filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal. Consequently, respondent's claim was transferred to the National Labor Relations Commission, Arbitration Branch, in San Pablo City. ISSUE: Whether the employer in Taiwan could lawfully terminate private respondent's employment as domestic helper for incompetence during the probationary period of her employment. HELD: It is an elementary rule in the law on labor relations that even a probationary employee is entitled to security of tenure. A probationary employee can not be terminated, except for cause. In this case, the employment contract was for a definite period of one (1) year, with six (6) months probationary period. After only eleven days of work, the employer dismissed private respondent without just cause. A probationary employee may be terminated on two grounds: (a) for just cause or (b) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. Under the contract of employment, the employer may terminate the services of private respondent during the probationary period for "being found losing ability to work." However, "the power of the employer to terminate a probationary employment contract is subject to limitations. First, it must be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the contract. Secondly, the dissatisfaction of the employer must be real and in good faith, not feigned so as to circumvent the contract or the law; and thirdly, there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal." In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer. In this case, petitioner was not able to present convincing proof establishing respondent Endozo's alleged incompetence. G.R. No. 47800 2 December 1940 Calalang vs. Williams FIRST DIVISION, LAUREL (J): 4 CONCUR Facts: A resolution by the National Traffice Commission that animal drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic was approved and adopted by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications upon indorsement by the Director of Public Works pursuant to Commonwealth Act 548 with modifications that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme Court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number." Decision: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Writ of Prohibition Prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered. Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Horrilleno, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-2089 October 31, 1949 JUSTA G. GUIDO, petitioner, vs. RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, c/o FAUSTINO AGUILAR, Manager, Rural Progress Administration,respondent. TUASON, J.: This a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of First Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of the petitioner Justa G. Guido's land, two adjoining lots, part commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just outside the north Manila boundary, on the main street running from this city to the north. Four grounds are adduced in support of the petition, to wit: (1) That the respondent RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted without jurisdiction or corporate power in filling the expropriation complaint and has no authority to negotiate with the RFC a loan of P100,000 to be used as part payment of the value of the land. (2) That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539. (3) That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid contracts for lease, or option to buy at an agreed price, and expropriation would impair those existing obligation of contract. (4) That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the land at P118,780 only and in ordering its delivery to the respondent RPA. We will take up only ground No. 2. Our conclusion on this branch of the case will make superfluous a decision on the other questions raised. Sections 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, copied verbatim, are as follows: SECTION 1. The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands or any interest therein, through purchaser or farms for resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to theirbona fide tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines. SEC. 2. The President may designated any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National Government, or he may organize a new agency to carry out the objectives of this Act. For this purpose, the agency so created or designated shall be considered a public corporation. The National Assembly approved this enactment on the authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, copied verbatim, is as follows: The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. What lands does this provision have in view? Does it comprehend all lands regardless of their location, nature and area? The answer is to be found in the explanatory statement of Delegate Miguel Cuaderno, member of the Constitutional Convention who was the author or sponsor of the above-quoted provision. In this speech, which was entitled "Large Estates and Trust in Perpetuity" and is transcribed in full in Aruego's "The Framing of the Philippine Constitution," Mr. Cuaderno said: There has been an impairment of public tranquility, and to be sure a continuous of it, because of the existence of these conflicts. In our folklore the oppression and exploitation of the tenants are vividly referred to; their sufferings at the hand of the landlords are emotionally pictured in our drama; and even in the native movies and talkies of today, this theme of economic slavery has been touched upon. In official documents these same conflicts are narrated and exhaustively explained as a threat to social order and stability. But we should go to Rizal inspiration and illumination in this problem of this conflicts between landlords and tenants. The national hero and his family were persecuted because of these same conflicts in Calamba, and Rizal himself met a martyr's death because of his exposal of the cause of the tenant class, because he would not close his eyes to oppression and persecution with his own people as victims.lawphi1.nêt I ask you, gentlemen of the Convention, knowing this as you do and feeling deeply as you must feel a regret over the immolation of the hero's life, would you not write in the Constitution the provision on large estates and trust in perpetuity, so that you would be the very instrument of Providence to complete the labors of Rizal to insure domestic tranquility for the masses of our people? If we are to be true to our trust, if it is our purpose in drafting our constitution to insure domestic tranquility and to provide for the well-being of our people, we cannot, we must fail to prohibit the ownership of large estates, to make it the duty of the government to break up existing large estates, and to provide for their acquisition by purchase or through expropriation and sale to their occupants, as has been provided in the Constitutions of Mexico and Jugoslavia. No amendment was offered and there was no debate. According to Dean Aruego, Mr. Cuaderno's resolution was readily and totally approved by the Convention. Mr. Cuaderno's speech therefore may be taken as embodying the intention of the framers of the organic law, and Act No. 539 should be construed in a manner consonant with that intention. It is to be presumed that the National Assembly did not intend to go beyond the constitutional scope of its powers. There are indeed powerful considerations, aside from the intrinsic meaning of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution, for interpreting Act No. 539 in a restrictive sense. Carried to extremes, this Act would be subversive of the Philippine political and social structure. It would be in derogation of individual rights and the time-honored constitutional guarantee that no private property of law. The protection against deprivation of property without due process for public use without just compensation occupies the forefront positions (paragraph 1 and 2) in the Bill for private use relieves the owner of his property without due process of law; and the prohibition that "private property should not be taken for public use without just compensation" (Section 1 [par. 2], Article III, of the Constitution) forbids necessary implication the appropriation of private property for private uses (29 C.J.S., 819). It has been truly said that the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of and citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with very just principle and fundamental maxim of a free government. (29 C.J.S., 820.) Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is a declaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino people "the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control. In paving the way for the breaking up of existing large estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or undermine the property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to authorize of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving of it to another. Evincing much concern for the protection of property, the Constitution distinctly recognize the preferred position which real estate has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspects of social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The Constitution owned in reasonable quantities and used legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the formation and growth of a social middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every progressive and happy country. The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and received on the basis of efforts exerted in their production. As applied to metropolitan centers, especially Manila, in relation to housing problems, it is a command to devise, among other social measures, ways and means for the elimination of slums, shambles, shacks, and house that are dilapidated, overcrowded, without ventilation. light and sanitation facilities, and for the construction in their place of decent dwellings for the poor and the destitute. As will presently be shown, condemnation of blighted urban areas bears direct relation to public safety health, and/or morals, and is legal. In reality, section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is in harmony with the Bill of Rights. Without that provision the right of eminent domain, inherent in the government, may be exercised to acquire large tracts of land as a means reasonably calculated to solve serious economic and social problem. As Mr. Aruego says "the primary reason" for Mr. Cuaderno's recommendation was "to remove all doubts as to the power of the government to expropriation the then existing landed estates to be distributed at costs to the tenant-dwellers thereof in the event that in the future it would seem such expropriation necessary to the solution of agrarian problems therein." In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town, or a large section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. The expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices, and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and public peace and order. Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to be applied in determining whether the use is public or not, some go far in the direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public advantage, and to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the interest involved are considerable magnitude. (29 C.J.S., 823, 824. See also People of Puerto Rico vs. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 Fed. [2nd], 316.) In some instances, slumsites have been acquired by condemnation. The highest court of New York States has ruled that slum clearance and reaction of houses for low-income families were public purposes for which New York City Housing authorities could exercise the power of condemnation. And this decision was followed by similar ones in other states. The underlying reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of congested areas and insanitary dwellings diminishes the potentialities of epidemic, crime and waste, prevents the spread of crime and diseases to unaffected areas, enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding communities, and promotes the safety and welfare of the public in general. (Murray vs. La Guardia, 52 N.E. [2nd], 884; General Development Coop. vs. City of Detroit, 33 N.W. [2ND], 919; Weizner vs. Stichman, 64 N.Y.S. [2nd], 50.) But it will be noted that in all these case and others of similar nature extensive areas were involved and numerous people and the general public benefited by the action taken. The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families does not inure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use public character. The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public health, public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises. No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can be made; each case has to be judge according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public convenience or public use. It is patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in our system of government and embraced by the majority of the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case would open the gates to more oppressive expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional, we see no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be expropriated and subdivided, and sold to those who want to own a portion of it. To make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the Rural Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing an area of 1,000 or 2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupants or those who want to build thereon. The petition is granted without special findings as to costs. Moran, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur. Paras and Reyes, JJ., concur in the result. G.R. No. L-45748 April 5, 1939 People vs. Vera Reyes EN BANC, IMPERIAL, J.: Facts: The defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the assistant city fiscal with a violation of Act No. 2549, as amended by Acts Nos. 3085 and 3958. The information alleged that from September 9 to October 28, 1936, and for the some time after, the accused, in his capacity as president and general manager of the Consolidated Mines, having engaged the services of Severa Velasco de Vera as stenographer, at an agreed salary of P35 a month willfully and illegally refused to pay the salary of said stenographer corresponding to the above- mentioned period of time, which was long due and payable, in spite of her repeated demands. The accused interposed a demurrer on the ground that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute any offense, and that even if they did, the laws penalizing it are unconstitutional. After the hearing, the court sustained the demurrer, declaring unconstitutional the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549 as last amended by Act No. 3958 for the reason that it violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, and dismissed the case. The last part of Section 1 of Act No. 2549, as last amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958 considers as illegal the refusal of an employer to pay when he can do so, the salaries of his employers or laborers on the 15th or last day of every month or on Saturday of every week, with only two days extension, and the non-payment of the salary within the period specified is considered as a violation of the law. The same act exempts from criminal responsibility the employer who, having failed to pay the salary, should prove satisfactorily that it was impossible to make such payment. The fiscal appealed from said order. In this appeal the Solicitor-General contends that the court erred in declaring Act No. 3958 unconstitutional, and in dismissing the cause. Issue: Whether or not the last part of Sec. 1 of Act No. 2594 as amended by Act No. 3958 is constitutional and valid. Held: We hold that the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as last amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958, is valid. We do not believe that this constitutional provision has been correctly applied in this case. A close perusal of the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958, will show that its language refers only to the employer who, being able to make payment, shall abstain or refuse to do so, without justification and to the prejudice of the laborer or employee. An employer so circumstanced is not unlike a person who defrauds another, by refusing to pay his just debt. In both cases the deceit or fraud is the essential element constituting the offense. The first case is a violation of Act No. 3958, and the second is estafa punished by the Revised Penal Code. In either case the offender cannot certainly invoke the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. In the exercise of this power the Legislature has ample authority to approve the disputed portion of Act No. 3958 which punishes the employer who, being able to do so, refuses to pay the salaries of his laborers or employers in the specified periods of time. Undoubtedly, one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the part of employers who hire laborers or employees without paying them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus causing them financial difficulties. Without this law, the laborers and employees who earn meager salaries would be compelled to institute civil actions which, in the majority of cases, would cost them more than that which they would receive in case of a decision in their favor. Decision: We hold that the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as last amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958, is valid, and we reverse the appealed order with instructions to the lower court to proceed with the trial of the criminal case until it is terminated, without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance. So ordered. Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur P.I. Manufacturing v. P.I. Manufacturing Supervisors and Foremen Association GR No. 167217 4 February 2008 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. Facts: RA 6640 was signed into law on 10 December 1987, providing, among others, an increase in the statutory minimum wage and salary rates of employees and workers in the private sector. It provides that the minimum wage of workers and employees in the private sector shall be increased by P10, except those outside Manila who shall receive an increase of P11, provided those that are already receiving above the minimum wage shall receive an increase of P10. PI Manufacturing Supervisors and Foremen Association (PIMASUFA) entered into a new CBA whereby the supervisors were granted an increase of P625 per month and the foremen, P475 per month. The increases were made to retroact to 12 May 1987, or prior to the passage of RA 6640. The application of said CBA resulted in a wage distortion, which prompted the PIMASUFA together with the National Labor Union to file a case against PIMA for violation of RA 6640. PIMA asseverates that the The Company and Supervisors and Foremen Contract absolves, quitclaims, and releases the company for any monetary claim that the supervisors and the foremen may have previous to the signing of the agreement on 17 December 1987. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of PIMASUFA and ordered PIMA to give the PIMASUFA members wage increases equivalent to 13.5% of their basic pay. The CA affirmed, but raised the wage increase to 18.5%. Issues: 1. W/N the PIMASUFA, by signing The Company and Supervisors and Foremen Contract, has waived any benefit it may have under RA 6640. 2. W/N the 13.5% increase in the supervisors and foremen’s basic salary should be increased to 18.5% to correct the wage distortion brought about by the implementation of RA 6640. Held: 1. NO. The increase resulting from any wage distortion brought about by the implementation of the new minimum wage law is not waivable. 2. NO. Although there was a wage distortion, the same was cured or remedied when PIMASUFA entered into the 1987 CBA with PIMA after the effectivity of RA 6640. The 1987 CBA increased the monthly salaries of the supervisors by P626 and P475, which re-establishes the gap not only between supervisors and foremen but also between them and the rank-and-file employees. Such gap as re- established by virtue of the CBA is more than a substantial compliance with RA 6640. Moreover, requiring PIMA to pay 18.5%, over and above the negotiated wage increases provided under the 1987 CBA, is highly unfair and oppressive to the former. A CBA constitutes the law between the parties when freely and voluntarily entered into. It was not shown that PIMASUFA was coerced or forced by PIMA to sign the 1987 CBA. All of its 13 officers signed the CBA with the assistance of NLU. They signed it fully aware of the passage of RA 6640. The duty to bargain requires that the parties deal with each other with open and fair minds. PIMASUFA cannot invoke the beneficial provisions of the 1987 CBA but disregard the concessions it voluntarily extends to PIMA. Quitclaims by laborers are generally frowned upon as contrary to public policy and are held to be ineffective to bar recovery for the full measure of the worker’s rights. The reason for the rule is that the employer and the employee do not stand on the same footing. Article 1149 of the Civil Code states that: When the law sets, or authorizes the setting of a minimum wage for laborers, and a contract is agreed upon by which a laborer accepts a lower wage, he shall be entitled to recover the deficiency. According to RA 6727, wage distortion is a situation where an increase in prescribed wage results in the elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation. Otherwise stated, wage distortion means the disappearance or virtual disappearance of pay differentials between lower and higher positions in an enterprise because of compliance with a wage order. The goal of collective bargaining is the making of agreements that will stabilize business conditions and fix fair standards of working conditions People vs. Pomar G.R. No. L-22008November 3, 1924 EN BANC, JOHNSON, J.: Facts: On the 26th day of October, 1923, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila presented a complaint in the Court of First Instance, accusing the defendant of a violation of section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature. The complaint alleged that the defendant being the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela (a tobacco factory) failed and refused to pay Macaria Fajardo (employed as cigar maker) the sum of P80 to which she was entitled as her regular wages on time of delivery and confinement by reason of pregnancy depite and over the demands to do so. To said complaint, the defendant demurred, alleging that the facts therein contained did not constitute an offense. The demurrer was overruled, whereupon the defendant answered and admitted at the trial all of the allegations contained in the complaint, and contended that the provisions of said Act No. 3071, upon which the complaint was based were illegal, unconstitutional and void. Upon a consideration of the facts charged in the complaint and admitted by the defendant, the Honorable C. A. Imperial, judge, found the defendant guilty of the alleged offense described in the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50, in accordance with the provisions of section 15 of said Act, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. From that sentence the defendant appealed. Issue: Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 are a reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state. Held: The provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void, in that they violate and are contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of the United States of August 29, 1916. Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. It has been said that the particular statute before us is required in the interest of social justice for whose end freedom of contract may lawfully be subjected to restraint. The right to liberty includes the right to enter into contracts and to terminate contracts. One citizen cannot be compelled to give employment to another citizen, nor can anyone be compelled to be employed against his will. The Act of 1893, now under consideration, deprives the employer of the right to terminate his contract with his employee. Clearly, therefore, the law has deprived, every person, firm, or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description within the Philippine Islands, of his right to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon. The law creates a term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are, therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. The constitution of the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract. Every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and morals, must come within this category. But the state, when providing by legislation for the protection of the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, is subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by that instrument or interfere with the execution of the powers and rights guaranteed to the people under their law —the constitution. The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the people's law — the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law. It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the employment of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It will hardly be contended that the person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for sixty days during which no services were rendered. Decision: The rule in this jurisdiction is, that the contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. (Art. 1255, Civil Code.) Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed, and the defendant is hereby discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. So ordered. Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur 79 PHIL. 40 G.R. No. L-1206 October 30, 1947 THE MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE PUBLIC UTILITIES EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, respondent. FERIA, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 44 of the Rules of Court interposed by the petitioner Manila Electric Company against the decision of July 15, 1946 of the Court of Industrial Relations, which reads as follows: Although the practice of the company, according to the manifestations of counsel for said company, has been to grant one day vacationwith pay to every workingman who had worked for seven consecutivedays including Sundays, the Court considers justified the oppositionpresented by the workingmen to the effect that they need Sundays andholidays for the observance of their religion and for rest. The Court,therefore, orders the respondent company to pay 50 per cent increasefor overtime work done on ordinary days and 50 per cent increase for work done during Sundays and legal holidays irrespective of the numberof days they work during the week. The appellant contends that the said decision of the Court of IndustrialRelations is against the provision of section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 444, which reads as follows: No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or center of labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays, unless he is paid an additionalsum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular remuneration: Provided, however, Thast this prohibition shall not apply to publicutilities performing some public service such as supplying gas,electricity, power, water, or providing means of transportationor communication. After a careful consideration of the issue involved in this appeal, we are of the opinion and so hold that the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is erroneous od contrary to the clear and express provision of the above quoted provisions. The power of theCourt to settle industrial disputes between capital and labor, which include the fixing of wages of employees or laborers, granted by the general provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, has beenrestricted by the above quoted special provisions of Commonwealth ActNo. 444, in the sense that public utilities supplying electricity,gas, power, water, or providing means of transportation or communication may compel their employees or laborers to work duringSundays and legal holidays without paying them an additional compensation of not less than 25 per cent of their regular remuneration on said days. Since the provisions of the above quoted section 4, are plain and unambiguous and convey a clear and definite meaning, there is no need of resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation orconstruction in order to determine the intention of the Legislature.Said section 1 consists of two parts: the first, which is the enactmentclause, prohibits a person, firm or corporation, business establishment,or place or center of labor from compelling an employee or laborer towork during Sundays and legal holidays, unless the former pays thelatter an additional sum of at least twenty five per centum of his regular remuneration; and the second part, which is an exception,exempts public utilities performing some public service, such assupplying gas, electricity, power, water or providing means oftransportation or communication, from the prohibition establishedin the enactment clause. As the appellant is a public utility that supplies the electricity and provides means of transportation to the public, it is evident that the appellant is exempt from the qualifiedprohibition established in the enactment clause, and may compel its employees or laborers to work during Sundays and legal holidays without paying them said extra compensation. To hold that the exception or second part of section 4, CommonwealthAct No. 444, only exempts public utilities mentioned therein from the prohibition to compel employees or laborers to work during Sundaysand legal holidays, but not from the obligation to pay them an extraor additional compensation for compelling them to work during thosedays, is to make the exception meaningless or a superfluity, thatis, an exception to a general rule that does not exist, because theprohibition in the enactment clause is not an absolute prohibitionto compel a laborer or employee to work during Sundays and legal holidays. The prohibition to compel a laborer or employee to workduring those days is qualified by the clause "unless he is paid anadditional sum of at least twenty five per centum of his regular remuneration," which is inseparable from the prohibition whichthey qualify and of which they are a part and parcel. The secondportion of section 1 is in reality an exception and not a provisoalthough it is introduced by the word "provided"; and it is elementalthat an exception takes out of an enactment something which wouldotherwise be part of the subject matter of it. To construe section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 444, as exempting public utilities, like the appellant, from the obligation to pay the additional remuneration required by said section 4 should they compel their employees or laborers to work on Sundays and legalholidays, would not make such exception a class legislation, violative of the constitutional guaranty of equal protectionof the laws (section 1 [1] Art. III of our Constitution). For itis a well-settled rule in constitutional law that a legislation which affects with equal force all persons of the same class and notthose of another, is not a class legislation and does not infringesaid constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws, if thedivision into classes is not arbitrary and is based on differenceswhich are apparent and reasonable. (Magonn vs. Illinois Trust Savings Bank, 170 N. S., 283, 294; State vs. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496; 56 L. R. A., 570.) And it is evident that the division made by section 4, of Commonwealth Act No. 444, of persons, firms, and corporations into two classes: one composed of public utilities performing somepublic service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water orproviding means of transportation; and another composed of persons,firms, and corporations which are not public utilities and do notperform said public service , is not arbitrary and is based ondifferences which are apparent and reasonable. The division is not arbitrary, and the basis thereof is reasonable. Public utilities exempted from the prohibition set forth in the enactment clause of section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 444, are required to perform a continuous service including Sundays andlegal holidays to the public, since the public good so demands,and are not allowed to collect an extra charge for services performed on those days; while the others are not required to do so and are free to operate or not their shops, business, or industries on Sundays and legal holidays. If they operate andcompel their laborers to work on those days it is but just andnatural that they should pay an extra compensation to them, because it is to be presumed that they can make money or business by operating on those days even if they have to pay such extra remuneration. It would be unfair for the law to compel publicutilities like the appellant to pay an additional or extra compensation to laborers whom they have to compel to work duringSundays and legal holidays, in order to perform a continuous service to the public. To require public utilities performingservice to do so, would be tantamount to penalize them forperforming public service during said days in compliance withthe requirement of the law and public interest. The conclusion on which the dissenting opinion is based, which is alsosubstantially the basis of the resolution of the lower court, is that "As to them [referring to public utilities like the petitioner] section4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 may be considered as not having been enacted at all. . . . Therefore, when there is a labor dispute as in the present case, and the dispute is submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for decision or settlement, the court is free to providewhat it may deem just and more beneficial to the interested parties,and that freedom to settle and decide the case certainly includesthe power to grant additional compensation to workers who work onSundays and holidays. The general power granted by section 1, 4, and13 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, are not affected in any way or senseby section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444." This conclusion finds no support in law, reason or logic. It is a well settled rule of statutory construction adopted by courts of last resort in the States that if one statute enacts some thing in general terms,and afterwards another statute is passed on the same subject, whichalthough expressed in affirmative language introduces special conditions or restrictions, the subsequent statute will usually be considered asrepealing by implication the former regarding the matter covered by the subsequent act; and more specially so when the latter act is expressed in negative terms , as where for example it prohibits a certain thing for being done, or where it declares that a given act shall be performed in a certain manner and not otherwise. (See Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., p. 354, and Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3d ed., Vol. 1, section 1922, and cases therein cited.) In accordance with this rule, the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 103 which confers upon the Court of Industrial Relations power to settle dispute between employers and employees in general, including those relating to compulsion of laborers to work on Sundays and legalholidays and additional compensation for those working on those days,should be considered as impliedly repealed by section 4 of Act No. 444,which limits or restricts the minimum of the additional compensationand specifies the persons, firms or corporation who may be requered to pay said compensation. That is, that the Court of Industrial Relations may, under the provision of said section 4, order a person, firm orcorporation or business establishment or place or center of labor whocompel an employee or laborer to work on Sundays and legal holidays,to pay him an additional compensation of at least 25 per centum of his regular remuneration; but said court can not require public utilities performing public service mentioned therein to pay saidextra compensation to laborers and employees required by them towork on Sundays and legal holidays, because the necessity of publicservice so requires.lawphil.net It is evident that the principal purpose of the Legislature in enactingsaid section 4, is not only to restrict the general power of the Court of Industrial Relations granted by Act No. 103, to fix the minimumadditional compensation which an employer may be required to pay a laborer compelled to work on those days, but principally to exemptpublic utilities affected with public interest, from the payment ofsuch additional compensation. If it were the intention of the lawmakersin enacting section 4 of the Act No. 444 to fix the limit of the minimum of additional compensation of laborers working on those days, withoutexempting the public utilities, that is, leaving intact the general power of the court to require the public utilities to pay said additional compensation, the law would have only provided, in substance, that allemployers are prohibited from compelling their laborers to work onSundays and legal holidays without paying them an additional compensationof not less than 50 per cent of their regular remuneration. That the intention of the Legislature is to exempt the public utilitiesunder consideration from the prohibition set forth in the enactmentclause of section 4, Act No. 444, is supported by the provision ofsection 19 of Act No. 103. As amended this section provides "that with exception of employers engaged in the operation of public services orin the business coupled with a public interest, employers will notbe allowed to engage the services of the strike breakers within fifteendays after the declaration of the strike; which shows a contrario sensu that public utilities performing public services are permitted to engage the services of strike breakers within fifteen days, that is,immediately upon the declaration of the strike. The same public interest, the reason of the exception in the above quoted provision, underlies the exception provided in section 4, of Act No. 444. Therefore, the ruling of the Court of Industrial Relations quoted in the first part of this decision appealed from, being contrary to law, is set aside. So ordered. Paras, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-10107 February 4, 1916 Cerezo vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company EN BANC: TRENT, J.: Facts: Jorge Ocumen (plaintiff’s son and only means of support) was an employee of the defendant as a day laborer on the 8th of July, 1913, assisting in laying gas pipes on Calle Herran in the City of Manila. The digging of the trench was completed both ways from the cross-trench in Calle Paz, and the pipes were laid therein up to that point. The men of the deceased's gang were filling the west end, and there was no work in the progress at the east end of the trench. Shortly after the deceased entered the trench at the east end to answer a call of nature, the bank caved in, burying him to his neck in dirt, where he died before he could be released. It has not been shown that the deceased had received orders from the defendant to enter the trench at this point; nor that the trench had been prepared by the defendant as a place to be used as a water-closet; nor that the defendant acquiesced in the using of this place for these purposes. At the time of the accident the place where the deceased's duty of refilling the trench required him to be was at the west end. There is no contention that there was any danger whatever in the refilling of the trench. The plaintiff insists that the defendant was negligent in failing to shore or brace the trench at the place where the accident occurred. While, on the other hand, the defendant urges (1) that it was under no obligation, in so far as the deceased was concerned, to brace the trench, in the absence of a showing that the soil was of a loose character or the place itself was dangerous, and (2) that although the relation of master and servant may not have ceased, for the time being, to exist, the defendant was under no duty to the deceased except to do him no intentional injury, and to furnish him with a reasonably safe place to work. Judgment was entered in a favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P1,250, together with interest and costs. Defendant appealed. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff has the right to recover based on the Employers' Liability Act (Act No. 1874) or the Civil Code. Held: Act No. 1874 is essentially a copy of the Massachusetts Employers' Liability Act, it having been originally enacted in that jurisdiction in 1887. The Massachusetts statute was "copied verbatim, with some variations of detail, from the English statute. We agree with the Supreme Court of Massachusetts that the Act should be liberally construed in favor of employees. The main purpose of the Act was to extend the liability of employers and to render them liable in damages for certain classes of personal injuries for which it was thought they were liable under the law prior to the passage of the Act. We do not doubt that it was, prior to the passage of Act No. 1874 and still is, the duty of the employer in this jurisdiction to perform those duties, in reference to providing reasonably safe places, and safe and suitable ways, works, and machinary, etc., So, to this extent, the first subsection of section 1 of the Act is simply declaratory of the law as it stood previous to the enactment. Standing in this form, it is quite clear that it was not intended that all rights to compensation and of action against employers by injured employees or their representatives must be brought under be governed by the Act. Assuming that the excavation for the gas pipe is within the category of "ways, works, or machinery connected with the used in the business of the defendant, " we are of the opinion that recovery cannot be had under the Act for the reason that, as we have indicated, the deceased was at a place where he had no right to be at the time he met his death. His work did not call him there, nor is it shown that he was permitted there tacitly or otherwise. Under the Anglo-American law the applicable to such a set of facts is that the master is not responsible, under the Employers' Liability Act, for accidents to his employees when they are outside the scope of their employment for purpose of their own. The case under consideration does not fall within the exceptions of Art 1105 of the Civil code. Mentioned. After providing a reasonably safe place in and about which the deceased was required to work, the defendant's liability was then limited to those events which could have been foreseen. Article 1902 provides that a person who, by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. Article 1903 after providing for the liability of principals for the acts of their employees, agents, or these for whom they are otherwise responsible, provides that such liability shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. We have then, on the one hand, nonliability of an employer for events which could not be foreseen (article 1105), and where he has exercised the care of a good father of a family (article 1903), and, on the other hand, his liability where fault or negligence may be attributed to him (article 1902). The cause of Ocumen's death was not the weight of the earth which fell upon him, but was due to suffocation. The accident was of a most unusual character. Experience and common sense demonstrate that ordinarily no danger to employees is to be anticipated from such a trench as that in question. The fact that the walls had maintained themselves for a week, without indication of their giving way, strongly indicates that the necessity for bracing or shoring the trench was remote. To require the company to guard against such an accident as the one in question would virtually compel it to shore up every foot of the miles of trenches dug by it in the city of Manila for the gas mains. Upon a full consideration of the evidence, we are clearly of the opinion that ordinary care did not require the shoring of the trench walls at the place where the deceased met his death. The event properly comes within the class of those which could not be foreseen; and, therefore, the defendant is not liable under the Civil Code. Effect upon the Law in this country The act was not intended to curtail the any of the rights which an employee had under the pre-existing law. Under the act, the defense of contributory negligence would defeat an action for damages. Decision: Having reached the conclusions above set forth, it is unnecessary to inquire into the right of the plaintiff to bring and maintain this action. For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed, without costs. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., Concur G.R. No. 96169 September 24, 1991 EMPLOYERS CONFEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NATIONAL WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION Facts: On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No. NCR-01, increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region. The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) moved for reconsideration; so did the Personnel Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP). ECOP opposed. On October 23, 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No. NCR01-A, amending Wage Order No. NCR-01. It provides that all workers and employees in the private sector in the National Capital Region already receiving wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to one hundred and twenty-five pesos (P125.00) per day shall also receive an increase of seventeen pesos (P17.00) per day. ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity Commission contending that the board's grant of an "across-the-board" wage increase to workers already being paid more than existing minimum wage rates (up to P125.00 a day) as an alleged excess of authority. ECOP further alleges that under the Republic Act No. 6727, the boards may only prescribe "minimum wages," not determine "salary ceilings." ECOP likewise claims that Republic Act No. 6727 is meant to promote collective bargaining as the primary mode of settling wages, and in its opinion, the boards can not preempt collective bargaining agreements by establishing ceilings. On November 6, 1990, the Commission promulgated an Order, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. On November 14, 1990, the Commission denied reconsideration. ECOP then, elevated the case via petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. Issue: The main issue in this case is whether Wage Order No. NCR-01-A providing for new wage rates, as well as authorizing various Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards to prescribe minimum wage rates for all workers in the various regions, and for a National Wages and Productivity Commission to review, among other functions, wage levels determined by the boards is valid. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the National Wages and Productivity Commission and Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR, Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and denied the petition of ECOP. The Supreme Court held that Republic Act No. 6727 was intended to rationalize wages, first, by providing for full-time boards to police wages round-the-clock, and second, by giving the boards enough powers to achieve this objective. The Court is of the opinion that Congress meant the boards to be creative in resolving the annual question of wages without labor and management knocking on the legislature's door at every turn. . The Court's opinion is that if Republic No. 6727 intended the boards alone to set floor wages, the Act would have no need for a board but an accountant to keep track of the latest consumer price index, or better, would have Congress done it as the need arises, as the legislature, prior to the Act, has done so for years. The fact of the matter is that the Act sought a "thinking" group of men and women bound by statutory standards. The Court is not convinced that the Regional Board of the National Capital Region, in decreeing an across-the-board hike, performed an unlawful act of legislation. It is true that wage-firing, like rate-fixing, constitutes an act Congress; it is also true, however, that Congress may delegate the power to fix rates provided that, as in all delegations cases, Congress leaves sufficient standards. As this Court has indicated, it is impressed that the above-quoted standards are sufficient, and in the light of the floor- wage method's failure, the Court believes that the Commission correctly upheld the Regional Board of the National Capital Region. G.R. No. 71813 July 20, 1987 Abella vs. NLRC EN BANC: PARAS (J), 13 CONCUR Facts: Ricardo Dionele, Sr. (private respondent) has been a regular farm worker since 1949 in Hacienda Danao- Ramona located in Ponteverde, Negros Occidential. Said farm land was leased to Rosalina Abella (petitioner) for a period of ten (10) years, renewable for another ten years. Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed Ricardo and another co-employee. Private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner at the Ministry of Labor and Employment for overtime pay, illegal dismissal and reinstatement with backwages. After presenting their respective evidence, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal is warranted by the cessation of business, but granted the private respondents’ separation pay. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the present petition. Issue: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay. Held: The petition is devoid of merit. Article 284 of the Labor code provides that “the employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one month pay or to at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six months shall be considered one whole year." The purpose of the said article is obvious: the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like private respondents in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled for the number of years served. Although they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the latter has assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as new employees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing. In any event, it is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. Decision: The instant petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the Resolution of the Ministry of Labor and Employment are hereby affirmed. G.R. No. 78782 December 1, 1987 Euro-Linea Phil, Inc. vs. NLRC FIRST DIVISION, PARAS, (J): Facts: Petitioner Euro-Linea Phil, Inc hired private respondent Pastoral as shipping expediter on a probationary basis for a period of six months. Prior to hiring by petitioner, Pastoral had been employed by Fitscher Manufacturing Corporation also as shipping expediter. On 4 February 1984, Pastoral received a memorandum terminating his probationary employment in view of his failure “to meet the performance standards set by the company”. Pastoral filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. On 19 July 1985, the Labor Arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC on 5 August 1985 but the appeal was dismissed. Hence the petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the resolution of public respondent NLRC, affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, which ordered the reinstatement of complainant with six months backwages. Issue: Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ruling against the dismissal of the respondent, a temporary or probationary employee, by his employer. Held: Although a probationary or temporary employee has a limited tenure, he still enjoys the constitutional protection of security of tenure. Furthermore, what makes the dismissal highly suspicious is the fact that while petitioner claims that respondent was inefficient, it retained his services until the last remaining two weeks of the six months probationary employment. No less important is the fact that private respondent had been a shipping expediter for more than one and a half years before he was absorbed by petitioner. It therefore appears that the dismissal in question is without sufficient justification. It must be emphasized that the prerogative of management to dismiss or lay-off an employee must be done without abuse of discretion, for what is at stake is not only petitioner's position but also his means of livelihood. The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. Decision: In the instant case, it is evident that the NLRC correctly applied Article 282 in the light of the foregoing and that its resolution is not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction (Rosario Brothers Inc. v. Ople, 131 SCRA 73 [1984]). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the resolution of the NLRC is affirmed. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-58639 August 12, 1987 CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION), vs. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and RAMON PILONES FACTS: Ramon Pilones, private respondent, was employed on February 16, 1978 on a probationary period of employment for six (6) months with petitioner CRP. After said period, he underwent medical examination for qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is suffering from PTB minimal. Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his employment by respondent since his illness was not curable within 6 months. Pilones complained against his termination before the Ministry of Labor which dismissed the same. The dismissal was reversed by the public respondent who ordered the reinstatement and payment of back wages. Granting reinstatement, the public respondent argues that Pilones was already a permanent employee at the time of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure. The alleged ground for his removal, to wit, “pulmonary tuberculosis minimal,” was not certified as incurable within six months as to justify his separation and that the petitioner should have first obtained a clearance, as required by the regulations then in force, for the termination of his employment. CRP claims that the private respondent was still on probation at the time of his dismissal and so had no security of tenure. The dismissal was necessary for the protection of the public health, as he was handling ingredients in the processing of soft drinks which were being sold to the public. ISSUE: Whether the dismissal was proper. HELD: No. The dismissal was not proper. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, “an employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.” Pilones was already on permanent status when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after he ceased to be a probationer. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure guaranteed to him by the Constitution and the Labor Code. The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier because the x-ray examination was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not immediately available. That excuse is untenable. We note that when the petitioner had all of six months during which to conduct such examination, it chose to wait until exactly the last day of the probation period. The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code which states that “the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment.” The record does not contain the certification required by the above rule. Hence, dismissal was illegal. It is also worth noting that the petitioner’s application for clearance to terminate the employment of the private respondent was filed with the Ministry of Labor only on August 28, 1978, or seven days after his dismissal. As the NLRC has repeatedly and correctly said, the prior clearance rule (which was in force at that time) was not a “trivial technicality.” It required “not just the mere filing of a petition or the mere attempt to procure a clearance” but that “the said clearance be obtained prior to the operative act of termination. Although we must rule in favor of his reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his fitness to resume his work, as certified by competent authority. **Another Doctrine under Sec4 of Labor Code on construction: Concern for the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his employers, must look up to the law for his protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness and even favor and always with faith and hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nation’s future. It is error to take him for granted. He deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will determine whether the knife in his hands shall be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry weapon of defiance and revenge. The choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should, we must resolve to lighten “the weight of centuries” of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but does not bow his head. G.R. No. L-2779 October 18, 1950 DANIEL SANCHEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. HARRY LYONS CONSTRUCTION, INC., ET AL., defendants-appellants. MORAN, C. J.: This case originated in the Municipal Court of Manila upon a complaint filed on March 9, 1948, by the herein appellees as plaintiffs, against the herein appellants as defendants, for the sum of P2,210 plus interest, which plaintiffs claimed as one month advance pat due them. On April 28, 1948, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts upon which said municipal court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration of this judgment, the defendants filed an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein the parties submitted the case upon the same facts agreed upon in the Municipal Court. On October 2, 1948, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered its decision holding for plaintiffs, as follows: Wherefore judgment is hereby rendered — 1. Ordering defendant Material Distributors, Inc. to pay plaintiff Enrique Ramirez the sum of P360 and plaintiff Juan Ramirez the sum of P250 with legal interest on each of the said sums from the date of the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila until the date of full payment thereof; and 2. Ordering defendant Harry Lyons Construction, Inc. to pay plaintiff Daniel Sanchez the sum of P250, and plaintiff Mariano Javier, Venancio Diaz, Esteban Bautista, Faustino Aquillo, Godofredo Diamante, Marcial Lazaro, Ambrosio de la Cruz, and Marcelino Maceda the sum of P150 each, with legal interest on each of the said sums from the date of the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila until the date of full payment thereof. One half of the costs is to be paid by Material Distributors, Inc. and the other half by Harry Lyons Construction, Inc. From this judgment, defendants filed an appeal with this court purely upon a question of law. The stipulation of facts entered into by the parties on April 28, 1948, is as follows: STIPULATION OF FACTS. Come now the plaintiffs and the defendants, by their respective undersigned attorneys and to this Honorable Court, respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts: 1. That the plaintiffs were respectively employed as follows: EMPLOYED BY DEFENDANT MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC. Name Date of Position Salary employment Enrique Ramirez .............. 12/16/46 Warehouseman P450 a mo. Juan Ramirez ................... do do 250 a mo. NOTE. — The salary of Enrique Ramirez was later reduced to P360 per month. This was the amount he was receiving at the time of his dismissal. EMPLOYED BY DEFENDANT HARRY LYONS CONSTRUCTION, INC. Daniel Sanchez ................ 1/1/47 Carpenter- P250 a mo. Foreman Mariano Javier ................. ....do.................. Guard................. 5 a day Venancio Diaz ................. ....do.................. do....................... 5 a day Esteban Bautista ............ ....do.................. do....................... 5 a day Faustino Aquillo ............ ....do.................. do....................... 5 a day Godofredo Diamante ..... ....do.................. do....................... 5 a day Marcial Lazaro ................ ....do.................. do....................... 5 a day Ambrosio de la Cruz ..... ....do.................. do....................... 5 a day Marcelino Macada ........ ....do.................. do....................... 5 a day as per contracts of employment, copies of which are attached to defendants' answer marked Exhibits 1 to 11 inclusive 2. That in said contracts of employment the plaintiff agreed as follows: "I accept the foregoing appointment, and in consideration thereof I hereby agree that such employment may be terminated at any time, without previous notice, and I further agree that salary and wages, shall be computed and paid at the rate specified up to the date of such termination. "Also in consideration of such employment I hereby expressly waive the benefit of article 302 of the Code of Commerce and that of any other law, ruling, or custom which might require notice of discharge or payment of salary or wages after date of the termination of such employment." 3. That the plaintiffs were dismissed by the defendants on December 31, 1947 without one months' previous notice. 4. That each of the plaintiffs demanded payment of one month's salary from the defendants and that the latter refused to pay the same. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment on the foregoing stipulation of facts be rendered by this Honorable Court. The points in issue herein are: first, whether plaintiffs, both those paid on a monthly and daily basis, are entitled to the benefit granted in article 302 of the Code of Commerce; and secondly, if they are so entitled, was their waiver of such benefits legal and valid? Article 302 of the Code of Commerce reads as follows: ART. 302. In cases in which no special time is fixed in the contracts of service, any one of the parties thereto may cancel it, advising the other party thereof one month in advance. The factor or shop clerk shall be entitled, in such case, to the salary due for said month. It is a clear doctrine, as gleaned from the provision of the law and settled jurisprudence, 1 that in a mercantile contract of service in which no special time is fixed, any one of the parties may cancel said contract upon giving of a one-month notice, called a mesada, to the other party. The law gives an added proviso that in the case of factors or shop clerks, these shall be entitled to salary during this one month of standing notice. In any case, the one-month notice must be given to any employee, whether factor, shop clerk or otherwise, so long as the two conditions concur, namely, that no special time is fixed in the contract of service, and that said employee is a commercial employee. And when such notice is not given under these conditions, not only the factor or shop clerk but any employee discharged without cause, is entitled to indemnity which may be one month's salary. 2 In the instant case, there lies no doubt that plaintiffs are commercial employees of appellant corporations, rendering service as warehousemen, carpenter- foreman and guards. There is likewise no doubt as can be seen from the contracts of employment submitted as exhibits, that no special time has been fixed in the contracts of services between plaintiffs- appellees and defendants-appellants. The stated computation or manner of payment, whether monthly or daily, does not represent nor determine a special time of employment. Thus, a commercial employee may be employed for one year and yet receive his salary on the daily or weekly or monthly or other basis. Appellants allege that the use of the word "temporary" in the contracts of services of some of the plaintiffs shows that their employment was with a term, and the term was "temporary, on a day to day basis." The record discloses that this conclusion is unwarranted. The contracts simply say — "You are hereby employed as temporary guard with a compensation at the rate of P5 a day . . . ." The word "temporary" as used herein does not mean the special time fixed in the contracts referred to in article 302 of the Code of Commerce. The daily basis therein stipulated is for the computation of pay, and is not necessarily the period of employment. Hence, this Court holds that plaintiffs-appellants come within the purview of article 302 of the Code of Commerce. Now, as the second question, namely, the validity of plaintiffs' waiver of the benefits given them by said article 302. This court holds that such a waiver, made in advance, is void as being contrary to public policy. Granting that the "mesada" given in article 302 of the Code of Commerce, is for the bilateral benefit of both employer and employee, nevertheless, this does not preclude the finding that a waiver of such "mesada" in advance by the employee is contrary to public policy. Public policy, with regard to labor, is clearly stated in article II, section 5, of the Philippine Constitution, which reads — The promotion of social justice to insure the well- being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State. and article XIV, section 6, which reads — The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and shall regulate the relations between land-owner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. . . . Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance with these provisions of our constitution. In the matter of employment bargaining, there is no doubt that the employer stands on higher footing than the employee. First of all, there is greater supply than demand for labor. Secondly, the need for employment by labor comes from vital and even desperate, necessity. Consequently, the law must protect labor, at least, to the extent of raising him to equal footing in bargaining relations with capital and to shield him from abuses brought about by the necessity for survival. It is safe to presume therefore, that an employee or laborer who waives in advance any benefit granted him by law does so, certainly not in his interest or through generosity but under the forceful intimidation of urgent need, and hence, he could not have so acted freely and voluntarily. For all the foregoing, this court hereby affirms the decision of the lower court, with costs against appellants. Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Bengzon and Reyes, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-48926 December 14, 1987 Sosito vs. Aguinaldo Development Corp. FIRST DIVISION: CRUZ, J.: Facts: Petitioner Manuel Sosito was employed in 1964 by the private respondent, a logging company, and was in charge of logging importation, with a monthly salary of P675.00, 1 when he went on indefinite leave with the consent of the company on January 16, 1976. On July 20, 1976, the private respondent, through its president, announced a retrenchment program and offered separation pay to employees in the active service as of June 30, 1976, who would tender their resignations not later than July 31, 1976. The petitioner decided to accept this offer and so submitted his resignation on July 29, 1976, "to avail himself of the gratuity benefits" promised. However, his resignation was not acted upon and he was never given the separation pay he expected. The petitioner complained to the Department of Labor, where he was sustained by the labor arbiter. The company was ordered to pay Sosito the sum of P 4,387.50, representing his salary for six and a half months. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, this decision was reversed and it was held that the petitioner was not covered by the retrenchment program. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is covered by the retrenchment program and thus entitled to separation benefits. Held: It is clear from the memorandum that the offer of separation pay was extended only to those who were in the active service of the company as of June 30, 1976. It is equally clear that the petitioner was not eligible for the promised gratuity as he was not actually working with the company as of the said date. Being on indefinite leave, he was not in the active service of the private respondent although, if one were to be technical, he was still in its employ. Even so, during the period of indefinite leave, he was not entitled to receive any salary or to enjoy any other benefits available to those in the active service. We note that under the law then in force the private respondent could have validly reduced its work force because of its financial reverses without the obligation to grant separation pay. This was permitted under the original Article 272(a), of the Labor Code, which was in force at the time. To its credit, however, the company voluntarily offered gratuities to those who would agree to be phased out pursuant to the terms and conditions of its retrenchment program, in recognition of their loyalty and to tide them over their own financial difficulties. The Court feels that such compassionate measure deserves commendation and support but at the same time rules that it should be available only to those who are qualified therefore. We hold that the petitioner is not one of them. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, this Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded us to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. Decision: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 73681 June 30, 1988 Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc., vs. Ople SECOND DIVISION: PARAS, J.: Facts: On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their membership with the union and restraining non- union members from joining the union. After efforts at amicable settlement proved unavailing, the Office of the MOLE, upon petition of petitioner assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code. In its position paper, the petitioner pointed out that the infractions committed by the three salesmen fully convinced the company, after investigation of the existence of just cause for their dismissal, that their dismissal was carried out pursuant to the inherent right and prerogative of management to disciplne erring employees. Moreover, the petitioner refuted the union’s charge that the membership in union and refusal to retract precipitated their dismissal was totally false and amounted to malicious imputation of union busting. Thre respondent union on hte other hand assailed its answers to the petitioner’s position paper. On August 9,1985, respondent Minister rendered a decision whichfound no merit in the Union's Complaint for unfair labor practice allegedly committed by petitioner and that the the three salesmen, Peregrino Sayson, Salvador Reynante & Cornelio Mejia, "not without fault" hence "the company has grounds to dismiss above named salesmen". At the same time respondent Minister directly certified the respondent Union as the collective bargaining agent for the sales force in petitioner company and ordered the reinstatement of the three salesmen to the company on the ground that the employees were first offenders. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by respondent Minister in his assailed Order, dated December 27, 1985. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the respondent Minister committed a grave abuse of discretion when, notwithstanding his very own finding that there was just cause for the dismissal of the three (3) salesmen, he nevertheless ordered their reinstatement. Held: The respondent Minister has the power to decide a labor dispute in a case assumed by him under Art. 264 (g) of the Labor Code. The order of the respondent Minister to reinstate the employees despite a clear finding of guilt on their part is not in conformity with law. Reinstatement is simply incompatible with a finding of guilt. Where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the employees the law warrants their dismissal without making any distinction between a first offender and a habitual delinquent. Under the law, respondent Minister is duly mandated to equally protect and respect not only the labor or workers' side but also the management and/or employers' side. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. To order the reinstatement of the erring employees would in effect encourage unequal protection of the laws as a managerial employee of petitioner company involved in the same incident was already dismissed and was not ordered to be reinstated. As stated by Us in the case of San Miguel Brewery vs. National Labor Union, "an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interest." Decision: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Order of the respondent Minister, dated December 27, 1985 for grave abuse of discretion. However, in view of the fact that the dismissed employees are first offenders, petitioner is hereby ordered to give them separation pay. The temporary restraining order is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED. Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 155421 July 7, 2004 Mendoza vs. Rural Bank of Lucban FIRST DIVISION: PANGANIBAN, J.: Facts: On April 25, 1999, the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Lucban, Inc., issued Board Resolution Nos. 99-52 and 99-53, providing that “in line with the policy of the bank to familiarize bank employees with the various phases of bank operations and further strengthen the existing internal control system, all officers and employees are subject to reshuffle of assignments” and that those” affected branch employees are reshuffled to their new assignments without changes in their compensation and other benefits.” On May 3, 1999, in an undated letter addressed to Daya, the Bank’s Board Chairman, petitioner Elmer Mendoza expressed his opinion on the reshuffle alleging that "his reshuffling is deemed to be a demotion without any legal basis and thus asking to be allowed to remain in his position. On May 10, 1999, Daya replied reitirating that “it was never the intention (of the management) to downgrade his position in the bank considering that due compensation is maintained and no future reduction was intended. It was further reiterated that the “conduct of reshuffle is also a prerogative of bank management." . On June 7, 1999, petitioner submitted to the bank's Tayabas branch manager a letter in which he applied for a leave of absence from work. On June 21, 1999, petitioner again submitted a letter asking for another leave of absence for twenty days effective on the same date. On June 24, 1999, while on his second leave of absence, petitioner filed a Complaint before Arbitration Branch No. IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Complaint -- for illegal dismissal, underpayment, separation pay and damages -- was filed against the Rural Bank of Lucban and/or its president, Alejo B. Daya; and its Tayabas branch manager, Briccio V. Cada. The case was docketed as NLRC Case SRAB-IV-6-5862-99- Q.The labor arbiter's June 14, 2000 Decision upheld petitioner's claims. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter. In its July 18, 2001 Resolution. After the NLRC denied his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner brought before the CA a Petition for Certiorari assailing the foregoing Resolution. Finding that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the NLRC, the CA Decision ruled in favor of the private respondent rural bank. Issue: Whether or not the the petitioner was constructively dismissed from employment and that the reshuffling pursuant to Board Res. Nos. 99-52 and 99-53 is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Held: The Petition has no merit. Constructive dismissal is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives. For this reason, courts often decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. Indeed, labor laws discourage interference in employers' judgments concerning the conduct of their business. The law must protect not only the welfare of employees, but also the right of employers. In the pursuit of its legitimate business interest, management has the prerogative to transfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation to another -- provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges; and the action is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. This privilege is inherent in the right of employers to control and manage their enterprise effectively. The right of employees to security of tenure does not give them vested rights to their positions to the extent of depriving management of its prerogative to change their assignments or to transfer them. Managerial prerogatives, however, are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice. Decision: WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED, and the June 14, 2002 Decision and the September 25, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. vs. NLRC G.R. No. 85668 August 10, 1989 FIRST DIVISION: GANCAYCO, J.: Facts: Private respondent Felix Francis started working as an auto-mechanic for petitioner Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. (GELMART) sometime in 1971. As such, his work consisted of the repair of engines and underchassis, as well as trouble shooting and overhauling of company vehicles. He is likewise entrusted with some tools and spare parts in furtherance of the work assigned to him. On April 11, 1987, private respondent was caught by the security guards taking out of GELMART's premises one (1) plastic container filled with about 16 ounces of "used' motor oil, without the necessary gate pass to cover the same as required under GELMART's rules and regulations which provides that theft and/or pilferage of company property merits an outright termination from employment. By reason thereof, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension pending investigation for violation of company rules and regulations on April 13, 1987. After due investigation, or on May 20, 1987, private respondent was found guilty of theft of company property. As a consequence, his services were severed. Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. In a decision dated February 26, 1988, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed and, accordingly, ordered the latter's reinstatement with full backwages from April 13, 1987 up to the time of actual reinstatement. From this decision, GELMART interposed an appeal with the NLRC. In its decision dated October 21, 1988, the NLRC affirmed with modification the ruling of Labor Arbiter Diosana. On December 12, 1988, GELMART filed before this Court a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. On January 18, 1989, this Court, without necessarily giving due course to the petition, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the assailed decision. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion for rendering a decision that is contrary to law and existing jurisprudence in ordering the reinstatement of private respondent to his former position with payment of backwages. Held: We find no merit in this petition. Consistent with the policy of the State to bridge the gap between the underprivileged workingmen and the more affluent employers, the NLRC rightfully tilted the balance in favor of the workingmen — and this was done without being blind to the concomitant right of the employer to the protection of his property. On the other hand, without being too harsh to the employer, and naively liberal to labor, on the other, the NLRC correctly pointed out that private respondent cannot totally escape liability for what is patently a violation of company rules and regulations. To reiterate, be it of big or small commercial value, intended to be re-used or altogether disposed of or wasted, the "used" motor oil still remains, in legal contemplation, the property of GELMART. As such, to take the same out of GELMART's premises without the corresponding gate pass is a violation of the company rule on theft and/or pilferage of company property. In this score, it is very difficult for this Court to discern grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in modifying the appealed decision. The suspension imposed upon private respondent is a sufficient penalty for the misdemeanor committed. Considering that private respondent herein has no previous derogatory record in his fifteen (15) years of service with petitioner GELMART the value of the property pilfered (16 ounces of used motor oil) is very minimal, plus the fact that petitioner failed to reasonably establish that non-dismissal of private respondent would work undue prejudice to the viability of their operation or is patently inimical to the company's interest, it is more in consonance with the policy of the State, as embodied in the Constitution, to resolve all doubts in favor of labor. Thus, the penalty of preventive suspension was sufficient punishment for the violation under the circumstance and that complainant-appellee’s dismissal unwarranted. Decision: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The, restraining order issued by this Court on January 18, 1989 enjoining the enforcement of the questioned decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby lifted. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. China Banking Corp., vs. Borromeo G.R. No. 156515 October 19, 2004 SECOND DIVISION: CALLEJO, SR., J.: Facts: Respondent Mariano M. Borromeo joined the petitioner Bank on June 1, 1989 as Manager Level 1 assigned at the latter’s Regional Office in Cebu City. Subsequently, the respondent was laterally transferred to Cagayan de Oro City as Branch Manager of the petitioner Bank’s branch thereat. For the years 1989-1995 he was promoted from Manager Level I to Senior Manager Level II having consistently received a "highly satisfactory" performance rating (1989-1990) and a "very good" performance rating (1991-1995). Finally, in 1996, with a "highly satisfactory" performance rating, the respondent was promoted to the position of Assistant Vice-President, Branch Banking Group for the Mindanao area effective October 16, 1996. However, prior to his last promotion and then unknown to the petitioner Bank, the respondent, without authority from the Executive Committee or Board of Directors, approved several DAUD/BP (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposits/Bills Purchased) accommodations amounting to P2,441,375 in favor of certain Joel Maniwan. Such checks, which are not sufficiently funded by cash, are generally not honored by banks. Further, such accommodations may be granted only by a bank officer upon express authority from its Executive Committee or Board of Directors. Upon knowing of this by the bank authorities, Samuel L. Chiong, First Vice-President and Head-Visayas Mindanao Division of the petitioner bank issued a memorandum seeking clarification on issues relative thereto. In reply, the respondent answered the queries but nonetheless, accepted full responsibility for committing an error in judgment, lapses in control and abuse of discretion. However, respondent vehemently denied benefiting therefrom. Apology was accorded by the respondent in relation to this and subsequently tendered his irrevocable resignation effective May 31, 1997. His acts having constituted a violation of the Bank’s Code of Ethics, respondent was directed to restitute the amount of P1,507,736.79 representing 90% of the total loss of P1,675,263.10 incurred by the petitioner Bank. However, in view of his resignation and considering the years of service in the petitioner Bank, the management earmarked only P836,637.08 from the respondent’s total separation benefits or pay. The said amount would be released upon recovery of the sums demanded from Maniwan in a civil case. Consequently, the respondent, through counsel, made a demand on the petitioner Bank for the payment of his separation pay and other benefits but the petitioner Bank maintained its position to withhold the sum earmarked. Thus, the respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the complaint for payment of separation pay, mid-year bonus, profit share and damages against the petitioner Bank. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the bank. Respondent appealed to the NLRC but it affirmed in toto the findings of the Labor Arbiter. However, the CA upon petition set aside the NLRC decision and alleged that repondent was denied his rights to due process. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the bank has the prerogative/right to impose the withholding of respondent’s benefits as what it considered the appropriate penalty under the circumstances pursuant to its company rules and regulations. Held: The petition is meritorious. The petitioner Bank was left with no other recourse but to impose the ancillary penalty of restitution in view of his voluntary separation from the petitioner Bank. It was certainly within the petitioner Bank’s prerogative to impose on the respondent what it considered the appropriate penalty under the circumstances pursuant to its company rules and regulations. It is well recognized that company policies and regulations are, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, generally binding and valid on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised or amended unilaterally or preferably through negotiation or by competent authority. Moreover, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties on erring workers pursuant to company rules and regulations. The petitioner Bank’s business is essentially imbued with public interest and owes great fidelity to the public it deals with. It is expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. As a corollary, and like all other business enterprises, its prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties on erring workers pursuant to company rules and regulations must be respected. The law, in protecting the rights of labor, authorized neither oppression nor self-destruction of an employer company which itself is possessed of rights that must be entitled to recognition and respect. Significantly, the respondent ids not wholly deprived of his separation benefits but were merely withheld and will be released without delay as soon as the bank has satisfied a judgment in the civil case. Decision: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 19, 2002 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated January 6, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 57365 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated October 20, 1999 of the NLRC, affirming the Decision dated February 26, 1999 of the Labor Arbiter, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. Pampanga Bus Company, INC., vs. PAMBUSCO Employees' Union, Inc. G.R. No. 46739 September 23, 1939 EN BANC: MORAN, J.: Facts: On May 31, 1939, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order, directing the petitioner herein, Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., to recruit from the respondent, Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc., new employees or laborers it may need to replace members of the union who may be dismissed from the service of the company, with the proviso that, if the union fails to provide employees possessing the necessary qualifications, the company may employ any other persons it may desire. This order, in substance and in effect, compels the company, against its will, to employ preferentially, in its service, the members of the union. Issue: Whether or not the said order issued by the CIR valid and not violative of the right of the employer to select employees. Held: We hold that the court has no authority to issue such compulsory order. The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is an essential part of the liberty of the citizens protected by the due-process clause of the Constitution. The right of the laborer to sell his labor to such person as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the Constitution. Section of Commonwealth Act No. 213 confers upon labor organizations the right "to collective bargaining with employers for the purpose of seeking better working and living conditions, fair wages, and shorter working hours for laborers, and, in general, to promote the material, social and moral well-being of their members." This provision in granting to labor unions merely the right of collective bargaining, impliedly recognizes the employer's liberty to enter or not into collective agreements with them. Indeed, we know of no provision of the law compelling such agreements. Such a fundamental curtailment of freedom, if ever intended by law upon grounds of public policy, should be effected in a manner that is beyond all possibility of doubt. The supreme mandates of the Constitution should not be loosely brushed aside. As held by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hitchman Coal & Co. vs. Mitchell (245 U. S., 229; 62 Law. ed., 260, 276): Decision: Thus considered, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs against the respondent Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc. G.R. No. L-6846 July 20, 1955 GREGORIO ARANETA EMPLOYEES UNION, ETC., ET AL., petitioners, vs. ARSENIO C. ROLDAN, ET AL., respondents. JUGO, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to review the Resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated March 31, 1953. Associate Judge Jose S. Bautista of said court, in his order of February 10, 1953, states the facts of the case substantially as follows: The Agricultural Division of the Gregorio Araneta, Inc., was established in 1947 with a capital of P200,000. The total investment in that Division in 1953 was about P3,000,000. To reduce this overcapitalization, the Board of Directors felt that it was necessary either to invite fresh capital from outside or to adopt a retrenchment policy. When Heacock and Company refused the invitation to invest in the enterprise, the Board took the alternative of retrenchment. The Board decided not to import as much merchandise as usual. It also reduced credits. All these plans required a reduction in the volume of business necessitating likewise a reduction of personnel and caused the laying off of 17 employees. The selection of those to be laid off was made by a technical man and approved by the Board. These employees were given one month separation pay, except Nicolas Gonzalez who refused to receive it. The reorganization of the Agricultural Division was adopted by unanimous resolution of the Board of Directors as a consequence of the retrenchment policy. This was adopted even before the petitioner, "Gregorio Araneta Employees' Union", was organized and; consequently, it was never directed against the union. Judge Bautista adds: ". . . Considering this fact, and taking into account all the circumstances of this case, especially the actual reduction of business of said Division, the court fails to find sufficient justification for altering the action of the Board of Directors regarding those employees, who received their severance pay". Judge Bautista, however, believed that Gonzales should not have been separated because his work was shifted to another employee by the name of Augusto Achacoso, who was thus overburdened. Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration with the court en banc. The latter modified the decision of Associate Judge Bautista in its resolution of March 31, 1953, prepared by the Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan and concurred in by Associate Judges Modesto Castillo and Juan L. Lantin. The modification consists only in holding that the laying off of Gonzalez was also legal. Judge Bautista dissented with regard to the separation of Gonzalez, giving the same reasons he gave in his original opinion. We find no reason for disturbing the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, en banc. The laying off of the 17 employees was due to the retrenchment policy which the Company had to adopt in order to reduce the overcapitalization and minimize expenses. The volume of business was considerably reduced. It should be noted that the retrenchment policy was adopted before even the organization of the petitioning union. It was not, therefore, aimed at the Union or any of its members for union or labor activities. It was not an unfair labor practice. In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. Bengzon, Acting C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur. Philippine Sheet Metal Workers Union vs CIR G..R. No. L-2028 April 28, 1949 Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to review an order of the Court of Industrial Relations on the ground that the same was rendered in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their membership with the union and restraining non- union members from joining the union. The said order was issued of said court involving an industrial dispute between the respondent company (a corporation engaged in the manufacture of tin plates, aluminum sheets, etc.) and its laborers some of whom belong to the Philippine Sheet Metal Workers' Union (CLO) and some to the Liberal Labor Union. The dispute was over certain demands made upon the company by the laborers, one of the demands, being for the recall of eleven workers who had been laid off. Temporarily taken back on certain conditions pending final determination of the controversy, these eleven workers were in the end ordered retained in the decision handed down by the court on February 19, 1947. The petitioner tried to prove that the 11 laborers were laid off by the respondent company due to their union activities. On February 10, 1947, that is, nine days before the decision came down, filed a motion in the case, asking for authority to lay off at least 15 workers in its can department on the ground that the installation and operation of nine new labor-saving machines in said department had rendered the services of the said workers unnecessary. Issue: W/N the firing of the laborers due to their union activities is valid? Held: Yes. The right to reduce personnel should, of course, not be abused. It should not be made a pretext for easing out laborers on account of their union activities. But neither should it be denied when it is shows that they are not discharging their duties in a manner consistent with good discipline and the efficient operation of an industrial enterprise. The petitioner contends that the order complained of was made with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in that it is contrary to the pronouncement made by the lower court in its decision in the main case where it disapproved of the dismissal of eleven workers "with whom the management is displeased due to their union activities." It appears, however, that the pronouncement was made upon a distinct set of facts, which are different from those found by the court in connection with the present incident, and that very decision, in ordering the reinstatement of the eleven laborers, qualifies the order by saying that those laborers are to be retained only "until the occurrence of facts that may give rise to a just cause of their laying off or dismissal, or there is evidence of sufficient weight to convince the Court that their conduct is not satisfactory." After a careful review of the record, we find that the Court of Industrial Relations has neither exceeded its jurisdiction nor committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the order complained of. The petition for certiorari is, therefore, denied, but without costs against the petitioner for the reasons stated in its motion to litigate as pauper. TIONG KING, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and THE NATIONAL TAILOR'S ASSOCIATION, respondents G.R. No. L-3587 December 21, 1951 Facts: Gaw Pun So owned and operated a tailor shop known as the Army Shirt Factory, located in his own house at Nos. 231-245 Soler Street, Manila. In January, 1948, he had a labor dispute with his personnel and, pending the case in the Court of Industrial Relations, Gaw Pun So, irked and worried by the incidents of litigation, thought of dissolving the business and selling the sewing machines. Tiong King offered to take over the business by leasing the place and the sewing machines. The transfer was put in writing. Tiong King continued the Army Shirt Factory from the month of February with the same employees had by Gaw Pun So. This transfer was known to the personnel, so much so that the latter, as petitioner in the pending dispute in the Court of Industrial Relations, prayed that Tiong King be included as a respondent. In due time, the National Tailors Association entered that all cases were terminated against the respondents. This agreement was duly approved by the Court of Industrial Relations. On April 27, 1948, Tiong King filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations Case No. 117-V-3, alleging that since he operated his shop in February, 1948, he had continually suffered losses; that as there remained only very little of the capital originally invested, and that he was definitely closing the shop on May 30, 1948. Tiong King accordingly prayed that he be allowed to close his tailor shop and business from six o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 1948. On May 29, 1948, Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan of the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order enjoining Tiong King not to close his factory and not to dismiss, suspend or lay off any laborer or employee without previous authority of said court. Upon petitioner for reconsideration filed by counsel for Tiong King, the Court of Industrial Relations promulgated a resolution dated May 27, 1949, allowing Tiong King to close his business and shop, subject to the condition that, upon reopening the same, his former personnel would be taken back. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the National Tailor's Association, the Court of Industrial Relations, promulgated a resolution dated October 31, 1949, reaffirming their stand on the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations under date of July 1, 1949. The present appeal by certiorari was taken by Tiong King against the last resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations. Issue: Whether he was the owner or operator thereof and had the right to file the petition in the Court of Industrial Relations to close the tailor’s shop? Held: Upon this point, it is only sufficient to recall that the National Tailors Association entered into a stipulation with Tiong King alone whereby they agreed that all cases against the former owners of the business were terminated. That Tiong King was conceded to be the owner and operator of the army shirt factory at the time his petition to close it was filed, is conclusively borne out by the fact that Presiding Judge Roldan in his decision of January 13, 1949, ordered Tiong King, and not Gaw Pun So, to pay the salaries and wages of the personnel. It is contended, however, that "If at all the court has approved of the agreement between the National Tailors' Association and Mr. Tiong King it was because — 'this arrangement is a very good solution to the present conflict as it is advantageous not only to the union but also the management, and, is in consonance with the contract entered into between the management and the new workers." This contention is followed with the remark that the approval of said agreement did not include a finding that Tiong King was either the owner or the lessee of the Army Shirt Factory. We are unable to agree. In entering into the agreement with the National Tailors Association, Tiong King acted in his own behalf, regardless of the former owners of the business. Indeed, it was covenanted that all the cases against the latter were deemed terminated. Considerations of fair play and justice demand that Tiong King be given the full legal effect of said agreement which before the sanction of the Court of Industrial Relations. There being no question that Tiong King's capital invested in the Army Shirt Factory was almost exhausted at the time of the filing of his petition to close it, said petition must necessity be granted. It is admitted by all the Judges of the Court of Industrial Relations that an employer may close his business, provided the same is done in good faith and is due beyond his control. To rule otherwise, would be oppressive and inhuman. Wherefore, reversing the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated October 31, 1949, we hereby affirm the resolution of said court dated May 27, 1949. So ordered without costs. Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-20987 June 23, 1965 PHILIPPINE LAND-AIR-SEA LABOR UNION (PLASLU) ET AL., petitioners, vs. CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, ET AL., respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Petition for review of an order of the Court of industrial Relations of December 8, 1962 denying a motion of Petitioners Union and individual members thereof to reopen CIR Case No. 241-V (2), decided March 17, 1960. The petitioners had originally instituted the case in the Court of Industrial Relations to secure an order directing the respondent Cebu Portland Cement Company to pay overtime compensation and differentials to the individual petitioners, for work performed as security guards on Saturdays after the enactment of the Forty Hours a Week Law (Rep. Act 1880), starting from March 22, 1958, when the Company stopped paying overtime compensation for work on Saturdays even if done in excess of the 40 weekly hours of work prescribed in said Republic Act. The Company resisted the claim, alleging that petitioners had no cause of action because they were not covered by the law invoked, as implemented by Executive Order No. 251. At the hearing, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts; and on March 17, 1960 the Industrial Court issued an order finding that, pursuant to the opinion of the Civil Service Commissioner, dated August 23, 1957, and that of the Executive Secretary, dated October 23, 1957, security guards are not within the coverage of Republic Act No. 1880 (Forty Hours a Week Law), and are not entitled to overtime compensation. This order of the hearing judge was affirmed, and reconsideration thereof denied, by the court en banc on May 10, 1960. Over two years later, on April 3, 1962, petitioners herein, through new counsel, made it of record that their former attorney had not been authorized by them to enter into the so-called stipulations of facts in the case, and particularly that said counsel had not been authorized to stipulate, as he did, that the individual petitioners were required by the Company to Work 56 hours a week "due to the nature of their services and in the interest of public service," which petitioners termed a stipulation of legal conclusions. On April 5, 1962, petitioners, by their new counsel, filed a petition to reopen case No. 241-V(20), alleging that the order of March 17, 1960 was not in accordance with law; that the Stipulation of Facts therein was merely a stipulation of legal conclusions not binding on petitioners; that the order of dismissal by the court was based on administrative opinions that had been since overruled and superseded by subsequent rulings of the administrative authorities, particularly that issued on August 23, 1960 by the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, ruling that security guards in government-owned or controlled corporations discharging proprietary functions are not excluded from the benefits of the 40- hour week law (R.A. 1880); that the Auditor General, by memorandum Circular No. 438 of November 29, 1960, had implemented said ruling of the Executive Secretary; and that the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. L- 16984, Manila Port Service vs. C.I.R., promulgated June 30, 1961, had ruled that under Republic Act No. 1880 and Executive Order No. 251 work on Saturday may be counted for overtime purposes if during the preceding 5 days (Monday to Friday) the laborers or employees had worked the required minimum of 40 hours, which was allegedly the case of petitioning security guards. Upon opposition of the respondent Company, the Industrial Court, by order of July 17, 1962, denied the motion to reopen, reasoning that the order of March 17, 1960 constituted res judicata, and that under the ruling of this Supreme Court in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. vs. Philippine Labor Organizations, L-3506, January 31, 1951, a proceeding may, be reopened only upon grounds coming into existence after the order rendered by the C.I.R., grounds not already litigated and decided, and not available to the parties at the former proceeding. Their motion to reconsider this last ruling having been rejected, petitioners brought the case to us for review. In this appeal, it is insisted, on behalf of the appellant laborers, that the order of March 17, 1960 now under appeal was erroneous and unwarranted in law, and that the Industrial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it held that the exemption from the 40-hour week law, "where the exigencies of the service so require", applies to security guards, instead of holding that its application is limited only to workers in offices and entities performing governmental functions. Erroneous or not, the order of March 17, 1960 has long become final and executory, and is beyond our power to alter. The appellants could have secured a review of the correctness of this order by seasonable appeal, which they failed to do for reasons not apparent in the record. No reason or excuse is given why they allowed more than two years to elapse before adopting remedial steps. The argument that former counsel for the workers had no authority to stipulate that petitioners were required to work 56 hours a week without overtime compensation due to the nature of their work and duties and in the interest of public service, because the same is a legal conclusion, is untenable. The reasons why the petitioners-appellants were required to work are matters of fact, and within the power of counsel to stipulate without special authority (Rodriguez vs. Santos, 55 Phil. 721), not being a compromise. That the facts as agreed upon were unfavorable to the clients does not detract from the binding effect of the stipulation, and it has been repeatedly held that clients are bound by the acts and even the mistakes of counsel in procedural technique (Montes vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 48 Phil. 640; Islas vs. Platon, 47 Phil. 162; Re Filart, 40 Phil. 205). Appellants lay stress on the last portion of section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 creating the Court of Industrial Relations and defining its powers. Said legal precept, invoked here and in the court below, is to the effect: That at any time during the effectiveness of an award, order or decision the Court may, on application of an interested party, and after due hearing alter, modify in whole or in part, or set aside such award, order or decision, or reopen any question involved therein. The difficulty lies in reconciling this provision with the well established rules of res judicata and the preclusive effect of final adjudications. It is clear that if we interpret it is conferring on the C.I.R. unconditional power to reopen finally adjudicated cases, its decisions and orders could never, be relied upon as final; conflicts between capital and labor would be interminable; and industrial planning would become impossible. The rulings of the Supreme Court have established the conditions for reopening under section 17 of C.A. 103: if must be upon grounds not already directly or indirectly litigated, and the grounds must not be available to the parties in the previous proceedings; and the reopening must not affect the period already elapsed at the time the order to be reopened was issued. Thus, in Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. vs. Philippine Labor Organization, G.R. No. L-3506, January 31, 1951, this Court held: Petitioner invokes Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 to the effect that "... at any time during the effectiveness of an award, order or decision, the Court may, on application of an interested party, and after due hearing alter, modify in whole or in part, or set aside any such award, order or decision, or reopen any question involved therein." Under this provision, a proceeding may be reopened only upon grounds coming into existence after the order or decision was rendered by the Court of Industrial Relations, but not upon grounds which had already been directly or indirectly litigated and decided by said court, nor upon grounds available to the parties at the former proceedings and not availed of by any of them. To hold otherwise may give way to vicious and vexatious repetition of proceedings. And in Nahag vs. Roldan, 94 Phil. 88, it was ruled: While the above section (17) apparently authorizes the modification of an award at any time during its effectiveness, there is nothing in its wording to suggest that such modification may be authorized even after the order for execution of the award has already become final, with respect, of course, to the period that had already elapsed at the time the order as issued. To read such authority into the law would make of litigations between capital and labor an endless affair, with the Industrial Court acting like a modern Penelope, who puts off her suitors by unraveling every night what she has woven by day. Such a result could not have been contemplated by the Act creating said Court. (Nahag vs. Roldan, 94 Phil. 88, 91) The main is issue in this appeal is thus reduced to the point whether, under the rulings heretofore quoted, appellants have shown new grounds entitling them to a reopening of C.I.R. Case No. 241-V,(20). We are of the opinion that they have done so, and that it was error for the CIR to hold otherwise. In their motion to reopen the proceedings, as well as in the supporting memoranda, appellants specifically called attention to the ruling of the Office of the President, dated August 23, 1960, extending the benefits of the Forty-Hour Week Law to security guards of government-owned or controlled corporations performing proprietary functions; and also to the Memorandum Circular No. 438 of the General Auditing Office calling the attention of "All Managing Heads and Auditors and/or Comptrollers of government-owned or controlled corporations" to the preceding ruling. These executive rulings apparently superseded those of 1957 upon which the CIR rested its order denying appellants' right to extra compensation. There is furthermore the decision of the Industrial Court, rendered on August 23, 1962, in Case No. 1389-V, Cenon Francisco, et al. vs. Cebu Portland Cement Co., directing the latter company to "pay all petitioners security guards their additional overtime compensation for their Saturday services from March 22, 1958," contrary to the ruling of March 17, 1960, review of which is now being sought. All these rulings came after the order of March 17, 1960, that denied overtime pay to appellants herein, and were, therefore, not available when the appellants' case was originally tried and submitted. Without in any way anticipating the weight to be accorded to these subsequent rulings, nor how they would influence the case of appellants, their incompatibility with the order of March 17, 1960, that decided appellants' rights, is apparent, and, therefore, justify a rehearing under the doctrine of the Pepsi- Cola case. Appellee Cebu Portland Cement Company argues that it was laches for appellants to have delayed their motion to reopen, and that the facts of appellants' case differ from those of Case No. 1389-V. Whether or not the delay was sufficient to constitute laches, and whether it was inexcusable or not, cannot be inquired into unless appellants' case is first reopened. The same can be said about the alleged differences between their case and Case No. 1389-V. Of course, as pointed out in Nahag vs. Roldan, supra the new award, even if favorable to appellants, must be limited to the period subsequent to that covered by the order of March 17, 1960. WHEREFORE, the orders of the Court of Industrial Relations denying reopening of Case No. 241-V(20) are revoked and set aside, and the records ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in conformity with this decision. Costs will be taxed against appellee Cebu Portland Cement Co. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, .J.P., concur. Barrera, J., is on leave. RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents. G.R. No. 73140 May 29, 1987 Facts: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk- typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position- designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits. On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on a technicality. Held: Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides: SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. —Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof. SECTION 6. No extension of period. —No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained. The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]). Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal. Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded. WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED Philippine Association of Service Expporters, Inc. vs. Drilon G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988 EN BANC, SARMIENTO, J: Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," and specifically assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. Issue: Whether the challenged Department Order is a valid regulation in the nature of a police power measure under the Constitution. Held: The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection. It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. 13 In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment. This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. Decision: The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave CBTC Employees Union v. Clave G.R. No. 49582 January 7, 1986 Article 5: Rules and Regulations Facts: Petitioner Commercial Bank and Trust Company Employees' Union (CBTC) lodged a complaint with the Department of Labor, against private respondent bank (Comtrust) for non-payment of the holiday pay benefits provided for under Article 95 (now Article 94) of the Labor Code. Failing to arrive at an amicable settlement at conciliation level, the parties opted to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. On 22 April 1976, the Arbitrator handed down an award on the dispute in favor of petitioner union. The next day, 23 April 1976, the Department of Labor released Policy Instructions No. 9, a policy regarding the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays. Said bank interposed an appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), contending that the Arbitrator demonstrated gross incompetence and/or grave abuse of discretion when he failed to apply Policy Instructions No. 9. This appeal was dismissed on 16 August 1976. Private respondent then appealed to the Secretary of Labor. On 30 June 1977, the Acting Secretary of Labor reversed the NLRC decision. On the principal issue of holiday pay, the Acting Secretary, guided by Policy Instructions No. 9, applied the same retrospectively, among other things. Issue: Whether or not the monthly pay of the covered employees already includes what Article 94 of the Labor Code requires as regular holiday pay benefit in the amount of his regular daily wage. Ruling: In excluding the union members the benefits of the holiday pay law, public respondent predicated his ruling on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement Article 94 of the Labor Code promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor and Policy Instructions No. 9. In Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, this Court's Second Division, speaking through former Justice Makasiar, expressed the view and declared that the section and interpretative bulletin are null and void, having been promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor in excess of his rule-making authority. The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the Secretary's Policy Instruction No. 9 add another excluded group, namely, 'employees who are uniformly paid by the month'. While the additional exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all monthly paid employees have already been paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or a deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. Ruled in favor of the petitioners. Presidential Executive Assistant and the Acting Secretary of labor are set aside, and the award of the Arbitrator reinstated. G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988 NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) AND ARTURO L. PEREZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE THIRD DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MANILA AND EUGENIA C. CREDO, respondents. FACTS: Respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), to which the petitioners appealed, rendered a decision directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position, or substantially equivalent position, with six (6) months' backwages and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto. In NASECO's comment in G.R. No. 70295, it is belatedly argued that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to order Credo's reinstatement. NASECO claims that, as a government corporation (by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government owned corporation), the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. ISSUE: Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction to order Credo’s reinstatement. HELD: On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter. G.R. No. 98107 August 18, 1997 BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, respondents. FACTS: Juco was hired as project engineer of NHC from Nov16, 1970 to May 14, 75. On May 14, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On March25, 1977, Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against NHC with the Department of Labor. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing complaint on the ground that NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case.Juco then elevated the case to NLRC which rendered a decision reversing decision of Labor Arbiter. NHC appealed before this SC. On Jan6, 1989, Juco filed with CSC a complaint for illegal dismissal, with prelim mandatory injunction. NHC moved for dismissal of complaint on the ground that CSC has no jurisdiction over case. So, having no jurisdiction, CSC dismissed the case. Subsequently Juco also filed with NLRC complaint for illegal dismissal with prelim mandatory injunction. Labor Arbiter Caday rendered a decision declaring that Juco’s dismissal was illegal. NHC appealed before NLRC and later on, NLRC reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether NLRC or CSC has jurisdiction over Juco’s case. HELD: Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides: The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government owned and controlled corporations with original charters. In NASECO v NLRC SC had occasion to apply the present Constitution in deciding whether or not the employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil Service Law or the Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. It was ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision. Furthermore, the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is exluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission. The National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. 13 Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government- owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing Corporation, 14 where we held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, we also held that the workers or employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code. Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government- owned or controlled corporations with original charters. 15 Having been incorporated under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission. TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION and ATTY. VIRGILIO SY, as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, respondents. FACTS: July 13, 1977. TUPAS filed petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office of the DOL to determine exclusive bargaining representative of workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised majority of employees of NHC. Petition dismissed by med-arbiter Jimenez holding that NHC "being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to the (IRR) of the Labor Code." From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to Bureau of Labor Relations where Dir. Noriel reversed Jimenez’s order of dismissal and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was, however, set aside by OIC Sy in his upon a motion for reconsideration of NHC. In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks reversal of said reso and prays that a certification election be held among rank and file employees of NHC. ISSUE: Whether NHC employees may or are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. HELD: Under the Constitution, the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Consequently, the civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. As We recently held “..., the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed by this Court in the National Housing Corporation case ... appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987 Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government-owned controlled corporations with original charters and therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation law. “ The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees' organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that "(t)he right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged" This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human Rights, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self- organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law ...." Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX B 12 which provides that "(t)he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees." The rationale of and justification for this innovation which found expression in the aforesaid provision was explained by its proponents as follows: “... The government is in a sense the repository of the national sovereignty and, in that respect, it must be held in reverence if not in awe. It symbolizes the unity of the nation, but it does perform a mundane task as well. It is an employer in every sense of the word except that terms and conditions of work are set forth through a Civil Service Commission. The government is the biggest employer in the Philippines. There is an employer-employee relationship and we all know that the accumulated grievances of several decades are now beginning to explode in our faces among government workers who feel that the rights afforded by the Labor Code, for example, to workers in the private sector have been effectively denied to workers in government in what looks like a grotesque, (sic) a caricature of the equal protection of the laws. For example, ... there were many occasions under the old government when wages and cost of living allowances were granted to workers in the private sector but denied to workers in the government for some reason or another, and the government did not even state the reasons why. The government employees were being discriminated against. As a general rule, the majority of the world's countries now entertain public service unions. What they really add up to is that the employees of the government form their own association. Generally, they do not bargain for wages because these are fixed in the budget but they do acquire a forum where, among other things, professional and self- development is (sic) promoted and encouraged. They also act as watchdogs of their own bosses so that when graft and corruption is committed, generally, it is the unions who are no longer afraid by virtue of the armor of self-organization that become the public's own allies for detecting graft and corruption and for exposing it....” There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Statutory implementation of the last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus: “... Right of employees in the public service. Employees of the government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law. For employees in corporations and entities covered by the Labor Code, the determination of the exclusive bargaining representative is particularly governed by Articles 255 to 259 of said Code. Article 256 provides for the procedure when there is a representation issue in organized establishments, while Article 257 covers unorganized establishments. These Labor Code provisions are fleshed out by Rules V to VII, Book V of the Omnibus Implementing Rules. With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government including government- owned or controlled corporations with original charters and who are, therefore, covered by the civil service laws, the guidelines for the exercise of their right to organize is provided for under Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of the "sole and exclusive employees representative"; Under Section 12, "where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the appropriate organization unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition order the conduct of certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organizational unit." Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific qualification in the Constitution that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self- organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" and that they shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995 Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion. At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on December 1- 15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same. Issue: Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities Held: Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise: (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein. This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected. In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED. Republic vs Court of Appeals G..R. No. 87676 December 20, 1989 Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 88- 44048 praying for a declaration of illegality of the strike of the private respondents and to restrain the same. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's petition for certiorari, hence, this petition for review. Although the NPDC was originally created in 1963 under Executive Order No. 30, as the Executive Committee for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks, and later renamed as the National Parks Development Committee under Executive Order No. 68, on September 21, 1967, it was registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-stock and non-profit corporation, known as "The National Parks Development Committee, Inc." However, in August, 1987, the NPDC was ordered by the SEC to show cause why its Certificate of Registration should not be suspended for: (a) failure to submit the General Information Sheet from 1981 to 1987; (b) failure to submit its Financial Statements from 1981 to 1986; (c) failure to register its Corporate Books; and (d) failure to operate for a continuous period of at least five (5) years since September 27, 1967. Issue: W/N the petitioner, National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a government agency, or a private corporation, for on this issue depends the right of its employees to strike. Held: Since NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service rules and regulations (Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil service employees (Sec. 14, Executive Order No. 180). While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions of their choice, there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of a labor dispute between the employees and the government, Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides that the Public Sector Labor- Management Council, not the Department of Labor and Employment, shall hear the dispute. Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor dispute between the NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of Labor and Employment. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14204 is hereby set aside. The private respondents' complaint should be filed in the Public Sector Labor- Management Council as provided in Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180. Costs against the private respondents. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents. G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989 Facts: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. Held: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self- organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.