The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union results of the strike vote to NCMB pursuant to Article263 of the Labor vs. NLRC Code and because of the illegality of the strike the Union members and GR No. 156635 January 11, 2016 officers were deemed to have lost their employment status. NLRC modified the ruling of LA that the dismissal of the 18 Union members Facts: Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union unlawful for failure of HSBC to accord procedural due process. (Union) was the duly recognized collective bargaining agent of the rank- Issues: and-file employees of Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Whether or Not the strike commenced by the union is lawfully conducted? (HSBC). The company and the union was governed by a CBA which Whether or Not dismissal of the union members is valid? includes a salary structure of the employees comprising of grade levels, Ruling: entry level pay rates and the individual pays depending on the length of NO. The petitioners neither filed the notice of strike with the DOLE, nor service. observed the cooling-off period, nor submitted the result of the strike vote HSBC (company) announced the implementation of a job evaluation although the strike vote was conducted, the same was done by open, not program (JEP) retroactively. The JEP consists of a job designation per grade secret, balloting,42 in blatant violation of Article 26. Petitioners strike was level with salary scale which provides the minimum and maximum pay an rendered unlawful because their picketing which constituted an obstruction employee is entitled per grade level. The Union sent letter to company and to the free use of the employer's property or the comfortable enjoyment of demanded the suspension of the JEP because it constitutes an unfair labor life or property, when accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and practice (ULP). It also inform HSBC that it would exercise its right to coercion as to constitute nuisance, should be regulated. The strike, even if concerted action. justified as to its ends, could become illegal because of the means On the same day the Union members started picketing during breaktime. employed, especially when the means came within the prohibitions under HSBC (company) in its letter to the union insist that the JEP was an express Article 264(e) of the Labor Code. recognition of its obligation under the CBA. The procedural requirements for a valid strike are, therefore, the following, The Union's concerted activities persisted for 11 month, which impelled to wit: ( 1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE at least 30 days before the HSBC to suspend the negotiations and issued memoranda, warnings and intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of ULP; (2) a strike vote approved reprimands to remind the members of the Union to comply with HSBC's by the majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit Code of Conduct. Due to the sustained concerted actions, HSBC filed a concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; complaint for ULP in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor and (3) a notice of the results of the voting at least seven days before the Relations Commission (NLRC) he NLRC, and directed the remand of the intended strike given to the DOLE. These requirements are mandatory, such case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. that non-compliance therewith by the union will render the strike illegal. The Union conducted a strike after majority of the members of the Union On the second issue. voted in favor of a strike in protest of the continued implementation of the NO. The failure by HSBC to strictly observe the twin-notice requirement JEP. The Union's officers and members walked out and gathered outside the resulted in the illegal dismissal. premises of HSBC's offices. It was alleged that there were Union members As a general rule, the mere finding of the illegality of the strike does not who blocked the entry and exit points of the bank premises preventing bank justify the wholesale termination of the strikers from their employment the officers from entering the bank including its CEO. HSBC filed its responsibility for the illegal strike is individual instead of collective. complaint to declare the strike illegal with prayer for temporary restraining Under Article 264 there is a need to distinguish between the officers and the order and injunction with NLRC. members of the union who participate in an illegal strike. The officers may When HSBC issued return-to-work notices to the striking employees only be deemed terminated from their employment upon a finding of their 25 employees complied and returned to work. Due to the continuing knowing participation in the illegal strike, but the members of the union concerted actions, HSBC terminated employment of the the individual shall suffer the same fate only if they are shown to have knowingly petitioners. participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared the strike illegal for failure of the Union to HSBC fail to give them sufficient opportunity to present their side and file the notice of strike, observe the cooling-off period; and to submit the adequate opportunity to answer the charges against them. The twin 1 requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases are as much relationship. The Med-Arbiter’s order in this case dismissing the petition indispensable and mandatory as the procedural requirements enumerated in for certification election based on non-existence of employer-employee Article 262 of the Labor Code. HSBC notice to return-to work is not as relationship was issued after the members of the respondent union were substantial compliance with due process requirement. dismissed from their employment. The purpose of a petition for certification election is to determine which HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION vs. EPIFANIO P. MEJARES, organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with REMEGIO C. BAL URAN, JR., DANTE SAYCON, and CECILIO the employer. The respondent union, without its member-employees, was CUCHARO, represented by NAMABDJERA-HRC stripped of its personality to challenge the Med-Arbiter’s decision in the G.R. No. 208986 January 13, 2016 certification election case. Thus, the members of the respondent union were left with no option but to pursue their illegal dismissal case filed before the FACTS: Petitioners claimed that they were employed by HPI as farm Labor Arbiter. To dismiss the illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor workers in HPI’s plantations as area harvesters, packing house workers, Arbiter on the basis of the pronouncement of the Med-Arbiter in the loaders, or labellers. HRC, formerly known as Hijo Plantation Incorporated certification election case that there was no employer-employee relationship (HPI), owns agricultural lands. Respondents assert that contractor-growers between the parties would be tantamount to denying due process to the receive compensation and are under the control of HRC. Petitioners formed complainants in the illegal dismissal case. their union NAMABDJERA-HRC registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Later, they filed a petition for certification. ALLAN M. MENDOZA vs. OFFICERS OF MANILA WATER When HRC learned that complainants formed a union, the three contractor- EMPLOYEES UNION (MWEU), EDUARDO B. BORELA, growers filed a notice of cessation of business that led to the termination of BUENAVENTURA QUEBRAL, ELIZABETH COMETA et al. complainant’s employment. Petitioners, represented by NAMABDJERA- G.R. No. 201595 January 25, 2016 HRC, filed a case for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and illegal deductions. Facts: Petitioner was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union DOLE Med-Arbiter Jasa dismissed the petition for certification election (MWEU) a duly registered labor organization of the rank-and-file claiming there was no employer-employee relationship. Petitioners did not employees within Manila Water Company. During the period material to appeal but pursued the illegal dismissal case. Labor Arbiter Sagmit held that this Petition, Eduardo Borela as President and Chairman of the MWEU res judicata does not apply and that finding by the Med-Arbiter that no Executive Board, Buenaventur Quebral as First Vice-President and employment relationship exists between HRC and complainants does not Treasurer, and Elizabeth Cometa as Secretary. bar the Labor Arbiter from making his own independent finding on the Union Secretary (Cometa) informed Petitioner (Mendoza) that the union same issue. HRC filed TRO and seeks to nullify the orders of LA Sagmit. was unable to deduct the increased P200.00 union dues from his salary due NLRC granted the petition holding that LA Sagmit gravely abused her to lack of the required check-off authorization from him and that his failure discretion. Court of Appeals concluded that the decision in a certification to pay the unions he can be sanctioned. election case does not foreclose further dispute as to the existence or non- Quebral (Vice President and Treasurer) informed Borela (President and existence of an employer-employee relationship between HRC and the Chairman) about the failure of petitioner together with others to pay their complainants. CA set aside the NLRC decision and remanded case to Labor union dues such failure amounts to violation of MWEU’s Constitution and Arbiter for further proceedings. By-Laws Borela referred the situation to the grievance committee for ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter, in the illegal dismissal case, is investigation after which it recommended that petitioner be suspended for bound by the ruling of the Med-Arbiter regarding the existence or non- 30 days. existence of employer-employee relationship between the parties in the When Petitioner learned about the suspension he indicated his intention to certification election case appeal to the General Membership Assembly in accordance with union’s RULING: No. The decision in a certification election case, by the very Constitution and By-Laws, which grants him the right to appeal any nature of that proceeding, does not foreclose all further dispute between the arbitrary resolution, policy and rule promulgated by the Executive Board. parties as to the existence or non-existence of an employer-employee 2 Petitioner sent two letters about its intention to appeal but both were not which case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor acted upon. Arbiters, in accordance with Article 217 of the Labor Code. When MWEU scheduled an election of officers Mendoza filed certificate of candidacy but was disqualified for not being a member of good standing Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda sa Sitio Nasawe, Inc v. Tan, due to his suspension. Later Mendoza was expelled from the union, all his GR 196028, 18 April 2016 pleas for appeal were let unheeded. FACTS: Petitioner is an association of farmers and fishermen residing at Petitioner then joined another union (WATER-AFWC) and was elected Sitio Talaga, Barangay Ipag, Mariveles, Bataan. It that its members “have union President. Other MWEU members were inclined to join WATER- resided in the area for several years doing farming activities” from which AFWC, but MWEU director Torres threatened others that they will not get they “derive their income for their daily sustenance.” In 1995, the benefits from the new CBA, on the proposed CBA it contains a provisions Philippine Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) published in the that in that in the event of retrenchment, non-MWEU members shall be newspaper an Invitation to Bid for the sale of its assets, which included 34 removed first, and that upon the signing of the CBA, only MWEU members hectares of a 129.4227-hectare land in Barangay Ipag, Mariveles, Bataan, shall receive a signing bonus. previously owned by Anchor Estate Corporation. The PCGG sequestered Petitioner filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against MWEU, the the properties of said Corporation after it was identified to be a dummy Labor Arbiter ordered that the case be referred to the Union level. While corporation of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Respondent Tomas NLRC declared order of LA null and void for being rendered without Tan emerged as the highest bidder in the bidding of the 34-hectare property. jurisdiction and conflict fall under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor The PCGG Committee on Privatization approved the sale and a Notice of Relations, as these are inter/intra-union disputes. Award was issued to the respondent. The Office of the President (OP) also Petitioner filed appeal to CA arguing that unfair labor practices is approved the sale of the property. The PCGG, representing the Republic of cognizable by the Labor Arbiter; that the fact that the dispute is inter- or the Philippines, executed a Deed of Sale in the respondent’s favor. Then intra-union in nature cannot erase the fact that respondents were guilty of Chairman of the PCGG Committee on Privatization Sarmiento wrote the unfair labor practices in interfering and restraining him in the exercise of DAR requesting to stop the acquisition of the property under the CARP. It his right to self-organization as member of both MWEU and WATER- appeared that a Notice of Coverage had been issued over the 129.4227- AFWC, and in discriminating against him and other members through the hectare land and that the 34 hectares sold by the PCGG to Tan had been provisions of the proposed 2008 CBA which they drafted. already identified for CARP coverage and targeted for acquisition in the Issue: Whether or Not labor organization MWEU committed unfair labor year 2000. In an Order, DAR Secretary Morales, Jr. granted Sarmiento’s practice against the petitioner? request and lifted the Notice of Coverage on the 129.4227-hectare property. Ruling: Secretary Morales also ordered to stop the acquisition proceedings on the Yes. Unfair labor practices may be committed both by the employer under property. Thereafter, the petitioner filed with the DAR a Petition to Revoke Article 248 and by labor organizations under Article 249 of the Labor Code. Secretary Morales’s order. The DAR denied both the petitioner’s petition Mendoza claim on illegal suspension on the union, the documentary and its subsequent motion for reconsideration. The DAR based its denial evidence is clear that when petitioner letter about his suspension. He on the ground that the subject property, being government-owned, does not immediately and timely filed a written appeal. However, the Executive fall as ‘private agricultural land’ subject to the CARP. The petitioner then Board did not act. The Court finds that petitioner was illegally suspended appealed to the OP, which dismissed the same for lack of merit and and thereafter unlawfully expelled from MWEU due to respondents’ failure affirmed the DAR Secretary’s Order. The motion for reconsideration was to act on his written appeals. The petitioner was unceremoniously denied. The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 with suspended, disqualified and deprived of his right to run for the position of the CA. The CA held that, while the lifting of the subject Notice of MWEU Vice-President in the September 14, 2007 election of officers, Coverage was irregular and erroneous, the petitioner’s petition for review expelled from MWEU, and forced to join another union, WATER-AFWC. must be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was not a real party in For these, respondents are guilty of unfair labor practices under Article 249 interest to the case. Nothing is stated as to them being beneficiaries, or at (a) and (b) – that is, violation of petitioner’s right to self-organization, least potential beneficiaries, under CARP. unlawful discrimination, and illegal termination of his union membership – 3 ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly held petitioners as not a real party Facts: Singson, Pasaqui, Lominiqui, and Andales filed complaints for illegal in interest. dismissal against William Go Que Construction and/or William Go Que HELD: Yes. The petitioner is not a real party-in-interest to question the before the NLRC, claiming that they were hired as steelmen on various July 26, 2000 DAR Order. The Constitutional right to form associations dates, and were regular employees of Go Que until their illegal dismissal on does not make the petitioner a real party-in-interest in this case. While June 3, 2006. Go Que averred that they were hired as project employees, organizations and associations may represent their members before the and that sometime in May 2006, he learned that some workers were getting DAR, these members must have such real, actual, material, or substantial excess and cutting unused steel bars, and selling them to junk shops, interest in the subject matter of the action, NOT merely an expectancy, or a prompting him to announce that he will bring the matter to the proper future contingent interest. Here, the petitioner alleged that it is duly authorities. Thereafter, the private respondents no longer reported for work. registered with the SEC acting on behalf of its farmers and fishermen The LA ruled that the employees were illegally dismissed by Go Que and members which allegation gave it the right to represent its members. declared that they were regular employees and not project or contractual However, it failed to allege and prove that these members are identified employees considering that there was no written contract duly signed by and registered qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, or have already said employees and that they were continuously employed to perform the been actually awarded portions of it, or have been issued Certificates of same tasks for 2 to 8 years. However, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Land Ownership Award for which they could validly claim the status of the LA. The private respondents then filed a petition for certiorari before the land’s grantees having a real, actual, material interest to question the Order CA but the CA noted that the Affidavit of Service and the Verification/ of the DAR Secretary lifting the Notice of Coverage. Not being identified Certification of Non-Forum Shopping contained a defective jurat. The CA and duly registered qualified beneficiaries, these members’ interest over the required private respondents anew to submit a Verification/Certification of subject land were at most an expectancy that, unfortunately for them, did Non-Forum Shopping with a properly accomplished jurat indicating not ripen to actual award and ownership. Thus, notwithstanding its competent evidence of their identities. After submitting photocopies of Ids representative capacity, the petitioner and its members are not real parties- and a Joint-Affidavitattesting to the identity of Andales who was unable to in-interest to question the DAR’s Order. The constitutional considerations: submit his ID , the CA held that these served as competent evidence of provisions governing agrarian reform program do not entail automatic grant private respondents' identities and cured the defect. The CA also dismissed of lands to every farmer and farmworker. Social justice in the land reform the petition with respect to Singson and Pasaqui on account of the program also applies to landowners, not merely to farmers and Satisfaction of Judgment/Release of Claim they had submitted after farmworkers. This is precisely why the law – RA No. 6657 – and the amicable settlement with Go Que. applicable rules provide for the procedure for determining the proper Issues: 1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition with respect to beneficiaries and grantees or awardees of the lands covered or to be covered Singson and Pasaqui under the CARP. Jurisprudence dictates that the “CARL is specific in its 2. WON the CA erred in refusing to dismiss the petition on the ground of requirements for registering qualified beneficiaries.” Those who have not non-compliance with the requirements of verification and certification been identified and registered as qualified beneficiaries are not real parties- against forum shopping. in-interest. Furthermore, the SC held that DAR Order has already attained Ruling: 1. No. The settled rule is that legitimate waivers resulting from finality is no longer reviewable by the Court. voluntary settlements of laborers' claims should be treated and upheld as the law between the parties. Since Singson and Pasaqui filed a motion to dismiss the petition filed by them after having entered into an amicable settlement with Go Que, there is no longer any justiciable controversy between them, rendering the instant case moot and academic and WILLIAM GO QUE CONSTRUCTION AND/OR WILLIAM GO dismissible with respect to them. QUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND DANNY SINGSON, RODOLFO 2. Yes. The IDs presented by the private respondents were not issued by an PASAQUI, LENDO LOMINIQUI, AND JUN ANDALES official agency and the Joint-Affidavit identifying Andales and assuring that G.R. No. 191699, April 19, 2016 he was a party-litigant is not competent evidence of Andales's identity under Section 12 (b), Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, 4 considering that they (i.e., Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui) themselves are Evergreen Marine moved for the dismissal of the case and its referral for privy to the instrument, i.e., the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Voluntary Arbitration on the ground that Ricasata's employment was Shopping, in which Andales's participation is sought to be proven. To note, covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the it cannot be presumed that an affiant is personally known to the notary Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines and the public; the jurat must contain a statement to that effect. Tellingly, the National Chinese Seamen's Union. The Panel of Arbitrators ruled in favour notarial certificate of the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping of Ricasata and also rejected the contention of Cargo Safeway and attached to the petition before the CA did not state whether they presented Evergreen Marine that the flexibility provision of the CBA for the competent evidence of their identities, or that they were personally known completion of the contract "one month more or one month less as a result of to the notary public, and, thus, runs afoul of the requirements of verification operational convenience or convenience of the port of call" should apply to and certification against forum shopping under Section 1,68 Rule 65, in justify Ricasata's early embarkment.. Ricasata appealed for the relation to Section 3,69 Rule 46, of the Rules of Court. Because of this, the modification of the Decision of the Panel of Arbitrators by increasing the fact that even one of the private respondents swore that the allegations in award for back disability benefit and sick allowance but was denied by CA the pleading are true and correct of his knowledge and belief is shrouded in on the ground that that entitlement to disability benefits is a matter doubt. There was also no substantial compliance with the certification governed by law and contract and not solely by medical findings and that against forum shopping requirement and non-compliance therewith or a Ricasata forfeited his claim for compensation by failing to comply with the defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its mandatory reporting requirements. subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax ISSUE: the Rule on the ground of 'substantial compliance' or presence of'special (1) Whether or not Ricasata is entitled to disability benefits, sickness circumstances or compelling reasons. Here, the CA did not mention - nor allowance, and attorney's fees. does there exist - any perceivable special circumstance or compelling (2) Whether Ricasata was able to finish his contract of employment reason which justifies the rules' relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if HELD: any of the private respondents certified under oath that no similar action has (1) Ricasata arrived in the Philippines on 23 March 2010. On 29 been filed or is pending in another forum. March 2010, he underwent an Audiogram at the Seamen's Hospital. On 27 April 2010, Dr. Lara-Orencia diagnosed him with "Permanent Medical EDREN RICASATA v. CARGO SAFEWAY Unfitness with a Disability Grade 1" based on the Audiogram. GR Nos. 208896-97, Apr 06, 2016 It is a settled rule that for a seaman's disability claim to prosper, it is FACTS: Ricasata was hired as an engine fitter for M.V. Uni Chart, a ship mandatory that within three days from repatriation, he is examined by a owned by Evergreen Marine Corporation, represented in the Philippines by company-designated physician. His failure to do so will result to the its local manning agency, Cargo Safeway. The deployment was for a period forfeiture of his right to claim for compensation and disability benefits. of nine months with a basic monthly salary of US$704 and was found fit for Ricasata failed to comply with this requirement. He also failed to show that sea duty without restrictions and was deployed. His work included handling he was physically incapacitated to be medically examined by a company- noisy equipment such as grinders, generators, and pumps in the vessel's designated physician that would have justified his non-compliance with the engine room on a regular eight to five shift schedule. Ricasata experienced mandatory three-day period. We note the finding of the Court of Appeals severe pain in his ears. He reported it to the Chief Engineer and requested that Ricasata was inconsistent on whether he was referred to a company- for a medical check-up, but his request was denied. He experienced another designated physician. In his Petition before the Court of Appeals, he alleged bout of severe pain in his ears, but wad again denied. He was then replaced that Cargo Safeway referred him to a company-designated physician while by a reliever and thereafter disembarked from the vessel and returned to the in his Memorandum; he alleged that Cargo Safeway refused to refer him for Philippines. Ricasata underwent an Audiogram and was diagnosed with post-medical check-up. Considering the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did "Permanent Medical Unfitness with a Disability Grade 1" due to a not err in ruling that Ricasata failed to prove that he is entitled to the "profound hearing loss." Ricasata filed an action against Cargo Safeway disability benefits and sickness allowance that he was claiming. and Evergreen Marine before the NLRC, for his claim. Cargo Safeway and 5 (2) In their Comment, Cargo Safeway and Evergreen Marine contend that January to February 2002; that she had explained that the invoices were not Ricasata is not entitled to unearned wages, unearned leave pay, and basic delivered on time because the delivery receipts were delayed and wages corresponding to the unserved portion of his contract. They invoke overlooked; that despite her explanation, she had been suspended for 10 Section 19(C) of the POEA-SEC to the effect that "[i]f the vessel arrives at days; that upon reporting back to work, she had been advised to cease a convenient port within a period of three (3) months before the expiration working because her application for retirement had already been approved; of his contract, the master/employer may repatriate the seafarer from such that she had been subsequently informed that her application had been port x x x.” but the Court did not agree because Cargo Safeway and disapproved, and had then been advised to tender her resignation with a Evergreen Marine only quoted a portion of Section 19(C) of POEA-SEC request for financial assistance; that she had manifested her intention to and if quoted in full, will not apply to this case. Section 19(C) of POEA- return to work but the petitioner had confiscated her gate pass; and that she SEC states that the mode of termination it provides may only be exercised had since then been prevented from entering the company premises and had by the master/employer if the original period of the seafarer is at least ten been replaced by another employee. The petitioner admitted that Villa had months. Ricasata's contract of employment is only for nine months. been its sales clerk at Robina Farms. It stated that her attention had been Granting that the provision is applicable, Cargo Safeway and Evergreen called by the accounting department to explain her failure to issue invoices Marine failed to present proof that they paid Ricasata all his earned wages, for the unhatched eggs for the month of February; After the administrative his leave pay for the entire contract period, and his termination pay hearing Villa was found to have violated the company rule on the timely equivalent to one month of his basic salary. The Court held that the issuance of the invoices that had resulted in delay in the payment of buyers provision of the CBA was specific: the flexibility period is one month more considering that the payment had depended upon the receipt of the invoices; or one month less from the term of the contract. Ricasata disembarked one that she had been suspended from her employment as a consequence; that and a half months before the expiration of his contract, meaning it does not after serving the suspension, she had returned to work and had followed up fall within the one month more or one month less covered by the CBA. The her application for retirement with Lucina de Guzman, who had then CBA also provides that if any lesser period is agreed for operational informed her that the management did not approve the benefits equivalent convenience, it should be specified in the employment contract. No such to 86% of her salary rate applied for, but only 1/2 month for every year of provision is present in this case. Hence, the flexibility provision of the CBA service; and that disappointed with the outcome, she had then brought her does not also apply to this case. complaint against the petitioners LA rendered a decision finding that Villa had not been dismissed from employment. The NLRC rendered its judgment dismissing the appeal by the petitioner but granting that of Villa. CA upheld the finding of the NLRC that the petitioner had illegally dismissed Villa ISSUE: Whether or not Villa illegally dismissed? HELD: Yes, private respondent was illegally dismissed. It is undeniable Robina Farms Cebu v. Villa that private respondent was suspended for ten (10) days. Ordinarily, after an G.R. No. 175869, April18, 2016 employee [has] served her suspension, she should be admitted back to work and to continue to receive compensation for her services. In the case at bar, FACTS: Respondent Elizabeth Villa brought against the petitioner her it is clear that private respondent was not admitted immediately after her complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime suspension. When she reported back after her suspension, she was advised pay, and nonpayment of service incentive leave pay in the RAB No. VII of not to report back anymore as her application was approved, which was the NLRC in Cebu City. In her verified position paper, Villa averred that latter [sic] on disapproved. She was then advised to tender a resignation she had been employed by petitioner Robina Farms as sales clerk since letter with request for financial assistance by Lucy de Guzman. After that August 1981; that in the later part of 2001, the petitioner had enticed her to another letter of petitioner Lily Ngochua advised private respondent to do avail herself of the company's special retirement program; that on March 2, the same. Clearly, these acts are strong indication that petitioners wanted to 2002, she had received a memorandum from Lily Ngochua requiring her to severe [sic] the employer-employee relationship between them and that of explain her failure to issue invoices for unhatched eggs in the months of private respondent. This is buttressed by the fact that when private 6 respondent signified her intention to return back to work after learning of benefits to which they are legally entitled, but disregarded his years of the disapproval of her application, she was prevented to enter the service in ASJ for the computation of retirement pay. The CA sustainedthe petitioner's premises by confiscating her ID and informing her that a new NLRC's ruling. employee has already replaced her. Issues:WON there was constructive dismissal Moreover, private respondent’s application for early retirement did not WON the retirement benefits should include Mina's service in ASJ manifest her intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Ruling:Yes. The Constitution and the Labor Code mandate that employees Although she applied for early retirement, she did so upon the belief that be accorded security of tenure. The right of employees to security of tenure, she would receive a higher benefit based on the petitioner's offer. As such, however, does not give the employees vested rights to their positions to the her consent to be retired could not be fairly deemed to have been knowingly extent of depriving management of its prerogative to change their and freely given. assignments or to transfer them. In cases of transfer of an employee, the employer is charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action DIVINE WORD COLLEGE OF LAOAG vs. SHIRLEY B. MINA, as are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity and heir-substitute of the late DELFIN A. MINA that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the G.R. No. 195155 employee. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the Facts: DWCL is a non-stock educational institution offering catholic employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. education to the public. It is run by the Society of Divine Word (SVD), a Here, Mina’s transfer clearly amounted to a constructive dismissal since for congregation of Catholic priests. Then, the Society of Divine Word almost 23 years, he was a teacher enjoying a permanent status but then was Educational Association (DWEA) established a Retirement Plan to provide appointed as a college laboratory custodian, which is a clear relegation from retirement benefits for qualified employees of their member institutions. his previous position. Not only that. He was also divested of his teaching Said retirement plan contains a clause about the portability of benefits. load and his appointment even became contractual in nature and was Mina was first employed in as a high school teacher, and later on a high subject to automatic termination after one year "without any further school principal, at the Academy of St. Joseph (ASJ), a school run by the notification." DWCL failed to show any reason for Mina’s transfer and that SVD. Then, he transferred to DWCL and was accorded a permanent status it was not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to him. Mina’s after a year of probationary status. He was subsequently transferred to appointment as laboratory custodian was a demotion. DWCL’s college department as an Associate Professor III. Thereafter, Mina SC also affirmed that the eight years of service rendered by Mina in ASJ was assigned as the College Laboratory Custodian of the School of Nursing shall not be included in the computation of his retirement benefits. No and was divested of his teaching load, subject to automatic termination and adequate proof is shown that he has complied with the portability clause of without need for any further notification. the DWEA Retirement Plan. The employee has the burden of proof to show Mina was thereafter offered early retirement but initially declined it. He compliance with the requirements set forth in retirement plans, being in the later received a Memorandum from the Office of the Dean enumerating nature of privileges granted to employees. Failure to overcome the burden specific acts of gross or habitual negligence, insubordination, and reporting of proof would necessarily result in the employee’s disqualification to for work under the influence of alcohol. He answered the allegations but receive the benefits. sensing that it was useless, he negotiated for his retirement benefits. Then, it Mariano v. Martinez Memorial Colleges, Inc, was made to appear that his services were terminated by reason of GR 194119, 13 April 2016 redundancy to avoid any tax implications. Mina was also made to sign a deed of waiver and quitclaim. Mina then filed a case for illegal dismissal FACTS: Martinez Memorial Colleges, Inc. (MMC) is a private educational and recovery of separation pay and other monetary claims. institution, with respondents Martinez as the College incumbent President The LA ruled that there was no constructive dismissal and that his and Del Rio as the College Executive Vice-President. The petitioner was retirement pay should include the number of years he had worked for ASJ. MMC's Assistant Cashier. Part of her job was to accept payments and issue However, the NLRC ruled otherwise as to the constructive dismissal. The receipts and deposit slips to MMC students. In 2008, the petitioner went on NLRC also held that Mina was not deemed to have waived all his claims an authorized leave of absence, as she and her husband Dario Mariano against DWCL as quitclaims cannot bar employees from demanding (Dario), Director for Finance of MMC, would be vacationing. When the 7 petitioner returned to work, she received a Memorandum signed by the advancement of its interest and not for the purpose of defeating the lawful respondents, stating that in line with the streamlining activities of MMC, rights of the petitioner. It was within MMC's discretion to allow husband she would be transferred from the Cashier's Office to the Office of the Vice- and wife to be in one department and there is no express prohibition on this President (OVP) for Finance, her husband's office. Dario then advised the matter. The Board of Directors' decision to transfer the petitioner to her petitioner to file an extended leave of absence, which was granted. husband's department did not cause any conflict at all and the same was on Subsequently, the petitioner went to MMC to file another application for an interim basis only. As regards the petitioner's dismissal from leave as she was not feeling well but this was denied by the Human employment, the Court also affirms the CA ruling that the NLRC did not Resources. The resident physician at Martinez Memorial Hospital commit any grave abuse of discretion in declaring its validity. In this case, recommended her confinement and she was later hospitalized. In the MMC's ground for terminating the petitioner's employment was "serious or meantime Muallil was tasked to conduct an audit review of MMC's Finance gross dishonesty and for having committed an offense against [MMC]," Department. Muallil submitted her report and findings, which showed the which was based on the findings in the System Review Report submitted by petitioner's improper handling of cash accounts of MMC. A separate Muallil. The Court has ruled that in dismissing a cashier on the ground of account called "non-essential accounts" (containing a total amount of loss of confidence, it is sufficient that there is some basis for the same or P40,490,619.26) in which some collections of MMC were deposited and that the employer has a reasonable ground to believe that the employee is diverted from MMC's general fund was likewise discovered. Thereafter, responsible for the misconduct, thus making him unworthy of the trust and Dario received a letter from Martinez, addressed to the petitioner, where the confidence reposed in him. Courts cannot justly deny the employer the latter was asked to explain in writing, within five days, her possible authority to dismiss him for employers are allowed wider latitude in involvement in the diversion of MMC's funds. In a letter, they explained dismissing an employee for loss of trust and confidence. The petitioner that the MMC Board of Directors sanctioned the non-essential account. The contends that she had no opportunity to defend herself from the charges as petitioner did not submit any separate reply. Then, petitioner received a MMC deliberately failed to provide her a copy of the System Review letter from Martinez, informing her that her employment has been Report. The letter that Martinez sent to the petitioner ordering her to explain terminated on the ground of serious or gross dishonesty in relation to the in writing her possible involvement in the diversion of MMC's funds discovered misappropriation and diversion of funds of MMC, and complies with the first written notice requirement as it specified the ground aggravated by her continuous absence from office without leave or any for termination and gave the petitioner an opportunity to explain her side. explanation. Petitioner amended her earlier complaint of constructive The due process mandate does not require that the entire report from which dismissal to illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal as the termination is based should be attached to the notice. What is essential illegal for failure of the respondents to prove lawful or just cause for the is that the particular acts or omissions for which her dismissal is sought are termination of her employment and for their failure to accord her due indicated in the letter. Accordingly, the CA's denial of the petitioner's process. On appeal, the NLRC vacated and set aside the LA' s decision. The petition must be upheld. CA denied the petitioner’s appeal, saying that the petitioner was the Assistant Cashier who performs the duties of a cashier, position that BLUE EAGLE MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. NAVAL requires a high degree of trust and confidence, and her infraction reasonably G.R. No. 192488. April 19, 2016 taints the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mariano was illegally dismissed. FACTS: By virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), finalized on RULING: No. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The CA correctly September 29, 2006, Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU), owner of the ruled that MMC's act of transferring the petitioner from the Cashier's Office Moro Lorenzo Sports Center (MLSC) located within the ADMU to the OVP for Finance is a valid exercise of management prerogative. The compound, gave petitioner BEMI the authority to manage and operate the Court has often declined to interfere in legitimate business decisions of following businesses at MLSC. Petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama were employers, as long as the company's exercise of the same is in good faith to then the General Manager and Human Resources (HR) Manager, advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing respectively, of petitioner BEMI. Respondent was hired on January 15, the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements. In this case, the 2005 by petitioner BEMI as a member of its maintenance staff. MMC's exercise of its management prerogative was done for the 8 During its first year of operation in 2005, petitioner BEMI suffered On the afternoon of March 3, 2006, respondent filed a complaint for illegal financial losses. In an attempt to reduce its financial losses, the dismissal against petitioners before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter rendered Management of petitioner BEMI (Management) resolved to decrease the a Decision on October 12, 2006 finding that respondent was illegally operational expenses of the company. One of the measures the Management dismissed. According to the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were not able to intended to implement was the downsizing of its workforce. Pursuant to prove that petitioner BEMI was suffering from serious business losses that such decision of the Management, petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama would have justified retrenchment of its employees. Petitioners appealed evaluated and identified several employees who could be the subject of before the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the assailed decision. This prompted retrenchment proceedings, taking into consideration the employees’ respondent to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The positions and tenures at petitioner BEMI. After their evaluation, petitioners Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 11, 2010, favored respondent. Bonoan and Dela Rama identified five employees for retrenchment. The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners. Respondent was included in the list because she was one of the employees Petitioners now come before the Court via the instant Petition for Review with the shortest tenures. on Certiorari. Before actually commencing retrenchment proceedings, petitioner Dela ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed; which depends Rama separately met with each of the five aforementioned employees and on the question of whether or not respondent’s resignation was voluntary. presented to them the option of resigning instead. The employees who would choose to resign would no longer be required to report for work after HELD: For the resignation of an employee to be a viable defense in an their resignation but would still be paid their full salary for February 2006 action for illegal dismissal, an employer must prove that the resignation was and their prorated 13th month pay, plus financial assistance in the amount voluntary, and its evidence thereon must be clear, positive, and convincing. of one-month salary for every year of service at petitioner BEMI. This The employer cannot rely on the weakness of the employee’s evidence. In option would also give the employees free time to seek other employment this case, petitioners, as employers, were able to present sufficient evidence while still receiving salary from petitioner BEMI. to establish that respondent’s resignation was voluntary. As borne out by the Since all the five employees identified for retrenchment decided to Financial Statements for 2005 of petitioner BEMI, there was ground for the voluntarily resign instead and avail themselves of the financial package company to implement a retrenchment of its employees at the time offered by petitioner BEMI, there was no more need for the company to respondent resigned. initiate retrenchment proceedings. The five employees were instructed to The evaluation and identification of the employees to be retrenched were return on February 28, 2006 to comply with the exit procedure of petitioner jointly undertaken by petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama, as the General BEMI and receive the amounts due them by reason of their voluntary Manager and HR Manager, respectively, of petitioner BEMI, based on fair resignation. and reasonable criteria, i.e., the employees’ positions and tenures at the On February 28, 2006, the resigned employees, except for respondent, company. Respondent was included in the final list of five employees to be completed their exit procedures, received the amounts due them, and retrenched because she was one of the employees with the shortest tenures. executed release waivers and quitclaims in favor of petitioner BEMI. That there were four other employees of petitioner BEMI who were to be Respondent’s nonappearance on prompted petitioner Bonoan to write her a retrenched and similarly offered the option of resigning in exchange for a letter stating that in connection with respondent’s voluntary resignation, she more favorable financial package refutes respondent’s insinuation of a must comply with the exit procedures of petitioner BEMI. Respondent scheme by petitioners to remove her because of Dr. Florendo’s complaint appeared at petitioner Bonoan’s office on March 3, 2006. Because against her for the incident that took place in December 2005. respondent was finding it difficult to find new employment, she asked if it Because the five employees to be retrenched opted to voluntarily resign was possible for her to return to work for petitioner BEMI. However, instead and avail themselves of the financial package offered, there was no petitioner Bonoan replied that respondent’s resignation had long been more need for petitioner BEMI to comply with the notice requirement to the approved and that petitioner BEMI would not be able to rehire respondent Department of Labor and Employment. Said five employees were to receive given the difficult financial position of the company. Petitioner Bonoan more benefits than what the law prescribed in case of retrenchment, advised respondent to just receive the amount she was entitled to by reason particularly: (a) full salary for February 2006 although they were no longer of her voluntary resignation. required to report to work after submission of their resignation letters in 9 mid-February 2006; (b) prorated 13th month pay; and (c) financial To be a valid ground for dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be assistance equivalent to one-month salary for every year of service. based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, The foregoing circumstances persuade the Court that no fraud or deception without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, was employed upon respondent to resign because petitioner BEMI was thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial indeed about to implement in good faith a retrenchment of its employees in grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or order to advance its interest and not merely to defeat or circumvent the suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of respondent’s right to security of tenure. the employer. Loss of confidence must not also be indiscriminately used as a shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an employee COCOPLANS, INC. vs. VILLAPANDO was arbitrary. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act G.R. No. 183129. May 30, 2016 complained of must be work-related and show that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. FACTS: Respondent Ma. Socorro R. Villapando, began working as a In the instant case, the Court does not find the evidence presented by financial Advisor for petitioner Cocoplans, Inc., (Cocoplans) in 1995. In petitioners to be substantial enough to discharge the burden of proving that 2000, she was eventually promoted to Division Head/Senior Sales Manager. Villapando was, indeed, dismissed for just cause. Thus, in view of the On 2002, however, her employment was terminated by Cocoplans, through irregularities identified by the CA, the Court cannot take Ms. Gurango’s its President, Michelena, on the alleged ground that she was deliberately affidavit into account. In dismissing an employee for just cause, it must be influencing people to transfer to another company thereby breaching the shown that the employer fairly made a determination of just cause in good trust and losing the confidence given to her by Cocoplans. Consequently, faith, taking into consideration all of the evidence available to him. Thus, Villapando filed an action for illegal dismissal alleging that she was not only is there no showing that said affidavit was considered by dismissed without the just cause mandated by law. petitioners in arriving at their decision to dismiss Villapando; Villapando On 2004, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Villapando finding that she never had the opportunity to address the accusations stated therein. As such, was illegally terminated from her employment. However, the NLRC the Court cannot consider the same. disagreed with the Labor Arbiter in its Decision holding that the matter of resignation is a nonissue as the termination of Villapando’s employment PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. LIGAN was affected for reasons other than her resignation. Yet, in its 2008 G.R. No. 203932. June 8, 2016 Decision, the CA disagreed with the NLRC and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, finding that while Villapando was duly afforded the FACTS: PAL and Synergy Services Corporation (Synergy) entered into a required due process mandated by law, the evidence adduced by herein station services agreement and a janitorial services agreement whereby petitioners was not substantial enough to support their allegation that Synergy provided janitors and station attendants to PAL at Mactan airport. Villapando deliberately influenced people to transfer to another company. Enrique Ligan was among the personnel of Synergy posted at PAL to carry ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was terminated for just cause. out the contracted tasks. Claiming to be performing duties directly desirable HELD: Settled is the rule that to constitute a valid dismissal from and necessary to the business of PAL, the respondents, along with 12 other employment, two (2) requisites must concur, viz.: (a) the employee must be co-employees, filed complaints in March 1992 against PAL and Synergy in afforded due process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and the NLRC Region VII Office in Cebu City for regularization of their status defend himself; and (b) the dismissal must be for a valid cause, as provided as employees of PAL, underpayment of salaries and nonpayment of in Article 282 of the Labor Code, or for any of the authorized causes under premium pay for holidays, premium pay for rest days, service incentive Articles 283 and 284 of the same Code. In the case before the Court, it is leave pay, 13th month pay and allowances. already undisputed that petitioners duly afforded Villapando the opportunity In the Decision dated August 29, 1994, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that to be heard and defend herself, thereby complying with the first requisite. Synergy was an independent contractor and dismissed the complaint for The issue that remains, therefore, is whether Villapando was dismissed for regularization, but granted the complainants’ money claims. On appeal, the valid and just cause. NLRC, 4th Division, Cebu City on January 5, 1996 declared Synergy a 10 labor-only contractor and ordered PAL to accept the complainants as regular dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. Unfortunately, in this employees and as such, to pay their salaries, allowances and other benefits petition, PAL has advanced no such justification whatsoever to dismiss or under the Collective Bargaining Agreement subsisting during the period of retrench the respondents. The Court is left with no conclusion: PAL’s their employment. PAL went to this Court on certiorari, but the case was petition is misleading and clearly baseless and dilatory. referred to the CA. On September 29, 2000, the CA, in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 52329, affirmed the NLRC in toto. G.R. No. 205061, June 08, 2016 Meanwhile, while the above regularization cases were pending in the CA, EMERTIA G. MALIXI vs. MEXICALI PHILIPPINES AND/OR PAL terminated its service agreements with Synergy effective June 30, FRANCESCA MABANTA, 1998, alleging serious business losses. Consequently, Synergy also terminated its employment contracts with the respondents, who forthwith Facts: Petitioner was hired by respondents as a team leader at delivery filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal against PAL. PAL in turn service. Due to her satisfactory performance, she was then transferred at a filed a third party complaint against Synergy. newly opened branch in Alabang Town Center as a store manager. In In his Decision dated July 27, 1998, Executive LA Reynoso A. Belarmino December 2008, she was compelled to sign an end of contract letter due to declared that Synergy was an independent contractor and the respondents her criminal complaint for sexual harassment against the respondent’s were its regular employees, and therefore Synergy was solely liable for the operations manager. However, she refused to do so. Thereafter, Luna went payment of their separation pay, wage differential, and attorney’s fees. In to the branch and caused the signing of the same and informed her that it their appeal to the NLRC, the respondents cited seven previous cases was her last day. wherein the NLRC also declared that Synergy was a labor-only contractor. Respondents denied responsibilities to the petitioner on the ground that she They argued that Synergy and PAL dismissed them without just cause. In was no longer an employee of Mexicali but rather Calexico. That the two the Decision dated August 27, 2004, the NLRC found that the functions are distinct and Separate Corporation. Petitioner alleged that it was performed by the respondents under Synergy’s service contracts with PAL Mexicali who engaged, dismissed and controlled her. That her resignation indicated that they were directly related to PAL’s air transport business. was a condition for her promotion as a store manager. PAL’s motion for reconsideration having denied, it filed a petition for The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the petitioner. Declaring that Mexicali certiorari before the CA. On February 15, 2012, the CA dismissed PAL’s and Calexico are one and the same with interlocking board of directors. The petition, and on September 27, 2012, it also denied its motion for NLRC, nevertheless, ordered Mexicali, being the employer of Teves and reconsideration. Luna who caused petitioner's termination from her employment with Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed by PAL. Calexico, to reinstate petitioner to her job at Calexico but without paying her any backwages. The CA affirmed the decision of NLRC that there was ISSUE: Whether the termination of the respondents’ employment by no illegal dismissal. Synergy in June 1998 was without just cause and observance of due Issue: Whether or not there was an illegal dismissal process. Held: The Court finds that there exists no employer-employee relationship HELD: between petitioner and respondents as to hold the latter liable for illegal PAL has insisted that the NLRC erroneously relied on an inexistent CA dismissal. "Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a decision, and therefore its decision is void, but the CA in its resolution of situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in September 27, 2012 has concluded that “[a] perusal of the Decision of the favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to NLRC shows that it is not without basis,” that the NLRC “made findings of dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or facts, analyzed the legal aspects of the case taking into consideration the relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office evidence presented and formed conclusions after noting the relevant facts of accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must the case.” But more importantly, the Court cannot lose sight of the settled concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the onus to prove that the employee was and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether not dismissed, or if dismissed, that his dismissal was not illegal, rests on the he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment."30 Here, employer, and that its failure to discharge this burden signifies that the petitioner tendered her resignation letter preparatory to her transfer to 11 Calexico for a higher position and pay. In the said letter, she expressed her union and the general membership; (2) the attempt to form another union; gratitude and appreciation for the two months of her employment with and (3) an appeal to the general membership urging them to commence Mexicali and intimated that she regrets having to leave the company. legal action without exhausting remedies under the RPNEU CBL. Clearly, expressions of gratitude and appreciation as well as manifestation The CA denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC ruling of regret in leaving the company negates the notion that she was forced and coerced to resign. In the same vein, an inducement for a higher position and ISSUES: salary cannot defeat the voluntariness of her actions. It should be • WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion emphasized that petitioner had an option to decline the offer for her transfer, • WON the expulsion of the petitioner was justified however, she opted to resign on account of a promotion and increased pay. "In termination cases, the employee is not afforded any option; the HELD: employee is dismissed and his only recourse is to institute a complaint for illegal dismissal against his employer x x x."31 Clearly, this does not hold We find no reversible error in the CA's affirmation of the NLRC's true for petitioner in the instant case. Further, as aptly observed by the CA, acceptance of the appeal despite its non-perfection as described by the petitioner is a managerial employee, who, by her educational background petitioner. Article 227 (formerly Art. 221) of the Labor Code (renumbered could not have been coerced, forced or induced into resigning from her by R. A. No. 10151, An Act Allowing the Employment of Night work. Workers), provides that "In any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or YUMANG v. RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC. G.R No. 201016 equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiter shall use every FACTS: and all means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of On May 1, 1998, the petitioner Leoncia A. Yumang started her employment due process. with the respondent Radio Philippines Network, Inc. She was a member of In the issue of the expulsion case, which is paramount in the mind of the the Radio Philippines Network Employees Union (RPNEU) which had a management, we asked ourselves whether the so-called General Assembly collective bargaining agreement with RPN 9 effective July 1, 2004 to June resolution that they tout as having reversed the expulsion case actually 30, 2009. occurred. When asked whether a General Assembly meeting was actually Allegedly, after the conclusion of the CBA, a new Toyota Revo driven by held to discuss the reversal of the expulsion case, no categorical answer was RPNEU President Reynato Siozon Jr., was found to be registered in the given by Ms. Ruth Yap, et al. In our search for truth, we called some name of the RPN 9 General Manager. The petitioner and 14 other union members who signed and asked them if indeed a General Assembly was members filed complaints with the DOLE-NCR against the RPNEU called and if any deliberation on the expulsion was discussed, the answer of officers and members of the Board of Directors for: impeachment, an audit the member-signatories that we called was negative. In fact they said that of union funds, and the conduct of a snap election. one of the 15 in the group of Ms.Yap approached them and appealed to On August 17, 2005, Mediator-Arbiter Clarissa G. Beltran-Lerios (Med- them to sign lest they be expelled from the union. Arbiter Lerios) ordered the conduct of a referendum to determine whether the incumbent RPNEU officers would be impeached. The union officers The constitution and bylaws of the union provide that charges for any and the BOD appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR Director violations thereof shall be filed before the said board. But as explained by Henry Parel granted the appeal and reversed Med-Arbiter Lerios' ruling. the lower court, if the complainants had done so the board of directors would in effect be acting as respondent investigator and judge at the same In the meantime or on June 1, 2005, two complaints were filed with the time. To follow the procedure indicated would be a farce under the RPNEU Executive Board against several union members. The complaints circumstances; where exhaustion of administrative remedies within the involved alleged violations of the RPNEU Constitution and Bylaws (CBL), union itself would practically amount to a denial of justice or would be 6 principally: (1) the commission of acts inimical to the interests of the illusory or vain, it will not be insisted upon. 12 HELD: No. In the present case, the only permissible consideration we can The records show that there was no categorical finding of the petitioner's take is to determine whether circumstances exist to excuse the petitioners’ guilt on this question. But we find the petitioner well within her rights as a delay in the filing of their motion for reconsideration. If there are none, as union member when she took the officers to task for then handling of the indeed we find because the petitioners utterly failed to show us one, then affairs of the union, especially with respect to matters relating to the union the delay is fatal. funds and the quality of the union leadership. The union President's We note that on Jan. 13, 2011, the petitioners filed an Opposition, dated integrity was itself put in serious doubt when he was seen using a vehicle January 5, 2011, to the motion filed by Beronia seeking reconsideration of registered in the name of the RPN9 General Manager after the conclusion the NLRC’s Dec. 7, 2010 decision. Significantly, this Jan. 5, 2011 of the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2009 CBA. opposition was signed personally by petitioners Ilagan and Ikeda, on behalf of themselves and of petitioner Barrio Fiesta, instead of by Atty. Chua for In sum, the court finds merit in the petition. The petitioner was illegally Ligon, et al. as the petitioners’ counsel. As a rule, when a party to a dismissed, as her expulsion from the union had no basis. proceeding is represented by counsel, it is the counsel who signs any pleading filed in the course of the proceeding. The party represented does BARRIO FIESTA RESTAURANT v. BERONIA, G.R No. 206690 not have to sign the pleadings, save only in the specific instances required FACTS: by the rules; they appear before the court and participate in the proceedings ON Aug. 17, 2009, respondent Helen C. Beronia filed a complaint for only when specifically required by the court or tribunal. In the petitioners’ illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioners Barrio Fiesta case, they were themselves aware that Beronia sought reconsideration of the Restaurant, Liberty Ilagan, Sunshine Ongpauco-Ikeda, and Marico NLRC decision as they had, in fact, personally opposed this motion instead Cristobal. The petitioners, through Atty. Richard Neil S. Chua of Ligon of through their counsel on record, Ligon, et al. Had they still been Solis Mejia Florendo law firm, denied the claims prayed for. In a decision represented by their counsel, through Atty. Chua as they claim, the latter dated May 31, 2010, the labor arbiter (LA) declared that Beronia had been would have signed and filed the opposition in their behalf. Viewed in this illegally dismissed. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) light, the petitioners must have known that Ligon, et al. no longer reversed the LA’s ruling in its Dec. 7, 2010 decision. Beronia moved for represented them in this case; this was true even at the NLRC level and reconsideration of the NLRC decision. On Jan. 13, 2011, the petitioners before the case reached the CA. (Brion, J.; SC 2nd Division, Barrio Fiesta filed their opposition to Beronia’s motion for reconsideration. The Restaurant, et. al. vs. Helen C. Beronia, G.R. No. 206690, July 11, 2016). opposition was signed and personally filed by Ilagan and Ikeda. In its July 21, 2012 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) reinstated the LA decision. GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES v. GUAGUA NATIONAL On Nov. 29, 2012, the petitioners, through Real Bartolo & Real law offices, COLLEGES FACULTY LABOR UNION, G.R No. 204693 filed with the CA an entry of appearance with manifestation and motion for reconsideration. In its April 5, 2013 resolution, the CA denied petitioners’ FACTS: motion for reconsideration for being 138 days late, pointing out that GNC is an educational institution located in Sta. Filomena, Guagua, petitioners’ counsel has long received a copy of its June 21, 2012 decision. Pampanga. On the other hand, respondents Guagua National Colleges Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners asked for a liberal application of Faculty Labor Union (GNCFLU) and Guagua National Colleges Non- the procedural rules, reasoning that they believed all the while that they Teaching and Maintenance Labor Union (GNCNTMLU) were the were being represented by their former counsel, Ligon, et. al., through Atty. bargaining agents for GNC's faculty members and non-teaching and Chua. They argued that the procedural lapse before the CA was clearly due maintenance personnel, respectively. to a miscommunication with the law firm for which they should not be Beginning 1994 until their present dispute, the parties concluded their made to suffer, in the interest of substantial justice. Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) without issue as follows: (1) CBA effective June 1, 1994 to May 31, 1999 (1994-1999 CBA), the ISSUE: Does this argument find merit? economic provisions of which were renegotiated on November 3, 1997 for years 1997-1999; (2) CBA effective June 1,1999 to May 31, 2004, the economic provisions of which were renegotiated on July 4, 2002 for years 13 2002-2004; and, (3) CBA effective June 1, 2004 to May 31, 2009. The aforementioned CBAs applied to both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU without HELD: distinction. Significantly, the 1994-1999 CBA has a "no-strike, no lock-out" GNC asserts that it is the voluntary arbitrator which has jurisdiction over clause under Section 17 thereof which likewise provides for mechanism for the grounds cited by respondents in their notice of strike in view of Section grievance resolution and voluntary arbitration. This provision was 17 of the parties' 1994-1999 CBA. The said provision contains the considered carried over in the subsequent CBAs. agreement of the parties on a "no strike, no lock-out" policy and on grievance resolution and voluntary arbitration which was carried over to Respondents alleged that after several mediation meetings, the parties their subsequent CBAs up to the existing one. According to GNC, finally agreed on the details regarding the grant of signing bonus. Hence, respondents should not have filed a notice of strike in view of such "no- they undertook to compose the final draft of the 2009-2014 CBA which it strike, no lock-out" clause and also since respondents' grounds for strike are submitted to the NCMB on May 14, 2010 and copy furnished GNC on May within the scope of "grievance" to be resolved in accordance with the said 21, 2010. Respondents likewise averred that the parties already agreed to Section 17. It argues that respondents, by the simple expedient of filing a schedule the signing of the said CBA on May 28, 2010. notice of strike, were able to circumvent the "no strike, no lock-out" clause and the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provision of their GNC, on the other hand, contended that during mediation meetings with the CBA. NCMB, respondents submitted several CBA drafts for its consideration. Upon its receipt on May 21, 2010 of another draft CBA23 from respondents Indeed, the parties through their CBA, agreed to a "no-strike, no lock-out" under cover letter dated May 20, 2010, it decided to secure the services of policy and to resolve their disputes through grievance machinery and Atty. Padilla to assist it in its negotiations with respondents. Hence, on May voluntary arbitration. Despite these, respondents were justified in filing a 28, 2010, Atty. Padilla appeared before the NCMB and asked for 10 days to notice of strike in light of the facts of this case. It is settled that a "no strike, submit GNC's comment/counter-proposal to the purported draft CBA of no lock-out" provision in the CBA "may [only] be invoked by [an] respondents. However, on June 1, 2010, respondents filed a notice of strike. employer when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other agreements from the employer that are not mandated GNC called attention to the fact that when it requested the Secretary of to be granted by law. It [is not applicable when the strike] is grounded on Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the dispute, it also unfair labor practice."48 Here, while respondents enumerated four grounds prayed that the same be ordered submitted to the grievance machinery and in their notice of strike, the facts of the case reveal that what primarily voluntary arbitration provided for under the parties' CBA. It stressed that its impelled them to file said notice was their perception of bad faith participation in the compulsory arbitration proceeding should therefore not bargaining and violation of the duty to bargain collectively by GNC - be construed as a waiver of its position that jurisdiction over the dispute charges which constitute unfair labor practice under Article 248(g) of the rests with the voluntary arbitrator in view of the parties' agreement in the Labor Code. CBA, the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code. The NLRC rendered a decision that GNC committed unfair labor practice The CA, on certiorari petition, found merit in the University's argument by violating the statutory duty to bargain collectively in good faith. that the Secretary of Labor abused his/her discretion in resolving the GNC’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. It sought economic issues on the ground that the same were proper subject of the recourse from the CA through a petition for certiorari. grievance machinery as embodied in the parties' CBA. Accordingly, the said The CA also denied the petition for lack of merit, the motion for court directed the parties to submit the economic issues to voluntary reconsideration was likewise denied. arbitration. ISSUE: This Court affirmed the CA's ruling based on the following ratiocinations: WHETHER THE CA COMMITTED GRIEVOUS AND IRREVERSIBLE We xxx find logic in the CA's directive for the herein parties to proceed ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED GNC's PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with voluntary arbitration as provided in their CBA. As we see it, the issue AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION as to the economic benefits, which included the issue on the formula in 14 computing the TIP share of the employees, is one that arises from the on absence without leave, presumably to evade liability for his recklessness. interpretation or implementation of the CBA. To be sure, the parties' CBA Since respondent was the one who refused to report for work, he should be provides for a grievance machinery to resolve any 'complaint or considered as having voluntarily severed his own employment. Thus, his dissatisfaction arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA money claims cannot prosper, as he was not terminated. and those arising from the interpretation of enforcement of company LA dismissed the charge of illegal dismissal. Petitioner appealed to NLRC. personnel policies.' Moreover, the same CBA provides that should the NLRC affirmed the finding of LA that there was no illegal dismissal. grievance machinery fail to resolve the grievance or dispute, the same shall Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied. be 'referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator for arbitration and final resolution.' CA affirmed NLRC decision. However, through no fault of the University these processes were not exhausted. It must be recalled that while undergoing preventive mediation ISSUE: WON respondent was illegally dismissed. proceedings before the NCMB, the Union declared a bargaining deadlock, filed a notice of strike and thereafter, went on strike. The University filed a HELD: Respondent had not been dismissed at all. Other that the latter’s Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer the Dispute to Voluntary unsubstantiated allegation of having been verbally terminated from his Arbitration but the motion was not acted upon by the NCMB. As borne by work, no substantial evidence was presented to show that he was indeed the records, the University has been consistent in its position that the Union dismissed or was prevented from returning to his work. In the absence of must exhaust the grievance machinery provisions of the CBA which ends in any showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitioner had voluntary arbitration. dismissed respondent, the latter’s claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained as such supposition would be self-serving, conjectural and of no HSY Marketing Ltd. Co. v. VILLASTIQUE, G.R No. 2119569 probative value. FACTS: Similarly, petitioner’s claims of respondent’s voluntary resignation and/or On January 3, 2003, petitioner hired respondent as a field driver for abandonment deserve scant consideration, considering petitioner’s failure to Fabulous Jeans & Shirt & General Merchandise, tasked to deliver ready-to- discharge the burden of proving the deliberate and unjustified refusal of wear items and/or general merchandise for a daily compensation of respondent to resume his employment without any intention of returning. It P370.00. On January 10, 2011, respondent figured in an accident when the was incumbent upon petitioner to ascertain respondent’s interest or non- service vehicle he was driving in Iligan City bumped a pedestrian, Ryan interest in the continuance of his employment, but to no avail. Dorataryo. Fabulous jeans shouldered the hospitalization and medical Hence, since there is no dismissal or abandonment to speak of, the expenses of Dorataryo which respondent was asked to reimburse, but to no appropriate course of action is to reinstate the employee. avail. PENINSULA EMPLOYEE UNION v. ESQUIVEL, G.R No. 218454 On February 24, 2011, respondent was allegedly required to sign a resignation letter, which he refused to do. A couple of years later. He tried FACTS: to collect his salary for that week but was told that it was withheld because On December 13, 2007, Peninsula Employees Union’ (PEU) Board of of his refusal to resign. Convinced that he was already terminated on Directors passed Local Board Resolution No. 12, series of 20078 February 26, 2011, he lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal authorizing, among others, the affiliation of PEU with NUWHRAIN, and with money claims against petitioner, Fabulous Jeans and its owner before the direct membership of its individual members thereto. On the same day, the NLRC. the said act was submitted to the general membership, and was duly ratified by 223 PEU members. Beginning January 1, 2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN In their defense, petitioner, et al. contended that respondent had committed sought to increase the union dues/agency fees from one percent (1%) to two several violations in the course of his employment, and had been found by percent (2%) of the rank and file employees’ monthly salaries, brought his superior and fellow employees to be a negligent and reckless driver, about by PEU’s affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires which resulted in the vehicular mishap involving Dorataryo. After they its affiliates to remit to it two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries. paid for Dorataryo's hospitalization and medical expenses, respondent went 15 The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased agency fees conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. In the present case, arguing that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no written CBA has PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency fees is not disputed. been formally signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and the Hotel; 2. Yes. Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and (o) of the Labor Code (b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant and unreasonable; and (c) PEU- mandates the submission of three (3) documentary requisites in order NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for such to justify a valid levy of increased union dues. These are: (a) an increase. authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the OSEC’s June 2, 2010 decision upheld PEU-NUWHRAIN's right to collect members at the general membership meeting duly called for the agency fees from the non-PEU members in accordance with Article 4, purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting, Section 2 of the expired CBA, which was declared to be in full force and which shall include the list of all members present, the votes cast, the effect pursuant to the October 10, 2008 Decision, but only at the rate of one purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such percent (1%), and denied its bid to increase the agency fees to two percent assessment or fees; and (c) individual written authorizations for (2%) for failure to show that its general membership approved the same check-off duly signed by the employees conceded. In the present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show compliance with PEU moved for reconsideration. On March 6, 2012, the OSEC issued an the foregoing requirements. It attempted to remedy the “inadvertent Order partially granting PEU-NUWHRAIN's motion for reconsideration, omission” of the matter of the approval of the deduction of two and declaring it entitled to collect two percent (2%) agency fees from the percent (2%) union dues from the monthly basic salary of each union non-PEU members beginning July 2010 since the GMR showing approval member. for the increase of the union dues from one percent (1%) to two percent PEOPLE’S SECURITY INC. v. FLORES, G.R No. 211312 (2%) was only procured at that time FACTS: Julius S. Flores and Esteban S. Tapiru (respondents) were security CA reinstated the June 2, 2010 OSEC’s decision. guards previously employed by People's Security, Inc. (PSI). The PEU-NUWHRAIN moved for reconsideration, which was denied. respondents were assigned at the various facilities of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) pursuant to a security services ISSUE: agreement between PSI and PLDT • WON PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect the increased agency On October 1, 2001, however, PSI's security services agreement with PLDT fees was terminated and, accordingly, PSI recalled its security guards assigned • WON PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory to PLDT including the respondents. requirements for such increase On October 8, 2001, the respondents, together with several other security HELD: guards employed by PSI, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the 1. Yes. The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against PLDT and PSI, negotiated the CBA with the employer is given the right to collect a claiming that they are PLDT employees. reasonable fee called “agency fee” from non-union members who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount Thereafter, PSI assigned the respondents to the facilities of its other clients equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in case such as the warehouse of a certain Marivic Yulo in Sta. Ana, Manila and they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the collection of Trinity College's Elementary Department in Quezon City. agency fees is recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code, as amended, the legal basis of the union’s right to On January 13, 2003, the respondents were relieved from their respective agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual, assignments pursuant to Special Order No. 200310108 dated January 10, deriving from the established principle that non-union employees 2003 issued by Col. Leonardo L. Aquino, the Operations Manager of PSI.9 may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment Accordingly, Flores and Tapiru, on September 6 and 27, 2005, respectively, filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City a 16 complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of service incentive ▪ Whether respondents were illegally dismissed? leave pay and cash bond, with prayer for separation pay, against PSI and ▪ Whether Racho is jointly and solidarily liable with PSI for the its President Nestor Racho (Racho) (collectively, the petitioners). payment of the monetary awards to the respondents? Respondents claimed that, after they were relieved from their assignment in HELD: the warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila on January 13, 2003, they repeatedly reported to PSI's office for possible assignment, but the latter refused to ▪ Yes give them any assignment. As rule, employment cannot be terminated by an employer without any just Petitioners, in their position paper, claimed that the respondents were or authorized cause. No less than the 1987 Constitution in Section 3, Article merely relieved from their assignment in the warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila 13 guarantees security of tenure for workers and because of this, an and that the same was on account of their performance evaluation, which employee may only be terminated for just or authorized causes that must indicated that they were ill-suited for the said assignment. comply with the due process requirements mandated by law. Hence, employers are barred from arbitrarily removing their workers whenever and On January 30, 2009, the LA rendered a Decision finding that the however they want. respondents were illegally dismissed from their employment and, thus, directing the petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay the former separation pay and back wages. Further, as aptly ruled by the CA, the petitioners miserably failed to prove that the respondents abandoned their work. Abandonment is a matter of On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision dated April 14, 2010, reversed the LA intention and cannot lightly be inferred or legally presumed from certain Decision dated January 30, 2009. On April 25, 2013, the CA rendered the equivocal acts. For abandonment to exist, two requisites must concur: first, herein assailed Decision, reversing the NLRC's Decision dated April 14, the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent 2010 and Resolution dated June 15, 2010. In finding that the respondents without valid or justifiable reason; and second, there must have been a clear were illegally dismissed, the CA found that the petitioners failed to intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee prove that the respondents had abandoned their work and that their relationship as manifested by some overt acts. The Court is not convinced defense of abandonment was negated by the filing of a case for illegal that the respondents failed to report for work or have been absent without dismissal. valid or justifiable cause. After the petitioners relieved them from their previous assignment in Sta. Ana, Manila, the respondents were no longer In this petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners claim that the CA given any assignment. committed reversible error in ruling that the respondents were illegally dismissed from their employment. They maintain that PSI never What is more, PSI did not afford the respondents due process. The validity terminated the respondents' employment. On the contrary, they claim of the dismissal of an employee hinges not only on the fact that the that the respondents freely and voluntarily resigned from their employment. dismissal was for a just or authorized cause, but also on the very manner of the dismissal itself. It is elementary that the termination of an employee Petitioners also claim that the CA erred when it ruled that they should be must be effected in accordance with law. It is required that the employer held jointly and solitarily liable to pay the respondents separation pay and furnish the employee with two written notices: (1) a written notice served back wages considering that there was absolutely no allegation or proof of on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and participation, bad faith, or malice on the part of Racho in dealing with the giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his respondents. side; and (2) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds ISSUES: have been established to justify his termination. 17 because of his failure to submit a medical clearance showing he was fit to • No resume to work. Furthermore, it is the companies precautionary measure to avoid any incident that would endanger the life of Ancheta. Anent, the propriety of holding Racho, PSI's President, jointly and The Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission ruled in solidarily liable with PSI for the payment of the money awards in favor of favor of Marina but reversed by The Court of Appeals stating that the the respondents, the Court finds for the petitioners. medical certificate given by Ancheta’s examining physician attached to his SSS Sickness Notification was enough proof that he is fit to work. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or ISSUE: defend crime. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of The issue in this case is whether Ancheta was illegally dismissed by law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be Marina. made personally liable for corporate liabilities. HELD: The respondents failed to adduce any evidence to prove that Racho, as Yes, In its petition, Marina argues that the company's action of requiring President and General Manager of PSI, is hiding behind the veil of Ancheta to undergo a medica1 examination and to submit a medical corporate fiction to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, certificate was a valid exercise of management prerogative. Marina's or defend crime. Thus, it is only PSI who is responsible for the respondents' contention is not correct. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides: "In cases illegal dismissal of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this title. x x x." MARINA’S CREATION ENTERPRISES v. ANCHETA, G.R No. 218333 Since Ancheta was a regular employee of Marina, Ancheta's employment can only be terminated by Marina based on just or authorized causes FACTS: provided in the Labor Code. In its position paper, Marina admitted that the Petitioner Marina Creation Enterprises (Marina) is engaged in the business company had refused to give Ancheta work assignments until Ancheta of making shoes and bags. In 2010, Marina hired respondent Romeo V. submitted a new medical certificate. It is Marina's position that Ancheta's Ancheta (Ancheta) as a sole attacher in Marina. In 2011, Ancheta suffered a employment would not continue if Ancheta would not submit a new stroke and was placed under home care. Thereafter, Ancheta suffered medical certificate. Marina's action in refusing to accept Ancheta another stroke and was confined at St. Victoria Hospital in Marikina City notwithstanding the medical certificate attached to Ancheta's SSS Sickness for 4 days. Notification stating that Ancheta was physically fit to resume his work in Ancheta filed for a Sickness Notification with the Social Security System Marina on 12 August 2011 amounts to an illegal dismissal of Ancheta. (SSS) and was paid sickness benefits. The physician who examined Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code Ancheta told that he would be fit to resume work after ninety (90) days. provides: When Ancheta reported for work. He was required by Marina to submit a new medical certificate before he could resume his work in Marina. Section 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. - Where the employee suffers However, Ancheta did not comply and therefore was not able to resume from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or work. He filed a complaint with the LA against Marina for illegal dismissal prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer and non-payment of separation pay. shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a Ancheta alleged that he recovered from his illness and went to work but competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or Marina advised him to just wait for the companies call. He was also told at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months that he should take more rest and that Marina employed 2 new workers as even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be his replacement. He alleged that there was no notice for his termination. cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but On the other hand, Marina claimed that Ancheta was employed on a piece shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate the rate bases and was not terminated but instead was not allowed to work 18 employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his WUP, on the other hand, asseverated that the dismissal or removal of normal health. (Emphasis supplied) Maglaya, being a corporate officer and not a regular employee, is a The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code impose upon the employer the corporate act or intra-corporate controversy under the jurisdiction of the duty not to terminate an employee until there is a certification by a RTC. WUP also maintained that since Maglaya's appointment was not competent public health authority that the employee's disease is of such renewed, he ceased to be a member of the corporation and of the Board; nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six thus, his term for presidency has also been terminated. months even with proper medical treatment. In this case, Marina terminated The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of WUP and held that the action between Ancheta from employment without seeking a prior certification from a employers and employees where the employer-employee relationship is competent public health authority that Ancheta's disease is of such nature or merely incidental is within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even regular courts. This instant case involves intra-corporate dispute, which was with proper medical treatment. Hence, Ancheta was illegally dismissed by definitely beyond the jurisdiction of the labor tribunal. Marina. Ruling in favor of Maglaya, the NLRC explicated that although the position of the President of the University is a corporate office, the manner of WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES v. MAGLAYA Sr. G.R No. Maglaya's appointment, and his duties, salaries, and allowances point to his 212774 being an employee and subordinate. In a Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by WUP. FACTS: Hence, this petition. Wesleyan University-Philippines (WUP) is a non-stock, non-profit, non- sectarian educational corporation duly organized and existing under the ISSUE: Whether or not Maglaya is a corporate officer or a mere employee. Philippine laws. Respondent Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya, Sr. (Maglaya) was appointed as a HELD: This Court expounded that an "office" is created by the charter of corporate member and was elected as a member of the Board of Trustees the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders, (Board), both for a period of five years. Then he was elected as President of while an "employee" usually occupies no office and generally is employed the University for a five-year term and was re-elected as a trustee. not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of In a Memorandum created by the incumbent Bishops of the United the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such Methodist Church (Bishops) apprised all the corporate members of the employee. expiration of their terms, unless renewed by the former. The said members, It is under the By-laws of WUP that the president was one of the officers of including Maglaya, sought the renewal of their membership in the WUP's the corporation, and was an honorary member of the Board. He was Board, and signified their willingness to serve the corporation. appointed by the Board and not by a managing officer of the corporation. Maglaya learned that the Bishops created an Ad Hoc Committee to plan the The Court held that one who is included in the by-laws of a corporation in efficient and orderly turnover of the administration of the WUP in view of its roster of corporate officers is an officer of said corporation and not a the alleged "gentleman's agreement” and that the Bishops have appointed mere employee. the incoming corporate members and trustees. He clarified that there was no A corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra- agreement and any discussion of the turnover because the corporate corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a members still have valid and existing corporate terms. corporation, and the nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom with Complaint was filed as the termination of their membership in the which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action. The issue of corporation necessarily resulted in the conclusion of their positions as the alleged termination involving a corporate officer, not a mere employee, members of the Board pursuant to the WUP by-laws. is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of Thereafter, Maglaya filed the present illegal dismissal case against the corporate affairs and management and is a corporate controversy in WUP, claiming that he was unceremoniously dismissed in a wanton, contemplation of the Corporation Code. reckless, oppressive and malevolent manner. He also alleged that he In sum, this Court finds that the NLRC erred in assuming jurisdiction over, faithfully discharged his necessary and desirable functions as President. and thereafter in failing to dismiss, Maglaya's complaint for illegal 19 dismissal against WUP, since the subject matter of the instant case is an part of Pajaron and Carbonilla. "In termination cases, the burden of proof intra-corporate controversy which the NLRC has no jurisdiction. rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause."37 For lack of any clear, valid, and just cause in terminating Pajaron and TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY v. FELICIANO PAJARON, G.R. No. Carbonilla's employment, petitioners are indubitably guilty of illegal 207156 dismissal. FACTS: Gem Zeñarosa, owner of Turks Shawarma Company, hired Feliciano Z. PNCC Skyway Corporation v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND Pajaron in May 2007 as service crew and Larry A. Carbonilla in April 2007 EMPLOYMENT, G.R No. 196110 as head crew. On April 15, 2010, Pajaron and Carbonilla filed their FACTS: respective Complaints for constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non- The Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) was awarded by payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) with the franchise of constructing, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against petitioners. operating and maintaining the north and south expressways, including the Pajaron alleged that on April 9, 2010, Zeñarosa asked him to sign a piece of South Metro Manila Skyway (referred as Skyway herein). It created the paper stating that he was receiving the correct amount of wages and that he petitioner PNCC Skyway Corporation (PSC) on December 15, 1998, for the had no claims whatsoever from petitioners. Disagreeing to the truthfulness purpose of taking charge of its traffic safety, maintaining its facilities and of the statements, Pajaron refused to sign the paper prompting Zeñarosa to collecting toll. fire him from work. Carbonilla, on the other hand, alleged that sometime in Eight years have passed, the Citra Metro Manila Tollway Corporation June 2008, he had an altercation with his supervisor Conchita Marcillana (Citra), a private investor under a build-and-transfer scheme, entered into an while at work. When the incident was brought to the attention of Zeñarosa, agreement with the TRB and the PNCC to transfer the operation of the he was immediately dismissed from service. He was also asked by Zeñarosa Skyway from petitioner PSC to the Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO). to sign a piece of paper acknowledging his debt amounting to ₱7,000.00. The said transfer provided for a five-month transition period from July 2007 Both Pajaron and Carbonilla claimed that there was no just or authorized until the full turn-over of the Skyway at 10:00 p.m. of December 31, 2007 cause for their dismissal and that petitioners also failed to comply with the upon which petitioner PSC will close its operation. requirements of due process. Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron However, on December 28, 2007 or three (3) days before the full transfer of and Carbonilla; they averred that they actually abandoned their work. the operation of the Skyway to SOMCO, petitioner PSC served termination The Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and held letters to its employees, many of whom were members of private them constructively and illegally dismissed by petitioners. The National respondent PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals both denied the Motion Worker's Organization (Union). for Reconsideration of the petitioners. According to the letter, PSC has no choice but to close its operations ISSUE: Whether the Labor Arbiter's Decision declaring Pajaron and resulting in the termination of its employees effective January 31, 2008. Carbonilla illegally terminated from employment was not based on However, the employees are entitled to receive separation pay amounting to substantial evidence. 250% of the basic monthly pay for every year of service, among others HELD: The Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter's Decision declaring Pajaron things. Petitioner PSC, likewise, served a notice of termination to the and Carbonilla illegally dismissed was supported by substantial evidence. Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). While petitioners vehemently argue that Pajaron and Carbonilla abandoned On that same day of December 28, 2007, private respondent Union, their work, the records are devoid of evidence to show that there was intent immediately upon receipt of the termination letters, filed a Notice of Strike on their part to forego their employment. In fact, petitioners adamantly before the DOLE alleging that the closure of the operation of PSC is admitted that they refused to rehire Pajaron and Carbonilla despite tantamount to union-busting because it is a means of terminating employees persistent requests to admit them to work. Hence, petitioners essentially who are members thereof. In addition, the notices of termination were admitted the fact of dismissal. However, except for their empty and general served on its employees three (3) days before petitioner PSC ceases its allegations that the dismissal was for just causes, petitioners did not proffer operations, hence violating the employees' right to due process. any evidence to support their claim of misconduct or misbehavior on the 20 As a matter of fact, the employees were no longer allowed to work as of one month before the intended date thereof; (b) the cessation of business January 1, 2008. Private respondent Union, thus, prayed that petitioner PSC must be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of be held guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal. It, likewise, termination pay amounting to one month pay or at least one-half month pay prayed for the reinstatement of all dismissed employees, along with the for every year of service, whichever is higher. award of backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. PSC denied that the closure of its operation was intended to remove The required written notice under Article 283 of the Labor Code is to employees who are members of private respondent Union. Instead, it inform the employees of the specific date of termination or closure of claimed that it was done in good faith and in the exercise of management business operations and must be served upon them at least one (1) month prerogative, considering that it was anchored on an agreement between the before the date of effectivity to give them sufficient time to make the TRB, the PNCC and the private investor Citra. necessary arrangements. The purpose of this requirement is to give PSC likewise denied that it had violated the right to due process of its employees time to prepare for the eventual loss of their jobs, as well as to employees, considering that the notices of termination were served on give DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the veracity of the alleged cause of December 28, 2007 while the termination was effective only on January 31, termination. 2008. PSC alleged that the Union was guilty of an illegal strike when it started a strike on the same day it filed a notice of strike on December 28, Thus, considering that the notices of termination were given merely three 2007. (3) days before the cessation of the PSC's operation, it defeats the very Public Respondent Secretary of Labor found that there was authorized purpose of the required notice and the mandate of Article 283 of the Labor cause for the closure of the operation however it failed to comply with the Code. Neither the payment of employees' salaries for the said one-month procedural requirements set forth under Article 283 of the Labor Code. period nor the employees' alleged actual knowledge of the ASTOA is On appeal, PSC filed a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of sufficient to replace the formal and written notice required by the law. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Secretary of Labor when it additionally directed payment of an additional Moreover, as early as July 2007, PSC already had knowledge of the ₱30,000.00 to PSC's former employees pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor eventual take-over by SOMCO of the Skyway by December 31, 2007. Code. Thus, considering that PSC had ample time of more than five (5) months to serve the notice of termination to its employees, its failure to comply with ISSUE: the notice requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code is inexcusable. Whether or not PSC failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Article 283 of the Labor Code PJ LHUILLIER, INC v. CAMACHO, G.R No. 223073 HELD: FACTS: On 2011, petitioner P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. (PJLI), the owner and operator of the YES. The SC agreed with the appellate court's stance that public respondent "Cebuana Lhuillier" chain of pawnshops, hired petitioner Feliciano Secretary of Labor committed no grave abuse of discretion in its resolution Vizcarra as PLJI's Regional Manager for Northern and Central Luzon that while there was an authorized cause for the closure of PSC's operations pawnshop operations and respondent Camacho as Area Operations and the subsequent termination of its employees, it however failed to Manager (AOM) for Area 213, covering the province of Pangasinan. comply with the procedural requirements set forth under Article 283 of the Camacho was assigned to administer and oversee the operations of PJLI's Labor Code, that is, by serving notices of termination upon the employees pawnshop branches in the area. and the DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. On May 15, 2012, Vizcarra received several text messages from some personnel assigned in Area 213, reporting that Camacho brought along an Article 283 of the Labor Code provides the three requirements are unauthorized person, a non-employee, during the QTP operation (pull-out necessary for a valid cessation of business operations which are as follows: of "rematado" pawned items) from the different branches of Cebuana (a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least Lhuillier Pawnshop in Pangasinan. 21 During the formal investigation on June 1, 2012, Camacho admitted that he ground for termination, the employer must establish that: (1) the employee brought along a non-employee, Marasigan, during the QTP operations on holds a position of trust and confidence; and (2) the act complained against May 15, 2012. He explained that on May 12, 2012, he went home to Manila justifies the loss of trust and confidence. to celebrate Mother's Day with his family on May 13, 2012. He drove The first requisite mandates that the erring employee must be holding a himself using the service vehicle assigned to him and arrived in Manila at position of trust and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence is not a one- around 11:00 o'clock in the evening. size- fits-all cause that can be applied to all employees without distinction on their standing in the work organization. Distinction yet should be made Camacho admitted that he knew that it was prohibited to bring unauthorized as to what kind of position of trust is the employee occupying. personnel, especially a non-employee, during the QTP operations because The law contemplates two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first class this was discussed in the seminars facilitated by the company's Security consists of managerial employees. They are as those who are vested with Service Division. He only realized his mistake at the end of their 13-branch the power or prerogative to lay down management policies and to hire, stop when he noticed that his companions were unusually quiet throughout transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or the trip. It was also discovered that Camacho committed another violation effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class consists of company policy when he allowed an unauthorized person to drive a of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc. who, in the normal and company vehicle. routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of On June 14, 2012, the Formal Investigation Committee issued the Report of money or property. Formal Investigation. The committee concluded that Camacho was guilty as Clearly from the foregoing, it can be deduced that Camacho held a charged. This prompted Camacho to file a complaint before the Labor managerial position and, therefore, enjoyed the full trust and confidence of Arbiter (LA) against the petitioners for illegal dismissal, money claims, his superiors. As a managerial employee, he was "bound by more exacting damages, and attorney's fees. work ethics" and should live up to this high standard of responsibility." The NLRC reversed and set aside the May 14, 2013 Decision of the LA. It The second requisite for loss of confidence as a valid ground for declared the dismissal of Camacho as illegal. It opined that there was no termination is that it must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded indication that Camacho, in allowing his mother's driver to be present on clearly established facts. during the conduct of the QTP operation, was motivated by malicious intent As can be culled from the records of the case, Camacho admitted that he so as to construe the infraction as serious misconduct punishable by had committed a breach of trust when he brought along his mother's driver, dismissal. an unauthorized person, during the QTP operation, a very sensitive and The CA reversed the NLRC resolutions. It held that contrary to the findings confidential operation. As explained by PJLI in its petition for review: of the LA and the NLRC, the misconduct of Camacho was not of a serious Camacho, as AOM, was a managerial employee. As such, he could be nature as to warrant a dismissal from work. At most, said the CA, he was terminated on the ground of loss of confidence by mere existence of a basis negligent and remiss in the exercise of his duty as an AOM. for believing that he had breached the trust of his employer. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. It would already be sufficient that there is ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Camacho was illegally dismissed some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the concerned employee is responsible for the purported misconduct and the nature of his participation therein. This HELD: distinguishes a managerial employee from a fiduciary rank-and-file where The Court finds merit in the petition. loss of trust and confidence, as ground for valid dismissal, requires proof of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes the employer to dismiss an involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated employee for committing fraud or for willful breach of trust reposed by the assertion and accusation by the employer will not be sufficient. employer on the employee. Loss of confidence, however, is never intended In this case, there was such basis. It was established that Camacho had to provide the employer with a blank check for terminating its employee breached PJLI's trust when he took an unauthorized person with him to the a. "Loss of trust and confidence" should not be loosely applied in justifying QTP operation which was already a violation of company existing policy the termination of an employee." For loss of trust and confidence to be valid and security protocol. His explanation that his alleged misdeed was brought 22 about by his poor physical and health condition on that day could not On her defense, she alleged that she started her lending business 15 years prevail over two significant details that PJLI pointed out in its petition. ago prior to the takeover of the new management of MJCI and she sold her Although it may be true that PJLI did not sustain damage or loss on account fishing vessels 2 years ago to finance her lending business. of Camacho's action, this is not reason enough to absolve him from the She was eventually terminated by MJCI. Consequently, she filed a consequence of his misdeed. The fact that an employer did not suffer complaint for illegal dismissal. pecuniary damage will not obliterate the respondent's betrayal of trust and Note that Sta. Ana was dismissed for willful breach of trust and confidence. confidence reposed on him by his employer. The LA dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the National The NLRC affirmed the LA Decision. It ruled that MJCI validly dismissed Labor Relations Commission is REINSTATED. Sta. Ana for loss of trust and confidence. The CA also affirmed the NLRC Resolutions. STA. ANA v. MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC. G.R No. 208459 ISSUE: Whether Sta. Ana was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. FACTS: HELD: The Supreme Court enumerated the elements to legally dismiss an Julieta Sta. Ana was hired by MJCI as outlet teller of its off-track betting employee on the ground of loss and trust, to wit: (OTB) station in Tayuman, Manila. As teller, Sta. Ana performed the “The employer must establish that: following duties and functions: a) the employee occupied a position of trust and confidence, or has been 1. Waits on [OTB] tellers' booth for customers/clients; sells betting tickets. routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or 2. Answers bettor's inquiries, provides information on racing events, assists property; patrons with information, and takes bet orders. b) the employee committed a willful breach of trust based on clearly 3. Processes cash payments through terminal registers; balances registers established facts; and and makes daily ticket sales reports after the races. c) such loss of trust relates to the employee’s performance of duties.” 4. Handles cash and transactions with due diligence and honesty to the In the case at bar, only the first element was proven by MCJI. The SC ruled bettors and to the company as well. that nowhere in the evidence presented by MJCI that Sta. Ana utilized the 5. Coordinates with the Betting Operations Department (BOD) on matters funds of the corporation for her lending business. Also, Sta. Ana was able to beyond the standard operating procedure of the BOD. present documents to show her capability to engage in loan operations. 6. Strictly observes and implements' company policies and procedures to Quoting the words of the SC: protect the interests of the company against unscrupulous bettors and “Particularly, it [MJCI] failed to establish that Sta. Ana used its employee operators for her personal business during office hours, and used its money, without 7. Reports incidents to the company on matters pertaining to the operations. authority, to lend money to another” 8, Submits or remits the cash sales for the day to the official collection team MJCI failed to prove that Sta. Ana committed willful breach of its and/or to the assigned banks with night depository box.1âwphi1 trust. Particularly, it failed to establish that Sta. Ana used its employee for 9. May be assigned to different OTBs as necessary to the company's her personal business during office hours, and used its money; without operations. authority, to lend money to another. Hence, to dismiss her on the ground of 10. Performs miscellaneous job-related duties as assigned.8 loss of trust and confidence is unwarranted. It was found out by MJCI that its treasury department has been illegally Under these circumstances. Sta. Ana is also entitled to receive backwages appropriating funds and lending it out to the employees of the latter and separation pay. corporation. The Special Disciplinary Committee of MJCI found Sta. Ana conducting her lending business during office hours and using the funds and DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOLS, INC. v. BIGKIS personnel of MJCI; thus, she was found guilty of dishonesty and other MANGGAGAWA SA DE OCAMPO, INC, G.R No. 192648 fraudulent acts by the said committee. FACTS: 23 De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. a domestic corporation has two main Company with unfair labor practice "for transferring several employees of divisions; De Ocampo Memorial Medical Center (DOMMC), its hospital its Provisioning Support Division to Bicutan, Taguig." The notice of strike entity, and the De Ocampo Memorial Colleges (DOMC), its school entity. contains the following unfair labor practices: 1. PLDT's abolition of the Provisioning Support Division A Union Registration was issued in favor of Bigkis Manggagawa sa De 2. PLDT's unreasonable refusal to honor its commitment before Ocampo Memorial Medical Center - LAKAS (BMDOMMC) while Bigkis this Honorable Office that it will provide MKP its Manggagawa sa De Ocampo Memorial School, Inc. (BMDOMSI) was later comprehensive plan/s with respect to personnel downsizing/ declared a legitimate labor organization. Due to this, De Ocampo Memorial reorganization and closure of exchanges. Schools, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Ce1iificate of Registration 3. PLDT's continued hiring of "contractual," "temporary," to cancel the Certificate of Registration of BMDOMSI on the following "project," and "casual" employees for regular jobs performed grounds: 1) misrepresentation, false statement and fraud in connection with by union members, resulting in the decimation of the union its creation and registration as a labor union as it shared the same set of membership and in the denial of the right to self-organization officers and members with BMDOMMC; 2) mixed membership of rank- to the concerned employees and-file and managerial/supervisory employees; and 3) inappropriate Another notice of strike was filed by MKP. The labor organization accused bargaining unit. PLDT of unfair labor practice where PLDT's alleged restructuring of its [Greater Metropolitan Manila] Operation Services December 31, 2002 and DOLE-NCR ruled that BMDOMSI committed misrepresentation by making its closure of traffic operations at the Batangas, Calamba, Davao, Iloilo, it appear that the bargaining unit is composed of faculty and technical Lucena, Malolos and Tarlac Regional Operator Services effective December employees. In fact, all the union officers and most of the members are from 31, 2002. These twin moves unjustly imperil the job security of 503 of the General Services Division. Furthermore, the members of the union do MKP's members and will substantially decimate the parties' bargaining unit. not share commonality of interest, as it is composed of academic and non- Secretary of Labor and Employment certified the labor dispute at the PLDT academic personnel. However, reversed the Regional Director's finding. to the NLRC compulsory Arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of Labor The CA affirmed the decision of the Regional Director but also ruled that Code. All striking workers are hereby directed to return to work within there was no commonality of interest present. twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order, except those who were ISSUE: Whether or not the union committed fraud and misrepresentation terminated due to redundancy. The employer is hereby enjoined to accept by having same set of officers with BMDOMMC the striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to HELD: No. For fraud and misrepresentation to constitute grounds for the strike. The parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code Art. 247, the nature committing any act that might worsen the situation. of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to CA nullified and set aside the order of Secretary of Labor and Employment. vitiate the consent of a majority of union members. Moreover, there is PLDT appealed CA’s decision to the SC. SC upheld the CA’s decision and nothing in the form "Report of Creation of Local Chapter" that requires the ordered to readmit all the workers under the same terms and conditions applicant to disclose the existence of another union, much less the names of prevailing before the strike. the officers of such other union. Although commonality of interest is absent, However, NLRC dismissed MKP’s charges of unfair labor practices against it is not a ground for cancellation of union registration. PLDT. MKP filed a petition for certiorari with CA. CA upheld the validity of PLDT’s redundancy program. 27. MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS V. PLDT Consequently, Sec of Labor and Employment dismissed MKP’s motion for G.R. NO. 190389 April 19, 2017 execution of the SC’s decision of readmitting all the workers. MKP filed a FACTS: petition for certiorari before CA. CA found that NLRC did not commit Labor organization Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP), grave abuse of discretiona and that PLDT’s redundancy program was not which represented the employees of Philippine Long Distance Telephone unattended by unfair labor practice. Company, filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and ISSUES: Mediation Board. MKP charged Philippine Long Distance Telephone 24 1. WHETHER THE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF when he /she reaches the age of 60 years or when he/she completes 30 years DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF PLDT’S of service, whichever comes first”. 2002 REDUNDANCY PROGRAM Catotocan and other co-employees assailed the said order. They believed 2. WHETHER THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF THE that they do not deserve to be retired and be rehired when they are, in fact, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT WAS very much capable of doing their duties and responsibilities. RENDERED MOOT WHEN THE NLRC UPHELD THE LSQC retired Catotocan sometime in June 2006 after completing 35 years VALIDITY OF THE REDUNDANCY PROGRAM of service. Full retirement benefits were given to her computed based on the RULING: latest salary multiplied by the total years of service. Under the school's 1. NO. The Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it retirement policy, 60% of her retirement benefit was paid in lump sum by regarded the technological advancements resulting in less work for the trustee bank, and the balance was to be paid in equal monthly pensions the redundated employees as justifying PLDT’s declaration of over the next 3 years. redundancy. 60% or Php571,701.00 was credited to her savings account, which she PLDT’s declaration of redundancy was backed by substantial evidence opened in accordance with the school's retirement policy. showing a consistent decline for operator-assisted calls for both local and Catotocan was told that if she desires, she may signify in writing her intent international calls because of cheaper alternatives like direct dialing to continue serving the school on a contractual basis. She responded by services, and the growth of wireless communication. Thus, the National submitting a "Letter of Intent" on February 14, 2006. Labor Relations Commission did not commit grave abuse of discretion LSQC rehired Catotocan twice as a Grade School Guidance Counselor. On when it upheld the validity of PLDT's redundancy program. Redundancy is the 3rd re-application, LSQC no longer considered her application for the ultimately a management prerogative, and the wisdom or soundness of such position. business judgment is not subject to discretionary review by labor tribunals Catotocan filed a complaint to the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, which or even this Court, as long as the law was followed and malicious or the latter dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter pointed out that, arbitrary action was not shown. although there were exchanges of communications between her and 2. YES. Return-to-work order aims to preserve the status quo ante respondents regarding her earlier opposition to the school's retirement while the validity of redundancy program is being threshed out in policy, her subsequent actions, however, such as opening her own the proper forum. When the petitioner filed its Motion for individual savings account where the retirement benefits were deposited Execution pursuant to the Court’s ruling in PLDT, there was no and credited thereto, her subsequent withdrawals therefrom, her application longer any existing basis for the return-to-work order. This was for contractual employment after her retirement, constituted implied because the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s return-to-work consent to the assailed addendum in LSQC's retirement policy and, in order had been superseded by the NLRC’s Resolution. Hence, the effect, abandoned her objection thereto. Secretary did not err in dismissing the motion for execution on the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. The NLRC held that ground of mootness. Catotocan performed all the acts that a retired employee would do after 28. EDITHA M. CATOTOCAN v. LOURDES SCHOOL OF QUEZON retirement under the new school policy. These were voluntary acts and she CITY, INC./LOURDES SCHOOL, INC. AND REV. FR. CESAR F. cannot be considered to have been forced to retire or to have been illegally ACUIN, OFM CAP, RECTOR dismissed. FACTS: The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Editha Catotocan was a music teacher with a monthly salary Php30,081.00 ISSUE: of Lourdes School of Quezon City (LSQC). By the school year 2005-2006, Whether or no Catotocan was illegally dismissed by LSQC. she had already served for 35 years. RULING: LSQC has an existing retirement plan providing for retirement at 60 years No, she was not for there was no illegal dismissal. old, or separation pay depending on the number of years Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary On November 25, 2003, LSQC issued another retirement plan providing agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after that “an employee may apply for retirement or be retired by the school reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the 25 former. Article 287 of the Labor Code is the primary provision: In the Although there was an exchange of communications about the retirees' absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement objection to the new retirement policy years earlier, eventually, appellant benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching assented thereto when she opened a savings account with BDO, withdrew the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years the money for her personal use and applied again for a teaching job with the which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at school. least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled While it is true that the acceptance of retirement pay and her eventual to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every appointment as Guidance Counselor did not amount to a waiver to contest year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one her alleged forced retirement or illegal dismissal, the voluntary nature of whole year. her acts from June 2006 up to June 2009 clearly belies her claim of illegal Jurisprudence is replete with cases discussing the employer's prerogative to dismissal. lower the compulsory retirement age subject to the consent of its Obviously, appellant filed this complaint claiming illegal dismissal after she employees. had benefited from the proceeds of her retirement in June 2006, and Thus LSQC's retirement plan, allowing employers to retire employees who received salaries as Guidance Counselor of the appellee school for the have not yet reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years are not per subsequent three (3) years which ended in 2009. By her actuations, she is se repugnant to the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure. The Labor already estopped from questioning the legality of the new retirement policy. Code permits employers and employees to fix the applicable retirement age Moreover, in the Letter dated August 6, 2006 addressed to Fr. Acuin, at 60 years or below, provided that the employees' retirement benefits under Catotocan, along with other co-employees, referred to themselves as any CBA and other agreements shall not be less than those provided therein. "retirees" and even signed as "the retired employees." The context of the Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be letter does not, in any way, show any animosity with LSQC which would explicit, voluntary, free, and uncompelled. While an employer may otherwise indicate that they still harbor ill feelings towards LSQC due to unilaterally retire an employee earlier than the legally permissible ages their alleged illegal dismissal. Thus, We hold that Catotocan's filing of the under the Labor Code, this prerogative must be exercised pursuant to a illegal dismissal case was just an afterthought subsequent to LSQC's denial mutually instituted early retirement plan. Due process only requires that of her fourth re-application for the Guidance Counselor position. notice of the employer's decision to retire an employee be given to the It must be stressed also that Catotocan's repeated application and availment employee. of the re-hiring program of LSQC for qualified retirees for 3 consecutive Here, the CA and the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion. It must be years is a supervening event that would reveal that she has already stressed that Catotocan's subsequent actions after her "retirement" are voluntarily and freely signified her consent to the retirement policy despite actually tantamount to her consent to the addendum to the LSQC's her initial opposition to it. In this case, not only did Catotocan received all retirement policy of retiring her from service upon serving the school for of her retirement benefits but she also applied and availed the LSQC's re- at least thirty (30) continuous years, to wit: (1) after being notified that she hiring policy of retirees. was being retired from service by LSQC, she opened a savings account with BDO, the trustee bank; (2) she accepted all the proceeds of her retirement 29. UST vs. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG UST package: the lump sum and all the monthly payments credited to her GR No. 184262, April 24, 2017 account until June 2009; (3) upon acceptance of the retirement benefits, Facts: there was no notation that she is accepting the retirement benefits under A complaint for regularization and illegal dismissal was filed by protest or without prejudice to the filing of an illegal dismissal case. We respondents Samahang Manggagawa ng UST and Pontesor, et also did not find an iota of evidence showing that LSQC exerted undue al. (respondents) against petitioner before the NLRC. Respondents alleged influence against Catotocan to acquire her consent on the school's that on various periods spanning the years 1990-1999, petitioner repeatedly retirement policy. Suffice it to say that from the foregoing, Catotocan hired Pontesor, et al. to perform various maintenance duties within its performed all the acts to ratify her retirement in accordance with LSQC's campus. Respondents insisted that in view of Pontesor, et al.' s performance retirement policy. of such maintenance tasks throughout the years, they should be deemed regular employees of petitioner. Respondents further argued that for as long 26 as petitioner continues to operate and exist as an educational institution, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity with rooms, buildings, and facilities to maintain, the latter could not and while such activity exists dispense with Pontesor, et al. 's services which are necessary and desirable In the case at bar, a review of Pontesor, et al. 's respective CEAs reveal that to the business of petitioner. petitioner repeatedly rehired them for various positions in the nature of On the other hand, while petitioner admitted that it repeatedly hired maintenance workers for various periods spanning the years 1990-1999. Pontesor, et al. in different capacities throughout the aforesaid years, it Although nature of work are not necessary and desirable to petitioner's nevertheless maintained that they were merely hired on a per-project basis, usual business as an educational institution; nonetheless, it is clear that their as evidenced by numerous Contractual Employee Appointments respective cumulative periods of employment as per their respective CEAs (CEAs) signed by them. In this regard, petitioner pointed out that each of each exceed one (1) year. Thus, Pontesor, et al. fall under the second the CEAs that Pontesor, et al. signed defined the nature and term of the category of regular employees under Article 295 of the Labor Code. project to which they are assigned, and that each contract was renewable in Accordingly, they should be deemed as regular employees but only with the event the project remained unfinished upon the expiration of the respect to the activities for which they were hired and for as long as such specified term. In accordance with the express provisions of said CEAs, activities exist. Pontesor, et al. 's project employment were automatically terminated: (a) upon the expiration of the specific term specified in the CEA; (b) when the 3 0 . Z A M B R A N O , E T. A L V. P H I L I P P I N E M A R K E T project is completed ahead of such expiration; or (c) in cases when their MANUFACTURING CORPORATION employment was extended due to the non-completion of the specific project G.R. NO. 224099, June 21, 2017 for which they were hired, upon the completion of the said project. As such, FACTS: the termination of Pontesor, et al. 's employment with petitioner was validly Petitioners were terminated on the ground of cessation of operation due to made due to the completion of the specific projects for which they were serious business losses. They allege that their dismissal was without just hired. cause and in violation of due process because the closure of Phil Carpet was Issue: WON Respondent Pontesor is a regular employee thus rendering the a mere pretense to transfer its operations to Pacific Carpet. They claimed dismissal invalid that the job orders of some regular clients of Phil Carpet was transferred to Held: Pacific Carpet and that several machines were moved from Phil Carpet to YES. Pontesor should be considered regularized casual employees who Pacific Carpet. Petitioners also alleged that their dismissal was constituted enjoy security of tenure. The law provides for two (2) types of regular with unfair labor practice as it involved mass dismissal of its union officers employees, namely: (a) those who are engaged to perform activities which and members. are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the Respondent countered that it permanently closed and totally ceased its employer ; and (b) those who have rendered at least one year of service, operations because there had been a steady decline in the demand for its whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are products due to global recession, stiffer competition and the effects of a employed. The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular changing market. Respondent also faithfully complied with the requisites employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity for closure and cessation of business under the Labor Code. performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the LA dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in NLRC affirmed LA’s ruling. CA ruled that the total cessation of Phil the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be Carpet’s manufacturing operations was not made in bad faith because the determined by considering the nature of work performed and its relation to same was clearly due to economic necessity. the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if the ISSUES: employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the 1. Whether the petitioners were dismissed from employment for a performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems lawful cause repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of 2. Whether the petitioners’ termination from employment constitutes the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, unfair labor practice 27 3. Whether Pacific Carpet may be held liable for Phil Carpet’s pierce the veil of corporate fiction in the absence of fraud or other public obligations policy considerations." 4. Whether the quitclaims signed by the petitioners are valid and The petitioners failed to present substantial evidence to prove their binding allegation that Pacific Carpet is a mere alter ego of Phil Carpet. RULING: 4. YES. The quitclaims were valid and binding upon the petitioners. 1. YES. Petitioners were terminated for an authorized cause. The contents of the quitclaims, which were in Filipino, were clear and Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessary for a simple, such that it was unlikely that the petitioners did not understand what valid cessation of business operations: (a) service of a written notice to the they were signing. employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended date 31. Sumifru Corp. v. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm thereof; (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c) GR. No. 202091, June 7, 2017 payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to one month pay FACTS: or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is Sumifru is a domestic corporation and is the surviving corporation higher. after its merger with Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC) in In this case, the LA's findings that Phil Carpet suffered from serious 2008. FBAC was engaged in the buying, marketing, and exportation of business losses which resulted in its closure were affirmed in toto by the Cavendish bananas. Respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm NLRC, and subsequently by the CA. It is a rule that absent any showing (NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU) (NAMASUFA) is a labor organization that the findings of fact of the labor tribunals and the appellate court are not affiliated with the National Federation of Labor Unions and Kilusang Mayo supported by evidence on record or the judgment is based on a Uno. misapprehension of facts, the Court shall not examine anew the evidence Private respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa filed a Petition for submitted by the parties. Certification Election before the DOLE Regional Office in Davao City. 2. NO. The dismissal did not amount to unfair labor practice. NAMASUFA sought to represent all rank-and-file employees, numbering Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove around 140, of packing plant 90 of FBAC. NAMASUFA claimed that there the same. was no existing union in the aforementioned establishment. FBAC filed an The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty imposed upon them. Opposition arguing that there exists no employer-employee relationship They did not identify the acts of Phil Carpet which, they claimed, between it and the workers involved as the members of NAMASUFA are constituted unfair labor practice. They did not even point out the specific actually employees of A2Y Contracting Services (A2Y), a duly licensed provisions which Phil Carpet violated. Thus, they would have the Court independent contractor, as evidenced by the payroll records of the latter. pronounce that Phil Carpet committed unfair labor practice on the ground NAMASUFA countered that its members were former workers of Stanfilco that they were dismissed from employment simply because they were union before FBAC took over its operations sometime in 2002. The said former officers and members. The constitutional commitment to the policy of employees were then required to join the Compostela Banana Packing Plant social justice, however, cannot be understood to mean that every labor Workers’ Cooperative (CBPPWC) before they were hired and allowed to dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor. work at the Packing Plant of FBAC. It further alleged that the members of In this case, as far as the pieces of evidence offered by the petitioners are NAMASUFA were working at PP 90 long before A2Y came. concerned, there is no showing that the closure of the company was an ISSUE: WON the members of the Union are employees of SUmifru attempt at union-busting. Hence, the charge that Phil Carpet is guilty of unfair labor practice must fail for lack of merit. HELD: 3. NO. Pacific Carpet is not liable for Phil Carpet’s obligations. Yes. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Med Arbiter granting the Petition This Court has declared that "mere ownership by a single stockholder or by for Certification Election of NAMASUFA and declared that Sumifru was another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation the employer of the workers concerned. is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate Based on the “four-fold test”, the elements to determine the existence of an personality." It has likewise ruled that the "existence of interlocking employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the directors, corporate officers and shareholders is not enough justification to employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the 28 employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. The most important Corporation accused the Panaligan et al of theft and stated that the latter element is the employer’s control of the employee’s conduct, not only as to were responsible for the loss of the money and properties. Later, the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to Corporation terminated the employer-employee relationship between them accomplish it. and Panaligan et al based on loss of trust and confidence. Also, the On the first factor, it is apparent that the staff of respondent FBAC advised Corporation filed a criminal complaint of theft against the Pangilinan et al, those who are interested to be hired in the Packing Plant to become but the same was dismissed by the city prosecutor, there being no sufficient members first of CBPPWC and get a recommendation from it. On the evidence. second factor, while the respondent tried to impress upon us that workers Pangilinan et al filed a complaint with the LA alleging that they were are paid by A2Y Contracting Services, this at best is but an administrative illegally dismissed. The Corporation, on their defense, stated that the arrangement. The payroll summary submitted does not contain the relevant dismissal was legal because the alleged criminal complaint was enough information such as the employee’s rate of pay, deductions made and the evidence to produce a substantial evidence. LA ruled in favor of the amount actually paid to the employee. On the third factor, it is very clear Corporation. NLRC reversed the decision of LA and decided in favor of that respondent FBAC is the authority that imposes disciplinary measures Panaligan et al. CA reversed the decision of NLRC. against erring workers. This alone proves that it wields disciplinary authority over them. Finally, on the fourth factor which is the control test, Issue: the fact that the respondent FBAC gives instructions to the workers on how Whether or not, Panaligan et al. were illegally dismissed. to go about their work is sufficient indication that it exercises control over their movements. The workers are instructed as to what time they are Held: Yes, Panaligan et al. were illegally dismissed. supposed to report and what time they are supposed to return. They were ARTICLE 297. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an required to fill up monitoring sheets as they go about their jobs and even the employment for any of the following causes:(a) Serious misconduct or materials which they used in the packing plant were supplied by FBAC. willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer Viewed from the above circumstances, it is clear that respondent FBAC is or representative in connection with his work;(b) Gross and habitual neglect the real employer of the workers of Packing Plant 90. They are in truth and by the employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee in fact the employees of the respondent and its attempt to seek refuge on of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized A2Y Contracting Services as the ostensible employer was nothing but an representative;(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee elaborate scheme to deprive them their right to self-organization. against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and(e) Other causes analogous to the 32. PANALIGAN v PHYVITA ENTERPRISES CORPORATION foregoing. G.R. No. 202086, June 21, 2017 Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct; it is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, Facts: willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in Phyvita Enterprises Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the judgment. The misconduct, to be serious within the meaning of the Labor business of health club massage parlor, spa and other related services under Code, must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely the name and style of Starfleet Reflex Zone. Panaligan et al were employees trivial or unimportant. Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a of Corporation assigned as Roomboys. just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the Sometime in Jan 2005, the Corporation discovered that the amount of performance of the employee's duties; and (c) it must show that the 180,000 including some receipts and payroll were missing. The Corporation employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. conducted police investigation and while it was pending, Panaligan et al On the other hand, loss of trust and confidence, as a just cause for with some employees filed a complaint before the DOLE against termination of employment, is premised on the fact that an employee Corporation for 1.underpayment of wages, 2.non payment of special and concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed by management and legal holidays, 3.5 days service incentive leave, 4.night shift differential from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. The pay, 5.no pay slip, 6.signing of blank payroll. In the interim, the 29 betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is imposition of said penalty. Respondent could have easily produced penalized. documents to support its contention that Ibon had been suspended, Thus, it must be proved that the employees must be guilty of an actual and considering that employers are required to observe due process in the willful breach of trust and that they committed a serious misconduct duly discipline of employees. Respondent could not rely on its letter requiring supported by substantial evidence. However, in the case at hand, the Ibon to report back to work to refute a finding of constructive dismissal. Corporation failed to adduce evidence supporting the accusation. Hence a The letters merely requested him to report back to work and to explain why Corporation dismissed criminal complaint does not tantamount to a ground he failed to report to the office after inquiring about his posting status. More for termination of employment, the employees were illegally dismissed. importantly, there was no proof that Ibon had received the letters. In Tatel v. JFLP Investigation, the court held that [1] an employer must 33. IBON v. GENGHIS KHAN SECURITY SERVICES assign the security guard to another posting within six (6) months from his G.R. No. 221085 last deployment, otherwise, he would be considered constructively dismissed; and [2] the security guard must be assigned to a specific or FACTS: particular client. A general return-to-work order does not suffice. Ravengar G. Ibon was employed as a security guard by Genghis Khan Applying the foregoing to the present controversy, respondent should have Security Services sometime in June 2008. He was initially assigned to Mr. deployed petitioner to a specific client within six (6) months from his last Solis in Quezon City. However, in June 2009, Ibon was transferred to the assignment. The correspondences allegedly sent to petitioner merely Aspen Tower Condominium until his last duty on October 4, 2010. required him to explain why he did not report to work. He was never Thereafter, respondent promised to provide him a new assignment, which, assigned to a particular client. Thus, even if petitioner actually received the however, did not happen. letters of respondent, he was still constructively dismissed because none of On May 10, 2011, Ibon filed a complaint against respondent for illegal these letters indicated his reassignment to another client. dismissal. He alleged that he was no longer assigned to a new post after his last duty. Respondent denied that Ibon was placed on a floating status for 34. BRAVO vs. URIOS COLLEGE more than six (6) months. It claimed that Ibon was suspended on October 4, G.R. No. 198066, June 7, 2017 2010 for sleeping on the job. It also averred that Ibon was endorsed to FACTS: another client for re-assignment, but the client refused because Ibon’s Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher in 1988 by Urios College. In license was due for renewal, and that they sent a letter to Ibon requiring him addition to his duties as a part-time teacher, Bravo was designated as the to report back to work. school's comptroller from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2002. Urios College ISSUE: organized a committee to formulate a new "ranking system for non- Whether or not Ibon was constructively dismissed academic employees for school year 2001-2002” where Bravo HELD: recommended that "the position of Comptroller should be classified as a YES. In Reyes v. RP Guardians Security Agency, it was held that temporary middle management position. displacement or temporary off-detail of security guard is, generally, allowed A committee to review the ranking system implemented during school year in a situation where a security agency's client decided not to renew their 2001-2002 was formed and found out that the ranking system for school service contract with the agency and no post is available for the relieved year 2001-2002 caused salary distortions. There were also discrepancies in security guard. Such situation does not normally result in a constructive the salary adjustments of Bravo and of two (2) other employees. The dismissal. Nonetheless, when the floating status lasts for more than six (6) committee discovered that "the Comptroller's Office solely prepared and months, the employee may be considered to have been constructively implemented the [s]alary [a]djustment [s]chedule" without prior approval dismissed. No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of workers to from the Human Resources Department. The committee recommended that security of tenure, thus, employees can only be dismissed for just or Bravo be administratively charged for serious misconduct or willful breach authorized causes and after they have been afforded the due process of law. of trust. In this case, aside from respondent's bare assertions that Ibon was On March 16, 2005, Bravo received a show cause memo requiring him to suspended, which the latter had denied, there was no evidence of the explain in writing why his services should not be terminated for his alleged 30 acts of serious misconduct. A committee was organized to investigate the required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of matter. Hearings were conducted thereafter. Bravo was found guilty of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe serious misconduct for which he was ordered to return the sum of ₱ that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, 179,319.16, representing overpayment of his monthly salary. On July 25, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust 2005, Urios College notified Bravo of its decision to terminate his and confidence demanded by his position. services for serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Upon The Supreme Court holds that petitioner was validly dismissed based on receipt of the termination letter, Bravo immediately filed before Executive loss of trust and confidence. Petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for the employee. His position of responsibility on delicate financial matters payment of separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees. entailed a substantial amount of trust from respondent. It was reasonable for The Executive Labor dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the employer to trust that he had basis for his computations especially with the National Labor Relations Commission found that Bravo's dismissal respect to his own compensation. Petitioner's act in assigning to himself a from service was illegal. The Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor higher salary rate without proper authorization is a clear breach of the trust Relations Commission's Resolution and reinstated the decision of Executive and confidence reposed in him. Petitioner's position made him accountable Labor Arbiter Pelaez. in ensuring that the Comptroller's Office observed the company's ISSUES: established procedures. It was reasonable that he should be held liable by (1) Whether or not the petitioner's employment was terminated for a just respondent on the basis of command responsibility. cause; and RULING: (2) Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of procedural due process (2) NO. Any meaningful opportunity for the employee to present evidence RULING: and address the charges against him or her satisfies the requirement of (1) YES. Under Article 297 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate ample opportunity to be heard. the services of an employee for “fraud or willful breach by the employee of In this case, respondent complied with all the requirements of procedural the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative” due process in terminating petitioner's employment. Respondent furnished Due to the nature of his occupation, petitioner's employment may be petitioner a show cause memo stating the specific grounds for dismissal. terminated for willful breach of trust under Article 297(c), not Article The show cause memo also required petitioner to answer the charges by 297(a), of the Labor Code. A dismissal based on willful breach of trust or submitting a written explanation. Respondent even informed petitioner that loss of trust and confidence under Article 297 of the Labor Code entails the he may avail the services of counsel. Respondent then conducted a concurrence of two (2) conditions. First, the employee whose services are to thorough investigation. Three (3) hearings were conducted on separate be terminated must occupy a position of trust and confidence. And that occasions. The findings of the investigation committee were then sent to there must be the presence of some basis for the loss of trust and petitioner. Lastly, petitioner was given a notice of termination containing confidence. This means that "the employer must establish the existence of respondent’s final decision. There was a just cause for terminating an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence." Otherwise, employees petitioner from employment, there is no basis to award him separation pay will be left at the mercy of their employers. Different rules apply in and backwages. determining whether loss of trust and confidence may validly be used as a justification in termination cases.1âwphi1 Managerial employees are treated 35. JAVINES VS. XLIBRIS differently than fiduciary rank-and-file employees. GR. No. 214301, June 7, 2007 [W]ith respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as Facts: ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged Javines was hired by respondent Xlibris as operations manager in events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations September 2011. In July 2012, Javines submitted meal receipts for by the employer will not be sufficient. But, as regards a managerial reimbursement at the finance department of the company, wherein employee, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has falsification was discovered. A notice to explain was issued against him, breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in charging him with acts constituting dishonesty for allegedly tampering meal the case of managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not receipts from fast food chains with the total amount of P811.00 to 31 P10,821.00. He submitted his written explanation, denying having tampered c) matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision the receipts. He countered the allegations by explaining that it was the and complete resolution of the case, or in serving the interests of justice or supervisors who submitted the receipts to him; he merely prepared the avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice; reimbursement request, and that he had no knowledge nor participation in d) matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some bearing on the tampering of the receipts. the issue submitted that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court An administrative hearing was conducted. Javines failed to explain why and ignored; how the incident transpired. He instead requested for further investigation e) matters closely related to an error assigned; and because he cannot recall who submitted the receipts to him. On the same f) matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is day, notices to explain were sent to the supervisors under Javines, who dependent. likewise denied participation in the tampering of the receipts. Xlibris None of the aforesaid instances exists in the instant case. Hence, CA cannot terminated Javines’ employment through an end of employment notice. be faulted for not discussing said issue in its decision as the same was Javines then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was dismissed by already resolved with finality. the Labor Arbiter who found that the dismissal was for a just cause and with due process. On appeal, NLRC modified the decision, noting that while the 36. LUIS S. DOBLE, JR. v. ABB, INC. dismissal was for a just cause, Javines was not afforded due process in that G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017 no other hearing was called to afford him the opportunity to confront the Facts: witnesses against him before he was dismissed. Thus, P10,000.00 worth of Doble, Jr., a duly licensed engineer, was hired by respondent ABB Inc. as nominal damages was awarded in his favor. Javines did not move for Junior Design Engineer on March 29, 1993. Doble rose through the ranks reconsideration; only Xlibris elevated the case to CA on certiorari on the and was promoted up to Vice President and Local Division Manager of issue that NLRC abused its discretion by holding that Xlibris failed to Power System Division. However, on March 2, 2012, Doble was called by afford Javines due process. By way of comment, Javines reiterated that he Country Manager and President Nitin Desai, and was informed that his was not granted further investigation when he requested. CA granted the performance rating for 2011 was 1, which is equivalent to unsatisfactory petition and held that Javines was not given an opportunity to rebut the performance. Doble had a meeting and during the meeting, President Desai additional pieces of evidence secured by Xlibris. However, CA reduced the explained to Doble that the Global and Regional Management have nominal damages from P10,000.00 to P1,000.00 considering that the altered demanded for a change in leadership due to the extent of losses and level of meal receipts show a discrepancy of P10,000.00. discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Desai then raised the option Issues: for Doble to resign. Thereafter, HR manager Miranda told Doble that he 1. Whether or not Javines was dismissed for a just cause would be paid separation pay equivalent to 75% of his monthly salary for 2. Whether or not the issue as to whether the requirements of procedural every year of service, provided he would submit a letter of resignation, and due process to constitute a valid dismissal were complied with has been gave him until 12:45 PM within which to decide. Shocked by the abrupt resolved with finality decision of the management, Doble asked why he should be the one made Ruling: to resign. Miranda said that it was the decision of the management and left 1. Yes, Javines was dismissed for a just cause, as uniformly held by the him alone in the conference room to decide whether or not to resign. At this Labor Arbiter and NLRC. juncture, the parties gave contrasting accounts on the ensuing events which 2. Yes, the issue has attained finality. For failure to file the requisite petition led to the termination of Doble’s employment. Then, Doble filed a before CA, the NLRC decision attained finality and had been placed complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of beyond the appellate court’s power of review. The appellate court is given backwages, other monetary claims and damages. In a decision the LA held broad discretionary powers to waive lack of proper assignment of errors and that Doble was illegally dismissed because his resignation was involuntary, to consider errors not assigned in the following circumstances: and ordered ABB Inc. to pay his backwages and separation pay, since a) when the question affects jurisdiction over the subject matter; reinstatement is no longer feasible. The NLRC granted the appeal filed by b) matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of ABB Inc. and Desai, and dismissed the partial appeal of Doble. They found law; that the resignation of Doble being voluntary, there can be no illegal 32 dismissal and no basis for the award of other monetary claims, damages and photocopy of BPI’s manager’s check representing the separation benefit; (6) attorney’s fees. Dissatisfied with the NLRC decision and resolution, Doble Employee Final Pay Computation showing in the payment of leave credits, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. rice subsidy and bonuses; and, (7) the Receipt, Release and Quitclaim. Issues: Whether or not, Dolbe was illegally dismissed. Held: No, Doble was not illegally dismissed. 37. United Polyresins Inc. v. Pinuela In illegal dismissal cases, the fundamental rule is that when an employer G.R. No. 209555, July 31, 2017 interposes the defense of resignation, the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned necessarily rests upon the employer. But, since FACTS: Doble claims to have been forced to submit a resignation letter, it is United Polyresins, Inc. (UPI) is a registered domestic corporation while incumbent upon him to prove with clear and convincing evidence that his Ernesto Uy Soon, Jr. and Julito Uy Soon are its corporate officers. resignation was not voluntary, but was actually a case of constructive Marcelino Pinuela was employed by UPI in 1987. He was a member of the dismissal. labor union, Polyresins Rank and File Association (PORFA), and was Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because elected President thereof. Under the existing CBA between UPI and continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; PORFA, it was provided that UPI shall grant to PORFA PHP 300,000 as the when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay and other benefits. union’s capital for establishing a cooperative to meet the needs of its It exists if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an members. The CBA also contained a union security clause which provided employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could that employees who cease to be PORFA members in good standing by foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. reason of his resignation or expulsion shall not be retained in the employ of There is involuntary resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable UPI. conditions set by the employer. The test of constructive dismissal is whether During Pinuela’s term as PORFA President, it appeared that UPI a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to automatically deducted from the respective salaries of PORFA members give up his employment/position under the circumstances. amounts representing union membership dues and loan payments. These On the other hand, "resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is amounts, which totalled ₱2,402,533.43, were then regularly turned over by in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed UPI to PORFA in the form of fifty eight (58) crossed checks. Several days in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to before the PHP 300,000 loan became due, the union officers and UPI met to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or discuss the proposed new CBA. However, UPI told Pinuela that it will not relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office discuss the proposed CBA until the loan is paid. Pinuela told UPI that the accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must union did not have the finances. Because of the recurring threat of failed concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before CBA negotiations and salary deductions as a means of recovering the and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether amount of the loan, the union members began to demand the holding of a he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment." special election of union officers. A special election was held, and a new In the case at bar, it appears that Doble was not coerced into submitting a union President and set of officers were elected. When the new union resignation letter. He is holding one of the top positions in the company and officers conducted an investigation and found that the union had no more answerable only to the President, herein Desai. He is a highly educated funds as they were utilized in the prosecution of cases during Pinuela’s man. It is improbable that a man of his stature may be pressured into doing incumbency. Pinuela also failed to make a formal turnover of documents to something that he does not want to do. In fact, even if the option to resign the new President. originated from the employer, what is important for resignation to be The officers held that these violations constituted an infringement if the deemed voluntary is that the employee's intent to relinquish must concur union’s Constitution which prohibit the misappropriation of union funds with the overt act of relinquishment. It was proved by substantial evidence and property and give ground for the impeachment and recall of union that Doble voluntarily resigned, as shown by the following documents (1) officers. Thus, PORFA wrote a letter communicating Pinuela’s expulsion the affidavit of ABB Inc.’s HR Manager Miranda; (2) the resignation letter; from the union. Eventually, UPI issued a letter of termination to Pinuela. (3) the Employee Clearance Sheet; (4) the Certificate of Employment; (5) ISSUE: 33 1. Whether or not Pinuela was illegally dismissed option and were made to sign quitclaims as a condition for receiving any HELD: and all forms of monetary benefits. Yes. The union and UPI claimed that the dismissal was based on the union Respondents argued that the termination of Genpact and Allstate's security clause. Pinuela’s expulsion from the union was based on the agreement neither amounted to a closure of business nor justified their union’s constitution. However, these provisions provides for the retrenchment. impeachment and recall of union officers, not expulsion from union In their defense, petitioners justified respondents' termination of membership. Any officer found guilty of violating these provisions shall employment on the ground of closure or cessation of Allstate's account with simply be removed, impeached or recalled, from office, but not expelled or Genpact as part of the former' s "[g]lobal [d]ownsizing due to heavy losses stripped of union membership. It was therefore error on the part of PORFA caused by declining sales in North America." Further, petitioners claimed and UPI to terminate Pinuela’s employment based on Article XV, Section 1, that they incessantly pursued efforts to retain respondents within their paragraphs (e) and (f) of the union's Constitution. Such a ground does not organization, but the same proved futile, thus, leaving them with no other constitute just cause for termination. choice but to provide respondents with the option to either resign or be In addition, the union may not insist on expelling Pinuela from PORFA and separated on account of redundancy - an option which they reported to the assist in his dismissal from UPI without just cause, since it is an unfair labor DOLE and resorted to in the exercise of management prerogative with practice for a labor organization to "cause or attempt to cause an employer utmost good faith. Lastly, petitioners pointed out that respondents were to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an properly given separation pay, as well as unpaid allowances and 13th month employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been pay, thus, rendering the latter's monetary claims bereft of merit. denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual The Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents' complaint for lack of merit. The terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of LA found that respondents' termination from service was due to the membership is made available to other members." untimely cessation of the operations of Genpact's client, Allstate, wherein respondents were assigned. In this regard, the LA pointed out that Genpact 38. GENP ACT SERVICES, INC. v. FALCESO tried to remedy respondents' situation by assigning them to other accounts, [July 31, 2017, G.R. No. 227695] but such efforts proved futile as respondents were hired specifically to FACTS: match the needs of Allstate. Furthermore, the LA took Genpact's act of Genp Act Services, Inc. is engaged in business process outsourcing, paying respondents their separation pay computed at one-half (½) month particularly servicing various multinational clients, including Allstate pay for every year of service as a sign of good faith. Thus, the LA Insurance Company. concluded that there was an authorized cause in terminating respondents' On different dates spanning the years 2007 to 2011, Genpact hired services, and that Gen pact complied with DOLE's reportorial requirements respondents Maria Katrina Santos-Falceso, Janice Ann M. Mendoza, and in doing so. Jeffrey S. Mariano to various positions to service its Allstate account. NLRC affirmed the LA ruling. It held that Allstate's pullout from Gen pact However, on April 19, 2012, Allstate ended its account with does not mean an automatic termination of the employees assigned to the Genpact, resulting in respondents being placed on floating status, and Allstate account, such as respondents, but purports that the employees eventually, terminated from service. assigned to the withdrawing client would be "benched" or placed on Respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal, non- floating status as contemplated in Article 286 (now Article 301) of the payment of separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees against Genpact Labor Code, as amended. In fact, the NLRC pointed out that Genpact and/or its Country Manager, Reyes. They alleged that after Allstate recognized the applicability of the said provision in the case of respondents, terminated its contract with Genpact, they were initially placed on as well as other similarly-situated employees, considering that: (a) it "benching" status with pay, and after five (5) months, Genpact gave them embarked on a Retention Effort Program which resulted in the the option to either "voluntarily resign" or to "be involuntarily terminated redeployment of more or less 100 of its employees affected by Allstate's on the ground of redundancy" with severance pay of one-half (½) month pullout; (b) it placed respondents and the other similarly-situated employees basic salary for every year of service, in either case. Left without the option on "benching" status with full pay; (c) it only resorted to termination after to continue their employment with Genpact, respondents chose the latter alleged incessant efforts to find a suitable position for respondents proved 34 unsuccessful; and (d) such terminations were done during the six (6)-month jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings period within which employees were allowed to be placed on floating have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same status. Thus, Genpact's acts of placing respondents on "benching" or as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an floating status, and thereafter, terminating their employment were made in urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay the exercise of its management prerogative in good faith and in accordance would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the with internal hiring procedures. As such, it cannot be said that respondents subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the were illegally dismissed from service. circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where Respondents moved for reconsideration, which was partly granted by the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for NLRC ordering the increase of respondents' entitlement to separation pay to relief; (j) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent one (1) month salary for every year of service. In said Resolution, the and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the NLRC held that since respondents' positions were rendered superfluous by proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due the closure of the Allstate account, then it follows that they were terminated process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner on account of redundancy pursuant to Article 286 (now Article 301), in had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of relation to Article 283 (now Article 298) of the Labor Code. As such, they law or where public interest is involved. should be paid separation pay amounting to one (1) month salary for every A judicious review of the records reveals that the exceptions in year of service, instead of the one-half (½) month salary for every year of items (d) and (e) are attendant in this case. service. Notably, the NLRC Resolution explicitly stated that "[n]o further The dispositive portion of the NLRC's June 30, 2014 Resolution, it motion of similar import shall be entertained." explicitly warns the litigating parties that the NLRC shall no longer CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari purely on procedural entertain any further motions for reconsideration. Irrefragably, this grounds. circumstance gave petitioners the impression that moving for ISSUE: reconsideration before the NLRC would only be an exercise in futility in Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed outright the certiorari petition light of the tribunal's aforesaid warning. filed by petitioners before it on procedural grounds. The remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration may be availed of once RULING: by each party. In this case, only respondents had filed a motion for The petition is meritorious. (The case was remanded to the CA. The SC reconsideration before the NLRC. Applying the foregoing provision, only ruled on the procedural process of the case.) petitioners also had an opportunity to file such motion in this case, should A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special they wish to do so. However, the tenor of such warning effectively deprived civil action that may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any petitioners of such opportunity, thus, constituting a violation of their right to plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is due process. adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or All told, petitioners were completely justified in pursuing a direct recourse quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Court. Given the special and extraordinary nature of a Rule 65 petition, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower CASE NO. 39 court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, since a SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION (SWOFLU) vs. motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the G.R. No. 220383 July 5, 2017 prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This notwithstanding, the FACTS: foregoing rule admits of well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the In 2007, while there was no Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect, order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no URC-SONEDCO offered, among other benefits, a P16.00/day wage 35 increase to their employees. To receive the benefits, employees had to sign Yes. The Supreme Court held that URC-SONEDCO is guilty of unfair labor a waiver that said: "In the event that a subsequent [Collective Bargaining practice for failing to bargain with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union Agreement] is negotiated between Management and Union, the new in good faith.13 URC-SONEDCO restricted SONEDCO Workers Free [Collective Bargaining Agreement] shall only be effective [on] January 1, Labor Union's bargaining power when it asked the rank-and-file employees 2008." Realizing that the waiver was an unfair labor practice, some to sign a waiver foregoing Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiations in members of SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union refused to sign. URC- exchange for wage increases.14 Thus, this Court ordered URC-SONEDCO SONEDCO offered the same arrangement in 2008. It extended an to grant the union members the 2007 and 2008 wage increases. additional P16.00/day wage increase to employees who would agree that Nevertheless, this Court denied the claim for the 2009 wage increase and any Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiated for that year would only ruled that if SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union wished to continue be effective on January 1, 2009.6 Several members of SONEDCO Workers receiving the additional wage after 2008, the proper recourse was to include Free Labor Union again refused to waive their rights. Consequently, they it in the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement. By reason of the unfair did not receive the wage increase which already amounted to a total of labor practice on the party of respondent URC – SONEDCO, petitioner P32.00/day, beginning 2009. SWOFLU is entitled to a wage increase of P16.00 for the years 2007 and On July 2, 2009, SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union and its members 2008. The grant of the P32.00/day wage increase is not an additional benefit who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers filed a complaint for unfair outside the Collective Bargaining Agreement of 2009. By granting this labor practices against URC-SONEDCO. They argued that the requirement increase to petitioners, this Court is eliminating the discrimination against of a waiver prior to the release of the wage increase constituted interference them, which was a result of respondent's unfair labor practice. The wage to the employees' right to self-organization, collective bargaining, and increase was integrated in the salary of those who signed the waivers. When concerted action. They asked that they be granted a P16.00/day wage the affiants waived their rights, respondent rewarded them with a P32.00/ increase for 2007 and an additional P16.00/day wage increase for day wage increase that continues to this day. The respondent company 2008.8SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union also demanded a continuing granted this benefit to its employees to induce them to waive their wage increase of P32.00/day "from January 1, 2009 onwards." Both the collective bargaining rights. This Court has declared this an unfair labor National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found practice. Accordingly, it is illegal to continue denying the petitioners the URC-SONEDCO not guilty of unfair labor practice.10 Nonetheless, they wage increase that was granted to employees who signed the waivers. To ordered URC-SONEDCO to give petitioners the same benefits their co- rule otherwise will perpetuate the discrimination against petitioners. All the workers received in 2007 and 2008. However, SONEDCO Workers Free consequences of the unfair labor practice must be addressed. Labor Union's claim for the 2009 wage increase was denied. Since a new Collective Bargaining Agreement was already in effect by 2009, this Collective Bargaining Agreement governed the relationship between the management and the union.11 The Court of Appeals ruled: “As there was no provision in the existing CBA regarding wage increase of [P]16.00 per day, CASE NO. 40 the [National Labor Relations Commission] was correct in ruling that it August 22, 2017 G.R. No. 178379 cannot further impose private respondents to pay petitioners the subject CRISPIN S. FRONDOZO,* DANILO M. PEREZ, JOSE A. ZAFRA, wage increase for the year 2009 and onwards.” ARTURO B. VITO, CESAR S. CRUZ, NAZARIO C. DELA CRUZ, and LUISITO R. DILOY, Petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC ISSUES: COMPANY,, Respondent. Whether or not respondent Universal Robina Corp. –SONEDCO is guilty of A Notice of Strike filed by the MERALCO Employees and Workers unfair labor practice? Association (MEWA), on the ground of ULP. Then Acting Secretary· of the Whether or not petitioner SWOFLU is entitled to wage increase? DOLE certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, ordered all the striking workers to return to work, and directed MERALCO HELD: to accept the striking workers back to work under the same terms and conditions existing prior to the work stoppage. 36 MERALCO terminated the services of Petitioners for having committed G.R. No. 161311. The Court's Third Division denied the petition in G.R. unlawful acts and violence during the strike. Then MEWA filed a second No. 161159 on the ground that the Petitioners failed to show that a Notice of Strike on the ground of discrimination and union busting that reversible error had been committed by the Court of Appeals in rendering resulted to the dismissal from employment of 25 union officers and its Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 72480 (in favor of MERALCO). The Court's workers. Third Division also denied the petition in G.R. No. 161311 for failure of the The labor dispute resulted to the filing of two complaints for illegal petitioners to show that a reversible error had been committed by the dismissal. The NLRC consolidated the two illegal dismissal cases and appellate court in the same case, CA-G.R. SP No. 72480. rendered a Decision stating among others, that it upholds the dismissal of In one case, 46 this Court explained that "[ w ]hen the Court does not find the workers in view of the illegal acts they committed during the subject any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the petition, there strike. However, the NLRC First Division subsequently modified said is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means Decision and ruled that said dismissal of employees was unjustified and that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA". ordered their reinstatement without loss of seniority rights. Hence, the Court's Third Division adopted the findings and conclusions From the two conflicting resolutions of the NLRC, two petitions reached by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 which dismissed for certiorari were filed before the Court of Appeals: 1. CA-G.R. SP No. petitioners from the service. Such decisions have already became final and 72480 filed by MERALCO; and 2. CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 filed by the executory. Petitioners. And from which the CA arrived at 2 conflicting decisions as WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We REMAND this case to the well. NLRC for the execution of this Court's Decision in G.R. Nos. 161159 and The Petitioners moved for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the 161311. satisfaction of their accrued wages arising from the recall of their payroll reinstatement which was granted by the Labor Arbiter. Subsequently, a Case 41 Second Alias Writ of Execution24 was issued directing the Sheriff to cause Pedro C. Perea vs. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., et al.; the reinstatement of the respondents and to collect the amount representing G.R. No. 206178; August 9, 2017 backwages. MERALCO filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction directed against FACTS: the Second Alias Writ of Execution, which the NLRC granted and was Perea entered into a Contract of Employment with Elburg Shipmanagement affirmed by the CA. Philippines, Inc. (Elburg) under its principal Augustea Atlantica SRL/Italy. Issue: Did the CA commit a grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Perea was hired as a fitter and was deployed to work aboard MV Lemno. NLRC’s Decision? From the conflicting decisions, which should prevail? While repairing apipe, Perea had difficulty breathing. The following day, he Ruling: No. The situation in this case is analogous to a change in the had chest pains with palpitations. He was seen by a doctor that same situation of the parties making execution unjust or afternoon and was advised to take medication and to rest for three (3) inequitable. MERALCO's refusal to reinstate petitioners and to pay their consecutive days. However, he did not feel any better even after resting and backwages is justified by the Decision of the CA in the 1st petition filed taking medications; thus, he asked to be repatriated. before it. On the other hand, petitioners' insistence on the execution of A few days later, Perea was welding when the oxygen and acetylene torch judgment is anchored on the the CA’s Decision in the 2nd petition filed by he was holding exploded. He hit his left shoulder and twisted his fingers in said Petitioners. Given this situation, we see no reversible error on the part trying to avoid the explosion. He took a pain reliever to ease the pain but of the Court of Appeals in holding that the NLRC did not commit grave three days later, he found that two of his fingers had grown numb. He was abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings. Grave abuse of sent to a medical facility in Tuzla, Turkey because of continued chest pains. discretion implies that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, He was pronounced to have soft tissue trauma and was told to rest, avoid whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as exertion, and avoid using his right arm. The following day, he was to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. transferred to SEMA Hospital where he was declared to be suffering from Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 should prevail. This Court actually “[C]ubital [T]unnel Syndrome, soft, tissue injury of the right elbow.” The ruled on the merits of the assailed CA Decisions in G.R. No. 161159 and 37 treatment proposed was to put his right arm in a sling and to rest for Whether or not the medical findings of company-designated physician who recovery for 10 days. He was soon repatriated to the Philippines. conducted extensive examination prevail over private physician who After conducting laboratory examinations and other medical procedures on examined the seafarer only once and did not order medical tests? Perea, company-designated physicians Dr. Karen Hao-Quan (Dr. Hao- Quan) and Dr. Robert D. Lim (Dr. Lim) gave an initial impression, “To HELD: Consider Cubital Tunnel Syndrome, Right; Hypertension; Rule Out Ischemic Heart Disease” and recommended that a Dipyridamole Thallium For an illness or injury to be compensable under the POEA Contract, it Scan be conducted. In a letter to Elburg, Dr. Hao-Quan stated that the cause must have been work-related and acquired during the term of the seafarer’s of hypertension was not work-related and opined that Perea’s estimated contract. Work-related illness is defined as “any sickness resulting to length of treatment would be approximately three to four months. Perea disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section filed a complaint for underpayment of his sick leave pay, permanent 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied. disability benefits, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and Hypertension classified as primary or essential is considered compensable if attorney’s fees. Perea consulted Dr. Antonio C. Pascual (Dr. Pascual), an it causes impairment of function[s] of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes internist, cardiologist, and echocardiographer, who diagnosed him with and brain, resulting in permanent disability; Provided, that, the following “Uncontrolled Hypertension [and] Coronary Artery Disease.” Dr. Pascual documents substantiate it: (a) chest x-ray report, (b) ECG report, (c) blood found Perea to be medically unfit to work as a seafarer. chemistry report, (d) funduscopy report, and (f) C-T scan. After a series of examinations, Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim certified that As between the findings made by the company-designated physicians who Perea was cleared of the injuries that caused his repatriation. The parties conducted an extensive examination on the petitioner and Dr. Pascual who met for mediation proceedings and a possible compromise agreement but saw petitioner on only one occasion and did not even order that medical were unsuccessful They were then directed to submit their respective tests be done to support his declaration that petitioner is unfit to work as [a] position papers, together with their supporting evidence. The Labor Arbiter seaman, the company-designated physicians’ findings that petitioner has dismissed Perea’s complaint for lack of merit. been cleared for work should prevail. The court further held that the doctor who have had a personal knowledge The Labor Arbiter ruled that the Collective Bargaining Agreement could not of the actual medical condition, having closely, meticulously and regularly apply to Perea’s claim for disability benefits because its effectivity period monitored and actually treated the seafarer’s illness, is more qualified to was only from March 28, 2008 to December 31, 2009. The Collective assess the seafarer’s disability. Bargaining Agreement had already lapsed by the time Perea was repatriated to the Philippines by late May 2010. CASE NO. 42 WILLIAM R. WENCESLAO v. MAKATI DEVELOPMENT The Labor Arbiter ruled that while Section 32-A of the POEA Contract CORPORATION provided that hypertension may be compensable, this was applicable only if it caused “impairment of function[s] of body organs like kidneys, heart and Facts: brain, resulting in permanent disability.” The Labor Arbiter held that Perea’s hypertension did not impair the functions of his organs, as evidenced by Dr. The case stemmed from a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Monetary Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim’s medical reports. Between the findings of Dr. Hao- Claims filed by the petitioners against private respondent Makati Quan and Dr. Lim and those of Dr. Pascual, the Labor Arbiter gave more Development Corporation (MDC) before the Labor Arbiter.[4] Records show weight to the findings of the company-designated physicians who that the petitioners were former construction workers of MDC.[5] In their concluded that Perea was not suffering from coronary disease based on the complaint, the petitioners claimed that they were regular employees of results of a coronary angiogram. MDC and were illegally dismissed for refusing to apply and be transferred to another contractor, Asiapro Multi-Purpose Cooperative.[6] In due course, ISSUE: the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. In affirming the status of the petitioners as project employees, the Labor Arbiter relied on 38 the evidence of MDC showing that the petitioners had worked in several of First, the matter concerning the nature of the petition. its other projects before being engaged in the West Tower @ One Serendra While the pleading filed by the petitioners is denominated as “Petition for Project and the North Triangle Building Project.[7] The Labor Arbiter ruled Review on Certiorari” pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, its that repeated re-employment does not make a project employee a regular contents, however, particularly the ground raised and supporting arguments, employee.[8] The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter assert grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction reads: on the part of the CA, an averment apposite in a petition for certiorari under WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal dismissal is Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The seeming inconsistency of the petition’s DISMISSED for lack of merit. style and substance must be resolved as its proper characterization, on Respondent Makati Development Corporation, however, is directed to pay whether it is pursued under Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, would the aggregate sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND objectively determine its outright dismissal for being the wrong remedy. THREE HUNDRED FOURTEEN & 78/100 PESOS Accordingly, if the petition is to be treated as a petition for certiorari under (P118,314.78) representing complainants’ prorated 13th month pay for 2015, Rule 65, then it should appropriately be dismissed because there is a plain, as follows: adequate, and speedy remedy available under the circumstances. It is settled All other claims, including those of complainants Virgilio B. Cristobal, that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or Noel N. Damiasan, James M. Real, Vivencio B. Rodrigo and Alfredo T. independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or Visaya, are hereby denied for lack of merit. The computation hereto excess of jurisdiction; and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other attached is made an integral part hereof.[9] plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[34] In this On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Fourth case, what the petitioners seek to be annulled are the resolutions of the CA Division affirmed[10] in toto the decision[11] of the Labor Arbiter. The dismissing their petition for certiorari and the motion for reconsideration dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision dated 31 May 2016, states: from such dismissal being, without a doubt, a final order for the complete WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the appeal filed by the 21 disposition of such petition. Consequently, the petitioner’s right and complainants is DENIED for lack of merit.Accordingly, the decision available legal recourse to assail such resolutions is an appeal by certiorari rendered by Labor Arbiter Raymund M. Celino on 29th February 2016 is under Rule 45 instead of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[12]. Undaunted, the petitioners filed before the Proceeding to the merits, we find that the CA did not err, much less commit CA a Petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in lack or excess of jurisdiction of the NLRC for issuing the order affirming dismissing the petition for certiorari due to procedural lapses and lack of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. substantive merit of the said petition. The CA pointed to the petitioners’ The CA dismissed the petition on two grounds: failure to state the material dates and to attach the certified true copies of ( 1 the petition is non-compliant with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC as well as the other ) and pertinent documents referred to in the petition, such as the labor arbiter’s decision, the petitioner’s Appeal Memorandum and Motion for Reconsideration.[37] The CA also determined that the petition, on its face, ( 2 the petition, on its face, lacks merit for failing to illustrate public did not establish the whimsical exercise of discretion which the NLRC ) respondent’s grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of supposedly had committed.[38] jurisdiction in renderinthe assailed 31 May 2016 Decision and 26 July 2016 While the CA invoked several grounds in dismissing the petition, the Resolution.[14] petitioners raised before this Court only the issue on the necessity of Issue: attaching to the petition relevant portions of the case records. The threshold issue is whether the CA was justified in dismissing the Second, petitioner's entitlement to separation pay primarily hinges on their petition for certiorari due to the failure of the petitioners to attach the employment status. As earlier discussed, petitioners merely offered a self- pertinent records of the case. serving conclusion that they are "regular employees" based on the factual Ruling: allegation contained in the petition. Petitioners' allegation has no weight or persuasive effect upon this Court absent any evidence to support the same. 39 To be circumspect, it is worth pointing out that a project employee may The petitioners' argument that the CA should have proceeded in the nevertheless receive separation pay. Under Section 3.2 of DOLE Order No. resolution of the case must fail. 19, Series of 1993, project employee's entitlement to separation pay is As noted, the dismissal by the CA of the petition for certiorari was not qualified by certain conditions, to wit: purely on a technicality but also on a ruling on the substantive merits of the 3.2. Project employees not entitled to separation. - The project employees case. However, we will not dwell on the disquisition of the CA as to the contemplated by paragraph 2.1. hereof are not by law entitled to separation nature of the employment of the petitioners and their subsequent pay if their services are terminated as a result of the completion of the termination for two reasons: first, the only issue raised before this Court project or any phase thereof in which they are employed. Likewise, project concerns the failure to attach the material documents in the petition for employees whose services are terminated because they have no more work certiorari; second, the determination on whether the petitioners were project to do or their services are no longer needed in the particular phase of the employees and whether they were illegally dismissed would necessarily project are not by law entitled to separation pay. require us to inquire into the factual matters which the Court cannot do in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3.3. Project employees entitled to separation pay. - Moreover, factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive upon the parties and a) Project employees whose aggregate period of continuous employment in binding on this Court.[48] a construction company is at least one year shall be considered regular employees, in the absence of a "day certain" agreed upon by the parties for In fine, we find no compelling reason to set aside the dismissal by the CA the termination of their relationship. Project employees who have become of this petition for certiorari. regular shall be entitled to separation pay. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for Review on x x x x Certiorari dated 10 April 2017, is DENIED. The 23 August 2016 and 26 January 2017 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. b) If the project or the phase of the project the employee is working on has 147009 are hereby AFFIRMED. not yet been completed and his services are terminated without just cause or unauthorized cause and there is no showing that his services are Case 43 unsatisfactory, the project employee is entitled to reinstatement with Read-Rite Philippines, Inc. Vs. Gina G. Francisco, et al backwages to his former position or substantially equivalent position. If the G.R. No. 195457, August 16, 2017 reinstatement is no longer possible, the employee is entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of the agreement. Facts: In the case at bench, the petitioners did not present any evidence, by way of In April 1999, Read-Rite began implementing a retrenchment program due contract of employment or other relevant proof which would establish the to serious business losses. About 200 employees were terminated and they facts pertaining to their tenure. Without basis to rule on the same, this were each given involuntary separation benefits equivalent to one month Court can only rely on the findings of public respondent adjudging them pay per year of service. From this first batch of retrenched employees, to be not entitled to separation pay. however, there were eight employees – who had rendered at least ten years of service that apparently received additional voluntary separation benefits It bears stressing that the factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, which are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their All of the respondents received involuntary separation benefits equivalent respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even to one month pay per year of service. Accordingly, they each executed a finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence.[47] Release, Waiver and Quitclaim[10] (quitclaim), which stated, among others, (emphasis supplied) that they had each received from Read-Rite the full payment of all 40 compensation due them and they will not undertake any action against the company. In contrast to the instant case, however, Read-Rite made no such company to demand further compensation. admission. Quite the opposite, Read-Rite has consistently claimed that the payment of additional voluntary separation benefits to the eight retrenched Meanwhile in February 2002 and February 2003, respondents filed employees in April 1999 was made by mistake and was no longer repeated complaints against Read-Rite.Respondents sought the payment of in the next batches of retrenchment. additional voluntary separation benefits, legal interest thereon, and attorney’s fees. They argued that Read-Rite discriminated against them by CASE NO. 44 not granting the aforesaid benefits, the award of which had since become a Adtel Inc. vs. Valdez company policy. Issue: WON were arbitrarily discriminated upon when they were not Facts: Adtel, Inc. (Adtel) is a domestic corporation engaged in the awarded additional voluntary separation benefits despite being in Read- distribution of telephone units, gadgets, equipment, and allied products. On Rite’s employ for at least ten years. 9 September 1996, Adtel hired Marijoy A. Valdez (respondent) to work as an accountant for the company. Adtel promoted respondent as the company's purchasing and logistics supervisor.4 Adtel then entered into a Held: In granting the claim of the first batch of retrenched BSSI dealership agreement with respondent's husband, Angel Valdez (Mr. employees, the Court found that “there was impermissible discrimination Valdez), to distribute Adtel's wideband VHF-UHF television antem1as. The against [them] in the payment of their separation benefits. The law requires dealership agreement was for twelve (12) months and the agreement was an employer to extend equal treatment to its employees. It may not, in the extended for another three (3) months.5 On 3 February 2006, Mr. Valdez guise of exercising management prerogatives, grant greater benefits to some filed a civil case against Adtel for specific performance and damages for the and less to others.”[34] However, in so ruling, the Court took into account execution of the terms of the dealership agreement.6 On 10 May 2006, Mr. the following findings of the NLRC: Valdez also instituted a criminal complaint for libel against Adtel's chairman, president, and officers. “The respondent argued that the giving of more separation benefit to the On 22 May 2006, Adtel issued a memorandum8 directing respondent to second and third batches of employees separated was their expression of show cause in writing why she should not be terminated for conflict of gratitude and benevolence to the remaining employees who have tried to interest and/or serious breach of trust and confidence.The memorandum save and make the company viable in the remaining days of operations. stated that the filing of cases by respondent's husband created a conflict of This justification is not plausible. There are workers in the first batch who interest since respondent had access to vital information that can be used have rendered more years of service and could even be said to be more against Adtel.Respondent was placed under preventive suspension by Adtel. efficient than those separated subsequently, yet they did not receive the On 23 May 2006, respondent denied the charges of Adtel. Respondent same recognition. Understandably, their being retained longer in their job contended that the cases had nothing to do with her being an employee of and be not included in the batch that was first terminated, was a concession Adtel and had not affected her performance in the company. enough and may already be considered as favor granted by the respondents On 29 May 2006, Adtel terminated respondent from the company. to the prejudice of the complainants. As it happened, there are workers in Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. In the first batch who have rendered more years in service but received lesser her Position Paper,respondent alleged that she did not violate any company separation pay, because of that arrangement made by the respondents in rule or policy; neither was she guilty of fraud, nor willful breach of trust. paying their termination benefits[.] x x x. [35] (Emphasis supplied, citation Respondent contended that she was illegally dismissed without just cause omitted.)” and was entitled to separation pay, backwages, and damages. Clearly, BSSI admitted that it purposely favored the second and third Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of Valdez was illegal. batches of retrenched employees by giving them a higher separation pay and a mid-year bonus as a reward for their efforts during the last days of the 41 Held:Yes.The NLRC held that Adtel failed to substantially prove the evidence the company's code of conduct, which was used as basis to existence of an act or omission personally attributable to the respondent to dismiss Esponga. serve as a just cause to terminate her employment.The CA denied the motion for extension and dismissed Adtel's petition for certiorari for being Appeal to the NLRC: NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling. It filed beyond the reglementary period. The Supreme Court affirmed the declared that Esponga's dismissal was valid. The NLRC observed that as a decision of the CA. result of incident, Esponga no longer performed his duties and simply spent the remaining working hours talking with his co-workers CASE NO. 45 Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, INc. vs KMM – Katipunan and Issue: W/N the cause of Esponga’s dismissal amounts to serious raymonf Esponga misconduct Facts: Ruling: YES. Accusatory and inflammatory language used by an employee towards his employer or superior can be a ground for dismissal or Petitioner hired respondent Raymond Esponga as a machine operator. June termination. Esponga's assailed conduct was related to his work. Vinoya did 2006, Sterling imposed a 20-day suspension on several employees not prohibit him from taking a nap. She merely reminded him that he could including Esponga, for allegedly participating in a wildcat strike. The not do so on the sheeter machine for safety reasons. Esponga's acts reflect Notice of Disciplinary Action contained a warning that a repetition of a an unwillingness to comply with reasonable management directives. similar offense would compel the management to impose the maximum penalty of termination of services. Sterling averred, their supervisor Mercy CASE NO. 46 Vinoya (Vinoya), found Esponga and his co-employees about to take a nap Yu v SR METALS, INC. (SRMI) G.R. No. 214249, September 25, 2017 on the sheeter machine. She called their attention and prohibited them from taking a nap thereon for safety reasons. Esponga and his co-employees then The Facts transferred to the mango tree near the staff house. When Vinoya passed by the staff house, she heard Esponga utter, "Huwag maingay, puro bawal. " SR Metals, Inc. Workers Union - FFW Chapter (SRMIWU-FFW) is a She then confronted Esponga, who responded in a loud and disrespectful legitimate labor organization and certified as the sole and exclusive tone. When Vinoya turned away, Esponga gave her the "dirty finger" sign in bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of SR Metals, Inc. (SRMI). front of his co-employees. The incident was witnessed by Mylene On the other hand, SRMI is a corporation duly organized and existing under Pesimo (Pesimo), who executed a handwritten statement,. Esponga was the Philippine laws and engaged in mining business at Agusan del Norte. found to have been not working as the machine assigned to him was not running instead he was having a conversation with his co-employees, A. Illegal Dismissal Cases Bobby Dolor and Ruel Bertulfo. Additionally, he failed to submit his daily reports. Subject of this petition are the fifteen (15) groups of employees who filed cases for illegal dismissal and money claims before the NLRC. Esponga submitted his written explanation denying the charges against him. He claimed that he did not argue with Vinoya as he was not in the area Executive Labor Arbiter (ELA) Noel Augusto S. Magbanua (Magbanua) where the incident reportedly took place. Esponga further reasoned that issued separate rulings on the 15 cases. Those regular employees of SRMI during the time when he was not seen operating the machine assigned to were found to have been illegally dismissed. On the other hand, the labor him, he was at the Engineering Department and then he proceeded to the arbiter did not find merit in the complaints for illegal dismissal of those comfort room. who were project or fixed-term employees; contractual employees; one whose services as house helpers were not directly related to the mining Labor Arbiter’s ruling: Esponga was illegally dismissed. It held that business; those who lacked interest to pursue the case for failure to submit Sterling failed to discharge the burden of proof for failure to submit in 42 Position Paper; and who was not an employee of SRMI but of SAN R Ruling of the CA Mining & Const. Corp. The petition for certiorari was dismissed for failure to state the date of Both the aggrieved employees and the SRMI appealed to the NLRC filing of the Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC and to indicate the serial number of the notary public's commission in violation of Section B. Unfair Labor Practice Case 2 (b) and (d) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Meantime, while the illegal dismissal cases were pending, Angat Kalawakang Hanapbuhay, Inc. - Union of Filipino Workers (AKHSRMI- SC Ruling UFW) and SRMIWU-FFW — the two unions that were organized within SRMI - agreed to a consent election, which was eventually conducted on The petition is partially granted. October 28, 2010. Upon opening and canvassing of the ballots, all 75 votes were for SRMIWU-FFW. The Med-Arbiter rendered an Order proclaiming In particular, there are three material dates that must be stated in a petition SRMIWU-FFW as the winner in the CE and as the certified sole and for certiorari brought under Rule 65: (a) the date when notice of the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of SRMI. judgment or final order or resolution was received, (b) the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration when one such was filed, and, SRMIWU-FFW demanded for the negotiation of a collective bargaining (c) the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. These dates agreement (CBA) but SRMI refused to bargain. SRMI countered that it does should be reflected in the petition to enable the reviewing court to not recognize the legitimacy of the union, which was organized only after determine if the petition was filed on time. the contracts of employment of its members ceased and only after they filed illegal dismissal cases against SRMI. Hence, SRMIWU-FFW filed ULP Nonetheless, procedural rules are designed to promote or secure, rather than against SRMI for refusal to bargain. frustrate or override, substantial justice. The Court restated the reasons that may provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to Ruling of the NLRC procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the The NLRC held that there were valid fixed-term contracts that negated the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the regularity of petitioners' employment. NLRC also ruled that SRMI did not party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that commit ULP for refusal to negotiate with SRMIWU-FFW. It was opined: the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.2 “Clearly, under the circumstances, the company would have cried foul, as it did, given that the members thereof were already separated from In the case at bar, the procedural lapses cited by the CA do not affect the employment. Added to this is the fact that at the time the consent election merits of the petition; procedural rules should have been relaxed in order to was conducted and upon the certification of the Union as the sole and serve substantial justice. What the CA should have done was to require exclusive bargaining agent, illegal dismissal cases were already on the petitioners' counsel to submit the lacking information instead of dismissing wheels of arbitration. Being the respondent in the copious illegal dismissal the case outright. Petitioners, who are merely rank-and-file employees and cases which covered the majority, if not the entire, membership of the are mostly, if not all, minimum wage earners, must not be penalized for the Union, SRMI cannot be expected to sit down and negotiate for a CBA with honest mistakes of their counsel. They deserve to have their case properly a union whose members were already separated from the company due to ventilated at the appellate court since what is at stake is their means of expiration of contracts or completion of the projects for which they were livelihood. hired, lest SRMI be misconstrued to have deserted its postulation on the validity of the separation from employment of the workers involved.” Hence, SC ruled that the case be remanded to the CA based on two grounds: First, the cases of illegal dismissal and ULP involved matters that 43 are not purely legal in nature. There are facts that need to be ascertained, 9. November 28, 2014- the NCMB-Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA) established, and resolved in relation to the legal issues raised. Unfortunately ruled in favor of Dabu, and ordered respondent to pay him $60,000 for petitioners, this Court is not a trier of facts.37 And Second, based on the 10. COURT OF APPEALS records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the determinative facts are not Petitioner appeled the PVA’s decision, on September 15, 2015, the Court of yet complete, hence, SC is not yet in a position to resolve the dispute with Appeals reversed the PVA Decision, and dismissed Dabu’s complaint. finality. However, after Dabu filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), the CA 47) Case Title: NYK-FIL Management, Inc. vs. Gener G. Dabu amended its decision and granted Dabu’s (MR). G.R. No. 225142 Sept. 13, 2017 CA dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground of being FILED OUT OF TIME. FACTS: 11. Petitioner filed for review on the ground that the Court of Appeals 1. Petitioner NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc., a local manning agent, committed a serious error in redering the amended decision on the ground hired respondent Gener G. Dabu to work as oiler for nine months on that it was allegedly filed out of time. board the vessel M/V Hojin with a monthly basic salary of US$584.00. ISSUE: WON the CA committed an error in rendering the amended 2. March 25, 2013 - Respondent underwent a pre-employment medical decision. examination (PEME) on where he disclosed that he has diabetes mellitus. The doctor who conducted the PEME noted that respondent has diabetes HELD: SUPREME COURT HELD no merit in the petition. mellitus type 2, controlled with medications. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. 3. On April 10, 2013, respondent consulted a doctor in Sri Lanka who found RATIO: him with elevated blood sugar level and was suffering from diabetes mellitus, and declared him unfit for sea duty. 1) Art. 262-A of the Labor Code provides: 4. April 12, 2013- Respondent was repatriated to Manila. The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary 5. July 18, 2013- the company-designated physician declared that Arbitrators shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall respondent's diabetes mellitus is not work-related. However, respondent's be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the treatment was continued for a maximum period of 130 days. Respondent copy of the award or decision by the parties. continued his follow-up consultations as he still complained of body pains 2) Clearly, the decision of the voluntary arbitrator becomes final and and weakness and was prescribed medicines. executory after 10 days from receipt thereof. 6. Respondent wrote letters to petitioner appealing for the continuation of 3) In Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals: his treatment since his sickness was work-related taking into account his 23 years of working in petitioner's various vessels. It is true that Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides for a 15-day 7. Respondent then consulted Two (2) other doctors, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo reglementary period for filing an appeal: Despite Rule 43 providing for a and Dr. Czarina Sheherazade Mae A. Miguel, who both found that this 15-day period to appeal, SC ruled that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision ilness is work-aggravated/ related. must be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor Code. 8. Dabu sought payment of disability benefits, damages and attorney's fees 4) We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of from petitioner, but was denied. Dabu then filed a notice to arbitrate with decisions rendered by Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute provides that the the National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB). Voluntary Arbitrator's decision "shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties." Being provided in the statute, this 10-day period must be complied 44 with; otherwise, no appellate court will have jurisdiction over the appeal. she failed to remit the subscription payment supposedly due to her busy This absurd situation occurs when the decision is appealed on the 11th to schedule, but agreed to return the payment of the students instead. 15th day from receipt as allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under Based on the findings of the School's investigating committee, a case for the law, has already become final and executory. misappropriation amounting to estafa could allegedly be built against Perez. 5) Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution provides, the SUPREME However, in view of her extensive service to the school, as well as to give COURT "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" in her the benefit of the doubt, the investigating committee reduced its promulgating rules of procedure in courts. The 10-day period to appeal findings to negligence and recommended that Perez be suspended without under the Labor Code being a substantive right, this period cannot be pay for ten working days.10 Accordingly, Perez was suspended from work diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules of Court. from April 10 to 25, 1995.11 A co-teacher suspected that cheating occurred 6) In Shioji v. Harvey, this court held that the "rules of court, promulgated on January 26, 1995, during the Math quarterly examinations of Grade V by authority of law, have the force and effect of law, if not in conflict with students proctored by Perez. Upon the teacher's inquiry, the student positive law." Rules of Court are "subordinate to the statute." In case of admitted she cheated by copying the answers of another student with the conflict between the law and the Rules of Court, "the statute will prevail." consent and instruction of Perez.12 Perez was suspended from work 7) The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or decision effective May 26, 1995 to June 11, 1995 with one week commutation. She shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt was then directed to report to work on June 13, 1995 for her assignment.16 of the award or decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion Perez correspondingly served out her suspension. Thereafter, nothing more for reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the motion must be filed was heard from Perez, until she filed a Complaint19 for payment of within the same 10-day period since a motion for reconsideration is filed separation benefits with the Labor Arbiter (LA) on June 15, 1998. In her "within the period for taking an appeal."23 Position Paper,20 Perez argued that she was constructively dismissed from 8) IN THIS CASE, petitioner received the PVA decision on February 9, employment21 and prayed that she be granted separation pay in light of her 2015, and filed the petition for review 15 days after receipt thereof, i.e., twenty-three (23) years of service to the School.22 Perez also submitted an on February 24, 2015. The CA, upon respondent's motion for Affidavit23 executed by one Teresita Limochin (Limochin), who attested reconsideration, rendered its Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016 that she received separation pay from the School following her voluntary dismissing the petition and vacating the earlier decision it made granting the resignation. petition. The CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time, citing the PHILEC case above-quoted. On April 24, 2000, the LA rendered a Decision34 granting Perez's claim for separation pay due to its conclusion that the petitioners have, as a practice, Case no.48 given separation pay to its employees who resigned.35 However, the LA SECOND DIVISION decreed that Perez resigned voluntarily from work and was not G.R. No. 185938, September 06, 2017 constructively dismissed.36 ALICIA M.L. COSETENG AND DILIMAN PREPARATORY SCHOOL, Petitioners, v. LETICIA P. PEREZ, Respondent. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners made a partial appeal on the LA Decision with tlie National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Facts: In 1972,4 Perez was hired by the School as a teacher for elementary On May 10, 2002, the NLRC promulgated its Decision38 modifying the LA students.In 1994, she was assigned to teach Grade V Level students with ruling. While tlie NLRC affirmed the grant of separation pay to Perez, it working hours from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 noon.6 Sometime in August 1994, deemed Perez as constructively dismissed from employment because she several students reported that Perez collected payment from them for was placed on floating status.39 The NLRC also ruled that it was erroneous subscription to Saranggola magazine, an educational publication endorsed to hold Coseteng liable for Perez's money claims as the former was neither by the School. However, they did not receive their copies of the magazine, a proper party to the case nor did she act with malice or bad faith.40 The while students from other sections had already received theirs. Thereafter, NLRC modified the LA judgment as follows: the School created a committee to conduct an investigation. Perez admitted 45 WHEREFORE, the decision dated 24 April 2000 is MODIFIED. The Article 28654 of the Labor Code, floating status refers to a temporary lay-off complaint against Alicia Coseteng is dismissed and the award of attorney's or off-detail of an employee by reason of a bonafide suspension of the fees is deleted. operation of a business or undertaking which shall not exceed six months. Perez was not constructively dismissed from employment In its Decision43 dated July 29, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition. It held that Perez's cause of action had not prescribed since "an employee has four While Perez has enjoyed her position of having a regular teaching load and years within which to institute an action for illegal dismissal."44 As with the advisory class for years, and may have to adjust to her temporary NLRC, the CA ruled that Perez was constructively dismissed from assignment, it is a recognized rule that "not every inconvenience, employment, necessitating an award for separation pay. The CA considered disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must endure results Perez's reassignment as a demotion amounting to additional penalty for her in a finding of constructive dismissal."71 Having failed to prove that her infractions. transfer was a result of discrimination, bad faith or disdain by the The decision of the public respondent Commission dated May 10, 2002 petitioners, Perez's claim of constructive dismissal must necessarily fail. and its resolution dated June 21, 2002 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary No separation pay may be granted to Perez injunction prayed for by the petitioners, being a mere adjunct in this petition, is perforce DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. As a general rule, an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to separation pay, except when it is stipulated in the ISSUES: employment contract or CBA, or it is sanctioned by established employer practice or policy.72 To be considered as a regular company practice, the WON Perez failed to discharge her burden of proving that her resignation employee must prove by substantial evidence that the giving of the benefit was involuntary. is done over a long period of time, and that it has been made consistently WON Perez was neither demoted nor was she placed on floating status. and deliberately.73 WON there is no basis for the CA's inference that the School has a practice or policy of granting separation pay to resigned employees, nor can Perez In an effort to show that the School has a policy of granting separation pay claim separation pay under the principle of social justice in view of her to its employees who resigned, Perez submitted an Affidavit74 executed by dishonest acts unbecoming of a teacher.48 Limochin, a co-teacher who received separation pay from the School despite having resigned from work. HELD: A scrutiny of Limochin's affidavit reveals that the School's grant of At the outset, the Court reiterates that only questions of law, not questions separation benefits or financial assistance to her was an isolated act, not of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. borne out by any established employer practice or policy. All in all, the While it is true that factual findings made by quasi-judicial and Court disagrees with the view of the labor tribunals and the CA relative to administrative tribunals, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded the award of separation benefits to Perez. They clearly overlooked the lack great respect and even finality by the courts, this general rule admits of of substantial evidence proving that the School grants separation pay to all exceptions. When there is a showing that a palpable and demonstrable its employees who resigned; its one-time act of giving separation benefits or mistake that needs rectification has been committed or when the factual financial assistance to an employee could hardly be considered as a practice findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, done consistently and deliberately over a long period of time. Having these findings may be examined by the courts.52 voluntarily resigned from work, Perez is not entitled to separation pay or The Court also clarifies that while the term "floating status" was used financial assistance. To reiterate, there is no evidence that payment of extensively in the pleadings, as well as in the decisions of the labor separation pay is stipulated in her employment contract or is sanctioned by tribunals and the CA, the petitioners aptly argued that Perez was not placed an established practice or policy of the School. under floating status in its legal sense. Under case law,53 with reference to 46 Petitioners are not entitled to damages and attorney's fees saying, "Matapang ka ha! Matapang ka!" Respondent replied, "Candy, ikaw pa naman ang nagdadasal araw-araw, tapos ganyan ang ugali mo!" Anent the petitioners' prayer for moral damages on account of the complaint filed by Perez, the Court denies the same for the reason that Consequently, Abaya directed respondent to see Lim in his office. During moral damages are not automatically granted; "there must still be proof of their meeting, the latter (Estolas) allegedly asked what she would feel if he the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to the would hit her ear, then proceeded to hit her ear. Respondent reasoned out defendants' acts."77 that she did not hit Banayad's ear and that it was the latter who provoked her. However, Lim insisted that respondent was rude towards Banayad. With respect to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code states Thus, on July 13, 2011, respondent was issued a suspension order effective that, "[e]xemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example the following day for a period of days. While she was in the locker area, the or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, company guard on duty informed respondent to report for work the liquidated or compensatory damages." Since the Court has adjudged the following day. petitioners as not entitled to moral damages, their plea for award of exemplary damages cannot be granted pursuant, to the aforestated On November 28, 2011, Lim directed respondent to sign a paper, which she provision. refused as it pertained to the promotion of Banayad as Strategy and Control Group-Senior Assistant 1. On November 30, 2011, respondent received a On the subject of attorney's fees, the Court holds that while the petitioners letter from Lim directing her to seek the assistance of a lawyer for the were compelled to engage the services of a counsel and incurred litigation hearing on December 7, 2011. At the scheduled hearing, respondent was expenses to defend their interests, it appears that Perez was not impelled by required to sign the statements of Banayad and other witnesses, which she malice and bad faith in filing her complaint. refused to follow. Thereafter, on December 16, 2011, respondent was served a notice of termination effective December 17, 2011, finding her guilty of serious misconduct. Case No. 49 Fabricator Philippines, Inc. v. Estolas Hence, Respondent Estolas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with G.R. Nos. 224308-09 claims for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees filed September 27, 2017 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of respondent Estolas after finding that although FACTS: the respondent may have indeed committed acts of misconduct, the same Petitioner Fabricator Philippines which is a domestic corporation engaged were not willful and intentional in character. As such, the penalty meted on in the manufacture and sale of motorcycle parts, with Victor Lim as its respondent, i.e., dismissal, was not commensurate to the offense charged President hired Respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas as a welder. against her. Before break time of July 2, 2011, while waiting for a replacement part she Aggrieved, petitioner and Lim appealed to the NLRC which initially issued requested to be installed on the welding machine she was using, respondent a Resolution dismissing the appeal on technical grounds. Upon Estolas took a seat and rested. At that time, another employee, Rosario reconsideration, however, the NLRC modified LA ruling by deleting the Banayad, passed by and saw her sitting, then uttered "Ayos ka ha." The award of separation pay and backwages, and in lieu thereof, ordered matter was brought to the attention of Assembly Action Team Leader, respondent's reinstatement to her former position without loss of seniority Warlito Abaya, who confronted respondent about the said incident. rights, opining it as the commensurate penalty for the latter's act of Thereafter, while Abaya and Banayad were talking to each other, professional misconduct. respondent told the latter in the vernacular "Ang kitid ng utak mo[.] [B]akit hindi mo muna ako tinanong kung bakit ako nakaupo[?] [B]akit hindi mo muna tinanong kung ano [ang] nasa likod ng nakita mo?" Banayad retorted, 47 Both parties moved for reconsideration, which were, however, denied in a NLRC Resolution. Dissatisfied, they elevated the matter to the Court of Misconduct is defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a Appeals (CA) via their respective petitions for certiorari. transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent The CA reinstated the LA ruling with modifications: (a) ordering petitioner and not mere error in judgment. To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal to pay respondent backwages from the time she was illegally dismissed within the text and meaning of the foregoing provision, the following until finality of the ruling less her salary for 15 days corresponding to her elements must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate suspension, and separation pay computed from the time respondent was to the performance of the employee's duties, showing that the employee has hired until finality of the decision, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have finality of the decision until fully paid; (b) absolving Lim from any personal been performed with wrongful intent. liability arising from respondent's illegal dismissal; and (c) ordering the LA to make a recomputation of the total monetary benefits awarded and due In this case, the tribunals a quo aptly observed that while respondent indeed respondent. committed some sort of misconduct when she engaged in a verbal tussle with Banayad during work hours and in front of their superior, Abaya, the Agreeing with the findings of the labor tribunals a quo, the CA held that same was not serious enough to warrant respondent's dismissal. Neither was respondent's acts did not amount to gross misconduct that would have it shown that respondent performed such act of misconduct with wrongful justified her termination from work. In this regard, it found that the NLRC intent nor did the same render her unfit to continue working for petitioner. gravely abused its discretion in deleting the award of backwages, pointing As such, the tribunals a quo correctly concluded that petitioner illegally out that respondent was already suspended for 3 days for her misconduct, dismissed respondent. It is settled that "where the factual findings of the and thus, a second disciplinary proceeding, which resulted in her dismissal, labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed by the CA, the as well as the consequent filing of the instant case, was no longer same are accorded respect and finality and are binding upon this Court," as warranted. Nonetheless, the CA opined that respondent's infraction was in this case. minor, for which a 15-day suspension would have sufficed. Moreover, it is well to stress that (July 13, 2011) petitioner already issued Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied an order suspending respondent for a period of 3 days on account of her in a Resolution; hence, this petition. misconduct. Thus, petitioner could no longer subject respondent to another disciplinary proceeding based on the same act of misconduct. Clearly, respondent could not have been validly terminated from work. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that respondent was illegally Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the CA dismissed Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 133794 and 133833 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, deleting the deduction of HELD: salary/wages for 15 days from the award of backwages in favor of YES. Article 297 (formerly Article 282) 45 of the Labor Code, as amended, respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas. The rest of the CA ruling STANDS. lists serious misconduct as one of the just causes for an employee's dismissal from work, pertinent portions of which read: CASE NO. 50 Article 297 [282]. Termination by Employer. — An employer may Allan John Uy Reyes vs Global Beer Below Zero, Inc. terminate an employment for any of the following causes: G.R. No. 222816, October 4, 2017 (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employe e of the Facts: lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; 48 Petitioner Reyes was an employee of respondent Global as Operations claim of Co Say that he asked Reyes to return to work in order to possibly Manager. On January 18, 2012, Reyes, in accordance with his duties explain his numerous absences, negligence in performing his duties and reported to the main office of respondent Global in Makati instead of going serious misconduct. NLRC Ruling: On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA. to the Pasig warehouse in order to request for budget because there was a The NLRC ruled that Reyes sufficiently alleged the surrounding scheduled delivery in the following day. The following day, Reyes ran late circumstances of his dismissal and was able to state, with the required because according to him, his three-year-old son was sick. Around 10:30 particularities how he was terminated from his employment; thus, a.m. of the same day, respondent Global’s Vice-President for Operations, respondent Global should have proven that it was legally done. According Vinson CO Say (Co Say), Reyes’ immediate and direct superior at that time, to the NLRC, respondent Global failed to disprove Reyes’ allegation that he called Reyes and asked him why he was not yet at the office. Reyes was verbally dismissed twice by Co Say, hence, there is no evidence apologized and said that he was on his way. According to Reyes, he tried to showing that Reyes was dismissed from his job for cause and that he was explain why he was late, but Co Say did not listen and the latter shouted at afforded procedural due process. Respondent filed with the CA a petition the other end of the line and told Reyes not to report for work anymore. for certiorari under Rule 65. CA Ruling: The CA reversed the NLRC. In Reyes further claimed that Co Say angrily retorted that he will talk to him finding merit to respondent Global’s petition, the CA ruled that the “text” the following week before Co Say hung up the phone. As instructed, Reyes messages allegedly sent by Co Say and Tet Manares to Reyes could hardly did not report for work on the following days and waited for further meet the standard of clear, positive and convincing evidence to prove instructions from Co Say. On January 24, 2012, Reyes received a text Reyes’ bare assertion that he was verbally terminated from employment by message from Co Say stating the following, “Allan, let’s meet thu, puno aka Co Say, no corroborative and competent evidence was adduced by Reyes to today, bukas.” Around 1:28 p.m. of January 26, 2012, Reyes received a text substantiate his claim that he was illegally dismissed. The CA, instead, message from Co Say which says, “Allan, let’s meet in Starbucks found that there was no overt or positive act on the part of respondent Waltermart around 3:00.” During the said meeting, Co Say told Reyes to no Global proving that it had dismissed Reyes. Hence, the present petition, longer report for work and insisted that he file a resignation letter which after the denial of Reyes’ motion for reconsideration. Reyes refused to do because he believed that he had not done anything that would warrant his dismissal from the company. Thus, Reyes instituted a Issue/s: complaint for constructive dismissal on February 22, 2012 and amended the Whether or not the word “turnover” means dismissal from employment? same complaint on March 29, 2012, changing his cause of action to illegal Whether or not unauthenticated text message can be given credence in a dismissal. Respondent Global, on the other hand, claimed that Reyes was labor case? not dismissed from service, but the latter stopped reporting for work on his own volition after repeatedly violating company rules and regulations. He committed a total of six (6) absences constituting those without filing leave Ruling: of absence and not following the prior notice rule. He also incurred a total The SC found merit in the petition. Verbal notice of termination can hardly balance of Php 7,977.10 for personal use of WAP services, and his absences be considered as valid or legal. To constitute valid dismissal from resulted in several work remaining undone. LA Ruling: The LA ruled in employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a favor of complainant. According to the LA, Reyes had no intention of just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an quitting his job as seen from his filing of applications of leaves of absences opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. In justifying that such verbal days before he supposedly abandoned his job and hist texting Co Say about command not to report for work from respondent Global’s Vice President is work on the day he supposedly abandoned his job. It also found that the for Operations Co Say as not enough to be construed as overt acts of accusation that Reyes committed serious misconduct and was negligent in dismissal, the CA cited the case of Noblejas v. Italian Maritime Academy the performance of his duty is more consistent with a finding that there was Phils., Inc. In the said case, an employee filed an illegal dismissal case after dismissal than with finding that there was an abandonment of employment. the secretary of the company’s Managing Director told him, “No, you better The Labor Arbiter further ruled that the word “turnover” in Co Say’s last pack up all your things now and go, you are now dismissed and you are no text message to Reyes indicates that on the date that it was sent, the latter longer part of this office -clearly, you are terminated from this day on.” was already expected to turnovers duties to his replacement and belies the There was no dismissal to speak of because the secretary’s words were not 49 enough to be construed as overt acts of dismissal. Be that as it may, the cases. Thus, the “text” messages may be given credence especially if they factual antecedents of that case is different in this case. In the present case, corroborate the other pieces of evidence presented. Again, while as a rule, the one who verbally directed Reyes to no longer report for work was his the Court strictly adheres to the rules of procedure, it may take exception to immediate or direct supervisor, the VicePresident for Operations, who has such general rule when a strict implementation of the rules would cause the capacity and authority to terminate Reyes’ services, while in Noblejas, substantial injustice to the parties. Having thus proven the fact of being the one who gave the instruction was merely the secretary of the company’s dismissed, the burden to prove that such dismissal was not done illegally is Managing Director. Hence, in Noblejas, the Court found it necessary that now shifted to the employer to show by substantial evidence that the the employee should have clarified the statement of the secretary from his employee’s termination from service is for a just and valid cause. In this superiors before the same employee instituted an illegal dismissal case. In case, respondent Global asserts that there was no dismissal; instead, there the present case, Co Say’s verbal instruction, being Reyes’ immediate was abandonment of the part of Reyes of his employment. The Labor supervisor, was authoritative, therefore, Reyes was not amiss in thinking Arbiter, however, found that on the days that Reyes supposedly abandoned that his employment has indeed already been terminated. The text messages his employment according to respondent Global, no such indication was produced in a machine copy by Reyes tended to show that he was actually found as Reyes filed applications for leave and even sent “text” messages to dismissed from his work. The text message purportedly sent by respondent his immediate or direct superior regarding his work. Abandonment requires Co Say that: “Tet will contact you plus turnover” was clear enough. A literal the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his interpretation of said text message leaves no doubt that the complainant’s employment, without any intention of returning. For abandonment to exist, days with the respondent company was numbered. The word “turnover” two factors must be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence simply connotes “to transfer,” “to yield” or “to return.” In employment without valid of justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever parlance, the word “turnover” is associated with severance of employment. employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more An employee makes proper “turnover” of pending work before he leaves determinative factor being manifested by some overt acts. In this case, no his employment. The text message of respondent Co Say was followed by such abandonment was proven by respondent Global. In fact, Reyes would another message from Ms. Tet Manares which stated that: “Kuya, pianos ko not have filed a case for illegal dismissal if he really intended to abandon na kay gen salary mo.” This is consistent with the first message that Tel will his work. Employees who take steps to protest their dismissal cannot contact the complainant. True enough, Ms. Tet Manares contacted the logically be said to have abandoned their work. complainant informing him that his salary was already being prepared. The two (2) text messages, when taken together, support complainant’s insistence that he was actually dismissed from his work. Respondent Co Say’s text message regarding “turnover” and Ms. Manares’ text message regarding the preparation of the complainant’s salary were quite consistent with the complainant’s allegation that he was dismissed by respondent Co Say during their telephone conversation and during their meeting at Starbucks Waltermart. Global’s assertion that the purported text messages submitted by Reyes should not be given credence as he failed to authenticate the same in accordance with the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. In labor cases, the strict adherence to the rules of evidence may be relaxed consistent with the higher interest of substantial justice. In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice, technicalities must be avoided. It is well settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in labor 50