SAROCAM VS INTERORIENT MARITIME 493 SCRA 502 (2006) FACTS: On June 27, 2000, petitioner Benjamin Sarocam was hiredby Interorient Maritime and Demaco United Ltd., for 12-month contract as “bosun” on borad M/V Despina. While navigating to China, Sarocam suffered lumbar sprain when he accidentally fell from a ladder. On Nov 15, 2000, he was examined and was found to have neuromyositis and diabetes. The examining physician prescribed medicine and recommended signing of and hospitalization. He was repatriated on Nov 30, 2000. On Dec 5, 2000, petitioner was referred to the company-designated physician. Sarocam was given medicine for his back pain and diabetes and was advised to return for a checkup. On Dec 13, he returned to the clinic with normal results; petitioner was then declared “fit for duty.” On Mar 20, 2001, petitioner executed a release and quitclaim in favor of his Interorient Maritime where he acknowledged receipt of $405 as sick wages. However on Nov 2001, petitioner filed a complaint with NLRC for disability benefit, illness allowance/reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and fees. To support his claim, he presented medical certificates issued by his 3 personal doctors, recommending Grade VIII disability under POEA schedule of disability grading. LA dismissed the complaint citing that he was not entitled to disability benefits because he was declared fit for duty and had previously executed a release and quitclaim in favor of his employers and had already received his sickness allowance. NLRC affirmed the same. Sarocam’s argument: the quitclaim he executed is invalid, as the amount he received was much lower than what he should have received under the POEA standard employment contract. Quitclaims are frowned upon by the courts as they are contrary to public policy. ISSUES: W/N SAROCAM’S EXECUTION OF A RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM ESTOP HIM FROM CLAIMING DISABILITY BENEFITS UDNER THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT HELD: While the petitioner may be correct in stating that quitclaims are frowned upon for being contrary to public policy, the Court has, likewise recognized legitimate waivers that represent voluntary and reasonable settlement of a worker’s claim which should be respected as the law between the parties. Where the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking. In the present case, Sarocam wrote the release and quitclaim with his own hand. From the document itself, the element of voluntariness in its execution is evident. He also appears to have fully understood the contents of the document he was signing, as the important provision thereof had been relayed to him in Filipino. Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable on its face, the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. Let it be emphasized that the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right. DAYAN V. BPI 369 SCRA 712 (2001) FACTS: Petitioner Rogelio C. Dayan (Dayan) started his employment on 30 June 1956 with the Commercial Bank and Trust Company (CBTC). CBTC was eventually absorbed by the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) where Dayan was maintained as employee. In 1981, Dayan was promoted Administrative Assistant by respondent bank in its centralized accounting office. He held several positions thereafter - Assistant Manager of Internal Operations in 1983, Assistant Manager of Correspondent Bank in 1988, Assistant Manager of Branch Operations in 1990, Assistant Manager of the Supplies Inventory in 1991, and then Senior Assistant Manager of the Supplies Inventory in 19911992. In addition to the series of promotions, Dayan was the recipient of various commendations. December 1991, the post of Purchasing Officer became vacant. The vacated position was offered to Dayan which he initially declined but, due to the insistence of his superiors, he later accepted on a temporary basis in February 1993. 10 June 1993, Asst VP Gerlanda E. De Castro of the bank, in a memorandum, placed petitioner under suspension. Dayan is placed under suspension due to matters presented to him in a meeting on the same morning of the suspension memo. It appears that BPI conducted earlier interviews regarding supposed malpractices committed by Dayan during his term as Purchasing Officer. The report signed and noted by Rololfo Bernejo (Mgr) and Victor Guillermo (Sr Mgr) contained alleged misconduct such as asking for 5% commission on purchase orders, “donations totaling 5K” for medical bills, overpricing BPI Family Bank’s passbook, etc. The report also made negative findings and observations about his work performance. 14 June 1993, petitioner wrote a memorandum to the bank narrating what had transpired in his meeting with the bank on 10 June 1993 where he denied all the accusations against him and contested his preventive suspension. His denials and plea for compassion notwithstanding, petitioner was dismissed by respondent bank via a notice of termination, dated 25 October 1993, signed by AVP Gerlanda de Castro. In a letter of confession, dated 28 October 1993, petitioner ultimately admitted his infractions and instead asked for financial assistance. He, at the same time, executed an undated "Release Waiver and Quitclaim" acknowledging receipt of P400,000.00 financial assistance from the bank and thereby releasing and discharging it from any action or claim arising from his employment with the bank and membership in the retirement plan. Subsequently, however, petitioner claimed that the letter and the quitclaim were signed by him under duress . On 14 February 1994, he filed a case for Illegal Dismissal and Illegal Suspension, with a prayer for an award of retirement benefits, before the Labor Arbiter. In his decision of 30 June 1995, the Labor Arbiter upheld the validity of the dismissal of petitioner based on loss of trust and confidence and denied his claim for retirement benefits and damages. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the labor arbiter and declared the dismissal to be illegal on the ground that petitioner was denied due process ratiocinating that a hearing should have been afforded petitioner for a chance to confront the witnesses against him. BPI filed with SC, a petition for certiorari questioning the NLRC decision. The Court referred the petition to CA. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the NLRC. In its petition for review before the SC, petitioner argues that the CA has wrongly relied on unsworn statements taken by the bank from its contractual employees. Petitioner believes that the factual conclusions of the NLRC which has acquired expertise on the matters entrusted to it should have instead been respected by the appellate court. HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter and setting aside the NLRC's decision is AFFIRMED. The Court of Appeals was convinced that petitioners dismissal had been justified under Article 282 of the Labor Code A bank, its operation being essentially imbued with public interest, owes great fidelity to the public it deals with. In turn, it cannot be compelled to continue in its employ a person in whom it has lost trust and confidence and whose continued employment would patently be inimical to the bank interest. The law, in protecting the rights of labor, authorized neither oppression nor self-destruction of an employer company which itself is possessed of rights that must be entitled to recognition and respect The lack of notice and hearing is considered as being a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the dismissal ineffectual but not necessarily illegal. The procedural infirmity is then remedied by ordering the payment to the employee his full backwages from the start of his dismissal until the court finally rules that the dismissal has been for a valid cause. FRANCISCO V. NLRC 500 SCRA 690 (2007) ISSUE: WON CA committed an error in granting Dayan’s dismissal; WON the respondent should be reinstated in BPI FACTS: In 1995, petitioner was hired by Kasei Corporation. She was designated as Accountant and Corporate Secretary and was assigned to handle all the accounting needs of the company. She was also designated as Liaison Officer to secure licenses for the initial operation of the company. In 1996, petitioner was designated Acting Manager. As Acting Manager, petitioner was assigned to handle recruitment of all employees and perform management administration functions; represent the company in all dealings with government agencies, especially with the BIR, SSS and in the city government of Makati; and to administer all other matters pertaining to the operation of Kasei Restaurant which is owned and operated by Kasei Corporation. For five years, petitioner performed the duties of Acting Manager. As of December 31, 2000 her salary was P27,500.00. In January 2001, petitioner was replaced by Fuentes as Manager. Petitioner alleged that she was required to sign a prepared resolution for her replacement but she was assured that she would still be connected with Kasei Corporation. Then, the designated Treasurer, Acedo, convened a meeting of all employees of Kasei Corporation and announced that petitioner was still connected with Kasei Corporation as Technical Assistant. Thereafter, Sept. 2001, Kasei Corporation reduced her salary by P2,500.00 a month. Petitioner was not paid her mid-year bonus allegedly because the company was not earning well. In October 2001, petitioner did not receive her salary from the company. She made repeated follow-ups with the company but she was advised that the company was not earning well. On October 15, 2001, petitioner asked for her salary from Acedo but she was informed that she is no longer connected with the company. Since she was no longer paid her salary, petitioner did not report for work and filed an action for constructive dismissal before the labor arbiter. ISSUE: WON there was an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent Kasei Corporation HELD: The SC held that there has been no uniform test to determine the existence of an employer-employee relation. The better approach would therefore be to adopt a two-tiered test involving: (1) the putative employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and (2) the underlying economic realities of the activity orrelationship. This is especially appropriate in this case where there is no written agreement or terms of reference to base the relationship on; and due to the complexity of the relationship based on the various positions and responsibilities given to the worker over the period of the latter's employment. Thus, the determination of the relationship between employer and employee depends upon the circumstances of the whole economic activity, such as: (1) the extent to which the services performed are an integral part of the employer's business; (2) the extent of the worker's investment in equipment and facilities; (3) the nature and degree of control exercised by the employer; (4) the worker's opportunity for profit and loss; (5) the amount of initiative, skill,judgment or foresight required for the success of the claimed independent enterprise; By applying the control test. the corporation's Technical Consultant. with the power to dismiss her for cause. Technical Consultant. Liaison Officer. (6) the permanency and duration of the relationship between the worker and the employer. She was selected and engaged by the company for compensation. there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei Corporation because she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura. for The corporation constructively dismissed petitioner when it reduced her salary by P2. and (7) the degree of dependency of the worker upon the employer for his continued employment in that line of business.500 a month from January to September 2001. Since the position of petitioner as accountant is one of trust and confidence.where the petitioner is entitled to full backwages. Respondent corporation hired and engaged petitioner compensation. and under the principle of strained relations. She reported for work regularly and served in various capacities as Accountant. Her main job function involved accounting and tax services rendered to respondent corporation on a regular basis over an indefinite period of engagement. in lieu of reinstatement. petitioner is further entitled to separation pay. . Acting Manager and Corporate Secretary. This amounts to an illegal termination of employment. and is economically dependent upon respondent for her continued employment in that line of business. They averred that the said company policy is illegal and contravenes Art 136 Labor Code. also an employee there. In case of two of our employees (both single) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married. whom he married on June 27. Symbol was employed by the company on October 27. Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married. Prior to the marriage. Simbol. Each respondent signed a release and confirmation agreement stating that they no claims or demands of whatever nature against the company. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case s/he has a relative. However. was dismissed for immoral conduct (with no hearing) on the account of her supposed affair with a married man who was another employee in the company. CA reversed the NLRC decision and ordered Star Paper Corp to reinstate Simbol et al to their former positions with loss of seniority rights with full back wages. discharge or discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage. LA dismissed the complaint on the account that the said policy was management prerogative. et al are regular employees of the company. There are two types of employment policies involving spouse: policies banning only spouses from work in the same company (no-spouse employment policies) and those banning all immediate family members including spouses from working in the same company (antinepotism employment policies). NLRC affirmed the same. 1998. on the other hand.Respondents filed a complaint for unfair labor practice. up to the 3rd degree. Simbol et al resigned pursuant to company policy. one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above. Zuniga. constructive dismissal. . He met Alma Dayrit. they have the right to choose who between them should resign. separation pay and fees. STAR PAPER CORP VS SIMBOL 487 SCRA 228 (2008) FACTS: Petitioner Star Paper Corp is a corporation engaged — principally of paper products with Josephine Ongsitco as manager of Personnel and Administration and Sebastian Chua as managing director. 1993. ISSUE: W/N THE COMPANY POLICY IN QUESTION IS ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL HELD: The Constitution clearly affirms labor as a primary social economic force and protects the rights of workers and promote their welfare. already employed by the company 2. Petitioners argue that said company policy does not prohibit its employees from marrying but that should two company employees decide to marry one other. or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated or to actually dismiss. one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995 stating: 1. Art 136 Labor Code even provides: It shall be unlawful for an employee to require as a condition for employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married. Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign voluntarily but were forced toresign in view of an illegal company policy. To determine of an employment policy is within the ambit of two types of employment policies: Under the disparate treatment analysis. while questioned policy may not facially violate Art 136 Labor Code. . the policy often disproportionately affects one sex. The failure of the petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company. but not husbands of female. These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the business. the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. That the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved 2. To justify this. They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other spouse in the same office. It is also significant to note that the respondents were hired after they found fit for the job but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. the complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class. Unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the of the business require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose. the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of tenure. is discriminatory on its face. although most employment policies do not expressly indicate which spouse will be required to transfer or leave the company. the employer must prove two factors: 1. If the courts uphold the questioned rule without valid justification. For example. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. For example. Moreover. an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employee’s spouse. Under the disparate impact. There is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job Petitioner’s sole contention that the company did not just want to have 2 or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity or consanguinity is lame as it does not provide a valid reasonable business necessity required by law. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of respondents could be detrimental to its business operations. the only way to pass judicial scrutiny is a show that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory effect. This is known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception. an employment policy prohibiting the employer from hiring wives of male employees. it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory. 8 As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers. Inc. 8042 violate Section 1.5 According to the respondent. CA 429 SCRA 81 (2004) FACTS: The Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter. 1995. Section 126 and Article XV. ARCO-Phil was joined in the petition by eleven other corporations which were allegedly members of the organization when it filed an amended petition. The amended petition also questioned other sections of the law which dealt with the overseas deployment only of skilled Filipino workers alleging discrimination against unskilled workers. 1995 a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 0f the Rules of Court with the RTC of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional portions of RA 8042. Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and. otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the government from enforcing the said portions of the law. only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The questioned portions of the said RA deal with illegal recruitment. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers. Furthermore. According to the respondent. (ARCOPhil) filed on July 17. on its claim that a great number of duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. Act No. On August 1. Article III of the Constitution. penalties for illegal recruitment. as such. the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters. and on the venue of criminal action for illegal recruitment. violated the equal protection clause. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment abroad. Sections 17 and 3(3) of the Constitution. the trial court issued a temporary restraining order on the implementation or effectivity of the questioned provisions based on the allegations of the private . It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers. as well as Article II. The respondent justified its plea for injunctive relief on the allegation in its amended petition that its members are exposed to the immediate and irreparable danger of being deprived of their right to a livelihood and other constitutional rights without due process. Respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses.respondents that they will suffer grave or irreparable damage or injury if the law is implemented. In JMM Promotion and Management. sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. thus: A profession. Act No. ISSUE: WON the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s order and the writ it issued HELD: The SC also held that the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction is mooted by case law.25 the issue of the extent of the police power of the State to regulate a business. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights. Diaz. v. the preservation of the State. the Professional Regulation Commission has begun to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. the public health and welfare and public morals. 8042 is but an amendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied retroactively. Court of Appeals. The Court however dismissed the petition. Petitioners filed a petition with the court of Appeals assailing the order and the writ with the court of Appeals on the grounds that it has not shown any convincing proof that in fact damage or injury would result in the implementation of the questioned statute. The SC cited various cases it had earlier decided on apply RA 8042. According to the maxim. by final judgment declares the provisions to be unconstitutional. Locally. under the mantle of the police power.24 we held that Rep. business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions. and the proper regulation of a profession. NLRC 362 SCRA 56 (2001) ASUNCION V NLRC FACTS: Asuncion was employed as an accountant/bookkeeper by the respondent Mabini Medical Clinic. the SC. no right is absolute. trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. Officials of the DOLE conducted a routine inspection of the company and discovered upon the disclosure of Asuncion . Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. In any case. of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. affirmed the validity of the assailed provisions. the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. By these rulings. Hence the enforcement of the provisions cannot be enjoined unless the SC. profession or calling vis-à-vis the equal protection clause and the non-impairment clause of the Constitution were raised and we held. in effect. where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property. Nevertheless.suspended their operations for fear that (a) their officers and employees would be prosecuted under the unjust and unconstitutional penal provisions of Rep. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice. calling. 8042 and meted equally unjust and excessive penalties. Inc. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. Act No. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. ASUNCION V. In People v. it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others. Dr. ISSUE: WON NLRC erred in finding that Asuncion was dismissed by the Company for a just or authorized cause HELD: YES. unreliable. These should not be considered as absences as there was no arrangement between her and the private respondents that she is required to work on Saturdays. It is the employer who has the burden of proving that the dismissal was with just or authorized cause. Loitering. Labor Arbiter Caday rendered judgment declaring that the petitioner was illegally dismissed. Company failed to present a single piece of credible evidence to serve as the basis for their charges against Asuncion and consequently. A worker’s employment is property in the constitutional sense. There is no evidence that the Company that Asuncion was given any warning or reprimanded for her alleged absences and tardiness.violations of the labor standards laws (such as the noncoverage from the SSS of the employees). Medical Director. petitioner submitted her response to the memorandum. dismissed the petitioner on the ground of disobedience of lawful orders and for her failure to submit her reply within the two-day period. Three days later. The handwritten listing was not signed by the one who made the same. not only must it be based on just cause supported by clear and convincing evidence. charged Asuncion with offenses such Chronic Absentism. The handwritten listing and unsigned computer print-outs were unauthenticated and. Habitual tardiness. failed to fulfill their burden of proving the facts which constitute the just cause for the dismissal of the petitioner. Asuncion’s letter did not amount to an admission of her alleged absences. the employee must also be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself. In order for the dismissal to be valid. Disobedience and insubordination. On the same day. There is lack of evidence to establish the charges of absenteeism and tardiness. Petitioner was required to explain within two (2) days why she should not be terminated based on the above charges. hence. Juco. respondent Dr. He cannot be deprived of his work without due process. On appeal. The company was made to correct these violations. Her alleged absences were incurred on Saturdays. NLRC rendered the assailed decision which set aside the Labor Arbiter’s ruling. Company submitted mere handwritten listing and computer print-outs. The failure of the employer to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is not justified and that the employee is entitled to reinstatement and backwages. Juco. . The law mandates that every opportunity and assistance must be accorded to the employee by the management to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense. the cashier inquired about the P1000 deposit made. The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. Forging. as a telephone operator. Restaurants and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) with an existing CBA with the private respondent. She refused to sign and wrote “under protest. If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee. MANEJA VS NLRC 290 SCRA 603 (1998) FACTS: FACTS: Petitioner Rosario Maneja worked with private respondent Manila Midtown Hotel beginning January 1985. The same evening. LA found that the petitioner was illegally dismissed.” On October 2. some of which were allegedly committed almost a year before. falsifying official documents and. 1990. she changed the date to February 13. Asuncion has been illegally terminated. Both submitted their written explanation. On March 7. The deposit was then forwarded to the cashier. She was a member of the National Union of Workers in Hotels. Maneja filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the labor arbiter (LA). In February 13. But after realizing that the call was made 2 days before. a written report was submitted. Culpable carelessness—negligence or failure to follow specific instruction/s or established procedure/s On March 23. the charges leveled against her lacked particularity. After a search. 23 half-days and 108 tardiness). On March 20. Petitioner insists that her termination is not an unresolved grievance as there had been no grievance meeting between the union and the management. a fellow telephone operator. Petitioner alleged that it has been a company policy that termination cases are not referred to the grievance machinery but directly to LA. stating that their actions were covered violations of the Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Action (OSDA) as 1. considering that she was charged with several offenses and infractions (35 absences. 2. NLRC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction of LA because the case was subject to voluntary arbitration. The two-day period given to Asuncion to explain and answer the charges against her was most unreasonable. stating that even though the case revolves on the matter of implementation and interpretation of company policies and is thus within the jurisdiction of the grievance procedure under the CBA. but the call was also unanswered. Rowena Loleng. received a request for long distance call (RLDC) form and a deposit for P500. she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority and the payment of backwages. petitioner was then served notice of dismissal effective on April 1. Art. Loleng passed the RLDC to Maneja for follow up. the first one was found in the guest folio while the other in the folder for cancelled calls.00 . 217 Labor Code confers original and exclusive jurisdiction of all termination cases to LA. the chief telephone operator asked the petitioner and Loleng to explain the Feb 15 incident.00 from a Japanese guest but the call was unanswered. Petitioner Maneja saw that the 2nd RLDC form was not time stamped so she placed it in the machine to stamp it with the date February 15. ON February 15. the Japanese guest again made an RLDC and deposited another P500. the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. 1990. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR. An examination of the record reveals that no hearing whatsoever was ever conducted by the Hotel before Maneja was dismissed. The reason for this. the union does not have into the picture.” ANG TIBAY V. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. no hearing was actually conducted before she was terminated. While it may be true that the petitioner submitted a written explanation. Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. In the case at bar. . 2. It can thus be deduced that only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. and that the terminated employee who wishes to question the legality of his termination usually goes to LA for arbitration. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay. according to the petitioner is that “the practice in said hotel in cases of termination is that the latter cases are not referred anymore to the grievance committed. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by the parties to a CBA of the union and company. There is no cause for dismissal as the petitioner’s actions were not contrary to company practice and there is also no basis for personal appropriation based on the facts 2. whether the termination arose from the interpretation or enforcement of the company policies or otherwise. That the dismissal must be for any causes expressed in Art 282 Labor Code and. She was not accorded the opportunity to fully defend herself which is clearly a violation of her right to due process. CIR 59 PHIL 635 (1940) Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations 59 Phil 635 (1940) Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Art. Due to alleged shortage of leather. not having objected or voiced any dissent to the dismissal of Maneja. The employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.ISSUE: W/N MANEJA’S TERMINATION WAS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW HELD: Petitioner was illegally dismissed as there are two requisites in a valid dismissal: 1. 260 Labor Code further provides that the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representative to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level. 1. NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial. a machine operator at Century Textile. it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded. They are. another factory worker. that of having something to support its decision. Calangi filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch. but that he had “kept silent” all the while. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. in all controversial questions. Marin. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should. or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Petitioner Century Textile Mills alleged that Calangi had been previously informed of and given the chance to answer the company’s accusations against him. and the reasons for the decisions rendered. therefore. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right. HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. Torrena and Calangi were preventively suspended and eventually dismissed. (1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Torrena confessed that Calangi personally instructed him to put the substance in the pitcher as an act of revenge against Melitona and Santos because they repeatedly instigated the termination of the two machine operators. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. put some substance in a pitcher where Meliton and Santos usually drank from. render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. CENTURY TEXT MILLS INC VS NLRC 161 SCRA 528 (1988) FACTS: Eduardo Calangi. was terminated because he was allegedly behind the plot to kill his two supervisors. . a place when directly attached. Melchor Meliton and Antonio Santos. a machine operator. namely.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.ISSUE: WON there has been a due process of law. NCR. and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges. and was dismissed because the evidence was “so overwhelming” and “sufficient enough” against Calangi and he failed to inexplicably to deny or controvert any charges. noticed that Torrena. must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy. Calangi filed an appeal in NLRC and the decision of the Arbitration branch was reversed. MOLE. It was later found out that the substance was formaldehyde. In the present case. Such consultation or consent is not a substitute for actual observance of the rights. there is security of tenure. Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code states: Sec 2 Notice of dismissal: Written notice of the particular acts or omission constituting grounds for dismissal. No loss of seniority rights and payment of back wages are the normal consequences when finding an employee illegally dismissed but reinstatement is not in the best interest of the parties involved. Sec 5 Answer and hearing: Employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representatives if he so desires Sec 6 Decision to dismiss: Employer should immediately inform the worker in writing of the decision to dismiss him clearly stating the reasons. . Rule 4. According to Art 280 Labor Code. It was also stated that the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause rests on the employer. Art 278 Labor Code states that an employer should furnish the worker a written notice containing causes for termination and shall afford ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules. there was nothing in the record that the Cainta Police interrogated Calangi himself. Therefore. Prior consultation with the labor union is legally insufficient because right to notice and hearing are rights personal to an employee. The basis for the ground of dismissal is anchored solely on Torrena’s sworn statement which was not proven sufficiently. The corporation cannot be forced to take back an employee who poses a threat to the lives of other employees. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in cases of employee dismissal: the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer’s intent and the reason for the proposed dismissal while the requirement of hearing affords the employee the opportunity to answer his employer’s charges against him and to accordingly defend himself.ISSUE: W/N RESPONDENT CALANGI WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED BECAUSE HIS TERMINATION WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH DUE PROCESS HELD: The SC held that Calangi’s termination was without notice and hearing. separation pay must be paid in lieu of reinstatement. There is no question that Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers. Further. because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. Inc.class by themselves. 1. Phil association of Service Exporters. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. like all other freedoms. male and female of overseas employment. as the right to travel is subjects among other things. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. 1 does not impair the right to travel. must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. It admits of classification.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. invoked by the petitioner. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution. Order No. more so in this jurisdiction. to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. rest on substantial distinctions. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. provided that: PHIL ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS V. That they are germane to the purpose of the law 3.. and that it is in violation of the right to travel. is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers. providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a 1. DRILON 163 SCRA 386 (1988) Facts: Petitioner. They apply equally to al members of the same class In the case at bar.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. is not free from restrictions. They are not confined to existing conditions 4. . it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution. where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life. Dept. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills. the classifications made. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions 2. Order No. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. HELD: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification. LEYTE LAND TRANSPORTATION CO V. mechanics and other workers. . CIR had no power to order such directives and violated appellant’s freedom to contract. LLTCI’s contentions: CIR made a mistake in conceding salary/wage increases merely because such increases would enable employees to meet high cost of living. however reckless he may be. LLTCI appealed. (LLTCI) to grant various employees increase in wages and salaries (5-10 pesos) to its drivers. The fact that both parties are of full age and competent to contract does not necessarily deprive the State of the power to interfere where the parties do not stand upon an equality. conductors. Inc. if added to the crippling losses. The increases. and grant 15 days vacation with pay and 15 days sick leave with pay to employees and laborers. or where the public health demands that one party to the contract shall be protected against himself. would only throw the company into bankruptcy. ISSUE: WON appealed decision in effect has deprived LLTCI of its rights to enter into contract of employment as it and the employee may agree HELD: NO. LEYTE FRAMERS AND WORKERS UNION 80 PHIL 842 (1948) FACTS: Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) issued order directing Leyte Land Transportation Company. The State still retains an interest in his welfare. approved June 17. distribute and service electric power and energy to them. re-servicing and reselling the said electric power and energy to individual customers within the coverage of their respective franchises. NPC approved a rate of at least 17. 1963. distributing. . the court held that as the workers are laborers of the company. an act authorizing the increase of the capital stock of NPC to P100M took effect. with the threat that in case petitioners would fail to sign the revised contract proving for the increased rate. On Mar 21. RA 3043. Reference was made to the particular contracts petitioners entered into with respondent NPC. dismissed the same. then subsequently to Jan 15. as amended by RA 2641) to require franchise holders the conditions that: 1. and where the individual health.013 per kilowatt hour. On June 17. payable in 12 equal monthly installments plus an energy charge of P0.000 kilowatt-hours in any contract year at the rate of P120 per kilowatt per year. On June 18. purportedly to increase further the authorized capital stock. NPC can renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy NPC has for some years now been supplying. redistributing. The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts . payable on the basis of monthly delivery. the contracts to continue indefinitely unless and until either party would give to the other 2 years previous notice in writing of its intention to terminate the same. Citing Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v CIR (concurring): The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest Obiter regarding the criticism that the additional benefits would benefit the union and well as non-union members. Parrish). 1962. was at first deferred to Nov 1. ALALAYAN VS NATIONAL POWER CORP 24 SCRA 172 FACTS: NPC was given the power (pursuant to Sec 3. safety and welfare are sacrificed or neglected. They shall not realize a net profit of more than 12% annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses 2. ISSUE: W/N PETITIONER ALALAYAN IS DEPRIVED OF THE LIBERTY TO CONTRACT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW Decision Affirmed. considering that there was no sufficient ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction the petitioner claims. NPC would then cease to supply. they are entitled to the increase regardless of their affiliation.5% the effectivity of which. Petitioner claims: the challenged provision is a violation of the constitutional requirement that a bill cannot embrace more than one subject to be expressed in its title. the State must suffer (citing a US case: West Coast Hotel Company vs. It was alleged in the facts that Alalayan did purchase and take power and energy as follows: 60 kilowatts and of not less than 140. To make a distinction would only be an unjust and unwarranted discrimination against non-members. 1961. legally engaged in re-supplying. 1963. 1961. but including the alleged rider provision. it was alleged that the challenged legislation became a law. servicing and selling electric power and energy at fixed rate schedules to the latter who have for some years now been and still are. entitled: An act to further amend Commonwealth Act No 120. the lower court. 1960. PALEA alleged that copies of the Code had been circulated in limited numbers. that being penal in nature the Code must conform to the requirements of sufficient publication. the statute complained of may be characterized as a denial of due process. NLRC 225 SCRA 301 (1993) FACTS: On March 15. a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill which is not the case here. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life. between labor and capital. and some employees were subjected to the disciplinary measures. including liberty of contract. that . or property. by its unilateral implementation of the Code. It prayed that implementation of the Code be held in abeyance. There is the clause on the promotion of social justice to ensure the wellbeing and economic security of all people. The Constitution. is not susceptible to the indictment that the government is impotent to take the necessary remedial measures. The liberty relied upon is not freedom of the mind not freedom of the person but the liberty to contract. The Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) filed a complaint before the NLRC contending that PAL. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter. in view of its commitment to the claims of property. PAL INC V. The rider provision is aimed against the evils of so-called omnibus bills as logrolling legislaton as well as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation. Standard of due process: responsiveness to the supremacy of reason and obedience to the dictates of justice. 1985. Petitioner Alalayan is not deprived of the liberty to contract without due process of the law. be valid. associated with business activities. as long as due process is observed. PAL completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. and that the Code was arbitrary. in each appropriate case. as well as the pledge of protection to labor with the specific authority to regulate the relations between landowners and tenants. specifically Paragraphs E and G of Art 249 and Art 253 of the Labor Code. oppressive. to restrictions valid in character and wide ranging in scope as long as due process is observed. was guilty of unfair labor practice.HELD: The amendment does not constitute a rider problem. There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. and prejudicial to the rights of the employees. the alleged nullity of a legislative act of this character can only be shown if in fact there is such a denial. The police power as an attribute to promote the common welfare would be diluted considerably of its reach and effectiveness if on the mere plea that the liberty to contract would be restricted. would not be able to cope effectively with the problems of poverty and misery that unfortunately afflict so many of our people. For in the face of a constitutional provision that allows deprivation of liberty. The Code was circulated among the employees and was immediately implemented. which may be subjected in the interest of general welfare under the police power. the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. liberty. Employees have a right to participate in the deliberation of matters which may affect their rights and the formulation of policies relative thereto and one such matter is the formulation of a code of discipline. duties and welfare. management should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its decisions or modes of action. this Court will uphold them. Management of the Company includes the right to organize. to introduce new or improved methods or facilities or to change existing methods or facilities and the right to make and enforce Company rules and regulations to carry out the functions of management. All this points to the conclusion that the exercise of managerial prerogatives is not unlimited. It is circumscribed by limitations found in law. discipline. it must be duly established that the prerogative being invoked is clearly a managerial one. and alleging that it had not violated the CBA or any provision of the Labor Code. The exercise by management of its prerogative shall be done in a just. humane and/or lawful manner. even in the absence of said clear provision of law. that employees dismissed under the Code reinstated and their cases subjected to further hearing. which finding. PAL filed a Motion to Dismiss. but gave the following caveat: So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employee. Moreover. or the general principles of fair play and justice. direct and control operations. the LA and the NLRC found to the contrary. we upheld the company's right to implement a new system of distributing itsproducts. reasonable. to promote. Ople. PAL asserts that all its employees have been furnished copies of the Code.PAL should discuss the substance of the Code with PALEA. Thus. amending Art 211 of the Labor Code. Verily. to hire. In San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union vs. a line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those which affect the rights of the employees. ISSUE: WON the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and the employees HELD: YES. asserting its prerogative as an employer to prescribe rules and regulations regarding employees' conduct in carrying out their duties and functions. . suspend or discharge employees for just cause. under special laws or under valid agreements. transfer employees from one department to another. it was held that management's prerogatives must be without abuse of discretion. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED. the exercise of management prerogatives was never considered boundless. Medina. and that PAL be declared guilty of unfair labor practice and be ordered to pay damages. PALEA recognizes the right of the Company to determine matters of management policy and Company operations and to direct its manpower. 1989. assign employees to work. that the law explicitly considered it a State policy "to ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting their rights. In treating the latter. with the approval of RA 6715. to lay-off employees for valid and legal causes. demote. And one such matter is the formulation of a code of discipline. is entitled to great respect. It was only on March 2. a CBA. Industrial peace cannot be achieved if the employees are denied their just participation in the discussion of matters affecting their rights. in Cruz vs." However. Such provision in the CBA may not be interpreted as cession of employees' rights to participate in the deliberation of matters which may affect their rights and the formulation of policies relative thereto. plan. Inc. and that it is in violation of the right to travel. The petitioners' reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" is not well-taken.. the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection. male and female of overseas employment. an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute. and humane. of the lack or inadequacy of such protection. must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation. In this case. DRILON 163 SCRA 386 (1988) Facts: Petitioner. organized and unorganized. HELD: No. just. again. while away from home. and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. decent. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Under these circumstances. it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills. The State shall afford full protection to labor. Further. What concerns the Constitution more paramount is that such an employment be above all. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. 3. personally and economically.informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment. The right granted by this provision. the Government has evidence. Phil association of Service Exporters. The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. ISSUE: WON the petitioner’s reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation in policy and decision making processes is well-taken. The Constitution declares that: Sec. is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers. Order No. local and overseas. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and . and as part of its duty. PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General. PHIL ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS V. explained that she was not aware of such a policy and that she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. In the ordinary sequence of events. 1992 which she then contested before the arbitration branch of NLRC . however. PTTC. is not free from restrictions. invoked by the petitioner. Freedom of contract and enterprise. through its Baguio branch supervisor. must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. to relieve 2 of its employees who went on maternity leave. She was later asked to join the company as a probationary employee with the probation period covering 150 days. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for. PT&TC VS NLRC 272 SCRA 596 (1997) FACTS: Private respondent Grace de Guzman was initially hired by PTTC on 3 separate occasions. PTTC was unconvinced and dismissed de Guzman on January 29. Upon discovery. in her response. On her application form. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. The concern of the Government. more so in this jurisdiction. De Guzman.The non-impairment clause of the Constitution. sent a memo to de Guzman requiring her to explain the discrepancy and reminding her of the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life. it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. The reliever agreement stated that her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. she indicated her civil status was single although she contracted marriage 3 months earlier. like all other freedoms. This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The Labor Code states. over and on top of that. PD 148 and the Constitution and therefore. discharge. PTTC claimed that the dismissal was due to the fact that she concealed her civil status not because of the fact that she was married. In Zialcita et al vs PAL. and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on the account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. On the other hand. all aspects of employment. was ger violation of the company’s policy against marriage (“and even told you that married employees are not applicable are accepted in our company”). The petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of. Parenthetically. an employer is free to regulate. CA considered a policy of the same nature as repugnant to the Civil Code. afforded all women workers by our labor laws and even the Constitution. The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by PTTC. except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. LA held that de Guzman. in no uncertain terms. That it was so can easily be seen from the memo sent to de Guzman by the branch supervisor with the reminder that “you’re fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee. PTTC was ordered to reinstate private respondent with payment of back wages and COLA on the grounds that PTTC failed to provide sufficient grounds to terminate her. in the termination notice sent to her by the same. as it was verbally instructed to you. PTTC appealed but NLRC uphed the LA decision with only a modification that de Guzman deserved to be suspended for 3 months on the account of her dishonest acts. was illegally dismissed by the petitioner. who had already gain regular status. ISSUE: W/N PTTC ERRED IN DISMISSING DE GUZMAN HELD: An employer is required. this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that PTTC was represented in case only by its supervisor and not by its highest ranking officers who could otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation.” Again. to convincingly establish—through substantial evidence—the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee. or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married. and the right against discrimination.Baguio through a complaint for dismissal. or to actually dismiss. . as follows: Art 136. Contrary to PTTC’s assertion. discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage. from hiring to firing. a PAL policy requiring that prospective flight attendants must be single and that they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry was declared void for being violative of the clear mandate in Art 136 Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married women. a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated. the record clearly discloses that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because the company’s policy th at married women are not qualified for employment in PTTC. Stipulation against marriage – It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a women shall not get married. and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. In Gualberto et al vs Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corp. void and unlawful. as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ. as one’s labor is regarded as constitutionally protected property. according to his discretion and best business judgment. she was made to understand her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but. a co-complainant in the labor case.. that the act of complainant in absenting from work for 1 month without official leave is deleterious to the business of respondent. dismissed for cause. BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL INC V. is a labor union of which complainant is a member.Complainant was first employed by Brew Master on 16 September 1991 as route helper with the latest daily wage of P119. under the law and jurisprudence which upholds the right of an employer to discharge an employee who incurs frequent. NLRC: “.. complainant went on absent without permission (AWOP). that the dismissal of complainant from the service is legal. 1993 to June 16. Inc.. On 20 May 1993. NAFLU 271 SCRA 275 (1997) FACTS: Private respondent NAFLU. which recognizes the employer’s prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his employees. that it will result to stoppage of production which will not only destructive to respondent’s interests but also to the interest of its employees in general.” Finding said explanation unsatisfactory.we regret to inform you that we do not consider it valid. a penalty less punitive will suffice such as suspension for a definite period. therefore. the company issued a Notice of Termination: “. Brew master sent him a Memo: “Please explain in writing within 24 hours of your receipt of this memo why no disciplinary action should be taken against you for the following offense: You were absent since April 19. complainant explained: “Sa dahilan po na ako ay hindi nakapagpaalam sainyo dahil inuwi ko ang mga anak ko sa Samar dahil ang asawa ko ay lumayas at walang mag-aalaga sa mga anak ko. that in imposing such penalty. . An . 1993 are unjustified.. Upon the other hand. You are aware of the company Rules and Regulations that absence without permission for 6 consecutive working days is considered abandonment of work. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.. respondent should have taken into consideration complainant’s length of service and as a first offender.” In answer to the aforesaid memo.that individual complainant has indeed abandoned his work. respondent contends that individual complainant was dismissed for cause allowed by the company Rules and Regulations and the Labor Code. citing the principle of managerial control. Kaya naman hindi ako naka long distance or telegrama dahil wala akong pera at ibinili ko ng gamot ay puro utang pa. From 19 April 1993 up to 19 May 1993. vs. that it was not sufficiently established that individual complainant’s absence from April 19. for a period of 1 month.” Complainants contend that individual complainant’s dismissal was done without just cause. 1993. that the penalty of dismissal for such violation is too severe. 1993 up to May 19. prolonged and unexplained absences as being grossly remiss in his duties to the employer and is therefore. He relied on Shoemart.00.... complainant immediately complied with the memo requiring him to explain his absence. employee is deemed to have abandoned his position or to have resigned from the same. relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual.Reliance on the ruling enunciated in the cited case of Shoemart is quite misplaced because of the obvious dissimilarities-. ISSUE: WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In this light. psychological. there was no one to whom he could entrust the children and he was thus compelled to bring them .. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his employees. what is plain is that it was wielded with undue haste resulting in a deprivation of due process. whenever he has been absent there from without previous permission of the employer for three consecutive days or more. While we do not decide here the validity of petitioner's Rules and Regulations on continuous. b) Verily. these rules and their implementation must be fair. Our Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state policy. and upon knowledge of his termination. HELD: NO. and (2) a clear intention to sever the employeremployee relationship.the elements of abandonment are not present here. While his failure to inform and seek petitioner's approval was an omission which must be corrected and chastised. although unauthorized. “ The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's decision and held that complainant’s dismissal was invalid for the following reasons: Complainant-appellant’s prolonged absences. . just and reasonable. unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. This is not to say that his absence should go unpunished. Complainant’s absence was precipitated by a grave family problem as his wife unexpectedly deserted him and abandoned the family. unauthorized absences. spiritual and physical stress and strain. Dismissal is too severe a penalty. complainant's absence was justified under the circumstances. under these circumstances. as impliedly noted by the NLRC in declining to award back wages. immediately sued for illegal dismissal.. Considering that he had a full-time job. Abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the deliberate. perforce. These plainly refuted any claim that he was no longer interested in returning to work. justified.complainant in the Shoemart Case was “an inveterate absentee who does not deserve reinstatement” compared to herein complainantappellant who is a first offender to the province. yield to the common good. First. petitioner's dismissal was illegal. thus placing labor contracts on a higher plane and with greater safeguards. may not amount to gross neglect or abandonment of work to warrant outright termination of employment. As to the second requisite. They are impressed with public interest and labor contracts must. He was then under emotional. Disposition petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner’s finding that complainant was guilty of abandonment is misplaced. The reason for his absence is. he did not merit the severest penalty of dismissal from the service. but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights. thus not allowing for a determination of just cause or abandonment. as held above. Two elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of law and order in society. where it was visible and accessible to the public. the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent’s business establishment. the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation. respondent Quiamco was approached by Davalan. Meanwhile. QUIAMCO 510 SCRA 172 (2007) . accompanied by policemen. The leader of the police team talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. It turned out that. To live virtuously. Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments. not to injure others and to give everyone his due. Nine years later. And to secure its payment. They surrendered to him a red Honda motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see him again.Honeste vivere. petitioner Uypitching. FACTS: In 1982. Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments. Inc. When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments. Vendiola and the clerk were UYPITCHING V. While P/Lt. In September 1982. in October 1981. the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by Uypitching Sons. Gabutero and Generoso to settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. however. the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. or to obtain judicial foreclosure. petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent’s establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. In this case. They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from respondent’s establishment in an abusive manner. exemplary damages. talking. however. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. took the motorcycle. Article 19. petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle. and transgressed the proper norms of human relations. Petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent but was dismissed. the policemen on petitioner Uypitching’s instruction and over the clerk’s objection. Worse. Instead. otherwise he opens himself to liability. Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief. there must be no intention to harm another. HELD: YES. he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale. also known as the "principle of abuse of right. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. . in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle." prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith. There is." Unable to find respondent. a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement. took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. The basic principle of human relations. Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. ISSUE: WON the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law warranted the award of moral damages. attorney’s fees and costs in favor of respondent. embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code. Petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement. Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s) A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. filed a petition asking the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the matter or certify the same to NLRC for compulsory arbitration. BATU filed a notice of strike. claiming that ATC had committed an unfair labor practice. At the same time. ATC. SARMIENTO VS TUICO 162 SCRA 676 (1988) FACTS: Asian Transmission Corp (ATC) terminated the services of Catalino Sarmiento.Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. MOLE set aside the previous orders and directly assumed jurisdiction of the dispute. it enjoined the management from locking out its employees and the union from declaring a strike or similar concerted action. then. MOLE then returned the cases to NLRC and directed it to expedite the resolution of all issues relating to the dispute. VP of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU). MOLE issued an order certifying the labor dispute to NLRC. leaving only the vice-chairman in office. Aquino of the resignations of 8 of its members. Proceedings could not continue in the NLRC. for allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in the company premises. . because of the acceptance by Pres. at the same time. enjoined the company to accept all returning workers. however. This order was later set aside upon motion of both BATU and ATC in view of the appointment of new commissioners in NLRC. denying the motion of reconsideration. THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF CERTAIN PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE SAID STRIKE MAY BE VALIDLY RESTRAINED HELD: The authority for the order is found in Art 264(g) Labor Code. and while as a right it may be waived. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption order. The petitioners had earlier moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest and the referral of the coercion charge to NLRC and later. Respondent Judge Orlando Tuico issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and committed 72 of them to jail although he later ordered the release of 61 of them to the custody of the mayor of Calamba. The challenged order of NLRC was actually only an implementation of the above provision of the Labor Code and a reiteration of the directive earlier issued by MOLE in its own assumption order of Sept 9. which provides: When in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest. 1987 a resolution. the more important reason is to prevent impairment of the national interest in case the operations of the company are disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to work as directed. ISSUES. Three criminal complaints were filed against the workers. two by the personnel administrative officer of ATC and the third by Philippine Constabulary. It is also to emphasize that the return to work order not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty. and export oriented industries. barricading the gates of the ATC plant and preventing the workers through intimidation. it is the national economy that will suffer because of the resultant reduction in our export earnings and our dollar reserves. including those within export processing zones. the defendants were charged with staging an illegal strike. such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities. Thus. hospitals. banks. The first two complaints were for “Violation of Art 265 par 1. for the dismissal of the criminal cases on the ground that they came under the primary jurisdiction of the NLRC. MOLE shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the commission for compulsory arbitration. given the predictable prejudice the strike might cause not only to the parties but more especially to the national interest. In all 3 complaints. the return to work order was equally valid as a statutory part and part of the certification order issued by MOLE on Nov 24. More particularly. NLRC issued on Jan 13.” The third was for coercion. in relation to Art 273 Labor Code. 1986. It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return to work order is to protect the workers who might otherwise be locked out by the employer for threatening or waging the strike. companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy. harassment and force from reporting for work. 227. There can be no question that MOLE acted correctly in certifying labor dispute to NLRC. which it affirmed in its resolution of Feb 12. W/N A RETURN TO WORK ORDER MAY BE VALIDLY ISSUED BY NLRC PENDING DETERMINATION OF THE LEGALITY OF THE STRIKE. it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker’s . not to mention possible cancellation of contracts of the company with foreign investors. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification. all striking our locked out employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The minister may seek the assistance of lawenforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.Conformably. 1986. as amended by BP blg. W/N SUCH DETERMINATION. .He was in-charge of the various branches in Metro Bacolod City and Negros Occidental. The 3 criminal cases should be suspended until the completion of the compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC. pharmacies. WYETH PHILS 440 SCRA 67 (2004) FACTS: . issued by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the implementation of BP 227. obstructing the free ingress to and egress from a factory or place of operation of the machines of such factory. as a pharmaceutical territory manager. series of 1982 and Circular no. . including allegations of violence. GUSTILO V. series of 1986.Among his tasks were visiting hospitals. 9. monthly itinerary and weekly locator and incurred expenses. conformably to the procedure laid down to attain the industrial peace which is the primordial objects of this law. it does not appear from the record that such clearance was obtained. These circulars require fiscals and other government prosecutors to first secure clearance of MOLE and/or Office of the President before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and filing in court of the corresponding informations of cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute. assault upon a person in authority and other similar acts of intimidation. drugstores and physicians. The suspension of proceedings in the criminal complaints filed is justified on the ground of prematurity as there is no question that the acts complained of are connected with the compulsory arbitration proceedings still pending in NLRC. .Gustilo was employed by Wyeth Phils Inc. conformably to the policy embodied in Circular no. preparing and submitting his predated itinerary. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option but of obligation. or the employer’s premises. 15. coercion. physical injuries. and submitting periodic reports of his daily call visits.will. 90 representing back wages . which under Art 282 of the Labor Code. separation pay. Gustilo isn’t entitled to his Separation Pay OR to reinstatement as there was a just cause for dismissal.CA. . is a just cause for dismissal. other monetary benefits.Gustilo then filed with the Regional Arbiter Br.Wyeth sent a notice reprimanding Gustilo for the late submission of weekly expense report > July 5.Wyeth. 1995.NLRC.Wyeth’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied so they filed with the CA a petition for Certiorari and TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. terminated Gustilo’s services.His employment records show that on various dates.Wyeth appealed to the NLRC in Cebu City . > Nov. and instructions of the employer..Gustilo filed an Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. 28. it is one of the fundamental duties of the employee to yield obedience to all reasonable rules.late submission of same report so Wyeth suspended him for 5 days > Oct 16 to 20. upon the recommendation of a review panel. and ensure 95% territory program performance for every cycle.Piedad v Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative.Family Planning Org of the Phils Inc v NLRC – SC held that “it is the employer’s prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for the conduct of its business or concern to provide certain disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to assure that the same be complied with. At the same time. . as amended.. .Gustilo failed to achieve his objectives so Wyeth sent him 2 notices charging him with willful violation of company rules and regulations and directed him to submit a written explanation. submit promptly all periodic reports.282 of the Labor Code due to gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties) but awarded him separation pay considering the “mitigating factors” of length of service. . and willful or intentional disobedience thereof. 6 in Bacolod City a complaint against Wyeth for illegal suspension. 13-17. damages and attorney’s fees. car reimbursement. ISSUE WON GUSTILO is entitled to his separation pay. Filemon Verzano Jr. 1994. Reasoning . Wyeth reprimanded and suspended him for habitually neglecting to submit his periodic reports. 23-27.Gustilo explained that he was overworked and an object of reprisal by his immediate supervisor.Phil Journalists Inc v Mosqueda.didn’t submit his daily call reports so Wyeth suspended him for 15 days.reversed NLRC’s decision and dismissed Gustilo’s complaint for illegal dismissal (as Gustilo was terminated based on Art. orders. . loyalty awards Gustilo received and Verzano’s grudge against Gustilo. . No." .157.The Labor Arbiter found that Gustilo was illegally dismissed from employment and ordered Wyeth and Verzano to pay Gustilo jointly and severally Php 991. or in lieu of reinstatement.a series of irregularities when put together may constitute serious misconduct. justifies rescission of the contract of service and the preemptory dismissal of the employee.Wyeth put Gustilo in charge of promoting 4 Lederle (Wyeth’s sister company) pharmaceutical products. HELD NO. (all 1995). 1995. as a general rule. . . pay his separation benefits. .affirmed but modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision ordered reinstatement of Gustilo. . illegal dismissal and payment for allowances. Inc. damages and atty’s fees. .late submission of his daily call reports > Nov 20-24. Nov 6-10. G then submitted to Wyeth a plan of action where Gustilo committed to make an ave of 18 daily calls to physicians.SC ruled that the findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court . on the ground of social justice. Hence. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is. Disposition Petition is DENIED ***Wyeth did not interpose an appeal to this Court.[T]hose who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless x x x. NLRC andAbucay. petitioner failed to measure up to such requirement. National Labor Relations Commission.PLDT v NLRC and Abucay. separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. So it has to comply with the CA’s decision to grant Gustilo his Separation Pay. .“We are of course aware that financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of social justice in exceptional circumstances and as an equitable concession. Gustilo did not only violate company disciplinary rules and regulations.Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v Court of Appeals. or whatever other name it is called." . 234 SCRA 689).In the case at bar. no affirmative relief can be extended to it. x x x an offense involving moral turpitude x x x."x x x henceforth. there is NO exceptional circumstances to warrant the grant of financial assistance or separation pay to petitioner. In Simple term. he is dishonest. Danao. vs.Gustilo manifested his slack of moral principle through his infractions." Here. . x x x.. . or financial assistance. We are likewise mindful that financial assistance is allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character (Zenco Sales. respondent Wyeth’s Nutritional Territory Manager." .Philippine Long Distance Telephone vs. He falsified his employment application form by not stating therein that he is the nephew of Mr.The rule embodied in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code is that a person dismissed for cause as defined therein is not entitled to separation pay. the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay. Inc. . . The practice was for its sales representatives to be given work assignments within specific territories by the so-called "draw method. said cancelled accounts were deemed no longer "open territory. 1984." grids (divisions/sections) within each territory usually numbering five (i. to assure GTE that it will get its share of advertising budget from clients as early as possible. the sales representatives therein assigned were given quotas that is they had to achieve a certain amount of revenue or advertisements sold. Among the actions taken were: 1. 1984: GTE realized that competition among media for a share of the advertising revenue had stepped up. a salesperson should have achieved a certain amount of the revenue target designated for his grid. o A new "Sales Evaluation and Production Policy" was thereafter drawn up. o The new policy did not sit well with the union. Increments were given by the so-called "Grid System. If the cancelled revenue accounts were not renewed within the assigned period." and the same could be referred for handling to contractual salespersons and/or outside agencies. otherwise. GTE DIRECTORIES CORP V. The Grid System was installed for the following reasons: to give all salespersons an opportunity to contact advertisers within a reasonable period. said accounts were declared OPEN TERRITORY to all sales representatives including the one who reported the cancellation. June. GTE launched an aggressive campaign to get what it considered to be its rightful share of the advertising budget of its clientele before it could be allocated to other media. . decreased. Grids I-V). he loses the forthcoming grid or forfeits the remaining grids not yet received. A territory was not fully released to the salesperson for handling at one time. o The Union demanded that it be given 15 days to raise questions or objections. but assigned in increments or partial releases of account. 2. increased or cancelled within a given period of time. o GTE informed all its sales representatives of the new policy in a Memorandum dated October 12. Within these territories. SANCHEZ 197 SCRA 452 (1998) FACTS: GTE Directories Corporation (GTE) is a foreign corporation engaged in the Philippines in the business of publishing the PLDT telephone directories for Metro Manila and several provinces. At such closing date.. Each grid was assigned a fixed closing date.e. If not renewed during said open territory period." These sales territories were so plotted to have an equal number of advertisers as well as revenue. and to ensure an even flow of work throughout the company. upon proper clearance and submission of company documents. a notice of strike grounded on alleged unfair labor practices of GTE o On the same day GTE sent another Memorandum to 16 PSRs. but as before the PSR refused to comply. the union declared a strike o GTE again demanded for the said reports in another Memorandum. 1985: GTE terminated the employment of the recalcitrant sales representatives (14). by memorandum of the Marketing Director dated August 19. By memorandum dated August 23. 1985. the union submitted its proposals for "revisions. set at August 2. 1985. 1985 until the submitted the report. No compliance was made." Among those dismissed were the union's president and third vice president. with the undertaking to give them "separation pay. GTE gave its sales representatives an ultimatum. 1985. some Premise Sales Representatives (members of the union) omitted to submit reports regarding the P20K revenue. (their) possession." Still. GTE granted. to submit the required reports within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the memorandum. 1984 including the new policies recently promulgated by Management. 1984. GTE suspended its sales representatives "without pay for five (5) working days" and warned them that their failure to submit the requisite reports would merit "more drastic disciplinary actions. 1985: the union filed in behalf of the sales representatives. otherwise they would be terminated "for cause. So. corrections and deletions of some policies incorporated in the Sales Administrative Practices issued on June 14. . 1985. no sales representative complied with the requirement to submit the reports. as well as. and several members of its board of directors On September 2." pursuant to which it issued on July 9. material etc. . 1985. ISSUE: WON the union's objections to the regulations or policies automatically suspend enforcement thereof and excuse the employees' refusal to comply with the same? . and by letter dated October 26.” August 29.o This." The amount required initially (P30K) was reduced to P20K o Following this requirement." o GTE next formulated a new set of "Sales Administrative Practices. o August 6. revising the previous schedules on the basis of "the consensus reached after several discussions with your DSMs. all the sales representatives concerned were suspended anew effective August 20. in . most of you. GTE required them for the last time. o This was superseded by another memorandum dated July 16.. a memorandum requiring all Premise Sales Representatives (PSRs) to submit individual reports reflecting target revenues as of deadlines. 1985. Petition is granted. HELD: No." that the new policy was incomprehensible. defiance of management authority cannot be countenanced. . dismissal and recall of work. working regulations. objections presented by the union. procedure and processes by which particular work activities should be done. time.. illegal. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied. transfer of employees. according to its own discretion and judgment. lay-off of workers and the discipline. work assignments. Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules. supervision of workers. including the manner. . an employer is free to regulate.e. . The Court failed to see how the objections and accusations justify the deliberate and stubborn refusal of the sales representatives to obey the management's simple requirement for submission by all PSRs of individual reports or memoranda requiring reflecting target revenues which it addressed to the employees concerned no less than six (6) times.” In the case of GTE. So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements. it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. this Court will uphold them. it must thus be conceded that its adoption of a new "Sales Evaluation and Production Policy" was within its management prerogative to regulate. on the pleaded theory that the rule or order is unreasonable. PCIB VS JACINTO 196 SCRA 197 (1991) . all aspects of employment. place and manner of work. There were. that the schedule had not been "drawn (up) as a result of an agreement of all concerned. tools to be used. to be sure. would be disastrous to the discipline and order that it is in the interest of both the employer and his employees. To sanction disregard or disobedience by employees of a rule or order laid down by management. “Except as limited by special laws. discriminatory and whimsical. according to his own discretion and judgment. work supervision. processes to be followed. i. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees. all aspects of employment. working methods. and the order of the public respondent is nullified and set aside. or otherwise irregular for one reason or another. including hiring. and "would result to further reduction" of the sales representatives' compensation. ISSUE: W/N GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO JACINTO AS SHE WAS NOT FORMALLY DESIGNATED TO PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS OF AN FX CLERK HELD: An employee who is entrusted with responsibility by his employer should perform the task assigned to him with care and dedication. On May 1. She did not formally endorse the FX box to the night shift FX clerk or to the cashier. As Jacinto acted as FX clerk on the said day. Jacinto accepted the request. Jacinto filed a complaint with NLRC questioning her suspension. PCIB appealed. PCIB discovered discovered the loss of some travelers checks amounting to P25. penalty and transfer assignment. the employee must suffer the consequences of his negligence of not lack of due care in the performance of his duties. an investigation was conducted by PCIB allowing Jacinto and other personnel to explain their side. The following day. 1986. She did not microfilm the checks as a matter of course. On August 14. considering that she knew the lock of the box to be defective. 1984. and thereafter placed the checks and proof sheet in the FX cash box. she reported the loss of the said checks from the cashbox. 1989: NLRC affirmed the decision with only a modification that Jacinto’s transfer be management prerogative.325. none was found in the box. NAIA branch OIC. She was transferred to the Baclaran branch on May 21. 1988. The lack of written or formal designation should not be an excuse to disclaim any responsibility for any damage suffered by the employer due to his negligence. Jacinto was found guilty of gross negligence and was given a 10-day suspension without pay. she herself stated that she received the travelers checks. More so. verbally requested Jacinto to assume the duties of the FX clerk who was on leave (no written memo of assignment).FACTS: Respondent Nilda Jacinto is a PCI (NAIA Branch) customer relation assistant (CRA) whoa acts as alternate FX clerk or teller. PCIB’s finding that Jacinto was grossly negligent is well-taken. Jacinto’s 10-day suspension without pay is a proper penalty in accordance with the prescribed rules of PCIB. But since PCIB is guilty of contributory negligence for failing to have the lock of the FX box fixed and to have taken other security measures in the bank premises. Failing in this. he may not be held personally liable for any damage arising there from. . On Feb 19. PCIB was further directed to return Jacinto to her former assignment. Gilberto Marquez. The measure of the responsibility of an employee is that if he performed his assigned task efficiently and according to the usual standards. was required to pay the loss by way of salary deductions (P200/month + 50% of midyear and Christmas bonus and profit sharing). made the proof sheet thereof. LA found the suspension and deductions to be unjustified and ordered PCIB to erase from Jacinto’s 201 file said suspension and return what has been deducted from her so far. Oct 23. 1984. the penalty of reimbursement of the full value o loss is mitigated by requiring Jacinto to reimburse the petitioner ½ of the loss by way of salary deduction. Although she claimed to have prepared the proof sheet. As a Group Franchise Director. Inc (SPI) o She sold and promoted SPI products and even to several employees of Avon o Luna have written letters to other members of Avon salesforce inducing them to violate their own contracts with Avon. LUNA 511 SCRA 376 (2007) FACTS: Luna began working for Beautifont. In 1988. Avon notified Luna of the termination or cancellation of her Supervisor’s Agreement wih Avon for the following reason: o Luna signed up as Group Franchise Director of Sandre Phil. 1988 – Luna requested a law firm to render legal opinion as to the consequence of the Supervisor’s Agreement she executed with Avon. Luna filed a complaint for damages. Sometime in 1978. concurrent with being a Group Supervisor of Avon. respondent Luna continued working for said successor company. (Avon). herein petitioner. Inc. a lawyer in the firm opined that the Supervisor’s agreement was “contrary to law and public policy. for which she received a per diem for each theatrical performance. Inc. Luna signed up as a Group Franchise Director of Sandre Phil. in 1972. respondent Luna also acted as a make-up artist of petitioner Avon’s Theatrical Promotion’s Group. In response to her query. Aggreived. AVON COSMETICS INC V. acquired and took over the management and operations of Beautifont. 23 Sept. Nonetheless. . 1988. Luna began selling/promoting Sandre products to other Avon employees and friends.” Luna wrote a letter to her colleagues sharing the legal opinion she obtained from her legal counsel 11 Oct. On 5 November 1985. RTC and CA rendered their decision in favor of respondent ISSUE: a)Whether or not paragraph 5 of the Supervisor’s Agreement is void for being violative of law and public policy. petitioner Avon and respondent Luna entered into an agreement. entitled Supervisor’s Agreement which later on made respondent Luna part of the independent sales force of petitioner Avon. first as a franchise dealer and then a year later. Inc. Avon Cosmetics. Inc. Aside from her work as a supervisor. as a Supervisor. it also stated that it can be terminated without cause. the right already . which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals. thus. QUISUMBING 333 SCRA 12 (2000) INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS: Generally. both at any time and after written notice. controlling the price by which they are to be sold. forego the use of a middleman in selling their products. Inc. it admits that the reason for such exclusion is to safeguard the network that it has cultivated through the years. whether or not the termination or cancellation of the Supervisor’s Agreement was "for cause. in the absence of express legislation or constitutional prohibition.b)Whether or not paragraph 6 of the Supervisor’s Agreement which authorizes petitioner Avon to terminate or cancel the agreement at will is void for being contrary to law and public policy. The only requirement is that of notice to the other party. Admittedly. b. nor foreclose new entrants to the market. must find that the contract as to the consideration or thing to be done. Thus. a court. 1. for cause. in order to declare a contract void as against public policy. free choice of employment. these conventions recognize enumerated in our Constitution. Such prohibition is neither directed to eliminate the competition like Sandré Phils. petitioner Avon and Sandre. HELD: a. As applied to contracts. The contract provided that it can be terminated or cancelled for cause. or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. the manufacturer. whether of personal liability or of private property. In its Memorandum.) The "exclusivity clause" as embodied in paragraph 5 of the Supervisor’s Agreement is valid and not against public policy. The limitation does not affect the public at all.. By direct selling. respondent Luna was duly notified thereof. right to work. Public policy is that principle of the law. is against the public good. both companies employ the direct selling method in order to peddle their products. It is only a means by which petitioner Avon is able to protect its investment. or contravenes some established interests of society. The termination clause of the Supervisor’s Agreement clearly provides for two ways of terminating and/or canceling the contract. When petitioner Avon chose to terminate the contract.) No. has a tendency to injure the public. INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS V." is immaterial. One mode does not exclude the other. taxes. WON the International School’s point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates between foreign-hires and local hires is discriminatory and an invalid classification under the law. Quisumbing denied petitioner's MFR. These include housing. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. and home leave travel allowance.that is leaving his family and friends for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator). shipping costs. skill. should be paid similar salaries. transportation.that he will eventually return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after along period in a foreign land. At the negotiations for a new CBA. The School justifies the difference on 2 "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure. Inc. The School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. and (b) limited tenure . Then DOLE Sec. This issue. eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. Also foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure ISSUES 1. with nationalities other than Filipino. petitioner International School alliance of Educators. DOLE issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. “a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members” of the School. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.. (School). effort and responsibility under similar conditions. pursuant to PD 732. WON foreign-hires should belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires HELD . classifying the same into two: foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. Petitioners filed notice of strike. 2. The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members. numbering 38 in all. contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.2. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than localhires. FACTS: Respondent International School. namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" . who have been hired locally and classified as local hires. and the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. equal pay for equal work (to prevent discrimination): persons who work with substantially equal qualification. shipping costs. transportation.The International Covenant on Economic. The Orders of the Sec. effort and responsibility. skill. Discrimination. with equal pay for equal work. NO It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. This rule applies to the School. of Labor and Employment are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires. and Cultural Rights in Art. shipping costs." Similarly. through its Constitution. local-hires enjoy security of tenure. particularly in terms of wages. transportation. the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. taxes. .7 provides that: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work. race or creed. fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind. Social. and home leave travel allowance. taxes and home leave travel allowances. Labor Code and the International Covenant on Economic. its "international character" notwithstanding. foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local hires. and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. is frowned upon by the Labor Code (Art. Although foreignhires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires.135) The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires. the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex. These benefits. in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men." The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all. which ensure. Reasoning . Social. such as housing. in particular. YES Ratio: The Constitution. Foreign-hires have limited tenure.” The Philippines. Disposition Petition GRANTED IN PART. 2." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications. should be paid similar salaries. The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work.1. and Cultural Rights impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work. such as housing. under similar conditions. are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires. Hence. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. in August 1994. UY V. In May 1994. The Labor Code was promulgated to promote the welfare and wellbeing of the working man. Elena Cubillan are principals of said school. any alteration or amendment which substantially affects a final and executor. She was verbally and summarily dismissed by Atty. Paz Go. holding that petitioners are contractual employees and that respondents merely allowed their contracts to lapse. Its spirit and intent mandate the speedy administration of justice. (bank hereafter) Marbel Branch. Grace Gonzales and Bella Gonzales were all employed as teachers in the Sun Yat Sen Elementary School. BUENAO 484 SCRA 628 (2006) LA rendered in favor of petitioners. ISSUE: WON Uy is an officer of the bank. interim President and Corporate Secretary of the bank. ECOLA. 13th month pay different and service incentive leave benefits. Surigao City.MAGALLANES VS SUN YAT SEN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 542 SCRA 78 (2008) FACTS: Azucenan Magallanes. Bueno filed a case for illegal dismissal and prayed for reinstatement with full backwages and damages. NLRC reversed the Arbiter’s judgment. They are all respondents herein. citing that they were illegally dismissed and ordered the respondents to reinstate them to their former or equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights. Willy Ang Gan Teng and Benito Ang are its directors. petitioners filed a complaint for the NLRC for illegal dismissal. respondents terminated the services of petitioners. with least attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process. Judith Cotecson. Thus. and pay them their back wages. moral damages and fees. separation pay. making her soldarily liable with the corporation for illegal dismissal HELD: NO . during a depositors' meeting. She was only elected as .The minutes of the depositors' meeting clearly showed that Uy was a mere depositor of the bank. Evelynm Bacolod. underpayment of wages. salary differential. FACTS Amalia Bueno was the Manager of Countrywide Rural Bank of La Carota. payment of back wages. 13th month pay. Inc. Andrea Uy. while Teotimo Tan is the school treasures. Under the principle of immutability of judgments. ISSUE: W/N THE NLRC REVERSAL OF THE LA’S DECISION IS VALID AND LAWFUL HELD: Quasi-judicial agencies have neither business nor power to modify or amend the final and executory Decisions of the appellate courts. the test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil . The act of dismissing Bueno by Uy cannot be deemed as an act as an officer of the bank. to construct and maintain a light rail transit system and provide the commuting public with an efficient. Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under the general Corporation Law are not within its coverage. Series of 1980. benefits. Disposition CA decision finding Uy solidarily liable with the bank reversed LRTA V. Petitioner LRTA. Inc. and moral damages. dependable and safe transportation. 1994 with petitioner METRO. economical. and ordering them to jointly and severally pay the latter their full back wages. FACTS: Consolidated petitions of Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Metro Transit Organization. The LRTA and METRO were also ordered to jointly and severally pay attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total money judgment. 603. it cannot be held that there existed an employer-employee relationship between Uy and Bueno. Since such relationship was not established. VENUS 485 SCRA 301 (2006) Under the present state of the law. entered into a ten (10)-year Agreement for the Management and Operation of the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit System from June 8. petitioner METRO hired its own employees. was a qualified transportation corporation duly organized in accordance with the provisions of the Corporation Code. it had no legal authority to act for the bank. the labor arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over Uy. Consequently. The requirement of employer-employee relationship is jurisdictional for the provisions of the Labor Code on Postemployment to apply. after a bidding process. registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Petitioner METRO. as amended. There is no evidence that the association of depositors that elected the interim board was recognized by BSP. (METRO). formerly Meralco Transit Organization. Inc.officer of the Interim Board of Directors craeted by the association of depositors with the sole task of rehabilitating the bank (which is under receivership). and existing under Philippine laws. including private respondents. Petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by Executive Order No. Hence.. Pursuant to the Agreement. Petitioner METRO thereafter entered into a collective bargaining agreement. 1984 until June 8. seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals directing them to reinstate private respondent workers to their former positions without loss of seniority and other rights and privileges. 603 with an original charter” and “it had no participation with the termination of complainants’ employment. Thus. Despite the issuance. However. were considered dismissed from employment Workers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. In June 1989. posting. Further. The power supply switches in the different light rail transit substations were turned off. the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and reinstated the Decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter. the Union struck. On October 1. then Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E. . private respondents. the NLRC found that the striking workers failed to heed the return to work order and reversed and set aside the decision of the labor arbiter . the Union officers and members failed to return to work. respectively. 2000. petitioners LRTA and METRO executed a Deed of Sale where petitioner LRTA purchased the shares of stocks in petitioner METRO. The suit against LRTA was dismissed since “LRTA is a governmentowned and controlled corporation created by virtue of Executive Order No. Labor Arbiter Luis D. On a petition for certiorari however.” In fine. the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board – National Capital Region against petitioner METRO on account of a deadlock in the collective bargaining negotiation. 2000. Laguesma issued on that same day an assumption of jurisdiction order directing all the striking employees “to return to work immediately upon receipt of this Order and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prevailing prior to the strike In their memorandum. DOLE Sheriffs reported to Sec. They completely paralyzed the operations of the entire light rail transit system. Petitioner LRTA argues that it has no employer-employee relationship with private respondent workers as they were hired by petitioner METRO alone pursuant to its ten (10)-year Agreement for the Management and Operation of the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit System with petitioner METRO. The sheriffs posted the Order in the different stations/terminals of the light rail transit system. on appeal. ISSUE WON LRTA should be held liable for the illegal dismissal of employees HELD: NO. 2000 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirerand the Philippine Star. Laguesma that they tried to personally serve the Order of assumption of jurisdiction to the Union through its officials and members but they refused to receive the same. Flores rendered a consolidated judgment in favor of the private respondent workers On May 29. the Order of assumption of jurisdiction was published on the July 27. 2001. . and publication of the assumption of jurisdiction and return to work order. On the same day. 2002. Public respondent appellate court declared the workers’ dismissal as illegal. petitioners LRTA and METRO continued with their distinct and separate juridical personalities On July 25. for lack of jurisdiction and for lack of merit. As the strike adversely affected the mobility of the commuting public. the cases against the LRTA and METRO were dismissed. effective July 27. Article IX – B. 1987 Constitution. Hon. Herein private respondent workers cannot have the best of two worlds. Executive Order No. 1999. National Labor Relations Commission.” Corporations with original charters are those which have been created by special law and not through the general corporation law. whereas the employees of petitioner LRTA. not the NLRC.“under the present state of the law. We therefore hold that the employees of petitioner METRO cannot be considered as employees of petitioner LRTA. it is the Department of Labor and Employment. as amended. are covered by civil service rules. Leogrado. Diokno. In Lumanta v. and thus under the exclusive jurisdiction only of the Civil Service Commission. including the right to strike. Series of 1980. and not the Labor Code and beyond the reach of the Department of Labor and Employment. and not the Civil Service Commission. this Court ruled that labor law claims against government-owned and controlled corporations without original charter fall within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment and not the Civil Service Commission Petitioner METRO was originally organized under the Corporation Code. therefore. petitioner METRO has no original charter. in his letter dated February 22. In Philippine National Oil Company – Energy Development Corporation v. Moreover. instrumentalities. subdivisions. the rights and prerogatives granted to private employees thereunder. 37 for government .. and agencies of the Government. e.” There should be no dispute then that employment in petitioner LRTA should be governed only by civil service rules. be considered government employees of petitioner LRTA.g. the employees of METRO are not entitled to the government amelioration assistance authorized by the President pursuant to Administrative Order No. yet allowed to strike as private employees under our labor laws. 603. Series of 1980 In contrast. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. of the Department of Budget and Management. and only became a government-owned and controlled corporation after it was acquired by petitioner LRTA . which has jurisdiction over disputes arising from the employment of its workers. This being so. Section 2 (1). METRO employees are not covered by the Civil Service law. are available to them. The employees hired by METRO are covered by the Labor Code and are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment. Even then. since petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. hence. a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. the test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under the general Corporation Law are not within its coverage. We agree with petitioner LRTA. petitioner METRO is covered by the Labor Code despite its later acquisition by petitioner LRTA. 603. Executive Order No. as noted by Secretary Benjamin E. rules and regulations but are covered by the Labor Code and. expressly provides that “[t]he civil service embraces all branches.Petitioner LRTA further contends that it is a government owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. We believe that METRO employees are not covered by the prohibition against strikes applicable to employees embraced in the Civil Service. etc. damages.445 inclusive of cost of living allowance If either party wishes to terminate employment. Upon being made regular after successful completion of the six (6) months probationary period your monthly salary will be adjusted to P3.O. the latter's services were terminated for his failure to meet the requirements of 1. Compliance with ICMC and PRPC policies and procedures. petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. 1985. 1985. 518 Even if petitioner LRTA eventually purchased METRO in 1989. ICMC notified petitioner that effective Dec 21. Petitioner alleged that there was no objective evaluation of his performance to warrant his dismissal and that he should have been considered a regular employee from the start because ICMC failed to acquaint him with the standards under which he must qualify as such. He prayed for reinstatement with back wages. Category II. Morong. attorney's fees. It is duly registered with the United National Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status. It was one of the agencies accredited . Classroom performance…up to the standards set in the Guide for Instruction. 1986. 3. and in the schedule team meetings.445 for regular salary adjustments. one-on-one conferences with the supervisor. On June 24. value of lodging or dormitory privileges. P3. The employment contract provided in pertinent part: Salary: Your monthly salary for the first 6 months probationary period is P 3.employees. unfair labor practice. Bataan. both parties maintained their separate and distinct juridical personality and allowed the agreement to proceed. and expenses of litigation. by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center at Sabang. a notice of two (2) weeks should be given in writing to the party. cost of insurance coverage for group EBRO III VS NLRC 216 SCRA 399 (1996) FACTS: Private respondent International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) is a non-profit agency engaged in international humanitarian and voluntary work. Regular attendance in the mandated teacher training. After 6 months. 14th month pay.155 for probationary and P3.. Inc. 2. On Feb 4.155 inclusive of cost of living allowance. "could not be considered as GOCC as defined under Section 3 (b) of E. Ebro III to teach "English as a Second Language and Cultural Orientation Training Program" at the refugee processing center. accrued leave pay. private respondent ICMC employed petitioner Jose G. because the employees of METRO are not government employees since Metro. underpayment of wages. and exemplary. §4. 1949. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. moral. medical. and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions." LA ordered ICMC to reinstate petitioner as regular teacher without loss of seniority rights and pay him 1 year back wages and other benefits. III. Art III §4 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations requires that the waiver of the privilege must be express. from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member State of the organization. As pointed out in ICMC v. dismemberment and disability benefits. ICMC was immune from suit. they. This Convention has the force and effect of law. 1985. On appeal. and concurred in by the Philippine Senate on May 17. After the parties had formally offered their evidence. ISSUE: DOES THE MOA. NLRC rendered in favor ICMC and dismissed the case on the ground that under the MOA. since a writ of execution is "a legal process" within the meaning of Article III. private respondents submitted their memorandum on July 31. 1988. that petitioner was paid his salary up to Dec 31. can claim immunity under the same in order to prevent enforcement of an adverse judgment. (International Catholic Migration Commission v. LA held that ICMC's legal immunity under the Memorandum could not be given retroactive effect since "[that would] deprive complainant's property right without due process and impair the obligation of contract of employment. Calleja) The grant of immunity to ICMC is in virtue of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies of the United Nations adopted by the UN General Assembly on Nov 21. Finally. Nor can ICMC be estopped from claiming diplomatic immunity since estoppel does not operate to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. in accordance with international practice. §4 of the Convention provides for immunity from "every form of legal process. There was no such waiver of immunity in this case. The scope of immunity of the ICMC contained in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations is instructive. ICMC claimed that petitioner failed to qualify for regular employment because he showed no interest in improving his professional performance both in and out of the classroom after he had been periodically evaluated. considering that under the Constitution. GRANT ICMC IMMUNITY FROM SUIT? HELD: The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes.life. 1988 between the Philippine government and ICMC. petitioner is not exactly without remedy for whatever violation of rights it may have suffered for the following reason: . neither can it be said that recognition of ICMC's immunity from suit deprives petitioner of due process. and that his accrued leave balance already been converted to cash. and nominal damages plus interest on the above claims with attorney's fees. the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Calleja. they invoked ICMC's diplomatic immunity on the basis of the MOA signed on July 15. 1947. and 14th month pay prorata. two weeks pay in lieu of notice. even if private respondents had been served summons and subpoenas prior to the execution of the Memorandum. The exercise of jurisdiction by DOLE in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity." Thus. Art. death. 1989 in which. as officers of ICMC. among other things. EXECUTED ON JULY 15. which is to shield the affairs of international organizations. " Moreover. Diana Belo. Then the legal process and provisions of law in the Philippines will apply. ISSUE: WON private respondent was constructively dismissed . In May 1993. nonetheless. she was informed of the school policy that if she takes a leave of absence. she attempted to return to CKSC and signified her readiness to teach for the coming school year. CHIANG KAI SHEK COLLEGE V CA (NLRC. the remedy of the employee is to ask the Philippines to withdraw the grant of immunity from suit. August 24. However. .Ms.Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party. the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. Ms. she is not assured of a teaching load upon her return. she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. BELO) 437 SCRA 171 DAVIDE. Hence. pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC and the Philippine Government. Hence. The Court of Appeals upheld the NLRC’s ruling. against CKSC. JR. such as free tuition for the teachers’ children. applied for a leave of absence for the school year 19921993. She was likewise informed that only teachers in active service may enjoy the privilege and benefits provided by the school. a teacher of Chiang Kai Shek College since 1977. whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC. CALAYLAY. GACUTAN. among others. this petition. Belo. Exception: If there’s abuse or any injustice created due to this exemption from suit. she was not allowed to return. 2004 FACTS: In 1992.The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but the NLRC disagreed. took her leave of absence. AQUINO. . Upon submitting her application. in this case.Ms. Belo was illegally dismissed.This case is an exception to the general rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter are accorded weight and respect on appeal. Patently clear is the illegal manner by which the petitioners eased out Ms.Ms. Hence. and. it must necessarily be passed upon and scrutinized. While this alleged policy was mentioned in Mr. only to Ms.. hence. effectively barred her from teaching for the school year 1993-1994. . . Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. (b) the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of service. for a private school teacher to acquire a permanent status of employment and. Belo was also rendered unlikely by the insistence of the petitioners in implementing the alleged policy that a teacher who goes on leave for one year is not assured of a teaching load. the findings of the NLRC . Belo was definitely singled out in the implementation of a future policy (i. Since Ms. When a non-existent policy is implemented and.Petitioners’ invocation of the third policy – that of giving teaching assignments to probationary teachers in April – to justify their refusal to provide Ms. . be entitled to a security of tenure.Constructive dismissal is defined as a cessation from work because continued employment is rendered impossible. in implementing their policies. . she therefore enjoys security of tenure. since the alleged illegality was never raised as an issue before the respondent court or in the forums below. The petitioners did not take heed of the principle enshrined in our labor laws that policies should be adequately known to the employees and uniformly implemented to the body of employees as a whole and not in isolation.e. or unlikely. that policy was part of the defense invoked by the petitioners in the Arbiter level. the policy that employees not in service are not entitled to any benefit extended by the school). unreasonable. . insensibility. or when a clear discrimination. Belo was constructively dismissed when the petitioners. and even finality. . As pointed out by the private respondent. we do not find merit in petitioners’ assertion that the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the illegality of the school policy of non-assurance of a teaching load. it constitutes a clear case of discrimination. it was then a nonexistent policy.Likewise. (2) the hiring of non-permanent teachers in April to whom teaching loads were already assigned when Ms. The three policies are: (1) the non-assurance of a teaching load to a teacher who took a leave of absence. . in the NLRC. Belo a teaching load is a lame excuse that rings of untruth and dishonesty. Belo has measured up to these standards. the following requisites must concur: (a) the teacher is a full-time teacher. and (3) the non-applicability to children of teachers on leave of the free tuition fee benefits extended to children of teachers in service. Besides.The continued employment of Ms. it was not included in the school’s written statement of policies dated 13 March 1992. For one thing. that policy is intimately intertwined with the main issue of whether Ms. and (c) such service must have been satisfactory. Chien’s letter of 9 June 1992. or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. Belo from the teaching corps. Belo. and in the respondent court to the charge of illegal dismissal. Belo signified in May 1993 her intention to teach. therefore.HELD: YES. when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay or both. her dismissal was without due process. the SICAFP was formalized into a labor union affiliated with NAMAWU. The probationary employees were not even informed of their performance rating when they were denied renewal of their appointment. from June 1988 to March 1991. The Office of the Solicitor General moves for the dismissal of the petition except as to ARROYO. They demanded reinstatement and payment of back wages. were informed of the non-renewal of their respective contracts. asked that she be allowed to teach on a full-time basis. She initially requested a leave of absence. NO. When the College opted not to renew the appointments it merely invoked the expiration of the period fixed in the appointments without giving any other reason or granting the teachers concerned an opportunity to explain their side. forced resignation. harassment. These acts of the College amounted to union busting. The contracts of employment were not bilateral agreements. In April. The non-renewal was timely made while individual petitioners were in the process of organizing themselves into a union. The petitioners and NAMAWU filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. a “tenured teacher” who later became a part-time teacher. an affiliate of NAMAWU. ISSUE 1. Private respondent Lloren is the directress of the College. The next month. Petitioner Juliet Arroyo was the president of the San Ildefonso College Association of Faculty and Personnel. who were issued yearly appointment. Also. ARROYO. The Labor Arbiter held private respondents guilty of illegal dismissal. unfair labor practice. however. and violation of Waeg Order No. but the COLLEGE suggested that she teach on a part-time basis because it was in need of teachers at that time. the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings. 1991.and the Labor Arbiter are contrary to each other. NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION V. SAN ILDEFONSO COLLEGE 299 SCRA 24 (1998) NATURE: Petition for certiorari seeking to set aside an NLRC decision and resolution denying a motion for reconsideration FACTS: National Mines and Allied Workers’ Union is the certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of respondent College. . WON ARROYO was legally dismissed 2. hence. but letters of appointment. Disposition The Petition is DENIED. The reason why she failed to complete her master’s degree could not be solely attributed to her. the other individual petitioners. that all petitioners except ARROYO were legally dismissed. non-payment of service incentive leave pay. unfair labor practice interfering with the organization of the labor union. In February. WON the other petitioners were permanent employees HELD 1. 1991. she became a parttime teacher. The COLLEGE denied her request for her failure to “make use of the privilege” of her study leave in the two years she was allowed to do so. IV-1. underpayment of wages. It is undisputed that Arroyo had been teaching in the COLLEGE since 1965 and had obtained a permanent status. There is no showing. . and the study leave was extended for another year. Odiste and Buan had rendered three consecutive years of service. apart from its mere allegation. No further notice was served.She did not lose her permanent status when she requested to teach on a part-time basis. Arroyo’s dismissal was substantively and procedurally flawed. the following requisites must concur: (1) the teacher is a full-time teacher. and other benefits computed from the date of her actual dismissal to the date of reinstatement 2. Article 277 of the Labor Code. ARROYO. It was effected without just cause and due process. The reason for the request was that she wanted to pursue a master's degree. could only be dismissed for just cause and only after being afforded due process. Thus." This letter served as notice of ARROYO's termination from employment. Evidently. that the two were on a full-time basis during those three years and that their services were satisfactory. and (2) pay her back wages from the date of her actual dismissal to the date of her actual reinstatement. the COLLEGE failed to prove that a master's degree was a pre-requisite for ARROYO's teaching position. The COLLEGE approved the request. as now claimed by the COLLEGE. subject to the modification that private respondent San Ildefonso College is DIRECTED to (1) reinstate petitioner JULIETA ARROYO to her former position at the time of her dismissal. NO. Eleven of the individual petitioners were full-time teachers during the school year 1990-1991. NLRC. which is applicable. without of loss of seniority rights and benefits that may be due her. It must be emphasized that the letter did not indicate that a master's degree was necessary for ARROYO to continue her service. however. citing as reason her failure "to make use of the privilege granted [her] by the administration regarding [her] study leave in the past four semesters. a permanent teacher. and at the same time penalize her with the loss of permanent status. Disposition the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. be entitled to security of tenure. In fact. from which the COLLEGE would have also benefited in terms of her higher learning and experience. (2) the teacher must have rendered three (3) consecutive years of service. where we explicitly ruled that for a private school teacher to acquire permanent status in employment and. RAB-IV-4-3710-91-RI is AFFIRMED. namely. ARROYO relinquished her permanent status. private respondents in its letter of 27 March 1991 refused. in light of paragraph (b). not one of the said teachers can be considered to have acquired a permanent status. full backwages inclusive of allowances. This was settled in University of Sto. She is therefore entitled to reinstatement to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. and (3) such service must have been satisfactory. When ARROYO subsequently requested that she continue teaching on a full-time basis. and not the Labor Code. or to any equivalent position if reinstatement to such position is no longer feasible. but only two. therefore. It would as well be absurd and illogical to maintain that by teaching on a part-time basis after obtaining the permission to take up a master's degree. It would have been unjust and unreasonable to allow ARROYO to pursue her master's degree. it is the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. her termination was void. On the issue of whether the individual petitioners were permanent employees. Tomas v. 1991.078. an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith. worship and governance of the AUSTRIA VS NLRC 312 SCRA 410 (1999) FACTS: Pastor Dionisio Austria worked with the Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) for 28 years from 1963 to 1991. On Oct 17. Subsequently. 1991. gross and habitual neglect of duties. the treasurer of the Negros Mission asked him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his . Thelma Austria. serious misconduct. and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. willful breach of trust.10. petitioner tried to persuade Pastor Buhat to convene the Executive Committee for the purpose of settling the dispute between him and Pastor David Rodrigo. as grounds for the termination of his services. Based on this definition. IS THE TERMINATION OF THE SERVICES OF PETITIONER IS AN ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIR? HELD: An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine. petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the Executive Committee meeting. n Jan 1991. He held the position of district pastor until his services were terminated on 31 October 1991. Eufronio Ibesate. 1991. religious doctrines. On Oct 16. or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership.wife. Pastor Buhat denied the request of petitioner since some committee members were out of town and there was no quorum. ISSUES: 1. and commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative. Petitioner reasoned out that he should not be made accountable for the unremitted collections since it was Pastor Gideon Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that time. and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. creed or form or worship of the church. he was transferred to Bacolod City. On various occasions from Aug to up to Oct. in his district which amounted to P15. petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds. DOES LA/NLRC HAVE JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE THE COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER AGAINST THE SDA? 2. Simply stated. which notified petitioner and his wife to attend the meeting on 21 October 1991.00 as Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer . without justifiable excuse. After all. the termination would. Private respondents try to pin on petitioner the alleged nonremittance of the tithes collected by his wife. caprices or suspicion. Without the concurrence of these twin requirements. grounds have been established to justify his termination. heedlessly or inadvertently. the letter dated 17 October 1991. As to Due Process Article 277(b) of the Labor Code further require the employer to furnish the employee with 2 written notices. In fact. Noncompliance therewith is fatal because these requirements are conditions sine quo non before dismissal may be validly effected. whims. he cannot be made accountable for the alleged infraction committed by his wife. to wit: (a) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination. in the eyes of the law. cannot be construed as the written charge required by law. A perusal of the said letter reveals that it never categorically stated the particular acts or omissions on which his impending termination was grounded. SDA admitted in a certification issued by its officer.congregation. worship or doctrines of the church. he must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. The issue being the legality of petitioner's dismissal. the letter never even mentioned that he would be subject to investigation. the allegation of breach of trust has no leg to stand on. As such. With regard to the first notice. as distinguished from an act done carelessly. SDA even registered petitioner with the SSS as its employee. namely: (a) the employee must be afforded due process. Aside from these. they still have separate and distinct personalities. Thus. through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. otherwise. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith. what is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally. In the absence of conspiracy and collusion.000. be illegal. the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. has the right to take cognizance of the case. and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side. The worker's records of petitioner have been submitted by private respondents as part of their exhibits. knowingly and purposely. Ibesate. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness. From all of these it is clear that when the SDA terminated the services of petitioner. PENARANDA V. the same must be measured against the requisites for a valid dismissal. it was merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an employee which it believes to be unfit for the job. and. the State. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. As to Just Cause Settled is the rule that under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code. which private respondents failed to demonstrate. (b) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances. SDA failed to substantially comply with the above requirements. and. that petitioner has been its employee for 28 years. between petitioner and his wife. i. BAGANGA PLYWOOD CORP 489 SCRA 94 (2006) FACTS Petitioner’s Claims Petitioner Charlito Peñaranda alleges that he was employed by respondent [Baganga] with a monthly salary of P5. the breach of trust must be willful. (b) the dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code.. thoughtlessly.e. HELD: NO .The labor arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal and that petitioner’s complaint was premature because he was still employed by BPC. He was not paid his overtime pay. being a managerial employee he is not entitled to overtime pay and if ever he rendered services beyond the normal hours of work. .NLRC deleted the award of overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest days for the petitioner was not entitled to these awards because he was a managerial employee. allege that complainant’s separation from service was done pursuant to Art.” . . there was no office order/or authorization for him to do so. and attorney’s fees in the total amount of P21. The temporary closure of BPC’s plant did not terminate his employment. XI to shut down and to dismiss employees. including entitlement to overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest days. Regional Office No. CA denied reconsideration on the ground that petitioner still failed to submit the pleadings filed before the NLRC.Article 82 of the Labor Code exempts managerial employees from the coverage of labor standards.Under this provision. .In its later Resolution. ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest days .CA dismissed Peñaranda’s Petition for Certiorari and held that he failed to: 1) attach copies of the pleadings submitted before the labor arbiter and NLRC. and 2) explain why the filing and service of the Petition was not done by personal service. 283 of the Labor Code. Labor standards provide the working conditions of employees. Peñaranda was not terminated from employment much less illegally. managerial employees are “those whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision.The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code state that managerial employees are those who meet the following conditions: . premium pay for working on rest days.98. premium pay for working during holidays/rest days. .257. BPC was on temporary closure due to repair and general maintenance and it applied for clearance with the DOLE. . His services were terminated without the benefit of due process and valid grounds.Nevertheless.Respondents’ Claims Respondent [BPC] represented by its General Manager HUDSON CHUA. night shift differentials and finally claims for payment of damages and attorney’s fees having been forced to litigate the present complaint. He opted to severe employment when he insisted payment of his separation benefits. Furthermore. the labor arbiter found petitioner entitled to overtime pay. . . or (iii) execute under general supervision special assignments and tasks. even petitioner admitted that he was a supervisor. He belonged to the 10% of respondent’s 354 employees who were paid on a monthly basis. or their suggestions and recommendation as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight. petitioner is deemed a member of the managerial staff.Noteworthy. which also takes him out of the coverage of labor standards.The Court disagreed with the NLRC’s finding that petitioner was a managerial employee. “(3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of low er rank. In his Position Paper. However.” . The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code define members of a managerial staff as those with the following duties and responsibilities: “(1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of the employer. and (3) above. Disposition Petition was DENIED . “(2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment. officers and members of the managerial staff are not entitled to the provisions of law on labor standards. This work necessarily required the use of discretion and independent judgment to ensure the proper functioning of the steam plant boiler. he stated that he was the foreman responsible for the operation of the boiler.“(1) Their primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof. or (ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training. the others were paid only on a daily basis. or knowledge. petitioner was a member of the managerial staff. His classification as supervisor is further evident from the manner his salary was paid. Like managerial employees. His work involved overseeing the operation of the machines and the performance of the workers in the engineering section. and “(4) who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (1). Petitioner supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. (2). “(2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein. experience.” . Petitioner’s evidence also showed that he was the supervisor of the steam plant. “(3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof.Petitioner’s duties and responsibilities conform to the definition of a member of a managerial staff under the Implementing Rules. As supervisor. The term foreman implies that he was the representative of management over the workers and the operation of the department. This circumstance indicates an independent contractual relationship between SONZA and ABS-CBN. etc. talents and celebrity status.If SONZA were ABS-CBN’s employee. It stands to reason that a "talent" cannot be considered as an employee.if Sonza didn’t possess his skills.NO This is the first Court resolution on nature of relationship between a station and a talent. Sonza filed certiorari action with CA.whatever Sonza received arose from the contract and not from the employer-employee relation . which dismissed the case. which agreed to provide Sonza’s services exclusively to the network as talent for radio and TV. . most important to determine relationship) HELD FACTS ABS-CBN signed Agreement with Mel and Jay Management and Devt Corp (MJMDC). Power to dismiss . 4. ABS CBN would not have entered into agreement with him but would have hired him through personnel department just like any other employee. Payment of wages . Labor Arbiter dismissed complaint because of lack of jurisdiction. There are 4 elements of employer-employee relationship: SONZA V ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION 1. x x x and 13th month pay" which the law automatically incorporates into every employer-employee contract. The selection and engagement of employee . NLRC affirmed Arbiter’s decision. ABS-CBN could not retrench SONZA because ABS-CBN remained obligated to pay SONZA’s talent fees during the life of the Agreement. ABS filed Motion to Dismiss because there was no employeremployee relationship. service incentive leave pay. There is no case law stating that a radio and television program host is an employee of the broadcast station. Sonza resigned and filed a complaint against ABS-CBN before the DOLE that the said network didn’t pay his salaries. ISSUE WON there was an employer-employee relationship between ABSCBN and Sonza? . there would be no need for the parties to stipulate on benefits such as "SSS. Hence this petition. ABS continued to remit Sonza’s monthly talent fees through his account. 2. separation pay.and the talent fee is so huge that it indicates more a contractual than an employment relationship 3. Medicare. Control on employee on means and methods (also called control test.Even if the network suffered severe business losses. Sonza said his exclusivity is a form of control by ABS. action should not be based on Labor Code but on breach of contract. Under this policy. Under the NIRC. Clearly.Policy Instruction No. Besides. The code of conduct imposed on SONZA under the Agreement refers to the "Television and Radio Code of the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster sa Pilipinas (KBP). Broadcasters are not necessarily employees of radio and television stations. . appeared on television. ABS-CBN could not dictate the contents of SONZA’s script. The classification of workers in the broadcast industry into only two groups under Policy Instruction No. .SONZA argues that Policy Instruction No. SONZA contends that ABS-CBN exercised control over the means and methods of his work. the rules and standards of performance referred to in the Agreement are those applicable to talents and not to employees of ABS-CBN. 40 determines SONZA’s status. SONZA only needed his skills and talent.Sonza contends that ABS exercised control in providing equipment and crew. How SONZA delivered his lines.Second. . . - Court said exclusivity is a widespread practice in entertainment industry. as protection of investment in “building up” a talent." The KBP code applies to broadcasters.Difference in tax treatment also showed that there’s no employer employee relation. which has been adopted by the COMPANY (ABS-CBN) as its Code of Ethics. talents and broadvasters are subject to the 10% value-added tax ("VAT") on services they render. . the types of employees in the broadcast industry are the station and program employees. Exempted from the VAT are those under an employer-employee relationship - . . . What he needed were his talent. SONZA did not have to render eight hours of work per day. 40 issued by then Minister of Labor Blas Ople on 8 January 1979 finally settled the status of workers in the broadcast industry. 40 is a mere executive issuance which does not have the force and effect of law. especially when the classification has no basis either in law or in fact. To perform his work.Court said these are not tools needed by Sonza. Sonza contends that ABS subjected him to rules and standards. . the huge talent fees of an exclusive talent compensates for exclusivity.First.. 40 is not binding on this Court. skills. and sounded on radio were outside ABS-CBN’s control.Sonza’s claim is based on their agreement.Lastly. A mere executive issuance cannot exclude independent contractors from the class of service providers to the broadcast industry. not to employees of radio and television stations. Therefore. There is no legal presumption that Policy Instruction No. costume. until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk.00 a month plus cost of living allowance. and are entitled to great respect. Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the NLRC on appeal. 1978 – Coria was made a regular employee. Jan 1. The record shows that REIG received a copy of the decision of the LA on April 1. having been appointed as clerk-typist. without change in his position-designation. 15. have the force of law. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11. Being a permanent employee. Oct. Coria was hired by Rizal Empire Insurance Group(REIG) as a casual employee with a salary of P10. he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information. he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450 a month. . on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. ISSUE: W/N IT IS STILL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF SC HELD: Under the provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules.00 a day. REIG appealed to the NLRC but was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time.00 plus allowances and other benefits. Coria filed a complaint with MOLE March 14. Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce. he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580. 1983 Coria was dismissed from work. 1985. Even on the merits. provides that decisions or orders of a LA shall be final and executor unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within 10 calendar days from receipt of notice and that no motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained. 198 LA reinstated him to his position with back wages. SC need not interpret the Revised Rules of the NLRC as they are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. NLRC correctly dismissed REIG’s appeal pursuant to said rules. 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22. In 1980. Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations. the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal. with a monthly salary of P300. the ruling of the LA appears to be correct. the consistent promotions in RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP VS NLRC 150 SCRA 565 (1987) FACTS: In August 1977.In July 1983 he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685. 1985. The NLRC didn’t commit GAD amounting to lack of jurisdiction in arbitrarily dismissing petitioners' appeal on a technicality." In the same year. who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. The issue presented was: "Whether the permanent employees of the Bank within the collective bargaining unit paid on a monthly basis are entitled to holiday pay effective November 1. . including subsequent issuances for clarificatory and/or relief purposes. notwithstanding Article 262 of the Labor Code. . " . Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. the disputants signed a Submission Agreement stipulating as final.rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker. against Comtrust Bank for non-payment of the holiday pay benefits provided for under Art 95 of the Labor Code in relation to Rule X. as amended and Rule X (now Rule IV). Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. 1986 FACTS . the parties opted to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration.Commercial Bank and Trust Company Employees' Union lodged a complaint with the Department of Labor. unappealable and executory the decision of the Arbitrator. Perfection cannot after all be demanded.Failing to arrive at an amicable settlement at conciliation level.In addition. 1974. pursuant to Article 95 (now Article 94) of the Labor Code. CBTC EMPLOYEES UNION V CLAVE 141 SCRA 9 January 7. . It is thus easy to see that a mere reading of the Decree and of the Rules would show that the monthly-paid employees of the Bank are not expressly included in the enumeration of the exception.In the course of the hearing. it is because there is really nothing to deduct properly since the monthly. he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days divided by twelve.The Union filed a Manifestation stating that in the event that said Interpretative Bulletin regarding holiday pay would be adverse to the present claim union respectfully reserves the right to take such action as may be appropriate to protect its interests. the Arbitrator apprised the parties of an interpretative bulletin on "holiday pay" about to be issued by the Department of Labor.” . salary never really included pay for such unworked daysand which give credence to the conclusion that the divisor '250' is the proper one to use in computing the equivalent daily rate of the monthly-paid employees. the Department of Labor released Policy Instructions No. a question of law being involved. and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December. An Interpretative Bulletin which was inexistent at the time the said commitment was made and which may be contrary to the law itself should not bar the right of the union to claim for its holiday pay benefits . Sundays.” .Bank appealed to NLRC but appeal was dismissed because it was filed way beyond the ten-day period for perfecting an appeal and because it contravened the agreement that the award shall be final and unappealable. shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. For this purpose. if the Bank has never made any deduction from its monthly-paid employees for unworked Saturdays. the maximum monthly minimum wage. Status of employees paid by the month -Employees who are uniformly paid by the month. . . 9 which clarifies controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid employees. there is more reason to believe that. of the Rules and Regulations (SECTION 2. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that putting an exception limits or modifies the enumeration or meaning made in the law. Book 111 . Petitioner’s Claim The legal presumption established in Section 2. However.Voluntary Arbitrator stated that. is merely a disputable presumption .Presidential Executive Assistant affirmed DOJ ruling. irrespective of the number of' working days therein with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage. legal and special holidays. then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. relying heavily on the Manifestation and Policy Instructions No.000. 9. The new determining rule is this: If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P 240.) implementing particularly Article 94 (formerly Article 208) of the Labor Code.Acting Secretary of Labor reversed NLRC decision and ruled that the appeal was filed on time and that a review of the case was inevitable as the money claim exceeded P100. if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur.The next day. that “both the decree itself and the Rules mentioned enumerated the excepted workers. Rule IV.00.Voluntary Arbitrator directed the bank to pay its monthly paid employees their “legal holiday pay.. . 'employees who are uniformly paid by the month'.The question submitted for arbitration is now moot and academic. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. “the liberal interpretation in favor of labor stems from the mandate that the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. expressed the view and declared that the aforementioned section and interpretative bulletin are null and void. it also wears down .” This Court has repeatedly ruled that delay in the settlement of labor cases cannot be countenanced.In Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union(IBAAEU) vs. 9. there is no room for liberality in the instant case “as it would render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality is adopted. shelter. . Book III of the Integrated Rules and the Secretary's Policy Instruction No. namely. legals and special holidays. Rule IV. that in the guise of clarifying the provisions on holiday pay.” As so rightfully enunciated. public respondent predicated his ruling on Section 2.Respondent’s Comments . it also maintains that. Disposition The questioned decision set aside and the award of the arbitrator reinstated. said rule and policy instructions in effect amended the law by enlarging the scope of the exclusions. medicine and education. 'always conscious of its employee who has to work.The Bank maintains that. Rule IV. Not only does it involve the survival of an employee and his loved ones who are dependent on him for food.The Bank further maintains that the holiday pay is intended only for daily-paid workers. Manaya v Alabang Country Club (525 SCRA 144) Indeed. speaking through former Justice Makasiar. . all monthly-paid employees in the Bank are paid their monthly salaries without any deduction for unworked Saturdays. on respondent's rest days of Saturdays and Sundays or on a legal holiday. Book III of the Rules to implement Article 94 of the labor Code promulgated by the then Secretary of labor and Policy Instructions No. having been promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor in excess of his rule-making authority. as a matter of fact. it constitutes a taking away or a deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid. . 9 add another excluded group.The questioned Section 2.In excluding the union members of herein petitioner from the benefits of the holiday pay law. While the additional exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all monthly paid employees have already been paid holiday pay. 7 this Court's Second Division. since its inception or start of operations in 1954. On the other hand. Inciong. ISSUE WON the permanent employees of the bank are entitled to holiday pay HELD YES . It was pointed out. an employee who works overtime on any of said days is paid one addition regular pay for the day plus 50% of said regular pay . Sundays. clothing. inter alia. The appeal having been belatedly filed. The Decision is now final and executory. not infrequently. As heretofore adverted. Then. notice to counsel is notice to client. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals Hence. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and ordered the NLRC to give due course to respondent’s appeal of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. this petition. The NLRC found that respondent’s counsel of record received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision on or before 11 December 2000. the Decision of the Labor Arbiter had become final and executory. he was later designated as company electrician. Petitioner alleged that he was forcibly and illegally dismissed without cause and without due process. the Court will rightly assume that the counsel of record continues to represent his client and receipt of notice by the former is the reckoning point of the reglementary period. Respondent filed an Appeal with the NLRC which dismissed the same for failure to perfect appeal within the statutory period of appeal. a Complaint WAS FILED before the Labor Arbiter. the original counsel did not file any notice of withdrawal. Hence. Said counsel did not file a withdrawal of appearance. a Memorandum of Appeal was filed by the respondent’s new counsel. It is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect that . FACTS: Petitioner alleged that in1989. Inc and his dismissal from the service is declared illegal. He continued to work for the respondent until 1998 when he was informed that his services were no longer required by the company. Instead.the meager resources of the workers to the point that. they either give up or compromise for less than what is due them. he was hired by the respondent as a maintenance helper. In the absence of a notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel. The Labor Arbiter held that Manaya is a regular employee of respondent Alabang Country Club. The filing of the Memorandum of Appeal by its new counsel on 26 December 2000 was clearly made beyond the reglementary period. Respondent filed a Petition for CERTIORARI before the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: WON THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT ORDERED THE NLRC TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE APPEAL OF RESPONDENT EVEN IF THE SAID APPEAL WAS FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF TEN (10) DAYS FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL HELD: YES When a client is represented by counsel. must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. and in case of decisions. Sunday or holiday. The rules. resolutions or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions. it is a basic rule that in carrying out and in interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations. awards. the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. to allow the appeal of the respondent as what the Court of Appeals had done and remand the case to the NLRC would only result in delay to the detriment of the petitioner. as the case may be. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds: (a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter. including graft an corruption. and . In this particular case. the last day to perfect the appeal shall be the first working day following such Saturday.all it has to do is sit back. 223. respondent has not shown sufficient justification to reverse the findings of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC. we hold that the notice to respondent’s counsel. Of relevance is Section 1. on 11 December 2000 is the controlling date of the receipt of the decision. particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law. relax and await the outcome of the case On this score. APPEAL. Pertinent provision of the Labor Code provides: ART. Furthermore. Sunday or holiday. Thirdly. If the 10th or 5th day. – Decisions. we adhere to the strict interpretation of the rule for the following reasons: Firstly. resolutions or orders of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment pursuant to Article 129 of the Labor Code. order or award was secured through fraud or coercion. within five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof. Without doubt. entry of judgment had already been made which rendered the Decision of the Labor Arbiter as final and executory. the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory. in this case. falls on a Saturday. PERIODS OF APPEAL. or orders. (c) If made purely on question of law. Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of the NLRC — Section 1. Secondly. This Court has repeatedly ruled that delay in the settlement of labor cases cannot be countenanced. awards. No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed. – Decisions. (b) If the decision. Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy. but was not issued samples of products which were competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. He sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to Glaxo’s Grievance Committee. an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra). among others. With Bettsy’s separation from her company. remained firm in its decision and gave Tecson time to comply with the transfer order. to resign from the company. Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level. Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Even before they got married. During the pendency of the grievance proceedings. Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates. Tecson’s superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs. At the same time. Tecson was subsequently transferred to another area.(d) If serious errors in the finding of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant. Glaxo. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. they would be able to avail of the attractive redundancy package from Astra. Tecson was paid his salary. and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by Astra. that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules. Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. He explained that Astra. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employee’s employment with the company. however. He was also not included in product conferences regarding such products. to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest. Thereafter. DUNCAN ASSOCIATION VS GLAXO WELLCOME 438 SCRA 343 (2004) FACTS: Petitioner Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome as medical representative after Tecson had undergone training and orientation. The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. was planning to merge with Zeneca. a competitor of Glaxo. Subsequently. although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he was performing his job well. the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation for employment outside the company after six months. Bettsy was Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a relationship with an employee of a competitor company. Bettsy’s employer. another drug company. Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its . What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. W/N PETITIONER TECSON WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED HELD: Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets. while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor. unreasonable. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo. Agusan del Sur. Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting. and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory. Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. Indeed. Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for Astra. from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook. Glaxo properly exercised its management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. The record does not show that Tecson was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of such transfer. When the problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting. Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecson’s family. None of these conditions are present in the instant case. or when a clear discrimination. . In effecting Tecson’s transfer. Notably. it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Glaxo did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home province.employees and persons employed with competitor companies. manufacturing formulas. an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible. especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry. ISSUES: IS THE GLAXO POLICY AGAINST ITS EMPLOYEES MARRYING EMPLOYEES FROM COMPETITOR COMPANIES VALID. it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. or unlikely. In laying down the assailed company policy. insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors. Clearly. In any event. was included. The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. CA held that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives. Upon appeal. when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay. WON the petitioners are project employees Procedural 2. and they performed the same kind of work through out their employment. that they have been assigned to different work projects. and such was usually necessary and desirable in the trade or business of the respondent corporation.Appeal to NLRC: Affirmed LA’s findings SALINAS V NLRC (ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC CO) 319 SCRA 54 November 24.LA: Dismissed petitions on the ground that the petitioners are project employees are project employees whose work contracts with AG & P indicate that they were employed in such category. 20 (rule governing project employees). WON this petition for certiorari was proper . (AG & P): Salinas: 1983-1988 as carpenter/finishing carpenter Alejandro: 1982-1989 as bulk cement operator. relative to termination. 1999 FACTS . .Cortez: 1979-1988 as carpenter/forklift operator Samulde: 1982-1989 as lubeman/stationary operator . .Petitioners’ Claim: They had been covered by a number of contracts renewed continuously. bulk cement plant/carrier operator & crane driver ISSUES 1. with periods ranging from five (5) to nine (9) years. not just to one and that their work relation with AG & P. although the contrary was made to appear by the employer through the signing of separate employment contracts.Complaints (separate but consolidated by the LA): illegal dismissal . and their work did not end on a project-to-project basis. is governed by Policy Instruction No.Petitioners were employed with Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. . its usual trade or business. 2.g. NO . as lubeman. . Throughout the duration of their contracts.With regard to the issue on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. often the Court has judiciously treated as special civil actions for certiorari petitions erroneously captioned as petitions for review on certiorari. YES . periods in the present case have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by petitioners.' should apply in the case of petitioner. 20 requires reports of terminations) . Their contracts had been renewed several times.HELD 1. . especially in cases . At all events and in the interest of substantial justice. (PI No. which pertinently prescribes that the 'provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties. except for a day or so gap in their successive employment contracts. the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.Undoubtedly. The interpretation herein made gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article 4 of Labor Code that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor".It is beyond cavil that petitioners had been providing the respondent corporation with continuous and uninterrupted services. bulk cement operator and carpenter). . and must be struck down for being contrary to public policy.The mandate in Article 281 of the Labor Code. as in this case. which were usually necessary and desirable in the construction business of AG & P. the Court hold that the failure of petitioners to interpose a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision before coming to this Court was not a fatal omission.The petitioners are regular employees. good customs or public order.Anent the issue that the petition should have been brought under Rule 65 and not under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is not a hard and fast rule and does not apply where the issue is purely a legal one. . . In the interest of justice. they had been performing the same kinds of work (e.It is basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations. morals. this rule is not inflexible. whether such service is continuous or broken shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer' and that ‘any employee who has rendered at least one year of service. A motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite for the bringing of an action under Rule 65 may be dispensed with where the issue is purely of law.Failure to report the termination to Public Employment Office is a clear indication that petitioners were not and are not project employees. with the total length of their services ranging from five (5) to nine (9) years. to 8:00 a.m. The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law. Petitioners also claim they were made to work twelve hours a day. petitioners claimed they signed a uniformly-worded employment contract with private respondents which stipulated that they were to work as machine operators for a period of two years with a monthly salary of $15. They were made to sign another contract which stated that their salary was only NT$11. CA .involving the rights of workers. They were likewise informed that the dormitory which would serve as their living quarters was still under construction. In December 1999. especially since it has been shown that the intervention of the Court is necessary for the protection of the herein petitioner(s). 840 exclusive of overtime. This liberality is warranted in the case at bar. from 8:00 p. which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. doubts reasonably arising from the evidence. Petitioners are Filipino overseas workers deployed by respondent Join International Corporation (JIC).00. or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the worker’s favor. to its principal. (3D) in Taiwan. Sometime in Sept 1999. ACUÑA v.840. After their papers were processed.. procedural lapses. petitioners filed with respondents applications for employment abroad. a licensed recruitment agency. petitioners left for Taiwan. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a worker and his employer. may be disregarded to enable the Court to examine and resolve the conflicting rights and responsibilities of the parties. Inc.m. FACTS: Disposition The questioned Resolution of the NLRC is SET ASIDE and another one is hereby ENTERED ordering the respondent corporation to reinstate petitioners without loss of seniority and with full backwages. if any. 3D Pre-Color Plastic. under a uniformlyworded employment contract for a period of two years. They were not illegally dismissed. While normally we would require the presentation of payrolls. Forty women were jampacked in the room. Petitioners alleged that they were brought to a "small room with a cement floor so dirty and smelling with foul odor". On appeal. daily time records and similar documents before allowing claims for overtime pay. overtime pay. Private respondents offered a settlement and petitioners received their quitclaim Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment/underpayment of salaries or wages. 1999. The claim for overtime pay should not have been disallowed because of the failure of the petitioners to substantiate them. payment of salaries/wages for 3 months. narrated what happened. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioners admitted they resigned from their jobs without force. and refund of placement fee before the NLRC. The petitioners averred that on December 16. Act No. refund of transportation fare. coercion. at their own expense. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners did not resign voluntarily from their jobs. the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint of petitioners. . The NLRC partially granted the appeal and ordered that the received under the quitclaim be deducted from their respective awards. The claim of overseas workers against foreign employers could not be subjected to same rules of evidence and procedure easily obtained by complainants whose employers are locally based. thus entitling them to benefits plus damages HELD: No. petitioners went to private respondents’ office. In addition. we cannot rule that there was constructive dismissal. they were made to sign a written waiver. and demanded the return of their placement fees and plane fare. Private respondents refused. 1999. Upon arrival in the Philippines. moral and exemplary damages. in this case. that would be requiring the nearimpossible. On this matter. 8042. Before they left. we rule for the petitioners. There isa no malice by private respondents nor do they show the principal’s intention to subject petitioners to unhealthy accommodations. Regarding the claim of the respondents that petitioners were not entitled to overtime pay. petitioners were not paid any salary for work rendered on December 11-15. Under these facts. due to unbearable working conditions they booked a flight home. Private respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. since they had offered no proof that they actually rendered overtime work. ISSUE: whether petitioners were illegally dismissed under Rep. but respondents are liable for the petitioners overtime pay. intimidation and pressure from private respondents’ principal abroad. we hold that such award lacks legal basis. and. By their failure to do so. Accordingly. the controversy was submitted for voluntary arbitration. On the award of moral and exemplary damages. ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORP VS CA 425 SCRA 478 (2004) FACTS: DOLE. Despite the explanatory bulletin. 1998 was both Maundy Thursday and Araw ng Kagitingan. Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested. which. through Undersecretary Cresenciano B. issued an Explanatory Bulletin dated March 11. we rule that private respondents are solidarily liable with the foreign principal for the overtime pay claims of petitioners. which is also a legal holiday. it is private respondents who could have obtained the records of their principal to refute petitioners’ claim for overtime pay. 1993. doubts reasonably arising from the evidence. On July 31. or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the worker’s favor. Said bulletin was reproduced on January 23. 1998. therefore. good customs or public policy. or constituted an act oppressive to labor. wherein it clarified. private respondents waived their defense and in effect admitted the allegations of the petitioners.To our mind. 1998. 1993. Moral and exemplary damages are recoverable only where the dismissal of an employee was attended by bad faith or fraud. 1998. Trajano. or was done in a manner contrary to morals. a legal holiday. the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision directing petitioner to pay its covered employees "200% and . petitioner opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100% of their basic pay on April 9. even if unworked. that employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage on April 9. is also Araw ng Kagitingan. In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of the existing CBA between petitioner and BATLU. apart from being Good Friday. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a worker and his employer. when April 9. as amended. 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its provisions. afford a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays. the computation of which is determined by a legal formula which is not changed by the fact that there are two holidays falling on one day. holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the law. 94 of the Labor Code. Art. supplements or payments for unworked regular holidays as provided in existing individual or collective agreement or employer practice or policy. It is elementary. In the absence of an explicit provision in law which provides for [a] reduction of holiday pay if two holidays happen to fall on the same day. that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal.not just 100% of their regular daily wages for the unworked April 9. his holiday pay. any doubt in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code provisions on holiday pay must be resolved in favor of labor ISSUE: W/N DAILY PAID EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO BE PAID FOR 2 REGULAR HOLIDAYS WHICH FALL ON THE SAME DAY HELD: Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection to labor. Book III of the Omnibus Rules to Implement the Labor Code provides that "Nothing in the law or the rules shall justify an employer in withdrawing or reducing any benefits. under the rules of statutory construction. clearly recognizes their intent to consider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday. the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive. the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. he earns what he should earn. Subject of interpretation in the case at bar is Article 94 of the Labor which was amended by Executive Order No. In the case at bar. qualification or exception for any variance from the clear intent that all holidays shall be compensated. Art. there is nothing in the law which provides or indicates that the entitlement to ten days of holiday pay shall be reduced to nine when two holidays fall on the same day. regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly or daily basis. . that is." It is also intended to enable the worker to participate in the national celebrations held during the days identified as with great historical and cultural significance. 1998. and should not be interpreted as authorizing a reduction to nine the number of paid regular holidays "just because April 9 (Araw ng Kagitingan) in certain years. which is a management prerogative. on whatever date they may fall in any calendar year. although the worker is forced to take a rest. Moreover." CA upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator. 203 . The provision is mandatory. As reflected above. In deciding in favor of BATLU. In other words. For the working man’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. is also Holy Friday or Maundy Thursday. In any event. 11. Unlike a bonus. holding that the CBA between petitioner and BATLU. like 1993 and 1998. Rule IV. as amended. the law governing the relations between them. as paid legal holidays during the effectivity of the CBA and that "there is no condition. Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the workers on account of work interruptions. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays. the Voluntary Arbitrator held that Article 94 of the Labor Code provides or holiday pay for every regular holiday. including its implementing rules and regulations. shall be resolved in favor of labor. Sec. and that that the law. enumerates ten regular holidays for every year. Ramona.The closing wasn’t due to serious losses or financial reverses. at her option. Sr. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of . cultivation and operation of the farm operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses. for a period of ten (10) years. redundancy. In case of termination due to the installation of laborsaving devices or redundancy. DIONELE) 152 SCRA 140 July 20. whichever is higher. the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay "Art. — The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of laborsaving devices. On the other hand. the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service.Petitioner Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm land in Ponteverde. During the existence of the lease. who continued the management. by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title. Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights. for another ten (10) years. has been a regular farm worker for 33 years while . private respondent Romeo Quitco started worked for 14 years. known as Hacienda Danao.ISSUE WON private respondents are entitled to separation pay HELD YES . Private respondent Ricardo Dionele. she employed private respondents. 1987 FACTS . Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The Court cited Article 284 (this should be 283) which says: ABELLA V NLRC (QUITCO. petitioner dismissed private respondents and turned over the hacienda to the owners thereof. She did renew for another ten years. renewable. 284. Negros Occidental. In any event. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED. The law is clear and to permit such an argument would mean that the years of service given by the workers will mean nothing since there is no agreement here that the new management will be the one to shoulder the separation pay. Then. both or all of which are correct. it is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations. Bureau of Labor Relations. . which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. This was denied by GSIS because the ailments of her husband are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of his work and were not causally related to his duties and conditions of work.He was hospitalized for 12 days due to his ailment of nephritis. 137 SCRA 43 [1985]) It is the kind of interpretation which gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that `all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor. and was also found to be suffering from Hansen’s disease (portal cirrhosis and leprosy).Petitioner then filed with GSIS a claim for employees’ compensation under the Labor Code. he died on Nov 14. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year. because w hen she leased Hacienda Danao-Ramona. 167(L) of the Labor Code and Sec. Pedro Clemente was a janitor for 10 years in the DOH Dagupan City assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic. There’s doubt when the law is susceptible to 2 or more interpretations. FACTS . should give the payment. the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration (Volshel Labor Union v. 1(b) Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. 1976.Petitioner then contends that the aforequoted provision violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts.for every year of service whichever is higher." The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law. for the sickness and ." .Carolina’s husband. Under Art. . The old management. neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to workers at the end of the lease. The Court said that this contention by petitioner is untenable. pertaining to Abella in this case. CLEMENTE V GSIS Doubt: resolve in favor of labor (liberal construction). . which means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For instance. he was the employee most exposed to the dangerous concentration of infected material. Doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimant-employee. HELD YES. Petitoner’s husband worked in a skin clinic and was exposed to different carriers of diseases. . least likely to know how to avoid them. and not being a med practitioner.the GSIS forwarded the records of the petitioner's claim for review by the ECC (Employees’ Compensation Commission). ISSUE WON petitioner is entitled to the Employees’ compensation? The major ailments of the deceased could be traced to bacterial and viral infections. Strict rules of evidence are NOT applicable in claims for compensation. ECC also dismissed the claim since there was no substantial evidence of causal connection and there was evidence that deceased had already contracted the Hansen’s before employment. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence. otherwise proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. .’ What the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not a direct causal relation. it is known that the source of infection is discharge from lesions of persons with active cases.Petitioner claimed that the ailments were contracted in the course of employment and were aggravated by his work since he was in direct contact with persons suffering from different skin diseases and was exposed to obnoxious dusts and other dirt. As janitor.the resulting disability or death to be compensable. Disposition Decision appealed from is set aside and GSIS is ordered to pay petitioner death benefits and attorney’s fees. . GSIS’s conservative stand is not consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee embodied in the Constitution in favor of workers. in the case of leprosy. sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the rules. BONIFACIO VS GSIS 146 SCRA 276 (1986) FACTS: Lourdes Bonifacio was a classroom teacher assigned to the district of Bagamanoc." and "paved the way for the latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the employee or worker. The old law as embodied particularly in Section 43 of RA 772 amending Act No." Thus. that sufficient notice thereof was given. Thereafter a claim for death benefits under P. and that the contents of verified medical and surgical reports introduced in evidence by claimants for compensation are correct. It is sufficient to show that the employment had contributed to the . This onus petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge.D. carcinoma of the breast with metastases to gastrointestinal tract and lungs. Division of Catanduanes. No. or any other sickness caused by employment subject to proof by claimant that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. No. nor is the risk of contracting said disease increased by her working conditions. was filed by petitioner with the GSIS. 1978. 3812." [Art. the sickness must be the result of an accepted occupational disease listed by the ECC. the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. it became incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the decedent's working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness. 626. on appeal affirmed the decision of the GSIS. 1978]. 1368." The presumption in essence states that in any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act "it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary that the claim comes within the provisions of the said Act. The same was however denied on the ground that the decedent's principal ailment. under the Workmen's Compensation Law. provided for "the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness. The cancer which affected the deceased not being occupational in her particular employment. for the sickness or the resulting disability or death to be compensable. For this purpose. that the injury did not result solely from the intoxication of the injured employee while on duty. Thus. it is not necessary for the claimant to carry the burden of proof to establish his case to the point of demonstration It is not necessary to prove that employment was the sole cause of the death or injury suffered by the employee. 5. is not an occupational disease for her particular work as a teacher. which favor the employee. that the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another. as amended. from August 1965 until she contracted carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs which caused her death on Oct. effective May 1. Carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs is not listed by the Commission as an occupational disease. The Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). 167(1) Labor Code as amended by P.D. ISSUES: SHOULD THE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE AND IRR BE INTERPRETED IN FAVOR OF THE LABORER IN THIS CASE HELD: A compensable sickness means "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC. or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. His MFR was denied on the ground that his exposure to photographic solutions as litho-photoengraving supervisor had no . BRAVO V EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 143 SCRA 101 July 22. oleic acids. . he complained of irregular bowel movement.650. constipation and abdominal pain. 1986 FACTS .31 from GSIS. in case of doubt in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code. He went through a series of operations and incurred hospitalization expenses amounting to P8.He did not return to work and retired at the age of 45 under the provisions of RA 1616.sometime in 1979. . In 1980 he was admitted to St. potassium ferricynamide. ammonium hydroxide and ammonium dichromate in the kithographic laboratory.002. that it arose out of it. Once the disease had been shown to have arisen in the course of employment. developing and processing either dry or wet negatives.05. he was involved in drafting and plate printing. phosphoric. He filed a claim for disability benefits in the GSIS. Luke’s Hospital and was diagnosed with "adenocarcinoma sigmoid (colon) Duke's C and chronic periappendicitis".Evelio Bravo was a supervising cartographer engineer at the Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey. in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary. While the court does not dispute petitioner's contention that under the law.GSIS: Denied. -He sought reconsideration. the doubt shall be resolved in favor of the laborer. it is presumed by law.aggravation or acceleration of such death or ailment. including its implementing rules and regulations. and supervising the formulation of lightsensitive lithographic chemicals from reagent of nitric. the court finds that the same has no application in this case since the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code leave no room for doubt either in their interpretation or application. claiming that his work exposed him to chemicals. . As litho-photo engraving supervisor (another term for a supervising cartographer engineer?). He received P37. His diagnosed disease were not occupational diseases in his particular employment and his working conditions did not increase the risk of contracting them. His widow. His contention that his cancer could be traced toexposure to photographic solutions was merely supposition and devoid of medical support. if not caused by it) . and that Commission . . . .Commission: affirmed GSIS deci. chronic lymphogranulomavenereum." It also approves the modified guidelines on cancer of the breast. 2610 and 2677 which provides guidelines for deciding on pending compensation cases regarding cancer. Employees' Compensation Commission where it was held that the very fact that the cause of a disease is unknown creates the probability that the working conditions could have increased the risk of contracting the disease. her husband’s cancer of the colon is a compensable disease because his exposure to chemicals and the "stressful demand" of his work increased the risk of contracting said ailment. in line with pertinent Supreme Court Decisions. Resolution No.He appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission. rationalize. For cancer cases decided by the Supreme Court. or opinions of cancer specialists". and if the cause of the cancer disease is unknown". 2610 approves the recommendation of the Commission's Technical Committee on edical Matters that appealed compensation cases "whose subject contingencies concern cancer diseases shall be held compensable. the guidelines states: "A claim must be resolved in favor of a claimant or appellant if facts of his or her case on record indicate reasonable work-connection of the disease.Solicitor General’s reply > resolutions are just proofs that the Commission is continuously in involved in its task "to initiate. chronic granuloma inguinale and perhaps adenoma”. the guideline states: "An employee's prolonged exposure to chemicals may predispose him or her to contract and develop other types of cancer diseases". issued the Resolutions Nos. there is a "probability" that the fatal ailment of Bravo was work connected as shown by the fact that he was exposed to various chemicals which are generally considered predisposing factors of cancer (relying on the decision in Panotes vs. Angeles. that under the theory of increased risk.causal relationship to thedevelopment of his adenocarcinoma considering thatsaid ailment is traceable to "familial multiple polyposis. 2610 by adding to the pertinent paragraph thereof the phrase "provided that certain predisposing factors that are medically recognized or proven are resent. provided that such diseases shall duly confirmed by formal reports on biopsies. 2677 amends Resolution No. chronic ulcerative colitis. As regards "other types of cancer diseases". Bravo's ailments were"too remote to be related causally to his work and working conditions" at the Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey. and coordinate policies of . that the law merely requires reasonable work connection because of the liberal interpretation accorded to social legislation. but died pending the appeal. That resolution shall be pplied prospectively. pursued his appeal. the disease belongs to borderline or 'twilight' cases. liver stomach (gastric). lungs and asopharynx.Petitioner’s contention > while the causes of colonic malignancy are as yet undetermined. Resolution No. the present scheme and theory of employees' compensation under the Labor Code requires a clear medical basis for .the employees' compensation program. Section IN of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provide that for a sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable. b. WON cancer of the colon and peri-appendicitis are listed under compensable diseases under the Labor Code and Rule III. ISSUES WON cancer of the colon and peri-appendicitis which caused the death of a former litho-photo engraving supervisor are compensable diseases under the Labor Code a." They do not imply that the law merely requires reasonable work-connection because that requirement which was mandated in the repealed Workmen's Compensation Act is different from the present requirement of clear medical basis "where before a mere aggravation or presumption of compensability was sufficient. otherwise. the claimant or employee concerned must prove that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (increased risk doctrine) Ratio A claimant who depends on the theory of increased risk must present substantial proof to show that his ailment was contracted during his employment. However. In the present case.Both cancer of the colon and peri-appendicitis are not listed as occupational diseases for Bravo's kind of employment." a. WON petitioner could claim benefits through the increased risk doctrine HELD NO Ratio Article 167. Reasoning .On reliance on Panotes case: In the Panotes case and the Cristobal case. paragraph (1) of the Labor Code and Rule III. the said sickness must be an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of said Rules. He or she must also submit proof that the risk of contracting the ailment was increased by the particular working conditions. On interpretation in compensation cases > Strict rules of evidence are not applied in compensation cases . both claimants presented conditions of their employment. the petitioner only enumerated the chemicals to which Bravo was allegedly exposed as a litho-photo engraving supervisor and rely on the "probability" that those chemicals caused his cancer of the colon.Petitioner failed to submit convincing proofs to entitle her to compensation benefits. Section IV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation b. NO . NO . FACTS: This case treats of an employee of Philippine Airlines. That there should be care and solicitude in the protection and vindication of the rights of workingmen cannot be gainsaid. Inc. namely: Rogelio Damian.” Four of the PAL employees were prosecuted for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the Court of First Instance in 1968. The Fact Finding Panel recommended the criminal prosecution of the employee. on account of complicity in irregular refunds of international plane tickets. Jacinto Macatol and Jesus Saba. who was dismissed from his work on August 23. On application of the resolutions by the Commission > they were issued after the death of Evelio. However. les virtual law library On liberal interpretation due to social legislation > “We are aware of the mandate that social legislation should be applied in consonance with the principles of social justice and protection to labor. The case resulted in the conviction after due trial of all the accused on March 1. There are no more presumptions as to what caused a particular illness because the determination of compensability is medically and scientifically oriented. the petitioner did not submit formal requirements required by said resolutions. (PAL).a claim for benefits to succeed. Even if they were applied. Disposition decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is hereby affirmed. but that care and solicitude cannot justify disregard of relevant facts or eschewal of rationality in the construction of the text of applicable rules in order to arrive at a disposition in favor of an employee who is perceived as otherwise deserving of sympathy and commiseration. together with four others. NLRC Factual Considerations and Rationality . 17 years after the termination of his employment. we cannot adopt a sweeping interpretation of the law in favor of labor lest we engage in judicial legislation. Irineo filed a complaint against PAL for reinstatement and back wages on the claim that that termination was illegal. virtual law lib The Intermediate Appellate Court acquitted Irineo. Ireneo then appealed. Antonio Rabasco. and are applied prospectively. 1976.les virtual law library PAL V. Oscar Irineo. 1967 on the basis of the findings and recommendations of a Fact Finding Panel. The NLRC agreed with the Arbiter law library PAL is now before this Court.. That dispute however ended when the parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement two (2) years or so before Irineo was fired on August 23. as being unpardonably tardy.an exemplary example of power arbitrarily exercised without due regard to the rule of law. law library The letter to Oscar Irineo of then PAL President. Lazaro Benedicto. the language is plain and categorical. is equally indefensible. His assertion thereof after seventeen (17) years from his discharge from employment can only mean that he slept on his rights or that his counsel did not share the respondent Commission's belief in the soundness of the theory. that under existing PAL rules and the CIR injunction.a. That prohibition was imposed only in relation to a labor dispute then pending before the Court of Industrial Relations. The Labor Arbiter decreed his reinstatement to his position." HELD: YES. i. when Irineo's employment was terminated. praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to nullify and set aside the NLRC Resolution brary The attempt to sustain the strained theory of dismissal-quasuspension by referring to a standing order by the Court of Industrial Relations at that time forbidding the dismissal of any employee by PAL without court authority. MANNING INTERNATIONAL CORP VS NLRC 195 SCRA 155 (1991) ISSUE: WON NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of the same . based evidently on the investigation and report of the fact finding panel. leaves no doubt that Irineo's employment was being ended. it appears clear to the Court that the respondent Commission's conclusions are flawed by errors so serious as to constitute grave abuse of discretion and should on this account be struck down. the CIR injunction adverted was already functions officio and could no longer have any relevance to that event. There should be care and solicitude in the protection and vindication of the rights of workingmen that cannot be gainsaid. law library There is moreover. In other words. Manning . His claim must thus be rejected as timebarred. thru its Philippine representative. .e.. law library PAL appealed to the NLRC but failed to obtain reversal of the Arbiter's judgment. he could only be placed under preventive suspension and therefore his dismissal was illegal. nothing in the record to excuse respondent Irineo's omission to impugn his termination of employment by PAL in line with the respondent commission's theory. law library Premises considered. FACTS: Francisco Benedicto—a.k. 1967. according to his passport—was hired by a foreign firm. The NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion. but that care and solicitude can not justify disregard of relevant facts or eschewal of rationality in the construction of the text of applicable rules in order to arrive at a disposition in favor of an employee who is perceived as otherwise deserving of sympathy and commiseration. Aljomaih Co. Abdulasis & Mohamed A. The cases above cited constitute the exception. etc. and. he was confined at a hospital in Saudi Arabia until sometime when his employment was terminated. However. of course. and in consequence. He was repatriated to the Philippines in Aug 1982. it cannot prevail against the expressed provision of the labor laws allowing dismissal of employees for cause and without any provision for separation pay. Equity has been defined as justice outside law. NLRC set aside the POEA Order and on considerations of equity and social justice as well as the theory of “medical treatment should not be stopped until Benedicto’s injury or disability is healed” and entered a new judgment increasing the amount to be paid by employers. injuries or death. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect. He left for Saudi Arabia on Dec 1.450. lost both his legs. . Manning and Abdulasis were ordered to provide compensation benefits for service connected illness. being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law.000. Benedicto filed a complaint with POEA for the recovery of his salary for the unexpired portion of his contract. was injured. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction of positive law. as a truck driver for its establishment in Riyadh. Considerations of equity and social justice” cannot prevail over against the expressed provision of the labor laws allowing dismissal of employees for cause and without any provision for separation pay. Some months before the expiration of his contract with Abdulasis. Benedicto was involved in a vehicular accident.International Corporation. Benedicto moved for computation of the amounts due him. W/N THE CHALLENGED DECISION OF THE NLRC IS WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS HELD: When a final judgment becomes executory. insurance benefits and projected cost of medical expenses amounting to P 25.000 as total and permanent disability benefits and P19. submitted receipts evidencing his actual medical expenses. POEA dismissed Benedicto’s claim upon finding that “complainant was legally terminated from employment” because of his disability.450. 1982.00 as hospitalization and medical expenses for 120 days or a total of P31. ISSUES: IS THE NEW JUDGMENT OF THE NLRC VOID INSOFAR AS IT ATTEMPTS TO VARY A DECISION THAT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. Feb 2. and directed the issuance of an alias writ of execution to enforce payment of P12. The rule embodied in the Labor Code is that a person dismissed for cause as defined therein is not entitled to separation pay. it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. Benedicto filed a motion for reconsideration was filed to NLRC to protest the limitation of the award to him of medical expenses to a period of 120 days. His former employers opposed the motion on the ground that the medical expenses referred to another person. based upon considerations of equity.. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party. Subsequently. even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. where the judgment is void. the judgment became final and executory. Lazaro Benedicto but the Administrator overruled the objection and pointed out that the names Lazaro and Francisco Benedicto both referred to one person. Saudi Arabia. Hence. NLRC affirmed the decision of POEA. From the date of the accident. Benedicto was engaged for a stipulated term of two (2) years. 1980 to fulfill his employment contract. and in substantiation. and regardless of whether the modifications is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. 6 March 1987. it caused the resignation and withdrawal of union members from the union. and because. . the Reliance Surety & Insurance Employees Union (union) filed in behalf of the dismissed employees with the NLRC.The manager of Reliance Surety Insurance Co (RSIC) effected a change in the seating arrangement of its personnel to avoid .productivity loss due to conversations. Hence. . Rosalinda Macapagal. because it interfered in the union members' exercise of their right to self-organization by forcing them to undertake overtime work even on a non-working Saturday and in times when there were scheduled union meetings to prevent them from attending the same. Tension rose in the office as Rubio continued to refuse to stay at his designated place. Glene Molina. a heated discussion ensued. RELIANCE & INSURANCE CO INC V NLRC (RELIANCE SURETY & INSURANCE EMPLOYEES UNION) 193 SCRA 365 January 25 1991 . insubordination. personal and non-work-related .Isagani Rubio. against the RSIC a complaint for illegal dismissal including the charge of unfair labor practice. and Molina and Macapagal still leveled insults to those who testified against them. FACTS .Union’s claim: The company was guilty of unfair labor practice because it effected transfer and changes in the seating arrangement to pressure or intimidate union members. and Severa Cansino protested the transfer of their tables because said change was without prior notice and was just to harass them as union members.The 4 employees were asked to explain within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for misconduct. When the manager insisted. calls and visits. Rubio and companions were placed under preventive suspension on 3 February 1987 and ultimately dismissed after investigation on 3 March 1987. thru its manager and assistant managers. and gross disrespect. during which Rubio and companions insulted the manager and supervisors. and as a general rule. NLRC affirmed with modification upon appeal holding that although the strike was illegal. (3) as to submission of the strike vote to the Department of Labor at least seven days prior to the strike. Inc) HELD 1. YES . YES . thereby preventing its officials and employees from doing their usual duties. . for failure of the striking personnel to observe legal strike requirements. much less assail as an act of unfair labor practice. Rearranging furniture cannot justify a four-month-long strike. which obstructed the free ingress to and egress from its premises. Court of Industrial Relations 6 and Almira v. BF Goodrich Philippines. called company officers names. the petitioner merely exercised a reasonable prerogative employees could not validly question. the Commission found none. the Court is bound by its findings of fact. (2) as to the two-thirds required vote to strike done by secret ballot. WON the petition should be granted . As to the private respondent's charges of harassment. existing unfair labor practice committed by the petitioner. 2. ISSUE 1. the reinstated union officers were clearly in b ad faith.The strike that was illegal in more ways than one.Petitioner’s claim: NLRC was guilty of grave abuse of discretion.) . In effecting a change in the seating arrangement. WON the strike was illegal 2. and to reinstate them without loss of seniority rights. is to reward them for an act public policy does not sanction. But even before the initial conference could take place.The strike in question was illegal. and committed acts of violence (as a result of which.NLRC also found that certain strikers harassed non-striking employees.. dismissal was not the proper penalty. . to wit: (1) as to the fifteen-day notice. It said that the strikers should be reinstated without backwages due to the union’s belief that the company was committing unfair labor practice. the union filed with the DOLE a notice of strike predicated on unfair labor practices by the company. .RSIC them filed with the NLRC a petition to declare the strike illegal due to the defiance of the 30 or 15 day cooling-offperiod.Labor Arbiter found the strike to be illegal. disregard of the legal requirement to furnish the department with the results of the strike vote at least 7 days before the strike and failure to furnish a written notice of the meeting to declare a strike to the BLR or the Regional Office . criminal charges were brought with the fiscal's office. (Ferrer v. RSIC was given notice of strike and a telegram from DOLE for initial conciliation conference both to be held on the same date. the union in the morning of 17 March 1987 struck and picketed the company premises.Pending trial.The strike itself was prompted by no actual. - The Ferrer and Almira cases did not involve illegal strikes. In Ferrer was a defective strike, one conducted in violation of the thirty-day "cooling-off" period, but one carried out in good faith "to offset what petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices [committed by] Management. What Almira on the other hand declared was that a violent strike alone does not make the action illegal, which would justify the dismissal of strikers. - The Court reiterates that good faith is still a valid defense against claims of illegality of a strike. We do find, however, not a semblance of good faith here, but rather, plain arrogance, pride, and cynicism of certain workers. - WRT respondent, Isagani Rubio, what militates against his readmission to the firm is the fact that he had accepted the sum of P2,448.80 "in full satisfaction of the . . . Decision" (of the Labor Arbiter). - The sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because the Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. The Court must take care, however, that in the contest between labor and capital, the results achieved are fair and in conformity with the rules. We will not accomplish that objective here by approving the act of the National Labor Relations Commission which we hold to constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Disposition petition is GRANTED. DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO V GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES INC Balancing Conflicting Claims The sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because the Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. The Court must take care, however, that in the contest between labor and capital, the results achieved are fair and in conformity with the rules . FACTS Petitioner Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative. Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, o that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; o to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with coemployees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo provides that an employee is expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with coemployees or employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employee’s employment with the company, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation for employment outside the company after six months. Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area. Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy. Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecson’s superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs. Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a relationship with an employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by Astra. With Bettsy’s separation from her company, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. His application was denied and Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City- Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to Glaxo’s Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tecson time to comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but was not issued samples of products which were competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in product conferences regarding such products. Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half month pay for every year of servicebut he declined the offer. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory. Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate court held that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives. Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s Decision, but the motion was denied by the appellate court. ISSUES 1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution 2. WON petitioner was constructively dismissed - That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. - The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The only exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct. Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this case. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee. - In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships. HELD 1. NO - Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry. - The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. - The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which forms part of respondent’s Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such as that signed by Tecson, was made known to him prior to his employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction when he signed his employment contract and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith.” He is therefore estopped from questioning said policy. 2. NO - Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case. The record does not show that Tecson was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of such transfer. Glaxo properly exercised its management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area. When the problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, Glaxo did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecson’s family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC VS NLRC 201 SCRA 687 (1991) FACTS: On the basis of the findings and recommendations of a Fact Finding Panel upon investigation, Irineo and 3 other PAL employees, Damian, Rabasco and Macatol, were prosecuted and convicted for estafa through falsification of commercial documents All 4 filed motions for reconsideration and/or new trial. Only one of them, Macatol, was absolved “for lack of sufficient evidence”. 12 years later, Macatol filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which was dismissed by LA on the ground of prescription. The NLRC affirmed, contending that the prescriptive period accrued from the time of his dismissal and not the termination of the criminal case A later appeal with the IAC resulted in the acquittal of Irineo and Rabasco on grounds of reasonable doubt. 17 years after his dismissal, Irineo filed a complaint against PAL for reinstatement and back wages, claiming the termination was illegal. LA’s decision decreed his reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, payment of back wages and moral damages of P300k. LA cited that since there was a PAL circular which placed any employee charged with any crime inimical to the company’s interest under preventive suspension, and a standing order by the CIR forbidding the dismissal of any PAL employee without court authority, Irineo’s dismissal merely amounted to suspension. PAL appealed to the NLRC but failed to obtain a reversal of the Arbiter’s decision. ISSUE: W/N IRINEO ET AL WERE MERELY SUSPENDED HELD: To say, as both the Arbiter and the respondent Commission do, that that declaration, "you are dismissed from the service effective and one certainly not justified by the recorded facts. in other words. It is a construction that has nothing to support it. the CIR injunction adverted was already functus officio and could no longer have any relevance to that event. 1967. That prohibition was imposed only in relation to a labor dispute then pending before the Court of Industrial Relations. That dispute however ended when the parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement 2 years or so before Irineo was fired on Aug 23." and construe this as a complete foreclosure or prohibition of any alternative or concurrent action on PAL's part. not a dismissal. In other words. is illogical if not downright ludicrous. no disciplinary measure of any nature being permissible against the employee "until the final adjudication" of his criminal case. is contrary to common sense. from employment. such as the imposition of administrative sanctions or penalties. when Irineo's employment was terminated." should be construed merely as a suspension. is equally indefensible. as being unpardonably tardy. 1966 to the effect that "(a)n employee charged with any crime inimical to the company's interest shall be placed under preventive suspension until the final adjudication of his case. The attempt to sustain the strained theory of dismissal-quasuspension by referring to a standing order by the Court of Industrial Relations at that time forbidding the dismissal of any employee by PAL without court authority.immediately. They attempt to justify this conclusion by adverting to a PAL circular dated June 15. . His claim must thus be rejected as timebarred. any disciplinary action against an erring employee was absolutely dependent on the outcome of the criminal action against the latter. His assertion thereof after seventeen (17) years from his discharge from employment can only mean that he slept on his rights or that his counsel did not share the respondent Commission's belief in the soundness of the theory.