lab rel digests

The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union vs.NLRC GR No. 156635 January 11, 2016 Facts: Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union (Union) was the duly recognized collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). The company and the union was governed by a CBA which includes a salary structure of the employees comprising of grade levels, entry level pay rates and the individual pays depending on the length of service. HSBC (company) announced the implementation of a job evaluation program (JEP) retroactively. The JEP consists of a job designation per grade level with salary scale which provides the minimum and maximum pay an employee is entitled per grade level. The Union sent letter to company and demanded the suspension of the JEP because it constitutes an unfair labor practice (ULP). It also inform HSBC that it would exercise its right to concerted action. On the same day the Union members started picketing during breaktime. HSBC (company) in its letter to the union insist that the JEP was an express recognition of its obligation under the CBA. The Union's concerted activities persisted for 11 month, which impelled HSBC to suspend the negotiations and issued memoranda, warnings and reprimands to remind the members of the Union to comply with HSBC's Code of Conduct. Due to the sustained concerted actions, HSBC filed a complaint for ULP in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) he NLRC, and directed the remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. The Union conducted a strike after majority of the members of the Union voted in favor of a strike in protest of the continued implementation of the JEP. The Union's officers and members walked out and gathered outside the premises of HSBC's offices. It was alleged that there were Union members who blocked the entry and exit points of the bank premises preventing bank officers from entering the bank including its CEO. HSBC filed its complaint to declare the strike illegal with prayer for temporary restraining order and injunction with NLRC. When HSBC issued return-to-work notices to the striking employees only 25 employees complied and returned to work. Due to the continuing concerted actions, HSBC terminated employment of the the individual petitioners. The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared the strike illegal for failure of the Union to file the notice of strike, observe the cooling-off period; and to submit the results of the strike vote to NCMB pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code and because of the illegality of the strike the Union members and officers were deemed to have lost their employment status. NLRC modified the ruling of LA that the dismissal of the 18 Union members unlawful for failure of HSBC to accord procedural due process. Issues: Whether or Not the strike commenced by the union is lawfully conducted? Whether or Not dismissal of the union members is valid? Ruling: NO. The petitioners neither filed the notice of strike with the DOLE, nor observed the cooling- off period, nor submitted the result of the strike vote although the strike vote was conducted, the same was done by open, not secret, balloting,42 in blatant violation of Article 26. Petitioners strike was rendered unlawful because their picketing which constituted an obstruction to the free use of the employer's property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, when accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and coercion as to constitute nuisance, should be regulated. The strike, even if justified as to its ends, could become illegal because of the means employed, especially when the means came within the prohibitions under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code. The procedural requirements for a valid strike are, therefore, the following, to wit: ( 1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE at least 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of ULP; (2) a strike vote approved by the majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (3) a notice of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike given to the DOLE. These requirements are mandatory, such that non-compliance therewith by the union will render the strike illegal. On the second issue. NO. The failure by HSBC to strictly observe the twin-notice requirement resulted in the illegal dismissal. As a general rule, the mere finding of the illegality of the strike does not justify the wholesale termination of the strikers from their employment the responsibility for the illegal strike is individual instead of collective. Under Article 264 there is a need to distinguish between the officers and the members of the union who participate in an illegal strike. The officers may be deemed terminated from their employment upon a finding of their knowing participation in the illegal strike, but the members of the union shall suffer the same fate only if they are shown to have knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. HSBC fail to give them sufficient opportunity to present their side and adequate opportunity to answer the charges against them. The twin requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases are as much indispensable and mandatory as the procedural requirements enumerated in Article 262 of the Labor Code. HSBC notice to return-to work is not as substantial compliance with due process requirement. HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION vs.EPIFANIO P. MEJARES, REMEGIO C. BAL URAN, JR., DANTE SAYCON, and CECILIO CUCHARO, represented by NAMABDJERA-HRC G.R. No. 208986 January 13, 2016 FACTS: Petitioners claimed that they were employed by HPI as farm workers in HPI’s plantations as area harvesters, packing house workers, loaders, or labellers. HRC, formerly known as Hijo Plantation Incorporated (HPI), owns agricultural lands. Respondents assert that contractor-growers receive compensation and are under the control of HRC. Petitioners formed their union NAMABDJERA-HRC registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Later, they filed a petition for certification. When HRC learned that complainants formed a union, the three contractor-growers filed a notice of cessation of business that led to the termination of complainant’s employment. Petitioners, represented by NAMABDJERA-HRC, filed a case for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and illegal deductions. DOLE Med-Arbiter Jasa dismissed the petition for certification election claiming there was no employer-employee relationship. Petitioners did not appeal but pursued the illegal dismissal case. Labor Arbiter Sagmit held that res judicata does not apply and that finding by the Med-Arbiter that no employment relationship exists between HRC and complainants does not bar the Labor Arbiter from making his own independent finding on the same issue. HRC filed TRO and seeks to nullify the orders of LA Sagmit. NLRC granted the petition holding that LA Sagmit gravely abused her discretion. Court of Appeals concluded that the decision in a certification election case does not foreclose further dispute as to the existence or non-existence of an employer- employee relationship between HRC and the complainants. CA set aside the NLRC decision and remanded case to Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter, in the illegal dismissal case, is bound by the ruling of the Med-Arbiter regarding the existence or non-existence of employer-employee relationship between the parties in the certification election case RULING: No. The decision in a certification election case, by the very nature of that proceeding, does not foreclose all further dispute between the parties as to the existence or non-existence of an employer-employee relationship. The Med-Arbiter’s order in this case dismissing the petition for certification election based on non-existence of employer-employee relationship was issued after the members of the respondent union were dismissed from their employment. The purpose of a petition for certification election is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The respondent union, without its member-employees, was stripped of its personality to challenge the Med-Arbiter’s decision in the certification election case. Thus, the members of the respondent union were left with no option but to pursue their illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter. To dismiss the illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter on the basis of the pronouncement of the Med-Arbiter in the certification election case that there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties would be tantamount to denying due process to the complainants in the illegal dismissal case. ALLAN M. MENDOZA vs. OFFICERS OF MANILA WATER EMPLOYEES UNION (MWEU), EDUARDO B. BORELA, BUENAVENTURA QUEBRAL, ELIZABETH COMETA et al. G.R. No. 201595 January 25, 2016 Facts: Petitioner was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union (MWEU) a duly registered labor organization of the rank-and-file employees within Manila Water Company. During the period material to this Petition, Eduardo Borela as President and Chairman of the MWEU Executive Board, Buenaventur Quebral as First Vice-President and Treasurer, and Elizabeth Cometa as Secretary. Union Secretary (Cometa) informed Petitioner (Mendoza) that the union was unable to deduct the increased P200.00 union dues from his salary due to lack of the required check-off authorization from him and that his failure to pay the unions he can be sanctioned. Quebral (Vice President and Treasurer) informed Borela (President and Chairman) about the failure of petitioner together with others to pay their union dues such failure amounts to violation of MWEU’s Constitution and By-Laws Borela referred the situation to the grievance committee for investigation after which it recommended that petitioner be suspended for 30 days. When Petitioner learned about the suspension he indicated his intention to appeal to the General Membership Assembly in accordance with union’s Constitution and By-Laws, which grants him the right to appeal any arbitrary resolution, policy and rule promulgated by the Executive Board. Petitioner sent two letters about its intention to appeal but both were not acted upon. When MWEU scheduled an election of officers Mendoza filed certificate of candidacy but was disqualified for not being a member of good standing due to his suspension. Later Mendoza was expelled from the union, all his pleas for appeal were let unheeded. Petitioner then joined another union (WATER-AFWC) and was elected union President. Other MWEU members were inclined to join WATER-AFWC, but MWEU director Torres threatened others that they will not get benefits from the new CBA, on the proposed CBA it contains a provisions that in that in the event of retrenchment, non-MWEU members shall be removed first, and that upon the signing of the CBA, only MWEU members shall receive a signing bonus. Petitioner filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against MWEU, the Labor Arbiter ordered that the case be referred to the Union level. While NLRC declared order of LA null and void for being rendered without jurisdiction and conflict fall under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations, as these are inter/intra-union disputes. Petitioner filed appeal to CA arguing that unfair labor practices is cognizable by the Labor Arbiter; that the fact that the dispute is inter- or intra-union in nature cannot erase the fact that respondents were guilty of unfair labor practices in interfering and restraining him in the exercise of his right to self-organization as member of both MWEU and WATER-AFWC, and in discriminating against him and other members through the provisions of the proposed 2008 CBA which they drafted. Issue: Whether or Not labor organization MWEU committed unfair labor practice against the petitioner? Ruling: Yes. Unfair labor practices may be committed both by the employer under Article 248 and by labor organizations under Article 249 of the Labor Code. Mendoza claim on illegal suspension on the union, the documentary evidence is clear that when petitioner letter about his suspension. He immediately and timely filed a written appeal. However, the Executive Board did not act. The Court finds that petitioner was illegally suspended and thereafter unlawfully expelled from MWEU due to respondents’ failure to act on his written appeals. The petitioner was unceremoniously suspended, disqualified and deprived of his right to run for the position of MWEU Vice-President in the September 14, 2007 election of officers, expelled from MWEU, and forced to join another union, WATER-AFWC. For these, respondents are guilty of unfair labor practices under Article 249 (a) and (b) – that is, violation of petitioner’s right to self-organization, unlawful discrimination, and illegal termination of his union membership – which case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, in accordance with Article 217 of the Labor Code. Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda sa Sitio Nasawe, Inc v. Tan, GR 196028, 18 April 2016 FACTS: Petitioner is an association of farmers and fishermen residing at Sitio Talaga, Barangay Ipag, Mariveles, Bataan. It that its members “have resided in the area for several years doing farming activities” from which they “derive their income for their daily sustenance.” In 1995, the Philippine Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) published in the newspaper an Invitation to Bid for the sale of its assets, which included 34 hectares of a 129.4227-hectare land in Barangay Ipag, Mariveles, Bataan, previously owned by Anchor Estate Corporation. The PCGG sequestered the properties of said Corporation after it was identified to be a dummy corporation of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Respondent Tomas Tan emerged as the highest bidder in the bidding of the 34-hectare property. The PCGG Committee on Privatization approved the sale and a Notice of Award was issued to the respondent. The Office of the President (OP) also approved the sale of the property. The PCGG, representing the Republic of the Philippines, executed a Deed of Sale in the respondent’s favor. Then Chairman of the PCGG Committee on Privatization Sarmiento wrote the DAR requesting to stop the acquisition of the property under the CARP. It appeared that a Notice of Coverage had been issued over the 129.4227-hectare land and that the 34 hectares sold by the PCGG to Tan had been already identified for CARP coverage and targeted for acquisition in the year 2000. In an Order, DAR Secretary Morales, Jr. granted Sarmiento’s request and lifted the Notice of Coverage on the 129.4227-hectare property. Secretary Morales also ordered to stop the acquisition proceedings on the property. Thereafter, the petitioner filed with the DAR a Petition to Revoke Secretary Morales’s order. The DAR denied both the petitioner’s petition and its subsequent motion for reconsideration. The DAR based its denial on the ground that the subject property, being government-owned, does not fall as ‘private agricultural land’ subject to the CARP. The petitioner then appealed to the OP, which dismissed the same for lack of merit and affirmed the DAR Secretary’s Order. The motion for reconsideration was denied. The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 with the CA. The CA held that, while the lifting of the subject Notice of Coverage was irregular and erroneous, the petitioner’s petition for review must be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was not a real party in interest to the case. Nothing is stated as to them being beneficiaries, or at least potential beneficiaries, under CARP. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly held petitioners as not a real party in interest. HELD: Yes. The petitioner is not a real party-in-interest to question the July 26, 2000 DAR Order. The Constitutional right to form associations does not make the petitioner a real party-in- interest in this case. While organizations and associations may represent their members before the DAR, these members must have such real, actual, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, NOT merely an expectancy, or a future contingent interest. Here, the petitioner alleged that it is duly registered with the SEC acting on behalf of its farmers and fishermen members which allegation gave it the right to represent its members. However, it failed to allege and prove that these members are identified and registered qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, or have already been actually awarded portions of it, or have been issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award for which they could validly claim the status of the land’s grantees having a real, actual, material interest to question the Order of the DAR Secretary lifting the Notice of Coverage. Not being identified and duly registered qualified beneficiaries, these members’ interest over the subject land were at most an expectancy that, unfortunately for them, did not ripen to actual award and ownership. Thus, notwithstanding its representative capacity, the petitioner and its members are not real parties-in-interest to question the DAR’s Order. The constitutional considerations: provisions governing agrarian reform program do not entail automatic grant of lands to every farmer and farmworker. Social justice in the land reform program also applies to landowners, not merely to farmers and farmworkers. This is precisely why the law – RA No. 6657 – and the applicable rules provide for the procedure for determining the proper beneficiaries and grantees or awardees of the lands covered or to be covered under the CARP. Jurisprudence dictates that the “CARL is specific in its requirements for registering qualified beneficiaries.” Those who have not been identified and registered as qualified beneficiaries are not real parties-in-interest. Furthermore, the SC held that DAR Order has already attained finality is no longer reviewable by the Court. WILLIAM GO QUE CONSTRUCTION AND/OR WILLIAM GO QUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND DANNY SINGSON, RODOLFO PASAQUI, LENDO LOMINIQUI, AND JUN ANDALES G.R. No. 191699, April 19, 2016 Facts: Singson, Pasaqui, Lominiqui, and Andales filed complaints for illegal dismissal against William Go Que Construction and/or William Go Que before the NLRC, claiming that they were hired as steelmen on various dates, and were regular employees of Go Que until their illegal dismissal on June 3, 2006. Go Que averred that they were hired as project employees, and that sometime in May 2006, he learned that some workers were getting excess and cutting unused steel bars, and selling them to junk shops, prompting him to announce that he will bring the matter to the proper authorities. Thereafter, the private respondents no longer reported for work. The LA ruled that the employees were illegally dismissed by Go Que and declared that they were regular employees and not project or contractual employees considering that there was no written contract duly signed by said employees and that they were continuously employed to perform the same tasks for 2 to 8 years. However, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA. The private respondents then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but the CA noted that the Affidavit of Service and the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping contained a defective jurat. The CA required private respondents anew to submit a Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping with a properly accomplished jurat indicating competent evidence of their identities. After submitting photocopies of Ids and a Joint-Affidavitattesting to the identity of Andales who was unable to submit his ID , the CA held that these served as competent evidence of private respondents' identities and cured the defect. The CA also dismissed the petition with respect to Singson and Pasaqui on account of the Satisfaction of Judgment/Release of Claim they had submitted after amicable settlement with Go Que. Issues: 1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition with respect to Singson and Pasaqui 2. WON the CA erred in refusing to dismiss the petition on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping. Ruling: 1. No. The settled rule is that legitimate waivers resulting from voluntary settlements of laborers' claims should be treated and upheld as the law between the parties. Since Singson and Pasaqui filed a motion to dismiss the petition filed by them after having entered into an amicable settlement with Go Que, there is no longer any justiciable controversy between them, rendering the instant case moot and academic and dismissible with respect to them. 2. Yes. The IDs presented by the private respondents were not issued by an official agency and the Joint-Affidavit identifying Andales and assuring that he was a party-litigant is not competent evidence of Andales's identity under Section 12 (b), Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, considering that they (i.e., Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui) themselves are privy to the instrument, i.e., the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, in which Andales's participation is sought to be proven. To note, it cannot be presumed that an affiant is personally known to the notary public; the jurat must contain a statement to that effect. Tellingly, the notarial certificate of the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the petition before the CA did not state whether they presented competent evidence of their identities, or that they were personally known to the notary public, and, thus, runs afoul of the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping under Section 1,68 Rule 65, in relation to Section 3,69 Rule 46, of the Rules of Court. Because of this, the fact that even one of the private respondents swore that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct of his knowledge and belief is shrouded in doubt. There was also no substantial compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement and non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of 'substantial compliance' or presence of'special circumstances or compelling reasons. Here, the CA did not mention - nor does there exist - any perceivable special circumstance or compelling reason which justifies the rules' relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if any of the private respondents certified under oath that no similar action has been filed or is pending in another forum. EDREN RICASATA v. CARGO SAFEWAY GR Nos. 208896-97, Apr 06, 2016 FACTS: Ricasata was hired as an engine fitter for M.V. Uni Chart, a ship owned by Evergreen Marine Corporation, represented in the Philippines by its local manning agency, Cargo Safeway. The deployment was for a period of nine months with a basic monthly salary of US$704 and was found fit for sea duty without restrictions and was deployed. His work included handling noisy equipment such as grinders, generators, and pumps in the vessel's engine room on a regular eight to five shift schedule. Ricasata experienced severe pain in his ears. He reported it to the Chief Engineer and requested for a medical check-up, but his request was denied. He experienced another bout of severe pain in his ears, but wad again denied. He was then replaced by a reliever and thereafter disembarked from the vessel and returned to the Philippines. Ricasata underwent an Audiogram and was diagnosed with "Permanent Medical Unfitness with a Disability Grade 1" due to a "profound hearing loss." Ricasata filed an action against Cargo Safeway and Evergreen Marine before the NLRC, for his claim. Cargo Safeway and Evergreen Marine moved for the dismissal of the case and its referral for Voluntary Arbitration on the ground that Ricasata's employment was covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines and the National Chinese Seamen's Union. The Panel of Arbitrators ruled in favour of Ricasata and also rejected the contention of Cargo Safeway and Evergreen Marine that the flexibility provision of the CBA for the completion of the contract "one month more or one month less as a result of operational convenience or convenience of the port of call" should apply to justify Ricasata's early embarkment.. Ricasata appealed for the modification of the Decision of the Panel of Arbitrators by increasing the award for back disability benefit and sick allowance but was denied by CA on the ground that that entitlement to disability benefits is a matter governed by law and contract and not solely by medical findings and that Ricasata forfeited his claim for compensation by failing to comply with the mandatory reporting requirements. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Ricasata is entitled to disability benefits, sickness allowance, and attorney's fees. (2) Whether Ricasata was able to finish his contract of employment HELD: (1) Ricasata arrived in the Philippines on 23 March 2010. On 29 March 2010, he underwent an Audiogram at the Seamen's Hospital. On 27 April 2010, Dr. Lara-Orencia diagnosed him with "Permanent Medical Unfitness with a Disability Grade 1" based on the Audiogram. It is a settled rule that for a seaman's disability claim to prosper, it is mandatory that within three days from repatriation, he is examined by a company-designated physician. His failure to do so will result to the forfeiture of his right to claim for compensation and disability benefits. Ricasata failed to comply with this requirement. He also failed to show that he was physically incapacitated to be medically examined by a company-designated physician that would have justified his non-compliance with the mandatory three-day period. We note the finding of the Court of Appeals that Ricasata was inconsistent on whether he was referred to a company- designated physician. In his Petition before the Court of Appeals, he alleged that Cargo Safeway referred him to a company-designated physician while in his Memorandum; he alleged that Cargo Safeway refused to refer him for post-medical check-up. Considering the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Ricasata failed to prove that he is entitled to the disability benefits and sickness allowance that he was claiming. (2) In their Comment, Cargo Safeway and Evergreen Marine contend that Ricasata is not entitled to unearned wages, unearned leave pay, and basic wages corresponding to the unserved portion of his contract. They invoke Section 19(C) of the POEA-SEC to the effect that "[i]f the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three (3) months before the expiration of his contract, the master/employer may repatriate the seafarer from such port x x x.” but the Court did not agree because Cargo Safeway and Evergreen Marine only quoted a portion of Section 19(C) of POEA-SEC and if quoted in full, will not apply to this case. Section 19(C) of POEA-SEC states that the mode of termination it provides may only be exercised by the master/employer if the original period of the seafarer is at least ten months. Ricasata's contract of employment is only for nine months. Granting that the provision is applicable, Cargo Safeway and Evergreen Marine failed to present proof that they paid Ricasata all his earned wages, his leave pay for the entire contract period, and his termination pay equivalent to one month of his basic salary. The Court held that the provision of the CBA was specific: the flexibility period is one month more or one month less from the term of the contract. Ricasata disembarked one and a half months before the expiration of his contract, meaning it does not fall within the one month more or one month less covered by the CBA. The CBA also provides that if any lesser period is agreed for operational convenience, it should be specified in the employment contract. No such provision is present in this case. Hence, the flexibility provision of the CBA does not also apply to this case. Robina Farms Cebu v. Villa G.R. No. 175869, April18, 2016 FACTS: Respondent Elizabeth Villa brought against the petitioner her complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, and nonpayment of service incentive leave pay in the RAB No. VII of the NLRC in Cebu City. In her verified position paper, Villa averred that she had been employed by petitioner Robina Farms as sales clerk since August 1981; that in the later part of 2001, the petitioner had enticed her to avail herself of the company's special retirement program; that on March 2, 2002, she had received a memorandum from Lily Ngochua requiring her to explain her failure to issue invoices for unhatched eggs in the months of January to February 2002; that she had explained that the invoices were not delivered on time because the delivery receipts were delayed and overlooked; that despite her explanation, she had been suspended for 10 days; that upon reporting back to work, she had been advised to cease working because her application for retirement had already been approved; that she had been subsequently informed that her application had been disapproved, and had then been advised to tender her resignation with a request for financial assistance; that she had manifested her intention to return to work but the petitioner had confiscated her gate pass; and that she had since then been prevented from entering the company premises and had been replaced by another employee. The petitioner admitted that Villa had been its sales clerk at Robina Farms. It stated that her attention had been called by the accounting department to explain her failure to issue invoices for the unhatched eggs for the month of February; After the administrative hearing Villa was found to have violated the company rule on the timely issuance of the invoices that had resulted in delay in the payment of buyers considering that the payment had depended upon the receipt of the invoices; that she had been suspended from her employment as a consequence; that after serving the suspension, she had returned to work and had followed up her application for retirement with Lucina de Guzman, who had then informed her that the management did not approve the benefits equivalent to 86% of her salary rate applied for, but only 1/2 month for every year of service; and that disappointed with the outcome, she had then brought her complaint against the petitioners LA rendered a decision finding that Villa had not been dismissed from employment. The NLRC rendered its judgment dismissing the appeal by the petitioner but granting that of Villa. CA upheld the finding of the NLRC that the petitioner had illegally dismissed Villa ISSUE: Whether or not Villa illegally dismissed? HELD: Yes, private respondent was illegally dismissed. It is undeniable that private respondent was suspended for ten (10) days. Ordinarily, after an employee [has] served her suspension, she should be admitted back to work and to continue to receive compensation for her services. In the case at bar, it is clear that private respondent was not admitted immediately after her suspension. When she reported back after her suspension, she was advised not to report back anymore as her application was approved, which was latter [sic] on disapproved. She was then advised to tender a resignation letter with request for financial assistance by Lucy de Guzman. After that another letter of petitioner Lily Ngochua advised private respondent to do the same. Clearly, these acts are strong indication that petitioners wanted to severe [sic] the employer-employee relationship between them and that of private respondent. This is buttressed by the fact that when private respondent signified her intention to return back to work after learning of the disapproval of her application, she was prevented to enter the petitioner's premises by confiscating her ID and informing her that a new employee has already replaced her. Moreover, private respondent’s application for early retirement did not manifest her intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Although she applied for early retirement, she did so upon the belief that she would receive a higher benefit based on the petitioner's offer. As such, her consent to be retired could not be fairly deemed to have been knowingly and freely given DIVINE WORD COLLEGE OF LAOAG vs. SHIRLEY B. MINA, as heir-substitute of the late DELFIN A. MINA G.R. No. 195155 Facts: DWCL is a non-stock educational institution offering catholic education to the public. It is run by the Society of Divine Word (SVD), a congregation of Catholic priests. Then, the Society of Divine Word Educational Association (DWEA) established a Retirement Plan to provide retirement benefits for qualified employees of their member institutions. Said retirement plan contains a clause about the portability of benefits. Mina was first employed in as a high school teacher, and later on a high school principal, at the Academy of St. Joseph (ASJ), a school run by the SVD. Then, he transferred to DWCL and was accorded a permanent status after a year of probationary status. He was subsequently transferred to DWCL’s college department as an Associate Professor III. Thereafter, Mina was assigned as the College Laboratory Custodian of the School of Nursing and was divested of his teaching load, subject to automatic termination and without need for any further notification. Mina was thereafter offered early retirement but initially declined it. He later received a Memorandum from the Office of the Dean enumerating specific acts of gross or habitual negligence, insubordination, and reporting for work under the influence of alcohol. He answered the allegations but sensing that it was useless, he negotiated for his retirement benefits. Then, it was made to appear that his services were terminated by reason of redundancy to avoid any tax implications. Mina was also made to sign a deed of waiver and quitclaim. Mina then filed a case for illegal dismissal and recovery of separation pay and other monetary claims. The LA ruled that there was no constructive dismissal and that his retirement pay should include the number of years he had worked for ASJ. However, the NLRC ruled otherwise as to the constructive dismissal. The NLRC also held that Mina was not deemed to have waived all his claims against DWCL as quitclaims cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled, but disregarded his years of service in ASJ for the computation of retirement pay. The CA sustainedthe NLRC's ruling. Issues:WON there was constructive dismissal WON the retirement benefits should include Mina's service in ASJ Ruling:Yes. The Constitution and the Labor Code mandate that employees be accorded security of tenure. The right of employees to security of tenure, however, does not give the employees vested rights to their positions to the extent of depriving management of its prerogative to change their assignments or to transfer them. In cases of transfer of an employee, the employer is charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity and that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. Here, Mina’s transfer clearly amounted to a constructive dismissal since for almost 23 years, he was a teacher enjoying a permanent status but then was appointed as a college laboratory custodian, which is a clear relegation from his previous position. Not only that. He was also divested of his teaching load and his appointment even became contractual in nature and was subject to automatic termination after one year "without any further notification." DWCL failed to show any reason for Mina’s transfer and that it was not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to him. Mina’s appointment as laboratory custodian was a demotion. SC also affirmed that the eight years of service rendered by Mina in ASJ shall not be included in the computation of his retirement benefits. No adequate proof is shown that he has complied with the portability clause of the DWEA Retirement Plan. The employee has the burden of proof to show compliance with the requirements set forth in retirement plans, being in the nature of privileges granted to employees. Failure to overcome the burden of proof would necessarily result in the employee’s disqualification to receive the benefits. Mariano v. Martinez Memorial Colleges, Inc, GR 194119, 13 April 2016 FACTS: Martinez Memorial Colleges, Inc. (MMC) is a private educational institution, with respondents Martinez as the College incumbent President and Del Rio as the College Executive Vice-President. The petitioner was MMC's Assistant Cashier. Part of her job was to accept payments and issue receipts and deposit slips to MMC students. In 2008, the petitioner went on an authorized leave of absence, as she and her husband Dario Mariano (Dario), Director for Finance of MMC, would be vacationing. When the petitioner returned to work, she received a Memorandum signed by the respondents, stating that in line with the streamlining activities of MMC, she would be transferred from the Cashier's Office to the Office of the Vice-President (OVP) for Finance, her husband's office. Dario then advised the petitioner to file an extended leave of absence, which was granted. Subsequently, the petitioner went to MMC to file another application for leave as she was not feeling well but this was denied by the Human Resources. The resident physician at Martinez Memorial Hospital recommended her confinement and she was later hospitalized. In the meantime Muallil was tasked to conduct an audit review of MMC's Finance Department. Muallil submitted her report and findings, which showed the petitioner's improper handling of cash accounts of MMC. A separate account called "non-essential accounts" (containing a total amount of P40,490,619.26) in which some collections of MMC were deposited and diverted from MMC's general fund was likewise discovered. Thereafter, Dario received a letter from Martinez, addressed to the petitioner, where the latter was asked to explain in writing, within five days, her possible involvement in the diversion of MMC's funds. In a letter, they explained that the MMC Board of Directors sanctioned the non-essential account. The petitioner did not submit any separate reply. Then, petitioner received a letter from Martinez, informing her that her employment has been terminated on the ground of serious or gross dishonesty in relation to the discovered misappropriation and diversion of funds of MMC, and aggravated by her continuous absence from office without leave or any explanation. Petitioner amended her earlier complaint of constructive dismissal to illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal as illegal for failure of the respondents to prove lawful or just cause for the termination of her employment and for their failure to accord her due process. On appeal, the NLRC vacated and set aside the LA' s decision. The CA denied the petitioner’s appeal, saying that the petitioner was the Assistant Cashier who performs the duties of a cashier, position that requires a high degree of trust and confidence, and her infraction reasonably taints the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mariano was illegally dismissed. RULING: No. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The CA correctly ruled that MMC's act of transferring the petitioner from the Cashier's Office to the OVP for Finance is a valid exercise of management prerogative. The Court has often declined to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers, as long as the company's exercise of the same is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements. In this case, the MMC's exercise of its management prerogative was done for the advancement of its interest and not for the purpose of defeating the lawful rights of the petitioner. It was within MMC's discretion to allow husband and wife to be in one department and there is no express prohibition on this matter. The Board of Directors' decision to transfer the petitioner to her husband's department did not cause any conflict at all and the same was on an interim basis only. As regards the petitioner's dismissal from employment, the Court also affirms the CA ruling that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in declaring its validity. In this case, MMC's ground for terminating the petitioner's employment was "serious or gross dishonesty and for having committed an offense against [MMC]," which was based on the findings in the System Review Report submitted by Muallil. The Court has ruled that in dismissing a cashier on the ground of loss of confidence, it is sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has a reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct, thus making him unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Courts cannot justly deny the employer the authority to dismiss him for employers are allowed wider latitude in dismissing an employee for loss of trust and confidence. The petitioner contends that she had no opportunity to defend herself from the charges as MMC deliberately failed to provide her a copy of the System Review Report. The letter that Martinez sent to the petitioner ordering her to explain in writing her possible involvement in the diversion of MMC's funds complies with the first written notice requirement as it specified the ground for termination and gave the petitioner an opportunity to explain her side. The due process mandate does not require that the entire report from which the termination is based should be attached to the notice. What is essential is that the particular acts or omissions for which her dismissal is sought are indicated in the letter. Accordingly, the CA's denial of the petitioner's petition must be upheld. BLUE EAGLE MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. NAVAL G.R. No. 192488. April 19, 2016 FACTS: By virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), finalized on September 29, 2006, Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU), owner of the Moro Lorenzo Sports Center (MLSC) located within the ADMU compound, gave petitioner BEMI the authority to manage and operate the following businesses at MLSC. Petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama were then the General Manager and Human Resources (HR) Manager, respectively, of petitioner BEMI. Respondent was hired on January 15, 2005 by petitioner BEMI as a member of its maintenance staff. During its first year of operation in 2005, petitioner BEMI suffered financial losses. In an attempt to reduce its financial losses, the Management of petitioner BEMI (Management) resolved to decrease the operational expenses of the company. One of the measures the Management intended to implement was the downsizing of its workforce. Pursuant to such decision of the Management, petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama evaluated and identified several employees who could be the subject of retrenchment proceedings, taking into consideration the employees’ positions and tenures at petitioner BEMI. After their evaluation, petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama identified five employees for retrenchment. Respondent was included in the list because she was one of the employees with the shortest tenures. Before actually commencing retrenchment proceedings, petitioner Dela Rama separately met with each of the five aforementioned employees and presented to them the option of resigning instead. The employees who would choose to resign would no longer be required to report for work after their resignation but would still be paid their full salary for February 2006 and their prorated 13th month pay, plus financial assistance in the amount of one-month salary for every year of service at petitioner BEMI. This option would also give the employees free time to seek other employment while still receiving salary from petitioner BEMI. Since all the five employees identified for retrenchment decided to voluntarily resign instead and avail themselves of the financial package offered by petitioner BEMI, there was no more need for the company to initiate retrenchment proceedings. The five employees were instructed to return on February 28, 2006 to comply with the exit procedure of petitioner BEMI and receive the amounts due them by reason of their voluntary resignation. On February 28, 2006, the resigned employees, except for respondent, completed their exit procedures, received the amounts due them, and executed release waivers and quitclaims in favor of petitioner BEMI. Respondent’s nonappearance on prompted petitioner Bonoan to write her a letter stating that in connection with respondent’s voluntary resignation, she must comply with the exit procedures of petitioner BEMI. Respondent appeared at petitioner Bonoan’s office on March 3, 2006. Because respondent was finding it difficult to find new employment, she asked if it was possible for her to return to work for petitioner BEMI. However, petitioner Bonoan replied that respondent’s resignation had long been approved and that petitioner BEMI would not be able to rehire respondent given the difficult financial position of the company. Petitioner Bonoan advised respondent to just receive the amount she was entitled to by reason of her voluntary resignation. On the afternoon of March 3, 2006, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision on October 12, 2006 finding that respondent was illegally dismissed. According to the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were not able to prove that petitioner BEMI was suffering from serious business losses that would have justified retrenchment of its employees. Petitioners appealed before the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the assailed decision. This prompted respondent to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 11, 2010, favored respondent. The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners. Petitioners now come before the Court via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed; which depends on the question of whether or not respondent’s resignation was voluntary. HELD: For the resignation of an employee to be a viable defense in an action for illegal dismissal, an employer must prove that the resignation was voluntary, and its evidence thereon must be clear, positive, and convincing. The employer cannot rely on the weakness of the employee’s evidence. In this case, petitioners, as employers, were able to present sufficient evidence to establish that respondent’s resignation was voluntary. As borne out by the Financial Statements for 2005 of petitioner BEMI, there was ground for the company to implement a retrenchment of its employees at the time respondent resigned. The evaluation and identification of the employees to be retrenched were jointly undertaken by petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama, as the General Manager and HR Manager, respectively, of petitioner BEMI, based on fair and reasonable criteria, i.e., the employees’ positions and tenures at the company. Respondent was included in the final list of five employees to be retrenched because she was one of the employees with the shortest tenures. That there were four other employees of petitioner BEMI who were to be retrenched and similarly offered the option of resigning in exchange for a more favorable financial package refutes respondent’s insinuation of a scheme by petitioners to remove her because of Dr. Florendo’s complaint against her for the incident that took place in December 2005. Because the five employees to be retrenched opted to voluntarily resign instead and avail themselves of the financial package offered, there was no more need for petitioner BEMI to comply with the notice requirement to the Department of Labor and Employment. Said five employees were to receive more benefits than what the law prescribed in case of retrenchment, particularly: (a) full salary for February 2006 although they were no longer required to report to work after submission of their resignation letters in mid-February 2006; (b) prorated 13th month pay; and (c) financial assistance equivalent to one-month salary for every year of service. The foregoing circumstances persuade the Court that no fraud or deception was employed upon respondent to resign because petitioner BEMI was indeed about to implement in good faith a retrenchment of its employees in order to advance its interest and not merely to defeat or circumvent the respondent’s right to security of tenure. COCOPLANS, INC. vs. VILLAPANDO G.R. No. 183129. May 30, 2016 FACTS: Respondent Ma. Socorro R. Villapando, began working as a financial Advisor for petitioner Cocoplans, Inc., (Cocoplans) in 1995. In 2000, she was eventually promoted to Division Head/Senior Sales Manager. On 2002, however, her employment was terminated by Cocoplans, through its President, Michelena, on the alleged ground that she was deliberately influencing people to transfer to another company thereby breaching the trust and losing the confidence given to her by Cocoplans. Consequently, Villapando filed an action for illegal dismissal alleging that she was dismissed without the just cause mandated by law. On 2004, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Villapando finding that she was illegally terminated from her employment. However, the NLRC disagreed with the Labor Arbiter in its Decision holding that the matter of resignation is a nonissue as the termination of Villapando’s employment was affected for reasons other than her resignation. Yet, in its 2008 Decision, the CA disagreed with the NLRC and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, finding that while Villapando was duly afforded the required due process mandated by law, the evidence adduced by herein petitioners was not substantial enough to support their allegation that Villapando deliberately influenced people to transfer to another company. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was terminated for just cause. HELD: Settled is the rule that to constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two (2) requisites must concur, viz.: (a) the employee must be afforded due process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself; and (b) the dismissal must be for a valid cause, as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code, or for any of the authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284 of the same Code. In the case before the Court, it is already undisputed that petitioners duly afforded Villapando the opportunity to be heard and defend herself, thereby complying with the first requisite. The issue that remains, therefore, is whether Villapando was dismissed for valid and just cause. To be a valid ground for dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. Loss of confidence must not also be indiscriminately used as a shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an employee was arbitrary. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and show that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. In the instant case, the Court does not find the evidence presented by petitioners to be substantial enough to discharge the burden of proving that Villapando was, indeed, dismissed for just cause. Thus, in view of the irregularities identified by the CA, the Court cannot take Ms. Gurango’s affidavit into account. In dismissing an employee for just cause, it must be shown that the employer fairly made a determination of just cause in good faith, taking into consideration all of the evidence available to him. Thus, not only is there no showing that said affidavit was considered by petitioners in arriving at their decision to dismiss Villapando; Villapando never had the opportunity to address the accusations stated therein. As such, the Court cannot consider the same. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. LIGAN G.R. No. 203932. June 8, 2016 FACTS: PAL and Synergy Services Corporation (Synergy) entered into a station services agreement and a janitorial services agreement whereby Synergy provided janitors and station attendants to PAL at Mactan airport. Enrique Ligan was among the personnel of Synergy posted at PAL to carry out the contracted tasks. Claiming to be performing duties directly desirable and necessary to the business of PAL, the respondents, along with 12 other co-employees, filed complaints in March 1992 against PAL and Synergy in the NLRC Region VII Office in Cebu City for regularization of their status as employees of PAL, underpayment of salaries and nonpayment of premium pay for holidays, premium pay for rest days, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and allowances. In the Decision dated August 29, 1994, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that Synergy was an independent contractor and dismissed the complaint for regularization, but granted the complainants’ money claims. On appeal, the NLRC, 4th Division, Cebu City on January 5, 1996 declared Synergy a labor-only contractor and ordered PAL to accept the complainants as regular employees and as such, to pay their salaries, allowances and other benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement subsisting during the period of their employment. PAL went to this Court on certiorari, but the case was referred to the CA. On September 29, 2000, the CA, in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 52329, affirmed the NLRC in toto. Meanwhile, while the above regularization cases were pending in the CA, PAL terminated its service agreements with Synergy effective June 30, 1998, alleging serious business losses. Consequently, Synergy also terminated its employment contracts with the respondents, who forthwith filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal against PAL. PAL in turn filed a third party complaint against Synergy. In his Decision dated July 27, 1998, Executive LA Reynoso A. Belarmino declared that Synergy was an independent contractor and the respondents were its regular employees, and therefore Synergy was solely liable for the payment of their separation pay, wage differential, and attorney’s fees. In their appeal to the NLRC, the respondents cited seven previous cases wherein the NLRC also declared that Synergy was a labor-only contractor. They argued that Synergy and PAL dismissed them without just cause. In the Decision dated August 27, 2004, the NLRC found that the functions performed by the respondents under Synergy’s service contracts with PAL indicated that they were directly related to PAL’s air transport business. PAL’s motion for reconsideration having denied, it filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. On February 15, 2012, the CA dismissed PAL’s petition, and on September 27, 2012, it also denied its motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed by PAL. ISSUE: Whether the termination of the respondents’ employment by Synergy in June 1998 was without just cause and observance of due process. HELD: PAL has insisted that the NLRC erroneously relied on an inexistent CA decision, and therefore its decision is void, but the CA in its resolution of September 27, 2012 has concluded that “[a] perusal of the Decision of the NLRC shows that it is not without basis,” that the NLRC “made findings of facts, analyzed the legal aspects of the case taking into consideration the evidence presented and formed conclusions after noting the relevant facts of the case.” But more importantly, the Court cannot lose sight of the settled rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the onus to prove that the employee was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that his dismissal was not illegal, rests on the employer, and that its failure to discharge this burden signifies that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. Unfortunately, in this petition, PAL has advanced no such justification whatsoever to dismiss or retrench the respondents. The Court is left with no conclusion: PAL’s petition is misleading and clearly baseless and dilatory. G.R. No. 205061, June 08, 2016 EMERTIA G. MALIXI vs. MEXICALI PHILIPPINES AND/OR FRANCESCA MABANTA, DEL CASTILLO, J. Facts: Petitioner was hired by respondents as a team leader at delivery service. Due to her satisfactory performance, she was then transferred at a newly opened branch in Alabang Town Center as a store manager. In December 2008, she was compelled to sign an end of contract letter due to her criminal complaint for sexual harassment against the respondent’s operations manager. However, she refused to do so. Thereafter, Luna went to the branch and caused the signing of the same and informed her that it was her last day. Respondents denied responsibilities to the petitioner on the ground that she was no longer an employee of Mexicali but rather Calexico. That the two are distinct and Separate Corporation. Petitioner alleged that it was Mexicali who engaged, dismissed and controlled her. That her resignation was a condition for her promotion as a store manager. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the petitioner. Declaring that Mexicali and Calexico are one and the same with interlocking board of directors. The NLRC, nevertheless, ordered Mexicali, being the employer of Teves and Luna who caused petitioner's termination from her employment with Calexico, to reinstate petitioner to her job at Calexico but without paying her any backwages. The CA affirmed the decision of NLRC that there was no illegal dismissal. Issue: Whether or not there was an illegal dismissal Held: The Court finds that there exists no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondents as to hold the latter liable for illegal dismissal. "Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment."30 Here, petitioner tendered her resignation letter preparatory to her transfer to Calexico for a higher position and pay. In the said letter, she expressed her gratitude and appreciation for the two months of her employment with Mexicali and intimated that she regrets having to leave the company. Clearly, expressions of gratitude and appreciation as well as manifestation of regret in leaving the company negates the notion that she was forced and coerced to resign. In the same vein, an inducement for a higher position and salary cannot defeat the voluntariness of her actions. It should be emphasized that petitioner had an option to decline the offer for her transfer, however, she opted to resign on account of a promotion and increased pay. "In termination cases, the employee is not afforded any option; the employee is dismissed and his only recourse is to institute a complaint for illegal dismissal against his employer x x x."31 Clearly, this does not hold true for petitioner in the instant case. Further, as aptly observed by the CA, petitioner is a managerial employee, who, by her educational background could not have been coerced, forced or induced into resigning from her work. YUMANG v. RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC. G.R No. 201016 FACTS: On May 1, 1998, the petitioner Leoncia A. Yumang started her employment with the respondent Radio Philippines Network, Inc. She was a member of the Radio Philippines Network Employees Union (RPNEU) which had a collective bargaining agreement with RPN 9 effective July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2009. Allegedly, after the conclusion of the CBA, a new Toyota Revo driven by RPNEU President Reynato Siozon Jr., was found to be registered in the name of the RPN 9 General Manager. The petitioner and 14 other union members filed complaints with the DOLE-NCR against the RPNEU officers and members of the Board of Directors for: impeachment, an audit of union funds, and the conduct of a snap election. On August 17, 2005, Mediator-Arbiter Clarissa G. Beltran-Lerios (Med-Arbiter Lerios) ordered the conduct of a referendum to determine whether the incumbent RPNEU officers would be impeached. The union officers and the BOD appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR Director Henry Parel granted the appeal and reversed Med-Arbiter Lerios' ruling. In the meantime or on June 1, 2005, two complaints were filed with the RPNEU Executive Board against several union members. The complaints involved alleged violations of the RPNEU Constitution and Bylaws (CBL),6 principally: (1) the commission of acts inimical to the interests of the union and the general membership; (2) the attempt to form another union; and (3) an appeal to the general membership urging them to commence legal action without exhausting remedies under the RPNEU CBL. The CA denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC ruling. ISSUES:  WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion  WON the expulsion of the petitioner was justified HELD: We find no reversible error in the CA's affirmation of the NLRC's acceptance of the appeal despite its non-perfection as described by the petitioner. Article 227 (formerly Art. 221) of the Labor Code (renumbered by R. A. No. 10151, An Act Allowing the Employment of Night Workers), provides that "In any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiter shall use every and all means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. In the issue of the expulsion case, which is paramount in the mind of the management, we asked ourselves whether the so-called General Assembly resolution that they tout as having reversed the expulsion case actually occurred. When asked whether a General Assembly meeting was actually held to discuss the reversal of the expulsion case, no categorical answer was given by Ms. Ruth Yap, et al. In our search for truth, we called some members who signed and asked them if indeed a General Assembly was called and if any deliberation on the expulsion was discussed, the answer of the member- signatories that we called was negative. In fact they said that one of the 15 in the group of Ms.Yap approached them and appealed to them to sign lest they be expelled from the union. The constitution and bylaws of the union provide that charges for any violations thereof shall be filed before the said board. But as explained by the lower court, if the complainants had done so the board of directors would in effect be acting as respondent investigator and judge at the same time. To follow the procedure indicated would be a farce under the circumstances; where exhaustion of administrative remedies within the union itself would practically amount to a denial of justice or would be illusory or vain, it will not be insisted upon. The records show that there was no categorical finding of the petitioner's guilt on this question. But we find the petitioner well within her rights as a union member when she took the officers to task for then handling of the affairs of the union, especially with respect to matters relating to the union funds and the quality of the union leadership. The union President's integrity was itself put in serious doubt when he was seen using a vehicle registered in the name of the RPN9 General Manager after the conclusion of the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2009 CBA. In sum, the court finds merit in the petition. The petitioner was illegally dismissed, as her expulsion from the union had no basis. BARRIO FIESTA RESTAURANT v. BERONIA, G.R No. 206690 FACTS: ON Aug. 17, 2009, respondent Helen C. Beronia filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioners Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, Liberty Ilagan, Sunshine Ongpauco-Ikeda, and Marico Cristobal. The petitioners, through Atty. Richard Neil S. Chua of Ligon Solis Mejia Florendo law firm, denied the claims prayed for. In a decision dated May 31, 2010, the labor arbiter (LA) declared that Beronia had been illegally dismissed. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LA’s ruling in its Dec. 7, 2010 decision. Beronia moved for reconsideration of the NLRC decision. On Jan. 13, 2011, the petitioners filed their opposition to Beronia’s motion for reconsideration. The opposition was signed and personally filed by Ilagan and Ikeda. In its July 21, 2012 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) reinstated the LA decision. On Nov. 29, 2012, the petitioners, through Real Bartolo & Real law offices, filed with the CA an entry of appearance with manifestation and motion for reconsideration. In its April 5, 2013 resolution, the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for being 138 days late, pointing out that petitioners’ counsel has long received a copy of its June 21, 2012 decision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners asked for a liberal application of the procedural rules, reasoning that they believed all the while that they were being represented by their former counsel, Ligon, et. al., through Atty. Chua. They argued that the procedural lapse before the CA was clearly due to a miscommunication with the law firm for which they should not be made to suffer, in the interest of substantial justice. ISSUE: Does this argument find merit? HELD: No. In the present case, the only permissible consideration we can take is to determine whether circumstances exist to excuse the petitioners’ delay in the filing of their motion for reconsideration. If there are none, as indeed we find because the petitioners utterly failed to show us one, then the delay is fatal. We note that on Jan. 13, 2011, the petitioners filed an Opposition, dated January 5, 2011, to the motion filed by Beronia seeking reconsideration of the NLRC’s Dec. 7, 2010 decision. Significantly, this Jan. 5, 2011 opposition was signed personally by petitioners Ilagan and Ikeda, on behalf of themselves and of petitioner Barrio Fiesta, instead of by Atty. Chua for Ligon, et al. as the petitioners’ counsel. As a rule, when a party to a proceeding is represented by counsel, it is the counsel who signs any pleading filed in the course of the proceeding. The party represented does not have to sign the pleadings, save only in the specific instances required by the rules; they appear before the court and participate in the proceedings only when specifically required by the court or tribunal. In the petitioners’ case, they were themselves aware that Beronia sought reconsideration of the NLRC decision as they had, in fact, personally opposed this motion instead of through their counsel on record, Ligon, et al. Had they still been represented by their counsel, through Atty. Chua as they claim, the latter would have signed and filed the opposition in their behalf. Viewed in this light, the petitioners must have known that Ligon, et al. no longer represented them in this case; this was true even at the NLRC level and before the case reached the CA. (Brion, J.; SC 2nd Division, Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, et. al. vs. Helen C. Beronia, G.R. No. 206690, July 11, 2016). GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES v. GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES FACULTY LABOR UNION, G.R No. 204693 FACTS: GNC is an educational institution located in Sta. Filomena, Guagua, Pampanga. On the other hand, respondents Guagua National Colleges Faculty Labor Union (GNCFLU) and Guagua National Colleges Non-Teaching and Maintenance Labor Union (GNCNTMLU) were the bargaining agents for GNC's faculty members and non- teaching and maintenance personnel, respectively. Beginning 1994 until their present dispute, the parties concluded their Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) without issue as follows: (1) CBA effective June 1, 1994 to May 31, 1999 (1994-1999 CBA), the economic provisions of which were renegotiated on November 3, 1997 for years 1997-1999; (2) CBA effective June 1,1999 to May 31, 2004, the economic provisions of which were renegotiated on July 4, 2002 for years 2002-2004; and, (3) CBA effective June 1, 2004 to May 31, 2009. The aforementioned CBAs applied to both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU without distinction. Significantly, the 1994-1999 CBA has a "no-strike, no lock-out" clause under Section 17 thereof which likewise provides for mechanism for grievance resolution and voluntary arbitration. This provision was considered carried over in the subsequent CBAs. Respondents alleged that after several mediation meetings, the parties finally agreed on the details regarding the grant of signing bonus. Hence, they undertook to compose the final draft of the 2009-2014 CBA which it submitted to the NCMB on May 14, 2010 and copy furnished GNC on May 21, 2010. Respondents likewise averred that the parties already agreed to schedule the signing of the said CBA on May 28, 2010. GNC, on the other hand, contended that during mediation meetings with the NCMB, respondents submitted several CBA drafts for its consideration. Upon its receipt on May 21, 2010 of another draft CBA23 from respondents under cover letter dated May 20, 2010, it decided to secure the services of Atty. Padilla to assist it in its negotiations with respondents. Hence, on May 28, 2010, Atty. Padilla appeared before the NCMB and asked for 10 days to submit GNC's comment/counter-proposal to the purported draft CBA of respondents. However, on June 1, 2010, respondents filed a notice of strike. GNC called attention to the fact that when it requested the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the dispute, it also prayed that the same be ordered submitted to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provided for under the parties' CBA. It stressed that its participation in the compulsory arbitration proceeding should therefore not be construed as a waiver of its position that jurisdiction over the dispute rests with the voluntary arbitrator in view of the parties' agreement in the CBA, the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code. The NLRC rendered a decision that GNC committed unfair labor practice by violating the statutory duty to bargain collectively in good faith. GNC’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. It sought recourse from the CA through a petition for certiorari. The CA also denied the petition for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA COMMITTED GRIEVOUS AND IRREVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED GNC's PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION HELD: GNC asserts that it is the voluntary arbitrator which has jurisdiction over the grounds cited by respondents in their notice of strike in view of Section 17 of the parties' 1994-1999 CBA. The said provision contains the agreement of the parties on a "no strike, no lock-out" policy and on grievance resolution and voluntary arbitration which was carried over to their subsequent CBAs up to the existing one. According to GNC, respondents should not have filed a notice of strike in view of such "no-strike, no lock-out" clause and also since respondents' grounds for strike are within the scope of "grievance" to be resolved in accordance with the said Section 17. It argues that respondents, by the simple expedient of filing a notice of strike, were able to circumvent the "no strike, no lock-out" clause and the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provision of their CBA. Indeed, the parties through their CBA, agreed to a "no-strike, no lock-out" policy and to resolve their disputes through grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration. Despite these, respondents were justified in filing a notice of strike in light of the facts of this case. It is settled that a "no strike, no lock-out" provision in the CBA "may [only] be invoked by [an] employer when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other agreements from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by law. It [is not applicable when the strike] is grounded on unfair labor practice." 48 Here, while respondents enumerated four grounds in their notice of strike, the facts of the case reveal that what primarily impelled them to file said notice was their perception of bad faith bargaining and violation of the duty to bargain collectively by GNC - charges which constitute unfair labor practice under Article 248(g) of the Labor Code. The CA, on certiorari petition, found merit in the University's argument that the Secretary of Labor abused his/her discretion in resolving the economic issues on the ground that the same were proper subject of the grievance machinery as embodied in the parties' CBA. Accordingly, the said court directed the parties to submit the economic issues to voluntary arbitration. This Court affirmed the CA's ruling based on the following ratiocinations: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary We xxx find logic in the CA's directive for the herein parties to proceed with voluntary arbitration as provided in their CBA. As we see it, the issue as to the economic benefits, which included the issue on the formula in computing the TIP share of the employees, is one that arises from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA. To be sure, the parties' CBA provides for a grievance machinery to resolve any 'complaint or dissatisfaction arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and those arising from the interpretation of enforcement of company personnel policies.' Moreover, the same CBA provides that should the grievance machinery fail to resolve the grievance or dispute, the same shall be 'referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator for arbitration and final resolution.' However, through no fault of the University these processes were not exhausted. It must be recalled that while undergoing preventive mediation proceedings before the NCMB, the Union declared a bargaining deadlock, filed a notice of strike and thereafter, went on strike. The University filed a Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration but the motion was not acted upon by the NCMB. As borne by the records, the University has been consistent in its position that the Union must exhaust the grievance machinery provisions of the CBA which ends in voluntary arbitration. HSY Marketing Ltd. Co. v. VILLASTIQUE, G.R No. 2119569 FACTS: On January 3, 2003, petitioner hired respondent as a field driver for Fabulous Jeans & Shirt & General Merchandise, tasked to deliver ready-to-wear items and/or general merchandise for a daily compensation of P370.00. On January 10, 2011, respondent figured in an accident when the service vehicle he was driving in Iligan City bumped a pedestrian, Ryan Dorataryo. Fabulous jeans shouldered the hospitalization and medical expenses of Dorataryo which respondent was asked to reimburse, but to no avail. On February 24, 2011, respondent was allegedly required to sign a resignation letter, which he refused to do. A couple of years later. He tried to collect his salary for that week but was told that it was withheld because of his refusal to resign. Convinced that he was already terminated on February 26, 2011, he lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against petitioner, Fabulous Jeans and its owner before the NLRC. In their defense, petitioner, et al. contended that respondent had committed several violations in the course of his employment, and had been found by his superior and fellow employees to be a negligent and reckless driver, which resulted in the vehicular mishap involving Dorataryo. After they paid for Dorataryo's hospitalization and medical expenses, respondent went on absence without leave, presumably to evade liability for his recklessness. Since respondent was the one who refused to report for work, he should be considered as having voluntarily severed his own employment. Thus, his money claims cannot prosper, as he was not terminated. LA dismissed the charge of illegal dismissal. Petitioner appealed to NLRC. NLRC affirmed the finding of LA that there was no illegal dismissal. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied. CA affirmed NLRC decision. ISSUE: WON respondent was illegally dismissed. HELD: Respondent had not been dismissed at all. Other that the latter’s unsubstantiated allegation of having been verbally terminated from his work, no substantial evidence was presented to show that he was indeed dismissed or was prevented from returning to his work. In the absence of any showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitioner had dismissed respondent, the latter’s claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained as such supposition would be self-serving, conjectural and of no probative value. Similarly, petitioner’s claims of respondent’s voluntary resignation and/or abandonment deserve scant consideration, considering petitioner’s failure to discharge the burden of proving the deliberate and unjustified refusal of respondent to resume his employment without any intention of returning. It was incumbent upon petitioner to ascertain respondent’s interest or non-interest in the continuance of his employment, but to no avail. Hence, since there is no dismissal or abandonment to speak of, the appropriate course of action is to reinstate the employee. PENINSULA EMPLOYEE UNION v. ESQUIVEL, G.R No. 218454 FACTS: On December 13, 2007, Peninsula Employees Union’ (PEU) Board of Directors passed Local Board Resolution No. 12, series of 20078 authorizing, among others, the affiliation of PEU with NUWHRAIN, and the direct membership of its individual members thereto. On the same day, the said act was submitted to the general membership, and was duly ratified by 223 PEU members. Beginning January 1, 2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union dues/agency fees from one percent (1%) to two percent (2%) of the rank and file employees’ monthly salaries, brought about by PEU’s affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its affiliates to remit to it two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries. The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased agency fees arguing that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no written CBA has been formally signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and the Hotel; (b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant and unreasonable; and (c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for such increase. OSEC’s June 2, 2010 decision upheld PEU-NUWHRAIN's right to collect agency fees from the non-PEU members in accordance with Article 4, Section 2 of the expired CBA, which was declared to be in full force and effect pursuant to the October 10, 2008 Decision, but only at the rate of one percent (1%), and denied its bid to increase the agency fees to two percent (2%) for failure to show that its general membership approved the same PEU moved for reconsideration. On March 6, 2012, the OSEC issued an Order partially granting PEU-NUWHRAIN's motion for reconsideration, and declaring it entitled to collect two percent (2%) agency fees from the non-PEU members beginning July 2010 since the GMR showing approval for the increase of the union dues from one percent (1%) to two percent (2%) was only procured at that time CA reinstated the June 2, 2010 OSEC’s decision. PEU-NUWHRAIN moved for reconsideration, which was denied. ISSUE:  WON PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect the increased agency fees  WON PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for such increase HELD: 1. Yes. The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully negotiated the CBA with the employer is given the right to collect a reasonable fee called “agency fee” from non-union members who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in case they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the collection of agency fees is recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code, as amended, the legal basis of the union’s right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that non- union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. In the present case, PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency fees is not disputed. 2. Yes. Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and (o) of the Labor Code mandates the submission of three (3) documentary requisites in order to justify a valid levy of increased union dues. These are: (a) an authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting duly called for the purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting, which shall include the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees; and (c) individual written authorizations for check-off duly signed by the employees conceded. In the present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show compliance with the foregoing requirements. It attempted to remedy the “inadvertent omission” of the matter of the approval of the deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the monthly basic salary of each union member. PEOPLE’S SECURITY INC. v. FLORES, G.R No. 211312 FACTS: Julius S. Flores and Esteban S. Tapiru (respondents) were security guards previously employed by People's Security, Inc. (PSI). The respondents were assigned at the various facilities of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) pursuant to a security services agreement between PSI and PLDT On October 1, 2001, however, PSI's security services agreement with PLDT was terminated and, accordingly, PSI recalled its security guards assigned to PLDT including the respondents. On October 8, 2001, the respondents, together with several other security guards employed by PSI, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against PLDT and PSI, claiming that they are PLDT employees. Thereafter, PSI assigned the respondents to the facilities of its other clients such as the warehouse of a certain Marivic Yulo in Sta. Ana, Manila and Trinity College's Elementary Department in Quezon City. On January 13, 2003, the respondents were relieved from their respective assignments pursuant to Special Order No. 200310108 dated January 10, 2003 issued by Col. Leonardo L. Aquino, the Operations Manager of PSI.9 Accordingly, Flores and Tapiru, on September 6 and 27, 2005, respectively, filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of service incentive leave pay and cash bond, with prayer for separation pay, against PSI and its President Nestor Racho (Racho) (collectively, the petitioners). Respondents claimed that, after they were relieved from their assignment in the warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila on January 13, 2003, they repeatedly reported to PSI's office for possible assignment, but the latter refused to give them any assignment. Petitioners, in their position paper, claimed that the respondents were merely relieved from their assignment in the warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila and that the same was on account of their performance evaluation, which indicated that they were ill-suited for the said assignment. On January 30, 2009, the LA rendered a Decision finding that the respondents were illegally dismissed from their employment and, thus, directing the petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay the former separation pay and back wages. On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision dated April 14, 2010, reversed the LA Decision dated January 30, 2009. On April 25, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, reversing the NLRC's Decision dated April 14, 2010 and Resolution dated June 15, 2010. In finding that the respondents were illegally dismissed, the CA found that the petitioners failed to prove that the respondents had abandoned their work and that their defense of abandonment was negated by the filing of a case for illegal dismissal. In this petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners claim that the CA committed reversible error in ruling that the respondents were illegally dismissed from their employment. They maintain that PSI never terminated the respondents' employment. On the contrary, they claim that the respondents freely and voluntarily resigned from their employment. Petitioners also claim that the CA erred when it ruled that they should be held jointly and solitarily liable to pay the respondents separation pay and back wages considering that there was absolutely no allegation or proof of participation, bad faith, or malice on the part of Racho in dealing with the respondents. ISSUES:  Whether respondents were illegally dismissed?  Whether Racho is jointly and solidarily liable with PSI for the payment of the monetary awards to the respondents? HELD:  Yes As rule, employment cannot be terminated by an employer without any just or authorized cause. No less than the 1987 Constitution in Section 3, Article 13 guarantees security of tenure for workers and because of this, an employee may only be terminated for just or authorized causes that must comply with the due process requirements mandated by law. Hence, employers are barred from arbitrarily removing their workers whenever and however they want. Further, as aptly ruled by the CA, the petitioners miserably failed to prove that the respondents abandoned their work. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal acts. For abandonment to exist, two requisites must concur: first, the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts. The Court is not convinced that the respondents failed to report for work or have been absent without valid or justifiable cause. After the petitioners relieved them from their previous assignment in Sta. Ana, Manila, the respondents were no longer given any assignment. What is more, PSI did not afford the respondents due process. The validity of the dismissal of an employee hinges not only on the fact that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause, but also on the very manner of the dismissal itself. It is elementary that the termination of an employee must be effected in accordance with law. It is required that the employer furnish the employee with two written notices: (1) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; and (2) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.  No Anent, the propriety of holding Racho, PSI's President, jointly and solidarily liable with PSI for the payment of the money awards in favor of the respondents, the Court finds for the petitioners. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities. The respondents failed to adduce any evidence to prove that Racho, as President and General Manager of PSI, is hiding behind the veil of corporate fiction to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. Thus, it is only PSI who is responsible for the respondents' illegal dismissal MARINA’S CREATION ENTERPRISES v. ANCHETA, G.R No. 218333 FACTS: Petitioner Marina Creation Enterprises (Marina) is engaged in the business of making shoes and bags. In 2010, Marina hired respondent Romeo V. Ancheta (Ancheta) as a sole attacher in Marina. In 2011, Ancheta suffered a stroke and was placed under home care. Thereafter, Ancheta suffered another stroke and was confined at St. Victoria Hospital in Marikina City for 4 days. Ancheta filed for a Sickness Notification with the Social Security System (SSS) and was paid sickness benefits. The physician who examined Ancheta told that he would be fit to resume work after ninety (90) days. When Ancheta reported for work. He was required by Marina to submit a new medical certificate before he could resume his work in Marina. However, Ancheta did not comply and therefore was not able to resume work. He filed a complaint with the LA against Marina for illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation pay. Ancheta alleged that he recovered from his illness and went to work but Marina advised him to just wait for the companies call. He was also told that he should take more rest and that Marina employed 2 new workers as his replacement. He alleged that there was no notice for his termination. On the other hand, Marina claimed that Ancheta was employed on a piece rate bases and was not terminated but instead was not allowed to work because of his failure to submit a medical clearance showing he was fit to resume to work. Furthermore, it is the companies precautionary measure to avoid any incident that would endanger the life of Ancheta. The Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission ruled in favor of Marina but reversed by The Court of Appeals stating that the medical certificate given by Ancheta’s examining physician attached to his SSS Sickness Notification was enough proof that he is fit to work. ISSUE: The issue in this case is whether Ancheta was illegally dismissed by Marina. HELD: Yes, In its petition, Marina argues that the company's action of requiring Ancheta to undergo a medica1 examination and to submit a medical certificate was a valid exercise of management prerogative. Marina's contention is not correct. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides: "In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this title. x x x." Since Ancheta was a regular employee of Marina, Ancheta's employment can only be terminated by Marina based on just or authorized causes provided in the Labor Code. In its position paper, Marina admitted that the company had refused to give Ancheta work assignments until Ancheta submitted a new medical certificate. It is Marina's position that Ancheta's employment would not continue if Ancheta would not submit a new medical certificate. Marina's action in refusing to accept Ancheta notwithstanding the medical certificate attached to Ancheta's SSS Sickness Notification stating that Ancheta was physically fit to resume his work in Marina on 12 August 2011 amounts to an illegal dismissal of Ancheta. Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provides: Section 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. - Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment . If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. (Emphasis supplied) The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code impose upon the employer the duty not to terminate an employee until there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the employee's disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment. In this case, Marina terminated Ancheta from employment without seeking a prior certification from a competent public health authority that Ancheta's disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment. Hence, Ancheta was illegally dismissed by Marina. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES v. MAGLAYA Sr. G.R No. 212774 FACTS: Wesleyan University-Philippines (WUP) is a non-stock, non-profit, non-sectarian educational corporation duly organized and existing under the Philippine laws. Respondent Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya, Sr. (Maglaya) was appointed as a corporate member and was elected as a member of the Board of Trustees (Board), both for a period of five years. Then he was elected as President of the University for a five-year term and was re-elected as a trustee. In a Memorandum created by the incumbent Bishops of the United Methodist Church (Bishops) apprised all the corporate members of the expiration of their terms, unless renewed by the former. The said members, including Maglaya, sought the renewal of their membership in the WUP's Board, and signified their willingness to serve the corporation. Maglaya learned that the Bishops created an Ad Hoc Committee to plan the efficient and orderly turnover of the administration of the WUP in view of the alleged "gentleman's agreement” and that the Bishops have appointed the incoming corporate members and trustees. He clarified that there was no agreement and any discussion of the turnover because the corporate members still have valid and existing corporate terms. Complaint was filed as the termination of their membership in the corporation necessarily resulted in the conclusion of their positions as members of the Board pursuant to the WUP by-laws. Thereafter, Maglaya filed the present illegal dismissal case against the WUP, claiming that he was unceremoniously dismissed in a wanton, reckless, oppressive and malevolent manner. He also alleged that he faithfully discharged his necessary and desirable functions as President. WUP, on the other hand, asseverated that the dismissal or removal of Maglaya, being a corporate officer and not a regular employee, is a corporate act or intra-corporate controversy under the jurisdiction of the RTC. WUP also maintained that since Maglaya's appointment was not renewed, he ceased to be a member of the corporation and of the Board; thus, his term for presidency has also been terminated. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of WUP and held that the action between employers and employees where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental is within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the regular courts. This instant case involves intra-corporate dispute, which was definitely beyond the jurisdiction of the labor tribunal. Ruling in favor of Maglaya, the NLRC explicated that although the position of the President of the University is a corporate office, the manner of Maglaya's appointment, and his duties, salaries, and allowances point to his being an employee and subordinate. In a Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by WUP. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Maglaya is a corporate officer or a mere employee. HELD: This Court expounded that an "office" is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders, while an "employee" usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee. It is under the By-laws of WUP that the president was one of the officers of the corporation, and was an honorary member of the Board. He was appointed by the Board and not by a managing officer of the corporation. The Court held that one who is included in the by-laws of a corporation in its roster of corporate officers is an officer of said corporation and not a mere employee. A corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation, and the nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom with which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action. The issue of the alleged termination involving a corporate officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management and is a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code. In sum, this Court finds that the NLRC erred in assuming jurisdiction over, and thereafter in failing to dismiss, Maglaya's complaint for illegal dismissal against WUP, since the subject matter of the instant case is an intra-corporate controversy which the NLRC has no jurisdiction. TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY v. FELICIANO PAJARON, G.R. No. 207156 FACTS: Gem Zenñ arosa, owner of Turks Shawarma Company, hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron in May 2007 as service crew and Larry A. Carbonilla in April 2007 as head crew. On April 15, 2010, Pajaron and Carbonilla filed their respective Complaints for constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against petitioners. Pajaron alleged that on April 9, 2010, Zenñ arosa asked him to sign a piece of paper stating that he was receiving the correct amount of wages and that he had no claims whatsoever from petitioners. Disagreeing to the truthfulness of the statements, Pajaron refused to sign the paper prompting Zenñ arosa to fire him from work. Carbonilla, on the other hand, alleged that sometime in June 2008, he had an altercation with his supervisor Conchita Marcillana while at work. When the incident was brought to the attention of Zenñ arosa, he was immediately dismissed from service. He was also asked by Zenñ arosa to sign a piece of paper acknowledging his debt amounting to ₱7,000.00. Both Pajaron and Carbonilla claimed that there was no just or authorized cause for their dismissal and that petitioners also failed to comply with the requirements of due process. Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron and Carbonilla; they averred that they actually abandoned their work. The Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and held them constructively and illegally dismissed by petitioners. The National Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals both denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether the Labor Arbiter's Decision declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla illegally terminated from employment was not based on substantial evidence. HELD: The Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter's Decision declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla illegally dismissed was supported by substantial evidence. While petitioners vehemently argue that Pajaron and Carbonilla abandoned their work, the records are devoid of evidence to show that there was intent on their part to forego their employment. In fact, petitioners adamantly admitted that they refused to rehire Pajaron and Carbonilla despite persistent requests to admit them to work. Hence, petitioners essentially admitted the fact of dismissal. However, except for their empty and general allegations that the dismissal was for just causes, petitioners did not proffer any evidence to support their claim of misconduct or misbehavior on the part of Pajaron and Carbonilla. "In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause."37 For lack of any clear, valid, and just cause in terminating Pajaron and Carbonilla's employment, petitioners are indubitably guilty of illegal dismissal. PNCC Skyway Corporation v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, G.R No. 196110 FACTS: The Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) was awarded by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) with the franchise of constructing, operating and maintaining the north and south expressways, including the South Metro Manila Skyway (referred as Skyway herein). It created the petitioner PNCC Skyway Corporation (PSC) on December 15, 1998, for the purpose of taking charge of its traffic safety, maintaining its facilities and collecting toll. Eight years have passed, the Citra Metro Manila Tollway Corporation (Citra), a private investor under a build-and-transfer scheme, entered into an agreement with the TRB and the PNCC to transfer the operation of the Skyway from petitioner PSC to the Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO). The said transfer provided for a five-month transition period from July 2007 until the full turn-over of the Skyway at 10:00 p.m. of December 31, 2007 upon which petitioner PSC will close its operation. However, on December 28, 2007 or three (3) days before the full transfer of the operation of the Skyway to SOMCO, petitioner PSC served termination letters to its employees, many of whom were members of private respondent PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division Worker's Organization (Union). According to the letter, PSC has no choice but to close its operations resulting in the termination of its employees effective January 31, 2008. However, the employees are entitled to receive separation pay amounting to 250% of the basic monthly pay for every year of service, among others things. Petitioner PSC, likewise, served a notice of termination to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On that same day of December 28, 2007, private respondent Union, immediately upon receipt of the termination letters, filed a Notice of Strike before the DOLE alleging that the closure of the operation of PSC is tantamount to union-busting because it is a means of terminating employees who are members thereof. In addition, the notices of termination were served on its employees three (3) days before petitioner PSC ceases its operations, hence violating the employees' right to due process. As a matter of fact, the employees were no longer allowed to work as of January 1, 2008. Private respondent Union, thus, prayed that petitioner PSC be held guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal. It, likewise, prayed for the reinstatement of all dismissed employees, along with the award of backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. PSC denied that the closure of its operation was intended to remove employees who are members of private respondent Union. Instead, it claimed that it was done in good faith and in the exercise of management prerogative, considering that it was anchored on an agreement between the TRB, the PNCC and the private investor Citra. PSC likewise denied that it had violated the right to due process of its employees, considering that the notices of termination were served on December 28, 2007 while the termination was effective only on January 31, 2008. PSC alleged that the Union was guilty of an illegal strike when it started a strike on the same day it filed a notice of strike on December 28, 2007. Public Respondent Secretary of Labor found that there was authorized cause for the closure of the operation however it failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth under Article 283 of the Labor Code. On appeal, PSC filed a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Secretary of Labor when it additionally directed payment of an additional ₱30,000.00 to PSC's former employees pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: Whether or not PSC failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Article 283 of the Labor Code HELD: YES. The SC agreed with the appellate court's stance that public respondent Secretary of Labor committed no grave abuse of discretion in its resolution that while there was an authorized cause for the closure of PSC's operations and the subsequent termination of its employees, it however failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth under Article 283 of the Labor Code, that is, by serving notices of termination upon the employees and the DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. Article 283 of the Labor Code provides the three requirements are necessary for a valid cessation of business operations which are as follows: (a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended date thereof; (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The required written notice under Article 283 of the Labor Code is to inform the employees of the specific date of termination or closure of business operations and must be served upon them at least one (1) month before the date of effectivity to give them sufficient time to make the necessary arrangements. The purpose of this requirement is to give employees time to prepare for the eventual loss of their jobs, as well as to give DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the veracity of the alleged cause of termination. Thus, considering that the notices of termination were given merely three (3) days before the cessation of the PSC's operation, it defeats the very purpose of the required notice and the mandate of Article 283 of the Labor Code. Neither the payment of employees' salaries for the said one-month period nor the employees' alleged actual knowledge of the ASTOA is sufficient to replace the formal and written notice required by the law. Moreover, as early as July 2007, PSC already had knowledge of the eventual take- over by SOMCO of the Skyway by December 31, 2007. Thus, considering that PSC had ample time of more than five (5) months to serve the notice of termination to its employees, its failure to comply with the notice requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code is inexcusable. PJ LHUILLIER, INC v. CAMACHO, G.R No. 223073 FACTS: On 2011, petitioner P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. (PJLI), the owner and operator of the "Cebuana Lhuillier" chain of pawnshops, hired petitioner Feliciano Vizcarra as PLJI's Regional Manager for Northern and Central Luzon pawnshop operations and respondent Camacho as Area Operations Manager (AOM) for Area 213, covering the province of Pangasinan. Camacho was assigned to administer and oversee the operations of PJLI's pawnshop branches in the area. On May 15, 2012, Vizcarra received several text messages from some personnel assigned in Area 213, reporting that Camacho brought along an unauthorized person, a non-employee, during the QTP operation (pull-out of "rematado" pawned items) from the different branches of Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop in Pangasinan. During the formal investigation on June 1, 2012, Camacho admitted that he brought along a non-employee, Marasigan, during the QTP operations on May 15, 2012. He explained that on May 12, 2012, he went home to Manila to celebrate Mother's Day with his family on May 13, 2012. He drove himself using the service vehicle assigned to him and arrived in Manila at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening. Camacho admitted that he knew that it was prohibited to bring unauthorized personnel, especially a non-employee, during the QTP operations because this was discussed in the seminars facilitated by the company's Security Service Division. He only realized his mistake at the end of their 13-branch stop when he noticed that his companions were unusually quiet throughout the trip. It was also discovered that Camacho committed another violation of company policy when he allowed an unauthorized person to drive a company vehicle. On June 14, 2012, the Formal Investigation Committee issued the Report of Formal Investigation. The committee concluded that Camacho was guilty as charged. This prompted Camacho to file a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) against the petitioners for illegal dismissal, money claims, damages, and attorney's fees. The NLRC reversed and set aside the May 14, 2013 Decision of the LA. It declared the dismissal of Camacho as illegal. It opined that there was no indication that Camacho, in allowing his mother's driver to be present during the conduct of the QTP operation, was motivated by malicious intent so as to construe the infraction as serious misconduct punishable by dismissal. The CA reversed the NLRC resolutions. It held that contrary to the findings of the LA and the NLRC, the misconduct of Camacho was not of a serious nature as to warrant a dismissal from work. At most, said the CA, he was negligent and remiss in the exercise of his duty as an AOM. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Camacho was illegally dismissed HELD: The Court finds merit in the petition. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes the employer to dismiss an employee for committing fraud or for willful breach of trust reposed by the employer on the employee. Loss of confidence, however, is never intended to provide the employer with a blank check for terminating its employee a. "Loss of trust and confidence" should not be loosely applied in justifying the termination of an employee." For loss of trust and confidence to be valid ground for termination, the employer must establish that: (1) the employee holds a position of trust and confidence; and (2) the act complained against justifies the loss of trust and confidence. The first requisite mandates that the erring employee must be holding a position of trust and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence is not a one-size- fits-all cause that can be applied to all employees without distinction on their standing in the work organization. Distinction yet should be made as to what kind of position of trust is the employee occupying. The law contemplates two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first class consists of managerial employees. They are as those who are vested with the power or prerogative to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc. who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. Clearly from the foregoing, it can be deduced that Camacho held a managerial position and, therefore, enjoyed the full trust and confidence of his superiors. As a managerial employee, he was "bound by more exacting work ethics" and should live up to this high standard of responsibility." The second requisite for loss of confidence as a valid ground for termination is that it must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. As can be culled from the records of the case, Camacho admitted that he had committed a breach of trust when he brought along his mother's driver, an unauthorized person, during the QTP operation, a very sensitive and confidential operation. As explained by PJLI in its petition for review: Camacho, as AOM, was a managerial employee. As such, he could be terminated on the ground of loss of confidence by mere existence of a basis for believing that he had breached the trust of his employer. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. It would already be sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the concerned employee is responsible for the purported misconduct and the nature of his participation therein. This distinguishes a managerial employee from a fiduciary rank-and-file where loss of trust and confidence, as ground for valid dismissal, requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertion and accusation by the employer will not be sufficient. In this case, there was such basis. It was established that Camacho had breached PJLI's trust when he took an unauthorized person with him to the QTP operation which was already a violation of company existing policy and security protocol. His explanation that his alleged misdeed was brought about by his poor physical and health condition on that day could not prevail over two significant details that PJLI pointed out in its petition. Although it may be true that PJLI did not sustain damage or loss on account of Camacho's action, this is not reason enough to absolve him from the consequence of his misdeed. The fact that an employer did not suffer pecuniary damage will not obliterate the respondent's betrayal of trust and confidence reposed on him by his employer. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is REINSTATED. STA. ANA v. MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC. G.R No. 208459 FACTS: Julieta Sta. Ana was hired by MJCI as outlet teller of its off-track betting (OTB) station in Tayuman, Manila. As teller, Sta. Ana performed the following duties and functions: 1. Waits on [OTB] tellers' booth for customers/clients; sells betting tickets. 2. Answers bettor's inquiries, provides information on racing events, assists patrons with information, and takes bet orders. 3. Processes cash payments through terminal registers; balances registers and makes daily ticket sales reports after the races. 4. Handles cash and transactions with due diligence and honesty to the bettors and to the company as well. 5. Coordinates with the Betting Operations Department (BOD) on matters beyond the standard operating procedure of the BOD. 6. Strictly observes and implements' company policies and procedures to protect the interests of the company against unscrupulous bettors and operators 7. Reports incidents to the company on matters pertaining to the operations. 8, Submits or remits the cash sales for the day to the official collection team and/or to the assigned banks with night depository box.1âwphi1 9. May be assigned to different OTBs as necessary to the company's operations. 10. Performs miscellaneous job-related duties as assigned. 8 It was found out by MJCI that its treasury department has been illegally appropriating funds and lending it out to the employees of the latter corporation. The Special Disciplinary Committee of MJCI found Sta. Ana conducting her lending business during office hours and using the funds and personnel of MJCI; thus, she was found guilty of dishonesty and other fraudulent acts by the said committee. On her defense, she alleged that she started her lending business 15 years ago prior to the takeover of the new management of MJCI and she sold her fishing vessels 2 years ago to finance her lending business. She was eventually terminated by MJCI. Consequently, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Note that Sta. Ana was dismissed for willful breach of trust and confidence. The LA dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC affirmed the LA Decision. It ruled that MJCI validly dismissed Sta. Ana for loss of trust and confidence. The CA also affirmed the NLRC Resolutions. ISSUE: Whether Sta. Ana was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. HELD: The Supreme Court enumerated the elements to legally dismiss an employee on the ground of loss and trust, to wit: “The employer must establish that: a) the employee occupied a position of trust and confidence, or has been routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property; b) the employee committed a willful breach of trust based on clearly established facts; and c) such loss of trust relates to the employee’s performance of duties.” In the case at bar, only the first element was proven by MCJI. The SC ruled that nowhere in the evidence presented by MJCI that Sta. Ana utilized the funds of the corporation for her lending business. Also, Sta. Ana was able to present documents to show her capability to engage in loan operations. Quoting the words of the SC: “Particularly, it [MJCI] failed to establish that Sta. Ana used its employee for her personal business during office hours, and used its money, without authority, to lend money to another” MJCI failed to prove that Sta. Ana committed willful breach of its trust. Particularly, it failed to establish that Sta. Ana used its employee for her personal business during office hours, and used its money; without authority, to lend money to another. Hence, to dismiss her on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is unwarranted. Under these circumstances. Sta. Ana is also entitled to receive backwages and separation pay. DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOLS, INC. v. BIGKIS MANGGAGAWA SA DE OCAMPO, INC, G.R No. 192648 FACTS: De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. a domestic corporation has two main divisions; De Ocampo Memorial Medical Center (DOMMC), its hospital entity, and the De Ocampo Memorial Colleges (DOMC), its school entity. A Union Registration was issued in favor of Bigkis Manggagawa sa De Ocampo Memorial Medical Center - LAKAS (BMDOMMC) while Bigkis Manggagawa sa De Ocampo Memorial School, Inc. (BMDOMSI) was later declared a legitimate labor organization. Due to this, De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Ce1iificate of Registration to cancel the Certificate of Registration of BMDOMSI on the following grounds: 1) misrepresentation, false statement and fraud in connection with its creation and registration as a labor union as it shared the same set of officers and members with BMDOMMC; 2) mixed membership of rank- and-file and managerial/supervisory employees; and 3) inappropriate bargaining unit. DOLE-NCR ruled that BMDOMSI committed misrepresentation by making it appear that the bargaining unit is composed of faculty and technical employees. In fact, all the union officers and most of the members are from the General Services Division. Furthermore, the members of the union do not share commonality of interest, as it is composed of academic and non-academic personnel. However, reversed the Regional Director's finding. The CA affirmed the decision of the Regional Director but also ruled that there was no commonality of interest present. ISSUE: Whether or not the union committed fraud and misrepresentation by having same set of officers with BMDOMMC HELD: No. For fraud and misrepresentation to constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code Art. 247, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members. Moreover, there is nothing in the form "Report of Creation of Local Chapter" that requires the applicant to disclose the existence of another union, much less the names of the officers of such other union. Although commonality of interest is absent, it is not a ground for cancellation of union registration. 27. MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS V. PLDT G.R. NO. 190389 April 19, 2017 FACTS: Labor organization Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP), which represented the employees of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. MKP charged Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company with unfair labor practice "for transferring several employees of its Provisioning Support Division to Bicutan, Taguig." The notice of strike contains the following unfair labor practices: 1. PLDT's abolition of the Provisioning Support Division 2. PLDT's unreasonable refusal to honor its commitment before this Honorable Office that it will provide MKP its comprehensive plan/s with respect to personnel downsizing/ reorganization and closure of exchanges. 3. PLDT's continued hiring of "contractual," "temporary," "project," and "casual" employees for regular jobs performed by union members, resulting in the decimation of the union membership and in the denial of the right to self-organization to the concerned employees Another notice of strike was filed by MKP. The labor organization accused PLDT of unfair labor practice where PLDT's alleged restructuring of its [Greater Metropolitan Manila] Operation Services December 31, 2002 and its closure of traffic operations at the Batangas, Calamba, Davao, Iloilo, Lucena, Malolos and Tarlac Regional Operator Services effective December 31, 2002. These twin moves unjustly imperil the job security of 503 of MKP's members and will substantially decimate the parties' bargaining unit. Secretary of Labor and Employment certified the labor dispute at the PLDT to the NLRC compulsory Arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of Labor Code. All striking workers are hereby directed to return to work within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order, except those who were terminated due to redundancy. The employer is hereby enjoined to accept the striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. The parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any act that might worsen the situation. CA nullified and set aside the order of Secretary of Labor and Employment. PLDT appealed CA’s decision to the SC. SC upheld the CA’s decision and ordered to readmit all the workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. However, NLRC dismissed MKP’s charges of unfair labor practices against PLDT. MKP filed a petition for certiorari with CA. CA upheld the validity of PLDT’s redundancy program. Consequently, Sec of Labor and Employment dismissed MKP’s motion for execution of the SC’s decision of readmitting all the workers. MKP filed a petition for certiorari before CA. CA found that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretiona and that PLDT’s redundancy program was not unattended by unfair labor practice. ISSUES: 1. WHETHER THE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF PLDT’S 2002 REDUNDANCY PROGRAM 2. WHETHER THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT WAS RENDERED MOOT WHEN THE NLRC UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE REDUNDANCY PROGRAM RULING: 1. NO. The Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it regarded the technological advancements resulting in less work for the redundated employees as justifying PLDT’s declaration of redundancy. PLDT’s declaration of redundancy was backed by substantial evidence showing a consistent decline for operator-assisted calls for both local and international calls because of cheaper alternatives like direct dialing services, and the growth of wireless communication. Thus, the National Labor Relations Commission did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the validity of PLDT's redundancy program. Redundancy is ultimately a management prerogative, and the wisdom or soundness of such business judgment is not subject to discretionary review by labor tribunals or even this Court, as long as the law was followed and malicious or arbitrary action was not shown. 2. YES. Return-to-work order aims to preserve the status quo ante while the validity of redundancy program is being threshed out in the proper forum. When the petitioner filed its Motion for Execution pursuant to the Court’s ruling in PLDT, there was no longer any existing basis for the return-to-work order. This was because the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s return-to-work order had been superseded by the NLRC’s Resolution. Hence, the Secretary did not err in dismissing the motion for execution on the ground of mootness. 28. EDITHA M. CATOTOCAN v. LOURDES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY, INC./LOURDES SCHOOL, INC. AND REV. FR. CESAR F. ACUIN, OFM CAP, RECTOR FACTS: Editha Catotocan was a music teacher with a monthly salary Php30,081.00 of Lourdes School of Quezon City (LSQC). By the school year 2005-2006, she had already served for 35 years. LSQC has an existing retirement plan providing for retirement at 60 years old, or separation pay depending on the number of years On November 25, 2003, LSQC issued another retirement plan providing that “an employee may apply for retirement or be retired by the school when he /she reaches the age of 60 years or when he/she completes 30 years of service, whichever comes first”. Catotocan and other co-employees assailed the said order. They believed that they do not deserve to be retired and be rehired when they are, in fact, very much capable of doing their duties and responsibilities. LSQC retired Catotocan sometime in June 2006 after completing 35 years of service. Full retirement benefits were given to her computed based on the latest salary multiplied by the total years of service. Under the school's retirement policy, 60% of her retirement benefit was paid in lump sum by the trustee bank, and the balance was to be paid in equal monthly pensions over the next 3 years. 60% or Php571,701.00 was credited to her savings account, which she opened in accordance with the school's retirement policy. Catotocan was told that if she desires, she may signify in writing her intent to continue serving the school on a contractual basis. She responded by submitting a "Letter of Intent" on February 14, 2006. LSQC rehired Catotocan twice as a Grade School Guidance Counselor. On the 3 rd re-application, LSQC no longer considered her application for the position. Catotocan filed a complaint to the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, which the latter dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter pointed out that, although there were exchanges of communications between her and respondents regarding her earlier opposition to the school's retirement policy, her subsequent actions, however, such as opening her own individual savings account where the retirement benefits were deposited and credited thereto, her subsequent withdrawals therefrom, her application for contractual employment after her retirement, constituted implied consent to the assailed addendum in LSQC's retirement policy and, in effect, abandoned her objection thereto. NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. The NLRC held that Catotocan performed all the acts that a retired employee would do after retirement under the new school policy. These were voluntary acts and she cannot be considered to have been forced to retire or to have been illegally dismissed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether or no Catotocan was illegally dismissed by LSQC. RULING: No, she was not for there was no illegal dismissal. Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the former. Article 287 of the Labor Code is the primary provision: In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year. Jurisprudence is replete with cases discussing the employer's prerogative to lower the compulsory retirement age subject to the consent of its employees. Thus LSQC's retirement plan, allowing employers to retire employees who have not yet reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years are not per se repugnant to the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure. The Labor Code permits employers and employees to fix the applicable retirement age at 60 years or below, provided that the employees' retirement benefits under any CBA and other agreements shall not be less than those provided therein. Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be explicit, voluntary, free, and uncompelled. While an employer may unilaterally retire an employee earlier than the legally permissible ages under the Labor Code, this prerogative must be exercised pursuant to a mutually instituted early retirement plan. Due process only requires that notice of the employer's decision to retire an employee be given to the employee. Here, the CA and the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion. It must be stressed that Catotocan's subsequent actions after her "retirement" are actually tantamount to her consent to the addendum to the LSQC's retirement policy of retiring her from service upon serving the school for at least thirty (30) continuous years, to wit: (1) after being notified that she was being retired from service by LSQC, she opened a savings account with BDO, the trustee bank; (2) she accepted all the proceeds of her retirement package: the lump sum and all the monthly payments credited to her account until June 2009; (3) upon acceptance of the retirement benefits, there was no notation that she is accepting the retirement benefits under protest or without prejudice to the filing of an illegal dismissal case. We also did not find an iota of evidence showing that LSQC exerted undue influence against Catotocan to acquire her consent on the school's retirement policy. Suffice it to say that from the foregoing, Catotocan performed all the acts to ratify her retirement in accordance with LSQC's retirement policy. Although there was an exchange of communications about the retirees' objection to the new retirement policy years earlier, eventually, appellant assented thereto when she opened a savings account with BDO, withdrew the money for her personal use and applied again for a teaching job with the school. While it is true that the acceptance of retirement pay and her eventual appointment as Guidance Counselor did not amount to a waiver to contest her alleged forced retirement or illegal dismissal, the voluntary nature of her acts from June 2006 up to June 2009 clearly belies her claim of illegal dismissal. Obviously, appellant filed this complaint claiming illegal dismissal after she had benefited from the proceeds of her retirement in June 2006, and received salaries as Guidance Counselor of the appellee school for the subsequent three (3) years which ended in 2009. By her actuations, she is already estopped from questioning the legality of the new retirement policy. Moreover, in the Letter dated August 6, 2006 addressed to Fr. Acuin, Catotocan, along with other co-employees, referred to themselves as "retirees" and even signed as "the retired employees." The context of the letter does not, in any way, show any animosity with LSQC which would otherwise indicate that they still harbor ill feelings towards LSQC due to their alleged illegal dismissal. Thus, We hold that Catotocan's filing of the illegal dismissal case was just an afterthought subsequent to LSQC's denial of her fourth re-application for the Guidance Counselor position. It must be stressed also that Catotocan's repeated application and availment of the re-hiring program of LSQC for qualified retirees for 3 consecutive years is a supervening event that would reveal that she has already voluntarily and freely signified her consent to the retirement policy despite her initial opposition to it. In this case, not only did Catotocan received all of her retirement benefits but she also applied and availed the LSQC's re-hiring policy of retirees. 29. UST vs. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG UST GR No. 184262, April 24, 2017 Facts: A complaint for regularization and illegal dismissal was filed by respondents Samahang Manggagawa ng UST and Pontesor, et al. (respondents) against petitioner before the NLRC. Respondents alleged that on various periods spanning the years 1990-1999, petitioner repeatedly hired Pontesor, et al. to perform various maintenance duties within its campus. Respondents insisted that in view of Pontesor, et al.' s performance of such maintenance tasks throughout the years, they should be deemed regular employees of petitioner. Respondents further argued that for as long as petitioner continues to operate and exist as an educational institution, with rooms, buildings, and facilities to maintain, the latter could not dispense with Pontesor, et al. 's services which are necessary and desirable to the business of petitioner. On the other hand, while petitioner admitted that it repeatedly hired Pontesor, et al. in different capacities throughout the aforesaid years, it nevertheless maintained that they were merely hired on a per-project basis, as evidenced by numerous Contractual Employee Appointments (CEAs) signed by them. In this regard, petitioner pointed out that each of the CEAs that Pontesor, et al. signed defined the nature and term of the project to which they are assigned, and that each contract was renewable in the event the project remained unfinished upon the expiration of the specified term. In accordance with the express provisions of said CEAs, Pontesor, et al. 's project employment were automatically terminated: (a) upon the expiration of the specific term specified in the CEA; (b) when the project is completed ahead of such expiration; or (c) in cases when their employment was extended due to the non-completion of the specific project for which they were hired, upon the completion of the said project. As such, the termination of Pontesor, et al. 's employment with petitioner was validly made due to the completion of the specific projects for which they were hired. Issue: WON Respondent Pontesor is a regular employee thus rendering the dismissal invalid Held: YES. Pontesor should be considered regularized casual employees who enjoy security of tenure. The law provides for two (2) types of regular employees, namely: (a) those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer ; and (b) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists In the case at bar, a review of Pontesor, et al. 's respective CEAs reveal that petitioner repeatedly rehired them for various positions in the nature of maintenance workers for various periods spanning the years 1990-1999. Although nature of work are not necessary and desirable to petitioner's usual business as an educational institution; nonetheless, it is clear that their respective cumulative periods of employment as per their respective CEAs each exceed one (1) year. Thus, Pontesor, et al. fall under the second category of regular employees under Article 295 of the Labor Code. Accordingly, they should be deemed as regular employees but only with respect to the activities for which they were hired and for as long as such activities exist. 30. ZAMBRANO, ET. AL V. PHILIPPINE MARKET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION G.R. NO. 224099, June 21, 2017 FACTS: Petitioners were terminated on the ground of cessation of operation due to serious business losses. They allege that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation of due process because the closure of Phil Carpet was a mere pretense to transfer its operations to Pacific Carpet. They claimed that the job orders of some regular clients of Phil Carpet was transferred to Pacific Carpet and that several machines were moved from Phil Carpet to Pacific Carpet. Petitioners also alleged that their dismissal was constituted with unfair labor practice as it involved mass dismissal of its union officers and members. Respondent countered that it permanently closed and totally ceased its operations because there had been a steady decline in the demand for its products due to global recession, stiffer competition and the effects of a changing market. Respondent also faithfully complied with the requisites for closure and cessation of business under the Labor Code. LA dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. NLRC affirmed LA’s ruling. CA ruled that the total cessation of Phil Carpet’s manufacturing operations was not made in bad faith because the same was clearly due to economic necessity. ISSUES: 1. Whether the petitioners were dismissed from employment for a lawful cause 2. Whether the petitioners’ termination from employment constitutes unfair labor practice 3. Whether Pacific Carpet may be held liable for Phil Carpet’s obligations 4. Whether the quitclaims signed by the petitioners are valid and binding RULING: 1. YES. Petitioners were terminated for an authorized cause. Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessary for a valid cessation of business operations: (a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended date thereof; (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In this case, the LA's findings that Phil Carpet suffered from serious business losses which resulted in its closure were affirmed in toto by the NLRC, and subsequently by the CA. It is a rule that absent any showing that the findings of fact of the labor tribunals and the appellate court are not supported by evidence on record or the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, the Court shall not examine anew the evidence submitted by the parties. 2. NO. The dismissal did not amount to unfair labor practice. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty imposed upon them. They did not identify the acts of Phil Carpet which, they claimed, constituted unfair labor practice. They did not even point out the specific provisions which Phil Carpet violated. Thus, they would have the Court pronounce that Phil Carpet committed unfair labor practice on the ground that they were dismissed from employment simply because they were union officers and members. The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice, however, cannot be understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor. In this case, as far as the pieces of evidence offered by the petitioners are concerned, there is no showing that the closure of the company was an attempt at union-busting. Hence, the charge that Phil Carpet is guilty of unfair labor practice must fail for lack of merit. 3. NO. Pacific Carpet is not liable for Phil Carpet’s obligations. This Court has declared that "mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality." It has likewise ruled that the "existence of interlocking directors, corporate officers and shareholders is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction in the absence of fraud or other public policy considerations." The petitioners failed to present substantial evidence to prove their allegation that Pacific Carpet is a mere alter ego of Phil Carpet. 4. YES. The quitclaims were valid and binding upon the petitioners. The contents of the quitclaims, which were in Filipino, were clear and simple, such that it was unlikely that the petitioners did not understand what they were signing. 31. Sumifru Corp. v. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm GR. No. 202091, June 7, 2017 FACTS: Sumifru is a domestic corporation and is the surviving corporation after its merger with Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC) in 2008. FBAC was engaged in the buying, marketing, and exportation of Cavendish bananas. Respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm (NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU) (NAMASUFA) is a labor organization affiliated with the National Federation of Labor Unions and Kilusang Mayo Uno. Private respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa filed a Petition for Certification Election before the DOLE Regional Office in Davao City. NAMASUFA sought to represent all rank-and-file employees, numbering around 140, of packing plant 90 of FBAC. NAMASUFA claimed that there was no existing union in the aforementioned establishment. FBAC filed an Opposition arguing that there exists no employer-employee relationship between it and the workers involved as the members of NAMASUFA are actually employees of A2Y Contracting Services (A2Y), a duly licensed independent contractor, as evidenced by the payroll records of the latter. NAMASUFA countered that its members were former workers of Stanfilco before FBAC took over its operations sometime in 2002. The said former employees were then required to join the Compostela Banana Packing Plant Workers’ Cooperative (CBPPWC) before they were hired and allowed to work at the Packing Plant of FBAC. It further alleged that the members of NAMASUFA were working at PP 90 long before A2Y came. ISSUE: WON the members of the Union are employees of SUmifru HELD: Yes. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Med Arbiter granting the Petition for Certification Election of NAMASUFA and declared that Sumifru was the employer of the workers concerned. Based on the “four-fold test”, the elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. The most important element is the employer’s control of the employee’s conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it. On the first factor, it is apparent that the staff of respondent FBAC advised those who are interested to be hired in the Packing Plant to become members first of CBPPWC and get a recommendation from it. On the second factor, while the respondent tried to impress upon us that workers are paid by A2Y Contracting Services, this at best is but an administrative arrangement. The payroll summary submitted does not contain the relevant information such as the employee’s rate of pay, deductions made and the amount actually paid to the employee. On the third factor, it is very clear that respondent FBAC is the authority that imposes disciplinary measures against erring workers. This alone proves that it wields disciplinary authority over them. Finally, on the fourth factor which is the control test, the fact that the respondent FBAC gives instructions to the workers on how to go about their work is sufficient indication that it exercises control over their movements. The workers are instructed as to what time they are supposed to report and what time they are supposed to return. They were required to fill up monitoring sheets as they go about their jobs and even the materials which they used in the packing plant were supplied by FBAC. Viewed from the above circumstances, it is clear that respondent FBAC is the real employer of the workers of Packing Plant 90. They are in truth and in fact the employees of the respondent and its attempt to seek refuge on A2Y Contracting Services as the ostensible employer was nothing but an elaborate scheme to deprive them their right to self-organization. 32. PANALIGAN v PHYVITA ENTERPRISES CORPORATION G.R. No. 202086, June 21, 2017 Facts: Phyvita Enterprises Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of health club massage parlor, spa and other related services under the name and style of Starfleet Reflex Zone. Panaligan et al were employees of Corporation assigned as Roomboys. Sometime in Jan 2005, the Corporation discovered that the amount of 180,000 including some receipts and payroll were missing. The Corporation conducted police investigation and while it was pending, Panaligan et al with some employees filed a complaint before the DOLE against Corporation for 1.underpayment of wages, 2.non payment of special and legal holidays, 3.5 days service incentive leave, 4.night shift differential pay, 5.no pay slip, 6.signing of blank payroll. In the interim, the Corporation accused the Panaligan et al of theft and stated that the latter were responsible for the loss of the money and properties. Later, Corporation terminated the employer- employee relationship between them and Panaligan et al based on loss of trust and confidence. Also, the Corporation filed a criminal complaint of theft against the Pangilinan et al, but the same was dismissed by the city prosecutor, there being no sufficient evidence. Pangilinan et al filed a complaint with the LA alleging that they were illegally dismissed. The Corporation, on their defense, stated that the dismissal was legal because the alleged criminal complaint was enough evidence to produce a substantial evidence. LA ruled in favor of the Corporation. NLRC reversed the decision of LA and decided in favor of Panaligan et al. CA reversed the decision of NLRC. Issue: Whether or not, Panaligan et al. were illegally dismissed. Held: Yes, Panaligan et al. were illegally dismissed. ARTICLE 297. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct; it is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct, to be serious within the meaning of the Labor Code, must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. On the other hand, loss of trust and confidence, as a just cause for termination of employment, is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized. Thus, it must be proved that the employees must be guilty of an actual and willful breach of trust and that they committed a serious misconduct duly supported by substantial evidence. However, in the case at hand, the Corporation failed to adduce evidence supporting the accusation. Hence a Corporation dismissed criminal complaint does not tantamount to a ground for termination of employment, the employees were illegally dismissed. 33. IBON v. GENGHIS KHAN SECURITY SERVICES G.R. No. 221085 FACTS: Ravengar G. Ibon was employed as a security guard by Genghis Khan Security Services sometime in June 2008. He was initially assigned to Mr. Solis in Quezon City. However, in June 2009, Ibon was transferred to the Aspen Tower Condominium until his last duty on October 4, 2010. Thereafter, respondent promised to provide him a new assignment, which, however, did not happen. On May 10, 2011, Ibon filed a complaint against respondent for illegal dismissal. He alleged that he was no longer assigned to a new post after his last duty. Respondent denied that Ibon was placed on a floating status for more than six (6) months. It claimed that Ibon was suspended on October 4, 2010 for sleeping on the job. It also averred that Ibon was endorsed to another client for re-assignment, but the client refused because Ibon’s license was due for renewal, and that they sent a letter to Ibon requiring him to report back to work. ISSUE: Whether or not Ibon was constructively dismissed HELD: YES. In Reyes v. RP Guardians Security Agency, it was held that temporary displacement or temporary off-detail of security guard is, generally, allowed in a situation where a security agency's client decided not to renew their service contract with the agency and no post is available for the relieved security guard. Such situation does not normally result in a constructive dismissal. Nonetheless, when the floating status lasts for more than six (6) months, the employee may be considered to have been constructively dismissed. No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of workers to security of tenure, thus, employees can only be dismissed for just or authorized causes and after they have been afforded the due process of law. In this case, aside from respondent's bare assertions that Ibon was suspended, which the latter had denied, there was no evidence of the imposition of said penalty. Respondent could have easily produced documents to support its contention that Ibon had been suspended, considering that employers are required to observe due process in the discipline of employees. Respondent could not rely on its letter requiring Ibon to report back to work to refute a finding of constructive dismissal. The letters merely requested him to report back to work and to explain why he failed to report to the office after inquiring about his posting status. More importantly, there was no proof that Ibon had received the letters. In Tatel v. JFLP Investigation, the court held that [1] an employer must assign the security guard to another posting within six (6) months from his last deployment, otherwise, he would be considered constructively dismissed; and [2] the security guard must be assigned to a specific or particular client. A general return-to-work order does not suffice. Applying the foregoing to the present controversy, respondent should have deployed petitioner to a specific client within six (6) months from his last assignment. The correspondences allegedly sent to petitioner merely required him to explain why he did not report to work. He was never assigned to a particular client. Thus, even if petitioner actually received the letters of respondent, he was still constructively dismissed because none of these letters indicated his reassignment to another client. 34. BRAVO vs. URIOS COLLEGE G.R. No. 198066, June 7, 2017 FACTS: Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher in 1988 by Urios College. In addition to his duties as a part-time teacher, Bravo was designated as the school's comptroller from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2002. Urios College organized a committee to formulate a new "ranking system for non- academic employees for school year 2001-2002” where Bravo recommended that "the position of Comptroller should be classified as a middle management position. A committee to review the ranking system implemented during school year 2001-2002 was formed and found out that the ranking system for school year 2001-2002 caused salary distortions. There were also discrepancies in the salary adjustments of Bravo and of two (2) other employees. The committee discovered that "the Comptroller's Office solely prepared and implemented the [s]alary [a]djustment [s]chedule" without prior approval from the Human Resources Department. The committee recommended that Bravo be administratively charged for serious misconduct or willful breach of trust. On March 16, 2005, Bravo received a show cause memo requiring him to explain in writing why his services should not be terminated for his alleged acts of serious misconduct. A committee was organized to investigate the matter. Hearings were conducted thereafter. Bravo was found guilty of serious misconduct for which he was ordered to return the sum of ₱ 179,319.16, representing overpayment of his monthly salary. On July 25, 2005, Urios College notified Bravo of its decision to terminate his services for serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Upon receipt of the termination letter, Bravo immediately filed before Executive Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for the payment of separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees. The Executive Labor dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission found that Bravo's dismissal from service was illegal. The Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor Relations Commission's Resolution and reinstated the decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Pelaez. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the petitioner's employment was terminated for a just cause; and (2) Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of procedural due process RULING: (1) YES. Under Article 297 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee for “fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative” Due to the nature of his occupation, petitioner's employment may be terminated for willful breach of trust under Article 297(c), not Article 297(a), of the Labor Code. A dismissal based on willful breach of trust or loss of trust and confidence under Article 297 of the Labor Code entails the concurrence of two (2) conditions. First, the employee whose services are to be terminated must occupy a position of trust and confidence. And that there must be the presence of some basis for the loss of trust and confidence. This means that "the employer must establish the existence of an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence." Otherwise, employees will be left at the mercy of their employers. Different rules apply in determining whether loss of trust and confidence may validly be used as a justification in termination cases.1âwphi1 Managerial employees are treated differently than fiduciary rank-and-file employees. [W]ith respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. But, as regards a managerial employee, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in the case of managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. The Supreme Court holds that petitioner was validly dismissed based on loss of trust and confidence. Petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. His position of responsibility on delicate financial matters entailed a substantial amount of trust from respondent. It was reasonable for the employer to trust that he had basis for his computations especially with respect to his own compensation. Petitioner's act in assigning to himself a higher salary rate without proper authorization is a clear breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Petitioner's position made him accountable in ensuring that the Comptroller's Office observed the company's established procedures. It was reasonable that he should be held liable by respondent on the basis of command responsibility. RULING: (2) NO. Any meaningful opportunity for the employee to present evidence and address the charges against him or her satisfies the requirement of ample opportunity to be heard. In this case, respondent complied with all the requirements of procedural due process in terminating petitioner's employment. Respondent furnished petitioner a show cause memo stating the specific grounds for dismissal. The show cause memo also required petitioner to answer the charges by submitting a written explanation. Respondent even informed petitioner that he may avail the services of counsel. Respondent then conducted a thorough investigation. Three (3) hearings were conducted on separate occasions. The findings of the investigation committee were then sent to petitioner. Lastly, petitioner was given a notice of termination containing respondent’s final decision. There was a just cause for terminating petitioner from employment, there is no basis to award him separation pay and backwages. 35. JAVINES VS. XLIBRIS GR. No. 214301, June 7, 2007 Facts: Javines was hired by respondent Xlibris as operations manager in September 2011. In July 2012, Javines submitted meal receipts for reimbursement at the finance department of the company, wherein falsification was discovered. A notice to explain was issued against him, charging him with acts constituting dishonesty for allegedly tampering meal receipts from fast food chains with the total amount of P811.00 to P10,821.00. He submitted his written explanation, denying having tampered the receipts. He countered the allegations by explaining that it was the supervisors who submitted the receipts to him; he merely prepared the reimbursement request, and that he had no knowledge nor participation in the tampering of the receipts. An administrative hearing was conducted. Javines failed to explain why and how the incident transpired. He instead requested for further investigation because he cannot recall who submitted the receipts to him. On the same day, notices to explain were sent to the supervisors under Javines, who likewise denied participation in the tampering of the receipts. Xlibris terminated Javines’ employment through an end of employment notice. Javines then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter who found that the dismissal was for a just cause and with due process. On appeal, NLRC modified the decision, noting that while the dismissal was for a just cause, Javines was not afforded due process in that no other hearing was called to afford him the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him before he was dismissed. Thus, P10,000.00 worth of nominal damages was awarded in his favor. Javines did not move for reconsideration; only Xlibris elevated the case to CA on certiorari on the issue that NLRC abused its discretion by holding that Xlibris failed to afford Javines due process. By way of comment, Javines reiterated that he was not granted further investigation when he requested. CA granted the petition and held that Javines was not given an opportunity to rebut the additional pieces of evidence secured by Xlibris. However, CA reduced the nominal damages from P10,000.00 to P1,000.00 considering that the altered meal receipts show a discrepancy of P10,000.00. Issues: 1. Whether or not Javines was dismissed for a just cause 2. Whether or not the issue as to whether the requirements of procedural due process to constitute a valid dismissal were complied with has been resolved with finality Ruling: 1. Yes, Javines was dismissed for a just cause, as uniformly held by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC. 2. Yes, the issue has attained finality. For failure to file the requisite petition before CA, the NLRC decision attained finality and had been placed beyond the appellate court’s power of review. The appellate court is given broad discretionary powers to waive lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned in the following circumstances: a) when the question affects jurisdiction over the subject matter; b) matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; c) matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case, or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice; d) matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some bearing on the issue submitted that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored; e) matters closely related to an error assigned; and f) matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent. None of the aforesaid instances exists in the instant case. Hence, CA cannot be faulted for not discussing said issue in its decision as the same was already resolved with finality. 36. LUIS S. DOBLE, JR. v. ABB, INC. G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017 Facts: Doble, Jr., a duly licensed engineer, was hired by respondent ABB Inc. as Junior Design Engineer on March 29, 1993. Doble rose through the ranks and was promoted up to Vice President and Local Division Manager of Power System Division. However, on March 2, 2012, Doble was called by Country Manager and President Nitin Desai, and was informed that his performance rating for 2011 was 1, which is equivalent to unsatisfactory performance. Doble had a meeting and during the meeting, President Desai explained to Doble that the Global and Regional Management have demanded for a change in leadership due to the extent of losses and level of discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Desai then raised the option for Doble to resign. Thereafter, HR manager Miranda told Doble that he would be paid separation pay equivalent to 75% of his monthly salary for every year of service, provided he would submit a letter of resignation, and gave him until 12:45 PM within which to decide. Shocked by the abrupt decision of the management, Doble asked why he should be the one made to resign. Miranda said that it was the decision of the management and left him alone in the conference room to decide whether or not to resign. At this juncture, the parties gave contrasting accounts on the ensuing events which led to the termination of Doble’s employment. Then, Doble filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages, other monetary claims and damages. In a decision the LA held that Doble was illegally dismissed because his resignation was involuntary, and ordered ABB Inc. to pay his backwages and separation pay, since reinstatement is no longer feasible. The NLRC granted the appeal filed by ABB Inc. and Desai, and dismissed the partial appeal of Doble. They found that the resignation of Doble being voluntary, there can be no illegal dismissal and no basis for the award of other monetary claims, damages and attorney’s fees. Dissatisfied with the NLRC decision and resolution, Doble filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Issues: Whether or not, Dolbe was illegally dismissed. Held: No, Doble was not illegally dismissed. In illegal dismissal cases, the fundamental rule is that when an employer interposes the defense of resignation, the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned necessarily rests upon the employer. But, since Doble claims to have been forced to submit a resignation letter, it is incumbent upon him to prove with clear and convincing evidence that his resignation was not voluntary, but was actually a case of constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay and other benefits. It exists if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. There is involuntary resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his employment/position under the circumstances. On the other hand, "resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment." In the case at bar, it appears that Doble was not coerced into submitting a resignation letter. He is holding one of the top positions in the company and answerable only to the President, herein Desai. He is a highly educated man. It is improbable that a man of his stature may be pressured into doing something that he does not want to do. In fact, even if the option to resign originated from the employer, what is important for resignation to be deemed voluntary is that the employee's intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment. It was proved by substantial evidence that Doble voluntarily resigned, as shown by the following documents (1) the affidavit of ABB Inc.’s HR Manager Miranda; (2) the resignation letter; (3) the Employee Clearance Sheet; (4) the Certificate of Employment; (5) photocopy of BPI’s manager’s check representing the separation benefit; (6) Employee Final Pay Computation showing in the payment of leave credits, rice subsidy and bonuses; and, (7) the Receipt, Release and Quitclaim. 37. United Polyresins Inc. v. Pinuela G.R. No. 209555, July 31, 2017 FACTS: United Polyresins, Inc. (UPI) is a registered domestic corporation while Ernesto Uy Soon, Jr. and Julito Uy Soon are its corporate officers. Marcelino Pinuela was employed by UPI in 1987. He was a member of the labor union, Polyresins Rank and File Association (PORFA), and was elected President thereof. Under the existing CBA between UPI and PORFA, it was provided that UPI shall grant to PORFA PHP 300,000 as the union’s capital for establishing a cooperative to meet the needs of its members. The CBA also contained a union security clause which provided that employees who cease to be PORFA members in good standing by reason of his resignation or expulsion shall not be retained in the employ of UPI. During Pinuela’s term as PORFA President, it appeared that UPI automatically deducted from the respective salaries of PORFA members amounts representing union membership dues and loan payments. These amounts, which totalled ₱2,402,533.43, were then regularly turned over by UPI to PORFA in the form of fifty eight (58) crossed checks. Several days before the PHP 300,000 loan became due, the union officers and UPI met to discuss the proposed new CBA. However, UPI told Pinuela that it will not discuss the proposed CBA until the loan is paid. Pinuela told UPI that the union did not have the finances. Because of the recurring threat of failed CBA negotiations and salary deductions as a means of recovering the amount of the loan, the union members began to demand the holding of a special election of union officers. A special election was held, and a new union President and set of officers were elected. When the new union officers conducted an investigation and found that the union had no more funds as they were utilized in the prosecution of cases during Pinuela’s incumbency. Pinuela also failed to make a formal turnover of documents to the new President. The officers held that these violations constituted an infringement if the union’s Constitution which prohibit the misappropriation of union funds and property and give ground for the impeachment and recall of union officers. Thus, PORFA wrote a letter communicating Pinuela’s expulsion from the union. Eventually, UPI issued a letter of termination to Pinuela. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Pinuela was illegally dismissed HELD: Yes. The union and UPI claimed that the dismissal was based on the union security clause. Pinuela’s expulsion from the union was based on the union’s constitution. However, these provisions provides for the impeachment and recall of union officers, not expulsion from union membership. Any officer found guilty of violating these provisions shall simply be removed, impeached or recalled, from office, but not expelled or stripped of union membership. It was therefore error on the part of PORFA and UPI to terminate Pinuela’s employment based on Article XV, Section 1, paragraphs (e) and (f) of the union's Constitution. Such a ground does not constitute just cause for termination. In addition, the union may not insist on expelling Pinuela from PORFA and assist in his dismissal from UPI without just cause, since it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members." 38. GENP ACT SERVICES, INC. v. FALCESO [July 31, 2017, G.R. No. 227695] FACTS: Genp Act Services, Inc. is engaged in business process outsourcing, particularly servicing various multinational clients, including Allstate Insurance Company. On different dates spanning the years 2007 to 2011, Genpact hired respondents Maria Katrina Santos-Falceso, Janice Ann M. Mendoza, and Jeffrey S. Mariano to various positions to service its Allstate account. However, on April 19, 2012, Allstate ended its account with Genpact, resulting in respondents being placed on floating status, and eventually, terminated from service. Respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal, non-payment of separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees against Genpact and/or its Country Manager, Reyes. They alleged that after Allstate terminated its contract with Genpact, they were initially placed on "benching" status with pay, and after five (5) months, Genpact gave them the option to either "voluntarily resign" or to "be involuntarily terminated on the ground of redundancy" with severance pay of one-half (½) month basic salary for every year of service, in either case. Left without the option to continue their employment with Genpact, respondents chose the latter option and were made to sign quitclaims as a condition for receiving any and all forms of monetary benefits. Respondents argued that the termination of Genpact and Allstate's agreement neither amounted to a closure of business nor justified their retrenchment. In their defense, petitioners justified respondents' termination of employment on the ground of closure or cessation of Allstate's account with Genpact as part of the former' s "[g]lobal [d]ownsizing due to heavy losses caused by declining sales in North America." Further, petitioners claimed that they incessantly pursued efforts to retain respondents within their organization, but the same proved futile, thus, leaving them with no other choice but to provide respondents with the option to either resign or be separated on account of redundancy - an option which they reported to the DOLE and resorted to in the exercise of management prerogative with utmost good faith. Lastly, petitioners pointed out that respondents were properly given separation pay, as well as unpaid allowances and 13th month pay, thus, rendering the latter's monetary claims bereft of merit. The Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents' complaint for lack of merit. The LA found that respondents' termination from service was due to the untimely cessation of the operations of Genpact's client, Allstate, wherein respondents were assigned. In this regard, the LA pointed out that Genpact tried to remedy respondents' situation by assigning them to other accounts, but such efforts proved futile as respondents were hired specifically to match the needs of Allstate. Furthermore, the LA took Genpact's act of paying respondents their separation pay computed at one-half (½) month pay for every year of service as a sign of good faith. Thus, the LA concluded that there was an authorized cause in terminating respondents' services, and that Gen pact complied with DOLE's reportorial requirements in doing so. NLRC affirmed the LA ruling. It held that Allstate's pullout from Gen pact does not mean an automatic termination of the employees assigned to the Allstate account, such as respondents, but purports that the employees assigned to the withdrawing client would be "benched" or placed on floating status as contemplated in Article 286 (now Article 301) of the Labor Code, as amended. In fact, the NLRC pointed out that Genpact recognized the applicability of the said provision in the case of respondents, as well as other similarly-situated employees, considering that: (a) it embarked on a Retention Effort Program which resulted in the redeployment of more or less 100 of its employees affected by Allstate's pullout; (b) it placed respondents and the other similarly- situated employees on "benching" status with full pay; (c) it only resorted to termination after alleged incessant efforts to find a suitable position for respondents proved unsuccessful; and (d) such terminations were done during the six (6)-month period within which employees were allowed to be placed on floating status. Thus, Genpact's acts of placing respondents on "benching" or floating status, and thereafter, terminating their employment were made in the exercise of its management prerogative in good faith and in accordance with internal hiring procedures. As such, it cannot be said that respondents were illegally dismissed from service. Respondents moved for reconsideration, which was partly granted by the NLRC ordering the increase of respondents' entitlement to separation pay to one (1) month salary for every year of service. In said Resolution, the NLRC held that since respondents' positions were rendered superfluous by the closure of the Allstate account, then it follows that they were terminated on account of redundancy pursuant to Article 286 (now Article 301), in relation to Article 283 (now Article 298) of the Labor Code. As such, they should be paid separation pay amounting to one (1) month salary for every year of service, instead of the one-half (½) month salary for every year of service. Notably, the NLRC Resolution explicitly stated that "[n]o further motion of similar import shall be entertained." CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari purely on procedural grounds. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed outright the certiorari petition filed by petitioners before it on procedural grounds. RULING: The petition is meritorious. (The case was remanded to the CA. The SC only ruled on the procedural process of the case.) A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Given the special and extraordinary nature of a Rule 65 petition, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This notwithstanding, the foregoing rule admits of well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (j) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. A judicious review of the records reveals that the exceptions in items (d) and (e) are attendant in this case. The dispositive portion of the NLRC's June 30, 2014 Resolution, it explicitly warns the litigating parties that the NLRC shall no longer entertain any further motions for reconsideration. Irrefragably, this circumstance gave petitioners the impression that moving for reconsideration before the NLRC would only be an exercise in futility in light of the tribunal's aforesaid warning. The remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration may be availed of once by each party. In this case, only respondents had filed a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC. Applying the foregoing provision, petitioners also had an opportunity to file such motion in this case, should they wish to do so. However, the tenor of such warning effectively deprived petitioners of such opportunity, thus, constituting a violation of their right to due process. All told, petitioners were completely justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. CASE NO. 39 SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION (SWOFLU) vs. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION G.R. No. 220383 July 5, 2017 FACTS: In 2007, while there was no Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect, URC-SONEDCO offered, among other benefits, a P16.00/day wage increase to their employees. To receive the benefits, employees had to sign a waiver that said: "In the event that a subsequent [Collective Bargaining Agreement] is negotiated between Management and Union, the new [Collective Bargaining Agreement] shall only be effective [on] January 1, 2008." Realizing that the waiver was an unfair labor practice, some members of SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union refused to sign. URC-SONEDCO offered the same arrangement in 2008. It extended an additional P16.00/day wage increase to employees who would agree that any Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiated for that year would only be effective on January 1, 2009. 6 Several members of SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union again refused to waive their rights. Consequently, they did not receive the wage increase which already amounted to a total of P32.00/day, beginning 2009. On July 2, 2009, SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union and its members who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers filed a complaint for unfair labor practices against URC-SONEDCO. They argued that the requirement of a waiver prior to the release of the wage increase constituted interference to the employees' right to self-organization, collective bargaining, and concerted action. They asked that they be granted a P16.00/day wage increase for 2007 and an additional P16.00/day wage increase for 2008. 8SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union also demanded a continuing wage increase of P32.00/day "from January 1, 2009 onwards." Both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found URC-SONEDCO not guilty of unfair labor practice.10 Nonetheless, they ordered URC-SONEDCO to give petitioners the same benefits their co-workers received in 2007 and 2008. However, SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union's claim for the 2009 wage increase was denied. Since a new Collective Bargaining Agreement was already in effect by 2009, this Collective Bargaining Agreement governed the relationship between the management and the union.11 The Court of Appeals ruled: “As there was no provision in the existing CBA regarding wage increase of [P]16.00 per day, the [National Labor Relations Commission] was correct in ruling that it cannot further impose private respondents to pay petitioners the subject wage increase for the year 2009 and onwards.” ISSUES: Whether or not respondent Universal Robina Corp. –SONEDCO is guilty of unfair labor practice? Whether or not petitioner SWOFLU is entitled to wage increase? HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that URC-SONEDCO is guilty of unfair labor practice for failing to bargain with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union in good faith. 13 URC-SONEDCO restricted SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union's bargaining power when it asked the rank-and-file employees to sign a waiver foregoing Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiations in exchange for wage increases. 14 Thus, this Court ordered URC-SONEDCO to grant the union members the 2007 and 2008 wage increases. Nevertheless, this Court denied the claim for the 2009 wage increase and ruled that if SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union wished to continue receiving the additional wage after 2008, the proper recourse was to include it in the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement. By reason of the unfair labor practice on the party of respondent URC – SONEDCO, petitioner SWOFLU is entitled to a wage increase of P16.00 for the years 2007 and 2008. The grant of the P32.00/day wage increase is not an additional benefit outside the Collective Bargaining Agreement of 2009. By granting this increase to petitioners, this Court is eliminating the discrimination against them, which was a result of respondent's unfair labor practice. The wage increase was integrated in the salary of those who signed the waivers. When the affiants waived their rights, respondent rewarded them with a P32.00/day wage increase that continues to this day. The respondent company granted this benefit to its employees to induce them to waive their collective bargaining rights. This Court has declared this an unfair labor practice. Accordingly, it is illegal to continue denying the petitioners the wage increase that was granted to employees who signed the waivers. To rule otherwise will perpetuate the discrimination against petitioners. All the consequences of the unfair labor practice must be addressed. August 22, 2017 G.R. No. 178379 CASE NO. 40 CRISPIN S. FRONDOZO,* DANILO M. PEREZ, JOSE A. ZAFRA, ARTURO B. VITO, CESAR S. CRUZ, NAZARIO C. DELA CRUZ, and LUISITO R. DILOY, Petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,, Respondent. A Notice of Strike filed by the MERALCO Employees and Workers Association (MEWA), on the ground of ULP. Then Acting Secretary· of the DOLE certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, ordered all the striking workers to return to work, and directed MERALCO to accept the striking workers back to work under the same terms and conditions existing prior to the work stoppage. MERALCO terminated the services of Petitioners for having committed unlawful acts and violence during the strike. Then MEWA filed a second Notice of Strike on the ground of discrimination and union busting that resulted to the dismissal from employment of 25 union officers and workers. The labor dispute resulted to the filing of two complaints for illegal dismissal. The NLRC consolidated the two illegal dismissal cases and rendered a Decision stating among others, that it upholds the dismissal of the workers in view of the illegal acts they committed during the subject strike. However, the NLRC First Division subsequently modified said Decision and ruled that said dismissal of employees was unjustified and ordered their reinstatement without loss of seniority rights. From the two conflicting resolutions of the NLRC, two petitions for certiorari were filed before the Court of Appeals: 1. CA- G.R. SP No. 72480 filed by MERALCO; and 2. CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 filed by the Petitioners. And from which the CA arrived at 2 conflicting decisions as well. The Petitioners moved for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of their accrued wages arising from the recall of their payroll reinstatement which was granted by the Labor Arbiter. Subsequently, a Second Alias Writ of Execution24 was issued directing the Sheriff to cause the reinstatement of the respondents and to collect the amount representing backwages. MERALCO filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction directed against the Second Alias Writ of Execution, which the NLRC granted and was affirmed by the CA. Issue: Did the CA commit a grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC’s Decision? From the conflicting decisions, which should prevail? Ruling: No. The situation in this case is analogous to a change in the situation of the parties making execution unjust or inequitable. MERALCO's refusal to reinstate petitioners and to pay their backwages is justified by the Decision of the CA in the 1st petition filed before it. On the other hand, petitioners' insistence on the execution of judgment is anchored on the the CA’s Decision in the 2nd petition filed by said Petitioners. Given this situation, we see no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in holding that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings. Grave abuse of discretion implies that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 should prevail. This Court actually ruled on the merits of the assailed CA Decisions in G.R. No. 161159 and G.R. No. 161311. The Court's Third Division denied the petition in G.R. No. 161159 on the ground that the Petitioners failed to show that a reversible error had been committed by the Court of Appeals in rendering its Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 72480 (in favor of MERALCO). The Court's Third Division also denied the petition in G.R. No. 161311 for failure of the petitioners to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate court in the same case, CA-G.R. SP No. 72480. In one case, 46 this Court explained that "[ w ]hen the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA". Hence, the Court's Third Division adopted the findings and conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 which dismissed petitioners from the service. Such decisions have already became final and executory. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We REMAND this case to the NLRC for the execution of this Court's Decision in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311. Case 41 Pedro C. Perea vs. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., et al.; G.R. No. 206178; August 9, 2017 FACTS: Perea entered into a Contract of Employment with Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. (Elburg) under its principal Augustea Atlantica SRL/Italy. Perea was hired as a fitter and was deployed to work aboard MV Lemno. While repairing apipe, Perea had difficulty breathing. The following day, he had chest pains with palpitations. He was seen by a doctor that same afternoon and was advised to take medication and to rest for three (3) consecutive days. However, he did not feel any better even after resting and taking medications; thus, he asked to be repatriated. A few days later, Perea was welding when the oxygen and acetylene torch he was holding exploded. He hit his left shoulder and twisted his fingers in trying to avoid the explosion. He took a pain reliever to ease the pain but three days later, he found that two of his fingers had grown numb. He was sent to a medical facility in Tuzla, Turkey because of continued chest pains. He was pronounced to have soft tissue trauma and was told to rest, avoid exertion, and avoid using his right arm. The following day, he was transferred to SEMA Hospital where he was declared to be suffering from “[C]ubital [T]unnel Syndrome, soft, tissue injury of the right elbow.” The treatment proposed was to put his right arm in a sling and to rest for recovery for 10 days. He was soon repatriated to the Philippines. After conducting laboratory examinations and other medical procedures on Perea, company- designated physicians Dr. Karen Hao-Quan (Dr. Hao-Quan) and Dr. Robert D. Lim (Dr. Lim) gave an initial impression, “To Consider Cubital Tunnel Syndrome, Right; Hypertension; Rule Out Ischemic Heart Disease” and recommended that a Dipyridamole Thallium Scan be conducted. In a letter to Elburg, Dr. Hao-Quan stated that the cause of hypertension was not work-related and opined that Perea’s estimated length of treatment would be approximately three to four months. Perea filed a complaint for underpayment of his sick leave pay, permanent disability benefits, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. Perea consulted Dr. Antonio C. Pascual (Dr. Pascual), an internist, cardiologist, and echocardiographer, who diagnosed him with “Uncontrolled Hypertension [and] Coronary Artery Disease.” Dr. Pascual found Perea to be medically unfit to work as a seafarer. After a series of examinations, Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim certified that Perea was cleared of the injuries that caused his repatriation. The parties met for mediation proceedings and a possible compromise agreement but were unsuccessful They were then directed to submit their respective position papers, together with their supporting evidence. The Labor Arbiter dismissed Perea’s complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the Collective Bargaining Agreement could not apply to Perea’s claim for disability benefits because its effectivity period was only from March 28, 2008 to December 31, 2009. The Collective Bargaining Agreement had already lapsed by the time Perea was repatriated to the Philippines by late May 2010. The Labor Arbiter ruled that while Section 32-A of the POEA Contract provided that hypertension may be compensable, this was applicable only if it caused “impairment of function[s] of body organs like kidneys, heart and brain, resulting in permanent disability.” The Labor Arbiter held that Perea’s hypertension did not impair the functions of his organs, as evidenced by Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim’s medical reports. Between the findings of Dr. Hao- Quan and Dr. Lim and those of Dr. Pascual, the Labor Arbiter gave more weight to the findings of the company-designated physicians who concluded that Perea was not suffering from coronary disease based on the results of a coronary angiogram. ISSUE: Whether or not the medical findings of company-designated physician who conducted extensive examination prevail over private physician who examined the seafarer only once and did not order medical tests? HELD: For an illness or injury to be compensable under the POEA Contract, it must have been work-related and acquired during the term of the seafarer’s contract. Work-related illness is defined as “any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied. Hypertension classified as primary or essential is considered compensable if it causes impairment of function[s] of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability; Provided, that, the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest x-ray report, (b) ECG report, (c) blood chemistry report, (d) funduscopy report, and (f) C-T scan. As between the findings made by the company-designated physicians who conducted an extensive examination on the petitioner and Dr. Pascual who saw petitioner on only one occasion and did not even order that medical tests be done to support his declaration that petitioner is unfit to work as [a] seaman, the company-designated physicians’ findings that petitioner has been cleared for work should prevail. The court further held that the doctor who have had a personal knowledge of the actual medical condition, having closely, meticulously and regularly monitored and actually treated the seafarer’s illness, is more qualified to assess the seafarer’s disability. CASE NO. 42 WILLIAM R. WENCESLAO v. MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Facts: The case stemmed from a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Monetary Claims filed by the petitioners against private respondent Makati Development Corporation (MDC) before the Labor Arbiter.[4] Records show that the petitioners were former construction workers of MDC.[5] In their complaint, the petitioners claimed that they were regular employees of MDC and were illegally dismissed for refusing to apply and be transferred to another contractor, Asiapro Multi-Purpose Cooperative. [6] In due course, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. In affirming the status of the petitioners as project employees, the Labor Arbiter relied on the evidence of MDC showing that the petitioners had worked in several of its other projects before being engaged in the West Tower @ One Serendra Project and the North Triangle Building Project. [7] The Labor Arbiter ruled that repeated re- employment does not make a project employee a regular employee. [8] The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal dismissal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondent Makati Development Corporation, however, is directed to pay the aggregate sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FOURTEEN & 78/100 PESOS (P118,314.78) representing complainants’ prorated 13th month pay for 2015, as follows: All other claims, including those of complainants Virgilio B. Cristobal, Noel N. Damiasan, James M. Real, Vivencio B. Rodrigo and Alfredo T. Visaya, are hereby denied for lack of merit. The computation hereto attached is made an integral part hereof.[9] On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Fourth Division affirmed [10] in toto the decision[11] of the Labor Arbiter. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision dated 31 May 2016, states: WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the appeal filed by the 21 complainants is DENIED for lack of merit.Accordingly, the decision rendered by Labor Arbiter Raymund M. Celino on 29 th February 2016 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[12]. Undaunted, the petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of the NLRC for issuing the order affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The CA dismissed the petition on two grounds: (1) the petition is non-compliant with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and (2) the petition, on its face, lacks merit for failing to illustrate public respondent’s grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in renderinthe assailed 31 May 2016 Decision and 26 July 2016 Resolution.[14] Issue: The threshold issue is whether the CA was justified in dismissing the petition for certiorari due to the failure of the petitioners to attach the pertinent records of the case. Ruling: First, the matter concerning the nature of the petition. While the pleading filed by the petitioners is denominated as “Petition for Review on Certiorari” pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, its contents, however, particularly the ground raised and supporting arguments, assert grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the CA, an averment apposite in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The seeming inconsistency of the petition’s style and substance must be resolved as its proper characterization, on whether it is pursued under Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, would objectively determine its outright dismissal for being the wrong remedy. Accordingly, if the petition is to be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, then it should appropriately be dismissed because there is a plain, adequate, and speedy remedy available under the circumstances. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [34] In this case, what the petitioners seek to be annulled are the resolutions of the CA dismissing their petition for certiorari and the motion for reconsideration from such dismissal being, without a doubt, a final order for the complete disposition of such petition. Consequently, the petitioner’s right and available legal recourse to assail such resolutions is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 instead of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Proceeding to the merits, we find that the CA did not err, much less commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in dismissing the petition for certiorari due to procedural lapses and lack of substantive merit of the said petition. The CA pointed to the petitioners’ failure to state the material dates and to attach the certified true copies of the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC as well as the other pertinent documents referred to in the petition, such as the labor arbiter’s decision, the petitioner’s Appeal Memorandum and Motion for Reconsideration. [37] The CA also determined that the petition, on its face, did not establish the whimsical exercise of discretion which the NLRC supposedly had committed.[38] While the CA invoked several grounds in dismissing the petition, the petitioners raised before this Court only the issue on the necessity of attaching to the petition relevant portions of the case records. Second, petitioner's entitlement to separation pay primarily hinges on their employment status. As earlier discussed, petitioners merely offered a self-serving conclusion that they are "regular employees" based on the factual allegation contained in the petition. Petitioners' allegation has no weight or persuasive effect upon this Court absent any evidence to support the same. To be circumspect, it is worth pointing out that a project employee may nevertheless receive separation pay. Under Section 3.2 of DOLE Order No. 19, Series of 1993, project employee's entitlement to separation pay is qualified by certain conditions, to wit: 3.2. Project employees not entitled to separation. - The project employees contemplated by paragraph 2.1. hereof are not by law entitled to separation pay if their services are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed. Likewise, project employees whose services are terminated because they have no more work to do or their services are no longer needed in the particular phase of the project are not by law entitled to separation pay. 3.3. Project employees entitled to separation pay. - a) Project employees whose aggregate period of continuous employment in a construction company is at least one year shall be considered regular employees, in the absence of a "day certain" agreed upon by the parties for the termination of their relationship. Project employees who have become regular shall be entitled to separation pay. x x x x b) If the project or the phase of the project the employee is working on has not yet been completed and his services are terminated without just cause or unauthorized cause and there is no showing that his services are unsatisfactory, the project employee is entitled to reinstatement with backwages to his former position or substantially equivalent position. If the reinstatement is no longer possible, the employee is entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of the agreement. In the case at bench, the petitioners did not present any evidence, by way of contract of employment or other relevant proof which would establish the facts pertaining to their tenure. Without basis to rule on the same, this Court can only rely on the findings of public respondent adjudging them to be not entitled to separation pay. It bears stressing that the factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, which are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence. [47] (emphasis supplied) The petitioners' argument that the CA should have proceeded in the resolution of the case must fail. As noted, the dismissal by the CA of the petition for certiorari was not purely on a technicality but also on a ruling on the substantive merits of the case. However, we will not dwell on the disquisition of the CA as to the nature of the employment of the petitioners and their subsequent termination for two reasons: first, the only issue raised before this Court concerns the failure to attach the material documents in the petition for certiorari; second, the determination on whether the petitioners were project employees and whether they were illegally dismissed would necessarily require us to inquire into the factual matters which the Court cannot do in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive upon the parties and binding on this Court. [48] In fine, we find no compelling reason to set aside the dismissal by the CA of this petition for certiorari. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 10 April 2017, is DENIED. The 23 August 2016 and 26 January 2017 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 147009 are hereby AFFIRMED. Case 43 Read-Rite Philippines, Inc. Vs. Gina G. Francisco, et al G.R. No. 195457, August 16, 2017 Facts: In April 1999, Read-Rite began implementing a retrenchment program due to serious business losses. About 200 employees were terminated and they were each given involuntary separation benefits equivalent to one month pay per year of service. From this first batch of retrenched employees, however, there were eight employees – who had rendered at least ten years of service that apparently received additional voluntary separation benefits All of the respondents received involuntary separation benefits equivalent to one month pay per year of service. Accordingly, they each executed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim[10] (quitclaim), which stated, among others, that they had each received from Read- Rite the full payment of all compensation due them and they will not undertake any action against the company to demand further compensation. Meanwhile in February 2002 and February 2003, respondents filed complaints against Read- Rite.Respondents sought the payment of additional voluntary separation benefits, legal interest thereon, and attorney’s fees. They argued that Read-Rite discriminated against them by not granting the aforesaid benefits, the award of which had since become a company policy. Issue: WON were arbitrarily discriminated upon when they were not awarded additional voluntary separation benefits despite being in Read-Rite’s employ for at least ten years. Held: In granting the claim of the first batch of retrenched BSSI employees, the Court found that “there was impermissible discrimination against [them] in the payment of their separation benefits. The law requires an employer to extend equal treatment to its employees. It may not, in the guise of exercising management prerogatives, grant greater benefits to some and less to others.”[34] However, in so ruling, the Court took into account the following findings of the NLRC: “The respondent argued that the giving of more separation benefit to the second and third batches of employees separated was their expression of gratitude and benevolence to the remaining employees who have tried to save and make the company viable in the remaining days of operations. This justification is not plausible. There are workers in the first batch who have rendered more years of service and could even be said to be more efficient than those separated subsequently, yet they did not receive the same recognition. Understandably, their being retained longer in their job and be not included in the batch that was first terminated, was a concession enough and may already be considered as favor granted by the respondents to the prejudice of the complainants. As it happened, there are workers in the first batch who have rendered more years in service but received lesser separation pay, because of that arrangement made by the respondents in paying their termination benefits[.] x x x. [35] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)” Clearly, BSSI admitted that it purposely favored the second and third batches of retrenched employees by giving them a higher separation pay and a mid-year bonus as a reward for their efforts during the last days of the company. In contrast to the instant case, however, Read-Rite made no such admission. Quite the opposite, Read-Rite has consistently claimed that the payment of additional voluntary separation benefits to the eight retrenched employees in April 1999 was made by mistake and was no longer repeated in the next batches of retrenchment. CASE NO. 44 Adtel Inc. vs. Valdez Facts: Adtel, Inc. (Adtel) is a domestic corporation engaged in the distribution of telephone units, gadgets, equipment, and allied products. On 9 September 1996, Adtel hired Marijoy A. Valdez (respondent) to work as an accountant for the company. Adtel promoted respondent as the company's purchasing and logistics supervisor. Adtel then entered into a dealership agreement with 4 respondent's husband, Angel Valdez (Mr. Valdez), to distribute Adtel's wideband VHF-UHF television antem1as. The dealership agreement was for twelve (12) months and the agreement was extended for another three (3) months. On 3 February 2006, Mr. Valdez filed a civil case against Adtel for 5 specific performance and damages for the execution of the terms of the dealership agreement. On 6 10 May 2006, Mr. Valdez also instituted a criminal complaint for libel against Adtel's chairman, president, and officers. On 22 May 2006, Adtel issued a memorandum directing respondent to show cause in writing why 8 she should not be terminated for conflict of interest and/or serious breach of trust and confidence.The memorandum stated that the filing of cases by respondent's husband created a conflict of interest since respondent had access to vital information that can be used against Adtel.Respondent was placed under preventive suspension by Adtel. On 23 May 2006, respondent denied the charges of Adtel. Respondent contended that the cases had nothing to do with her being an employee of Adtel and had not affected her performance in the company. On 29 May 2006, Adtel terminated respondent from the company. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. In her Position Paper,respondent alleged that she did not violate any company rule or policy; neither was she guilty of fraud, nor willful breach of trust. Respondent contended that she was illegally dismissed without just cause and was entitled to separation pay, backwages, and damages. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of Valdez was illegal. Held:Yes.The NLRC held that Adtel failed to substantially prove the existence of an act or omission personally attributable to the respondent to serve as a just cause to terminate her employment.The CA denied the motion for extension and dismissed Adtel's petition for certiorari for being filed beyond the reglementary period. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. CASE NO. 45 Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, INc. vs KMM – Katipunan and raymonf Esponga Facts: Petitioner hired respondent Raymond Esponga as a machine operator. June 2006, Sterling imposed a 20-day suspension on several employees including Esponga, for allegedly participating in a wildcat strike. The Notice of Disciplinary Action contained a warning that a repetition of a similar offense would compel the management to impose the maximum penalty of termination of services. Sterling averred, their supervisor Mercy Vinoya (Vinoya), found Esponga and his co-employees about to take a nap on the sheeter machine. She called their attention and prohibited them from taking a nap thereon for safety reasons. Esponga and his co-employees then transferred to the mango tree near the staff house. When Vinoya passed by the staff house, she heard Esponga utter, "Huwag maingay, puro bawal. " She then confronted Esponga, who responded in a loud and disrespectful tone. When Vinoya turned away, Esponga gave her the "dirty finger" sign in front of his co-employees. The incident was witnessed by Mylene Pesimo (Pesimo), who executed a handwritten statement,. Esponga was found to have been not working as the machine assigned to him was not running instead he was having a conversation with his co- employees, Bobby Dolor and Ruel Bertulfo. Additionally, he failed to submit his daily reports. Esponga submitted his written explanation denying the charges against him. He claimed that he did not argue with Vinoya as he was not in the area where the incident reportedly took place. Esponga further reasoned that during the time when he was not seen operating the machine assigned to him, he was at the Engineering Department and then he proceeded to the comfort room. Labor Arbiter’s ruling: Esponga was illegally dismissed. It held that Sterling failed to discharge the burden of proof for failure to submit in evidence the company's code of conduct, which was used as basis to dismiss Esponga. Appeal to the NLRC: NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling. It declared that Esponga's dismissal was valid. The NLRC observed that as a result of incident, Esponga no longer performed his duties and simply spent the remaining working hours talking with his co-workers Issue: W/N the cause of Esponga’s dismissal amounts to serious misconduct Ruling: YES. Accusatory and inflammatory language used by an employee towards his employer or superior can be a ground for dismissal or termination. Esponga's assailed conduct was related to his work. Vinoya did not prohibit him from taking a nap. She merely reminded him that he could not do so on the sheeter machine for safety reasons. Esponga's acts reflect an unwillingness to comply with reasonable management directives. CASE NO. 46 Yu v SR METALS, INC. (SRMI) G.R. No. 214249, September 25, 2017 The Facts SR Metals, Inc. Workers Union - FFW Chapter (SRMIWU-FFW) is a legitimate labor organization and certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of SR Metals, Inc. (SRMI). On the other hand, SRMI is a corporation duly organized and existing under the Philippine laws and engaged in mining business at Agusan del Norte. A. Illegal Dismissal Cases Subject of this petition are the fifteen (15) groups of employees who filed cases for illegal dismissal and money claims before the NLRC. Executive Labor Arbiter (ELA) Noel Augusto S. Magbanua (Magbanua) issued separate rulings on the 15 cases. Those regular employees of SRMI were found to have been illegally dismissed. On the other hand, the labor arbiter did not find merit in the complaints for illegal dismissal of those who were project or fixed-term employees; contractual employees; one whose services as house helpers were not directly related to the mining business; those who lacked interest to pursue the case for failure to submit Position Paper; and who was not an employee of SRMI but of SAN R Mining & Const. Corp. Both the aggrieved employees and the SRMI appealed to the NLRC B. Unfair Labor Practice Case Meantime, while the illegal dismissal cases were pending, Angat Kalawakang Hanapbuhay, Inc. - Union of Filipino Workers (AKHSRMI-UFW) and SRMIWU-FFW — the two unions that were organized within SRMI - agreed to a consent election, which was eventually conducted on October 28, 2010. Upon opening and canvassing of the ballots, all 75 votes were for SRMIWU- FFW. The Med-Arbiter rendered an Order proclaiming SRMIWU-FFW as the winner in the CE and as the certified sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of SRMI. SRMIWU-FFW demanded for the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but SRMI refused to bargain. SRMI countered that it does not recognize the legitimacy of the union, which was organized only after the contracts of employment of its members ceased and only after they filed illegal dismissal cases against SRMI. Hence, SRMIWU-FFW filed ULP against SRMI for refusal to bargain. Ruling of the NLRC The NLRC held that there were valid fixed-term contracts that negated the regularity of petitioners' employment. NLRC also ruled that SRMI did not commit ULP for refusal to negotiate with SRMIWU-FFW. It was opined: “Clearly, under the circumstances, the company would have cried foul, as it did, given that the members thereof were already separated from employment. Added to this is the fact that at the time the consent election was conducted and upon the certification of the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, illegal dismissal cases were already on the wheels of arbitration. Being the respondent in the copious illegal dismissal cases which covered the majority, if not the entire, membership of the Union, SRMI cannot be expected to sit down and negotiate for a CBA with a union whose members were already separated from the company due to expiration of contracts or completion of the projects for which they were hired, lest SRMI be misconstrued to have deserted its postulation on the validity of the separation from employment of the workers involved.” Ruling of the CA The petition for certiorari was dismissed for failure to state the date of filing of the Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC and to indicate the serial number of the notary public's commission in violation of Section 2 (b) and (d) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. SC Ruling The petition is partially granted. In particular, there are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65: (a) the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received, (b) the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration when one such was filed, and, (c) the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. These dates should be reflected in the petition to enable the reviewing court to determine if the petition was filed on time. Nonetheless, procedural rules are designed to promote or secure, rather than frustrate or override, substantial justice. The Court restated the reasons that may provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.2 In the case at bar, the procedural lapses cited by the CA do not affect the merits of the petition; procedural rules should have been relaxed in order to serve substantial justice. What the CA should have done was to require petitioners' counsel to submit the lacking information instead of dismissing the case outright. Petitioners, who are merely rank-and-file employees and are mostly, if not all, minimum wage earners, must not be penalized for the honest mistakes of their counsel. They deserve to have their case properly ventilated at the appellate court since what is at stake is their means of livelihood. Hence, SC ruled that the case be remanded to the CA based on two grounds: First, the cases of illegal dismissal and ULP involved matters that are not purely legal in nature. There are facts that need to be ascertained, established, and resolved in relation to the legal issues raised. Unfortunately for petitioners, this Court is not a trier of facts.37 And Second, based on the records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the determinative facts are not yet complete, hence, SC is not yet in a position to resolve the dispute with finality. 47) Case Title: NYK-FIL Management, Inc. vs. Gener G. Dabu G.R. No. 225142 Sept. 13, 2017 Ponente: Peralta Doctrines: (a) Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, SC ruled that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor Code. (b) Rules of Court are "subordinate to the statute." In case of conflict between the law and the Rules of Court, "the statute will prevail." FACTS: 1. Petitioner NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc., a local manning agent, hired respondent Gener G. Dabu to work as oiler for nine months on board the vessel M/V Hojin with a monthly basic salary of US$584.00. 2. March 25, 2013 - Respondent underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) on where he disclosed that he has diabetes mellitus. The doctor who conducted the PEME noted that respondent has diabetes mellitus type 2, controlled with medications. 3. On April 10, 2013, respondent consulted a doctor in Sri Lanka who found him with elevated blood sugar level and was suffering from diabetes mellitus, and declared him unfit for sea duty. 4. April 12, 2013- Respondent was repatriated to Manila. 5. July 18, 2013- the company-designated physician declared that respondent's diabetes mellitus is not work-related. However, respondent's treatment was continued for a maximum period of 130 days. Respondent continued his follow-up consultations as he still complained of body pains and weakness and was prescribed medicines. 6. Respondent wrote letters to petitioner appealing for the continuation of his treatment since his sickness was work-related taking into account his 23 years of working in petitioner's various vessels. 7. Respondent then consulted Two (2) other doctors, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo and Dr. Czarina Sheherazade Mae A. Miguel, who both found that this ilness is work- aggravated/ related. 8. Dabu sought payment of disability benefits, damages and attorney's fees from petitioner, but was denied. Dabu then filed a notice to arbitrate with the National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB). 9. November 28, 2014- the NCMB-Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA) ruled in favor of Dabu, and ordered respondent to pay him $60,000 10. COURT OF APPEALS Petitioner appeled the PVA’s decision, on September 15, 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed the PVA Decision, and dismissed Dabu’s complaint. However, after Dabu filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), the CA amended its decision and granted Dabu’s (MR). CA dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground of being FILED OUT OF TIME. 11. Petitioner filed for review on the ground that the Court of Appeals committed a serious error in redering the amended decision on the ground that it was allegedly filed out of time. ISSUE: WON the CA committed an error in rendering the amended decision. HELD: SUPREME COURT HELD no merit in the petition. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. RATIO: 1) Art. 262-A of the Labor Code provides: The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. 2) Clearly, the decision of the voluntary arbitrator becomes final and executory after 10 days from receipt thereof. 3) In Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals: It is true that Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides for a 15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal: Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, SC ruled that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor Code. 4) We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of decisions rendered by Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute provides that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision "shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties." Being provided in the statute, this 10-day period must be complied with; otherwise, no appellate court will have jurisdiction over the appeal. This absurd situation occurs when the decision is appealed on the 11th to 15th day from receipt as allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under the law, has already become final and executory. 5) Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution provides, the SUPREME COURT "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" in promulgating rules of procedure in courts. The 10-day period to appeal under the Labor Code being a substantive right, this period cannot be diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules of Court. 6) In Shioji v. Harvey, this court held that the "rules of court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law, if not in conflict with positive law." Rules of Court are "subordinate to the statute." In case of conflict between the law and the Rules of Court, "the statute will prevail." 7) The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or decision shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt of the award or decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion for reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the motion must be filed within the same 10-day period since a motion for reconsideration is filed "within the period for taking an appeal."23 8) IN THIS CASE, petitioner received the PVA decision on February 9, 2015, and filed the petition for review 15 days after receipt thereof, i.e., on February 24, 2015. The CA, upon respondent's motion for reconsideration, rendered its Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016 dismissing the petition and vacating the earlier decision it made granting the petition. The CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time, citing the PHILEC case above-quoted. Case no.48 G.R. No. 185938, September 06, 2017 ALICIA M.L. COSETENG AND DILIMAN PREPARATORY SCHOOL, Petitioners, v. LETICIA P. PEREZ, Respondent. DECISION REYES, JR., J.: In the present petition for review on certiorari, Diliman Preparatory School (the School) and its former President, Alicia M.L. Coseteng (Coseteng)1 (petitioners, for brevity), challenge the Decision2 dated July 29, 2008 and Resolution3 dated December 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 72706, which held that Leticia P. Perez (Perez) was constructively dismissed from employment. The Antecedent Facts In 1972,4 Perez was hired by the School as a teacher for elementary students.In 1994, she was assigned to teach Grade V Level students with working hours from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 noon. 6 Sometime in August 1994, several students reported that Perez collected payment from them for subscription to Saranggola magazine, an educational publication endorsed by the School. However, they did not receive their copies of the magazine, while students from other sections had already received theirs. Thereafter, the School created a committee to conduct an investigation. Perez admitted she failed to remit the subscription payment supposedly due to her busy schedule, but agreed to return the payment of the students instead. Based on the findings of the School's investigating committee, a case for misappropriation amounting to estafa could allegedly be built against Perez. However, in view of her extensive service to the school, as well as to give her the benefit of the doubt, the investigating committee reduced its findings to negligence and recommended that Perez be suspended without pay for ten working days. 10 Accordingly, Perez was suspended from work from April 10 to 25, 1995.11 . A co-teacher suspected that cheating occurred on January 26, 1995, during the Math quarterly examinations of Grade V students proctored by Perez. Upon the teacher's inquiry, the student admitted she cheated by copying the answers of another student with the consent and instruction of Perez. 12 Perez was suspended from work effective May 26, 1995 to June 11, 1995 with one week commutation. She was then directed to report to work on June 13, 1995 for her assignment. 16 Perez correspondingly served out her suspension. Thereafter, nothing more was heard from Perez, until she filed a Complaint 19 for payment of separation benefits with the Labor Arbiter (LA) on June 15, 1998. In her Position Paper, 20 Perez argued that she was constructively dismissed from employment21 and prayed that she be granted separation pay in light of her twenty-three (23) years of service to the School.22 Perez also submitted an Affidavit 23 executed by one Teresita Limochin (Limochin), who attested that she received separation pay from the School following her voluntary resignation. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter On April 24, 2000, the LA rendered a Decision34 granting Perez's claim for separation pay due to its conclusion that the petitioners have, as a practice, given separation pay to its employees who resigned. 35 However, the LA decreed that Perez resigned voluntarily from work and was not constructively dismissed. 36 The complaint for constructive dismissal, damages and respondents' counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.37 Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners made a partial appeal on the LA Decision with tlie National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Decision of the NLRC On May 10, 2002, the NLRC promulgated its Decision38 modifying the LA ruling. While tlie NLRC affirmed the grant of separation pay to Perez, it deemed Perez as constructively dismissed from employment because she was placed on floating status.39 The NLRC also ruled that it was erroneous to hold Coseteng liable for Perez's money claims as the former was neither a proper party to the case nor did she act with malice or bad faith. 40 The NLRC modified the LA judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision dated 24 April 2000 is MODIFIED. The complaint against Alicia Coseteng is dismissed and the award of attorney's fees is deleted. All other findings are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.41 The Decision of the CA In its Decision43 dated July 29, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition. It held that Perez's cause of action had not prescribed since "an employee has four years within which to institute an action for illegal dismissal." 44 As with the NLRC, the CA ruled that Perez was constructively dismissed from employment, necessitating an award for separation pay. The CA considered Perez's reassignment as a demotion amounting to additional penalty for her infractions. The decision of the public respondent Commission dated May 10, 2002 and its resolution dated June 21, 2002 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioners, being a mere adjunct in this petition, is perforce DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.46 The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its Resolution 47 dated December 17, 2008. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Issues The petitioners maintain that, first, Perez's cause of action has already prescribed. Second, Perez failed to discharge her burden of proving that her resignation was involuntary. Third, Perez was neither demoted nor was she placed on floating status. Fourth, there is no basis for the CA's inference that the School has a practice or policy of granting separation pay to resigned employees, nor can Perez claim separation pay under the principle of social justice in view of her dishonest acts unbecoming of a teacher. 48 The Ruling of the Court At the outset, the Court reiterates that only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. While it is true that factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative tribunals, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts, this general rule admits of exceptions. When there is a showing that a palpable and demonstrable mistake that needs rectification has been committed or when the factual findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, these findings may be examined by the courts. 52 The Court also clarifies that while the term "floating status" was used extensively in the pleadings, as well as in the decisions of the labor tribunals and the CA, the petitioners aptly argued that Perez was not placed under floating status in its legal sense. Under case law, 53 with reference to Article 28654 of the Labor Code, floating status refers to a temporary lay-off or off-detail of an employee by reason of a bonafide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking which shall not exceed six months. Perez was not constructively dismissed from employment While Perez has enjoyed her position of having a regular teaching load and advisory class for years, and may have to adjust to her temporary assignment, it is a recognized rule that "not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must endure results in a finding of constructive dismissal."71 Having failed to prove that her transfer was a result of discrimination, bad faith or disdain by the petitioners, Perez's claim of constructive dismissal must necessarily fail. No separation pay may be granted to Perez As a general rule, an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to separation pay, except when it is stipulated in the employment contract or CBA, or it is sanctioned by established employer practice or policy.72 To be considered as a regular company practice, the employee must prove by substantial evidence that the giving of the benefit is done over a long period of time, and that it has been made consistently and deliberately.73 In an effort to show that the School has a policy of granting separation pay to its employees who resigned, Perez submitted an Affidavit 74 executed by Limochin, a co-teacher who received separation pay from the School despite having resigned from work. A scrutiny of Limochin's affidavit reveals that the School's grant of separation benefits or financial assistance to her was an isolated act, not borne out by any established employer practice or policy. All in all, the Court disagrees with the view of the labor tribunals and the CA relative to the award of separation benefits to Perez. They clearly overlooked the lack of substantial evidence proving that the School grants separation pay to all its employees who resigned; its one-time act of giving separation benefits or financial assistance to an employee could hardly be considered as a practice done consistently and deliberately over a long period of time. Having voluntarily resigned from work, Perez is not entitled to separation pay or financial assistance. To reiterate, there is no evidence that payment of separation pay is stipulated in her employment contract or is sanctioned by an established practice or policy of the School. Petitioners are not entitled to damages and attorney's fees Anent the petitioners' prayer for moral damages on account of the complaint filed by Perez, the Court denies the same for the reason that moral damages are not automatically granted; "there must still be proof of the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to the defendants' acts." 77 With respect to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code states that, "[e]xemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages." Since the Court has adjudged the petitioners as not entitled to moral damages, their plea for award of exemplary damages cannot be granted pursuant, to the aforestated provision. On the subject of attorney's fees, the Court holds that while the petitioners were compelled to engage the services of a counsel and incurred litigation expenses to defend their interests, it appears that Perez was not impelled by malice and bad faith in filing her complaint. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 29, 2008 and Resolution dated December 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72706 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by respondent Leticia P. Perez for constructive dismissal, separation pay and damages is DISMISSED. However, petitioners Alicia M.L. Coseteng and Diliman Preparatory School's prayer for the award of moral damages, exemplary and attorney's fees must be DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Peralta,*Bersamin,**Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur. Case No. 49 Fabricator Philippines, Inc. v. Estolas G.R. Nos. 224308-09 September 27, 2017 Petitioner: Fabricator Philippines, Inc. Respondent: Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas CASE: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the CA Decision (September 14, 2015) and Resolution (May 2, 2016) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 133794 and 133833, which, inter alia, ruled that petitioner Fabricator Philippines, Inc. (petitioner) illegally dismissed respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas (respondent). FACTS: Petitioner Fabricator Philippines which is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of motorcycle parts, with Victor Lim as its President hired Respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas as a welder. Before break time of July 2, 2011, while waiting for a replacement part she requested to be installed on the welding machine she was using, respondent Estolas took a seat and rested. At that time, another employee, Rosario Banayad, passed by and saw her sitting, then uttered "Ayos ka ha." The matter was brought to the attention of Assembly Action Team Leader, Warlito Abaya, who confronted respondent about the said incident. Thereafter, while Abaya and Banayad were talking to each other, respondent told the latter in the vernacular "Ang kitid ng utak mo[.] [B]akit hindi mo muna ako tinanong kung bakit ako nakaupo[?] [B]akit hindi mo muna tinanong kung ano [ang] nasa likod ng nakita mo?" Banayad retorted, saying, "Matapang ka ha! Matapang ka!" Respondent replied, "Candy, ikaw pa naman ang nagdadasal araw-araw, tapos ganyan ang ugali mo!" Consequently, Abaya directed respondent to see Lim in his office. During their meeting, the latter (Estolas) allegedly asked what she would feel if he would hit her ear, then proceeded to hit her ear. Respondent reasoned out that she did not hit Banayad's ear and that it was the latter who provoked her. However, Lim insisted that respondent was rude towards Banayad. Thus, on July 13, 2011, respondent was issued a suspension order effective the following day for a period of days. While she was in the locker area, the company guard on duty informed respondent to report for work the following day. On November 28, 2011, Lim directed respondent to sign a paper, which she refused as it pertained to the promotion of Banayad as Strategy and Control Group-Senior Assistant 1. On November 30, 2011, respondent received a letter from Lim directing her to seek the assistance of a lawyer for the hearing on December 7, 2011. At the scheduled hearing, respondent was required to sign the statements of Banayad and other witnesses, which she refused to follow. Thereafter, on December 16, 2011, respondent was served a notice of termination effective December 17, 2011, finding her guilty of serious misconduct. Hence, Respondent Estolas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of respondent Estolas after finding that although the respondent may have indeed committed acts of misconduct, the same were not willful and intentional in character. As such, the penalty meted on respondent, i.e., dismissal, was not commensurate to the offense charged against her. Aggrieved, petitioner and Lim appealed to the NLRC which initially issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal on technical grounds. Upon reconsideration, however, the NLRC modified LA ruling by deleting the award of separation pay and backwages, and in lieu thereof, ordered respondent's reinstatement to her former position without loss of seniority rights, opining it as the commensurate penalty for the latter's act of professional misconduct. Both parties moved for reconsideration, which were, however, denied in a NLRC Resolution. Dissatisfied, they elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via their respective petitions for certiorari. The CA reinstated the LA ruling with modifications: (a) ordering petitioner to pay respondent backwages from the time she was illegally dismissed until finality of the ruling less her salary for 15 days corresponding to her suspension, and separation pay computed from the time respondent was hired until finality of the decision, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from finality of the decision until fully paid; (b) absolving Lim from any personal liability arising from respondent's illegal dismissal; and (c) ordering the LA to make a recomputation of the total monetary benefits awarded and due respondent. Agreeing with the findings of the labor tribunals a quo, the CA held that respondent's acts did not amount to gross misconduct that would have justified her termination from work. In this regard, it found that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in deleting the award of backwages, pointing out that respondent was already suspended for 3 days for her misconduct, and thus, a second disciplinary proceeding, which resulted in her dismissal, as well as the consequent filing of the instant case, was no longer warranted. Nonetheless, the CA opined that respondent's infraction was minor, for which a 15-day suspension would have sufficed. Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution; hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed HELD: YES. Article 297 (formerly Article 282) 45 of the Labor Code, as amended, lists serious misconduct as one of the just causes for an employee's dismissal from work, pertinent portions of which read: Article 297 [282]. Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employe e of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; xxx xxx xxx Misconduct is defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text and meaning of the foregoing provision, the following elements must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties, showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent. In this case, the tribunals a quo aptly observed that while respondent indeed committed some sort of misconduct when she engaged in a verbal tussle with Banayad during work hours and in front of their superior, Abaya, the same was not serious enough to warrant respondent's dismissal. Neither was it shown that respondent performed such act of misconduct with wrongful intent nor did the same render her unfit to continue working for petitioner. As such, the tribunals a quo correctly concluded that petitioner illegally dismissed respondent. It is settled that "where the factual findings of the labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed by the CA, the same are accorded respect and finality and are binding upon this Court," as in this case. Moreover, it is well to stress that (July 13, 2011) petitioner already issued an order suspending respondent for a period of 3 days on account of her misconduct. Thus, petitioner could no longer subject respondent to another disciplinary proceeding based on the same act of misconduct. Clearly, respondent could not have been validly terminated from work. Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the CA Decision and Resolution in CA- G.R. SP Nos. 133794 and 133833 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, deleting the deduction of salary/wages for 15 days from the award of backwages in favor of respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas. The rest of the CA ruling STANDS. CASE NO. 50 Allan John Uy Reyes vs Global Beer Below Zero, Inc. G.R. No. 222816, October 4, 2017 Facts: Petitioner Reyes was an employee of respondent Global as Operations Manager. On January 18, 2012, Reyes, in accordance with his duties reported to the main office of respondent Global in Makati instead of going to the Pasig warehouse in order to request for budget because there was a scheduled delivery in the following day. The following day, Reyes ran late because according to him, his three-year-old son was sick. Around 10:30 a.m. of the same day, respondent Global’s Vice-President for Operations, Vinson CO Say (Co Say), Reyes’ immediate and direct superior at that time, called Reyes and asked him why he was not yet at the office. Reyes apologized and said that he was on his way. According to Reyes, he tried to explain why he was late, but Co Say did not listen and the latter shouted at the other end of the line and told Reyes not to report for work anymore. Reyes further claimed that Co Say angrily retorted that he will talk to him the following week before Co Say hung up the phone. As instructed, Reyes did not report for work on the following days and waited for further instructions from Co Say. On January 24, 2012, Reyes received a text message from Co Say stating the following, “Allan, let’s meet thu, puno aka today, bukas.” Around 1:28 p.m. of January 26, 2012, Reyes received a text message from Co Say which says, “Allan, let’s meet in Starbucks Waltermart around 3:00.” During the said meeting, Co Say told Reyes to no longer report for work and insisted that he file a resignation letter which Reyes refused to do because he believed that he had not done anything that would warrant his dismissal from the company. Thus, Reyes instituted a complaint for constructive dismissal on February 22, 2012 and amended the same complaint on March 29, 2012, changing his cause of action to illegal dismissal. Respondent Global, on the other hand, claimed that Reyes was not dismissed from service, but the latter stopped reporting for work on his own volition after repeatedly violating company rules and regulations. He committed a total of six (6) absences constituting those without filing leave of absence and not following the prior notice rule. He also incurred a total balance of Php 7,977.10 for personal use of WAP services, and his absences resulted in several work remaining undone. LA Ruling: The LA ruled in favor of complainant. According to the LA, Reyes had no intention of quitting his job as seen from his filing of applications of leaves of absences days before he supposedly abandoned his job and hist texting Co Say about is work on the day he supposedly abandoned his job. It also found that the accusation that Reyes committed serious misconduct and was negligent in the performance of his duty is more consistent with a finding that there was dismissal than with finding that there was an abandonment of employment. The Labor Arbiter further ruled that the word “turnover” in Co Say’s last text message to Reyes indicates that on the date that it was sent, the latter was already expected to turnovers duties to his replacement and belies the claim of Co Say that he asked Reyes to return to work in order to possibly explain his numerous absences, negligence in performing his duties and serious misconduct. NLRC Ruling: On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA. The NLRC ruled that Reyes sufficiently alleged the surrounding circumstances of his dismissal and was able to state, with the required particularities how he was terminated from his employment; thus, respondent Global should have proven that it was legally done. According to the NLRC, respondent Global failed to disprove Reyes’ allegation that he was verbally dismissed twice by Co Say, hence, there is no evidence showing that Reyes was dismissed from his job for cause and that he was afforded procedural due process. Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. CA Ruling: The CA reversed the NLRC. In finding merit to respondent Global’s petition, the CA ruled that the “text” messages allegedly sent by Co Say and Tet Manares to Reyes could hardly meet the standard of clear, positive and convincing evidence to prove Reyes’ bare assertion that he was verbally terminated from employment by Co Say, no corroborative and competent evidence was adduced by Reyes to substantiate his claim that he was illegally dismissed. The CA, instead, found that there was no overt or positive act on the part of respondent Global proving that it had dismissed Reyes. Hence, the present petition, after the denial of Reyes’ motion for reconsideration. Issue/s: Whether or not the word “turnover” means dismissal from employment? Whether or not unauthenticated text message can be given credence in a labor case? Ruling: The SC found merit in the petition. Verbal notice of termination can hardly be considered as valid or legal. To constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. In justifying that such verbal command not to report for work from respondent Global’s Vice President for Operations Co Say as not enough to be construed as overt acts of dismissal, the CA cited the case of Noblejas v. Italian Maritime Academy Phils., Inc. In the said case, an employee filed an illegal dismissal case after the secretary of the company’s Managing Director told him, “No, you better pack up all your things now and go, you are now dismissed and you are no longer part of this office -clearly, you are terminated from this day on.” There was no dismissal to speak of because the secretary’s words were not enough to be construed as overt acts of dismissal. Be that as it may, the factual antecedents of that case is different in this case. In the present case, the one who verbally directed Reyes to no longer report for work was his immediate or direct supervisor, the VicePresident for Operations, who has the capacity and authority to terminate Reyes’ services, while in Noblejas, the one who gave the instruction was merely the secretary of the company’s Managing Director. Hence, in Noblejas, the Court found it necessary that the employee should have clarified the statement of the secretary from his superiors before the same employee instituted an illegal dismissal case. In the present case, Co Say’s verbal instruction, being Reyes’ immediate supervisor, was authoritative, therefore, Reyes was not amiss in thinking that his employment has indeed already been terminated. The text messages produced in a machine copy by Reyes tended to show that he was actually dismissed from his work. The text message purportedly sent by respondent Co Say that: “Tet will contact you plus turnover” was clear enough. A literal interpretation of said text message leaves no doubt that the complainant’s days with the respondent company was numbered. The word “turnover” simply connotes “to transfer,” “to yield” or “to return.” In employment parlance, the word “turnover” is associated with severance of employment. An employee makes proper “turnover” of pending work before he leaves his employment. The text message of respondent Co Say was followed by another message from Ms. Tet Manares which stated that: “Kuya, pianos ko na kay gen salary mo.” This is consistent with the first message that Tel will contact the complainant. True enough, Ms. Tet Manares contacted the complainant informing him that his salary was already being prepared. The two (2) text messages, when taken together, support complainant’s insistence that he was actually dismissed from his work. Respondent Co Say’s text message regarding “turnover” and Ms. Manares’ text message regarding the preparation of the complainant’s salary were quite consistent with the complainant’s allegation that he was dismissed by respondent Co Say during their telephone conversation and during their meeting at Starbucks Waltermart. Global’s assertion that the purported text messages submitted by Reyes should not be given credence as he failed to authenticate the same in accordance with the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. In labor cases, the strict adherence to the rules of evidence may be relaxed consistent with the higher interest of substantial justice. In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice, technicalities must be avoided. It is well settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in labor cases. Thus, the “text” messages may be given credence especially if they corroborate the other pieces of evidence presented. Again, while as a rule, the Court strictly adheres to the rules of procedure, it may take exception to such general rule when a strict implementation of the rules would cause substantial injustice to the parties. Having thus proven the fact of being dismissed, the burden to prove that such dismissal was not done illegally is now shifted to the employer to show by substantial evidence that the employee’s termination from service is for a just and valid cause. In this case, respondent Global asserts that there was no dismissal; instead, there was abandonment of the part of Reyes of his employment. The Labor Arbiter, however, found that on the days that Reyes supposedly abandoned his employment according to respondent Global, no such indication was found as Reyes filed applications for leave and even sent “text” messages to his immediate or direct superior regarding his work. Abandonment requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment, without any intention of returning. For abandonment to exist, two factors must be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid of justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor being manifested by some overt acts. In this case, no such abandonment was proven by respondent Global. In fact, Reyes would not have filed a case for illegal dismissal if he really intended to abandon his work. Employees who take steps to protest their dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned their work.