KMU Labor Center v Garcia G.R. No. 115381.December 23, 1994 07/05/2010 0 Comments Facts: LTFRB Chairman Remedios A.S. Fernando submitted the following memorandum to Oscar M. Orbos on July 24, 1990, to wit: “With reference to DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90395 dated 26 June 1990 which the LTFRB received on 19 July 1990, directing the Board "to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all provincial bus routes in the country (except those operating within Metro Manila)" December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. An across-the-board increase of eight and a half centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all types of provincial buses December 6, 1990, private respondent PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an acrossthe-board increase of six and a half (P0.065) centavos per kilometer for ordinary buses. December 14, 1990, public respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase. On February 17, 1993, the LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92-587: …The control in pricing shall be liberalized to introduce price competition complementary with the quality of service, subject to prior notice and public hearing. Fares shall not be provisionally authorized without public hearing. (Section V. Rate and Fare Setting) Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. Said increased fares were to be made effective on March 16, 1994. On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares. First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity is illegal for being violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit. PBOAP, DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner does not have the standing to maintain the instant suit. They further claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRB's authority to set a fare range scheme and establish a presumption of public need in applications for certificates of public convenience. Issue:Whether DOTC Department Order No. 92-587: Defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009: Promulgating the implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 92-587 is violative of the Constitution, Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. Whether, the twenty (20%) per centum fare increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16, 1994 without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is constitutional. Held: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587 and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 is both violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. The twenty (20%) per centum fare increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16, 1994 without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is null and void and of no force and effect. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined the bus fare rate increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned administrative circulars, memoranda and/or orders declared invalid. Ratio: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein: (a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney operators the authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of public need for a service in favor of the applicant for a certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service to the oppositor. LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 is INCONSISTENT with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public Service Act which requires that before a CPC will be issued, the applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing that the operation of the public service proposed will promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner. The provision does not put the burden of proof to the oppositor but the applicant. In view of legal standing: The principle of locus standi of a party litigant. One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise must be reasonable and fair and must be affordable to the end user who will utilize the services. the PSC and LTFRB alike. The presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. or other public service. decisions. ordinary taxpayers. brushing aside. 1987. therefore.of its discretion. is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. the rate should enable public utilities to generate revenues sufficient to cover operational costs and provide reasonable return on the investments. a transport operator. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier. Court brushed aside this technicality because 'the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely. In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi. or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. the applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing that the operation of the public service proposed will promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner. and even association of planters. However. nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies. 202 dated June 19. A rate. and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws. A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. In view of DELEGATION Respondent LTFRB. while the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's is inconsistent with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public Service Act which requires that before a CPC will be issued. acts. rulings. The Authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare. is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. if we must. this will unduly prejudice a commuter who will be made to pay a fare that has been computed in a manner similar to those of compounded bank interest rates. the existing regulatory body today. members of Congress. In view of Transcendental Importance One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport fares is a compounded fare. Hence. . technicalities of procedure. If transport operators will be authorized to impose and collect an additional amount equivalent to 20% over and above the authorized fare over a period of time. one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. so that. On the other hand. if necessary. but which may be left to take effect in future. Ang Tang Ho.00 fine.A case Digest RESTITUTO YNOT -petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General. in form and substance. On 08 August 1919. On 01 August 1919. he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500. upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event. the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. an owner of carabaos . The said Act. Palay and Corn. Ynot vs IAC .United States vs Ang Tang Ho On December 18. so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated. it is a law in all its details in presenti. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice. Hence. the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. as to the judgment of the SC. Pursuant to this Act. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. 2011 Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies On 30July 1919. he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. HELD: Fist of. Further. wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. a rice dealer. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature. voluntarily. Measure should have not been presumed 4.00. 3. when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo.Station Commander. HELD: Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications: 1. Barotac Nuevo. Therefore.000. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as there’s no exigency showing to . Iloilo & the Regional Director.respondents Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ISSUE: Whether Executive Order No. the court sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and. since they could no longer be produced. 626-A is constitutional or not. However. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery. Integrated National Police. 1984. ordered the confiscation of the bond. Petitioner raised the issue of EO’s constituitonality and filed case in the lower court. for violation of the above measure. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright 2. Region IV. as raised by the petitioner. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a competent and impartial court. Bureau of Animal Industry. FACTS: Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13. Iloilo. and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President. petitioner appealed the decsion to IAC with the following contentions: 1. Gonong. West Traffic District vs. and that the Court has received several complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance. 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. the Court issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated that the Ordinance No. Withstanding the Gonong decision still violations of the said decision transpired. Issue: W/N Ordinance No. 11. 7. authorizing itself “to detach license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 1991. Even the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. Series of 1998 are valid in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of the national legislature? Held: . Hon. 11. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defense and was immediately condemned and punish Solicitor General vs. that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. Case involved ‘roving commission’ and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of police power 4. Arsenio M.justify the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President 2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destrcution 3. On May 24. Series of 1991. Section 2 appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court. wherein there were several persons who sent complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of driver’s licenses and removal of license plate numbers. After no motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became final and executor.” On July 2. 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command. Metropolitan Manila Authority Facts: On July 13. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions: No examinee shall attend any review class. college or university. or any review center or the like or any reviewer. lecturer. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of the principal. Null and Void. 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 1986. of the MMA and Ordinance No. Art. 8.No. and 2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating driver’s licenses for traffic violations within the said area. herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. 7. 5) must not be unreasonable. Series of 1991. of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures under consideration did not pass the first criterion because it did not conform to existing law. or any tip from any school. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. Series of 1998. and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. Thus Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). . the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 2) must not be unfair or oppressive. Lupangco v. which are merely local in origin. 11. Court of Appeals FACTS: On or about October 6. which has the force and effect of a statute. conference or the like conducted by. according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be valid the following requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. cannot prevail against the decree. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. review material. In the case at bar the enactments in question. briefing. To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipal corporations was applied. or shall receive any hand-out." to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. 3) must not be partial or discriminatory. As delegates of the Congress. a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the abovementioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. Said petition was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 13. Not satisfied therewith. there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. respondent PRC. In an Order of October 21. in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. or the like three (3) days before the date of the examination? HELD:The Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examinees from attending review classes. to wit: In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. In Medalla vs. filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them. . issued by the respondent Professional Regulation Commission. 105. all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same year. 1986. 105. 1986. 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21. with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.this rule was thoroughly propounded on. 1987. the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. As already mentioned. Sayo. Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission. In view of the foregoing. The respondent court erred when it placed the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation Commission in the same category. Branch XXXII. on November 10. tips. receiving handout materials. we find no cogent reason why Resolution No. herein petitioners. stated as its basis that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are coequal bodies. there should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. Upon the other hand. 1987. the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No.On October 16. paragraph 3 of B. Resolution No. The contention is devoid of merit. Furthermore. boards or commissions. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. instrumentalities. 162070 Present: .P. such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary. Blg. it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. PONCE (OIC). Blg. 9. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM. decisions. on the other hand. No.P. This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. Jurisdiction. there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. we hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. G. 129. or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies. The said law provides: SEC. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9. To be valid. it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. In view of the foregoing. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations. represented by SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.Respondent PRC. paragraph 3 of B. 129. ² The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments. resolutions.R. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution. orders. contends that under Section 9. except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. the provisions of this Act. . 2005 Promulgated: x .... JJ. Sandoval-Gutierrez....... Azcuna. Ynares-Santiago. DELIA T. Corona. Tinga.. SUTTON. Davide..versus - Austria-Martinez.... ELLA T... Sr. Carpio. SUTTON. . Chico-Nazario and Garcia.... SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T... Respondents...... Callejo.Petitioner.... Quisumbing..J. Carpio Morales... Puno... C. Panganiban.. October 19.x . 2004. . respectively. On October 26. respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)[1] their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.O. which declared DAR Administrative Order (A. 9. dated September 19.) No. The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy. series of 1993.DECISION PUNO. 1987. inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. Masbate. J. pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government. 2003 and February 4.: This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. null and void for being violative of the Constitution. 1992. In view of the Luz Farms ruling. in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v.A. a new agrarian law. the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy. Hence.[2] this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultryraising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.On June 10. 6657. 1988. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock. Secretary of DAR.) No. Republic Act (R. 1990. poultry and swine. inspected respondents’ land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. On December 4. also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. . respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL. took effect. Masbate.[3] On December 21. then DAR Secretary Ernesto D.[6] On September 14. 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner). poultry and swine as of June 15. their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL. DAR issued A.e. respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.. 1995. 9. On December 27. 1993. Garilao issued an Order[7] partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the . 1994. under the Luz Farms doctrine. In determining the area of land to be excluded. and a ratio of 1. respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as. series of 1993. No.On April 27. On February 4.O. 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL.[4] Petitioner ignored their request.O. viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i. fixed the following retention limits. the A.[5] which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock. 1993. However. No. does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A. 9. On October 9.[10] It ruled that DAR A.O. s. 1993. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A. which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL. and a maximum of 102. s. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A. 9.O.[8] They filed a notice of appeal[9] with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A. the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR.209 hectares of respondents’ land for grazing purposes. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising.O.coverage of CARL. Their motion was denied. petitioner exempted 1. No. No. s.O.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents’ landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. 1993. the . 9. No. 9. Respondents moved for reconsideration.O. in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattleraising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. 2001. 1993. s. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may . series of 1993. Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL. The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A. which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising. petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. DAR Administrative Order No.O. On appeal. void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government. this petition.[11] Hence. premises considered.O. was left for the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue. No.issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A. 1993. 9. The assailed order of the Office of the President dated 09 October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reform’s ruling that petitioners’ landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program of the government is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 09. the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Series of 1993 is hereby DECLARED null and void. It declared DAR A. SO ORDERED. 9. No.O. Petitioner also contends that the A.O.e. the power to make rules and regulations.be retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform. Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature. However. Petitioner’s arguments fail to impress. while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law. they are not immune from judicial review. . i..[12] They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform program. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock. swine and poultry.O. to be valid. we find that the impugned A.O. It is an industrial. administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations. swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming.” The raising of livestock. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership.raising.[14] In the case at bar. However. activity. The A. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. inter alia.The fundamental rule in administrative law is that. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. not an agricultural. all lands exclusively devoted to livestock. swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of “agriculture” or “agricultural activity. A great portion of the .[13] The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands. and other technological appurtenances. commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL.A. commercial or industrial. exhausts and generators. v. anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds. Thus. sprayers. No. DAR[16] reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case. extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies. pumphouses. Inc. petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform.investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets. mixers. conveyors. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A. drainage. feedmill with grinders. the term “agricultural land” does not include lands classified as mineral. even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision. The subsequent case of Natalia Realty. In Natalia Realty. deepwells.O. which are arable yet still undeveloped. such as: animal housing structures and facilities. residential. the Court held that industrial. forest. waterers and blowers. could not be considered as .[15] Clearly.[17] We stressed anew that while Section 4 of R. elevated water tanks. in Natalia Realty. Again. Lands devoted to raising of livestock. lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines.[18] Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A. in issuing the impugned A. Respondents’ family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. clearly does not apply in this case.. A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar.agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non- . Petitioner DAR argues that.O. not agricultural. Indeed. we find neither merit nor logic in this contention.O. poultry and swine have been classified as industrial. Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform. by making a new law. Moreover.agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. On the other hand. No. after the passage of the 1988 CARL. poultry and swine-raising. they must conform to and be consistent with the .[21] With this significant modification. In sum. the new law changed the definition of the terms “agricultural activity” and “commercial farming” by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock. it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. Congress enacted R. 7881[20] which amended certain provisions of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.A. Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. Specifically. To be valid.[19] In the case at bar. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. No pronouncement as to costs. respectively. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.[22] The assailed A. are AFFIRMED. the latter prevails. 2004.Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution. dated September 19. the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED .O. 2003 and February 4. IN VIEW WHEREOF.