The evolution of the safety culture of IMO: a case of organisational culture changeKiriaki Mitroussi Introduction The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as the only international regulatory body for safety affairs in the maritime industry is directly connected with the management and prevention of disaster, whether this alludes to marine accidents or sea pollution. Thus, it holds a great interest as the central subject of such a research. The way the IMO shapes, develops, and puts into practice the notion of marine safety and environmental protection not only reflects the organisation's attitude towards these issues but also affects the formulation of the international conception of marine safety. Most of the key players in shipping recognise in the organisation the authority to set safety standards to be achieved and be applicable to all, thus ensuring not only an acceptable level of safety but fair competition as well. In this way, the IMO is an interesting case of a UN agency. It is both efficient and effective, and in contrast with the majority of the UN departments ± in the sense that its own understanding of several topics, its principles, and its practices have implications for the wider maritime world ± they have a profound effect on international business. It is, in other words, an active body with powers, rarely enjoyed by other UN agencies, to regulate to a high degree the industry with which it deals. As a result, an examination of the IMO is essentially an investigation into the field of disaster prevention and risk management in the business of shipping worldwide. The IMO, as with any other organisation whether business, social, governmental, intergovernmental, or political, exhibits and is characterised by certain organisational features, one of which is the organisational culture. As culture we can define a system of values shared by all the members of an organisation, by an underlying philosophy that serves and reflects its core mission, its ``reason to be''. In the case of the IMO this culture can be described as ``safety culture'' since the organisation's main concern and primary aim has always been the safety at sea. Organisational cultures are likely to evolve in order to adjust to developments of a dynamic environment, that is they can be strengthened, be reshaped, or even change. In the same way, the IMO has responded to different forces within and outside the 16 The author Kiriaki Mitroussi is an appointed Lecturer at the University of Piraeus, Piraeus, Greece. Keywords Safety, Corporate culture, Organizational change, Shipping Abstract The focus of this paper is the UN's agency for the maritime affairs, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and more precisely its approach to maritime safety. Being the only international rule-maker, the sole setter of maritime safety standards that apply universally, the IMO exhibits increased interest especially with regard to its organisational culture, the safety culture that constitutes its core mission. An examination of the evolution of IMO's safety culture is in essence an examination of the international approach to disaster prevention and risk management in shipping and it is in fact the subject of our present study. Our investigation will reveal the various safety issues that have been treated by IMO as high agenda items in recent years, as well as the factors that can be regarded as instrumental in cultural change and, thus, in the evolution of IMO's safety philosophy. Electronic access The Emerald Research Register for this journal is available at http://www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregister The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . Number 1 . 2003 . pp. 16-23 # MCB UP Limited . ISSN 0965-3562 DOI 10.1108/09653560310463810 the sustaining and even the changing of cultures. and so effectively the international approach to marine disaster prevention and management. The concept of organisational culture The large number of definitions for organisational culture has developed around the notion of a cultivated system of values. they are more willing to give up old values and practices and take up new ones. the organisation's ability to live by and up to its established values is of major importance not only to the achievement of its aims. It has been described as the dominant values espoused by an organisation (Deal and Kennedy. its culture. 1990). discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration ± that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore. 1980) and its public image. but essentially also to its survival capabilities. think. When 17 a culture becomes weak and requires enhanced strengthening or transformation. leaders must recognise the problematic areas and have the ability and the commitment to redefine or replace the already existing assumptions with other more appropriate ones. 1982). When people recognise that significant aspects of the way in which the organisation operates are not any more effective and that the survival of the organisation is threatened. the purpose of the organisation.The evolution of the safety culture of IMO Kiriaki Mitroussi Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . changes in the social milieu and the political scene. economic shifts. On such an occasion the organisation. 16-23 organisation. the people who build them up and the environment closely connected with their formulation. there are some conditions that have been observed to favour and even initiate cultural change. will have to re-evaluate. 1985). ideology. the philosophy that guides an organisation's policy (Ouchi. For instance. that is. The aim of the present paper is to examine the changes that IMO's culture underwent during the last decade demonstrating in this way how the organisation's approach to safety. Organisational culture is ``a pattern of basic assumptions ± invented. The values are the basic concepts and beliefs. in order to survive. because once formed they tend to become entrenched (Robbins. A major facilitating force for cultural change is a dramatic crisis. 1981). or even the organisation's personality (Robbins. The process involves a shared problem definition and a shared recognition that something invented actually works and continues to work. The term ``environment'' encompasses everything that could be directly or indirectly relevant to the achievement of the organisation's goals and influence the success or failure of its efforts to fulfill its mission. has evolved. the transmission. something that has been reflected in its priorities. It is not rare for a particular organisation's culture to prove effective for a certain time and within a set of conditions but whose effectiveness is seriously hindered when times and conditions change. Although changing organisational cultures can be difficult. As a result. 1994). cultural . and feel in relation to those problems'' (Schein. to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive. Number 1 . The key people are the ones behind the creation. reinforce or even revise some of its assumptions and practices. at least to the required degree. 2003 . and its practices and that has affected its formation and application of the concept of safety. When the established patterns no longer serve. the purpose and the objectives according to which the organisation develops its sense of identity (Schein. however. They are distinguished figures in the group who usually hold leading positions and have the responsibility and power to communicate assumptions and values to the members in a clear manner and ultimately set the cultural tone running through the organisation. strategy and practices. Technological advances. Changing organisational cultures Culture is the outcome of group learning. a system of shared meaning (Robbins. 1995). 1990). which. is consciously perceived by the organisation's members (Harrison. its content. The major constituents of organisational culture are the values and mores of an organisation. the sensitivity of public opinion and the rise of public pressure groups are some of the major factors that constitute a dynamic environment and can contribute to the evolution of a given organisational culture. new codes of industrial ethics and values. then the latter may be facing the beginning of a cultural changing process. 1995a). which prevents it from achieving its goals and damages its public image and reputation. especially the first half. which was adopted by the organisation and widely used especially in the 1980s and 1990s. ``Strengthening a culture means bringing it to the top of its capability without changing its fundamental values and beliefs'' (Harrison. The case of IMO comes. In fact. The need for global cooperation and the organisation became the development of for success of the technical assistance international machinery to improve safety at programme was emphasized on many sea. rather than overall culture change. It may also be that not fundamental change but a strengthening of the current culture is required. The change of emphasis from the adoption of new regulations to the effective implementation of existing instruments became an official policy of the IMO Assembly in 1979 (Srivastava. This was a cultural evolution that has affected deeply the international perception and practice of marine safety. the highlight of these international agreements would be kept up-to. 2003 . 1995). while the technical assistance programme. 16-23 change has been observed when the organisation experiences economic difficulty or inability to respond to drastic changes in the environment. closer to the notion of culture strengthening. which was the original intention (O'Neil. As most of the key subjects were covered and the complexity in the industry increased. were distinctly marked by the focus on improving implementation of the conventions by offering technical assistance to developing countries. IMO. practices. In the early years the IMO concentrated on developing international regulation and as a result the majority of its conventions were adopted between 1969 and 1979. 1984). The concept of safety culture of the IMO also includes the notion of pollution prevention. The slogan ``Safer Shipping and Clearer Oceans''. which concentrated on technical issues occasions in the 1980s (Srivastava. on created as an answer to the need for a developing human resources within universal permanent shipping body under developing countries and improving the whose auspices the already adopted quality of seafarers. the oceans. the wildlife and the waterfowl and of the public health. respectful leadership carrying with them a new. The 1980s. as this is also an issue of safety: a safety of the environment. The technical cooperation activities of 1948 and entered into force in 1958. A new.efforts being the foundation of the World date and further measures would be promoted Maritime University in Malmo. Sweden in on a regular basis. without ever actually tackling such sensitive 1982) but there was always a distinction between traditional. developed maritime areas as discrimination and restrictive 18 . 1981. In the following pages we will examine this evolution by looking into IMO's priorities. IMO's concerns in the 1980s On many occasions the focus of the IMO changed and its objectives evolved. epitomizes IMO's objectives and offers a successful representation of its culture. was IMO concentrated mainly on training. Number 1 . as we will see. the aims of the organisation in the realization of its safety culture began to move in different directions. which had begun in the 1960s expanded in the The case of IMO 1980s and was formally recognised by the The purpose of IMO IMO Assembly in 1981 (IMO Assembly. Second. principles and objectives during the 1980s as well as the approach to safety in the 1990s. clear set of values and ideas and the ability to communicate them successfully favour a shift in the existing culture. This can prove very effective for organisations that have a feasible strategy and a solid culture but are not at the highest level of functioning that can be obtained within their basic cultural assumptions. the main concern of 1983. This can be achieved by looking critically into the weaknesses and deficiencies of the organisation and primarily adjusting to the dynamic environment by reorganising and allocating resources to those areas which are crucial to success. which was adopted and convened in 1981). The culture of the IMO is identified as a safety culture with all the members of the organisation sharing the same values concerning safety and being dedicated to the aim of improving safety standards to the highest practicable levels.The evolution of the safety culture of IMO Kiriaki Mitroussi Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . a change in the organisation's leadership has been found to have an impact on cultural change. the Leros Strength and the Albion Two and of 47 lives. and their lack of maritime expertise and financial and human resources made the provision of appropriate assistance to these states imperative (O'Neil. 1991). IMO started moving away from a mere technical domain to the encouragement and promotion of a new. 1990) and about ``becoming proactive rather than reactive in improving international legislation'' (O'Neil. In later years when the will to implement the regulations would also be questioned irrespective of the maritime history of the country a new perspective had to be adopted. campaigned vigorously for the establishment and expansion of the technical assistance programme and of training (IMO News. 1996). IMO appeared determined to shake off the characterization of it being simply reactive to marine disasters and it started talking about a philosophy of ``anticipating and preventing'' (O'Neil. Until then IMO . Mr Srivastava. On several occasions a tragic accident has brought to the fore a number of safety issues which previously had not been given the proper attention by the maritime community. despite the fact that they had both undergone 19 A change in IMO's organisational culture The alertness of the shipping industry following a marine disaster has been a phenomenon ever since the sinking of the Titanic. involving people from different sectors and enabling a more proactive activity (Pattofatto. which was used for a thorough review of safety legislation for both ro-ro ferries and bulk carriers. IMO became concerned with a number of safety issues. however. he knew firsthand the requirements and problems of the development of maritime infrastructure. the increasing number of developing countries becoming IMO members and ratifying its conventions. 1981) and managed to be convincing in what he proposed and represented. 1996a). 16-23 countries and emerging. although effective implementation was still the issue. It was appreciated that regulatory activity in itself is not sufficient and that for effective disaster prevention shipping needed something it always lacked: a more safety oriented attitude by all parties to make safety an integral part of the day-to-day activities. 1986). 1994a) ± caused the bulk carrier issue to be consistently on the agenda of the MSC (sessions 65th to 68th). Within the realms of that effort. 1991) but the increase in relevant accidents in 1994 ± Marika 7. From the beginning of the 1990s. developing ones and a question of lack of means and not of will with regard to the issue of problematic implementation (Srivastava. 2003 . that of a safety culture penetrating all the sectors and the people in the industry. but now it adopted a more holistic approach to the safety concept and that was clearly exhibited in the joint meetings of the organisation's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). which started taking place in 1993. With the dawn of the 1990s the appallingly high rate of bulk carrier losses and casualties ± 34 bulk carrier casualties in one year with 16 total losses and a cost of 250 lives (O'Neil. for the maritime world. thus reducing the likelihood of human error (Srivastava. Apollo Sea and Iron Antonis vanished without trace together with another seven bulker casualties and the loss of 130 lives (Lloyd's List. concept.The evolution of the safety culture of IMO Kiriaki Mitroussi Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . The severity of the problem was once again exhibited with the loss of two more bulk carriers at the beginning of 1997. The sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987 signified a shift of attention and. Number 1 . Coming from a non-maritime country ± India ± and having a past professional experience in its public sector. The adoption of a proactive stance and the support and promotion of the concept of safety culture marked the evolution of the IMO's organisational culture over the last decade. 1991). On the other hand. the Secretary-General during that period. played a very important role. 1991) ± caused the Secretary-General to prepare a number of draft resolutions dealing with the safety of bulk carriers and submitting them to the 17th Assembly (IMO News. Generally. The ship-type approach Particular emphasis was given to the ship-type approach. bringing the IMO close to the developing world. the emphasis was now on promoting safe shipboard management and changing attitudes for diligent application of rules. 1988). tended to treat safety issues on a fragmented basis. The industry was asked to put into effect a series of interim measures (IMO Assembly. On top of the above. 2003 . establishing a panel of safety experts to recommend action (IMO News. 16-23 an enhanced survey and made inevitable the adoption of amendments to the SOLAS convention on bulk carrier safety. The MSC agreed that there was a need to improve both port and flag state procedures and in November 1991 the Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of regional port state control 20 arrangements ± similar to the Paris memorandum of understanding in Europe ± following a draft resolution prepared and submitted to the Assembly by the SecretaryGeneral himself. IMO's preoccupation in the last decade has been with ensuring uniform compliance of its regulations by all flag states. A more proactive stance to the question of roro safety was clearly adopted. Ship management ± the human element The other most attended problem has been the contribution of the human element ± whether shipboard or shore-based personnel ± to the occurrence of marine accidents. The SecretaryGeneral took the unprecedented step of ordering a complete review of ro-ro safety. that is. After the fire on the ro-ro Scandinavian Star. and on the Moby Prince with the loss of 141 people. addressing many contemporary issues and exhibiting IMO's determination for promoting implementation matters. which killed 158 passengers. In November 1995 the Assembly adopted a draft resolution ``.The evolution of the safety culture of IMO Kiriaki Mitroussi Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . however. . and in November of the same year. 1993).'' (IMO Assembly. In respect of the flag state. regardless of their maritime tradition and to develop a procedure for monitoring their application and enforcement. 1997). In the same way. and this was exhibited through a number of further amendments to SOLASL the May 1990. The panel's report and recommendations were considered by the MSC in its 65th session in May 1995. The Herald of Free Enterprise disaster underlined the importance of management and ship operations in promoting safety and . IMO's treaties gave governments the authority to inspect ships visiting their ports to see that they meet IMO requirements but had been limited to examining the relevant certificates and so the 1994 amendments to SOLAS came to extend port state's authority to include control of operational requirements. . recommending governments and international organizations concerned to initiate work with the aim of establishing a safety culture in and around passenger ships . In its first meeting in April 1993 under the title Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation (FSI) it approved guidelines for the authorization of organisations acting on behalf of the administration. Through the years the sub-committee has been very active. The next time the question of ro-ro safety was addressed was in relation to the operation of passenger ships and was closely intertwined with the concept of embedding a safety culture in the industry. Number 1 . It was judged that port state control is most successful when organised regionally with the exchange of information and the quick identification of sub-standard ships. ro-ros continued attracting IMO's special attention. at a special conference. another tragic disaster with the loss of more than 900 lives ± the capsizing of the Estonia in September 1994 ± to reopen the whole question of ro-ro safety. after the 1988 and 1989 SOLAS amendments. It took. agreement on the application of the full SOLAS 90 damage stability standard to existing passenger ro-ro ferries was achieved. many parties ± the UK for example ± pressured for the adoption of more stringent measures. 1994). 1995). the ability of the crew to carry out their duties. the MSC at its 61st session sanctioned the creation of a new sub-committee to probe flag-state implementation of international agreed conventions on safety and pollution prevention in an effort to limit the freedom of interpretation allowed by vague phrases such as ``to the satisfaction of administration'' contained in its conventions (Lloyd's List. in December in 1992. IMO shifted its emphasis from mainly technical aspects to dealing with human factors (Moloney. the May 1991 and the April and December 1992 amendments (Focus on IMO. which were adopted by the Assembly later in the year and were made mandatory as Regulation 1 of a new Chapter XI included in SOLAS with the 1994 amendments to the Convention. IMO's consistent efforts to improve ship operations and management and seafarers' standards led to the adoption of a new chapter in SOLAS ± Chapter IX ± in May 1994 and a revised STCW convention in July 1995. . . Implementation With regard to the implementation issue. 1993). O'Neil.680(17). does not apply only to seafarers but includes those on shore as well. 1995). IMO's first attempt to address this problem was made at the end of 1980s with the adoption of IMO guidelines on management for the safe operation of ships and for pollution prevention. 21 Safety culture The concept of safety culture in and around ships which came about through the procedures of developing and adopting the SOLAS Chapter IX and the revised STCW has been strongly advocated by IMO. The focus on operational error in the casualty statistics related to crew standard was first identified as a priority agenda item in May 1990 at the 58th session of the MSC.The evolution of the safety culture of IMO Kiriaki Mitroussi Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . Investment in new . particularly during and after 1995. 1995a). Under the code it is clear that the so-called human element. 1995). 1996b. 1993). it also took the subject even further: in November 1993. 16-23 environmental protection. from a reactive attitude to accidents to the promotion of a safety culture and the adoption of formal safety assessment. 1995). At the beginning of the 1990s. the Assembly adopted the International Safety Management (ISM) code with a view to making it mandatory the following year. On the whole. and from a mere advisory role of the organisation to a supervisory and auditing role. while in the same year Mr O'Neil advocated that IMO was trying to make safety part of the culture of shipping and not some sort of optional extra (O'Neil. Another idea closely connected with IMO's implementation of a more proactive stance was also the adoption of formal safety assessment (FSA) for the management of safety in shipping. and as the 65th session of the MSC adopted the STCW amendments. 1995c. IMO concentrated more on the issue.c. with the high-profile marine accidents. Under these amendments IMO became the ``guarantor of the validity of a flag's certificates'' and it was given the power to control and the ability to react to ineffective administrations by refusing to approve their certificates (Grey. Significant changes that have taken place in the last years in the composition of the maritime industry have contributed to the IMO's choices and the evolution of its culture. SOLAS Chapter IX introduced a more safety oriented attitude within the industry and was officially seen as instrumental to the concept of safety culture (IMO Assembly. Mr O'Neil in his closing remarks at the IMO conference in July 1995 predicted that this could be the turning point in IMO's history and heralds a new dawn (O'Neil. In a number of speeches given by the IMO's head the need for an attitude of a safety culture was firmly underlined (O'Neil. by the 1994 amendments to the convention. One of the most discussed initiatives of IMO was the incorporation of the ISM code into the SOLAS as a new chapter. 1994b). 2003 . Chapter IX. 1995). In this way. underlining the importance of the issue of the human element which has since been repeatedly raised in connection with the newly evolved concept of establishing a safety culture in the industry. IMO's concept of safety has evolved the past decade from a fixation on technical matters to the concentration on the human element in ship operations and on implementation. Number 1 . which essentially means setting safety goals by identifying particular hazards and risks that can be dealt with by risk management (Lloyd's List. Factors affecting change IMO as any other organisation is in a constant and active interaction with its immediate and wider environment and is affected by it. 1997). which has been found to be responsible for 80 percent of the marine accidents. IMO kept asserting that people remained the crucial element in the management of safety (Lloyd's List. The maritime scene The unfavourable economic conditions prevailing for long periods in the industry have been the root cause for many of the contemporary trends. 1995b).d. O'Neil. and with the increasing worries about poor management standards. In March 1995 the Director of the Maritime Safety Division stated that the underlying drive within IMO at that time was to become more proactive rather than reactive in preventing accidents (Mitropoulos. the evolution of its culture becomes more than evident. replacing in 1991 the already existing guidelines with a new updated version in resolution A. However. Through 1995. and in 1993 at the 64th session on the MSC it was agreed to speed up the review process of the STCW Convention by employing outside consultants and inviting international maritime training institutes to assist (IMO News. the questionable seafarers' commitment with the weakening of the links between shipboard personnel and ownership and language and communication problems among ratings. an investigation into its safety culture. aiming at resolving complicated safety matters and being reflected in the targets the organisation set each time to eliminate or reduce the likelihood of accidents. Added to all the above. Liberia and Panama proved unable to fulfill their financial obligations and as a result 22 many of IMO's activities were suspended and much of its work slowed down. both of which are recognised as factors facilitating change in organisations. Pressures on IMO A number of additional factors made necessary and signified a change in IMO's safety orientations. ± spreads the accountability for its safety very thinly and makes IMO's work even more strenuous. the mass media and green organisations. Conclusions This paper has attempted an examination of the evolution of the organisational culture of IMO. officers and even passengers inhibit the safe ship operation by increasing the risk of human error. At the beginning of 1990s IMO faced a major survivability problem due to the lack of financial support and its falling credibility. who took over after a 15-year leadership by Mr Shrivastava. the fragmentation of the shipping industry has also been a cause of concern for the IMO. infrastructure and doubtful certificates of qualification. Three times he dared to break from the customs and practices of his predecessors and used his influence on the organisation as a whole in significant marine safety matters. The fact that so many different companies and nationalities are involved in the operation of a single ship ± in terms of ownership. a number of marine disasters highly publicized. The safety culture of the IMO did gradually evolve during the last . the proliferation of flags of convenience designed to suit owners' requirements for operation of sub-standard ships without having to face stringent enforcement of safety measures. low freight rates and the 1970s massive oversupply of vessels and caused the world fleet to be characterised by old and badly maintained ships. the weakness of flag states to carry out successfully their statutory duty of surveying. as societies sought to maintain their client base under commercial pressures (Lloyd's List. managed to personally signify many times a shift in the organisation's priorities and affect the evolution of its safety culture. continuous pressure from politicians and unilateral initiatives. Number 1 . registration. opening the bulk carrier and ro-ro safety debate and putting his weight behind the revision of STCW Convention by bringing it forward from 1998 to mid-1995 without having to resort to undermining compromises. 2003 . IMO's concept of safety has gone through a number of different phases responding each time to the industry's needs. two of its largest contributors. The focus of interest of the IMO has shifted many times from the concerns about the safety implications of particular types of ship to the concentration on the involvement of the human factor in marine casualties and from adopting regulations connected with technical issues to designing official instruments for safe practices in ship operation and processes for risk management. like the Friends of the Earth and Green peace International ± both of which have been admitted as non-governmental consultative members to IMO ± proved on many occasions driving forces for IMO's work. The increasing supply of seafarers from non-traditional labour supply areas with insufficient training. According to our findings.The evolution of the safety culture of IMO Kiriaki Mitroussi Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . In the same way. IMO's focus on the human element and crew standards can be seen within the context of the internalization of shipping and the use of multi-national crew. and the decline of the quality of classification society inspections. On the other hand. At that time. 16-23 tonnage and proper repairs and maintenance have been discouraged by high building costs. 1991). Bringing in a solid background of maritime and management experience he represented ``an efficiency and clarity of purpose'' as opposed to ``the traditional IMO well-mannered diplomacy and charm'' (BIMCO Bulletin. manning etc. The role of the Secretary-General Mr William O'Neil. management. One such example would be the establishment of a new flag state implementation sub-committee and generally IMO's attempts to ensure implementation of its conventions through the flag and port state activities. 1993b) influenced IMO's decisions. Robbins. ``Speech by Mr William O'Neil''. ``World maritime day 1995''. says the Secretary-General''. O'Neil.A. O'Neil. IMO News.The evolution of the safety culture of IMO Kiriaki Mitroussi Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . No. 31 March. p. 3. 11. IMO Assembly (1995). NJ. Structure. Lloyd's List. pp. Englewood Cliffs. Robbins. 3rd ed.A. political or intergovernmental organisations. (1995a). The Collected Papers of Roger Harrison. Mr W.A. therefore. 4. Theory Z. ``Facing responsibilities for safety''. IMO News (1994). G. O'Neil. Resolution A. Schein. November-December. Focus on IMO. Reading. p. MA. P. Jossey-Bass. says IMO chief''. Mitropoulos. (1981). Lloyd's List (1994a). 11 October. T. E. the approach to achieving it has taken different forms. W. Norwegian Maritime Traffic and Environment Safety Conference. (1986). IMO News (1993). No. IMO News (1991). McGraw-Hill. No. (1982). (1995). ``IMO told prevention is better than cure''. ``Committee backs Secretary-General's safety proposals''. 23 March. ``World maritime day 1991: a message from the Secretary-General. IMO News. (1995c). 29 March. No. (1996a). January. S. W.A. ``Complete review of ro-ro ferry safety called for by Secretary-General''. 3.E. 6. NY. p.H. a crisis and a change in leadership. IMCO News. 3. 23 . 4. November. Deal. IMO News. 3. 24 March. November. pp. p. Management. Resolution A. 16-23 decade but whatever change has been observed it has been connected with the safety issues the organisation treated as high priority agenda items and always with the aim of strengthening its culture rather than changing it completely. In this way.500 (XII) adopted by IMO 12th Assembly. (1984). 3. Srivastava. 6-8.A. ``Times are changing''. The Wakeford Memorial Lecture. 14-15 May. 10. 3. October. (1982). O'Neil. W.P. O'Neil. pp. (1995).. IMCO News (1981). ``World maritime day 1984''.A. Srivastava. 4. W. NJ. Southampton. E. Srivastava. Resolution A. However. ``IMO aims to get tough with rogue states''. ``IMO recognises the need to be more proactive''. 12. ``IMO sets seal on major overhaul of STCW rules''. 3.P. CA. No.P. Srivastava. ``Ageing bulkers at risk. No. Grey. 2. Lloyd's List. No. C. ``IMO and ro-ro safety''. (1995b). (1995d). Lloyd's List (1993). (1991). (1995). No. ``Interim measures to improve the safety of ships carrying solid bulk cargoes''. 31 March. IMO's priorities and course of action have clearly been affected by the aforementioned forces as we have already seen. Moloney. Lloyd's List. Third International Summit on Safety at Sea.A. IMO News. O'Neil. W. ``The latest IMO safety initiatives''. Lloyd's List. Corporate Cultures. 15 September. Ouchi. Lloyd's List. ``World maritime day 1981''. in the sense that its culture has always been and still is a ``safety culture''. ``World maritime day 1986''. London. 2. We can. W.A. S. 104. 7. W.E.C. IMO News. References BIMCO Bulletin (1991). ``Preventing pollution: the way ahead''. adopted by the IMO Assembly 19th Session. Oslo. C. Our examination has also shown that the organisational culture of the IMO has been subject to the same factors recognised as contributory to change in also other business. IMO News.173 (17) adopted by IMO Assembly17th Session. Prentice-Hall International. 4. E. such as a dynamic environment. IMO News. IMCO News. Organization Theory. Englewood Cliffs.A. November.P. Harrison. (1994). pp. Focus on IMO (1997). M. p. 7 November. 1 May. p. O'Neil.P. 7-10.A. R. No. (1981). ``World maritime day 1996''. 13-18. (1997). p. ``The quest for safety: the limits to regulations''. 40. Lloyd's List. W. Number 1 . O'Neil. A. No. O'Neil''. IMO Assembly (1981).H. No. 4th ed. ``Secretary-General addresses Royal Society of Arts on role of IMCO''. Addison-Wesley. 15 September. p. and Kennedy. Srivastava.G. (1993). Westminster. No. C. Lloyd's List (1994b). Prentice-Hall. Hausgesund. W. p. ``Safety culture in and around passenger ships''.A. Pattofatto. ``The IMO Assembly''. Lloyd's List (1993b). Organizational Culture and Leadership. IMO News. O'Neil. San Francisco. C.12. 3. 1. p.. Organizational Psychology. O'Neil. p. BIMCO Bulletin. 8 July. 23 March. A Dynamic View. 3. Training and the Human Element in Accident Prevention Conference. ``Quality management and the human factor''. ``World maritime day 1982''. an evolution in the organisational culture of IMO triggered by certain factors can clearly be observed. ``Objectives of the organization in the 1980s''. (1985). IMO News. ``Keynote speech by Mr William O'Neil''. Design and Applications. p. IMO News. 1-2. Seaways. IMO Assembly (1991). Schein. (1990). ``World maritime day 1988''. MA. Lloyd's List. ``IMO head in safety warning''. ``World maritime day 1990''. No. New York. 3. House of Lords. (1988). Addison-Wesley. James Callaghan Lecture. conclude that first of all although the core mission of the IMO has remained unaltered. Prentice-Hall. IMO News. when we talk about cultural evolution in the case of IMO we talk about the strengthening of its organisational culture and not a complete and fundamental change in its philosophy and system of shared values. W. Lloyd's List. ``A message from the SecretaryGeneral of IMO''. Reading.792(19). ``More challenges lie ahead. Lloyd's List (1995). (1996b). S. BIMCO Review. (1980).P. (1996). (1996c). 2003 . London. W.A. (1990).